Consti 2 Finals Reviewer

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
a. There must be a hearing, where a party may

present evidence in support of his case.
Bill of Rights b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
by a party.
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case
CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence.
POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION d. The evidence supporting the decision must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor conclusion.
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the e. The evidence must have been presented at the
laws. hearing or at least contained in the record and known to the
parties affected.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent
of contracts shall be passed. consideration of evidence, and not rely on the
recommendation of a subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and the law in
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY such a way that the parties can know the issues involved and
the reasons for the decision.
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even
required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police,
eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, Substantive Due Process
notably the due process, equal protection and non-
impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to
protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the
the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in
to the individual. violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule
A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority
to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
Civil Procedural Due Process petition for review.
In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction
case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca: to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final
a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
c. Judgement rendered according to law. these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male
and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work
(requirement on notice and hearing) or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We
do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no
less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously,
Criminal Due Process retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
Vera v. People: carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
and what charge he must answer. the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead
is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard. meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
If the prosecution produces the conviction based confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated
by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the
c. Judgment according to law petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was
carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be
Administrative Due Process distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
In administrative proceedings, the elements were Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR as the "seven deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may
administrative tribunals: see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c
better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate
when they make their distribution. VV. but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is
that the title of the law remained the same so that the power
granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not
B. Due Process and Police Power prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun.
corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs
would be to construe it in a way that it violates the
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply
of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other
plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV.
It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T
(Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC
(Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, C. Due Process and Eminent Domain
Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of
the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and The taking by the State of private property in an
cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2)
questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due
discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied process.
the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted
to a request for advisory opinion. Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take
for public use without just compensation.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick
and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest
the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. industries and, upon payment of just compensation,
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for enterprises to be operated by the government.
evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As
underlying the questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity 1. Taking either for public use or public
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of purpose.
record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a Public Use
problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not
petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It is
LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not large group of people short of the public in general (e.g.
required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." expropriating property for the relocation of squatters).
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does
not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the
expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and
Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA
to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation
Services Valid. proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports
complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold purpose: a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the
(1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for operating taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the
massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the
and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise from obligation of contracts.
the construction of separate rooms.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like.
based on general welfare clause. VV. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area
of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the being developed is land reform area and that the affected
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates
or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded
the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise
Hence, this petition for certiorari. eminent domain. VV.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented
from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority
granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land
maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands.
They brought this suit in the SC challenging the F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known
constitutionality of PD 1224. as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila,
both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The
purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional
will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" right to due process and equal protection since by their mere
requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing passage their properties were automatically expropriated and
conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public such expropriation. The government on the other hand
use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it State and when the legislature or the President through his
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and
environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just
claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of compensation become political in nature and the courts must
hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why respect the decision.
should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not
confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures
expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting
the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
designate the property. The property owner may not interpose semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
objections merely because in their judgment some other expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
property would have been more suitable. The provisions on immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before
just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the the taking is required. There is not provision for any interest to
same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners
EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation,
prerogatives. VV. or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but
the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond
judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
2. Just compensation must be judicially unconstitutional.
determined
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly
Just Compensation overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the
power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly
of the loss sustained by the owner of the property due to the recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the
taking; it is the fair market value of the property measured exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago it was taken the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that
(e.g. the time of the taking was in the 1920's, the time of such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial
payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and Amigable scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act
cases, supra), and using the conversion rates at the time of transgresses the due process and equal protection and just
taking (because according to those cases, Art. 1250 of the compensation guarantees of the Constitution. VV.
Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) 3. Due process must be observed
F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA
expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be
trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition originally called for the expropriation of properties along
for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry
should be the fair and current market value declared by the of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension
owner or the market value determined by the assessor, pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of
whichever is lower. the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on
Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the
PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial government P2 million. The government filed expropriation
prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
the power to determine the just compensation for the property, streets, among whom was petitioner.
following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is
the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The Human
of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between
condition of the property and its surroundings, its the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates
improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while
case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on
compensation were made long before the declaration of the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem
martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and
value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are progress and development, on the other, it is to be
outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV. remembered that progress and development are carried out for
the benefit of the people. VV.
For these reasons, the owner of the property

expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The
along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking
Government sought to expropriate to give way to the by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation.
extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. Charo.
De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from
proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by
the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower D. Equal Protection
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht
ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
remanded to the lower court. liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
No further action was taken despite the SC decision any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
for the same purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
Appeal. reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt and political power for the common good.
on the subject becomes the law of the case between the To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
private properties for public use upon payment of just increments.
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws.
Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the
petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land 1. Economic equality
owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice
on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of shall include the commitment to create economic
the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-
factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to reliance.
be arbitrary had disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protec-
legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its tion to labor, local and overseas, organized and
own independent assessment of the circumstances then unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation employment opportunities for all.
of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security of
legislative fiat. Charo. tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making
process affecting the rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay The State shall regulate the relations between
transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to pass the lands workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. expansion and growth.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement

fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon
transmissin lines. recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned measures that will encourage the formation and operation
property, without loss of title or possession. It is enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters accordance with its national goals and priorities.
is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of ts ordinary use. Id., Sec. 2. xxx
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth

in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive At that time of the decision thought, the law was
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment already inoperative.
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. of filled milk products. They brought an action in the CFI for a
declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have Code. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed
the following powers: milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been
xxx removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice nourishment for infants less than one year of age.
of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against
Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the equal
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the protection of the laws. VV.
Supreme Court.
2. Political equality
There are areas of economic activity which can be
limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges this
in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII, Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained
Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
to name a few.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC office shall be free from any form of harassment and
upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail discrimination.
trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the
national interest.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC
upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying
retired elective local officials who have received retirement
benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the
term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives younger
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937) blood the opportunity to run the local government.
But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a
common means of livelihood, especially when they are F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired
admitted to the country as immigrants. elective provincial, city ot municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270 under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
(1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500 commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of office from which he has retired." Petitioner, Governor of
taxation, and deprived aliens of the right to earn a common Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of
livelihood. the law on the ground that it was contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantee of the Constitution.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the provision. No petition seeking his disqualification has been
employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless filed against him. His petition is a mere request for advisory
they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid opinion. Nevertheless, because of public interest, the question
a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, should be resolved. The purpose of the law is to allow the
brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the emergence of younger blood in local governments and
ordinance null and void. therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in effect declares
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate VV.
of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in
situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the
granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged
exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance with national security offenses was struck down as
denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws. unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence
VV. and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat)
to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful for F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the bar,
infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer and voter, sued for
that it did not require the same labeling in the case of filled prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which
milk (coco-fat added) provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person
convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or similar Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
offenses.
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp.
with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being candidates judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have
for local elective positions. They have no personal or been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board.
substantial interest at stake and therefore no locus standi. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained
Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does not from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW,
involve disbursement of public funds. VV. commanding any officer of the law "to search the person,
house or store of the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents & other papers relating to her activities as
3. Social equality userer."
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a
captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and after
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, & w/o
priority to the enactment of measure that protect and the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof
and political power for the common good. issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal cases were filed
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its documents seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of
increments. the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. By
. resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's
motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there
was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are
sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in these
proceedings.
A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it must
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search another; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge such witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the warrant
after examination under oath or affirmation of the issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and persons or things to be seized.
particularly describing the place to be searched and the In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was
person or things to be seized. determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All
that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by
Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and agent Almeda. It does not appear that he examined the
correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the
otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section, shall the meaning of the law, the prop. seized were not delivered to
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. the court w/c issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead,
they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by
him in building up cases against petitioner. Considering that
1. Requirements for Search Warrants at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending
against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued
primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis.
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW was issued to
search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of To constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must
violating the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and other appear first that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
articles were seized and retained in the possession of the Anti- involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
Usury Board. existence of such right; (3) that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality
were complied with. of the search when it was made. She could not have objected
bec. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application, served upon Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity
swore that "he made his own personal investigation and from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal
ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license, one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose
charging usurious rates." The witness he presentted testified rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so
before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE was lending in his or her behalf. The failure on the part of the petitioner
without a license because he personally investigated the and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the
victims who secured loans from the petitioner. Their affidavits warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of the consti.
were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for right. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. The
perjury. The existence of probable cause has been determined delay in making the demand for the return of the documents
by the justice of the peace before issuing the warrant seized is not such as to result im implied. waiver. RAM.
complained of, as shown in the warrant itself. Charo.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Angeles, issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of

Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom arms, ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the PUP
which were supposed to be in possession of Dr. Prudente. In
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC, enforcing the warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found in
the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were the bathroom of the office of Dr. Prudente.
search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other
literature seized on the ground that they were used in the RULING: NO.
commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners brought (1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal
and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the knowledge of the applicant and his witness. The probable
things seized. cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one specific
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable offense, and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances personally examine in the form of searching questions and
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any
believe that an offense has been committed and that the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper any affidavit submitted. However, in the case at bar,
publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must contain Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his
a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified
materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad sources." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.
statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the
does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another form of searching questions and answers. What appears on
factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly
warrant void. VV. describe the place to be searched, the SC ruled that the
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) and identify the place intended to be searched. Here, the SW
described the place as PUP, with its address and specifically
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the mentioned the offices of the "Dept. of Military Science and
seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the President at
the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the the 2nd floor and the other rooms in that floor." This is
Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, deemed sufficient.
mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines
and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was
motion was denied. issued for one specific offense. The warrrant was issued for
violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. While
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere there was failure to state the particular provision of the law
conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of violated, the warrant itself qualified the description of the
probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This suffices to
include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner cure the defect.
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on single
warrant which is objectionable. VV. offense, for notwithstanding that possession of firearms,
explosives and ammunitions are punished in different sections
of the PD, they are treated as belonging to a single specie. An
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single
offense is when existing laws prescribe a single punishment
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Examiner for various offenses. Charo.
de Leon filed an application for a SW against Bache & Co.
and its pres., Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the
NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing, the Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
deposition of de Leon and his witness, Logronio, was taken by
the Dep. Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to the F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge
judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of was invalid. They also question the extrajudicial confession
his statements. The judge then signed the SW and accordingly taken from them without according them the right to
issued the same. assistance of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the SW
consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
were complied with.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425," it is
complainant and his witnesses. The judge did not have the clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause
opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession
propound initial and follow-up questions which his judicial and control, marijuana dried stalks which are suject of the
mind, on account of his training, was in the best position to offense stated above." Although the specific section of the law
conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on is not stated, there is no question at all that the specific offense
the all-importatnt question of w/n there was probable cause. alleged to have been committed as basis for determining
Charo. probable cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW specifically
described the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990) As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the
same are deemed inadmissible against them. In People V.
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. Dimagmaliw, Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is
supported by a "Deposition of Witness," executed by P/Lt. arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his HELD: NO.
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now
any statement he might make could be used against him. The embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying vestiges
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III,
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other,
means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed of deportation. The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we
the wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the of no force and effect.
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence." a. Existence of probable cause.
These requirements were even made stricter under the Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as
1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a person would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime
under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when have been committed and that the documents or things sought
made in writing and in the presence of counsel. Charo. to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person
against whom the warrant is sought. Without probable cause,
there can be no valid search warrant.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 SCRA
348 (1989) In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967),
42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the
as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the
salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found
probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know
authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he
Constitition. did not know this, how could it be determined if the person
against whom the warrant was issued was probably guilty
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated
PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal a the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. To
legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-judicial establish the requirement of probable cause, the rule is: One
responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. crime, one warrant.
Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable cause
exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, b. As determined by a judge
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial
recourse, and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other
to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the Constitution has been removed
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search.
Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation
success of his case. Although his office "is to see to it that the complainant and his witness.
justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of
the accused," he stands invariably, as the accused's adversary The examination conducted by the judge takes the
and his accuser. To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, form of searching questions.
warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his
own right, when he is neither. This makes to our mind and to The requirement that the judge must personally
that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002, examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the
unconstitutional. actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else, like
The "responsible officer" referred to under the the clerk of court.
Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills
and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when the BIR agent and his
judicial officer. witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the judge
suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to
examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went
back to his chambers and finding that the examination was
F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they
1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he
the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that issued the search warrant in question.
she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He further
ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias, d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts
being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting that they are testifying to.
illegal recruitment. This order was enforced on 26 January
1988. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial
warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who has
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. The
warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of the testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be
Labor Code? based on a report. Otherwise, the warrant is void.
area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of

Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 the arrest.
(1984), reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. Villamiel,
the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985);
We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m.,
having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away, was searched
the testimony based on investigation reports that certain items and some documents seized. The SC at first held that the
in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be not search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for
personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized,
not valid. because it was an incident of a valid arrest.
e. The search warrant must describe particularly But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC
describe the place to be searched and the things to be granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just
seized. because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search
was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be
Failure to state with particularity the place to be "incidental" to the arrest, that is, not separated by time or place
searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is
fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. looked into, one can see that this situation is not one involving
a valid incidental search.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read
"subversive documents, leaflets, papers to promote the The law allows the arresting officer to search a person
objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (a) a
Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his
be particular descriptions, thus making the warrant a general captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the
warrant. arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a
judge.
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed
copies and dummies of Philippine Times, subversive If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30
documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, minutes after the arrest, there is no longer any danger that the
banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again captured may turn against the captor; and if the documents in
invalidated for the description was not at all particular or the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer
specific, thus making the warrants general warrants. be justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the
apartment and destroy the documents, having been arrested
When it comes to printed matters, the offensive already.
material need not be set out in full. It is enough if it specifies
the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to seize
"subversive materials" is not valid because the determination Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
of whether a material is subversive or not is not for the police
officer to decide; no unfettered discretion must be granted to F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with
him. Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group.
Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the
The matter is different if goods were searched and CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At
seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428
stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for
sought). In the latter case, a more detailed description of the rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the documents
physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating seized, charges of subversion and rebellion were filed but the
the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression. fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials. Milagros asked for
2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained. The search warrant described the things to be seized
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles as "Documents, papers and other records of the CPP, NPA and
NDF, xxx".
The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant
has to be applied for the mean time. In the Tariff and Customs HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe
Code, customs agents are specifically authorized to search and with particularity the things to be seized. It does not specify
seize vehicles even without a warrant. what the subversive books and instructions are and what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on them subversive. There is absent a definite guideline as to
the purpose (e.g. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the what items might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers
circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside discretion regarding what articles they should seize. It is thus
the car). There is no question that when a child has been in the nature of a general warrant. But the seizure of the
reported kidnapped in a community, the police can stop all articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a
cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them. general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place of
premises where the arrest was made can also be searched
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest. without a search warrant.
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.-- (c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous party
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
(Rules of Court.)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on
A person arrested may be searched for dangerous 5/10/84. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later but
weapons or anything that proves the commission of the none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The
offense. It follows that the search can only be made within the officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver
& 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon
Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from dealers,
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and indecent
complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the
by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy"
himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his
question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the
"to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did HELD: YES.
not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only
contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become
deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of
w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly the RTC authorizing the serach of the premises WE Forum
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason in this case to
be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a
Bayona.) warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case
The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known political case, because speech is speech, whether political or
to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to "obscene".
justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a
necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an
info., to establish the applicant's claims. obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that
Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a
the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their warrant State interference and action. The judge must
depositions. determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search warrant
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a will issue.
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except
that they were made in the form of answers to the questions
put to them by the resp. judge. (d) Stop and Frisk
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp.
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the
presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence
really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes,
considering that these acts were against the law. These would St., Davao City. While they were w/in the premises of the
have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted petitioner carrying a
omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. approached the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but was
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED stopped by the 2. They then checked the "buri" bag of the
WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER petitioner where they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a
MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. smoke grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for further
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
by the military authorities, who practically coerced the firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein
petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a after a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision
possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were was rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the
conducting. appealed decision in toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. an w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure,
offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of
simply bec. they are prohibited. A SW is still necessary. ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before a commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
coming to the SC, filed a motion to quash the search warrant
by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person,
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
consitutional issues raised." RAM. has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense, or when an offense has in fact, just been was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so
committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts pending arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and void. He also contends that he was not assisted by
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they counsel during custodial investigation, where he was forced to
did not know that he had committed, or was actually sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of
committing, the offense. They just suspected that he was Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet.
hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the
w/o a warrant. seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
However, there are many instances where a warrant &
seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a
arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at result of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c has warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were
been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa. also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the house of
conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest
latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the former, that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the
it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the
cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the
attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable cause person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was arrest was made.
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after the investigation were admissible in evidence.
they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was then
As the Sol-Gen said: assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
(The rejection of these evidence would not affect the
"The assailed S & S may still be conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other
justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation evidence establishing his guilt.) Bam.
whose object is either to determine the
identity of suspicious individuals or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)
the police officers seeks to obtain more info.
... The US SC held in Terry v. Ohio that "a F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the
police officer may in appropriate height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989. Accused-
circumstances & in an appropriate manner appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
approach a person for the purpose of informations for illegal possession of ammunition and
investigating possible criminal behaviour explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
even though there is no probable cause to homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of
make an arrest." In such a situation, it is firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
reasonable for an officer rather than simply attempted homicide.
to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to Surveillance was undertaken by the military along
occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly EDSA because of intelligence reports about a
in order to determine his identity or coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in
maintaing the status quo while obtaining gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team
more info." raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-
PETITION DENIED. RAM. 4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"
bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a
and intelligently. door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search
consented or did not object to the search, for it many happen warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found
that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. The guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
waiver must be expressly made. That judgment of conviction is now challenged
before us in this appeal.
People v. De lara Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in
this case.
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation
was conducted by the police, as a consequence of which, Ruling: YES
accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the It is admitted that the military operatives who raided
marked money and handed two foils to the police when he the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant
sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried to reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
escape by running inside his house. The police pursued him RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
and were able to subdue him. The accused admitted that he the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
drugs. The team, together with the accused, proceeded to refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so,
WPD headquarters for investigation. During the investigation, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed,
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against
addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time unlawful search and seizure of other rights.
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity The constitutional right against unreasonable searches
of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
and houses therein were deserted. w/c are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public.
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security.
crime was being committed. There was consequently more Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search conducted, the former should prevail.
warrant from the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that
with. all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
There are two separate statutes penalizing different cost of occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even
offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the
or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. community.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a
specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms
committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in
each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit
furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions the military and police officers represented by public
for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or
and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised "saturation drives" in MM.
Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age,
be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their
special law while the second is a felony punished by the respective communities.
Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements. Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings"
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and military and police as places where the subversives are
ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
time the offense charged in this case was committed under the common pattern of human rights abuses.
governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have
was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And, second, they
De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial disregard for human rights, are total lies.
court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres.
therewith. shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target executed."
zonings." They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the
Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989) necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx
F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the
mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some
responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
social, economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part of its personal verification." However, the remedy is not to stop all
duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones.
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the people are protected and not violated. A blanket
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially all police actions to one on one confrontation where search
at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are
alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the
was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the police decide to sit down in their offices bec. all concerted
NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
warning shots fired in the air. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a TP's suit. Where not one victim complains,
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not
at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
initially for the SC. It is basically one for the executive

departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP's suit, there is no 6. Exclusionary Rule
erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In
the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the
look by admin. officials at the policy implications of the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures)
prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie
showing that some abuses were probably committed and could One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an
be committed during future police actions, we have to illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized
temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in and the evidence illegally taken.
of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for
examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence
if these are humble shanties of squatters, and other alleged acts obtained in violation of secs. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any
w/c are shocking to the conscience. purpose" and in "any proceeding". The evidence is absolutely
useless. This has not always been the case.
4. Wire Tapping In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC,

following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that
evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In such
case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal,
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally
withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is
Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was
was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as acquired.
requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S.
arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the case of Maop v. Ohio 1969, when the exclusionary rule was
money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to preserve.
Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies (e.g.
action for damages, criminal punishment, resistance),
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited especially in the Philippines where violations were committed
devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning
private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception power to water down the gravity of the other penalties
of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. imposed to violators of those constitutional rights.
HELD: NO The victim may or may not get back the thing seized,
An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same depending on whether it is contraband or not. It the thing is
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices contraband, it would not be returned, and only its suppression
enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. its return, even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed, as
This section refers to instruments whose installation or in the Stonehill case.
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp.
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of 42
happened to be there for ordinary office use. search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes w/c they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices,
case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal
included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or
statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB
that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig.
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to be documents, and things seized from the officers of the
punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards
devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. those found & seized in the residences of petitioners.
5. What may be seized ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the
offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners have cause of
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be seized.-- A action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the
the following personal property: residences of petitioners, w/n the search warrants in question
(a) Subject matter of the offense; and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or are valid.
fruits of the offense; and (3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said
(c) Used or intended to be used as a means of documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
committing an offense. (Rules of Court.) petitioners.
of communication and therefore argues that the same should

HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail be held inadmissible in evidence.
the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in
pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their respective The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the and w/o the intervention and participation of state authorities.
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ against the state?
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of
manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
particularly describe the things to be seized. Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This
None of these requirements has been complied w/. It constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person,
was stated that the natural and juridical persons has committed whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx
a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific (Villanueva v. Querubin.)
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments The contraband in the case at bar having come into
thereof w/ respect to the offense committed were abstract. As possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing appellant's
a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the
warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that admitted against him.
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
provision of our criminal laws. evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The arguments
General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place of appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication First, the factual considerations of the case at bar
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
passion of peace officers. illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever of the forwarding agency, who made the search/ inspection.
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr.
our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be seized be particularly Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. delivery of packages to
described-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts.
the elimination of general warrants. RAM. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
7. Civil Action for Damages warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to
observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search.
A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Having observed that w/c is open, where no trespass has been
Article 32 of the Civil Code. committed in aid thereof, is not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
of the writ is suspended, the court can nevertheless entertain support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill
an action not only against the task force but even against the of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and
top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
damages for the illegal searches and seizures made in a between a private individual and other individuals. xxx"
despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire into (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
the validity of the suspension of the privilege. The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the govt
and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention of
& husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating police authorities, the right against unreasonable S & S cannot
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he be invoked for only the act of private individuals, not law
opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted therefrom. enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts committed by
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit of alleged
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane unlawful intrusion by the govt.
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took 9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as
several grams of the contents thereof. distinguished from SEARCH warrants, the judge may rely
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist of the
Narcotics Section of the NBI. Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may
Thereafter, an information was filed against issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-- Upon the filing
appellant for violation of RA 6425. of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the municipal
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti. trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the
that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of his sound judgment or discretion.
justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.) The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused. Bam.
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;
record.-- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel
to them and attach to the records their sworn statements against the petitioners, who were publisher and columnist of
together with any affidavits submitted. the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal that the Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall,
latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and has during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her bed,
found probable cause on the part of the accused. The judge while the firing was going on-- perhaps the first Commander-
can issue the warrant on the basis of the information filed by in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
the fiscal and the certification of probable cause. Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran
moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal deniend his
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. Abbas, motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners
98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it has been practice long and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued warrants of
settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition
of the certificate. for certiorari and prohibition.
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word
the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the deletion of the grant of
investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other
basis of the affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is responsible officer as may be authorized by law," has
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon the affiants. apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956) his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the exclusive
investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
believe that Arangale should be arrested. to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the
Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required cases filed before their courts.
xxx
of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to
perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue
10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Court. Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, without
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to a warrant, arrest a person:
issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
accused commited the crime charged. commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
OR OFFICER. who has escaped from a penal establishment of place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is transferred from one confinement to another.
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets, which
an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a private the male person, the driver and the passengers of the tricycle
person without need of a warrant. did. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small
The key element in the first case is that the offense was plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. The
committed "in his presence". The key element in the second tricycle driver brought out from his right front pocket 3 sticks
case is that he has "personal knowledge". of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal was found
in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle.
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the The appellant contends that the police officers had
arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a farmer no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing marijuana
on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the
unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was not valid as
offense itself. the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied
with.
The gun and subversive documents found by the
officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise held Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule.
Ruling: YES.
a. Strict enforcement of rule The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was
valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman, person:
Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
caliber revolver was found buried under his house. commit an offense;
Subversive documents were also seized from a place near his
house. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of
readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only
The appellant was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the
20 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police
perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and documents were officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade
ordered confiscated. of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs
was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious stuff'
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after
have personal knowledge that the crime has been committed, tests were conducted on them. The attendant circumstances
is being committed, or is about to be committed, in order to taking place before their eyes led the police officers to
justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must also be reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being
committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is no such committed.
personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the
appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are
inadmissible in evidence. (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted
ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who pointed to Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
the place where the subversive documents were hidden.
However, as the appellant was not informed of his These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef.
constitutional rights at that time, his admission is inadmissible the Court. The Court finds that the persons detained have not
under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6 days later he been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances
counsel, but it was then already too late. attending these cases do not warrant their release on HC.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b)
the testimony of Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is justified when the person
unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun and arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
the subversive documents must be confiscated. committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989) knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC
desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who have been filed had freshly committed or were actually
informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their
marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they are,
and requested that said person be apprehended. Acting on this further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against
phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of them in court.
policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the
house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a I
tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2 passengers,
stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received
saw a male person come out of the said house and approach confidential info. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit
and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
male person go back to the house and a little later come back Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded person,
and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle driver in actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
turn give something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan together squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the
with his companions approached the male person and the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle driver and his
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his behalf is now
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an moot and academic.
inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info.
charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault III
upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are Anonuevo v. Ramos.
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon
a crim. case, who has been released on bail. Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the
shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested after the house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. The military
commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for being a agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to
member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, they
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
offense when arrested. At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades.
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD
but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of capturing 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for HC
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, was filed bef. this Court.
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court
for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires arrested bec. there was no previous warrant, is w/o merit. The
the determination by a judge of the existence of probable records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and
cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a There is also no merit in the contention that the info.
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or filed against them are null and void for want of prel. inv. The
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted,
govt forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
of the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.) Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the
serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. informations had been filed against them in court.
Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
IV
II
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra,
w/o warrant is also justified. On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command, armed w/ a
In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located at
former NPA, the Constantino house in Marikina Heights was Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito
placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant to Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search,
a search warrant , a search of the house was conducted at 5 Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of the search were documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal.
found several firearms, regular power supply, antennae, pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to
speaker and subversive documents. the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce any
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an info.
produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms, charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig.
ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for Rivera was released from custody.
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of
statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of these 2.
the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
International Dept. of the CPP. HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's arrest w/o warrant is justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted
house. When arrested, he readily submitted to the military bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive
agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec.
he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong," referring 7, ROC.
to RC and other members of the rebel group. Also found in
Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the V
jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of Amelia Roque,
aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address on 8/13/88 and The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque
arrived at the place about 11 AM. After identifying claim that the firearms, ammunitions and subversive
themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to documents alleged to have been found in their possession,
search the place, w/c was granted, the military agents when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by the
conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the military to justify their illegal arrest.
house and the barangay captain of the place. The petitioners, however, have not introduced any
The military found the place to be another safehouse of evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, no evil
the NUFC/ CPP. They found firearms, subversive documents, motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could
ledgers, journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia admitted cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners
ownership of the documents seized. falsely, has been shown.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the
inquest after w/c an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra. safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf of petitioners.
Roque and Buenaobra. At the hearing, Buenaobra manifested VI
his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame,
Espiritu v. Lim. As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/

a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON. the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not
Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88, while he was to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the
sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was court w/c issued the process, judgement or order of
awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons commitment, or bef. whom the detained person is charged,
wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order
them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the court itself
for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the
their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's
allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his detention-- "from the moment petitioner was taken into
request. custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court
(Inciting to sedition) was filed against him. satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at the fact has been satisfied."
NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-media was heard urging all
drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88
xxx." Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in
order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen his slip. He PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR
was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION
sympathizers, where he was heard as saying, PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa
magkagulo na." The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule that mere
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his
accordance w/ the provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and arrest w/o warrant.
the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
competent court, he may not be released on HC. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
VII Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as

it can be said that, w/in the contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113,
Nazareno v. Station Commander. ROC, he was committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II outlawed org., where membership is penalized, and for
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a
One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was continuing crime.
arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a
pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply bec. he
Bunye II. In view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked up was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning. Dural was identified as one of several persons who, the day
xxx before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot 2 CAPCOM
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan, policemen in their patrol car. Dural, given another
Laguna, issued a resolution denying the petition for HC, it opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen,
appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. It
respondents by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the is in this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on
RTC-Mkti., MM. an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the same acts
of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o overthrowing organized govt is attained.
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R 113, ROC, after he was His arrest was based on "probable cause."
positively implicated by his co-accused; and after Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for a valid
investigation by the police. arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be arrested has just
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has
arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence arrested is the one who committed the offense.
of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrests w/o warrant must be based upon probable cause, w/c
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
detained participated therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.) that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
VIII cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges Said confidential info. received by the arresting
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. officers, to the effect that an NPA was being treated for a
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his gunshot wound was based on actual facts and supported by
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to member was truly in said hospital. The actual facts supported
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is by circumstances are: (1) the day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2
charged before any court, the writ of HC will not be allowed. CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo.,
(Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.) Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie
On the Ilagan Doctrine. Javelon" was actually then being treated in said hospital for
for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded against E. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail
man was in reality Dural. cancelled.
On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of
Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while Nazareno's arrest w/o
considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest
perform their official duties. falls under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on 12/28/88 that
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was
w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed arrest had to be made promptly, even w/o a warrant (after the
under judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to prevent
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. They were, These admissions strengthen the Court's perception
therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified their that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based
outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. A their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.,
few days after their arrests, informations were filed in court that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R
disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. he had chosen 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not
to remain in detention. to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the
The reason which compelled the military agents to offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated.
make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. given to the The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. It
by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
their operations, w/ info. as to their exact location and the
names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief of the
military that the info. they had received was true and the People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission
of certain crimes: first, the search warrant was duly issued to F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust”
effect the search of the Constantino safehouse; second, found operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from
in the safehouse was a person named RC, who admitted that him. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills.
he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the
possession were unlicensed firearms and communist accused were submitted for examination. After finding these
equipment; third, at the time of their arrests, in their positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation of the
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions, and/ or Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the charge. The
subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of the
well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not
after their arrests, they were positively identified by their holding that when the policemen required him to initial the
former comrades as CPP/ NPA members. marked bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel,
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure.
to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under
The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as
custodial investigation.
the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This rule is
founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and
order in our community. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
upon the fact of the crime, but xxx upon the nature of the WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be
inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel
moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in
suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.) his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated
for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
subversive or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the
words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa presence of his initials on the marked bills, but on the fact that
magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting officers, the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that
was inciting to sedition. they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling
marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The
Many persons differ as to the validity of such trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations
perception and regard the language as falling w/in free speech than to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should be for as
guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the peace law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their
officers to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the words official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending
were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough
balancing of authority and freedom, w/o obviously becomes without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly
difficult at times, the court, has in this case, tilted the scale in so.
favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction.)
11. Immunity from arrest of members of
Supervening events made this case moot and Congress
academic. for E. had bef. arraignment asked the court a quo
for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the (The reading of these rights is no less indispensable
House shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six even if the person arrested is a prominent Constitutional
(6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged lawyer. Although he may already know these rights, the
from arrest while Congress is in session. xxx purpose is not so much to inform him, as to assure him that his
interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the
pressure of custodial investigation.)
B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation
The reading of these rights is required during
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under custodial "custodial investigation".
investigation for the commission of an offense, shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of 1) "General exploratory investigation" - when the
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights investigation consists merely of general questions to find out
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of who might be the culprit, but without being directed at
counsel. anyone's guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda rule is
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, not yet applicable; otherwise, people who could otherwise
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used explain their innocence would be arrested.
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are 2) "Custodial investigation" - when the investigation
prohibited. now focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is no longer
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in allowed to leave the premise. It is at this stage that the
violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose of the
evidence against him. interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil prosecute the person.
sanctions for violations of this section, as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running
similar practices, and their families. with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man, he
can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an
explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda
Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) rights. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in the
police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for there can
According to Chief Justice Warren, when a defendant only be one purpose to the questioning, and that is to elicit
is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through evidence to be used to prosecute him.
menacing police interrogation procedures, where compulsion
is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated, Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
the officers must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61 Phil. LJ 409
reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the
investigation to ensure that the statements made are truly the I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF
product of free choice. PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS.
Any person under custodial or police investigation has
the right to be informed of the following rights: Since the introduction of the American accusatorial
system of criminal procedure in the Phils., the rule has been
1. Right to remain silent that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence
against the accused.
a) To make him aware of it. The question is on whom the burden of proof is
b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the placed. The early rule placed the burden of proving that the
interrogating atmosphere confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
c) To show the individual that his interrogators are evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was
prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily
his right. given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of
silent, anything he says can and will be used against him. 1916, w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to show
that his confession was involuntary. Under the new rule, it
a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions
right to remain silent. w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility.
b) To make him aware that this is an adversary In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held
system, and that the police are not acting in his interest. in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A confession, to be repudiated,
must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and
3. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects
the confession when, by force or violence or intimidation, the
a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood, not
testimony, since the inherent pressures initially overcome by even when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the
the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with truth. In the later case of Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated
the right to counsel. "the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police. supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth
or falsity of the facts or admission contained therein.
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel, then The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence
one will be provided for him by the state. does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.)
a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
cannot afford one, he does not have to defend himself alone. SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he
should lose his right to counsel. The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases (Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a parallel in
the law of confession. W/o expressly overruling its decision
in de los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro, HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an
went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced interrogation, when the police officer starts to ask questions
confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and void. xxx designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or admissions from
Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by law, w/c the accused. As the police line-up in this case was not part of
proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to the custodial inquest, the petitioner was not entitled to counsel
secure confessions. xxx xxx.
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional
coercion will render inadmissible even the most
unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is not III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights
the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an and the waiver of warnings. The first can be made provided
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but the
the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and second cannot. As the warnings are the means of insuring that
freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any subsequent
accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v. Richmond, J. waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing and
Frankfurter.) intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no valid waiver of
the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be presumed.
THE MIRANDA RULE
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17,
The prosecution may not use statements, whether 1973, the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has a
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel
interrogation of the def. unless it demonstrates the use of does not apply. such confessions, even though presented in
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti., are
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the traditional
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a test of voluntariness.
person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. xxx 2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17,
1973, but before March 20, 1985, when the decision of Peo. v.
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED Galit was handed down, the rule is that the voluntariness of a
AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be
determined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account the
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be circumstances under w/c the waiver was made.
given by police interrogators bef. a person in custody may be
interrogated, w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC: 3. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20,
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987, when the present Consti. took
and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. The effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent
purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled and to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be made w/
to incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent pressures of the assistance of counsel.
the interrogation atmosphere, and to assure the individual that
his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege, 4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987,
should he choose to exercise it. the present Consti. requires that the waiver to be valid, must
2. The person in custody must be warned that anything be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel.
he will say can and wilol be used against him. This warning is
intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators, it him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. confession
is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel. or admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of
confessions only, I have argued that it was not so limited but
that it also embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it could ... never be
used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely intended to
At what stage of the police interrogation must the be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his
warnings be given? The Consti. does not state at what stage of testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
the interrogation process they must be made. but in Miranda, given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the implication."
interrogation that its ruling applied. As the Court indicated in
Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the investigation ceases to EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding"
and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
to operate. exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this
mean there can be instances, where uncounselled statements
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit, for a
warrant, for vagrancy. He was taken to police precint no. 2 in limited purpose?
Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of 5
detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession
complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible
accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it
complainant, while the latter was interrogated. The accused may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his
was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to dismiss credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a prosecution for selling heroin,
the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking
assistance of counsel during the line-up. His motion was powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk weeks later with respect to Bandula. And counsel who
of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Zerna, the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, whose interest is
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public admittedly adverse to the accused and who is not an
safety" exception to the Miranda rule. xxx. "There is public independent counsel. On top of this, there are telltale
safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be signs that violence was used against the accused.
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in Certainly, these are blatant violations of of Sec. 12, Art
evidence." It held that the warnings were not themselves III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of
Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to the accused during custodial investigation. Suzette.
insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court noted
the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the 1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed
giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering before January 17, 1973
questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. It
then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of
warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than 2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public safety.
When answers are not actually coerced, this social cost People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such exigent Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an
circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet. exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is
giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be based on the belief that because certain statements are made
endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk that naturally, spontaneously and without deliberation during the
probative evidence will be excluded. course of an event, they leave little room for
misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by someone
else( i.e. by the witness who will later repeat the statement to
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 the court) and thus the courts believe that such statements
carry a high degree of credibility. Evidence which can be
F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The victim, admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three headings:
Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining stab wounds. When the
policemen inquired about the circumstances of the incident, Words or phrases which either form part of, or explain a
they were informed that the deceased was with two physical act,
companions, on the previous night. The accused was Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie concoction,
apprehended. In the vehicle where the accused boarded, on and
his way to the Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of mind.
he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative
investigations
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was
admissible in evidence.
People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial It should at once be apparent that there are two
confession of the accused in evidence, violated his (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to namely:
have a counsel of his choice, while already in police custody.
Since the extra-judicial confession was the only basis for the 1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of
conviction of the accused, the trial coust’s judgment was a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
reversed. Bam. set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction
of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is
similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 American Constitution, and
2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e.,
F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
and their house ransacked, Atty. Garay was found dead commission of an offense."
with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death and the loss of
their things on the occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo, Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much
Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court for robbery more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
with homicide. On the basis of the extrajudicial rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right
confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to
Dionanao during their custodial investigation which the be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
court found to "have all the qualities and have Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in
complied with all the requirements of an admissible custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit,
confession, it appearing from the confession that are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
acussed were informed of their rights under the law
regarding custodial investigation and were duly Right Against Self-Incrimination
represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded
the defenses interposed by the accused and convicted The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in
Bandula. The 3 other accused were acquitted for Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to
"insufficiency of evidence". every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
conformed with the constitutional requisites for its compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes an
validity, hence admissible in evidence. "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness,
HELD: NO whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any
From the records, it can be gleaned that when particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However,
immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and 2 cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness
the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
the court at the time appointed. counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
The right against self-incrimination is not self- vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. It violation of these rights rejected; and
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly,
as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
Rights in Custodial Interrogation a) to refuse to be a witness;

b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also result to him by such refusal;
treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to
rights apply to persons "under investigation for the cross-examination by the prosecution;
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to
by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights answer a specific question which tends to incriminate
different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against him for some crime other than that for which he is
self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately then prosecuted.
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
"earthquake in the world of law enforcement." interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under relevance to the inquiry.
investigation for the commission of an offense"--
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, Police Lineups
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights Police line-up not part of custodial inquest
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The
Miranda rights following day, he was included in a police line-up and was
identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. He was
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has later charged with robbery and charged. He moved to dismiss
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the the assistance of counsel, was unconstitutional.
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. counsel. VV.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado several companions including Ongue who vaguely recognized
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, the assailant, describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days
resulting in self- incriminating statement without full warnings later, Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect
of constitutional rights." in a police line- up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the
assailant. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted by counsel.
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of Hence, his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble.
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into for indentification, technically, he was not yet under custodial
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any investigation. Thus, the right to counsel does not yet apply.
significant way." However, there is every reason to doubt the regularity
of the identification of the suspect by the witness. During the
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of proceedings in the police station, Ongue identified Hatton not
Testimony because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but
because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a was pointed by the police as the suspect. This cannot be
crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, considered as positive identification of the accused by the
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or witness.
producing evidence, to wit:
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or
with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of No valid waiver.
his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether
there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but
voluntary, knowing and intelligent the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for
the moment." As worded, the question suggested a
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent
the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution presented Corporal foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a
statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free.
alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. VV.
When Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in
the statement, the defense objected, contending that Yupo's Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a
statement was given without the assistance of counsel. written confession showing that he was apprised of his right
Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the ground that not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he waived
the right to counsel cannot be waived. these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, knowing
and intelligent and thus admissible.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation
may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and
voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. In b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987)
this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening
question, after informing the suspect that he was under It is not enough that the confession is voluntary,
investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that anything knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the
he said could be used for or against him and after asking presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be
whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from
"yes." The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant, a March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
native of Samar, had not been shown to be fully acquainted
with. The date of execution of the statement before the In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC,
municipal court was not indicated. The separate statement reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be
opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that
they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver
whether the defendant was properly informed of his right. should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales
obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this case was
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not need the
Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession.
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was
they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner. convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his
Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI
"surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it
they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. They into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they
were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. They took the had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for
witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was pictures for re-enactment as directed by the investigators.
sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial
took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it was contended
that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
counsel.
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by
HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually the Circuit Criminal Court. The principal prosecution witness
excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was the
accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there. mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the
Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In another crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house
case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that, because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The
for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National prosecution also presented the extrajudicial confession of the
Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had a defendant.
right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was
willing to answer questions of the police. There is no doubt HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible
that the confession was voluntarily made. The truth is that because it was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators
shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their covered the defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into
guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and
was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the
statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there is no
urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to remain showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two weeks after
silent and to counsel. he executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to
visit him. His statement does not contain any waiver or right
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the
procedure in custodial investigations: No custodial
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of
woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based solely counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on
on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court. his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
The confession was given to the police and subscribed before detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to
the clerk of court and contains a waiver. counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule,

however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be
SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit, made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel.
which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the
Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to rest 6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on
all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and the prosecution
embraced its ruling.
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to present
of subversion against Asis by means of her confession given the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies
in the hospital, in which she admitted through a leading whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was
wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted
decision excluding the confession on the ground that the that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically all
waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the assistance extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
of counsel. assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators
automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or ask
the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its
People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) tired punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding
F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the on the part of the accused.
trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession
given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted, Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one
through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against
The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly
waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
counsel. The prosecution contends that the ruling in Morales voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly and
v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a
with the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum. lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en

banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)
part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile. F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with
homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de
Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991) same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of
the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made
Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind.
the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in The confessions were taken while the two were held
1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after
the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings two weeks of detention.
were given, but these were not made in the presence of
counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that the HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model.
before the SC pronouncement. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create
an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person
entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with
confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly
found substantial to establish guilt. and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That
was made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has held proof is missing in this case.
in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v.
Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any 7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to
statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings"
inadmissible in evidence. VV.
The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987) effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived.
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in What cannot be waived are:
the presence of counsel
1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation how can one waive what one does not know?)
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have 2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the
competent and independent counsel preferably of his right to remain silent or to counsel.
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged

with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
8. Exclusionary rule evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
in evidence against him. required.
1. When right may be invoked

Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary
rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the The right to bail is available from the very moment of
preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal
any proceeding." charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. judgement (which means after appeal).
One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two, public
safety. No charge need be filed formally before one can file
for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So ruled the SC in
Impeach the credibility Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally The case was unique in that after the war, the People's
without use. While it is not admissible to prove the guilt of Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer
the accused, it may be used against him to impeach his time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing
credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled the charges within the reglementary period due to the number of
U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 indictees.
(1971).
Bail and Habeas Corpus
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that
the arrest and detention, are valid, or that even if they were
In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the subsequent
heroin to an undercover police agent. He confessed to the filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one be
crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was released temporarily from such valid detention, and this can be
uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. made anytime after arrest.
But when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that what
he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the
agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to introduce the arrest and detention are illegal, so that the prayer is to be
uncounselled statment to show that he was lying. released permanently from such illegal detention. When the
privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention
In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is
Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect
cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully of the suspension has been considerably lessened to the need
obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can turn to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise
the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession of the detainee is to be released.
the government was obtained to his own advantage, providing
himself with a shield against perjury and the contradiction of The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v.
his untruths. Enrile, that the suspension of the privilege of the writ does not
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas
The reason, continued the Court is that the shield Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail refers to legal
provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a detention, or even detention that started as illegal but was
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk cured by the filing of a case in court.
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of
Public Safety discretion
Public Safety may justify the police in taking Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by
confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the U.S. reclusion perpetua.
Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984). It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt
is strong. In such a case, according to People v. San Diego, 26
SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must be
exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). by the prosecution. Thus, the order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
In the case, the Court excused the giving of the followed by the conclusion on whether or not the evidence of
Miranda warning because the public safety required that the guilt is strong.
weapon had to be located before it could be used by the
accused against those in the supermarket. The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (b) the
The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the evidence of guilt is strong.
police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where
the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and
evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution. the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion
perpetua, it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion
C. Right to bail perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those crimes which were
once punishable by death. For if it includeds even those
crimes which before and now are really punishable by
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the One, the accused may be placed beyond the
Constitution. jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of the
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) conditions in the grant of bail, namely to have the accused
available whenever the court requires his presence.
3. Bail in courts-martial
Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between the
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) State and the surety that the State will do nothing to make it
difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of the
4. Standards for fixing bail court. If the court thus allows his to leave, then the State loses
its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself has
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- The breached its obligation to the surety.
judge who issed the warrant or granted the application
shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering The case leaves the question of allowing an accused
primarily, but not limited to the following guidelines: under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-ended.
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; This reason was not foreclosed by the Court, which hinted that
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient
(c) Penalty of the offense charged; reason". What the Court found insufficient was the business
(d) Character and reputation of the accused; trip.
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial; Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two
when arrested; and corporations, in one of which he was the president. The firms
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the were placed under a management committee by the SEC and
accused is under bond. petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of
Excessive bail shall not be required. Immigration. Petitioner was charged with estafa. He later
asked for permission to leave the country for business reasons,
but his request was denied by the courts. He filed a petition for
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit.
nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive, otherwise, it He appealed to the SC.
becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will" HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the
(Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la Camara v. Enage, 41 accused to make himself available whenever the court requires
SCRA 1 (1971). his presence, operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. The constitutional right to travel is not absolute, but is
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated
murder was found excessive.
6. Waiver of the Right to Bail
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing
the amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
(1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
D. Rights during trial
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail.
2. Nature of the offense. Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to
3. Penalty for the offense charged. answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
4. Character and reputation of the accused In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
5. Health of the accused. presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
6. Character and strength of the evidence. enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial. informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
8. Forfeiture of other bonds. him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
when arrested. to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
in other cases. may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, appear is unjustifiable.
still he cannot be denied bail. the remedy in this case is to
increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
1. Presumption of innocence
5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of noted that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be presumed
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. innocent.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law. In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law
disqualifying candidates charged with national security
offences was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating the
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 presumption against innocence.
(1986), the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel
abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail
operates only within the country. In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a judge
who allowed the accused to present his evidence ahead of the
prosecution, over the objection of the prosecution, after the
acused admitted the killing but invoked self-defense, was trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the
reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order facts pleaded in the information.
of trial violated the constitutional presumption of innocence
which places the burden proof on the prosecution. Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified
plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was
This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3 (e) of the not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which now reverses the serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes a offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten
justifying or exempting circumstance. years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without
absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of
the case.
People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739 The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the
beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule
F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap were charged 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that:
with murder for the killing of an unidentified person on
Nov. 16, 1994. Only De Guzman and Castro were If the defendant appears without attorney, he must
arrested and both pleaded not guilty. They were be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the before being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid
testimony of Adelia Angeles. She positively identified of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
maltreated an unidentified person whom they had tied attorney.
to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her, she testified that
they untied the man and brought him towards the Not one of these duties had been complied with by the
direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses trial court.
away. This was further strengthened by the One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our
extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
who killed the victim and that he and de Guzman acted accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
only as look-outs. counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
innocenec of the accused has been overcome. include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
HELD: YES the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
accused to the killing of the unknown victim, the because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4, this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
the circumstances is such as to produce conviction rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
beyond resonable doubt. accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
Cpl. Cunanan, there is no evidence that Cunanan had any that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and
motive to falsely testify against accused. While it is true that he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney
accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of of his own.
counsel, hence inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as
a verbal admission of the accused established through the
testimonies of persons who heard it or who conducted the Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the
investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the
Moreover in Peo v Alvarez, the court ruled that an prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied --
extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused could the defense still present its own evidence?
when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC
committed. ruled in the affirmative, contending that the right of the
accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right which
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer.
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be
person by reason of poverty (Art. III, Sec. 11.) No matter how heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.)
educated one may be, he may not know how to establsih his
innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)
rules of evidence said the SC in People v. Holgado, 85 Phil
752 (1952). F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was
accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952) case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and against the
First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs sufficient to
he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the
detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado defense offered to present evidence for the accused. The
for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the
of her personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel, pleaded defense, contending that the present procedural practice and
guilty and said that he was instructed by Mr. Ocampo to do so. laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting
Accused was convicted of a capital offense. any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with
Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no or without reservation and after said motion had been denied,
evidence appears to have been presented by either party, the and citing as authority the case of United States vs. De la
Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained Ruling: YES
the opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing A dismissal ordered after the termination of the
the accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the force
of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to prove the
years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000. guilt of the accused, the case must be dismissed, and it will be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express
evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way as a
ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution judgment of acquittal.
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence. Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused- case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its
petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity
his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed proper leave of court.
in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the
provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of the Constitution that accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
There is no law nor "procedural practice" under which the for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.)
accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being
sentenced. 3. Right to free legal assistance
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal
cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and
jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for
dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present
evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. The F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo
reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to
heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant
course if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to
waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution alone. Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the
basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a
habeas corpus lies in a case like the present. preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first a
We have already shown that there is no law or part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission
precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal
of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says,
clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional right is this is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person
inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government accused of crime."
has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
instant case invokes that rough, and the court denies it to him, The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not
that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be held under the this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may stand constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
were valid and should be resumed from there. that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own."
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973) This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon
the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues,
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a
counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the defense intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where
moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
of evidence. The judge granted the motion. court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal.
Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de
accused? oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason.
After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on
Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious,
It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative
always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause
order to favor one party over another. of the accused-appellant (his client).
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to
court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients'
imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public
Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and
possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause."
has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free. Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects
counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
upon submission of which the case would be deemed does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
submitted for decision. community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
From the records of the case, it is established that duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar
the accused- appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a and to the public.
verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he
subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the
of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows: discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, a law, a transgressor of its precepts.
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. owed to his client. The ethics of the profession require that
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused- counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty
appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any
CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
to the offense charged. distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar.
xxx
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of 4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation
the crime of rape.
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely
The theory of the defense at the trial level was intended to comply with the right of the accused to be
grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of the informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process
This claim was corroborated by the accused's brother, Amado requires that the accused must be informed why he is being
Rio. However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the prosecuted and what charge he must meet.
prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the
theory of the defense. The new theory presented by counsel de F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the
oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant City Court of Cebu. After one postponement due to
had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset. Again,
stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman. The
March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time accused court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite
had abused complainant. This allegation as well as the fact the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After the
that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could offended party had testified and presented documentary
only have been due to the fact that there was consent. The evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed
charge was filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
because the complainant's mother caught them.
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
been consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt as discretion and his decision is void. Because petitioner was not
to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and cause of
indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable
the ways of the world, would permit the occurrence of an requirement in any criminal proceeding.
incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
own mother. The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of 5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
the defense from one of total denial of the incident in question,
by way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged (1) Speedy Trial
consent of the complainant. This new version could only be
attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from
different from the counsel in the trial court. Although the vexatious and oppressive delays. Its objective is to free the
Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court litigation,
interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate or otherwise, to have his guilt determined within the shortest
effort to get himself acquitted, the Court deems it more likely possible time, compatible with the presentation and
that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of consideration of whatever legitimate defense the accused may
the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of interpose.
the case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal,
had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined
would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a on a case to case basis, an unreasonable delay on the part of
shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense. the prosecution to present its case, thereby causing the threat
Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies equally in of penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the
accused for an extended period of time, violates the right of There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is
the accused to a speedy trial. to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such
The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this
corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty, or certiorari, right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are
prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case; smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in
and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
amounts to an acquittal. requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have
his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 offense he may be charged."
(1970), a case involving the prosecution for damage to Then, too, reference may also be made to the
property through reckless imprudence which had been pending undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
for 6 years, the last step taken being the start of the cross- chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part
examination of the complaining witness, who did not appear of respondent policemen. xxx
thereafter. The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice,
thus acquitting the accused. (3) Impartial trial
(2) Public Trial One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate

who exercises cold impartiality.
A public trial does not require that the entire public can
witness the trial. It is enough if it is conducted at a place In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held
where one's relatives and friends can be accommodated and that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he
the public may know what is going on. imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking
laws, could not be an impartial judge. Under such a situation,
The right is not absolute. The court can order the he would be interested in convicting those he tries so he would
public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and earn more.
order.
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the SC tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of
dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was evidence and procedure.
conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground that
the objection came too late (the party only complained after In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144
the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon by the (1987), the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a military
parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long
conditioned). as the civil courts are open and operating, even during Martial
Law.
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970) 6. Right to confront witness
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to
prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is the test the credibility of the witness. The best means of
meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. confrontation is the process of cross-examination.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge 7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the
violative of the right to a public trial? production of evidence in his behalf)
Ruling: NO There are various means available to the parties to

The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
held in the chambers. On fourteen separate occasions this was documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of
the case and there was no objection on their part. There was a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces
no evidence to substantiate the claim that any other person tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery;
was excluded from the chambers. It is thus evident that what perpetuation of testimonies.
took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid
of haste or intentional secrecy. 8. Trial in Absentia
The trial must be public. It possesses that character
when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge Although the right to be present is not explicit in the
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is provision, it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed
to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the notwithstanding the absence of the accused"
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need
be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the This right to be present may, however, be waived by
belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c), talks of 3 ways that the
that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the
tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is
Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is identification; (b) implied waiver when the accused without
thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular date
procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite of which he had notice; and (c) implied waiver when the
usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be accused under custody who had been notified of the date of
heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of trial escapes.
events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right
so. There is the well recognized exception though that to be present, whether expressed or implied, the trial may be
warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may held "in absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in absentia
be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." are: (i) the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he was duly
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is
the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it unjustified.
was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was
held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the
violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. accused has been arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria v. Mendoza,
77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a charge for slight present during the trial. If he does, he runds the risk of having
physical injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the his bail bond forfeited.
trial court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence even
if the accused has not yet been arraigned. Arraignment is Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping
crucial because it informs the accued of the nature and cause bail
of the accusation against him. Conviction without
arraignment violates due process and ousts the court of its F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to
jurisdiction. appear, respondent Judge declared the bail bond forfeited and
required the bondsmen to produce the accused within thirty
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. days and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against them. However, on motion of defense counsel, who
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of invoked the last sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III,
his right to be heard by himself and counsel. The sec. 14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge reconsidered
indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it should his order. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the
come after arraignment. VV. accused has been arraigned and identified, the conclusion is
inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the bail bond
is premature." The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari.
Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of
the right to present evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution
attend trial (which presupposes arraignment), without any goes no further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial
justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein
presentation of the evidence, and thereupon, the court may specified. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail.
consider the case submitted for decision. The court will VV.
decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
evidence. This does not violate the constitutional presumption Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
of innocence because it does not mean that the judgment of the
trial court will result in conviction. In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present
evidence and confront witnesses
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
(1986), which further ruled that trial in absentia applies even F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five others, was
to capital cases. charged with murder. After arraignment, during which he
pleaded not guilty, the case was set for hearing on Sept. 18,
1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia. The trial court
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused
but it held in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases give him the chance to cross examine the witnesses against
him and present evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in
the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned, the case was HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped
reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no trial? No. As we have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once
bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues
commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner took until the case is terminated. The lower court was correct in
advantage of the first information filed and succeeded in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it erred when is
deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and suspended the proceedings as to the respondent. The court
ordering his release. The respondent Judge, learning of the need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's appear. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the
re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. The 9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
respondent Judge denied the motion and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused. Hence, this In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that
petition. (a) the accused has the right to be present during trial; (b) if
he is in the custody of the law, presence in all stage is likewise
HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña has a duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, and (iii)
been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of promulgation of judgment. This rule however has been
the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. The modified.
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only As things stand, the following are the rules:
that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of
the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The right 1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present at
to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of
that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses judgment).
who will identify the accused. The defendant's escape will be
considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court 2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, his
to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it presence during the trial is a duty only if the court orders his
from continuing with his trial. VV. presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to identify him.
(People v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military
Commiission, infra. modifying People v. Avancena, infra.)
Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973
Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal 3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the
prosecution could not move because the accused has either law (and more so if he is in the custody of the law), his
escaped or jumped bail. presence is required in the following cases:
In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC ruled a) Arraignment, regardless of the offense;
that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to jump bail.
Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia does not b) Entering a plea, regardless of whether the
mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be plea is guilty or not guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has

c) Promulgation of judgment, except that gonorrhea may be used against him
when the judgment is for a light offense, he may be
represented by his counsel or a personal emissary. Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any
admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an
object found on his person was examined: seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in
a. Arraignment and plea, whether of evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
innocence or of guilt The substance was taken from the body of the
defendant without his objection, the examination was made by
Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how competent medical authority and the result showed that the
made.-- defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested
xxx by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen
(b) The accused must be present at the property upon his person, there certainly could have been no
arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing
failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had
proceedings. furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of
b. During trial, for identification even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the
case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra. against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a
person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
be waived except only at that stage where the court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
identify the accused. communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle,
c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his
which case accused may appear by counsel, or a features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not
representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.) considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to
exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily
E. Priviledge against self incrimination or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent.
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine
a witness against himself. Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against admission of his guilt.
him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)] Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in
discussing the question before us, said:
1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not
Testimonial self-incrimination only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised,
then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up
The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and
obtained compulsorily. It refers therefore to the use of the defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything
mental process and the communicative faculties, and not to a that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
merely physical activity. If the act is physical or mechanical, possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act, and articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not
the result can be used in evidence against him. merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but
testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine
a substance taken from his body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners
145 (1912)). before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the
F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
He was found guilty of the charge. He appeals the decision on The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit
the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even, for the
testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the
substance from the body of the accused while he was confined prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted.
in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by
substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the
with reference to a venereal disease. It was discovered that the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a
rape victim was infected by venereal disease so that the witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
finding of venereal disease in the accused was material to his responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in
conviction. this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body his
Upon this information the defendant was arrested body itself.
and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine
took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
result of the examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea. Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question
that the accused was compelled to be a witness against
himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing
the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. To latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in
force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along rebuttal.
the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the Respondent required complainant to copy the letters
court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The
from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan complainant, refused invoking her right not to incriminate
Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to herself. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did not
be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the
of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to respondent's petition.
hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make
purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit a copy of the letters in her own handwriting
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort
unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self-
commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.) incrimination.
The constitution provides: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It should be noted
The accused can be made to take off her garments and that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy
shoes and be photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth
(1950)). before the investigator authorized to receive statements under
oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents in
question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to
A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write
show her body for physical investigation to see if she is later that said documents had really been written by her, it
pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury.
against present standards, however, it is possible that this The reason for the privilege appears evident. The
method of determining pregnancy would violate due process purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the
as being too barbaric. repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure
of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If
such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought
F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the
before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he
the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant should be asked, one for all, to furnish such evidence
Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the examination of voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion
one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant that in order that the constitutional provision under
or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead
that such examination of her person was a violation of the letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. favorable to the person invoking it.
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should it is hereby held, that the complainant is perfectly entitled to
permit the medical examination required by the court. the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is
denied.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body
to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not
violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights allowed, for this also involves the mental process.
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the
The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three
facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial
proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case, and the
by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding
taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any the killing.
more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the
physical examination being made by the family doctor of the RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible.
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by
the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused
ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People v. when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings.
Salas and People v. Sara). But the accused were denied their right to counsel not
once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime.
However, making the accused take dictation to get a Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced
specimen of her handwriting is not allowed, for this involves confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination.
the use of the mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection
485 (1937).] against testimonial compulsion but this has since been
extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937) under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant
to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence
F: In connection with this administrative case, said of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in
respondent filed, six letters which, for purposes of a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. necessary for his conviction.
He contends that said six letters are the complainant's, but the
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
complainant in said investigation without his consent and

F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by against himself."
the police. Upon the presentation of a search warrant, the
house of the accused was searched, and several prohibited HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as
drugs were seized. They were charged with and convicted of a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended that Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
they had not been shown a search warrant. In concluding that constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
a search warrant had been presented to the accused prior to the accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
search, the trial court relied on a document entitiled unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
“Certificate of Re-conduct of Search”, signed by the accused. objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
evidence. creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
ENTIRETY. foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
an implied admission that shabu, the marked money, and citizens."
shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police authorities Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore, subject to the Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen
control and custody of the accused (the spouses) and to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
necessarily in their possession. To this extent, the surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of
“Certification” is a declaration against the interest and tacit the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave
admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph of the where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time our democracy." In the light of the above, it could thus clearly
when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and under appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised
circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the search against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold
of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
render intelligent waiver of their right against self- for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
incrimination open to serious doubt. Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that a witness stand without his consent.
search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the
attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to
operation carried out at their residence and that in the course extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body.
thereof, no force or intimidation had been exercised upon the
spouses.
Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
the crime charged against them.
A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given
2. In what proceedings available immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self-
incrimination
The privilege is available in any proceedings, even
outside the court, for they may eventually lead to a criminal F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major
prosecution. General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava Board
looking into the killing of former Senator Benigno Aquino.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for
344 (1969), the SC held that the privilege against self- the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando Galman. They were
incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which charged as accessories in both. The prosecution offered in
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava
that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board Board, but on the latter's objections, the Sandiganbayan
for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found excluded the testimony. The private and public prosecutions
guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand filed petitions for certiorari.
without his consent.
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969) Board were "under investigation for the commission of the
offense" within the meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the
February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Miranda reference to "custodial investigation." The subject
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava Board
against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent- indubitably evinced purposes other than merely determining
appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an the surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination.
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for The respondents were called to determine their probable
complainants announced that he would present as his first involvement in the crime. Yet they were not informed or at the
witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the respondent in very least warned of their right to remain silent and that any
such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, statement given by them may be used against them. The first
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 denied them the right to remain
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against silent, and gave power to the Board to punish refusal to testify.
himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took The SC said it is not satisfied that when they testified they
note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next waived their constitutional right not be compelled to be a
scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee witness against themselves, much less their right to remain
would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the silent. The SC also said it cannot be contended that the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a privilege against self- incrimination applies only to criminal
competent authority. prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No
A decision was rendered by the lower court on person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be
well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra.

Use and Fruit Immunity
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. "Transactional
Immunity" On the other hand, "use and fruit immunity can be
found in P.D. 1886, which created the Agrava Fact Finding
When the State requires testimony to be made before a Board, and which was the subject-matter of Galman v.
board or body, it has to grant immunity by means of law to the Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985).
persons testifying, so as not to violate their right against self-
incriminatrion. This is the only way to reconcile two In this case, Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials
conflicting values; public interest to get certain relevant were made to testify before the Agrava Board investigating the
information, say, to legislation, that can only be supplied by double murder of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under P.D.1886,
the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed every person summoned by the Board has to appear and testify
constitutional right not to make a person a witness against on pain of being held in contempt. Any testimony made, in
himself. turn, was exempted from being "used" in a criminal
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was file against Ver
Through an immunity statute, the state in effect in the Sandiganbayan, and one of the evidence presented was
exchanges immunity for the testimony of a witness. The the testimony he made before the Board. When objected to,
problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must the Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so the matter
grant in order to protect the privilege against self- was raised to the SC on certiorari.
incrimination.
The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a
Transactional Immunity subsequent proceeding. it hinted that were it not for the
provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and testimony
In a transactional immunity, a person is given on pain of being held in contempt, the accused could have
immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with invoked the right against self-incrimination. But since the
which he gave his testimony. The immunity is from the state needed the testimony, it gave them immunity and so
prosecution, not merely from the use of the testimony. Thus, now, the State must honor its obligation and disallow the use
even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven by of the testimony in the criminal prosecution.
independent means, he can not be prosecuted anymore.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra.
Use and Fruit Immunity
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into
In a use and fruit immunity, a person is exempted from two: one, which grants "use immunity" and the other, which
the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits) that the grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The
testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising from distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use
what he testified on. The immunity in this case is from the of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
testimony given. Thus, if the state can procure evidence, in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On
independent of the testimony and its fruits, it can prosecute the the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to
person testifying nevertheless. the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his
compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely
immunity from use of any statement given before the Board,
History in the United States but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis
thereof. VV
In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the SC ruled that
the only way to respect the right against self-incrimination is
to give transactional immunity; anything less violates the 4. Exclusionary rule
constitutional right.
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
Testimony Act, providing for transactional immunity. violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York hinted that it was not really The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule
necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect is a traditionally coerced confession, and not so much on
the right against self incrimination. uncounselled statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a
person cannot be used in evidence against that person.
This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to revise the
Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit 5. Effect of denial of the privilege by court
immunity".
When the privilege against self-incrimination is
With the validity of this limited immunity was raised, violated outside of court, say, by the police, then the
the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled that the testimony, as already noted, is not admissible under the
right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity. exclusionary rule.
When the privilege is violated by the court itself, that

In the Philippines is, by the judge, the court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its
proceedings are null and void, and it is as if no judgment has
There is no fixed rule in the Philippines. been rendered. A classic case is Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
"Transactional immunity" can be found in the following: 34 SCRA 663 (1968).
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human
Rights shall have the following powers and functions F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original
xxx and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
person whose testimony or possession of documents or imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to
truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its be compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer,
authority. too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative
remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be
Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function
and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a
to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely conviction where the consitutional rights of the accused were
questions of law. violated.
Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for A court which denies the accused of his constitutional
the prosecution without him being considered a state witness rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. The judgment of conviction
inspite of objections by his counsel. pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
Roger Chavez was found guilty. The court had this imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.
to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter
of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Chavez
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in
him "a self- confessed culprit". contempt to take the witness stand, in spite of his objection
that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness
Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-incrimination against himself. And so he took the witness stand and was
was violated convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was
Ruling: YES dismissed, the judgment became final and executory, and he
The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a served his sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC on
formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the habeas corpus, contending that his convictioin was void
discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental the violation of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
to our scheme of justice. granted the petition and released him.
The constitutional proscription was established on Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an
broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy extraordinary post-conviction, mid-sentence, remedy. The
because it would place the witness against the strongest petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all
temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it questions of illegal detention. When the judge compelled the
would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress accused to take the witness stand, he was ousted of his
every species and degree of which the law abhors. jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's Ultimately, the judgment of conviction and even the sentence
own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor were likewise void, thus making the detention of Chavez
may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a The case also illustrates the difference between the
confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove ordinary witness and the accused. A witness can be
the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego conmpelled to take the stand; he can only object to the
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the questions as they come, invoking his right against self-
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own incrimination.
free, genuine will. But in the case of the accused, he cannot even be made
Compulsion as it is understood here does not to take the witness stand, for the only purpose of such is to
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product incriminate him.
of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to Of course, the moment the accused agrees to take the
overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational stand, he is deemed to have waived his right, and must now
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in thus submit himself to cross-examination.
our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of military courts
protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406
the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating (1986)
answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military
questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as tribunal to try twelve accused persons, only one of whom is in
a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. the military, for the offense devoid of any national security or
political complexion and committed long before the
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying proclamation of martial law,
that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in The petitioners were charged with murder in
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a political
be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer leader,during the November 11 elections.
to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer The accused were arrested almost a year later, on
himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was
upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was
answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate
perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot General Service. The petitioners were recommended for
be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one
choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military
a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the
possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen corresponding charge sheet, but he modified the crime charged
to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised
made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same
examination would be taken right then and thereon the first Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of
day of the trial. Firearms with Murder."
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of
as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn
illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. 27.
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or
loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. 27 is without
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right jurisdiction over the criminal case
Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over

Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. civilians
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v. Hon.
Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, (G.R. No. 62798, December 22, Ruling: No
1983 and March 13, 1984) where the lone military personnel As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal
was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of
civil court. It is also clear from the records that the acts for martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by
which Sgt. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and
performance of official duty. that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
committed on November 10, 1971 long before the military tribunal concerned
proclamation of martial law. There was no question about the The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes
case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil appear to have been committed, and there are accusations
courts at the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and martial against herein petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot
law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to return, there and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these
is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should charges, or establish that the same are baseless, so as to entitle
still be retained, at this time, by a military tribunal. them to immediate release from detention. It is not to be
forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
petitioners have as much interest as the State has to prosecute
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 the alleged authors of the misdeeds. Justice will be better
served if the detention of such of the petitioners as are not
Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the hereby ordered released or excepted, is continued until their
civil courts are open cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having jurisdiction,
and the necessary informations have been filed against them
F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the therein, as has already been done in the case of petitioners
respondent military commission and sentenced to death. They Imperial D. Usman and Samu Gumal. The State should be
filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and given a reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer,
mandamus before the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the at which time the petitioners may apply for bail for their
military tribunal. temporary release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates
HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975), the SC held questions to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to
that "Martial law creates and exception to the general rules of the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
exclusive jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of seems evident, however, that no breach of the constitutional
war as well as those of a civil character, triable by military prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of
tribunals.xxx" Due process, however demands that in all punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial
criminal cases prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to, of the petitioners" cases, for the simple reason that the absence
among others, a trial. As explained by Justice Teehankee in of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the
his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Military Commission petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid
supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of
exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts as are double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second
established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts prosecution.
which have the exlcusive power to hear and determine those
matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative adjudication of guilt
citizen." Since we are not an enemy occupied territory and
even on the premise that martial continues in force, the Bill of Attainder
military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the
properly cognizable by the civil courts. legislative determination of guilt for a judicial determination.
xxx Through a statute, the legislature finds individuals or groups
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge guilty, without the benefit of being proven so in court.
whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure
and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder
but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty) and (ii) bill
evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence
on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972), the Anti-
it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the Communist
usually has direct command and authority over its members is Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to
a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to Philippine security, and thus prohibited membership in such
eliminate the danger. VV. organization, was contended to be a bill of attainder. The SC,
however, dismissed the contention, holding that although the
law mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose is not to define
a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the legislative
determination that membership in such organization is a crime
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988) because of the clear and present danger to national security.
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this

Court on October 1, 1986 to test the legality of the continued People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees arrested
in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the
the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act, which outlaws
stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial; the Communist Party and other "subversive associations", and
if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
been pleaded nor proved. acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains a member,"
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 of the Party and of any other similar "subversive"
confirmed as military personnel. organization.
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.

Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123 (1986),

HELD: NO the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) as
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against non-
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this law deceit is
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The not necessary. It is, however, a valid exercise of the State of
constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement its power to determine what acts constitute a crime.
the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures
to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation What the Consitution further prohibits is imprisonment
of the judicial function. for non-payment of poll tax, which is a tax imposed on certain
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will persons regardless of their property or business. The
be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the prohibition does not apply to non-payment of property taxes
Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of and taxes on privilege.
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government
for the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in the Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
outlawed organization. The term "CPP" is used solely for
definition purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or
CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having the same draws and issues any check on account or for value,
purposes and their successors". Its focus is not on individuals knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
but on conduct. sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of the payment of said check in full upon presentment,
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners
suffice to secure their punishement. But the undeniable fact is challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the
that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The following grounds: 1) It offends the constitutional
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt; 2) it
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal
that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and
objectives. executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed
because the Interim Batasan prohibited amendment of
H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases the bill on 3rd reading.
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi- 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
judicial, or administrative bodies. or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non- payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property but as an offense against
The right to a speedy disposition of cases complements public order. Recent statistics show that one third of
the right to a speedy trial. After the case has been submitted the entire money supply of the country consists of
for decision, so that technically the trial stage is terminated, currency in circulation. These demand deposits in the
the Constitution mandates that the judicial, quasi- judicial or banks constitute the funds against which commercial
administrative body or tribunal must decide the case consistent papers are drawn. The amount concerned justifies the
with the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his legitimate concern of the state in preserving the
case. integrity of the banking system.
To carry out this mandate, the Constitution in several 3. Acts which when done were innocent
other places provides periods for deciding a case:
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of
The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24 attainder shall be enacted.
months from the date of submission of the case for decision
which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. VIII, Sec. Ex Post Facto Law
15 (1).]
III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an
PROCESS CLAUSE act which, when committed, was not yet a crime or was not as
heavily punished. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act
so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. Its
A. What acts cannot be criminalized unfairness consists in the fact that the person could not have
known the act was criminal, and thus could not have avoided
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations the crime. When a law is more favorable to the accused,
however, it is allowed to retroact.
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas

2. Debts and civil obligations Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized non-stock and
non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and
Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for praying for the detremination of the validity of Sec. 8, RA
debt or non-payment of a poll tax. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties
thereunder. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision
constitutes an ex post facto law.
What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-
payment of a contractual obligation. ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison, the HELD: NO

imprisonment is not for the non- payment of debt but for the An ex post facto law is one which:
deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict.
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of inhuman" punishment. The purpose in changing the
the law which was innocent when done, and punishes such an phraseology is to allow for experimentation, and not to fix the
act; concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present
2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater than it was, civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is supposed to
when committed; expand and grow, so that what today is considered as
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when penalty.
committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law form or whether it depends on its severity has been
required at the time of the commission of the offense; ambivalently answered by the SC:
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the SC
something which when done was lawful; and ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some (pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity, that
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a Constitution. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years
proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is
(1902)] only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of punishment
This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal (imprisonment).
laws which are given retroactive effect.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of The SC spoke in a different way in People v. Borja 91
any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was sentenced and he served at the
penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to the
of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is SC. The Court said that Borja had been living in the shadow
nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its provisions of death. Although the sentence was initially valid, it had
shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a form of
penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual.
B. What punishments cannot be imposed
1. Involuntary servitude People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor
form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime who killed three persons on suspicion that they were cattle
whereof the party shall have been convicted. rustlers. They were found guilty of murder. Three appealed to
the SC which found them equally liable for the killing. The
penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to
2. Excessive fines death. The question concerns the penalty to be imposed in
view of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither shall the
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it. Any death
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the perpetua."
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC except insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it to
3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and minimum
penalties remain the same. VV.
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging Remelito Lubreo along
Id., Sec. 12. xxx with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, Mamerto Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used both the preliminary investigation and preliminary
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, examination. Thereafter, he forwarded the records of the case
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted his
prohibited. own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an information for
murder not only against remelito but also against Lucresio
Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime charged.
Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the
accused has been convicted the Constitution now further ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in
prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution
meted out. After all, due process prohibits barbaric and
disproportionate penalties. HELD: NO.
An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
The employment of physical, psychological or proved. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and until
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the such burden is sufficiently discharged , the accused continues
use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the instant case, the
subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with by law. [Art. III, lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis of its conclusion
Sec. 19 (2).] that he was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter
and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the assailants, and that
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel and therefore, his defense of alibi would not prosper.
unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against "cruel or unusual " Unfortunately, the testimonies of the abovementioned
penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against "cruel, degrading or
witnesses did not categorically stated or proved that Lucrecio Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766 (1950), the SC
took part in hacking the victim. allowed the amnedment of the information from its original
Though Monter categorically stated in her direct cahrge of frustrated homicide, because after the filing of the
examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the information, the victim died.
victim, in the "re-enactmment", she however candidly
informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she (2) The facts constituting the graver charge became
could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim. known or were discovered only after the filing of the former
From her version, the participation of Lucrecio is at one complaint or information.
enveloped inserious doubt. It is worse in the case of
Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in This overrules People v. Yorac, where the SC
hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking his disallowed the amendment of the information from slight
mind (sic) and the neck", he never elaborated as to what physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution
"abetted in hacking " means. He could not even specify the subjected the victim to another medical examination and
part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio. found a wound, that it was the fault of the prosecution if they
There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the had an incompetent medical examination.
actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. There being no
evidence of conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
co- appellant. without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and Identity of offenses and identity of act
other forms of detention and the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities When an act gives rise to two or more offense which
are punished by the same authority, and an individual is
convicted, acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx consent, of one of these offense (Crime A), there is no double
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, jeopardy if he is charged of another offfense (Crime B)
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used flowing from the same act. Double jeopardy arises only when
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, he is again charged of that same offense (Crime A). Thus, this
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are is called double jeopardy by "identity of offenses".
prohibited.
But when an act which give rise to two or more
Id., Sec. 19. xxx offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and an
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or ordinance), then if an individual is convicted, acquitted, or the
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or case dismissed without his consent, of any of these offenses
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under punished by one authority (Crime A by law), even if he is
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. charged of another offense which is punished by the other
auhtority (Crime B by ordinance), there is double jeopardy,
5. Indefinite Imprisonments because both offenses, one punished by a law and the other
punished by an ordinance, flowed from the same act. Thus,
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act."
C. The protection against double jeopardy Sum: If only a law in involved, there is double
jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. But is a
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in law and an ordinance are involved, there is double jeopardy
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is when there is an identity of act.
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another Identity of Offenses:
prosecution for the same act.
If a married man maintains as concubine a married
woman not his wife, the man is guilty of both concubinage
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People v. and adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the married
Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): woman), two offenses arise. And yet he can be prosecuted for
both because, the two offenses coming from the same
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction; authority, there is no identity of offenses.
(2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; Identity of Act:
(3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused;
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), Relova was
without the express consent, of the accused. prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use of
wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following: authorities, but the case was dismissed because the crime has
prescribed. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of electricity
(1) Same offense under the RPC. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy
(2) Attempt of the same offense already, and so the second case could no longer be filed. For
(3) Frustration of the same offense although the offenses were different, both flowed from the
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All same act. And in this case, the act was punished by a law and
the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements of an ordinance.
the 1st offense)
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy
(All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the elements
of the 2nd offense) If the court has no jurisdiction, or was ousted of its
jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of the
Exceptions to no. 5: parties, the decision is null and void, the accused may again be
charged.
(1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening
facts" arising from the same act or omission constituting the In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985), the SC,
former charged. held that the move by the trial court of summarily dismissing a
criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved a
question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due process Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion
by denying it the chance to introduce its evidence. This pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
ousted the court of its juridsiction. Pictures does not include or is not included inthe offense
defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), indecent and immoral motin pictures.
the SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused in The elements of the 2 offenses are different. The
the Aquino-Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after the gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public
SC commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been
Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the President previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
and instructed on how to conduct the trial. Due process is a Pictures. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral but
right not only of the accused but also of the State. Once the if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public
court deprives either party, which in this case is the State, of a showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the other hand, the
fighting chance, then it is ousted from its jurisdiction, and offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the public
double jeopardy would not apply. Thus, the accused were showing os indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows,
ordered retried. not just motion pictures.
The nature of both offenses also differs. The crime
1. Two situations contemplated punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal
intent need not ber proved because it is presumed, while the
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se,
which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Suzette.
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of
Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting
the installation of electric wiring devices without authority 2. Rules of Court provisions
from the city government. He admitted installing the electric
wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal;
readings of electric current. The case was however dismissed double jeopardy.-- When an accused has been convicted or
on the ground that the offense had prescribed. Fourteen days acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
later, the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against him. terminated without his express consent by a court of
The court also dismissed this case on the ground of double compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending the offense information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
was different. substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first sentence of Art. accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
III, sec. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional protection another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
against double jeopardy is not available where the second attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both may be included in the offense in the former complaint of
based from the same facts. The second sentence provides an information.
exception: that the protection against double jeopardy is However, the conviction of the accused shall not be
available although the prior offense charged under an a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
under the national statute such as the RPC provided that both complaint or information under any of the following
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. VV. instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175 consituting the former charge;
(1987) (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after the filing of the
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, former complaint or information; or
was accused of violating Sec.7, in relation to Sec. 11 RA 3060 (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
and Art. 201(3) of the RPC, in two separate informations filed without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party.
with the City Court of Manila. Upon arraignment, accused In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused
Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he
accused, Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he is still at large. shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction
Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 for the graver offense.
cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an
offense. Motion denied. Later, he again moved to quash the
information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of duble Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending aginst
him another criminal case, where the informatin allegedly F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal with
contain the same allegations as the information in the first frustrated homicide , for having allegedly inflicted upon
criminal case. Court granted the motion. Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the
HELD: NO same period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, accused
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 am of the
jeopardy, 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy same day, Obillo died from his wounds. An amended
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy information was filed charging accused with consummated
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the amended
jeopardy must be for teh same offense, or the second offense information alleging double jeopardy. Motion denied.
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this
case, HELD: NO
The 2 informations with which the accused was Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged
charged , do not make only one offense, contrary to private with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal
repondent's allegation. In other words, the offense defined in or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same caused to accused was found to be longer. A motion to quash
or identical offense. The phrase "the same offense" has was filed by the accused on the ground of double jeopardy.
always been construed to mean not only that the second
offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already been convicted
first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. of slight physical injuries for injuries inflicted on Lam Hock ,
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence and had served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same
warrant a conviction for the other. person
This rule of identity however does not apply, however,
when the second offense was not in existence at the time of HELD: NO.
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition on
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first double jeopardy, there is the indispensable requirement of the
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the
inesistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime
injuries and after conviction the accused dies, the charge for imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in constituting a new and distinct offense.
jeopardy. In this case, there is no supervening fact which
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily occurred to justify the non-existence of double jeopardy. The
include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries caused
the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy, to the victim was already in existence at the time of the first
when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of examination of the doctor. Said delay was caused by the very
the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was superficial and inconclusive examination then made resulting
then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the to a later finding of fracture. Suzette.
first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the
same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette. Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available.--
(1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of evidence; (2)
dismissal bec. of denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3)
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637 accused is discharged to be a state witness.
(1983)
When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- When
F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion of
of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide the accused personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is
thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, who is
case on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double
held that the accused having been previously tried and jeopardy.
convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
the accused in double jeopardy.
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious a city ordinance. Later he was charged again in another
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries
thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to quash the latter
reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of information. Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first
the same injuries. case.
HELD: YES ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy.

Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged
with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law - the
former. However as held in the MELO case, the rule of offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute, strictly
identity does not apply when the second offense was not in different offenses, although, under certain conditions, one
existence at the time of teh first prosecution , for the reason offense may include the other, and accordingly, once placed in
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was as regards the other.
inexistent. Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second
The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information were not established by the evidence, petitioner
information was filed , and the accused was arraigned 2 days could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation
after or on October 20, 1972 . When the information for of municipal ordinance charged in the first case, unless he
homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on pleaded double jeopardy. Charo.
October 24, 1972, the accused was already in doubly
jeopardy. Suzette.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971) F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the
proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-Galman duble murder
F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting
being Lam mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr. violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8 1968 up to the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. The
present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial SC dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged.
in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. On Respondents submitted that in view of the SB decision, the
April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information case has become moot and academic. Petitioners filed a
charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. The SC created
from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for the Vasquez Commisssion to look into petitioners' allegations.
upon further diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries
RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the Government only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
the judicial process in this case. The unwholly scenario for the
acquittal of the accused after the rigged trial would accomplish During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
the two principal objectives of satisfying the public clamor for person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giviing within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec.
them, through their acquittal, the legal shield of double 18.)
jepardy.
However, double jeopardy does not attach where a A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ directed to the
criminal trial was a sham. A dictated, coerced and scripted person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. In body of the detainee at a designated time and place, and to
legal contemplation, it is no judgment. It neither binds nor show cause why he should continue to be detained.
bars anyone. The criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents completely The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the
disqualified them and voided ab initio the SB verdict. DJ immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of
cannot be invoked where the prosecution, which represents the physical liberty.
sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process.
What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, and not
the writ itself. The writ will always issue as a matter of
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 course. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended, all
the detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of
F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that habeas corpus is to show to the court that the detainee is being
through violence and intimidation, Obsania had carnal detained for an offense covered by the suspension, and the
knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will. court cannot inquire any further to find out if the detention is
Later, the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein that legal. Under the Conmstitution, this is so only for 3 days.
the offense was committed with lewd designs. The accused After 3 days, the Court can now require the detaining officer
after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case to produce the body of the detainees and show cause why he
on the ground that the first information was fatally defective should not be released.
for failing to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the amended
information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied only
motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. Hence this to crimes related to invasion or rebellion. An extensive
appeal by the fiscal. discussion was made under the Commander-in- Chief clause
of the President, supra. This rest of the section will be
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses.
designs" in the first information does not affect the sufficiency
in substance of the information, for unchaste motives are In general as already noted above, the privilege of the
deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. In any case, the writ is an extraordinary remedy to question the illegality of the
lower court erred in dismissing the case by failing to arrest or detention, or any other restraint to liberty. When all
distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and else is lost, it is the last recourse to get someone out of his
insufficiency in substance of an indictment. illegal detention.
As to the question of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have been obtained to invoke the constitutional 1. Functions of the writ
protection against it:
(1) a valid complaint or information; Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is merely
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated restrained. Thus, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233
without his express consent. (1986), the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
though temporarily released, could not travel outside Metro
The only remaining and decisive issue in this case Manila, could not change his residence, could not be
seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed interviewed by media, and had to report to the military.
without the prior consent of the accused.
The SC ruled that as a general rule, when the case is
dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy
accused, such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express
consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have
waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra, habeas corpus
estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of a
Government or in another indictment for the same offense. void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge
The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought violated due process by compelling him to take the stand and
by the accused on the ground that they were denied their right testify against himself.
to a speedy trial and that the government failed to prosecute;
in which case double jeopardy will set in. The case of herein Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 (1986), supra.
accused falls under the general rule.
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 SCRA 420
(1971), some persons who were charged with the complex
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas crime of rebellion with homicide, rape, or other common
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or crimes, did not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced
rebellion, when the public safety requires it. accordingly. The other accused, however, appealed their
conviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to
the effect that there can be no complex crim of rebellion with
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety homicide, rape, etc., for these common crimes are absorbed by
requires it, the President may, for a period not exceeding 60 rebellion. As a result, while those who appealed were now
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus... free, those who did not remained in jail. The SC ruled that
those who conrtinued to languish in jail could avail of habeas
corpus to question the legality of their continued detention padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez. and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such
closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
3. Suspension of the privilege abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's
Art. VII, Sec. 18. freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971) patenly anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political
E. Affirmative rights enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
1. Free access to the courts New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and 3. For individual protection
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. B. Prior Restraints
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights Thus any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx constitutionality, giving the government a heavy burden to
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil show justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New
sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as York v. United States (1971); also in New York Times v.
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon
similar practices, and their families. Papers).
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of tortures

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil Subsequent Punishment
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the
similar practices, and their families. greater interest of promoting free public opinion. The most
significant expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the background of a

profound national commitment to debate on public issues
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION being uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. The falsity of
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging some of the factual statements and alleged defamations do not
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the qualify the role. And just as factual error afforded no warrant
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the for repressing speech that would otherwise be free, the same is
Government for redress of grievance. true of injury to official reputation. (New York Times v.
Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely
by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. The interest of society and good government demands
xxx a full discussion of public affairs. Whether the law is wisely
or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. Public
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees policy, welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion.
Free Market Place of Ideas The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
1. For the discovery of political truth [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731 (1918).]
When men have realized that time has upset many While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any defamatory
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-in-law), when
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the the defense proves that the communication is privileged, such
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-- a presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get public interest involved.
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and the truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in
carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United States, 250 parliamentary freedom of speech), the prosecution cannot
U.S. 616. (1919) even prove malice-in-fact.
The theory behind freedom of expression is the If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged
principle that ours is a democratic society, and so the only way (Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting
to rule ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which is of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact,
compete in the free market place of ideas. which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the
defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials
2. For self government may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to the
conduct of his office) and good motive.
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
C. Content-Based Restrictions
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), supra 1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions
HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the

premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation, Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-
the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to and-present danger test is over- simplified judgement unless it
regulate the contents of speech. takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body of the occasion for speech or political activity, (2) the
has determined generally, in the exercise of its discretion, that availability of more moderate controls than those the State has
utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the
substantive evil that they may be punished, the question speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United
whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
class is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, is
not open to consideration. In such cases, the general provision
of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific 2. Applications of tests in various contexts
utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit. a. Freedom of expression and national security
[Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the (1984)
legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain
conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On different
evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a dates in July 1980, they were summoned by military
statute, in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which authorities for interrogation regarding their work, feelings,
applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute. sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private lives. In
addition, one of them was charged with libel by a General who
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every sought to recover P10 million in damages. They brought an
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning them
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress of inquiry by the NIB.
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).] HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be that
as it may, it is not idle to note that, while ordinarily, an
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not
circumstances under which it is uttered. The speech itself may illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain
not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things that might circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume
be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." Or group composed predominantly of ranking military officers
saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house. and the designate interrogation site is a military camp.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct:
the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such an The Test of "Actual Malice"
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361-
Learned Hand.] 362
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present Freedom of expression and libel
danger. They both emphasize the circumstances of the speech,
but this latter test consider the weighing of values. Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel is
the most common form of subsequent punishment. Although
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees one cannot be prevented from saying something before he
of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or actually says it, one can be held liable for what one has said if
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, it causes damage to the rights of others.
except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or
produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).] (1988)
The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for
words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of such libel against the petitioners, who were the publisher and
utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test for columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following
being top dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may, statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The
when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you
inciting to sedition. recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid
under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the first
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit a
the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss the complaint.
and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.
[American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383 cited HELD: xxx
in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] (3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that
he could not be held liable for libel bec. of the privileged
The test applied when two legitimate values not character of the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a
involving national secuirty crimes compete. Involves an trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial
appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec) court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the press
question of balancing the freedom of expression of the freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
producer and the right to privacy of Enrile. point. VV.
(not in VV's revised outline) Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
outright unless made in bad faith
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly committed by important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the press reporters and editors usually have to race to their
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
But the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice
charges of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors of words.
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against .
the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today published a news item
based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the basis of Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
an action for libel brought against petitioner and his clients.
Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied. F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a
telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the
law, the charge is defective. The letter constitutes privileged Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that
communication. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He filed a
lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He motion to dismiss on the ground that his communication was
could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to privileged, but his motion was denied. He filed another motion
expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was which was also denied. Thus, this petition for certiorari,
addressed to the official who had authority over them and mandamus and prohibition in the SC.
could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by
addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for the news forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to the
report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of whether
citizen without known ties to newspaper, could have by or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of
himself caused the publication. It does not appear either that free speech and free press. However, Justice Malcolm in US v.
the report was paid for like an advertisement. At any rate, the Bustos was careful to point out that qualified privilege and this
news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, is one instance may be "lost by proof of malice." What casts
made in good faith and without comments or remarks. VV. doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis
private respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had
pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides
of petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance to
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the prove malice.
publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of Newsweek of the
article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy
Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed them as
exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous since
it did not single any particular individual. The trial court F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a
denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for certiorari book written by Rodriguez. xxx Nelly Amane who was a
in the IAC which was dismissed. Thus, this appeal to the SC. half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that
it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life,
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de
at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so Gonzales, and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend.
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister and
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and
individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the producing the pictures," in consideration of P20,000.
action separately if need be. The disputed portion which refers Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay the balance
to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. The news report agreed upon, he was sued. Judgement was rendered against
merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner
a special police unit brought into the area by Sola, the mayor. appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into
Hence, the report referring as it does to an official act is within the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in
the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional the showing of the movie and the relatives of Padilla did not
guarantees of free speech and press. VV. have a property right in the life of M. Padilla since Padilla was
a public figure.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in
the Visayas" did not specify any individual, it cannot be HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a
libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific or at least public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
sweeping as to apply to all members of a group, in order to be right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to
deemed libelous. disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how a public
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970) figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-life story of
The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would be a drab story of
inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan Islands, torture and brutality.
claiming of murders there, so they could go and he could be Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
rescued. An erratum was published by the This Week position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however,
magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however, w/o limitations. In the particular circumstances presented and
found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since the error considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under the
in in this case could have been checked consideringing that agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be
this was a weekly magazine and not a daily. upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of private or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice. But if the
concern. [In the agreement signed by him, petitioner admitted case is not pending, such comment is a valid exercise of the
that in the picture produced, he had "exploited the life story of freedom of expression.
Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain, and other profit motives,
and (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case
immediate family, and (had) in fact included, in the
PICTURE's case, persons portraying some of MOISES Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected
PADILLA's kin..."] speech.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988 demonstration where he burned an American flag while
protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in threatened with injury, although several witnesses were
the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was
the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a
EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of, among
right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would other things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in a
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference persons likely to observe or discover the act. A state court of
whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari. appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
reversed, holding that the desecration statute as applied
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the
to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because the statute
involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes as it related
speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not adequately supported
preferred character of speech and of expression, a weighty by the state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of
presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. unity.
The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the
movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not unconstitutional
relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no
more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1)
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of
may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed communication to implicate the First Amendment, given that
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its this flag burning was the culmination of a political
presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless demonstration and that the state conceded that the protester's
disregard of truth. conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest in preventing
breaches of the peace was not implicated on the record in this
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or
revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use threatened to occur because of the flag burning, (b) it cannot
of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to be presumed that an audience which takes serious offense at a
enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace,
and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by and (c) the flag burning does not fall within the small class of
the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior "fighting words" that are likely to provoke the average person
restraint, which is no better if imposed by the courts than if to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace; and (3)
imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials. the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity does not justify the
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction on expression is
his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or content-based, and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny,
altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at
life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both circumstances, but only against impairments that would cause
the public and private lives of Moises Padilla. serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers
from being offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice activity, and (b) although the state has a legitimate interest in
(contempt of court) encouraging proper treatment of the flag, it may not foster its
own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990 relating to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning
the flag as a means of political protest.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
f. Movies Censorship
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium, it
sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee complaining has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant
about the delay in the disposition of the agrarian case, was reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers which are
lifted by the SC. It held that although such a letter should read by people separated by walls.
have been sent to the SC and not the PAC, it was nevertheless
a valid exercise of speech which did not significantly destroy,
the orderly administration of justice. Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939) F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa
Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
A person can be held liable for making comments on a Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were
pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to impair made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner
brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of was denied due process because no hearing was held and no
expression. proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure.
However, before the Court could promulgate its decision the
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground
the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic that it had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that
impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the the National Telecommunications Commission had expressed
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule its willingness to grant the requisite license.
and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However, for
against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative bodies,
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid
legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a
discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of
before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of
abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print media.
erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have
like lesbians. VV. a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3)
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4)
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all
Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the clauses of the Constitution.
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior h. Freedom of Information
restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a
deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to
substantive evil against national security or public morals or information on matters of public concern shall be
other public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
classify. and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as
But a different standard must be followed in television basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
medium on people who watch its programs without having to
pay anything. Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is Access of official records (the docket book) for any
not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report on
contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the peace and order situation of the municipality) is
the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for custodian of the records.
subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a
narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that
the abuse was grave. Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
Tests of obscenity:
(1) Whether the average person, applying D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by government; if it furthers an important or substantial
the applicable law. governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (Miller v. restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than
California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.) is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [US v. O'brien,
391 US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207
g. Radio Broadcast SCRA 712 (1992)]
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the 1. Regulation of political campaign
SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of the
freedom of expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy the National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang
Tibay v. CIR. F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media
which were prevented from selling and donating space or air
But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers time for political advertisements under RA 6646.
because it could invade the privacy of everyone for no fee, and
it is such that one is likely to listen to what is being said. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by
(1985) the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f
F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent media of communication and information. The fundamental
government officials to allow the reopening of Radio Station purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity, time,
DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and
to incite the people to sedition. The petitioner contended that it reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities,
in connection with "public information campaigns and forums heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger
among candidates." exists, then he can deny the application.
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The The applicant can then go to any court other than the
limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the
with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the
and television time that the resources of the financially applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment becomes
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. final and executory immediately, and no appeal can be taken
by the local authorities anymore.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant,
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC.
Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or During the rally, the police must be limited to
private, and limits their location or publication to authorized maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100
posting areas. meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional. a nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the
citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is no public attention of the leader of the rallyists. When trouble actually
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right away but
involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a
mobile places does not endanger any substantial government second warning. If still violence continues, only then can they
or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not fight back.
only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present
but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to If a rally does not have a permit, the police can
justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be disperse the crowd, but they cannot use violence. Penalty is
stilled. imposed only on the leaders and organizers.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by
the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an members of their duty under the law, (b) to police their own
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining
his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be peace and order.
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have
it placed on his private vehichle, the expression becomes a
statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably
else. assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the title or steets
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this for the use of the public and, time out of time have been used
case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this for purposes of assembly, communicating thought betwee
prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the citizens, and discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts.
Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be Hague v. CIO)
deprived of his property without due proocess of law.
Although under a "permit system", before one can use
2. Freedom of Assembly a public place, one must first obtain prior permit from the
proper authorities, the principle has always been that one has
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable regulation.
The validity of the permit system has been upheld by the
A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, place
of the Mayor at least, five working days before the day of the and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the
rally. licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the
groups which could use the public place and discriminate
But no permit from the mayor is required in case the others.
rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a
private property (provide with consent of the owner), and (iii) As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71,
campuses of state universities (which are left to university the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor to
authorities) issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to
the time, place, and manner of the parades socially to secure
The application must be in writing and must include: public order, convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the
(1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) date and time, Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza
place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5) Miranda on the ground that passions raised by the recent
sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a national election were still high and a rally to protest election
statement of the duties of the rallyists. anomalies could only exacerbate the matter, was overturned
by the court.
The written application is filed with the Office of the
Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the Mayor
refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for filing Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority
application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted. Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to
issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government
present danger" to public peace, order, health, etc., and he has for redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the application on
proof of this, he should not deny the application right away. the ground that passions still run high due to the recent
He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be
election, and a rally to protest election anomalies might permit unconditionally. Experience in connection with
threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of public order. present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they
pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders,
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit. breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner has
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor under manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.
the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to its
authority under the Revised Administrative Code which
pertains to the use of streets and public places, can be In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority
construed only to mean the power to regulate, which means upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the
and includes the power to control, govern, and to restrain but Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town
cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members
"prohibit." of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are opposed to
The Court quoted with approval the decision in the those of the petitioners, and whose church is very near the
American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, " a statute klosk.
requiring persons using public streets for a parade or
procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights
of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for the
procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the
and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance of the
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church
license..." which was said to be within hearing distance from the kiosk
and which might lead to any untoward incident with members
of the rival denomination.
But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v.
Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding that
everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983),
business was gravely affected because of violent incidents. It the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-
found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street
weekends to be reasonable. fronting the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that
the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained by
city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970) provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the NPD
that adequate security measures were provided by the police.
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for a
Democratic Philippines (MDP), an association of students, The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance
workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor of of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any
Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent Mayor foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva
denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time Convention that requires the host country to protect the
specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired premises and personnel of the embassy.
during the last demonstration held by them which ended in
the destruction of public and private property, loss of a few Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits
lives, injuries to a score of other persons and the closing down (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so
of schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor suggested within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act:
that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the
its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier applicant can question the denial in the lower court, which can
during the day so that it may end before dark. try questions of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be made to
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the the SC on an expedited procedure.
ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right to
freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended that the right of the J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government
for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases
necessity of securing a permit from the government and that Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from
right to use public places for that purpose. Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed this petition
because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his request to
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit hold a rally.
amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of
assembly. HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
HELD: NO. public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits,
refused the permit sought by petitioner. He has expressed prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless
willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
during certain days and time, and at a place when they would the State has a right to prevent." There can be no legal
not disrupt the normal activities of the community. objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta.
to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used Neither can there be objection to the use of the streets up to
for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring persons to secure
others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize a special license to use public streets for a procession is not
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are strictly
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty limited to the consideration of the time, place and manner and
on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for a
the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to

issue or refuse a permit. HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course of
such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic,
upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel were let loose, that is quite understandable. They would be
Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and
restriction", in order to protect the President and his family, judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a
based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence
palace were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's. excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The refusal of the
In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate
the mayor is required. However, the consent of the owner of penalty.
the place must be acquired. Notes: Note that while the permit system is not
allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in the case of
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or justification
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were for the regulation of news. The remedy in this case is
businessmen, students and employees, met on JP Laurel Street prosecution or subsequent punishment.
in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. They needed by the very nature of the expression, when people use
wore yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists, marched on the streets, they may deprive other groups which want to use the
street and shouted anti-government invectives. They were streets too. So as long as only the incidents of speech are
stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential regulated, the measure is constitutionally acceptable.
Security Command. They brought an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)
their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives
support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor
was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti- unions involved intensified the pickets they had been
government demonstration close to the residence of the conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and
President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and egress
The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be from the Court's premises. When required to show cause why
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt they should not be held in contempt of court, their lawyer
throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained in apologized and assured that the above incident would not be
their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which they repeated.
had attempted to translate the same into action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld the right to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
to expression of students who held a rally in a private those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or
university. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a the other in any case pending before it. Grievances must be
place other than the one allowed by the administration, their ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. through appropriate
suspension was condoned. petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the
courts as impartial administrators of justice. Moreover,
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried
fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a
were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and
of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the the citizenry at large.
students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time
and held it in a different place from that indicated in the 3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public
permit. They expressed in a vehement language their sector
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office
work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in to law shall not be abridged.
the SC.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic
considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the and labor right, the right to association in general is a civil-
students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the political right.
constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights of Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public
peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and strike.
of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is
out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of
views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, the SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the
youth should be taken into consideration. F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a
prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA,
alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985) illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building
preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. The Public
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to
were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28, return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA
1982. went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the
for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into individual university teacher.
an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right
appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the of each university teacher to seek and express the truth as he
employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
strike. capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual
teacher is as important as the status of the institution to which
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to he belongs and through which he disseminates learning.
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like On other hand, the internal conditions for academic
workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have
accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule de facto control of the following functions: (a) admission and
III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the examination of students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c)
Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d)
after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of allocation of income among the different categories of
employment in the Govt, including any political subdivision or expenditure. It is the business of a university to proviide that
instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
corporations with original charters, are governed by law and experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing essential freedoms of a university prevail - to determine for
changes thereof. itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers taught, and who may be admitted to study.
v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is For the above reason, mandamus is not available for
relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. the petitioner. There is no duty on the part of the School to
workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion
the right to strike? to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
Since the terms and conditions of govt. component considerations. There are standards to meet and
employment are fixed by law, govt. workers policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a privilege
cannot use the same weapons employed by rather than a right.
workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of
secured through compulsion of law. the UPCB Highshool to serve, among others, "as a laboratory
Relations bet. private employers and their and demonstration school for prospective teachers - provided
employees rest on an essentially voluntary that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." However, the Dept of
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the
of wage laws and other labor and welfare BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the
legislation, the terms and conditions of conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS Foundation Inc.
employment in the unionized private sector sought to restrain the University from phasing out the
are settled through the process of collective UPCBHS.
bargaining. In govt employment, however,
it is the legislature and, where properly ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an
given delegated power, the administrative institution of higher learning such as the UP?
heads of govt w/c fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom.
effected through statutes or administrative Private respondent invokes the right to quality education and
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through to free secondary education.
CBA's The rights invoked by private respondent may be
asserted only as against the Government through the DECS.
E. Academic Freedom UP was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary
education. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975) to provide for secondary education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was established
readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A. program because they subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing on such
felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic grounds.
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the Charo.
progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest (of
the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more compatible
with her orientation. Garcia assailled her expulsion for being UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
unreasonable; that the reasons given therefor were invalid for
nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the
of the school's regulations and grave misconduct. Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages and
declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find
mandamus to readmit petitioner. and made a proposition in various conferences attended by
them that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by Tasadays.
institutions of higher learning of the right to academic UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the
freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives respondents as faculty members for acts and utterances made
and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court denied
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy Hence this petition.
certainly extending to the choice of the students.
The collective liberty of an organization is by no RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
means the same thing as the freedom of the individual "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic
members within it. In considering the problems of academic community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin
to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of the
which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. Non- Establishment clause.
The complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity
and honor. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to make
pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To F: The respondent Board of Education upon the
be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may recommendation of the State Board of Regents, directed the
find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the School's District principal to cause the recitation in public
field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its
proper role and function is the determination of legal issues. observance on the part of the students was voluntary.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by
using its public school system to encourage the recitation of
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent
establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious govt officials as part of a governmental program to further
profession and worship, without discrimination or religious beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against laws
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall respecting an establishment of religion means at least that it is
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. not part of the business of the government to compose official
prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program
A. Non-Establishment Clause carried on by the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws
The clause prohibits excessive government respecting an establishment of religion and abridging the free
entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain instances,
[Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 forbids two diff kinds of governmental encroachment upon
(1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., religious freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the free
concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburg ACLU, exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
492 US 574 (1989).] governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion, whether or not those
The clause prohibits the State from establishing a laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals. It
religion. In assessing the validity of the law, the questions to rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to
be asked are: destroy govt and to degrade religion, and upon an awareness
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it secular? of the historical fact that governmentally established religion
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion? and religious persecutions go hand in hand.
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive
entaglement between the State and religious matters in In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203
religion? (1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from
the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to the
The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the Non- Establishment clause.
State gives any manifest support to any one religion, even if
nothing is done against the individual. Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions, The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated
for there may be atheists who are not so favored. by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of
Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory
1. Operation of sectarian schools authority requiring the reading without comment, at the
opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the
While the ownership, creation and management of recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The
educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or students and parents may refuse to participate in the school
60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian schools and those exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the
run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from curricular activities of students who are required by law to
these requirements, provided the administration is in the hands attend school and held in school buildings under the
of Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).] supervision and participation of teachers employed in those
schools.
2. Religious instruction in public schools RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated.
The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing
official support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and
Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents the free exercise clause guarantees the right of every person to
and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely freely choose his own course with reference to religious
possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are training, teaching and observance, free from any compulsion
costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary from the State.
and secondary schools during class hours, by one approved by The test in determining whether a legislative enactment
the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is allowed. violates the Establishment clause which withdraws all
[Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated in the legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression
school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).] thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the
enactment. If either is the advancement or inhibition of
3. Anti-evolution laws religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. To
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must
held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose neither advances nor inhibits religion.
religions finds the theory offensive. The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so where the State's
4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools recognition of the pervading religious character of the exercise
is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from
disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer a recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the
exercises, none of those factors being consistent with the

contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of the Phil. Ind.
non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the Church, sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from
teaching of secular subjects. issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued the
5. Tax exemption stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which appropriates
public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of the
Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the stamps was
(3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or done in violation of the Constitutional provision that no public
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit money or property shall be appropriated for the use, benefit or
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements, support of any sect or religion.
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable.
taxation.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in
view. What it gave the Director of Posts was the discretionary
The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial power to determine when the issuance of special postage
Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now that stamps would be advantageous to the government.
the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively" used The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise the
for religious purposes to be exempt. Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
If not for religious purposes, educational purposes. considered of international importance to give publicity to the
country and its people. The stamp contained a map of the
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 Philippines and the location of Manila, and an inscription as
(1927) follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade."
What was emphasized was not the event but Manila.
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to be
represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the owner and inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church
the south siide is a part of the church yard, the convent and an was merely incidental and was not the aim and purpose of the
adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. In the center is the government.
remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north side
is an old cemetery and the base of what was once a tower. The In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion of
Prov. Board imposed a tax on the whole land. Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved the
application for a permit not so much because he was afraid
ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal. that breach of peace would ensue but because he wrongly
though the kiosk should be used for public purposes only and
RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land tax not for religious purposes. When the Jehovah's Witness
mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious entities members use the public squares, they are no different from
refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who use the street: that
and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his they are performing religious acts is only incidental. So long
duties. It therefore must include not only the land actually as the use of public property is only incidentalally and
occupied by the church but also the adjacent ground destined temporarilly for religious purposes and so long as the use is
for the ordinary incidental uses of man. such as to be reasonably compatible with the use to which
Except in large cities where the density of the other members of the community are similarly entitled, then
population and the development of commerce require the use the non-establishment clause is not violated. The tests then
of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden are (1) Is the use of the public facility compatible with
belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is general use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious group
limited to the necessities of the priest. Therefore, which only incidental.
comes under the tax exemption.
As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while it B. Free Exercise Clause
is no longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial
purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a 1. Flag Salute
lodging house by the people who participate in religious
festivities. The same constitutes an incidental use in religious Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu, 219
functions. It also comes within the exemption. SCRA 256 (1993)
6. Public aid to religion Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the

flag.
The payment or use of public money or property for
any religious institution or clergy is not allowed; except in F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled from
those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
the AFP, penal institution, government orphanage, or refusing to salute the flag, since the national anthem and recite
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)] the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept.
Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the SC ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
held that the stamp printed by the government showing the
map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a religious
International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did not sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from
violate the Non-Establishment clause because its main school (both private and public), for refusing, on account of
purpose, was to call the world's attention to Manila as the site their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
of an international congress, and whatever benefit it gave the includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil. National
Catholic Church was only incidental. Anthem, saluting the Phil. flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
HELD: NO.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag,
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937) sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotice pledge,
during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance.
job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience Plaintiff protested against this requirement as constituting a
of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on restraint upon the exercise of religion. It claimed that it is not
the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech engaged in business which necessitates the securing of a
and the free exercise of religious profession and worship. license as it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles.
xxx
xxx Forcing a small religious group, through the iron ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their is unconstutional for being in restraint of petitioner's right to
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country free exercise of religion.
or respect for duly constituted authorities.
xxx HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can
on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave tax the exercise of religious practice can make its exercise so
and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
a serious evil to public safety, moral, health or any other maintenance. It is true that the price asked for the religious
legitimate public interest, that the state has a right and duty to articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual
prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was
of the pets. from the schools is not justified. engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
xxx "merchandise" for profit. The mark up can only be treated as
Although petitioners do not participate in the contributions by the faithfuls to the religious cause. The
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff society, for in so
or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in doing, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
exercising their love of country through the observance of the religious profession and worship, as well as its right to
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the disseminate religious beliefs.
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. As there is 3. Exemtion from union shop
no disruption, expulsion is unwarranted.
However, if they should commit breaches of peace by Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
action that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, (1974)
of other persons, the school authorities have the power to
discipline them. F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde
Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the respondent labor
union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a
Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624 member prohibits union membership. As the union demanded
(1943) his dismissal from employment pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, Victoriano brought this action for injunction. The
F: The State Board required public school pupils to salute CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the closed-shop
the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of contracts members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation
allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of of their members in any labor organization. The union
both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful appealed.
absence. Appellees, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
consider the flag as a graven image which they are forbidden HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association.
to salute under their religious beliefs. The State asserts the It does not impair the obligation of contracts for not only are
power to condition access to public education. existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation
of the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid. sovereign power is also read into such contracts. Neither does
the law constitute an establishment of religion. It has been
RULING: NO. held that in order to withstand objections based on this ground,
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is a form of the statute musr have a secular purpose and that purpose must
utterance. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an attitude not directly advance or diminish the interest of any religion.
of mind. It is now a commonplace that censorship or Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the burden
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the imposed by union security agreements.
Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to 4. Disqualification from local government office
prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is invoked
without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would
justify an effort even to muffle expression. F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are required Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on the
to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to
him to utter what is not in his mind. a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or
with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed
organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.
patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of
a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices
appeal of our institutions to free minds. held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice Fernando
held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise
2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. III of the
1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957) had been repealed by the Election Code. Five justices held
that section 2175 is constitutional.
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of
bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila
informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
general merchandise without securing the necessary license
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of

changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga came

to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the
issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the
first case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became moot and
academic. The present petition is likewise moot and academic.
In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor General, it was
stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been
granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that this Court
may be faced again with the same situation, it is desirable that
respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the
utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens
desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could
be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The freedom to
travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760

(1989)
F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the

Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to
enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. The case for petitioners is
founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of
the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and right to
travel. Respondents argue the primacy of the right of the State
to national security over individual rights.
RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to

travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return
to one's country, a totally distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is the Court's well considered view that the right to return may
be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl.
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against being
arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed
to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that
is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of
the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be granted
or not.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES

a. There must be a hearing, where a party may

For these reasons, the owner of the property

ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth

Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Angeles, issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of

area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of

initially for the SC. It is basically one for the executive

4. Wire Tapping In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC,

of communication and therefore argues that the same should

Espiritu v. Lim. As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/

VII Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as

Rights in Custodial Interrogation a) to refuse to be a witness;

Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule,

HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged

1. When right may be invoked

(2) Public Trial One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate

Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970) 6. Right to confront witness

Ruling: NO There are various means available to the parties to

Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has

Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be

complainant in said investigation without his consent and

Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra.

When the privilege is violated by the court itself, that

Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over

F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this

ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.

Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123 (1986),

F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas

When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison, the HELD: NO

1. Involuntary servitude People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)

HELD: YES ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy.

3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of tortures

We consider this case against the background of a

HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the

F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political

the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to

exercises, none of those factors being consistent with the

6. Public aid to religion Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the

Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of

Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)

This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga came

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760

F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the

RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to

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