Fundamentals of Human Resource Management 5th Edition Noe Test Bank
Fundamentals of Human Resource Management 5th Edition Noe Test Bank
Fundamentals of Human Resource Management 5th Edition Noe Test Bank
Training Employees
1. Training refers to any planned effort by a firm to facilitate the learning of job-related
knowledge, skills, or behavior by employees.
True False
2. The last step in the instructional design process involves choosing a training method.
True False
True False
True False
5. The task analysis phase of needs assessment includes determining employees’ readiness for
training.
True False
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
6. Readiness for training is a combination of employee characteristics and positive work
environment that permit training.
True False
7. Social support refers to the ways the organization’s people encourage training.
True False
True False
True False
10. Presentation methods are preferred over hands-on training methods in helping trainees to
handle interpersonal issues.
True False
11. The training technique most widely used in the workplace is behavior modeling.
True False
12. Attending classes is a faster and more efficient method of learning new skills as compared to
EPSSs.
True False
7-2
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
13. Apprenticeship programs can only be sponsored by the government.
True False
14. For on-the-job training (OJT) programs to be effective, an organization should review OJT
practices at companies in similar industries.
True False
15. Training programs use case studies to develop employees’ management skills.
True False
True False
17. Coordination training trains the team in understanding and practicing each other’s skills so
that they are prepared to step in and take another member’s place.
True False
18. Action learning uses challenging, structured outdoor activities, which include difficult sports.
True False
19. Along with physical elements, the training context should include emotional elements.
True False
7-3
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
20. If a concept involves more than five items, the training program should deliver information in
shorter sessions or chunks.
True False
21. The best stage to prepare for evaluating a training program is after the program has been
implemented.
True False
22. The most accurate way to assess training effectiveness is to conduct pretests and posttests
and then train all the employees.
True False
23. Orientation training is designed to prepare employees to perform their job effectively, learn
about the organization, and establish work relationships.
True False
24. A risk of diversity training programs is that they may alienate minorities.
True False
25. Interaction with persons from different cultures is known as cultural immersion.
True False
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
26. An organization’s planned effort to help employees acquire job-related knowledge, skills,
abilities, and behaviors is known as:_____
A. attrition.
B. benchmarking.
C. training.
D. compensation.
E. electromation.
27. _____ refers to a process of systematically developing training to meet specified needs.
A. Fair representation
B. Orientation
C. Bumping
D. Instructional design
E. Organization analysis
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
29. What is a learning management system?
A. A team of trainers and human resource professionals who are responsible for planning and
conducting the training programs in an organization.
B. The process of evaluating the organization, individual employees, and employees’ tasks to
determine what kinds of training, if any, are necessary.
30. Which of the following defines needs assessment in the context of training?
A. It is the process of evaluating the organization, individual employees, and employees’ tasks
to determine what kinds of training are necessary.
C. It is a process that evaluates the monetary needs of employees that can motivate them to
undertake a training program.
7-6
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in any manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
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the Army, and, in case of his inability, through the next in rank,” was
unconstitutional, and not binding upon General Emory; the intent
being to induce General Emory to violate the law, and to obey orders
issued directly from the President.
The foregoing articles of impeachment were adopted on the 2d of
March, the votes upon each slightly varying, the average being 125
ayes to 40 nays. The question then came up of appointment of
managers on the part of the House to conduct the impeachment
before the Senate. Upon this question the Democratic members did
not vote; 118 votes were cast, 60 being necessary to a choice. The
following was the result, the number of votes cast for each elected
manager being given: Stevens of Penn., 105; Butler, of Mass., 108;
Bingham, of Ohio, 114; Boutwell, of Mass., 113; Wilson, of Iowa, 112;
Williams, of Penn., 107; Logan, of Ill., 106. The foregoing seven
Representatives were, therefore, duly chosen as Managers of the Bill
of Impeachment. The great body of the Democratic members of the
House entered a formal protest against the whole course of
proceedings involved in the impeachment of the President. They
claimed to represent “directly or in principle more than one-half of
the people of the United States.” This protest was signed by forty-five
Representatives.
On the 3d the Board of Managers presented two additional articles
of impeachment, which were adopted by the House. The first
charges, in substance, that
“The President, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of
the harmony and courtesies which ought to be maintained between
the executive and legislative branches of the Government of the
United States, designing to set aside the rightful authority and
powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace the Congress
of the United States and the several branches thereof, to impair and
destroy the regard and respect of all the good people of the United
States for the Congress and legislative power thereof, and to excite
the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States
against Congress and the laws by it enacted; and in pursuance of his
said design openly and publicly, and before divers assemblages
convened in divers parts thereof to meet and receive said Andrew
Johnson as the Chief Magistrate of the United States, did on the 18th
day of August, in the year of our Lord 1866, and on divers other days
and times, as well before as afterward, make and deliver with a loud
voice certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues,
and did therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces as well against
Congress as the laws of the United States duly enacted thereby.”
To this article are appended copious extracts from speeches of Mr.
Johnson. The second article is substantially as follows:
“The President did, on the 18th day of August, 1866, at the City of
Washington, by public speech, declare and affirm in substance that
the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of
the United States, authorized by the Constitution to exercise
legislative power under the same, but, on the contrary, was a
Congress of only a part of the States, thereby denying and intending
to deny that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory
upon him, except in so far as he saw fit to approve the same, and did
devise and contrive means by which he might prevent Edwin M.
Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of the office of
Secretary for the Department of War; and, also, by further unlawfully
devising and contriving means to prevent the execution of an act
entitled ‘An act making appropriations for the support of the army
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,’
approved March 2, 1867; and also to prevent the execution of an act
entitled ‘An act to provide for the more efficient government of the
rebel States,’ passed March 2, 1867, did commit and was guilty of a
high misdemeanor in office.”
On the 4th of March the Senate notified the House that they were
ready to receive the Managers of the Impeachment. They appeared,
and the articles were formally read. The Senate had meanwhile
adopted the rules of procedure. Chief Justice Chase sent a
communication to the Senate to the effect that this body, when acting
upon an impeachment, was a Court presided over by the Chief
Justice, and that all orders and rules should be framed by the Court.
On the 5th the Court was formally organized. An exception was taken
to the eligibility of Mr. Wade as a member of the Court, on the
ground that he was a party interested, since, in the event of the
impeachment being sustained, he, as President of the Senate, would
become Acting President of the United States. This objection was
withdrawn, and Mr. Wade was sworn as a member of the Court. On
the 7th the summons for the President to appear was formally served
upon him. On the 13th the Court was again formally reopened. The
President appeared by his counsel, Hon. Henry Stanbery, of Ohio;
Hon. Wm. M. Evarts, of New York; Hon. Wm. S. Groesbeck, of Ohio;
Hon. Benjamin R. Curtis, of Massachusetts; Hon. Thomas A. R.
Nelson, of Tennessee, who asked for forty days to prepare an answer
to the indictment. This was refused, and ten days granted; it being
ordered that the proceedings should reopen on the 23d. Upon that
day the President appeared by his counsel, and presented his answer
to the articles of impeachment. This reply was in substance as
follows:
The first eight articles in the Bill of Impeachment, as briefly
summed up in our last record, are based upon the action of the
President in ordering the removal of Mr. Stanton, and the temporary
appointment of General Thomas as Secretary of War. The gist of
them is contained in the first article, charging the unlawful removal
of Mr. Stanton; for, this failing, the others would fail also. To this
article a considerable part of the President’s answer is devoted. It is
mainly an amplification of the points put forth in the Message of
February 24th, in which he gave his reasons for his orders. The
President cites the laws by which this department of the
administration was created, and the rules laid down for the duties
pertaining to it; prominent among which are: that the Secretary shall
“conduct the business of the department in such manner as the
President of the United States shall from time to time order and
instruct;” and that he should “hold the office during the pleasure of
the President;” and that Congress had no legal right to deprive the
President of the power to remove the Secretary. He was, however,
aware that the design of the Tenure-of-Office Bill was to vest this
power of removal, in certain cases, jointly in the Executive and the
Senate; and that, while believing this act to be unconstitutional, yet it
having been passed over his veto by the requisite majority of two-
thirds, he considered it to be his duty to ascertain in how far the case
of Mr. Stanton came within the provisions of this law; after
consideration, he came to the conclusion that the case did not come
within the prohibitions of the law, and that, by that law he still had
the right of removing Mr. Stanton; but that, wishing to have the case
decided by the Supreme Court, he, on the 12th of August, issued the
order merely suspending, not removing, Mr. Stanton, a power
expressly granted by the Tenure-of-Office Act, and appointed
General Grant Secretary of War ad interim. The President then
recites the subsequent action in the case of Mr. Stanton; and, as he
avers, still believing that he had the constitutional power to remove
him from office, issued the order of February 21st, for such removal,
designing to thus bring the matter before the Supreme Court. He
then proceeds formally to deny that at this time Mr. Stanton was in
lawful possession of the office of Secretary of War; and that,
consequently, the order for his removal was in violation of the
Tenure-of-Office Act; and that it was in violation of the Constitution
or of any law; or that it constituted any official crime or
misdemeanor.
In regard to the seven succeeding articles of impeachment the
President, while admitting the facts of the order appointing General
Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim, denies all and every of the
criminal charges therein set forth. So of the ninth article, charging an
effort to induce General Emory to violate the law, the President
denies all such intent, and calls attention to the fact that while, for
urgent reasons, he signed the bill prescribing that orders to the army
should be issued only through the General, he at the same time
declared it to be, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and affirms that
in his interview with General Emory he said no more than he had
before officially said to Congress—that is, that the law was
unconstitutional.
As to the tenth article, the first of the supplementary ones, the
President, while admitting that he made certain public speeches at
the times and places specified, does not admit that the passages cited
are fair reports of his remark; denies that he has ever been
unmindful of the courtesies which ought to be maintained between
the executive and legislative departments; but he claims the perfect
right at all times to express his views as to all public matters.
The reply to the eleventh article, the second supplementary one, is
to the same general purport, denying that he ever affirmed that the
Thirty-ninth Congress was not a valid Congress of the United States,
and its acts obligatory only as they were approved by him; and
denying that he had, as charged in the article, contrived unlawful
means for preventing Mr. Stanton from resuming the functions of
Secretary of War, or for preventing the execution of the act making
appropriations for the support of the army, or that to provide for the
more efficient government of the rebel States. In his answer to this
article the President refers to his reply to the first article, in which he
sets forth at length all the steps, and the reasons therefor, relating to
the removal of Mr. Stanton. In brief, the answer of the President to
the articles of impeachment is a general denial of each and every
criminal act charged in the articles of impeachment.
The counsel for the President then asked for a delay of thirty days
after the replication of the managers of the impeachment should
have been rendered, before the trial should formally proceed. This
was refused, and the managers of the impeachment stated that their
replication would be presented the next day: it was that,
“The Senate will commence the trial of the President upon the
articles of impeachment exhibited against him on Monday, the 30th
day of March, and proceed therein with all dispatch under the rules
of the Senate, sitting upon the trial of an impeachment.”
The replication of the House of Representatives was a simple
denial of each and every averment in the answer of the President,
closing thus:
“The House of Representatives ... do say that the said Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, is guilty of the high crimes
and misdemeanors mentioned in the said articles, and that the said
House of Representatives are ready to prove the same.”
The trial began, as appointed, on March 30. There being twenty-
seven States represented, there were fifty-four Senators, who
constituted the Court, presided over by Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase, of Ohio. Senators: California, Cole, Conness; Connecticut,
Dixon, Ferry; Delaware, Bayard, Saulsbury; Indiana, Hendricks,
Morton; Illinois, Trumbull, Yates; Iowa, Grimes, Harlan; Kansas,
Pomeroy, Ross; Kentucky, Davis, McCreery; Maine, Fessenden,
Morrill (Lot M.); Maryland, Johnson, Vickers; Massachusetts,
Sumner, Wilson; Michigan, Chandler, Howard; Minnesota, Norton,
Ramsay; Missouri, Drake, Henderson; Nebraska, Thayer, Tipton;
Nevada, Nye, Stewart; New Hampshire, Cragin, Patterson (J. W.);
New Jersey, Cattell, Frelinghuysen; New York, Conklin, Morgan;
Ohio, Sherman, Wade; Oregon, Corbett, Williams; Pennsylvania,
Buckalew, Cameron; Rhode Island, Anthony, Sprague; Tennessee,
Fowler, Patterson (David); Vermont, Edmunds, Merrill, (J. S.); West
Virginia, Van Winkle, Willey; Wisconsin, Doolittle, Howe.
Managers for the Prosecution: Messrs. Bingham, Boutwell, Butler,
Logan, Stevens, Williams, Wilson.
Counsel for the President. Messrs. Curtis, Evarts, Groesbeck,
Nelson, Stanbery.
The following was the order of procedure: The Senate convened at
11 or 12 o’clock, and was called to order by the president of that body,
who, after prayer, would leave the chair, which was immediately
assumed by the Chief Justice, who wore his official robes. The
prosecution was mainly conducted by Mr. Butler, who examined the
witnesses, and, in conjunction with the others, argued the points of
law which came up. The defense, during the early part of the trial,
was mainly conducted by Mr. Stanbery, who had resigned the office
of Attorney-General for this purpose, but, being taken suddenly ill,
Mr. Evarts took his place. According to the rule at first adopted, the
trial was to be opened by one counsel on each side, and summed up
by two on each side; but this rule was subsequently modified so as to
allow as many of the managers and counsel as chose to sum up,
either orally or by filing written arguments.
THE PROSECUTION.
The whole of the first day (March 30) was occupied by the opening
speech of Mr. Butler. After touching upon the importance of the case,
and the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in providing for its
possible occurrence, he laid down the following proposition,
supporting it by a copious array of authorities and precedents:
“We define, therefore, an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor
to be one, in its nature or consequences, subversive of some
fundamental or essential principle of government, or highly
prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a violation
of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act
committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the
abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives, or for any
improper purpose.”
He then proceeded to discuss the nature and functions of the
tribunal before which the trial is held. He asked: “Is this proceeding a
trial, as that term is understood, so far as relates to the rights and
duties of a court and jury upon an indictment for crime? Is it not
rather more in the nature of an inquest?” The Constitution, he urged,
“seems to have determined it to be the latter, because, under its
provisions, the right to retain and hold office is the only subject to be
finally adjudicated; all preliminary inquiry being carried on solely to
determine that question, and that alone.” He then proceeded to
argue that this body now sitting to determine the accusation, is the
Senate of the United States, and not a court. This question is of
consequence, he argued, because, in the latter case, it would be
bound by the rules and precedents of common law-statutes; the
members of the court would be liable to challenge on many grounds;
and the accused might claim that he could only be convicted when
the evidence makes the fact clear beyond reasonable doubt, instead
of by a preponderance of the evidence. The fact that in this case the
Chief Justice presides, it was argued, does not constitute the Senate
thus acting a court, for in all cases of impeachment, save that of the
President, its regular presiding officer presides. Moreover, the
procedures have no analogy to those of an ordinary court of justice.
The accused merely receives a notice of the case pending against
him. He is not required to appear personally, and the case will go on
without his presence. Mr. Butler thus summed up his position in this
regard:
“A constitutional tribunal solely, you are bound by no law, either
statute or common, which may limit your constitutional prerogative.
You consult no precedents save those of the law and custom of
parliamentary bodies. You are a law unto yourselves, bound only by
the natural principles of equity and justice, and that salus populi
suprema est lex.”
Mr. Butler then proceeded to consider the articles of
impeachment. The first eight, he says, “set out, in several distinct
forms, the acts of the President in removing Mr. Stanton and
appointing General Thomas, differing, in legal effect, in the purposes
for which, and the intent with which, either or both of the acts were
done, and the legal duties and rights infringed, and the Acts of
Congress violated in so doing.” In respect to all of these articles, Mr.
Butler says, referring to his former definition of what constituted an
impeachable high crime:
“All the articles allege these acts to be in contravention of his oath
of office, and in disregard of the duties thereof. If they are so,
however, the President might have the power to do them under the
law. Still, being so done, they are acts of official misconduct, and, as
we have seen, impeachable. The President has the legal power to do
many acts which, if done in disregard of his duty, or for improper
purposes, then the exercise of that power is an official misdemeanor.
For example, he has the power of pardon; if exercised, in a given
case, for a corrupt motive, as for the payment of money, or wantonly
pardoning all criminals, it would be a misdemeanor.”
Mr. Butler affirmed that every fact charged in the first article, and
substantially in the seven following, is admitted in the reply of the
President; and also that the general intent to set aside the Tenure-of-
Office Act is therein admitted and justified. He then proceeded to
discuss the whole question of the power of the President for removals
from office, and especially his claim that this power was imposed
upon the President by the Constitution, and that it could not be
taken from him, or be vested jointly in him and the Senate, partly or
in whole. This, Mr. Butler affirmed, was the real question at issue
before the Senate and the American people. He said:
“Has the President, under the Constitution, the more than royal
prerogative at will to remove from office, or to suspend from office,
all executive officers of the United States, either civil, military or
naval, and to fill the vacancies, without any restraint whatever, or
possibility of restraint, by the Senate or by Congress, through laws
duly enacted? The House of Representatives, in behalf of the people,
join issue by affirming that the exercise of such powers is a high
misdemeanor in office. If the affirmative is maintained by the
respondent, then, so far as the first eight articles are concerned—
unless such corrupt purposes are shown as will of themselves make
the exercise of a legal power a crime—the respondent must go, and
ought to go, quit and free.
This point as to the legal right of the President to make removals
from office, which constitutes the real burden of the articles of
impeachment, was argued at length. Mr. Butler assumed that the
Senate, by whom, in conjunction with the House, the Tenure-of-
Office Act had been passed over the veto of the President, would
maintain the law to be constitutional. The turning point was whether
the special case of the removal of Mr. Stanton came within the
provisions of this law. This rested upon the proviso of that law, that—
“The Secretaries shall hold their office during the term of the
President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one
month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”
The extended argument upon this point, made by Mr. Butler, was
to the effect that Mr. Stanton having been appointed by Mr. Lincoln,
whose term of office reached to the 4th of March, 1869, that of Mr.
Stanton existed until a month later, unless he was previously
removed by the concurrent action of the President and Senate. The
point of the argument is, that Mr. Johnson is merely serving out the
balance of the term of Mr. Lincoln, cut short by his assassination, so
that the Cabinet officers appointed by Mr. Lincoln held their places,
by this very proviso, during that term and for a month thereafter; for,
he argued, if Mr. Johnson was not merely serving out the balance of
Mr. Lincoln’s term, then he is entitled to the office of President for
four full years, that being the period for which a President is elected.
If, continues the argument, Mr. Stanton’s commission was vacated
by the Tenure-of-Office Act, it ceased on the 4th of April, 1865; or, if
the act had no retroactive effect, still, if Mr. Stanton held his office
merely under his commission from Mr. Lincoln, then his functions
would have ceased upon the passage of the bill, March 2, 1867; and,
consequently, Mr. Johnson, in “employing” him after that date as
Secretary of War, was guilty of a high misdemeanor, which would
give ground for a new article of impeachment.
After justifying the course of Mr. Stanton in holding on to the
secretaryship in opposition to the wish of the President, on the
ground that “to desert it now would be to imitate the treachery of his
accidental chief,” Mr. Butler proceeded to discuss the reasons
assigned by the President in his answer to the articles of
impeachment for the attempt to remove Mr. Stanton. These, in
substance, were, that the President believed the Tenure-of-Office Act
was unconstitutional, and, therefore, void and of no effect, and that
he had the right to remove him and appoint another person in his
place. Mr. Butler urged that, in all of these proceedings, the
President professed to act upon the assumption that the act was
valid, and that his action was in accordance with its provisions. He
then went on to charge that the appointment of General Thomas as
Secretary of War ad interim, was a separate violation of law. By the
act of February 20, 1863, which repealed all previous laws
inconsistent with it, the President was authorized, in case of the
“death, resignation, absence from the seat of Government, or
sickness of the head of an executive department,” or in any other
case where these officers could not perform their respective duties, to
appoint the head of any other executive department to fulfil the
duties of the office “until a successor be appointed, or until such
absence or disability shall cease.” Now, urged Mr. Butler, at the time
of the appointment of General Thomas as Sectary of War ad interim,
Mr. Stanton “had neither died nor resigned, was not sick nor absent,”
and, consequently, General Thomas, not being the head of a
department, but only of a bureau of one of them, was not eligible to
this appointment, and that, therefore, his appointment was illegal
and void.
The ninth article of impeachment, wherein the President is
charged with endeavoring to induce General Emory to take orders
directly from himself, is dealt with in a rather slight manner. Mr.
Butler says, “If the transaction set forth in this article stood alone, we
might well admit that doubts might arise as to the sufficiency of the
proof;” but, he adds, “the surroundings are so pointed and significant
as to leave no doubt in the mind of an impartial man as to the intents
and purposes of the President”—these intents being, according to
Mr. Butler, “to induce General Emory to take orders directly from
himself, and thus to hinder the execution of the Civil Tenure Act, and
to prevent Mr. Stanton from holding his office of Secretary of War.”
As to the tenth article of impeachment, based upon various
speeches of the President, Mr. Butler undertook to show that the
reports of these speeches, as given in the article, were substantially
correct; and accepted the issue made thereupon as to whether they
are “decent and becoming the President of the United States, and do
not tend to bring the office into ridicule and disgrace.”
After having commented upon the eleventh and closing article,
which charges the President with having denied the authority of the
Thirty-ninth Congress, except so far as its acts were approved by
him, Mr. Butler summed up the purport of the articles of
impeachment in these words:
“The acts set out in the first eight articles are but the culmination
of a series of wrongs, malfeasances, and usurpations committed by
the respondent, and, therefore, need to be examined in the light of
his precedent and concomitant acts to grasp their scope and design.
The last three articles presented show the perversity and malignity
with which he acted, so that the man as he is known may be clearly
spread upon record, to be seen and known of all men hereafter.... We
have presented the facts in the constitutional manner; we have
brought the criminal to your bar, and demand judgment for his so
great crimes.”
The remainder of Monday, and a portion of the following day, were
devoted to the presentation of documentary evidence as to the
proceedings involved in the order for the removal of Mr. Stanton and
the appointment of General Thomas. The prosecution then
introduced witnesses to testify to the interviews between Mr. Stanton
and General Thomas. They then brought forward a witness to show
that General Thomas had avowed his determination to take forcible
possession of the War Office. To this Mr. Stanbery, for the defense,
objected. The Chief Justice decided the testimony to be admissible.
Thereupon Senator Drake took exception to the ruling, on the
ground that this question should be decided by the Senate—not by
the presiding officer. The Chief Justice averred that, in his judgment,
it was his duty to decide, in the first instance, upon any question of
evidence, and then, if any Senator desired, to submit the decision to
the Senate. Upon this objection and appeal arose the first conflict in
the Senate as to the powers of its presiding officer. Mr. Butler argued
at length in favor of the exception. Although, in this case, the
decision was in favor of the prosecution, he objected to the power of
the presiding officer to make it. This point was argued at length by
the managers for the impeachment, who denied the right of the Chief
Justice to make such decision. It was then moved that the Senate
retire for private consultation on this point. There was a tie vote—25
ayes and 25 nays.—The Chief Justice gave his casting vote in favor of
the motion for consultation. The Senate, by a vote of 31 to 19,
sustained the Chief Justice, deciding that “the presiding officer may
rule on all questions of evidence and on incidental questions, which
decision will stand as the judgment of the Senate for decision, or he
may, at his option in the first instance, submit any such question to a
vote of the members of the Senate.” In the further progress of the
trial the Chief Justice, in most important cases, submitted the
question directly to the Senate, without himself giving any decision.
Next morning (April 1) Mr. Sumner offered a resolution to the effect
that the Chief Justice, in giving a casting vote, “acted without
authority of the Constitution of the United States.” This was
negatived by a vote of 27 to 21, thus deciding that the presiding
officer had the right to give a casting vote. The witness (Mr. Burleigh,
delegate from Dakotah,) who had been called to prove declarations of
General Thomas, was then asked whether, at an interview between
them, General Thomas had said anything as “to the means by which
he intended to obtain, or was directed by the President to obtain,
possession of the War Department.” To this question Mr. Stanbery
objected, on the ground that any statements made by General
Thomas could not be used as evidence against the President. Messrs.
Butler and Bingham argued that the testimony was admissible, on
the ground that there was, as charged, a conspiracy between the
President and General Thomas, and that the acts of one conspirator
were binding upon the other; and, also, that in these acts General
Thomas was the agent of the President. The Senate, by 39 to 11,
decided that the question was admissible. Mr. Burleigh thereupon
testified substantially that General Thomas informed him that he
had been directed by the President to take possession of the War
Department; that he was bound to obey his superior officer; that, if
Mr. Stanton objected, he should use force, and if he bolted the doors
they would be broken down. The witness was then asked whether he
had heard General Thomas make any statement to the clerks of the
War Office, to the effect that, when he came into control, he would
relax or rescind the rules of Mr. Stanton. To this question objection
was made by the counsel of the President on the ground of
irrelevancy. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the question was
not admissible, but, if any Senator demanded, he would submit to
the Senate whether it should be asked. The demand having been
made, the Senate, by a vote of 28 to 22, allowed the question to be
put, whereupon Mr. Burleigh testified that General Thomas, in his
presence, called before him the heads of the divisions, and told them
that the rules laid down by Mr. Stanton were arbitrary, and that he
should relax them—that he should not hold them strictly to their
letters of instruction, but should consider them as gentlemen who
would do their duty—that they could come in or go out when they
chose. Mr. Burleigh further testified that, subsequently, General
Thomas had said to him that the only thing which prevented him
from taking possession of the War Department was his arrest by the
United States marshal. Other witnesses were called to prove the
declarations of General Thomas. Mr. Wilkeson testified that General
Thomas said to him that he should demand possession of the War
Department, and, in case Mr. Stanton should refuse to give it up, he
should call upon General Grant for a sufficient force to enable him to
do so, and he did not see how this could be refused. Mr. Karsener, of
Delaware, testified that he saw General Thomas at the President’s
house, told him that Delaware, of which State General Thomas is a
citizen, expected him to stand firm; to which General Thomas replied
that he was standing firm, that he would not disappoint his friends,
but, that, in a few days, he would “kick that fellow out,” meaning, as
the witness supposed, Mr. Stanton.
Thursday, April 2d.—Various witnesses were introduced to testify
to the occurrences when General Thomas demanded possession of
the War Department. After this General Emory was called to testify
to the transactions which form the ground of the ninth article of
impeachment. His testimony was to the effect that the President, on
the 22d of February, requested him to call; that, upon so doing, the
President asked respecting any changes that had been made in the
disposition of the troops around Washington; that he informed the
President that no important changes had been made, and that none
could be made without an order from General Grant, as provided for
in an order founded upon a law sanctioned by the President. The
President said that this law was unconstitutional. Emory replied that
the President had approved of it, and that it was not the prerogative
of the officers of the army to decide upon the constitutionality of a
law, and in that opinion he was justified by the opinion of eminent
counsel, and thereupon the conversation ended.
The prosecution then endeavored to introduce testimony as to the
appointment of Mr. Edmund Cooper, the Private Secretary of the
President, as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in support of the
eighth and eleventh articles of impeachment, which charge the
President with an unlawful attempt to control the disposition of
certain public funds. This testimony, by a vote of 27 to 22, was ruled
out.
The prosecution now, in support of the tenth and eleventh articles
of impeachment, charging the President with endeavoring to “set
aside the rightful authority of Congress,” offered a telegraphic
dispatch from the President to Mr. Parsons, at that time (January 17,
1867) Provisional Governor of Alabama, of which the following is the
essential part:
“I do not believe the people of the whole country will sustain any
set of individuals in the attempt to change the whole character of our
Government by enabling acts in this way. I believe, on the contrary,
that they will eventually uphold all who have patriotism and courage
to stand by the Constitution, and who place their confidence in the
people. There should be no faltering on the part of those who are
honest in their determination to sustain the several coördinate
departments of the Government in accordance with its original
design.” The introduction of this was objected to by the counsel for
the President, but admitted by the Senate, the vote being 27 to 17.
The whole Friday, and a great part of Saturday, (April 3d and 4th,)
were occupied in the examination of the persons who reported the
various speeches of the President which form the basis of the tenth
article, the result being that the reports were shown to be either
substantially or verbally accurate. Then, after some testimony
relating to the forms in which commissions to office were made out,
the managers announced that the case for the prosecution was
substantially closed. The counsel for the President thereupon asked
that three working days should be granted them to prepare for the
defense. This, after some discussion, was granted by the Senate by a
vote of 36 to 9, and the trial was adjourned to Thursday, April 9th.
THE DEFENSE.
Before the close of 1869 the Supreme Court, in the case of Texas
vs. White, sustained the constitutionality of the Reconstruction acts
of Congress. It held that the ordinances of secession had been
“absolutely null;” that the seceding States had no right to secede and
had never been out of the Union, but that, during and after their
rebellion, they had no governments “competent to represent these
States in their relations with the National government,” and
therefore Congress had the power to re-establish the relations of any
rebellious State to the Union. This decision fortified the position of
the Republicans, and did much to aid President Grant in the difficult
work of reconstruction. It modified the assaults of the Democrats,
and in some measure changed their purpose to make Reconstruction
the pivot around which smaller political issues should revolve.
The regular session of the 41st Congress met Dec. 4th, 1869, and
before its close Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi had all
complied with the conditions of reconstruction, and were re-
admitted to the Union. This practically completed the work of
reconstruction. To summarize:—*
Tennessee was re-admitted July 24th, 1866; Arkansas, June 22d,
1868; North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia and
Florida under the act of June 25th, 1868, which provided that as
soon as they fulfilled the conditions imposed by the acts of March,
1867, they should be re-admitted. All did this promptly except
Georgia. Virginia was re-admitted January 25th, 1870; Mississippi,
Feb. 23d, 1870; Texas, March 30th, 1870. Georgia, the most powerful
and stubborn of all, had passed State laws declaring negroes
incapable of holding office, in addition to what was known as the
“black code,” and Congress refused full admission until she had
revoked the laws and ratified the 15th Amendment. The State finally
came back into the Union July 15th, 1870.
The above named States completed the ratification of the 15th
amendment, and the powers of reconstruction were plainly used to
that end. Some of the Northern States had held back, and for a time
its ratification by the necessary three-fourths was a matter of grave
doubt. Congress next passed a bill to enforce it, May 30th, 1870. This
made penal any interference, by force or fraud, with the right of free
and full manhood suffrage, and authorized the President to use the
army to prevent violations. The measure was generally supported by
the Republicans, and opposed by all of the Democrats.
The Republicans through other guards about the ballot by passing
an act to amend the naturalization laws, which made it penal to use
false naturalization papers, authorized the appointment of Federal
supervisors of elections in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants; gave to
these power of arrest for any offense committed in their view, and
gave alien Africans the right to naturalize. The Democrats in their
opposition laid particular stress upon the extraordinary powers given
to Federal supervisors, while the Republicans charged that Seymour
had carried New York by gigantic naturalization frauds in New York
city, and sought to sustain these charges by the unprecedented vote
polled. A popular quotation of the time was from Horace Greeley, in
the New York Tribune, who showed that under the manipulations of
the Tweed ring, more votes had been cast for Seymour in one of the
warehouse wards of the city, “than there were men, women, children,
and cats and dogs in it.”
The Legal Tender Decision.