PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. vs.

HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 granting private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal
and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by
petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe
enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of September 25, 1985 this Court as prayed for, without
necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing the order complaint of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a
sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During
the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial
Corporation upon the posting of a superseded bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of
P1,400, 000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12% interest per annum from the
date of default until fully paid;

2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;

3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for
execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varian was required to file its
comment but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending
appeal as prayed for. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the
previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent
Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. In compliance
with the Resolution of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. In the
Resolution of September 12, 1985, the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action.

It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsideration of the
questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion for reconsideration has been
considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has been held further that a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and the need for
relief was extremely urgent. 11

The counterbond provides:

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was issued against abovenamed Defendant;

WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of attachment issued against
them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5,
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and the PHILIPPINE
BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order
of attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS
ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the
condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver
the attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the payment of the
judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of
the property released.

EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing the order shall without delay attach, to await
judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the
province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives a
counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an
amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of
any judgement ment which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the
applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the
province.

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an order of attachment has
been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon
reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in
which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The
judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the
judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the
filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon
the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the
proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond
aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be,
or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching
creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of
this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay
to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered
from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the
payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule
it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of
the judgment shall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as
provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third
paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither
the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed,
it is specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only
logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied
maybe charged against such a counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general
words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other
so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it
and without regard to consequences.

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Thus where a statute
grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
residential, or mineral.Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any
exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be
interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.
All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in the case of
Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart,

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the counterbond, it is
necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability
for the judgment under his counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on
September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April
28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).

Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated
April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

II

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer
of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices
of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the
statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.

Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which
the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or
registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to
comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC
promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral
Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:

Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five
(5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of
the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in
writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them
to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the
elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the
statement required within the period prescribed by law.

(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which
the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and
should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be
made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).

In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No.
2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."

Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a
statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public
policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v.
Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of
the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and
expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and
expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94;
Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg.
881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are
authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution
No. 2348, Sec. 8).

Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the
United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of
statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes
also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are
designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such
publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur
2d, Elections § 289). These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates
by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor
[Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270
Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have
received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and
is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that
"[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending
obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."

Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

CECILIO S. DE VILLA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B.
Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed
as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors
Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount
of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no
sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said
accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss
the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation
created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin
and Currency).
On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:

Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in
the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though
drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn
against current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court in its order
dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:

Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied
for lack of merit.1âwphi1

The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency
(Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila
City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A",
Decision, pp. 20-22).

A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and
September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:

(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank,
respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar
accounts;

(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction between petitioner
and private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No.
529; and

(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable
with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor
of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. ( Rollo,
Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).

On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 ( Rollo,
Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo,
Annex "B", p. 26).

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.

The petition is without merit.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and
deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).

Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the
action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).

The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes
an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed
or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167
SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the
information."

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro
Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a
complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the
case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the
place of the issuance of the check."

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of
People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4
dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:

(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the
check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The Law
on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12,
October-December, 1983, p. 14).

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private
respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a
foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court
correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in
the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150
SCRA 520 [1987]).

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning
put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City
of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law
to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa
fully sustains this view, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check
may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar
checks, checks, in our currency, and many others.

THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.

MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.