LABOUR LAW CASES

1. The Tamil Nadu Non-Gazetted Government Officers vs. Registrar of

Trade Union

Facts –

The non-gazetted government officers such as Sub-Magistrates, Tehsildars, Sub-

Treasuries and the people working under the Home Department and such of their
10 members went to register their Trade Union with the Registrar of Trade Union
in Tamil Nadu.

However, the Registrar of the Trade Union denies and rejects their application on
the ground that the Ministerial employees and the government officers cannot form
a trade union and therefore, a registration cannot be done.

Note –

Sovereign functions are only in the hands of the government, police, Judiciary.

Both Government and private individuals can perform non-sovereign functions.

Labour law will not be applicable to the people working in sovereign functions,
only be applicable to the people working in non-sovereign functions,

Those performing sovereign functions can’t form Trade Union.

Issue –

Can government servants and other non-gazetted officers form a trade union?

Reasoning –

The civil servants are integrated with inalienable and regal functions of the
government which are sovereign in nature. The functions that are performed by
them, cannot be concluded as an “industry” as per the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Therefore, these civil servants cannot be concluded as workmen. Further, Sections
2(h) and 2(g) does not apply to these civil servants, therefore, they cannot form a
trade union or claim any dispute as “Trade Dispute”.

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 Held –

The court held that, as per Section 16 and Section 22 of the Trade Unions Act,
1926, allows/permits to form a separate fund for political purposes and office
bearers to be connected with the industry. However, both of these things cannot
be done by the government officers. This concludes that government servants
do not come under this act.

2. Mario Raposo vs. H.M. Bhandarkar and Others

Facts –

The petitioners and the respondents are members of a union called UCO Bank
Employees Association, Nagpur.

A complaint came to be made under Trade Unions Act, 1926, before the industrial
court whereby it was pointed out that the office bearers of the union had purchased
the shares floated by the Unit Trust of India to the extent of Rs. 75,000 and that
these shares were purchased in the personal capacity of the concerned office
bearers.

The complaint sought the dissolution of the Executive Body and the appointment
of a committee for administration. An interim relief freezing the Association's
accounts was requested. The Industrial Court rejected the application for interim
relief, stating that there was no prima facie case for freezing the accounts.

Issues –

● Whether the Industrial Court's rejection of the application for interim relief,
freezing the Association's accounts, was justified?
● Whether the purchase of shares by the Association's office bearers was in
accordance with the Trade Unions Act and the Association's constitution?

Reasoning –

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The petitioner argued that the purchase of shares was speculative and contrary to
the Association's constitution, which dictated that funds should be kept in
scheduled banks. The respondent defended the purchase as a means to enhance the
Association's economic viability and denied malafides. The petitioner referred to
Section 15 of the Trade Unions Act, which outlines the permitted uses of general
funds, and claimed that speculative activities like share purchases were not
included.

The Court examined Section 15 and Clause 14 of the Association's constitution.

Section 15 outlines the legitimate uses of general funds, while Clause 14 dictates
that funds should be deposited in scheduled banks. The Court held that the
purchase of shares was speculative and a form of profit-making, which was
inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of a trade union, i.e., to work for the
welfare of its members. The Court also emphasized that a union's funds,
contributed by workers, must be carefully managed and used only for legitimate
purposes.

The Court further noted that the purchase of shares by the office bearers in their
individual names violated the Association's constitution and principles. The Court
criticized the Industrial Court's decision to consider the general body's approval of
the transaction as sufficient justification.

Judgment –

The Court set aside the Industrial Court's decision and ordered it to reconsider the
application for interim relief within one month. The Court held that the purchase of
shares by the Association's office bearers was contrary to the Trade Unions Act
and the Association's constitution. The Industrial Court was directed to decide
based on the observations made by the Court.

Conclusion –

The Court concluded that the purchase of shares by the Association's office bearers
for speculative purposes violated the spirit of the Trade Unions Act and the
Association's constitution. The Industrial Court's decision was deemed illegal, and
the case was sent back for reevaluation based on the Court's observations. The
petition was allowed with costs.

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 3. All India Bank Officers’ Confederation vs. Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd.,
1997

Facts –

The petitioner, a Confederation of All India Bank Officers registered under the
Trade Unions Act, purchased 164 shares of Dhanalakshmi Bank Limited through
the assistance of a third party. The petitioner submitted transfer forms and share
certificates to the bank for registration. However, the bank refused the transfer,
claiming that it contravened the Companies Act, 1956, and that the petitioner,
being a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, was not a "person"
under Section 41(2) of the Companies Act.

Issues –

● Whether the bank's refusal to register the transfer of shares to the petitioner
was justified?
● Whether the petitioner, as a trade union registered under the Trade Unions
Act, is a "person" under Section 41(2) of the Companies Act?
● Whether the objections raised by the bank under Sections 14 and 15 of the
Trade Unions Act are valid?

Reasoning –

The petitioner argued that it should be considered a "person" within the meaning of
Section 41(2) of the Companies Act, citing the definition of "person" in Section
3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which includes any company, association,
or body of members. Furthermore, Section 13 of the Trade Unions Act grants the
petitioner legal personality, allowing it to hold properties, sue and be sued, and
contract in its own name.

The bank's objections were as follows:

a) The petitioner is not a "person" under Section 41(2) of the Companies Act.

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b) Section 14 of the Trade Unions Act renders the provisions of the Companies Act
inapplicable to registered trade unions.

c) Section 15 of the Trade Unions Act restricts expenditure to purposes specified in

the section.

The Court concluded that the petitioner fulfilled the criteria of legal personality,
which constitutes being a "person" under Section 41(2) of the Companies Act. A
registered trade union satisfies conditions like perpetuity, succession, and
contracting capacity. The Court emphasized that while a partnership lacks legal
entity status and thus, can't be a member, a registered trade union qualifies.

Regarding the objection under Section 14 of the Trade Unions Act, the Court
explained that this provision pertains to the registration and functioning of trade
unions, not their rights to invoke the Companies Act's provisions for enforcing
their rights. Therefore, the bank's argument in this regard was deemed without
merit.

As for the objection under Section 15 of the Trade Unions Act, the Court clarified
that investment in shares isn't an expenditure, but rather an investment of capital,
which is covered by Section 13 of the same Act. The objection was thus,
dismissed.

Judgment –

The Court directed the bank to register the petitioner's shares within a month from
the receipt of the transfer forms and share certificates, as the bank's refusal to do so
was found to be erroneous. No costs were awarded.

Conclusion –

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, a trade union, stating that it qualifies as a
"person" under Section 41(2) of the Companies Act and is entitled to hold shares.
The objections raised by the bank under Sections 14 and 15 of the Trade Unions
Act were rejected, and the bank was directed to register the shares in favor of the
petitioner.

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 4. R.S. Ruikar vs. Emperor, AIR 1935 NAG 149

Facts –

● In order to strengthen the strike in 1934, the Nagpur Textile Union of which
the applicant was the President, resorted to a system of picketing.
● In pursuance of the same on 3rd, 4th and 5th May, 1934, the applicant made
speeches supporting the strike and in the course of his speeches encouraged
the picketing of the mills and called for volunteers for the same.
● On account of two female picketers being harassed by the police on 5 th May,
the applicant posted his wife on one of the mill gates instructing her to
picket and to use violence if anyone interfered with her.
● Charges were framed under four heads, three relating to the speeches
delivered on 3rd, 4th and 5th May, 1934, and the fourth relating to the incident
of the abetment of picketing by his wife on 5th May.

Decision of the Trial Court –

R.S. Ruikar was convicted of abetting the offence of molestation defined in

Section 7 of the Criminal Law Administration Act (23 of 1932). He had been
sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment, which was upheld on appeal. The
conviction was based on his involvement in advocating and encouraging picketing
during a strike organized by the Nagpur Textile Union. The applicant challenged
his conviction through an application in revision.

Issues –

● Whether the application of Section 7 of the Criminal Law Administration

Act to the present case is valid?
● Whether there is a conflict between Section 7, Criminal Law Administration
Act, and the Trade Unions Act of 1926?

Held –

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The Court observed that Trade Unions have the right to declare strikes and to do
certain acts in furtherance of trade disputes. They are not liable civilly for such acts
and criminally for conspiracy in the furtherance of such acts as Trade Unions Act
permits.

But there is nothing in that act which apart from immunity from criminal
conspiracy allows immunity from any criminal offences.

Indeed, any agreement to commit an offence would under Section 17, Trade
Unions Act, make them liable for criminal conspiracy. Section 7 of the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act is part of the criminal law of the land and an offence
committed as defined in that section, is an offence to which the concluding
sentence of Section 17, Trade Unions Act, applies as much as it would do to an
agreement to commit murder.

5. Jay Engineering Works Ltd. vs. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1968
Cal 407)

Facts –

● The case involves a series of "gherao" incidents where employees encircled

and obstructed the employer's premises, leading to physical and mental
harassment.
● The petitioner, Jay Engineering Works Ltd., manufactures sewing machines
and fans and has faced multiple gherao situations –
⮚ January 17, 1967: 18 retrenched employees, along with others,
blockaded the corporation's premises, obstructing personnel and
goods. Lifted after police intervention.
⮚ March 2-3, 1967: Retrenched workers and others gheraoed the
manager and officers for 33 hours, involving confinement, property
damage, and insults. No police action.

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 ⮚ April 17-18, 1967: Gherao repeated, resulting in trespassing, property
tampering, and insults. Police intervention occurred following a court
order.
● State Government circulars on March 27, 1967, and June 12, 1967, directed
law enforcement to refrain from acting against gherao incidents.
● Petitioners moved the court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
challenging the legality of gherao, circulars, and police inaction.
● Nature of gherao, its legality, validity of circulars, responsibility of police
officials, and reliefs sought were key questions before the court.

Issues –

● What is the definition and nature of a "gherao"?

● Is the practice of gherao, as observed in this case, lawful?

● Are the circulars issued by the State Government, restricting police action,
lawful or competent?
● Did the police officials fail to perform their legal duties due to adherence to
the circulars?
● What reliefs are the petitioners entitled to?

Reasoning –

The court defines "gherao" as an encirclement by workers, coupled with hostile

manifestations, involving physical and mental torture. It encompasses blockading a
target from inside to oust employers, often using threats and coercion to compel
compliance.

The court establishes that the gherao practices in this case violate the Indian Penal
Code and other statutes, rendering them unlawful. The nature of the acts, including
physical and verbal aggression, supports the conclusion of their illegality.

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Circulars issued by the State Government, directing the police not to take action
against gherao incidents, are deemed unlawful. The court emphasizes that such
directives cannot override the obligation of law enforcement agencies to address
criminal offenses.

The court finds that police officials, specifically the Commissioner of Police and
the Officer-in-Charge, Hare Street Police Station, failed in their duties. This failure
is attributed to their adherence to the impugned circulars, indicating that the
circulars influenced their non-action.

Judgment –

Petitioners sought a declaration that the circulars issued by the State Government
were unlawful. Requested a declaration that the police officials failed to perform
their legal duties as a result of following the impugned circulars. Prayed for
appropriate writs and orders under Article 226 of the Constitution to address the
grievances arising from gherao incidents, the circulars, and police inaction.

The court held the circulars unlawful, deemed the gherao practices in the case as
illegal, and found the police officials responsible for not fulfilling their duties.

The court made the rule absolute, granting the relief sought by the petitioners and
emphasizing the unlawfulness of gherao, the circulars, and police inaction.

6. Rama Vilas Service Limited and Another vs. Simpson and Group
Companies

Facts –

Two separate suits have been filed against trade unions by industrial
management as plaintiffs. In both cases, there is an ongoing trade dispute
between the management and their workers, who are members of the defendant
trade unions. The workers have initiated a "stay-in-strike," resulting in a
cessation of work in the plaintiff companies. The management seeks permanent
injunctions in both suits to prevent the defendants from obstructing the
movement of goods, customers, officers, and other staff.

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Issues -

● Can the management obtain permanent injunctions against the trade

unions to prevent them from obstructing various activities during the
strike?
● Do the actions of the defendants fall outside the immunity granted to
trade unions under Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926?

Reasoning -

● Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, provides immunity to

registered trade unions and their members for acts done in contemplation
or furtherance of a trade dispute, as long as those acts do not involve
inducing someone to break a contract of employment or interfering with
the trade, business, or employment of others.
● The court refers to previous judgments that establish the principle that
trade unions and their members can engage in peaceful strikes as a
legitimate means of pursuing their demands, provided those strikes do
not involve unlawful or tortious activities.
● Acts such as unlawful confinement, criminal trespass, violence, criminal
force, or intimidation would not be protected under the immunity granted
by Section 18 of the Act.
● In these cases, the plaintiffs' complaints primarily revolve around
obstruction of the movement of goods and personnel. The court notes that
allowing customers to remove goods without the assistance of striking
workers would undermine the effectiveness of the strike, and the court
should not intervene in such matters.
● The court acknowledges that certain concessions have been made by the
defendants, such as not preventing entry and exit of the plaintiffs' officers
and staff, as well as refraining from threats and intimidation.

Judgment -
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 The court grants a temporary injunction in both suits, restraining the defendants
(trade unions and their members) from preventing the officers and managerial
staff of the plaintiffs, along with other members of the public, from entering or
leaving the plaintiffs' premises. However, the court dismisses the applications in
other respects.

Conclusion -

The court ruled in favor of the management by granting a temporary injunction

to prevent obstruction of personnel movement but refused to grant broader
injunctions that would undermine the strike. It affirmed that peaceful strikes are
a legitimate means for trade unions to pursue their demands, provided they do
not engage in unlawful or tortious activities.

7. Rohtas Industries Staff Union vs. State of Bihar

Facts –

Rohtas Industries Limited faced a strike due to disputes regarding non-payment of

bonus and non-implementation of Shree Jee Jee Bhoy's award. The strike was
called off based on an agreement to refer certain matters to arbitration. By this
agreement, the parties agreed to refer certain matters in dispute to arbitration. The
arbitrators also decided that the cost of arbitration should be divided equally
between the employers and the trade unions concerned. The petitioners obtained a
rule from the High Court asking the respondents to show cause why the award of
the arbitrators should not be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari under
Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues –

● Whether compensation by workmen to the employer falls under the

definition of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act?
● Whether an illegal strike can be considered "in furtherance of a trade
dispute"?

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 ● Whether the employers have the right to a civil action for damages
against workers involved in an illegal strike within the meaning of
Section 24(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Decision of the Arbitrators –

It was held that the strike by the workmen was illegal and the civil immunity
couldn’t be granted under Section 18 of the Trade Union Act, 1926. All the
damages suffered by the company due to the strike were to be compensated by the
workmen.

Reasoning –

The petitioners argued that compensation to employers by workmen lacks a direct

connection with the employment conditions and does not come under the Industrial
Disputes Act. The arbitrators stated that an illegal strike cannot be seen as "in
furtherance of a trade dispute". The petitioners argued that the employers have no
right to civil action for damages, and the exclusive remedy is criminal prosecution
under Section 26(2) of the Act.

Decision of Patna HC –

Patna HC in this case said that, the real purpose of the strike must be seen. If the
strike’s purpose was not to cause damage, then no wrong has been committed and
no action will be taken against the workers’ union. In this case, the union’s main
objective was to improve the wages and therefore, no action is needed to be taken
against them. The HC said that, a strike is an essential element in collective
bargaining and the workers have the full right to strike. The HC said that, if the
strike’s purpose is mixed and not clear, then the dominant motive must be seen,
i.e., whether the strike’s purpose was to cause the damage to the company or to
improve the working conditions or wages. It was held by the arbitrators that the
strike by the workmen was to fulfill their ulterior/secret motives, but the arbitrators
were not able to figure out those motives and Patna HC directed the arbitrators to
find out those motives. Patna HC quashed the decision of the arbitrators and held
that the strike was undoubtedly illegal, but the workers would receive civil
immunity under Section 18 of the Trade Union Act, 1926 and said that the strike
must be peaceful without any violence. Also held that, the employers don’t have
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any right of civil action for damages against the employees participating in an
illegal strike within the meaning of Section 24(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

8. Delhi Transport Corporation vs Sardar Singh,12 August, 2004

Facts –

The Delhi Transport Corporation (referred to as the 'employer') initiated

departmental proceedings against several employees, who worked as conductors,
for misconduct due to unauthorized long absence from duty, negligence of duties,
and lack of interest in the employer's work. The employer relied on certain service
regulations and standing orders to support its case. The Disciplinary Authority
imposed the punishment of dismissal/removal from service. Seeking approval for
this action, as an industrial dispute was already pending, the employer approached
the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred
to as 'the Act').

Issues –

Whether the Tribunal's refusal to grant approval for the dismissal/removal from
service was correct, given that the employees had been absent without obtaining
prior leave?

Reasoning –

● The standing orders (paras 4(ii) and 19(h)) and the service regulations
allowed the employer to treat unauthorized absence as misconduct.
● The standing orders required employees to obtain leave in advance, except
in cases of sudden illness, where intimation had to be sent immediately with
medical certificates if the illness lasted over three days.
● Habitual absence without permission or sanctioned leave for more than ten
days could be treated as misconduct.
● Treating absence as leave without pay was done to maintain accurate service
records and did not constitute the approval or sanction of leave.
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 ● Unauthorized long absence, especially without prior leave, indicated a lack
of interest in work, and negligence could be inferred from such conduct.
● The burden was on the employees to prove that their absence was not due to
negligence or a lack of interest.
● The Tribunal had erroneously concluded that treating absence as leave
without pay indicated the grant of leave. This was a misinterpretation of the
situation.
● In cases of long unauthorized absence without leave, the employer had
ample material to establish misconduct and lack of interest in work.

Judgment –

The appeals were allowed to the extent indicated below:

● In most cases, the Tribunal's refusal to grant approval for dismissal/removal

was unjustified. The absence without sanctioned leave was indicative of
misconduct.
● The learned Single Judge's view upholding dismissal/removal was affirmed,
and the Division Bench's decision was reversed.

Conclusion –

The Tribunal's refusal to approve the dismissal/removal from service was incorrect
in cases of long unauthorized absence without prior leave. The employer's actions
were justified, and the appeals were allowed accordingly. In a couple of cases, the
matters were remitted back to the Tribunal for further consideration due to specific
reasons.

9. Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd vs. P. J. Sterling And Others

Facts –

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The appellant, an engineering company, submitted draft standing orders for
certification under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The
certified standing order stated that employees would retire at the age of 55, with
the company having discretion for extensions. Despite 47 employees retiring and
seven receiving extensions, the respondent disputed the compulsory retirement,
challenging the standing order's validity.

Even so the respondent raised a dispute about the compulsory retirement of the
said workmen and in fact challenged the validity of the relevant standing order
itself, Tribunal held it to be justified. Labour Appellate Tribunal held it in favour
of respondent. So the present appeal lies.

Issues –

● Is the system of forced retirement of workmen at the age of 55 as introduced

by the management justified?
● To what relief the workmen are entitled on retirement?

● What is the validity of the forced retirement and to what relief including
reinstatement and/or compensation are they entitled?

Reasoning –

The tribunal's jurisdiction was contested on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction
under Section 7(1)(a) unless it involves a substantial question of law, which, in this
case, affected 5,000 workers.

The scope of the certifying officer's inquiry was initially limited, but amendments
to Section 10(2) of the Standing Orders Act, expanded the role of certifying
officers to adjudicate on the fairness of standing orders.

The tribunal was deemed appropriate to review industrial disputes about standing
orders, even if they were part of the terms of employment. Although the standing
order set the retirement age at 55, it didn't apply to employees hired before its
enactment. The Labour Appellate Tribunal found this to be a pertinent issue.

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The employees in question retired willingly and accepted benefits like gratuities
and presents from the company. This implied they had no grounds for
reinstatement.

The argument on whether fixing superannuation age for the first time affected the
legitimate expectations of those not previously subjected to such a rule was raised.

Judgment –

The Labour Appellate Tribunal’s decision to uphold the retirement age at 55 was
confirmed. The employees who had retired voluntarily and accepted retirement
benefits were not entitled to reinstatement. Hence, none of the retired employees
were granted reinstatement.

10. A.G. Kher vs. Atlas Copco (India) Ltd. (1992) I LLJ 423

Headnote –

Petition filed in the labor court in pune, grievance with regards to the colorable
exercise of the employer’s rights, involving complete absence of good faith.
Principles of natural justice were completely disregarded while terminating the
petitioner.

Facts –

The petitioner has been an employee in the factory belonging to Atlas Copco
(India) Ltd. which is situated in Pune. The petitioner at all times has worked as a
senior-typist-cum-clerk in the said company. Respondent 1.- Managing Director;
Respondent 2- Factory Manager; Respondent 3- General Secretary of the trade
union who has brought settlement with the employer on behalf of the workmen.

a) The petitioner has been employed by the company since 1966, initially
serving as a receptionist-cum-telephone operator and later taking on the role
of a Typist-cum-clerk.
b) The management's grievance arose when, despite being assigned the role of
a typist, the petitioner was occasionally called upon to perform telephone

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 operator duties. The petitioner expressed reluctance to undertake this
additional work.
c) In 1979, a charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner, leading to an inquiry
into the alleged misconduct.
d) In 1980, the management issued a warning to the petitioner, concluding that
the charges against her were proven.
e) Subsequently, the petitioner filed a complaint in the labor court. However,
her services were terminated, and the complaint was disregarded.
f) In May 1981, the petitioner faced another charge-sheet related to her refusal
to issue stationery to the accounts department, which was deemed as willful
insubordination.
g) In October 1981, the management suspended the petitioner for three days
without wages.
h) Meanwhile, in June, the petitioner wrote a letter to the secretary of the Trade
Union (respondent no. 3), expressing her objection to the management
making deductions from her monthly salary for the employee benevolent
fund.
i) Just a week later, the petitioner was terminated from her services without
any specified reason. The management offered one month's salary as
compensation, amounting to Rs. 13,893.75, under Section 25-F(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
j) Despite repeated applications for interim relief, the labor court finally heard
the arguments, granting the petitioner interim relief in 1982.
k) Dissatisfied with the order, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this court.
After considering the employer's report, the court upheld the termination.

Judgment –

The petitioner is entitled to the total of rs. 5,87,772. Court relied on O.P. Bhandari
case. In result the petition succeeded. The employer shall be liable to pay to the
petitioner a sum of Rs. 5,56,615.30 within one month from today. If the amount is
not paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% p.a. On the
said amount.

11. Mysore Kirloskar Employees' ... vs Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore ...

on 11 December, 1958

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Facts –

● The petitioner, in this case, is an association representing employees of

Mysore Kirloskar, Ltd. (referred to as respondent 2).
● The case is centered around the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act (Central Act XX of 1946), hereinafter referred to as "the Act."
● Respondent 2 (Mysore Kirloskar, Ltd.) submitted draft standing orders to the
Labour Commissioner in Mysore, who acts as the certifying officer under
the Act.
● The certifying officer made significant modifications to the draft standing
orders, essentially substituting them with model standing orders prescribed
by the Government under the Act.
● Both parties, namely the employees' association and respondent 2, expressed
dissatisfaction with the certifying officer's decision.
● Subsequently, appeals were filed by both parties under Section 6 of the Act
before the Industrial Tribunal in Bangalore, which is respondent 1 in this
case.
● The Employees' Association, not satisfied with the tribunal's decision, has
initiated this writ petition before the Court.
● The primary plea in the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of certiorari or
another appropriate writ to invalidate certain certified standing orders.
● The main ground for this request is the contention that the specified standing
orders were certified in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Act.

Provisions Discussed –

Section 4 of the Act stipulates the conditions for the certification of standing
orders. It specifies that standing orders shall be certifiable if they meet the
following criteria:

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a) Provision is made for every matter outlined in the schedule applicable to the
industrial establishment.

b) The standing orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act.

Moreover, it emphasizes that the certifying officer or appellate authority is not

tasked with adjudicating on the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any
standing orders.

Section 5 of the Act outlines the procedure to be followed before the certification
of standing orders. Sub-section (1) pertains to the issuance of notice and the filing
of objections. Sub-section (2) mandates that, after providing an opportunity for the
employer and the workmen or their representatives to be heard, "the certifying
officer shall decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft
submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft standing orders
certifiable under this Act."

After making necessary modifications, the certifying officer is authorized to certify

the standing orders. Section 6 allows any aggrieved person to appeal to the
appellate authority. This section specifies that "the appellate authority, whose
decision shall be final, shall, by order in writing, confirm the standing orders either
in the form certified by the certifying officer or after amending the standing orders
by making such modifications thereof or additions thereto as it thinks necessary to
render the standing orders certifiable under this Act".

Issues Raised –

● Is an employer confined to the matters set out in the schedule alone,

including of course additional matters prescribed by the Government?
● What is meant by the requirement that the draft shall be, so far as is
practicable, in conformity with model standing orders?

Reasoning –

The statute requires that standing orders cover matters specified in the schedule,
along with additional matters as applicable to the specific industrial establishment.
However, this doesn't prohibit provision for additional matters. The Act doesn't

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aim to address all possible contingencies for every industrial establishment. Some
matters in the schedule are considered compulsory.

The statute uses the terms "conformity" and "model." Conformity doesn't mean
identical; it implies similarity or adaptation to a pattern. "Model" refers to a
proposed pattern for imitation. Therefore, when the Act mentions that draft
standing orders should be in conformity with model standing orders, it means they
should resemble or imitate the model but not necessarily copy it verbatim. The
mandate of the statute is not that the model shall invariably be copied, but that the
draft shall conform to the model as far as is practicable. The very content of the
mandate is limited to the practicability of achieving conformity.

Section 4 states that it shall not be the function of the certifying officer or appellate
authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of any standing orders.
The preamble of the Act requires definition of conditions of employment with
sufficient precision. Reading the two together, Wanchoo, J., states that if a draft
standing order is sufficiently precise in its statement, the certifying officer has no
jurisdiction to change the draft on considerations of fairness or
reasonableness.Chagla, C.J., does not agree and his lordship states that the power
of the certifying officer or appellate authority to make modifications or additions is
exercised not because the draft standing orders submitted by the employer are
unreasonable or unfair, but with a view to see that the statutory obligation upon the
employer under S. 3(2) should be discharged by him.

Judgment –

The appellate authority, while discussing general principles, has correctly stated
that conformity does not mean "sameness" and that all that has to be seen is
whether the standing orders to be certified would be against the substance and
spirit of the model standing orders.

It is in the light of these general principles that the appellate authority has
approached the question before it.

Court held that in no case can the modifications or additions made by the appellate
authority to the draft standing orders be said to go beyond the requirement of the
statute. The appellate authority has, in each case after discussing the contentions of

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both sides, either accepted the draft or has made modifications or additions to see
that the draft conforms to the model of standing orders as far as is practicable.

In the circumstances, the writ petition was, in our opinion, uncalled for and
unnecessary. The writ petition is dismissed.

12. Palghat Bpl & Psp Thozhilali Union vs Bpl India Ltd. & Anr., 7
September, 1995

Facts –

● The appellant represents a trade union advocating for three workers (V.
Rajamanicham, N. Raghavan, and M. Prabhakaran).
● During a strike, the management withdrew from a reconciliation settlement,
leading to the workers resuming the strike.
● On March 14, 1983, while the workers were at a bus stop, they assaulted
officers from the management.
● The management claimed that the workers threw stones, causing injuries to
one officer, and issued a show cause notice to the workers on March 21,
1983.
● The workers denied the allegations, and an inquiry was conducted, resulting
in their dismissal.

Issue –

Whether the dismissal of the workers was justified under Clause 39(h) of the
certified Standing Orders of the Company, which pertains to misconduct, including
acts subversive of discipline both within and outside the company premises?

Reasoning –

21
 ● Clause 39(h) of the Standing Orders defines misconduct as drunkenness,
riotous or disorderly behavior within the company premises during working
hours, and any act subversive of discipline within or outside the premises.
● The court concluded that any act subversive of discipline committed outside
the company premises would also constitute misconduct.
● The determination of misconduct depends on the specific facts and
circumstances of each case.
● In this case, the workers had allegedly thrown stones and attacked officers,
resulting in injuries.
● While the workers were not the only participants, the Labour Court had the
discretion to consider the severity of the misconduct and the appropriate
punishment.
● The workers had been agitating for their demands collectively, and the
management had initially agreed to a settlement during conciliation
proceedings but later withdrew its agreement.
● Given these circumstances, the Labour Court's decision to set aside the
dismissal order and reinstate the workers with a 75% cut in back-wages was
deemed justified.

Judgment and Conclusion –

The appeal was allowed. The management was directed to reinstate the workers
into service forthwith. The Labour Court was instructed to conduct an inquiry into
the workers' gainful employment during the period from November 3, 1989, until
the present date. The decision of the Labour Court regarding back-wages would be
final and not subject to further appeals. The workers were ordered to report for
duty on October 1, 1995. No costs were awarded.

13. Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam (TTD) vs. Commissioner Of Labour

And Ors.
22
Facts –

Employees of the Power and Water Wings in Devasthanam applied for their
association’s registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Subsequently, the
Devasthanam sought cancellation of this registration, but the Registrar rejected
their application. The case reached the High Court, where the question of whether
these wings qualified as an 'industry' was central to the decision on the certificate
cancellation.

Issues –

● Applicability of grounds for cancellation under Section 10 of the Trade

Unions Act.
● The condition for registering a trade union and its relevance to the 'industry'
status of the concerned wings.

Reasoning –

● The appellant lacked appropriate grounds to cancel the trade union

certificate under Section 10 of the Act. Grounds mentioned in Sub-Sections
(a) and (b) didn’t apply.
● The definition of 'Trade Union' under Section 2(h) was the core
consideration. It involved the regulation of relations between workers and
employers, regardless of the 'industry' status.
● The association of workmen qualifies as a trade union based on the purpose
of regulating their relations with their employer, irrespective of whether the
wings were deemed an 'industry'.

Judgment –

● The High Court’s determination regarding the wings being an 'industry'

wasn’t crucial to the present issue and thus remained inconsequential.

23
 ● The workmen were deemed entitled to have their association registered
under the Trade Unions Act.
● The appeal was dismissed, with no order on costs, while clarifying that no
opinion was expressed on the High Court’s determination that the wings
constituted an 'industry'.

The Court upheld the workmen's right to register their association, focusing on the
purpose of the trade union rather than the specific 'industry' categorization.

14. Federation of Western India Cine Employees vs. Filmalaya Pvt. Ltd.

Facts –

In this case, there was a dispute between Filmalaya Pvt. Ltd., a private limited
company and the workers (represented through federation of affiliated unions)
regarding employment, non-employment, status of 19 employees and alleged
illegal termination of services of certain workers. A letter was issued by the
federation instructing cine artists, technicians, and workers not to report for
shooting work at Filmalaya Pvt. Ltd. This action resulted in a standstill of the
company's business, prompting the company to file a suit against the employees
seeking an injunction to prevent them from following the federation's directive.

Issue –

The primary question was whether the court could issue an injunction restraining
the trade union and its members from adhering to the union's directive, thereby
preventing workers from reporting at the studio? This raised the issue of the
applicability of Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926.

Reasoning –

The civil court concluded that as there was no existing trade dispute between the
parties, Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act didn't apply to the situation. It found
that while the directive might be considered as a form of coercion or intimidation,
such actions were protected by Section 18 only when they were related to a trade

24
dispute and were carried out through lawful means. The High Court reiterated this,
clarifying that actions protected by Section 18 should not involve violence or
unlawful measures.

The court differentiated between peaceful trade union activities and violent actions,
emphasizing that while slogans or demonstrations were part of legitimate union
activities and couldn’t be termed unlawful, actions typically recognized as violent
couldn’t be protected as trade union activities.

Judgment –

The court upheld the stance that Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act protected
trade unions from carrying out their legitimate activities peacefully. It emphasized
that slogans and demonstrations couldn't be termed unlawful per se. However, it
clarified that this protection didn’t extend to violent activities or actions typically
categorized as violent, as those couldn't be regarded as legitimate trade union
activities. Hence, the court declined to grant a blanket injunction against the
union's actions, distinguishing between lawful and violent activities.

15. The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. vs. R. K. Pathan & Ors.

Facts –

The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd., a registered limited company engaged in cement
manufacturing, submitted draft Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The Certifying Officer made amendments, including
the addition of clause (7) to paragraph 11, specifying conditions for leave and
holidays. The appellant challenged this addition.

Issues –

The key issue was the scope and effect of clause 5 in the Schedule to the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Specifically, whether the certifying
authority had the jurisdiction to include substantive provisions for the quantum and
extent of leave and holidays in the Standing Orders?

Reasoning –

25
The appellant argued that the clause was limited to conditions and procedures,
excluding substantive provisions for the quantum of leave and holidays. However,
the court adopted a broad and liberal interpretation, considering the word
"condition" to encompass substantive provisions for leave and holidays.

The court emphasized that the Act aimed to define precise conditions of
employment through Standing Orders, suggesting that these conditions could
reasonably include the quantum of leave and holidays.

Reference to Model Standing Orders framed by the Central Government supported

the idea that substantive provisions for leave and holidays were consistent with the
Act's purpose.

The court rejected the argument that the scope of the Schedule was intended to be
narrow, citing clauses such as termination of employment and suspension for
misconduct as examples of broader coverage.

Section 10 of the Act allows modification of Standing Orders after six months if
found unreasonable or inconvenient. This provided a mechanism for adjusting
provisions related to leave and holidays.

Judgment –

The court concluded that the authorities below were not in error, holding that it
was within their competence to include substantive provisions for leave and
holidays in the Standing Orders. The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to
costs.

16. Indian Bank vs. Federation of Indian Bank

Facts –

The plaintiff management imposed a wage cut equivalent to a day's salary on a

sub-staff member in the Central Office. This action was taken due to the
employee's intentional failure to perform assigned work. In response to the wage
cut, the defendants, two bank unions, initiated an agitation. However, the agitation
was not solely in response to the wage cut; it was a consequence of the plaintiff

26
Bank's failure to implement a solemn agreement dated 16-12-1978, under Section
2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, providing for a promotion policy in the
establishment. This failure led to simmering discontent among the staff members.
The Indian Bank Officers Association and the Indian Bank Staff Union, with
substantial followings, denounced the actions of the defendant unions.

Issue –

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an interim injunction against the defendants for
their alleged violent activities and gherao (a form of protest involving encircling or
barricading)?

Reasoning –

The defendants contended that the plaintiff, in seeking an injunction, had not
disclosed the main reason for the agitation—the failure to implement the
agreement on the promotion policy. The court considered this failure to disclose as
coming to court with "unclean hands".

Granting an injunction is subject to the circumstances outlined in Order 39 Rule 1

of the Civil Procedure Code. The court emphasized that it is a serious matter and
should be granted only in essential cases.

The court found that the plaintiff approached the court without disclosing all
relevant facts, presenting the wage cut as the sole cause of the agitation.

Judgment –

The court, acknowledging that the plaintiff's failure to implement the agreement
contributed to the agitational atmosphere, dismissed the application for an interim
injunction. The defendants' claim that the plaintiff came to court with unclean
hands was accepted, and costs were awarded against the plaintiff.

17. Orchid Employees Union and Ors. vs. Orchid Chemicals and
Pharmaceuticals

Facts –

27
 ● This case involves a challenge to an order passed by a learned Single Judge
of the Madras High Court in response to three Civil Revision Petitions. The
petitions were filed against a common order of dismissal by the District
Munsif, Madurantagam.
● Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. filed a suit seeking an injunction
against Orchid Employees' Union and its members.
● The company sought to restrain the union from assembling within 100
meters of its boundary, obstructing the movement of vehicles, and causing
disruptions at the company premises.
● The High Court found a prima facie contravention of Section 22 of the Trade
Unions Act, 1926, and observed that the formation of the union was
challenged.

Issues –

● Whether the union's actions constituted a contravention of Section 22 of the

Trade Unions Act?
● Whether an injunction should be granted to restrain the union's activities?

Reasoning –

The High Court noted the pending cancellation proceedings against the formation
of Orchid Employees' Union.

It deemed it appropriate for the parties to pursue their remedy before the Deputy
Commissioner of Labour, and if unsuccessful, the matter should be referred to an
Industrial Tribunal.

The High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petitions, setting aside the order passed
by the District Munsif, and imposed interim injunctions on the appellants and
union members.

Judgment –

28
The Labour and Employment Department issued an order, stating that, for
maintaining employment and industrial peace, Orchid Chemicals and
Pharmaceuticals Limited should provide work to all workers who called off the
strike, except those against whom criminal complaints were filed.

In light of this order, the Court found that nothing further survived in the appeal,
leading to its disposal.

18. Scooters India Ltd. vs. Mohammed Yaqub

Facts –

● M/S. Scooters India Ltd. employed Mr. M. Mohammad Yaqub as an

unskilled worker in 1974 and later promoted him to a semi-skilled worker in
1975.
● Mr. Yaqub's name was removed from the company's rolls on August 1,
1976, under Standing Order 9.3.12, which stated that if a worker remained
absent from duty without leave for more than 10 consecutive days, they
would be considered to have left the company's service.
● An industrial dispute arose, and the Labor Court ruled in 1984 that Mr.
Yaqub's termination was illegal, directing reinstatement with back wages.
● Scooters India Ltd. filed a Writ Petition challenging this Award.

Issues –

● Whether Mr. Yaqub's absence from duty constituted retrenchment or not?

● Whether the principles of natural justice were followed in the case?

Reasoning –

The appellant argued that Mr. Yaqub had been suspended and repeatedly advised
to rejoin duty, but he failed to do so. They relied on a previous judgment related to

29
Standing Order 9.3.12.
The respondent argued that the principles of natural justice were not followed, as
Mr. Yaqub claimed he was not allowed to join duty despite attempting to.

Judgment –

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Labour Court's decision. It
concluded that the automatic termination of Mr. Yaqub based on Standing Order
9.3.12 was not valid. The court emphasized that the principles of natural justice
needed to be followed. The evidence showed that Mr. Yaqub was not allowed to
join duty, and the company did not provide evidence to the contrary.

Conclusion –

The appeal was dismissed, affirming Mr. Yaqub's reinstatement with back wages.
The court emphasized that natural justice principles must be upheld in such cases,
and automatic termination under the standing order was not valid without proper
evidence and procedures. No costs were awarded in the case.

19. Uptron India Ltd. vs. Shammi Bhan

Facts –

● Respondent 1 was employed as an operator (Trainee) by UPTRON India

Limited on 13.6.1980.
● She was confirmed as a permanent employee on 13.7.1982.

● On 7th November 1984, she went on maternity leave and remained absent
from work until 12th April 1985 without permission.
● UPTRON India terminated her services on 12th April 1985, citing Clause
17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders.
● Respondent 1 raised an industrial dispute, leading to a reference to the
Industrial Tribunal in 1990.

30
Issues –

● Whether the termination of Respondent 1's services was legal under Clause
17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders?
● Whether this termination constituted "retrenchment" under Section 2(00) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

Reasoning –

● The Court noted that a permanent employee enjoys job security and can't be
terminated arbitrarily.
● The provision in Clause 17(g) gave the management discretion to terminate
services if an employee overstayed leave without permission for more than
seven days.
● The Court emphasized the importance of natural justice, stating that the
employee must be given an opportunity to be heard before such termination.
● Previous case law had established that automatic termination without such
opportunity violated Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution.
● The definition of "retrenchment" in Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes
Act encompassed any termination by the employer for any reason except as
punishment through disciplinary action.
● Certain exceptions to "retrenchment" included voluntary retirement,
superannuation, and termination due to continued ill-health.
● The termination of Respondent 1's services did not fall under these
exceptions.
● Therefore, the termination could be considered "retrenchment" under the
Act.

Judgment –

31
The Court upheld the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court. It
found that the termination of Respondent 1's services was illegal as it violated
natural justice and constituted "retrenchment" under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Conclusion –

The judgment affirmed that permanent employees have job security and can't be
terminated arbitrarily. It clarified the meaning of "retrenchment" under the
Industrial Disputes Act and the importance of adhering to natural justice in
employment terminations.

20. M/S. Ashok Leyland Ltd. vs. The Presiding Officer

Facts –

● The writ petitions arise from the order of the Labour Court in I.D.No.83 of
1986 dated 21.12.1993, involving a dispute between Ashok Leyland Limited
(the management) and Mr. M. Shyam Sundar (the employee).
● Shyam Sundar, employed as a checker, faced charges of fraudulent
acknowledgment of delivery challans, causing a loss of approximately
Rs.1,15,500 to the company.
● The management conducted a domestic enquiry, found Shyam Sundar
guilty, and dismissed him from service on 31.1.1985.
● The Labour Court, in its award, directed Shyam Sundar's reinstatement
without back wages but with continuity of service.

Issues –

● Whether the Labour Court's order directing Shyam Sundar's reinstatement is

justified?
● Whether the charges against Shyam Sundar were proven in the domestic
enquiry?

32
Reasoning –

● Shyam Sundar's role as a checker involved a crucial responsibility of

accurately accounting for received materials.
● The charges against Shyam Sundar were serious, involving fraudulent
acknowledgment resulting in a significant loss to the company.
● The Labour Court found the domestic enquiry to be proper and the charges
against Shyam Sundar to be proven.
● The Labour Court, however, ordered reinstatement based on reasons such as
perceived discrimination and the past record of the employee.
● The court held that charges of theft or misappropriation, as in this case, are
severe and cannot be equated with other forms of misconduct.
● The court rejected the argument of discrimination, stating that the
management had impartially taken action based on the findings of the
enquiry.

Judgment –

● The court set aside the Labour Court's order directing reinstatement, citing
that such serious charges, if proven, would result in termination.
● The court emphasized the nature of the delinquency and the responsibility of
the employee in maintaining the integrity of the workplace.
● Shyam Sundar's current gainful employment was considered a relevant
factor, making the order of reinstatement unnecessary.
● The award of the Labour Court was found to be erroneous, and the
punishment awarded by the management (dismissal) was confirmed.
● Writ Petition filed by the management was allowed and Writ Petition filed
by Shyam Sundar was dismissed. No costs were awarded.

33
 21. Kala Silk Factory vs. Phankoo Bakas Yadav and Anr.

Facts –

● The petitioner, a silk textile mill, challenged an Order of the Industrial Court
dated 30th December, 1984, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
● The first respondent, an employee, joined on 21st February 1972 as a printer.
He applied for leave on 14th September 1975, which was rejected due to
excessive employees on leave.
● The first respondent, despite rejection, remained absent from work since
26th September 1975. The petitioner informed him via a notice on 3rd
October 1975, stating termination if he didn't resume work within 10 days.
● The first respondent neither replied nor resumed work, leading to his
termination on 1st November 1975.
● The first respondent approached the Labour Court, alleging illegal
termination, and the Labour Court ruled in favor of the employer,
considering it a case of misconduct.
● On appeal, the Industrial Court found the termination improper and illegal
but declined reinstatement due to the factory's closure in October 1982.
● The Industrial Court awarded 50% of back-wages from 1st November 1975
to the closure date.

Issues –

● Whether the termination was justified or amounted to abandonment of

service?
● The applicability of Standing Order 12(5) and its relevance to the case.

● The correctness of the Industrial Court's decision on back-wages.

34
Reasoning –

● The Standing Order 12(5) applies to overstaying leave and is not relevant to
cases of absence without leave ab initio. The employer's argument of loss of
lien under this provision is misconceived.
● The Industrial Court rightly concluded that the termination was improper
and illegal, as there was no alternative case presented by the employer.
● On the issue of relief, the court noted an offer of reinstatement made in
August 1980, which the first respondent declined. The court found that the
first respondent wasn't entitled to back-wages after refusing unconditional
reinstatement.

Judgment –

● The petitioner's request for reinstatement is denied.

● Back-wages are awarded at 50%, but the period is restricted to August 1980,
or at most, 30th November 1980.
● The first respondent is entitled to retrenchment compensation as of the
closure date (16th November 1982) and gratuity as per legal entitlement.
● All amounts payable to the first respondent should be deposited in court
within 8 weeks.
● The rule is partly made absolute, with no order as to costs.

22. State of MP and Ors. vs. Onkar Prasad Patel

Facts –

The State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries filed an appeal challenging the
dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. The
respondent, a workman, had petitioned for regularization of his services, claiming

35
to have worked for more than six months in a permanent vacant post in the Public
Health Engineering Department.

Issues –

The primary issue revolved around the regularization of the workman's services.
The State contested that the respondent was not working in a permanent post, and
thus, regularization was not justified.

Reasoning –

The Labour Court found that the workman had not been appointed to any
permanent and vacant post but directed the payment of regular wages from a
specified date. The Industrial Court upheld this decision, and the High Court,
observing that sufficient opportunity was given to the employer to present its case,
did not interfere.

The appellant argued that, as per the Standard Standing Order, certain criteria must
be met for a declaration of permanency. These criteria include completing six
months of satisfactory service and rendering service in a clear vacancy in one or
more posts. The Labour Court, however, did not focus on the crucial issue of
whether there was a clear vacancy.

Judgment –

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the direction categorizing the workman
as a permanent employee. It held that, as per the Standard Standing Order, being a
"permanent employee" requires completing six months of satisfactory service in a
clear vacancy. Since the evidence did not establish the existence of a clear
vacancy, the workman could not be categorized as a permanent employee. The
court set aside this part of the direction but allowed the rest. No costs were
awarded.

23. Sompal Singh vs Artificial Limbs Mfg. Corpn.

Facts –

36
The petitioner, a Senior Assistant working in the P.S. 3 Department, challenged an
order transferring them from Kanpur to Calcutta, issued by the respondent
industrial establishment.

Issues –

● Whether the respondent had the authority to pass the transfer order when the
certified Standing Orders of the establishment did not contain any provision
for transfers?
● Whether the petitioner's unconditional acceptance of the condition of
transfer in their appointment order was valid?
● Whether the amendment to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Central Rules in 1983, which included provisions for transfers, could be
applied in this case?
● Whether the petitioner should have raised the transfer dispute as an
industrial dispute under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, instead of
approaching the court directly?

Reasoning –

● The petitioner argued that the certified Standing Orders, which did not
include provisions for transfers, should prevail and render the transfer order
invalid.
● The court referred to a Supreme Court decision, stating that certified
Standing Orders have uniform application to both current and future
employees.
● It was noted that the certified Standing Orders prevailed, and the condition
of transfer in the appointment order was not enforceable.
● The court also highlighted that the matter of transfer had been adjudicated
upon by a quasi-judicial authority, resulting in the deletion of transfer

37
 provisions from the draft Standing Orders. This adjudication was binding on
the respondent.
● The court rejected the argument that the 1983 amendment to the Rules
justified the transfer, as the certified Standing Orders were in force, making
the Model Standing Orders inapplicable.
● The court considered the petitioner's alternative remedy of raising an
industrial dispute but noted that the transfer order's immediacy made this
remedy ineffective.

Judgment –

The court allowed the petition and quashed the transfer order, citing the prevalence
of the certified Standing Orders. No costs were awarded.

Conclusion –

The court ruled that the transfer order was invalid due to the absence of provisions
for transfers in the certified Standing Orders, and the petitioner's unconditional
acceptance of the transfer condition in the appointment order was not enforceable.
The court also rejected the applicability of the 1983 amendment to the Rules and
allowed the petition due to the lack of an efficacious alternative remedy.

24. Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. Michael Mark and Another

Facts –

The appellants, Express Newspapers Ltd., posted notices on December 31, 1956,
addressing the striking workmen, indicating that the strike was viewed seriously
and warning of possible actions if work was not resumed. Subsequent notices were
published, and a letter was sent to the workers' union. On January 14, 1957, the
appellants removed the names of striking workers from the muster roll, indicating
abandonment of employment.

Issues -

38
The main issue was whether the striking workers had abandoned their
employment, and if so, whether they were entitled to compensation under Standing
Order 25?

Reasoning -

The appellants argued that the striking workers had abandoned their employment
by participating in an illegal strike, and, therefore, they were not entitled to
compensation under Standing Order 25. The appellants attempted to unilaterally
convert the absence of the strikers into abandonment of employment without
following disciplinary procedures.

The court held that the striking workers had not abandoned their employment as
their strike was for better terms, indicating a desire to continue employment. The
notices given by the management, claiming abandonment, were deemed
ineffective. The removal of names from the muster roll was treated as termination
of employment without notice, entitling the workers to compensation under
Standing Order 25.

Judgment -

The appeals were dismissed. The court held that the removal of names from the
muster roll constituted termination of employment, and the striking workers were
entitled to compensation under Standing Order 25. The appellants' attempt to treat
the strike as abandonment without following proper procedures was not accepted.
The appeals were dismissed with costs.

25. G.T. Lad & Ors. vs. Chemicals & Fibres Of India Ltd.

Facts –

The appeal arose from a common award dated February 27, 1976, issued by the
Industrial Tribunal in Maharashtra. The award rejected complaints made by the
appellants (workmen) against the respondent company under Section 33(A) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workmen were employees of the company and
had gone on strike demanding the reinstatement of three union leaders who were
dismissed by the company during a pending industrial dispute reference.
39
Issues –

● What constitutes the abandonment of service?

● Did the appellants voluntarily abandon the company's service?

● Did the company's action in removing the appellants from its rolls during the
pendency of the industrial dispute proceedings amount to a change in their
conditions of service?
● Should the appellants be entitled to back wages?

Reasoning –

● The term "abandonment of service" was not defined in the Industrial

Disputes Act. Therefore, the court relied on dictionary definitions, common
law principles, and legal dictionaries to understand its meaning.
● Abandonment of service means a total or complete giving up of duties with
an intention not to resume them. It is a question of fact determined by the
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the employee.
● In this case, the appellants had gone on strike to press their demands and had
unequivocally communicated that they did not intend to abandon service.
Their absence from duty was temporary and could not be construed as
voluntary abandonment.
● The company's action in removing the appellants from its rolls was illegal
and constituted a change in their conditions of service during the pending
industrial dispute proceedings. The certified standing orders did not provide
for terminating the appellants' services in such circumstances.
● The company was directed to reinstate the appellants.

● Back wages were awarded to the appellants, calculated at 75% of their

wages for the entire period from 1972 to the date of reinstatement.

40
Judgment –

The appeal was allowed, and the industrial tribunal's award was set aside. The
company was directed to reinstate the appellants and pay them back wages as per
the specified calculation.

Conclusion –

The court held that the company's action in removing the appellants from its rolls
during a pending industrial dispute amounted to a change in their conditions of
service and was illegal. The appellants were entitled to reinstatement and back
wages.

26. Sachin Charlus Mirpagar vs. Divisional Controller Maharashtra State

Road Transport Corporation

Facts –

The petitioner, working as a Junior Assistant with the respondent Corporation, was
arrested after completing his shift due to an FIR against him. Subsequently, he was
suspended, served with a charge sheet, and faced the possibility of dismissal based
on alleged misconduct, specifically moral turpitude. The charge sheet was issued
because the petitioner's arrest, linked to a reported case of robbery, tarnished the
Corporation's image. The petitioner challenged the second show cause notice,
claiming the incident occurred outside the establishment premises and was
unrelated to his employment.

Issue –

● Whether the petitioner's actions, leading to his arrest, constituted misconduct

within the premises or vicinity of the Corporation?
● Whether the charge sheet alleging moral turpitude and tarnishing the
Corporation's image was justified based on the petitioner's arrest?
● Whether the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Corporation were
valid?
41
Reasoning –

The court emphasized the principle that an accused or charge-sheeted employee is

presumed innocent until proven guilty. Referring to established jurisprudence, it
clarified that the burden of proving charges against an employee lies with the
employer. The court discussed relevant judgments, including Glaxo Laboratories
and Mulchandani Electrical & Radio Industries, emphasizing that misconduct must
have a connection to the establishment's premises or its vicinity.

The court rejected the Corporation's contention that the petitioner's arrest and
subsequent tarnishing of the Corporation's image constituted moral turpitude. It
highlighted that the petitioner had been acquitted of the theft charge, and unless an
offense was proven, the claim of moral turpitude couldn't be sustained. The court
also dismissed the argument that the Corporation could proceed based on the
perceived damage to its reputation.

Judgment –

The court allowed the petition, quashing the orders of the Labour Court and the
Industrial Court. It held that the charge sheet was without basis, as the alleged
misconduct did not occur within the premises or vicinity of the establishment. The
second show cause notice was set aside, but the judgment did not hinder the
Corporation from taking disciplinary action for other potential misconducts during
the litigation or after any adverse trial court outcome.

27. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Accounts and Executive Staff Union vs.
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Facts –

● This case involves an appeal against the order of Justice Mohan, dated
August 11, 1980, which allowed Writ Petition No. 5742 of 1979 filed by the
respondent.
● The respondent had been granted recognition by the appellant, the Tamil
Nadu Electricity Board, through proceedings dated July 30, 1969, for the

42
 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Accounts Subordinates Union, Coimbatore,
with certain conditions.
● The appellant claimed that the respondent violated the conditions of
recognition by enrolling members from peons, bill-collectors, and store-
keepers. Consequently, the appellant proposed to de-recognize the union,
and this led to the filing of the writ petition challenging the de-recognition.

Issues –

● Whether the writ petition is maintainable, given that recognition was not
granted under any statute, and whether the Code of Discipline in Industry
mentioned in the recognition proceedings is statutory?
● Whether the withdrawal of recognition was justified based on the alleged
violation of recognition conditions?

Reasoning –

● The appellant argued that the writ petition was not maintainable because
recognition was not granted under any statute, and the Code of Discipline in
Industry was not statutory. They relied on two cases, one from the Calcutta
High Court and the other from the Kerala High Court.
● The Calcutta High Court case stated that the Code of Discipline is not
statutory, but the matter was not conclusively decided in that case.
● The Kerala High Court case involved de-recognition without notice and
mentioned that in the absence of statutory rules or an agreement, the union
cannot insist on being heard before recognition is withdrawn.
● However, the circumstances of the present case were different, as
recognition was granted on the union's application, and no three-year
limitation on recognition existed as in the Kerala case.

43
 ● The absence of statutory provisions regarding recognition does not bar the
respondent from approaching the court under Article 226 of the Constitution
in case of de-recognition due to illegal or unjust reasons.

Judgment and Conclusion –

The withdrawal of recognition was based on the alleged violation of recognition

conditions. The recognition was granted for the ministerial staff, excluding peons,
bill-collectors, and store-keepers. The respondent maintained that it continued to
represent only the ministerial staff and did not claim the right to represent the other
categories. The withdrawal of recognition was deemed erroneous as it was based
on the false premise that the respondent violated the recognition conditions.
Consequently, the writ appeal was dismissed.

The court ruled that the writ petition was maintainable, and the withdrawal of
recognition was unjustified as there was no violation of the conditions of
recognition. Therefore, the appeal against the order allowing the writ petition was
dismissed.

28. Avtech Limited Power Products vs. The Superintendent of Police

Facts –

● The writ petitioner, a company, filed a writ petition seeking police protection
against members of a workers' union (respondents 4 to 12) who were on
strike.
● The strike arose from an industrial dispute between the management and the
union regarding the alleged change in the status of temporary workers.
● The petitioner had obtained an order of interim injunction from the Civil
Court, which was later made absolute, restraining the union from various
activities near the factory premises.

44
 ● Despite the injunction, the union members were allegedly involved in illegal
activities, prompting the petitioner to seek police protection through the writ
petition.

Issues –

● Whether the court should grant police protection to the petitioner against the
union's alleged illegal activities?
● Whether the union's strike is lawful and whether the petitioner's engagement
of trainees/apprentices as regular employees is valid?

Reasoning –

● The court acknowledged the ongoing strike by the union members and the
industrial dispute between the parties.
● The petitioner had obtained a valid injunction order from the Civil Court
against the union's activities, indicating a prima facie entitlement to
protection.
● The court emphasized that while the right to strike is recognized, it does not
permit violent activities or obstruction of willing workers and other staff.
● Reference was made to relevant case laws, including instances where courts
granted police protection to employers facing disruption due to strikes.
● The court rejected the union's argument that they had immunity under
Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, asserting that violent actions were not
protected.
● The court considered the petitioner's right to carry on lawful trade and the
need for police protection to enforce the injunction order.

Judgment –

45
 ● The court ordered police protection for the petitioner, allowing them to
perform their legal obligations as per the injunction order.
● The union was granted the liberty to approach the appropriate forum to
address their grievances regarding the alleged employment of
trainees/apprentices on a regular basis.
● The court did not award costs.

29. Western India Automobiles Association vs. State of Bombay

Facts –

● This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Bombay
regarding a writ of prohibition issued by Coyajee J. against an Industrial
Tribunal.
● The dispute in question is between the Western India Automobile
Association and its workers, referred under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, XIV of 1947.
● Coyajee J. initially held that the Western India Automobile Association was
an employer, but the dispute regarding the reinstatement of dismissed
employees was outside the scope of the Act.
● The Province appealed, and Coyajee J.'s decision on the reinstatement issue
was set aside. The appellate court held that the dispute falls within the
definition of an "industrial dispute" under the Act.

Issue –

The principal question is whether the definition of "industrial dispute" in the

Industrial Disputes Act includes a dispute concerning the reinstatement of
dismissed employees?

Reasoning –

46
 ● The definition in the Industrial Disputes Act is neither exhaustive nor
inclusive.
● The Act was intended to be more comprehensive than its predecessor, the
Trade Disputes Act, 1929.
● The term "in connection with" in the definition widens the scope of the
dispute.
● The jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends to disputes related to employment or
non-employment, and if termination by the employer results in non-
employment, it falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
● The power to grant reinstatement is within the Tribunal's jurisdiction as it is
covered by the definition of "industrial dispute."
● The distinction made in a previous case regarding the unusual power of
reinstatement does not apply to Act XIV of 1947.

Judgment –

The appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs. The decision of the High Court of
Bombay, which held that the dispute, including the issue of reinstatement, falls
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, is upheld.

30. T.P. Srivastava vs. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd.

Facts –

● The appellant, a Section Salesman in the service of the respondent-company,

was terminated from service on the grounds of unauthorized absence.
● The Government of Rajasthan referred the question of the legality and
justification of the termination to the Labour Court.
● The Labour Court, in its award, held that the appellant was not a
"workman," making the reference incompetent. However, it found the
termination itself to be illegal.

47
Issue –

The main issue is whether the appellant qualifies as a "workman" under the
Industrial Disputes Act, as the Labour Court deemed the reference incompetent
based on this classification?

Reasoning –

● The appellant's employment involved canvassing and promoting sales for

the company, suggesting ways to improve sales, studying the market, and
participating in advertising and publicity efforts.
● The nature of the appellant's duties required imaginative and creative
thinking, not fitting the categories of manual, skilled, unskilled, or clerical
work.
● The supervision of other salesmen was considered incidental to the main role
of canvassing and promotion.
● The Tribunal relied on precedents and cited the Sales Promotion Employees
(Conditions of Service) Act, 1976, enacted after the appellant's termination,
which supports the view that employees engaged in sales promotion may not
be considered workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Judgment –

● The Court upholds the Labour Court's decision that the Industrial Disputes
Act is not applicable to the appellant.
● To address the injustice of the termination, the company is directed to pay
the appellant an amount equivalent to three years' salary at the rate he was
drawing when the services were terminated, in addition to any amount paid
during the appeal's pendency.
● The direction for compensation is specific to this case and should not be
treated as a precedent.
● The appeal is dismissed, and there is no order as to costs.
48
 31. Miss A. Sundarambal vs. Government of Goa, Daman & Diu

Overview –

This case dealt with the issue of whether a teacher working in a school will be
considered a Workman or not under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act,
1947. It also focuses on the issue of ‘school’ falling under the Industrial Dispute
Act, 1947 as industry.

Facts –

The appellant, Miss A. Sundarambal, was employed as a teacher in a school

conducted by the Society of Franciscan Sisters of Mary at Caranzalem, Goa. Her
services were terminated, leading to the initiation of conciliation proceedings under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Government declined to make a reference
for adjudication, asserting that the appellant did not qualify as a 'workman' under
the Act. Subsequently, the appellant filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus
directing the Government to make a reference for the determination of the validity
of her termination. The High Court, in its judgment dated 5th September 1983,
dismissed the writ petition, holding that the appellant was not a 'workman' under
the Act.

Issues –

● Whether the school in question qualifies as an industry?

● Whether the appellant, being a teacher, can be considered a 'workman' under

the Industrial Disputes Act?

Reasoning –

● The first issue was briefly addressed, referencing a prior decision

(University of Delhi & Anr. v. Ram Nath) to establish that educational
institutions, including schools, are considered industries.

49
 ● The primary focus was on whether the appellant, as a teacher, could be
categorized as a 'workman' under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The definition of 'workman' includes individuals engaged in skilled or
unskilled manual, supervisory, technical, or clerical work.
● The court highlighted the nature of a teacher's role, emphasizing the mission
of imparting education, molding characters, and building personalities. It
concluded that the clerical work, if any, performed by teachers was
incidental to their main work of teaching.
● Reference was made to May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
establishing that for a person to be considered a workman, their main duties
must involve skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work.
● The court rejected the suggestion that all employees in an industry, except
those falling under specified exceptions, should be treated as workmen. Such
an interpretation would render the specific categories in the definition
meaningless.
● The judgment acknowledged the importance of ensuring justice for teachers
and suggested the need for legislative measures to address disputes between
teachers and educational institutions.

Judgment –

● The first issue was briefly addressed, referencing a prior decision

(University of Delhi & Anr. v. Ram Nath) to establish that educational
institutions, including schools, are considered industries.
● The primary focus was on whether the appellant, as a teacher, could be
categorized as a 'workman' under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The definition of 'workman' includes individuals engaged in skilled or
unskilled manual, supervisory, technical, or clerical work.
● The court highlighted the nature of a teacher's role, emphasizing the mission
of imparting education, molding characters, and building personalities. It

50
 concluded that the clerical work, if any, performed by teachers was
incidental to their main work of teaching.
● Reference was made to May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
establishing that for a person to be considered a workman, their main duties
must involve skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work.
● The court rejected the suggestion that all employees in an industry, except
those falling under specified exceptions, should be treated as workmen. Such
an interpretation would render the specific categories in the definition
meaningless.
● The judgment acknowledged the importance of ensuring justice for teachers
and suggested the need for legislative measures to address disputes between
teachers and educational institutions.

32. Management of M/S. Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills vs. Ajit Singh

Facts –

● The Respondent was appointed by the Appellant as a Legal Assistant with

duties including legal work, representing the Appellant, and conducting
departmental enquiries.
● The post of Legal Assistant was abolished, leading to the termination of the
Respondent's services.
● The Respondent raised an industrial dispute questioning the justification of
his termination.
● The Labour Court framed issues, including whether the Respondent qualifies
as a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Issues –

51
 ● Whether the Respondent is a 'workman' as per Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act?
● Whether the termination of the Respondent's services was proper and
justified?

Reasoning –

● The definition of 'workman' includes those employed in manual, skilled,

technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory work.
● The Respondent's job involved legal and clerical work, but the dominant
nature was legal and quasi-judicial in character.
● The Court considered the precedent in S.K. Verma but held it per incuriam
based on a later decision in H.R. Adyanthaya. The latter affirmed the
importance of the nature of duties in determining workman status.
● The Respondent, engaged in legal and quasi-judicial functions, did not fit
the definition of a 'workman'.

Judgment –

The impugned judgments of the Labour Court and the High Court were set aside.
The Court directed the Appellant to pay the balance of 50% back wages to the
Respondent within eight weeks and there were no costs awarded in this case.

Additional Points –

● The principle of res judicata does not apply when a jurisdictional question is
wrongly decided.
● The Court clarified the inapplicability of Section 16(3) of the Arbitration Act
in the context of remitting a part of an award.

33. Darshan Lal vs Director, State Transport And Sons

52
Facts –

● The petitioner, employed as a Legal Assistant by Punjab Roadways, had his

services terminated without notice, charge-sheet, or inquiry on April 3,
1980.
● The petitioner raised an industrial dispute, claiming relief under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
● The management argued that the petitioner was not a "workman" as per
Section 2(s) of the Act, and thus, not entitled to relief.

Issues –

Whether the petitioner, working as a Legal Assistant, qualifies as a "workman"

under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act?

Reasoning –

● The Labour Court, siding with the management, held that the petitioner is
not a workman and, therefore, declined to grant any relief.
● The critical question is whether the petitioner, a Legal Assistant, is a
workman under Section 2(s) of the Act.
● The court refers to a prior decision (Rajesh Garg v. Punjab State Tubewell
Corporation Ltd., 1985 1 PLR 153) where a similar position as a Legal
Assistant was considered a workman.
● The duties of the petitioner were described as "techno-clerical," involving
legal knowledge but not administrative or managerial functions.
● The respondent argued that the petitioner's salary exceeded Rs. 500,
invoking Clause (iv) of Section 2(s). The court rejects this, stating that the
petitioner did not perform managerial functions or work in a supervisory
capacity.

Judgment –

53
 ● The court sets aside the Labour Court's award as it did not decide the matter
on merits.
● The case is remitted back to the Labour Court to determine if the termination
was contrary to law and if the petitioner is entitled to relief.
● No costs are awarded.

34. Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla vs. Union of India and Ors.

Facts –

● The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Medical Officer in Class II on

an ad hoc basis by the Railways in 1975.
● The post of Assistant Medical Officer Class II was created due to the non-
availability of Class I officers after an upgrade in 1973.
● The petitioner's services were terminated in 1979 but later restored based on
a court interim order.
● The petitioner's services were terminated again in 1983, and the challenge
was against this termination in the present writ petition.

Issues –

Whether the petitioner, an Assistant Medical Officer Class II, is a 'workman' under
the Industrial Disputes Act, making the termination subject to compliance with
Section 25-F of the Act?

Reasoning –

● The petitioner argued that he was a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes
Act, and his termination without complying with Section 25-F of the Act
rendered the order invalid.

54
 ● The Railways asserted that the petitioner was not a 'workman' and that
Section 25-F did not apply to his case.
● The duties of an Assistant Divisional Medical Officer, as cited by the
Railways, were different from those of an Assistant Medical Officer Class II.
● The court examined the primary duty of the petitioner, emphasizing that his
main purpose was to treat railway employees and their families.
● Referring to precedent, the court established that a doctor's work is of a
technical nature, and any supervisory functions are incidental to medical
duties.
● The petitioner was deemed a 'workman,' and the non-compliance with
Section 25-F rendered the termination void.

Judgment –

● The order terminating the petitioner's services on November 11, 1983, was
quashed.
● The petitioner is deemed to be in service and entitled to emoluments as if the
termination order had not been made.
● The petitioner is awarded costs.

● The court recognized the right to livelihood as protected by Article 21 of the

Constitution and, considering the prolonged unemployment of the petitioner,
declined to relegate him to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act.

35. Mar Baselios Medical Mission Hospital vs. Dr. Joseph Babu

Facts –

A hospital filed a writ appeal challenging the order of the Labour Court, which
affirmed that a consultant physician employed by the hospital is a "worker" within

55
the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The doctor had
filed a claim petition seeking wage arrears for Sundays and holidays worked
during 1989 to 1991.

Issues –

The primary issue was whether the consultant physician qualifies as a "worker"
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act?

Reasoning –

● The claimant was a Post-Graduate Doctor employed by the hospital.

● The Labour Court ruled in favor of the claimant, but the hospital contested,
arguing that the doctor is not a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Act.
● The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the Burma Shell case,
which held that a doctor is a "workman."
● The appellant relied on a recent Supreme Court judgment (Muir Mills Unit
of N.T.C. v. Swayam Prakash Srivastava) to contest the Labour Court's
order.
● The court considered the position that a teacher is not a workman, as
established in the Sundarambal case.
● The court examined the Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation
Ltd. case, where the Supreme Court assumed that a medical officer could be
a workman if not engaged in a supervisory capacity.
● The court referred to a more recent Supreme Court judgment declaring that a
professional cannot be termed as a workman.
● The appellant argued that, even if the doctor's work is technical, the test of
supervisory work stands satisfied, placing the doctor outside the scope of a
workman.

56
 ● The court agreed that a senior doctor engaged in diagnosis and treatment
inherently involves the supervision of subordinate medical staff.

Judgment –

The court allowed the appeal, vacating the judgment of the single judge and the
order of the Labour Court. It dismissed the claim petition filed by the doctor under
Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, holding that the doctor, being
engaged in supervisory and technical work, does not qualify as a workman.

36. Hussainbhai vs. Alath Factory Thozhilali Union

Facts –

The petitioner, a factory owner manufacturing ropes, hired workmen through

contractors to make ropes within the factory. The workmen were denied
employment, leading to a reference and an industrial award. The petitioner
contended that the workmen were contractors' employees, not directly employed
by the petitioner.

Issues –

The primary issue was whether the workmen were employees of the petitioner or
the contractors, determining the applicability of industrial law?

Reasoning –

● The work done by the 29 workmen was integral to the industry.

● The raw material, factory premises, equipment, and finished products

belonged to the petitioner.
● Workmen were under the control of the petitioner, and defective articles
were rectified by the petitioner.
● The economic reality was an employer-employee relationship.

57
 ● The petitioner's argument that agreements with contractors severed the
employer-employee relationship was rejected.
● The court considered the principles of industrial jurisprudence and social
justice, emphasizing the protection of workers' livelihood.
● The true test was whether the goods or services produced by the workers
benefited another's business, making that entity the real employer.
● Intermediate contractors' presence was irrelevant when the real employer
had economic control over workers' subsistence, skill, and continued
employment.
● Legal forms and appearances could not conceal the real-life bond between
the workers and the management.
● The court must be astute to avoid mischief and achieve the purpose of labor
laws, focusing on the real-life relationship rather than legal formalities.
● If livelihood substantially depended on labor rendered for the benefit of an
enterprise, the presence of intermediaries could not break the real-life bond.
● The court dismissed the petitioner's argument that the workmen were not
directly employed, as the facts supported the conclusion that the
management was the real employer.

Judgment –

The petition was dismissed, upholding the conclusion that the workmen were
employees of the petitioner, and the industrial law was applicable.

37. The Sirsilk Ltd. And Others vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh

Facts –

The appeals involve a common question. In one of the appeals, certain disputes
between the appellant and its workers were referred to the Industrial Tribunal.

58
Before the government could publish the award under Section 17 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, a settlement was reached between the employer and employees. The
parties jointly requested the government not to publish the award, but the
government, considering Section 17 mandatory, declined. The appellants filed writ
petitions challenging this decision.

Issues –

● Whether Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, mandating the

publication of an award within a specified period, is mandatory or directory?
● In case of conflict between a settlement binding under Section 18(1) and an
award binding under Section 18(3) on publication, what should be the course
of action for the government?

Reasoning –

● The use of the word "shall" in Section 17(1) indicates its mandatory nature.
The provision requires the government to publish the award within a specific
timeframe. The finality of the award on publication, as mentioned in Section
17(2), supports the mandatory interpretation.
● Considering the mandatory nature of Section 17(1) and the binding nature
of a settlement under Section 18(1), a potential conflict arises. The
settlement becomes binding as soon as it is signed and comes into operation.
The court suggests that in such cases, the government should withhold the
publication of the award to avoid conflict between a binding settlement and
a binding award.
● The court acknowledges that the situation, where a settlement is reached
after the tribunal has sent its award to the government, is exceptional. In
such cases, the government, considering the binding nature of the settlement,
should refrain from publishing the award to prevent a possible conflict.
● If disputes arise regarding the bona fides of a settlement, the government can
refer the matter for adjudication. In such cases, if the settlement is found not

59
 to be binding under Section 18(1), the government can then proceed to
publish the award.

Judgment –

The court allows the appeals, directing the government not to publish the awards
sent by the industrial tribunal in view of the binding settlements reached between
the parties under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The parties are
ordered to bear their own costs.

38. Ramachandra Spinning Mills vs. State Of Madras And Anr.

Facts –

● The plaintiff, a partnership firm named Sri Ramachandra Spinning Mills,

faced a situation where it had to shut down its mill due to financial losses.
● Government-appointed adjudicators, Mr. Sherfuddin and Mr.
Venkataramiah, were involved in determining dearness allowance rates and
the overall wage structure of textile mills.
● The plaintiff complied with government orders related to wages and
dearness allowance until June 1947.
● Citing financial losses, the plaintiff closed its mill on July 1, 1947, intending
to reopen on April 1, 1948.
● The government perceived this closure as an industrial dispute and referred
the matter to an adjudicator, Mr. Markandeyulu.
● The plaintiff contested the classification of the closure as an industrial
dispute and challenged the government orders related to it.
● The second defendant, an employee, filed a suit for pending wages based on
Mr. Venkataramiah's award.

Issues –

60
 ● Are government orders ultra vires, void, and not binding on the plaintiffs?

● Is the plaintiff a registered firm?

● Is the suit not maintainable under the Industrial Disputes (Madras

Amendment) Act, 1949?
● Does the court lack jurisdiction to try the suit?

● Does the closure of the mill from July 1, 1947, to March 31, 1948, amount
to a "lockout"?
● What reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled to?

Reasoning –

● The definition of "lockout" under the Industrial Disputes Act includes the
closing of a place of employment or the suspension of work by an employer.
● The adjudicator, Mr. Markandeyulu, made a distinction between closures
due to uncontrollable reasons (act of God) and deliberate acts by the
employer. The focus was on the intention behind the closure.
● The plaintiff provided financial evidence indicating losses and justified the
shutdown as a bona fide business decision.
● Arguments suggesting profitability and capital gains were countered by
considering depreciation, business decisions, and the inability to utilize
capital gains for immediate payments.

Judgment –

● The court declared that government orders were null and void as they were
based on a misconception of facts.
● The Industrial Disputes (Madras Amendment) Act, 1949, did not bar the
suit.

61
 ● The court had jurisdiction to try the suit, and the plaintiff was a registered
firm.
● The closure of the mill was deemed a bona fide business decision, not a
lockout.
● The plaintiff was not liable for wages or dearness allowance during the
shutdown.
● The second defendant's claim for wages was rejected.

● The second defendant was directed to pay the costs of the plaintiff.

39. Delta Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Their Workmen

Facts –

● Workmen requested Friday evening and Saturday morning off for

Muharram, which was denied by management.
● Management agreed to declare the whole of Saturday as a holiday.

● Workmen requested wages on Friday morning instead of the evening.

● It's unclear if management accepted this demand.

● Workmen, en masse, absented themselves from the Friday afternoon shift,

disrupting work.

Issues –

● Whether the collective absence of workmen from the Friday afternoon shift
constitutes a strike?
● Whether the management's actions regarding the holiday and wage payment
influenced the work stoppage?
62
Reasoning –

● The workmen's joint request for time off and the subsequent mass absence
indicate a common intention to disrupt the Friday afternoon shift.
● The management's decisions on holiday and wage payment have contributed
to the workmen's actions.
● The absence of clarity regarding management conceding to the wage
payment demand leaves room for speculation on the workmen's motivation.

Judgment –

● It was held that, the collective absence of workmen from the Friday
afternoon shift is deemed a strike.
● The common intention to remain absent indicates a concerted effort to
disrupt work, irrespective of the management's decisions on holiday and
wage payment.
● The disruption of work during the afternoon shift on Friday constitutes a
clear instance of a strike.

40. Standard Vacuum Oil Compny, Madras vs. Gunaseelan and Ors.

Facts –

● The workers of the company wanted to celebrate the May Day.

● They requested the employer to declare that day a holiday.

● The employees were ready to compensate the loss of work by working on a

Sunday.
● The company rejected the suggestion and refused to declare the May Day as
a holiday.

63
 ● On the company’s failure to declare the May Day as a holiday, the workers
absented themselves from the work.

Issue –

The question was whether this procedure resulted in a strike?

Reasoning –

The workers applied for the leave and their leave was rejected by the company.
When the workers are absent from the work without the leave is approved, it will
amount to misconduct and not strike.

Judgment –

The full bench held that, there was cessation of work or concerted refusal to work
and the action of the employees to absent themselves from the work did not
amount to strike.

41. Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs. Its Workmen

Facts –

Mr. Sabbarval, a typist and secretary of the Punjab National Bank Employees'
Union in Delhi, applied for 7 days' leave, but the management declined the request.
Despite the denial, Sabbarval absented himself from duty. Upon his return, he was
chargesheeted for unauthorized absence. Sabbarval refused to accept the show-
cause notice, leading to his suspension pending further inquiry. In response, the
employees' union instructed its members to stick to their seats and refuse to work
until police intervention or until orders of discharge or suspension were served.
This resulted in 60 employees being suspended. A crowd gathered outside the bank
premises, expressing support for the employees. The management, in response,
terminated the services of 150 employees who did not resume duties by a specified
date.

Issues –

64
Whether the employees' refusal to work, as instructed by the union, amounts to a
strike?

Reasoning –

The court considered the nature of the employees' activities—sticking to their seats
but refusing to work. Refusal, under common understanding, to continue working
constitutes a strike. The employees, following the union's instructions, entered the
premises and refused to take up their pens, meeting the criteria of a strike under
Section 2(q) of the relevant law.

Judgment –

The court concluded that the employees' activities, characterized by their refusal to
work in accordance with a common understanding instructed by the union,
amounted to a strike under Section 2(q). Therefore, the nature of their actions fell
within the definition of a strike, and the management's response, including
suspension and termination, was justified.

42. Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. GR Sapre

Facts –

Premier Automobiles Ltd. had three plants in Kurla, Kalyan, and Wadala. Workers
in the Kurla plant engaged in a go-slow protest due to the non-recognition of their
union. In response, the management not only locked out the Kurla plant but also
suspended work at the Kalyan plant.

Issue –

Whether the suspension and stoppage of work at the Kalyan Plant constituted a
lockout?

Reasoning –

The court reasoned that the definition of a lockout was broad enough to encompass
any process of stopping work. Even though the employers did not explicitly make
demands against the workers, the court held that it was not necessary for explicit

65
demands and that demands could be implied from the course of conduct. The court
concluded that the suspension of work at the Kalyan plant amounted to a 'lockout'
based on this interpretation.

Judgment –

The court held that the suspension of work at the Kalyan plant constituted a
lockout, emphasizing the broad definition that includes any form of work stoppage.
The implied demand from the conduct of the parties was deemed sufficient for
such a classification.

43. Workmen Of M/S Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India vs. Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Company

Facts –

The respondent company, based in Bombay, faced a strike at its Bombay factory,
leading to a shortage of products at its Delhi Distribution office. Subsequently, 17
out of 30 employees at the Delhi office were laid off due to reduced production
caused by the strike. The layoff was later recalled, but the employees were not paid
wages or compensation for the layoff period. An industrial dispute was raised,
questioning the legality and justification of the layoff.

Issues –

● Whether the management had the right to lay off the workmen?

● If yes, whether the workmen are entitled to claim wages or compensation for
the layoff period?

Reasoning –

The court considered the definition of "lay-off" under the Industrial Disputes Act,
the relevant provisions of Chapter VA, and the absence of specific provisions
granting the power to lay off in the Act. It was noted that in the absence of such
power in the contract, standing orders, or statute, the employer is obligated to pay

66
wages during the layoff period. The court distinguished layoff from retrenchment
and emphasized the need for a legal basis for layoff.

Judgment –

The court held that, in the absence of a contractual or statutory provision granting
the power to lay off, the workmen were laid off without legal authority.
Compensation for layoff, as provided in Chapter VA, was not applicable due to the
small number of employees (30) at the Delhi office. The court directed that 75% of
the basic wages and dearness allowance be paid to the workmen for the layoff
period. The judgment clarified that this directive would not cover cases where
workmen had already settled or compromised their disputes. In another set of
appeals with identical facts from the Madras office, the court held that the laid-off
workmen were entitled to quantification of wages for the layoff period under
section 33C(2) of the Act. All the appeals were allowed, and there was no order as
to costs.

44. Mgmt Of Thanjavur Textiles Ltd. vs. B. Purushotham And Ors.

Facts –

● Respondents 1 to 3 were employees of the appellant company.

● A domestic enquiry, based on alleged misconduct, was conducted by an

advocate appointed by the company's manager.
● The findings of the advocate-led enquiry resulted in the dismissal of the
employees on November 24, 1980.
● Respondents 1 and 2 sought reference, but only respondents 1 to 3 were
referred to the Labour Court by the government.
● The Labour Court, in its April 28, 1988 award, found the reference invalid
for respondents 1 to 3, stating it lacked union sponsorship. It also gave
alternative findings on the misconduct charges.

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 ● Respondents filed a Writ Petition, which the Single Judge allowed,
remanding the case to the Labour Court for evidence and wage
determination.
● The Division Bench upheld the referral to the advocate but held that findings
on misconduct by the advocate were improper.

Issues –

● Whether the manager's appointment of an advocate for the enquiry was

valid?
● Whether the advocate could give findings on the misconduct of the
employees?
● The impact of the advocate's findings on the overall award and remand?

Reasoning –

● The Standing Order's language regarding enquiry officers was debated, but it
was unnecessary to determine as the workmen's counsel conceded the
advocate's appointment validity.
● The concession established that an advocate could be appointed, giving them
normal enquiry officer powers, including findings on misconduct.
● Distinctions were made from prior cases where delegation wasn't allowed.
The Division Bench's error in not considering these distinctions was
highlighted.

Judgment –

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench and Single Judge's
judgments. Relief was rejected for respondents 1 and 3 due to the nature of the
proven misconduct. Relief was not granted to respondent 1, and there were no
costs awarded.

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 45. Munuswami (M) vs. Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity
System

Facts –

The petitioner, Munuswami, was a lineman, grade-I and 3 charges were framed
against him: filing of a false petition against a superior officer, leaving the station
before the actual sanction of casual leave and unauthorized extension of casual
leave. When the enquiry was done by the Divisional Engineer, Vellore, the
witnesses were examined in support of charges, the lineman had applied for leave
and was actually on leave on those days.

The petitioner had been sanctioned leave for the purpose of attending on his sick
wife. He asked for postponement of enquiry. The postponement was refused and
witnesses were examined on ex parte basis by enquiry officer. After that enquiry,
the officer took into account the explanation submitted by the petitioner,
presumably after he returned from leave, found the petitioner guilty of charges and
reduced him to the rank of wireman for a period of one year. There was a further
ride to the order stating that his case for restoration to the post of lineman, grade-I,
would be considered after period of one year, only if he shows good conduct.

Issue –

Whether holding an enquiry during petitioner’s absence when he was on leave was
proper?

Reasoning –

The petitioner had been sanctioned leave for attending on his ailing wife. The
authorities should have granted him the adjournment of the enquiry and not
insisted on his partaking in the enquiry during the period when he was on leave,
which was already sanctioned by the appropriate authority.

Judgment –

It was held that, it was improper for the officer to hold an enquiry during the
petitioner’s absence when he was on leave for attending on his ailing wife.

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 46. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay vs. Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors.

Facts –

● The appellant, an employee, faced a disciplinary enquiry for alleged

misconduct.
● The appellant requested permission to engage a legal practitioner for
defense, but this request was denied.
● Two legally trained officers were appointed as Presenting Officers by the
employer for the enquiry.
● The enquiry continued, leading to the dismissal of the appellant.

● The appellant challenged the dismissal in court, arguing a denial of natural

justice.

Issues –

● Whether the denial of the appellant's request to be represented by a legal

practitioner in the disciplinary enquiry violated the principles of natural
justice?
● Whether the appointment of legally trained officers as Presenting Officers
while denying legal representation to the appellant created an unfair
imbalance?

Reasoning –

● The court considered the evolving perspective on the right to legal

representation in domestic enquiries.
● It emphasized the need for fairness and equality, especially when legally
trained officers represented the employer.
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 ● The court noted that the refusal to allow legal representation while
appointing legal officers for the employer creates an imbalance and may
result in an unfair enquiry.
● Reference was made to constitutional principles, emphasizing the
importance of fair procedures, even in domestic enquiries.
● The court distinguished previous decisions that did not consider the
imbalance created by legally trained officers on one side and an
unrepresented employee on the other.
● The court also highlighted the obligation to review the denial of legal
representation, especially when regulations changed during the course of the
enquiry.

Judgment –

● The court held that the denial of the appellant's request for legal
representation, coupled with the appointment of legally trained officers for
the employer, violated the principles of natural justice.
● The dismissal order was set aside.

● The court directed the continuation of the enquiry but allowed the appellant
the right to legal representation.
● The appellant was entitled to cross-examine witnesses, adduce fresh
evidence, and participate effectively in the enquiry.
● The suspension order was revived, and subsistence allowance was directed
to be paid to the appellant until the conclusion of the enquiry.

47. State of Uttarakhand and Ors. vs. Sureshwati

Facts –

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 ● The State of Uttarakhand filed a Special Leave Petition challenging the High
Court's decision to reverse the Labour Court's award and direct the
reinstatement of the Respondent.
● The Respondent, initially employed as an Assistant Teacher and later as a
Clerk in a private school, claimed illegal termination in 2006.
● The school, initially unaided, started receiving grants-in-aid from the state in
2005, becoming governed by the Uttaranchal School Education Act, 2006.
● The Respondent alleged termination without hearing or compensation in
2006, nine years after her marriage, prompting a complaint.

Issues –

● Did the Respondent abandon her service since her marriage in 1997, as
claimed by the Appellants?
● Was the termination of the Respondent's services in 2006 illegal, as claimed
by the Respondent?
● Did the High Court err in setting aside the Labour Court's award solely on
the ground of no disciplinary inquiry?

Reasoning –

● The School presented evidence that the Respondent had abandoned her
service after marriage in 1997.
● The Labour Court, after affording a full opportunity for evidence, found the
Respondent failed to prove continuous employment until her alleged
termination in 2006.
● The Respondent's claims lacked supporting evidence like attendance
registers or salary slips. The High Court didn't consider this evidence but
solely focused on the absence of a disciplinary inquiry.

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 ● Previous decisions established that if no domestic inquiry is conducted, the
employer can justify the action before the tribunal. The tribunal has the
authority to consider all relevant evidence to determine the justification of
dismissal.

Judgment –

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment.
The Labour Court's award, which found the Respondent's termination legal, was
restored. The Respondent failed to discharge the onus to prove continuous
employment and the illegality of her termination. No costs were awarded, and
pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

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