Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

Schmid Korea Problem

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 27

Colonialism and the `Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review

Article
Author(s): Andre Schmid
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Nov., 2000), pp. 951-976
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659218 .
Accessed: 08/01/2014 14:16

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Asian Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Colonialismand the 'Korea
Problem'in the Historiography
ofModernJapan:
A ReviewArticle
ANDRE SCHMID

BYTHE TIME EMPEROR MEIJIdied in 1912, mournedas thefirst "modern"emperor,


Japan had alreadyacquired a sizeable colonial realm. Two yearsearlier,Japanese
newspapersand magazineshad celebratedthe annexationof Korea, congratulating
themselveson living in an empirethatwas now 15 millionpeople morepopulous
and almosta thirdlargerthan it had been priorto annexation.For journalistsand
politiciansat the time,the phrase"Chosenmondai"(the Chosenquestion)servedas
a euphemismforthe panoplyof issues relatingto Japaneseinterestsin the Korean
peninsula.Yet despitethis contemporary recognitionof the significanceof empire,
English-language studiesofJapanhavebeenslowto interweave thecolonialexperience
intothehistoryofmodernJapan.Today,formodernhistorians, thequestionofhow,
or even whether,to incorporatethese eventsinto the historyof Japan is itselfa
quandary-what might be termed the "Korea problem" in modern Japanese
historiography.
This paperaskswhetherthehistoryofmodernJapan,especiallytheMeiji period,
can be rightlyisolatedas "island history"or whetherit should be contextualized
withinJapan'sdeepeningcolonialengagements.I arguethatalthoughthelatteroffers
a morecomprehensive history,English-languagehistorieshave tendedto emphasize
a formof nation-centered historyat the expenseof thoseforcestranscendent to the
nation,especiallywhen those forceshave derivedfromAsia. One consequencehas
been that the relationshipwith the colonies,in particularKorea, has been largely
writtenout ofJapanesehistory. When raised,the"Chosenmondai"has beenrelegated
to a foreignhistory,usuallyviewed as part of the evolutionof empireas narrated
throughtheacquisitionofcolonialholdings.Yet, it is thedynamismofJapanthatis
highlightedin such narratives;the centrifugal forcesof empireunderscoredas the
centripetalforcesare glossedover.As can be seen in some of themajorworkson the

Andre Schmid is an AssistantProfessorin the Departmentof East Asian Studies,Uni-


versityofToronto.
This paper has greatlybenefitedfromcommentsby Kim Brandt,JohnBrownlee,Eric
Cazdyn,Michael Donnelly,Alexis Dudden, HenryEm, JaHyunKim Haboush, KyungMoon
Hwang, Koichi Okamoto,SarahThal, Bob Wakabayashi,MargheritaZanasi, and one anon-
ymousreviewer.

TheJournalofAsian Studies59, no. 4 (November2000):951-976.


(? 2000 by the AssociationforAsian Studies,Inc.

951

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
952 ANDRE SCHMID

Meiji period,muchoftheliteratureis markedby a top-down,metrocentric approach


thatrenderscolonialhistorytangentialto themain narrativesofthemodernJapanese
nationand, in some instances,comes precariouslyclose to reproducingversionsof
Japanesecolonialdiscourse.Howcolonialhistoryis written,therefore,
is justas critical
as ensuringthatthe colonialexperiencebe integratedinto modernJapanesehistory.
Morerecentstudies,joiningin a widereffortinitiatedbyscholarsofEuropeanempires,
have begun to offera more variedaccountof the manyrelationshipsbetweenthe
islandsand thepeninsula.As theseworksarebeginningto show,attentionto colonial
historyoffersa means of challengingthe bounds of Japanesenationalhistoryand
suggeststhatmanyfeaturesofJapan'smodernsenseof self,includingthewritingof
nationalhistory,
weredevelopedin relationto its colonies.

Islands Versus Empire

Over the last two decadesone of the mostproductiveareasof studyin European


historyhas been colonial history.Ever since the publication of Edward Said's
Orientalism in 1978, an evergrowingnumberof researchers-betheychampionsof
Said's thesisor not-have been challengingconventional approachesto thehistoryof
Europe's relationswith its empires,posing questionsabout an earliergeneration's
willingnessto considerEurope as a historicalsubject insulatedfromits colonies.
Instead,a new visionof Europe as a continentthatacrossa wide spectrumof areas
was deeplyentwinedwithits colonieshas emerged.'This push has been undertaken
by a wide range of scholarswith oftenstartlinglydifferent agendas, making the
debatesquite cantankerous and leavingbattlescarsall around.Historiansemploying
a postcolonialapproachhavegainedthemostpublicity-and earnedthemostjeers-
forbringingdiscourseanalysisand questionsof representation to bearon a fieldthat
conventionallyhad been devoted to the political, economic, and institutional
frameworksof colonial rule.2 Other historians,sometimes using less radical
methodologies and lessheatedrhetoric,havebegunto writesocialand genderhistories
of empire.3The insightsofanthropologists haveoftenbeen crucialto thesehistorical
reevaluations.4 Still othershave soughtto findpointsof commonalityamong these
contendinggroupsthathaveoftentendedto speakpast each other.5
In the case of Britishhistory,wheresome of the mostfar-reaching researchhas
been conducted,thesetrendshave led one scholarto characterize traditionalBritish
Imperialhistoryas a "Humpty-Dumpty"thathas fallen(Fieldhouse1984). Justhow
farit has plungedand who gave themostdecisivepush remainsa questionofdebate,
yet for many scholars,though by no means all, the new researchhas led to a
reconsideration ofthewayBritishhistoryis to be written.It has beenshownthatthe
most quintessentialof Britishpastimes,high tea, dependedon the complexlabor,
financing, and productionstrategies oftheimperialplantationeconomy(Mintz 1985);

1Forone ofthemostsweepingtreatments ofthisliterature,


see theintroductionin Cooper
and Stoler 1997. For two otherusefulcollectionsrepresentative of the varietyof theseap-
proaches,see Dirks 1992 and Prakash1995.
2Forone reviewof this literature,
see Kennedy1996.
3Forone discussionof recentworkon womenand empire,see Buzard 1993.
4See Cohn 1996 and the collaborativeworkof Cooperand Stoler1997.
5Fortwo articlesusing the workof David Fieldhouseas a startingpoint,see Howe 1998
and Darby 1998; fora morepostcolonialperspective, see Kennedy1998.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 953

thatBritishdietarypatternsand senseofstyleweretransformed by colonialproducts


(Walvin 1997); thatattitudestowardsBritishimperialactivitiesshapedthepolitical
and culturallifeof eventhe mostremoteprovincialtownsin the eighteenthcentury
(Wilson 1995); thatwomeneitherin thefeministmovementat homeor travelingin
the colonies servedto supportimperialideologies (Burton 1994; Chaudhuriand
Strobel1992); and thatBritishself-conceptions ofrace,class,and genderwereformed
throughvariousrelationships withthecolonies(McClintock1995). All theseareas-
and manymore-of what had earlierbeen seen as separateaspectsof the historyof
Britainhavebeenshownto havebeenanythingbut isolatedfromcomplexinteractions
with the empire.6As BernardCohn has most forcefully argued,the "metropoleand
colonyhave to be seen in a unitaryfieldof analysis"(1996, 4).
The state of affairsin English-languagestudiesof the JapaneseEmpire is, of
course,quite different.A fieldin its infancy,the studyofJapanesecolonialhistory
has certainlynot developed an equivalentbody of scholarshipmeritingthe label
"Humpty-Dumpty."Part of the task is simplyto get broaderquestionsof empire
onto the agenda of historiansof modernJapan. Marius Jansen,despite his earlier
importantworkon JapanesePan-Asianistsin China (1954), could writeas late as
1984, "imperialismneverbecame a veryimportantpart of nationalconsciousness"
(76). More recently,in the 1997 New Directions in theStudyofMeijiJapan, Helen
Hardacrein herintroduction to the volume'smorethanfifty essays-what she calls
a "collectiveassault on the entiretyof Meiji Japan" (xvii)-repeatedly notes the
importance ofthecoloniesand colonialsubjectsin thisperiod.Yet fewofthehistorical
papersin thevolumeactuallypursuethisline of inquiry.The openingessays,which
ask, "What is Meiji?" and "What was Meiji?" pursue a multitudeof fascinating
avenues,but again the factthatMeiji Japanwas a colonialpower is barelyraised.7
Work in otherfieldswill certainlynotprovideanswersforquestionsposed about the
Japaneseempire,but as the centralityof the colonizing experienceforJapanese
modernity gains moreconsideration, thepathsfollowedby colleaguesin otherfields
may point in some generaldirectionsforwritinga morediversehistoryof modern
Japan,witha fulleraccountingof theplace of empire.In particular,the attemptsby
historiansto bridgethe divisionbetweena foreignhistoryof the coloniesand an
internalhistoryof Europeand its constitutive nation-statesare mostsuggestive.
Historians of Japan, like their counterpartsin other fields, have devoted
considerableenergy in recent years to calling into question many nationalist
understandings thathavecontinuedto resonatein studiesoftheJapanesepast.Work
in areas as diverseas social ideologies(Gluck 1985), the emperorsystem(Fujitani
1996) and the inventionof tradition(Vlastos 1998), to name just a few, has
highlightedthepowerofnationalismto createa formofhistoryand memorythathas
servedto naturalizeand denythehistoricity ofthenation.Such trends,however,have
generallynotyetbeen carriedoverto the nation'srelationship to its colonialempire,
in particularto challengethecommonassumptionthatJapan'smoderndevelopment
remainedinsulatedfrominteractions thatwiththe coloniesthatwereconstitutive of
the nationitself.Indeed,in studiesofJapanesehistorythe storiesof the islandsand

60f course,an even more restrictiveview has focusedon England ratherthan Britain,
makingan interesting comparisonwiththe issuesofHokkaido and Okinawa. For the issueof
"littleEnglandism,"see Samuel 1989.
exceptionto this is the essayby Seung-MiHan (Hardacre 1997, 688-
7One significant
701). In heroverviewofthevolume,Carol Gluck makesa relatedpointthatnotenoughAsian
viewsof Meiji have been included(1997, 27).

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
954 ANDRE SCHMID

thecoloniesgenerallyfollowtwodistinctplot lines,reproducing thedivisionbetween


home and abroad capturedin the colonial phrasesnaichi(internallands or Japan
proper)and gaichi(externallands or outlyingcolonies).8This is a styleof nation-
centeredhistory, whereas theprimarysubjectof the studyof thepast, the nationis
neatly separatedfrom the colonies and seen as developing independently.The
transnationalprocessesinherentto empire are truncated,reinforcing assumptions
about nationalsubjectivity and ensuringthathistoryremainsin serviceto thenation.
Authoritative historiessuch as the Cambridge HistoryofJapan reflecthow this
separationhas becomeone of the fundamentalorientationsof the modernJapanese
historyfield(Duus 1988). In the twentieth-century volume, the islands and the
coloniesare compartmentalized into formalchapterdivisionsin whicha "Domestic
Politics"is juxtaposedto an "ExternalRelations."This organizationmaynotin itself
presenta problem,but what is remarkableis the degreeof impermeability between
these sections.There is no discussionof the largestcolony,Korea, outside of the
chapterson foreignaffairs-thisdespitethe increasingly interlinkedeconomies,the
headline-grabbing Japaneseinvolvement in thepeninsula,theroleofJapan'scolonies
in its relationswithWesternpowers,the substantialemigrationto Korea, the issue
ofthecoloniesin thearticulation ofthelimitsofliberalthought,and theveryobvious
factthat Korea, as an annexedterritory, was arguablynot part ofJapan's"external
relations"at all. The forceof such historysplitsthe narrativeof modernJapaninto
two solitudes-the first,a domestic historyuntaintedby interactionswith the
continent,and the second,a historyof the coloniespenetratedby the forcesof the
metropole.Such an organizationofhistoryprecludesthepossibilityofexploringhow
these two storylines were part of the same historicalprocessesand how Japanese
modernity (as well as narrativesofthatmodernity) emergedfromtheseengagements.
Historyremainsharnessedto the nationand, in turn,preservesthe self-justifying
claim of the nationto an independentsubjectivitythatwas so essentialto colonial
ideology.
Monographicstudieson theMeiji period,whetherfocusingon domesticorforeign
history, havein particularbeeninformed bythisseparation.In one ofthelastdecade's
mosthighlyacclaimedbookson theMeiji period,Japan's ModernMyths(1985), there
are indeed glimpses of empire in the ideological realm which Carol Gluck so
engaginglyportrays. Beginningwiththepromulgation oftheconstitution and ending
withthehighlypublicizedfuneraloftheMeiji emperor, Gluck'streatment ofideology
coverssuch topics as the creationof a modernmonarchy,the growingromantic
attachment to an increasingly disappearingrurallife,thepromotionofself-helpideas,
and the gloryof the "nationalpolity"(kokutai),to name just a few.Notable forits
textureduse of abundanthistoricalsources,Japan's ModernMythsshows ideology
functioning in placesbeyondtheusual ideologicalredoubtssuchas thegrandspeeches
made by leading officers of the state. Instead,the workingsof ideologyare just as
likelyto be locatedin the minutiaeof everydaysocial life,whetherin the formation
of local punctualityassociations(184) or the proliferation of "get-rich-quick market
fevers"(161). Such a perspectivemakesformorethanjust an entertaining read,for
as Gluck argues,the creationof ideologyin the late Meiji periodwas not merelya
top-downcreationof ambitiousoligarchseager to engineersocietyaccordingto a
prescribedvision.It was insteada "fitfuland inconsistent process"(4), a "trial-and-

81tis importantto note that even the boundariesbetweenthesetwo shiftedovertime,


in relationto Okinawa and Hokkaido.
particularly

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 955

erroraffair"(4), which involveda wide rangeof social actorssuch that therewere


alwaysa multiplicityof ideologicalformations identifiablefromthe "concreteand
particularsocial history"(8) of theperiod.
Yet despitethe rangeof subjectscoveredand the depthof materialsused, there
is a gaping rentin Gluck's otherwiserichtapestry.This is ideologywithoutempire.
Gluck gives us not an emperorwithoutclothes-we learn,afterall, that Emperor
Meiji delightedin wearingstrikinggeneralissimooutfits-but an emperorshornof
his empire.This is ideologyshapedby bunmei kaika,Japaneseversionsof"civilization
and enlightenment," but Gluck's portrayalof the uses of bunmeikaika, whether
manifestin the construction of rail lines or in the dancesheld fordiplomatsin the
Rokumeikan (CrystalPalace), is again articulatedwithoutempire.Ideologyherefaces
two directions:inward,as a way of rethinkingsociety,and towardthe West, as a
meansofrenegotiating the unequal treatiesand achievingequalitywiththepowers.
This gaze to the West has fascinatedforeignscholarsofJapansince the earliest
historicalresearchon modernJapan. Indeed, going back at least as faras George
Sansom'smagisterialThe Western WorldandJapan (1950), it is no exaggerationto
notethatthedialogicprocessesinvolvedinJapan'smodernpolitical,economic,social,
and intellectualhistoryhave been seen as being almostexclusivelyengagedwiththe
West. The metanarrative of modernJapan,fromthe timeof Perry'sarrivalin Tokyo
throughthe Meiji Restorationand up until the Second World War, has tracedthe
various"turnsto" and "revoltsagainst"the West. Suggestiveof the inextricability
and power of Eurocentricnarratives,the West remainsthe sole locus of external
change,progress,and influence, a styleofmetanarrative thathas generallymeantthe
eclipseof Asia. With fewexceptions,most notablythe workofJoshuaFogel whose
writingsrangingfromintellectualbiographiesofprominent Chinahistorians to travel
writingon China has raised some of these issues (1984, 1989, 1995, 1996), the
significance of Asia during the Meiji period has been neglected.Yet during this
period,with the takeoverof Taiwan in 1895 and the annexationof Korea in 1910,
Japanemergedas a significant playerin thecolonizingcontestin Asia. Gluck'sstudy
ofideologyin theMeiji periodis one ofthemostmasterful examinations ofthis"turn
to theWest" yet,like herpredecessors, she leavesout thegrowingcentripetalforces
of empirein hertreatment of theperiod.The mythsof modernJapancan indeedbe
foundin the social feversof urban dwellers,yet missingfromthis accountis the
growinghold of anotherset of modernmyths-those moderncolonizingmyths-
overthe imaginationof a populationmobilizedin supportof empire.
To be sure,Japan'sModernMythsdoes not suggestthat Meiji Japan stood in
"splendid isolation"fromcontinentalAsia. Yet the connectionsGluck draws are
limitedto the warswith China and Russia. In the firstwar,China servedas a kind
of "ideologicalmirror"forJapan to redefineitself.Both officialand public writers
vilifiedChina as an "enemyof civilization,"referring to it derogativelyas "pigtail
land." The consequence,as Gluck argues, was that this war "enhancednational
confidence and prideofempireat theexpenseofan age-oldrespectforChina" (1985,
135-36). Gluck concludesthat by the end of the Russo-Japanese war the imperial
imagewas at its"fullmeridian,"fornowtheemperorwas notjusta symbolofprogress
but one of empire(90). With thisoblique reference to the takeoverof Taiwan after
the Sino-Japanese war and theprotectorate statusimposedon Korea afterthe Russo-
Japanese War, Gluck ends any explicit discussion of empire. But these wars
represented onlythe initialstepsin buildinga colonialempire.Possessionof Korea
and Taiwan now entailedadministeringa vastlyexpandedstretchof territory and

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
956 ANDRE SCHMID

mobilizinga newpopulation-a taskthatwas to stretchthintheideologicalresources


of bothpublic and privateJapaneseinstitutions.
Nonetheless,the colonial presence in Japan's ModernMythsis irrepressible.
Insinuated throughoutGluck's wide-rangingsource material is the consistent
appearance,howeverunremarkedupon by the author,of materialswith colonial
content.Songswerewrittenwithtitleslike "The FutureofAsia," withlineswistfully
speakingofthejoyofseeingtheJapaneseflag"waveo'ertheHimalayas"(1985, 131).
In the fourmillion copies of his officiallysolicited commentaryon the Imperial
Rescripton Education,Inoue Tetsujirononchalantly listeda stringof "weak" Asian
countriessuchas Korea,and wroteofa Chinathat"clingsto theclassics,"contrasting
themto the "progress"achievedin Japan(quoted in Gluck 1985, 129). At Emperor
Meiji's funeral,we get a glimpse of the empirecoming home in the presenceof
representatives oftheJapaneseresidentcommunitiesin Korea,Taiwan,and Sakhalin,
who traveledthe lengthof the empireto pay theirfinalobservancesto the monarch
underwhomtheirnewforeignhomeshad beenmadepossible(214). Buddhistmonks,
like their Christiancounterparts,began to ventureinto the colonies, sending
missionaries overseasto Korea and Taiwan (138). Ito Hirobumicould makea speech
on the twentiethanniversary of the promulgationof the constitutionin his capacity
as one ofits chiefarchitectsin 1908, but onlyby leavinghis currentpost as resident-
generalofthecolonialstatein Korea,one yearbeforebeingassassinatedbytheKorean
patriotAn Chunggiun(146). Thus, even thoughJapan's ModernMythsdoes not
explicitlyexploretherelationship betweenMeiji ideologyandJapan'sroleas a colonial
power,the colonialquestionnevertheless sneaksinto its pages throughGluck's rich
sourcematerials-an indicationof just how difficult it is to divorcethe islandsfrom
empire.
The inattentionto the empireon the home frontthatup until the mid-1990s
has characterized thestudyof theMeiji periodhas been complementedby studieson
theempirethattendalmostexclusivelyto tracetheforcesemanatingfromtheislands.
This is a visionofcolonialhistoryas externalhistory,a historyof"over-there" beyond
the nation,whereJapaneseact and impact,shapingcolonial societiesthroughthe
policies and institutionsthat largely constitutethe subjects of this style of
investigation. This approachrestson thesameassumptionabout theinsularity ofthe
islandsthatunderpinsmuch domestichistoryofJapan.So, too, does it confirmthe
uniquely transformative power of the West, since Japanesecolonialismis seen as
possibleonlyaftertheWestern-style reformsoftheMeiji projecthavebeencompleted
at homeand thenare readyto empowerthe moveabroad.
One of the earliestefforts to take up the questionof empireboth conceptually
and empirically was thefirstvolumeofa now completedtrilogy,TheJapanese Colonial
Empire,1895-1945, editedby Ramon Myersand Mark Peattie(1984).9 The volume
brings togetherthirteenessays related to Korea, Taiwan, and the South Pacific
Islands-the earlycolonialpossessionsthattheeditorsidentify as the"formalempire."
Unlike thetwosubsequentvolumes,whichextensively treatJapan'srelationshipwith
China and the wartimeempire,the firstvolumeplaces colonial rule and strategyat
thecenterofinquiry.Manyofthecontributions revolvearoundquestionsconcerning
theoriginsand motivationsforJapaneseimperialism, theprocessofempirebuilding,
and the waysand means of colonial administration. This is the historyof imperial
policy:Why and how was Korea annexed?How werethecoloniespoliced?What was
colonialeducation?How was law deployed?What was agricultural policy?These are

9Forthe othertwo volumes,see Duus, Myers,and Peattie 1989, 1996.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 957

all significantquestionsrelatingto policy,institutions,


and infrastructure.A number
ofthearticlesexaminethereactionoflocal colonialsubjectsto theactionsundertaken
by the metropole.The essaysin this volume significantly expandedthe available
materialon the JapaneseEmpire in English, raised many new questionsforlater
scholarship, and, becauseof the fullrangeof topicsand accessibility, continueto be
widelyused in classroomsto thisday.
As spelled out most clearlyin Mark Peattie'sintroductionthat appearsin the
firstvolume,thisis foreignhistorywherethe emphasisis on thecentrifugal forcesof
empire.For Peattie the colonial effortis understoodas an "extensionof the Meiji
patternof nationaldevelopment"(1984, 43), or, as he moresweepinglyasserts,"all
thatJapanundertookin its coloniesduringthe firstquartercenturyof the empire
was based on Meiji experiencein domesticreform"(23). The visionofempireoffered
in the book is one whereinteractions betweenthe home islandsand the coloniesare
primarilyunilateral,fromthe formertowardsthe latter.Japannot only "extended"
and "undertook,"as Peattie describes,but also sought to "carryout" and "bring
about"-doing so "withvigor,confidence and determination" (24). The center,be it
Tokyo or the seat of rule in the colonyitself,emergesas virtuallythe sole locus of
agency.Writingthehistoryofempireas an outwardflowfromcenterto periphery is
a necessarypart of understandingthe Japanesecolonial enterprise, but the subject
that remainscuriouslyunbroachedin these essays is the impact of the colonial
experienceon Japanitself.
Underlyingthe approachto empirefoundin TheJapanese ColonialEmpire, 1895-
1945 is a divorce, both temporal and geographical, between the political,
socioeconomic,and ideologicalprocessesoccurringin the islandsand thoseon the
colonies.By presentingthe "Meiji experience"as havingbeenfirstconsolidated,even
completed,at homeindependentofanyinteraction withthecontinent,Peattieis able
to speakofthe"Meiji experience"in termslittledifferent fromanyothercommodity
producedduringthe period: it is readyto be exportedto the colonies.Though the
historicalperspectiveof the book does not look inward,the assumptionin this
approachis one sharedwithdomestichistoriesin thatthe "Meiji experience"is seen
as having been achieved in isolation fromrelationswith Asia. That the "Meiji
experience"itselfwas in partshaped by the islands'interactions with the continent
priorto the adventof formalcolonialismis an issue not takenup by Peattie.Tokyo
and its local seatsof colonialrule molded local societyin a unidirectionalhistorical
flowwherecolonial societies,while not quite inert,are only included in termsof
reactions,whetherfavorableor not, to the actionsof the metropole.Yet forall the
intensity and depthof the interactions describedin the volume,Japanesesocietyon
the homeislandsremainsstrangely untouchedby anycountereffects ofits experience
as a colonizer.Centripetalforcesare almostnowhereto be found.
Peattiedoes mentionone importantexception:rice (1984, 36-7). Samuel Pao-
San Ho's chapteron colonialismand development(347-99) pursuesthisissue more
fully.Ho's piece, like that of Ramon Myersand Yamada Sabur6 (420-52), traces
variouspolicies that integrateda numberof sectorsin the Korean and Taiwanese
colonial economieswith those of the home islands. Ho, however,moves beyonda
discussionofhowcolonialpolicyalteredtheeconomiclandscapeofKorea and Taiwan
to note thatthis integrationenabledthe importintoJapanof massivequantitiesof
cheap rice. As Ho makes clear,this cheap importwas a key link in the economy,
which helped prevent"the termsof tradebetweenagricultureand industry"from
shifting"adverselyforthe modernsector"(349). This encouragedmigrationfrom
ruralareas into urban factoriesand decreasedpressureson wages, which,in turn,

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
958 ANDRE SCHMID

permittedindustriesto increaseprofitsand furtherinvest in productivity.Rice


imports,by keepingthe priceof a staplefoodlow, also playedan importantrole in
preventingthetypeofsocioeconomicproblemsthateventuallyled to theurbanriots
of 1918 (349-50). Here,thecentrality ofthecoloniesto thesocioeconomic conditions
leadingto Japan'smuchlauded rapidindustrialization is manifest.The consequences
ofcolonialismimpinged,directlyor indirectly,on theeveryday lifeofJapanese farmers
and urbanworkersas well as theinvestment ofthemodernindustrialsector.
strategies
Ho's briefdiscussionof this staple in theJapanesediet demonstrates thatto ignore
the relationshipbetweenimperialistpoliciesand domesticdevelopmentsis to missa
crucialdynamicin the historyof modernJapan.Like the examplesof empirethat
slide intoJapan'sModernMyths,thecase ofricein TheJapanese ColonialEmpire, 1895-
1945 hintsat the deep interactions withthe coloniesthatto varyingdegreesshaped
the intellectual,
political,and socioeconomicdynamicsof the islands.

Modernizationand Empire

If colonial historyhas not disturbedthe bounds of nation-centered historyfor


Japan,it has also beenpresentedas thetriumphoftheJapanesenation.The reticence
to questiontheboundsofnationalhistoryhasspilledoverto thewaysthatinteractions
betweenJapanand its empirehavebeen recounted-a questionthatrelatesto theuse
of the colonialarchive.As a moderndiscoursearticulatedby themedia,bureaucracy,
military,and a new fieldof colonialexperts,colonialismproduceda vastquantityof
information, oftenorganizedin the formofstatistics,charts,typologies,and thelike
thatare mosthelpfulto the historian.But withfewexceptionsthisinformation was
producedto support,strengthen, and maintaincolonialrule,moreoftenthannot by
appealingto modernnotionsabout the developmentalpotentialofcolonialism.This
modernsensibilitycan prove alarminglyseductive,especiallyfora fieldthat has
struggledwith the implicationsof postwarmodernizationtheoryforthe writingof
history.Preciselybecause of the modernistcongruencebetween the ideological
orientationof thecolonialarchiveand modernization theory,thereis thedangerthat
a historybased on thesesourcesmaymerelyconfirm colonialistinterpretations about
theirendeavors-in short,reproducefeaturesof colonial discoursein the formof a
historyof empire.
This dilemmais mostevidentin accountsof the riseof theJapaneseEmpire.As
articulatedin MarkPeattie'sintroductory essayto TheJapanese ColonialEmpire, 1895-
1945, this is a narrativethatbeginswith the formalacquisitionof Taiwan, follows
thepath ofempirebuildingthroughtheannexationofKorea,theexpansionintothe
southPacific,theadvanceintoManchuria,and theeventualmoveintoChinaproper. '0
In Peattie'stimeline,theyear1931 takeson specialsignificance. The expansioninto
Manchuriain thisyearstandsas thebeginningofwhathe refers to as an "ill-considered
adventure."This turningpointin the narrative ofempireis highlyreminiscent ofan
earliergeneration'snotionof the "darkvalley,"at one time used to label what was
seen as the irrationalbetrayalof the Meiji period'senlightenedreformlegacyby a
militarybenton aggression.Significantly, 1931 is thestartof"recklessadventurism"
(1984, 50), sinceaccordingto Peattie'saccountthecolonialempirewas runningquite

thistimeline omitsthe earlierexpansionof theJapanesestateintoHokkaido


"0Notably,
and Okinawa.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 959

smoothlybeforethe invasionofManchuria.To make thispoint,Peattieengagesin a


bit of counterfactual history,wonderingwhatmighthave happenedhad thepolicies
of the 1920s been able to continue.He concludes"it is possible that the positive
effects of its colonialstrategieswould have been moreenduringand thememoriesof
itspresencelessbitter. . . But"-a keywordhere- "largelythroughtheunchecked
ambitionsof the homegovernment . .. the empirewas overtakenby disaster"(46).
This statementis a clearindicationof the metropolitan perspectiveof thishistoryof
empire.The questionmust be asked,forwhomwas this disastrous?Peattie'snotion
of disasterconflatesthe interestsof all subjectsacross the empire,as though the
interestsof intellectuals,peasants,and workersin Korea were all one and differed
littlefromthoseof statesmenin Tokyo.This mayverywell have been the visionin
TokyooncetheconsequencesofthemoveintoManchuriaweremorefullyappreciated,
but formanycolonialsubjectsin the Koreanpeninsula,Taiwan,or thesouthPacific,
1931 was less a "disaster"than 1895, 1910, or 1920. This is not to gainsaythe
geopoliticalimportanceof 1931. However,pinpointing1931 as the startof disaster
fortheempire in itsentiretyis to privilegethe visionof empireoffered by its architects
in Tokyoand to downplaywhatby 1931 amountedto theseveraldecadesofdisasters
experiencedby manycolonialsubjects.
Peattie'sdesignationof 1931 as thestartofdisasterdependson a positiveappraisal
of colonial policy forthe two precedingdecades, an evaluationbuttressedby his
generoustreatment of thecivilizingclaimsofempire.To use Peattie'sown notionof
an "extension"of the Meiji experienceonto the colonies,it would not be unfairto
say thatwhat has been "extended"is the historiographic tendencyof earlyresearch
on the Meiji period to emphasizemodernization.In his piece, the awe held by an
earlier generationof historiansfor the accomplishmentsof the Meiji oligarch
flourishes, only here this wonderhas been shiftedfromthe domesticfrontto the
colonies." The legacyof the "superblysuccessfulmodernization effort" (1984, 23) of
the earlyMeiji periodis by late Meiji, accordingto Peattie,in the handsof colonial
officialscharacterized by their"determination" (25), "competence"(26), "quality"
(26), "dedication"(26), "integrity"(26), and "scrupulous"honesty(31). They were
"imbuedwitha vigoroussenseofpublic servicetypicalofJapanesecivilgovernment
and took theirjobs seriously"(26). The materialsigns of modernity-railwaysand
bridges(37), togetherwith "impressively modernbuildings"(25)-are highlighted
as arethosefeatures ofcolonialrulethatPeattieemphasizesas "rationalizing," whether
theybe law (29), land tenure(31), or thecentraladministrative system(25). In short,
Peattieargues,colonialism"broughtpeace, order,and development"(43).
This unqualifiedrepresentation of Japan as at once modern internallyand
modernizing externallyis supportedbyPeattie'sdepictionofthecolonies.ForifJapan
is to be seen as modernand its colonialenterprise as modernizing,thencoloniesare
anythingbut modern.His choiceofadjectivesalone revealsthecontrast.Korea,"that
unhappycountry"(1984, 17) withan "obdurate"(16) government, is seenas a society
witha "derelictnature"(24). But thisis not a problemofdescriptive passagesalone.
Peattie'sassumptions,by equatingJapanesecolonizationwith modernization, make
it difficultforhimto come to termswithresistancetoJapanesepolicyin thecolonies.
Accordingto thelogic ofhis account,oppositionto rationaladministration intenton
bringing"orderand progress"(25) can only be seen as runningcounterto the
modernizing processand thusassumesa less-than-progressive function. This leadsthe

I'For critiqueson modernization


theoryinJapanesehistory,
see Dower 1975, Kano 1976,
and Najita 1993.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
960 ANDRE SCHMID

author to underplayboth the legitimacyof nationalistresistanceas well as the


harshnessofJapanesecolonial policies. In his discussionof Korea, Peattiesuggests
thatthe riseof "a senseofKoreannationalidentity"occurredat a mostinconvenient
time,forit contributed to resistancethroughits "sentiment"and "conservatism" (24).
Using a vocabularyremarkablyclose to that of the colonial administration itself,
PeattiedepictsKorea as "mostsensitiveand troubleprone"(27). Most surprisingly,
whatrepressive colonialpoliciesareacknowledgedbyPeattieto havebeenundertaken
aredepictedas stemmingfromKoreanresistanceratherthanas partofthecolonizing
projectitself."Such resistance,"he writes,"made externally imposedmodernization
in Korea a matterof ruthlessenforcement"(24). As though Koreans had only
themselvesto blame for the ruthlessnessof the otherwiseenlightenedJapanese
colonialists,Peattieassertsunquestioninglythatthe"resistanceofa fearful, obstinate,
and antagonizedcolonizedpeople made reform a matterof harshenforcement" (19).
To be sure,Peattieacknowledgesthatthesesame administrators made mistakes.
He writes,"Japan'scolonialagentskickedand draggedKorea into conformity with
Japan's modernvalues and institutions,ratherthan explainingthe objectivesor
rewards of modernization"(1984, 25). This statementis rife with troubling
assumptions.It accepts the colonialistpropositionthatJapan had a monopolyon
modernityin East Asia, thattherewas no modernizingforceinternalto Korea, and
thatJapaneseclaims to be carryingout what was tantamountto a mission civilatrice
constituteda sufficient rationaleforcarryingout its unilateralpolicies in Korea. It
further impliesthatKoreanswould have been willingto acquiesceto colonialruleif
onlyJapanhad playedtheroleofteachermoreeffectively. In thisway,theruthlessness
could have been avoided and Korean supportfor colonial rule would have been
garnered.
These assumptionsallow Peattie to presentthe harshnessof Japanesecolonial
role-the kickingand dragging-as somehowsuperficial, an ephemeralby-product
ofcolonialismthatshouldnotdetractfromthelargermodernizing project.Repression
of the MarchFirstMovementin whichthousandswerekilled overseveralmonthsis
seen as no morethana "spasm of colonial repression"(1984, 21), as thoughit was
momentary ratherthantheculminationofnineyearsofbrutalrule.Suchcases,Peattie
feels,should not tarnishthe image of an otherwisecompetentand high-quality
bureaucracy. Pointingout thatin theearlyyearsa "fewundesirables"mayhavecreated
someproblems,Peattieconcludesthattheywere"shakenout ofthesystem"(26). On
the whole,"one mustgive Japanesecolonialadministrators high marksas a group"
(26). Here, thenegativeaspectsofcolonialismare notonlyincidentalto theprogram
of reform, but come to reston the shouldersofa fewwaywardofficials. Peattiewarns
the readernot to be too severe:"the ruthlessness and insensitivity
withwhichJapan
set about applying the Meiji domestic strategiesoverseasshould not cloud our
judgementsabout theirpurpose,work,or effectiveness" (25). Once thesemavericks
wereremoved,it is insinuated,theseexcesseswereended.The undeniableharshness
ofJapanesecolonialrule is in thiswayperfunctorily acknowledged,but at the same
timeit is dismissedas littlemorethana by-product ofcolonialism,eithera temporary
excessor theconsequenceofmaverickofficials which,Peattiesuggests,shouldnotbe
givenundue attention.Instead,strippedof these"incidentals,"theJapanesecolonial
projectrevealsits truecivilizing,if not quite benevolentnature.Such an approach,
by separatingtherepression ofcolonialismfromwhatPeattiesees as thefundamental
enterpriseof colonialism,allows the authorto salvagecolonialism'sself-proclaimed
progressive force.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 961

It shouldhardlybe necessaryto point to the manyworksthathave challenged


the notionthatprocessesof modernizationlead to social resultsthat can be solely
characterized as morefree.SheldonGaronhas takenup thisline of inquiryforJapan
(1994). CitingtheworkofFoucaultand recenttrendsin thestudyofNazi Germany,
Garonarguesthatthestate'sverymoderntechniquesofsocialmobilizationand control
showthatthe"conceptofmodernization can be used betterto understandthenature
of Japanese authoritarianism"(350). Showing how this relationshipbetween
modernizationand authoritarianism manifesteditselfin 1920s campaignsforthe
improvement of everydaylifeas well as the modernization of genderand sexuality,
Garon shows that many membersof the growingmiddle class consideredtheir
activities in these often less-than-progressive activities as highly "modern."
Unfortunately, Garonmakesno connectionbetweentheseactivitiesand thatrealmof
thestatethatin theseyearswas withoutdoubtthemostauthoritarian, namelycolonial
rule. Yet his point applies equally to the Korean colony,though the connection
betweenauthoritarianism and modernityarguablystartedon the peninsulaearlier
thanon the home islands.
In fact,one does nothaveto go beyondthecoversofTheJapanese ColonialEmpire,
1895-1945 to observethispoint. Ching-chihChen, in his contribution to this first
volume, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," shows how the
colonialpolice systemwas themostmodernof institutions (1984, 213-39). Fromits
first
inception,policeorganization was centralizedand hierarchical,extendingitsreach
fromthe capital down to townshipswith populationsof roughly800 (223). What
enabledthisunprecedented penetrationoflocal societybycentralauthorities werethe
veryformsof organizationthat Peattie indicateswerepart of the rationalization of
administration. But in the case of thepolice, bruteforceservedas a standardpartof
theirpolicyrepertoire. Not infrequently,as Chendescribes,thepoliceplayeda crucial
role in implementingreformsnot popularwith the Koreanpopulation,whetherin
the controversial land censusof 1910-18 (230) or in the introduction of high-yield
rice strainsmorepalatable to Japanesetastes(231). This involvementwas not the
resultof"maverick"officials, as Peattiewould haveus believe,norwas it a temporary
function.Rather,Chen showsthe extensiveand sustainedefforts of the police force.
Theirstrength was beefedup aftertheMarchFirstMovement(224), and by thetime
ofthewarwithChina,thepoliceplayeda crucialfunction in recruitingyoungKoreans
to volunteerfortheJapanesearmywhileprovidingthemusclebehindtheideological
driveto convertKoreansintoloyalimperialsubjects(233). Thus,contrary to Peattie's
depiction,Chen shows how the police forceunderpinneda wide rangeofJapanese
policies essentialto colonial rule and made the verychangesPeattie has labeled as
modernizationpossible. In these ways, Peattie's piece reflectstwo of the broader
tendenciesin muchof the earlyEnglishlanguagewritingon theJapaneseempire:a
metrocentric perspectiveand an insufficiently criticalapproachto the modernizing
claims of colonial officials.The consequence is a form of historythat comes
unwittingly close to legitimizingand heraldingthepre-1931 stagesofcolonialrule.

The EmpireStrikesBack

Since themid-1990s therehas been a renewedinterestin mattersrelatingto the


JapaneseEmpire. A numberof works,benefitingfromthe boom in postcolonial
studies and the researchon European colonialismin challengingthe traditional

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
962 ANDRE SCHMID

assumptionsof imperialhistory,have begun to bridgethe gap betweenthe islands


and the coloniesand avoid some of the pitfallsof earlierhistoriesof empire.These
studieson late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuryJapanhave been less eagerto
accept eitherthe imperviousness of the boundariesdividingthe domesticfromthe
colonialor thetendencyto see thedynamismofempireas headingsolelyin an outward
direction.One of these studies,StefanTanaka'sJapan's Orient:Rendering Pasts into
History (1993), tacklestheseissuesby focusingon the riseof T5y5shi (Historyof the
East), Japanesestudies of Asian history.Tanaka argues that the creationof this
historicalfieldwas partofan effort bya numberofJapanesehistoriansled byShiratori
Kurakichito createa realm that would allow the assertionof an identityat once
distinctfromand equal to the West. "Throughthis concept,whichcontainedand
orderedthepastsofJapanand Toyo,theJapanesecreatedtheirown modernidentity"
(11). This point alone is a welcome counterto the preoccupationwith the usual
narrative ofthe"turnto theWest," forAsia is broughtback intothestoryofmodern
Japan-and not just as an interestingsidelightbut as a vital elementin Japanese
attemptsto redefinetheirpositionin the global order.The quest formodernity and
equalitywiththeWest, sucha dominantmotivationin theseyears,becomesa matter
ofnotonlybattleships, renegotiationsofunequaltreaties,and thewearingofWestern
fashions,but also one of historyand identityin whichJapanesediscourseon Asia
playeda crucialfunctionin defininga new senseof a nationalself.Indeed,thiswas
a historyofbothJapanand its coloniesthatnotonlyoffered powerfulrepresentations
of the colonizer-colonized relationship,but just as importantly also restedon reified
divisionbetweenthe two,despitethe transnational historicalprocessesunleashedby
colonialism.As Tanaka argues,Japanwas withAsia as part of Toyo,and apartfrom
Asia as the self-proclaimed "civilized"leaderof thegroup.The boundsof the nation
were preservedin this historyat the same time as the colonies helped definethat
historyas national.The creationof a discourseon T5y5,Tanaka continues,prepared
the ideologicalgrounds-those moderncolonialmythsnecessaryformobilizingthe
populationin supportofimperialaspirations.In thisway,Tanaka seeksto interweave
the functionplayed by representations of Asia into Meiji and Taisho ideological
worlds.
Yet, in examiningthe rise of T5ywshi, Tanaka has the unfortunate tendencyto
reduceAsia to China.ThoughentitledJapan's Orient, thebookwould havemoreaptly
reflected its contentifcalled "Japan'sChina." Leftout of his discussionof T5ywshi is
anysystematic treatment of thevoluminoushistoriographical literaturedealingwith
Korea. Referencesto the peninsulaare foundin the work-most notably,mentions
are made of Shiratori'swritingson Tan'gun (1993, 82-84), the rise of Mansenshi
(Manchurian-Korean history,247-48), and debatesconcerningKorea'sconnectionto
ancientJapaneseculture(91, 155, 171-72). The appearanceof these remarksis
testamentto the difficulty of delvinginto the ideologicalsphereofMeiji and Taisho
Japan withoutexplicitlydealing with Korea. But these briefreferences are not
incorporated into the body of his argument.'2This is curious,forif he is interested
in pursuingthe relationshipbetweenhistoricalknowledgeand imperialism,then
Tanaka is remissin overlookingthefunctionofKorea in a studythatcoverstheperiod
whenthepeninsulais annexedand madeintoChasen.By notdealingmoreextensively
and conceptually withKorea'spositionin T5y5shi, Tanaka makesthemistakethatthe

12Asimilarobservationhas been made by RobertBorgen and Gina L. Barnes in their


1996 reviewof TheCambridgeHistoryofJapan,vol. 1: AncientJapan
(1993), editedby Delmer
H. Brown.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 963

verysubjectsofhis study,Meiji historians, werecarefulto avoid-conflatingToyoto


China.
Given that Tanaka's primarysubject of interestis the historicalwritingsof
ShiratoriKurakichi,his oversightof Korea is especiallypuzzling. As Japanese
historianssuchas Hatada Takashilong ago argued,T5y5shi was begunby thelikesof
Shiratoriwithstudieson Korea,notChina (1969). In the 1880s and 1890s, whenthe
institutionsand journalssupportingT5ywshi were firstset up, it was Korea-the
"Chosen mondai"-that oftendominatedJapanesenewspaperheadlines.Historical
scholarshipfollowed.Indeed,Hatada pointsout thatevenpriorto theriseofT y shi,
the earliestJapanesenationalhistorieswrittenin theMeiji periodgrappledwiththe
problemsof Korea's position in that history.Scholarssuch as ShigenoYasutsugu,
Kume Kunitake,and Hoshino Hisashi, buildingon the traditionsof the Edo period
nativistschooland usingJapanesehistoricalrecords,elaboratedmythsabouttheearly
Japaneseconquestof Korea: thattheJapanesedeitySusano-ohad ruledKorea, that
the brotherofJimmuhad becomeking of Silla, and thatEmpressJinguhad forced
theSilla kingto submitto herrule.As formulated in influentialworkssuchas Kokushi
gan, theseimagesof ancientKorea exaltedthe earlyJapanesestateand elevatedthe
imperialline.Thus,historicalrepresentationsofKoreawerefromtheearliestmoments
in modernJapanesehistoriography forelaboratingthemythsthatwereto
significant
becomeso centralto theimperialsystemandJapanesenationalhistory(Hatada 1969,
231-40).
Theseearlywritingson Korea,basedlargelyonJapanesesources,becamethebasis
by the 1890s of a new fieldof Korean history,ensconcedin the newly formed
departments of T5y5shi.Scholarsbegan to movebeyondJapanesehistoricalsourcesto
examinewhat Korean sourceshad to say about the islandsas well as the peninsula.
In additionto comprehensive workssuchas HayashiTaisuke's"Chosenshi,"theearly
issues of the Shigakuzasshi (Journalof Historical Studies) featuredmany articles
concerningKorea. It was these studies,Hatada asserts,that providedthe starting
point forthe developmentof the fieldof T5yoshi(1969, 231-40). Shiratoriwas a
leadingplayerin thesedevelopments.Between 1904 and 1906 he publishedseven
differentarticleson Koreanhistory,manydealingwithphilologicalissuessurrounding
Koreanplace namesand titles,and begana manuscriptofa comprehensive historyof
Korea,one whichhe neverpublished.Manyofhis earlypieceson ancientJapanwere
explicitlycomparativewith Korea (Shiratori1969, vol.1). Over the remainingyears
of the Meiji period,Shiratoripublishedmore than a dozen otherarticleson Korea
and continuedto returnto this subjectduringthe Taisho and earlyShowa periods
(Shiratori1969, vol.3).
But most significantfor the question of the relationshipbetween historical
knowledgeand imperialism, theseversionsoftheancientpastmovedbeyondacademe
intothelargerpublicsphere.Shiratorihimselfpublishedhistoricalarticleswithstrong
politicalovertonesin the mainstreampress(1910). In short,the versionsof Korean
historyoffered by manyMeiji historians,byprovidingprecedentsofan earlier,more
exaltedtimewhenJapansupposedlyruledthepeninsula,offered a directand specific
rationalizationforthe reassertionofJapanesecontrol-and in the earlyyearsof the
twentieth century, ofa supposedancientdominationmeanta verymodern
reassertion
formof colonialrule.
In thesemanyways,Tanaka has overlookedan importantfacetof the writingof
the veryhistorianshe makes the centerof his study.For historianslike Shiratori,
writingson Korea playeda crucialfunctionin the use of historyforthe articulation
ofa modernJapaneseidentitybyassuminga prominent place in boththedevelopment

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
964 ANDRE SCHMID

of a new nationalhistoryand the fieldof T5y5shi. This is not to suggestthatKorea


supersededChina in importance.Far from it. Yet it is to propose that when
consideringthe largeand complexfieldof T5yWshi, Korea cannotbe leftout.
If Tanaka's work,despiteits neglectof the Korean dimension,has nevertheless
been helpful in drawing attentionto the functionof Asia in the ideological
environment, thenthemorerecentworkofLouise Young has servedto highlightthe
penetrating powerof the colonialexperiencein manyothersectorsofmodernJapan.
HerJapan'sTotal Empire:Manchuriaand theCultureofWartime Imperialism
(1998) is
the firstEnglish-languagemonographexpresslyaimed at tracingthe penetrating
forcesofempireon theJapanesepopulationremainingin thehomeislands.As Young
explains,herexpression"total empire"is an analoguefortotalwar,since "like total
war,totalempirewas madeon thehomefront":it touched"thelivesofmostJapanese
in the 1930s in one wayor another"(13). By narrowing thegap betweeninternaland
externalhistory, Young demonstrates how in numerousareasthedomestichistoryof
modernJapancannotbe recountedto the exclusionof empire.
Her vantagepoint is that of the social historyof culture,as she exploresthe
popularforcesunleashedby the militaryengagementsin northeastChina that "led
to theformation ofnewlinkagesbetweenempire,stateand society"(1998, 180). The
popular culture of the 1930s, Young shows, was deeply embedded in empire.
Publisherswereable to recoverfromthedepressionthathitin 1929 onlybyappealing
to what Young refersto as the "war fever"of the periodwith arrestingnew book
titlessuchas "The Unswervingly LoyalThreeHuman Bombs"(70-71). Musicaltastes
shiftedafter1931, awayfrom"languorousjazz rhythms"to war songswithstirring
titlessuchas "AttackPlane" (72). The campaignson thecontinentoffered newspaper
organizations a chanceto expandintotherelativelyuntappedruralmarkets,as farmers
soughtnewsof the combatexperiencesof local troops(59-61). Competitionamong
different newspapersforcoveragebecamea keyfactorin technologicaldevelopments
in the productionand reportingprocesses(62-63). Young shows how "through
appealsto patriotismand defenseofempire"(162), womenand laborgroupstookthe
lead in mobilizingnon-elitegroupsforthe purposeof both empireand theirown
organizationalinterests.In a fieldthat has been slow to examinethe home front
implicationsof empire, Young gives us over four hundred pages of detailed
descriptions about experiencesofempirewithoutevenleavingthe islands.
The focusofJapan's Total Empireis Manchukuo,the "crown" in the colonial
holdings.In choosingManchukuoas the focusof her study,Young sharesPeattie's
emphasison 1931. But Young does makea nod in thedirectionoftheearlycolonies,
suggestingon a numberof occasionsthatit all startedwithKorea. She writesabout
the originsof this totalempirethat "onlyKorea in the 1890s and early1900s ever
involveddomesticsocietyto a degreethatapproachedmysenseof total"(1998, 14).
Her analysisofvariousfeaturesof colonialrule in Manchuriabearsthisout. In areas
as diverse as colonial vocabulary(97-99), the advent of "state and quasi-state
enterprises"as a basis forcolonial expansion(201), racial discourse(363-64), the
linkage of colonialismwith notionsof 'civilization'(433), as well as policies on
Japaneseemigrationout to the empire(316-17), patternswereinitiallyestablished
in Korea and it was fromKorea thatforcesofempirefirstcame to be feltbythehome
population.This point about the seminalpositionof the Koreancolonialexperience
can also be observedin two otherworks,one quite old and a secondof morerecent
vintage.
One oftheearliestbooksto be writtenonJapaneseimperialismin English,Hilary
Conroy'sTheJapanese SeizureofKorea,1868-1910 (1960), givesa senseoftheintensity

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 965

of the interactionsbetweenJapan and Korea in the political arena. Not expressly


designedto draw out the domesticexperiencesof imperialism,Conroy'sworkused
the peninsulaas a case studyto examinea thesis,derivedfrompoliticaltheorieson
theconductofstatesin theinternational realm,thatcontrasted theeffectsof"realism"
versus"idealism"on foreignpolicydecisionmaking.Few studentsofJapanesehistory
have takenup thisthesis,but Conroy'scarefulattentionto the ragingdebatesabout
Korea amongJapanesepoliticalelitesand in thepopularpressshowshowprominent
the "Chosenmondai"was in Meiji Japan.PrimeMinisterSanjo Sanetomiunderstood
thissignificance onlytoo well,for,as Conroysuggests,his anxietyoverthe"Conquest
of Korea" debates(seikanron) was at leastpartiallyto explainfora rupturein a blood
vesselin his brain.Clearly,Korea was no small worry(19). In examiningannexation
as a case studyof decisionmaking,Conroywas less interestedin the questionof the
role of empirein Japanper se thanin problemsof foreignpolicyformulation. As a
result,theperspectiveof the book is not unexpectedly lookingoutwardsfromTokyo
to Korea. Yet the evidencehe wields so colorfully is quite tellingof theprominence
of the "Chasen mondai": the public uproarover the assassinationof the would-be
Koreanrevolutionary, Kim Okkyun,at thehandsofa Koreangovernment agentand
the resultantsuccessfulnon-confidence motionagainstIto Hirobumi'scabinet(222-
28); thearrestofOi Kentaroand his associatesforpossessingbombsand carrying out
robberiesto raisefundsforan attemptedcoup againsttheKoreangovernment (362-
66); the astoundingassassinationof Queen Min on the Seoul palace groundsled by
theJapaneselegationministerMiura Goro, and the subsequentdismissalof charges
in a verypublic trial(310-23); and, thecelebrationofannexationby a pressquick to
printcommemorative editionsaccompaniedby overzealouseditorspenningpieces
with such memorabletitlesas "The Happiness of the World" (388-90). All these
examplesand manymorerevealhow eventsrelatingtoJapan'sclosestneighborwere
interwoven intothepoliticaland ideologicalconsciousnessofan increasingly literate
and politicallyastuteMeiji public.

The ProblemswithEmpire

For more than thirtyyearsJapan'sSeizureofKorearemainedthe only extensive


EnglishlanguagestudyofJapaneserelationswithKorea duringtheMeiji period.In
1995, however,PeterDuus added to thesescarceofferings with his much-awaited
study,The Abacusand theSword:TheJapanesePenetration ofKorea,1895-1910. For
Duus, Japaneseimperialismin thepeninsulawas the "productofa complexcoalition
unitingthe Meiji leaders,backed and proddedby a chorusof domesticpoliticians,
journalists,businessmen,and military leaders with a subimperialistJapanese
communityin Korea" (23). Seeking to tracethe economicand political means by
which control over the peninsula was asserted,Duus provides a wide-ranging
treatment oftheprocessesthatled Japaneseleadersto annexthepeninsula.But ifthis
book is about howJapan "penetrated"Korea, as Duus assertsin his subtitle,so too
does it indirectly
showhow colonialKorea deeply"penetrated"thesocial,economic,
and politicallifeofMeiji Japan.
Duus is at his best in the politicalhistoryof colonialconquest,wherehe shows
how the "Chosen mondai" reachedthe top of the agenda forthe mandarinsof the
foreignpolicyestablishment. The peninsulawas perceivednotonlyas theparamount
securityrisk-the infamous"daggerpointingat the heartofJapan''but also as a

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
966 ANDRE SCHMID

meansofprovingto Westernimperialiststhroughits successfulcolonizingendeavors


thatJapantoo belongedin theupperrankofcivilizedcountries.In thissectionofthe
work he coverssome of the same territory as Conroy,with some significantnew
additionsand twists.But, moreimportantly, Duus sees imperialismas the outcome
of morethan just stateendeavors.In tracingthesenon-stateactivitiesDuus breaks
into new groundforEnglish-languagestudies of the period, raisinga numberof
importanttopics.His treatmentof economicrelationsreiteratesthe significance of
Korea fortheJapaneseeconomy,whichby thetimeofannexationwas alreadyJapan's
fourth-largest tradepartner(1995, 262). Duus examinesthe issue of emigrationto
the peninsula,notingthat Korea quicklyemergedas home to the largestoverseas
Japanesecommunity, numberingover 171,000 by 1910 (289). For theseresidents
and thegrowingnumberof tourists,therewas a growthin how-toguidebooksand
travelguideswithtitlessuchas "How to make it in Korea withonly100 yen"(323).
Government agenciesand privateorganizationsurgedpeople to move to Korea, as
one guidebookexplained,forthe "golden opportunity. Korea is a place wherethere
are greenhills everywhere; it is a place richin resources;it is a place wherethereis
freedom;thisis our homeland(waga kJkyo)" (322).
Duus is fullyawareof the dilemmapresentedby writingcolonial historyfrom
the perspectiveof Tokyo, especiallywhen Japaneserecordsare the sole sources
availableto thehistorian.He is candidaboutthisperspective:"I cannotreadKorean,"
he acknowledges,divulginghis dependencyon sourcescreatedin the metropoleby
thebureaucrats, politicians,and public supporters ofempire(1995, 25). In itselfthis
is not necessarilya problem. Many historiansof the various European empires,
workingcriticallywith only the colonial archive,have produced much valuable
research.And as TheAbacusand theSworditselfshows,theabundantJapanesesources
on the empireprovidea myriadof perspectivesfromwhich to explorethe colonial
experience.Yet such a sourcebase has its limits,limitsforwhichDuus compensates
by tryingto restrictthe scope of his inquiryto two areas. As he explainsin the
introduction, "the purpose"of TheAbacusand theSword,"is the reconstruction of a
mentalworld,not a materialone" (24). Secondly,due to his dependenceon Japanese
sources,Duus classifiesthe book as belongingto Japanesehistory:it is "Japanese
historyratherthanKoreanhistory, orevenJapanese-Korean history, ifonecanimagine
such a thing"(25). Thus, TheAbacusand theSword,as definedin its openingpages,
purportsto be a book aboutJapaneseimagesand perceptionsof the peninsula.It is
a book,Duus explains,whichwill "moreoftenreflecttheperspectiveof the traveler
fromTokyothanthevisitorfromUiju" (25).
The possibilitiesofferedby this approachare most evidentin the eleventhand
finalchapter,entitled"Definingthe Koreans."Here Duus examinesthe derogatory
and racistrepresentations of Koreansand theirculture-representations that Duus
arguessupportedand rationalizedtheannexationofthepeninsula.Questionsofrace,
theoriesof history,and prejudicedstereotypes of local people are discussed.Delving
intopreviouslyunusedmaterialssuchas travelaccountsand newspapers, Duus shows
how negativeimages could be wielded to proposethat Korean backwardnesscould
only be overcomewith Japanese guidance and that racial argumentsstressing
commonality could be employedto call for"reunion"withJapan,as thoughKorea
werean estrangedfamilymember.Whichevermodeofrepresentation was undertaken,
bothservedinevitablyto justifyannexation.
These are importantpoints,whichshow the powerof whatDuus has called the
"mentalworld."Unfortunately, however,Duus does notfollowhis line ofinquiryto
its logical end. Duus neglectsto considerhow his notionof the colonial "mental

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 967

world" reachedfarbeyondthe clumsyracial and culturalstereotypes of the public


media,sinceit was thissame "mentalworld"thatproducedtheveryprimarysources
thatDuus reliesupon to writethe restofhis book. The hackneyedimagesofKoreans
were the most blatantmanifestations of colonial discourseand todayare the most
jarringto our retrospective eyes.But just as important,if not moreso, are the ways
colonialdiscoursemoldedtheothertypesofdocumentsand recordsthatenableDuus,
nearlyone hundredyearslater,to discussthediversetopicsthatmakeTheAbacusand
theSwordsuch compellingreading.Despite the professedgoal of focusingon the
mentalworld,Duus neverquestionsthe relationshipbetweenthis "mentalworld"
and his ownuse ofcolonialdocumentsto exploreissuessuchasJapan'scurrency policy
in the peninsula,the politicsof the protectorate, Japanesesettlercommunities,and
agricultural policy.Becausethismethodologicalquandaryis neverbroached,Duus on
some importantoccasionsfailsto maintaina criticalapproachto his sources,leading
him to acceptclaimsmadeaboutKoreansocietyand politicsas unproblematic truths.
This createsdifficulties, fordespite the two self-imposedlimitationsof the study,
Duus at keypointsmovesbeyondhis definitionof the "mentalworld" ofJapanese
colonialistsand into what he calls the "materialworld" of the Koreanpeninsula-
and it is preciselyin theseareasthathe encounterstrouble.
This troubleis evidentin one of the keyargumentsof TheAbacusand theSword
concerningthe roleof Korean collaborators in the annexationof the peninsula.Like
Conroy beforehim, Duus seeks to debunk conspiracytheoriesabout Japanese
intentionstowardsKorea,arguingon the basis ofcabinetdocumentsthatannexation
was not a policy determinedat the beginningof the Meiji period, then pursued
relentlesslyuntilfinallyachievedin 1910. As bothauthorsargue,dominationof the
peninsulawas certainly an objectivecommonto mostJapanesepolicymakers, butthey
weredividedon how best to achievethatgoal. For Duus, then,the line of inquiryis
not how an earlyambitionto colonize was realized,but ratherwhen and why the
decisionforannexationas the most suitableformof dominationwas made. Duus'
ultimateanswerto the "when?" question was a May 1904 cabinet decision; the
solutionto the "why annexation?"question centerson Korean collaboratorsor, in
Duus' opinion,the lack thereof.Accordingto Duus, Ito0Hirobumihad been keento
findan arrangement wherebya pliable groupof Koreanscould be placed in powerto
protectJapaneseinterests.But Duus concludesthatIto0"overestimated the intrinsic
appeal of 'civilization' to the Korean populace" (1995, 241). This is a revealing
It
statement. is not as
presented Ito's perception or as Japaneserepresentations of
it
conditionsin thepeninsula.Rather, is pointa made by Duus and is just one of the
moreobviousexamplesof how he allows colonialrhetoricto insinuateitselfinto his
own authorialvoice. At no point does he considerhow his conclusionresonateswith
early-twentieth-century Japaneseclaimsabout the low levelof Koreancivilization-
a strategy which,as in othercolonialsettings,was wieldedto justifyempire.
This problemis more than just a questionof the inappropriate use of colonial
rhetoric,forDuus' evaluation of the appeal of civilization to Koreans is the key
assumptionunderlying his argument about collaboration. As he states on morethan
one occasion,"Had theanxietiesoftheMeiji leadershipbeenallayedbytheemergence
of a strongactivelymodernizingelite willingto turnto Japanforhelp,perhapsthe
annexationof Korea mightneverhave takenplace" (1995, 425).'3 In thisstatement,
as withhis commentaboutthe"appeal ofcivilization,"Duus againviolatesthelimits
ofhis studyas outlinedin his introduction. He movesbeyondthe "mentalworld"of

also a similarstatementon page 241.


S3See

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
968 ANDRE SCHMID

Japanesecolonialistsand delvesinto the "materialworld"oftheKoreanpeninsula-


hereto make a claim about the absenceof modernizingKoreanelites,a claim with
stronglinks to his earlierassertionabout the lack of appeal of civilizationto the
Koreanpopulace.That Japanesedecisionmakersbelievedtherewereno suchgroups
is clear fromDuus' discussion.Duus runsinto troublewhen he attemptsto equate
theseJapaneseperceptionswith actual conditionson the peninsula-conditionsto
which Duus has access only throughthoseverysame documentswhich reflectthe
biases of Japanesedecision-makers. He employsthe same colonial documentsfor
reconstructing boththe mentaland material.There is a definitecircularityto this
approach: Duus' treatmentof Japanese perceptionsabout Korea are regularly
confirmed byDuus' objectivestatements about conditionsin thepeninsula,but these
objectivestatementsare themselvesderivedby Duus fromthosesourcesthat are a
productof thisproblematic"colonialmind." In the case of collaboration, whatwere
Japanese colonial judgementsabout Korean political circumstances-no actively
reforming forces-are unquestioningly presentednow not simplyas "theperspective
of the travelerfromTokyo" but as a historicalfact.
That Japaneseofficials who in the end made the decisionto annexKorea would
perceiveconditionsin thepeninsulaas necessitating annexationis, ultimately,notin
the least surprising.But that their perceptionsof the situationon the Korean
peninsulawould be uncritically acceptedand reproducedalmostninetyyearslateras
objectiveaccountsofconditionson thepeninsulais surprising. In termsofapproach,
this would be akin to askingthe same questions-why annexation?And what was
the role of collaborators?-ofthose documentsthat Duus leaves out of his study,
Korean nationalistsources.The answerfromthese sourceswould be preciselythe
opposite:toomanycollaborators accountedforannexation.14Althoughthis answeris
usefulforthe intellectualhistoryof the Koreannationalistmovement,the approach
givesa skewedperspectiveto theposed questionand is as unsatisfying as thesolution
offered in TheAbacusand theSword.
The treatment of the centralissue of collaborationis just one of the manyways
TheAbacusand theSwordoversimplifies the politicalsituationin Korea duringthese
years.While Duus sets himselfthe task of unravelingthe complicatedcoalitionof
interestsin Japanthatsupportedtheimperialistprojectin thepeninsula-a taskthat
he admirablyfulfills-he neglectsto give similarattentionto the equallyvariegated
spectrumofpoliticalgroupsin Korea. His assertionthathe is dealingwithJapanese
historyand the "mentalworld" would appearto excusehim fromthis task,but in
factas his treatment ofcollaborationshows,keyargumentsin TheAbacusand theSword
frequently dependon assumptionsmade about conditionsin the Koreanpeninsula.
His argumenton collaborationand reforming forcescentersalmostexclusively on the
vicissitudesof the politicalofficeholdersin the capital-again, a focusderivedfrom
sourceswrittenby colonial administrators in searchof Korean allies to protectand
expand their interests.Missing fromthis storyare the influentialand far more
numerousindividualsengagedin reform effortsoutsideofthestateand oftenbeyond
the capital,largelyin educationaland newspaperactivities.Newspaperreadersand
writerswereimportantnot just in Japan,as TheAbacusand theSwordwould seemto
suggest,but in Korea as well-especially if Duus insistson engagingin evaluations
of the level of civilizationof the Korean populace. For many Korean reformers,

14Forsuch nationalistinterpretations,
see theeditorialsoftheSan Francisco-based
Korean
newspaper,Kongnipsinmun.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 969

"civilization,"to use Duus' ownphrase,was indeed"intrinsically appealing"and,due


to Japan'spresence,theydevoted,sometimesliterally,theirlives to it.
However,pursuing"civilization"througha reform programwas trickybusiness
in the late yearsof the Choson dynasty.Like elitesin othercolonialor semicolonial
settings,would-beKoreanreformers wereput intoa delicatesituationvis a visexternal
powersthatwerethemselvesseekingto encouragechangesthatwould supporttheir
own vision of progressand, most importantly, their own materialand political
interests.A wide varietyofstrategieswas undertakenbydifferent Koreangroupsand
individualsto deal withthissituation,but the nuancesof thesevariouspositionsare
whollylackingin TheAbacusand theSword.Implicitin Duus' accountofcollaboration
is the notionthatall Koreansinterestedin "civilizing"reformwould naturallyally
themselveswithJapan,an assumptionall too reminiscent of contemporary Japanese
colonialdiscourseand again reflective of the sourcesupon whichthe workis based.
In actuality,the relationship thatKoreanelitesinterested in pursuingreform sought
to forgewithJapanwas not reducibleto a simple dichotomyof "collaboration"or
"resistance."A spectrumof strategieswas availableand the positionsof individuals
or groupsfrequently shiftedovertimein relationto thechangingsignalsarrivingout
of Tokyo, different segmentsof the nationalistmovement,or even the Korean
countryside. It is thisfluidityand variationindicativeofautonomousKoreanactivity
thatis entirelymissingfromTheAbacusand theSword.
This reductiveapproachto domesticKoreanissuescan be seen in the case,cited
in passingby Duus (1995, 195), of Chang Chiyon,a leadingnewspaperwriter,who
penneda famouseditorialagainsttheJapaneseimpositionof protectorate statuson
Korea in 1905 (foran Englishtranslation, see Lee 1996, 422-23). For Duus, Chang
represents a case of outrightresistance,but in factChang's careeras editorof the
longeststandingdailyofthetime,theHwangsong sinmun (CapitalGazette),showshow
resistanceand collaborationwere not an either-ordilemma. Like many writers
throughoutEast Asia, Chang had been impressedwith the achievementsofJapan,
interpreting his neighbor'ssuccessat reform as proofoftheveracityofa kaleidoscope
of theoriesincluding notionsof civilization,Social Darwinism,and nationalism.
Latchingon to Pan-Asiantheoriescurrentat the time,Chang promotedreformas a
wayof strengthening Korea as partofa tripartite allianceofthe nationsofEast Asia.
The peace of East Asia and the sovereignty of Korea, he assertedin his editorials,
dependedon workingtogetherwithJapanand China. Becauseofitsgreaterstrength,
Japan,he admitted,would necessarily assumetheroleofleaderin thealliance.Chang
went so far as to publish an editorialduring the Russo-JapaneseWar wistfully
imagininga joint forceofJapan,Korea, and China expellingRussia fromAsia (20
February1904). So convincedwas he of the importanceof this alliance forKorean
independencethatthefollowingmonthChangwelcomedIto0Hirobumito Koreaand
urgedKoreanofficials to cooperatewithhim. " We musttogetherfollowtheprinciple
of crossingthe riverin the same boat," he editorialized,"and vigorouslypursuethe
taskof renewal(yusin)"(19 March).
Eight monthslaterChang sat in a Japanesejail. Japan had just announcedits
protectorate overthepeninsula,effectively strippingKoreaofitsindependence. Chang
had respondedwithhis famouseditorial,distributedfreeofcostto avoid theJapanese
censors,in whichhe denouncedtheprotectorate and accusedtheJapaneseofbetraying
Korean trust. Arrested,Chang spent the next three months in jail, no doubt
wonderingabout the effectof his editorialsurginghis countrymen to worktogether
withJapan.Even afterthe newspaperwas resurrected, thoughno longerwithChang
at the top ofthe masthead,the editorsofthe Hwangsdng sinmun soughtto establisha

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
970 ANDRE SCHMID

middleground.A strategywas pursuedof criticizingnot onlythoseit referred to as


the "flatterersand panderers"of Japan,but also of thoseit viewedas overtlyanti-
Japanese.Considerableeffort was expendedin editorialstryingto debunkthe many
mythsand rumorsthat,it noted,had grownaroundthe Japanesepresencein the
country(3 November1905 and 15 April 1907). But as Duus demonstrates, Japanese
policybecameincreasingly aggressive.With the tighterrestrictionson publications
in 1907, the Hwangsodng sinmun'seditorialpolicy became less tenable.When Duus
cites Chang's famous editorial as a case of "resistance,"he does so without
contextualizing thepiece withineithertheevolvingeditorialpolicyofthisinfluential
newspaperor the shiftingimpact on the Korean domesticpolitical scene of the
changingJapanesepolicythathis own studytraces.The impactof an evolvingand
everharsher Japanesepolicyon thepoliticalpositionofleadingKoreanfigures is never
addressedand no place is allowed in his narrativesforthose Koreans,like Chang,
interestedin productivelyengagingwith Japan in pursuitof "civilizing"reforms
withoutabandoningtheirdesirefora fullysovereignnation.Instead,the TheAbacus
and theSword,adoptinga mode ofanalysisfromcontemporary Japanesepolicymakers
eager to slate Koreansalmostsolelyaccordingto theirreactionto Japanesepolicy,
tendsto judge Koreansas eitherpotentialcollaborators or resistors.
This dividesthe
Koreanspectrumintotwoextremesand missesthedynamicpoliticalalignmentsthat
Japanwas certainlyinfluencing but that cannotbe simplisticallyreducedto either
pro-Japanese or anti-Japanesecharacterizations.
TheAbacusand theSwordhas increasedourunderstanding oftheJapanese-Korean
relationshipat the turnof the centurymorethananyotherrecentEnglish-language
book. Yet just as Duus adds to our knowledgeof this understudiedand under-
appreciatedsubject,so too does his work forewarnus of some of the dilemma of
writingcolonialhistory.Duus' richworkopensmanynewavenuesforfutureresearch,
but withoutfurther exploringwhat he calls the "mentalworld"so as to understand
the fullpowerand reachofcolonialdiscourse,it will be difficultforfuturestudiesto
avoid the same quandariesthatultimatelyraisereservations about the conclusionsof
TheAbacusand theSword.

RewritingColonial History

To thisend,moreresearch on theformation ofthecomplexideologiesthatenabled


the construction
and maintenance of the empireis needed. The potentialforsuch
studiesis immense,especiallygiven the enormousquantitiesofdocumentsproduced
bythecolonialbureaucraciesand theJapaneseresidentcommunities.'5 Officialsources
are becoming increasinglyavailable in published collections. Ranging from
16
economic bulletinsto police arrestreportsto anthropologicalstudies of Korean
customs,theyoffermeansto move beyondthe institutionaland policyemphasisof
studieson empireand to examinethe wider productionof colonial knowledgeon
Korea.

I50ne countofJapanesenewspapersin the peninsulalistsmorethanthirtyin just under


twentycitiesbetween1881-1910 alone (Yi Hae'chang 279-319). For a studyofone ofthese
newspapers,see Altman 1984.
16Manyoftheseare being republishedin multivolumeformby Koreanpublishinghouses
and are listedin AmericanlibrariesundertheirKoreantitles.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 971

Some workhas begun in thisdirection.AlexisDudden has conducteda studyof


the translation,adaptation,and uses oftheconceptualvocabularyofinternational law
to showhow its deploymenteased thewayfortheMeiji stateto establishcontrolover
Korea and legitimizethe annexationas "legal" in the eyes of the international
community(1998). For Dudden, this is not just a questionof legal history-what
legislationwas passedwhenand bywhom?-but ratherone ofhowthetranshistorical
claimsof international law could be used by one sovereignnation,Japan,"to define
certainpeople unfitto rule themselves"(13). Seeing international law as something
that must be performed, she shows how Korea servedas the stage on which the
Japanesestatecould exerta "legal" controlof the populationunderthe gaze of the
Westernpowersand therebypresentitselfas "civilized."Attemptsby Koreansin
these yearsto contestthese "legal terms,"Dudden argues,servedto reinforce the
power of legal discourseto determinethe fateof the peninsula.Such an approach
extricatesher studyfromdebateson whetherannexationwas legal or not, showing
how the masteryof one specificfield of discoursefunctionedto give Japan the
consentingnod of the powersto controlthe peninsula.'7The relevanceof thiswork
to the currentquestionofJapaneseapologiesforthe colonialperiodand theattempt
by theJapanesegovernmentto escape claims forcompensationon the basis of the
"legality"of annexationis clear.
Otherworkhas begun to examineimperialideologyon the homefrontin areas
thatearlierwerenotgenerallyseenas havingbeingrelevantto thecolonialenterprise.
Kim Brandt has brought the empire quite literallyback home through her
examinationof the Korean colonialoriginsof what todayis oftenconsideredone of
thekeyrepositories ofJapaneseidentity, artsand crafts(mingei).
Brandtexamineshow
leadingproponentsofJapanesemingei, in particularYanagi Soetsu,broadenedtheir
"horizonsin tandemwiththoseof theJapaneseempire"(1996, 29). The movement
began with theirdiscoveryof the whiteware ceramicsof the Choson dynasty.This
initial exultationin the beautyof Korean objects,Brandtshows,was nevertheless
based on derogatorystereotypes, forthe Korean "lack of civilization"was itselfan
advantagewhenit came to pottery.Untouchedby "civilization,"Koreanpotterswere
believedto be able to createa truer,morenaturalhandiworkno longerwithinthe
reach of Japanese craftsmen,who had been tainted by modernity.Thus, while
individualKorean art objectscould be celebrated,the celebrationitselfbecameone
more realm in which the ideologiesof empirewere furtherarticulated.Moreover,
Brandt shows that the aestheticprinciplesrefinedvis a vis Korean objects were
importedback to Japan,such that the discourseon Korean objects "shaped future
encountersby Japanesewith otherculturesand theirartifacts, whetherthesewere
locatedwithinnationalbordersor without"(71). By themid-1920s,thisrepresented
a "returnof his [Yanagi'sl interestto Japan, not fromthe conventionalmodern
Japaneselocus of estrangement fromthe native-the West-but fromKorea" (78).
What began as the collectingactivityof a groupof youngaficionadosmade possible
by the annexationof Korea had emergedby the late 1920s as an importantway of
rethinking modernnotionsofJapaneseness.
In Japanand Korea,a smallnumberofstudieshaverecently emergedwhichhave
begun to pose more wide-rangingquestions about the place of empire in their
respectivehistoriesof the nation.In Korean,Ch'oe Sogyonghas examinedGovernor
General-sponsoredinvestigationsof Korean customs, in particular studies on

17Forthe argumentthat the annexationtreatywas illegal, see the special featureedited


by Yi Kibaek 1996.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
972 ANDRE SCHMID

shamanism(1997). Focusingon the work of MurayamaChijun, who in the 1920s


conductedseveralsurveysof shamanisticpracticesand beliefs,Ch'oe investigates the
emphasisplaced on culturalinvestigations as a basis ofattainingthetypeofevidence
necessaryto supportthe ideologicalpretensionsofculturalassimilationand, in turn,
enablinga tighter,moreeffective rule(ch. 2). Key forfostering thegrowthofShinto
in the colony,such studiespromotedshamanismas an indigenousbeliefsystemfor
the firsttime, if only to draw attentionto those areas that could be made appear
similarto Shinto.Commonrootscould thusbe claimed,whileshamanismcould still
be presentedas backwardand in need of improvementthroughassociationswith
Shintoism.Ch'oe draws out the ironyof this enterprise,explaininghow Korean
nationalistslaterbegan to celebrateshamanism,but oftenby buildingon the same
assumptionsthat animated the work of colonial investigators(210-42). One
consequenceofthiscolonialendeavorwas a broadenedinterpretation ofShintoism,as
those aspects of the state-sponsoredbelief systemthat could be equated with
shamanismreceivedgreateremphasisand attentionin its colonialversions.
In Japanese,Oguma Eiji in a lengthywork has exploredwhat he calls "The
Boundariesof theJapanese"as theyweredefinedvis a vis the colonies(1998). Most
significantly,Oguma raisestheissueofinternalcolonialismby tracingthecolonizing
processback to theattemptsto make the Ryukyuislandersand theAinu people into
"Japanese."With this verydifferent chronologyof empire,Oguma is able to link
thoseprocessesthatareso oftenretrospectively seenas partofinternalnationbuilding
to thelaterquestforan overseasempire.As he showsbyexploringtheusesofcivilizing
discourse,educationpolicy, the contradictions in assimilationefforts, and various
debatesamongthecolonizers,it was throughtheseengagementsthatvariouswaysof
thinkingabout Japan itselfwere articulated.The work is ambitiouslyempirical,
offering one ofthemostexhaustivesingle-volumeaccountsavailablein anylanguage
ofthetwistsand turnsofcolonialpoliciesand theindividualsinvolved,butultimately
Oguma's efforts demonstrate howcomingto termswiththeirendeavorsin thecolonies
forcedJapanesepolicymakers and intellectualsto reconsider someofthefundamental
assumptionsaboutJapaneseidentity.
Such conclusionsare beginningto demonstrate the centralityof Korea and the
broadercolonialrealmto Japaneseexperiencesof modernity. They are showingthat
previoushistories, bypreserving theboundsofnation-centered historyand nottaking
into accountthe transnational forcesboth unleashedby and enablingcolonialism,
haveglossedovera crucialpartof the historyofmodernJapan.
The integrationof the coloniesinto the narrativeof modernJapandoes pose a
numberof hazards,however.It must be remembered thathistoryoffered some very
specificideological justificationsfor the attemptsto assimilateKoreans as loyal
imperialsubjectsunderthe infamousbannerof nissenittai,"Japanand Korea as a
single body." By writingpieces that soughtto eraseany sense of Korean historical
subjectivity,historianscould argue that a historicalbasis existedfortreatingthe
peninsulaas littlemorethanan extensionofJapan.Today,ifthe colonialexperience
is to be writtenback intothemain narrative ofmodernJapan,thereis a riskthatthe
acquisitionof empirewill be seen merelyas a processof territorial aggrandizement,
wherethe agencyof the colonial populationswill again be lost and, like in earlier
Japanesehistoricalworks,the colonies will be objectifiedas little more than the
stompinggroundsofJapanesecolonizers.
This pointwould seemto be obvious.Yet in a recentstudyon Europeancolonial
history, FrederickCooperand Ann LauraStolerhavefoundit necessary to remarkthat
colonieswerenot "emptyspaces"to be transformed in theimage ofthemetropoleor

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 973

"fashionedin its interests"(1997, 1). In short,colonial subjectswere not merelya


backdropto the storyof the formation, development,and governanceof Chosen.It
a
was not Japaneseenterprise alone.Attentionto themutualinteractions betweenthe
islands and the peninsula-engagements that cannot be comprehended solely as
"reactions"to "impacts" -offers a way of avoiding the problems rooted in the
metropolitan perspectivethat has so dominatedthe studyof the Japaneseempire.
Although this means a more challengingbilingual enterprise,a focus on these
interactions has the added advantageof blurringthe line so easilydrawnbetween
colonizerand colonized,betweena monolithicexternalpowerand the colonizedseen
as eitherresistorsor collaborators. These easydivisions,vitalto thepoliticalstruggle
oftheseyears,havegenerallyunderlaincolonialhistory,be it writtenby historiansof
Japanor Korea.Yet in so thoroughly dominatinghistoricalapproachesto theperiod,
theyhavetendedto obscurethe manyothertypesofinteractions thatenabledsucha
powerfulJapanese colonialism. In the end, only a transnational
historycan capture
the tremendousvarietyof transnational forcesat play, forcesthatare not alwaysso
easilyidentifiableas explicitlyJapaneseor Koreanbutwhichhaveoftenbeenexcluded
fromour nation-centered histories,despite theircentralityto the formationof the
nation.As thedepthand fluidity ofcolonialengagementsis takenintoaccount,such
hard boundariesbetween colonizer and colonized can be more frequentlyand
productively crossed,providinga morecomplexhistoryof bothempireand nation.
Such a history,I would like to suggest,is morethanjust a deeperempiricaleffort
to gain a keenerinsighton a wider realm of activities.Just as importantly, any
integration of the colonialexperienceinto modernJapanesehistorynecessarily raises
questionsabout whyour historieshave been so doggedlyobservantof the boundsof
the nation.Such an approachforcesus to considerhow our historiesofJapanhave
grownout of some of the same assumptionsabout the relationshipbetweennation,
empire,and historythatat the beginningof the centuryinformeda styleof history
that has been criticizedin manyquartersas nationalistbut that must now also be
acknowledgedas colonialist.Needless to say,because thesequestionsare associated
with how Japan'srelationswith its Asian coloniesare rememberedtoday,theseare
especiallysensitiveissuesthatrequiremuchmoreresearchand will likelyelicitheated
comment,even rancorousdebate.Yet a move awayfromthe "island history"of the
past to a morediversehistorythatintegratesrelationswithKorea and othercolonies
intothemain narrative ofJapanesemodernity offersa valuablemeansofreexamining
someofthe unquestionedparametersofJapanesehistory.

List of References

ALTMAN, ALBERT. 1984. "Korea's FirstNewspaper:The JapaneseChosenShimpo"


JournalofAsianStudies43(4): 685-96.
BARKIN, ELAZAR. 1994. "Post-Anti-Colonial the Otherin
Histories:Representing
ImperialBritain"JournalofBritishStudies33 (April):180-203.
BORGEN, ROBERT, and GINA L. BARNES. 1996. Reviewof TheCambridge History
ofJapan,Vol. 1, AncientJapan,edited by Delmer M. Brown.JournalofJapanese
Studies22(1):129-33.
BRANDT, KIM. 1997. "The Folkcraft Movementin EarlyShowaJapan"Ph.D. diss.,
ColumbiaUniversity.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
974 ANDRE SCHMID

BURTON, ANTOINETTE. 1994. BurdensofHistory:


BritishFeminists,
IndianWomen,
andImperial
Culture,
1865-1915. ChapelHill: University
ofNorthCarolinaPress.
BUZARD, JAMES. 1993. "Victorian Women and the Implications of Empire"
Victorian
Studies(Summer):441-53.
CHAUDHURI, NUPOR, and MARGARET STROBEL, eds. 1992. Western
Women
and
Imperialism:
Complicity and Resistance.Bloomingtonand Indianapolis: Indiana
UniversityPress.
CH'OE S6GY6NG. 1997. IlcheUiitonghwaideollogiviich'angch'ul [The creationof
Japaneseassimilationideology].Seoul: Sogyongmunhwasa.
COHN, BERNARD. 1996. Colonialism and ItsFormsofKnowledge:TheBritishin India.
Princeton,N.J. : PrincetonUniversityPress.
CONROY, HILARY. 1960. TheJapanese SeizureofKorea,1898-1910: A StudyofRealism
and Idealismin InternationalRelations.Philadelphia:Universityof Pennsylvania
Press.
COOPER, FREDERICK, and ANN LAURA STOLER, eds. 1997. Tensions of Empire:
ColonialCulturesin a Bourgeois
World.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
DARBY, PHILLIP. 1998. "Taking Fieldhouse Further: Post-Colonizing Imperial
History"TheJournal and Commonwealth
ofImperial History
26(2): 233-50.
DIRKS, NICHOLAS, ed. 1992. Colonialism
and Culture.Ann Arbor: University of
MichiganPress.
DOWER, JOHNW. 1975. "E.H. Norman,Japan,and theUses ofHistory."In Origins
JapaneseState:Selected
oftheModern ofE. H. Norman,editedbyJohnW.
Writings
Dower. New York: Pantheon.
DUDDEN, ALEXIS. 1998. "International Terms: Japan's Engagement in Colonial
Control"Ph.D. diss.,University of Chicago.
Duus, PETER. 1995. TheAbacusandtheSword:TheJapanese Penetration
ofKorea,1895-
1910. Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
, ed. 1988. Cambridge
HistoryofJapan,Vol. 6, TheTwentieth Century.Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
DUUS, PETER, RAMON H, MYERS, and MARK R. PEATTIE, eds. 1989. TheJapanese
Informal Empirein China,1895-37. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
. 1996. TheJapaneseWartime Empire,1931-45. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press.
FIELDHOUSE, DAVID. 1984. "Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Back Together Again?
ImperialHistoryin the 1980s"Journal ofImperialand Commonwealth History,
12(2):
9-23.
FOGEL, JOSHUA. 1984. Politicsand Sinology: The Case ofNaito-Konan(1866-1934).
Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.
. 1989. Nakae Ushikichiin China: The Mourningof the Spirit.Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
. 1995. The CulturalDimension ofSino-Japanese EssaysontheNineteenth
Relations:
and Twentieth Centuries.
Armonk,N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
1996. TheLiteratureofTravelin theJapaneseRediscoveryofChina,1812-1945.
Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.
FUJITANI, TAKASHI. 1996. Splendid Monarchy:Powerand Pageantry in ModernJapan.
Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
GARON, SHELDON. 1994. "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese
History:A Focus on State-Society Relations"JournalofAsianStudies53(2): 342-
62.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLONIALISM AND THE 'KOREA PROBLEM' 975

GLUCK, CAROL. 1985. Japan's ModernMyths:Ideology in the Late Meiji Period.


Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
. 1997. "'Meiji' For Our Time." In New Directions in theStudyofMeijiJapan,
editedby Helen HardacrewithAdam L. Kern. Leiden:Brill.
HAN SEUNG-MI. 1997. "Colonial Subject as Other: An Analysisof Late Meiji
Travelogueson Korea." In New Directions in theStudyofMeijiJapan,edited by
Helen HardacrewithAdam L. Kern. Leiden: Brill.
HARDACRE, HELEN, ed. with Adam L. Kern. 1997. New Directions in theStudyof
MeijiJapan.Leiden:Brill.
HATADA TAKASHI. 1969. NihonjinnoCh6senkan UJapanese Views ofKorea]. Tokyo:
Keiso shobo.
HOWE, STEPHEN. 1998. "David Fieldhouse and 'Imperialism': Some
HistoriographicalRevisions"TheJournalofImperialand Commonwealth History,
26.2 (May) 213-32.
JANSEN, MARIUS. 1954. The Japaneseand Sun Yat-sen.Cambridge: Harvard
UniversityPress.
. 1984. "JapaneseImperialism:Late Meiji Perspectives." In TheJapanese Colonial
Empire,1895-1945 edited by Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie. Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
KANO MASANAO. 1976. "The Changing Concept of Modernization:From a
Historian'sViewpoint"JapanQuarterly 32(1): 28-35.
KENNEDY, DANE. 1996. "Imperial History and Post-ColonialTheory"TheJournal
ofImperialand Commonwealth History 27(3 ): 345-63.
. 1998. "The ImperialKaleidoscope"Journal ofBritishStudies37(4): 460-67.
LEE, PETER, ed., with Don Baker,et al. 1996. Sourcebook ofKoreanCivilizationVol.
2. New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress.
MCCLINTLOCK, ANNE. 1995. ImperialLeather:Race, Genderand Sexualityin the
ColonialConquest. New York: Routledge.
MINTZ, SIDNEY. 1985. Sweetness andPower:ThePlaceofSugarin Modern History.New
York: Viking.
MYERS, RAMON, and MARK PEATTIE, eds. 1984. TheJapaneseColonialEmpire,
1895-1945. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
NAJITA TETSUO. 1993. "PresidentialAddress: Reflectionson Modernityand
Modernization" JournalofAsianStudies52(4): 845-53.
OGUMA Eiji. 1998. "Nihonjin"noky5kai: Okinawa,Ainu,Taiwan,Cho-sen shokuminchi
shihaikarafukkiundomade[The Boundariesof "theJapanese":Okinawa,Ainu,
Taiwan, Chosen, from colonial rule to the recoverymovement]. Tokyo:
Shin'yosha.
PRAKASH , GYAN, ed. 1995. AfterColonialism: ImperialHistoriesand Postcolonial
Displacements.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
SAID, EDWARD. 1978. Orientalism.New York: RandomHouse.
SAMUEL, RAPHAEL. 1989. "In SearchofBritain"NewStatesmen andSociety25 August,
21-24.
SANSOM, GEORGE B. 1950. The Western WorldandJapan. 3 vols. London:Cresset
Press.
SHIRATORI KURAKICHI. 1910. "Wagaga joko ni okeru Kanhanto no seiryokuo
ronzu"[Concerningour poweron the Koreanpeninsulain ancienttimes]Chfi-
koronOctober,44-55.
1969-71. ShiratoriKurakichiZenshu. [The complete works of Shiratori
KurakichilTokyo:Iwanamishoten.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
976 ANDRE SCHMID

TANAKA, STEFAN. 1993. Japan's Orient:RenderingPasts into History.Berkeley:


Universityof CaliforniaPress.
VLASTOS, STEPHEN, ed. 1998. Mirrorsof Modernity: Invented Traditionsof Modern
Japan.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
WALVIN, JAMES. 1997. FruitsofEmpire:' ExoticProduce
andBritishTaste,1660-1800.
Houndmills,Basingstoke,Hampshire: Macmillan.
WILSON, KATHLEEN. 1995. TheSenseofPeople:Politics, Cultureand Imperialism.
New
York: CambridgeUniversityPress.
Yi HAECH'ANG. 1971. Han'guksinmunsa yon'gu[Studies on the historyof Korean
newspapers].Seoul: Songmungok.
Yi KIBAEK, ed. 1996. "Ilbon iuitaeHan chegukch'amt'aluiipulbopsong"[The illegal
natureofJapan'sseizureof the TaeHan empire]Han'guksasiminkangjwa19:1-
133.
YOUNG, LOUISE. 1998. Japan'sTotal Empire: Manchuriaand theCultureofWartime
Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Imperialism.

This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Wed, 8 Jan 2014 14:16:05 PM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

You might also like