Dean S Circle Criminal Law With Qna

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDDIE OLAZO, MIGUEL CORDIS, CHARITO

FERNANDEZ AND ROGELIO LASCONIA
G.R. No. 220761, October 03, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct evidence is not
indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during,
and after the commission of the crime.
FACTS
Accused Rogelio Lasconia together with several others hatched a plan to rob the
spouses Erlinda and Nicanor Vallecera inside their home in Barangay Bito, Abuyog, Leyte.
Dionesia Lasconia, who was then employed as a stay-out house help of the spouses Vallecera
would assist them by helping them get access inside the house undetected.
On the day of the commission of the crime, Dionesia tended to her usual chores. She,
however, left the back gate open to allow her co-accused to enter the compound as agreed.
At around seven in the evening, Dionesia heard sounds near the back portion of the house.
She then immediately opened the kitchen door and allowed accused to enter the house.
When Erlinda Vallecera opened the master's bedroom door, she was immediately
accosted by the three intruders. Accused Eddie Fernandez then pointed a gun at Erlinda
Vallecera and grabbed her. The three then covered her face, and then dragged her into the
master's bedroom where they then hogtied Nicanor Vallecera.
The three then forced Erlinda to open the vault where they then took away at least
one hundred thousand pesos in cash and several pieces of jewelry. Afterwards, they brought
Erlinda into one of the comfort rooms where Rommel Escobio slashed her throat with the
use of a samurai.
An Information was filed with the RTC against Eddie Olazo, Miguel Corbis and Charito,
together with Rogelio Lasconia, Joseph Oronos, Dionesia Lasconia, Rommel Escobio, and
Eddie Fernandez, charging them with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Rommel Escobio
pleaded guilty, while Eddie Fernandez remained at large. During trial, Joseph was discharged
as state witness. On the other hand, Dionesia Lasconia was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Homicide.
The RTC convicted Charito, together with Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Olazo, and Miguel
Corbis, of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC insofar as it convicted Charito of the
crime charged. Notably, however, the CA acquitted Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis on the
ground that there was a lack of evidence in the records to sustain their conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Charito is guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
RULING
YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct
evidence is not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the candid
testimony of state witness Joseph unmistakably produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. That Charito was present before, during, and after the commission of the crime and
that there was conspiracy between the malefactors are findings fully supported by the
evidence on record.
Joseph also testified that he saw Charito in the evening of the commission of the crime,
when he brought the accused near the house of the spouses Vallecera and again upon their
return to the drop-off area almost an hour later. It was also established that Charito paid
Joseph for the use of his motorcycle two (2) days after the commission of the crime and that
he was threatened by Charito should the former "squeal" on them. These facts clearly evince
unity of purpose and criminal design between Charito and his cohorts.
Finally, we take note of the fact that the RTC and the CA had concurring factual and
legal findings insofar as they found Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Thus, in the absence of any showing that material facts or circumstances were overlooked
by the inferior courts, this Court affirms the questioned Decision.
With respect to the imposition of the appropriate penalty, Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
when by reason or on occasion of the crime of Robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons, the crime of Homicide is committed. Considering that the imposable penalty for
Robbery with Homicide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties (i.e., death and reclusion
perpetua), Article 63 of the RPC finds application. In this regard, we note that both the RTC
and the CA failed to consider "evident premeditation" and "taking advantage of superior
strength" as ordinary, aggravating circumstances, despite having been sufficiently alleged in
the Information filed with the RTC.
Here, the evidence clearly established evident premeditation when Charito and his
co-conspirators hatched their malevolent plan to rob the spouses Vallecera and likewise "kill
[Dionesia Lasconia's] master". The first attempt of the malefactors to carry out their scheme
was foiled and it was only on their second attempt that they were able to consummate the
conspiracy. Hence, that there were persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently
demonstrate how determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient
lapse of time.
Taking advantage of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance was also

present in this case. The records disclose that during the commission of the offense, Nicanor
Vallecera was hogtied by three (3) of the perpetrators, while Erlinda Vallecera, a woman,
was successively and fatally injured using a samurai sword and a long knife. Clearly, the
means employed by the culprits were patently excessive.
Proceeding from the foregoing, applying Article 63 of the RPC would mean that the
imposable penalty on the accused would be death given the presence of two (2) aggravating
circumstances. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, and as correctly ruled by the CA,
the imposition of the penalty of death has been prohibited and in lieu thereof, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is to be imposed.
Q: X, together with Y and Z participated in a plan to rob the spouses A and B inside
their home in Barangay Bito, Abuyog, Leyte. When A opened the master's bedroom
door, she was immediately accosted by X, Y, Z. Y then pointed a gun at A and grabbed
her. The three then covered her face, and then dragged her into the master's bedroom
where they then hogtied B. The three then forced A to open the vault where they then
took away at least one hundred thousand pesos in cash and several pieces of jewelry.
Afterwards, they brought A into one of the comfort rooms where Z slashed her throat
with the use of a samurai. K was able to point out that X was present during all stages
of the commission of the crime. Is X guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide?
A: YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct evidence is
not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the candid testimony of K
unmistakably produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. That X was present before,
during, and after the commission of the crime and that there was conspiracy between the
malefactors are findings fully supported by the evidence on record. Without doubt, K
positively identified X and declared that he saw him during the initial planning of the
commission of the crime and noted X’s express agreement thereto. These facts clearly evince
unity of purpose and criminal design between X and his cohorts. (People Of The Philippines v.
Eddie Olazo, Miguel Cordis, Charito Fernandez And Rogelio Lasconia, G.R. No. 220761, October
03, 2016, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANDITO LASTROLLO y DOE
G.R. No. 212631, November 7, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
AAA's deportment after the rape does not impair her credibility nor does it negate the
occurrence of the crime. There is no established singular reaction to rape by all victims of this
crime. It has likewise been judicially settled that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an
indication of fabrication and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the
complainant. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or
unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
FACTS
AAA was only 17 years old when she testified in court. According to her mother, AAA
has abnormalities. When she was brought to a mental hospital, the doctor issued a medical
certification stating that AAA had Moderate Mental Retardation.
Sometime in November and December 2003, AAA went to the land of May Aida
Niebres which is located at the back of their own house in Brgy. CCC. As she was picking
banana blossoms, Dandito, carrying a bolo, suddenly pulled down her pants. AAA asked him
to let her go, but Dandito threatened to hack her with his bolo. Thereafter, he inserted his
penis inside AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain. Before leaving, Dandito told AAA not to tell her
mother about what happened, otherwise he would kill her.
Dandito raped AAA for the second time while the latter was at home cooking. He
suddenly entered the house and closed the door. He covered AAA's mouth with his hand,
pulled down AAA's pants and underwear, and let AAA lie down in their living room. Just like
the first incident, Dandito threatened to kill AAA if she tells her mother.
On March 15, 2004, BBB noticed that her daughter AAA was vomiting. When she
asked AAA, the latter was unable to answer and remained quiet. Suspicious, BBB brought
AAA to a clinic where it was found that AAA was about 4 months pregnant. When asked who
impregnated her, AAA answered Dandito.
According to Dandito, at the time of the alleged rape, he was working as a fish gatherer
in Bato Lake. Nestor, Dandito’s employer claimed that Dandito was the caretaker of his farm
and that during the period of November to December 2003, Dandito stayed in the farm and
worked with him.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dandito is guilty of one count of simple rape
RULING
YES. Dandito was charged with one count of simple rape as defined under Article 266-
A of the RPC. For a charge of rape under the abovementioned provision to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that (1) Dandito had carnal knowledge of AAA;and (2) he
accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation.
The Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and CA that carnal knowledge
through threat or intimidation was established beyond reasonable doubt by the lone
testimony of the victim herself. In her testimony, AAA positively identified Dandito as the
man who pulled down her pants, let her lie down and inserted his penis to her vagina. AAA
also categorically stated that during the incident, Dandito, who was carrying a bolo,
threatened to kill her.
In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Dandito questioned AAA’s

credibility. However, the RTC found AAA’s testimony positive and categorical which was
confirmed by the CA. Dandito failed to point any significant fact or circumstance which would
justify the reversal of the findings on AAA’s credibility. Furthermore, Dandito also finds fault
in AAA’s behavior after the incident, claiming that it is unnatural for someone whose dignity
was supposedly ravaged to not show fear, remorse, hate or anxiety or to delay reporting the
rape to the authorities. It has been established that there is no singular reaction to rape. It
has likewise been settled that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of
fabrication as the victim may have chosen only to keep quiet rather than to expose her to
public scrutiny.
Q: AAA is a minor who has been issued a medical certificate for mental retardation.
While she was picking banana blossoms, B, carrying a bolo, suddenly pulled down her
pants. AAA asked him to let her go, but B threatened to hack her with his bolo.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina. B was charged with rape.
However, during trial, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove AAA’s age
and mental retardation. Therefore, he was convicted of simple rape. B, as a defense,
questioned AAA’s credibility and faults AAA’s behavior after the rape. However, the
RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to be positive and categorical. Is the conviction of
B proper?
A: YES. For a charge of rape under the Article 266-A of the RPC to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that (1) a man had carnal knowledge with a woman; and (2) he accompanied
such act by force, threat or intimidation. In this case, carnal knowledge through threat or
intimidation was established beyond reasonable doubt by the lone testimony of the victim
herself. Furthermore, Dandito failed to point any significant fact or circumstance which
would justify the reversal of the findings on AAA’s credibility. Regarding B’s defense that
AAA’s behavior after the rape was irregular, it has been established that there is no singular
reaction to rape. It has likewise been settled that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not
an indication of fabrication as the victim may have chosen only to keep quiet rather than to
expose her to public scrutiny. (People Of The Philippines v. Dandito Lastrollo Y Doe, G.R. No.
212631, November 7, 2016, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO DACANAY Y TUMALABCAB
G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As ruled by the Court in the case of People v. Andan, confession made before news
reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. “Verbal confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.”
FACTS
Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several
puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then
coming home from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray,
with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery
had just taken place.
Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Jay Santos (PO3 Santos), during which
interview, Antonio informed PO3 Santos that One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
in cash and pieces of jewelry were missing. Antonio alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged
"lover" of Norma who may have perpetrated the crime. However, after further investigation,
the identity of "Miller" was never ascertained, as none of Norma's friends knew of any such
person.
After PO3 Santos's inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited to the precinct
to formalize his statement, to which the latter declined, as he still had to take care of the
funeral arrangements of Norma. Antonio failed to make good of his promise to go to the
police station the next day.
In a separate instance, Antonio was once again invited to the police station and he
acceded to the request after fetching Quinn from school. While at the precinct, Barangay
Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that Antonio was already willing to
confess to killing Norma. In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional
rights, including the right to remain silent. Antonio confessed to the crime before the media
representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos.
Antonio interposed the twin defenses of alibi and denial, claiming coercion and
intimidation on the part of the police officers involved in the investigation of the crime.
ISSUE
Whether or not Antonio can be held guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his
extrajudicial confession
RULING
YES. At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief
that he was not under custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession.
Hence, Antonio's reliance on constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is
unfounded.
During the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters,
there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity who could
have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by two reporters during
their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid
and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him". As
observed further by the Court of Appeals in its decision, while accused was physically
restrained by the cold bars of steel, he was at liberty to remain mute. Yet, he opted to respond
to inquiries from the media.
As ruled by the Court in the case of People v. Andan, confession made before news
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill
of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a
detention cell does not by itself render such confession inadmissible, contrary to what
Antonio would like this Court to believe. All told, absent any independent evidence of
coercion or violence to corroborate Antonio's bare assertions, no other conclusion can be
drawn other than the fact that his statements were made freely and spontaneously,
unblemished by any coercion or intimidation.
Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused. Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.
Q: A was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their
home by their son, BB. When C, husband of A was invited to the police station,
members of the media were present. Despite having been apprised of his
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent, A confessed to the crime
before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him without the police
officer. On the basis of such confession, he was charged with the crime of parricide. C
raised the twin defenses of alibi and denial, claiming coercion and intimidation on the
part of the police officers involved in the investigation of the crime. Is C correct?
A: NO. As ruled by the Court in the case of People v. Andan, confession made before news
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill
of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by C while inside a detention cell
does not by itself render such confession inadmissible. All told, absent any independent
evidence of coercion or violence to corroborate C’s bare assertions, no other conclusion can
be drawn other than the fact that his statements were made freely and spontaneously,
unblemished by any coercion or intimidation. (People of the Philippines v. Antonio Dacanay Y
Tumalabcab, G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016, as penned by J. Caguioa)
ZENAIDA P. MAAMO AND JULIET O. SILOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 201917, December 01, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
To be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the
following essential elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
c. The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is
accountable; and
d. The offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.
FACTS
Petitioners herein were accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents in a Letter-Complaint dated April 10, 2001 (Complaint) filed with the OMB
detailing a series of acts allegedly committed by them. Petitioner Maamo filed a Counter-
Affidavit dated July 9, 2001, denying the allegations contained in the Complaint for being
"false, imaginary, capricious, baseless, and politically motivated". Petitioner Maamo claimed
that based on the evidence presented, her alleged involvement in the disputed transactions
was not sufficiently proven. Petitioner Silor likewise denied the accusations in the Complaint
on the ground that the questioned disbursements were done regularly and that the payees
actually received their wages for services rendered.
In its Resolution dated September 26, 2001, the OMB found probable cause against
the Petitioners for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and
recommended the filing of the necessary informations against them with the SB.
SB convicted the Petitioners for the crime of Malversation through Falsification of

Public/Official Document. Notably, the SB also concluded that only one (1) crime was
technically committed by the Petitioners under the principle of delito continuado, there being
a plurality of acts performed during a period of time and unity of intent and penal provision
violated.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2011 arguing
that, inter alia, the absence of a name did not conclusively prove beyond reasonable doubt
that there was a ghost employee in the roll and that since the Time Books and Payrolls passed
audit, it followed that they were in order. The said Motion was denied by the SB in a
Resolution dated May 4, 2012.
ISSUE
Whether or not the SB erred in finding Petitioners guilty of the crime of Malversation
through Falsification by feigning a signature.
RULING
YES. This Court has repeatedly adhered to the policy that when the guilt of the
accused is not proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must be favored,
and exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. After judicious examination of the
records and the submissions of the parties, the Court ruled that the guilt of the petitioners
were not proven.
To be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the following
essential elements:
b. The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;
accountable; and
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds
or property.
Notably, Article 217 of the RPC provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly
authorized officer gives rise to the presumption that he has put such missing funds to
personal use. As this Court clarified in Estino v. People, while demand is not an element of
Malversation, it is a requisite for the application of the presumption. Hence, absent such
presumption, the accused may still be proven guilty, albeit based on direct evidence of
Malversation.
Here, while the records support the presence of the first three (3) elements, we find
that the Prosecution was unable to satisfactorily prove the fourth element. In the cases
where the petitioners were found liable, the common denominator is the mere absence of
the name of a payee-laborer, as shown by the blanks in the Time Book and Payroll
corresponding to the signatures.
The evidence is severely insufficient and inconclusive to establish the guilt of the
Petitioners beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. In the first place, as correctly
argued by the Petitioners, nowhere was the fact of demand shown in any of the documentary
exhibits or testimonies of the witnesses of the Prosecution. Considering that the Prosecution
never established such material fact, the burden of evidence was never shifted to the
Petitioners to prove their innocence, there being no prima facie presumption of
misappropriation under the facts obtaining.
Moreover, the mere absence of a name in the Time Book and Payroll does not
automatically translate to the non existence of the alleged worker. Contrary to the
conclusions of the SB, there are other "logical explanation[s]" for such omission, one of which
is the explanation proffered by the Petitioners, i.e., that what was presented during trial were
the third original carbon copies on which the carbon paper did not work to copy those names
listed on the first page. Indeed, it is also entirely possible that the person responsible simply
forgot to write down the name of the payee-laborer even as he secured their signatures.
Certainly, the allegation that Petitioners hired "ghost employees" must be weighed against
the fact that Time Book and Payrolls were found to be in order.
In addition, the fact that the July 1-15, 1997 Time Book and Payroll was able to pass
audit and that no Notice of Suspension was issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) was
an indication that said documents were in order. Indeed, if it were true that there were
blanks next to the signatures of the unnamed employees, such glaring deficiency surely
would not have gone unnoticed by the COA.
All told, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the SB that the blanks next to the
signatures are, by themselves alone, enough to prove that Petitioners committed
Malversation through Falsification by feigning the said signatures. This Court is not prepared
to deprive Petitioners of their liberty with finality simply on the basis of a superficial
deficiency in Time Books and Payrolls.
Q: A and B were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents.
The main issue is the alleged falsification of public documents consisting of Time
Books and Payrolls representing different time periods. Allegedly, fictitious laborers
were made to appear as laborers in the said documents, which enabled the Petitioners
to collect sums of money and misappropriate them for their personal use. Prosecution
anchors its case on the fact that there was an absence of a name in the Time Book and
Payroll, despite having a signature, and the amount indicated therein being released.
Will the case prosper?
A: NO. To be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the
following essential elements:
b. The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;
accountable; and
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds
or property.
Notably, Article 217 of the RPC provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly
authorized officer gives rise to the presumption that he has put such missing funds to
personal use.
The Prosecution was unable to satisfactorily prove the fourth element. Nowhere was
the fact of demand shown in any of the documentary exhibits or testimonies of the witnesses
of the Prosecution. Considering that the Prosecution never established such material fact,
the burden of evidence was never shifted to the Petitioners to prove their innocence, there
being no prima facie presumption of misappropriation under the facts obtaining.
Moreover, the mere absence of a name in the Time Book and Payroll does not
automatically translate to the non existence of the alleged worker. It is entirely possible that
the person responsible simply forgot to write down the name of the payee-laborer even as
he secured their signatures. (Zenaida P. Maamo And Juliet O. Silor v. People Of The Philippines,
G.R. No. 201917, December 01, 2016, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC
G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of
the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.
FACTS
In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc
(Roque) was charged with the crime of Murder. On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about
10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home along the road
in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato after attending a wedding celebration at the house of
Rodolfo Dayaday, when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back four (4) times,
successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place was well lit and
he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his gun. For fear of
his life, Alex an away from the place of incident. He reported the incident to his uncle Petring
Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala.
Roque, on the other hand, through the testimonies of Reynald Dayaday (Reynald) and
Dennis Blancada (Dennis), denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.
Reynald, accused-appellant's brother, testified that on October 27, 2005, the night before the
wedding of his niece, he was at the house of his older Brother, Teodolfo Dayaday, at Barangay
Esperanza (Barrio 3), Norala, South Cotabato. He was with Roque and seven (7) other people,
who were tasked to prepare the food for the wedding celebration. They were all together in
the kitchen from 5 o'clock in the evening to 3 o'clock in the morning.
Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala, South Cotabato on

October 27, 2005 because he was invited to cook in the house of Teodolfo Dayaday. He
arrived there at 12 o'clock noon but his duty started at 5 o'clock in the evening and ended at
3 o'clock in the morning the following day. He recalled that during those times that he was
cooking, Roque never left the kitchen.
ISSUE
Whether or not Roque is guilty of the crime of murder
RULING
YES. In the instant appeal, Roque essentially questions the credibility of Alex and the
veracity of his accusations. Roque insists that Alex is a biased witness considering his
relationship with the victim.
The Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter
overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the
case. The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the
RTC are sustained by the CA. In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony
of Alex straightforward and worthy of belief.
The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with the victim must
necessarily fail. In People v. Montemayor, the Court ruled that relationship by itself does not
give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of
witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. The relationship of a witness to the victim would even
make his testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested
in vindicating the crime to charge and prosecute another person other than the real culprit.
In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or improper motive on the part of Alex to
testify against the accused, his relationship with the victim even made his testimony more
credible and truthful.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any
of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide. Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the
crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to
the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the CA's finding that treachery
attended the killing of Basilio. The evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against
Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was
completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son.
Q: Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home along the road
in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato after attending a wedding celebration at the house
of Rodolfo Dayaday, when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back four (4) times,
successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place was well
lit. Is Roque guilty of murder?
A: YES. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1)
a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any
of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide. Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the
crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to
the presence of qualifying circumstances, the killing was attendant with treachery. The
evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind, was
sudden, deliberate and unexpected. Further, The victim was completely unaware of any
threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. (People Of The Philippines v.
Roque Dayaday Y Dagooc, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO RAYTOS Y ESPINO
G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly,
the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified - failure to
discharge which renders the act punishable.
Thus, to exonerate himself, the accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three,
unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated.
FACTS
Version of the Defense

On February 1, 2010, Raytos was invited by Indo Sabio to partake on some leftovers
from the fiesta and to join them as a dance session was being held. At around 11:30 in the
evening, David Araza (victim), passed by and was approached by Edgar Papiona, and the two
danced. After dancing, the victim approached Raytos' table and asked who was brave enough
while drawing a knife tucked in the waistband of his pants. Raytos tried to escape by moving
backwards and, while doing so, he got hold of the victim's right hand. Raytos twisted the
victim's arm, got hold of the knife and then stabbed the victim several times on the chest. He
delivered three (3) successive stabbing blows in a quick and swift manner because he
panicked. He ran away immediately and surrendered himself to the barangay officials and
they proceeded to the police station.
Version of the Prosecution

According to Papiona, while he was dancing with the victim, Raytos approached them
and said that he wanted to dance with the victim. Papiona acceded and went to the side of
the road just an arm's length away from the dance area. From his position at the side of the
road, he saw Raytos stab the victim when the latter turned his back from Raytos while
dancing. Papiona recalled that he saw Raytos hold the right back shoulder of the victim and
stab the latter's back several times with the use of a knife measuring 8 inches in length.
The RTC found Raytos guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed Raytos' conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Raytos' guilt for the crime of Murder was sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt
RULING
YES. In this case, the opposing sides are incessant on the truthfulness of their version
of the story, which differ in material points of fact; the State, on one hand, has successfully
presented strong evidence of guilt for Murder, while Raytos, on the other hand, maintains
his innocence based on his plea of self-defense.
Raytos failed to establish the elements of self-defense. To exonerate himself, the

accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (ii) that the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (iii) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is the
foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated.
After poring over the records of this case, the Court is convinced that Raytos failed to
establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, David Araza. In his version of the
incident, Raytos claimed that Araza drew a knife from his left waist following a brief
exchange of words between them. Raytos then moved back, allegedly intending to escape,
but instead ended up wresting possession of the knife from Araza. Here, it is difficult to
imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza's
hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick
succession. It has already been ruled by the Court that the mere drawing of a knife by the
victim does not constitute unlawful aggression, whether actual or imminent, as the peril
sought to be avoided by the accused was both premature and speculative.
Further on this point, even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression was present
on the part of Araza, there was no longer any danger on Raytos' person from the moment he
disarmed the former by wresting possession of the knife. Time and again, this Court has held
that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right fo kill or even to wound the former aggressor.
On the contrary, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently established

by evidence. To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were unwavering
as to the manner of killing - that Raytos suddenly stabbed Araza from the back while holding
the latter's shoulder.
Q: Accused B was charged with murder for killing the victim A. According to B, A drew
a knife tucked in the waistband of his pants and approached him. B tried to escape by
moving backwards and, while doing so, he got hold of the victim's right hand where he
was able to disarm B. When he got hold of the knife, he then stabbed the victim several
times on the chest. B interposed self-defense in order to exonerate him of the charge.
Is B correct?
A: NO. In pleading self-defense, the accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression
were reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the
three, unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated.
Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger -

not merely a threatening or intimidating action. In People v. Escarlos, the Court ruled that
the mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression, whether
actual or imminent, as the peril sought to be avoided by the accused was both premature and
speculative. The alleged act of simply drawing a knife from A’s waist fell short of the
threshold required by law and prevailing jurisprudence. At that point there was yet no actual
risk or peril to the life or limb of B. (People Of The Philippines v. Lorenzo Raytos Y Espino, G.R.
No. 225623, June 7, 2017, as penned by J. Caguioa)
CORAZON M. LACAP v. SANDIGANBAYAN [Fourth Division] and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city,
the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required
documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply
with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is
compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of
action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate
refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by
personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes
a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS
Corazon was indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019, for having allegedly
neglected or refused, after due demand, and without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time, on the application of complainant Fermina Santos (Fermina) for a business
permit in Masantol, Pampanga for the years 1999 and 2000 for the purpose of discriminating
against Fermina.
Fermina owns the Fersan Variety Store located in Masantol, Pampanga and engaged
in the sale of school supplies, furniture and accessories since 1975. She usually applies for a
Mayor's Permit between February and March of every year and has been submitting to the
Office of the Mayor for the issuance of Mayor's Permit the required documents. For the year
1999, she filed an Application for Mayor's Permit and submitted the requirements to the
Mayor's Office. However, accused Mayor Corazon Lacap denied her application and she
(accused) was angry at her. She went back to accused Lacap twice to ask for reconsideration
but she (Lacap) was even more angry, and told them to leave the place.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of official inaction
under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft Law
RULING
YES. There is no merit in Corazon's petition. The Court completely agrees with the
findings and ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The elements of the offense penalized under
Section 3(f) of RA 3019 are:
1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification
after due demand or request has been made on him;
3. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public
officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and
4. Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from
any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another
In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or

city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the
required documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of
failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the
application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act
is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If
the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is
motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory,
and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial, it is
discretionary. While a discretionary power or authority of Corazon, as the then Municipal
Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, is involved in this case, its exercise must be pursuant to law
and ordinance. The mayor must act on the application for a business permit, and as correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, the action expected of the mayor was either to approve
or disapprove the same.
Corazon argues that she did not refuse to act on Fermina's application for a mayor's
permit as contained in the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon to Corazon. Corazon deemed
it wise to refer the said letter to her retained lawyer, Atty. Andres Pangilinan (Atty.
Pangilinan), because of "other pending cases lodged by Fermina against Corazon in the
Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Pampanga."
However, when Corazon referred to her lawyer, Atty. Pangilinan, Corazon did not act
according to law or ordinance. Indeed, she failed to cite any law or ordinance which required
her to do so.
Q: Fermina owns the Fersan Variety Store engaged in the sale of school supplies,
furniture and accessories. She usually applies for a Mayor's Permit between February
and March of every year and has been submitting to the Office of the Mayor for the
issuance of Mayor's Permit the required documents. For the year 1999, she filed an
Application for Mayor's Permit and submitted the requirements to the Mayor's Office.
However, accused Mayor Corazon Lacap denied her application and she (accused) was
angry at her. She went back to accused Lacap twice to ask for reconsideration but she
(Lacap) was even more angry, and told them to leave the place.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019 for “Neglecting or refusing, after due
demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from
any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage,
or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.” Is the decision correct?
A: YES. In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or

city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the
required documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of
failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the
application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act
is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If
the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is
motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory,
and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Corazon M. Lacap v.
Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division] and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198162, June 21,
2017, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO GEROLA y AMAR alias "FIDEL"
G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has already held that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a
material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where the time
of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof
of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the
precise time alleged.
FACTS
Sometime in 1998 at around 8:30 in the evening, AAA and her sisters were sleeping.
Her mother was in the hospital tending to her aunt who had just delivered a baby. At that
time, appellant crawled towards AAA. Accused-appellant told AAA to keep quiet, lie down
and remove her underwear. AAA tried to resist but appellant gestured to box her. AAA tried
to shout but he covered her mouth. After removing her underwear, accused also removed
his brief and laid on top of AAA. Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA bled and
felt pain. AAA did not tell her mother about the incident because appellant threatened her of
maltreating them if she did so.
In July 1999 at around 9:30 in the evening, AAA was raped for the second time. While
she was sleeping in bed, appellant sat beside her and removed her underwear. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina. The victim felt pain and bled. At that time, AAA's mother
was in the Himamaylan hospital tending to her grandmother. Again, she did not tell her
mother due to appellant's threat to maltreat her mother.
In January of the year 2000, appellant did the same act of having carnal knowledge
with AAA for the third time. This was done at around 2:30 in the morning and lasted for
about thirty (30) minutes while everyone else in the house was sleeping. AAA's mother was
away from home to tend to the latter's younger sister who gave birth. Like the other
incidents, AAA did not tell her mother. Instead, AAA told her friend who advised her to tell
their teacher. AAA then narrated the incident to her teacher, Mrs. Rafil, who summoned her
mother and told her what happened.
Three (3) separate Informations for Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code were filed in the RTC against Federico. After trial, the RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of all charges filed against him and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each charge, without eligibility of parole. The CA rendered the questioned
Decision, affirming the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not Federico’s conviction for three (3) counts of Rape was proper
RULING
YES. Federico's lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA "could not exactly
determine what year x x x the first rape incident occurred," which purportedly creates doubt
on the credibility of AAA. Federico draws the same conclusion from AAA's failure to promptly
disclose her repeated defilement to the proper authorities. The assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is a task most properly within the domain of trial courts. Consequently,
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
The purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the

commission of the crime. The Court has already held that the date or time of the commission
of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute
accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged,
conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the
crime was not committed at the precise time alleged.
In the instant case, aside from harping on the alleged inconsistencies of AAA's
testimony, Federico relies on his bare and uncorroborated refutations and nothing more. No
other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered by Federico during the course of the
trial. Such counter evidence, when weighed against the positive identification and
straightforward testimony of AAA, do little to affect the issue of Federico's carnal knowledge
of AAA, the elements of which have been consistently narrated by the latter. Following
established jurisprudence, denials, being self-serving negative evidence, cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.
Q: X was charged with three counts of Rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. As a defense, the lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA
could not exactly determine what year the first rape incident occurred, which
purportedly creates doubt on the credibility of AAA. Is X correct?
A: NO. The purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the

commission of the crime. The Court has already held that the date or time of the commission
of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute
accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged,
conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the
crime was not committed at the precise time alleged. (People Of The People Of The Philippines
v. Federico Gerola Y Amar Alias "Fidel",G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN "ROBIN" BONGBONGA Y NALOS
G.R. No. 214771, August 09, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Court has consistently disfavored the
"sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature. Being an affirmative defense, the
allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the accused with convincing proof.
FACTS
Three (3) separate Informations were filed in the RTC, charging Ruben with two (2)
counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA, a minor of about 16 years
of age at the time she testified on February 4, 2003, declared that on April 26, 2000, while
she was seated in a chair reading a pocketbook in the yard of their house, appellant came
and he carried her inside the house up to the second floor where he laid her down the
bamboo floor. She wanted to shout, but the accused wielded a "balisong". The appellant then
went on top of AAA and forcibly had carnal knowledge with her and mashed her breast.
The second incident took place on May 29, 2000. While playing, appellant called AAA
and told her they were going to his mother Crising Bongbonga's house some 200 meters
away. Thereafter, appellant brought AAA inside one of the bedrooms and locked the door.
Armed with a "balisong", appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The third incident was on October 16, 2000, when AAA, BBB, CCC and their other
playmates, went to the river to go swimming. While the group was playing in the water,
appellant arrived. The group went home while AAA stayed behind because she was told by
the appellant "May gagawin tayo." Appellant carried AAA to the middle of the field,
undressed her and laid her down. Appellant undressed himself, went on top of AAA, kissed
her lips and for the third time, had carnal knowledge with the victim.
Pleading his innocence, Ruben denied the accusations against him on the claim that
he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. Ruben
further claimed that the charges against him were filed at the instance of AAA's Aunt,
possibly due to feelings of disapproval as Ruben was still married to another woman.
RTC rendered a Judgment finding Ruben guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. The CA affirmed the same but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the conviction of Ruben for two (2) counts of
Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness
RULING
NO. It is settled that in assessing the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial
court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe
the deportment of the witness while undergoing the rigors of examination. Hence, it is a
settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court
unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. Such rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA, as in the case at bench.
In this case, Ruben failed to show any misappreciation by the CA of the facts or
circumstances so as to warrant a reversal of the questioned Decision. In the same vein,
Ruben's arguments were already considered and thoroughly addressed by the courts below.
As correctly observed by the CA, Ruben's flimsy defense of consensual sexual

congress pales in comparison to the testimony of AAA, which was delivered in a clear and
straightforward manner. At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Court has
consistently disfavored the "sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature.
Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the
accused with convincing proof. It bears noting that Ruben's defense was corroborated only
by his daughter, Ruby Ann, which effectively weakened the defense, being supported by a
mere relative of the accused. In People v. Nogpo, Jr., the Court held that where nothing
supports the sweetheart theory except the testimony of a relative, such defense deserves
scant consideration.
On this note, Ruben anchors his claim of consensual sexual congress on the fact of his
cohabitation with AAA. However, such claim was already addressed by the CA in the
questioned Decision, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that such cohabitation occurred
only after the respective dates of the incidents. Here, such fact of cohabitation, by itself, had
no bearing on the prior forcible advances committed by Ruben upon AAA. In fact, contrary
to Ruben's assertions, any consent implied from the fact of cohabitation is dispelled by AAA's
express declarations that she was forced against her will to live with Ruben out of fear of her
father.
Moreover, in the landmark case of People v. Jumawan, the Court declared that even a
husband has no ownership over his wife's body by reason of marriage, for in assenting to
marital union, the wife does not divest herself of her right to exclusive autonomy over her
own body. Hence, a married woman can give or withhold her consent to sexual intercourse
with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case of her
refusal.
Q: Three (3) separate Informations were filed in the RTC, charging Ruben with two (2)
counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Pleading his innocence,
Ruben denied the accusations against him on the claim that he and AAA were live-in
partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. No other evidence was
presented to prove the fact of their relationship. Will Ruben’s defense prosper?
A: NO. Ruben's flimsy defense of consensual sexual congress pales in comparison to the
testimony of AAA, which was delivered in a clear and straightforward manner. At the outset,
it should be emphasized that the Court has consistently disfavored the "sweetheart theory"
defense for being self-serving in nature. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love
affair must be substantiated by the accused with convincing proof. It bears noting that
Ruben's defense was corroborated only by his daughter, Ruby Ann, which effectively
weakened the defense, being supported by a mere relative of the accused. In People v. Nogpo,
Jr., the Court held that where nothing supports the sweetheart theory except the testimony
of a relative, such defense deserves scant consideration. (People Of The Philippines v. Ruben
"Robin" Bongbonga Y Nalos, G.R. No. 214771, August 09, 2017, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERATO PENTECOSTES y CRONICO
G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State
in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way
that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence. In previous occasions, the Court has held
that the question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the
malefactor committing the offense charged.
FACTS
On March 24, 2005, Liberato was having a drinking spree at the house of Angel Vargas
(Angel), the father of the victim, Vivian Vargas (Vivian). Likewise present were Joel Basagre,
Mesio Caruito, Gerardo Rabal, and Daniel Briones. The drinking spree ended at around 2:00
in the aftemoon. At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring Rabal,
which was about two hundred (200) meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed.
Vivian would never return.
Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon. At around 3:30 to 4:30 p.m.,
Antonio Vargas (Antonio), the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre
(Jason), encountered Liberato at Antonio's com plantation. The plantation was around a
kilometer away from the house of Liberato. During the encounter, Liberato was seen
carrying Vivian on his back and appeared to be headed towards a nearby body of water. Jason
greeted Liberato, who then merely looked back at them angrily.
Later that day, with Vivian still missing, Angel began searching for Vivian with the
help of some relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail. The following morning, however,
on March 25, 2005, Vivian's lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the
father of Jason.
Immediately thereafter, the policemen summoned and investigated all those present
at the drinking spree in Angel's house. However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came,
he ran away. An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by
submersion" or drowning as the cause of death by Dr. Raoul Alcantara.
In the Decision dated December 28, 2012, the RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime
of Murder, qualified by treachery. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction with modification
only as to the damages awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not Liberato was guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of
motive in the commission of the crime charged
RULING
YES. Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting him despite the
prosecution's failure to establish a motive for the killing. Motive pertains to the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element
of a crime and need not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of
motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that the absence thereof cannot
establish innocence. In previous occasions, the Court has held that the question of motive
only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing
the offense charged.
Here, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt
that Liberato was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian. Liberato was positively
identified by two (2) eyewitnesses, coupled with the other pieces of circumstantial evidence
establishing Liberato's authorship of the crime.
First, Liberato was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian before she
disappeared. While Liberato strongly disputes this fact, pointing instead to Joel Basagre as
the last person he saw with Vivian, no independent testimony was ever presented to
corroborate Liberato's version of the facts. Second, the records disclose that Vivian's cause
of death was "asphyxia by submersion (drowning). Significantly, both Antonio and Jason
testified to the fact that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, was headed towards a
body of water within the vicinity of Antonio's com plantation. Third, during the investigation
of Vivian's death, which included four (4) other suspects who were present during the
drinking spree at Angel's house, Liberato fled the police station. In countless occasions, the
Court has held that the flight of an accused may be taken as evidence to establish his guilt.
Thus, after a thorough examination of the records of this case, the Court is fully
convinced that the evidence presented by the prosecution constitutes proof of Liberato's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that no direct evidence was adduced by the
prosecution, circumstantial evidence is by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis
direct evidence. Our prevailing jurisprudence has recognized that in its effect upon the
courts, circumstantial evidence may even surpass direct evidence in weight and probative
force. Accordingly, to the mind of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances
leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the
death of Vivian.
Q: Liberato was found guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery by the RTC,
which was affirmed by the CA. Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting
him despite the prosecution's failure to establish a motive for the killing. He also
argues that the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged based on a devious circumstantial evidence. Are Liberato’s claims
proper?
A: NO. Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State
in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same
way that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence. In previous occasions, the Court
has held that the question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the
identity of the malefactor committing the offense charged.
With regard to his contention that the CA gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged based on a devious circumstantial evidence, the Court
has ruled that circumstantial evidence is by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis
direct evidence. Our prevailing jurisprudence has recognized that in its effect upon the
courts, circumstantial evidence may even surpass direct evidence in weight and probative
force. Accordingly, to the mind of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances
leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the
death of the victim. (People Of The Philippines v. Liberato Pentecostes Y Cronico, G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO
DOCTRINE
Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following
conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of
the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by
the assailant.
FACTS
Beverly C. Quilana testified that on January 9, 2009 at around 1:48 in the morning,
she was awakened by someone calling for her, uttering "Ninang". At that time she was inside
her house located in Ligtong 3, Rosario, Cavite. She recognized the voice of the person as her
godson named Gilbert Grimaldo. She then asked why. Grimaldo replied from outside saying
"Ninang tulungan mo ako yung taong ito ay kinukursunada ako," "kinukursunada ako ng
taong ito, me dala siyang baril". Then she opened the door for her godson. She then saw the
accused Paul Duran shot Grimaldo with a .38 caliber revolver from behind at a distance of 2
1/2 feet. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and then fell to the ground lying with his face down.
Duran then left the place passing between their houses. Moments later accused returned and
shot Grimaldo three more times to make sure that the latter was dead. Witness then started
shouting and asking for help. At this point in time, witness saw the accused Duran ran away.
They then called the police. According to this witness, Grimaldo was hit on the nape, back
and head.
Duran invoked self-defense. According to him, on January 9, 2009 at around 2:15 to

2:45 a.m. while on his way to buy fish in Parañaque, he was blocked by two persons whose
identity he did not know. One of these men who turned out to be the victim Gilbert Grimaldo
poked a gun at him, and said that they only needed his money. That when Grimaldo
attempted to get the money from his belt bag, he was able to hold the victim's right hand
which was then holding the gun. Grimaldo then used his left hand to box his nape. Then they
wrestled for the possession of the gun for more or less thirty seconds. Then he (Duran) was
able to take the gun away from Grimaldo. When Grimaldo moved backward, he pulled the
trigger of the gun and hit Grimaldo. At that time he was worried that the other guy might
retaliate and that's the reason why he was able to pull the trigger of the .38 caliber revolver
gun.
The RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. The CA
affirmed Duran's conviction in toto.
ISSUE
Whether or not Duran's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt
RULING
NO. However, the Court ruled that the accused is guilty of Homicide. Pleading self-
defense was not proper in this case because there was no unlawful aggression. The burden
of proving self-defense rests on the accused. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim's aggression. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the
other elements are present.
Even if Duran's account of an attempted robbery against him is to be believed, his

testimony also shows that Grimaldo, albeit the initial aggressor, ceased to be the aggressor
as Duran had successfully wrested the weapon from him. Time and again, this Court has held
that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one's self. The condition
sine qua non of unlawful aggression being absent, self-defense cannot be appreciated in
favor of the accused.
With regard to the conviction for murder, the Court held that the prosecution failed
to prove treachery. Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an
offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
It was error for the RTC to rule that treachery was present as said finding is not
supported by the evidence. Treachery must be unequivocally proven as the crime itself. The
prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of
killing him. The confrontation between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance
encounter. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo could not
defend himself. In this case, Grimaldo was aware of the impending attack and was even able
to seek help from eyewitness Quilana.
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is Homicide
and not Murder.
Q: K was charged with the crime of murder qualified by treachery. During trial, it was
not proven that K intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him. It was
also not proven that K deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo could not defend
himself. In this case, victim J was aware of the impending attack and was even able to
seek help from the eyewitness. K was convicted by the RTC of the crime of murder, and
this was affirmed by the CA. Is K’s conviction of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery proper?
A: NO. Treachery was not proven in this case, and therefore, the crime must be Homicide and
not Murder. Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense,
the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the assailant.
It was error for the RTC to rule that treachery was present as said finding is not
supported by the evidence. The prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought
the victim for the purpose of killing him. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and
consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to
ensure that Grimaldo could not defend himself. In this case, Grimaldo was aware of the
impending attack and was even able to seek help from eyewitness Quilana. (People Of The
Philippines v. Paul Duran, Jr. Y Mirabueno, G.R. No. 215748, November 20, 2017, as penned by
J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR GIMPAYA AND ROEL GIMPAYA
G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action
and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime —
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Roosevelt Agamosa (Roosevelt), the victim's neighbor, and Roselyn Clete (Roselyn),
the victim's wife, testified as to the commission of the crime.
The testimonies of both witnesses, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Witness ROOSEVELT AGAMOSA testified: that he witnessed the commotion between the
two (2) accused and victim, Genelito Clete; that he saw the victim Genelito Clete being
hugged by accused Oscar Gimpaya while the other accused Roel Gimpaya was stabbing
him; that when accused Roel Gimpaya saw the witness he uttered the words: "IKAW,
GUSTO MO?"; that the witness upon hearing said utterance, ran and met along the way
the wife of the victim Genelito Clete, Roselyn Clete; that Roselyn Clete likewise saw the
manner how her husband was stabbed to death; that the victim was brought to the
University of Perpetual Help System Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The witness [Roselyn B. Clete] testified: that on September 16, 2000 she was inside their
house while the commotion happened; that as she was about to check what the
commotion was all about, she was met by one Roosevelt Agamosa, who informed her
that her husband Genelito Clete was stabbed; that when she reached the place of the
incident, she saw the lifeless and bloodied body of her husband slumped on the ground;
that [s]he saw accused Oscar Gimpaya on top of her husband as the former was
strangling her husband; that the witness tried to help as she came to the assistance of
her husband, but accused Oscar Gimpaya shoved her away; that thereafter, the
Barangay authorities arrived; that her husband Genelito Clete was brought to [the]
University of Perpetual Help Hospital, and died thereat.
The RTC held Oscar and Roel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
qualified by treachery, and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC
Decision with modification only as to the award of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not Oscar's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING
NO. In the instant case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between accused appellant Oscar and his co-
accused Roel in the killing of Genelito.
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the
crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC did not discuss its finding of conspiracy; it merely held that "both accused
acted in concert towards a common criminal goal." Conspiracy was not also discussed by the
CA. On the subject, the appellate court only said that "[the] [a]ccused-[a]ppellant [Oscar] and
[a]ccused Roel Gimpaya acted in concert in killing the victim." These pronouncements do not
sufficiently establish that there was a conspiracy between Oscar and Roel in the stabbing of
the victim.
Based on Roosevelt's testimony, it was the victim, Genelito, who went to the house of
Oscar where the quarrel and stabbing incident took place. When it was corroborated by Lea,
Oscar’s wife, it was also found that Oscar was just at his house on September 16, 2000 at
around 7:00 p.m. when he was called upon by Genelito. The house of Oscar and Genelito are
on separate sides of the Almarinez Compound while the house of Roel is beside the house of
Oscar.
Thereafter, Oscar and Genelito had a quarrel which escalated into a physical
altercation. Roel intervened and stabbed Genelito in the back. According to prosecution
witness Roosevelt, Oscar was hugging Genelito. Meanwhile, defense witness Lea testified
that Oscar had fallen down after being struck by Genelito. The common thread in their
testimony however, is that it was Roel who stabbed Genelito in the back and not Oscar.
As it was not Oscar who delivered the fatal blow (or any blows, at all) it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy. It must be borne in
mind that the evidence required to prove conspiracy is of the same weight of evidence
needed to establish the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Even if the prosecution's version were to be believed, to the mind of the Court, the act
of Oscar in merely hugging the victim does not establish conspiracy in the intent to kill. It
was not proven that he acted in concert with Roel or that he even knew of Roel's intention
to stab Genelito.
Q: Oscar was charged for the murder of Genelito. Before the actual killing, Oscar and
Genelito had an altercation. Oscar was hugging Genelito in the process of the
altercation. While ongoing, Roel stabbed Genelito in the back, and he was also the one
who delivered the final blow which caused the death of Genelito. The RTC convicted
Oscar for murder, finding he and his co-accused Roel acted in concert in killing the
victim. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. In the instant case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between accused appellant Oscar and his co-
accused Roel in the killing of Genelito.
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the
crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC did not discuss its finding of conspiracy;
it merely held that "both accused acted in concert towards a common criminal goal." It must
be borne in mind that the evidence required to prove conspiracy is of the same weight of
evidence needed to establish the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People Of
The Philippines v. Oscar Gimpaya And Roel Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018, as
penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET. ENRIQUE P.
ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 196094, March 5, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani v. Sayo:
Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.
FACTS
These cases originated from complaints for nine counts of libel on account of nine
interrelated newspaper articles which appeared in the newspapers Malaya and Abante
where statements allegedly derogatory to then Governor Casimiro "Ito" M. Ynares, Jr and
Atty. Narciso "Jun" Y. Santiago, Jr. (Santiago) were written by Amado "Jake" Macasaet
(Macasaet).
Of the nine counts of libel, probable causes for libel were found in relation to the April
21, 1999 issue of Malaya with respect to the article entitled "Santiago's gambling habits" and
the March 1, 1999 issue of Malaya regarding the article entitled "NCA-UCAP FEUD: Walang
trabaho, personalan lang." Both articles were written by Macasaet. The libel complaint
involving the newspaper Abante was dismissed.
Thus, separate Informations for the two counts of libel were filed against Macasaet,
Malaya's Publisher, Chairman and writer, Enrique P. Romualdez (Romualdez), Malaya's
Executive Editor, and Joy P. Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), Malaya's Editor (collectively, the
accused). The present cases revolve around these two libel cases.
G.R. No. 196094 (second petition)
The filing of the second petition on May 3, 2011 antedated that of the first petition.
However, the second petition arose from an incident before the RTC Manila, Br. 37 that
occurred after the incident that precipitated the first petition.
After the denial of the accused's motion to dismiss dated November 26, 2008 based
on the ground that the filing of the Information dated July 9, 2008 violated their
constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy disposition of their cases, the accused filed
before RTC Manila, Br. 37 another Motion to Dismiss dated September 24, 2009 on the
ground that the said court has no criminal jurisdiction over the case.
RTC Manila, Br. 37, in denying the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit, reasoned out
in its Order dated November 3, 2009 that:
x x x [T]he Information in the case at bar categorically stated the address of

Malaya at Port Area, Manila. While it is the position of [the] accused that this allegation
is insufficient, it must be stressed that this was followed by the phrase, "did then and
there x x x by writing, and publishing an article in the Malaya x x x." This shows that the
alleged libelous article was first published in Manila particularly at the address of
Malaya stated in the Information.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in the Order
dated January 29, 2010. The accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the
CA and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113449. The CA rendered its October 2010 Decision
which granted the petition.
ISSUE
In the second petition (G.R. No. 196094), whether the Information is sufficient in form
and substance to charge Macasaet and Romualdez with the crime of libel
RULING
YES. The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani v.
Sayo:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.
In the present case, the venue is apparently the place where the alleged defamatory article
in Malaya was printed and first published.
The CA's ruling that the criminal action for libel was filed with the wrong venue was founded
on the fact that the Information does not specifically indicate that Port Area, Manila is the
editorial or business office of Malaya, following the formulation in Bonifacio. And, it cannot
be presumed as the CA further claims that the "address of Malaya is the same place where it
conducts its business of publication."
Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and

editor defamed Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an
article in the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area,
Manila is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address
of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the
Information did not expressly state "first published" is of no moment because the word
"published" does not exclude the first publication.
In turn, the accused do not deny that Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business
offices of Malaya and interestingly, they did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 08-263272 despite the fact that the Information filed before RTC
Manila, Br. 36 is similarly worded as the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed
before RTC Manila, Br. 37 as to the address of Malaya being at Port Area, Manila City and the
non-inclusion of the phrase "printed and first published."
According to Bonifacio, "the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers." The
Information in question complies with the Bonifacio directive because it alleges with
particularity Port Area, Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published as evidenced or supported by the records of the case. The Information
need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase
"printed and first published."
Q: A charge for libel was filed against AA. The accused filed before RTC Manila, Br. 37
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the said court has no criminal jurisdiction over
the case. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. However, upon appeal to the CA, it
granted the same because the Information does not specifically indicate that Port
Area, Manila is the editorial or business office of Malaya. And, it cannot be presumed
that the "address of Malaya is the same place where it conducts its business of
publication." Did the CA err in granting the petition?
A: YES. Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and
editor defamed Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an
article in the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area,
Manila is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address
of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the
Information did not expressly state "first published" is of no moment because the word
"published" does not exclude the first publication. The Information need not parrot the
provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase "printed and first
published." (People Of The Philippines v. Amado "Jake" P. Macasaet. Enrique P. Romualdez And
Joy P. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 196094, March 5, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD
DOCTRINE
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained
more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals: Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The impossibility of
killing a person already dead falls in this category.
FACTS
The prosecution presented its lone witness, Sario Joaquin (Sario), who testified that
on July 15, 2006, he was at the flea market of Guincalaban, Tayasan, Negros Oriental together
with his friends Hesson, Junello and one Remmy Casello (Remmy). While in the market,
Hesson and Junello discussed a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as
ordered by one Enrile Yosores (Enrile).
Hesson, Junello, Remmy and Sario left the flea market and went to the house of
Fernando. Junello, upon seeing Fernando, asked for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando gave
Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape with a piece of firewood. Junello
then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the side. Fernando lost consciousness and
as he laid motionless on the ground, Hesson stabbed him twice in the chest using a knife.
Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the latter's heart using the same
knife. Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver using a bolo.
Sario was on the opposite side watching the incident. He and Remmy did not attempt
to stop the two (2) accused or run away for fear that the latter would kill them. Sario went
home from the crime scene and did not tell anyone about the incident because Hesson and
Junello threatened to kill him if he did so.
After the incident, Remmy was killed by Enrile during the town fiesta of Guincalaban.
The testimony of Florencio Adlawan, Fernando's father, was dispensed with after the
defense admitted the accused's civil liability and the funeral expenses incurred by the family.
Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Myrasol Zuniega, who examined the victim's body, was not
presented because the defense admitted the existence of the death certificate indicating that
the immediate cause of death is internal hemorrhage and the underlying cause is multiple
stab wounds.
The trial court found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery. The CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with modification only as
to the damages awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime.
RULING
NO. Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of
committing an impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it
was legally impossible for him to kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when Hesson
stabbed him.
However, the Court is not convinced. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1)
that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals:
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. xxx
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently
established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead
after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground
motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando
was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived
at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as
checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing.
Likewise, considering that Sario was in the middle of a surely stressful and frightful
event, he cannot be expected to have focused enough and be fit to determine if Fernando was
indeed dead when Sario thought he was. More importantly, even assuming that it was Junello
who killed Fernando and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson,
Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy between Hesson
and Junello. As such, Junello's acts are likewise, legally, Hesson's acts.
Q: While in the market, Hesson and Junello discussed a plan to kill the victim,
Fernando Adlawan. Hesson and Junello, together with Fernando went to Fernando’s
house. Junello approached Fernando and asked for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando
gave Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape with a piece of
firewood. Junello then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the side. Fernando
lost consciousness and as he laid motionless on the ground, Hesson stabbed him twice
in the chest using a knife. Both Hesson and Junello were charged with murder.
However, according to Hesson, he must only be charged with the commission of an
impossible crime as Fernando was already dead when he stabbed him. Is he correct?
A: NO. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that
its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
as occuring where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The
victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently established by
the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead after he was
hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground motionless, this
statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already
dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely
looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of
Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing. (People of the Philippines v. Hesson Callao Y
Marcelino And Junello Amad, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL DOMINGO
DOCTRINE
The Court has held that "self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and
substantial matter seriously erodes the credibility of a witness." As the Court further held in
People v. Amon:
For evidence to be believed "must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself — such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. There is no test of the truth
of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of
judicial cognizance.
FACTS
The prosecution sought to prove that three men armed with M-14 and M-16 rifles
attacked and shot Roque Bareng, Virgilio Dalere, Glenn Rodriguez and Edwin Andres at the
Abadilla Farm in Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte, around 11:30 PM on February 26,
2005. Virgilio Dalere and Glenn Rodriguez died from gunshot wounds. Roque Bareng, who
managed to escape unharmed, identified Joel Domingo as one of the assailants.
The prosecution's evidence showed that Roque Bareng was with Edwin Andres,
Glenn Rodriguez, and Virgilio Dalere at the bunkhouse of the Abadilla Farm at the time of the
shooting incident. While Roque Bareng and his companions were having coffee, three men
bearing M-14 and M-16 rifles appeared; one of them stayed outside the kitchen door, while
the other two entered.
The assailant with the M-16 rifle pointed his firearm towards Virgilio Dalere, and the
one with the M-14 rifle pointed it towards Glenn Rodriguez. Around two seconds after the
gunmen entered, each fired a single shot inside the kitchen.
Roque Bareng ran toward the fence. Upon reaching the fence, he looked back and saw
the assailant with the M-14 rifle pointing it at him. He then crouched toward the irrigation
and proceeded to the house of Edwin Andres where he stayed for the night.
The following morning, Piddig policemen fetched him at the house of Edwin Andres,
and they proceeded to the Abadilla Farm. There, they found the lifeless bodies of Glenn
Rodriguez and Virgilio Dalere outside the bunkhouse.
After taking Roque Bareng to a hospital in Piddig for treatment of the wounds, the
policemen brought him to the police station. In an answer to the query of the policemen,
Roque Bareng told them that he could recognize the assailants.
Three (3) days later, Roque Bareng was brought to the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial
Office in Camp Juan, Laoag City, where he gave his statement. Several days later, Roque
Bareng was again invited to the Piddig police station. During his stay, he saw two persons
being interviewed. He recognized them to be the assailants with the M-14 and M-16 rifles.
During the trial, he identified herein accused Joel Domingo as the gunman with an M-14 rifle.
The defense sought to prove that Accused Joel Domingo was attending a social dance
in Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte when the victims were shot at Brgy. Sta. Maria of that
town.
ISSUE
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The Court has held that "self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very
material and substantial matter seriously erodes the credibility of a witness. Here, the
testimony of Bareng, the prosecution's only witness, is inconsistent in material points
making it weak and incredible. Bareng testified in open court on December 11, 2007 that the
two assailants pointed their guns towards the two other victims, Virgilio Dalere and Glenn
Rodriguez. But during cross-examination, he changed his tune and testified that immediately
after the utterance of the two assailants, the assailant holding the M-14 rifle immediately
shot at him.
Bareng's identification of accused-appellant is also questionable given his

inconsistent statements and when weighed against the testimony of the defense witnesses.
In open court, when asked to describe the assailants, Bareng merely stated that they were
wearing brim buri hats. Edwin Andres (Andres), one of the defense witnesses and who was
also present during the attack by the assailants, however, testified that immediately after the
incident and while Bareng was in Andres's house, Bareng told Andres that all he saw were
small thin persons wearing hats and that he could not recognize the assailants.
Against the inconsistent statements of the lone eyewitness, accused-appellants’

evidence establishing his alibi gains significance and is, indeed, more credible. Accused-
appellant testified that he was in the barangay hall of Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte from
10:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until 2:00 A.M. of the following day and that the crimes were
committed in Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte.
The fact that accused-appellant was in another barangay attending social dance from
around 9:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until the early morning of the next day was
corroborated by the testimony of Norman Pablo. The foregoing testimonies convince the
Court that accused-appellant could not have committed the crime. Bareng's testimony, given
its material inconsistencies, cannot be given full faith and credit. Accused-appellant, on the
other hand, was able to prove his alibi.
Q: Accused A was convicted of murder by the RTC. His conviction was supported by the
testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness. During the latter’s testimony, he said that
the two assailants pointed their guns towards the two other victims. But during cross-
examination, he changed his tune and testified that immediately after the utterance of
the two assailants, the assailant holding the M-14 rifle immediately shot at him. A
argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Is he correct?
A: YES. The Court has held that "self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material
and substantial matter seriously erodes the credibility of a witness. Here, the testimony of
Bareng, the prosecution's only witness, is inconsistent in material points making it weak and
incredible. Bareng testified in open court on December 11, 2007 that the two assailants
pointed their guns towards the two other victims, Virgilio Dalere and Glenn Rodriguez. But
during cross-examination, he changed his tune and testified that immediately after the
utterance of the two assailants, the assailant holding the M-14 rifle immediately shot at him.
The foregoing testimonies convince the Court that accused-appellant could not have
committed the crime. Bareng's testimony, given its material inconsistencies, cannot be given
full faith and credit. (People of the Philippines V. Joel Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICHAEL LUNA Y TORSILINO
DOCTRINE
The law puts in place requirements of time, witnesses and proof of inventory with
respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: (1) The initial custody requirements
must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) The physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel and
the required witnesses:
• a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 9165 and prior to its
amendment by RA 10640, as in this case;
• an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service of the
DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 10640.
As a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory.
FACTS
The prosecution alleged that on April 14, 2008, a buy-bust operation was organized
by the Marikina City Police Station. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the buy-bust team, together with the CI, proceeded to accused-appellant
Luna's residence at Barangay Tumana, Marikina. Upon arrival thereat, SPO1 Soriano and the
CI walked toward the direction of accused-appellant Luna's house.
Accused-appellant Luna then approached both of them and told the CI, "pare, score
na kayo, mayroon pa ako dito." At that point, the CI introduced SPO1 Soriano to accused-
appellant Luna as an interested buyer. When asked how much worth of shabu he would like
to buy, SPO1 Soriano answered "tres lang brod," while handing accused-appellant Luna the
three (3) marked bills.
After the exchange, SPO1 Soriano checked the contents of the sachet using a flashlight,
which was then the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team. Immediately after, the other
members of the buy-bust team approached accused-appellant Luna and arrested him after
introducing themselves as police officers. Thereafter, SPO1 Soriano marked the two (2)
sachets and accomplished an Inventory of Confiscated Evidence in the presence of accused-
appellant Luna at the place of his arrest. The Inventory of Confiscated Evidence was
subsequently signed by Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank Rabe at the Barangay Hall, while a
certain Danny Placides, a representative from the media, signed the same at the police
station. Likewise, at the police station, accused-appellant Luna was photographed holding
the plastic sachets supposedly recovered from his person.
On the same day, SPO1 Soriano requested for a laboratory examination of the items
with the Crime Laboratory of the Eastern Police District. The request was personally
received by PCI Cejes, who then conducted a qualitative examination of the contents of the
plastic sachets. The contents later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Luna is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. The law puts in place requirements of time, witnesses and proof of inventory with
respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: (1) The initial custody requirements
must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) The physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel
and the required witnesses:
• a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 9165 and prior to
its amendment by RA 10640, as in this case;
• an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service of
the DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 10640.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the police
officers reneged on their duty to comply with the requirements on the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of the seized items. Based on the narrative of the prosecution, none of
the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were
allegedly recovered from accused appellant Luna. Neither were they present during the
preparation of the inventory at the place of seizure. As categorically admitted by SPO1
Soriano, Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank Rabe was only present at the Barangay Hall where
he was made to sign the Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. In the same manner, Danny
Placides, the purported media representative, only signed the inventory at the police station.
In the same vein, the police officers also failed to photograph the seized drugs
immediately after and at the place of seizure, as required under Section 21. Instead, it was
only at the police station that accused-appellant Luna was photographed while holding the
plastic sachets supposedly recovered from his person.
Significantly, in the Coordination Form dated April 14, 2008 prepared by the buy-bust
team ahead of the operation, a "camera" was among the listed "special equipment" that were
to be used in the operation. Hence, considering that the buy-bust team was able to
accomplish the Inventory of Confiscated Evidence at the place of seizure (albeit there was
belated participation of the required witnesses), there was no compelling reason for them to
defer the photographing requirement until their return to the police station.
All told, given the demonstrable failure of the police officers to faithfully observe the
mandatory requirements in Section 21, the question now is whether the saving clause under
the IRR of RA 9165 was triggered. For this purpose, the prosecution must satisfy the two-
pronged requirement: first, present justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and second,
show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved.
Based on the circumstances of the present appeal, however, the saving clause was not
triggered because the first prong was not satisfied - the prosecution did not offer any
justifiable grounds for the noncompliance. No explanation was proffered as to why none of
the insulating witnesses was present at the place and time of the seizure, or as to the failure
to photograph the drugs immediately after seizure in the presence of such witnesses. There
was likewise no showing of any efforts exerted by the police officers to at least coordinate
with witnesses ahead of the buy-bust operation.
All things considered, the evidence, appreciated in its totality, unequivocally points to
an acquittal.
Q: A was apprehended in a buy-bust operation. After the buy-bust operation, SPO1
Soriano accomplished an Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. The Inventory of
Confiscated Evidence was subsequently signed by Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank
Rabe at the Barangay Hall, while a certain Danny Placides, a representative from the
media, signed the same at the police station. Likewise, at the police station, accused-
appellant Luna was photographed holding the plastic sachets supposedly recovered
from his person. Was the chain of custody rule followed?
A: NO. None of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic
sachets were allegedly recovered from accused appellant Luna. Neither were they present
during the preparation of the inventory at the place of seizure. As categorically admitted by
SPO1 Soriano, Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank Rabe was only present at the Barangay Hall
where he was made to sign the Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. In the same manner,
Danny Placides, the purported media representative, only signed the inventory at the police
station.
In the same vein, the police officers also failed to photograph the seized drugs
immediately after and at the place of seizure, as required under Section 21. Instead, it was
only at the police station that accused-appellant Luna was photographed while holding the
plastic sachets supposedly recovered from his person.
Despite the failure to comply with the rules on the chain of custody, no explanation
was proffered as to why none of the insulating witnesses was present at the place and time
of the seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the drugs immediately after seizure in the
presence of such witnesses. There was likewise no showing of any efforts exerted by the
police officers to at least coordinate with witnesses ahead of the buy-bust operation. (People
of the Philippines v. Richael Luna Y Torsilino, G.R. No. 219164, March 21, 2018, as penned by
J. Caguioa)
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RECIO M. GARCIA, LEON O. TY, JOSE R. TENGCO,
JR., ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, VICENTE PATERNO, RUBEN ANCHETA, RAFAEL SISON,
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA AND GENEROSO F. TENSECO
G.R. No. 195962, April 18, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The essential elements of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are: 1. The
accused is a public officer discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or private
persons in conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, and 4. His action
caused injury to the Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference.
On the other hand, to determine the culpability of private respondents under Section
3(g) of RA 3019, it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
FACTS
On 8 October 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. On 9
November 1992, President Ramos further issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include in its investigation, inventory and study, all non-
performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
Among the loan accounts investigated by the Committee was that of the Philippine
Pigment and Resin Corporation (PPRC). In its Seventeenth (17th) Fortnightly Report to
President Ramos, the Committee reported that the loans/accommodations obtained by
PPRC from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) possessed positive
characteristics of behest loans.
On the strength of the Committee's findings, the complaint a quo was filed before [the]
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), accusing herein private respondents of violation of
Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
On 29 April 2008, [OMB] issued its now assailed Resolution dismissing petitioner's
complaint for lack of probable cause to warrant [private] respondents indictment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's complaint for alleged lack of probable
cause
RULING
NO. Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The essential elements
of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are: 1. The accused is a public officer
discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or private persons in conspiracy
with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his
official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, and 4. His action caused injury
to the Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference.
On the other hand, to determine the culpability of private respondents under Section
3(g) of RA 3019, it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
As found by the OMB, to which the Court fully agrees, the elements of evident bad
faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence are lacking in the instant case;
and petitioner failed to prove that the questioned foreign currency loans granted by the DBP
to PPRC were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. While petitioner
alleged that the subject foreign currency loans were undercollateralized and PPRC was
undercapitalized, it failed to sufficiently establish that indeed the transactions were either
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government or that there was evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of private respondents.
Petitioner took the position that since nearly 64% of the collaterals were yet to be
acquired, the loans of PPRC were undercollateralized. Even if the collaterals consisted mostly
of assets yet to be acquired, the inclusion of after-acquired properties in a mortgage contract
was held to be lawful.
Q: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans conducted an
investigation on all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. Among the
loan accounts investigated by the Committee was that of the Philippine Pigment and
Resin Corporation (PPRC) which it found to have possessed positive characteristics of
behest loans. A complaint was filed before [the] Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) for
violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The complaint
alleged that 64% of the collaterals to said loan consisted of yet to be acquired assets.
Further, there was no proof that the loans grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government or that there was evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence on the part of PPRC. Will the complaint prosper?
A: NO. The elements of evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable
negligence are lacking in the instant case; and petitioner failed to prove that the questioned
foreign currency loans granted by the DBP to PPRC were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. While petitioner alleged that the subject foreign
currency loans were undercollateralized and PPRC was undercapitalized, it failed to
sufficiently establish that indeed the transactions were either grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government or that there was evident bad faith, manifest partiality
or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of private respondents. Furthermore, even if the
collaterals consisted mostly of assets yet to be acquired, the inclusion of after-acquired
properties in a mortgage contract was held to be lawful as decided by the Supreme Court in
its previous decisions. (Presidential Commission On Good Government v. Office Of The
Ombudsman, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Recio M. Garcia, Leon O. Ty, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alejandro
Melchor, Vicente Paterno, Ruben Ancheta, Rafael Sison, Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., Carmelino G.
Alvendia And Generoso F. Tenseco,**G.R. No. 195962, April 18, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASHER TOMAWIS Y ALI
DOCTRINE
For a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165, the following must be proven: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. In cases involving
dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of
paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs must be established.
FACTS
Basher Tomawis y Ali (Tomawis) was charged with violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002." According to the Prosecution, a buy-bust operation was conducted in Metropolis
[Starmall], Alabang to meet with alias Salim. The confidential informant introduced
Alejandro to alias Salim and she told him that she wanted to buy shabu. Alias Salim, who was
later identified as Tomawis, said that he wanted to see the money first so she showed him
the money. He told her that he will get the shabu somewhere and will meet her in the food
court. After ten to fifteen minutes, Tomawis returned and they simultaneously exchanged
the money for the shabu. After getting the shabu, Alejandro removed her jacket which was
their pre-arranged signal.
A commotion occurred during the arrest because bystanders inside the food court
wanted to help Tomawis who shouted "Tulungan niyo ako papatayin nila ako." They were
not able to put markings on the evidence in the vicinity because of the commotion.
Upon reaching Brgy. Pinyahan, they immediately conducted the inventory which was
done before the barangay officials of the said barangay. Alejandro handed the seized item to
Alfonso Romano who was the inventory officer, but she was present during the inventory
process.
ISSUE
Whether or not Tomawis' guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and for their failure to establish the chain
of custody of the seized drugs. For a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of
drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, the following must be proven: (a) the identities of the
buyer, seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for it. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of
the seized drugs must be established.
Sec. 21 imposes the following requirements in the manner of handling and inventory,
time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the dangerous
drugs:
1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or

confiscation;
2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:
a. the accused or his representative or counsel;
b. a representative from the media;
c. a representative from the DOJ; and
d. any elected public official.
3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:
a. place where the search warrant is served; or
b. at the nearest police station; or
c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure
All the above requirements must be complied with for a successful prosecution for
the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165. Any deviation in the mandatory
procedure must be satisfactorily justified by the buy-bust team provided that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team.
In this case, the buy-bust team in this case utterly failed to comply with these
requirements. To start, the conduct of the inventory in this case was not conducted
immediately at the place of arrest but at the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City. As
explained by the buy-bust team of the PDEA, IO1 Alejandro and IO1 Lacap, they could not
conduct the inventory at Starmall, Alabang, because a commotion ensued as bystanders in
the food court tried to assist Tomawis who shouted for help. Evidently, this happened
because the buy-bust operation was conducted in a shopping mall.
While the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs, the requirement of having the three required witnesses
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension, is not dispensed with.
There are police stations closer to Starmall, Alabang, in Muntinlupa City and the office
of the PDEA is also in Pinyahan, Quezon City. And yet, the inventory was conducted in the
barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City - which is not one of the allowed alternative places
provided under Section 21 of the IRR.
More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. There were
no witnesses from the DOJ or the media. Only two witnesses who were elected barangay
officials were present. It thus becomes evident that the buy-bust team did not prepare or
bring with them any of the required witnesses at or near the place of the buy-bust operation
and the witnesses were a mere afterthought. The presence of the three witnesses must be
secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless
arrest.
Further, the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
In the present case, there are gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which creates
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof. There are glaring inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the buy-bust team. It is unclear as to who actually recovered the seized
drugs from Tomawis and who held custody of the drugs from the place of the arrest in transit
to Brgy. Pinyahan. There is also no testimony as to who held the drugs from the time of
inventory at Brgy. Pinyahan to the PDEA office; from the PDEA office until it was delivered
to the laboratory; and until its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted in Metropolis Starmall, Alabang. The
confidential informant introduced Alejandro to alias Salim and she told him that she
wanted to buy shabu. After the exchange of money and shabu, Salim was arrested. A
commotion ensued so the buy-bust team was not able to put markings on the evidence.
Upon reaching Brgy. Pinyahan, they immediately conducted the inventory which was
done before the barangay officials of the said barangay. Were the requirements under
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 complied with?
A: NO. To start, the conduct of the inventory in this case was not conducted immediately at
the place of arrest but at the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City. There are police stations
closer to Starmall, Alabang, in Muntinlupa City and the office of the PDEA is also in Pinyahan,
Quezon City. And yet, the inventory was conducted in the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon
City - which is not one of the allowed alternative places provided under Section 21 of the IRR.
More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. There were no
witnesses from the DOJ or the media. Only two witnesses who were elected barangay
officials were present. It thus becomes evident that the buy-bust team did not prepare or
bring with them any of the required witnesses at or near the place of the buy-bust operation
and the witnesses were a mere afterthought. (People Of The Philippines v. Basher Tomawis Y
Ali, G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY"
G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
To sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following elements
must be established: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of the
offense of illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the
buyer and the seller were identified.
In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that
the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral certainty. The
prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the accused
is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime.
FACTS
Narciso was charged in two (2) separate Informations with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. On 8 October 2005, a civilian informant and a Barangay Tanod of San
Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna arrived at the Municipal Police Station and reported the illegal
drug activities of Narciso. The team conducted a surveillance operation at Holiday Hills,
Narra Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna.
A buy-bust operation was conducted. The informant introduced PO3 Rivera to

Narciso as a customer. PO3 Rivera handed the P100.00 marked bill to Narciso, and the latter,
in turn, handed PO3 Rivera a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. After
receiving the sachet, PO3 Rivera gave SPO4 Dela Peña's phone a ring. The rest of the team
immediately entered Narciso's house and arrested Narciso.
The seized items were handed to SPO4 Dela Peña and were taken to the police station,
together with Narciso. The sachet bought by PO3 Rivera from Narciso was marked by SPO4
[Dela] Peña as "NS-B", while the two (2) other sachets confiscated by SPO1 Ame from
[Narciso's] possession were marked as "NS-P". An inventory of these seized items was
conducted. Afterwards, SPO4 [Dela] Peña transferred the custody of the seized sachets to the
crime laboratory for examination.
ISSUE
Whether or not Narciso's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. After a review of the records, the Court resolves to acquit Narciso as the
prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the
seized drugs.
In this case, Narciso was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. To
sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following elements must
be established: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of
the offense of illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction
or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3)
the buyer and the seller were identified.
In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential,
therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR imposed the following requirements in the manner of
handling and inventory, time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and
seizure of the dangerous drugs:
confiscation;
the accused or his representative or counsel;
a. a representative from the media;
b. a representative from the DOJ; and
c. any elected public official.
b. nearest police station; or
warrantless seizure.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section
21. To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure or at
the police station where the inventory was conducted. More importantly, there was no
compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of PO3 Rivera and SPO4
Dela Peña, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the
plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Narciso or during the inventory of the recovered
drugs at the police station.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory
but, more importantly, at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the
presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure
and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the
seized drug.
Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites are present:
(1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance;
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team. However, the prosecution failed to prove justifiable ground for non-
compliance.
First, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the three (3) witnesses at the
place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the confiscated items
immediately after seizure or during inventory in the presence of the insulating witnesses.
Second, The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Q: Narciso was charged in two (2) separate Informations with the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs. A buy-bust operation was conducted. The informant introduced
PO3 Rivera to Narciso as a customer. After the buy-bust operation, the seized items
were handed to SPO4 Dela Peña and were taken to the police station, together with
Narciso. The sachet bought by PO3 Rivera from Narciso was marked by SPO4 [Dela]
Peña as "NS-B", while the two (2) other sachets confiscated by SPO1 Ame from
[Narciso's] possession were marked as "NS-P". An inventory of these seized items was
conducted. Afterwards, SPO4 [Dela] Peña transferred the custody of the seized sachets
to the crime laboratory for examination. Narciso claimed that there were gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized items. Is Narciso correct?
A: YES. the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral certainty. Sec. 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR provides for the requirements in the manner of handling and inventory,
time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the dangerous
drugs. However, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements.
To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. More importantly, there was no
compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of PO3 Rivera and SPO4
Dela Peña, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the
plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Narciso or during the inventory of the recovered
drugs at the police station. Further, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the three
(3) witnesses at the place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the
confiscated items immediately after seizure. (People Of The Philippines v. Narciso Supat Y
Radoc Alias "Isoy", G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER GA-A Y CORONADO, AQUILA ADOBAR
DOCTRINE
Proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in establishing the corpus delicti - the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. It is important that the State
establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity of the illicit drugs sold as the same as
those examined in the laboratory and subsequently presented in court as evidence. This
rigorous requirement, known under RA 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of
ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
FACTS
A buy-bust team was against Adobar and his live-in partner. The confidential
informant introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy shabu.
Adobar asked IO1 Siglos how much worth of shabu she wanted to buy and the latter
answered P500.00, while handing the buy-bust money to Adobar. Upon receipt of the money,
Adobar excused himself to get the "item" inside the house. In less than a minute, Adobar
came back and handed to IO1 Siglos one heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
When Adobar was about to be arrested, he ran inside his house and locked the front
door behind him. The buy-bust team forced open the door, cleared the ground floor then
proceeded to the second floor where they found a small window through which they
suspected Adobar to have escaped. The buy-bust money was not recovered. IO3 Tablate
found Ga-a. Near her were seventeen (17) pieces of transparent sachets containing
suspected shabu together with other drug paraphernalia on top of a table. Upon inquiry, Ga-
a introduced herself as Mecaella, the live-in partner of Adobar, and claimed that the shabu
on the table were from Adobar.
After "clearing" Adobar's house, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an Punong
Barangay Acenas, media representative Rondie Cabrejas of Magnum Radyo (media
representative) and an unidentified representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Thereafter, the sachets of suspected shabu, including the subject drugs, were marked with
IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT." After the marking, IO3 Tablate proceeded with the inventory of
the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the table where the seventeen (17) sachets
were found, and prepared the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs (Inventory)
in the presence of Ga-a. Photographs of the seized drugs, the room where they were found
and the accomplishment of the Inventory were then taken. It appears from the prosecution's
submissions that among the three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay Acenas
and the media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed and signed the
Inventory.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Adobar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sale
of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. Adobar is charged with selling 0.03 gram of dangerous illegal drugs, in particular,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride colloquially known as shabu. Section 3(ii), Article I of RA
9165 defines "selling" as any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration. In the
context of a buy-bust operation, its elements are 1) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and 2) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Anent the latter element, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in
establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit
drug. It is important that the State establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity
of the illicit drugs sold as the same as those examined in the laboratory and subsequently
presented in court as evidence. This rigorous requirement, known under RA 9165 as the
chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
The applicable law mandates the following to be observed as regards the time, witnesses
and proof of inventory in the custody of seized dangerous illegal drugs:
confiscation;
a. the accused or his representative or counsel;
b. a representative from the media;
c. a representative from the DOJ; and
d. any elected public official.
b. at the nearest police station; or
warrantless seizure
However, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165, particularly as to the presence of the three (3) witnesses immediately after seizure
and confiscation of the illegal drugs. In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses
under Section 21 were present at the time the subject drugs were allegedly confiscated from
Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three (3) were summoned by the team and
were actually present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items.
The three (3) insulating witnesses must be present at the time of seizure of the drugs
such that they must be at or near the intended place of arrest so they can be ready to witness
the inventory and photographing of the seized items "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." These witnesses must sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. In the
present case, from the evidence of the prosecution itself, none of the witnesses were present
during the seizure and confiscation of the subject drugs. Moreover, only two (2) of them - the
punong barangay and the media representative - witnessed the photographing and signed
the inventory.
Q: A buy-bust team was against Adobar and his live-in partner. The confidential
informant introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy
shabu. After the conduct of buy-bust operation, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an
Punong Barangay Acenas, media representative Rondie Cabrejas of Magnum Radyo
(media representative) and an unidentified representative from the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Thereafter, the sachets of suspected shabu, including the subject drugs,
were marked with IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT." After the marking, IO3 Tablate
proceeded with the inventory of the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the
table where the seventeen (17) sachets were found, and prepared the Inventory of
Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs (Inventory) in the presence of Ga-a. Photographs
of the seized drugs, the room where they were found and the accomplishment of the
Inventory were then taken. It appears from the prosecution's submissions that among
the three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay Acenas and the media
representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed and signed the Inventory.
Were the requirements under Sec. 21 complied with?
A: NO. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165,
particularly as to the presence of the three (3) witnesses immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the illegal drugs. In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses under
Section 21 were present at the time the subject drugs were allegedly confiscated from
Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three (3) were summoned by the team and
were actually present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items.
(People Of The Philippines v. Jennifer Ga-A Y Coronado, Aquila Adobar, G.R. No. 222559, June
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORJANA SOOD Y AMATONDIN
DOCTRINE
The Court again takes this opportunity to emphasize that the presence of the three
witnesses required by Section 21 is precisely to protect and guard against the pernicious
practice of policemen in planting evidence. Without the insulating presence of the three
witnesses during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs that were evidence of the
corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of accused-
appellant.
FACTS
NORJANA SOOD y AMATONDIN was charged for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, R.A.
9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On 28 January 2009, a certain
"Florence" was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by police operatives
belonging to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group, Kamuning Police
Station (PS-10), Quezon City Police District. Upon their return to the police station, they were
informed by the confidential informant that the dealer of the alleged drugs, accused-
appellant, was due to arrive from Caloocan City that afternoon.
Police Senior Inspector Christopher N. Luyun, the Chief of SAID-SOTG, thereafter

allowed the continuous police operation for the arrest of accused-appellant. After a briefing
for accused-appellant's apprehension, the CI called the latter through a mobile phone on
loudspeaker. Pretending to be Florence, the CI asked accused-appellant, "Norjana, pwede
ako ulit magconsign ng isang bulto?" Accused-appellant replied: "Sige bigyan kita responde
pero ang remittance ay next week" to which the CI answered: "ok, text kana lang pag malapit
kana para pasundo kita." The CI and accused appellant agreed to meet later that day at the
place where they usually do their drug transactions.
The police operatives and the CI proceeded to the target area. When the CI saw
accused-appellant, she pointed the latter to SPO1 Regato. SPO1 Regato then approached
accused-appellant and asked her: "ikaw ba si Norjana, pinapasundo ka pala ni Florence."
Accused-appellant replied in the affirmative and added, "ah sige, kuya puwede kayo na
magbigay kay Ate Florence kasi nagmamadali ako." She then took from her right pocket two
(2) transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance believed to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu" and handed them to SPO1
Regato, who thereafter introduced himself as a police officer. Accused-appellant was then
arrested and apprised of her constitutional rights. Before leaving the target area, SPO1
Regato placed the markings "AR1-28 JAN09" and "AR2-28 JAN09" on the plastic sachets.
Accused appellant was then taken to the barangay hall. SPO1 Regato prepared the
Inventory of Seized Properties/Items and the inventory was conducted before Kgd. Manette
P. Salazar and Rey Argana, a media representative. Both Kgd. Salazar and Argana signed the
certificate of inventory for the two (2) transparent plastic sachets. Afterwards, accused
appellant was brought to the police station. SPO1 Regato turned over the confiscated items
to their investigator, PO3 Cortes, who prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination of the
subject specimens. Thereafter, SPO1 Regato submitted the evidence to the crime laboratory
for examination, which gave positive results to the tests for shabu.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 states the procedure to be followed by a buy-
bust team in the seizure, initial custody, and handling of confiscated illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia. Here, it is undisputed, as was found by both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. To be sure, the findings of the CA
show an utter failure on the part of the police to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure
of the drugs.
In addition, SPO1 Regato admitted that, at the time of the arrest, there were no
witnesses, and that, according to him, this was the reason the inventory was conducted in
the barangay hall instead of at the place of arrest of accused-appellant. He likewise admitted
that the photographing was also conducted in the police station instead of the place of arrest,
specifically at the investigation room of the police station.
Unquestionably, the prosecution failed to prove that the three required witnesses
were present during the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. As the RTC itself
found, only the barangay official and media representative were present during the
inventory, and they were called in only after the arrest and seizure had already happened —
which may have been at the barangay hall or at the police station.
The plain import of Section 21 of RA 9165 is that the buy-bust team is to conduct the
physical inventory and photographing of the seized items immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative
of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. And only if this is not practicable, can the
inventory and photographing be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
Here, the buy-bust team admittedly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.
The Court again takes this opportunity to emphasize that the presence of the three witnesses
required by Section 21 is precisely to protect and guard against the pernicious practice of
policemen in planting evidence. Without the insulating presence of the three witnesses
during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs that were
evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of accused-appellant.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted by police operatives belonging to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group, Kamuning Police Station (PS-10),
Quezon City Police District. After Norjana took from her right pocket two (2)
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance believed to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu", she was arrested.
Accused appellant was then taken to the barangay hall. The inventory was conducted
before Kgd. Manette P. Salazar and Rey Argana, a media representative. Afterwards,
accused appellant was brought to the police station. SPO1 Regato turned over the
confiscated items to their investigator, PO3 Cortes, who prepared a Request for
Laboratory Examination of the subject specimens. Norjana argues that the
requirements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 were not complied with. Is Norjana correct?
A: YES. First, the conduct of the inventory was not conducted immediately at the place of
seizure and apprehension; indeed, the police officers even contradicted each other as to
where the inventory was supposedly conducted. This creates a very serious doubt in the
Court's mind as to whether an inventory was actually even conducted.
Second, even assuming an inventory had been conducted, the prosecution failed to
comply with the requirement that the photographing be also done at the place of arrest. The
prosecution's excuse of not having a camera is flimsy as they had planned the operation.
Lastly, the three required witnesses were not present during the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs. Only the barangay official and media representative were
present during the inventory, and they were called in only after the arrest and seizure had
already happened. (People Of The Philippines v. Norjana Sood Y Amatondin, G.R. No. 227394,
June 06, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DELIA CALLEJO Y TADEJA AND SILVERA ANTOQUE Y
MOYA@ "INDAY"
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs
must be established.
FACTS
The Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG) conducted
a buy-bust operation against one "Delia Callejo" and "alias Bitoy" in Barangay Palanan,
Makati City. During the operation, appellants Delia Callejo and Silvera Antoque were arrested
and charged under two (2) separate Informations.
At the arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. They denied the prosecution's
allegations and claimed that the charges filed against them were completely fabricated.
In a Decision, the RTC found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
rejected the appellants' defense of frame-up. Callejo and Antoque were guilty for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. Moreover, Callejo was guilty for violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC ruled that sufficient evidence exists on record
to establish that the buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTG was valid, and the
prosecution successfully established the identity of the corpus delicti in the present case. The
CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in sustaining: (i) Appellants’ conviction
for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165; and (ii) Callejo's conviction for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
YES. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the SAID-SOTG complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, and establish the unbroken chain of
custody of the seized items.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized
drugs must be established.
However, in this case, the SAID-SOTG committed patent procedural lapses in the
seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug that create reasonable doubt as to
the identity and integrity of the drugs and consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the appellants. The SAID-SOTG also failed to comply with the three-witness rule as required
in Section 21. Said Section plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation. In addition, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his
counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public
official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory
and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or
at the place of apprehension. By the same token, this also means that the three required
witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension.
As confirmed by the testimonies presented by the prosecution, SAID-SOTG's lone

witness, Kagawad Bernal, was called to the place of arrest only after the apprehension of the
appellants and the alleged seizure of drugs from their possession. In fact, Kagawad Bernal
himself confirmed that he did not even have prior knowledge of the buy-bust operation and
that he was even taken by surprise when he was summoned to witness the physical
inventory and sign the Inventory Receipt thereafter. Further, no explanation was offered as
to the absence of the two other insulating witnesses from the DOJ and the media. The
submissions of the prosecution do not indicate that the SAID-SOTG exerted genuine effort in
order to secure their presence at the time of apprehension. The presence of the witnesses
from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the
possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug.
The prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the
SAID-SOTG, as well as the material inconsistencies in the apprehending officers' testimonies
on the confidentiality of their informant's identity, taken together, cast reasonable doubt
over appellants' guilt. Verily, the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence ascribed to the appellants.
Q: PNP Makati conducted a buy-bust operation against Alex and Nico, who were
arrested and charged with the violation of RA 9165. During trial, the prosecution
presented its lone witness, Kagawad Bernas, who claimed that he was called to the
place of arrest only after the apprehension of Nico and Alex and the alleged seizure of
drugs from their possession. He emphasized that he did not even have prior
knowledge of the buy-bust operation and that he was even taken by surprise when he
was summoned to witness the physical inventory and sign the Inventory Receipt
thereafter. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to prove Alex’s and Nico’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Decide.
A: The defense is correct. Under RA 9165, the presence of the witnesses from the DOJ,
media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of
planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Due to unexplained breaches of
procedure committed by the arresting officers, the integrity of the corpus delicti is put in
question. (People v. Callejo y Tadeja, G.R. No. 227427, June 06, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN MADRONA OTICO
DOCTRINE
Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to
stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment. The prosecution has the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti.
FACTS
Marvin Otico was indicted for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165. He was arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by personnel of Oslob Police
Station in Brgy. Looc, Oslob, Cebu. He was allegedly caught selling, delivering and
distributing to a PNP agent acting as poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
pack of white crystalline substance, weighing 0.02 gram, in consideration of P500.00 pesos,
which when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC found Otico guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Otico for the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, RA 9165.
RULING
YES. The Court reversed and set aside the conviction due to the unexplained major
procedural lapses, the indefiniteness of the substantiation of the elements of illegal drug sale
under Section 5 of RA 9165, and the questionable identification of the sachet of shabu, which
is the purported object of the illegal sale.
Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to
stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and its payment. The prosecution has the onus to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court
of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti.
In this case, the prosecution's proof that the "transaction actually took place" consists
of the "eyewitness" accounts of police officers PO1 Villasurda and PO3 Saquibal, neither of
whom was the poseur-buyer, and who were admittedly 10 meters away from where the
poseur-buyer allegedly transacted with Otico. Further, the civilian agent who was assigned
as the poseur-buyer was never presented as a witness. Informants are usually not presented
in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police. Considering these, the evidence presented against Otico by the prosecution falls
terribly short of the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, the identity of
the dangerous drug that Otico allegedly sold to the civilian agent is uncertain.
Concerned police officers also failed to comply with the standard rules to be followed
by PNP members and units engaged in the enforcement of RA 9165 in support of PDEA, part
of the handling of drug evidence is "the weighing of dangerous drugs, and if possible under
existing conditions, with the registered weight of the evidence on the scale focused by the
camera, in the presence of persons required, as provided under Section 21, Art II, RA 9165.
Given the failure to indicate the weight of the shabu in the documents required to prove the
regularity of the buy-bust operation and preserve the integrity of the recovered shabu, and
to comply with the requirement in the PNP Manual on the weighing thereof, the object of the
illegal sale has clearly not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. There is thus reasonable
doubt that the alleged shabu, which was recovered from the civilian agent and bought by the
latter from Otico, might not be the same one that was delivered to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 7 for examination.
Furthermore, there are serious lapses in the police officers' compliance with Section
21, Article II of RA 9165. These lapses include the following: (1) the inventory and
photograph taking were not done immediately after seizure and confiscation in the place of
operation; (2) Except for the elected official, the required witnesses were not present during
the inventory and photograph taking. Only one of the three third-party witnesses was
present; and (3) the police officers did not present justifiable grounds for their non-
compliance with the required procedure and proof that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were properly preserved by them. These lapses noted above are far
from being minor. They are major deviations from the statutorily mandated procedure and
there was no attempt whatsoever by the prosecution, through the testimonies of the police
officers, to explain why an honest-to-goodness compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its IRR, as well as the PNP Manual, was unavailable under the circumstances obtaining during
the buy-bust operation.
Given these lapses and noncompliance of the police officers, the Court is compelled to
acquit Otico for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence in favor of Otico stands.
Q: Martin was arrested for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165 in an
entrapment operation. He was allegedly caught selling, delivering and distributing to
a PNP agent acting as poseur buyer one heat-sealed transparent plastic pack of white
crystalline substance in consideration of P500.00 pesos. The defense argued that
Martin cannot be convicted because the police officers failed to indicate the weight of
the confiscated drugs in the documents required to prove the regularity of the
entrapment. Is the defense correct?
A: YES. Part of the handling of drug evidence is "the weighing of dangerous drugs, and if
possible under existing conditions, with the registered weight of the evidence on the scale
focused by the camera, in the presence of persons required, as provided under Section 21,
Art II, RA 9165. Given the failure to indicate the weight of the shabu in the documents
required, the object of the illegal sale has clearly not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
There is thus reasonable doubt that the alleged shabu, which was recovered from the civilian
agent and bought by the latter from Otico, might not be the same one that was delivered to
the Crime Laboratory Office for examination. (People v. Otico, G.R. No. 231133, June 06, 2018,
as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY AGRAMON
DOCTRINE
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods
or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. On the other
hand, for evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is indispensable to show concrete evidence
on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Gerry Agramon (Gerry) was charged with Murder after attacking,
assaulting and stabbing the wife of his brother, Pelita Aboganda. Gerry first attacked and
stabbed Roger and then stabbed Pelita who tried to cover her husband in order not to be hit
again. Pelita died, while Roger was taken to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center for
treatment. Gerry, on the other hand, interposed self-defense. He claimed that his brother was
the one who first attacked him while he was on his way to work.
In a Decision, the RTC gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and
found Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The RTC held that the
number and nature of the wounds inflicted upon the victim disproves Gerry's claim of self-
defense. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. The
CA agreed with the RTC that Gerry failed to prove self-defense because the element of
unlawful aggression is explicitly wanting. However, as regards the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA found that only evident premeditation was
clearly established. The CA held that treachery cannot be appreciated because the attack on
Pelita was not sudden and unexpected as Roger and Pelita were aware of the imminent
danger to their lives.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Gerry's conviction for Murder despite the fact that
the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. Gerry can only be convicted of Homicide, not Murder as treachery and evident
premeditation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1)
the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
The prosecution also did not prove that Gerry intentionally sought Pelita for the
purpose of killing her. In fact, Roger admitted that after Gerry delivered a stab thrust towards
him, Pelita used herself as a shield to protect him from being hit again. Indeed, jurisprudence
has established that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden
and unexpected. There must be proof that the accused intentionally sought the victim for the
purpose of killing him or that the accused carefully and deliberately planned the killing in a
manner that would ensure his safety and success. Also, the fact that a bladed weapon was
used did not per se make the attack treacherous. And even if it was shown that the attack
was intended to kill another, as long as the victim's position was merely accidental, alevosia
will not qualify the offense.
However, with respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the

Court cannot agree with the CA. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is
indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In this case, evident premeditation
was not established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to what transpired at
6:00 in the evening of December 24, 2005, when Gerry came to his brother's house yelling
and threatening to kill them all. The prosecution, however, did not present any proof
showing when and how Gerry planned and prepared to kill Pelita. Also, the mere fact that
the accused was armed at the beginning of the altercation does not unequivocally establish
that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder the victim. To qualify an offense, the
circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."
Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere
presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable, would not be
enough. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the offense in this case.
Q: Jeron was charged with Murder after attacking, assaulting and stabbing the wife of
his brother, Perlita. Jeron first attacked and stabbed Rogelio and then stabbed Perlita
when she tried to cover her husband in defense. Perlita died, while Roger was timely
taken to the hospital for treatment. During trial, Jeron interposed self-defense. The
RTC convicted him of Murder. The CA affirmed the conviction. On appeal, Jeron argued
that treachery and evident premeditation were not established. Is Jeron correct?
A: YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
offended party might make. On the other hand, for evident premeditation to be appreciated,
it is indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched
or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In this case, the prosecution also
did not prove that Jeron intentionally sought Perlita for the purpose of killing her.
Furthermore, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's evidence
was limited to what transpired at 6:00 of the day of the crime. It did not present any proof
showing when and how Jeron planned and prepared to kill Perlita. (People v. Agramon, G.R.
No. 212156, June 20, 2018, Second Division, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO B. SIEGA
DOCTRINE
An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and
indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.
FACTS
Siega was charged with the crime of Murder, after attacking, assaulting, stabbing and
hacking Pacenciano Bitoy. Due to the severity of his wounds, Bitoy died instantly. Siega
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, and he claimed that it was self-defense.
The RTC ruled Siega guilty of the crime of Murder. It found that Siega failed to prove
the element of unlawful aggression. Siega's claim that Bitoy tried to draw a weapon from his
waist was belied by the fact that no such weapon was recovered from the victim or at the
scene of the incident; and Alingasa's credible testimony verified that Bitoy was not carrying
any weapon at the time of the incident. Moreover, it found that the killing of Bitoy was
attended by treachery because, as testified by Alingasa, Siega suddenly stabbed Bitoy, who
was unsuspecting and unarmed. However, the RTC did not appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation because there was no proof on how Siega planned
and prepared in the killing of Bitoy and on the lapse of time for Siega to reflect and cling to
his determination to execute the crime.
The CA affirmed, with modifications on the civil damages, the ruling of the RTC. The
CA held that the RTC did not err in convicting Siega for the crime of Murder as there was
failure of the defense to sufficiently prove self-defense and it was positively proven by the
prosecution that the killing of Bitoy was attended by treachery
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding Siega's conviction for the crime of Murder
RULING
NO. The Court found Siega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most
important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.
In this case, records disclose that Siega failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, Bitoy. Thus, his claim of self-defense must necessarily fail.
In his version, Siega claimed that Bitoy came rushing to his house armed with a bolo.
When Bitoy attempted to draw his weapon, Siega picked up a sharp pointed bolo and stabbed
Bitoy several times. However, as duly pointed out by the RTC and CA, Siega's account of
events is belied by the straightforward and credible testimony of Alingasa that Bitoy did not
carry any weapon at that time. This was corroborated by the fact that no weapon was
recovered from the victim.
Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent

danger — not merely a threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a
weapon from his waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and
limb of Siega. The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Further, the
alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in
imminent danger. The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not
merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one's life.
On the matter of treachery as a qualifying circumstance of Murder, the courts a quo

correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing of Bitoy. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack against an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, who has no
chance of defending himself. Here, a credible eyewitness testified that Siega, armed with a
bolo, stabbed Bitoy on the chest several times, while the latter was merely conversing with
Alingasa. That the attack was frontal does not rule out the existence of treachery; because it
was so sudden and unexpected that Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself,
was felled down by Siega's repeated hacking blows. Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court
finds no reason to overturn the concurring findings of the RTC and the CA with respect to the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Q: JP was charged with the crime of Murder, after attacking, assaulting, stabbing and
hacking Philip. Due to the severity of his wounds, Philip died instantly. JP pleaded not
guilty and invoked self-defense, claiming that Philip tried to draw a weapon from his
waist. During the trial, an eyewitness testified that Philip did not carry any weapon at
that time. The RTC found JP guilty of the crime charged on the ground that JP failed to
prove the element of unlawful aggression. Is the RTC correct?
A: YES. An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most
important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.
In this case, JP’s invocation of self-defense is belied by the straightforward and credible
testimony of the eyewitness, which was also corroborated by the fact that no weapon was
recovered from the victim. (People v. Siega, G.R. No. 213273, June 27, 2018, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX
G.R. No. 225059, July 23, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The rule
becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and immature, not
only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment
which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified on were untrue.
FACTS
"BBB" is the daughter of the accused, [XXX]. She is the only girl in the brood of three.
Her mother is a manicurist while the accused is a pedicab driver. She recounted that on four
different occasions, her father ravished her, inside their residence. Four (4) separate
Informations for rape were filed in the RTC against XXX for four (4) counts of rape committed
against BBB.
During the arraignment, XXX pleaded "not guilty" to all charges. He claimed that there
is no truth in the charges against him stating that his daughter is "isip bata" and was
influenced by her friend with whom she is currently living with.
In the RTC Decision, XXX was found guilty on all four (4) counts of rape and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each charge. The RTC, in considering
the evidence on record, found BBB's testimony to be straightforward and credible as against
XXX's unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi. Likewise, XXX's imputation of ill motive to
BBB was considered by the RTC as "too petty to merit belief. The CA affirmed the RTC
Decision.
ISSUE
Whether XXX's guilt for the four counts of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court found the appeal lacks merit as the evidence against XXX was
sufficient to prove that he is guilty.
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The
rule becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and
immature, not only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and
embarrassment which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified
on were untrue.
The testimony of BBB had established sufficient evidence that showed that the
appellant committed the offense charged in the four (4) information. BBB’s testimony was
able to prove that appellant was able to rape her using force and intimidation in the four (4)
separate occasions. Significantly, BBB's narration of events was corroborated by the physical
evidence, as contained in the medico-legal report which the findings was consistent with the
testimony given by the victim.
The Court has held on several occasions that when a rape victim's account is
straightforward and candid and is further corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, such testimony is sufficient to support a conviction. As correctly
pointed out in the questioned Decision, BBB was able to describe in clear detail how each
incident of rape was committed by XXX. Moreover, the RTC, after observing BBB's manner
and demeanor firsthand during trial, was sufficiently convinced of her credibility and the
truthfulness of her testimony. Hence, the prosecution’s evidence prevail over the XXX's
defense of alibi and denial.
Q: Jojo was charged for fur (4) counts of rape after sexually ravishing her daugther,
AAA in four (4) separate occasions. JoJo denied it and pleaded not guilty to all the
charges. He claimed that his daughter is “isip bata” and was influenced by her friend.
The RTC ruled Jojo guilty of all the charges as XXX’s testimony was found sufficient and
credible. Further, XXX’s testimony was also consistent with the findings of the
medico-legal report. Is the RTC correct?
A: YES. An accused may be convicted based on the victim's sole testimony, provided that it
is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The rule becomes more binding where - as in
the instant case - the victims are young and immature, not only because of their relative
vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment which they stand to suffer
during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified on were untrue. In this case, Gigi’s testimony
is straightforward and candid and is further corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, such testimony is sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. XXX, G.R.
No. 225059, July 23, 2018, as as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JACINTO ANDES Y LORILLA
DOCTRINE
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a mere
reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry very
great weight and substance.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Andes for the rape of AAA. It was alleged that while
the private complainant, AAA, was sleeping with her 4 year old son in bed inside the room of
their house, she was awakened when suddenly somebody covered her mouth, and told her
not to shout and simultaneously poked a knife on her neck, saying, "don't shout, I will kill
you and your son.” While it was dark, she identified that person as the accused Andes through
his voice and the words he uttered. She did not resist in doing what was commanded of her
because she was thinking of the safety of her son as he could stab and kill him. The accused
had sexual intercourse with her twice.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Andes of the crime charged. It found AAA's
identification of Andes sufficient. likewise held that Andes' defense of denial could not
prevail over the positive identification by AAA. Lastly, the RTC found AAA's testimony
spontaneous and credible after it had observed the demeanors of both AAA and Andes on
the witness stand.
In the appeal, Andes raised questions on the believability of AAA's testimony, and if
the element of coercion or intimidation was sufficiently proven. Still, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Andes.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Andes.
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape - viz.: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation- are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail
how Andes committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a
mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry
very great weight and substance.
According to Andes, it was improbable that AAA was already able to grab the handle
of his supposed knife, and yet she failed to take advantage, and her supposed admission that
no weapon was used during the rapes. For Andes, it was an admission that force or
intimidation was absent during the time the rape was supposedly committed. Nonetheless,
the Court held that AAA sufficiently explained that despite the fact that no weapon was poked
at her body at the time the actual rapes were committed, she was of the belief that maybe
Andes was still holding the weapon and that she could not ascertain where the weapon was
because it was dark. It is established that the law does not impose on the rape victim the
burden of proving resistance. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light
of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not
by any hard and fast rule
Q: While AAA and her 4-year old son were sleeping, AAA’s stepfather Amboy entered
the room and poked a knife at her, commanding her not to shout and threatening to
kill her and her son if she did. She did not resist in doing what was commanded of her
because she was thinking of the safety of her son as he could stab and kill him. That
night, Amboy had sexual intercourse with her twice. After an information for rape was
filed, Amboy was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by the CA. Amboy pointed out AAA’s
admission that no weapon was used during the rapes, claiming that force and
intimidation was absent. Did the RTC and CA err in convicting Amboy?
A: NO. The two elements of rape: 1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl, and
(2) that such act was accomplished through force or intimidation are both present. It is
established that the law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance.
In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
(People v. Andes y Lorilla, G.R. No. 227738, July 23, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY DE VERA Y MEDINA
DOCTRINE
Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required of the mandatory
provisions of Sec. 21. The Court cannot absolve the failure of the buy-bust team to comply fully
with Sec. 21 for its successful observance of only some of the law's provisions. Selective and
partial compliance is tantamount to non-compliance which, as have been repeatedly
emphasized, is fatal to establishing the corpus delicti. Then, unless excused by the saving clause,
the acquittal of the accused must follow. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties cannot apply where there is a clear violation of Sec. 21. In such cases, the
innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, a walk-in Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Office
of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (CAIDSOTG) of the Baguio City
Police Office and reported that a certain Henry, who turned out to be De Vera, a drug pusher,
offered to sell shabu worth P5,000.00. Thereafter, a buy-bust team was formed and later on
proceeded to the meet-up place.
Upon arrival of De Vera, the CI introduced SPO2 Dolinta as the buyer. SPO2 Dolinta
brought out the buy-bust money worth P5,000 which he counted and handed to De Vera. De
Vera, in turn, brought out a purse from his front pocket, opened the same and took out one
(1) plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance (drugs subject of sale). After
assessing the item as shabu, the buy-bust team arrested De Vera. Upon frisking, PO2
Charmino recovered from De Vera the purse containing three (3) more plastic sachets of
suspected shabu (drugs subject of the possession case) and 42 pieces of transparent empty
plastic sachets which PO2 Charmino marked by putting his initials, date and signature
thereon.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought De Vera to the CAIDSOTG office where the
inventory of the confiscated items was conducted in the presence of elected Barangay
Tibong, media representative from ABS-CBN, Meilen B. Pacio and DOJ representative,
Prosecutor Sudaypan. Thereafter, with a request for qualitative examination, all four (4)
seized drugs were brought to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Bado Dangwa
(Crime Lab), for examination. The results yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
From the time of their seizure from De Vera to their submission to the Crime Lab,
SPO2 Dolinta held custody of the drugs subject of sale and the buy-bust money while PO2
Charmino held custody of the drugs subject of the possession case and the 42 pieces of
transparent plastic sachets.
The RTC found De Vera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes of
sale and possession of illegal drugs. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
ISSUE
Whether accused-appellant De Vera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the separate
crimes of sale and possession of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Sec. 5 and Sec.
11, respectively, both under Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165,
specifically, with the required inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drugs
in the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses and immediately after seizure and
confiscation.
Under Sec. 21 of, the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs must be at
the place of apprehension and/or seizure. Likewise, the three (3) mandatory witnesses —
the elected public official and the DOJ and media representatives — must already be
physically present at the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure.
However, the records show no attempt by the buy-bust team to secure the presence
of the three (3) witnesses to be present at the time and place of the alleged confiscation of
the drugs. Instead, what is evident is that the witnesses' presence were only secured upon
return of the buy-bust team to CAIDSOTG office, and during the inventory of the seized items.
Further, the buy-bust team failed to conduct a physical inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs immediately after and at the place of confiscation as required. Significantly, no
photographs at all of the drugs and drug paraphernalia alleged to have been confiscated from
De Vera were presented.
Apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Sec. 21 requires that the physical
inventory and photographing be likewise made in the presence of the accused or his his/her
representative or counsel. In the present case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence
concerning the presence of De Vera during the photographing, physical inventory and
marking of the seized items.
Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required of the mandatory

provisions of Sec. 21. The Court cannot absolve the failure of the buy-bust team to comply
fully with Sec. 21 for its successful observance of only some of the law's provisions. Selective
and partial compliance is tantamount to non-compliance which, as have been repeatedly
emphasized, is fatal to establishing the corpus delicti. Then, unless excused by the saving
clause, the acquittal of the accused must follow.
Courts must apply strictly the requirements of Sec. 21. The presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties cannot apply where there is a clear violation of Sec. 21.
In such cases, the innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.
Q: An informant reported to the Baguio City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Group that Don Mariano offered to sell shabu worth P5,000. Consequently, a buy-bust
team was formed and later on proceeded to the meet-up place. SPO2 Doronilla
presented himself as the buyer and handed the buy-bust money to Don Mariano. The
latter, in turn, brought out his purse opened the same and took out one (1) plastic
sachet which contained white crystalline substance. After assessing the item as shabu,
the buy-bust team arrested De Vera. Upon frisking, three (3) more plastic sachets of
suspected shabu and 42 pieces of transparent empty plastic sachets were also
recovered. marked by putting his initials, date and signature thereon. Thereafter, the
buy-bust team brought Mariano to the police station where the inventory of the
confiscated items was conducted in the presence of the Barangay Captain, a media
representative and a DOJ representative. Subsequently, all evidence was brought to
the crime laboratory for examination. The results yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC convicted Don Mariano of possession and
sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the defense argued that the integrity of the corpus
delicti was not preserved. Is the defense correct?
A: YES. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165,
specifically, with the required inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drugs
in the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses and the accused; and immediately after
seizure and confiscation. Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required
of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 21. The Court cannot absolve the failure of the buy-bust
team to comply fully with Sec. 21 for its successful observance of only some of the law's
provisions. Selective and partial compliance is tantamount to non-compliance which, as have
been repeatedly emphasized, is fatal to establishing the corpus delicti. Then, unless excused
by the saving clause, the acquittal of the accused must follow. (People v. De Vera y Medina,
G.R. No. 218914, July 30, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICKY GONZALES Y COS AND RENE GONZALES Y COS
G.R. No. 218946, September 05, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should
necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of the victim
show that the attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally without
opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the
result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between
Bobby and Rene which Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated act of the will. As far as
the prosecution's evidence is concerned, it was only able to establish the following: (a) a
commotion was caused when Rene and Bobby were taunting each other; (b) Rene punched
Bobby and (c) Ricky went out of the plaza and stabbed Bobby. Considering the foregoing, it was
not proven that Ricky deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the criminal act to ensure that Bobby could not defend himself. Thus, it is not
possible to appreciate treachery against Ricky.
FACTS
Ricky and his brother and co-accused Rene Gonzales (Rene) were charged with the
crime of murder.
According to prosecution witness Leo, at around 1:00 am, he was awakened from
sleep by the cry of his child whose sleep was disturbed by the commotion outside their
house. Leo got up to investigate and, at the same time, to buy cigarettes. Leo then discovered
that the commotion came from the house of his neighbor, Bobby. Bobby and his nephew,
Rene, were outside Bobby's house and were taunting each other. This confrontation led to
Rene punching Bobby who failed to retaliate. Ricky then emerged from the plaza, which was
five meters away from Leo's house, and without warning stabbed Bobby three times with a
knife which was approximately nine inches long. Bobby was hit at his left forearm, middle of
his chest, and at his stomach. When people started arriving to help the victim, Rene and Ricky
escaped together.
Ricky admitted that he stabbed and killed the victim, but only because it was
necessary to defend himself. On that day, on his way home from a benefit dance in the plaza,
he passed by the house of Bobby and observed that Bobby was staring at him in a bad way.
Ricky claimed that he saw Bobby was about to strike him with a knife, but he was fortunate
enough to stab him first. When someone fired a warning shot to stop them, he ran away but
later voluntarily surrendered himself to their barangay captain upon knowing that Bobby
died.
The RTC found Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It held that since
there was treachery in Ricky's sudden and unexpected attack, the killing was qualified to
murder. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution failed to prove treachery
RULING
YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
In this case, the prosecution was unable to prove that Ricky intentionally sought the
victim for the purpose of killing him. Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which
would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. There
must be a showing, first and foremost, that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
Indeed, it does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it
should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of
the victim show that the attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally
without opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence,
appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the
commotion between Bobby and Rene which Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated
act of the will. As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, it was only able to establish
the following: (a) a commotion was caused when Rene and Bobby were taunting each other;
(b) Rene punched Bobby and (c) Ricky went out of the plaza and stabbed Bobby. Considering
the foregoing, it was not proven that Ricky deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Bobby could not defend
himself. Thus, it is not possible to appreciate treachery against Ricky.
Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is
homicide and not murder.
Q: A disagreement ensued between Brian and his nephew Andres. They taunted each
other, which led to Andres punching the Brian who failed to retaliate. In the midst of
the commotion, suddenly, Andres’ brother Rico emerged and without warning
stabbed Brian three times with a knife. Brian was hit at his left forearm, middle of his
chest, and at his stomach. Later on, Brian died at the hospital while in surgery. An
information for murder was filed against Andres and Rico. Subsequently, they were
convicted by the RTC. On appeal, Andres and Rico argued that treachery was not
proven, and so the crime should be homicide and not murder. Are Andres and Rico
correct?
A: YES. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Well settled is the rule that the
circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the
crime itself. There must be a showing, first and foremost, that the offender consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime
which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself. However, it does not
always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed
as an attack attended with treachery. In this case, the wounds of the victim show that the
attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally without opportunity to
defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a
rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion, rather than from a
deliberated act of the will. Since treachery was not proven, the crime is homicide and not
murder. (People v. Gonzales y Cos, G.R. No. 218946, September 05, 2018, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AQUIL PILPA Y DIPAZ
G.R. No. 225336, September 05, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the attack was "sudden,"
"unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." It does not always follow that
because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Pilpa for the murder of Dave Alde. Prosecution
eyewitness Barangay Tanon Leonila Abuel went to Quirino Highway, Pandacan to look for a
certain Reynan. When she arrived at the highway, she saw a group of five persons which
include Alde, Carol, Eva and two other people the names of which she failed to remember.
She approached the said group and asked if they knew the whereabouts of Reynan to which
Carol answered in the negative. While still talking to the group, another group of five men,
which included one named JR and appellant Pilpa arrived. At this point, JR stabbed Alde on
the chest with a big knife while appellant was positioned at the back of Leonila. After JR
stabbed Alde, Pilpa, who was a mere arms-length away from Leonila, poised to thrust Alde
as well. At this point, witness Leonila tried to intervene by announcing her position as
Barangay Tanod but appellant disregarded said intervention by uttering "wala kaming
pakialam kahit Barangay Tanod ka." Witness Leonila sustained injuries as she attempted to
parry the thrusts. Appellant's attempts to stab Alde ultimately failed because Choy, a
companion of Alde, was able to parry the thrusts. Leonila then ordered Alde to run away
which he was able to do despite his wounds, but appellant and his group gave chase.
Thereafter, appellant and his group scampered away.
Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be given timely medical
attention. However, after an operation, Alde went into cardiac arrest and succumbed to
death.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Pilpa of the crime of Murder. The RTC
held that Pilpa was liable - although it was only the certain "JR" who was able to inflict stab
wounds on the victim - because there was conspiracy among the assailants of Alde. As
conspiracy was present, the RTC ruled that all of the assailants were liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime perpetrated in furtherance of such conspiracy. The RTC also found
that treachery attended the killing of Alde, hence Pilpa was liable for Murder instead of
Homicide. The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of Pilpa.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to
prove that conspiracy exists (NO)
2. Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery
(YES)
RULING
It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is the
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if at the
time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were
animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts
of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted
action. In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of
the assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect.
To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be

proven. Such conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct before and immediately after the
act of the people involved. The conduct of appellant and "JR" in approaching the group of
Alde, stabbing him and running after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him.
After the incident, appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary to human
experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend who had just stabbed another
without being aware of such occurrence as appellant alleges.
On the other hand, It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the attack was
"sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." It does not always follow
that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
In the case at bar, the testimonies reveal that the assailants attacked the victim while
the latter was having a seemingly random conversation with four friends in a public highway,
and even in the presence of a barangay tanod, who later joined the group. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree that the assailants, including Pilpa,
deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the
criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim
might offer. In addition, the attack itself was frontal.
Q: Caithlyn is a barangay tanod. While she was walking in a public highway, she saw a
group of five persons, including Carlo, and talked to them. In the midst of the
conversation, another group of five men, which included Jasper and Jeremy,
approached them. Suddenly, Jasper stabbed Carlo on the chest with a big knife. Jeremy
poised to stab Carloas well, ignoring the protestations of Caithlyn. However, Jeremy
was unsuccessful, since Caithlyn parried the attacks. Carlo and his group was able to
run away. Unfortunately, Carlo died at the hospital. An information was filed against
Jeremy for the crime of Murder. Jeremy argued that conspiracy was not proven, and
therefore he should not be liable for the crime. Furthermore, even if he was liable, the
crime should only be homicide, since treachery was not proved. Is Jeremy correct?
A: Partially correct. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, it is not
needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be proven because conspiracy may be
inferred from the conduct before and immediately after the act of the people involved. In this
case, conduct of Jasper and Jeremy in approaching the group of Carlo, stabbing him and
running after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him.
As for the presence of treachery, Jeremy is correct. It does not always follow that
because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery. In the case at bar,
the assailants attacked the victim while the latter was having a seemingly random
conversation with four friends in a public highway, and even in the presence of a barangay
tanod. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to agree that the assailants deliberately chose
a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal purpose
without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. In
addition, the attack itself was frontal. Hence, the crime is homicide. (People v. Pilpa y Dipaz,
G.R. No. 225336, September 05, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILLIAM VILLAROS Y CARANTO
G.R. No. 228779, October 08, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational
reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to
act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
FACTS
Two (2) separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant for the rape
of minor AAA. The incidents occurred inside the house of the victim. On November 29, 2009,
the victim went inside the bathroom beside the room of accused. She was still there when
accused Villaros peeped inside. When the said victim came out from the room, the accused
told her to buy cigarettes. The victim could not look at the accused when she gave the
cigarette to him as he was then only wearing shorts. Upon receiving the cigarette, the accused
pulled the victim inside his bedroom and closed the door. Accused Villaros who was then
already naked told the victim to remove her clothes while he was covering her mouth. At the
said time at around 6 o'clock in the afternoon there were no other persons inside the house
because the victim's mother and stepfather were at work. As the victim refuses to remove
her clothes, accused Villaros was the one who did so. The victim tried resisting but accused
Villaros covered her mouth with one hand while the other held her hands. Even when the
victim was petrified, she addressed the accused "Tito" as a sign of respect. After removing
the victim's clothes, accused Villaros made her lie down on foam which he used as a bed.
While crying, the accused touches the private part of the victim for about twenty (20)
minutes and then mounted on top of her inserting his sexual organ into her private part.
When done, the accused told the victim to dress up which she immediately did so and walked
out of the room.
During the incident that transpired on December 27, 2009 at 6 o'clock in the evening
the victim was alone in the house when the accused again sexually abused her. The victim
cried and felt hurt when accused inserted his sexual organ into her private part. One of the
accused's hands covered the victim's mouth while his other hand removes his shorts. The
accused remained on top of the victim for fifteen (15) minutes after the intercourse and then
hurriedly left. The accused warned the victim that he would hurt the victim's siblings if she
will not let him do what he wanted..
For the defense, Villaros testified that he knows the victim because she lives in the
house of his brother DDD, who is also the victim's stepfather. Their houses are adjacent to
one another. The accused denies that he had sex with the victim. He claims that the victim is
just trying to ruin his reputation.
The RTC convicted Villaros of the crime charged. It held that Villaros took advantage
of his moral authority, as he was the brother of the stepfather of the victim, and likewise
employed force, threats, and intimidation to accomplish his lewd design. The RTC, however,
did not appreciate any of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape — (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA testified in detail how the
accused-appellant committed the sexual abuses, and this testimony was given weight and
credence by both the RTC and the CA. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony
is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. This is a matter best
assigned to the trial court which had the first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of
the witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination.
Such matters cannot be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic
notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry great weight and substance.
Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in

accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational
reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected
to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
Additionally, the accused-appellant brazenly blames the victim for "exposing herself
to further abuse,” since she still went at their house after the first incident. The Court held
that such reasoning is outrageous, if not outright despicable. In his desperate attempt to
exculpate himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant turned on his victim who, to
repeat, was a minor at the time the rape incidents were committed, and blamed her for
putting herself in a vulnerable position in her own home.
Further, the fact that the accused-appellant did not use any weapon is immaterial,
especially since the victim in this case was just 12 or 13 years old at the time of the incidents.
Moreover, this case involves a rape of a close kin. In rapes committed by a close kin, it is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence or intimidation. The fact that the accused-appellant was only a
"brother of her stepfather" does not diminish the fact that he exercised moral influence over
the minor, much more so in this case where they actually live together in the same house.
Q: AAA is a minor who lives with her stepfather and his brother, BBB. In two separate
incidents, BBB raped AAA. Consequently, two (2) separate Informations were filed
against BBB for rape. The RTC convicted him, and the CA affirmed. On appeal, BBB
argues that the victim did not establish that she employed significant resistance
considering that she did not allege the use of any weapon during the rape incident,
and questions AAA’s demeanor following the incident. Does BBB’s argument have
merit?
A: NO. The fact that the accused-appellant did not use any weapon is immaterial, especially
since the victim in this case was just 12 or 13 years old at the time of the incidents.
Moreover,in rapes committed by a close kin, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation. Further, victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within
reason or in accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard
rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. (People v.
Villaros y Caranto, G.R. No. 228779, October 08, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELITO SERAD Y RAVILLES A.K.A. "WACKY"
DOCTRINE
While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined
in Section 21, it likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from
the said procedure is justifiable and subsequent earnest efforts were made to comply with the
mandated procedure, much like in this case where the officers showed that they did their duties
bearing in mind the requirements of the law. In short, it would be error for the Court not to
reward such compliance.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Wacky for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
The prosecution averred that Office of Task Force Kasaligan in Negros Oriental was informed
by a confidential informant that Wacky was engaged in the illegal sale of drugs at his home.
As appellant was included in the Task Force's anti-narcotics operation target list, SA Miguel
Dungog, team leader of the Task Force, decided to carry out a buy-bust operation.
PO2 Ayunting and the confidential informant transacted with Wacky outside the
latter's house. After telling Wacky that Ayunting and the confidential informant intend to
purchase shabu worth four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00), Wacky agreed to sell
and asked them to wait outside while he went to get the drugs inside the house. Upon his
return, appellant was in possession of one (1) plastic sachet which appeared to be containing
shabu. While Wacky handed the plastic sachet to the confidential informant, PO2 Ayunting
made the [pre]-arranged signal (drop call) to SPO2 Germodo. Upon receipt of the drop call,
the Task Force members proceeded to the area.
As Wacky demanded payment, PO2 Ayunting handed him the marked money and got
the plastic sachet from the confidential informant to confirm if it was shabu. At this moment,
Wacky noticed the arrival of the backup team, prompting him to flee.
PO2 Ayunting placed the plastic sachet inside his pocket and proceeded to run after
Wacky. The other members of the Task Force joined the pursuit. During the chase, Wacky
threw the marked money previously paid to him. He was caught by PO2 Ayunting with the
aid of SPO2 Germodo and the rest of the backup team, forty (40) or fifty (50) meters away
from where the sale took place. Speaking in the Visayan dialect, SPO2 Germodo informed
Wacky of their authority as police officers, and accordingly, arrested him. He was likewise
informed of the cause of his arrest and of his Constitutional rights. While PO2 Ayunting held
the accused, the rest of the members of the Task Force returned to the area to recover
marked money thrown away by Wacky. However, SPO2 Germodo was only able to get back
a single five hundred peso (P500) bill. PO2 Ayunting marked the transparent plastic sachet
with "WS-BB," which stood for "Wellito Serad[-]Buy Bust." After recovering the marked
money, SPO2 Germodo conducted an inventory of the item bought from Wacky.
The inventory was held at the place where Wacky was arrested and in the presence
of the required witnesses, which included a local media practitioner, a DOJ representative
and PDEA representative. Another witness to the inventory, Dandan Teves Leon (Dumaguete
City Kagawad), was not present at the place of the arrest, but he was present at the NBI-
Dumaguete District Office. PO2 Ayunting took pictures of the marked money recovered by
members of the Task Force and the plastic sachet bought from Wacky.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Wacky of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Wacky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
RULING
NO. Section 21 of the law plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (3) a representative of the media, all
of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
While the police officers were not able to explain why only two of the three required
witnesses were at the place of arrest – and why no elected official was available – the police
officers nevertheless showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. To
ensure that the integrity of the seized items were preserved, the police officers conducted a
preliminary inventory at the place of the arrest as preferred by law. Recognizing that what
was done was not strictly compliant with the law, the police officers conducted another
inventory, this time in the police station where all the three required witnesses were
available and were, in fact, present.
While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure
outlined in Section 21, it likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight
deviation from the said procedure is justifiable and subsequent earnest efforts were made
to comply with the mandated procedure, much like in this case where the officers showed
that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the law. In short, it would be
error for the Court not to reward such compliance.
Q: The Office of Task Force Kasaligan in Negros Oriental received a tip that Capo was
engaged in the illegal sale of drugs. As Capo was included in the Task Force's anti-
narcotics operation target list, they decided to carry out a buy-bust operation and
proceeded to the house of Capo. After the poseur-buyer announced his intention to
purchase Shabu worth P4,500, Capo brought out a plastic sachet and received the
marked money. When Capo noticed the approaching officers, he fled. Still, he was
captured. The inventory was held at the place where Capo was arrested and in the
presence of the required witnesses, which included a local media practitioner, a DOJ
representative and PDEA representative. Later on, a second inventory was held at the
police station. After Capo was charged with violating RA 9165, the RTC convicted him,
and the CA affirmed in conviction. On appeal, Capo assailed the integrity of the corpus
delicti, arguing that one of the required witnesses, an elected official, was not present
at the inventory. The prosecution countered that the elected official was not at the
place of arrest, but was present at the police station, during the second inventory. Will
Capo’s defense lie?
A: NO. Section 21 of the law plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (3) a representative of the media, all
While the police officers were not able to explain why only two of the three required
witnesses were at the place of arrest – and why no elected official was available – the police
officers nevertheless showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. To
ensure that the integrity of the seized items were preserved, the police officers conducted a
preliminary inventory at the place of the arrest as preferred by law. Recognizing that what
was done was not strictly compliant with the law, the police officers conducted another
inventory, this time in the police station where all the three required witnesses were
available and were, in fact, present. The Court recognized that there may be instances where
a slight deviation from the said procedure is justifiable and subsequent earnest efforts were
made to comply with the mandated procedure. (People v. Serad y Ravilles, G.R. No. 224894,
October 10, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
ALBERTO GRANTON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since
when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been sexually violated, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Furthermore, even granting that
appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his guilt with
reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.
FACTS
Housekeeper NNN was cleaning the house when she noticed blood in the
undergarments of CCC, the two (2)-year old daughter of MMM and FFF. The undergarments
had two blood stains - one was already brown but the other is still fresh and red. At first, she
thought CCC was suffering from a Urinary Tract Infection (UTI).
The following day, when NNN was about to do the laundry, once again, she saw one
of CCC's undergarments stained with blood. The day after, NNN noticed another of CCC's
undergarments with blood stains. It was then that she started having misgivings whether it
was really UTI that had been causing all these blood stains.
NNN asked CCC if she was "touched" by her "Tito Ambet" (referring to appellant). She
suspected appellant to have something to do with the blood stains found on the
undergarments because of his close familiarity with the child - appellant being a distant
relative of FFF and hired by the latter to feed his flock of fighting cocks on several occasions.
Appellant likewise resides in the house of spouses FFF-MMM and at times he was free to hug
and touch the child. CCC answered "yes", and demonstrated a push-and-pull movement of
her index finger. NNN likewise asked SSS, the elder sister of CCC, if she had seen appellant
touching the genitalia of her younger sister. SSS answered in the affirmative. NNN told the
spouses FFF-MMM about what appellant had done to their child. CCC was then brought to
the municipal hospital for physical examination.
Two (2) separate Informations for Rape through Sexual Assault were filed against
Alberto. The RTC found Alberto guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Alberto.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding Alberto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Rape through Sexual Assault.
RULING
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit,
since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been sexually violated, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Furthermore, Even granting
that appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his guilt
with reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on
the basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.
Q: Nadia is the housekeeper of the Smith Family. On multiple occasions, she noticed
that the undergarments of AAA, the two-year old child of the Smiths, were stained with
blood. She suspected that the family’s distant relative, Amber, was responsible for the
blood stains because of Amber’s close relationship to AAA. When Nadia asked AAA, the
latter confirmed that Amber inserted his finger in her vagina in multiple occasions.
Nadia informed AAA’s parents, who brought AAA to the hospital for examination. Two
(2) separate Informations for Rape through Sexual Assault were filed against Amber.
The RTC found Amber guilty. On appeal, Amber argued that the findings in the medical
certificate were not conclusive to establish that they were caused by him through
sexual assault. He also questioned the credibility of the testimony of CCC allegedly
because she did not even cry in pain or shout for help during the incidents. Do Amber’s
claims have merit?
A: NO. Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit,
since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been sexually violated, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Furthermore, even granting
that appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his guilt
with reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on
the basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant. (Granton v. G.R. No. 226045,
October 10, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENATO BACOLOT Y IDLISAN
DOCTRINE
For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal
liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In short, in
order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete
deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission
of the offense. Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is deemed to have
admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to establish with certainty
that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness.
FACTS
An Information was filed charging Renato of the crime of murder. Upon arraignment,
Renato's counsel manifested that Renato was suffering from mental disorder and requested
for his examination, which the RTC granted. The medical report submitted by Dr. Genotiva
of the EVRMC affirmed that Renato was mentally incompetent to stand for trial; hence, trial
was suspended and Renato was sent to the National Center for Mental Health for further
evaluation and treatment. Later on, the RTC received a letter from the Chief of the Forensic
Psychiatry Section of the National Center for Mental Health, attesting that Renato had
regained competency to stand trial and recommended his discharge. Subsequently, Renato
was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution witness Arnulfo, the brother of the victim Rodolfo, testified that on
May 14, 2008, while having a drinking spree with Renato and some other companions,
including Rodolfo who subsequently joined them, Renato suddenly took a scythe (matabia)
from Arnulfo's waist and hacked Rodolfo three times hitting the latter on the neck, back, and
fingers. The hacking happened while Rodolfo was singing with his face turned towards the
television. Renato then turned towards Arnulfo and hacked him too on the neck, head, and
left shoulder. Arnulfo survived, but Rodolfo died.
Renato pleaded insanity as defense. His lone witness, Dr. Genotiva, testified that she
had previously examined Renato in the year 2005 prior to his arrest. That was when Renato
tried to burn himself and had to be admitted for his suicidal tendencies. Dr. Genotiva
diagnosed Renato then as having "auditory hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate
effect," and was "able to converse, but he was not oriented to time and place, he had poor
memory recall of the incidents, and he had blank stares." Dr. Genotiva again examined
Renato after his arrest. Recent psychological tests led her to recommend against Renato's
trial as he still had psychotic trends despite his calm behavior. According to Dr. Genotiva,
Renato had poor memory recall of the incidents relating to the commission of the crime and
that he did not know what he did at the time. Also, Renato showed not only psychotic trends,
but a full-blown psychosis, and that his schizophrenia had no chance of being completely
healed.
The RTC convicted Renato of the crime of murder. The RTC emphasized that the
defense did not deny that Renato killed Rodolfo, but failed to present evidence to support
Renato's plea of insanity. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the fact that the defense was able to prove insanity (NO)
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder
despite the prosecution's failure to establish the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation (YES)
RULING
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was not proven. For this defense to be
successfully invoked to evade criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to
the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense. The
accused must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2)
such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before
the commission of the offense. Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is
deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to
establish with certainty that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his
mental condition or illness.
There was no finding whatsoever that accused-appellant exhibited any of the myriad
symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the
hacking of Rodolfo. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the CA that the defense of insanity is
belied by the following circumstances: First, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection
of the hacking incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. It
has been held that the professed inability of the accused to recall events before and after the
stabbing incident, as in the instant case, does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind, but
is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. Second, accused-appellant's
voluntary surrender the following day belies his claim of insanity. This act tends to establish
that he was well aware of what he had just committed, and that he was capable of
discernment. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Genotiva failed to show the mental condition of
accused-appellant between 2005 and 2008.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery. The following circumstances
negate the presence of treachery: First, the stabbing incident happened during a drinking
spree in which accused-appellant was a part. He did not deliberately seek the presence of the
victim as he was already in the same vicinity as the latter when he hacked the victim. Second,
in killing the victim, accused-appellant did not even use his own weapon – he merely took a
scythe from Arnulfo. Therefore, the crime is homicide and not murder.
Q: During a drinking spree with brothers Tisoy and Cap, Toyong suddenly took a
scythe (matabia) from Tisoy’s waist and hacked Cap three times hitting the latter on
the neck, back, and fingers. Toyong then turned towards Tisoy and hacked him too on
the neck, head, and left shoulder. Tisoy survived, but Cap died. Toyong pleaded
insanity as defense. He presented the testimony of Dr. Grace who claimed that she
previously examined Toyong in 2005 prior to his arrest, and diagnosed the latter as
having as having auditory hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate effect,"
and was "able to converse, but he was not oriented to time and place, he had poor
memory recall of the incidents, and he had blank stares. After Toyong’s arrest, she
again examined him. Recent psychological tests led her to recommend against
Toyong’s trial as he still had psychotic trends despite his calm behavior. According to
Dr. Grace, Toyong had poor memory recall of the incidents relating to the commission
of the crime and that he did not know what he did at the time. Also, Toyong showed
not only psychotic trends, but a full-blown psychosis, and that his schizophrenia had
no chance of being completely healed. Despite this, the RTC convicted Toyong. Is the
RTC correct?
A: YES. For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade

criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding
or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In
short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity,
he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such
complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the
commission of the offens. Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is
deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to
establish with certainty that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his
mental condition or illness. As can be gleaned from Dr. Genotiva's testimony, there was no
finding whatsoever that Toyong exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with
schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the hacking incident. (People v.
Bacolot y Idlisan, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALGLEN REYES Y PAULINA
DOCTRINE
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the Information. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense
is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Reyes in this case, the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
“That on or about 12:15 in the early dawn of July 5, 2011 in Brgy. Malindong,
Binmaley, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or "shabu", a dangerous drug, without any authority to sell the same.
Contrary to Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165”
The prosecution’s version of facts are as follows: A buy-bust operation was planned
against the accused. The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and waited for the
accused to arrive. When he showed up, the posuer-buyer approached the accused, saying:
"This is the money, so give me the thing that I will buy." Accused handed one (1) small plastic
sachet containing shabu in exchange for the marked P500.00 bill. Thereafter, the accused
was arrested. The police frisked the accused and recovered from his right pocket three (3)
plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Other items confiscated were bills, a key chain
with two keys, a lighter, a Nokia cellular phone, and a motorcycle. Vaquilar inscribed his
initials "JBV" on the four (4) sachets containing suspected shabu at the place of arrest and
immediately after he seized them from accused. He also prepared a Confiscation Receipt.
Thereafter, the officers brought the accused to the police station and turned him over,
together with the seized items, to the investigator on duty, SPO4 Guillermo Gutierrez.
Candelario prepared a request for laboratory examination of the seized specimens and drug
test on the person of the accused. The request and the specimens were delivered by Gutierrez
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City on the same day.
The RTC convicted Reyes of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Reyes
RULING
YES. The Information filed against Reyes in this case was defective, for which reason
alone Reyes should be acquitted. The importance of sufficiency of the Information cannot be
more emphasized; it is an essential component of the right to due process in criminal
proceedings as the accused possesses the right to be sufficiently informed of the cause of the
accusation against him.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the Information. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an
offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish
the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
In the case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify
therein all the components of the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
namely: the identity of the buyer, the object, and the consideration.
Even assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that the Information in this case
sufficiently informed Reyes of the charge against him, Reyes would still be acquitted on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time
of seizure and apprehension and even during the conduct of the inventory. Furthermore,
there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to
look for the said representatives.
Q: In a buy-bust operation, Rivero was arrested for selling shabu. The information
filed against him states that: “That on or about 12:15 in the early dawn of July 5, 2011
in Brgy. Malindong, Binmaley, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully sell Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu", a dangerous drug,
without any authority to sell the same. Contrary to Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165.”
The RTC convicted Rivero. On appeal, Rivero argued that the information filed against
him was defective. Is Rivero correct?
A: YES. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the Information. The test in determining whether the information validly charges
an offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish
the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In the case at bar, the
Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify therein all the components of
the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, namely: the identity of the buyer,
the object, and the consideration. (People v. Reyes y Paulina, G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA
DOCTRINE
Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily
crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A
denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime
and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Mercado for the murders of his aunt Alicia and her
live-in partner, Evelyn. The victims are partners who lived together in a house located in
Bulacan. Appellant was the nephew of Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI College in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used to live in the same house.
It appears that around 11:00 PM of October 14, 2007, appellant was already inside
the house, having come home from school. Around 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house
of Evelyn and Alicia was reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and
appellant were observed on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way to escape the blaze.
Eventually, through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and appellant were brought out of the
burning house. Evelyn looked weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt. She also had
blood oozing out of the right side of her head.
Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly
accused and pointed to appellant as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as
well as for setting the house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that appellant hit her and
Alicia with a baseball bat then set them on fire. One witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo
sa akin yang si Patrick dahil siya ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng bahay." Another
witness stated hearing the following utterances from Evelyn: "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan
papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," referring to appellant, and "ilayo nyo sa akin si Patrick
dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still, another witness claimed to have heard Evelyn say:
"Ilayo nyo sa akin yan batang yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan
ang pumalo sa ulo namin." Further, while on board the ambulance on the way to the hospital,
Evelyn repeated the name of appellant as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned
the house. Thus, she uttered: "Te, si Patrick ang may gawa," "Si Patrick sinunog kami," and
"Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si Patrick ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay." Despite
medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died.
Mercado, vehemently denied the charge against him. Dan Dacallos, a neighbor of
Patrick testified that, he was sleeping when he heard someone shouting "sunog". He checked
and saw a smoke coming out from the house of Patrick and also saw an unidentified bloodied
man coming out. He then saw Patrick throwing water on the burning house while at the
terrace. He did not report having seen the bloodied man to the authorities because of his
minority and since his parents did not want him to get involved.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Mercado of the crime of Double Murder.
The RTC held that although the evidence of the prosecution relied heavily on what appears
to be hearsay evidence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were still admissible
because they were the dying declarations of Evelyn, and these were admissible under Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The RTC further held that the crime committed was the
complex crime of Double Murder – instead of two counts of Murder – and sentenced him
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting Mercado despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The testimony failed to overcome the credibility and probative value of the dying
declarations and/or part of the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which were recounted by several
witnesses. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It
easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution
evidence which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is
negligible.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence

because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.
In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations,
they are nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. A
declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res
gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Applying
the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the res gestae.
The fire – which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-
in partner – was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made
immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused
by her injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The
statements were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly
claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked them, and thereafter set the house on fire.
Further, for voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements must
be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. In the present case,
Mercado did not actually surrender. Instead, he simply did not offer any resistance when so
arrested.
Q: Eva and her live-in partner Alice lived together with the former’s nephew, Asher.
One day, Eva and Alice’s house was reported to be on fire. While the house was
burning, Eva and Asher were observed on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way
to escape the blaze. Eventually, through the help of neighbors, they were brought out
Eva looked weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt. She also had blood oozing
out of the right side of her head. She repeatedly told several witnesses that it was
Asher who burned their house and hit her and Alice with a baseball bat. Asher was
thereafter arrested. Later on, despite medical attention, Eva died. Asher was charged
and convicted by the RTC with Double Murder. On appeal, he argued that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender was not appreciated in his favor. Is Asher
correct?
A: NO. As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence

because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Additionally, time
and again, it has been ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in
the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore,
voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated because Asher did not actually surrender.
Instead, he simply did not offer any resistance when so arrested. (People v. Mercado y Anticla,
G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
DOCTRINE
For the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court took the opportunity to
prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the
imposable penalty: 1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 2. If the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the
second proviso in Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in
its medium period. 3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12)
but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully
take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for the rape of AAA in 2003. The latter testified
that Sometime in July 2003, around 8:30 in the morning, while she was inside their house in
xxxx [CCC], appellant raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina. She was 10 years old
at that time. She was lying on the bed when appellant arrived and laid beside her. Appellant
embraced her while his hands touched her body. She was afraid and immobilized. Appellant
asked her to give him a massage on his chest, but she refused. As result, appellant pulled her
left hand and placed it on his chest as if massaging it, then pulled it down further to his penis.
Appellant only stopped when he heard her mother arrive from the market. He stood from
the bed and told her to fix her appearance. It took her a long time to report the incident
because appellant threatened her mother and older sister. In 2007, when she was already in
3rd year high school, she could no longer take appellant's abuses so she reported it to one of
her teachers.
XXX, on the other hand, admitted that something happened between him and his
daughter, he insisted that the same was consensual and it was even her daughter who
initiated their sexual congress by guiding his hand to her vagina. He assailed the date of
commission of the alleged crime claiming that the incident actually complained of happened
in 2007 and not 2003.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted XXX. It ruled that since XXX admitted that
he did have sexual intercourse with his daughter – although he claimed that it happened in
2007, instead of 2003 – sufficed to convict him of the crime charged since the precise time is
not an essential element of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting XXX
RULING
PARTIALLY ERRED. The Court modified the conviction of XXX from Statutory Rape
to Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. 7610), as
the prosecution was unable to prove that he committed the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
In rape cases in general, the prosecution has the burden to conclusively prove the two
elements of the crime – viz.: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl, and (2)
that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation. On the other hand,
to convict an accused for Statutory Rape, the prosecution has the burden of proving only the
following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Statutory Rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. What differentiates it with
other instances of rape is that, proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary,
considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is
below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court observes the following guiding principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.
In this case, records would reveal, that the evidence presented by the prosecution
failed to establish that he indeed had sexual intercourse with AAA in 2003, or at the time she
was still 10 years old. The testimony of AAA, establishes that what happened "sometime in
July 2003" was that XXX put her hand on his penis. She likewise testified that nothing else
happened as XXX was interrupted because BBB already arrived from the market. Thus, the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish the most crucial element of the crime of Rape –
that is, the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Neither could XXX be convicted through his admission that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA in 2007. This is because the Information filed in this case accused XXX of having
sexual intercourse with AAA "sometime in July 2003." While it is true, as the RTC and the CA
held, that the exact place and time of the commission of the crime is not an element of the
crime of Rape, XXX still could not be convicted of the crime for to do so would be to offend
the basic tenets of due process in criminal prosecutions.
For the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court took the opportunity
to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the
imposable penalty: 1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 2. If the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. 3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age,
or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old
or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua.
Q: An information was filed against XXX for the rape of his daughter AAA, who was 10
years old at the time, in 2003. During trial, AAA testified that in 2003, XXX forced her
to touch his private parts. After that, the act was cut short since her mother timely
arrived. She added that in 2007, XXX again tried to rape her and succeeded in doing
so. XXX admitted that he engaged in sexual intercourse with AAA in 2007, but claimed
that it was consensual. The RTC convicted XXX of rape despite the discrepancy of the
dates, ruling that the exact date or time of the commission is not an element of the
offense. The CA affirmed the conviction. On appeal, XXX argues that he could not be
convicted for a crime that happened in 2007, since the information charged him for
rape in 2003. Is XXX correct?
A: YES. XXX cannot be convicted through his admission that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA in 2007. This is because the Information filed in this case accused XXX of having sexual
intercourse with AAA "sometime in July 2003." While it is true, as the RTC and the CA held,
that the exact place and time of the commission of the crime is not an element of the crime
of Rape, XXX still could not be convicted of the crime for to do so would be to offend the basic
tenets of due process in criminal prosecutions. XXX can only be convicted of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness for what transpired in 2003. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 226467, October 17,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO BAGABAY Y MACARAEG
DOCTRINE
Although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did not prove that
Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution
of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim
might offer. As testified to by the witnesses, the incident happened in broad daylight outside a
public place where there were plenty of other people present who could have offered their help.
When aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances showed
that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused
indeed consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen
another place or time
FACTS
An information for Murder was filed against Armando. The prosecution witnesses
testified that in the morning of September 7, 2010, at around 7:00 o'clock, victim Guevarra
unloaded his passengers in front of Dr. Ramon De Santos National High School. While
Guevarra was giving his passengers their change, Armando alighted from his tricycle armed
with a kitchen knife. Without warning, Armando grabbed Guevarra's shoulder and stabbed
the latter twice in rapid successive motions near the heart. Guevarra got off his tricycle and
tried to run away, but Armando pursued him. When Guevarra collapsed on the road,
Armando took this as an opportunity to stab the former one more time. Armando left
thereafter. Gueverra was taken by bystanders to the Guimba District Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Armando, on his part, asserted self-defense.
The RTC found Armando guilty of murder. It ruled that Armando failed to prove that
he acted in self-defense. It also declared that treachery attended the commission of the crime,
considering that Guevarra was stabbed from behind; and that the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack were deliberately employed so that the victim would be
deprived of any means to resist it. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Armando's conviction for Murder
RULING
PARTIALLY ERRED. The Court affirmed the conviction of Armando, but only for the
crime of homicide, instead of murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven.
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the

killing itself. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance,
the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the assailant.
In this case, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did not
prove that Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured
the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense
that the victim might offer. As testified to by the witnesses, the incident happened in broad
daylight outside a public place where there were plenty of other people present who could
have offered their help. If Armando wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him,
he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim. In a similar case, the Court
held that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant
circumstances showed that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be
appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted means to insure the
facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Thus, the Court can
reasonably conclude that Armando acted impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim.
Q: While Arthur, a jeepney driver, was dropping off passengers in the morning at a
local high school and giving change, Merlin approached him and suddenly stabbed him
multiple times with a knife. The bystanders brought Arthur to the hospital, where he
was pronounced dead on arrival. Merlin was charged and convicted with Murder due
to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery by the RTC. Is the crime
charged correct?
A: NO. The incident happened in broad daylight outside a public place where there were
plenty of other people present who could have offered their help. It has been ruled that when
aid is easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances showed that
there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused
indeed consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have
chosen another place or time. (People v. Bagabay y Macaraeg, G.R. No. 236297, October 17,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SEGUNDO BRICERO Y FERNANDEZ
DOCTRINE
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because
of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient
evidence or proof making it very plausible or true
FACTS
A confidential informant came to the office of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) in
Camp Karingal, Quezon City, and reported about the illegal drug activities of an alias Budoy.
Consequently, a buy-bust team was formed. At past 4:00 pm of that same day, the team
proceeded to the target area. The poseur-buyer was accompanied by the confidential
informant, who introduced her to appellant as a friend and a buyer of shabu. When appellant
asked them "kukuha ba kayo? ", the latter expressed their desire to buy shabu. Appellant
thereafter took out from his pocket and handed to a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance, which turned out to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu,
in exchange for three hundred pesos, earlier marked. Subsequently, appellants was arrested.
Inventory of the items were made at the place where they were confiscated and
appellant was later turned over to the investigator for further questioning. Immediately
thereafter, PO2 Ortiz personally brought the confiscated items (sic) to PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination.
Appellant denied possession and ownership of the sachet of shabu, contending that
he saw them for the first time at the police station. He alleged that he was inside his house
together with his wife and two children, sleeping. Suddenly, several persons from DAID,
about 15 of them, entered the house. He was handcuffed by a police officer and brought to
DAID office.
An information was filed against Bricero for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC convicted him, and the CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether Bricero's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The prosecution admittedly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
the elements of the crime, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
Compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such
operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said
drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt.
In present case, the buy-bust team committed several patent procedural lapses in the
conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus created
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drug and, consequently, reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. First, records show that the apprehending team did not
conduct an inventory nor did it photograph the confiscated item in the presence of the
accused-appellant or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official. Second, the inventory was not prepared by the police
officer who recovered the prohibited item. It was prepared by PO1 Jimenez who was not
present at the time and place of apprehension. Third, no photographs of the seized drug were
taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory was conducted.
Lastly, the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the
apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedures.
Further, the Court held that the buy-bust operation was merely fabricated by the
police officers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught
in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized
but duty bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been
part of or used in the commission of the crime. However, where there really was no buy-bust
operation conducted, it cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs
cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty and the seeming straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers.
After all, the indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when
there is sufficient evidence or proof making it very plausible or true. Taking into
consideration the defense of denial by Bricero, in light of the testimonies of PO1 Reyes and
PO2 Ortiz, the Court cannot conclude that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the
arresting police officers as they attested to and testified on. The prosecution's story is like a
sieve full of holes.
Q: An information was filed against Alex for the sale of illegal drugs. The prosecution
claims that Alex was arrested in a buy-bust operation, where the inventory of
confiscated drugs was done right after the arrest. It appeared that the buy-bust
operation was not coordinated with PDEA and there were no witnesses to it. On the
other hand, Alex claims that there was no such buy-bust operation, and that he was
arrested while he was sleeping at home with his family. He pointed out the lack of
witnesses to the arrest. The RTC convicted Alex and held that the prosecution was able
to prove due compliance with the chain of custody rule. Based on the facts presented,
is the RTC correct?
A: NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, compliance with the chain of custody rule is
crucial. In present case, the chain of custody was not followed. The inventory and
photographing of confiscated items was not done in the presence of the accused or of the
witnesses required under RA 9165. Additionally, there are indications that the alleged buy-
bust was fabricated. As a rule, the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and
convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in
the regular performance of their official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given
credence when there is sufficient evidence or proof making it very plausible or true. In this
case, the fact that the operation was not coordinated with PDEA and was without witnesses
lends credence to the defense of frame-up. (People v. Bricero y Fernandez, G.R. No. 218428,
November 07, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN FATALLO Y ALECARTE A.K.A. "ALVIN PATALLO
Y ALECARTE"
DOCTRINE
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three
witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to
witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has
already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses
prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
FACTS
On the strength of an information about the drug selling activity of Fatallo relayed by
the confidential informant to the concerned operatives, at around 9:00 pm, Police Inspector
Lawzaga conducted a buy-bust operation on Fatallo at Jean's Store located at T. Calo, Butuan
City.
As soon as the poseur-buyer arrived at the store, the Fatallo immediately came out
from the store and the two had a conversation. Not long after, Fatallo handed something to
the poseur-buyer and the latter, in return, got something from his pocket and handed the
same to Fatallo. SPO1 Delos Santos admitted that he saw clearly the transaction between
Fatallo and the poseur-buyer because the team was positioned in front of the store, across
the street and there was a street lighting near the store. After the exchange of items. The
team proceeded to arrest Fatallo, who ran to the upper portion of the house but was
eventually cornered.
The buy-bust team then immediately brought [Fatallo] to the team's office for
booking and documentation. From the crime scene to the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy got hold of
the two (2) sachets of shabu seized from [Fatallo]. In the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy marked the
two (2) sachets of shabu with identifying marks A-l and A-2. The team also prepared four
request for laboratory examinations. Afterwards, pictures were taken on [Fatallo] and on the
shabu recovered from him. From the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy, accompanied by PO1 Cultura,
brought the two (2) sachets of shabu and the written requests to the crime laboratory for
examination.
Fatallo was charged for violation of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 under
the Informations. The RTC found him guilty of the crimes charged. The CA affirmed his
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Fatallo of the crimes charged
RULING
YES. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and for its failure to establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the procedure that police operatives must
strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used
as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and
In the present case, none of the three (3) required witnesses was present at the time
of seizure and confiscation and even during, the conduct of the inventory. Based on the
narrations of SPO1 Delos Santos and PO2 Coquilla not one of the required witnesses was
present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Fatallo or during the
inventory of the recovered drugs at the police station.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of
inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust
operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having
these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
Under the saving clause, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
the apprehending team. In this case, however, In the present case, prosecution neither
recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the
procedure contained in Section 21.
Q: Following a tip-off from a confidential informant on Gab’s alleged business of selling
illegal drugs, the anti-drug team of Butuan City formed a buy-bust operation. The buy-
bust team arrived at the target area and the sale between the poseur buyer and Gab
was consummated. Thereafter, Gab was arrested. The team brought Gab to the police
office for booking and documentation. It was at the office that the senior police officer
marked the confiscated items and sent them off to the laboratory for tests.
Subsequently, two informations were filed against Gab for the sale and use of
dangerous drugs. Gab was convicted by the RTC. On appeal, Gab argued that he should
be acquitted for the failure of the arresting officers to establish the unbroken chain of
custody of the seized drugs. Is Gab correct?
A: YES. Section 21 of the law plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a
representative of the DOJ, and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case,
none of the three (3) required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and confiscation
and even during, the conduct of the inventory. The procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article
II of R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 07, 2018, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODEL MAGBUHOS Y DIOLA ALIAS "BODIL"
DOCTRINE
It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally accorded great weight,
except when it appears on the record that the trial court may have overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if considered,
would have altered the result. This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole
case is thrown open for review on issues of both fact and law, and the court may even consider
issues which were not raised by the parties as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court
full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
FACTS
Rodel was charged with the crime of Murder. The prosecution presented as witnesses
Angelito and Michael, the victim's nephew and son, respectively.
Angelito testified that he was at the billiard hall of his father and brother when he saw
Rodel approach his uncle, Enrique Castillo (Enrique), who was then sitting. Angelito noticed
that when Rodel arrived at the billiard hall, he was already under the influence of liquor as
his body was swaying while walking. Without saying a word, Rodel suddenly stabbed
Enrique on his left chest. Rodel then ran. Enrique was brought to a hospital in San Juan,
Batangas but died on the way to the Villa Hospital in Lipa City where he was about to be
transferred.
Michael testified that on the day of the crime, he was watching billiard games at the
billiard hall of his uncle. There were a lot of people inside the billiard hall. His father, Enrique,
was also inside the billiard hall, seated at the bamboo bench at the right side of the entrance,
when Rodel approached his father and using a fan knife, stabbed his father once at the left
chest. Michael immediately attended to his father and noticed that Rodel had run away. They
brought his father to the San Juan District Hospital and they decided later on to transfer him
to the Villa Hospital in Lipa City but he died on the way.
The RTC found Rodel guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the Decision.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Rodel's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. Rodel can only be convicted of Homicide because treachery and evident
premeditation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the testimonies of Angelito and Michael reveal that Rodel attacked the
victim in the place familiar to the latter and in the presence of at least four other people, two
of whom are related to the victim. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to
agree with the CA that Rodel deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly
ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer. The Court further noted that the attack against Enrique
was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of treachery, when
the same is considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already
creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. As earlier stated,
treachery must be proven as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; and any doubt as to
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused.
There is also no basis for the Court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's
evidence was limited to what transpired between 12:00 o'clock noon to 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of October 6, 2002, when Rodel arrived in the billiard hall and stabbed Enrique.
The prosecution, however, did not present any proof showing when and how Rodel planned
and prepared to kill Enrique and the sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow Rodel to reflect upon the circumstance of his act. The fact that Rodel
approached and stabbed the victim does not unequivocally establish that Rodel earlier
devised a deliberate plot to murder Enrique. To qualify an offense, the circumstance must
not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." Hence, absent a clear
and positive proof of the overt act of planning, mere presumptions and inferences thereon,
no matter how logical and probable, would not be enough.
Q: Angel was watching games at a billiard hall with his son, nephew, and two others.
While he was sitting, Carlo, clearly drunk, approached him and without saying a word,
stabbed him with a fan knife. Despite being brought to the hospital, Angel died. Carlo
was charged and convicted with Murder. On appeal, he argued that the charge was
incorrect, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation
were not proven. Carlo correct?
A: YES. Carlo attacked the victim in the place familiar to the latter and in the presence of at
least four other people, two of whom are related to the victim. Jurisprudence dicatates that
when aid is easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show
that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including the victim's family, no
treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted means to
insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. As for evident
premediation, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, it
cannot be appreciated. (People v. Magbuhos y Diola, G.R. No. 227865, November 07, 2018, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NADER MUSOR y ACMAD
DOCTRINE
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The
rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug
is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
A confidential informant (CI) went to PNP, San Fernando City, La Union and relayed
to PO2 Armand Bautista accused-appellant's illegal drug activities. The PNP then
coordinated with PDEA and RAIDSOTG for a buy-bust operation.
When they arrived near the area, the informant pointed to the person standing in
front of Wil-Jan as the accused Musor. When they approached the accused, the informant
introduced PO2 Bautista as the interested buyer of shabu. The accused then asked PO2
Bautista how much shabu he wanted to buy. The latter told him that he wanted to buy
P500.00 worth of shabu. The accused got something from his pocket and gave it to PO2
Bautista. When PO2 Bautista confirmed that it was a genuine shabu, he gave the marked
money to the accused. After he received the money, PO1 Bersola announced his arrest. PO2
Bautista frisked the accused and recovered another plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, and put the same in his left pocket. Thereupon, their team leader
ordered them to return to the police station to avert any commotion, as their location was
dark and there were persons drinking in the area.
At the police station, the team asked for the presence of a barangay official and a
media representative to witness the marking and preparation of the inventory. PO2 Bautista
marked the plastic sachets and prepared the inventory. He also prepared a request for
laboratory examination which was submitted together with the sachets containing
crystalline substance to PO2 Baceloña at the crime laboratory. After receiving them, PO2
Bacelonia immediately turned over the same to the forensic chemist, P/Ins. Manuel. At the
crime laboratory, P/Ins. Manuel checked the markings of each specimen and conducted an
examination and found the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or a substance
known as "shabu".
The RTC found Musor guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and was
convinced that the chain of custody of evidence was not broken and that the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items were duly preserved. Undeterred with the decision,
Musor asked for reconsideration but was denied.
Aggrieved, Musor appealed to the CA. The CA, however, affirmed Musor's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Musor's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial
in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department
of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural
lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which
thus created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
None of the three required witnesses were present at the time of seizure and
apprehension as they were only called to the police station for the conduct of inventory.
Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed with.
The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and
confiscation" — that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence. Here, the buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements.
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. Neither were the inventory and
marking of the alleged seized items in this case done in the presence of accused Musor. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations
of PO2 Bautista, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time
the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Musor. They were only present during the
conduct of inventory in the police station. There was also no explanation as to their absence
during the apprehension and their belated appearance at the police station.
Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers
and (2) be able to justify the same.
Here, none of the requirements for the saving clause to be triggered is present as the
prosecution did not even concede that there were lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation. Also, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the three witnesses at the
place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the confiscated items
immediately after seizure or during inventory in the presence of the insulating witnesses.
The prosecution also failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. Their explanation — that
there might be a commotion since the place was very dark and there were plenty of persons
drinking at the place — is hollow and not worthy of belief.
Q: A confidential informant went to PNP, San Fernando City, La Union and relayed
accused-appellant's illegal drug activities. The PNP then coordinated with PDEA and
RAIDSOTG for a buy-bust operation. After the buy-bust operation, the team leader
ordered the officers to return to the police station to avert any commotion, as their
location was dark and there were persons drinking in the area. At the police station,
the team asked for the presence of a barangay official and a media representative to
witness the marking and preparation of the inventory. The RTC found the accused
guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and was convinced that the chain of
custody of evidence was not broken and that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items were duly preserved. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Is the CA
correct?
A: NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2)
that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. It further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation.
The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural
lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which
thus created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. Neither were the inventory and
marking of the alleged seized items in this case done in the presence of accused Musor. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations
of PO2 Bautista, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time
the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Musor. They were only present during the
conduct of inventory in the police station. There was also no explanation as to their absence
during the apprehension and their belated appearance at the police station. (People of the
Philippines v. Nader Musor y Acmad, G.R. No. 231843, November 7, 2018, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BOBBY PACNISEN y BUMACAS
DOCTRINE
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their compliance
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a sufficient
explanation for its deviation from the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165. While the Court
emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21, it likewise
recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said procedure is
justifiable, much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to comply with the
law.
FACTS
A confidential informant arrived at the PDEA office, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San
Fernando City, La Union and reported that a certain Bobby Pacnisen, who turned out to be
appellant, was selling marijuana at Santol and San Juan, La Union. Agent Asayco verified
appellant's name from their office's Intelligence Investigation Division. He learned that
appellant's name was included in the so-called "Summary of Information," a record of
complaints brought by the citizens against persons engaged in selling drugs. Based thereon,
Agent Asayco formed a buy-bust team.
The team proceeded to the agreed place of transaction. The confidential informant
and agent Esmin alighted from the team's vehicle and proceeded to the place on foot. Once
there, the confidential informant introduced Agent Esmin to the appellant as the person
interested to buy the P6,000.00 worth of marijuana. Agent Esmin asked appellant if he had
the "merchandise", to which the latter answered in the affirmative. Agent Esmin then asked
appellant if the price for the "merchandise" can be lowered. When the appellant did not
agree, Agent Esmin handed him the buy-bust money worth P6,000.00. Appellant, in turn,
gave him a plastic bag containing 2 packaged bricks. Agent Esmin asked appellant to show
him the "merchandise" which appellant did by cutting a portion of a packaged brick.
Thereafter, Agent Esmin wiped off his sweat with a handkerchief to signal the other team
members to arrest the appellant.
When the other team members arrived, they introduced themselves as PDEA agents.
Agent Mirindato informed appellant of his constitutional rights and placed handcuffs on him.
Agent Esmin then conducted a body search on appellant and made an inventory of the
confiscated items in the presence of the buy-bust team, Brgy. Captain of Urbiztondo Erickson
N. Valdriz, and DXNL anchor Dominador Dacanay. Photographs were also taken by team
leader Agent Asayco during the conduct of inventory.
After the inventory, the team returned to their office where Agent Mirindato prepared
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. Agent Esmin, on the other hand, made the request for
laboratory examination which he, along with the seized items, personally delivered to
forensic chemist Lei-Yen Valdez. Per Chemistry Report, the contents of the 2 packaged bricks
were found positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
The RTC convicted the appellant for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165.
In his appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant questioned his conviction by the RTC
because, according to him, the prosecution failed to prove (1) that a legitimate buy-bust
operation took place, and (2) that the proper chain of custody was complied with. The CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of the accused-appellant, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA upheld the finding that the
prosecution was able to establish (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object,
and the consideration of the sale; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the CA held that the prosecution
was able to establish the proper chain of custody. The CA ruled that since the prosecution
was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody from Agent Esmin to the forensic chemist
and then to the court, "the absence of a DOJ representative here would not destroy the
established identity and integrity of the seized drugs."
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged.
RULING
NO. In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti that the
procedure provided in Section 21 of RA 9165 is followed.
Furthermore, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

RA No. 9165 filled in the details as to where the physical inventory and photographing of the
seized items that had to be done immediately after seizure could be done: i.e., at the place of
seizure, at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.
Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of

the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation in the
presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a representative of the DOJ,
and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, however, only two of the three required witnesses — the elected
official and the representative from the media — were present at the time of seizure,
apprehension, and the conduct of the inventory. Nevertheless, the Court notes, based on the
evidence, that the absence of the DOJ representative could be explained by the urgency with
which the operation needed to be conducted. As the testimony of Agent Esmin reveals, there
was only a two-hour period from the time they received the information from their
confidential informant to the time that they needed to conduct the buy-bust operation. The
absence of the DOJ representative was likewise explained by Agent Esmin. According to
Agent Esmin, a colleague of his tried to contact a DOJ representative but there was no one
available.
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a sufficient
emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21, it
likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said
procedure is justifiable, much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the law.
The officers in this case thus showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure; they showed that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the
law. It would therefore be error for the Court not to reward their efforts towards
compliance.
Q: A confidential informant arrived at the PDEA office, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan,
San Fernando City, La Union and reported that a certain Bobby Pacnisen, who turned
out to be appellant, was selling marijuana. Agent Asayco verified appellant's name and
learned that appellant's name was included in the so-called "Summary of
Information," a record of complaints brought by the citizens against persons engaged
in selling drugs. Based thereon, Agent Asayco formed a buy-bust team. After the
operation, the appellant was arrested. Agent Esmin then conducted a body search on
the appellant and made an inventory of the confiscated items in the presence of the
buy-bust team, Brgy. Captain of Urbiztondo Erickson N. Valdriz, and DXNL anchor
Dominador Dacanay. The RTC convicted the appellant for violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165. In his appeal to the CA, the appellant questioned his conviction by the
RTC because, according to him, the prosecution failed to prove that the proper chain
of custody was complied with. Is he correct?
A: NO. Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation in the
presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a representative of the DOJ,
and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, however, only two of the three required witnesses — the elected
official and the representative from the media — were present at the time of seizure,
apprehension, and the conduct of the inventory. Nevertheless, the Court notes, based on the
evidence, that the absence of the DOJ representative could be explained by the urgency with
which the operation needed to be conducted. As the testimony of Agent Esmin reveals, there
was only a two-hour period from the time they received the information from their
confidential informant to the time that they needed to conduct the buy-bust operation. The
absence of the DOJ representative was likewise explained by Agent Esmin. According to
Agent Esmin, a colleague of his tried to contact a DOJ representative but there was no one
available.
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a sufficient
emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21, it
likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said
procedure is justifiable, much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the law. (People of The Philippines v. Bobby Pacnisen y Bumacas, G.R. No. 234821,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIET RIVERA y OTOM and JAYSON LACDAN y
PARTO, JULIET RIVERA y OTOM
DOCTRINE
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit;
and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Rivera for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs against Rivera was later on consolidated with
Criminal Case wherein her common-law husband, accused Jayson Lacdan stood charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Intelligence Division of San Pedro Municipal Police Station received a report from
a confidential informant that accused Jayson Lacdan was selling drugs. To confirm the
information, PO2 Carandang, PO1 De Leon, PO1 Signap, and one other confidential informant
went to the house of accused Lacdan and conducted a surveillance operation They saw
several people, who looked like drug users, coming in and out of the house. The confidential
informant also identified appellant Rivera. They then planned for the conduct of the buy-bust
operation.
PO1 De Leon, together with the confidential informant who reported the illegal sale,
went to the house of accused Lacdan. Upon his arrival, PO1 De Leon was approached by
appellant Rivera. PO1 De Leon asked the appellant if accused Lacdan was around because
they wanted to buy shabu. Accused-appellant informed them that she would be the one to
get it from accused Lacdan. Thereafter, she went back inside the house and returned,
bringing with her a small plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu. After handing her
the money, PO1 De Leon made a missed call to signal his team leader that the transaction
had been consummated. They then proceeded to arrest the accused-appellant and Lacdan.
PO1 De Leon recovered the buy-bust money from accused-appellant while PO2 Carandang
recovered one plastic sachet from accused Lacdan.
Upon arrest, the two policemen read them their rights. PO1 De Leon subsequently
marked the plastic sachet he possessed and the recovered plastic sachet from accused
Lacdan. Afterward, the accused and the accused-appellant were taken to the police station
for investigation.
Upon reaching the police station, the seized items were turned over to P/Insp.
Gutierrez to be photographed and inventoried. Mr. Nick Luares, a reporter from Laguna
Expose, acted as a witness.
The seized items were examined by Chief Rodrigo of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. Results of the laboratory
examination show that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The RTC found Rivera guilty of the crime charged. However, the RTC acquitted Lacdan
based on reasonable doubt on the identity and evidentiary value of the drugs allegedly
confiscated from him. Aggrieved, Rivera appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Rivera's
conviction
ISSUE
Whether or not Rivera's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
As stated, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a

physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation and in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of
In the case at bar, the buy-bust team utterly failed to strictly comply with the
abovementioned procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165. First, no photograph of the
seized drug was taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory was
conducted. Second, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of PO1 De Leon, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present
at the time the plastic sachet was allegedly seized from Rivera. They only called a
representative from the media at the police station. They also did not give any justifiable
reason for the absence of the three required witnesses during or immediately after the buy-
bust operation for purposes of physical inventory and photograph of the seized item.
Q: Rivera was arrested in a buy bust operation for illegal sale of drugs. Upon her arrest,
the policemen read her rights and subsequently marked the plastic sachet recovered
from her. Afterward, she was taken to the police station for investigation. Upon
reaching the police station, the seized items were turned over to P/Insp. Gutierrez to
be photographed and inventoried. Mr. Nick Luares, a reporter from Laguna Expose,
acted as a witness. Rivera was then charged for violating Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. The RTC found her guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Is the CA correct?
A: NO. In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
As stated, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a

physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation and in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of
In the case at bar, the buy-bust team utterly failed to strictly comply with the
abovementioned procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165. First, no photograph of the
seized drug was taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory was
conducted. Second, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of PO1 De Leon, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present
at the time the plastic sachet was allegedly seized from Rivera. They only called a
representative from the media at the police station. They also did not give any justifiable
reason for the absence of the three required witnesses during or immediately after the buy-
bust operation for purposes of physical inventory and photograph of the seized item. (People
of the Philippines v. Juliet Rivera y Otom and Jayson Lacdan y Parto, Juliet Rivera Y Otom, G.R.
No. 225786, November 14, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL ANGELES y ARIMBUYUTAN
DOCTRINE
It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where the Court
had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid
out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses.
FACTS
Two (2) Informations were filed against the accused-appellant Angeles for violating
Sections 5 and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
PO1 Engracia, per instruction of the Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs- Special
Operation Task Group contacted through a mobile phone an informant at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City to confirm the text message of a concerned citizen as regards the illegal-drug
selling activity of an alias "Panget." Immediately, said informant went to the office of the
SAID- SOTG, CCPS and confirmed to PO1 Engracia that alias "Panget" was indeed engaged in
selling illegal drugs. Thus, a buy-bust team was formed.
Upon arrival at the designated place, the informant and PO1 Engracia approached a
male person, who was later identified as appellant Angel Angeles. The informant said to
appellant, "Pare, kukuha itong kumpare ko." Appellant answered, "Ilan?" Thus, PO1 Engracia
answered, "Limang Daan lang brod," and handed to appellant the buy-bust money.
Afterwards, appellant said, "Sandali lang," left and entered an alley. After a while, appellant
returned and handed to PO1 Engracia two (2) plastic sachets, containing white crystalline
substance believed to be shabu, in exchange for the money that PO1 Engracia gave him.
PO1 Engracia then touched his nape as a pre-arranged signal that the sale was already
consummated. Upon seeing the other members of the buy-bust team approaching, PO1
Engracia held appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. Thereafter, PO1 Engracia
recovered the buy-bust money. PO1 Engracia marked the two (2) plastic sachets bought
from appellant. PO2 Gagarin informed appellant of his violation and Constitutional Rights.
Subsequently, appellant, the subject evidence and the buy-bust money were brought to the
Office of the SAID-SOTG, CCPS.
At the said office, PO1 Engracia turned over the appellant, the buy-bust money and
the subject evidence to the duty investigator, PO1 Pascual. An inventory of the confiscated
items was then conducted. In the course of the turn-over and inventory, PO1 Engracia was
given an Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and was made to sign the Chain of Custody Form
and Physical Inventory of Evidence Form. Photographs of the appellant and the subject
evidence were likewise taken.
Thereafter, PO1 Pascual brought appellant and the subject evidence to the NPD-CLO
for drug test and laboratory examination, respectively. Said examinations yielded positive
results for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC ruled that
the evidence on record was sufficient to pronounce a verdict of conviction against the
accused-appellant. The RTC also recognized that nothing in the records indicates that the
procedure for the conduct of the required physical inventory, outlined in Section 21, RA
9165, was complied with. Despite recognizing this, however, it stated that the non-
compliance, by itself, did not invalidate the seizure of the dangerous drugs.
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of the accused-appellant. As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the
CA held that the defense's failure to question the police officers, on cross-examination,
regarding their alleged non-compliance with Section 21, amounts to a waiver and thus could
no longer be a ground for his acquittal
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crimes charged.
RULING
YES. It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where
the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution
still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses.
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension and even during the conduct of the inventory. It bears emphasis
that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is
mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an
essential purpose.
The prosecution, in this case, neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. Breaches of the procedure
outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused- appellant as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
With the acquittal of the accused-appellant in relation to the charge of violation of
Section 5, RA 9165, it follows then that he should likewise be acquitted as to the charge of
violation of Section 15, RA 9165. The case for violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed
because the accused-appellant was found positive for use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride after he was subjected to a drug test following his arrest.
The accused-appellant was thus subjected to a drug test as a result of his

apprehension which, as already illustrated, was conducted in violation of Section 21, RA
9165 — a rule that is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. Section 21, RA 9165 is a statutory exclusionary rule of evidence,
bearing in mind that, under the Rules of Court, "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules."
The results of the drug test cannot thus be used against the accused- appellant for it
is considered, under the law, as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Applied in the present case, since the apprehension of the accused- appellant by the
police officers was illegal for non-compliance with the procedure provided by Section 21, RA
9165, it therefore follows that the drug test conducted on him was likewise illegal for it is an
indirect result of his arrest.
Q: Angeles was arrested in a buy bust operation conducted by Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs- Special Operation Task Group. Two (2) Informations were filed against him for
violating Sections 5 and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The RTC convicted
Angeles of the crimes charged. The RTC ruled that the evidence on record was
sufficient to pronounce a verdict of conviction against the accused-appellant. The RTC
also recognized that nothing in the records indicates that the procedure for the
conduct of the required physical inventory, outlined in Section 21, RA 9165, was
complied with. Despite recognizing this, however, it stated that the non-compliance,
by itself, did not invalidate the seizure of the dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed the
RTC's conviction of the accused-appellant. As regards compliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165, the CA held that the defense's failure to question the police officers, on cross-
examination, regarding their alleged non-compliance with Section 21, amounts to a
waiver and thus could no longer be a ground for his acquittal. Are they correct?
A: NO. It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where the
Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses.
In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. Breaches of the procedure
outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused- appellant as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. (People of the Philippines v. Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan, G.R. No. 237355,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON CASCO y VILLAMER
DOCTRINE
Case law states that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For indeed, however
noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may be, it
is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
FACTS
The District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) Special Operations Task Force in Quezon City
received a tip from an informant that a certain "Marco" was selling illegal drugs along Loans
Street, Project 8, Barangay Sangandaan, Quezon City. A team was immediately formed and in
the afternoon of the same day, the team arrived at the place. PO1 Kalbi, acting as the poseur
buyer, and the informant went to a sari-sari store where Marco was standing. The informant
then talked to Marco and told him, "Ito yung sinasabi ko sa iyo na kasama ko, gustong
kumuha ng item, SHABU sa halagang limang piso, panggamit lang." Marco then asked "Atin
ba 'yan?" to which the informant replied that "Oo atin 'yan, hindi 'yan kalaban." Marco then
took from his pocket a sachet with white crystalline substance and handed it to PO1 Kalbi,
who, in exchange, gave a P500.00 bill which had been marked. After that, PO1 Kalbi removed
his cap as a pre-arranged signal of the completion of the buy-bust operation. The other
members of the team immediately descended on the place, arrested Marco and brought him
to the police station. The buy-bust money and the plastic sachet taken from Marco were
turned over to PO1 Gula.
For his defense, accused-appellant Casco denied the charge and claimed that armed
men, one of which is PO1 Kalbi, entered his house and pointed their guns at him. They
immediately handcuffed accused-appellant and boarded him in a red van. They also searched
the house but found nothing. Accused-appellant was then brought to Camp Karingal in
Quezon City. There, PO1 Gula demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for his freedom. When he
failed to produce the money, he was then brought to jail and the next thing he knew, he was
charged with selling illegal drugs.
The RTC found accused-appellant Casco guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5 of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA, sustained accused- appellant Casco's conviction.
The CA held that the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1 Kalbi, together with the
stipulations with respect to the proposed testimony of PSI Bonifacio and PO1 Gula, was able
to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug from the time it came into the
possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining accused-appellant Casco's conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
identity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from accused-appellant Casco.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the mandatory witnesses' rule. Here, none of the three (3) required witnesses under Section
21 was present at the time the subject drug was allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Casco or during the conduct of the inventory at the police station. As admitted by PO1 Kalbi
himself, only the buy-bust team and their confidential asset were present at the place of
arrest. Moreover, the inventory of the seized drug was made not in the presence of accused-
appellant Casco or his representative or counsel, an elected public official, a representative
from media and a representative from the DOJ, as mandated by Section 21. To be sure, the
only witnesses who signed the Inventory Receipt were the police officers themselves/
Indeed, case law states that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
For indeed, however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against
illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.
the apprehending team. If these elements are present, the seizure and custody of the
confiscated drug shall not be rendered void and invalid regardless of the non-compliance
with the mandatory requirements of Section 21. It has also been emphasized that the State
bears the burden of proving the justifiable cause. Thus, for the said saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the part of the buy-bust team and
justify or explain the same.
In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or
explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21.
Undeniably, the police officers did not exert even the slightest effort to secure the attendance
of the required witnesses considering that they had ample time to comply with the
requirements established by law from the time they were informed of an alleged peddling of
illegal drugs by accused-appellant Casco.
Moreover, contrary to the findings of the CA, the prosecution failed to establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug. Records reveal that gaps exist in the chain of
custody of the seized item which create reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity
thereof.
Q: Accused appellant Marlon Casco was arrested in a buy bust operation conducted by
the District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) Special Operations Task Force of Quezon City.
He was then charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165. He interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up. The RTC found
accused-appellant Casco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On
appeal, the CA, sustained Casco's conviction. The CA held that the prosecution was able
to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug from the time it came into
the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine
its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the identity and
evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from accused-appellant Casco.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the mandatory witnesses' rule. Moreover, the inventory of the seized drug was made not in
the presence of accused-appellant Casco or his representative or counsel, an elected public
official, a representative from media and a representative from the DOJ, as mandated by
Section 21. To be sure, the only witnesses who signed the Inventory Receipt were the police
officers themselves.
Indeed, case law states that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
For indeed, however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against
illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.
the apprehending team. However, in the present case, the prosecution neither recognized,
much less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure
contained in Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Marlon Casco y Villamer, G.R. No. 212819,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOVA DE LEON y WEVES
DOCTRINE
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must strictly follow to preserve
the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
While it is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid; the law requires
the prosecution to still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
FACTS
An informant went to the office at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Task Force (SAIDSOTF) of the Parañaque City Policea and reported the illegal drug activities
of a certain "Nova De Leon." A buy bust team was then formed. was designated. SPO1
Lumabao, acting as poseur buyer, and the informant spotted the suspect standing in an alley
whom they approached. SPO1 Lumabao was introduced to the suspect as a bus driver in need
of shabu. The suspect replied that she had some with her. He handed the suspect the buy
bust money and in turn, the suspect handed him a sachet of suspected shabu. At this juncture,
SPO1 LUmabao then executed the pre-arranged signal of removing his cap to signal the rest
of the team that the transaction had materialized. SPO1 Macaraeg rushed to their location
and they effected the arrest of the accused. They brought the suspect to the Barangay Hall of
Tambo, Parañaque City and requested Tanod Melchor Alconaba to witness the preparation
of the inventory. There, SPO1 Lumabao marked the recovered evidence in his custody and
likewise prepared the inventory of recovered/seized evidence, signed by Tanod Alconaba as
witness.
On cross examination, SPO1 Lumabao testified that he placed markings on the

recovered specimen at the Barangay Hall and not at the scene of arrest as it was raining at
that time. There was no representative from the DOJ or media present during the inventory.
He personally placed markings on the buy bust money but he was not able to include the buy
bust money in the inventory at the time the pictures were taken.
The RTC convicted accused- appellant De Leon of violating Section 5, Article II of RA

9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant De Leon appealed to the CA. The CA sustained accused-
appellant De Leon's conviction and held that the prosecution sufficiently discharged its
burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and proving accused-
appellant De Leon's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It also ruled that there is a valid
justification for the arresting officers' non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21
of RA 9165; and at any rate, the prosecution was able to adequately show the continuous and
unbroken possession and subsequent transfer of the illegal drug from the time it was
confiscated up to the time the marked plastic sachet of shabu was offered in court.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant De Leon's guilt for violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must strictly follow to
preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The
provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.
While it is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid; the law
requires the prosecution to still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses; without any justifiable explanation, the evidence of
the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements. First, while the IRR provides alternative places for the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs, whenever practicable, a barangay hall, is not one of them.
Also, the illegal drug was not marked immediately upon seizure and confiscation. Second,
the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory three (3)-witness rule. As SPO1
Lumabao, the poseur-buyer himself, testified, the marking, inventory and photographing of
the seized drug were witnessed only by a Barangay Tanod.
Moreover, records do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable
ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the DOJ and
media representatives. The Court finds SPO1 Lumabao's excuse that there were no available
DOJ and media representatives because of the weather condition insufficient and
uncorroborated by evidence.
Q: Upon the tip of an informant, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Force (SAIDSOTF) of Parañaque City Police conducted a buy bust operation to arrest
the accused-apellant, Nova De Leon. After her arrest, she was brought to the Barangay
Hall of Tambo, Parañaque City where the inventory took place. This was witnessed by
Tanod Alconaba. An Information was then filed against accused-appellant De Leon for
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC convicted her of the crime charged.
The CA sustained accused-appellant De Leon's conviction and that there is a valid
justification for the arresting officers' non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. While it is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid; the law
requires the prosecution to still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
reasons behind the procedural lapses; without any justifiable explanation, the evidence of
In the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements. First, while the IRR provides alternative places for the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs, whenever practicable, a barangay hall, is not one of
them. Also, the illegal drug was not marked immediately upon seizure and confiscation.
Second, the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory three (3)-witness rule. As
SPO1 Lumabao, the poseur-buyer himself, testified, the marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized drug were witnessed only by a Barangay Tanod.
ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the DOJ and
media representatives. The Court finds SPO1 Lumabao's excuse that there were no available
DOJ and media representatives because of the weather condition insufficient and
uncorroborated by evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Nova De Leon y Weves, G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN CABEZUDO y RIEZA
DOCTRINE
Section 21, RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of
the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires: (1) that the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "non- compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must (1) first recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers
and (2) then be able to justify the same.
FACTS
A confidential informant (CI) went to the Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Camarines Norte Unit and informed the officers therein that accused-
appellant Edwin Cabezudo is engaged in illegal drug trade. A verification from PDEA office
files revealed that accused-appellant is included in the watchlist. The buy-bust team decided
to conduct an entrapment operation against accused- appellant.
The team proceeded to Brgy. Palanas, Paracale, Camarines Norte to entrap accused-
appellant. The CI and SI2 Magpantay waited in a store near a cockpit while others
strategically positioned themselves waiting for the pre-arranged signal. At around 12:20 in
the afternoon, accused-appellant arrived and alighted from a tricycle. The CI approached the
latter and they talked. Then, the CI introduced accused-appellant to SI2 Magpantay. Accused-
appellant asked the latter to walk further in an attempt to conceal the sale. While walking,
he handed to SI2 Magpantay a sachet containing white crystalline substance. In exchange,
SI2 Magpantay gave the Php500.00 to him. After the sale was consummated, he raised his
bull cap as a pre-arranged signal to the other officers for them to arrest accused-appellant.
The officers rushed to the area and arrested him. The latter tried to resist but was subdued
by the team. The arrest resulted to the recovery of eleven (11) pieces of Php1,000.00 bills
and fourteen (14) pieces of Php500.00 bills, and one (1) plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
At the scene of the crime, SI2 Magpantay marked the confiscated items. Other
members of the team photographed the accused and the seized items. Later on, they
transferred to the barangay hall where the witnesses, the Barangay Chairman and the
representatives from the media and DOJ, signed the inventory report. SI2 Magpantay was in
possession of the seized drugs from Brgy. Palanan to the Office of PDEA until the same were
delivered to the laboratory for examination. PCI Grace Tugas conducted laboratory
examination of the seized white crystalline substance which yielded a positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
For his part, the accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and frame-up.
The RTC convicted Cabezudo of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Cabezudo, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The CA added that, contrary to Cabezudo's
contention, the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved because "the chain of custody
was unbroken from the time of markings, inventory and laboratory examination up to the
presentation to the court of the sachet containing shabu."
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Cabezudo of the crime
charged.
RULING
YES. In this connection, Section 21, RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires:
(1) that the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
a copy thereof.
Section 21, RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
and confiscation in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, while all three required witnesses signed the inventory receipt, a
thorough review of the records reveals that (a) none of them was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension, and (b) only one of them was present during the actual conduct
of the inventory.
It is worth emphasizing that Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR requires the
apprehending team to conduct the physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing of the same in the presence of the required witness, all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, clear from the afore-quoted testimonies is the fact that while the
inventory was conducted at the place of the apprehension, it was conducted only in the
presence of the barangay official. To repeat, the representatives from the media and the DOJ
were only "called-in" to sign the inventory receipt at the barangay hall. Parenthetically, even
the place where the other witnesses were "called-in" was improper, for the rules require the
inventory to be conducted at the place of the arrest or, if impracticable, at the nearest police
station.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "non- compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be
effective, however, the prosecution must (1) first recognize any lapse on the part of the police
officers and (2) then be able to justify the same.
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize and justify the police officers'
deviation from the procedure provided in Section 21, RA 9165.
Q: Accused-appellant Edwin Cabezudo was arrested in a buy-bust operation for
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. After his arrest, SI2 Magpantay
marked the confiscated items. Other members of the team photographed the accused
and the seized items. Later on, they transferred to the barangay hall where the
witnesses, the Barangay Chairman and the representatives from the media and DOJ,
signed the inventory report. The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime
charged. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Cabezudo, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The CA added that,
contrary to Cabezudo's contention, the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved
because "the chain of custody was unbroken from the time of markings, inventory and
laboratory examination up to the presentation to the court of the sachet containing
shabu." Is the CA correct?
A: NO. It is worth emphasizing that Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR requires the
apprehending team to conduct the physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing of the same in the presence of the required witness, all of whom shall be
In this case, clear from the afore-quoted testimonies is the fact that while the
inventory was conducted at the place of the apprehension, it was conducted only in the
presence of the barangay official. To repeat, the representatives from the media and the DOJ
were only "called-in" to sign the inventory receipt at the barangay hall. Parenthetically, even
the place where the other witnesses were "called-in" was improper, for the rules require the
inventory to be conducted at the place of the arrest or, if impracticable, at the nearest police
station.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "non- compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be
effective, however, the prosecution must (1) first recognize any lapse on the part of the police
officers and (2) then be able to justify the same.
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize and justify the police officers'
deviation from the procedure provided in Section 21, RA 9165. (People of the Philippines v.
Edwin Cabezudo y Rieza, G.R. No. 232357, November 28, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO BULUTANO y ALVAREZ
DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to
themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In the same vein, jurisprudence provides that there cannot be treachery if the meeting
between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was impulsively done.
FACTS
On February 16, 1998 at around 11:30 in the evening, Reynaldo Astrolavio and his
friend Mark Gil Desono were at M. Aquino corner M.H. Del Pilar Streets, Barangay Rizal,
Makati City. Abeng Tabeng Jeremy provoked the two which resulted to a fist fight. Abeng’s
brother "Kulot" also arrived and boxed them. Reynaldo then saw the group of Mario
Bulutano and Jhun Serad rushing towards them. Sensing danger, Reynaldo ran away and hid.
From where he was hiding, he saw Serad hit Wilbert on his head. Afraid, Reynaldo went
home.
Around the same time, Allan Ramos Allan was at his house having a drinking spree
with some of his friends. He suddenly heard a commotion. Afraid that his friends were
involved, he immediately went outside the house and proceeded to M. Aquino corner M.H.
Del Pilar Streets. Upon reaching the place, Allan saw Bulutano, Serad, Dennis Cabangon
Pengpeng Estelera, and Vermel, also known as "Panot," rushing towards the same place. He
noticed that these people were drunk and carrying bladed weapons, stones, and pieces of
wood.
Allan tried to talk the group in order to settle the problem. Allan was then facing the
group while Wilbert, who was just passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site, stood
next to him. Suddenly, Serad surreptitiously went behind Wilbert and hit the latter with a
piece of wood. Wilbert fell on the ground, shaking. Allan was shocked and his immediate
reaction was to punch Serad. However, Serad was able to parry Allan's fist with the same
piece of wood he had used to hit Wilbert. Thereafter, a fight ensued. Allan was pulled away
by one of his companions while the others retreated upon seeing that their adversaries were
armed with weapons.
While Allan was retreating from the place, he looked back and there he saw Bulutano
hit Wilbert on the head even if the latter was already lying on the ground gasping for breath.
Pengpeng, Vermel and Dennis likewise kicked and mauled the hapless Wilbert.
Meanwhile, Gerald Manaog also witnessed the brawl. Before the affray, Gerald saw
Wilbert just standing and doing nothing. But then, Serad suddenly hit Wilbert on the right
side of the latter's face. As a result, Wilbert fell on the ground. But despite Wilbert's state,
Bulutano still hit him with a piece of wood. Gerald shouted at Bulutano to stop hitting Wilbert
but Bulutano just replied "Bakit, papalag ka ba?["]. Gerald then could only warn them that if
something happened to Wilbert, they will all be held responsible.
At that point, operatives from Bantay Bayan arrived. Allan then rushed to the
bloodied Wilbert. With the assistance of concerned citizens, they carried Wilbert's body and
boarded him on a vehicle. Wilbert was brought to the hospital where he was subsequently
pronounced dead.
In his defense, accused-appellant Mario Bulutano denies participation in the crime

yet points at his co-accused, Jhun Serad, as the sole perpetrator thereof.
The RTC convicted Bulutano of the crime of murder. It found that treachery attended
the killing of Wilbert. Aggrieved, Bulutano appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Bulutano, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the
elements of the crime charged and the element of treachery were present in the killing of
Wilbert. The CA likewise ruled that treachery attended the killing as the victim was already
in a hapless state when Bulutano continued to strike him.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in convicting Bulutano despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
RULING
1. NO. It is well settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn
the factual findings of the trial court. Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the
credibility of the witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great
weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the
demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. Here, after examining the records
of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the
evidence, particularly on the credibility of the eyewitnesses, which was also affirmed
in toto by the CA.
Furthermore, the absence of evidence as to improper or ill motive on the part

of the prosecution witnesses — it being anchored merely on the allegation that their
testimonies were motivated by the supposed basketball rivalry between them and
Bulutano — strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
existed. Hence, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
2. YES. It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the victim was suddenly
attacked by Serad, and he was already defenseless at the time that Bulutano
continued attacking him. It does not always follow that because the attack is sudden
and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
As the Court held in People v. Santos, “[t]reachery, just like any other element
of the crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence
sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed
or taken for granted from a mere statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there must
be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be
'sudden.'"
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that
treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively
tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of
their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that
the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the
act without risk to the aggressor.
In the same vein, jurisprudence provides that there cannot be treachery if the
meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
impulsively done.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
melee was only a chance encounter between the warring groups. More importantly,
the deceased Wilbert "was just passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site"
when he was hit in the head by Serad with a piece of wood and then later on
continually hit by Bulutano. The foregoing thus negates the existence of the second
requisite for treachery to be appreciated, namely, that the offenders deliberately and
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
The meeting between the parties — Bulutano, Serad, and the victim Wilbert — was
casual, and the attack was done impulsively. Therefore, the killing could not have
been attended by treachery.
Q: The victim Wilbert Augusto was just passing by after making a phone call when
Serad surreptitiously went behind him and hit the latter with a piece of wood. Wilbert
fell on the ground, shaking. The accused-appellant Bulutano then hit Wilbert on the
head even if the latter was already lying on the ground gasping for breath. Wilbert was
brought to the hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead. The RTC
convicted Bulutano of the crime of murder. It also found that treachery attended the
killing of Wilbert. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Bulutano and likewise ruled
that treachery attended the killing as the victim was already in a hapless state when
Bulutano continued to strike him. Are the RTC and CA correct in ruling that treachery
attended the killing of Augusto?
A: NO. It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the victim was suddenly attacked
by Serad, and he was already defenseless at the time that Bulutano continued attacking him.
It does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with
treachery.
As the Court held in People v. Santos, “[t]reachery, just like any other element of the
crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to
establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for granted
from a mere statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there must be a clear showing from the
narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be 'sudden.'"
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that
treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal
purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was
deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In the same vein, jurisprudence provides that there cannot be treachery if the meeting
between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was impulsively done. (People
of the Philippines v. Mario Bulutano y Alvarez, G.R. No. 232649, November 28, 2018, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER ILAGAN y BAÑA alias "WENG"
G.R. No. 227021, December 5, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is
with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
FACTS
A civilian asset went to the San Jose Municipal Police Station and reported to SPO1
Flores and PO2 Mitra that there is a certain "Weng," a helper of the Juennesse Flower Shop,
who is engaged in the selling marijuana. SPO1 Flores and PO2 Mitra informed their Chief, PCI
Eduard Padilla Mallo, who immediately instructed them to prepare for a buy-bust operation.
Thereafter, SPO1 Flores, PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset proceeded to Poblacion 3,
San Jose, Batangas and parked the car near the flower shop. PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset
alighted while SPO1 Flores was left inside the vehicle. When PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset
entered the flower shop, the only person inside was "Weng" who at that time was lying on a
chair. The asset told the latter that his companion will buy marijuana and upon hearing the
same, "Weng" immediately stood up. PO2 Mitra then gave the Two One Hundred Peso Bills
to the asset and at that moment, "Weng" brought out from his right pocket three (3) pieces
of heat sealed sachet containing suspected marijuana. PO2 Mitra gave the money to the
civilian asset who handed it to "Weng." After receiving the money, "Weng" gave to PO2 Mitra
the suspected marijuana. When SPO1 Flores saw the pre-arranged signal, he immediately
entered the shop and help PO2 Mitra in arresting the pusher. They informed the pusher, who
identified himself as herein accused Christopher Ilagan y Baña, of his constitutional rights.
When they frisked the accused, PO2 Mitra found the two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills.
Afterwards, the policemen brought the accused to the barangay hall of Brgy. 3, San
Jose, Batangas. In the presence of the Brgy. Captain Modesto Kalalo and media representative
Mr. Lito Rendora, they conducted the inventory of the confiscated items. PO2 Mitra marked
the three (3) sachets containing suspected marijuana and the two (2) One Hundred Peso
bills. Photographs were taken during the inventory at the barangay hall. Thereafter, they
went back to the police station.
For his part, the accused interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found Christopher guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant Christopher appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
accused-appellant Christopher's conviction. It ruled, among others, that the integrity and
identity of the seized marijuana were not compromised because the buy-bust team was able
to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Christopher's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2)
that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
thereof.
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However,
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there
is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several glaring procedural lapses
in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus
created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant Christopher.
Clearly, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 (1)
of RA 9165. First, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure.
Second, neither was the inventory and marking of the alleged seized items done at the place
of apprehension. Lastly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of the buy-bust team, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was
present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Christopher. The media representative and barangay captain were only present during the
conduct of the inventory in the barangay hall. Moreover, there were only two witnesses
present — a barangay official and a media representative — when the law explicitly requires
three witnesses.
The prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its compliance with Section 21, RA
9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. In this case, none
of the abovementioned reasons is present.
Q: Accused-appellant Christopher Ilagan was arrested in a buy bust operation
conducted by the San Jose Municipal Police for Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. After his arrest, the policemen brought the accused-appellant to the barangay
hall of Brgy. 3, San Jose, Batangas. In the presence of the Brgy. Captain Modesto Kalalo
and media representative Mr. Lito Rendora, they conducted the inventory of the
confiscated items. PO2 Mitra marked the three (3) sachets containing suspected
marijuana and the two (2) One Hundred Peso bills Photographs were taken during the
inventory at the barangay hall. Thereafter, they went back to the police station. The
RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged. The CA affirmed accused-
appellant Christopher's conviction. It ruled, among others, that the integrity and
identity of the seized marijuana were not compromised because the buy-bust team
was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized. Is the CA
correct?
A: NO. In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several glaring procedural lapses
in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus
created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant Christopher.
Clearly, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 (1)
of RA 9165. First, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure.
Second, neither was the inventory and marking of the alleged seized items done at the place
of apprehension. Lastly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of the buy-bust team, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was
present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Christopher. The media representative and barangay captain were only present during the
conduct of the inventory in the barangay hall. Moreover, there were only two witnesses
present — a barangay official and a media representative — when the law explicitly requires
three witnesses. (People of the Philippines v. Christopher Ilagan y Baña Alias "Weng," G.R. No.
227021, December 5, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NILA MALANA y SAMBOLLEDO
DOCTRINE
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is
items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
FACTS
An informer reported that a female individual, later identified to be Malana, was
engaged in rampant selling of shabu at Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. A buy bust
operation was then planned. The informer, Rex Cortez, was designated as the civilian poseur
buyer.
Cortez ordered shabu worth P2,500.00 from Malana by sending a text message to
Malana. Unfortunately, Malana failed to appear at the designated place. Hence, P/C Insp.
Cablarda directed the team to execute another entrapment operation the following day, at
the same place and time.
The following day, Cortez ordered P500.00 worth of shabu from Malana to be
delivered at around 3 in the afternoon. Cortez informed the team that he will meet Malana
at a waiting shed in Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. At around 4:14 in the afternoon, a
multicab from Aparri stopped near the designated waiting shed where Malana alighted.
Cortez and Malana had a brief conversation. Malana then handed something to Cortez, who
in turn, handed something to Malana. When Cortez gave the pre-arranged signal, which was
the removal of his hat, members of the team ran towards the waiting shed. SPO2 Alonzo
immediately frisked Malana and recovered the P500.00 marked money. P/C Insp. Cablarda
took possession of the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance handed by
Malana to Cortez.
For documentation, they sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip Arce, and
kagawads Wilma Gonzaga and Perlita Arellano, who witnessed the inventory as evidenced
by the Confiscation Receipt and photographs on record. SPO1 Urian marked the seized
plastic sachet After, they proceeded to the Camalaniugan Police Station and prepared the
Request for Laboratory Examination.
For her part, the accused-appelant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found Christopher guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant Malana appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of accused-appellant Malana. The CA declared that the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and its implementing rules do not
require strict compliance with the rule on chain of custody."
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Malana of
the crime charged.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires
that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
a copy thereof.
seizure and apprehension, and only one of them was present during the conduct of the
inventory.
Verily, courts cannot, as the CA did in this case, make a blanket justification that "given
the nature of the operation, it is understandable that [the required witnesses'] immediate
presence could not be immediately secured at the place of seizure or the nearest police
station." As the Court held in People v. De Guzman, "the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist."
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict accused-
appellant Malana by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.
Q: Accused-appellant Nila Malana was arrested in a buy bust operation for violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. For documentation, the police officers
sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip Arce, and kagawads Wilma Gonzaga and
Perlita Arellano, who witnessed the inventory as evidenced by the Confiscation
Receipt and photographs on record. SPO1 Urian marked the seized plastic sachet
After, they proceeded to the Camalaniugan Police Station and prepared the Request
for Laboratory Examination. The RTC found Christopher guilty of the crime charged.
The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant and declared that the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and
its implementing rules do not require strict compliance with the rule on chain of
custody." Is the CA correct?
A: NO. It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
Verily, courts cannot, as the CA did in this case, make a blanket justification that
"[g]iven the nature of [the] operation, it is understandable that [the required witnesses']
immediate presence could not be immediately secured at the place of seizure or the nearest
police station." As the Court held in People v. De Guzman, "[t]he justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist."
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict accused-
appellant Malana by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
accused.
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. (People
of the Philippines v. Nila Malana y Sambolledo, G.R. No. 233747, December 5, 2018, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR DELA CRUZ y LIBONAO ALIAS SESI of
ZONE 3, MACANAYA, APARRI, CAGAYAN
DOCTRINE
alleged crime, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to preserve
the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of
(a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same
and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination.
The Court, however, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
items are properly preserved.
FACTS
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office received a phone call from a
confidential informant disclosing that a certain Cesar Dela Cruz alias Sesi is engaged in illegal
drug activities at Macanaya, Aparri, Cagayan. A buy bust team was then formed. IO2 Vivien
A. Molina was designated as the poseur buyer while IO1 Robert Baldoviso was assigned as
the immediate back-up.
At 8:30 in the evening, upon reaching Zone 3 of Brgy. Macanaya, Aparri, Cagayan, IO2
Molina and the confidential agent saw a man standing along the highway. The confidential
agent recognized the said man as Cesar Dela Cruz. The two approached the accused. The
poseur-buyer, confidential informant and the accused talked briefly. The accused asked IO2
Molina how much shabu she was buying and the latter replied that she needed shabu worth
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos only. Upon hearing the amount, accused proceeded to an
alley at his residence and got something. When the accused returned, he handed IO2 Molina
a small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet while the latter in return handed to the accused
two pieces of five hundred (P500.00) peso bills. Upon confirming that the plastic sachet
contained shabu, IO2 Molina ignited her lighter prompting her immediate back-up and the
rest of the team to rush to the place. IO2. Baldoviso frisked the accused and recovered from
him the buy bust money.
The PDEA agents brought the accused including the seized items to the Aparri Police
Station for marking and inventory of the confiscated items. The inventory was witnessed by
two Barangay officials namely, Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo and Barangay Captain Eder
Peneyra.
For his part, the accused-appellant interposed the defense of frame-up.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. Aggrieved, Dela Cruz
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Dela Cruz's conviction. As to the contention of Dela Cruz
that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, the
CA ruled that his argument is devoid of merit. It noted that non- compliance with Section 21
does not invalidate the seizure and custody of the seized drugs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dela Cruz's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
of the alleged crime, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid.
However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, par. 1 of RA 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to mark
and photograph the seized illegal drug at the place of arrest. Moreover, none of the three
required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. Second, even more
revealing is the fact that Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo, whose signature was affixed on
the inventory, did not witness the actual preparation of the inventory and photographing of
the seized items. Lastly, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for their failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21.
Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised. In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much
less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in
Section 21.
Q: Accused-appellant Cesar Dela Cruz was arrested in a buy bust operation conducted
by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165. After his arrest, the PDEA agents brought the accused including the seized items
to the Aparri Police Station for marking and inventory of the confiscated items. The
inventory was witnessed by two Barangay officials namely, Barangay Kagawad
Anthony Pipo and Barangay Captain Eder Peneyra. The RTC convicted the accused-
appellant of the crime charged. As to the contention of Dela Cruz that the buy-bust
team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, the CA ruled
that his argument is devoid of merit. It noted that non- compliance with Section 21
does not invalidate the seizure and custody of the seized drugs. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. The Court, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure of the
seized items are properly preserved.
requirements under Section 21, par. 1 of RA 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to mark
and photograph the seized illegal drug at the place of arrest. Moreover, none of the three
required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. Second, even more
revealing is the fact that Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo whose signature was affixed on
the inventory, did not witness the actual preparation of the inventory and photographing of
the seized items. Lastly, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for their failure to
delicti had been compromised. In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much
less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in
Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Cesar Dela Cruz y Libonao Alias Sesi of Zone 3,
Macanaya, Aparri, Cagayan, G.R. No. 234151, December 5, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
REYNALDO ARBAS RECTO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode
adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that
the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
FACTS
An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas Recto for the
death of Margie Carlosita. Thereafter, Recto's former counsel filed a Petition for Bail with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the RTC denied Recto's Petition for Bail as it gave
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas, son of
Carlosita, that Recto was the one who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the Petition for
Bail, noted that "without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, the Court is
of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is incumbent on the part of the
accused to take the witness stand to show otherwise."
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a
Demurrer to Evidence for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of Murder.
The RTC, however, denied the Demurrer to Evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging that the prosecution was able to show
that the crime charged should be Homicide only and not Murder. He pointed out that
Rabillas, who was five years old at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by
the bottle during a quarrel over money. Citing People v. Rivera, a case with substantially the
same facts wherein the common-law wife was killed by the common-law husband during a
heated argument, Recto argued that the case established by the prosecution was thus merely
Homicide due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The RTC issued denied the Motion to Fix Bail. Aggrieved, Recto then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. The CA affirmed the denial of Recto's Motion to Fix Bail. The CA
reasoned that Recto failed to show that the RTC's issuance of the Order was attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recto then sought
reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not Recto is guilty of the crime of Murder.
RULING
NO. As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best,
only convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The testimony of the main prosecution
witness, Rabillas, was to the effect that his mother and Recto had an argument prior to her
death.
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend
himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must
clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen
with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
Applying the same principles, the Court in People v. Rivera concluded that treachery
is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument.
The other qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information filed against Recto —
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength — are likewise negated by the
foregoing fact. For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be properly appreciated, it
must first be shown that there was a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. Similarly, for abuse of superior strength to be properly appreciated, there must be
evidence showing that the assailants "consciously sought the advantage " or that "there was
deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof."
Based on the foregoing, there is thus merit in Recto's claim that the evidence
presented by the prosecution could, at most, convict him only of Homicide and not Murder.
The RTC thus gravely abused its discretion when it denied Recto's Motion to Fix Bail.
Q: An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas Recto for
the death of Margie Carlosita. According to the petitioner, the crime charged should
be Homicide only and not Murder. He pointed out that Rabillas, who was five years old
at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by the bottle during a quarrel
over money. Citing People v. Rivera, a case with substantially the same facts wherein
the common-law wife was killed by the common-law husband during a heated
argument, Recto argued that the case established by the prosecution was thus merely
Homicide due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Is he correct?
A: YES. Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend
himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must
clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen
with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
Applying the same principles, the Court in People v. Rivera concluded that treachery
is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument. (Reynaldo Arbas Recto v.
The People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236461, December 5, 2018, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BRYAN LABSAN y NALA and CLENIO DANTE y
PEREZ
G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:(a) there is
justifiable ground for non- compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
FACTS
While the police officers assigned at City Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force (CAIDTF),
Cagayan de Oro City Police Office were having their tour of duty at the night cafe in Divisoria,
Cagayan de Oro City, a Confidential Informant (CI) arrived and informed PCI Cacdac that a
certain "Opaw" and "Bryan" were selling illicit drugs at Barangay Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro
City. A buy-bust operation was then planned by the team.
Before the team arrived at the target area, the CI disembarked first from the taxi and
approached the two (2) suspects at the side of the road. PO3 Baillo saw the actual transaction
of the CI and the suspects as there was a light coming from the lamp post. He saw the CI give
the ordinary marked money to "Opaw" while "Bryan" gave one (1) heat-sealed sachet plastic
cellophane to the CI. Immediately after the exchange, the CI removed his bull cap as the
agreed pre-arranged signal to show that the transaction was already consummated. Hence,
the buy-bust team rushed towards the suspects and arrested them. PO3 Vicente bodily
searched the suspects and he recovered from "Bryan" two (2) sachets of suspected shabu.
Likewise, PO3 Vicente recovered from "Opaw" one (1) sachet of suspected shabu, the two
(2) P100.00 bills used as buy-bust money, and an improvised hand gun. Also, the sachet of
suspected shabu subject of the buy-bust operation was turned over by the CI to PO3 Vicente.
Then, the buy-bust team took pictures of the items recovered from the suspects at the area.
The suspects were then brought to the CAIDTF office for proper documentation. Upon
their arrival thereat, PO3 Vicente turned over to SPO1 Tarre the seized items. SPO1 Tarre
then marked the seized items. The markings were done in the presence of PO3 Vicente, the
other members of the team, and also the accused-appellants. Thereafter, SPO1 Tarre turned
over the marked items together with the crime laboratory requests for the examination
thereof to the PNP Crime Laboratory, and the living body of the two (2) appellants to PO3
Vicente and PO3 Baillo for drug testing. The qualitative examination conducted on the
specimens and urine sample taken from appellants Labsan and Dante gave positive result to
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
For their part, Labsan and Dantes denied the charges against them.
The RTC found accused- appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA sustained accused- appellants'
conviction. The CA held that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the
provisions of Section 21 of RA 9165 is of no moment since the integrity and evidentiary value
of the drugs seized from accused-appellants were preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining accused-appellants' conviction for violation
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, 30 Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, outlines the procedure which the police officers must
strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used
as evidence. Said provision requires that: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and (3) the seized drugs must
be turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove
that:(a) there is justifiable ground for non- compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the Court finds that the police officers utterly failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21, which put into question the identity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
To start with, the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants were not marked
immediately upon seizure and confiscation. Records show that three (3) plastic sachets were
recovered from accused-appellants: one (1) sachet was bought by the confidential informant
and two (2) sachets were confiscated by PO3 Vicente; but the markings were made not in the
place of seizure and not by the police officer who recovered the seized drugs. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three (3)-witness rule. None of the required
witnesses was present at the place of apprehension and even at the police station where the
inventory and photography of the seized drugs were made.
Indeed, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For however noble the purpose or necessary the
exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that
must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the witnesses.
In this case, PO3 Vicente admitted that despite knowledge of the mandatory requirements of
Section 21, the buy-bust team did not exert any effort to secure the presence of the required
witnesses.
Q: The accused-appellants, Bryan Labsan and Clenio Dante, were arrested in a buy-
bust operation conducted by the Cagayan de Oro City Police Office for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. After their arrest, they were brought to the City
Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force (CAIDTF) office for proper documentation. PO3 Vicente
turned over to SPO1 Tarre the seized items. SPO1 Tarre then marked the seized items.
The markings were done in the presence of PO3 Vicente, the other members of the
team, and also the accused-appellants. Thereafter, SPO1 Tarre turned over the
marked items together with the crime laboratory requests for the examination
thereof to the PNP Crime Laboratory, and the living body of the two (2) appellants to
PO3 Vicente and PO3 Baillo for drug testing. The qualitative examination conducted
on the specimens and urine sample taken from appellants Labsan and Dante gave
positive result to the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The RTC
convicted the accused-appellants of the crimes charged. The CA affirmed the RTCS’s
decision. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. In this case, the Court finds that the police officers utterly failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21, which put into question the identity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
To start with, the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants were not marked
immediately upon seizure and confiscation. Records show that three (3) plastic sachets were
recovered from accused-appellants: one (1) sachet was bought by the confidential informant
and two (2) sachets were confiscated by PO3 Vicente; but the markings were made not in the
place of seizure and not by the police officer who recovered the seized drugs. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three (3)-witness rule. None of the required
witnesses was present at the place of apprehension and even at the police station where the
inventory and photography of the seized drugs were made.
Indeed, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For however noble the purpose or necessary the
exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that
must always be executed within the boundaries of law. (People of the Philippines v. Bryan
Labsan y Nala and Clenio Dante y Perez, G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONDON GUERRERO y ELING
DOCTRINE
While there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the
prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
reasons behind the procedural lapses.
FACTS
On August 31, 2013, at about 4:30 p.m., a confidential informant (CI) came to the office
of Regional Anti- Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Group (RAIDSOTG) Region I and
reported to SPO1 Rosario that appellant and Marian Dagium were looking for buyers of
shabu. Using the Cl's cellphone, SPO1 Rosario contacted appellant and informed him that he
was interested in buying Php5,000.00 worth of shabu. They agreed to meet near the RITZ
Apartelle.
The CI then contacted appellant again to confirm the time of their meeting. Appellant
informed the CI that he's already on his way and so SPO1 Rosario, acting as poseur-buyer,
and the CI rode a tricycle to the apartelle at around 12:20 am of September 1, 2013 and
positioned themselves in front of RITZ Apartelle.
The CI informed appellant that they were already in front of the apartelle. Four
individuals came out from the building: appellant, Melchor Lorenzo, Jerry Salingbay and
Marian Dagium. Appellant approached SPO1 Rosario and the CI. Appellant then asked SPO1
Rosario if he has the money and SPO1 Rosario likewise asked if appellant has the "stuff with
him. Appellant answered in the affirmative and instructed Melchor Lorenzo to receive the
marked money. Melchor Lorenzo took the marked money while appellant handed over to
SPO1 Rosario a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. SPO1
Rosario confirmed that the contents of the sachet as shabu and then executed a pre-arranged
signal. This signal prompted arresting officer SPO1 Bitabit and the rest of the back-up team
to approach the group and arrest the four individuals, including appellant.
SPO1 Bitabit apprised them of their constitutional rights, after which, each person
under arrest was frisked, resulting in the seizure of another plastic sachet from the wallet of
Jerry Salingbay and another sachet from Marian Dagium. The marked money was recovered
from Melchor Lorenzo. The recovered items were marked by SPO1 Rosario in the place of
arrest, in the presence of other members of the team, Dominador Dacanay of DZNL and
barangay official Americo Flores of Canaoay. However, because it was dark in that place, the
team leader ordered that they continue the inventory in their office at Camp Florendo Parian,
San Fernando City.
The team, together with appellant and his three other companions, went to Camp
Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City. In their office, the inventory of the seized items was
continued. Pictures were taken during the inventory. After the Certificate of Inventory was
signed, SPO1 Rosario prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination which was signed
by their Action Officer P/Supt. Bersola. SPO1 Rosario delivered the request and the three
plastic sachets of suspected shabu which were received by the Forensic Chemist of PDEA
Maximiano Valentin. The laboratory examination confirmed that the three sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC convicted Guerrero of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Aggrieved,

Guerrero appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Guerrero, holding that
the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA also declared
that there was substantial compliance in ensuring the integrity of the drug seized from
Guerrero was preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Guerrero of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR), the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the
procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated
drugs used as evidence. The provision requires: (1) that the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; and (3) that such conduct of the
physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the (a) place where the search warrant
is served; (b) nearest police station; or (c) nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure.
While the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed
with. The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the drugs' "seizure
and confiscation" — that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence.
In the present case, the records clearly show that the physical inventory and
photographing were not made before the three required witnesses. The Certificate of
Inventory dated September 1, 2013 was signed only by Americo Flores (Flores), the
barangay kagawad, and Dominador Dacanay (Dacanay), the representative from the media.
The two witnesses present — a barangay official and a media representative — do not suffice
in the face of the explicit requirement of the law that mandates the presence of three
witnesses. Neither did the police officers or the prosecution — during the trial — offer any
viable or acceptable explanation for their deviation from the law.
While there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat
that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. The prosecution did not
offer any plausible explanation as to why they did not contact the representative from the
DOJ. Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
delicti had been compromised.
Q: The appellant, Dondon Guerro, together with his three companions, was arrested
in a buy-bust operation conducted by Regional Anti- Illegal Drug Special Operations
Task Group (RAIDSOTG) of Region I for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
After the arrest, the recovered items were marked by SPO1 Rosario in the place of
arrest, in the presence of other members of the team, Dominador Dacanay of DZNL
and barangay official Americo Flores of Canaoay. However, because it was dark in that
place, the team leader ordered that they continue the inventory in their office at Camp
Florendo Parian, San Fernando City. The team, together with appellant and his three
other companions, went to Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City. In their office,
the inventory of the seized items was continued. Pictures were taken during the
inventory. The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime charged. The CA The CA
affirmed the RTC's decision holding that there was substantial compliance in ensuring
the integrity of the drug seized from Guerrero was preserved. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. While there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. The prosecution did not
offer any plausible explanation as to why they did not contact the representative from the
DOJ. Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
delicti had been compromised. (People of the Philippines v. Dondon Guerrero y Eling, G.R. No.
228881, February 6, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJIE CARANTO y AUSTRIA
DOCTRINE
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
FACTS
SPO4 Romeo Abordo received an information from a Confidential Informant (CI) that
a certain Benjie was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. At that time, Benjie, who may be
found at Dr. Cariño Street, was looking for a prospective buyer of a certain amount of drugs
valued at One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos. Upon learning this, a buy-bust operation was
organized.
Upon reaching Dr. Cariño Street, the CI exchanged text messages with Benjie
informing the latter that he was already in the area. When Benjie showed up at the meeting
place, the CI pointed at him so that PO2 Boado may be able to identify him. After alighting
from the vehicle, the CI approached Benjie and introduced PO2 Boado to him as the
prospective buyer. Benjie asked for the money. PO2 Boado handed him two (2) Five Hundred
(P500.00)-Peso bills and Benjie gave him a plastic sachet containing shabu. PO2 Boado then
removed his bull- cap, the pre-arranged gesture for the back-up team to assist him in the
arrest of Benjie. The back-up team approached Benjie, introduced themselves as police
officers, and placed him under arrest. Benjie was frisked for deadly weapons but what was
recovered from him was a Nokia cellphone and two (2) Five Hundred (P500.00)-Peso bills.
PO2 Boado marked the items on the site. Benjie was then brought to Police Station 5 along
with the confiscated items including the plastic sachet of shabu in PO2 Boado's possession
which were brought for inventory. The following individuals were present during the
inventory: herein appellant Benjie; Prosecutor Ruth Bernabe, the representative of the DOJ;
Danilo Patacsil, an elected Barangay official; and Roi Molina of the BCBC, the media
representative. After the inventory, PO2 Boado turned over the items to SPO1 Takayen who
then requested PO2 Boado to bring the plastic sachet of shabu to Police Senior Inspector
Rowena Canlas of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Bado, Dangwa.
For his part, the accused appellant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA

9165. he CA affirmed accused-appellant 's conviction. It ruled that the police officers' failure
to take photographs of the seized items while in the presence of the accused, a member of
the media, a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected Barangay
official does not affect the admissibility of the seized drugs. It further held that although the
police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA
9165, their non-compliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from
Benjie as the chain of custody of evidence was shown to be unbroken under the
circumstances of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not Benjie's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all
of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same
and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165.
First, the arresting officers failed to photograph the seized items at the place of arrest
and seizure and at the precinct where the mandatory witnesses were present. Neither did
they offer any explanation as to why they did not take photographs of the seized items.
Second, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the
accused and marking of the seized items at the place of arrest. The three witnesses were only
"called-in" to the police station to witness the inventory of the seized items and sign the
inventory receipt.
More so, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the
police's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The police officers did not
offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses during the buy-bust
operation itself, especially where, as here, they had more than sufficient time to secure their
presence prior to the planned arrest. Hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti has thus been compromised, thus necessitating the acquittal of Benjie.
Q: Accused-appellant Benjie Caranto was arrested in a buy-bust operation for
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. After his arrest, Benjie was
frisked for deadly weapons but what was recovered from him was a Nokia cellphone
and two (2) Five Hundred Peso bills. PO2 Boado marked the items on the site. Benjie
was then brought to Police Station 5 along with the confiscated items. The following
individuals were present during the inventory: herein appellant Benjie; Prosecutor
Ruth Bernabe, the representative of the DOJ; Danilo Patacsil, an elected Barangay
official; and Roi Molina of the BCBC, the media representative. After the inventory, PO2
Boado turned over the items to SPO1 Takayen who then requested PO2 Boado to bring
the plastic sachet of shabu to Police Senior Inspector Rowena Canlas of the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Bado, Dangwa.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision. It held that although the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, their non-compliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from Benjie as the chain of custody of
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.
A: NO. In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165.
First, the arresting officers failed to photograph the seized items at the place of arrest
and seizure and at the precinct where the mandatory witnesses were present. Neither did
they offer any explanation as to why they did not take photographs of the seized items.
Second, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the
accused and marking of the seized items at the place of arrest. The three witnesses were only
"called-in" to the police station to witness the inventory of the seized items and sign the
inventory receipt.
More so, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the
police's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The police officers did not
offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses during the buy-bust
operation itself, especially where, as here, they had more than sufficient time to secure their
presence prior to the planned arrest. Hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti has thus been compromised, thus necessitating the acquittal of Benjie. (People of the
Philippines v. Benjie Caranto y Austria, G.R. No. 217668, February 20, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
JESUS CONCEPCION y TABOR a.k.a. "BAKLA/BONG" v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
DOCTRINE
It does not go unnoticed that strict compliance with the mandatory procedure under
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any deviation
from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts established,
Concepcion's conviction must follow. In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does
not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed the crime, and neither does
it exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a
scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the
accused.
FACTS
An Information was filed against petitioner Jesus Concepcion y Tabor for violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: PCI Grace Tugas, IO2 Rodel Abina, SO2 Christopher Viaña, and Dennis Lladoc.
Witness PCI Tugas, the forensic chemist of the Camarines Norte Crime Laboratory,
testified she received a request from IO2 Abina for the laboratory examination of the subject
specimens. After the necessary examination of the content of the twelve (12) heat-sealed
sachets, it was found that the submitted specimens are positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu.
Witness IO2 Abina, narrated that on November 15, 2012, he participated in the
implementation of the search warrant dated November 14, 2012 issued against the
appellant. Agent Magpantay, their team leader, designated him to be the searcher. He
recounted that at around 4:30 a.m., after being given the go signal, he conducted the search
for illegal drugs and was able to recover twelve (12) pieces of small heat-sealed plastic
sachets containing crystalline substance that they suspected to be shabu. He affirmed that
during the conduct of the search, the barangay captain, DOJ representative Lladoc, Mr. Ricky
Pera from the media, and one barangay kagawad and the appellant were present. He further
testified that he put markings on each of the twelve (12) sachets. The inventory was then
prepared. After the necessary documentation, he proceeded to the crime laboratory and
submitted the request for laboratory examination together with the specimens.
SO2 Viana, in turn, testified that he was assigned as the arresting officer in the
enforcement of the search warrant against the appellant. He personally saw it when IO2
Abina found the subject items inside the Orocan cabinet. After seeing the seizure of the
suspected illicit drugs, he arrested the appellant, brought the latter to the Provincial Office,
and then submitted him for medical examination.
On the other hand, the testimony of witness Lladoc, a representative of the

Department of Justice (DOJ), was stipulated upon by the public prosecutor and the defense.
Both parties admitted that: (a) the witness is one of the witnesses in the conduct of the
inventory seized from the appellant; and (b) said witness, as one of the witnesses in the
preparation of the inventory process, had affixed his signature in the Certificate of Inventory.
For his part, Concepcion categorically denied the charges against him
The RTC found Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Aggrieved, Concepcion appealed his conviction to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings
but reduced the penalty imposed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming Concepcion's conviction of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to establish the chain
of custody and integrity of the seized drugs allegedly possessed by Concepcion.
RULING
NO. The movement of the confiscated contraband from the point of seizure until its
presentation in court was duly established by both testimonial and documentary evidence.
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any
deviation from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts
established, Concepcion's conviction must follow. In criminal cases, "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed
the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that
degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral
certainty of the culpability of the accused.
All told, the Court is convinced that Concepcion was indeed guilty of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, thereby violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Q: Jesus Conception was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. IO2 Abina, the designated searcher, affirmed that during the conduct of the
search, the barangay captain, DOJ representative Lladoc, Mr. Ricky Pera from the
media, and one barangay kagawad and the appellant were present. He further
testified that he put markings on each of the twelve (12) sachets. The inventory was
then prepared. After the necessary documentation, O2 Abina proceeded to the crime
laboratory and submitted the request for laboratory examination together with the
specimens. The RTC convicted Concepcion of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision. Is the CA correct?
A: YES. The movement of the confiscated contraband from the point of seizure until its
presentation in court was duly established by both testimonial and documentary evidence.
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any
deviation from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts
established, Concepcion's conviction must follow. In criminal cases, "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed
the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that
degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral
certainty of the culpability of the accused.
All told, the Court is convinced that Concepcion was indeed guilty of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, thereby violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. (Jesus Concepcion
y Tabor A.K.A. "Bakla/Bong" v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243345, March 11, 2019, as
MARLON DOMINGUEZ Y ARGANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In People v. Racho, the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the warrantless
arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the
arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an arrest should
therefore be determined first.
FACTS
While SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of
violators of RA 9165 at Purok 3, Brgy. Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, he saw a man, who was
later identified as Dominguez, holding with his left hand a small transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. SPO1 Parchaso then grabbed
the hands of Dominguez and seized therefrom one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing the substance suspected to be shabu. He arrested Dominguez and informed him
of his violation and his rights under the law. However, seeing that there was already a crowd
gathering in the area, SPO1 Parchaso and PO2 Genova decided to leave the scene, and
brought Dominguez and the seized item to their office.
At the police station, SPO1 Parchaso marked the seized item With the help of Police
Inspector Diaz and another police officer, they prepared Dominguez's Booking and
Information Sheet, and took photographs of Dominguez and the marked seized item. They
also conducted the inventory which was witnessed by Orlando Rodriguez, a local
government employee of Muntinlupa City. SPO1 Parchaso explained that despite P/Insp.
Diaz's calls to the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media to
witness the inventory, no one came. Nevertheless, they still proceeded with the inventory to
comply with the period within which to bring the evidence to the Philippine National Police-
Southern Police District (PNP-SPD) Crime Laboratory for examination.
The marked seized item was brought to the PNP-SPD Crime Laboratory for
examination. The request was received by PNP Non-Uniformed Personnel Bernardo
Bucayan, Jr. which he turned over to Police Chief Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson. Based on
Physical Science Report prepared by PCI Tecson, the specimen weighing 0.03 gram, yielded
a positive result for shabu.
For his part, Dominguez interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC convicted Dominguez of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

Aggrieved, Dominguez appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Dominguez, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime
charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Dominguez of the crime
charged.
RULING
YES. In People v. Racho, the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the
warrantless arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was
incident to the arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an
arrest should therefore be determined first.
The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
Dominguez was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1
Parchaso would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the
plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his
hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest.
The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was
legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was
inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not
apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only saw that
Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's mind, a very small plastic
sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be
seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could
even be just that — a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more.
Despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is
crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from
Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Dominguez mu must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
Q: While SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of
violators of RA 9165 at Purok 3, Brgy. Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, he saw a man, who
was later identified as Dominguez, holding with his left hand a small transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. SPO1
Parchaso then grabbed the hands of Dominguez and seized therefrom one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing the substance suspected to be shabu. He
arrested Dominguez and informed him of his violation and his rights under the law.
The seized item was brought to the PNP-SPD Crime Laboratory for examination. Based
on Physical Science Report, the specimen weighing 0.03 gram, yielded a positive result
for shabu. Is the seized item admissible in evidence against Domingo?
A: NO. Despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is
crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from
Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Dominguez mu must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability. (Marlon
Dominguez y Argana v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALD ESPEJO y RIZALDO
DOCTRINE
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
have consequently been compromised.
FACTS
Operatives from the Philippine National Police stationed at the Provincial Intelligence
Branch of the Laguna Police Provincial Office in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, received a report from a
"concerned citizen" that the accused-appellant Reynald Espejo was engaged in illegal drug
trade in the area of Laguerta Street, Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. Thereafter,
P/Supt. Protacio formed a buy-bust team.
The team proceeded to the target area and saw accused-appellant standing by the
doorstep of a house while conversing with another person. At a certain point, they saw
accused-appellant hand over to that person a plastic sachet of suspected shabu. Afterwards,
PO1 Ver and the informant, who are acting as poseur-buyer, alighted from the vehicle. They
walked towards accused-appellant who came out of the house. Accused- appellant uttered
"Ilan tol?" SPO1 Ver replied, "Lima tol," (meaning, P500 worth of shabu). SPO1 Ver gave the
buy-bust money to accused-appellant. Accused-appellant accepted the money, and then
pulled from underneath the ceiling a coin purse from which he retrieved several plastic
sachets of suspected shabu. Accused- appellant gave one (1) sachet to SPO1 Ver. At this
juncture, SPO1 Ver scratched his head to signal the consummation of the transaction. SPO1
Ver held accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police officer, while the back-up team
and the perimeter security rushed in. SPO1 Ver recovered the coin purse that contained four
(4) other plastic sachets with the P500.00 buy-bust money.
At the place of transaction, SPO1 Ver immediately marked all the sachets seized.
Thenceforth, they brought accused-appellant and the seized items to the police station, and
thereupon, prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination and a Certificate of Inventory.
Likewise, photographs of the accused-appellant and the seized items were taken in the
presence of a representative from the media. After documentation, SPO1 Ver and SPO4
Goyena personally delivered the request and the substances to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After chemical examination, the substances were confirmed positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
For his part, the accused-appellant denied the charges against him.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. The CA affirmed accused-appellant’s conviction. It ruled,
among others, that the absence of a Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative and
Barangay Official during the inventory is of no consequence. In cases involving dangerous
drugs, the mandatory procedure of Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) require only substantial compliance.
ISSUE
Whether or not Espejo's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and (3) the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid.
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165. First, none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs.
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of Section 21.
delicti have consequently been compromised.
In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or
explain, the buy-bust team's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The
police officers did not offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses
during the buy-bust operation itself, especially where, as here, they could have done so.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised,
thus necessitating the acquittal of Espejo.
Q: Accused-appellant Reynald Espejo was arrested in a buy-bust operation for of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. At the place of
transaction, SPO1 Ver immediately marked all the sachets seized. They then brought
accused-appellant and the seized items to the police station, and thereupon, prepared
the Request for Laboratory Examination and a Certificate of Inventory. Likewise,
photographs of the accused-appellant and the seized items were taken in the presence
of a representative from the media. After documentation, SPO1 Ver and SPO4 Goyena
personally delivered the request and the substances to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After chemical examination, the substances were confirmed positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the
crimes charged. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165. First, none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs.
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of Section 21.
delicti have consequently been compromised.
Here, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the
buy-bust team's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The police officers
did not offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses during the buy-
bust operation itself, especially where, as here, they could have done so.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised,
thus necessitating the acquittal of Espejo. (People of the Philippines V. Reynald Espejo y
Rizaldo, G.R. No. 240914, March 13, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY BRIONES y ESPINA
DOCTRINE
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance.
FACTS
While PO1 Carandang was on duty at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operation Task Force of the Batangas City Police Station, his asset arrived at the
police station and reported that there was a person who was selling shabu on a consignment
basis. PO1 Carandang relayed the information to SPO1 de Chavez, SPO1 Yap and PO2
Ponciano Asilo. SPO1 de Chavez, acting as team leader, decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation against the drug pusher who the asset referred to as "Garry."
The team proceeded to the Fil Oil Gasoline Station in Brgy. Gulod Labac, Batangas
City. When they reached the gasoline station, PO1 Carandang and the asset alighted from the
car and waited at a vacant lot nearby. After five (5) minutes, a man referred to by the asset
as alias "Garry" arrived. The asset and Garry talked while PO1 Carandang stood just beside
both of them. Then, Garry handed the asset a plastic sachet and uttered, "point three yan,
two five yan." The asset immediately passed the plastic sachet to PO1 Carandang. Thereafter,
PO1 Carandang arrested Garry and the back-up team rushed in. SPO1 de Chavez frisked the
accused, who identified himself as Garry Briones y Espina, but did not recover any other
illegal item. Then, PO1 Carandang marked the plastic sachet.
From the place of arrest, the team brought the accused to the barangay hall of Brgy.
Gulod Labac, Batangas City. SPO1 de Chavez tried to call a media representative but no one
arrived. Upon arrival of SPO1 Adelantar and the DOJ representative, the inventory of
confiscated items was conducted. Pictures were also taken while the inventory was being
conducted. PO1 Carandang was in possession of the plastic sachet of shabu from the time it
was confiscated until it was turned over to SPO1 Adelantar after the inventory was
conducted. Thereafter, they proceeded back to the police station.
At the police station, SPO1 Adelantar prepared the request for laboratory
examination and for drug test. He then delivered the documents and the confiscated item to
the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. As shown in the Chemistry Report No. BD
204-2013, the specimen tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted the Garry of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165. the CA affirmed in toto Garry's conviction. It held, among others, that the procedural
lapses lapses alleged by Garry were minor and did not affect the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not Garry's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
a copy of the same; and (3) the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In the instant case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, which thus creates reasonable doubt as to the identity and
integrity of the seized drug from Garry. Based on the testimony of PO1 Ruther Carandang,
the police officers only tried to contact the three mandatory witnesses when they were
already at the barangay hall after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the drug at the
crime scene. Moreover, the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for its failure to
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving
their compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case
of non-compliance.
In the case at bar, the police officers gave no such explanation. They merely "called-
in" the mandatory witnesses after the buy-bust operation was already accomplished
although it is obvious that they had no excuse to do so. The buy-bust team had enough time
to secure the presence of the required witnesses at the place of arrest and seizure.
Q: Accused-appellant Garry Briones was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. After his arrest, PO1 Carandang marked the plastic
sachet. From the place of arrest, the team brought the accused to the barangay hall of
Brgy. Gulod Labac, Batangas City. SPO1 de Chavez tried to call a media representative
but no one arrived. Upon arrival of SPO1 Adelantar and the DOJ representative, the
inventory of confiscated items was conducted. Pictures were also taken while the
inventory was being conducted. PO1 Carandang was in possession of the plastic sachet
of shabu from the time it was confiscated until it was turned over to SPO1 Adelantar
after the inventory was conducted. Thereafter, they proceeded back to the police
station and prepared the request for laboratory examination and for drug test. The
RTC convicted Garry of the crime charged. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Is the CA
correct?
A: NO. In the instant case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, which thus creates reasonable doubt as to the identity and
integrity of the seized drug from Garry. Based on the testimony of PO1 Ruther Carandang,
the police officers only tried to contact the three mandatory witnesses when they were
already at the barangay hall after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the drug at the
crime scene. Moreover, the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for its failure to
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving
their compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case
of non-compliance.
In the case at bar, the police officers gave no such explanation. They merely "called-
in" the mandatory witnesses after the buy-bust operation was already accomplished
although it is obvious that they had no excuse to do so. The buy-bust team had enough time
to secure the presence of the required witnesses at the place of arrest and seizure. (People of
the Philippines v. Garry Briones y Espina, G.R. No. 239077, March 20, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
ROLANDO P. DIZON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DOCTRINE
While as a rule, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is
mandatory, a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the existence
of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses in procedure, the prosecution must
recognize such and accordingly justify the same in order to warrant the application of the
saving mechanism.
FACTS
SI Cruz together with team leader SI Arthur Oliveros, SI Sindatuk Ulama, SI Erum and
SI Otec implemented a search warrant issued by the RTC of Quezon City to make an
immediate search of the residence of accused-appellant Dizon and to seize and take
possession of the following articles and bring them to the court: 1) undetermined quantity
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu"; 2) records and proceeds
of sale of shabu; 3) weighing scale, plastic sachets, sealers and other articles used or being
used in the same and distribution of shabu; 4) tooters, water pipes, burners and other
paraphernalia used or being used in the administration of "shabu."
SI Cruz, his team, accused-appellant, and the 2 barangay kagawad namely Kagawad
Alcantara and Kagawad Lim went inside the house. When the search began, SI Cruz
recovered plastic sachets containing crystalline substance at the nearest bedroom. The
plastic sachets were found inside the pocket of a white ladies jacket place on top of the bed.
Aware of the absence of accused-appellant's counsel, SI Cruz did not inquire about the owner
of the jacket. Thereafter, SI Cruz prepared an inventory and placed markings on the sachet
in the presence of accused-appellant, Kagawad Alcantara and Kagawad Lim. Based on the
inventory, the items seized from the premises of accused- appellant included a plastic sachet
containing seven (7) smaller heat- sealed transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance and another plastic sachet containing two (2) smaller unsealed Ajinomoto packets
of white crystalline substance. SI Cruz also took photographs of the articles seized in the
premises. The search team brought accused-appellant and the confiscated articles to the NBI
main office in Taft Avenue and continued with the booking procedure.
Accused-appellant Dizon, for his part, vehemently denied the accusation against him.
The RTC convicted Dizon for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165). Unsatisfied, Dizon appealed his conviction to the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC Decision in toto. The CA found that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drugs were preserved due to the unbroken chain of custody established by the
prosecution.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dizon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 lays down following procedure must be
observed in the seizure, custody, and disposition of dangerous drugs. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR), on the other hand, supplied additional custody
requirements and added a "saving clause" in case of non-compliance with such requirements
under justifiable grounds.
Thus, while as a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory,
a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the existence of
"justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses in procedure, the prosecution
must recognize such and accordingly justify the same in order to warrant the application of
the saving mechanism.
In this case, the apprehending team plainly failed to comply with the witness
requirements under the law, i.e., that the photographing and inventory of the seized items
be witnessed by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials were present to
witness the operation. Worse, there was no indication whatsoever that the apprehending
team attempted, at the very least, to secure the presence of the other required witnesses.
Thus, as a result of the foregoing irregularities committed by the government

authorities, the conviction of Dizon now hangs in the balance. In this respect, in order not to
render void the seizure and custody over the evidence obtained from the latter, the
prosecution is thus required, as a matter of law, to establish the following: (i) that such non-
compliance was based on justifiable grounds, and (ii) that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items were properly preserved.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed in this regard. At the outset, the Court finds it brazen of the
police officers to recognize their fatal error in procedure and yet at the same time offer no
explanation or justification for doing so, which, as stated above, is required by the law. What
further catches the attention of the Court is the fact that Dizon was apprehended pursuant
to a search warrant and therefore with more reason, the police officers could have secured
the presence of the other witnesses, i.e., the DOJ representative and media representative.
However, despite the advantage of planning the operation ahead, the apprehending team
nonetheless inexplicably failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 21 of R.A
No. 9165.
Q: SI Cruz together with team leader SI Arthur Oliveros, SI Sindatuk Ulama, SI Erum
and SI Otec implemented a search warrant issued by the RTC of Quezon City to make
an immediate search of the residence of accused-appellant Dizon. After the search was
effected, SI Cruz prepared an inventory and placed markings on the sachet in the
presence of accused-appellant, Kagawad Alcantara and Kagawad Lim. Based on the
inventory, the items seized from the premises of accused- appellant included a plastic
sachet containing seven (7) smaller heat- sealed transparent plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance and another plastic sachet containing two (2) smaller unsealed
Ajinomoto packets of white crystalline substance. An Information was filed against
Dizon for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC convicted him of
the crime charged. The Ca affirmed RTC’s ruling. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. While as a rule, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is
mandatory, a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the
existence of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and
(2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses in procedure, the prosecution
must recognize such and accordingly justify the same in order to warrant the application of
the saving mechanism.
In this case, the apprehending team plainly failed to comply with the witness
requirements under the law, i.e., that the photographing and inventory of the seized items
be witnessed by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials were present to
witness the operation. Worse, there was no indication whatsoever that the apprehending
team attempted, at the very least, to secure the presence of the other required witnesses.
In this respect, in order not to render void the seizure and custody over the evidence
obtained from the latter, the prosecution is thus required, as a matter of law, to establish the
following: (i) that such non-compliance was based on justifiable grounds, and (ii) that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed in this regard. At the outset, the Court finds it brazen of the
police officers to recognize their fatal error in procedure and yet at the same time offer no
explanation or justification for doing so, which, as stated above, is required by the law. What
further catches the attention of the Court is the fact that Dizon was apprehended pursuant
to a search warrant and therefore with more reason, the police officers could have secured
the presence of the other witnesses, i.e., the DOJ representative and media representative.
However, despite the advantage of planning the operation ahead, the apprehending team
nonetheless inexplicably failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 21 of R.A
No. 9165. (Rolando P. Dizon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 239399, March 25, 2019, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DON VEGA Y RAMIL
DOCTRINE
“An accused who pleads self-defense admits to the commission of the crime charged. He
has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
It is established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence. To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods
or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.”
FACTS
On 18 January 2009 at about 11:30 in the evening, the victim, Manuel Isip, was at
Arellano Street, Malate, Manila because his friend was celebrating his birthday. Among his
drinking buddies was Aldrin Fernandez, witness for the prosecution. While drinking,
chatting, and listening to music, they spotted accused Don Vega who was about 4 arms'
length away sniffing rugby from a bottle. After a few hours, Don Vega approached them and
caused a disturbance by smashing several items. Victim Manuel Isip tried to pacify the
accused saying, "pre, huwag naman dito, kasi may nagkakasiyahan dito" but accused harshly
replied, "huwag kang makialam dito, baka ikaw ang samain." Victim Isip did not comment
and merely turned his back to avert bigger trouble. While his back was turned on him,
accused suddenly grabbed him from behind, wrapped his left arm around the victim's neck
and using his right hand, plunged a knife to his chest. Victim Isip was rushed to the Ospital
ng Maynila but was declared "dead on arrival."
For its part, the defense presented accused himself. He claimed that on 18 January
2009, at about 11 in the evening, he was along Tuazon St., San Andres, Manila, drinking with
victim Isip and a certain "Fernandez," together with the birthday celebrator "Ogad." He
requested victim Isip to play his theme song. The victim asked him to wait because there
were many who made similar requests. He reiterated his request several times but was
ignored. He then approached the victim, but the latter punched him. Upset, he went back to
his table and picked up a bladed weapon. Victim Isip suddenly charged towards him, so he
stabbed him. He thought the people will pacify him (accused), but he was wrong.
RTC convicted Don of the crime of Murder, rulng that the defense was not able to
establish all the elements of self-defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, likewise
holding that the elements of self-defense are lacking.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Don's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. The Court affirmed Don’s conviction, but only for the crime of Homicide, as the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven.
The accused failed to prove self-defense. An accused who pleads self-defense admits
to the commission of the crime charged. He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable, which
refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon
a person."
All the requisites of self-defense are wanting in this case: First, there is no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be
real danger to life or personal safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of the 3 elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical
or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None of the elements of unlawful aggression
was proven by the defense. Aside from Don's self-serving statement that it was Manuel who
punched and attacked him, not one of the persons present at the incident corroborated his
account. Neither did he present any medical record showing that he sustained any injuries
as the result of the attack by Manuel.
Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second
requisite of self-defense could not have been present. Even assuming that there was unlawful
aggression, the means employed by Don in repelling the alleged attack by Manuel was not
reasonably necessary. Manuel was unarmed and had his back turned while Don used a
bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and stab Manuel repeatedly.
Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. It was Don who suddenly rushed to the victim and stabbed the latter several times
in the chest. In addition, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of Manuel. Based on
the account of the prosecution witnesses, Manuel merely implored Don to refrain from
breaking things and making unnecessary disturbance. In fact, when Don uttered harsh words
against Manuel, the latter did not make a comment and instead turned his back on the
former.
Further, treachery was not established by clear and convincing evidence. It is

established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must
exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal
act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, Don
was already a part of the drinking spree where the stabbing eventually happened; he did not
deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as they were already in the same vicinity. Second,
in killing Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was no
mention in the records as to who owned said weapon. The suddenness of an attack does not,
of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. Based
on these circumstances, Don's decision to attack Manuel was more of a sudden impulse than
a planned decision. Lastly, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, the incident happened
during a drinking spree where there were more or less 15 people, excluding Don and Manuel.
If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another
time and place to stab Manuel.
Q: Victim Isip, was at a drinking spree with his friend. While drinking, they spotted
accused Don Vega, who later approached them and caused a disturbance by smashing
several items. Victim Isip tried to pacify him but accused harshly replied, "huwag kang
makialam dito, baka ikaw ang samain." Victim Isip did not comment and merely
turned his back to avert bigger trouble. While his back was turned on him, accused
suddenly grabbed him from behind, wrapped his left arm around the victim's neck
and plunged a knife to his chest. Victim Isip was rushed to the hospital but was
declared "dead on arrival." Should accused Don Vega be convicted of murder due to
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery?
A: NO. He should be convicted of the crime of Homicide, as the qualifying circumstance of

treachery was not proven. The qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1)
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, Don
was already a part of the drinking spree where the stabbing eventually happened; he did not
deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as they were already in the same vicinity. Second,
in killing Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was no
mention in the records as to who owned said weapon. The suddenness of an attack does not,
of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. Based
on these circumstances, Don's decision to attack Manuel was more of a sudden impulse than
a planned decision. Lastly, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, the incident happened
during a drinking spree where there were more or less 15 people, excluding Don and Manuel.
If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another
time and place to stab Manuel. (People of the Philippines v. Don Vega y Ramil, GR No. 216018,
March 27, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY LUMAHANG Y TALISAY
DOCTRINE
“Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.”
FACTS
On December 14, 2008, around 9 in the evening, Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario, and
Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Joan of Arc Street, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches,
QC when appellant appeared fuming mad. Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from
behind and stabbed him in a hook motion with knife in his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit
on the buttocks, quickly ran towards an alley. Without warning, appellant then turned his ire
on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body.
RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries
on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Poraso, who positively identified
him as the assailant of Velitario and Pornelos. The RTC held that the stabbing of Pornelos
and the killing of Velitario were attended by treachery as the attacks were sudden, the
victims were unarmed, and they were not able to defend themselves. However, as to
Pornelos, the RTC only convicted Lumahang of less serious physical injuries as it could not
be inferred from the attack, or the wound sustained by Pornelos, that Lumahang had the
intent to kill Pornelos.
CA affirmed the RTC conviction with modifications. It likewise upheld the RTC finding
that the attacks were attended with treachery. As to the attack against Pornelos, Lumahang
effected the attack from behind; as to Velitario, the attack, while made frontally, was made
in a sudden, unexpected, and swift manner. However, as to Pornelos, Lumahang’s conviction
was downgraded to only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos only needed 7 days of hospital
confinement to recover.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery insofar as Velitario is concerned
RULING
YES. The Court disagrees with the CA insofar as it holds that treachery attended the
attack on Velitario. Treachery undoubtedly exists on the attack against Pornelos because (1)
the parties were attending a wake, and were thus not expecting an attack from happening;
(2) the attack was made suddenly and from behind.
The CA held that the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack caught Velitario off
guard, which rendered him unable to defend himself. This conclusion is erroneous. Mere
suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode
adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that
the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In this case, Lumahang had already made an attack against Pornelos who, after being
stabbed on the buttocks, was able to run away towards safety. Velitario was already apprised
that there was danger nearby as he saw the commotion between the two. Even if Velitario
was so surprised by the attack that he was unable to do anything, this does not automatically
make the attack treacherous. It is true that Velitario was unable to defend himself from
Lumahang's attacks not because he was not given an opportunity to do so, but simply
because he was not able to react in time from the initial attack on Pornelos.
The fact that the victim was unable to defend himself would not automatically mean
that the killing was attended by treachery if the prosecution, as in this case, failed to show
that the means used by Lumahang was consciously or deliberately adopted to ensure the
execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim
might offer.
In addition, the attack itself was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not
negate the existence of treachery, when it is considered along with the other circumstances,
like the attack not being unexpected, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence
of the qualifying circumstance. Hence, the Court must perforce rule in favor of the accused
and not appreciate the said circumstance. With the removal of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, the crime committed by Lumahang against Velitario is therefore Homicide and
not Murder.
Q: Poraso, Velitario, and Pornelos were attending a wake when appellant appeared
fuming mad, and suddenly approached Pornelos from behind, and stabbed him in a
hook motion with a knife in his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit on the buttocks,
quickly ran towards an alley. Without warning, appellant then turned his ire on
Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body.
The RTC held that the killing of Velitario was attended by treachery as the attacks
were sudden, the victims were unarmed, and they were not able to defend themselves,
therefore, the crime is murder. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk
to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
In this case, Lumahang had already made an attack against Pornelos who, after being
stabbed on the buttocks, was able to run away towards safety. Hence, Velitario was already
apprised that there was danger nearby. Even if Velitario was surprised by the attack that he
was unable to do anything, this does not automatically make the attack treacherous. It is true
that Velitario was unable to defend himself from Lumahang's attacks not because he was not
given an opportunity to do so, but simply because he was not able to react in time from the
initial attack on Pornelos. Further, the attack itself was frontal.
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed
by Lumahang against Velitario is therefore Homicide and not Murder. (People of the
Philippines v. Lumahang y Talisay, GR No. 218581, March 27, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAVE CLAUDEL y LUCAS
GR No. 219852, April 3, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain
of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.”
FACTS
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the operatives of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-
Special Operation Task Group Muntinlupa Police following a report that a certain Dave
Claudel is engaged in illegal drug activities. Prior to the buy-bust operation, Dave was
previously arrested for violation of RA 9165 involving illegal drugs. The buy-bust team
prepared the Pre-Operational Sheet and Coordination Sheet which they faxed to the PDEA.
In turn, the buy-bust team received a Certificate of Coordination from PDEA.
PO2 Hernaez was assigned as poseur-buyer while PO1 Yangson as the immediate
back up. PO2 Hernaez was handed a P500 Bill buy-bust money on which the latter wrote his
initials "RH" on the lower right portion. It was agreed that PO2 Hernaez will light a cigarette
as a pre-arranged signal that the sale was consummated.
As PO2 Hernaez was already familiar with Dave as he used to see him in court
hearings, PO2 Hernaez wore a disguise by wearing a gray polo shirt, maong pants, leather
shoes, and a cap to cover his face, in order to avoid being recognized.
At around 9:30pm, the team proceeded to the target place. PO2 Hernaez and the asset
walked towards Tuazon Street corner Rizal Street where it was dark and there was no light.
The asset pointed to Dave as the person selling illegal drugs and introduced PO2 Hernaez as
his kumpare who is interested in buying shabu. Dave asked how much they would buy and
PO2 Hernaez replied, "P500, pare." Dave reached into the secret pocket of his maong pants
and told PO2 Hernaez, "Tamang-tama pare huling kasa ko na lang 'to pauwi na rin ako." PO2
Hernaez handed Dave the buy-bust money while Dave handed him a transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Hernaez lit his cigarette and PO1 Yangson
immediately rushed to the scene and arrested Dave.
After informing Dave of his rights, PO2 Hernaez and the rest of the buy-bust team
brought him to their office where they recovered the buy-bust money. The plastic sachet
remained in PO2 Hernaez's custody until they reached their office. Upon arriving, PO2
Hernaez placed the marking "DC" on the seized plastic sachet. They conducted an Inventory
of the seized item in the presence of Dave and a DAPCO representative.
PO2 Hernaez explained that they contacted a representative from the media and the
barangay but received a negative reply as it was already around 10 or 11 in the evening.
Photographs of Dave, the buy-bust team, and the confiscated items were taken. They
prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination which was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory. PO2 Hernaez took custody of the seized item and submitted it to the Custodian
in the Crime Laboratory. The result of the Laboratory Examination yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thereafter, they executed a Joint Affidavit, a Booking
Sheet, and Spot Report of the incident.
RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established that Dave was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation.
CA affirmed Dave's conviction, ruling that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs have been amply proven by the prosecution to affirm the conviction of Dave.
Moreover, the non-compliance with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case. What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Further, it found that the police
officers exerted earnest efforts to obtain the presence and signatures of the required
witnesses, but the same proved futile as they received a negative reply since it was already
late at the time of the buy-bust operation.
ISSUE
Whether Dave's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
To preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as

evidence, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his/her
and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately
after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when it is not practicable that the IRR of RA
9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station/office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means
that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done at the
place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the
buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
However, strict compliance may not always be possible; and such failure of the
apprehending team does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void
and invalid. However, the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be
proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and acquittal should follow
on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements. First, the arresting officers failed to mark and photograph the seized item at
the place of arrest and seizure. Neither did they offer any explanation as to why they failed
to do so. Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest
and the marking, photographing, and conduct of the inventory of the seized items.
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to comply. PO2
Hernaez merely said that they tried to contact the three required witnesses, but they never
came as it was already late, having been around 10-11pm. This is not sufficient to justify their
non-compliance. They had sufficient time prior to the buy-bust operation, as PO2 Hernaez
admitted that they were able to coordinate with PDEA and prepare the required documents
at about 7-8pm. Also, it was their second time arresting Dave, thus, they already knew what
to expect, and should have made the necessary preparations.
The prosecution has the burden of: (1) proving its compliance with Section 21, RA
9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. Breaches of the
procedure committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been compromised.
In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, the police's
deviation from the procedure under Section 21. The integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti have thus been compromised, necessitating the acquittal of Dave.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the operatives of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-
Special Operation Task Group Muntinlupa Police and arrested Dave. The team
contacted a representative from the media and the barangay but received a negative
reply as it was already around 10 or 11 in the evening. Photographs of Dave, the buy-
bust team, and the confiscated items were taken. The result of the Laboratory
Examination yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
At the level of CA, Dave’s conviction was upheld, ruling that the non-compliance with
the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal. Further, it found that the
police officers exerted earnest efforts to obtain the presence of the required
witnesses, but it proved futile as they received a negative reply since it was already
late at the time of the buy-bust operation. Is the CA correct?
A: NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
moral certainty.

and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his/her
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
However, strict compliance may not always be possible; and such failure does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. However, the prosecution still
needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements: First, the arresting officers failed to mark and photograph the seized item at
the place of arrest and seizure. Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present
at the time of arrest and marking, photographing, and conduct of the inventory of the seized
items. Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to comply. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised,
necessitating the acquittal of Dave. (People of the Philippines v. Dave Claudel y Lucas, GR No.
219852, April 3, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
MA. CARMEN ROSARIO ABILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity
and integrity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty.
While the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs
to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
FACTS
NBI Agent Dungog went to the PDEA Dumaguete City Office and informed SI Kintanar
about the illegal drug activity of Chicky. NBI Agent Dungog suggested that they meet his
confidential informant for a possible conduct of a buy-bust operation. NBI Agent Dungog and
SI Kintanar, together with SPO3 Germodo and IO1 Bataan Coliflores, proceeded to Brgy.
Piapi, Dumaguete City to meet said informant. The informant assured that he could transact
with Chicky for the purchase of shabu. Hence, NBI Agent Dungog contacted other members
of Task Force 24. When they arrived, SI Kintanar prepared the P500 bill buy-bust money
while the informant contacted Chicky, who instructed the informant to meet her at Villa
Fortunata. Hence, the team went to said place.
The informant introduced SI Kintanar to Chicky and told her that they were buying
P1000 worth of shabu. Chicky handed SI Kintanar a sachet of shabu and SI Kintanar handed
the P500 marked money. SI Kintanar pretended to get another P500 from his wallet and
executed the prearranged signal by making a miss call to NBI Agent Dungog. The rest of the
team assisted him in arresting Chicky. Her black leather bag was inspected, where the
marked money and another sachet of shabu were found. To preserve the integrity of the
evidence seized, SI Kintanar marked each sachet and signed them.
After marking, Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived, so SI Kintanar showed him the seized
items. The team was about to conduct the inventory but it decided to have it at the NBI Office
instead, as the place of the incident was not well-lighted and there was already a commotion
from the passing vehicles, and the people were already scared as they had guns. From there
up to the NBI Office, SI Kintanar had all the seized items in his custody.
At the NBI Office, when all the required witnesses were already present, SI Kintanar
inventoried the seized items and prepared the Certificate of Inventory while NBI Agent
Dungog prepared a request for laboratory examination. SPO3 Germodo took photographs of
the seized items, the Certificate of Inventory, and the required witnesses with Chicky. After
inventory, all the confiscated items were left in the custody of SI Kintanar. As there was a
brown-out, IO1 Coliflores entered the incident in the PDEA blotter when the power was
restored.
On the next day, SI Kintanar personally submitted the seized sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. PCI Llena received the seized items and
conducted the qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug under R.A. 9165.
She prepared a Chemistry Report to reflect her findings, re-sealed the sachets, and placed
her own markings. She kept them in the crime laboratory's evidence room, where only she
had access to, until they were submitted by her to the RTC.
RTC convicted Abilla for violation of Section 5 and 11 of RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for having sold and possessed dangerous drugs without legal
authority. It further held that the chain of custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu has
never been broken. CA declared that there was substantial compliance in ensuring that the
integrity of the drugs seized from Abilla was preserved.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Abilla of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Abilla for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Abilla was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty.
This resonates even more in buy-bust operations because "by their very nature, the
need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with
which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the
possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the law requires strict compliance with procedures laid
down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; and (3) such conduct of the physical inventory and photograph
shall be done at the (a) place where the search warrant is served; (b) nearest police station;
or (c) nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure.
after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the IRR
of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
21. The seized items were not inventoried immediately after seizure or confiscation. NBI
Agent Dungog admitted, during his cross-examination, that there was no inventory
conducted at the place of apprehension except for the markings made on the sachets by SI
Kintanar. The apprehending officers also testified that "although the place was lighted, it was
not considered sufficient for the proper conduct of inventory" and given the "presence of so
many people at that time." There were also no photographs of the seized drugs that were
taken at the place of seizure.; photographs were taken only at the NBI Office.
Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure
and apprehension. SI Kintanar testified that Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived after the arrest of
Abilla was executed. Further, there was no DOJ and media representatives present. The
presence of the other two witnesses at the NBI Office–Benlot as DOJ representative and Rio
as media representative, did not provide the necessary insulation contemplated by the law.
Based on Benlot's testimony, he arrived when the seized items were already arranged on the
table; while Rio's testimony revealed that he arrived only after the inventory and
photography of the seized items, and he was merely asked to sign the inventory sheet. As
they were unable to witness how the alleged sachets of dangerous drugs were seized, the
manner on how the buy-bust operation was conducted creates doubt as to the source,
identity, and integrity of the seized drugs.
The prosecution failed to prove any justifiable ground for non-compliance. While the
Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
deviation from the procedure under Section 21, RA 9165. The reasons that (a) the place of
apprehension not being well-lighted; (b) existence of commotion from the passing vehicles,
and (c) people being scared because they had guns, do not persuade the Court to be
justifiable explanations to dispense with the conduct of the physical inventory and the
photographing required by the law.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted wherein Chicky was arrested for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. SI Kintanar found the marked money and
another sachet of shabu in her bag. To preserve the integrity of the pieces of evidence
seized, SI Kintanar marked each sachet and signed them. It was only after the marking
that Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived. Further, there was no DOJ and media
representatives present at the time. The team was about to conduct the inventory but
it decided to have it at the NBI Office instead, as the place of the incident was not well-
lighted and there was already a commotion from the passing vehicles, and the people
were already scared as they had guns. The DOJ representative and the media
representative arrived only after the inventory and photography of the seized items.
Should Chicky be convicted of the crimes charged?
A: NO. In illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain
a conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must
be established with moral certainty.
21, Article II of RA 9165. The seized items were not inventoried immediately after seizure or
confiscation. Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension. Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived after the arrest of Abilla was
executed. Further, there was no DOJ and media representatives present. Their presence at
the NBI Office did not provide the necessary insulation contemplated by the law as they
arrived only after the inventory and photography of the seized items. As they were unable to
witness how the alleged sachets of dangerous drugs were seized, the manner on how the
buy-bust operation was conducted creates doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of
the seized drugs.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove any justifiable ground for non-compliance.
While the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. (Ma. Carmen
Abilla v. People of the Philippines, GR No. 227676, April 03, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE
DOCTRINE
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti. Consequently,
compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any
prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation.
To maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs as evidence, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 requires: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official,
(c) a representative from media, and (d) a representative from DOJ, all required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
FACTS
An information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Tanes pleaded not guilty, and eventually, filed a Petition for Bail. RTC issued an Order
granting Tanes' application for bail, finding that the evidence of his guilt was not strong
because there was doubt as to whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was
preserved. The failure of prosecution to show that the 3 witnesses (media representative,
DOJ representative, elected official) were present in the actual buy-bust operation and not
only during the inventory negated the requirement of strong evidence of the accused's guilt
to justify a denial of bail.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail because:
(1) it did not state a summary of the prosecution's evidence in its Order, therefore, petitioner
was not accorded due process; and (2) it required the presence of the 3 witnesses during the
buy-bust operation and actual seizure of the drug, thereby extending the requirement laid
down in R.A. 9165.
CA dismissed the petition as petitioner failed to show that the RTC's exercise of
discretion in granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by jurisprudence.
CA found that the evidence presented by the prosecution in establishing that Tanes' guilt was
strong was tarnished by a broken chain in custody. Further, petitioner was not denied due
process as 3 hearings were conducted for the bail application where petitioner was duly
represented by its prosecutors.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes'
application for bail.
RULING
NO. Right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, xxx
Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, “No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.”
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua; it becomes a matter of discretion
if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that
is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, a violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
hearings is required. Non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody of illegal drugs
negates strong evidence of Tanes' guilt. As Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the burden is on the State to prove
not only the elements of the crime but also the corpus delicti. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti. Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of
custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-bust
operation.
official, (c) a representative from media, and (d) a representative from DOJ, all required to
of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the required witnesses should be physically present at the time of the conduct of the
physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation - a requirement that can easily be complied with as the buy-bust
operation is a planned activity.
In this case, the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses concerning the
chain of custody of the seized drug. The RTC and the CA found that: (1) there was no
representative from DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and inventory; (2) the two
other witnesses (media representative and elected public official) were not present during
the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the inventory
sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in
the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt
as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes'
guilt cannot be characterized as strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
Q: An information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Tanes pleaded not guilty, and eventually, filed a Petition for Bail. RTC issued an Order
granting Tanes' application for bail, finding that the evidence of his guilt was not
strong because there was doubt as to whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust
operation was preserved. The failure of prosecution to show that the 3 witnesses
(media representative, DOJ representative, elected official) were present in the actual
buy-bust operation and not only during the inventory negated the requirement of
strong evidence of the accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail. Is the RTC correct?
A: YES. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti. Consequently,
compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any
prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation.
official, (c) a representative from media, and (d) a representative from DOJ, all required to
Lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to the identity and integrity of the
seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be characterized as strong.
Accordingly, he is entitled to bail. (People of the Philippines v. Novo Tanes y Belmonte, GR No.
240596, April 03, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO ASENIERO
DOCTRINE
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk to himself. There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an
altercation between the accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending
attack by either of them.
FACTS
On the part of the prosecution, Roel Pilo testified that he is a friend of the victim,
Dominador Reyes. At about 2am, he went to the dancing hall, 10 meters from the barangay
hall, where he saw Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn Gomez, and Mira Pagay. At about
5am, he left with the group of Dominador. They passed by a narrow road, so they did not
walk side by side. Mira trailed first, followed by Mario, then Roel, and behind him were
Dominador and Analyn. Suddenly, he heard Dominador say "Aray" (Ouch!); Dominador ran
past him followed by accused Romeo, who was carrying a long bolo. Around 4 meters from
where he was, Dominador stumbled with his back on the ground, and the accused caught up
with the victim and hacked him multiple times. Prior to this, Roel did not notice that accused
was around. He was so shocked by the incident that he just stood there and watched. He
asked the accused why he stabbed the victim, to which the accused replied that he was
jealous. At the trial, Roel identified the murder weapon (long bolo) used in the killing. Roel
admitted that since the victim was walking behind him, he did not know if it was the accused
who assaulted the victim first.
Analyn testified that the victim was her current boyfriend and that the suspect was
her former boyfriend, and that the reason why Romeo killed Dominador is jealousy. On their
way home from the dancing hall, they passed upon a narrow road. She was walking behind
Dominador when Romeo suddenly came from behind her and stabbed Dominador in the
back with a bolo. Dominador tried to run but stumbled down 25 feet. The accused was able
to catch up with the victim and continued to stab the latter several times. She shouted "No!"
but the accused continued hacking the victim and even chopped off his feet. The rest of the
group ran away while she hid behind a coffee tree. She admitted that before the accused
stabbed the victim, the former pushed her aside but she did not fall down the cliff as there
was a rock on the side of the trail.
On the part of the defense, Loreto Papa testified that he left the dance hall with his
cousins and accused Romeo. Analyn and her group were walking ahead of them about 10
arms-length away. Analyn and the accused have not broken up yet, but were quarreling.
When accused saw Analyn, he tried to go after her, but he was kicked by Dominador.
Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in turn, unsheathed his bolo. Further,
until accused and the victim unsheathed their weapons, no altercation occurred. Meanwhile,
Gregorio testified that Dominador kicked the accused and stabbed him in the chest with a
knife. The accused then leaned back, unsheathed his bolo and stabbed Dominador.
RTC found Romeo guilty of Murder, ruling that treachery attended the killing. The CA
upheld the RTC ruling that the accused's attack was treacherously carried out.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Romeo's conviction for Murder despite the fact
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court affirmed the conviction of Romeo, but only for the crime of Homicide,
as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of the victim.
There is treachery when offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
offended party might make. The following conditions must exist: (1) assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the elements of treachery
in the killing of the victim. Based on the testimonies of the two defense witnesses the attack
was preceded by an altercation between Romeo and the victim. Both Loreto and Gregorio
testified that it was the victim who first assaulted the accused. This should prevail over the
testimony of the prosecution witness, Analyn, that Romeo immediately stabbed the victim,
considering that Analyn's testimony is uncorroborated by the other prosecution witness,
Roel, who testified that he did not see how the attack began as he was walking in front of the
victim.
There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation between the

accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending attack by either of them.
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the victim
who first attacked the former. Even assuming that the version of Analyn is to be considered,
she narrated that she was pushed by the accused prior to his attack on the victim. This event
should have made the victim aware that there was an impending attack on him. In addition,
the victim was able to defend himself from the initial stabbing as he had his own weapon and
was able to run away. The only reason why he was not able to escape was because he
stumbled down.
Q: Roel, Dominador, Mario, Analyn, and Mira were at the dancing hall. At about 5am,
they left and passed by a narrow road, so they did not walk side by side. Mira trailed
first, followed by Mario, then Roel, and behind him were Dominador and Analyn.
Suddenly, he heard Dominador say "Aray"; Dominador ran past him followed by
accused Romeo, who was carrying a long bolo. Around 4 meters from where he was,
Dominador stumbled with his back on the ground, and the accused caught up with the
victim and hacked him multiple times. Roel admitted that since the victim was walking
behind him, he did not know if it was the accused who assaulted the victim first.
Meanwhile, Analyn testified that accused Romeo immediately stabbed the victim.
Dominador tried to run but stumbled down 25 feet. Prior to his attack on the victim,
she was first pushed by the accused. However, her testimony is uncorroborated by the
other prosecution witness.
On the other hand, based on the testimonies of the two defense witnesses, the attack
was preceded by an altercation between Romeo and the victim. Dominador then
unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in turn, unsheathed his bolo. Further, it was the
victim who first assaulted the accused. Should Romeo should be convicted for Murder
as treachery attended the killing?
A: NO. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
ensuring its commission without risk to himself. There is no treachery if the attack was
preceded by an altercation between the accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned
of an impending attack by either of them.
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the
victim who first attacked the former. Even assuming that the version of Analyn is to be
considered, she narrated that she was pushed by the accused prior to his attack on the victim.
This event should have made the victim aware that there was an impending attack on him.
In addition, the victim was able to defend himself from the initial stabbing as he had his own
weapon and was able to run away. The only reason why he was not able to escape was
because he stumbled down. (People of the Philippines v. Romeo Aseniero, GR No. 218209, April
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SUSAN SAYO Y REYES AND ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON
DOCTRINE
Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in persons,
such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering, selling, or
trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those acts that
promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
The offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter
seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking.
FACTS
Combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC ("plaza girls") disclosed that they have
been under the control and supervision of Sayo as commercial sex workers. AAA testified
that she was only 15 years old when she began working for Sayo in December 2004. Her
Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on May 2, 1990. Likewise, BBB was born
on November 11, 1989, thus, a minor during their rescue on November 15, 2005.
As there were reported offerings of minor prostitutes at the Pasig Plaza by a pimp,
Susan Sayo, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Women and Children Complaint
Division (CIDG-WCCD) conceptualized an entrapment operation called "Oplan Sagip Angel."
A team was organized for the rescue operation. PO3 Ong, PO2 So, and an agent from IJM were
tasked to act as poseur-customers. Bills amounting to P2,000 were sent to PNP-Crime
Laboratory for Ultra Violet Powder dusting, to be used as payments to the owner of the
apartment/room, for the pimp, and for the services of the "plaza girls".
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target area. As the three men
tasked to pretend as customers were in front of the church at the Pasig Plaza, they were
approached by Sayo who asked if they wanted women, further asking if they wanted 15 year-
old girls. The customers agreed for P300 each. Sayo then informed them about a room which
they could rent for P100 for each couple, to which they agreed.
Sayo then informed the "plaza girls" that they have customers that night. They met
Sayo at the Pasig Plaza, and were introduced to the three men. After negotiation, all of them
proceeded to the house of Alfredo Roxas. They were greeted by "Fred" who openly discussed
with Sayo regarding the transaction. Roxas said that the room rate for each couple is P100,
and the customers gave Roxas the P300.
The undercover agents, Sayo, and Roxas talked about the payment for the girls'
services, and when P900 was handed to Sayo for payment, the agents announced that it was
a raid. PO3 Ong executed the pre-arranged signal and the back-up who were deployed in
different strategic locations rushed towards them and arrested Sayo and Roxas.
The marked money, P300 as payment for the use of the room, was recovered from
Alfredo Roxas; while the P900 for the sexual services was recovered from Sayo. They were
charged with a violation of RA 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) – Sayo for
recruiting and transporting AAA and BBB (minors), and CCC (of legal age) for prostitution;
while Roxas for managing and operating a room to be used for prostitution.
The RTC found Sayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4(a,e) and Section 6(a) of RA 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB
are concerned. Roxas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a) and Section 6(a) of RA 9208 insofar as the minors are concerned.
As for CCC, who was no longer minor, Sayo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of trafficking in Persons under Section 4(a,e) of RA 9208 while Roxas was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of
RA 9208.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal, which was
given due course by the CA. However, Sayo died due to multiple organ failure.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas for Qualified
Trafficking of Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the offenses proscribed under Section 5
of RA 9208 are properly denominated as Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. Thus, the
Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not
Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts of Trafficking in Persons
under Section 4; (2) Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5; (3) Violation
of the Confidentiality Rule under Section 7 in relation to Section 10(d); and (4) Use of
Trafficked Persons under Section 11.
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses with
their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying circumstances of
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which when alleged and proved, will merit the
imposition of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2M but not more than
P5M under Section 10(c).
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,

natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The following acts which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building
or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
xxxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as

qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child.
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in
persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering,
selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those
acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in
Persons.
It should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by
Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of
trafficking. This was clarified in the amendatory law, RA 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012) where Section 6 was amended accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of RA No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of
this Act shall be considered as qualified trafficking: x x x
Hence, only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section

5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot
be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory amendment,
being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor.
Q: In an entrapment operation, 2 minor girls were rescued from being subjected to
prostitution. Consequently, Sayo and Roxas were charged with a violation of RA 9208
(Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) – Sayo for recruiting and transporting AAA
and BBB (minors); while Roxas for managing and operating a room to be used for
prostitution.
The RTC found Roxas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) and Section 6(a) of RA 9208. Is the
conviction correct?
A: NO. The RTC committed serious error in convicting Roxas for Qualified Trafficking of
Persons. Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in
persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering,
selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those
acts that promote or facilitate any of the predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons, including
knowingly leasing or subleasing, using or allowing to be used any house, building, or
establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
The offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the
latter seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking. Thus, the
Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not
Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise. (People of the Philippines v. Susan Sayo and
Alfredo Roxas, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR GAYON Y FERRERAS
DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For
treachery to exist there must be a showing that the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing the act without risk to the
aggressor.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, on July 19, 2004 at around 9:40pm, Leyden Gayon was
in their house in Sulangan, Matnog, Sorsogon. Her husband is the first cousin of Rodolfo while
accused-appellant Edgar is the son of Rodolfo. Leyden testified that while she was having a
conversation with Leonora Givera, she saw Edgar enter. According to the People's witness,
Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly stabbed her several times. She even saw
Edgar’s knife embedded on Leonora's right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged Leonora
inside the house. Leyden claimed that she heard Edgar tell his father Rodolfo "Papay we have
no more problem because I killed your sister.”
RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo, giving credence to the
testimony of the eyewitness. It held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly
proven due to the suddenness of the attack by Edgar without giving the victim a chance to
defend herself. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that all the elements of Murder
were established. The prosecution managed to demonstrate that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house, talking to Leyden, was very sudden.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Edgar's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of Edgar but for the crime of Homicide, as the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not present in the
killing of the victim Leonora.
Qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself (beyond reasonable doubt). Hence, for Edgar to be convicted of Murder,
prosecution must not only establish that he killed Leonora; it must also prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the killing was attended by treachery or evident premeditation.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the killing of Leonora was attended by treachery
only because of the suddenness of Edgar's attack against the victim. However, mere
suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For treachery to
exist there must be a showing that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In this case, there is no showing that Edgar carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. Moreover, the testimony of
the eyewitness confirmed that Leonora was attacked at the place familiar to her and in the
presence of other people who are related to the victim. Under these circumstances, the Court
finds it difficult to agree with the courts a quo that Edgar deliberately chose a particular
mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any
risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. In addition, the attack
against Leonora was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of
treachery, when the same is considered along with the other circumstances as previously
discussed, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying
circumstance.
There is also no basis for the Court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following elements concur:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the
lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, evident premeditation was not
established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to what transpired in the house
of Leyden at 9:40pm of July 19, 2004, when Edgar stabbed Leonora, while the latter was
having a conversation with Leyden. The prosecution did not present any proof showing
when and how Edgar planned and prepared to kill Leonora.
Q: Leyden was in their house. While she was having a conversation with Leonora, she
saw Edgar enter. According to the People's witness, Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora
and suddenly stabbed her several times. She even saw Edgar’s knife embedded on
Leonora's right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden heard Edgar tell his father Rodolfo
"Papay we have no more problem because I killed your sister.”
RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar, giving credence to the testimony of the

eyewitness. It held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly proven due
to the suddenness of the attack by Edgar without giving the victim a chance to defend
herself. The CA affirmed the RTC decision as the prosecution managed to demonstrate
that the attack on the unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house, talking
to Leyden, was very sudden. Is the CA correct in upholding the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery?
A: NO. The Court affirms the conviction of Edgar but for the crime of Homicide, as the
qualifying circumstances of treachery was not present in the killing. Both the RTC and the
CA found that the killing of Leonora was attended by treachery only because of the
suddenness of Edgar's attack against the victim. However, mere suddenness of the attack is
not sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For treachery to exist there must be a showing
that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the accused with a
view of accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In this case, there is no showing that Edgar carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. Moreover, the testimony of
the eyewitness confirmed that Leonora was attacked at the place familiar to her and in the
presence of other people who are related to the victim. In addition, the attack was frontal.
While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of treachery, when the same is
considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already creates a
reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines v.
Edgar Gayon, G.R. No. 230221, April 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL GURO Y COMBO ALIAS "JASON,"
DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to
themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
FACTS
According to the prosecution, Jefferson, the first witness for the prosecution, is the
son of Jesus. He testified that while at home, in the early evening of February 12, 2007, his
father received a call from Venus, Jefferson's cousin. According to Jesus, a group of male
persons were waiting for his brother, Joemarie, in Marikina. Jefferson, by invitation of his
father, went to Marikina. They arrived at Joemarie's school at 9pm on board their respective
motorbikes. Joemarie rode with Jefferson.
While they were on their way home, at the intersection of CM. Recto and del Pilar
Streets, Joemarie saw the group composed of around 5 persons waiting for him at the
computer shop. Joemarie wanted to talk to them, so Joemari, Jefferson, and Jesus alighted
from their motorbikes and approached the group. Jefferson asked one Yayi what their
group's problem was with his uncle Joemarie. Yayi stood up and without saying any word,
pushed him in the chest. Jefferson fell to the gutter. When he was about to stand, he saw his
father kneeling and was about to stand when a group of persons lifted and threw a chair at
his father. As a result, he fell to the floor. He saw 3 persons continue to maul his father, as he
was about 15 meters away from his father who had fallen to his right side. While these
persons were mauling his father, the latter was just kneeling with his hands on the ground.
Suddenly, a male person arrived from the direction of the church and stabbed his father
twice in the back. The members of the group then fled together.
During the hearing, the person who stabbed his father was identified as Guro.
Jefferson admitted that at the time of the incident, he did not know his identity; he came to
know his name only from his uncle Joemarie.
Joemarie, the second witness for the prosecution, is the youngest brother of the
victim. He testified that there was this fraternity with whom he had a previous encounter, 3
days prior to the stabbing. He said that this group, composed of Yayi, Niki, and Lucky, had a
"trip" (nakursunadahan) on him wherein he was boxed on his right ear and mauled. He said
that this group was known at their school for being notorious in creating trouble. On
February 12, 2007, he was told by his classmate that the group was waiting for him. He texted
Jefferson and asked him to fetch him because the group might have another "trip" on him. At
around 8:30pm, his brother Jesus and Jefferson arrived. He then rode the motorbike of
Jefferson, and his brother followed them on his own motorbike.
When they reached the corner of CM. Recto Street, he saw the group, then with Jerry
and Guro, playing at the arcade. Joemari, Jefferson, and Jesus approached them, and after a
little conversation with Yayi, the latter pushed Jefferson who fell to the ground. The other
members were standing side by side. When Joemarie was about to help his nephew, Yayi
boxed him. He was hit very slightly and Yayi ran away. He saw that Niki was about to hit his
brother with a long bench. His brother moved back and was able to evade the chair and fell
to the gutter. He was about 5 steps away from them. When his brother was about to stand,
Guro jumped on top his brother and stabbed him twice in the back and ran away.
The RTC found Guro guilty of Murder, holding that there being treachery in Guro's
sudden and unexpected attack, so the killing was qualified to Murder. The CA sustained the
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether Guro is guilty of Murder.
RULING
NO. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
offended party might make. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying offense, the following
conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution
of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.
The RTC and CA erred when they ruled that treachery was present. The prosecution
was unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him.
Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must
be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.
As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, only the following were

established: (a) a commotion was caused when Yayi pushed Jefferson; (b) Jesus was being
mauled by a group of persons; and (c) Guro stabbed Jesus twice in the back. It was not proven
that Guro deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution
of the criminal act to ensure that Jesus could not defend himself. Indeed, it does not always
follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed as an
attack attended with treachery. The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result
of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between the
two groups, rather than from a deliberate act of the will. In fact, the target of Guro's group
was Joemarie and not Jesus. It was just unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged
up on.
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they
thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without
any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it
must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately
chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
Q: When Jefferson, Jesus, and Joemarie reached the corner of CM. Recto Street, he saw
the group of Yayi, Niki, Lucky, Jerry, and Guro, playing at the arcade. Joemari, Jefferson,
and Jesus approached them to have a little conversation about their altercation with
Joemarie 3 days prior. However, when Jefferson was asking Yayi what their problem
was with Joemari, Yayi suddenly pushed Jefferson who fell to the ground. When
Joemarie was about to help his nephew, Yayi boxed him. He was hit very slightly and
Yayi ran away. He saw that Niki was about to hit his brother with a long bench. His
brother moved back and was able to evade the chair and fell to the gutter. He was
about 5 steps away from them. When his brother was about to stand, Guro jumped on
top his brother and stabbed him twice in the back and ran away.
The RTC found Guro guilty of Murder, holding that there being treachery in Guro's
sudden and unexpected attack, so the killing was qualified to Murder. The CA
sustained the conviction. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
ensuring its commission without risk to himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not
sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does
not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the
act without risk to the aggressor.
The prosecution was unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought the victim for the
purpose of killing him. The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a rash
and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between the two groups,
rather than from a deliberate act of the will. In fact, the target of Guro's group was Joemarie
and not Jesus. It was just unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged up on. (People
of the Philippines v. Angel Guro, G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PERLY TUATES Y CHICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat
the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. In this case, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand because of the police officers' blatant disregard of the established
procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and Section 21 of RA 9165 on the conduct of inventory.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, Katehlene Bundang, a Jail Guard at the Provincial Jail of
Zambales, was assigned to frisk women visitors. Tuates, a former detainee, went to visit her
boyfriend, Samuel Elamparo, who was charged with Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bundang, while searching the lower part of Tuates’ body, found a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance tucked on the left side of her waist. Bundang took it and went to
the Office of the Jail Warden to report it. Bundang wrote her initials "KAB" on the sachet in
the presence of another Jail Guard, Randy, and PO2 Fennolar. Bundang and Fennolar went to
the crime laboratory to have the seized specimen examined, which was later found positive
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On the part of the defense, Tuates asserted that she went to visit her live-in partner,
Elamparo, who was sick. She was let in by a male jail guard who told her to wait as the lady
jail guard, Bundang, was not yet around. After 30 minutes, Bundang arrived and brought her
to the search room. Bundang frisked her for more than 5 minutes. She was baffled as in her
previous visits, it lasted only for less than 2 minutes, with 2 to 4 guards in the search room.
Moreover, Bundang placed her hand on Tuates’ pocket and inside her pants. When Bundang
took out her hand from her pants, she was surprised when something fell out. Bundang then
shouted, "O meron ho. Hulihin na ito." Thereafter, the other jail guards came and brought her
to the office where they asked her name and purpose in visiting. Tuates was brought to the
crime laboratory for a urine examination which yielded a negative result.
RTC convicted Tuates of Violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165, concluding that the
evidence sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged. It held that the
prosecution established an "unbroken link in the chain of custody of the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance which when examined tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride." CA affirmed the RTC conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Tuates of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of
RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
There is reasonable doubt, however, in the presence of the third element in this case — that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The Court reverses the RTC and the CA rulings. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People,
"the blind reliance by the RTC and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
police duty is misplaced. The presumption of regularity is a mere presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth."
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot arise in this case
because Bundang did not follow the prescribed procedure in searching or frisking Tuates.
Based on Bundang's own testimony, the search was conducted in contravention of the
established procedure. BJMP-SOP 2010-05 requires pat/frisk searches and rub searches to
be done over the jail visitor's clothing. Bundang admitted twice that what she instead did
was to raise Tuates' shirt. This she cannot do, for a strip search may be resorted to only "if
during the pat/frisk/rub search, the jail officer develops probable cause that contraband is
being hidden by the subject which is not likely to be discovered." Further, a strip search may
only be done after the visitor agrees in writing, which is a requirement to shield the jail
officer performing the search from harassment complaints.
In this case, there was no probable cause for a strip search, for Bundang's only basis
was that Tuates' boyfriend was a prisoner in that jail for a violation of RA 9165. Moreover,
Tuates never agreed in writing. It was thus highly irregular for Bundang to raise Tuates' shirt
in the conduct of her supposed search. Further, when Bundang realized that what she had
done was not allowed by the rules, she changed her testimony to the effect that she did not
raise Tuates' shirt but "just inserted her hand." This was also irregular as a pat/frisk/rub
search should be done only over the visitor's clothing.
Further, Bundang's testimony had material contradictions. Apart from the

inconsistency on whether she raised Tuates' shirt or inserted her hand inside Tuates'
undergarment, Bundang manifested in her Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Aresto that she saw
the sachet tucked on the right side of Tuates' undergarment. Yet, in her direct testimony, she
testified that she found it on the left of Tuates' waist. Under different circumstances, it may
be dismissed as immaterial. However, as that the Court cannot afford Bundang the
presumption of regularity, the other inconsistencies in her testimony become material, and
adds further reasonable doubt on the existence of the third element.
Finally, it is doubtful that an inventory of the seized item was conducted. Prosecution
witnesses, Bundang and PO2 Fennolar, testified that after confiscation, they immediately
submitted the seized item to the crime laboratory for examination. PO2 Fennolar testified
that "after turning it over, they delivered it to the police station for investigation and
preparation of documents such as sworn statements and receipts of the inventory.” Hence,
the police officers could not have conducted an inventory as they immediately turned it over
to the crime laboratory. Further, Bundang was a signatory to the Inventory Receipt as the
Seizing Officer; yet she testified that she did not know whether an inventory was conducted.
There is thus doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item — the corpus
delicti of the crime.
It bears emphasis that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty

cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise,
a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the police
officers' blatant disregard of the established procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and
Section 21 of RA 9165 on the conduct of inventory.
Q: Tuates asserted that she went to visit her live-in partner, Elamparo, who was sick –
in jail. She was let in by a male jail guard who told her to wait as the lady jail guard,
Bundang, was not yet around. After 30 minutes, Bundang arrived and brought her to
the search room. Bundang frisked her for more than 5 minutes. She was baffled as in
her previous visits, it lasted only for less than 2 minutes, with 2 to 4 guards in the
search room. Moreover, Bundang placed her hand on Tuates’ pocket and inside her
pants. When Bundang took out her hand from her pants, she was surprised when
something fell out. Bundang then shouted, "O meron ho. Hulihin na ito." Thereafter, the
other jail guards came and brought her to the office where they asked her name and
purpose in visiting. Tuates was brought to the crime laboratory for a urine
examination which yielded a negative result. Should Tuates be convicted of Violation
of Section 11 of R.A. 9165?
A: NO. There is reasonable doubt in the presence of the third element in this case — that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot arise because Bundang did not follow the prescribed procedure
in searching or frisking Tuates, being in contravention of the established procedure.
BJMP-SOP 2010-05 requires pat/frisk searches and rub searches to be done over the
jail visitor's clothing. Bundang admitted that what she instead did was to raise Tuates' shirt.
This she cannot do, for a strip search may be resorted to only "if during the pat/frisk/rub
search, the jail officer develops probable cause that contraband is being hidden by the
subject which is not likely to be discovered." Further, a strip search may only be done after
the visitor agrees in writing, which is a requirement to shield the jail officer performing the
search from harassment complaints. Finally, it is doubtful that an inventory of the seized
item was conducted. The police officers could not have conducted an inventory as they
immediately turned it over to the crime laboratory.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. In this
case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the police officers' blatant
disregard of the established procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and Section 21 of RA 9165
on the conduct of inventory. (Perly Tuates v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230789, April
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVANGELINE GARCIA Y SUING
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, compliance
with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. In this case, the presumption of regularity
cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established procedures
under Section 21 of RA 9165.
FACTS
On January 8, 2009, at about 8pm, a confidential informant (CI) reported to IO1
Ramos about the illegal drug activity of one Garcia in Ilocanos Norte, La Union. Garcia sells
drugs during midnight and that he could accompany their agents to Garcia’s house. Their
Regional Director was informed and upon verification that Garcia is listed in their Order of
Battle, organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation with IO1 Ancheta as the poseur
buyer, IO2 Gayuma as her back-up, and 5 other members as perimeter back-up. IO1 Ancheta
prepared the buy-bust money, a P500 bill marked with her initials 'LCA', photocopied it and
recorded it in their logbook.
At about 12:45 A.M. of January 9, 2009, the team, with the CI, proceeded to Ilocanos
Norte. IO1 Ancheta, IO2 Gayuma, and the CI proceeded to Garcia’s house, where Garcia was
standing outside. CI introduced IO1 Ancheta in Ilocano, which meant, “Manang Vangie, here
they are, the interested buyers of shabu.” Garcia asked IO1 Ancheta how much she would
buy, to which she answered P500 worth. Garcia asked for the money and after IO1 Ancheta
handed her the P500 buy bust money, Garcia gave IO1 Ancheta one transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu, and they arrested Garcia. IO1 Ancheta recovered the P500 bill from
her and marked the plastic sachet with, A-1LCA, and prepared the Certificate of Inventory
outside the house, in the presence of Valdez of DZNL and Nisperos, a Barangay Kagawad,
who affixed their signatures on the document. They took photographs of the evidence then
proceeded to their office, where IO1 Ancheta prepared the Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, and
a Request for Laboratory Examination which was signed by the higher ranking officer. After
preparing their Affidavit of Arrest, they brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where they were received by the duty officer as shown by his signature on the
request. The result yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
RTC convicted Garcia of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (The Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended). CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Garcia for violating Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases,
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
To maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing
must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an
elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
"Immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the IRR of RA 9165
allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the
nearest police station/office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means that the
three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension
— a requirement that can easily be complied with considering that the buy-bust operation
is a planned activity, hence the team has enough time.
In this case, there is serious doubt that the physical inventory and photographing of
the seized illegal drugs were conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the
place of apprehension. According to the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by IO1 Ancheta and
IO2 Gayuma, "inventory and photograph was made at the place of arrest." On cross
examination, IO1 Ancheta confirmed that the place of arrest was outside Garcia’s house and
the inventory immediately took place thereat. IO1 Ancheta further clarified that the
inventory, which was supposedly done outside the house, was specifically conducted in the
yard and that the items were placed on the cemented floor outside said house.
Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses offered any explanation as to why a

representative from the DOJ was not present. Further, the Certificate of Inventory, only
Valdez and Nisperos signed the same; it was not signed by Garcia or her counsel as required
by Section 21 of RA 9165.
Notably, the apprehending team had more than ample time to comply with the
requirements. As. IO1 Ancheta herself testified, Garcia had already been previously placed in
the PDEA's so-called "Order of Battle." Hence, PDEA had already known for some time that
Garcia was suspected of selling illegal drugs. Further, the CI made the report on January 8,
2009, about 8pm; the team proceeded to execute the buy-bust operation at about 12:45am
of January 9, 2009. Meaning, the team had almost 5 hours to contact and assemble the
required witnesses. Worse, the prosecution failed to offer any explanation for police officers'
deviation from the law during the trial.
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items void. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police
officers' compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in
case of non-compliance. In this connection, it was an error for both the RTC and the CA to
convict Garcia by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
accused. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. As the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been compromised, Garcia must be
acquitted.
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted, with IO1 Ancheta as the poseur buyer, IO2
Gayuma as her back-up, and 5 other members as perimeter back-up. Upon execution,,
they arrested Garcia. IO1 Ancheta searched Garcia and recovered the P500 bill from
her. IO1 Ancheta marked the plastic sachet with the marking A-1LCA and prepared the
Certificate of Inventory outside the house, in the presence of Valdez of DZNL and
Nisperos, a Barangay Kagawad, who affixed their signatures on the document. They
took photographs of the evidence then proceeded to their office, where IO1 Ancheta
prepared the Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, and a Request for Laboratory Examination
which was signed by the higher ranking officer in their office. After preparing their
Affidavit of Arrest, they brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory
where the items were received by the duty officer as shown by his signature on the
request. The result of the laboratory examination yielded positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Should Garcia be convicted of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (The

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended)?
A: NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
In this case, there is serious doubt that the physical inventory and photographing of
the seized illegal drugs were conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the
place of apprehension. Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses offered any explanation
as to why a representative from the DOJ was not present. Further, in the Certificate of
Inventory, only Valdez and Nisperos signed the same; it was not signed by Garcia or her
counsel as required by Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the prosecution failed to offer any
explanation for police officers' deviation from the law during the trial.

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. In this case, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established
procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. (People of the Philippines v. Evangeline Garcia, G.R.
No. 215344, June 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO URBANO TUBERA
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, compliance
with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving strict compliance with the chain of custody
because the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence
will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
FACTS
Investigating Agent III Levi Ortiz of PDEA filed a report for the conduct of surveillance,
casing, and buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Mario Tubera. After several
surveillance and casing operations conducted in Barangay Mabini, Ormoc City, it was
confirmed by PDEA operatives that Tubera indeed was one of the individuals engaging in the
illicit drug trade in the area.
Sometime around 7:45pm on May 19, 2008, Ortiz, acting as team leader and poseur-
buyer, with the other members of his team, arrived at Barangay Mabini, where they were
met by their confidential informant who was to accompany Ortiz during the buy-bust
operation. After casing the area, the confidential agent spotted Tubera. Ortiz and the
confidential agent approached him and engaged him in a conversation. The confidential
agent informed him of their desire to purchase shabu.
Suspicious about Ortiz, Tubera asked from the confidential agent whether the former
could be trusted, to which he answered in the affirmative. Wary, however, of Ortiz, Tubera
beckoned the pair to follow him into the interior portion of the barangay. After walking 15
meters through a narrow footpath, Tubera pulled out from his pocket a plastic container. He
then positioned himself into one of the dimly lit comers of the pathway and demanded
money for the shabu. Ortiz then handed Tubera the P500 peso bill he had pre-marked and
blottered at the PDEA office. Upon receipt of the money, Tubera pocketed it and opened the
plastic container, which contained several packets containing white crystalline substance,
and handed one to Ortiz.
While the whole transaction was going on, an unidentified person hovered around
the group and acted as a lookout for Tubera. Several inhabitants of the area were also keenly
observing the transaction.
After agent Ortiz received the plastic packet, he immediately announced his identity
and authority and arrested Tubera. While he was arresting Tubera, however, the latter was
able to toss the plastic container he was carrying to his lookout who immediately scampered
away into the maze of houses inside the interior portion of the barangay.
After Tubera was secured, and the marked money was retrieved from his possession,
the PDEA agents immediately left and proceeded to their office, with the packet and marked
money still in possession of Ortiz.
At the PDEA Regional Office 8, the packet was marked by Ortiz with the initial "MT".
Photographs and an inventory were made in the presence of an elected barangay official, a
member of the media, and Tubera. Subsequently, the packet, together with a letter request
for its laboratory examination, was delivered to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 8,
which later released a Chemistry Report finding the specimen to be positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
RTC convicted Tubera of having violated Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, holding that
although the marking, inventory, and photographing of the dangerous drugs were done at
the police station, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved as
Agent Ortiz had possession and control of the same from the time it was confiscated up to
the time it was submitted to the laboratory for examination. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether RTC and CA erred in convicting Tubera of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. In order to convict a person of the crime charged, the prosecution must prove:
1) the identity of the buyer, the seller, and the object of the consideration, and 2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State
bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or
the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the
violation of the law. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) xxx the physical inventory and
and be given a copy thereof.
of RA 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the required witnesses should be physically present at the time of the conduct of the
physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation, a requirement that can easily be complied with by the team
considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
It is true that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still
needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
It bears emphasis that the prosecution bears the burden of proving strict compliance
with the chain of custody because the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be
presumed innocent.
In this case, the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses in the conduct of
the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drugs. First, the marking and inventory
were not done and the photographs were not taken at the place of apprehension and seizure,
and no explanation or justification was proffered as to why the same was impracticable.
Second, the required witnesses were not present at the time of the seizure and arrest, and no
explanation or justification was proffered as to why their presence could not be procured.
Ortiz stated that when he proceeded to the place where the buy-bust operation was to take
place, he was only accompanied by his fellow agent and confidential informant. Finally, no
representative from the DOJ was present during the time of the arrest or even during the
marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized drugs. Again, no explanation or
justification was proffered as to why the presence of a DOJ representative could not be
procured.
Q: A buy-bust operation was set up for Tubera who was involved in the illicit drug
trade. Upon its execution, Ortiz immediately announced his identity and authority and
arrested Tubera. The marked money was retrieved from his possession and the PDEA
agents immediately proceeded to their office, with the packet and marked money in
possession of Ortiz.
At the PDEA Regional Office, the packet was marked by Ortiz. Photographs and an
inventory were made in the presence of an elected barangay official, a member of the
media, and Tubera. Subsequently, the packet, together with a letter request for its
laboratory examination, was delivered to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office,
which later released a Chemistry Report finding the specimen to be positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
RTC convicted Tubera of having violated Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Is the RTC
correct?
A: NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore,
compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving strict compliance with the chain of
custody because the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot
overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
In this case, the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses in the conduct of
the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drugs. First, the marking and inventory
were not done and the photographs were not taken at the place of apprehension, and no
explanation or justification was proffered as to why the same was impracticable. Second, the
required witnesses were not present at the time of the seizure and arrest, and no explanation
or justification was proffered as to why their presence could not be procured. Ortiz stated
that when he proceeded to the place where the buy-bust operation was to take place, he was
only accompanied by his fellow agent and confidential informant. Finally, no representative
from the DOJ was present during the time of the arrest or even during the marking,
inventory, and photographing of the seized drugs. Again, no explanation or justification was
proffered as to why the presence of a DOJ representative could not be procured. (People of
the Philippines v. Mario Tubera, G.R. No. 216941, June 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NELSON FLORES Y FONBUENA
DOCTRINE
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence
of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
FACTS
IO2 Ramos of the PDEA received a tip from an informant that accused-appellant was
selling illegal drugs. IO2 Ramos relayed the information to the team leader, IO3 Bautista, who
coordinated with the Quick Reaction Force Team and with the Illegal Drug Special Operation
Task Group (PAIDSOTG) of the PNP and thereafter, formed a team to conduct an anti-illegal
drug operation, composed of IO2 Ramos who was designated as poseur-buyer, PO2 Bautista
as the immediate back-up, the confidential informant, and about 6 members of the PNP Quick
Reaction Force. They prepared the buy-bust money and the prearranged signal to indicate
the done deal (IO2 Ramos to remove his bull-cap).
The confidential informant contacted Nelson to arrange the sale of shabu worth
P1,000. IO2 Ramos and the confidential informant then proceeded to meet him at Purok 4,
Sevilla, San Fernando City, La Union. They found Nelson standing in front of his house and
the informant introduced IO2 Ramos to Nelson as the buyer. The confidential informant told
Nelson in Ilocano dialect, which meant, he is the one who will get one thousand. Nelson asked
for the money and took out 2 pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets from his
pocket and handed them to IO2 Ramos, who executed the prearranged signal, and the rest of
the team rushed to the scene. As IO2 Ramos informed Nelson that he was a police officer,
Nelson suddenly ran towards his house. The policemen chased him as he jumped into a canal,
and he was eventually arrested. Nelson was allowed to wash up and change clothing.
Thereafter, IO2 Ramos marked and took pictures of the items. Nelson and the drugs were
brought to the police office where IO2 Ramos made an inventory and prepared a request for
laboratory examination. He submitted the request and the subject plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance to the crime laboratory and were received by the Forensic Chemist.
After examination, she issued a Chemistry Report affirming that the substances were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
RTC found Nelson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended), holding
that the prosecution clearly established the corpus delicti of the crime and that the police
officers complied with the chain of custody rule. There was substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, thus the integrity of the drugs seized was preserved.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether Nelson's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (I) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust
team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
However, the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure under Section 21 does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. However, this is with the caveat
preserved. The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1)
proving its compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation
in case of non-compliance. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a
fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should
follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements
under Section 21, which thus creates reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs from Nelson. First, none of the three required witnesses was present during the
arrest and the marking, photography, and inventory of the seized drugs. The barangay
official and media representative only arrived at the police station to sign the Certificate of
Inventory, which was already prepared by the police officers. Neither did the police officers
offer any sufficient explanation as to the absence of the DOJ representative. The testimony of
IO2 Ramos established that the mandatory witnesses were "called-in" only when the police
and the accused were already at the police station. This law imposes the said requirement
because their presence serves to prevent against planting of drugs.
Second, the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for their failure to strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21. Notably, IO2 Ramos has been an intelligence
officer of PDEA since 2008; thus, he has conducted several buy-bust operations. Here, the
buy-bust operation happened in 2010. They already knew the standard procedure and the
mandatory requirements under Section 21. Hence, they should have had the foresight to do
all the necessary preparations for it.
As the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal
drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust
team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution
was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Nelson.
Q: A team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation, composed of IO2 Ramos who
was designated as poseur-buyer, PO2 Bautista as the immediate back-up, the
confidential informant, and about 6 members of the PNP Quick Reaction Force. After
the exchange of money and 2 pieces of transparent plastic sachets, IO2 Ramos
executed the prearranged signal, and the team rushed to the scene. Nelson ran
towards his house. The policemen chased him as he jumped into a canal but he was
eventually arrested. Nelson was allowed to wash up and change clothing. Thereafter,
IO2 Ramos marked and took pictures of the items. Nelson and the drugs were brought
to the police office where IO2 Ramos made an inventory and prepared a request for
laboratory examination. He submitted the request and the subject plastic sachets with
white crystalline substance to the crime laboratory and were received by the Forensic
Chemist. After examination, she issued a Chemistry Report affirming that the
substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Was Nelson's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 proven beyond reasonable
doubt?
A: NO. The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of
non-compliance. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the
evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on
the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case – first, none of the three required witnesses was present during the arrest
and the marking, photography, and inventory of the seized drugs. Neither did the police
officers offer any sufficient explanation as to the absence of the DOJ representative. Second,
the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for their failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Nelson Flores, G.R. No. 220464, June
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PEDRACIO GABRIEL, JR.
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with
crime.
FACTS
SPO1 Danilo Sumpay received information about illegal drug activities of appellant
Oscar Gabriel in his house at No. 6 Claire Street, Barangay Cupang, Antipolo City. Hence, the
Chief of Police formed a buy-bust team, composed of SPO1 Sumpay as team leader, PO1
Robert Gangan as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Edmund Gacute and P/A Cristito Magsino as
members. The team coordinated with the PDEA, prepared the buy-bust money, and recorded
their operation in their blotter book. The team proceeded to the target area.
Upon arriving at appellant's house, PO1 Gangan knocked. Somebody asked who he
was, to which PO1 Gangan replied, "pa iskor naman." PO1 Gangan was told to wait, and after
a while, appellant opened the door and PO1 Gangan immediately handed him the marked
money. In turn, appellant handed him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO1 Gangan made the pre-
arranged signal by scratching his head and the other members of the team proceeded to the
scene and introduced themselves as police officers.
PO3 Gacute was able to recover the P100 buy-bust money from appellant. When PO3
Gacute ordered appellant to empty his pocket, 7 more plastic sachets of shabu were
recovered. They arrested him and brought him to the Police Station, where the team
executed a joint affidavit and put marking on the plastic packs recovered. They prepared the
letter requesting for laboratory examination of the 8 plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance, which later yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 2 Informations were filed against Gabriel for violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
RTC convicted Gabriel of the crimes charged. CA affirmed, holding that the failure of
the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest or to conduct the
required physical inventory and photographing of the evidence confiscated is not fatal, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team.
ISSUE
Whether RTC and CA erred in convicting Gabriel of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be

and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and
and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic
laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust
team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
may not always be possible; and, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. It has been
repeatedly emphasized by the Court that the prosecution has the positive duty to explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be
proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the
accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements under Section
21 of RA 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to mark and photograph the seized illegal
drug at the place of arrest. In fact, even at the police station, no inventory was prepared and
no photographs were taken of the illegal drugs. Second, none of the three required witnesses
was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. This is necessary to protect against the
possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Finally, the buy-bust team
proffered no explanation whatsoever to justify the non-compliance with the mandatory
rules.

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional
guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule
of evidence allocating the burden of evidence.
Q: A buy-bust team was formed, composed of SPO1 Sumpay as team leader, PO1 Robert
Gangan as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Edmund Gacute and P/A Cristito Magsino as
members. PO1 Gangan handed appellant the marked money. In turn, appellant
handed him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO1 Gangan made the pre-arranged signal and
the other members proceeded to the scene. PO3 Gacute recovered the P100 buy-bust
money from appellant, and 7 more plastic sachets of shabu when he was asked to
empty his pockets.
They arrested appellant and brought him to the Police Station, where the team
executed a joint affidavit and put marking on the plastic packs recovered. They
prepared the letter requesting for laboratory examination of the 8 plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, which later yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 2 Informations were filed
against Gabriel for violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. RTC convicted
Gabriel of the crimes charged, which the CA affirmed, holding that the failure of the
arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest or to conduct the
required physical inventory and photographing of the evidence confiscated is not
fatal. Is the CA correct?
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each
link in the chain of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its presentation in court
as evidence of the crime.
The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Without any
justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not
been shown beyond reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Oscar Gabriel, Jr., G.R. No.
228002, June 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON CRISTOBAL Y AMBROSIO
DOCTRINE
It must be emphasized that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the general
rule that warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently, intrude
on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should be balanced with the need to
protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution."
"Stop and frisk" searches should thus be allowed only in the limited instances
contemplated in Terry v. Ohio: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's
reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2) the
search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for the
purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the
area.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, on November 22, 2013, PO2 Ramos and other police
officers were conducting "Oplan Sita" in a checkpoint. At around 6pm, PO2 Ramos flagged
down accused-appellant Cristobal who was driving a motorcycle without a helmet, and
ordered Cristobal to alight then asked for its original receipt and certificate of registration.
As Cristobal failed to show either, PO2 Ramos asked for his driver's license. While PO2
Ramos was preparing the traffic citation ticket for the traffic violation, the latter ran away
but other police officers were quick to apprehend him. He was brought back to the
checkpoint where he was searched for deadly weapons but nothing was found. As PO2
Ramos noticed that Cristobal's pocket was bulging, he ordered him to remove the object from
his pocket. Cristobal obliged by pulling-out a small plastic bag. PO2 Ramos opened it and
found 7 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which he suspected as shabu.
PO2 Ramos arrested Cristobal. In the presence of Cristobal, PO2 Ramos signed and marked
said plastic sachets.
Still in possession of the seized items, PO2 Ramos and his companions brought
Cristobal to their office, where PO2 Ramos summoned a barangay kagawad to witness the
inventory. Kagawad Bernabe arrived and an inventory of the seized items was done in his
and Cristobal’s presence. Then, PO2 Singuillo prepared the indorsement for the transfer of
Cristobal to their headquarters at Brgy. Caniogan, where PO2 Ramos prepared the Chain of
Custody Form. At around 8:40pm, he turned over the seized items to the Investigator of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG).
At around 12am of November 22, 2013, PO3 Torallo brought the confiscated items as
well as the Request for Laboratory Examination to the Crime Laboratory Office in
Mandaluyong for qualitative examination where they were received by PSI Santiago , a
forensic chemist. The items tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. After the laboratory examination, PSI Santiago turned over the contraband
to SPO3 Rabino, Jr., the evidence custodian at the Eastern Police District, who released the
seized items on April 10, 2014 for their presentation in Court.
On the part of the Defense, Cristobal claims that he was riding his wife's motorcycle
on his way to SM Hypermart. However, he was flagged down by PO2 Ramos at a police
checkpoint. After giving his driver's license, he was asked to produce the OR/CR of the
motorcycle. As he was not able to produce the same, PO2 Ramos ordered him to empty his
pockets which he did; only P18,000 was found, money sent by his mother for his wedding.
PO2 Ramos went to the police car and returned to him and said "positive". PO2 Ramos frisked
him on his waist but found nothing. Cristobal told PO2 Ramos that he can prove that he is the
owner of the motorcycle if he will come with him to his house but PO2 Ramos ignored him
and ordered him to board the mobile car.
RTC convicted Cristobal for violating Section 11 of RA 9165, holding that the search
may be justified under the "stop and frisk" doctrine or the Terry search. While the police
officers were unable to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21, RA 9165, the
evidentiary value of the seized items were nevertheless preserved. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Cristobal.
RULING
YES. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized items were
confiscated from Cristobal as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations
consisted of 1) not wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle, and 2) being unable to show
the OR and CR of said motorcycle. Cristobal's first violation is punishable by RA 10054
(Motorcycle Helmet Act of 2009), which is only punishable by fine. Meanwhile, Cristobal's
second violation is likewise punishable only by fine pursuant to LTO Department Order No.
2008-39 or the "Revised Schedule of LTO Fines and Penalties for Traffic and Administrative
Violations." Stated simply, the police officers conducted an illegal search when they frisked
Cristobal on the basis of the said violations. Hence, there was no valid "stop and frisk" search.
It was also not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no lawful arrest to speak of,
as Cristobal's violations were only punishable by fine.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. Corollary, neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.
Even if the prosecution’s version of events were true, it did not justify the intensive
search. By the prosecution's own admission, after Cristobal was successfully apprehended
after he ran away, "PO2 Ramos searched him for any deadly weapon but he found none." This
is corroborated by Cristobal's narration, that "he was unable to produce the OR/CR as the
key to the motorcycle compartment was lost. PO2 Ramos suddenly told him to stand up and
empty his pockets. He brought out the contents of his pockets, P18,000, which was sent by
his mother for his wedding. PO2 Ramos then went to his police mobile, returned, said
"positive", and frisked him on his waist. Nothing else was found in his possession."
Even if the Court accepts this version, the search that led to the supposed discovery
of the seized items had nevertheless become unlawful the moment they continued with the
search despite finding no weapon on Cristobal's body.
It must be emphasized that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the
general rule that warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently,
intrude on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution."
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2)
the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for
the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other
persons in the area.
In this case, the police officers' act of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite
their own admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid
and unconstitutional search.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People, reminds: “To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. One of the recognized
exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.”
Q: At around 6pm, PO2 Ramos flagged down Cristobal who was driving a motorcycle
without a helmet, and ordered Cristobal to alight then asked for its original receipt
and certificate of registration. As Cristobal failed to show either, PO2 Ramos asked for
his driver's license. While PO2 Ramos was preparing the traffic citation ticket for the
traffic violation, the latter ran away but other police officers were quick to apprehend
him. He was brought back to the checkpoint where he was searched for deadly
weapons but nothing was found. As PO2 Ramos noticed that Cristobal's pocket was
bulging, he ordered him to remove the object from his pocket. Cristobal obliged by
pulling-out a small plastic bag. PO2 Ramos opened it and found 7 plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, which he suspected as shabu. PO2 Ramos
arrested Cristobal. The RTC convicted Cristobal for violating Section 11 of RA 9165,
holding that the search may be justified under the "stop and frisk" doctrine or the
Terry search. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. It must be emphasized that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the
general rule that warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently,
intrude on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution."
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2)
the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for
the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other
persons in the area.
In this case, the police officers' act of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite
their own admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid
and unconstitutional search. Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. (People of the Philippines v. Marlon Cristobal,
G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEX ESCARAN Y TARIMAN
DOCTRINE
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
crime.
FACTS
The confidential agent of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Mandaue made a phone call
to Police Chief Inspector Juanito Enguerra (PCI Enguerra,) informing the latter that Escaran
is selling shabu at Sitio Sapa-Sapa, Ibabao, Mandaue City. Hence, PCI Enguerra directed PO1
Montebon and PO1 Veraño, with their informant, to conduct a surveillance at around 8pm,
wherein they ascertained that the information was accurate.
Upon their return at the police station, PCI Enguerra conducted a briefing attended
by the confidential agent, PO1 Montebon, PO1 Veraño, and SPO4 Tumakay, wherein the
group hatched a plan to conduct a buy bust operation. PO1 Veraño was designated as the
poseur-buyer and he was given pre-marked two P100 peso bills furnished by
SPO1 Enriquez, who affixed his signature on the upper left portion thereof.
PO1 Montebon, PO1 Veraño and SPO1 Enriquez together with the confidential agent
went to the designated area. 20 minutes later, they were met by Escaran, who asked PO1
Veraño if he would be interested to buy shabu to which the latter answered in the affirmative.
PO1 Veraño then told Escaran that he would buy worth P200; thereafter the latter handed
him 2 packs of shabu. After that, PO1 Veraño and PO1 Montebon introduced themselves as
policemen, arrested Escaran, and apprised him of his constitutional rights. When Escaran
was frisked by PO1 Montebon, the policeman recovered additional 4 packs of shabu from the
right front pocket of Escaran's trousers. They brought Escaran to the police station, where
the 2 packets from the sale and the other 4 from the search were marked, and brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
Chemistry Report prepared by PSI Salinas yielded positive results for shabu.
RTC found Escaran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165. CA sustained Escaran's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in sustaining Escaran's conviction for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING

and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for
examination.
9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
This also means that the 3 required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
may not always be possible; and, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the
prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for the non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court that the prosecution
has the positive duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any
justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not
been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the police officers failed to comply with the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the identity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Escaran. First, while PO1 Montebon and PO1 Veraño narrated that
SPO1 Enriquez marked the items recovered from Escaran, there is no evidence as to when
and where they were marked and whether the marking was made in Escaran's presence.
Second, PO1 Veraño admitted that after the alleged sale of drugs was consummated
and Escaran was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights, he was immediately
brought to the police station for interrogation. The buy-bust team did not make any
inventory nor did it take photographs of the items seized from Escaran.
Third, none of the 3 required witnesses was

present at the place of seizure and apprehension and even at the police station. In
People v. Tomawis, the Court has held that the purpose of the law in mandating the presence
of said witnesses is to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the
seized drug.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish a justifiable ground as to why the police
officers failed to mark, photograph, and inventory the seized items and why they were not
able to secure the presence of the required witnesses. Notably,
they received the information that Escaran was peddling drugs at around 7pm and was
able to conduct a surveillance at the place before the buy-bust was operationalized at around
9pm. Thus, they had more than ample time to comply with the requirements; and yet they
did not exert even the slightest effort to secure the attendance of the required witnesses.
Further, gaps exist in the chain of custody of the seized items which create reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof. To establish an unbroken chain of custody, "it
is necessary that every person who touched the seized item describe how and from whom
he or she received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness' possession; its
condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain." This
requirement was not complied in this case.
PO1 Veraño testified that the 6 plastic sachets confiscated from Escaran were turned
over to PCI Enguerra, who later delivered the same to SPO1 Enriquez to prepare the
request for laboratory examination. The Request for Laboratory examination showed that
the drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory by PO1 Veraño. However, the Court does
not see from the records the details on how the specimens were handled from the time they
were handed to PCI Enguerra to the time they were delivered to SPO1 Enriquez until they
were returned to PO1 Veraño and submitted to PSI Salinas for examination.
The testimonies of PO1 Veraño and PO1 Montebon were sorely lacking on these details.
Similarly, PSI Salinas did not testify on how she handled the seized items during examination
and before it was transferred to the court.

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. In this
case, the presumption of regularity does not arise because of the buy-bust team's blatant
disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.
Q: PO1 Montebon, PO1 Veraño, and SPO1 Enriquez, together with the confidential
agent, hatched a plan to conduct a buy bust operation. They went to the designated
area, where the exchange of the P200 marked money and 2 packs of shabu. After that,
PO1 Veraño and PO1 Montebon introduced themselves as policemen, arrested
Escaran, and apprised him of his constitutional rights. When Escaran was frisked by
PO1 Montebon, the policeman recovered additional 4 packs of shabu from the right
front pocket of Escaran's trousers. They brought Escaran to the police station, where
the 2 packets from the sale and the other 4 from the search were marked, and brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
Chemistry Report prepared by PSI Salinas yielded positive results for shabu. RTC
found Escaran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165. Is the RTC correct?
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the
In this case, the police officers failed to comply with the prescribed chain of custody
rule, in relation to Section 21 of RA 9165, thereby putting into question the identity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Escaran. First, there is no evidence as
to when and where they were marked and whether the marking was made in
Escaran's presence. Second, the team did not make any inventory or take photographs of the
items seized. Third, none of the required witnesses was
present at the place of seizure and apprehension. Lastly, the prosecution failed to justify
the procedural lapses.
The prosecution has the positive duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Alex
Escaran, G.R. No. 212170, June 19, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
ALFREDO PILI, JR. v. MARY ANN RESURRECCION
G.R. NO. 222798, June 19, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
"In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and the private offended party
is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party is
limited only to the aspect of civil liability." While a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, "either the offended party or the accused may appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real parties-in-
interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused."
FACTS
Respondent entered into an agreement with Conpil Realty Corporation for the
purchase of a house and lot and issued 2 checks in favor of the latter. When Conpil deposited
the checks, they were dishonored and stamped as "Account Closed." A criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the MTC. Although the checks were issued in favor of
Conpil, the criminal complaint was signed by petitioner Alfredo Pili, Jr., President of Conpil,
as "Complainant."
The prosecution submitted: 1) a Secretary's Certificate, which stated that the Board
of Directors of Conpil resolved, at a special meeting on January 21, 2000, to
initiate all legal action against respondent and to authorize its President to represent the
Corporation in all civil and criminal cases against respondent and to sign the Complaint,
Affidavit of Complaint, and all necessary pleadings, and 2) an Affidavit of Complaint
subscribed before the Office of the Prosecutor on February 1, 2000, which stated that it was
filed because "Conpil Realty Corp. has extended its generosity and kind understanding to the
limit and cannot anymore extend its patience.” Both the Affidavit and the Secretary's
Certificate were formally offered as part of evidence to prove that petitioner was the
authorized representative of complainant corporation, and that he was authorized to file
the instant case, adduce evidence, and testify on behalf of Conpil.
The MTC rendered a Judgment acquitting respondent, but requiring respondent to

pay P500,000 by way of civil indemnity.
Respondent appealed her civil liability to the RTC, which was titled, "People of the
Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion." The RTC, however, affirmed the Judgment of the
MTC. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Respondent thus filed a petition for review with the CA, captioned by her as "Mary
Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." Nevertheless, Paragraph 12 of petitioner's
Memorandum filed with the CA in the petition for review alleged that "Conpil authorized its
President to file cases for violation of BP 22" in order to enforce its right.
In the CA, respondent claimed that petitioner "is not the real party in interest and
cannot file the criminal complaint in his personal capacity." On the other hand, petitioner
claimed that "he did not sue in his personal capacity but as a President of Conpil."
CA found respondent's petition for review meritorious and set aside the Decision and
Order of the RTC, holding that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest as Conpil was not included in the title of the case, even if it was the party: 1)
that signed the contract and 2) in whose favor the checks were issued.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in granting the appeal.
RULING
YES. "In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the
private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability." While a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, "either the offended party or the accused may
appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real
parties-in-interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused."
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
In Goco v. CA, we explained that: This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute
an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an
action.
Parties who are not the real parties in interest may be included in a suit in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party in interest xxx
There is no doubt that the People is the real party-in-interest in criminal

proceedings. As the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed in the MTC,
necessarily the criminal case before it was prosecuted "in the name of the People of the
Philippines." This shows the egregious error by the CA in ruling that the Conpil should have
been "included in the title of the case."
Records show that the civil aspect of the criminal case was appealed by respondent
and that it was Conpil, being the victim of fraud, that was the private complainant. This is
clear from the following facts: 1) a Secretary's Certificate, which stated that the Board of
Directors of Conpil resolved, at a special meeting on January 21, 2000, to initiate all legal
action against respondent and to authorize its President to represent the Corporation in all
civil and criminal cases against Ms. Mary Ann Resurreccion and to sign the Complaint,
Affidavit of Complaint and all necessary pleadings, 2) the Affidavit of Complaint subscribed
before the Office of the Prosecutor on February of 2000 concludes that the complaint
affidavit was filed because "Conpil Realty Corp. has extended its generosity and kind
understanding to the limit and cannot anymore extend its patience," and 3) both the Affidavit
and the Secretary's Certificate were formally offered as evidence to prove that Alfredo Pili
was the authorized representative of complainant corporation, and that he was authorized
to file the instant case, adduce evidence, and testify on behalf of Conpil. This belies the CA's
claim that the criminal complaint was not filed or prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.
More importantly, the CA grossly erred when it faulted petitioner for not having
included Conpil in the title of the petition for review, given that the criminal case was
correctly titled "People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion" and that the title was
changed by respondent when she filed her petition for review with the CA, to "Mary Ann
Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." The egregious error becomes more manifest considering that
in Paragraph 12 of the Memorandum filed by petitioner on behalf of Conpil, it expressly
stated that "Conpil authorized its President to file cases for violation of BP 22" in order to
enforce its right. That the CA closed its eyes to this constitutes not only gross manifest error
but grave abuse of discretion.
Q: Respondent issued 2 bouncing checks in favor of Conpil. A criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the MTC. Although the checks were issued in favor
of Conpil, the criminal complaint was signed by petitioner Alfredo Pili, Jr., President
of Conpil, as "Complainant."
The prosecution submitted a Secretary's Certificate, which stated that the Board of
Directors of Conpil resolved to initiate all legal action against respondent and to
authorize its President to represent the Corporation in all civil and criminal cases
against respondent and to sign the Complaint, Affidavit of Complaint, and all necessary
pleadings. This was formally offered as part of evidence.
The MTC rendered a Judgment acquitting respondent, but requiring respondent to

pay P500,000 by way of civil indemnity. Respondent appealed her civil liability to RTC,
which was titled, "People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion." Having been
denied, Respondent filed a petition for review with the CA, captioned by her as "Mary
Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." Respondent claimed that petitioner "is not the
real party in interest and cannot file the criminal complaint in his personal capacity."
CA held that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest as Conpil was not included in the title of the case. Is CA correct?
A: NO. "In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and the private offended
party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended
party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability." While a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, "either the offended party or the accused may appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real parties-in-
interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused."
There is no doubt that the People is the real party-in-interest in criminal

proceedings. As the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed in the MTC,
necessarily the criminal case before it was prosecuted "in the name of the People of the
Philippines." This shows the egregious error by the CA in ruling that the Conpil should have
been "included in the title of the case." (Alfredo Pili, Jr. v. Mary Ann Resurreccion, G.R. NO.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR VILLAMOR CORPIN @ "BAY"
DOCTRINE
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that
the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must
also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution,
without risk to himself.
FACTS
Helen Raymundo testified that: at around 2:30pm of September 1, 2010, while she
was tending to her vegetable stall in Las Piñas Public Market, she saw Kuya Bay (accused-
appellant Corpin), kill Kuya Paulo; Corpin was a pork vendor while Paulo was a chicken
vendor; their stalls were at the back of each other and had the same entrance and exit; prior
to the hacking incident, Corpin and Paulo were always joking at each other; Paulo often said
"Ang baho" which made Corpin frown as he thought he was the one being alluded to; there
was no provocation on the part of Paulo at the time of the incident; Corpin and the victim
were not facing each other and the latter was in no position to defend himself; she was 1
meter away from them; after Corpin hacked Paulo, the victim was able to get a knife but the
former embraced him; at that juncture, one of the meat vendors, Kuya Kris, arrived and
pushed Corpin away from Paulo; and, Paulo ran away for about 3 meters and fell down in
front of the canteen, in front of Raymundo's stall.
Dr. Ethel Punzalan testified that: she was at home when the resident doctor at Las
Piñas Doctors' Hospital called her to attend to a patient named Paulo Pineda; she rushed
because she was told that the patient was continuously bleeding; they tried to give him blood
transfusion but before they could do so, the patient expired; their hospital issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the patient was admitted with a hacking wound.
RTC found Corpin guilty of Murder, ruling that treachery attended the commission of
the crime. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Corpin's conviction for Murder.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of Corpin, but only for the crime of Homicide,
as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of Paulo.
The fact that Corpin killed the victim is undisputed as it was admitted by Corpin.
However, the Court is not convinced that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the killing of Paulo
was qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that
the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There
must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such
execution, without risk to himself.
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First,
although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was hacked from behind, the
prosecution did not prove that Corpin deliberately chose the particular mode of attack he
used to ensure the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself. As testified
by the prosecution witnesses, the incident happened in a public market where there were
numerous other people, including the witnesses, who could have offered their help. In a
similar case, the Court held that when aid is easily available to the victim, such as when the
attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be
appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted the particular means he used
to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Moreover,
after he was attacked by Corpin, Paulo was able to run away and escape, which shows that
the victim had the opportunity to defend himself.
Second, Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim. As testified by the
prosecution witnesses and Corpin himself, he and Paulo have been working as meat vendors
in the same public market for several years. The weapon he used to kill the victim was a
butcher's knife that he regularly used for his work. In this connection, the Court ruled in
another case that the fact that the victim and the accused were already within the same
vicinity when the attack happened and that the accused did not deliberately choose the
particular weapon he used to kill the victim as he merely picked it up from within his reach
is proof that there is no treachery involved.
All told, Corpin's decision to attack the victim was more of a sudden impulse than a
planned decision. The prosecution failed to prove the elements of treachery. Thus, Corpin
can only be held guilty of the crime of Homicide.
Q: Helen Raymundo testified that: while she was tending to her vegetable stall in Las
Piñas Public Market, she saw accused-appellant Corpin kill Kuya Paulo; Corpin was a
pork vendor while Paulo was a chicken vendor; their stalls were at the back of each
other and had the same entrance and exit; prior to the hacking incident, Corpin and
Paulo were always joking at each other; Paulo often said "Ang baho" which made
Corpin frown as he thought he was the one being alluded to; there was no provocation
on the part of Paulo at the time of the incident; Corpin and the victim were not facing
each other and the latter was in no position to defend himself; she was 1 meter away
from them; after Corpin hacked Paulo, the victim was able to get a knife but the former
embraced him; at that juncture, one of the meat vendors, Kuya Kris, arrived and
pushed Corpin away from Paulo; and, Paulo ran away for about 3 meters and fell down
in front of the canteen, in front of Raymundo's stall. RTC found Corpin guilty of Murder,
ruling that treachery attended the commission of the crime as the attack was sudden
and unexpected as the victim was hacked from behind. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. Corpin shall be convicted only for the crime of Homicide. In order to appreciate
treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was "sudden",
"unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must also be a showing that
the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms
in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to
himself.
In this case, although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was hacked from
behind, the prosecution did not prove that Corpin deliberately chose the particular mode of
attack he used to ensure the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself.
The fact that the incident happened in a public market where there were numerous other
people, including the witnesses, who could have offered their help, negates the presence of
treachery. Moreover, Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim. They have
been working as meat vendors in the same public market for several years, and the weapon
he used to kill the victim was a butcher's knife that he regularly used for his work. (People of
the Philippines v. Cesar Corpin, G.R. No. 232493, June 19, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY PADILLA Y BASE AND FRANCISCO BERMAS Y
ASIS
DOCTRINE
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in People v. Dalandas, does not
require a comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental
retardation needed to be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an
accused of rape based on the mental retardation of the private complainant must be anchored
on proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.
FACTS
According to BBB, her daughter, AAA, was mentally retarded since birth as
manifested by the latter's hardheadedness. AAA would utter senseless words which were
inappropriate for her age. At times, AAA would not be responsive to questions, and would
hit her nephews and nieces without any reason, while other times AAA would be out of
dimension and not within herself.
Barangay Captain CCC has been a neighbor of AAA for 10 years and has known AAA
to be mentally retarded for she was always smiling and laughing for no reason. He also knew
that AAA went to a special education school.
On 10 January 2008, AAA told her mother that she was to attend a birthday party near
their house. AAA testified that as she was watching those having videoke, she was told by
accused Bermas to go to Barangay Captain CCC's house. Bermas and one Garry Padilla were
already there. At the stairs, Bermas told her "AAA, wag kang magsumbong marami ako ritong
pera, sige na hubarin mo na ang panty mo." Both men then removed private complainants'
shorts and underwear. Bermas showed her his penis, inserted it into her vagina and moved
in a pumping motion. After a while, Bermas removed his penis and a liquid substance came
out. Thereafter, Garry inserted his penis into her vagina.
Meanwhile, Barangay Captain CCC testified that he was awakened by the sound of his
hogs and the barking of dogs. He peeped through his window and saw AAA raising her shorts
as she walked from his pig pen. AAA was also with a male companion who he identified as
Bermas. CCC then went next door to inform AAA's parents of what he saw.
When BBB saw her daughter, the latter was crying and trembling with fear. She asked
AAA who the man she was with. AAA replied that she was with Bermas. They then went to
the Women's and Children's Desk ng Himpilan ng Pulisya to report the incident.
Dr. Barasona testified that she examined AAA on 12 January 2008 and found that
there was clear evidence of penetration which happened within 72 hours from examination.
She referred AAA for psychiatric evaluation as she suspected her of having Down Syndrome
for having features such as low-set and malformed ears as well as oblique palpebral fissures.
In addition, AAA had difficulty in understanding questions; she was not fully responsive to
questions and could not fully narrate incidents.
The RTC convicted Bermas of the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC in
relation to RA 7610, finding that the testimony of the private complainant, as well as by the
barangay captain, who positively identified the accused, and the findings of the doctor gave
credence to the commission of the crime.
CA affirmed RTC's conviction, ruling that BBB's testimony that AAA was mentally
retarded since birth was sufficient to establish her retardation, and that medical evidence
was not a condition sine qua non to prove that AAA indeed was a mental retardate.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Bermas.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Bermas for the failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. In rape cases, the prosecution has
the burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Consequently, the Court holds that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not
sufficiently establish the second element of the crime charged, namely, that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA either (a) through force or intimidation, or (b) when she was deprived of
reason. Hence, Bermas' acquittal necessarily follows.
Records are bereft of any evidence conclusively establishing AAA's mental

retardation. The only evidence offered to prove the said fact were: (1) BBB's testimony that
AAA has had mental retardation since birth; (2) Barangay Captain CCC's testimony that he
has known AAA to have mental retardation and that she went to a special school; and (3) Dr.
Barasona's testimony that AAA "probably" has Down Syndrome.
BBB and CCC's testimonies are but mere conclusions that do not establish the fact of
AAA's mental retardation. Likewise, Dr. Barasona's testimony cannot be the basis for such as
said findings were inconclusive. Therefore, the finding that AAA is a mental retardate has no
leg to stand on.
The Court, in People v. Cartuano, Jr., explained that:

Mental retardation is a clinical diagnosis which requires demonstration of
significant subaverage intellectual performance (verified by standardized
psychometric measurements); evidence of an organic or clinical condition
which affects an individual's intelligence; and proof of maladaptive
behavior.
In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation based

on history, physical and laboratory examination made by a clinician is
necessary.
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in People v. Dalandas, does not require
a comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental retardation
needed to be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an accused of
rape based on the mental retardation of the private complainant must be anchored on
proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.
In this case, there is no such proof. Even if the Court were to appreciate BBB's
testimony, the same conclusion would be reached, for claims of "hardheadedness," "uttering
senseless words," and unresponsiveness to questions are all insufficient to conclude that
AAA is suffering from retardation such that she was unable to comprehend the consequences
of consenting to a sexual act. The Court needed to ascertain her level of understanding,
including that of sexual acts, for it is clear in the RTC decision, and in her testimony, that she
"consented" to the sexual act. The Court had to determine whether this consent was vitiated,
such that the act would amount to Rape under Article 266-A(l)(b) for having carnal
knowledge with a woman "deprived of reason." However, as discussed, the prosecution
failed to establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt.
As, the second element of the crime charged — that the victim be "deprived of reason"
— was not established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquits Bermas of the crime
charged.
Q: According to BBB, her daughter, AAA, was mentally retarded since birth as
manifested by the latter's hardheadedness. AAA would utter senseless words which
were inappropriate for her age. At times, AAA would not be responsive to questions,
and would hit her nephews and nieces without any reason, while other times AAA
would be out of dimension and not within herself.
On 10 January 2008, AAA told her mother that she was to attend a birthday party near
their house. AAA testified that as she was watching those having videoke, she was told
by accused Bermas to go to the Barangay Captain's house. Bermas and one Garry
Padilla were already there. At the stairs, Bermas told her "AAA, wag kang
magsumbong marami ako ritong pera, sige na hubarin mo na ang panty mo." Both men
then removed private complainants' shorts and underwear. Bermas showed her his
penis, inserted it into her vagina and moved in a pumping motion. After a while,
Bermas removed his penis and a liquid substance came out. Thereafter, Garry inserted
his penis into her vagina.
The RTC convicted Bermas of the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC in relation
to RA 7610, finding that BBB's testimony that AAA was mentally retarded since birth
was sufficient to establish her retardation, and that medical evidence was not a
condition sine qua non to prove that AAA indeed was a mental retardate. Is the RTC
correct?
A: NO, the Court acquits Bermas of the crime charged. In rape cases, the prosecution has the
burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or
when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years
of age or was demented.
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in People v. Dalandas, does not
require a comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental
retardation needed to be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an
accused of rape based on the mental retardation of the private complainant must be
anchored on proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation. In this case, there is
no such proof. (People of the Philippines v. Francisco Bermas, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019,
RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In Sindac v. People: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search
and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable." To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, PO1 Mark Peniano is a regular member of the PNP. On
March 27, 2014, at around 8pm, together with his companion PO1 Cristobal and PO1 Co,
while they were on a beat patrol back to the station, they chanced upon a person urinating
against the wall. They approached said person who was later identified as accused-appellant
Ramon Picardal. The place is well-lighted since it is within the main road. PO1 Peniano told
Picardal that it is forbidden to urinate in public, hence, they invited him to go to the precinct.
When PO1 Peniano was about to handcuff him, Picardal attempted to run but failed since
PO1 Peniano was able to get hold of his hand. PO1 Peniano frisked him and was able to
recover a caliber .38 revolver from his waist. The rusty pistol with a handle made of wood
contained 5 live ammunitions.
Picardal was brought to the police station, where PO1 Peniano referred Picardal to
the officers in-charge for medical examination and the recovered items were surrendered to
P/Chief Insp. Santos for safekeeping. The following morning, the items were retrieved by
PO1 Peniano and were given to the assigned investigator, PO3 Navarro, for proper marking.
PO1 Peniano had the confiscated firearm checked with the Firearm and Explosive Division
(FED) of the PNP and it was discovered that it is a loose firearm. The FED issued a
certification stating that Picardal is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
caliber.
The RTC convicted Picardal for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms under Section
28(a) in relation to Section 28(e-1) of RA 10591, finding that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of the crime charged, namely: (1) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed it, does not have the license or
permit to possess the same. The CA affirmed RTC's conviction
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Picardal.
RULING
YES. The factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final
and conclusive on the Court. However, an exception to this rule is where the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.”
In this case, the CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts that: (1) the subject
firearm was seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly
urinating in a public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place"
filed against Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the MeTC of Manila. The act supposedly
committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by Section 2(a) of
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which provides that:
Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts
a) It is unlawful xxx to urinate, defecate and spit in public places.
The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for said violation is only a
fine of P500 or community service of 1 day. Said regulation did not provide that the violator
may be imprisoned for violating it, precisely because it is, as its name implies, a mere
regulation, and not a law or an ordinance. Therefore, even if it were true that the Picardal
did urinate in a public place, the police officers still conducted an illegal search when they
frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable."
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may
be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.
Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, it cannot be used in any
prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As
there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.
Q: PO1 Mark Peniano chanced upon a person urinating against the wall. They
approached said person who was later identified as accused-appellant Ramon
Picardal. PO1 Peniano told Picardal that it is forbidden to urinate in public, hence, they
invited him to go to the precinct. When PO1 Peniano was about to handcuff him,
Picardal attempted to run but failed since PO1 Peniano was able to get hold of his
hand. PO1 Peniano frisked him and was able to recover a caliber .38 revolver from his
waist. The rusty pistol with a handle made of wood contained 5 live ammunitions.
Picardal was brought to the police station. PO1 Peniano had the confiscated firearm
checked with the Firearm and Explosive Division (FED) of the PNP and it was
discovered that it is a loose firearm. The FED issued a certification stating that Picardal
is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. The RTC convicted
Picardal for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms. Is the conviction correct?
A: NO. In Sindac v. People: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable."
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. One of the
recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
In this case, the act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place
— is punished only by a MMDA Regulation, which provides for a penalty of a fine of P500 or
community service of 1 day. As it is a mere regulation, and not a law or an ordinance, there
is no penalty of imprisonment. Therefore, even if it were true that the Picardal did urinate in
a public place, the police officers still conducted an illegal search when they frisked Picardal
for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there
could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of. (Ramon Picardal v. People of the Philippines,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JIMMY FULINARA
DOCTRINE
The presence of the three insulating witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of
the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest and
inventory; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated
drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation. Compliance with Sec 21, Art II of RA 9165 is
integral to every conviction. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a
FACTS
Upon receiving information about the illegal drug activities of a certain alias “Boyet”,
who was later identified as Jimmy Fulinara, herein accused-appellant, the Anti-Illegal Drugs,
Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of Valenzuela City Police Station planned and
executed a buy-bust operation.
After identifying Jimmy as the target, PO2 Julius A. Congson, the poseur-buyer, told
Jimmy that he would like to buy shabu worth P200.00. He gave the marked money consisting
of two (2) one hundred (100) peso bills to Jimmy who placed the said money in his left
pocket. Thereafter, Jimmy took out a black coin purse from his right side pocket and pulled
out one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu, which was handed over to PO2 Julius. Jimmy was
arrested and in his possession was found another plastic sachet of suspected shabu and two
(2) aluminum foil strips.
The buy-bust team was instructed by their lead operative to continue the inventory
of the confiscated items at the police station. Thereafter, the inventory was conducted in the
presence of Kagawad Rommel Mercado. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") Representative
and Media Representative were also called to witness the inventory, but their numbers were
busy. Jimmy was then charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.
In his defense, Jimmy denied the allegations against him and testified that he was on
his way to a pharmacy when the police officers apprehended him. The police officers
questioned Jimmy about knowing a certain “Sugar” and demanded P10,000 if he could not
point her to them. Jimmy maintained that the sachets of shabu recovered from him were not
his and that he was just tending to his lugawan.
ISSUE
Whether Jimmy's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
conviction. It is essential, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the
Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640 requires that: (1) the seized items
be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media or a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.
The phrase immediately after seizure and confiscation means that the physical
of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also means that the two required witnesses, whose presence at the time
of the warrantless arrest and inventory is mandatory, should already be physically present
at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily
be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity.
The Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and the failure of the
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs to
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.
requirements under Section 21(1) of RA 9165. First, none of the two required witnesses was
present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. The barangay
kagawad was merely "called-in" at the police station. The insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the drugs would belie any doubt as to the source, identity and integrity of the
seized drug to avoid the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425. If the buy-bust operation
is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the
usual defense of frame-up.
Second, the police officers offered the flimsy excuse that an alleged commotion
occurred as the reason why they decided to conduct the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest. The
commotion only involved a group of 10 persons, who were five meters away from the buy-
bust team. Moreover, the Court also points out that PO2 Congson expressly admitted himself
that there was really no compelling reason for them to transfer to the police station and that
they did it merely because they were instructed by their team leader to do so, hence the
saving clause does not apply in this case.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crimes of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed
by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drugs. Compliance
with Section 21 is integral to every conviction. Without any justifiable explanation, which
must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of
the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond
reasonable doubt.
Q: During a buy-bust operation, Daniel was apprehended for unlawfully selling and
possessing plastic sachets of suspected shabu and two (2) aluminum foil strips. After
the arrest, the inventory was conducted in the precinct in the presence of Kagawad
Tony. The DOJ Representative and Media Representative were also called to witness
the inventory, but were not available. Daniel was then charged with illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, as amended. Is Daniel's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 proven
beyond reasonable doubt?
A: NO. Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640 requires that the identity and
integrity of the seized drug be established by showing an unbroken chain of custody over the
same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drug is seized
up to its presentation in court as evidence of the crime. The seized item must be inventoried
and photographed immediately in the presence of the a) accused or his/her representative
or counsel, b) an elected public official and c) a representative from the media or a
representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The presence of the last two required witnesses at the time of the warrantless
arrest and inventory is mandatory. However, strict compliance with the requirements of Sec
21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the procedure does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void and invalid. The prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
The buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements under
Section 21(1) of RA 9165 because none of the two required witnesses was present at the
time of arrest of the Daniel and the seizure of the drugs. The barangay kagawad was merely
"called-in" at the police station. Also, the police officers’ flimsy excuse that an alleged
commotion occurred was the reason for failing to conduct the inventory at the place of arrest
was weak and unbelievable. The commotion only involved a group of 10 persons, who were
five meters away from the buy-bust team. Moreover, the police officer expressly admitted
himself that there was really no compelling reason for them to transfer to the police station
and that they did it merely because they were instructed by their team leader to do so, hence
the saving clause does not apply in this case.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crimes of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed
by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drugs. Compliance
with Section 21 is integral to every conviction. Without any justifiable explanation, which
must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of
the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond
reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Fulinara, G.R. No. 237975, June 19, 2019,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNALDO ENRIQUEZ, JR.
DOCTRINE
In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was
made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner
in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from
circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the
killing with treachery.
FACTS
At around 9:30PM on Dec 30, 2006, Luisa and her daughter, Jessica were in their
house watching the television when they saw a bloodied Florencio Dela Cruz coming out of
his house and upon reaching the door got stabbed in the back by Arnaldo Enriquez, herein
accused-appellant, with a bread knife. Dela Cruz managed to ask for help from his uncle's
house before collapsing. He was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival
causes by multiple stab wounds. Enriquez was charged with murder.
Barangay Security Development Officer Obar arrived at the reported place and
arrested the person being mauled and whom he later involved as Enriquez and as the one
involved in the killing. Enriquez was charged with murder and found guilty of the crime
charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed Enriquez’ conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Enriquez's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be
appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but
not the manner of how the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's
death unfolded. In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the
aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known
as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn
only from circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused
perpetrated the killing with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where
the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault.
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. In order to appreciate treachery, both
elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and
"without any warning or provocation.
In the instant case, treachery was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
The evidence presented by the prosecution only proved the events after the initial attack had
already happened. The prosecution witnesses, Luisa and Jessica, did not see the manner of
how the attack commenced or how the acts which resulted in the victim's death unfolded as
the attack started inside the house of the victim. They merely saw Enriquez stab the already
bloodied Dela Cruz from behind, as he was about to exit the house. It was not established
whether Enriquez deliberately or consciously employed the particular method he used so as
to deprive the victim any opportunity to defend himself. Even more telling is the fact that the
victim was able to escape from Enriquez and even ask for help from his uncle's house before
collapsing.
In view of the foregoing, Enriquez should only be liable for the crime of Homicide.
Q: Bella was in her house watching the television when she saw a bloodied Anthony
coming out of his house and upon reaching the door got stabbed in the back by Melo
with a bread knife. Anthony managed to ask for help from his uncle's house before
collapsing but eventually died due to multiple stab wounds. Melo was charged with
murder and was found guilty of the same. Is Melo liable for murder?
A: NO. The Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be appreciated where the
prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but not the manner of how
the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded. In
treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made,
how it began, and how it developed. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must
exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal
act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on
the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. In order to appreciate treachery, both
elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and
"without any warning or provocation.”
In the present case, the prosecution witness, Bella, did not see the manner of how the
attack commenced or how the acts which resulted in the victim's death unfolded as the attack
started inside the house of the victim. She merely saw Melo stab the already bloodied
Anthony from behind, as he was about to exit the house. It was not established whether Melo
deliberately or consciously employed the particular method he used so as to deprive the
victim any opportunity to defend himself. The evidence presented by the prosecution only
proved the events after the initial attack had already happened, thus treachery was not
established by clear and convincing evidence. With the foregoing, Enriquez should only be
liable for the crime of homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Arnaldo Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN NIEVES Y ACUAVERA A.K.A. "ADING"
DOCTRINE
FACTS
The PNP Iba Municipality Station conducted a buy-bust operation for the arrest of
accused-appellant Edwin Nieves, who was infamous for being a drug pusher. PO1 Rudico
Angulo, the designated poseur-buyer along with the Confidential Informant and four
deployed personnel carried out the operation. Nieves was apprehended after pocketing the
marked money and handing to PO1 Angulo a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. Upon reaching the police station, an inventory of the confiscated items
was done in the presence of PO2 Wilfredo F. Devera, one of the officers during the operation,
Department of Justice Representative Asst. State Prosecutor Olivia V. Non, and Elected
Barangay Official Bgy. Kagawad Victor Buenaventura. Nieves was then charged with illegal
use and sale of drugs under R.A. 9165 but was only found guilty for violation of Section 5 of
Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drugs) but acquitted him of the case for Use of
Dangerous Drugs.
Nieves on the other hand alleged that he was mistakenly taken as his brother Jun Jun
Nieves, the person that the police officers were looking for. He was surprised when they
removed his belt, tied both his hands, and dragged him towards their parked vehicle. He was
brought to Camp Conrado Yap where he was mauled. Nieves claimed that he saw the police
officers' asset, Armin Sarmiento who even questioned his arrest instead of his brother who
was the actual perpetrator of the crime charged. Upon realizing their mistake, the police
officers returned to Nieves’ house to look for Jun Jun, but failed to locate his whereabouts.
Nieves further claimed that he was subsequently brought to the Iba Police Station and was
forced to admit that he was his brother.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Nieves
RULING
YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of
proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless
also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are
safeguarded.
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
as that required to make a finding of guilt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;
and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
thereof.

The phrase ‘immediately after seizure and confiscation’ means that the physical
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be
physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the
said witnesses.
The Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat, as the CA itself
pointed out, that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
In the present case, a careful perusal of the records would reveal that the supposed
buy-bust operation was conducted without the presence of any of the three insulating
witnesses. In PO1 Angulo’s and PO2 Devera’s Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-
Aresto, the aforementioned apprehending officers claimed that they were only accompanied
by other operatives of PNP, Iba. Further, the inventory was subsequently conducted at the
police station without any explanation as to why it was impracticable to do the same at the
place of apprehension. More importantly, only two of the three required witnesses — the
DOJ representative and the elective official — were present in the conduct of inventory, as
evidenced by the signatures in the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized.
PO2 Devera then testified that the lack of media representative was due to the written
manifesto executed by them requesting that they be excluded from anti-drug operations. The
written manifesto, however, did not justify the police officers' deviation from the prescribed
procedure as it was undated, and was never even mentioned in any of the affidavits and
documents related to the case prior to PO2 Devera's testimony; only seven (7) media
practitioners signed the written manifesto and it was indicated therein that it binds only "all
mediamen whose name and signature appears thereon”; most importantly, the
requirements of the law cannot be set aside by the simple expedient of a written manifesto.
Thus, the Court finds that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable — without so much
as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the
evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence would again rear their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachet
of shabu that was evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this failure adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of
such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised. Furthermore, the
inconsistencies in the police officers' testimonies cast reasonable doubt on Nieves' guilt. In
light of these, Nieves must perforce be acquitted.
Q: During a buy-bust operation, Paolo was found to have unlawfully sold and
possessed a small plastic sachet containing shabu. Upon reaching the police station,
an inventory of the confiscated items was done in the presence of PO2 Santos, one of
the officers during the operation, Department of Justice Representative Asst. State
Prosecutor Olivia Garcia, and Elected Barangay Official Bgy. Kagawad Charlie Cruz but
without a media representative in view of the written manifesto which requested
their exclusion from anti-drug operations. Paolo was charged with the crime of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Did the RTC and CA err
in convicting Paolo?
A: YES. Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640 requires that the identity and
Section 21(1) of RA 9165 as the supposed buy-bust operation was conducted with only two-
the DOJ representative and the elective official- of the three required insulating witnesses.
The inventory was also subsequently conducted at the police station without any
explanation as to why it was impracticable to do the same at the place of apprehension. The
written manifesto did not justify the police officers' deviation from the prescribed procedure
as it was undated and was never even mentioned in any of the affidavits and documents
related to the case prior to PO2 Santos’ testimony. There is no proof, or even an intimation,
that these signatories constitute all of the media practitioners and most importantly, the
requirements of the law cannot be set aside by the simple expedient of a written manifesto.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised. Furthermore, the
inconsistencies in the police officers' testimonies cast reasonable doubt on Paolo’s guilt. In
light of these, Paolo must perforce be acquitted. (People of the Philippines v. Edwin Nieves,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BUNIAG
DOCTRINE
FACTS
During a buy-bust operation conducted by PDEA agents in Olape, Cagayan de Oro,
appellant Ferdinand Buniag was apprehended after showing three bundles of marijuana
stalks and leaves contained in a black travelling bag to PDEA Agent IO1 Rubylyn S. Alfaro
who was the designated poseur-buyer. The team then brought Buniag to their station with
IO2 Neil Vincent Pimentel in possession of the traveling bag and the illegal narcotics in going
thereto. At the station, IO2 Pimentel did the markings and prepared the inventory of the
seized items. Buniag and the seized items were then brought to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office. Buniag was charged with the crime of attempt to sell and/or delivery of a
dangerous drug under Sec 5, paragraph 1, in relation to Sec 26 of RA 9165.
Buniag countered that he went to Manila to check on his brother’s house and was
arrested as a suspect by the PDEA agents while he was out buying food. Buniag claimed that
the PDEA agents allegedly asked for P20,000 for his release, was made to point to a clack bag
while being photographed and was made to sign documents without knowing the contents
therein. Buniag denied owning the black travelling bag and the the three bundles of
marijuana inside it.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165
RULING
YES. The CA correctly ruled that the accused may only be held liable for attempted
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Under the rule on variance, while Buniag cannot be convicted
of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the sale was never consummated, he
may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily included in the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. In the present case, Buniag attempted to sell shabu and commenced by
overt acts the commission of the intended crime however, the sale was aborted when IO1
Alfaro, upon confirming that Buniag had with him the marijuana, made a "miss-call" to IO2
Pimentel, the pre-arranged signal, and the rest of the team rushed to the area and placed
Buniag under arrest.
The Court however held that Buniag may still not be convicted of attempted illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, which necessarily includes attempted sale of illegal drugs,
the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and the seller were
identified.
It is of prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the
court.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2)
the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done
at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity.
In addition, while the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void; and this has always
been with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
requirements under Section 21(1) of RA 9165 without having a valid excuse. The agents’
mere allegation that they feared that the people started coming out of the house is nothing
but a frail excuse since there were seven (7) of them and they were even armed. The Court
also ruled that there was really no buy-bust operation conducted.
First, the police officers did not conduct the marking, photography, and inventory of
the seized items at the place of arrest but at the police station, without having any valid
excuse for the deferment of the conduct of the required procedure under Section 21 of RA
9165. The total absence of any witness belies the claim that there was even a buy-bust
operation. Second, although there was a media representative who signed the inventory
report at the police office, such is not enough because the law requires that the mandatory
witnesses should already be present during the actual inventory and not merely after the
fact. Moreover, there was no representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any
elected official at the time of arrest of the accused and seizure of the illegal drugs, and
inventory and photography of the seized items at the police station. The Court has repeatedly
held that the fact that a buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust
team could not have ensured the presence of the required witnesses pursuant to Section 21.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot overcome

the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. The right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty is a constitutionally protected right. Thus, it would be
a patent violation of the Constitution to uphold the importance of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty over the presumption of innocence, especially
in this case where there are more than enough reasons to disregard the former.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged due to
the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution was not
able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Buniag. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised and Buniag must accordingly be
acquitted.
Q: During a buy-bust operation conducted by PDEA agents, Gary was apprehended
after showing three bundles of marijuana stalks and leaves contained in a black
travelling bag to the poseur-buyer agent. Gary was brought to the police station and
agent Reyes did the markings and prepared the inventory of the seized items without
any witnesses but the document was thereafter signed by a media representative.
Gary was charged with a violation under Sec 5, paragraph 1, in relation to Sec 26 of RA
9165. Is Gary's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
A: NO. The Court held that Gary may still not be convicted of attempted illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under RA 9165, which necessarily includes attempted sale of illegal drugs, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and the seller were
identified.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 strictly requires
that (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ. However, strict
compliance with the requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs
apprehending team.
Section 21(1) of RA 9165 without having a valid excuse. The police officers did not conduct
the marking, photography, and inventory of the seized items at the place of arrest but at the
police station. The total absence of any witness belies the claim that there was even a buy-
bust operation. Although there was a media representative who signed the inventory report
at the police office, such is not enough because the law requires that the mandatory
witnesses should already be present during the actual inventory and not merely after the
fact. Moreover, there was no representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any
elected official at the time of arrest of the accused and seizure of the illegal drugs, and
inventory and photography of the seized items at the police station.
able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Gary. The integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised and Gary must accordingly be acquitted.
(People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Buniag, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY DAGDAG A.K.A. "TISOY"
G.R. No. No. 225503, June 26, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Acting upon the information that one Jerry Dagdag alias ‘Tisoy” was rampantly selling
illegal drugs in Brgy. Bambang in Pasig City, a buy bust operation was conducted. While the
poseur-buyer PO1 Christopher Millanes and the confidential Informant were walking along
the alley, they accidentally met Dagdag who sold to them a sachet of suspected shabu. Dagdag
was apprehended and found in his possession the marked money and two (2) plastic sachets
of suspected shabu. Thereafter, Dagdag was brought to the Pasig Police Station for proper
booking and documentation and his photograph was taken as well as the items seized from
the operation and was charged with the crime of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of RA 9165.
Dagdag alleged that while at home two (2) men in civilian clothes and armed with
firearms entered the house, poked a gun at him and brought him to Pariancillo Police
Headquarters. He was allegedly told to settle the case by paying P50,000 and was later
reduced to P20,000. When Dagdag refused to give money, PO1 Millanes allegedly threatened
him with three small plastic sachets, lighter and a pair of scissors as evidence against him.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Dagdag for violating Section Sections 5
and 11 of Article II of RA 9165
RULING
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of
the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
safeguarded.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2)
the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

required witness. The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable
that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and
photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already
be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature,
a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring
with them the said witnesses.
Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that noncompliance of these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items. For this provision to be effective, however,
the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2)
be able to justify the same. In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried
to justify, its deviations from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
In the present case, no inventory and photographing of the evidence were conducted
whatsoever in the presence of the required witnesses either at the scene of the purported
buy-bust operation or even when Dagdag was brought to the police station thereafter. There
was no evidence presented by the prosecution whatsoever showing that an inventory of the
allegedly seized drugs was even conducted by the police. The supposed buy-bust operation
in the instant case was conducted in complete and utter derogation of Section 21 of RA 9165.
The CA's assessment that the brazen and wholesale deviations of Section 21 of RA 9165
committed by the police in the instant case are mere "minor lapses" is unquestionably
incorrect. Such an assessment by the CA is irresponsible and reprehensible.
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is
necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized
drug. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet
that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused.
The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice
of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. The RTC and the CA
therefore seriously and erred in simply brushing aside Dagdag's defense of frame-up,
especially when the testimonies of Dagdag, Albert, his son-in-law, and Joanna, his daughter,
were consistent in that the police officers forcibly apprehended Dagdag and planted on
Dagdag the supposedly seized specimens of shabu. In this connection, the Court sternly
reminds the trial and appellate courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying and deciding drug
cases, and directs the Philippine National Police to conduct an investigation on this incident
and other similar cases, lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.
In sum, the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
apprehending team's deviations from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of
this, Dagdag must perforce be acquitted.
Q: Acting upon the information that Leo was rampantly selling illegal drugs, a buy bust
operation was conducted. Leo was apprehended and found in his possession the
marked money and two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. Thereafter, Leo was
brought to the Pasig Police Station for proper booking and documentation. His
photograph was taken as well as the items seized from the operation and was charged
with the crime of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and
11, respectively, of Article II of RA 9165. Did the RTC and CA err in convicting Leo for
violating Section Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165?
A: YES. For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
RA 9165, which necessarily includes attempted sale of illegal drugs, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and the seller were identified.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 strictly requires
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ. However, strict
compliance with the requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs
apprehending team.
21(1) of RA 9165. No inventory and photographing of the evidence were conducted
whatsoever in the presence of the required witnesses either at the scene of the purported
buy-bust operation or even when Gary was brought to the police station thereafter. There
was no evidence presented by the prosecution whatsoever showing that an inventory of the
allegedly seized drugs was even conducted by the police. The supposed buy-bust operation
in the instant case was conducted in complete and utter derogation of Section 21 of RA 9165.
The CA's assessment that the brazen and wholesale deviations of Section 21 of RA 9165
committed by the police in the instant case are mere "minor lapses" is unquestionably
incorrect. Such an assessment by the CA is irresponsible and reprehensible.
In sum, the Court acquits Gary for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Jerry Dagdag, G.R. No. 225503, June 26, 2019,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO MENIL
DOCTRINE
Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or
that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. For treachery
to be appreciated, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was sudden,
unexpected, and without any warning or provocation. There must also be a showing that the
offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the
execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
FACTS
The victim, Edwin B. Bagaslao and Cynthia Rose Coloma, his common-law wife were
about to leave the Christmas party held at Tip-Topp Disco in Sing-Song Garden Restaurant
and organized by the Butuan Bet Takers Association, of which victim Bagaslao was a
member. On their way downstairs, accused-appellant Edgardo Menil pushed Coloma. A
heated argument ensued. When Coloma and Bagaslao were already on their path on the
sidewalk of the Sing-Sing Garden, Menil suddenly came from behind and shot the victim.
Ricardo Torralba was leaving the party and witnessed the appellant shoot Bagaslao and ran
away after. Bagaslao was brought to the hospital but died on the same day.
The appellant denied having killed Bagaslao, maintaining that he was at Sing-Sing
Garden with his friends. Bagaslao blocked his path and grabbed his revolver and that he had
no choice but to grapple with Bagaslao in order to regain possession of the revolver and
accidentally the shot was fired and killed Bagaslao.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Menil's conviction for murder
RULING
YES. The accused should only be convicted of the crime of homicide and not murder.
The prosecution failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that treachery attended
the commission of the crime. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of
attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
It has been consistently held by the Court that chance encounters, impulse killing or
crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations
are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack.
In this case, Menil and the victim had a heated altercation at the restaurant prior to
the killing of the victim by the accused. It is true that a certain Dodoy had pacified their fight.
However, this does not necessarily mean that at the time the shooting incident happened,
they already had cool and level heads since only a short amount of time had lapsed between
the heated altercation and the shooting of the victim. Immediately after they were pacified
by Dodoy, the victim went down the stairs followed by Menil and upon reaching the sidewalk,
Menil immediately shot the victim. Verily, the victim should have still been aware that there
was a possibility of an impending attack as the armed accused was still in the same area.
Furthermore, to qualify the crime to murder, the following elements of treachery in a

given case must be proven: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and, (b) said means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
It has been repeatedly held that for treachery to be appreciated, both elements must
be present. It is not enough that the attack was sudden, unexpected, and without any warning
or provocation. There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the second requisite for treachery, i.e., that the
accused deliberately adopted the means of execution, was not proven by clear and
convincing evidence by the prosecution. The means of execution used by the accused cannot
be said to be deliberately or consciously adopted since it was more of a result of a sudden
impulse due to his previous heated altercation with the victim than a planned and deliberate
action. Similarly, in another case, the Court held, "there is no treachery when the assault is
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the
victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former."
Thus, due to the absence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, Menil should
only be convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Q: Tom and Gina were about to leave the Christmas party when they saw Rolly push
Gina who mistook her as the girl who left him on the dance floor. A heated argument
then ensued. As Tom and Gina were walking on the sidewalk of the Sing-Sing Garden,
Rolly suddenly came from behind and shot Tom. Lito was leaving the party and
witnessed Rolly shot Tom and ran away after. Tom was brought to the hospital but
died on the same day. Is Rolly liable for murder?
A: NO. The accused should only be convicted of the crime of homicide and not murder. The
prosecution failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of
attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
It has been consistently held by the Court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are
generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack.
To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. That for treachery to be
appreciated, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was sudden,
unexpected, and without any warning or provocation. There must also be a showing that the
offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in
the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to
himself.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the second requisite for treachery, i.e., that the
accused deliberately adopted the means of execution, was not proven by clear and
convincing evidence by the prosecution. The means of execution used by the accused cannot
be said to be deliberately or consciously adopted since it was more of a result of a sudden
impulse due to his previous heated altercation with the victim than a planned and deliberate
action. Similarly, in another case, the Court held, "there is no treachery when the assault is
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the
victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. (People of the Philippines
v. Edgardo Menil., G.R. No. 233205, June 26, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAN DUMANJUG
DOCTRINE
The apprehending team should conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must
be done in the presence of the required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended
by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the
same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows
the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
FACTS
Upon receiving information from a walk-in Confidential Informant that appellant Dan
Dumanjug was selling shabu, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation with Agent Robin
Beniga Tibayan as the designated poseur-buyer. Upon reaching the boarding house of
Dumanjug, Agent Tibayan bought 500 worth of illegal drugs and Dumanjug handed over (1)
small sachet of shabu. Dumanjug was arrested and thereafter Agent Tibayan marked the
small sachet of shabu that was bought from Dumanjug as "RT-1" at the scene. In Dumanjug's
room, which was 3 to 5 meters away from the crime scene, the team saw in plain sight a
weighing scale, eyeglass casing containing four (4) disposable lighters, empty sachets,
aluminum foil and a Nokia cellular phone. No markings were made on the said items after
Agent Subang assessed that the scene was quite dangerous.
Dumanjug was then taken to the PDEA Office where he was thoroughly searched. At
the same time, the pieces of evidence were photographed, marked and inventoried in the
presence of Dumanjug, the barangay kagawad of Fort Poyohon and representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice. Dumanjug was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Dumanjug denied the charges against him and alleged that while he was doing his
report in his boarding house, armed men with faces covered with bonnets forcibly entered
his place and pointed guns at him while they conducted a search inside the rooms in the
boarding house. Dumanjug was interrogated as to the location of shabu and searched his
ants for any illegal drugs but did not find any. He was brought to the PDEA office where a
marked money was allegedly placed inside his pocket.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Dumanjug for violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165
RULING
proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
safeguarded.
thereof.
The Court has previously stressed that the presence of the three witnesses at the time
of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the
warrantless arrest, they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation.

after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that
the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the conduct
of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as aforementioned, must be immediately
done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied
said witnesses.
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs to
apprehending team.
The Court finds that there is no justifiable ground in the instant case that warrants
the non-observance of the mandatory requirements set by Section 21 of RA 9165. First, the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, i.e., Agents Tibayan and Balbada, offer conflicting
reasons as to how the buy-bust team arrived at the decision to conduct the inventory and
photographing of the evidence in the PDEA Regional Office and not at the crime scene.
Second, from the testimony of Agent Balbada herself, it becomes apparent that the supposed
convergence of roughly two hundred (200) persons in the vicinity of the crime scene, aside
from being uncorroborated, is in itself an incredible and implausible tale. Third, even if Agent
Balbada's incredible testimony on the convergence of two hundred (200) persons in the
vicinity of the crime scene was to be believed, there is still no justifiable reason to conclude
that it was "quite dangerous" to hold the inventory and photographing of the evidence in the
presence of the required witnesses at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation as the buy-
bust operation was conducted outdoors and that there was no serious danger posed
whatsoever to the team and that the inventory and photographing of the evidence could have
also been conducted immediately after the confiscation of the drugs at the crime scene.
Regardless of the level of danger extant in the venue of the buy-bust operation, from the get-
go, the PDEA agents really had no intention whatsoever to conduct the buy-bust in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised. In light of this,
Dumanjug must perforce be acquitted.
Q: Upon receiving information from a walk-in Confidential Informant that Jayson was
selling shabu, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation. Jayson was arrested and
thereafter Agent George marked the small sachet of shabu that was bought from
Jayson at the scene. In Jayson’s room, which was 3 to 5 meters away from the crime
scene, the team saw in plain sight a weighing scale, eyeglass casing containing four (4)
disposable lighters, empty sachets, aluminum foil and a Nokia cellular phone. No
markings were made on the said items after Agent Henry assessed that the scene was
quite dangerous. Jayson was then taken to the PDEA Office where the pieces of
evidence were photographed, marked and inventoried in the presence of Jayson, the
barangay kagawad of Fort Poyohon and representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice. Jayson was then charged with violation of Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is Jayson's guilt for violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 proven beyond reasonable doubt?
A: NO. Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640 requires that the apprehending
team should conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the
same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the
presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure
and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were
intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only
when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
Section 21(1) of RA 9165 as the inventory and photographing of the evidence was conducted
in the PDEA Regional Office instead of the crime scene. Assuming that the area of the buy-
bust operation was indeed dangerous, necessitating the conduct of the inventory and
photographing in another location, the PDEA Regional office is not the nearest police station.
There is also no justifiable reason to conclude that it was quite dangerous to hold the
inventory and photographing of the evidence in the presence of the required witnesses at
the place of the alleged buy-bust operation as the buy-bust operation was conducted
outdoors and that there was no serious danger posed whatsoever to the team and that the
inventory and photographing of the evidence could have also been conducted immediately
after the confiscation of the drugs at the crime scene. Regardless of the level of danger extant
in the venue of the buy-bust operation, from the get-go, the PDEA agents really had no
intention whatsoever to conduct the buy-bust in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
Jayson must perforce be acquitted. (People of the Philippines v. Dan Dumanjug, G.R. No.
235468, July 1, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAROL ALCANTARA
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Acting on the information relayed by an informant about an ongoing sale of shabu by
alias Jonjon, later identified as the accused Jonathan Manuel, PO1 Richie Gaerlan, a member
of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force of the Marikina City Police went to
the place and verified the information. They were told by Manuel to go to the house of a
certain alias "nanay" in San Mateo, Rizal as he already ran out of stock. The Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force of the Marikina City Police then planned and executed a buy-
bust operation.
Upon reaching the house of alias nanay, they noticed that there were several persons
seated in front of a table who were repacking suspected shabu. Manuel was packing the
suspected shabu inside sachets, accused Jerry Robles was cutting plastic sachets, Aniceto
Decena was heat sealing the plastic sachets using an improvised burner, and they would then
pass all the packed suspected shabu to Carol Alcantara. The old woman, Resurreccion, then
gave the plastic sachets to PO1 Gaerlan. All the accused were then arrested.
PO1 Christopher Años, a member of PO1 Gaerlan's team, seized the following items
that were on top of the table: 1) money in different denominations amounting to ₱3,500.00;
2) 30 plastic sachets of suspected shabu; 3) three bundles of plastic sachets; 4) three pairs
of scissors; and 5) one improvised burner. PO1 Años put the necessary markings on the
seized items, and listed the serial numbers of the seized peso bills. The team brought the
suspects to the San Mateo Police Station to be blottered, while the specimens were brought
to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. From the San Mateo Police
Station, all the accused were brought to the Marikina Police Station. They were charged of
violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The defense alleged that seven men suddenly barged in and conducted a search
thereat. The men allegedly took some of their belongings and Resureccion and Alcantara
were brought to the Marikina Station. Cruz, Decena and Robles alleged that they were in
Resurreccion’s house to clean when the agents arrived looking for a certain alias Jonjon. Cruz
was then arrested and boarded in a vehicle with Alcantara, Ressurreccion, and Manuel. He
alleged that while the commotion was happening, there were no representatives from the
barangay or the media and the barangay official and police officer from San Mateo, Rizal,
arrived only after they were already inside the vehicle. While they were being questioned in
Marikina Police Station, there were still no members of the IBP or members of the media.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellants
RULING
YES. The accused-appellants were charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, to reach a conviction in a case involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
thereof.

said witnesses.
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid as provided under a saving mechanism.
To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the prosecution still needs to
apprehending team.
In the present case, the apprehending team led by PO1 Gaerlan did not conduct the
buy-bust operation or the inventory post-operation in the presence of the required
witnesses. One of the prosecution’s witnesses testified that no person from the media or any
elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation or during the post-
operation inventory. The apprehending team in this case had more than ample time to
comply with the requirements established by law. PO1 Gaerlan testified that before
executing the operation, they even coordinated with PDEA via phone call and with the San
Mateo Police through a letter of coordination. Hence, the police officers had all the time to
coordinate with the required witnesses so as to be compliant with the law. The records of
this case, however, indubitably reveal that neither the police officers nor the prosecution
offered any explanation for such deviation.
the accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted.
Q: During a buy-bust operation, Denver and 5 other suspects were apprehended for
unlawfully selling and possessing 30 plastic sachets of suspected shabu and 3 bundles
of plastic sachets. After the arrest, the police agent put the necessary markings on the
seized items, and listed the serial numbers of the seized peso bills. The team brought
the suspects to the San Mateo Police Station to be blottered, while the specimens were
brought to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. From the San
Mateo Police Station, all the accused were brought to the Marikina Police Station.
Denver et al were charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended. Is their guilt for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Section 21 of RA 9165 as the apprehending team did not conduct the buy-bust operation or
the inventory post-operation in the presence of the required witnesses. No person from the
media or any elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation or during the
post-operation inventory. The apprehending team in this case had more than ample time to
comply with the requirements established by law as they even coordinated with PDEA via
phone call and with the San Mateo Police through a letter of coordination. Hence, the police
officers had all the time to coordinate with the required witnesses so as to be compliant with
the law. However, neither the police officers nor the prosecution offered any explanation for
such deviation.
the accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted. (People of the Philippines v. Carol
Alcantara, G.R. No. 231361, July 3, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LYNDON CAÑETE
DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after
seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs
were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is
only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches
the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
FACTS
Upon receiving a report from a confidential informant regarding Lyndon Canete‘s and
Peterlou Pimentel’s, herein appellants, drug activities, the PDEA Provincial Office in
Pagadian conducted a buy-bust operation. Agent Rolly Calangi, the designated poseur-buyer
was handed a sachet of suspected shabu wrapped in foil by Cañete. Thereafter, Cañete and
Pimentel were arrested. As people were starting to gather, Agent Pollisco decided to move
his team and appellants out of the vicinity. They proceeded to their service vehicle, where
Agent Calangi marked the confiscated evidence.
With Agent Calangi still in custody of the seized evidence, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the PDEA Office in Pagadian City. However, due to a power interruption, the
team had to go instead to the Provincial Intelligence Branch Office to conduct an inventory
of the evidence. Present during the inventory were appellants, media representative Vanessa
Cagas, elected official Ernesto Mondarte, and Department of Justice Representative
Prosecutor Mary Ann Tugbang-Torres. Thereafter, the investigator, Agent Decano, took a
photograph of the evidence. The appellants were charged with sale of illegal drugs under Sec
5, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Cañete and Pimentel were at the billiard hall when the agents
arrived, searched and have them boarded in a vehicle. They were arrested thereafter and
brought to Camp Abelon where they were padlocked and forced to sign a document.
ISSUE
Whether accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged
RULING
NO. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, to reach a
conviction in a case involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
thereof.

said witnesses.
apprehending team.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to justify their deviations from the
mandatory provisions of RA 9165. For this reason alone, accused-appellants must be
acquitted. Furthermore, at the time the drug was allegedly seized and confiscated from
accused-appellants, only the police officers were present. Likewise, at the time the item was
marked inside the service vehicle of the buy-bust team, there were yet no other witnesses to
observe the same. As detailed above, it was only at the time of the inventory and
photographing that the three (3) witnesses required under RA 9165 came into the picture.
The authorities also failed to follow the requirement that the inventory and photographs be
done at the place of apprehension which was the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station of
Labanga, or the PDEA Office in Dao, Pagadian City. Even assuming that the performance of
such procedure was impracticable at the billiard hall, the buy-bust team, without justifiable
reason or cause, still bypassed the nearest PNP and PDEA stations by still choosing to go to
Camp Abelon which was not the nearest police station or office from the crime scene. The
witnesses- representative from the media, Department of Justice, and local elected official-
were present only during the inventory and photographing at Camp Abelon.
In sum, the series of lapses committed by the apprehending team has created serious
doubt on whether the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. With the very
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti placed in serious doubt, the Court is duty-bound
to acquit accused-appellants.
Q: Acting upon a report, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation. Miko and Shane
were arrested. The buy-bust team decided to move Miko and Shane out of the vicinity
and proceeded to their service vehicle where an agent marked the confiscated
evidence. With the agent still in custody of the seized evidence, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the PDEA Office in Pagadian City. However, due to a power interruption,
the team had to go instead to the Provincial Intelligence Branch Office to conduct an
inventory of the evidence. Present during the inventory were Miko and Shane, a media
representative, an elected official, and a Department of Justice Prosecutor
Representative. Thereafter, the investigator, took a photograph of the evidence. Miko
and Shane were charged with sale of illegal drugs under Sec 5, Art II of RA 9165 also
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is their guilt for violation of the
crime charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
confiscation. However, strict compliance with the requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165 may
not always be possible and the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid.
The prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
preserved by the apprehending team.
The buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with and justify their deviations from the
mandatory requirements of the law. At the time the drug was allegedly seized and
confiscated from accused-appellants, only the police officers were present. Likewise, at the
time the item was marked inside the service vehicle of the buy-bust team, there were yet no
other witnesses to observe the same. As detailed above, it was only at the time of the
inventory and photographing that the three (3) witnesses required under RA 9165 came into
the picture. The authorities also failed to follow the requirement that the inventory and
photographs be done at the place of apprehension which was the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Station of Labanga, or the PDEA Office in Dao. Even assuming that the performance of
such procedure was impracticable at the billiard hall, the buy-bust team, without justifiable
reason or cause, still bypassed the nearest PNP and PDEA stations by still choosing to go to
Camp Abelon which was not the nearest police station or office from the crime scene. The
witnesses were present only during the inventory and photographing at Camp Abelon.
In sum, the series of lapses committed by the apprehending team has created serious
doubt on whether the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. With the very
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti placed in serious doubt, the Court is duty-bound
to acquit Miko and Shane. (People of the Philippines v. Lyndon Cañete, G.R. No. 242018, July 3,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMIE NARVAS
DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required
FACTS
Acting on a concerned citizen’s tip to the desk officer of the Sta. Barbara Police Station
regarding drug-related activities in Villa Sta. Barbara, a buy-bust operation was conducted
with PO2 Christopher Idos as the poseur-buyer. After accused-appellant Armie Narvas
handed the two plastic sachets and took the marked money, he was arrested. PO1 Quibrantos
took the items and gave them to the investigator. SPO1 Raymundo Bauzon conducted an
inventory of the items seized. Thereafter, photographs were taken. PO2 Idos placed the
markings "CVI-1" and "CVI-2" on two (2) plastic sachets, while PO1 Quibrantos placed the
markings on the other two. At the police station, SPO1 Bauzon prepared the request for
laboratory examination and submitted the specimen to the crime laboratory. Narvas was
charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165
also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Narvas went to the house of his friend when suddenly, a
group of seven to eight men, later identified as police officers, barged into the house, dragged
and frisked them, but produced nothing. However, they were still handcuffed and brought
outside the house where they were photographed with six plastic sachets and two five
hundred bills. The appellant also alleged that he was blindfolded and tortured by the police
officers.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Narvas for violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
thereof.

said witnesses.
apprehending team.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with and justify their
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. There was no legitimate inventory of
the alleged seized drug specimens that was conducted, both in the scene of the crime and at
the police station. PO2 Idos revealed that the Inventory Receipt was prepared and
accomplished, not at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation, but only at the police
station. There also inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses on the seized evidence and the conduct of the buy-bust operation. The marking of
the plastic sachets was highly irregular as they were merely marked with the initials of the
apprehending officers without indicating the date, time, and place the pieces of evidence
were supposedly confiscated. There was no photographing of the evidence conducted
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension as required under Section 21 of RA 9165.
It was not also explained by the prosecution why only elected public officials, i.e., local
barangay officials, were present during the supposed buy-bust operation. Further, there
were no photographs whatsoever showing that such witnesses were present during the
alleged buy-bust operation.
apprehending team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised.
In light of this, accused-appellant Narvas must perforce be acquitted.
Q: Acting on a concerned citizen’s tip to the desk officer of the Sta. Barbara Police
Station regarding illegal drug activities in the area, a buy-bust operation with only
local officials present was conducted and where Bong was arrested. Agent Liam took
the items seized and gave them to the investigator. Then SPO1 Gino conducted an
inventory of the items seized and photographs were taken. PO2 Guanzon and Agent
Liam placed the markings on the four plastic sachets of shabu. Bong was charged with
sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is Bong’s guilt for violation of the
crime charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
mandatory requirements of the RA 9165. There was no legitimate inventory of the alleged
seized drug specimens that was conducted, both in the scene of the crime and at the police
station. The agent revealed that the Inventory Receipt was prepared and accomplished, not
at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation, but only at the police station. There are also
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses on the
seized evidence and the conduct of the buy-bust operation. The marking of the plastic
sachets was highly irregular as they were merely marked with the initials of the
apprehending officers without indicating the date, time, and place the pieces of evidence
were supposedly confiscated. There was no photographing of the evidence conducted
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension as required under Section 21 of RA 9165.
It was not also explained by the prosecution why only elected public officials, i.e., local
barangay officials, were present during the supposed buy-bust operation. Further, there
were no photographs whatsoever showing that such witnesses were present during the
alleged buy-bust operation.
In light of this, accused-appellant Bong must perforce be acquitted. (People of the Philippines
v. Armie Narvas, G.R. No. 241254, July 8, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDSON BARBAC RETADA
DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended
by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the
same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows
the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
FACTS
After confirming that one Edson Retada is engaged in illegal drug activities, a buy-
bust operation was conducted. After the accused Retada handed one plastic sachet of shabu
to PO2 Catubag and got the money, Retada was arrested. Upon arrival at the police station,
PO2 Catubag made a thorough body search on the accused and recovered on the latter one
plastic sachet of suspected shabu, buy-bust money, coins in different denominations and a
cellphone. Retada was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and
11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Retada was at a store after attending a procession when
police suddenly arrived and he was immediately brought inside the Chief of Police Office and
bodily searched. The police then handcuffed him while his child was brought outside the
office. The police officers continued searching him until they showed him two sachets of
shabu and money amounting to Php 44.75 allegedly from his pocket. Thereafter, he was
placed inside the detention cell and the barangay officials arrived and signed the document.
ISSUE
Whether Retada's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
thereof.

of the physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with considering that
the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
apprehending team.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such
as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2)
their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. Although there were two elected
officials present during the inventory at the police station, the two other mandatory
witnesses were not present. The police officers admitted that they only tried to call-in the
mandatory witnesses when they were already at the police station. The buy-bust team did
not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the place of
arrest. Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only at the
police station with a flimsy excuse that there were several persons in the place where they
conducted the buy-bust operation. Moreover, considering that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was illegal, the subsequent warrantless search resulting in the recovery of one more
plastic sachet of shabu from Retada's possession is invalid and the seized shabu is
inadmissible in evidence being under the law, "fruit of the poisonous tree." Even more telling
is the fact that they only conducted the thorough body search of the accused at the police
station when they could have immediately done it at the place of arrest. Thus, Retada must
perforce also be acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11 of RA 9165.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of
illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-
bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Retada should be
acquitted of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
Q: After confirming that Theo is engaged in illegal drug activities, a buy-bust operation
was conducted. After the Theo handed one plastic sachet of shabu to PO2 Santos and
got the money, Theo was arrested. Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Santos made
a thorough body search on the accused and recovered on the latter one plastic sachet
of suspected shabu, buy-bust money, coins in different denominations and a
cellphone. Theo was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections
5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is
Theo’s guilt for violation of the crime charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
mandatory requirements of the RA 9165. Although there were two elected officials present
during the inventory at the police station, the two other mandatory witnesses were not
present. The police officers admitted that they only tried to call-in the mandatory witnesses
when they were already at the police station. The buy-bust team did not conduct the
marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the place of arrest. Instead, they
delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only at the police station with
a flimsy excuse that there were several persons in the place where they conducted the buy-
bust operation. Moreover, considering that the warrantless arrest of the accused was illegal,
the subsequent warrantless search resulting in the recovery of one more plastic sachet of
shabu from Retada's possession is invalid and the seized shabu is inadmissible in evidence
being under the law, fruit of the poisonous tree. Even more telling is the fact that they only
conducted the thorough body search of the accused at the police station when they could
have immediately done it at the place of arrest. Thus, Theo must perforce also be acquitted
of the charge of violating Section 11 of RA 9165.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of
illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-
bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Theo should be
acquitted of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Edson
Barbac Retada, G.R. No. 239331, July 10, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HAVIB GALUKEN
DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witnesses, all of whom shall be required
FACTS
The PDEA South Cotabato conducted a buy-bust operation with I01 Falle as the
poseur-buyer. After accused-appellant Havib Galuken handed two transparent plastic bags
containing shabu and took the buy-bust money, he was apprehended. The team brought the
appellant and the confiscated items at the Tacurong City Police Station. I01 Falle marked the
two sachets with "RPF" and "RPF-1". The police officers likewise prepared an inventory
receipt signed by Barangay Poblacion Kagawad Pamplona and took photographs of the
seized items. On the evening of the same day, appellant was brought to the PDEA Regional
Office while the two sachets remained in the custody of I01 Falle which was later on
endorsed to another agent. Galuken was charged with sale of illegal drugs under Section 5,
Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Galuken was at the Tacurong City Public Market to take his
lunch and was on his way to the terminal when he was arrested by unknown persons.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Galuken guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs
RULING
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
thereof.

said witnesses.
apprehending team.
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. None of the required witnesses was
present at the place of arrest. The police officers merely called-in a Barangay Kagawad and
media representative when they were already at the police station to sign the inventory
receipt which they had already prepared prior to the arrival of said witnesses. The police
officers did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the
place of arrest and offered a hardly plausible explanation that the crowd became
uncontrollable considering that they conducted the buy-bust operation at a Caltex Station
and it is highly unbelievable that there would be a crowd in the said area that would pose a
danger to their lives. The conflicting testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team make
their credibility questionable. Thus, to the mind of the Court, there is doubt whether there
was even really a buy-bust operation. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Havib, thus he must be acquitted.
Q: The PDEA South Cotabato conducted a buy-bust operation with I01 Cruz as the
poseur-buyer. After accused Donny handed two transparent plastic bags containing
shabu and took the buy-bust money, he was apprehended. The team brought the
appellant and the confiscated items at the Tacurong City Police Station where I01 Cruz
marked the two sachets. The agents prepared an inventory receipt signed by Brgy.
Poblacion Kagawad Pamplona and took photographs of the seized items. Then
appellant was brought to the PDEA Regional Office while the two sachets remained in
the custody of I01 Cruz which was later endorsed to another agent. Donny was charged
with sale of illegal drugs under Sec 5, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is Donny’s guilt for violation of the crime
charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
mandatory requirements of the RA 9165. None of the required witnesses was present at the
place of arrest. The police officers merely called-in a Barangay Kagawad and media
representative when they were already at the police station to sign the inventory receipt
which they had already prepared prior to the arrival of said witnesses. The police officers
did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the place of
arrest and offered a hardly plausible explanation that the crowd became uncontrollable
considering that they conducted the buy-bust operation at a Caltex Station and it is highly
unbelievable that there would be a crowd in the said area that would pose a danger to their
lives. The conflicting testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team make their credibility
questionable. Thus, to the mind of the Court, there is doubt whether there was even really a
buy-bust operation.
In light of this, accused-appellant Donny must perforce be acquitted. (People of the
Philippines v. Havib Galuken, G.R. No. 216754, July 17, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO MANABAT
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Upon receiving information through a text message from a confidential informant
that a certain alias Mario is engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs in Estaka, Miputak and
other places in Dipolog City, the members of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Force (CAIDSOTF) in Dipolog City conducted a buy-bust operation. After accused-
appellant Mario handed a sachet of shabu from inside a small container in his pocket and
took the buy-bust money, he was arrested.
The buy-bust team called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered from
Mario. Representatives from DOJ, media and the barangay of Miputak came. PO2 Barral
conducted body search on Mario in the presence of the witnesses. After the search, Mario
revealed his full name. Confiscated from Mario's possession were nine (9) pieces small
transparent plastic sachets in triangular shape containing white crystalline granules, one (1)
piece P500 bill (marked money), P150 proceeds money, one (1) unit Nokia cellphone. PO2
Barral turned over one small piece of sachet from Mario. SPO2 Vertudes made markings on
the confiscated items. He also prepared the certificate of inventory which was signed by the
witnesses. The sachets of shabu were marked as MM-01 to MM-09 with date and initials and
the one piece buy-bust shabu was marked BB-01. Photographs were taken during the
conduct of inventory. Mario was then brought to the ZaNorte Medical Center for routine
medical checkup then to the police station. From the time of the inventory until Mario was
brought to the police station, SPO2 Vertudes kept custody of the drug specimens and other
recovered items. Mario was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections
5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that here was no buy bust operation conducted against Mario as
he was just grappled by persons near Casa Jose. Thereafter, he was brought to the boulevard
then to the Fish Port where he was frisked and his short pants removed while his wallet and
cellphone were taken. He was then brought to the ABC Printing Press, the alleged place of
arrest, where pictures of him with nine cellophanes containing something were taken. There
was no lawyer during the search and inventory. He was then brought to the police station.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Manabat of the crimes
charged
RULING
thereof.
said witnesses.
apprehending team.
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The witnesses were not contacted at
all by the buy-bust team and were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime
only after the accused-appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. The prosecution
even offered conflicting testimonies as regards the time of arrival of the witnesses and PO2
barral admitted that he photographs of the inventory do not show the presence of the
witnesses except for the Councilor. The Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the
prosecution was irregularly executed as the document was not signed by accused-appellant
Manabat or by his counsel or representative without the prosecution providing any
explanation. The marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was irregularly done. As
incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic sachets allegedly retrieved from
accused-appellant Manabat, only the date and initials of the seizing officers were inscribed
on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were not indicated in the
markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-
bust operations. There was an error for the RTC to convict accused-appellant Manabat by
relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended
in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-
appellant Manabat must perforce be acquitted.
Q: Upon receiving information that a certain alias DJ is engaged in the selling of
prohibited drugs, the members of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task
Force (CAIDSOTF) in Dipolog City conducted a buy-bust operation where DJ was
arrested. The buy-bust team called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered
from DJ. Representatives from DOJ, media and the barangay of Miputak came. PO2
Melo conducted a body search on DJ in the presence of the witnesses. PO2 Melo turned
over one small piece of sachet from DJ while SPO2 Dino made markings on the
confiscated items. He also prepared the certificate of inventory which was signed by
the witnesses. The sachets of shabu were marked with date and initials and
photographs were taken during the conduct of inventory. From the time of the
inventory until DJ was brought to the police station, SPO2 Dino kept custody of the
drug specimens and other recovered items. DJ was charged with sale and possession
of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Is DJ’s guilt for violation of the crime charged
proven beyond reasonable doubt?
The buy-bust team failed to comply with and justify their deviations from the
mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The witnesses were not contacted at all by the buy-bust
team but were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime only after the accused-
appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Melo. The prosecution even offered conflicting
testimonies as regards the time of arrival of the witnesses and PO2 Melo admitted that he
photographs of the inventory do not show the presence of the witnesses except for the
Councilor. The Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the prosecution was irregularly
executed as the document was not signed by Melo or by his counsel or representative
without the prosecution providing any explanation. The marking of the plastic sachets
allegedly recovered was irregularly done. As incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs
of the plastic sachets allegedly retrieved from Melo, only the date and initials of the seizing
officers were inscribed on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were
not indicated in the markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for
the conduct of buy-bust operations. There was an error for the RTC to convict accused-
appellant Manabat by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
accused.
In light of this, DJ must perforce be acquitted. (People of the Philippines v. Mario Manabat, G.R.
No. 242947, July 17, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
EDWIN DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence
or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present
in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
FACTS
Charlotte and Kim Evangelista Casiano was inside a jeepney with two male persons
later identified as Edwin and Roxan. When the jeepney stopped at a red light, Roxan snatched
the necklace of Charlotte then he and Edwin disembarked from the jeepney and ran away.
Roxan was apprehended and with the information that he gave regarding Edwin’s identity,
the police were also able to arrest Edwin. Edwin and Roxan were both charged with robbery.
In his defense, Edwin alleged that he was driving his jeepney and taking his usual
route on the day the incident happened. He also alleged that the in-court identification made
by Charlotte and Kim was heavily tainted because even before they were able to identify
Roxan's companion, the police already told them that the perpetrator has been arrested.
ISSUES
1. Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Edwin of the crime of robbery
2. Whether the snatching of the necklace is robbery or theft
RULING
1) NO. The Court adopts the CA's findings and conclusion as to Edwin's guilt. The
Court is convinced that the elements of taking of personal property which belongs to another
person without his consent have been established and such taking was with intent to gain.
The Court consistently held that intent to gain is a mental state whose existence is
demonstrated by a person's overt acts.
As to Edwin's allegation that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the required identification that he was one of the persons responsible for the crime charged,
the Court agrees with the CA when it ruled that the testimonies of both witnesses on direct
and cross-examinations would show that they were consistent on their narrative of the
incident and of the participation of appellant Edwin. Thus, there is no reason to depart from
the findings of the trial court especially since the direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor
during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court's domain, not
that of a reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified.
2) THEFT. The elements of robbery are: (1) there is a taking of personal property;
(2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4)
the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. Theft,
on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of
another without the latter's consent.
Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use
of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the
element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. The testimonies
of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. The Court clarified that for the requisite
of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. The Court added
that the fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended
the taking.
The Court explained that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence
or physical force was employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court,
however, finds the argument to be a pure play of semantics. Grab means to take or seize by
or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly, the same does not suggest the
presence of violence or physical force in the act; the connotation is on the suddenness of the
act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with the employment of violence or
physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not
the presence of violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not
at all allege that She was pushed or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her
necklaces.
The crime committed by Edwin is thus clearly only theft, instead of robbery. The
failure to specify the correct crime committed, however, will not bar Edwin's conviction for
the crime of theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble
of the information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information. In this case, the allegations in the Information
are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.
Q: Bea and Julia were inside a jeepney with two male persons later identified as Gerald
and Dominic. When the jeepney stopped at a red light, Gerald snatched the necklace
of Bea then he and Dominic disembarked from the jeepney and ran away. Gerald was
apprehended and with the information that he gave regarding Dominic’s identity, the
police were also able to arrest Dominic. Gerald and Dominic were both charged with
robbery. In snatching the necklace robbery or theft?
A: The crime committed by Edwin is only theft, instead of robbery. The elements of
robbery are: (1) there is a taking of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to
another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. Theft, on the other hand, is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use
of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the
element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. The testimonies
of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. The Court clarified that for the requisite
of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. The Court added
that the fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended
the taking.
The Court explained that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence
or physical force was employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court,
however, finds the argument to be a pure play of semantics. Grab means to take or seize by
or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly, the same does not suggest the
presence of violence or physical force in the act; the connotation is on the suddenness of the
act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with the employment of violence or
physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not
the presence of violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not
at all allege that She was pushed or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her
necklaces. (Edwin del Rosario v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN CANATOY
DOCTRINE
Direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that
circumstantial evidence may be enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
The essence of treachery is a swift and sudden attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. For this circumstance to be appreciated,
two elements must be alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The mode of attack must also
be consciously adopted.
FACTS
Omega Barbas, the victim, was inside her apartment when two men entered the gate
and proceeded to Barbas’ room and told her that they were delivering a package. Two other
tenants of Ziega Apartment, Tan and Soliman, saw the men enter the apartment gate, went
out of Barbas’ room and fleeing towards the gate. Upon hearing Barbas’ screams, they went
to her apartment and found Barbas lying face down and bathed in her own blood. The
examination report showed that she suffered incise wounds and one fatal stab wound.
Fabian Mabalato, Julio Cartuciano and Luz Sato were arrested in a follow-up
operation conducted by the police. Canatoy was apprehended by virtue of a warrant of
arrest. Mabalato and Cartuciano executed their extrajudicial confessions where Mabalato
admitted that they were hired by Cartuciano to kill Barbas for a consideration. Cartuciano,
in his sworn statement, implicated Sato as the one who hired them. Go, Barbas’ boyfriend,
testified that Sato was one of Barbas’ clients and that Sato owed her P100,000 and that Sato
got into an argument with Barbas. Canatoy, along with accused Mabalato and Cartuciano, as
well as Sato, were charged with Murder qualified by the attending circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for killing Barbas.
In their defense, Mabalato and Canatoy were allegedly arrested and made to sign an
already prepared affidavit stating that they killed Barbas. Sato denied the accusations against
her and alleged that the police went to her workplace and invited her to the police station.
When she told the police that she knew Barbas, she was not allowed to leave the station and
was informed that she was the suspected mastermind in the killing. Canatoy denied knowing
the three other accused and was allegedly brought to the Gorordo Police Station in Cebu from
Misamis Oriental.
Mabalato, Cartuciano and Canatoy were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder while Sato was acquitted. Mabalato died during the pendency of the appeal.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but only Canatoy filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Canatoy of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The prosecution's case rests mainly on: 1) the testimonies of witnesses Soliman
and Tan; and 2) the extrajudicial confessions of Cartuciano and the deceased Mabalato.
The Court rules that these pieces of evidence were sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Canatoy, along with his other co-accused and in conspiracy with one
another, committed the crime charged. Although the records show that there was no
eyewitness to the actual killing of Barbas, the testimonies of Soliman and Tan on collateral
facts of the crime, were properly given ample weight by the trial court and the CA. It is settled,
that direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, consists of

proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court, circumstantial evidence will be sufficient to convict the offender if: 1) there is more
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and 3)
the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person
Tan saw a grey t-shirt stained with blood near the leg of Barbas. It was the same shirt
color worn by one of the men whom Tan saw earlier enter the gate of the apartment, and
who was already wearing a white shirt when Tan saw him again, this time running away
from Barbas' room. Both Soliman and Tan identified in open court the two accused, Canatoy
and Mabalato, as the men running away from the crime scene. Well-established is the rule
that factual findings made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe
the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the testimonies, are entitled to great
weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same.
The extrajudicial confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano were admissible in

evidence and were credible. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence, it
must be satisfactorily shown that the same was obtained within the limits imposed by the
Constitution, specifically Sections 12 and 17, Article III thereof and reinforced in RA No.
7438. The Court, applying the foregoing standards, has settled that extra judicial confessions,
to be admissible in evidence, must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in writing.
The confessions were voluntarily and freely executed. The confessants did not have
themselves examined by any physician nor did they institute any legal action against their
alleged abusers. Moreover, the confessants did not complain to their then counsel, Atty.
Truya, or Pros. Dinoy even when the latter inquired and ascertained from them the
voluntariness of the execution of their confessions. The rule is that where the defendant did
not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Mabalato
and Cartuciano, during the investigation, were duly assisted by Atty. Truya - a competent and
independent counsel, who informed them of their constitutional rights and the
consequences of their confessions. It has been held that a confession is presumed to be
voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden of proof is
upon the party who claims the contrary. Moreover, as the confessions of Mabalato and
Cartuciano meet the standards prescribed by the Constitution and the law, they constitute
evidence of a high order because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will
knowingly and deliberately confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Against the extrajudicial confessions and the testimonies of its witnesses as well as
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the alibi of Canatoy cannot
prevail. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
However, the Court held that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
The essence of treachery is a swift and sudden attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. As the evidence showed, the victim opened
the door expecting merely to acknowledge receipt of the letter or package brought by the
perpetrators, only to be held and stabbed with a knife by the accused. The victim was never
given a chance to defend herself. Soliman and Tan - the only witnesses on the actual
commission of the crime -did not testify that Barbas was "held" when she was stabbed by the
accused or that she was not given a chance to defend herself. Instead, they merely heard
Mabalato, Canatoy and Barbas' exchange of words after which they heard Barbas shout "Ay!"
three times.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For this circumstance to be appreciated, two elements must be
alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The mode of attack must also be
consciously adopted. The accused must take some preparation to kill the deceased in a
manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The attack, then, must not spring from the unexpected
turn of events. No witness or proof was presented by the prosecution on the manner the
killing was executed, particularly if Barbas was attacked unexpectedly and suddenly or if she
had any opportunity to defend herself or if the means by which she was killed were
consciously adopted. None of these circumstances may be derived from the testimonies of
Soliman and Tan, both of whom testified on collateral facts which they merely, heard occur
immediately before and after Barbas was stabbed - but not during.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance

of treachery, the Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and CA that the killing of
Barbas was qualified by the circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. Hence, the crime remains to be Murder under Article 24866 of the RPC, the
elements of which are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the guilt of accused-
appellant Canatoy of the crime of Murder. The Court affirms that the evidence proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Canatoy, Mabalato and Cartuciano, acting in conspiracy with one
another, perpetrated the killing of Barbas.
Q: Aileen, the victim, was inside her apartment when two men, Zach and Kid, entered
the gate and proceeded to her room and told her that they were delivering a package.
Two other tenants of Ziega Apartment, Nick and Lance, saw the men enter the
apartment gate, go out of Aileen’s room and flee towards the gate. Upon hearing
Aileen’s screams, they went to her apartment and found Aileen’s body lying face down
and bathed in her own blood. The examination report showed that she suffered incise
wounds and one fatal stab wound. Zach and Kid admitted thru their extrajudicial
confessions that they were hired to kill Aileen. Are Zach and Kid liable for murder?
A: YES. The Court ruled that the testimonies of witnesses Nick and Lance; and 2) the
voluntary and freely executed extrajudicial confessions of Zach and Kid were sufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Zach along with his other co-accused and in conspiracy
with one another, committed the crime charged. Although the records show that there was
no eyewitness to the actual killing of Aileen, the testimonies of Zach and Kid on collateral
facts of the crime, were properly given ample weight by the trial court and the CA. It is settled,
that direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that
However, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. The essence of
treachery is a swift and sudden attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim. As the evidence showed, Aileen opened the door
expecting merely to acknowledge receipt of the letter or package brought by the
perpetrators, only to be held and stabbed with a knife by the Zach. The victim was never
given a chance to defend herself. Nik and Lance - the only witnesses on the actual commission
of the crime -did not testify that Barbas was held when she was stabbed by the accused or
that she was not given a chance to defend herself. Instead, they merely heard Zach and Kid
and Barbas' exchange of words after which they heard Aileen shout "Ay!" three times.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The mode of attack must also be consciously adopted. No
witness or proof was presented by the prosecution on the manner the killing was executed,
particularly if Aileen was attacked unexpectedly and suddenly or if she had any opportunity
to defend herself or if the means by which she was killed were consciously adopted. None of
these circumstances may be derived from the testimonies of Nick and Lance, both of whom
testified on collateral facts which they merely, heard occur immediately before and after
Aileen was stabbed - but not during. (People of the Philippines v. Allan Canatoy, G.R. No.
227195, July 29, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOREN DY
DOCTRINE
FACTS
After receiving information from a confidential informant that an "alias Bebeng", later
identified as Loren Dy, is engaged in selling illegal drugs, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust
operation. Accused-appellants Dy and William Cepeda were in the target area and transacted
with the agents. They arrested Dy and Cepeda who immediately went to the other room and
threw something. The agents searched Cepeda’s body and they discovered from his right
pocket the buy-bust money and in the left pocket another sachet of shabu. They also seized
one (1) lighter, improvised needle, some pieces of aluminum foil which they found on top of
a table in the sala. The said items were then gathered in one cellophane which was marked
by IO3 Aguilar "RLA". He also marked with her initials the sachet recovered from the pocket
of Cepeda. IO2 Orcales marked the sachet he bought "BB-VCO" and turned over the said
sachet to IO3 Aguilar. Dy and Cepeda were jointly charged with sale of illegal drugs while
Cepeda alone was charged with possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11
respectively, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Dy and Cepeda who claimed to be husband and wife were in
their house when allegedly armed men who identified themselves as PDEA forcibly entered
their place, searched all the rooms and handcuffed Dy and Cepeda and bodily searched the
latter. The barangay kagawad and tanod arrived two hours after and was made to sign a
piece of paper, even though they refused to do so since they did not witness the search, after
which Cepeda and Dy were brought to the PDEA office. At the office, Cepeda pleaded that he
be submitted for a drug test, but his plea was ignored. Cepeda denied selling shabu and
having in his possession the buy-bust money and sachet of shabu.
ISSUE
Whether Dy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged
RULING
thereof.

said witnesses.
apprehending team.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. There were gaping holes in the
records with respect to the presence and extent of participation of the witnesses in the buy-
bust operation. Not all the witnesses required under Section 21 were present at the time or
at least near the place of apprehension. Testimonies are completely silent with respect to the
presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, as required under the law, and
neither was there an attempt to explain why there was a failure to secure such witness. The
witnesses were summoned only after the fact; that it was only after the actual buy-bust and
subsequent seizure of the items that the witnesses were called which was two hours after.
Both witnesses never testified before the RTC despite several attempts to secure their
attendance. The Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs dated September 5, 2011,
forming part of the records, is more corroborative of the defense's version of events.
Nowhere does it indicate the name of the alleged media representative except for the name
"Norman Jabagat.” There is no designation whatsoever of who Norman Jabagat is or what
office or organization he represents, and neither was his name mentioned in the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. Secondly, in one of the spaces where the witnesses are required
to affix their signature over their printed name, there is written the phrase "REFUSED TO
SIGN," which unquestionably corroborates the uniform testimonies of herein accused.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-
appellant Dy must perforce be acquitted and likewise acquits Cepeda, notwithstanding his
failure to perfect an appeal herein.
Q: After receiving information that an "alias Bebeng", identified as Sara is engaged in
selling illegal drugs, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation. Sara and Harry were
arrested. The agents searched Harry’s body and they discovered from pockets the
buy-bust money and another sachet of shabu. They also seized one lighter, improvised
needle, some pieces of aluminum foil which they found on top of a table in the sala.
The said items and the sachet recovered from the Harry’s pocket were marked by
Agent Pilo. Agent Marvel marked the sachet he bought and turned it over to another
agent. The Brgy Kagawad and Tanod arrived two hours after and were made to sign a
piece of paper by the agents. Sara and Harry were jointly charged with sale of illegal
drugs while Harry alone was charged with possession of illegal drugs under Sections
5 and 11 respectively, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. Is Sara’s guilt for violation of the crime charged proven beyond reasonable
doubt?
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. Not
all the witnesses required were present at the time or at least near the place of apprehension.
Testimonies are completely silent with respect to the presence of a representative of the
Dept of Justice, as required, and neither was there an attempt to explain why there was a
failure to secure such witness. The witnesses were summoned only after the fact, that it was
only after the actual buy-bust and subsequent seizure of the items that the witnesses were
called which was two hours after. Both witnesses never testified before the RTC despite
several attempts to secure their attendance. The Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-
Drugs forming part of the records, is more corroborative of the defense's version of events.
Nowhere does it indicate the name of the alleged media representative. There is also a
written phrase "REFUSED TO SIGN," which unquestionably corroborates the uniform
testimonies of herein accused.
team's deviation from the rules. The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have
thus been compromised. In light of this, Sara must perforce be acquitted and Harry likewise
acquitted, notwithstanding his failure to perfect an appeal herein. (People of the Philippines
v. Loren Dy, G.R. No. 229833, July 29, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO SOLAR
G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
An information alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have
factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make.
An information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction
when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured
by competent evidence presented therein.
FACTS
Ma. Theresa Capinig, the wife of Joseph, followed her husband who left the house to
get his cellphone from Rolando Solar, herein accused-appellant and along the way, saw
Rolando and Mark Kenneth hit Joseph Capinig, the victim, with a baseball bat on his nape.
Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
According to Dr. Nulud, the death resulted from traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a
blunt force applied on the head of the victim. Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar were charged
with the murder of Joseph. Rolando pleaded not guilty while Mark Kenneth remained at
large.
Rolando denied the accusation and claimed that he was attending a wake the night of
the incident. Joseph was also there, approached him and offered to pawn a cellphone in
exchange of cash. On his way home, he met Joseph who, upon seeing him, drew out a kitchen
knife and tried to stab him thrice. He was not hit and he immediately ran away.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to prove
that conspiracy exists.
RULING
NO. It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the
factual findings of the trial court. Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of
the witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as
they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of
witnesses during trial. Ma. Theresa was able to positively identify Rolando as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. She was only five meters away from the scene when it happened,
and she knew Rolando since he was a childhood friend of her siblings. The supposed
inconsistencies pointed out by Rolando were sufficiently explained by the prosecution. For
one, Ma. Theresa already clarified that she did not recognize Mark Kenneth initially as she
did not know him, and she was only able to identify him through the help of the barangay
official who helped her.
The essence of Ma. Theresa's testimony never changed, in that she repeatedly claimed
that she saw her husband being attacked by assailants who only stopped when she shouted
for help. The supposed inconsistency does not change the essence of her testimony and, in
fact, even strengthens her credibility. The Court stresses that slight contradictions, in fact,
even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as
badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have
not been rehearsed; nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no
person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.
The Court follows the established doctrine that as between a positive and credible
testimony by an eyewitness, on the one hand, and a hollow denial, on the other, the former
generally prevails over the latter. The Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA
that Rolando failed to prove any ill motive on the part of Ma. Theresa to implicate him. There
is no evidence on record, apart from the empty imputations of ill motive by Rolando, that
shows that Ma. Theresa was motivated by an improper motive to implicate Rolando for the
crime. In fact, relationship itself could even strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it
is highly unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness
abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent of the crime.
It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is the
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if at the
time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were
animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts
of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted
action. The rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct
reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. In the present case, implied
conspiracy between the accused can be deduced from the mode and manner in which they
perpetrated the killing. First, Rolando and Mark Kenneth were together at the crime scene.
Second, Rolando mauled the victim after Mark Kenneth hit him with a baseball bat. Third, as
soon as they achieved their common purpose, both accused fled together. All these acts point
to the conclusion that the accused conspired to commit the crime
In the assailed Decision, while the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that Rolando indeed
killed Joseph, it downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide for failure of the
Information to sufficiently state the particular facts establishing the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The Court held that merely averring the killing of a
person by hitting his head with a baseball bat, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the baseball bat as an instrument to kill was
not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.
The Court holds that it is insufficient for prosecutors to indicate in an Information

that the act supposedly committed by the accused was done "with treachery" or "with abuse
of superior strength" or "with evident premeditation" without specifically describing the
acts done by the accused that made any or all of such circumstances present. An information
alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have factual averments on how
the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of
the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused
arising from the defense that the victim might make. To this end, prosecutors are instructed
to state with sufficient particularity not just the acts complained of or the acts constituting
the offense, but also the aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, as well as
any other attendant circumstances, that would impact the penalty to be imposed on the
accused should a verdict of conviction be reached.
The Court notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by the
accused. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly
charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. An information
which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails
to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein. Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the
Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of
particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the
trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant
circumstances.
There are currently two different views on how the qualifying circumstance of
treachery should be alleged. On the one hand is the view that it is sufficient that the
Information alleges that the act be committed "with treachery." The second view requires
that the acts constituting treachery — or the acts which directly and specially insured the
execution of the crime, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which
the offended party might make — should be specifically alleged and described in the
Information.
The CA, in the assailed Decision in this case, took the second view and held that the
Information did not specifically allege the acts constituting treachery. As a result, it
downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide. The Court, however, reverses the ruling
of the CA. The Court thus convicts Rolando for Murder instead of Homicide.
Q: Maddie, the wife of Carlo, followed her husband who left the house to get his
cellphone from Nathan, herein accused-appellant and along the way, saw Nathan and
Ryan hit Carlo, with a baseball bat on his nape. Immediately, Carlo was rushed to the
hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. According to Dr. Tan, the death resulted
from traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a blunt force applied on the head of the
victim. Nathan and Ryan were charged with the murder of Joseph. Nathan pleaded not
guilty while Ryan remained at large. Is Nathan liable for murder?
A: YES. Ma. Theresa was able to positively identify Rolando as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. She was only five meters away from the scene when it happened, and she knew
Rolando since he was a childhood friend of her siblings. The essence of Ma. Theresa's
testimony never changed.
In the assailed Decision, while the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that Nathan indeed
killed Carlo, it downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide for failure of the
Information to sufficiently state the particular facts establishing the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The Court held that merely averring the killing of a
person by hitting his head with a baseball bat, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the baseball bat as an instrument to kill was
not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.
The Court notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by the
accused. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly
charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. An information
which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails
to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein. Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the
trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
circumstances.
With the foregoing, the Court, reverses the ruling of the CA. The Court thus convicts
Rolando for Murder instead of Homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Rolando Solar., G.R. No.
225595, August 6, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUTIQUIO BAER
DOCTRINE
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.
FACTS
Agents of the Provincial Anti-Narcotics Unit (PANU) and barangay officials Cerilo
Gaviola and Marcelo Estoque, went to Brgy. Iniguihan, Bato, Leyte to serve a search warrant
against accused-appellant Eutiquio Baer and search his rented stall. In the presence of the
police officers and barangay officials, accused-appellant Baer admitted that there were
prohibited drugs in his place. He retrieved a locked steel box and gave it to the team. It was
found to contain seven big plastic sachets and 142 sealed decks of suspected shabu. The
police officers confiscated those articles and made an inventory of the seized items, signed
by Baer and the witnesses to the search. A certification of search was also prepared. After
the search, the team brought Baer and the seized items to the municipal building where the
confiscated items were marked - the seven big plastic sachets were marked "AD ET-1" to "AD
ET-7," the small plastic sachet was marked with "D-476-2002 AD ET 1" while the 142 decks
of shabu were marked "C-l" to "C-142.". Thereafter, the seized items were forwarded to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. Baer was charged with sale and
possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act but was only convicted by the RTC and CA for sale of
illegal drugs.
The defense alleged that Baer was in his stall watching a basketball game when
Notarte alias "Ondo" approached him and requested if Notarte could leave the steel box he
was carrying at Baer's stall. Baer refused but since Notarte left already, he brought the steel
box inside his stall. On his way out, several police officers approached him and asked about
the steel box. The police officers did not present any document or search warrant to Baer,
nor inform him of the consequences of surrendering the steel box. Because the steel box was
locked, the police officers went to the municipal hall and obtained the key from Notarte.
When the steel box was opened, it was found to contain several items that looked like
"tawas." The police officers immediately listed the contents of the box, took a one-hundred-
peso bill from Baer and placed it on the table. After the incident, Baer was brought to the
municipal hall and placed inside a prison cell where Notarte was also detained.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Baer for violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
Jurisprudence holds that possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
transparent plastic bags and sealed decks allegedly containing shabu were not found on the
person of Baer. The prosecution does not refute or contest that the steel box which allegedly
contained the supposed confiscated drug specimen was owned by Notarte and not owned by
Baer, and that the latter was not capable of opening the same as the key that was used to
open the steel box did not come from accused-appellant Baer but from the authorities. Also,
when the search was conducted, Baer was not even inside the stall. The Court finds that the
supposed drug specimens were NOT constructively possessed by Baer.
thereof.

said witnesses.
apprehending team.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The inventory and marking of the
evidence allegedly retrieved were not done immediately after the seizure of the drug
specimens. The CA found that there was "failure on the part of the police officers to
immediately mark the prohibited drugs after they were seized from accused-appellant's
rented stall. The inventory was not conducted at or near the place of the apprehension, as
required under Section 21 of RA 9165. The CA found that the "accused-appellant and the
seized drugs were brought to the municipal building, where the inventory was prepared. The
evidence on record readily reveals that the authorities did not photograph the evidence
allegedly seized. The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses are completely silent as to
the photographing of the drug specimen. In fact, no photographs of the operation nor the
drug specimens were offered into evidence.
The operation was conducted only in the presence of the police officers and barangay
officials. It is not disputed that there were no representatives from the media and the DOJ to
witness the operation. The "Receipt of Confiscated Articles was also prepared, signed by the
police officers and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Baer and his family
members were not given a copy of the inventory receipt which is a blatant and explicit
disregard of Section 21 of RA 9165, which requires that the certificate of inventory should
also be signed by the accused or his/her representative, and that the latter be given a copy
of the same. The markings were irregularly done by inscribing only the agent’s initials and
signature. The date, time, and place of the operation were not indicated on the markings, in
clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures.
Lastly, the Court finds that the third element of the crime of illegal possession under
Section 11 of RA 9165 is also wanting. The third element requires that the accused freely and
consciously possesses the illegal drug. The Court notes Baer’s testimony that the steel box
was only left with him by Notarte was duly corroborated by another witness of the defense,
Raul Solante, who testified that he saw Notarte, who brought with him the steel box and
asked permission from them to leave the said box with accused-appellant Baer. Considering
that criminal cases are heavily construed in favor of the accused, the RTC and CA committed
a serious error in simply brushing aside the corroborated testimony of accused-appellant
Baer. The Court is convinced that accused-appellant Baer did not freely and consciously
possess illegal drugs.
In sum, the Court acquits accused-appellant Baer of the offense of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of RA 9165 because the prosecution seriously failed to
establish the existence of the elements of the crime charged and failed to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence supposedly seized during the operation.
Q: Agents of the Provincial Anti-Narcotics Unit (PANU) and barangay officials, went to
Brgy. Iniguihan, Bato, Leyte to serve a search warrant against Robin and search his
rented stall. In the presence of the police officers and barangay officials, a locked steel
box retrieved by Robin was opened using a key from Toby who was detained at the
municipal hall, and was found to contain seven big plastic sachets and 142 sealed
decks of suspected shabu. The police officers confiscated those articles and made an
inventory of the seized items, signed by Baer and the witnesses to the search. A
certification of search was also prepared. After the search, the team brought Robin
and the seized items to the municipal building where the confiscated items were
marked. Robin was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5
and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act but
was only convicted by the RTC and CA for sale of illegal drugs. Is DJ’s guilt for violation
of the crime charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Jurisprudence holds that possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
transparent plastic bags and sealed decks allegedly containing shabu were not found on the
person of Robin. The prosecution does not refute or contest that the steel box which allegedly
contained the supposed confiscated drug specimen was owned by Toby and not owned by
Robin, and that the latter was not capable of opening the same as the key that was used to
open the steel box did not come Robin but from the authorities. Also, when the search was
conducted, Robin was not even inside the stall. The Court finds that the supposed drug
specimens were NOT constructively possessed by Baer.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with and justify their deviations from the
mandatory provisions of RA 9165. In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to comply
with and justify their deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The inventory
and marking of the evidence allegedly retrieved were not done immediately after the seizure
of the drug specimens. There was failure on the part of the police officers to immediately
mark the prohibited drugs after they were seized from accused-appellant's rented stall. The
inventory was not conducted at or near the place of the apprehension, as required under
Section 21 of RA 9165. Robin and the seized drugs were brought to the municipal building,
where the inventory was prepared. The evidence on record readily reveals that the
authorities did not photograph the evidence allegedly seized. The testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses are completely silent as to the photographing of the drug specimen.
In fact, no photographs of the operation nor the drug specimens were offered into evidence.
The operation was conducted only in the presence of the police officers and barangay
officials. There were no representatives from the media and the DOJ to witness the operation.
The Receipt of Confiscated Articles was also prepared, signed by the police officers and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search. Robin and his family members were not given
a copy of the inventory receipt which is a blatant and explicit disregard of Section 21 of RA
9165, which requires that the certificate of inventory should also be signed by the accused
or his/her representative, and that the latter be given a copy of the same. The markings were
irregularly done by inscribing only the agent’s initials and signature. The date, time, and
place of the operation were not indicated on the markings, in clear contravention of the
PNP's own set of procedures.
Lastly, the Court finds that the third element of the crime of illegal possession under
Section 11 of RA 9165 is also wanting. The third element requires that the accused freely and
consciously possesses the illegal drug. The Court notes Robin’s testimony that the steel box
was only left with him by Toby was duly corroborated by another witness of the defense,
Dennis, who testified that he saw Toby, who brought with him the steel box and asked
permission from them to leave the said box with Robin. Considering that criminal cases are
heavily construed in favor of the accused, the RTC and CA committed a serious error in
simply brushing aside the corroborated testimony of accused-appellant Baer. The Court is
convinced that Robin did not freely and consciously possess illegal drugs.
In sum, the Court acquits Robin of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11 of RA 9165 because the prosecution seriously failed to establish the
existence of the elements of the crime charged and failed to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence supposedly seized during the operation. (People of the
Philippines v. Eutiquio Baer, G.R. No. 228958, August 14, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
CICL XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a
crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. The prosecution must
specifically prove as a separate circumstance that minor committed the alleged crime with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent is a determination to do a

certain thing which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, the discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years
of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong.
FACTS
Private complainant Glenn Redoquerio was sent by his mother Lolita Redoquerio to
buy iced tea powder from a store and saw CICL XXX, a 17 yr old minor but acting with
discernment, Christopher Puyo and Jayjay Narag there. CICL XXX suddenly poked a gun at
the face of Redoquerio. CICL XXX pulled the trigger several times but the gun did not fire.
CICL XXX then hit (hinataw) the left temple and top of the head of Redoquerio with the gun.
Puyo and Narag held the arms of Redoquerio while CICL XXX punched him several times.
Puyo then hit the head of Redoquerio with a stone causing the latter to lose consciousness.
Redoquerio was in a coma for 7 days while he was confined at the East Avenue Medical
Center. CICL XXX was charged with frustrated homicide.
The defense alleged that CICL XXX was with his family having a celebration for the
New Year in their residence when they heard a commotion outside and they were told that
there was a mauling incident that was happening. CICL XXX saw Redoquerio and De los
Santos mauling Narag. Thereafter, De los Santos ran away while Narag boxed Redoquerio
who fell on his back. He surmised that the reason why he was implicated in this case is that
Redoquerio did not really know who mauled him.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX despite the prosecution's failure to
show that he acted with discernment
Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX for Frustrated Homicide without proof
of the extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio
RULING
YES. The Court stated that when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18)
years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with
discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate
circumstance that the CICL XXX committed the alleged crime with discernment by evidence
of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent is a design; a determination
to do a certain thing; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is
essential to such intent; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts. It is
this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, the discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded
by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial.
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can
exist, and because the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts him from criminal liability.
In the present case, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed whether CICL XXX acted
with discernment. The CA, for instance, only noted CICL XXX's age in its discussion of the
penalty to be imposed on him. Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they
both equated "intent to kill" - which was admittedly established through the evidence
presented by the prosecution - with acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was
not proved by the prosecution.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said
to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) the
offender performs all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the
felony as a consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio was not fully established. The
medical records of Redoquerio were admitted into evidence only through the testimony of
Luague, the Administrative Officer 1 of East Avenue Medical Center who had custody of the
medical records. However, as he was not a medical doctor, both parties stipulated that
Luague could not: (1) "testify as to the nature and gravity of the wound sustained by the
private complainant;" and (2) "testify whether or not the alleged wound sustained by the
private complainant is fatal in nature. There is no testimonial evidence on record explaining
to the Court the medical findings which would have established the nature and extent of the
injuries that Redoquerio sustained. Any medical doctor, however, who was competent to
interpret Dr. Zorilla's findings, as indicated in Redoquerio's medical records, could have
testified in his stead to establish the nature and extent of the injuries. As the nature and
extent of the injuries were not sufficiently established, it was error for the lower courts to
conclude that the injuries were fatal and that Redoquerio would have died if not for the
timely medical assistance he received. In the final analysis, it was therefore error for the
courts to conclude that the crime committed was Frustrated Homicide instead of Attempted
Homicide.
With the foregoing, the Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
Q: Private complainant Rudy was sent by his mother Rachel to buy iced tea powder
from a store and saw Tennyson, a 17 year-old minor, Jayson and Miko
there. Tennyson suddenly poked a gun at the face of Rudy. Tennyson pulled the
trigger several times but the gun did not fire. Tennyson then hit (hinataw) the left
temple and top of the head of Rudy with the gun. Jayson and Miko held the arms of
Rudy while Tennyson punched him several times. Jayson then hit the head of
Tennyson with a stone causing the latter to lose consciousness. Rudy was in a coma
for 7 days while he was confined at the East Avenue Medical Center. Tennyson was
charged with frustrated homicide. Is Tennyson liable for the crime charged?
A: NO. When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a
crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. The prosecution must
specifically prove as a separate circumstance that minor committed the alleged crime with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. Intent and discernment
are two different concepts. Intent is a determination to do a certain thing which comprises
the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being
the other two. On the other hand, the discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. In the present case, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed whether
Tennyson acted with discernment. The CA only noted Tennyson’s age in its discussion of the
penalty to be imposed on him. Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Tennyson, as they
both equated "intent to kill" - which was admittedly established through the evidence
presented by the prosecution - with acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was
not proved by the prosecution.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said
to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance. On the other
hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) the offender performs
all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator.
The extent of the injuries sustained by Rudy was not fully established. The medical
records of Rudy were admitted into evidence only through the testimony of Gary, the
Administrative Officer 1 of East Avenue Medical Center who had custody of the medical
records. However, as he was not a medical doctor, both parties stipulated that Gary could
not: (1) "testify as to the nature and gravity of the wound sustained by the private
complainant;" and (2) "testify whether or not the alleged wound sustained by the private
complainant is fatal in nature. There is no testimonial evidence on record explaining to the
Court the medical findings which would have established the nature and extent of the
injuries that Rudy sustained. As the nature and extent of the injuries were not sufficiently
established, it was error for the lower courts to conclude that the injuries were fatal and that
Rudy would have died if not for the timely medical assistance he received. In the final
analysis, it was therefore error for the courts to conclude that the crime committed was
Frustrated Homicide instead of Attempted Homicide.
With the foregoing, the Court acquits Tennyson for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
(People of the Philippines v. CICL XXX, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
ROWENA SANTOS y COMPRADO AND RYAN SANTOS y COMPRADO
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 242656. August 14, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The concept of possession of illegal drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent
is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
another.”
FACTS
Two separate informations were filed against Rowena and Ryan for violations of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Pursuant to a search warrant that was issued against Ryan
and Rowena of Sagrada Familia, Peñafrancia, Naga City, PO1 Albao went to the house of Ryan
accompanied by P02 Altes.
PO1 Albao promptly informed Ryan of the search warrant. Ryan was handcuffed and
was transferred to the room of Rowena where both accused were informed of the contents
of the warrant. While converged at Rowena 's house, they waited around five minutes for the
arrival of the mandatory witnesses: Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Perry Boy
Solano, media representative Adiel Auxillo, and Barangay Kagawad Ma. Celina Breñ is.
In the presence of mandatory witnesses, PO1 Albao found among others, fourteen
(14) assorted cellphones, some cash in various denominations amounting to P8,275.00,five
pieces of empty plastic sachets, a plastic sachet with shabu contained in the black coin purse
on top of the refrigerator, some cash in various denominations amounting to P6,100.00, a
small blue box containing six sachets of shabu, and empty sachets separate from the six
sachets containing shabu. After bringing the specimens to the provincial crime laboratory
for examination. The laboratory examination yielded a positive result for the presence of
dangerous drugs.
From the foregoing, the RTC convicted Rowena and Ryan for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed Rowena’s and
Ryan’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioners for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
NO. The prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and an
unbroken chain of custody. The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links
that should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. In this
case, the prosecution was able to prove all the links that should be established in the chain
of custody.
In addition, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements
laid down in Section 21. They conducted the physical inventory and photography of the
seized items in the presence of petitioners, a representative from the media, a representative
of the DOJ and a barangay official at the place where the search was conducted.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the CA erred in ruling that petitioners
were in constructive possession of the seized drugs since that the place where the seized
drugs were found were under the control and dominion of petitioners. They mainly argue
that since there are other family members who live in their houses, it is possible that the
seized drugs are not owned by them. This argument has no merit.
The concept of possession of illegal drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction
if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located,
is shared with another.
There is no question that the dangerous drugs were found in a coin purse on top of
the refrigerator in the first-floor living room of Rowena and in a plastic container box inside
a cabinet in the bedroom of Ryan. These findings were witnessed by a media representative,
a DOJ representative and a barangay official who were present during the seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs until the conduct of the inventory and taking of
photographs. They also did not offer any satisfactory explanation to overcome the
presumption that the seized items belong to them. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that
petitioners had constructive possession of the illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy
dominion and control over the premises they occupied. The fact that there were other people
living in their house is of no consequence.
Q: A and B were convicted before the RTC and CA for violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165. They contend however, for the drugs found during the operation, that
constructive possession was not proven as there were other family members who live
in the house, and as such, it is possible that the seized drugs are not owned by them. Is
the contention of A and B tenable?
A: NO. The concept of possession of illegal drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction
if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located,
is shared with another.
It is enough that it can be shown that the accused enjoyed dominion and control over
the premises they occupied. The fact that there were other people living in their house is of
no consequence. (Rowena Santos y Comprado and Ryan Santos Y Comprado v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 242656. August 14, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODEL VELASCO y LUZON
DOCTRINE
“The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.”
FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged by the prosecution with the crime of violation of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516.
In the course of “OPLAN SITA,” police officers noticed a Daewoo Racer car without
any plate number attached in front, which they signaled to stop. PO1 Bacani noticed in plain
view a gun tucked at the waistline of one of the passengers by the name of Roberto Alegre y
Apat. This prompted them to order the three passengers to alight therefrom. PO3 Taguba
then frisked the accused and found in his possession one (1) MK2 fragmentation grenade.
Hence, they arrested the accused and his companions and brought them to the police station
where they executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted accused-appellant Velasco of violating
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Velasco, holding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the elements of the crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Velasco of
violating Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516.
RULING
YES. To convict an accused for illegal possession of an explosive devise under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, jurisprudence has held that two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be
proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the
accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the Philippine National
Police Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive.
While it is beyond serious dispute that accused-appellant Velasco had no license or

permit to possess a fragmentation hand grenade, thus satisfying the second requisite stated
above, a close examination of the evidence on record reveals that the evidence presented by
the prosecution failed to establish that the MK-2 fragmentation hand grenade identified and
admitted into evidence during the trial was the same object allegedly retrieved from the
person of accused- appellant Velasco.
Simply stated, the prosecution was clearly unsuccessful in establishing an unbroken

chain of custody of the allegedly confiscated fragmentation hand grenade, creating serious
doubt as to the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
Jurisprudence explains that the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.
The prosecution's witness, PO1 Bacani testified that after the apprehension of
accused-appellant Velasco, the fragmentation hand grenade was turned over to the
investigator. However, the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution are completely silent as to how the investigator
handled and stored the evidence, and the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item.
In addition, accounts of the two witnesses as to how the authorities discovered that
accused-appellant Velasco possessed the grenade sharply differed from each other. With
these accounts being inconsistent with each other, the Court is left to wonder as to how
exactly the apprehending team acquired custody over the corpus delicti.
Q: Pursuant to an “OPLAN SITA” A was convicted of illegal possession of an explosive
devise under P.D. No. 1866. However, with regard to the testimony and documentary
evidence of how the explosive device was handled, it was silent as to how the
investigator handled and stored the evidence, and the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item. Is the conviction of A under
the circumstances proper?
A: NO. Jurisprudence explains that the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same. (People of the Philippines v. Rodel Velasco y Luzon,
G.R. No. 231787. August 19, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN NIEVERA
DOCTRINE
“The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of
fear. physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against Nievera for the rape of AAA.
AAA was 14 years old at the time of the alleged rape incidents. Her family lived in a
residential apartment building in Valenzuela City. AAA and her family lived on the second
floor. Nievera occupied the third floor with his second wife, Liza Alonzo.
On December 17, 2014 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA asked permission
from her mother to visit her classmate Rachel, as they were going to cook gelatin for their
school Christmas party. On her way down, she bumped into Nievera who persuaded her to
go inside his apartment on the pretext that he would just show her something. Once inside
the apartment, Nievera grabbed her and then hugged her, uttering, "Sandali lang to."
Forthwith, Nievera escorted AAA inside his room, made her lie down and removed all her
clothing. Frightened, she allowed him to mount her, kiss her and insert his penis into her
vagina. After succumbing to his bestial desires, Nievera removed his penis and AAA felt his
semen coming out. He then uttered, "Kahit anong mangyari wag kang magsusumbong," and
ordered AAA to clean up.
On December 29, 2014, AAA asked her mother for permission to go to the computer
shop. On her way out, she met Nievera. He made her wait for him at the corner because they
allegedly had somewhere to go. AAA was unaware that she would be brought to Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Arriving thereat, they went inside Peach Blossom Hotel. When AAA alighted from
the motorcycle, Nievera ordered her not to remove her helmet and just proceed inside their
room. As it happened, AAA was again raped by Nievera. Before leaving the hotel premises,
Nievera showed AAA his gun and she became afraid.
The RTC convicted Nievera of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed Nievera's
conviction albeit with modification as to the amount of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Nievera.
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape — (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail
how Nievera committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given due weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
Nievera, however, raises an issue out of the alleged improbability of AAA's testimony.
According to him, AAA testimony "fails to qualify as clear, positive, convincing, and otherwise
consistent." He argues that AAA clearly testified that she did not resist, and hence the
element of force or intimidation was not established.
While AAA admitted that she did not offer strong resistance against the advances of
Nievera, she communicated to him that she was not giving her consent to what was being
done to her. This absence of consent was shown by (1) her saying "ayoko po," and (2) using
one of her hands to shove Nievera's body away from her. The sexual acts were, therefore,
done to her against her will and without her consent.
It is important to stress that "the gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1)
is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent."
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction.
Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance
at all.
Q: A was convicted for the crime of rape. However, he insists that for the second
element of the crime, “that such act was accomplished through the use of force or
intimidation,” the victim did not resist, and hence the element of force or intimidation
was not established. Is the argument of A tenable?
A: NO. It is important to stress that "the gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1)
is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent."
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction.
Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance
at all. (People of the Philippines v. Allan Nievera, G.R. No. 242830. August 28, 2019, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS SARABIA y REYES
DOCTRINE
With transmittal of the subject specimens from the latter to the evidence custodian
relying mainly on inadmissible evidence, the prosecution's version of events as to the
transmittal and examination of the drug specimens has no leg to stand on. With the transmittal
and examination of the subject specimens having no solid evidentiary basis, indubitably, there
is serious doubt cast, to say the least, on to the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti.
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides that in the conduct of buy-bust operations: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory, which includes the marking of the evidence, and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b)an elected
public official, (c)a representative from the media, and (d)a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. This procedure is mandatory in nature.”
FACTS
For allegedly selling a plastic sachet containing 0.0392 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly called shabu, and for allegedly possessing six plastic sachets
containing 3.219 grams of the same substance in a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) at Jose P. Rizal Street, Barangay 1, Laoag City,
accused-appellant Sarabia was charged in two separate Informations for violating Sections
5 and 11 of RA 9165.
The prosecution avers that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of June 30, 2013, a
male confidential informant (CI) went to the temporary office of the PDEA-INSET located in
Brgy. 13, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and reported the illegal activity of the accused, a resident
of Brgy. 12, Laoag City. After interviewing the CI who claimed that the accused had trust and
confidence in him and had asked him to look for buyers of shabu for a good commission, IO1
Mirindato informed their Team Leader SO2 Annabelle Cabarles who then told him to ask the
CI to call the accused and order from him shabu worth P1,000.00.
At around 10:20 o'clock that morning, when all was ready, the team proceeded to the
agreed place of transaction in their service vehicle and a private car. After the exchange
between the accused and IO1 Mirindato, the latter executed the pre-arranged signal and the
later stopped and informed his authority to the accused who was already astride the
motorcycle of his tricycle and was starting its engine. A few moments later as IO1 Mirindato
took hold of the hand of the accused who was unable to react as he appeared shocked, IO1
Bahiyan arrived at the place approaching from the back of the accused. He ordered the
accused to alight and brought him to the waiting shed where IO1 Mirindato body searched
him and was able to recover from his possession the buy bust money, a cellphone and six
more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. When barangay officials
including Barangay Chairman Darwin Domingo of Brgy. 1, Laoag City, and members of the
media arrived, the seized items were inventoried.
The RTC found accused - appellant Sarabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of accused-appellant Sarabia.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Sarabia.
RULING
consideration ; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the aforesaid elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug
cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Therefore, considering that the very corpus delicti is the drug specimen itself, establishing
the integrity of the specimen is imperative. Hence, compliance with the chain of custody rule
is crucial in establishing accused-appellant Sarabia's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the allegedly seized drug specimens.
According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust was conducted,
on July 1, 2013, the allegedly seized drug specimens were transmitted by one SPO3 Diosdado
C. Mamotos to Police Inspector Amiely Ann L. Navarro (PI Navarro), a forensic chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Office, Ilocos Norte. PI Navarro allegedly examined the specimens and
thereafter transmitted the same to the evidence custodian, PO3 John Edwin Padayao.
Instead of presenting the witness herself to testify on the transmittal and examination
of the allegedly seized drug specimens, the prosecution decided to submit before the RTC a
document entitled "Proffer Testimony (Police Inspector Amiely Ann L. Navarro)." The said
document, containing the testimony of PI Navarro was executed, not by PI Navarro herself,
but by the Assistant City Prosecutor Daryl U. Fajardo.
The RTC gravely erred in admitting the "Proffer Testimony," considering that it is
hearsay evidence. Jurisprudence has held that documents such as affidavits are generally
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.
Therefore, with the prosecution's testimony on the transmittal of the allegedly seized
drug specimens to the forensic chemist, the examination undertaken by the said forensic
chemist, and the transmittal of the subject specimens from the latter to the evidence
custodian relying mainly on inadmissible evidence, the prosecution's version of events as to
the transmittal and examination of the drug specimens has no leg to stand on.
With the transmittal and examination of the subject specimens having no solid
evidentiary basis, indubitably, there is serious doubt cast, to say the least, on to the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
On the other hand, the treatment of the law as to dangerous drugs cases is special and
unique, owing to the peculiar nature of the corpus delicti of the crime, which makes the same
easily susceptible to manipulation in the hands of the State. Hence, as the innocence and
liberty of the accused are pitted unevenly against the powerful machinery of the State, the
law requires the strict observance of certain special rules that provide for procedural
safeguards which ensure moral certainty in the conviction of the accused.
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides that in the conduct of buy-bust operations: (1) the
and (2) the physical inventory, which includes the marking of the evidence, and
counsel, (b)an elected public official, (c)a representative from the media, and (d)a
The aforementioned procedural requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and

the related administrative issuances are mandatory in nature, and can only be relaxed if the
prosecution (1) recognizes any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2) is able to
justify the same.
In the case at bar, the authorities failed to observe the mandatory requirements under
Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the prosecution failed to recognize these lapses and offer
sufficient justification to warrant the non-observance of these mandatory rules. As testified
by IO1 Ray Bahiyan, a member of the buy- bust team and a key witness of the prosecution,
the buy-bust team coordinated only "with the barangay officials and then he called the
cameraman of ABS CBN to witness the inventory x x x." Hence, it is readily admitted by the
prosecution that there was no representative of the DOJ present during the inventory. But
more importantly, the marking of the evidence, which is a crucial element of the physical
inventory process, was conducted without the presence of any of the required witnesses.
Q: In the conviction for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, instead of
presenting the witness herself to testify on the transmittal and examination of the
allegedly seized drug specimens, the prosecution decided to submit before the RTC a
document entitled "Proffer Testimony” which was not executed by a police officer but
rather by the Assistant City Prosecutor. Does this satisfy the requirement on satisfying
the evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged, according to the rules
established by RA 9165?
A: NO. The RTC gravely erred in admitting the "Proffer Testimony," considering that it is
hearsay evidence. Jurisprudence has held that documents such as affidavits are generally
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.
Therefore, with the prosecution's testimony on the transmittal of the allegedly seized
drug specimens to the forensic chemist, the examination undertaken by the said forensic
chemist, and the transmittal of the subject specimens from the latter to the evidence
custodian relying mainly on inadmissible evidence, the prosecution's version of events as to
the transmittal and examination of the drug specimens has no leg to stand on.
With the transmittal and examination of the subject specimens having no solid
evidentiary basis, indubitably, there is serious doubt cast, to say the least, on to the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. (People of the Philippines v. Dennis
Sarabia y Reyes, G.R. No. 243190. August 28, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 243151. September 2, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as
a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of

the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for doing lascivious acts against AAA.
The prosecution presented AAA, her older sister BBB, and social welfare officer Nancy
de Castro as witnesses during the trial. Among others, private complainant testified that that
sometime in 2005, when she was eight (8) years old, she was at home sleeping when she
suddenly felt appellant touch her breasts and vagina. She was so afraid that all she could do
was tremble. Worse, the incident was witnessed by her mother, who instead of coming to
her aid, said "kayo na lang ang magsama." After the unfateful incident, private complainant
tried to distance herself from appellant. However, she was repeatedly molested by appellant
almost everyday. On the other hand, private complainant's sister BBB testified that private
complainant ran away from their house sometime in August 2010 because she was being
sexually abused by appellant by touching her breasts and vagina.
The RTC convicted XXX of the crime charged. The RTC found AAA's testimony to be
candid and straightforward, with "no tinge of revenge or rancor" and thus deserving of full
faith and credit. The RTC found the five-year delay in reporting the incident to be
insignificant, as the victim was only able to run away from her home five years after the
incident complained of. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of XXX. The CA held
that AAA's testimony sufficiently established all the elements of the crime. It ruled that the
RTC correctly accorded credence to the testimony of AAA after finding her answers to the
questions on direct and cross-examination to be intelligible, candid, and unwavering.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting XXX.
RULING
NO. To convict XXX of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, the
prosecution, in turn, had to prove the following elements, to wit: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and
intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex. 22 The third element is immediately satisfied for the offended
party is, naturally, a person of either sex.
The first element — that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
— on the other hand, was satisfied through the testimony of AAA, the offended party. AAA
testified that the accused repeatedly touched her private parts and that incident only
stopped when she ran away. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, noted that the testimony of AAA
"deserves total credibility. It was candid, straight-forward, with no tinge of revenge or
rancor." Thus, the first element of the crime charged has been proven by the prosecution
For the second element, the RTC and the CA concluded that it was present because
AAA was only eight years old at the time of the incident complained of. Coincidentally,
because of this finding, the lower courts deemed R.A. 7610 to be applicable in light of recent
jurisprudence.
XXX, however, argues in this appeal that AAA's age was not properly established as
the Court's guidelines in People v. Pruna were not followed. The Pruna guidelines are as
follows:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of

the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
The Court agrees with XXX's contention. In the present case, the prosecution did not
present AAA's birth certificate. Instead, they presented a photocopy of AAA's Baptismal
Certificate, and both AAA and BBB testified as regards AAA's age. As pointed out by XXX,
however, these pieces of evidence were not compliant with the Pruna guidelines and thus do
not suffice to establish AAA's age.
It must be clarified, however, that the Court still convicts XXX for Acts of
Lasciviousness despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the victim's age, because all
the elements of the crime are still present. To reiterate, the first element — that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness — was sufficiently proved by the testimony
of AAA as regards the incident complained of. The third element was, in turn, immediately
satisfied as the offended party was a person of either sex.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA. He contests that
since the prosecution was not able to prove the victim’s age, he is entitled to an
acquittal. Is the argument tenable?
A: NO. To convict X of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, the prosecution, in
turn, had to prove the following elements, to wit: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either
sex. 22 The third element is immediately satisfied for the offended party is, naturally, a
person of either sex.
Despite failure to prove the victim’s age, the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime. The first element — that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness — was sufficiently proved by the testimony of AAA as regards
the incident complained of. The third element was, in turn, immediately satisfied as the
offended party was a person of either sex. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243151.
September 2, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HILARIO DE CASTRO y SANTOS alias "DACOY"
DOCTRINE
“While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and the failure of the
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been with the
caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.”
FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against De Castro for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The prosecution avers, among others that on 4 August 2010, at around 2:00 a.m.,
PINSP Domingo J. Diaz instructed the police to conduct the buy-bust operation after
receiving a tip from the Informant that the appellant De Castro was selling shabu for P300.00.
PO3 Amodia and the Informant arrived at the target site at 3:00 a.m. PO3 Amodia then
handed the appellant De Castro the buy-bust money; after receiving the buy-bust money, the
appellant De Castro folded the bills, and inserted the bills in the right waist of the appellant
De Castro's shorts; the appellant De Castro then drew from his left waist the small, yellow,
plastic container, opened the container, took out one small transparent plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and handed the plastic
sachet to PO3 Amodia. PO3 Amodia accepted the plastic sachet and executed the pre-
arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated; PO3 Amodia introduced
himself to the appellant De Castro as a policeman, and grabbed the appellant De Castro's
right hand which was then holding the plastic container; PO2 Hernaez frisked the appellant
De Castro and recovered the buy-bust money; PO3 Amodia retrieved from the appellant De
Castro's plastic container, two more plastic sachets; PO3 Amodia arrested the appellant De
Castro, and informed the appellant De Castro of his constitutional rights, and the reason for
the appellant De Castro's arrest.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, he CA affirmed
De Castro's conviction. The CA ruled that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs and illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting De Castro.
RULING
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must
be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21,28 Article II of RA
9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires
(DOJ).
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been
In the case at bar, the police officers blatantly disregarded the requirements laid
down under Section 21 and they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the rules. As
testified by PO3 Amodia, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. Neither were they present during the
inventory of the seized drugs at the police office. The police officers merely tried to "call-in"
the three witnesses after the conduct of the buy-bust operation already. Indubitably, this is
the very practice that the law seeks to prevent. The practice of police operatives of not
bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so —
and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing
of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve
the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of
drugs.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
However, during the trial, it was proved that the three witness rule was not complied
with. Can the presumption of regularity be used as a defense to excuse compliance
with Section 21 of RA 9165?
A: NO. The police officers merely tried to "call-in" the three witnesses after the conduct of
the buy-bust operation already. Indubitably, this is the very practice that the law seeks to
prevent. The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of
inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust
operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having
these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been
seized items are properly preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Hilario De Castro Y Santos
Alias "Dacoy", G.R. No. 243386. September 2, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JAMILLO QUILATAN y DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE
“The requirements outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are not mere
suggestions or recommendations. Undoubtedly, the buy-bust team is not at a liberty to select
only parts it wants to comply with and conveniently ignore the rest of the requirements.
Unjustified deviations from the prescribed procedure will result to the creation of reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs and, consequently, reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.”
FACTS
Two separate informations were filed against Quilatan for alleged violation of
Sections 5 6 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
According to the version of the prosecution, on June 15, 2009 at around 4:30 p.m., the
Parañ aque City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group received a
report from a female informant/asset about the illegal drug activities of Quilatan. Pursuant
to this, a buy-bust team was then formed. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the buy-bust team, together with the informant, went to the target area
in Tramo St., Brgy. San Dionisio, Parañ aque City at around 9:15 p.m. that same day. After
seeing the informant, Quilatan asked "iiskor ka ba?" and the informant replied by saying
"itong kasama k[o]ng taxi driver tropa ko kukuha ng halagang limang daang piso." PO2
Ocampo then handed the marked money to Quilatan. After counting the same, Quilatan took
out from his right pocket a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance and
handed the same to PO2 Ocampo. After consummating the sale, PO2 Ocampo alerted his team
and gave the pre- arranged signal by removing his cap. Seeing that SPO1 Lumabao was
already rushing to the scene, PO2 Ocampo grabbed the hand of Quilatan and revealed his
identity as a police officer. PO2 Ocampo then checked Quilatan's right hand and recovered
another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance.
The RTC ruled against Quilatan. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and ruled that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offenses charged. On appeal, he CA ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt an unbroken link in the chain of
custody of the seized items and that their integrity and evidentiary value had been
preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not prosecution proved Quilatan's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. Section 21 of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime, lays down the procedure to be followed by a buy- bust team in the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of confiscated illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia. Section 21
(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR), in turn, filled in
the details as to place of inventory and added a saving clause in case of non-compliance with
the requirements under justifiable grounds.
The requirements outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are not mere
suggestions or recommendations. Undoubtedly, the buy-bust team is not at a liberty to select
only parts it wants to comply with and conveniently ignore the rest of the requirements.
Unjustified deviations from the prescribed procedure will result to the creation of
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs and, consequently,
Among the essential requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are the
presence of the three required witnesses — namely, a media representative, a representative
from the DOJ, and any elected public official — and the immediate conduct of the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items in the specified places allowed under the
law. Here, however, the buy-bust team miserably failed to comply with these requirements.
A perusal of the records and the evidence presented by the prosecution would show that,
even believing its version of a buy-bust operation, the buy- bust team made no effort at all to
secure the three required witnesses.
After allegedly receiving the tip from the confidential informant, the buy-bust team
was formed, a team briefing was conducted, and the team went to the target area with the
informant. Conspicuously absent in the narration of facts by the prosecution is the part
where the buy-bust team sought the attendance of the three required witnesses. From the
time they received the tip at 4:30 p.m. up to the time they went to the target area at around
9:15 p.m., there was a span of around five (5) hours where they could have easily contacted
the required witnesses, but there was no hint that they made any effort to do so.
Consequently, the requirement of the presence of all the witnesses at the time of the
operation, conduct of inventory, and photographing was not fulfilled.
While the IRR has a saving clause excusing deviation from the required procedure,
the application of such clause must be supported by the presence of the following elements:
the apprehending team.
The above grounds were not present in this case; thus, the buy-bust team's failure to
comply with the three-witness rule is inexcusable. Moreover, the buy-bust team likewise
failed to immediately conduct the inventory and photographing of the seized items in the
places allowed by law.
A: NO. After allegedly receiving the tip from the confidential informant, the buy-bust team
was formed, a team briefing was conducted, and the team went to the target area with the
informant. Conspicuously absent in the narration of facts by the prosecution is the part
where the buy-bust team sought the attendance of the three required witnesses. From the
time they received the tip at 4:30 p.m. up to the time they went to the target area at around
9:15 p.m., there was a span of around five (5) hours where they could have easily contacted
the required witnesses, but there was no hint that they made any effort to do so.
Consequently, the requirement of the presence of all the witnesses at the time of the
operation, conduct of inventory, and photographing was not fulfilled.
While the IRR has a saving clause excusing deviation from the required procedure,
the application of such clause must be supported by the presence of the following elements:
the apprehending team.
The above grounds were not present in this case; thus, the buy-bust team's failure to
comply with the three-witness rule is inexcusable. Moreover, the buy-bust team likewise
failed to immediately conduct the inventory and photographing of the seized items in the
places allowed by law. (People of the Philippines v. Jose Jamillo Quilatan y Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
218107. September 9, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORLANDO RAMOS ORDIZ
DOCTRINE
“The prosecution's case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the supposed
poseur-buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be unclear and
lacking in details. To reiterate, sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer
fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
FACTS
For allegedly selling a plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of a white crystalline
substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly called shabu, in a buy-
bust operation conducted by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at about 1:00
p.m. at Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capitol Site, Cebu City, accused-appellant Ordiz was
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
In the afternoon of October 3, 2004, a buy-bust operation was conducted by members

of the Philippine National Police (PNP) against accused Orlando Ordiz who was reported to
be selling shabu in the Capitol area. During the entrapment, SPO1 Cerna, as the designated
poseur-buyer, approached accused with the intention of purchasing P100.00 worth of shabu
from him while SPO1 Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Capangpangan placed themselves at strategic
positions while they waited for the pre-arranged signal of waving Cerna's hand that would
indicate the consummation of the transaction. SPO1 Cerna, accompanied with a confidential
asset, who knows the accused negotiated to buy P100.00 of shabu, which transaction was
done in front of accused house. After the transaction was consummated, accused was
arrested in the presence of his parents. He was informed of his constitutional rights and
brought to the police station, along with the suspected shabu and the recovered buy-bust
money. In the meantime, the crystallized substance that was bought from the accused was
marked and brought to PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The results revealed that the
substance was positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
The RTC found accused- appellant Ordiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Ordiz.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Ordiz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged.
RULING
In the instant case, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its three witnesses,
i.e., SPO1 Ursal, Jr., PO2 Capangpangan, and SPO1 Cerna.A closer look at the testimonies of
SPO1 Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Capangpangan reveal that they did not actually see firsthand the
alleged sale of illegal drugs between accused-appellant Ordiz and the alleged poseur-buyer,
SPO1 Cerna, as they were positioned at some considerable distance away from the area
where SPO1 Cerna purportedly transacted with accused-appellant Ordiz.
In fact, the RTC itself made the observation that the testimonies of SPO1 Ursal, Jr., and
PO2 Capangpangan are unclear, holding in its Decision that "[t]he declaration of SPO1
Narciso Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Raniel Capangpangan are not clear whether they actually saw the
transaction or simply rushed up to arrest the accused after a pre- arranged signal was given."
The prosecution's case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the

supposed poseur-buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be
unclear and lacking in details. To reiterate, sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged
poseur-buyer fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Aside from the foregoing, the acquittal of accused-appellant Ordiz is likewise

warranted due to the patent non-observance of the chain of custody rule. In particular, the
following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the
seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the allegedly seized drug specimen. As readily admitted by the RTC in its Decision, "[a]t the
outset, it is noted that neither the Forensic Chemical Officer, PSI Medardo Palapo, nor the
custodian was presented to identify the Chemistry Report x x x." Through the testimony of
SPO1 Ursal, Jr., the prosecution merely established that there was a request to examine the
allegedly seized specimen and that the specimen was transferred from the police station to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Aside from the bare fact that the specimen was transferred to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, there was no evidence on the condition of the specimen and how the same was
exactly turned over to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. There is likewise no
evidence on record as to the conduct of the supposed laboratory examination. No testimony
was provided showing the procedures undertaken by the forensic chemist in examining the
specimen, assuming in the first place that an examination was really undertaken.
Moreover, there is no evidence providing details on how the specimen was returned
by the forensic chemist back to the evidence custodian. In fact, the identity of the evidence
custodian, assuming there was even a custodian, is unknown. In sum, there is absolutely no
evidence establishing how the specimen was stored and maintained while in the custody of
the PNP.
As if the prosecution's blatant failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the elements of the crime charged and the patent non-observance of the chain
of custody rule were not enough, the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the prosecution's evidence are further put into serious doubt due to the indisputable and
wholesale failure of the authorities to observe the mandatory procedural requirements laid
down in Section 21 of RA 9165.
The Court ruled that the authorities failed to observe literally ALL the mandatory
requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the prosecution failed to recognize these
lapses and offer sufficient justification to warrant the non-observance of these mandatory
rules.
As borne by the evidence of the prosecution, no inventory and photographing were

conducted whatsoever. As testified by the prosecution's witnesses, after the alleged drug
transaction, accused- appellant Ordiz was immediately apprehended and brought to the
police station. In fact, the record is silent as to whether any inventory receipt or certificate
of inventory was executed. Surely, no such document was admitted and offered as evidence
for the prosecution.
To make matters worse, none of the required witnesses was present during the buy-
bust operation. The testimonies of the witnesses reveal that only the parents of accused-
appellant Ordiz witnessed the apprehension of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the
marking of the allegedly seized drug specimen was not made immediately after and at the
place of apprehension. No justification was made as to why the marking was done in the
police station and not in the place of apprehension. Worse, it was not even shown that the
police station where the marking was conducted was the nearest police station.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. During the trial, the
prosecution relied on the testimonies of its three witnesses. However, the RTC itself
made the observation that the testimonies are unclear, holding in its Decision that
"[t]he declaration of A and B are not clear whether they actually saw the transaction
or simply rushed up to arrest the accused after a pre- arranged signal was given." Was
guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?
A: NO. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following
The prosecution's case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the

supposed poseur-buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be
unclear and lacking in details. To reiterate, sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged
poseur-buyer fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(People of the Philippines v. Orlando Ramos Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767. September 11, 2019, as
DANILO DE VILLA y GUINTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
“In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the police
officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused on board
his motorcycle. The police officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned, was
committing several traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification for their
act of flagging down the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon asking the
accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utility box, and the two (2) sachets
of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the sachets was inadvertent
and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2 Hamilton Salanguit (PO2
Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline substance since it appeared that
the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.”
FACTS
An information was filed against Danilo for violation of Section 11 (3), Article II of RA
9165. On 04 May 2011, at around 3:10 o'clock p.m., PO2 Hamilton Salanguit and SPO1
Edward Plata and other police officers from Tuy (Batangas) Police Station were conducting
a checkpoint in Barangay Rizal when they flagged down a Green Honda Wave motorcycle
driven by accused-appellant with his wife Josefina Maria de Villa as backrider. Accused-
appellant was not wearing helmet and shoes, and was only clad in sando. PO2 Salanguit
approached accused-appellant and thereupon noticed that the motorcycle did not have a
license plate. He asked accused-appellant to show his driver's license, but the latter could
not present the same. PO2 Salanguit then requested accused-appellant to show the
registration papers. Accused-appellant opened the motorcycle's utility box and took out a
plastic containing the LTO — issued license plate (WG-7720) as well as the photocopies of
the motorcycle's expired registration papers under the name of Alex Dayandayan which he
handed to SPO1 Plata. At this instance, PO2 Sanlanguit saw two (2) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance inside the utility box which he confiscated. Immediately, the
police officers bodily searched accused-appellant and ordered him to empty the contents of
his pocket. From accused- appellant's right pocket, two (2) more plastic sachets were
recovered.
From the foregoing, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove
the existence of all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA
affirmed Danilo's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Danilo's guilt for violation of Section 11 (3) of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
YES. All the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by
the prosecution. Moreover, there is no question that there was a valid warrantless arrest of
Danilo and seizure of the illegal drugs. It is undeniable that the seizure of the prohibited
items in this case was valid under the "plain view" doctrine.
In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the
police officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused
on board his motorcycle. The police officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned,
was committing several traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification
for their act of flagging down the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon
asking the accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utility box, and the
two (2) sachets of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the
sachets was inadvertent and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2
Hamilton Salanguit (PO2 Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline
substance since it appeared that the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
The seizure of these pieces of evidence in plain view is what justified the subsequent
searches and the arrest of Danilo. If not for the said plastic sachets, there would have been
no valid reason to search or frisk Danilo as his traffic violations were punishable only by fine.
His traffic violations per se did not justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was
as yet no lawful arrest to speak of. However, with the discovery of the two plastic sachets in
the utility box, there arose a valid reason to properly arrest Danilo and conduct a search
incidental to such lawful arrest. And true enough, they discovered two (2) more plastic
sachets of shabu in the right pocket of Danilo's pants.
The Court further ruled that with the CA that the police officers were able to strictly
comply with the requirements laid down in Section 21. The seized items were immediately
marked at the place of arrest by PO2 Salanguit. Since the arrest of the accused and seizure of
the dangerous drugs were merely a result of the routine checkpoint conducted by the police
officers and not because of a pre-planned buy-bust operation, they had a sufficient
justification to delay the conduct of the inventory and photography of the seized items at a
different venue. In addition, it is worthy to note that despite the fact that said arrest of the
accused and seizure of the illegal drugs was not planned, it is apparent that they exerted
enough reasonable efforts to ensure that the physical inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media,
a representative of the Department of Justice, and a barangay official immediately after the
arrest and seizure at the barangay hall — a requirement that many police officers normally
fail to comply with even in a planned buy-bust operation.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of illegal possession of illegal drugs. In addition, other
prohibited items was also seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Is the doctrine
applicable in drug cases?
A: YES. It is undeniable that the seizure of the prohibited items in this case was valid under
the "plain view" doctrine.
In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the
police officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused
on board his motorcycle. The police officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned,
was committing several traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification
for their act of flagging down the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon
asking the accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utility box, and the
two (2) sachets of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the
sachets was inadvertent and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2
Hamilton Salanguit (PO2 Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline
substance since it appeared that the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
The seizure of these pieces of evidence in plain view is what justified the subsequent
searches and the arrest of Danilo. If not for the said plastic sachets, there would have been
no valid reason to search or frisk Danilo as his traffic violations were punishable only by fine.
His traffic violations per se did not justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was
as yet no lawful arrest to speak of. However, with the discovery of the two plastic sachets in
the utility box, there arose a valid reason to properly arrest Danilo and conduct a search
incidental to such lawful arrest. And true enough, they discovered two (2) more plastic
sachets of shabu in the right pocket of Danilo's pants. (Danilo De Villa y Guinto v. People of the
Philippines. G.R. No. 224039. September 11, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL CARDENAS y HALILI
DOCTRINE
“If the arresting officers were unable to comply with the requirements under Section 21
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9156, they were under obligation to explain why the procedure was
not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable round. Otherwise, the requisites
under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the
arresting officers at their own convenience.”
FACTS
An information was filed against Cardenas for alleged violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," as amended.
On 12 September 2008, a male confidential informant reported to Police Inspector

Romeo Rabuya of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG)
of Police Station 11, Galas, Quezon City the illegal drug activities of a certain "Boom Tarat-
Tarat" (later identified as [accused-appellant Cardenas]) in the said area. In response, PI
Rabuya dispatched Police Officer 2 Jorge Santiago [(PO2 Santiago)] and Police Officer 2
Jayson Perez to conduct a surveillance and casing at Unang Hakbang St. in front of No. 78
Galas, Quezon City.
[PI] Rabuya recommended that a buy-bust operation be conducted against [accused-

appellant] Cardenas, designating [PO2] Santiago as the poseur- buyer who would use the
marked Php100.00 bill. The other members of the buy-bust operation team assembled by
[PI] Rabuya were Police Officer 1 Erwin Bautista [(PO1 Bautista)], Police Officer 1 Franklin
Gadia [(PO1 Gadia)], and [PI] Rabuya himself. The buy-bust operation team likewise
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
[Accused-appellant] Cardenas then asked [PO2] Santiago whether he had money to

buy drugs. [PO2] Santiago replied in the affirmative by showing the marked Php100.00 bill.
Thereafter, [accused-appellant] Cardenas pulled from the right front pocket of his pants one
(1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing marijuana leaves with fruiting
tops. [PO2] Santiago handed the marked Php100.00 bill to [accused- appellant] Cardenas
while the latter handed to him the said one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing marijuana leaves with fruiting tops. At that juncture, [PO2] Santiago scratched his
head, as a signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that was on standby that the sale had already
been consummated.
[PO2] Santiago then held the hand of [accused- appellant] Cardenas to prevent him
from escaping. Subsequently, the rest of the buy-bust team led by [PO2] Perez arrived and
approached [accused-appellant] Cardenas. [PO2] Perez informed [accused-appellant]
Cardenas of his constitutional rights.
The RTC found accused-appellant Cardenas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Cardenas.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Cardenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged.
RULING
the aforesaid elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug
cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Therefore, in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
establishing the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the alleged seized
drug specimen. According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust was
conducted, the team proceeded to the police station, wherein PO2 Santiago turned over the
seized item to PO3 Carranza. After PO3 Carranza prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination, PO2 Santiago brought the seized item for physical and chemical examination
to the crime laboratory and turned over the same to Engr. Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory.
However, on the witness stand, PO2 Santiago testified that he turned over the alleged
seized drug specimen to one SPO1 Ronaldo Corea (SPO1 Corea). According to PO2 Santiago's
testimony, it was SPO1 Corea who turned over the specimen to PO3 Carranza.
As SPO1 Corea was not presented by the prosecution, the evidence on record is silent
as to how SPO1 Corea handled the specimen, the condition of the specimen at the time the
specimen was handed over to SPO1 Corea, the precautions taken by SPO1 Corea to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item, and how SPO1 Corea transferred
possession of the specimen to PO3 Carranza. In short, the chain of custody of the specimen
from PO2 Santiago to SPO1 Corea and from SPO1 Corea to PO3 Carranza was not firmly
established.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of illegal possession of illegal drugs. During trial, the
person who handled the specimen was not the one presented as a witness. Is the
unbroken chain of custody established in such case?
A: NO As SPO1 Corea was not presented by the prosecution, the evidence on record is silent
as to how SPO1 Corea handled the specimen, the condition of the specimen at the time the
specimen was handed over to SPO1 Corea, the precautions taken by SPO1 Corea to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item, and how SPO1 Corea transferred
possession of the specimen to PO3 Carranza. In short, the chain of custody of the specimen
from PO2 Santiago to SPO1 Corea and from SPO1 Corea to PO3 Carranza was not firmly
established. (People of the Philippines v. Noel Cardenas y Halili. G.R. No. 229046. September 11,
DOCTRINE
“Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events narrated above is immaterial
to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that
sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. Such an
offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling
or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma
upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind
would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for committing lascivious acts against AAA.
At around one o'clock in the afternoon of April 28, 2012, she was about to pick up
something from the floor in one of the rooms of their house when without any warning,
accused-appellant approached her from the back. When she turned to face him, the accused-
appellant grabbed the lower end of her t-shirt, inserted his hands inside and touched her
breast while he uttered the words "pahawak nga." She immediately parried accused-
appellant's hands to resist it. Accused-appellant then tried to pull down her shorts but she
held on to the sides of it to prevent him from stripping it off. Thereafter, she ran towards the
kitchen where her mother was. She was teary eyed and about to cry when her mother asked
her what was wrong. However, she did not say anything because she was afraid that the
accused-appellant might kill or hurt them as he had laid his hands on her mother before.
While she was crying and trembling from shock and fear, she went outside and called
her boyfriend CCC to tell him about her ordeal. She decided to go to the house of DDD, her
biological father, in Bulacan but the latter was not there at that time. She then texted her
mother saying "Yung asawa mo, hayup yan, yung ginawa niya sakin." Her mother called her
and she narrated what happened between her and the accused-appellant. Her mother cried
profusely upon knowing of the incident and advised her to go home so they could file a case
against the accused-appellant. Thus, she went home as per her mother's instruction and
together, they went to the Valenzuela City Police Station to file a complaint against the
accused- appellant.
The RTC convicted XXX of the crime charged. On appeal, the RTC convicted XXX of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not RTC and the CA erred in convicting XXX.
RULING
NO. Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events narrated above is
immaterial to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it is worth
emphasizing that sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered
in detail. Such an offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as
to be worth recalling or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes deep psychological
wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her
conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone.
Thus, the inconsistencies, if any, pointed out by XXX would not exculpate him from
the crime. XXX cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance dated October 23, 2013
executed by AAA as the basis for his acquittal. It must be noted that, subsequent to the
execution of the Affidavit of Desistance, AAA still took the witness stand on July 26, 2016 to
testify against XXX.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of acts of lasciviousness. He used as his defense
inconsistencies in the actions of the victim such as testifying on the witnesses stand
and subsequently executing an affidavit of desistance. Is the argument of X tenable?
A: NO Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events narrated above is immaterial
to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that
sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. Such an
offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot be expected to mechanically
keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone.
Thus, the inconsistencies, if any, pointed out by XXX would not exculpate him from
the crime. XXX cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance dated October 23, 2013
executed by AAA as the basis for his acquittal. It must be noted that, subsequent to the
execution of the Affidavit of Desistance, AAA still took the witness stand on July 26, 2016 to
testify against XXX. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242101. September 16, 2019, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMALYN N. MORENO
DOCTRINE
“In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving the
elements of the crime charged, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned
by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires
strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against Moreno for alleged violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," as amended.
On 11 July 2012, at around 9:00 p.m., Marleo B. Sumale (Agent Sumale), an agent of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), was informed by a fellow PDEA agent that
a certain person named "Ara," a waitress at the WRJ Resto Bar in Barangay Salong, Calapan
City, Oriental Mindoro, was peddling dangerous drugs in said establishment. Acting on this
information, Agent Sumale — along with other PDEA agents — formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation against subject Ara. Agent Sumale was designated as the poseur-buyer,
while Rosemarie Catain (Agent Catain), was assigned to be the arresting officer. Before the
operation, Agent Sumale marked the money to be used with "SMB."
In accordance with the plan, Agent Sumale and the informant proceeded to the
establishment. At around 12:00 midnight, a woman approached them. The informant
identified the woman as the same "Ara" who was the alleged drug-seller. After having been
introduced to Agent Sumale, accused-appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing
suspectedshabu. Upon receipt of the sachet, Agent Sumale handed to accused-appellant the
marked P500.00 bill. Thereafter, Agent Sumale removed his baseball cap, signifying the
completion of the transaction, upon which the other agents, originally positioned in strategic
spots around the area, converged on the scene and effected the arrest of accused-appellant.
Agent Catain frisked accused-appellant and found the marked bill. Agent Sumale then placed
the marking "SMB 12/07/12" on the sachet containing suspected shabu. The apprehending
team, along with the accused- appellant, then proceeded to the PDEA office where the
inventory of the confiscated arms was done.
The RTC convicted Moreno of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Moreno, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the
crimes charged, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object, and the
consideration of the sale; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Moreno.
RULING
proving the elements of the crime charged, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body
of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation
of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven
procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law
nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that
rights are safeguarded.

and confiscation . The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
seizure and apprehension, and only two of them were present during the conduct of the
inventory. The records of this case are bereft of any explanation as to why no representative
from the DOJ was present in the inventory. The prosecution, despite its burden to prove the
officers' compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, did not address the issue in
their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely on supposed substantial
compliance with the rules to justify Moreno's conviction.
A: NO Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

and confiscation . The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
seizure and apprehension, and only two of them were present during the conduct of the
inventory. The records of this case are bereft of any explanation as to why no representative
from the DOJ was present in the inventory. The prosecution, despite its burden to prove the
officers' compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, did not address the issue in
their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely on supposed substantial
compliance with the rules to justify Moreno's conviction. (People of the Philippines v. Emalyn
N. Moreno, G.R. No. 234273. September 18, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE RASOS, JR. y PADOLLO @ "JOSE"
DOCTRINE
“Given the very nature of the anti-illegal drugs campaign, the nature of entrapment and
buy-bust operations, the usual practice of utilizing unreliable characters as informants, and the
great ease by which drug specimen can be planted in the pockets or hands of unsuspecting
persons, most of whom come from the marginalized sectors of society, the propensity for police
abuse is great. This is precisely why the innocent is provided refuge under the protective mantle
of the law — through the mandatory requirements laid down in Republic Act No. 9165, as
amended. The instant case is yet another example of how the lowly, through the majesty of the
law, triumphs over the daunting and all-powerful prosecutorial power of the State.”
FACTS
In two (2) separate Informations filed before the RTC of Manila, Rasos, Jr. was charged
with violations of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In the evening of September 11, 2015, a confidential asset reported to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Unit (SAID-SOTU) of the Manila Police District-
Ermita Police Station (PS-5), the illegal drug trade activity of [Rasos, Jr.] along L. Guerrero
St., Ermita, Manila. Immediately thereafter, a buy-bust team was formed to entrap [Rasos,
Jr.], with SPO4 Rowell Robles as team leader and PO2 Garchitorena as poseur-buyer,
together with six (6) other police officers as back-up operatives. A Pre-Operation Report and
Authority to Operate were sent to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Upon
receipt of the documents, the PDEA faxed Control No. 10001-042015-0154 authorizing the
buy-bust team to proceed with the operation. During the briefing, poseur-buyer PO2
Garchitorena was given two (2) pieces of P100 bill bearing his initials "JC" to be used as buy-
bust money. It was agreed that PO2 Garchitorena will remove his cap after the sale
transaction.
At 3:00 o'clock in the morning of September 12, 2015, PO2 Garchitorena and the
confidential informant proceeded to the target area on board a motorcycle while the rest of
the team strategically positioned themselves nearby. PO2 Garchitorena and the confidential
informant alighted from the motorcycle then walked towards [Rasos, Jr.]. Upon seeing the
confidential informant, [Rasos, Jr.] approached them. After a short conversation, the
confidential informant introduced PO2 Garchitorena to [Rasos, Jr.] as a buyer of shabu.
Noticing the big physique of PO2 Garchitorena, [Rasos, Jr.] asked him, "Ano ito? Gagamitin
mo pampayat?" [Rasos, Jr.] answered, "Hindi bibili lang ako panggamit, dalawang tarya."
[Rasos, Jr.] then pulled out from his pocket two (2) plastic sachets ofshabu. PO2 Garchitorena
gave the two (2) pieces of P100 bill to [Rasos, Jr.]. [Rasos, Jr.] made PO2 Garchitorena choose
between the two (2) plastic sachets ofshabu. After PO2 Garchitorena picked one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu, [Rasos, Jr.] placed the money and the remaining plastic sachet in his pocket.
At the conclusion of the transaction, PO2 Garchitorena removed his cap which was the pre-
arranged signal to his teammates that the sale has already been consummated. Seeing this,
the back-up operatives rushed to the crime scene, introduced themselves as police officers
and effected the arrest of [Rasos, Jr.]. PO2 Garchitorena directed [Rasos, Jr.] to empty his
pockets, to which he obliged. As a result thereof, the two (2) pieces P100 bill buy-bust money
and a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from [Rasos, Jr.]. As the rain then started to pour,
the team decided to conduct the marking and inventory of the seized evidence at the police
station. PO2 Garchitorena held in his custody the two (2) plastic sachets of shabu until it was
brought to the police station.
The RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Rasos, Jr. for committing illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. With respect to illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the RTC acquitted Rasos, Jr. on the
ground of reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Rasos, Jr.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Rasos, Jr. for violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays
down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that:(1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and
counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a representative of the National Prosecution
Service (NPS) or the media; and (3) the accused or his/her representative and all of the
aforesaid witnesses shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the
time of the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory, and that the
law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.
It is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165
when they conducted the subject buy-bust operation. As readily admitted by the CA in the
assailed Decision, "the arresting officers may not have strictly complied with requirements
of Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165."
First, it is undisputed that there was no elected official who witnessed the inventory
of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the same. Second, the prosecution
likewise admits without hesitation that Rasos, Jr.'s signature on the Receipt/Inventory of
Property/Seized Evidence/s dated September 12, 2015 is unavailing. Third, the
prosecution's main witness, PO2 Garchitorena, admitted on cross-examination that there
were no photographs taken during the inventory and markings of the alleged seized drug
specimens.
A: NO Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays down
the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated
drugs used as evidence. The said provision requires that:(1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative
or counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a representative of the National Prosecution
thereof.
The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the
time of the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory, and that the
law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.
(People of the Philippines v. Jose Rasos, Jr. y Padollo @ "Jose," G.R. No. 243639. September 18,
CARLOS A. CATUBAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 227371. October 2, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists
of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly
or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime
or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.”
FACTS
Acting on a complaint filed by Cornelio Ragasa (Ragasa) and Atty. Fernando Perito
(Atty. Perito), an Information was filed by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
against Catubao.
In 2007, estafa cases were filed against Cornelio Ragasa ("Ragasa"). He hired Atty.
Fernando Perito ("Atty. Perito") as his lawyer. The cases were pending before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacoor, Cavite and accused Catubao was then the handling
prosecutor. For two years, the cases remained unresolved prompting Atty. Perito to
personally follow them up with the accused several times. Accused Catubao asked him for
"pang inom" whenever Atty. Perito makes a follow up. Before going on a Christmas vacation,
they again met and it was there that the accused said he need[ed] money for he was leaving
for Samar.
On December 19, 2008 and while in Guiuan, Samar, accused Catubao called Atty.
Perito asking any amount of money for a drinking session with his friends and mentioned
that five thousand pesos (Php5,000.00) will do. Atty. Perito immediately informed Ragasa
about it. Ragasa proceeded to Atty. Perito's office and handed him said amount. Atty. Perito
then ordered his secretary, Susan Remoquillo, to send only four thousand pesos
(Php4,000.00) to the accused through LBC Padre Faura.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Catubao of the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan

ruled that all the elements of the crime had been sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan held that, based on the evidence, Catubao solicited and received a gift from
Atty. Perito to expedite the resolution of the estafa cases of Ragasa pending before him. Thus,
Catubao received a gift in consideration for doing an act, though not constituting a crime in
itself, but was related to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Catubao of the crime of Direct
Bribery.
RULING
YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present
or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not
constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
In the case at bar, the third element, was not duly proven. The third element of the
crime requires that the gift be given in consideration of the accused's commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do.
In the present case, the prosecution claimed, and the Sandiganbayan believed, that
the P3,000.00 was solicited by Catubao in exchange for finally acting on the estafa cases filed
against Ragasa that were then pending before Catubao. Catubao, on the other hand, claims
that it was only (1) a "return of favor" because he previously lent Atty. Perito P1,000.00, and
(2) a "balato" because Atty. Perito told him that Atty. Perito just won another case.
Apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty. Perito and Ragasa, the prosecution
presented no other evidence that the money was solicited by Catubao and that it was given
in consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The existence of the third element,
therefore, boils down to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court holds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the third element. This is so because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were so marred by inconsistencies that they are no longer believable.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of direct bribery. As defense he reasoned that the
amount he received was for a drinking session with his friends, thus disproving the
third element of the crime which is that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do. Is the argument of
X tenable?
A: YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present
or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not
constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
In the case at bar, the third element, was not duly proven. The third element of the
crime requires that the gift be given in consideration of the accused's commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do. (Carlos A. Catubao v. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 227371. October 2, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY FAYO y RUBIO A.K.A. "JEFF"
DOCTRINE
“Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays down
drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1)the seized items be inventoried and photographed
at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and
thereof.”
FACTS
In Crim. Case No. 20349-D, Fayo was charged with illegal sale of shabu. In addition,
he was charged with illegal possession of shabu in Crim. Case No. 20350-D.
On May 27, 2015, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Renato B. Castillo, Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group
(SAIDSOTG), Pasig City Police Station, conducted a meeting and informed the operatives that
a confidential informant can accompany any one of them to buy illegal drugs from [Fayo]
who is a known pusher at Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. A buy-bust operation was
planned against [Fayo] where PO1 Jonathan P. Bueno (PO1 Bueno) was tasked as the poseur-
buyer, who will buy illegal drugs from [Fayo] using a one thousand-peso bill with Serial No.
FA131613 bearing the markings "JPB" on its lower left corner. The agreed pre-arranged
signal will be the act of PO1 Bueno in scratching his head which will signify that the buy-bust
transaction is already consummated. The other operatives were tasked as perimeter back-
ups, while PO1 Randy S. Sanoy (PO1 Sanoy) was designated as the immediate back-up of the
poseur-buyer.
[Fayo] then asked the confidential informant and PO1 Bueno how much they were
buying, to which PO1 Bueno responded One Thousand Pesos (Php1,000.00) worth and
immediately handed to [Fayo] the marked money. [Fayo] took the marked bill and kept it in
his left pocket. He then took several sachets from his right pocket, choosing one and handing
it to PO1 Bueno.
PO1 Bueno received the sachet from [Fayo] and executed the pre-arranged signal to
alert his fellow operatives. PO1 Bueno then introduced himself as a police officer. While
being apprehended [Fayo] tried to reach for something from his waistline, but was stopped
by PO1 Sanoy. Upon frisking [Fayo], PO1 Sanoy discovered that [Fayo] was reaching for a
calibre .45 gun, also, [Fayo] had a grenade in his backpack.
PO1 Bueno confiscated from [Fayo] an additional four (4) transparent plastic sachets
all containing the same white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, as well as the
marked One Thousand Peso (Php1,000.00) bill.
The RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Fayo for committing illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Fayo.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Fayo for violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays
down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1)the seized items be inventoried and
thereof.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with
Section 21 of RA 9165 when they conducted the subject buy- bust operation.
First, it is beyond dispute that there was no representative from the NPS or media
who witnessed the inventory of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the
same. As readily acknowledged by the RTC, "[n]o representative from the National
Prosecution Service and/or media came."
Second, it is also an admitted fact that the inventory and photographing of the
allegedly seized drug specimen were undertaken at the Barangay Hall of Manggahan and not
at the place of the seizure or the nearest police station/office of the apprehending team.
Considering the foregoing premises, with the noncompliance of the requirements

mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, not being justified, the seizures and
custody of the alleged drug specimens are rendered void. Therefore, the conviction of Fayo
for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 does not have a leg to stand on.
A: NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays down
drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1)the seized items be inventoried and
thereof.
It is beyond dispute that there was no representative from the NPS or media who
witnessed the inventory of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the same.
As readily acknowledged by the RTC, "[n]o representative from the National Prosecution
Service and/or media came." (People of the Philippines v. Jeffrey Fayo y Rubio a.k.a. "Jeff," G.R.
No. 239887. October 2, 2019, as penned by J. Caguioa)
GIL "BOYING" R. CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
“It has been consistently ruled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty
as a co-conspirator, the prosecution must be able to show, at the very least, with the same
degree of proof required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt, that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a
common purpose or design to commit the felony. The participation in the transaction must be
intentional. Otherwise, none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own action.”
FACTS
In Bocaue Bulacan, accused Serafin dela Cruz, then Mayor; Gil Cruz, then Acting
Administrator; Dennis Carpio then Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan and Private
Secretary to the mayor; and Isidoro Mauricio, then Municipal Assessor, all public officials of
the Bocaue, while in the performance of their official functions, and as such taking advantage
of the same, obstruct and stop the execution of the Court’s valid writs of execution and
demolition of the structure illegally constructed on the lot owned by the wife of the
complainant, thereby causing undue injury to the complainant and giving unwarranted
benefits to certain Alex Halili.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision.
RULING
YES. In the assailed Decision, the SB held that petitioners Cruz and Carpio are guilty
of violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by reason of conspiracy. However, in finding Cruz and
Carpio liable through conspiracy, the SB simply ruled that it “lends credence to the claim of
the Prosecution that there had been conspiracy among accused in giving Alexander Halili
unwarranted benefits by interfering and obstructing in the enforcement of a legal process
enjoined by interfering and obstructing in the enforcement of a legal process enjoined by the
court accused exhibited evident bad faith.
These pronouncements are insufficient to establish that petitioners acted in

conspiracy to commit the crime charged. The be certain the SB failed to point to a specific act
performed by each petitioner that would indicate a unity of purpose or common design to
give Halili unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their functions.
Q: Public officials while in the performance of their official functions, and as such
taking advantage of the same, obstruct and stop the execution of the Court’s valid writs
of execution and demolition of the structure illegally constructed on the lot owned by
the wife of the complainant, thereby causing undue injury to the complainant. Is there
a violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 through conspiracy?
A: NO. It has been consistently ruled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held
guilty as a co-conspirator, the prosecution must be able to show, at the very least, with the
same degree of proof required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt, that
all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate
a common purpose or design to commit the felony. The participation in the transaction must
be intentional. Otherwise, none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only
be held responsible for the results of his own action
These pronouncements are insufficient to establish that petitioners acted in

conspiracy to commit the crime charged. The be certain the SB failed to point to a specific act
performed by each petitioner that would indicate a unity of purpose or common design to
give Halili unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their functions.
(Gil "Boying" R. Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197142. October 9, 2019, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMELO DORIA y PEREZ
DOCTRINE
“Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ; and (2) the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official , (c) a representative from the
media, and (d)a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.”
FACTS
Doria was charged in two (2) sets of Information both dated January 16, 2008 for
violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), and 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) of Article II of Republic Act No. 91655.
On January 15, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Dagupan City
conducted a conference meeting about having a buy-bust operation against a certain
Marcelina Doris ("Marcelina" for brevity) who was a known drug peddler, and was
reportedly residing in the house of Spouses Samuel and Melody Erguiza ("Sps. Erguiza" for
brevity) in Pantal District, Dagupan City. The team leader, Police Inspector Leo Llamas ("PI
Llamas" for brevity), instructed the police officers to form a buy-bust team. The team was
composed of PI Llamas, PI George Sali-em, PO1 Romulo Lavarias [(PO1 Lavarias)], and PO2
De Vera. PO2 De Vera was designated as the poseur-buyer, who was to use five (5) pieces of
One Hundred peso bills, which bore the markings, "MCV." PO1 Lavarias was tasked as PO2
De Vera's immediate back-up. The buy-bust operation and the serial numbers of the marked
money were then recorded in the Police Blotter Book of the Dagupan City Police Station. The
team then proceeded to the area of operation. At about fifty (50) meters away from the target
place, PO2 De Vera alighted from the vehicle and walked towards the house of Sps. Erguiza.
According to PO2 De Vera, he saw a male person, who would later be identified as [Doria],
standing in front of Sps. Erguiza's house. PO2 De Vera approached [Doria] and looked for
Marcelina who was also known as Mamang. [Doria] replied that Marcelina was not around
and suddenly told PO2 De Vera in Pangasinan dialect, "Siak lay pangaliwan mo," which means
"Just buy it from me." Surprised, PO2 De Vera brought out the marked money, and said that
he wanted to buy shabu worth Five Hundred pesos. [Doria] then introduced himself as
Romelo Doria. After PO2 De Vera handed to [Doria] the marked money, the latter brought
out two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. As a result, PO2 De Vera signaled to PO1
Lavarias in order to arrest [Doria]. [Doria], however, resisted the arrest and ran inside the
house of Sps. Erguiza. PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias chased [Doria] inside the house. They
were able to arrest [Doria]. Afterwards, PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias conducted a bodily
search on [Doria]. They were able to recover another three (3) plastic sachets of suspected
shabu, two (2) empty plastic sachets, one (1) small scissor, one (1) disposable lighter, and
the marked money.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting Doria on both charges. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of Doria.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Doria for violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ;
representative from the media, and (d)a representative from the Department of Justice
thereof.
In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures
required under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team.
First and foremost, not even one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust
operation and the inventory and photographing of the alleged drug specimen supposedly
retrieved from Doria.
Second, the inventory receipt produced by the prosecution, i.e., the handwritten
Confiscation Receipt dated January 15, 2008, contains the lone signature of PO2 De Vera.
Third, while testifying that the Confiscation Receipt was prepared at the place of the
incident, in the same breath, the prosecution's main witness, PO2 De Vera, testified that the
recording, disposition, and inventory of the supposedly confiscated drug specimen were
conducted at the Dagupan City Police Station (DCPS) and not at the place of apprehension.
Fourth, in further engendering serious doubt as to the integrity of the specimen

allegedly retrieved from the person of Doria, PO2 De Vera himself acknowledges that with
respect to some of the plastic containers allegedly confiscated from Doria's left pocket, he
"did not place any marking, however we took pictures on the said recovered items, sir."
A: NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ;
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official , (c) a
representative from the media, and (d)a representative from the Department of Justice
thereof.
In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures
required under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team. Not even
one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust operation and the inventory and
photographing of the alleged drug specimen supposedly retrieved from Doria. (People of the
Philippines v. Romelo Doria y Perez, G.R. No. 227854. October 9, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESARIA BASIO VERTUDES
and HENRY BASIO VERTUDES
DOCTRINE
“It is thus obvious that the police failed to comply with the three- witnesses requirement
under Section 21. Although there were two Barangay Tanods that were present at the
Barangay Hall for the inventory and photography of the seized items, they are not the required
witnesses contemplated by the law. It should be emphasized that the law requires the presence
of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected official; they are merely
appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.”
FACTS
Accused-appellants Cesaria and her son, Henry, were indicted for violation of Section
5 of RA 9165 in an Information. Cesaria was likewise charged for violating Section 11 of RA
9165.
On April 16, 2010 at around 10:00 p.m., PO2 Ocampo was on duty at the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group (SAIDSOTG) of Parañ aque Police Station, when
one of their regular assets came to their office to give information about the illegal selling of
drugs in the area of Barangay Baclaran, Parañ aque City by herein appellants Cesaria and
Henry. A buy-bust team was then organized composed of PO2 Ocampo, who was to act as
poseur-buyer, SPO1 Macaraeg, PSI Marlou Besona, PO3 Fernan Acbang, and PO2 Domingo
Julaton (PO2 Julaton). Two Php1,000.00 bills were given to PO2 Ocampo to purchase
Php2,000[.]00 worth of shabu from the suspects which he marked with "x." After
coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and conducting a short
briefing, the team, together with their informant, then proceeded to Barangay Baclaran.
Upon arrival at a small wet market along Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, PO2 Ocampo and the
informant went toward Bagong Ilog Street, while the rest of the team discre[e]tly followed.
There they spotted an elderly woman sitting outside of a house and a male person standing
along the street who were later identified respectively as herein appellants Cesaria and her
son[,] Henry.
At about 12:10 a.m. of April 17, 2010, PO2 Ocampo and the informant proceeded to
approach Henry to buy shabu. The informant greeted Henry and introduced PO2 Ocampo as
a businessman in need of shabu. PO2 Ocampo then asked Henry if he has Php2,000.00 worth
of shabu to which the latter replied that he does not have any and asked them to wait as he
will first ask his mother, Cesaria, if she has some left. Henry then shouted to the latter, "Nay,
meron ka pa ba diyan, meron akong scorer dito," to which the latter replied, "meron pa ako
at marami pa akong hawak dito." Cesaria then stood up to approach them. PO2 Ocampo
handed Henry the marked money which the latter in turn handed to his mother. In return,
Cesaria handed to Henry two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
which he in turn handed to PO2 Ocampo. Upon receiving the sachets, PO2 Ocampo executed
the pre-arranged signal by turning his cap backwards to alert the rest of the team that the
transaction has been completed. SPO1 Macaraeg then rushed to the scene and was able to
arrest Henry. Cesaria, on the other hand, was apprehended by PO2 Ocampo.
The RTC found accused guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Cesaria and Henry.
ISSUE
Whether or not the guilt of Henry for violation of Section 5 and of Cesaria for violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The prosecution admittedly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, which thus results in their failure to
prove the guilt of Cesaria and Henry beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
activity.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the police officers, assuming that their story of a
buy-bust operation is even true, blatantly disregarded the requirements laid down under
Section 21. The buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in the
conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug, which thus
compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs. More importantly,
they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the rules.
The Court points out that, as testified by PO2 Ocampo none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused- appellants and the seizure of the
drugs. It is thus obvious that the police failed to comply with the three- witnesses
requirement under Section 21. Although there were two Barangay Tanods that were present
at the Barangay Hall for the inventory and photography of the seized items, they are not the
required witnesses contemplated by the law. It should be emphasized that the law requires
the presence of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected official; they are
merely appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.
A: NO. Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
activity.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the police officers, assuming that their story of a
buy-bust operation is even true, blatantly disregarded the requirements laid down under
Section 21. The buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in the
conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug, which thus
compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs. More importantly,
they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the rules. (People of the Philippines v. Cesaria
Basio Vertudes and Henry Basio Vertudes, G.R. No. 220725. October 16, 2019, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL DOLANDOLAN
G.R. No. 232157. January 8, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“While seemingly immaterial, the contradictory statements that: (1) accused-appellant
and AAA took a tricycle to the scene of the crime; (2) accused-appellant and AAA walked for
about an hour while talking; and, (3) accused-appellant and AAA walked for a period of time
that AAA could no longer recall, all the while under threat of violence — taken with all other
evident discrepancies undoubtedly calls AAA's credibility into question.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against accused-appellant for the rape of AAA.
On February 10, 1995, when [AAA] was 15 years old, she went with two of her friends
to a peryahan in [Brgy. RTD, XYZ,] Zambales. When her friends went home, she was left alone
in the peryahan playing games with bets and promenading when [accused- appellant], an
employee of the peryahan and who she has not met before, introduced himself to her. During
her direct examination, she narrated that [accused-appellant] invited her to his place, and
that he talked to her in a pleasant manner and she thought that the intention of [accused-
appellant] was just to befriend her. [Accused-appellant] forced her to walk with him for more
than an hour to his place at [Brgy. NBL, BLT, Zambales] then brought her to a sapaan, or a
creek. [Accused-appellant] was holding something which looked like a knife which he
pointed at her. [Accused-appellant] then raped her by inserting his private part to her private
part. She cried because of too much pain. After that, her parents saw her in the place where
it happened and they took her to the police. Thereafter, her mother accompanied her to the
hospital because she was traumatized by the incident. She presented a Medico-legal
Certificate dated February 13, 1995.
During her cross-examination, she averred that [accused- appellant] was just strolling
around the peryahan when, without talking to her, he kissed her and forced her to go with
him by threatening her with bodily harm. [Accused-appellant] used a weapon which looked
like a stick or a ballpen. Although there were many people at the peryahan, she did not
scream, shout nor do anything to alarm other people around her because she was already
afraid. She could no longer recall at what time they left [RTD] or arrived in [NBL], or for how
long and for how far they walked. She likewise did not resist [accused-appellant] while
walking to [NBL] because she was taken by fear. She [could not] say if she was taken to a
house in [NBL], but they met a few people. She denied being brought to a sapa or a creek. She
also [could not] say that the alleged attack happened in a house; in fact she [could not] recall
in what area she was raped, but it was a vacant lot and it was dark. [Accused-appellant]
forced her, kissed her while holding the stick, and then inserted his penis in her private part.
It was at the place of [accused-appellant] where her mother found her.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC's
Decision but increased the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. The CA held that
although there were glaring inconsistencies between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and her
open court testimony, AAA never wavered in her claim that accused-appellant inserted his
private part into her private part after pointing a ballpen-like knife at her.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Rape.
RULING
YES. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court believes, and accordingly holds, that there are substantial discrepancies
between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay 31 dated February 13, 1995 (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
and her testimony, both during her direct examination and her cross-examination, which
discrepancies were never reconciled, explained, corrected, or justified by the prosecution.
As a result, the Court doubts the credibility of AAA. Thus, the guilt of accused-appellant has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, she stated that accused-appellant threatened her with
a ballpen knife while she was on her way to a sayawan and transported her via tricycle to
the purported scene of the crime. When AAA was presented for her direct testimony on
March 5, 2013, she narrated that she met accused-appellant at a peryahan and that he
introduced himself to her, spoke to her in a pleasant manner, and invited her to his place.
Thereafter, they walked together for about an hour. Unlike her statements in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay, there was no mention of a sayawan, of being threatened at knife-point
to accompany accused- appellant, or of a tricycle ride to the purported scene of the crime.
During her cross-examination on September 17, 2013, AAA's recollection again

changed, this time with her saying that while she was at the peryahan, accused-appellant
directly threatened her with a ballpen-like stick and forced her to accompany him to the
purported scene of the crime. In direct contrast to her direct testimony, AAA stated on cross-
examination that accused-appellant never spoke to her and never invited her to his house.
The Court notes that the claim that AAA was threatened at knife-point while on her
way to asayawan is starkly different and absolutely inconsistent with the claim that accused-
appellant befriended her in a peryahan and thereafter invited her to his house. While
seemingly immaterial, the contradictory statements that: (1) accused-appellant and AAA
took a tricycle to the scene of the crime; (2) accused-appellant and AAA walked for about an
hour while talking; and, (3) accused-appellant and AAA walked for a period of time that AAA
could no longer recall, all the while under threat of violence — taken with all other evident
discrepancies undoubtedly calls AAA's credibility into question.
Q: X was convicted for the crime of rape. X used as his defense the substantial
discrepancies in the victim’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, and her testimonies during the
direct and cross – examination. Furthermore, such were never reconciled, explained,
corrected, or justified by the prosecution. Is the argument of X tenable?
A: YES. In AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, she stated that accused-appellant threatened her
with a ballpen knife while she was on her way to a sayawan and transported her via tricycle
to the purported scene of the crime. When AAA was presented for her direct testimony on
March 5, 2013, she narrated that she met accused-appellant at a peryahan and that he
introduced himself to her, spoke to her in a pleasant manner, and invited her to his place.
Thereafter, they walked together for about an hour. Unlike her statements in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay, there was no mention of a sayawan, of being threatened at knife-point
to accompany accused- appellant, or of a tricycle ride to the purported scene of the crime.
During her cross-examination on September 17, 2013, AAA's recollection again

changed, this time with her saying that while she was at the peryahan, accused-appellant
directly threatened her with a ballpen-like stick and forced her to accompany him to the
purported scene of the crime. In direct contrast to her direct testimony, AAA stated on cross-
examination that accused-appellant never spoke to her and never invited her to his house.
Thus, the guilt of accused-appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(People of the Philippines v. Noel Dolandolan, G.R. No. 232157. January 8, 2020, as penned by
J. Caguioa)
ROLANDO GEMENEZ Y PARAME v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 241518, March 04, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
For alibi to prosper, the accused must satisfactorily prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Rolando Gemenez y Parame (Gemenez, Petitioner)
for the attack on Jerry Bechachino (Jerry), that the Petitioner, by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to take life, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot twice one Jerry Bechachino using a shotgun
while he was just walking along the street.
As a consequence, Jerry suffered gunshot wounds on his left chest, left arm and right
thumb, accused, having performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of MURDER but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to him.
Upon arraignment, Gemenez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and
trial on the merits then ensued.
On cross-examination, Jerry testified that he was walking home when he accidentally

met along his way Axiel and Reneson as they were also living in the same subdivision.
Reneson had to go on a different way so it was only him and Axiel who were left together
when they were accosted by accused Gemenez and his companion. He averred that accused
was with two (2) companions whose identities he did not know. He narrated that when he
was shot by the accused, the latter's two (2) companions dragged them and tried to board
them on a tricycle.
Last presented to the witness stand was Reneson, he testified that he is friends with
Jerry, and he knew that the accused is a barangay tanod in their place in Barangay San
Antonio. He denied the contents of the affidavit he executed which pointed to the accused as
the one who shot Jerry Bechachino.
On the other hand, the accused denied the allegations against him. While he was at a
tricycle terminal, the driver of the tricycle he boarded told him that a person was shot early
that morning. When he first heard that Jerry pointed to him as the assailant, he went to the
barangay hall and entered it on the blotter, but he cannot really recall what was entered on
the blotter; he did not have a copy of the excerpt of the blotter, but committed to secure a
copy from the barangay which he never did. He further denied knowing Jerry and averred
that he met him for the first time during the preliminary investigation at the fiscal's office.
After trial on the merits, in its judgment, the RTC convicted Gemenez of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide. The RTC ruled that it was only Homicide and not Murder because
neither of the qualifying circumstances of treachery or abuse of superior strength was
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. Treachery could not be appreciated because it was
unclear from the evidence that Gemenez specifically sought the mode of attack to facilitate
the perpetration of the crime without risk to himself. Similarly, abuse of superior strength
could not be appreciated because there was no clear proof of Gemenez's physical superiority
over Jerry, or that the former took advantage of any such superiority to consummate the
offense.
The CA affirmed the RTC's findings. It similarly did not believe the alibi and denial
interposed by Gemenez because he was not able to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the vicinity of the place where the crime was committed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, while
disregarding the consistent and corroborated testimonies of the defense witnesses;
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the findings of the RTC which were plainly based
on speculation and conjectures; and
3. Whether the CA erred in affirming his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to
prove the elements of frustrated homicide with evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The appeal is partly meritorious. The evidence of the prosecution established only the
elements of Attempted Homicide, instead of Frustrated Homicide.
First and Second Issues: The CA did not err in affirming the RTC's factual findings.
In this case, the accused failed to show by convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene during its commission considering that
his residence was only a short 500 meters more or less away from the place where the
incident happened. Likewise, as repeatedly held, positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his
alibi and denial. These guidelines find more compelling application when the lone witness is
the victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always
regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek
justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the
manner in which the latter committed the crime.
The Court likewise reiterates its ruling in People v. Sanchez as regards appeal; that it
gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand;
that absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments
and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings; and
that the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the Court sees no substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the RTC's finding as regards the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses, especially that such finding had been upheld by the CA. Thus, the Court is of the
view that it was indeed Gemenez who attacked Jerry, and that the said attack was made with
intent to kill.
Third Issue: The CA erred in affirming Gemenez's conviction for Frustrated Homicide,
instead of merely Attempted Homicide.
The RTC and the CA convicted Gemenez of Frustrated Homicide because of their
finding that Jerry would have died from the injuries he sustained if not for the timely medical
assistance extended to him. Both courts anchored this finding only on the pictures of Jerry
on the hospital bed showing that there were numerous tubes attached to him.
While the Medico-Legal Certificate — which shows the extent of Jerry's injuries —
was correctly admitted into evidence as it was authenticated by Dr. Angelo Leano (Dr.
Leano), the same was not sufficient to establish that Jerry would have died from the injuries
he sustained if not for the timely medical assistance. That there were pictures of Jerry on the
hospital bed showing that tubes were attached to him does not conclusively establish that
the injuries were so serious that he would have died without timely medical assistance.
Verily, the RTC and the CA were merely inferring, and this was error. At this juncture,
the Court deems it fit to emphasize that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its
own evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
As there is doubt as to the existence of the second element of Frustrated Homicide —

that the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical
assistance — Gemenez's conviction must thus be modified to Attempted Homicide. Thus,
Gemenez should suffer the penalty of prision correccional, instead of reclusion temporal.
Q: An Information was filed against Gemenez for the attack on Jerry Bechachino, that
the Petitioner, by means of treachery and abuse of superior strength and with
deliberate intent to take life, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
shoot twice one Jerry Bechachino using a shotgun while he was just walking along the
street. Therefore, Jerry suffered gunshot wounds on his left chest, left arm and right
thumb, accused, having performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of MURDER but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to
the said. Gemenez denied the allegations against him, that while he was at a tricycle
terminal to take a ride to Julie's Bakeshop where he was a chief baker, the driver of
the tricycle he boarded told him that a person was shot early that morning.
Will the alibi of Gemenez prosper?
A: No. For alibi to prosper, the accused must satisfactorily prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
In this case, the accused failed to show by convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene during its commission considering that
his residence was only a short 500 meters more or less away from the place where the
incident happened. Likewise, as repeatedly held, positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime is entitled to [greater] weight than
his alibi and denial. (Gemenez y Parame v. People, G.R. No. 241518, March 4, 2020, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
MICHAEL TAÑAMOR Y ACIBO, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
An unbroken chain of custody is necessary in order to establish before the court that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
An Information was filed against MICHAEL TAÑAMOR y' ACIBO and JUNFIL PIÑERO
for not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell
and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known "shabu",
a dangerous drug under R.A. No. 9165.
The RTC was able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner only, as his co-
accused, Piñero, managed to escape during the operation and has since remained at large.
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued
thereafter.
The prosecution sought to establish that petitioner was apprehended following a

legitimate buy-bust operation, and alleges that an informant came forward about a certain
Mike and Pilo who, conspiring with each other, were engaged in illegal drug trade. Acting on
said information, the Chief instructed PO2 Buenaflor and PO1 Briones to conduct a series of
surveillance operations on these two. Upon surveillance, said officers alleged that they were
able to find out that the real names of Mike and Pilo were Michael Tañamor and Junfil Piñero,
respectively, as well as confirm their involvement with the drug trade. Through an asset, a
test-buy was also conducted, where the asset was able to purchase two sachets of shabu from
petitioner and Piñero, which prompted the operatives to plan the buy-bust proper, beginning
with the negotiation of a drug deal by PO2 Buenaflor and PO1 Briones.
In his defense, petitioner denied ownership of the items that were allegedly seized
and submitted instead that no buy-bust operation took place before his arrest. He further
submitted that on board the vehicle, he was forcibly searched without the benefit of a search
warrant and that several personal items were recovered from him. Allegedly finding nothing
from his personal items which would point to any illegal activity, one police officer named
Gerald Manlan, whom he recognized as his neighbor, showed him three sachets containing
white substance, after which the persons in the vehicle threatened him with an allegation of
ownership of the same if he did not cooperate. He was thereafter brought to a house where
he was repeatedly interrogated about his knowledge of a certain "Edfox." Petitioner alleged
that the persons who detained him kept insisting that he knew "Edfox" despite petitioner's
persistent denial. Petitioner further alleged that he was kept in that house for over eight
hours, after which he was brought to the police station.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime.
The CA was unpersuaded by petitioner's contentions and affirmed his conviction. It
found that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs were sufficiently established. It
also held that with respect to the inventory having been conducted in a place other than the
site of arrest, it was nevertheless proper, given that Section 21 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows for the inventory to be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
cases of warrantless seizure.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting petitioner for violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. The Petition is meritorious. The unjustified, let alone admitted departures from
the chain of custody, particularly the undertaking of the inventory elsewhere than in the
place of arrest and the absence of the insulating witnesses at the time of seizure, lead the
Court to no sounder conclusion than petitioner's acquittal.
In drug cases, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the
crime, but also its body or corpus delicti, which in these cases pertains to the dangerous drug
itself. In cases involving illegal drugs, buy-bust operation has been declared as a valid and
effective procedure for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors and a legally
sanctioned means of trapping lawbreakers in felonious acts. Nevertheless, precisely due to
the peculiar nature of a buy-bust operation, the law concomitantly requires strict compliance
with procedures laid down by it to ensure that all the rights of the accused are guaranteed
and the credibility of the corpus delicti safeguarded.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, provides for the procedure
that police operatives are required to observe in order to assure the integrity of the
confiscated drugs. The said provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after confiscation at the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable;
(2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, an elected public official, and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media; and (3) the accused or his/her representative
and all of the aforesaid witnesses shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
Given the law, the decisive requirements that bear upon the present case are the
immediacy of the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items, and the
protective, insulating presence of the three required witnesses. This Court finds that the
arresting officers in this case failed to comply with these two requirements during the
conduct of the buy-bust operation and the prosecution neglected to justify, let alone
acknowledge these lapses, ultimately proving fatal to its case.
Undoubtedly, the requirement of the presence of the mandatory two insulating
witnesses in this case is inseparable from the requirement of physical inventory and
photographing at the place of seizure. Stated differently, since the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items must, as a general rule, be done at the place of seizure, it
follows that the two insulating witnesses whose presence are required during the inventory
and photographing must also be in or within the area of the site of seizure.
The seizure of the confiscated items, including the three sachets of shabu is therefore
invalid and void. The prosecution has no more evidence on which to ground petitioner's
conviction, and petitioner must be acquitted.
Q: An Information was filed against Michael in for violation of Section 5 in relation to
Section 26 Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution sought to establish that petitioner
was apprehended following a legitimate buy-bust operation. In his defense, petitioner
denied ownership of the items that were allegedly seized and submitted instead that
no buy-bust operation took place before his arrest. He further submitted that on board
the vehicle, he was forcibly searched without the benefit of a search warrant and that
several personal items were recovered from him, including his cellular phone, a
cellular phone battery and one P500.00 bill, which he intended to use as payment of
his breakfast. Allegedly finding nothing from his personal items which would point to
any illegal activity, one police officer named Gerald Manlan, whom he recognized as
his neighbor, showed him three sachets containing white substance, after which the
persons in the vehicle threatened him with an allegation of ownership of the same if
he did not cooperate. He was thereafter brought to a house in Sibulan, where he was
repeatedly interrogated about his knowledge of a certain "Edfox." Petitioner alleged
that the persons who detained him kept insisting that he knew "Edfox" despite
petitioner's persistent denial. Petitioner further alleged that he was kept in that house
for over eight hours, after which he was brought to the police station. Was there a valid
procedure?
A: No. A long line of cases decided by the Court has demonstrated that the exacting
procedures for observation during a buy-bust operation more often rise or fall on either the
adherence to or non-compliance with the chain of custody rule. The chain of custody means
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, to
presentation in court. An unbroken chain of custody is necessary to establish before the
court that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with
the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt. This rule is
imperative, under pain of rendering all seized evidence during the operation incredible.
(Tañamor y Acibo v. People, G.R. No. 228132, March 11, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence - it is for
the State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court
is given no alternative but to acquit the accused. Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence
against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.
FACTS
In an Information, the accused-appellant Sapla was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, control and custody four bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, and
transport in transit through a passenger jeepney without license, permit or authority from
any appropriate government entity or agency.
The next day the accused-appellant was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP). Upon his arraignment, he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged
against him.
The evidence for the Prosecution established that an officer on duty at the RPSB office
received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of
Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the
road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw Sapla seated at the
rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked him if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
him to open the blue sack, and the officers saw four bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested
him, informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in Ilocano dialect.
PO2 Mabiasan further searched accused-appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the
dried marijuana leaves and brought them to their office for proper markings.
At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of
the seized items and placed his signature on the said items. The conduct of inventory was
witnessed by accused-appellant Sapla, and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the
Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G.
Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the accused-appellant
at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for
further investigation.
On the other hand, the Defense presented accused-appellant Sapla as its sole witness,
who denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the incident.
He claimed that he boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers flagged down the said jeepney in order to check
its passengers' baggages and cargoes. The police officers then found marijuana inside a sack
and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3)
passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as the owner of
the marijuana found inside the sack. He denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted
that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested and brought him
to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to him.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
the corpus delicti of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications. The
CA found that the search and seizure was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present,
justifying the warrantless search and seizure
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers.
RULING
NO. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his release
from incarceration.
As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable

only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable
cause through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized particularly described. Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation
or exemption from the rule is not favored and is strictly construed against the government.
There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence
of a search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the
RTC and CA considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case
is a search of a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both long-
standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of
jurisprudence.
Q: At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which
stated that the subject male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a
collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on
board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the
police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its
driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the
jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated at the rear side of the vehicle The
police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack
in front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then
requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant
Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. Can
the police conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an
unverified tip relayed by an anonymous informant?
A: No. The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on
an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
jurisprudence. (People v. Sapla y Guerrero, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
MARIA AURORA G. MATHAY, ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, MARIA SONYA M. RODRIGUEZ,
AND RAMON G. MATHA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ANDREA L. GANDIONCO,
DOCTRINE
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with
it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS
Petitioners Maria Sonya M. Rodriguez (Maria Sonya), Ismael G. Mathay III (Ismael III),
Ramon G. Mathay (Ramon), and Maria Aurora G. Mathay (Maria Aurora) are siblings, whose
parents are the late Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. (Ismael) and Sonya Gandionco
Mathay (Sonya).
Sonya and her sons, Ismael III and Ramon, along with Sonya's youngest sister, Andrea
L. Gandionco (private respondent), organized Goldenrod, Inc. During her lifetime, Sonya
managed and operated Goldenrod, Inc
At the time of her death, Goldenrod, Inc.'s General Information Sheet (GIS) reflected
Sonya as having subscribed to 60% of its total shareholdings. This GIS was signed by its
corporate secretary, Aida Palarca (Aida), and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). After Sonya's death, the amended GIS showed that private respondent
owned 52% of the shareholdings of Goldenrod, Inc.,
The amendment of the GIS was prompted by the presentation of a Declaration and
Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) by private respondent to Aida. The Declaration was
executed by Sonya, who acknowledged therein that private respondent is the real owner of
the 60% shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc. Sonya, in said Declaration, returned 52% of said
shares of stock to private respondent through the SPA. The remaining 8% shares, upon the
wishes of private respondent, were donated to petitioners, but were placed under Sonya's
custodianship until their actual distribution to petitioners.
Petitioners successively filed two (2) GIS of Goldenrod, Inc. with the SEC. Both GISs
showed an increase of Sonya's shares to 60% from the 8% shares reflected in the amended
GIS. Private respondent's name as shareholder was likewise conspicuously absent. Hence,
Private respondent, then, filed a civil complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and
Mandamus against petitioners. Private respondent claimed deprivation of her shares of
Goldenrod, Inc. belonging to her by virtue of the SPA she allegedly entered into with Sonya.
Thus, she prayed for the return of shares, to call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a
new set of directors, to restrain petitioners from managing and exercising the powers and
duties as directors of Goldenrod, Inc., for accounting of proceeds and funds paid to, received,
and earned by Goldenrod, Inc.; and for inventory of assets of Goldenrod, Inc.
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Public Documents by a Private Individual. The RTC denied the motions of
petitioners and ordered the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest against them.
Holding that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction, the trial court found that the allegations in the
Information and the affidavit-complaint, together with the documents submitted by the
prosecution, prima facie show all the elements of qualified theft through falsification of
public documents. Furthermore, the RTC gave credence to the Declaration where Sonya
admitted that her sister, private respondent, is the real owner of the 60% shares of stocks of
Goldenrod, Inc.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance
of TRO/Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The CA held that in the crime of theft,
ownership of the stolen property is immaterial. The law merely requires that the stolen
property must not belong to the offender.
ISSUES
1. Whether there is probable cause to charge them with Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Public Documents;
2. Whether the Information is defective;
3. Whether there is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the criminal
proceedings against petitioners.
RULING
YES. The Court rules in the affirmative.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide when a
criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action, and what the elements of the prejudicial question are, respectively:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected
with it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
There are two pending civil cases, which bear issues that, to the mind of the Court,
are determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the instant criminal case.
Hence, should private respondent be adjudged not entitled to the shares of stocks in
the pending civil cases, there could have been no crime of qualified theft to speak of as the
elements of: (1) the property belonging to another; (2) the taking done with intent to gain;
(3) the taking done without the owner's consent; and (4) the taking done with abuse of
confidence would be absent.
In the same vein, there would be no crime of falsification to speak of, as well, because
there would be no perversion of truth and the statements in the two GISs would neither be
"untruthful statements in a narration of facts," nor "absolutely false." The Petition is
GRANTED.
Q: Sonya and her sons, along with Sonya's youngest sister, Andrea L. Gandionco
(private respondent), organized Goldenrod, Inc. During her lifetime, Sonya managed
and operated Goldenrod, Inc. At the time of her death in 2012, Goldenrod, Inc.'s
General Information Sheet reflected Sonya as having subscribed to 30,000 shares of
stocks in Goldenrod, Inc., equivalent to 60% of its total shareholdings. This GIS was
signed by its corporate secretary, Aida Palarca (Aida), and filed with the SEC. After
Sonya's death, an amended GIS was filed with the SEC. It was signed and attested by
Aida and showed a substantial reduction of the shares of Sonya from 30,000 to 4,000,
or from 60% to 8% ownership. The amendment of the GIS was prompted by the
presentation of a Declaration and Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) by private
respondent to Aida. The Declaration executed by Sonya, who acknowledged therein
that private respondent is the real owner of the 60% shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc.
she (Sonya) held on record. Sonya, in said Declaration, returned 52% of said shares of
stock to private respondent through the SPA. Respondent’s name as shareholder was
likewise conspicuously absent. In 2013 Respondent filed a civil complaint for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Mandamus against petitioners. It was filed
before the Quezon City RTC, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-13-289. Private
respondent claimed deprivation of 26,000 shares (52%) of Goldenrod, Inc. belonging
to her by virtue of the SPA she allegedly entered into with Sonya. Also in 2013, Ismael
filed a complaint against private respondent to declare null and void the SPA. It was
filed before the Quezon City RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-13-73089. Ismael
alleged that the SPA lacks his written consent, in contravention of Article 124 of the
Family Code. Is there a Prejudicial Question?
A: YES. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected
with it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
There are two pending civil cases, Civil Case No. Q-13-73089 and Civil Case No. Q-13-
289, which bear issues that, to the mind of the Court, are determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioners in the instant criminal case. (Mathay v. People, G.R. No. 218964, June
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO
DOCTRINE
By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence - it is for
the State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court
is given no alternative but to acquit the accused. Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence
against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.
FACTS
In an Information, the accused-appellant Sapla was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, control and custody four bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, and
transport in transit through a passenger jeepney without license, permit or authority from
any appropriate government entity or agency.
The next day accused-appellant was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP). Upon his arraignment, he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged against
him.
The evidence for the Prosecution established that an officer on duty at the RPSB office
received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of
Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the
road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw Sapla seated at the
rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked him if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
him to open the blue sack, and the officers saw four bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested
him, informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in Ilocano dialect.
PO2 Mabiasan further searched accused-appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the
dried marijuana leaves and brought them to their office for proper markings.
At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of
the seized items and placed his signature on the said items. The conduct of inventory was
witnessed by accused-appellant Sapla, and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the
Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G.
Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the accused-appellant
at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for
further investigation.
On the other hand, the Defense presented accused-appellant Sapla as its sole witness,
who denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the incident.
He claimed that he boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers flagged down the said jeepney in order to check
its passengers' baggages and cargoes. The police officers then found marijuana inside a sack
and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3)
passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as the owner of
the marijuana found inside the sack. He denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted
that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested and brought him
to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to him.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
the corpus delicti of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications. The
CA found that the search and seizure was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present,
justifying the warrantless search and seizure
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers. (NO)
RULING
NO. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his release
from incarceration.
As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable

only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable
cause through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized particularly described. Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation
or exemption from the rule is not favored and is strictly construed against the government.
There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence
of a search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the
RTC and CA considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case
is a search of a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
jurisprudence.
Q: At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which
stated that the subject male person who would transport marijuana was wearing a
collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on
board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the
police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its
driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the
jeepney and saw accused-appellant Sapla seated at the rear side of the vehicle The
police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then
requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant
Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. Can
the police conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an
unverified tip relayed by an anonymous informant?
A: No. The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on
an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
jurisprudence. (People v. Sapla y Guerrero, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LOPEZ Y CANLAS
DOCTRINE
The absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-
bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the
police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.
FACTS
Lopez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. When
arraigned, Lopez pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that the intelligence operatives of the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Iriga City held a briefing in preparation for a buy-bust operation
against Lopez whose identity was confirmed by a confidential asset. PO1 Jonard Buenaflor
was designated to act as a poseur-buyer. As they waited for Lopez, the back-up operatives
positioned themselves in the area. Lopez arrived on a motorcycle and proceeded to ask the
informant how much they would be buying. PO1 Buenaflor then handed P2,000.00 to Lopez.
In turn, the latter gave him a small heat-sealed transparent sachet containing crystalline
substance which the poseur-buyer suspected as shabu. PO1 Buenaflor then delivered the
seized plastic sachet and Lopez to the provincial crime laboratory for examination, which
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense established that Lopez just came from a gas station
where he met a certain Rico Murillo who gave him P2,000.00. He was instructed by the latter
to give the same to a person who he knew went by the name Engineer Tubig. He then rode
his motorcycle and went on his way only to be flagged down by PO1 Buenaflor upon reaching
Tantiado Hardware. When he inquired what his violation was, the police officer told him to
hold the money, but ordered him to stay put. In addition to that, PO1 Buenaflor collected the
keys of his motorcycle. After some time, about five to six policemen arrived at the scene.
When Viñas and Bongais showed up, the police officers took photographs of Lopez. He was
also frisked, but the police officers found nothing in his person. However, he saw one police
officer in civilian clothes take a plastic sachet from his own pocket which he revealed to Viñas
and Bongais. After Lopez's arrest, he was taken to the police station where he was
photographed with the plastic sachet and the money. Later, he was brought to the crime
laboratory. He was provided with water to drink which tasted unpleasant. Nevertheless, he
still drank it since the police officers needed his urine sample.
The RTC found Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC
gave full credence to the testimony of the apprehending officers considering that their
testimonies were corroborated on material matters by documentary proof. The CA affirmed
the RTC's Judgment and sustained the conviction of Lopez.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Judgment finding Lopez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
RULING
YES. After a careful review of the records, the Court partly grants the appeal.
Insofar as the charge for violation of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is concerned, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from
the lower courts' findings that, indeed, the guilt of Lopez was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
However, with respect to the charge for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 on illegal use of dangerous drugs, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove
the conduct of a confirmatory test subsequent to the screening test as required by law.
Hence, to this charge, Lopez should be acquitted.
The criminal liability of the accused-appellant under both charges are discussed
separately. In Criminal Case No. IR-10559, Lopez was found guilty by the lower courts of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. In the present case, the Court agrees with the lower
courts that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately and satisfactorily
established by the prosecution.
A perusal of the proceedings before the trial court shows that the police operatives of
PNP Iriga City held a briefing for the conduct of a buy-bust operation against Lopez. Settled
is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The
Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary,
especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the
essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case,
having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous
drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook
the buy-bust operation.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. This is a singular and rigid standard. Anything less than strict adherence
would automatically be a deviation from the chain of custody rule that would only pass
judicial muster in the most exacting of standards following the twin-requirements of: (1)
existence of justifiable reasons, and (2) preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items. In these cases, the point of contention should not revolve around the
amount of illegal drugs seized, but on whether the constitutional and statutory rights of an
accused are protected in the prosecution of the crime he or she stands accused.
The Court notes in this case the meticulousness of the apprehending officers in their
compliance with the chain of custody rule and in documenting their movements. Additional
safeguards employed by the police operatives in this case such as the taking of photographs
in every step of the operation, though not legally required, are commendable practices in law
enforcement. Equal note should also be made on the prosecution's efforts in drawing out the
details in establishing the crucial custodial links to secure the identity and integrity of the
dangerous drug seized from the accused. This shows that the requirements imposed by
Section 21, while exacting considering the liberties at stake, are logical and susceptible to
strict and full compliance.
Further, in drug cases, two distinct drug tests are required: a screening test and a
confirmatory test. A positive screening test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of
law. The evidence for the prosecution, however, shows the conduct of only one test.
When the urine sample recovered from Lopez yielded a positive result, the specimen
should have been subjected to a second test - the confirmatory test, which is an analytical
test using a device, tool or equipment with a different chemical or physical principle that is
more specific which will validate and confirm the result of the screening test. It is the second
or further analytical procedure to more accurately determine the presence of dangerous
drugs in the specimen.
Considering that the Chemistry Report merely contains the results of the screening
test conducted, the same cannot be valid before any court of law absent the required
confirmatory test report. Without the requisite confirmatory test, the accused-appellant
cannot be held criminally liable for illegal use of dangerous drugs under Section 15, R.A. No.
9165. An acquittal for this charge follows as a necessary consequence.
Q: Lopez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and use of dangerous
drugs defined under Sections 5 and 15, respectively, of Article II, R.A. No. 9165, under
two separate Information. When arraigned, Lopez pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Trial on the merits ensued. On March 20, 2014, the intelligence operatives of the
Philippine National Police Iriga City held a briefing in preparation for a buy-bust
operation against Lopez. His identity was confirmed by a confidential asset. PO1
Buenaflor was designated to act as a poseur-buyer and tasked to use [PhP]2,000.00 as
marked money consisting of four five-hundred-peso bills during the operation. Is
there a need for prior surveillance?
A: NO. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective
means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not
necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during
the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of
the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. (People v. Lopez y
Canlas, G.R. No. 247974, July 13, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ELIZABETH NYAMBURA RUNANA
AND MA. GRACE LACSON Y NAVARRO
DOCTRINE
It should be stressed that compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is crucial in
the prosecution of drugs cases for if substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
prohibited drugs are proven, this will cast serious doubts on the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court and entitle the accused to an acquittal.
FACTS
Lacson and Runana were charged with violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26,
Article II of R.A. 9165, or conspiracy to transport or deliver prohibited drugs.
When Runana and Lacson were arraigned, both pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution established that Runana and Lacson were indicted following their
arrest during an entrapment operation undertaken by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), which was undertaken following a tip from a regular confidential informant.
Said confidential informant came to the PDEA office to report that she had been recruited by
a certain "Gina" as a drug courier who would travel to Malaysia as a tourist to bring luggage
containing illegal drugs. She was also instructed by "Gina" to recruit another person to do
the same. IO2 Alarde relayed this information to his team leader, who instructed him to
report whatever would be discussed with "Gina”. Later on, IO2 Alarde found out that "Gina"
was in fact Lacson, the person who he had been communicating with two years ago as part
of his investigation on an African drug syndicate operating in Malaysia and Thailand. He did
not immediately recognize her because she looked different from her pictures on Facebook.
On the other hand, the defense established that Runana claimed that she was a Sales
Executive Manager back in Kenya. She came to the Philippines and met a Filipina, Gina
Lacson. They talked for a while and agreed to have a few drinks in Runana's room. While
drinking, Lacson excused herself to fetch her boyfriend. Fifteen minutes later, someone
knocked on the door. Two men suddenly entered the room, pointed guns at Runana and
ordered her to sit on one of the beds. The men allegedly took Runana's jewelry and cellular
phone, and ordered her to be quiet. Runana was taken to another room, about four doors
away. There, she saw Lacson and other persons. Runana was ordered to sit on the far end of
one of the beds. On the other bed were two bags with aluminum foils on top. One of the men
informed her that they were PDEA agents and that she was being arrested for drugs. Said
agent told her that he would help her cause if she would be silent about what happened in
her room earlier. The agents assured her that she would be able to catch her scheduled flight
back to Kenya that night. However, she was taken to the PDEA office and was detained there
for two days.
During the trial, Runana presented her wedding invitation, receipt from the caterer,
and photos with her fiance. Her sister, Alice, also testified on the alleged reason for Runana's
trip and that it was her who recommended visiting the Philippines to Runana.
On the other hand, only Lacson testified for her defense. While waiting for her
boyfriend to arrive from Cebu, she booked a room at Hostel 1632. She met Runana in the
elevator. Runana invited Lacson for a drink in her room. As she was opening the door of her
room, three men suddenly grabbed her and pushed her inside the room. Inside, there were
four other men and three women. They asked Lacson where "the foreigner" was. She
remembered Runana whom she had just met. Thus, she led the men to Runana's room and
knocked on the door. When Runana opened the door, two of the men entered the room, while
one of them brought her back to her room. Inside her room, Lacson saw two pieces of luggage
on the bed and several persons observing the luggage and searching the room. The persons
inside the room took pictures of the items on the bed and later brought in Runana to take
pictures of them as well.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding both Runana and Lacson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It declared that all the elements of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165 in relation to the attempt to deliver, distribute and transport any dangerous
drugs were duly proved by the prosecution. The RTC also held that conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused as they clearly had knowledge of the illegal drugs neatly
concealed in the two pieces of luggage. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Lacson guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of R.A. 9165.
RULING
NO. In illegal transportation of prohibited drugs, the essential element is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence clearly shows that Lacson intended to
transport the seized prohibited drugs. Based on the information gathered by IO2 Alarde,
Lacson planned to transport the seized prohibited drugs to Malaysia through the use of drug
couriers in the person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde. At that point, the crime
of transportation of prohibited drugs is already at its attempted stage. Again, under Section
26 of R.A. 9165, even an attempt to transport prohibited drugs is already penalized by the
same penalty prescribed for the commission thereof.
However, to sustain a conviction on illegal transportation of prohibited drugs, the

prosecution must also prove the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime. To maintain the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drug, the apprehending officers must
ensure that the chain of custody in handling the same is not compromised. The procedure
therefor is specifically outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 and the corresponding
provisions in its IRR.
Under Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, the apprehending team shall, among others,
"x x x immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative each from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." Thereafter, and "within twenty-
four (24) hours, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination." The forensic laboratory examiner shall then issue
a certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath,
within 24 hours after the receipt of the subject item/s.
As exemplified in this case, the apprehending officers were able to meet the
requirements mandated by law in spite of them having barely 24 hours to plan the
entrapment operation. This case is therefore an exemplar of how strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 can easily be done, so that law
transgressors will be properly penalized, on the one hand, and the rights of individuals be
safeguarded against undue abuses, on the other.
The Court thus enjoins law enforcement agencies, the prosecutorial services, as well
as the courts, to observe strict compliance with these mandatory requirements. Exceptions
therefrom should be limited and allowed only under justified and meritorious cases, and
when the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drugs are preserved. It
should always be remembered that what is at stake here is no less than the Constitution
which secures the life and liberty of individuals by recognizing the accused's right to be
presumed innocent — a Constitutional right that should never be made subservient to
expediency and convenience of prosecution. The appeal is DENIED.
Q: On June 20, 2011, a confidential informant came to the PDEA office to report to her
handler, Intelligence Officer 2 Alarde, that she had been recruited by a certain "Gina"
as a drug courier who would travel to Malaysia as a tourist to bring luggage containing
illegal drugs. She was also instructed by "Gina" to recruit another person to do the
same. IO2 Alarde relayed this information to his team leader, who instructed him to
report whatever would be discussed with "Gina." In 2011 the confidential informant
contacted "Gina" and informed the latter that she had already recruited a male
individual who was likewise willing to travel with a similar luggage. On June 27, 2011,
"Gina" contacted the confidential informant and instructed the latter to bring the new
recruit for instructions. When "Gina" left the room to fetch a person who had the
luggage that would be transported. She returned with a Fendi trolley bag, followed by
an African-looking woman, later identified as Runana, who was carrying a black
Ngoom trolley bag/back pack. IO2 Alarde asked and was permitted to check the bags.
While "Gina" and Runana were talking to the confidential informant, IO2 Alarde
discreetly pierced the side of the bag with a pen and inspected what was inside. He
discovered white crystalline substance contained in a plastic bag that was wrapped in
aluminum foil. IO2 Alarde closed the bag and discreetly placed a missed call to his
team leader using a cellular phone he had hidden in his pants. After less than a minute,
someone knocked on the door and IO2 Alarde let the PDEA operatives in. IO2 Alarde
continued to inspect the bags and ripped off the sides thereof with a cutter. The PDEA
team discovered two vacuum-sealed transparent plastic bags that were wrapped in
aluminum foil and containing white crystalline substance in each bag. Was there a
valid search and seizure?
A: Yes. In illegal transportation of prohibited drugs, the essential element is the movement
of the dangerous drug from one place to another. There is no definitive moment when an
accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an
accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to
the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. Yet, even in the absence of
actual conveyance, an attempt to transport prohibited drugs is meted the same penalty
prescribed for the commission thereof under Section 26 of R.A. 9165. In the present case, the
prosecution's evidence clearly shows that Lacson intended to transport the seized
prohibited drugs. Based on the information gathered by IO2 Alarde, Lacson planned to
transport the seized prohibited drugs to Malaysia through the use of drug couriers in the
person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde. (People v. Lacson y Navarro, G.R. No.
229055. July 15, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESMERALDO "JAY" AMURAO Y TEJERO
DOCTRINE
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing
an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing.
But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in
the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct.
In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted.
But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap
for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."
FACTS
Amurao and Valencia were charged with Trafficking in Persons under five separate
sets of Information. Both accused were also charged with violation of RA 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act under four sets of
Information. Amurao and Valencia pleaded "not guilty" to all charges.
The prosecution established that the National Bureau of Investigation - Central Luzon
Regional Office (NBI CELRO) received a report from the International Justice Mission (IJM),
a non-governmental organization involved in anti-trafficking in person project, that
appellant Esmeraldo T. Amurao was involved in prostituting women in Pampanga, some of
whom are minors. The NBI agents returned to their office and informed their superior about
the result of their operation. Special Investigator (SI) III Henry C. Roxas, Jr. organized a team
for possible rescue and entrapment operations. The team also coordinated with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Region III and requested them to
form part of the support group. Since the NBI failed to secure an arrest warrant for appellant,
they decided to proceed with the entrapment operation and prepared the entrapment
money. When they arrived at the area, the appellant offered them some girls but they insisted
that they be given minor girls. Minutes later, appellant, together with co-accused Marlyn D.
Valencia, arrived with six minor girls in tow. Realizing that the girls brought by appellant and
accused Marlyn D. Valencia were indeed minors, the undercover NBI agents requested the
girls to go inside their van. Accused Valencia also boarded the van as she was acting as their
"mamasan" as she was chaperoning the girls. SI Henry Roxas then handed to the appellant
the marked money. Appellant gave the rest of the money to BBB, who was acting as the leader
of the girls. Once the girls were all inside the van, SI Henry Roxas signaled the rest of the team
through a missed call and proceeded with the rescue operation. Appellant was subsequently
arrested and the marked money was recovered from him and BBB.
After the operation, the team brought the six girls to the DSWD Region III Office, while
appellant and accused Marlyn D. Valencia were brought to NBI-CELRO for fingerprinting and
photograph taking. At the DSWD, the girls executed sworn statements narrating the
circumstances that transpired prior to their rescue, particularly the fact that appellant and
accused Marlyn D. Valencia recruited and promised them money in exchange for sex with a
customer. They likewise declared that they were still minors at the time of their rescue.
Appellant and accused Marlyn D. Valencia were subjected to Inquest Proceedings to which
Prosecutor Modesto A. Cendana found probable cause and recommended the filing of several
Information for Violation of RA 9208 and RA 7610, respectively.
On the other hand, the defense established that the NBI agents gave him P500.00 to
look for girls, but, when he failed to provide the girls, the agents still gave him a tip of P500.00
since the said agents won in the casino. Accused-appellant then contacted his co-accused
Marlyn to look for girls. Later on, they were able to bring only four girls to the agents. While
in front of Natalia Hotel, two other girls passed by and were invited by one of the girls they
brought to the agents. When they introduced the girls to the agents, the girls and Marlyn
boarded the van of the agents. The agents handed the marked money. Thereafter, the agents
declared that they were NBI agents and immediately arrested accused-appellant
The RTC convicted accused-appellant Amurao. It held that the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant committed the acts of recruitment
upon the persons of AAA, and minors BBB and CCC, for prostitution.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with modification only as to the award of damages.
The CA did not give any credence to Amurao's defenses. On the defense of instigation, the CA
held that there was no indication that Amurao was merely induced to commit the crime. On
the contrary, the testimonies of the witnesses proved that Amurao was already engaged in
the illicit business of recruiting women into prostitution. The NBI agents merely devised a
scheme to facilitate Amurao's apprehension through the entrapment operation.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of Amurao was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The Court
upholds the findings of the courts a quo that Amurao's guilt for the offense of Trafficking in
Persons against AAA and Qualified Trafficking in Persons against minors BBB and CCC for
the purpose of prostitution was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able
to establish all the elements of the offense of simple Trafficking in Persons and Qualified
Trafficking in Persons. The testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC were direct,
straightforward, and consistent. They all similarly testified that Amurao recruited them
for the purpose of prostitution.
The testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC also corroborated the testimony of the
arresting officer from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Special Investigator III (SI)
Henry Roxas, who detailed the conduct of the entrapment operation which led to the arrest
of Amurao and Valencia. Even Amurao himself corroborated the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. He admitted that he was at the Natalia Hotel where he met two NBI
agents acting as poseur-buyers who inquired about minor girls. Amurao likewise did not
deny that he brought the female victims to Natalia Hotel for the purpose of prostituting them.
Amurao merely interposed the defense of instigation, alleging that he was forced by the NBI
agents to commit the crime.
Moreover, there is no indication that Amurao was merely forced or induced to commit
the crime. His defense is belied by his own actions in readily agreeing to procure girls for the
NBI agents/poseur-buyers and in his active recruitment of the victims. Thus, Amurao's
defense of instigation has no merit. Acting on the report from the International Justice
Mission, the NBI agents conducted a valid entrapment. They merely devised a scheme to
facilitate Amurao's illegal activities in order to arrest him. Given the foregoing, the Court
affirms Amurao's conviction. The appeal is DISMISSED.
Q: Sometime in February 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation - Central Luzon
Regional Office received a report from the International Justice Mission, involved in
anti-trafficking in person project, that appellant Esmeraldo T. Amurao was involved
in prostituting women in Balibago, Angeles City, Pampanga, some of whom are minors.
Special Investigator (SI) III Henry C. Roxas, Jr. organized a team for a possible rescue
and entrapment operations. The team also coordinated with DSWD and requested
them to form part of the support group. Since the NBI failed to secure an arrest
warrant for appellant, they decided to proceed with the entrapment operation and
prepared the entrapment money worth P9,000.00 which were all in P1,000.00
denomination.
When they arrived at the area, appellant offered them some girls but they insisted that
they be given minor girls. Minutes later, appellant, together with co-accused Marlyn,
arrived with six minor girls in tow. Realizing that the girls brought by appellant and
accused Marlyn D. Valencia were indeed minors, the undercover NBI agents requested
the girls to go inside their van. Accused Valencia also boarded the van as she was
acting as their "mamasan" as she was chaperoning the girls. Once the girls were all
inside the van, SI Henry Roxas signaled the rest of the team through a missed call and
proceeded with the rescue operation. Appellant was subsequently arrested, and the
marked money was recovered from him and BBB. Is Amurao guilty of simple
Trafficking in Persons and Qualified Trafficking in Persons?
A: Yes. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
offense of simple Trafficking in Persons and Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The testimonies
of AAA, BBB, and CCC were direct, straightforward, and consistent. They all similarly
testified that Amurao recruited them for the purpose of prostitution on the night of February
20, 2013.24 The minority of BBB and CCC were duly proven by their Birth Certificates. The
testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC also corroborated the testimony of the arresting officer
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Special Investigator III (SI) Henry Roxas,
who detailed the conduct of the entrapment operation which led to the arrest of Amurao and
Valencia. (People v. Amurao y Tejero, G.R. No. 229514. July 28, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. SAGISAG ATLAS “PAUL” BAUTISTA, ARLETH
BUENCONSEJO AND ROSAMEL CARA DE GUZMAN, SAGISAG ATLAS “PAUL” BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 218582, September 03, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
An illegal recruiter may be held liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, for as long as the accused
has been so charged under separate Informations.
FACTS
In 11 separate Informations, accused-appellant Bautista, together with co-accused
Buenconsejo and De Guzman, was charged with 10 counts of estafa. The Informations were
consolidated and during arraignment, accused-appellant Bautista pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Rowena G. Panganiban

(Rowena), Randy Pajarillo (Randy), Rolando De Vera (Rolando) and Efren Dingle (Efren)
(collectively, private complainants). Randy testified that he met accused-appellant Bautista
when the latter recruited him to work as a factory worker in Korea. He paid accused-
appellant Bautista P50,000.00 for the processing fee. After his payment, Randy later learned
that accused-appellant Bautista was arrested following an entrapment operation. Randy,
along with other persons who were also recruited by accused-appellant Bautista, visited the
latter in Camp Crame, but they failed to see accused-appellant Bautista in person. They were
instead told to go and see accused-appellant Bautista’s co-accused Buenconsejo, who
was supposedly the one who would speak to them about the money that they had given to
accused-appellant Bautista.
On cross-examination, Randy claimed that accused-appellant Bautista represented

that accused Buenconsejo was the owner of the recruitment agency, who later on denied
having any connections with the said agency. The prosecution also presented the testimony
of Rolando, who testified that similarly to Randy, Rolando was also introduced to accused-
appellant Bautista by Maribel, who told him that accused-appellant Bautista was looking for
workers to be sent to South Korea, as replacement for those applicants who backed out. On
the promise that he would be deployed to South Korea, Rolando gave accused-appellant
Bautista a total of P144,000.00 paid in seven installments, to supposedly cover the swapping
fee, the visa processing expenses, as well as airfare costs. Finally, the prosecution presented
Efren, who testified that he also met accused-appellant Bautista through Maribel, and that
accused-appellant Bautista also represented that he was recruiting applicants for work in
South Korea. Efren added that in order to be included among the list of recruits, he gave
accused-appellant Bautista a total of P159,000.00. Despite said payments, however, accused-
appellant Bautista failed to deploy Efren to South Korea as promised, and he later discovered
that the recruitment agency he paid fees to had already closed.
Accused-appellant Bautista countered that he was merely an administrative assistant

of Baler Aurora Travel & Tours, Inc., which in turn is owned by his co-accused Buenconsejo
and De Guzman. He alleged that he met Randy, Rolando, and Efren when they purchased
plane tickets for Korea. He claimed that it was his co-accused De Guzman who received the
payments for the tickets, and that he was merely instructed to issue provisional receipts for
the payments. He further denied conspiring with his co-accused to misrepresent and
promise work in South Korea in exchange for money. He said that whenever he accepted
money from the complainants, he merely did so in behalf of his co-accused De Guzman, and
that in cases when he accepted money on his own behalf, he did so on the understanding that
the money was for the payment of the tuition fee for the Korean language classes he
conducted.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant Bautista of the crimes charged. It found that the
prosecution was able to establish the requisites for a finding of estafa as committed against
Randy, Rolando, and Efren. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting accused-appellant Bautista of three
counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, and violation of Section 6 of
R.A. 8042.
RULING
NO. The appeal is bereft of merit. Accused-appellant Bautista counters that in all
instances, what were involved were only unfulfilled promises, absent deceit or
misrepresentation. He proffers that there was no fraud, but merely a non-compliance of the
supposed promise of job placements abroad.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. In this
situational context, the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means used by accused-appellant Bautista and sustained damages as a result
thereof
Here, it is not disputed that private complainants Randy, Rolando and Efren all relied
on accused-appellant Bautista’s promise that he would be able to arrange for their
placements in jobs in South Korea, but that despite payments of varying amounts of fees and
the processing of the supposedly required documents, they were unable to leave the country
to work abroad as they were assured, and as a consequence, all three suffered damages.
These facts squarely fall within the definition of estafa, and belies accused-appellant
Bautista’s insistence that these were merely cases of benign unfulfilled promises. Instead,
and as found by the lower courts, these consisted of a series of deceitful acts that are
precisely within the contemplation of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC.
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes
any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. It is committed on a large scale
when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely: (1) the person
charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not have
a license or authority to do so. Contrary to accused-appellant Bautista’s mistaken notion,
therefore, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case
for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority.
Further, to establish that the offense of illegal recruitment was conducted in a large
scale, it must be proven that: (1) the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement
of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority
to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the
unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All three elements
have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, as testified to by the private complainants, the accused nevertheless engaged

in recruitment and placement activities without the
requisite authority, and were therefore properly charged with illegal recruitment.
Accused-appellant Bautista's reliance on the Equipoise Rule is likewise misplaced.

The Equipoise Rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. This Rule
cannot find application in accused-appellant Bautista's case because, contrary to his
submission, the evidence submitted and evaluated by both lower courts mount high against
accused-appellant Bautista's denial and ineffective and uncorroborated feigning of
innocence. The total evidence presented by both parties is asymmetrical, with the
prosecution's submissions indubitably demonstrating accused-appellant Bautista's guilt.
Q: In 11 separate Informations, accused-appellant Bautista, together with co-accused
Buenconsejo and De Guzman, was charged with 10 counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, and one count of violation of R.A. 8042. Randy further
testified, he paid accused-appellant Bautista P50,000.00 for the processing fee, in
exchange for which accused-appellant Bautista issued a receipt under the name of
Baler Aurora Travel & Tours, Inc. After his payment, Randy later learned that accused-
appellant Bautista was arrested following an entrapment operation. Randy, along
with other persons who were also recruited by accused-appellant Bautista, visited the
latter in Camp Crame, but they failed to see accused-appellant Bautista in person. They
were instead told to go and see accused-appellant Bautista's co-accused
Buenconsejo, who was supposedly the one who would speak to them about the money
that they had given to accused-appellant Bautista. The prosecution also presented the
testimony of Rolando, he was also introduced to accused-appellant Bautista by
Maribel, who told him that accused-appellant Bautista was looking for workers to be
sent to South Korea, as replacement for those applicants who backed out. On the
promise that he would be deployed to South Korea, Rolando gave accused-appellant
Bautista a total of PI44,000.00 paid in seven installments, to supposedly cover the
swapping fee, the visa processing expenses, as well as airfare costs. Finally, Efren, for
his part, he gave accused-appellant Bautista a total of PI 59,000.00. Is Bautista guilty
of Estafa?
A: Yes. Here, it is not disputed that private complainants Randy, Rolando and Efren all relied
on accused-appellant Bautista's promise that he would be able to arrange for their
placements in jobs in South Korea, but that despite payments of varying amounts of fees and
the processing of the supposedly required documents, they were unable to leave the country
to work abroad as they were assured, and as a consequence, all three suffered damages.
These facts squarely fall within the definition of estafa and belies accused-appellant
Bautista's insistence that these were merely cases of benign unfulfilled promises. Instead,
and as found by the lower courts, these consisted of a series of deceitful acts that are
precisely within the contemplation of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC.
(People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582. September 3, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WODIE FRUELDA Y ANULAO
G.R. No. 242690, September 03, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
When the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial
court necessarily carry great weight and respect. This is because the trial court's determination
proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their
conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
candor.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Fruelda for the crime of rape. Upon arraignment,
Fruelda pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.
The private complainant testified that she is a member and a full-time worker of Jesus
the Anointed One Church. She is in charge of the storeroom where bars of soaps, coffee and
other items used to generate funds for the congregation were stored. On the other hand, the
accused was the driver of the church's Bishop. When the accused arrived on the morning of
28 April 2014, the accused asked her where the storeroom was, and asked to retrieve bar
soaps for him to which she obliged. Private complainant entered the storeroom through its
main door while the Accused trailed behind her. While she was explaining that an inventory
is required before the items can be disposed of, the Accused suddenly grabbed her breasts.
Out of shock, private complainant shouted. Although the Accused released her breasts, he,
however, immediately grabbed the front of private complainant's pants directly over her
private part. She was shouting in pain as the Accused dragged her further inside the bodega.
The last thing she saw was the accused pulling out his penis and she heard him saying
"tumuwad ka".
When she regained composure, private complainant realized that she was already
seated on the floor. She saw that her pants as well as her underwear were pulled down to
her knees but the Accused was no longer to be found. She also does not know how much time
has already lapsed after the accused told her "tumuwad ka". Although it was already dark
and she could not see anything, private complainant gathered her senses, pulled up her
clothes and went out of the bodega. She was bursting in tears when her fellow church
member Conchita Pandi saw her. She retrieved her cellphone and called Edna Rabano Ilagan,
her fellow member at "Samahang Magdalo", to come to her aid. Edna Rabano Ilagan testified
that she received a call from the private complainant who was crying on the line. Private
complainant was begging to be fetched as she was allegedly raped. When she arrived at Jesus
the Anointed One Church, she saw private complainant crying and shaking near the
storeroom. She also noticed that private complainant had bruises on her body. She then
accompanied private complainant to the women's desk at Camp Miguel Malvar where they
were interviewed by P/Insp. Julieta Magpantay.
For the defense, the following witnesses took the witness stand: the Accused Wodie
Fruelda himself, Conchita Pandi and Romel Elida.
The Accused denied the imputations against him and anchored his defense on the
sweetheart theory. The Accused testified he was acquainted with private complainant when
she joined the church in 1996. When he got married in 1999, private complainant would
usually ask him about his marital life. As time went by, they became closer with one another
until private complainant became his mistress. As such, it was just natural for the both of
them to engage in sexual activities as they did in the morning of 28 April 2014 inside the
storeroom.
When he and the Bishop returned to the church, the Accused was informed that there
was a complaint against him for rape filed by private complainant. The Bishop then told him
that they needed to go to CIDG at the PNP Headquarters wherein a certain SPO3 Mendoza
talked to him. He was then told to remain at the police station because of the complaint
lodged against him. He stayed at the police station for two (2) weeks before he was brought
to court and later to the city jail. He was saddened because the reason why he went to the
camp was to explain to his side that he did not commit the charges hurled against him.
The RTC found Fruelda guilty of the crime of rape: The CA affirmed the conviction of
Fruelda. However, the Accused-Appellant maintains that his sexual encounter with the
private complainant was consensual as they were sweethearts. By taking this stance,
Accused-Appellant inevitably admitted his carnal knowledge with private complainant. The
burden of evidence to prove their relationship as sweethearts is therefore shifted upon him.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in finding Fruelda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape by carnal knowledge.
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of Fruelda
RULING
1. The appeal is partly meritorious. In the case at bar, as in most rape cases, the issue
boils down to the credibility of the victim. In this regard, the Court pored over the
testimony of AAA and find that there is no reason to overturn the trial court's
assessment of AAA's credibility.
The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-
attendance of force or intimidation. When an accused in a rape case claims, as in the
case at bar, that he is in a relationship with the complainant, the burden of proof shifts
to him to prove the existence of the relationship and that the victim consented to the
sexual act.
No such proof was presented by the defense in this case. Thus, the Court is left with
the admission of Fruelda that he inserted his finger inside AAA's private part and that
AAA fellated him — against her will. Fruelda's acts of inserting his finger inside AAA's
private part against her will and forcing AAA to fellate him constitute two different
acts of sexual assault under 266-A (2). However, since the Information is silent as to
the second act admitted by Fruelda, that of forcing AAA to fellate him, he cannot be
convicted for it.
2. YES. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor

of Fruelda.
Contrary to the conclusion of the CA, the Court holds that the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Fruelda. When Fruelda
found out that AAA had lodged a complaint against him, he immediately went to the
Batangas Criminal Investigation and Detention Group to surrender. Acknowledgment
of guilt is not a condition sine qua non of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. It is sufficient that the accused spontaneously submits himself to the
authorities because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for
his search and capture.
Q: An Information was filed against Fruelda for the crime of rape. The private
complainant testified that she oversees the storeroom where bars of soaps, coffee and
other items used to generate funds for the congregation were stored. At around eight
o'clock in the morning of 28 April 2014, she was charging her cellphone inside the
church premises when the accused arrived and asked her where the storeroom was.
After being pointed to where the storeroom was located, the Accused asked private
complainant to retrieve bar soaps for him to which she obliged. The Accused suddenly
grabbed her breasts. Out of shock, private complainant shouted. Although the Accused
released her breasts, he, however, immediately grabbed the front of private
complainant's pants directly over her private part. The accused to escape one's
liability presented the idea that he has [a] prohibited love affair with the complainant.
Is the defense of the accused tenable?
A: No. In rape, the 'sweetheart' defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first, that
the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual
relations. The second is as important as the first, because this Court has held often enough
that love is not a license for lust.
For the Court to even consider giving credence to such a defense, it must be proven
by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of
the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required — such as tokens, mementos,
and photographs. No such proof was presented by the defense in this case. (People v. Fruelda
y Anulao, G.R. No. 242690. September 3, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PO2 BERNARDINO CRUZ Y BASCO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 216642, September 08, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As we already held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Hilario, "the fact that accused
killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original
intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray
bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting
Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS
Cruz was charged with homicide and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
According to the Prosecution, private complainant Archibald Bernardo y David

(Bernardo) was manning his LPG business when he received a call from a customer
complaining that the LPG gas tank delivered earlier was leaking. Bernardo decided to attend
to it personally and, using his own motorcycle, proceeded to the customer. While cruising
along Paulino Street and before reaching the intersection of Nepa and Alfonso Streets,
Bernardo chanced upon Cruz who was also on a motorcycle in front of Balut Bakery.
Bernardo overtook Cruz but the latter tried to flag him down. When Bernardo looked back
and their eyes met, Cruz placed his right hand on the gun tucked in his waist and then, in a
challenging voice, shouted "Ano?" at Bernardo. Bernardo responded with "Ano rin."
Immediately, Cruz drew his gun from his waist and fired successive shots at Bernardo, who
sped off with his motorcycle to flee. In the meantime, Gerwin F. Torralba (Torralba) was
flying a kite in the area at that time. Torralba fell to the ground upon being hit by one of the
bullets fired by Cruz. Upon seeing Torralba sprawled on the ground, Cruz stopped, left his
motorcycle, and ran towards Nepa Street.
As per the Version of the Defense, Cruz, a regular member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), was on a day shift duty. Using his own motorcycle, he conducted a roving patrol
along Paulino Street up to the vicinity of San Rafael Street. While traversing Paulino Street
between the corners of Nepa and Batasan Streets, Bernardo, who was also on a motorcycle,
suddenly overtook him, blocked his path and nearly collided with his motorcycle. Cruz then
asked Bernardo, "Ano ba?" It was then that he recognized that the person who overtook him
was Bernardo, son of a former Barangay Chairman who was defeated by his mother in the
recent election. Bernardo shouted back, "Ano rin!" At the same time, Bernardo drew his gun
from his waist and pointed it at Cruz, while also moving away slowly on board his
motorcycle. Faced with imminent danger to his own life, Cruz, a policeman, acted swiftly to
prevent the aggression by drawing his service firearm and firing at the arms of Bernardo.
Thereafter, Cruz surrendered to his superior and turned-over his service firearms,
and subsequently submitted himself for investigation. It was only then that he learned that
during the incident, Torralba, a child who was playing, was accidentally hit and had died.
The CA promulgated the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
The CA upheld the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
ISSUES
1. Whether the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of duty
should be appreciated in his favor;
2. Whether Cruz is guilty only of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead of
homicide; and
3. Whether his criminal liability should be mitigated given the sufficient provocation on
the part of Bernardo, and by his voluntary surrender.
RULING
1. NO. Cruz was not acting in self-defense or fulfillment of duty.
On the matter of self-defense, the Court concurs with the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that Cruz's act of shooting was not precipitated by any unlawful aggression on the
part of Bernardo. In self-defense, the accused bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these
three elements, the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the most
important.
As found by the RTC and the CA, Cruz failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it was Bernardo who first drew a gun. Thus, in the absence of unlawful aggression on
the part of Bernardo, the plea of self-defense must necessarily fail.
There is also no merit in Cruz's claim that he was acting in the fulfillment of his duties
as a police officer at the time of the shooting incident. To successfully invoke this justifying
circumstance, an accused must prove that: (1) he acted in the performance of a duty; and (2)
the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty. It has already been established-by the
consistent factual findings of the RTC and CA, which gave more credence to the facts as
narrated by the prosecution-that Cruz's act of shooting Bernardo was without any justifiable
cause. Consequently, there is no basis to conclude that Cruz's actions were committed in
furtherance of his police duties.
Further, having pleaded self-defense, Cruz essentially admitted to the felonious act of
shooting Bernardo and inflicting fatal injuries upon the latter. On this score, the Court
concurs with the findings of the RTC and CA that Cruz is guilty of frustrated homicide.
2. NO. The death of Torralba amounts to homicide.
Considering that the death of Torralba was caused by the same felonious act of
shooting at Bernardo, the OSG is correct when it argues that Cruz should be held guilty of
homicide as originally charged.
It has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional felony when he
fired multiple shots at Bernardo. The death of Torralba, who was hit by one of those bullets
intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional felony.
The death of Torralba is an example of aberratio ictus.
3. NO. Cruz is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
While Cruz is guilty of frustrated homicide and homicide, he is entitled to the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraph 7, of the RPC
which requires that the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents.” For this mitigating circumstance to be appreciated, the following
elements must be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was
voluntary.64 All three elements are present in this case. As shown by the records, Cruz
surrendered his person and service firearm to his superior immediately after the shooting
incident.
Q: Cruz was charged with homicide, and he was also charged with frustrated homicide
in another separate information. According to the Prosecution, private complainant
Bernardo was manning his liquified petroleum gas business when he received a call
from a customer complaining that the LPG gas tank delivered earlier was leaking.
Bernardo decided to attend to it personally and, using his own motorcycle, proceeded
to the customer. While cruising along Paulino Street and before reaching the
intersection of Nepa and Alfonso Streets, Bernardo chanced upon Cruz who was also
on a motorcycle in front of Balut Bakery. Earlier, one Herero noticed that Cruz
traversing Paulino Street slowly while looking from side to side as if in search of
someone. Bernardo overtook Cruz but the latter tried to flag him down. When
Bernardo looked back and their eyes met, Cruz placed his right hand on the gun tucked
in his waist and then, in a challenging voice, shouted "Ano?" at Bernardo. Bernardo
responded with "Ano rin." Immediately, Cruz drew his gun from his waist and fired
successive shots at Bernardo, who sped off with his motorcycle to flee. On the other
hand, according to Cruz he was faced with imminent danger to his own life, hence
being a policeman, he acted swiftly to prevent the aggression by drawing his service
firearm and firing at the arms of Bernardo. Can Cruz invoke the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of duty should be appreciated
in his favor?
A: No. Cruz was not acting in self-defense or fulfillment of duty. The Court held that that
Cruz's act of shooting was not precipitated by any unlawful aggression on the part of
Bernardo. In self-defense, the accused bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these three elements,
the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the most important. The test
for the presence of unlawful aggression is whether aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself, and such peril must not be
an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, (a) there must be a physical or material attack
or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack
or assault must be unlawful.
As found by the RTC and the CA, Cruz failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it was Bernardo who first drew a gun. Thus, in the absence of unlawful aggression on
the part of Bernardo, the plea of self-defense must necessarily fail. (Cruz y Basco v. People,
G.R. No. 216642. September 8, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa
ALMA CAMORO PAHKIAT, MAHALITO BUNAYOG LAPINID AND FE MANAYAGA LOPEZ,
v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT - XII
G.R. No. 223972, November 03, 2020, En Banc, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that the Court defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. The
Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination by the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.
The foregoing general rule, however, is subject to an exception - where there is an

allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In such case, the Ombudsman's act cannot escape
judicial scrutiny under the Court's own constitutional power and duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
FACTS
Kidapawan City State Auditor IV and Audit Team Leader, Marlene B. Aspilla issued
CAO Office Order No. 2006-07 to constitute a team to conduct a 10-day audit on the cash,
accounts and financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion after receiving information on the
alleged falsification of disbursement vouchers (DV), missing DVs, unrecorded check
issuances and other irregularities in the financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion. The
team proceeded to the Office of the Barangay Treasurer, but Joguilon failed to appear and
was later reported missing to the police. Nevertheless, the team proceeded with the audit
and submitted its 14-page Special Audit Report. A month after, Special Investigator IV
(Officer-In-Charge) Efren R. Rapacon of COA-XII indorsed the Special Audit Report to the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, recommending that criminal and administrative
proceedings be instituted against the persons named therein. Thus, the said Special Audit
Report was adopted as the complaint of COA-XII for the Complex Crime of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public or Commercial Documents and Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The criminal complaint was instituted together with the
administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
In a Joint Order, the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao ordered the respondents to
submit their counter-affidavits. Tamayo, Sambuang, and petitioners submitted their Joint
Counter-Affidavit, wherein they alleged that the complaint against them should be dismissed
outright for failure to specifically allege the acts or omissions constituting the crime charged.
They cited Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that the accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him or her. They posited that
the complaint failed to specifically establish their participation and that it merely concluded
that they conspired with barangay officials. They pointed out that COA-XII failed to establish
the elements of conspiracy against them.
Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued the assailed Resolution

dated February 28, 2011 for the criminal charges. On the same date, it also issued a Decision
for the administrative charges. The assailed Resolution and Decision are almost identical in
their narration of facts and ratiocination, extensively citing the Special Audit Report. In the
said Decision for the administrative case, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found
substantial evidence establishing the charges of Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and ordered CAO-Kidapawan personnel,
including petitioners, dismissed from the service.
Ruling on the separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, however, the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao reversed its earlier Decision insofar as petitioners were
concerned and absolved them from liability. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found
that petitioners had no direct participation in the anomalies.
With regard to respondents Fe Manayaga Lopez, Alma Camoro Pahkiat, Mahalito

Bunayog Lapinid, their Motions for Reconsideration are hereby GRANTED and they are
hereby reinstated to their respective former positions and are entitled to full back wages as
the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to charge herein petitioners with 107 counts of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public and Commercial Documents
under Articles 217 and 171 of the RPC, and one (1) count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended.
RULING
YES. The Petition is meritorious.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "an act too patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law" or that the tribunal, board or officer with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers "exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility." Petitioners here have convincingly shown the presence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in this case.
Firstly, the Court finds the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to have hastily and
arbitrarily denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. While procedural rules are
important since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, such rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. What should guide judicial action is that party-
litigants should be given the opportunity to establish the merits of their complaint or defense
rather than for them to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, when they result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Thus, if
only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had entertained the motion for reconsideration
instead of denying it cursorily and only on the basis of it being late, it would have realized
that there was a compelling reason to overturn its earlier Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners.
The rule that the three kinds of remedies, which flow from the threefold liability of a
public officer, may proceed independently, is hinged on the differences in the quantum of
evidence required in each case. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed,
whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is required. As such, defeat of any of the three remedies will not
necessarily preclude resort to other remedies or affect decisions reached thereat.
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved
an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the
same set of facts are (sic) the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already
litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude-by the principle of bar by prior
judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of
the case,"—the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that
when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them.
The ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, therefore, is much more than a
finding that there was "insufficient evidence" to hold petitioners administratively liable, but
rather, that petitioners did not commit anything at all which can potentially incriminate
them administratively or criminally.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did
not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused
may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained
of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.
While the Court has in the past been wary about quashing an Information or
overturning a finding of the Ombudsman on the sole basis that the administrative case
against the accused has been dismissed, it has also balanced this respect with the right of an
individual not to be subjected to the expense and rigors of a trial that has, by all accounts, no
leg to stand on. Certainly, the rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
"oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when
circumstances so require.
Q: State Auditor IV and Audit Team Leader, Aspilla issued CAO Office Order No. 2006-
07 to constitute a team to conduct a 10-day audit on the cash, accounts and financial
transactions of Barangay Poblacion after receiving information on the alleged
falsification of disbursement vouchers (DV), missing DVs, unrecorded check issuances
and other irregularities in the financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion. The team
proceeded to the Office of the Barangay Treasurer, but Joguilon failed to appear and
was later reported missing to the police. Nevertheless, the team proceeded with the
audit and submitted its 14-page Special Audit Report11 for the period of January 1,
2005 to May 10, 2006 to the COA Cluster Director, Cluster V-LGS-Mindanao on May 29,
2006.
On June 30, 2006, Special Investigator IV Rapacon of COA indorsed the Special Audit
Report to the Office of the Ombudsman recommending that criminal and
administrative proceedings be instituted against the persons named . Thus, the said
Special Audit Report was adopted as the complaint of COA for the Complex Crime of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public or Commercial
Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The criminal complaint was
instituted together with the administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. In a Joint Order the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits. Petitioners
submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit for both cases, wherein they alleged that the
complaint against them should be dismissed outright for failure to specifically allege
the acts or omissions constituting the crime charged. Did the Office of the Ombudsman
commit grave abuse of discretion?
A: Yes. Firstly, the Court finds the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to have hastily and
arbitrarily denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that party-litigants should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of their complaint or defense rather than for them to lose life, liberty, honor, or
property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, when they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.
Thus, if only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had entertained the motion for
reconsideration instead of denying it cursorily and only on the basis of it being late, it would
have realized that there was a compelling reason to overturn its earlier Resolution finding
probable cause against petitioners. (Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No.
223972. November 3, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
CECILIA Q. REJAS v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DIOSDADO N. DITONA, REPRESENTED BY EDWIN N.
DITONA
G.R. Nos. 241576 & 241623, November 03, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of
a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is considered grave where the elements of corruption
are present including a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established
rules. To constitute misconduct, however, it is likewise imperative that the act or omission
complained of must have a direct relation to the public officer's duties and affect not only his
character as a private individual, but also, and more importantly, the performance of his official
duties as a public servant. The misfeasance or malfeasance must amount to either
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
FACTS
In his Affidavit Complaint filed before the Ombudsman, Diosdado Ditona (Ditona)
alleged that Rogelio N. Quiño (Rogelio), the former Municipal Mayor of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, approved several appointments of his brother, Antonio N. Quiño, Jr. (Antonio), as
Mechanical Shop Foreman. Ditona alleged that these appointments violated the rule on
nepotism. He further averred that petitioner, Rogelio's and Antonio's sister, certified the
appointments in her capacity as the former Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon.8 The siblings purportedly conspired to make it appear that the
position of Mechanical Shop Foreman is of a higher salary grade (SG 15) when in truth, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, through Ordinance Nos. 2000-1519 and
2001-157,10 fixed a lower Salary grade of 11 to the position. Consequently, Antonio received
a salary higher than what was provided by law, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.11 Ditona finally alleged that Antonio falsified his personal data sheet (PDS) by
making it appear that he was not related to the appointing or recommending authority.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the siblings denied that there was an intention to hide
their relationship with Antonio, and that on the contrary, the fact was disclosed right from
the beginning. The position of Mechanical Shop Foreman was likewise contractual and of
non-career service, and was thusly excluded from the scope of the prohibition on nepotism
under Section 79 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner and her brothers maintained that the hiring of Antonio did not cause undue
injury to the government, but had even proved beneficial and advantageous to the
government considering the 1,544% increase in the annual gross receipts of the heavy
equipment operations from the calendar years 2006 to 2011.
In its Decision, the Ombudsman found the charge of nepotism against Rogelio
unmeritorious and also dismissed the charge of falsification against Antonio. However, the
Ombudsman found Rogelio and petitioner liable for grave misconduct.
In holding petitioner and Rogelio liable for grave misconduct, the Ombudsman found
their act of signing and approving the Plantilla of Casual Appointments which upgraded
Antonio's position as Mechanical Shop Foreman from salary grade 15 to 18, and of certifying
the appointments and the existence of an appropriation legally made for the purpose,
respectively, to have "transgressed some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."
The CA ruled that petitioner and Rogelio were guilty of grave misconduct for granting
unto themselves the determination of the salary increase of Antonio, in contravention of
Sections 81 and 325 of the LGC and Sangguniang Bayan Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and 2001-
157. Petitioner cannot likewise evade liability as she, being the local budget officer, ought to
know the budget that can only be allocated for Antonio's position
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding the finding of the Ombudsman of grave
misconduct against petitioner.
RULING
The Petition is meritorious.
Local government units are endowed with power to fix the compensation of their
officials and employees. Under the LGC, the function of salary determination, which includes
any increase or adjustment, is lodged in the sanggunian concerned. This is clear from
Sections 81 and 447 of the LGC, to wit:
SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. - The compensation of local
officials and personnel shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided,
That the increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after
the terms of office of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided,
further, That the increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees
shall take effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase: Provided,
however, That said increases shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations
for personal services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, finally,
That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-Seven Fifty-Eight (R.A. No. 6758), otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."
xxxx
SEC. 447. Powers. Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang bayan,
as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers
of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1)
Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
municipal government, and in this connection shall:
xxxx
(viii)
Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and
benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from municipal funds and
provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects,
services, and activities of the municipal government;
xxxx
Verily, in this case, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and
2001-157 which fixed the salary grade of Mechanical Shop Foreman to 11. Parenthetically,
this salary determination is compliant with DBM Local Budget Circular (LBC) No. 61, which
provides that a Mechanical Shop Foreman is a salary grade 11 position. DBM LBC No. 61 was,
in turn, prepared pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 6758 which states that:
SECTION 6. Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the
Compensation and Position Classification System. - All positions in the government
covered under Section 4 hereof shall be allocated to their proper position titles and
salary grades in accordance with the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System which shall
be prepared by the DBM.
It is undisputed that when Antonio was re-appointed as a Mechanical Shop Foreman

in a casual status beginning January 2009, his salary grade was 15. From the period of July
12, 2012 to October 11, 2012, his salary grade went up to 18. These salary adjustments, as
correctly held by the Ombudsman and the CA, contravened Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and
2001-157 and DBM LBC No. 61. No countervailing evidence was presented to show that the
ordinances were revoked or superseded by a later ordinance. Neither was there any proof
that DBM LBC No. 61 had been revised during the relevant periods.
The foregoing discussion, notwithstanding, the Court finds that petitioner had no
participation in the questionable act of increasing the salary grade of Antonio. Consequently,
the CA erred in affirming the finding of the Ombudsman that petitioner is guilty of grave
misconduct.
Hence, to hold petitioner liable for misconduct, the acts or omissions for which she
was charged must be of direct relation to and be connected with the performance of her
official duties as the Municipal Budget Officer and the same must be willful or intentional.
It bears emphasis at this point that the case against petitioner revolved around her
certifications appearing in the Plantilla of Casual Appointments of Antonio. It was alleged
that in certifying the same, petitioner effectively "had a hand" in irregularly upgrading the
salary of Antonio. However, a simple reading of the Plantilla of Casual Appointments plainly
shows the extent of petitioner's acts to be only with respect to certifying that appropriations
did exist for the position.
In order to establish administrative liability for misconduct, there must be a nexus

between the public official's acts and the functions of his or her office.58 Misconduct being
an intentional act, as well, the holding of the Court in PNP-CIDG v. Villafuerte,59 although
involving different charges, is illuminating. The Court in said case noted of a nexus that
should also be established between the functions of the official and a scheme to defraud the
Government. The Court cautioned that the Ombudsman cannot satisfy the threshold of
substantial evidence using only conjectures and suppositions.
Indeed, while the quantum of evidence in administrative cases does not require that
it be overwhelming or preponderant in order to be considered substantial, this does not
sanction drawing a nexus that is tenuous or rests on shaky grounds. The Court has always
lauded the Ombudsman in fulfilling its all too important role as "protector of the people," but
the Court has, at the same time, drawn the line when it becomes overzealous at the expense
of public officers. The Court once again puts its foot down in the shot-gun approach employed
by the Ombudsman in this case.
Q: In his Affidavit Complaint filed before the Ombudsman, Ditona alleged that Rogelio,
the former Municipal Mayor of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, approved several
appointments of his brother, Antonio, as Mechanical Shop Foreman. Ditona alleged
that these appointments violated the rule on nepotism. He further averred that
petitioner, Rogelio's and Antonio's sister, certified the appointments in her capacity
as the former Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon. The siblings purportedly conspired to make it appear that the position of
Foreman is of a higher salary grade (SG 15) when in truth, the grade should be of SG
11. Consequently, Antonio received a salary higher than what was provided by law, to
the damage and prejudice of the government. Ditona finally alleged that Antonio
falsified his personal data sheet by making it appear that he was not related to the
appointing or recommending authority. The CA ruled that petitioner and Rogelio were
guilty of grave misconduct for granting unto themselves the determination of the
salary increase of Antonio, in contravention of Sections 81 and 325 of the LGC and
Sangguniang Bayan Ordinance. Petitioner cannot likewise evade liability as she, being
the local budget officer, ought to know the budget that can only be allocated for
Antonio's position. Did the CA err in upholding the finding of the Ombudsman of grave
misconduct against petitioner?
A: Yes. Local government units are endowed with power to fix the compensation of their
officials and employees. Under the LGC, the function of salary determination, which includes
any increase or adjustment, is lodged in the sanggunian concerned. This is clear from
Sections 81 and 447 of the LGC.
Hence, to hold petitioner liable for misconduct, the acts or omissions for which she
was charged must be of direct relation to and be connected with the performance of her
official duties as the Municipal Budget Officer and the same must be willful or intentional.
It bears emphasis at this point that the case against petitioner revolved around her
certifications appearing in the Plantilla of Casual Appointments of Antonio. It was alleged
that in certifying the same, petitioner effectively "had a hand" in irregularly upgrading the
salary of Antonio. However, a simple reading of the Plantilla of Casual Appointments plainly
shows the extent of petitioner's acts to be only with respect to certifying that appropriations
did exist for the position. (Rejas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 241576 & 241623.
CARLOS PEREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OMBUDSMAN,
G.R. No. 245862, November 03, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The constitutional guarantee on due process requires the State not only to observe the
substantive requirements on preliminary investigation, but to conform with the prescribed
periods under the applicable rules.
The correlation of the due process rights of the accused and the right to speedy
disposition of cases was explained in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (Tatad) as follows: "[s]ubstantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law.
FACTS
A complaint for Malversation of Public Funds or Property, for violation of Sections
3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 and for violation of Sections 37 and 48 of R.A.
No. 90036 was filed against Perez, in his capacity as the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. The
complaint also impleaded Victor G. Rojo (Rojo), a private individual connected with Etsaw
Consultancy and Construction of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of
the Philippines.
The complaint stemmed from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on

November 12, 2001 between the Municipality of Biñan, as represented by Perez, and ECCE,
as represented by Rojo, wherein the Municipality of Biñan agreed to use ECCE's Hydromex
Technology for its solid waste management program, and to obtain its services for project
management, documentation, as-built drawings, installation, testing, supervision, and
training. The MOA further stated that the Municipality of Biñan was satisfied and convinced
of ECCE's capability to carry out the solid waste management program after it had observed
ECCE's Hydromex Technology in the Quezon City Hall compound. Perez's authority to enter
into the MOA was earlier granted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan.
An amended MOA was supposedly executed on March 25, 2002, having the same
terms and conditions as the original MOA, except for the price and terms of payment. From
P75,000,000.00, the price was reduced to P71,000,000.00, and the terms of payment were
accelerated.10
The complaint, filed 14 years after the execution of the MOA, alleged that there was
no competitive bidding undertaken to procure ECCE's solid waste management program and
other services.
After more than four months from the filing of the complaint, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer issued a report on September
6, 2016, recommending the assignment of the case to a member of the Environmental
Ombudsman Team.
In a Resolution dated February 22, 2018, the OMB Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer found probable cause to charge Perez with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019..
On October 31, 2018, Perez moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the offense. Perez pointed out that the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 occurred on November 12, 2001 up to March 25, 2002. Under Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, all offenses punishable under this law prescribe after 15 years. Since the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan only on October 5, 2018, or more than 16 years from the
commission of the offense, the criminal charges should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. In addition, Perez invoked his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of
cases.
On the issue of prescription of the offense, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the 15-year
period is applicable because R.A. No. 10910, the amendatory law of R.A. No. 3019, took effect
only on July 21, 2016. The Sandiganbayan likewise ruled that the prescriptive period
commenced to run only from the discovery of the commission of the offense, pursuant to the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. For this reason, it was only when
the problems with the MOA became evident that the offense was discovered. In any case, the
Sandiganbayan held that even if it were to reckon the prescriptive period on the Sangguniang
Bayan's passage of its resolution on October 1, 2001, which approved the execution of the
subject MOA, the filing of the complaint with the OMB interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period.
Further, the Sandiganbayan held that there was no violation of Perez's right to speedy
disposition of cases.
ISSUES
(a) Whether the offense charged against Perez has prescribed; and
(b) Whether Perez's right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.
RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
a. The prescription of offenses defined in special penal laws generally begins to

run upon the commission of the offense.
In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine
the following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period commenced to
run; and (c) when the period was interrupted.
Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prescriptive period of the offense is found in Section 1152 of the same law, which provides
that all offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. This provision was
later amended by R.A. No. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period from 15 to 20 years. The
amendatory law took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of prescription may
not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10910.53
The applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
R.A. No. 3019 does not explicitly provide when the period begins to run. For this
purpose, reference should be made to Act No. 3326, which governs the prescription of
offenses punished by special penal laws.
As a general rule, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 prescribes that prescription is triggered
by the commission of the crime:
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
If the commission of the offense is not known at that time, prescription begins to run
from its discovery. This is otherwise referred to as the "blameless ignorance" principle which
the Sandiganbayan relied upon to hold that the offense charged against Perez has not
prescribed.
This "blameless ignorance" principle was mostly applied in cases involving behest
loans executed during the Martial Law regime, as an exception to the general rule that
prescription runs from the commission of the crime. Behest loans, by their very nature, are
not easily discovered as they normally involved a large-scale conspiracy among the loan
beneficiaries and the concerned public officials. Furthermore, there were negative
repercussions entailing the prosecution of these offenses during the Martial Law regime.
Taking the unique circumstances of behest loans under consideration, the Court ruled that
the prescription of offenses arising from these contracts did not run until after the State
discovered the violations
As an exception, the "blameless ignorance" principle applies when the plaintiff is

unable to know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. It
cannot always be invoked to extend the prescriptive period of the offense.
Here, the Court does not agree with the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the "blameless
ignorance" principle to rule that the offense here has not prescribed.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it misapplied
the discovery rule. There was neither any allegation nor evidence that Perez deliberately
concealed the MOA with ECCE from the public, such that it would be impossible for the State
to discover the anomalies in the contract. For this reason, prescription began to run upon the
execution of the MOA between the Municipality of Biñan and ECCE on November 12, 2001,
or when the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was allegedly committed.
The filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively
commenced the preliminary investigation proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the
OMB was duty-bound to determine whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the
offenses stated in the complaint.66 It was at that point that the prescriptive period was
interrupted approximately 14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged
offense.
Having settled the issue on whether the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the
offense has set in, the Court proceeds to determine whether there was a violation of Perez's
right to speedy disposition of cases.
b. There was inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, for purposes of assessing whether the right of Perez to the speedy
disposition of cases was violated, the Court must examine whether the OMB observed the
specified time periods in its conduct of the preliminary investigation. But aside from the
reglementary periods for the filing of the counter-affidavits and reply affidavits, the Rules of
Procedure of the OMB75 do not prescribe a period within which the preliminary
investigation should be concluded. That said, the Rules also provide, however, that
preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the specific provisions under the Rules of Procedure of the OMB
In Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the investigating officer must
determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial within 10 days
after the investigation. Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which also fills
the gap77 in the procedure lacking in the Rules of Procedure of the OMB.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but
his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the
latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant
prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu propio, the Secretary of Justices reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, upon the termination of the investigation or the submission of the case for
resolution, the investigating officer of the OMB has 10 days within which to determine the
presence of probable cause.
The records of this case show that the complaint against Perez was filed on April 27,
2016. He was directed to file his counter-affidavit on October 13, 2016. After about five
weeks, or on November 22, 2016, Perez requested for additional time to comply with this
directive. Perez eventually filed his counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016.
Thereafter, the resolution of the complaint against Perez remained stagnant for
nearly two years, that is, until the investigating officer issued the February 22, 2018
Resolution finding probable cause to charge him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Perez's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 7, 2018, and an Information
dated July 19, 2018 was prepared by the Assistant Special Prosecutor of the OMB. The
Information was then filed with the Sandiganbayan only on October 5, 2018, or more than
two months counted from the denial of Perez's motion for reconsideration.
From the filing of the last pleading on December 20, 2016, it took the OMB one year,
two months, and two days to resolve the complaint against Perez. The preliminary
investigation was therefore resolved beyond the 10-day period prescribed under the Rules.
Following Cagang, the burden of proof was then shifted to the prosecution, who was required
to establish that such delay was not inordinate. This involves proving the following: (a) the
prosecution followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation
and in the prosecution of the case; (b) the complexity of the issues and the volume of
evidence made the delay inevitable; and (c) no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay
Since the prosecution failed to provide ample justification for the delay in the
termination of preliminary investigation, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Perez's motion to quash. In the same manner, the application for an injunctive relief
is meritorious. The Sandiganbayan is therefore permanently enjoined from proceeding with
the case.
Q: A complaint for Malversation of Public Funds or Property, for violation of Sections
3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and for violation of Sections 37 and 48 of
R.A. No. 9003 was filed against Perez, in his capacity as the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint, filed 14 years after the execution of the MOA, alleged that there was no
competitive bidding undertaken to procure ECCE's solid waste management program
and other services Perez moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the offense and violation of Perez's right to speedy disposition of cases.
Will the action of Perez prosper?
A: Yes. In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine
the following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period commenced to
run; and (c) when the period was interrupted.
Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prescriptive period of the offense is found in Section 1152 of the same law, which provides
that all offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. This provision was
later amended by R.A. No. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period from 15 to 20 years. The
amendatory law took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of prescription may
not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10910. The
applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it misapplied
the discovery rule. There was neither any allegation nor evidence that Perez deliberately
concealed the MOA with ECCE from the public, such that it would be impossible for the State
to discover the anomalies in the contract. For this reason, prescription began to run upon the
execution of the MOA between the Municipality of Biñan and ECCE on November 12, 2001,
or when the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was allegedly committed.
The filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively
commenced the preliminary investigation proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the
OMB was duty-bound to determine whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the
offenses stated in the complaint. It was at that point that the prescriptive period was
interrupted approximately 14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged
offense. (Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862. November 3, 2020, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 216745-46, November 10, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In all criminal cases, the prosecution is burdened with the duty of establishing with proof
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused. The determination of whether the prosecution
has fulfilled such a heavy burden is left to the trial court, which, in turn, must be satisfied with
moral certainty that an accused has indeed committed the crime on the basis of facts and
circumstances to warrant a judgment of conviction. Otherwise, where there is reasonable
doubt, acquittal must then follow, for all accused are presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved
FACTS
In two separate Informations, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented Engineer Constantino A. Pascual (Constantino),
Zenaida P. Pascual (Zenaida), Marciano T. Cruz (Marciano), and Clarissa Pascual Fernando
(Clarissa).
Constantino narrated that petitioner straightforwardly asked him to pay P1,000.00

as "pass way fee" per truckload. Constantino claimed that he tried to ask petitioner for any
legal document that could serve as basis for said collection, considering that RMDC was not
operating a quarry in San Miguel, Bulacan, but in Doña Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan, and only
passed through the territorial jurisdiction of San Miguel during hauling. Petitioner said that
temporary receipts would be issued by one Robert Tabemero12 (Tabernero), who was later
authorized by petitioner to receive said collections.
For her part, Zenaida she testified that the 30% royalty fee from quarrying operators
formed part of RMDC's revenue, and that the same was greatly prejudiced when its operator,
one Nora Tan (Nora), failed to remit the 30% royalty fee to RMDC due to the fact that Nora
already gave petitioner 20% thereof, allegedly per petitioner's order.24 She likewise
explained that the impounding of RMDC's delivery trucks disadvantaged RMDC because, as
a result, it failed to meet its daily quota of seven blocks per day of delivery.
The prosecution also presented Marciano, who testified that he has been the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan since 1998.27 His testimony centered on the
irregularity of the issuance of the official receipts which were issued to Constantino as proof
of payments of the pass way fees, more specifically the dates indicated thereon, and the
initials of the person who issued them.
The prosecution presented Clarissa as its final witness, who testified that she is the
Corporate Secretary of RMDC, as well as one of its mining operators.33 She testified that she
herself paid pass way fees to Tabernero, as evidenced by an official receipt.34 She also
clarified that although she was the registered owner of the impounded trucks, it was her
father, Constantino, who bought them for RMDC.
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith attributable to
petitioner, and found such bad faith as the direct and proximate cause of RMDC and
Constantino's undue injury.
In finding petitioner guilty, the Sandiganbayan found that all the elements of unlawful
acts penalized under Section 3(e) were proven by the prosecution, and held that petitioner
did cause undue injury to Constantino, RMDC, and the government, through acts that were
attended by evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of two counts of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
YES. Petitioner here is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which
provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur, to wit:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed. Petitioner was the
Mayor of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, and the acts complained of were done in the exercise of his official functions.
The dispute lies in whether the third element was proven, particularly whether his
act of collecting the pass way fees was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving RMDC
or the government undue injury. The Court here finds that the prosecution failed to establish
beyond doubt the third element of evident bad faith as charged under the Informations
leveled against petitioner.
The case the prosecution built fails on two fatal points.
First, the Court agrees with petitioner's observation that a variance does exist
between the mode of commission petitioner was charged with (i.e., evident bad faith) vis-à-
vis the one he was convicted with (gross inexcusable negligence).
Second, and even granting in arguendo the prosecution's claim that the gross
inexcusable negligence was discussed by the Sandiganbayan merely to flesh out the element
of evident bad faith, and that no variance as to the mode of commission existed, the Court
finds, after a careful contemplation of the entire body of evidence, that the prosecution failed
to prove that petitioner's assailed acts were attended by evident bad faith. The Court here
agrees with petitioner's objection to the admissibility of several pieces of documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution on the ground of them being hearsay evidence. And still,
even if the Court admits the entire body of documentary evidence as submitted by the
prosecution, it is compelled to find that what it only managed to show is that petitioner's acts
stemmed not from ill will or evident bad faith, but from an honest albeit erroneous reliance
on a defunct legal authority.
It must first be considered that there are three modes by which the offense for
violation of Section 3(e) may be committed:
1.Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
What is clear to the Court from the foregoing disquisition of the Sandiganbayan is that
it convicted petitioner on the modality of gross inexcusable negligence, which is separate
and distinct from the modality of evident bad faith petitioner was charged with in the
Information. This stark variance, as correctly pleaded by petitioner, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process, specifically his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. The two modalities of violating Section 3(e) are distinct in
their nature of commission: "evident bad faith" entails the willfulness to do something
wrong, whereas "gross inexcusable negligence" entails failure to exercise the required
diligence that either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a
wrongdoing. Thus, "gross inexcusable negligence" and "evident bad faith" are separate and
distinct modalities, and a charge of one in an Information may not be considered extendible
to a conviction for the other.
Petitioner here, therefore, may not be convicted on the basis of gross inexcusable
negligence, since the said modality was not included in the charge leveled against him on
both counts.
In all, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction.
Reasonable doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The
prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing
the pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict
injury on RMDC. Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases
involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute
evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as
he is constitutionally presumed.
Q: In two separate Informations, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019. After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith
attributable to petitioner, and found such bad faith as the direct and proximate cause
of RMDC and Constantino's undue injury. In finding petitioner guilty, the
Sandiganbayan found that all the elements of unlawful acts penalized under Section
3(e) were proven by the prosecution, and held that petitioner did cause undue injury
to Constantino, RMDC, and the government, through acts that were attended by
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Did the Sandiganbayan err in
convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
A: Yes. In order to hold a person liable under the said, the following elements must concur,
to wit:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial
functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The dispute lies in whether the third element was proven, particularly whether his
act of collecting the pass way fees was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving RMDC
or the government undue injury. The Court here finds that the prosecution failed to establish
beyond doubt the third element of evident bad faith as charged under the Informations
levelled against petitioner.
In all, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction.
Reasonable doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The
prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing
the pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict
injury on RMDC. Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases
involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute
evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as
he is constitutionally presumed. (Buencamino v. People, G.R. Nos. 216745-46. November 10,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 190728-29. November 18, 2020, Third Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Sequestration is the means to place or cause to be placed under the PCGG's possession
or control properties, building or office, including business enterprises and entities, for the
purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving
and preserving the same until it can be determined through appropriate judicial proceedings,
whether the property was in fact "ill-gotten."
FACTS
This controversy stems from the 1986 sequestration by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) of the properties of Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company, Inc., and its subsidiaries Philippine Dockyard Corporation and BASECO Drydock
& Construction Co., Inc. (collectively, BASECO). Among the sequestered properties were nine
parcels of land with a total area of 3,005,104 square meters (subject properties) and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan (RD Bataan).
On February 12, 1988, the Province of Bataan sold the subject properties via a tax
delinquency sale through a public auction for the nonpayment of real property taxes on the
said properties. The Province of Bataan was the only bidder and the subject properties were
sold to it. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period with neither PCGG nor BASECO
redeeming the subject properties, the Province of Bataan filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga, docketed as LRC No. 005-N'IL for the consolidation of its ownership
over the subject properties. With no opposition recorded, RTC Balanga, in its Order dated
June 22, 1989, granted the petition for consolidation and ordered the cancellation of the
pertinent Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued under BASECO's name, and directed the
RD Bataan to issue new certificates of title over the subject properties in the name of the
Province of Bataan.
The Province of Bataan thereafter leased the subject properties to RPort Services, and
the latter, in turn, ceded 10 hectares of the subject properties to Marina Port Services, which
entered into another lease contract for the said portion with the Province of Bataan.
Nearly four years after the RTC Balanga ordered the consolidation of ownership over
the subject properties to the Province of Bataan, or on May 14, 1993, the PCGG filed a
complaint for the annulment of the tax delinquency sale of the subject properties with the
RTC Balanga, alleging that said sale was invalid since there was no showing that the notice
of sale was published in accordance with law, or that said notice was otherwise sent to the
PCGG or BASECO. In this complaint, the PCGG further alleged that the subject properties sold
were included in the sequestered properties subject of the complaint for Reconveyance,
Reversion, Accounting, Restitution which was then pending with the Sandiganbayan, First
Division
Four years after the PCGG filed its complaint for the annulment of the tax sale, it filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment. However, when the same also remained unacted upon, the
PCGG requested for a transfer of venue, and the same was granted, thereby transferring Civil
Case No. 212-ML to RTC Makati.
The RTC Makati granted the PCGG's Motion for Summary Judgment in its Decision and
declared the tax delinquency sale of the subject properties null and void. Consequently, the
RTC Makati ordered the RD Bataan to cancel the certificates of title issued to the Province of
Bataan, and reinstate the certificates of title in the name of BASECO. However, Enrique T.
Garcia, Jr. (private respondent Garcia), then in his capacity as Representative of the Second
District of Bataan, and the Province of Bataan, both filed motions for reconsideration of the
RTC Makati's Decision. The RTC Makati heeded these motions and through its Order dated
December 18, 2001 18 recalled and set aside its earlier Decision, and further ordered the
reception of evidence for the PCGG.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in finding no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against private respondents, and dismissing the Informations against the latter
RULING
NO. The petition lacks merit and the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan.
First, the Court agrees with private respondents' submission that petitioner availed
of the wrong remedy with the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which dismissed the
Information against private respondents was a final order that finally disposed of the case,
the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Section 1
In the case at bar, it appears that petitioner resorted to the special civil action of
certiorari because petitioner failed to seasonably interpose an appeal. The Sandiganbayan
issued its Resolution on August 7, 2009. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
on August 28, 2009, but the same was denied via the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated
November 12, 2009, a copy of which was received by petitioner on November 16, 2009.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and the same may not be
entertained when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the
availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.
In this case, petitioner failed to demonstrate that the issue being raised in the present
petition, i.e., whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. SB-08-CRM-0410 and SB-08-CRM-0411,
could not have been raised on appeal.
Finally on this point, although the Court has, in some instances, treated petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule 45 in the interest of justice," the
same may not be afforded petitioner in this case since the instant petition was filed after the
lapse of the period for the filing of a petition for review.
Second, even on the ground invoked by petitioner, i.e., that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Informations filed against private
respondents, the present petition must still be denied.
Private respondents here were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violations of Section
3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited
or will profit thereby.
After a thoughtful and circumspect evaluation of the entire records of the case at bar,
the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Informations against private respondents. In finding no grave abuse, the
Court finds: (1) that at the time private respondents entered into the Compromise
Agreement, the Province of Bataan did not enjoy any vested right over the subject properties,
and therefore, private respondents could not have injured a right or interest that did not
exist; and (2) that private respondents' decision to negotiate and enter into the Compromise
Agreement with the PCGG and BASECO is their collective judgment call pursuant to the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and may not be interfered with absent
competent proof showing any ill motive on the part of private respondents.
Province of Bataan without a vested right over the subject properties
The case at bar, the Province of Bataan's ownership over the subject properties, apart
from it being disputed in Civil Case No. 212-ML, is likewise still subject to the resolution of
the sequestration case in Civil Case No. 0010.
More so, the Province of Bataan may not be considered to have enjoyed vested rights
so certain that a reduction of the same could support a criminal prosecution, as in this case.
Once more, since the Province of Bataan did not have a right in esse over the subject
properties, its interest could not be said to have been so permanent that the concessions
made by it in the Compromise Agreement were grossly disadvantageous to its interests as to
merit the criminal prosecution of private respondents for violation of Section 3( e) and (g)
of R.A. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, ruled well within its jurisdiction when it determined
lack of probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest against private respondents, and
dismissed the Informations in the face of apparent absence of legal ground to stand on.
Lastly, the issue of propriety and good faith in private respondents' act of entering
into the Compromise Agreement was not an isolated incident that only took into
consideration the duties of their public office vis-a-vis the property interests of their
province. Contrarily, said question found itself within a farsighted and complex context of
other simultaneous legal disputes that included the validity of a tax sale and the more
penultimate dispute of sequestration and recovery of suspected ill-gotten wealth. Since the
propriety of the terms of the Compromise Agreement rise and fall on the nature of the right
that the Province of Bataan enjoyed over the subject properties, and since said right has been
adjudged as questionable or otherwise in dispute, the criminal prosecution of herein private
respondents stand on shifting factual grounds, and was therefore correctly dismissed.
Entering into the Compromise Agreement is within the corporate powers of the local
government unit represented by private respondents
In order to challenge and interfere with this corporate prerogative of the local
government unit, ill motive must be shown. To be sure, such ill motive was not shown, much
less alleged, in petitioner's submissions. more, the Court finds that the records of the case
at bar are bereft of any showing of ill motive that may have underpinned private
respondents' act of negotiating and entering into the Compromise Agreement. Absent a
showing of such, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's exercise of its discretion in authorizing
private respondent Garcia, as the local chief executive, to negotiate and enter into the
Compromise Agreement may not be made a basis for criminal prosecution.
Stated differently, local chief executives and local legislative bodies are necessarily
given enough elbow room to navigate and respond to the different community-based needs
and challenges that vary per constituency. The crucial flexibility of these offices, designed no
less by R.A. 7160, is defeated when each decision that they make on behalf of their
constituency pursuant to their corporate powers are constantly threatened by prospects of
criminal backlash after the fact.
Absolutely, public office being a public trust, elected officials must be made to account
for any failure, irregularity or corruption in the discharge of the duties of their office.
However, absent clear proof of ill motive, these criminal prosecutions achieve no more than
paralyze locally elected officials into inaction, shortchange the people, and straitjacket public
service. This could not be farther from what R.A. 7160 intended. Absent proof of nefarious
motives, local elective officials must, as was intended, be given the space they need to capably
step into the shoes of the public offices they have been elected to, without the constant fear
of a Damocles sword hanging over their heads.
Q: A controversy stems from the 1986 sequestration by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government of the properties of Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company,
Inc., and its subsidiaries Philippine Dockyard Corporation and BASECO Drydock &
Construction Co., Inc. Among the sequestered properties were nine parcels of land
with a total area of 3,005,104 square meters and registered with the Registry of Deeds
of Bataan. On February 12, 1988, the Province of Bataan sold the subject properties
via a tax delinquency sale through a public auction for the nonpayment of real
property taxes on the said properties. The Province of Bataan was the only bidder, and
the subject properties were sold to it. After the lapse of the one-year redemption
period with neither PCGG nor BASECO redeeming the subject properties, the Province
of Bataan filed a petition with the RTC Balanga for the consolidation of its ownership
over the subject properties. Nearly four years after the RTC Balanga ordered the
consolidation of ownership over the subject properties to the Province of Bataan PCGG
filed a complaint for the annulment of the tax delinquency sale of the subject
properties that said sale was invalid since there was no showing that the notice of sale
was published in accordance with law, or that said notice was otherwise sent to the
PCGG or BASECO. Does the Province of Bataan have vested right over the subject
properties?
Q: No. The case at bar, the Province of Bataan's ownership over the subject properties, apart
from it being disputed in Civil Case No. 212-ML, is likewise still subject to the resolution of
the sequestration case in Civil Case No. 0010. More so, the Province of Bataan may not be
considered to have enjoyed vested rights so certain that a reduction of the same could
support a criminal prosecution, as in this case. Once more, since the Province of Bataan did
not have a right in esse over the subject properties, its interest could not be said to have been
so permanent that the concessions made by it in the Compromise Agreement were grossly
disadvantageous to its interests as to merit the criminal prosecution of private respondents
for violation of Section 3( e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Sequestration is the means to place or cause
to be placed under the PCGG's possession or control properties, building or office, including
business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing the destruction,
concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the same until it can
be determined through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in fruth
"ill-gotten." (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 190728-29. November 18, 2020, as penned by
J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEODORO ANSANO Y CALLEJA
G.R. No. 232455, December 02, 2020, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has always been mindful that "the greatest care should be taken in
considering the identification of the accused, especially when this identification is made by a
sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification."
This stems from the recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other forensic evidence such
as fingerprint and DNA testing which are real or object evidence, are subject to human errors
which may be intentional or unintentional. In
FACTS
An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA. Upon
arraignment, Ansano entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and trial on the merits then
ensued.
The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a resident of XXX. She
testified that she filed this case of rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed
to and identified in open court.
She stated that she did not know him at first, but when she went to the Municipal
Building, she came to know him because of his niece who is her friend. On April 6, 2005, at
about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was going to fetch her father at Narra, where he was
then selling goods at the river. This was at [GGG] near the river. Accused Ansano was then
carrying a bolo, wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in the farm; while she was
wearing red t-shirt and school uniform skirt. Ansano poked his bolo at her and told her to go
with him to the falls near the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill her
if she does not go with him, she went along.
She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00
o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in their house having a drinking spree with her
father. She was able to recognize him ("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on
his face; he has a moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to know his name for the first
time when she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where the accused was detained because of
the case filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she examined clearly,
and she was sure that he was the one who raped her.
Because she was raped, she went to [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital for a medical
examination. At the time of the incident on April 6, 2005, she was [just] thirteen (13) years
old. She presented her Certificate of Baptism issued by Santo Cristo of Bulacan, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, showing that she was born on September 14, 1991 and baptized on September
25, 1991. She does not have a Certificate of Live Birth, as her birth was not registered because
the midwife who attended to the delivery of her mother went abroad.
The defense presented the accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano, 45 years old,
single, slipper maker and residing at XXX. He stated that he does not personally know AAA.
The Court noted the manifestation of defense counsel that Ansano has no scar on his
face at the time he testified in court.
After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated November 16, 2015, the RTC convicted
Ansano of the crime.
In the questioned Decision dated February 20, 2017, the CA affirmed Ansano's
conviction, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant.
RULING
YES. The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Ansano on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its review of criminal
cases elevated to it, still commences its analysis from the fundamental principle that the
accused before it is presumed innocent." This presumption continues although the accused
had been convicted in the trial court, as long as such conviction is still pending appeal.
First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final
conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty
of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the
identity of the accused as the author of the crime.
Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw
its strength from the weakness of the defense.
Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the following guidelines in
its review of rape cases:
(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult
to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the
charge;
(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.22
From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the records of the case,
the Court rules that a reasonable doubt exists as to Ansano's culpability. While the Court does
not doubt AAA's claim that she had been raped, the Court does not, however, have moral
certainty that it was Ansano who committed the dastardly act.
People v. Nuñez (Nuñez), the Court elucidated:
The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on
human memory in criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible
deprivation of liberty, property, and even life, is equally established.
Thus, American jurisprudence has followed — and local jurisprudence later on

adopted — a "totality of circumstances test" in determining the reliability, or at times even
the admissibility, of a witness' out-of-court identification of the accused.
The jurisprudential test of "totality of circumstances"
The totality of circumstances test was first applied by the Court in People v.
Teehankee, wherein it applied the test as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite.
Application of the totality of circumstances test in the present case
To reiterate, the totality of circumstances test requires the Court to look at the
following factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The Court laments that neither the RTC nor the CA was able to discuss the doubt on
Ansano's identity as the perpetrator of the crime even though the issue was glaring in the
records of the case. Both the RTC and the CA focused on whether the crime indeed happened
and examined AAA's testimony only through that lens. The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear,
consistent and spontaneous testimony of [AAA] unrelentingly established how Ansano
sexually [assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force, threat and intimidation."59
The CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that: "AAA positively identified accused-
appellant as the perpetrator. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA
established that accused-appellant committed rape against the victim,"60 adding that
Ansano's defense of alibi and denial simply failed to stand in light of AAA's positive
identification.
The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "[a] conviction for a crime
rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing testimony establishing the identity of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution proving beyond reasonable
doubt that all elements of the crime are attributable to the accused."62 "Proving the identity
of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. Thus, in every
criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt."
Given the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that complainant has not been a
victim of rape, or that appellant's defense of alibi and denial can be given full faith and
credence. We only stress that her testimony was unable to pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands and the rules require to satisfy the prosecution's burden of
overcoming appellant's presumption of innocence.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt

— moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The defense may be weak, but the prosecution
is even weaker. As a result of this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues
raised.
Q: An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA. The
complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a resident of XXX. She testified
that she filed this case of rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to
and identified in open court. On April 6, 2005, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
she was going to fetch her father at Narra, where he was then selling goods at the river.
This was at [GGG] near the river. Accused Ansano was then carrying a bolo, wearing a
long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in the farm; while she was wearing red t-shirt
and school uniform skirt. Ansano poked his bolo at her and told her to go with him to
the falls near the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill her if
she does not go with him, she went along. She came to know the name and identity of
the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in
their house having a drinking spree with her father. She was able to recognize him
("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on his face; he has a moustache and
"medyo singkit." The defense presented accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano, 45
years old, single, slipper maker and residing at XXX. He stated that he does not
personally know AAA. , The RTC convicted Ansano of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed Ansano's conviction, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove the elements of the crime charged. Did the CA err in convicting Ansano?
A: Yes. The Court laments that neither the RTC nor the CA was able to discuss the doubt on
Ansano's identity as the perpetrator of the crime even though the issue was glaring in the
records of the case. Both the RTC and the CA focused on whether the crime indeed happened
and examined AAA's testimony only through that lens. The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear,
consistent and spontaneous testimony of [AAA] unrelentingly established how Ansano
sexually [assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force, threat and intimidation." The
CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that: "AAA positively identified accused-appellant
as the perpetrator. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA established that
accused-appellant committed rape against the victim," adding that Ansano's defense of alibi
and denial simply failed to stand in light of AAA's positive identification. A conviction in a
criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt — moral certainty that
the accused is guilty. The defense may be weak, but the prosecution is even weaker. As a
result of this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised. (People v.
Ansano y Calleja, G.R. No. 232455. December 2, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ALBERTO "BERT" MARTINEZ
A.K.A. "ALBERTO BELINARIO", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 248016, December 02, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has held time and again that the testimony of a child-victim is normally given
full weight and credit considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified was not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS
Three information were filed against the accused-appellant for rape.
During arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the charges.
Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
As culled from the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that [AAA] was born on
January 8, 1998 to [BBB] and [CCC]. She has five other siblings, the birth order of which is:
[DDD], [EEE], [FFF], [GGG], [AAA] and [HHH]. The family is living in a one[-]story house with
six rooms, five of which are being rented out to boarders and the sixth room was occupied
by them. In one of these rooms, accused-appellant and his live-in partner were renting.
In January 2010, while they were celebrating the New Year, [accused-appellant,] who
was under the influence of liquor, again called [AAA) in his room. When they were inside, he
locked the door, grabbed her hand and laid her down. He undressed her, fondled her breast,
and licked her vagina. He then undressed his lower garment and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. After the act, he gave her [P]50.00 not to tell anyone.
At noon of October 2, 2010, the same incident happened inside his room when he
called her and he was able to suck her breast, lick her vagina and insert his penis into her
vagina. Finally, on October 3, 2010, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-
appellant called [AAA] inside the comfort room because his live-in partner was in their room
and he put down her undergarments to her knees, licked her vagina and touched his penis
to her vagina. During all these incidents, she could not prevent him doing all these things to
her because he would create trouble in their residence and tell them that she was going out
with somebody. However, on October 4, 2010 when accused-appellant was again calling for
her to enter her [(sic)] room, [AAA] refused despite the trouble that he was creating by telling
stories about her. Alarmed why accused-appellant was acting this way towards [AAA], [BBB]
confronted her daughter as to the actuations of [accused appellant]. It was then that [AAA]
revealed to her what accused-appellant had been doing to her since she was in Grade 1. They
then filed a case against the accused-appellant.
When she was examined, it was found by Dr. Josefa Bentayen that there was an
absence of hymenal tissue on the labia of [AAA] and there were healed injuries at the 4:00
o'clock position. Because of the condition of the injury, she stated that these injuries could
have occurred [(sic)] a year prior to her examination on November 24, 2010.
Further tests were conducted on [AAA] by the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of La
Trinidad, Benguet who prepared the Social Case Study report of [AAA] and by Psychologist
who diagnosed the cognitive functioning of [AAA] to be within a mild retardation level with
a mental age of seven years and one-month oId.
Accused appellant denied the actuations hurled against him. He proffered no

knowledge why AAA charged him of the crime of rape.
In affirming the RTC, the CA held that AAA was able to clearly, positively, and
convincingly narrate her miserable ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant. The CA quoted
the threshold principle that the testimonies of child-victims are generally given full weight
and credence as a young woman would not concoct a story of defloration, endure the
embarrassment and humiliation of a public disclosure that she had been ravished, allow an
examination of her private parts, and undergo the ordeal of a public trial if her story was not
true.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty for three counts of Rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC.
RULING
NO. Article 266-A of the RPC reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve ( 12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element, as
the absence of a free consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes that a woman
below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to
the sexual act. Conviction will therefore lie, regardless of proof of force or intimidation
provided sexual intercourse is proven. Force, threat, or intimidation are not elements of
statutory rape, therefore proof thereof is unnecessary. But if the woman is 12 years of age or
over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.
The Court agrees with the conclusions of the lower courts' that the prosecution
sufficiently established, through the foregoing testimony, that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA on January 1, 2010, October 2, 2010, and October 3, 2010. The Court finds
no compelling reason to deviate from the lower courts' findings and their calibration of the
credibility of AAA, who related the details of her harrowing experiences in the hands of
accused-appellant in a simple yet convincing and consistent manner.
Q: Three information were filed against the accused-appellant for rape. That in
January 2010, while they were celebrating the New Year, accused-appellant, who was
under the influence of liquor, again called [AAA) in his room. When they were inside,
he locked the door, grabbed her hand and laid her down. He undressed her, fondled
her breast, and licked her vagina. He then undressed his lower garment and inserted
his penis inside her vagina. After the act, he gave her [P]50.00 not to tell anyone.
Accused-appellant denied the actuations hurled against him. He proffered no
knowledge why AAA charged him of the crime of rape. In its Decision dated August 8,
2017, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of rape. On appeal, the
CA affirmed accused-appellant's conviction in its Decision dated February 27, 2019 in
toto. Did the CA err in finding the accused-appellant guilty?
A: No. The Court agrees with the conclusions of the lower courts' that the prosecution
sufficiently established, through the foregoing testimony, that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA on January 1, 2010, October 2, 2010, and October 3, 2010. The Court finds
no compelling reason to deviate from the lower courts' findings and their calibration of the
credibility of AAA, who related the details of her harrowing experiences in the hands of
accused-appellant in a simple yet convincing and consistent manner. (People v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 248016. December 2, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
EVELYN ABADINES CUICO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 232293, December 09, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is "a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the
burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense."
FACTS
An Information was filed against Cuico for violating Section 12 of RA 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2011, at about 1:05 o'clock A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent and without any lawful purpose did then and there
have in her possession and her control twenty four (24) disposable syringes and three
(3) empty ampoules of Nubain used for injecting NUBAIN which instruments and/or
equipments (sic) fit or intended for injecting Nubain, otherwise known as
NALBUPHINE HYDROCHLORIDE, now classified as dangerous drug per Dangerous
Drug Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2010.
When arraigned, Cuico pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
When they were in the interior part of Barangay Kamagayan, they saw a group of men
coming out from a small shanty made of light materials. At that point, PO3 Tiempo, who was
then standing near the open door of said shanty, saw accused-appellant inside the shanty
holding a disposable syringe used for "injecting Nubain." He knew said fact on account of his
experience, being in the police service for fifteen (15) years, and having previously made
more than ten (10) arrests involving illegal possession of drug paraphernalia in the same
area. Thus, they accosted accused-appellant and introduced themselves as police officers.
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is based on the lone testimony of Cuico,
whose testimony was likewise summarized by the CA as follows:
Accused-appellant raised the defenses of denial and frame-up. According to her, on

June 15, 2011, at around 1:05 A.M. in Barangay Kamagayan, she was paid to attend to the
video "karera" machine at her friend's house, which was situated at a distance of three (3)
houses from hers.
While inside her friend's house, three (3) persons, whom accused-appellant did not
know, came inside, introduced themselves as policemen, and asked if she was the video
karera attendant. After answering in the affirmative, the policemen directed her to call the
owner of the machine. However, she did not know the owner thereof. The police officers then
brought accused-appellant to the police station.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Cuico of the crime.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Cuico.
RULING
YES. The petition is meritorious. The prosecution was unable to prove Cuico's guilt
In particular, in cases involving dangerous drugs, in order to hurdle the constitutional

presumption of innocence, the prosecution has the burden to prove compliance with the
chain of custody requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, to wit: (1) the seized
items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2)
the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and (3) the
seized drugs or drug paraphernalia must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
Strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is necessary in protecting the

integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, without which the crime of the illegal sale, or
illegal possession of dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalia cannot be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.21 In other words, non-compliance with Section 21 is tantamount to a
failure to establish an essential element of the crime, and will therefore engender the
acquittal of the accused.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12 of RA No. 9165 are: (1) possession or
control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
In the present case, there is no evidence showing that the aluminum foil, tube, and
lighters found in the petitioner's house were fit or intended for introducing any dangerous
drug into the body. The prosecution did not bother to show that there were traces of shabu
on any of these alleged drug paraphernalia. In fact, it appears that the only evidence that the
prosecution offered to prove this charge is the existence of the seized items by themselves.
For the prosecution's failure to prove that the items seized were intended to be used
as drug paraphernalia, the petitioner must also be acquitted of the charge under Section 12
of RA No. 9165. Indeed, we cannot convict the petitioner for possession of drug
paraphernalia when it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that these items were used
or intended to be used as drug paraphernalia.
Q: An Information was filed against Cuico for violating Section 12 of RA 9165. As per
the Prosecution, when they were in the interior part of Barangay Kamagayan, they saw
a group of men coming out from a small shanty made of light materials. At that point,
PO3 Tiempo, who was then standing near the open door of said shanty, saw accused-
appellant inside the shanty holding a disposable syringe used for "injecting Nubain."
He knew said fact on account of his experience, being in the police service for fifteen
(15) years and having previously made more than ten (10) arrests involving illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia in the same area. Thus, they accosted accused-
appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. Accused-appellant raised the
defenses of denial and frame-up. After trial on the merits, in its Decision the RTC
convicted Cuico of the crime charged. In the questioned Decision the CA affirmed the
RTC's conviction of Cuico. Is the contention of the accused-appellant, correct?
A: Yes. The petition is meritorious. The prosecution was unable to prove Cuico's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In particular, in cases involving dangerous drugs, in order to hurdle the
constitutional presumption of innocence, the prosecution has the burden to prove
compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
to wit: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of the same; and (3) the seized drugs or drug paraphernalia must be turned over to a forensic
laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. Strict
compliance with the foregoing requirements is necessary in protecting the integrity and
identity of the corpus delicti, without which the crime of the illegal sale, or illegal possession
of dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalia cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In
other words, non-compliance with Section 21 is tantamount to a failure to establish an
essential element of the crime, and will therefore engender the acquittal of the accused.
(Cuico v. People, G.R. No. 232293. December 9, 2020, as penned by J. Caguioa)
DIOSDADO SAMA Y HINUPAS AND BANDY MASANGLAY Y ACEVEDA, PETITIONERS, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 224469, January 05, 2021, En Banc, (Lazaro-Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person
doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the
case of mala prohibita, unless such words as "knowingly" and "willfully" are contained in the
statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. In other words, a person morally
quite innocent and with every intention of being a law-abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and
liable to criminal penalties, if he does an act prohibited by these statutes.
FACTS
By Information, petitioners and Demetrio were charged for Section 77 of Presidential
Decree 705 (PD 705) or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines
On arraignment, all three (3) accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, they filed a
Motion to Quash Information alleging among others, that they are members of the Iraya-
Mangyan tribe, and as such, are governed by Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371), The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
PO3 Villamor D. Ranee (PO3 Ranee) testified that on March 15, 2005, his team
comprised of police officers and representatives of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) surveilled Barangay Calangatan, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro
to address illegal logging operations in the area.
While patrolling the mountainous area of Barangay Calangatan, they heard the sound
of a chainsaw and saw a tree slowly falling down. They immediately crossed the river and
traced the source of the sound. In the area where the sound was coming from, they caught
the accused in the act of cutting a dita tree. They also saw a bolo stuck to the tree that had
been cut.
The team inquired from the accused if they had a license to cut down the tree. The
latter replied they had none. After informing the accused of their violation, the team invited
them to the police station for further investigation. The team left the illegally cut tree in the
area because it was too heavy. Pictures of the accused and the cut down tree were also taken.
By Decision the trial court convicted the accused.
In its Decision the Court of Appeals affirmed. It focused on the failure of the accused
to present any license agreement, lease, or permit authorizing them to log the dita tree. It
also faulted the accused for relying on IPRA as the source of their alleged rights to cultural
heritage and ancestral domain and lands. For they purportedly failed to substantiate their
claim that they are Iraya-Mangyan IPs and the land where the dita tree was situated is part
of their ancestral domain and lands.
ISSUES
1. Whether Petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs who are a publicly known ICC
inhabiting areas within Oriental Mindoro.,
2. Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioners for violation of
Section 77, PD 705, as amended, beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the dita tree cut and collected without authority granted by the State
RULING
1. YES. IPs in the Philippines inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindoro,
Negros, Samar, Leyte, Palawan, Mindanao, and Sulu group of islands.31 In Cruz v. Secretary
of Natural Resources,32 the Court recognized the following ICCs residing in Region IV:
Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo, and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan
of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
The Information stated that petitioners are residents of Barangay Baras, Baco,
Oriental Mindoro. They supposedly logged a dita tree in Barangay Calangatan, San Teodoro,
Oriental Mindoro. Notably, the municipalities of Baco and San Teodoro are areas where the
Iraya-Mangyan IPs are publicly known to inhabit. They have continuously lived there since
time immemorial.
The first evidence that petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs is the testimony of
Barangay Captain Aceveda of Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro. He testified in clear and
categorical language that petitioners are Mangyans and the dita tree was grown on the land
occupied by the Mangyan
As barangay captain of Barangay Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro where petitioners and
the Iraya-Mangyan IPs live, Aceveda is competent to testify that petitioners are Iraya-
Mangyan IPs and the dita tree was grown and found in the land where these IPs have
inhabited since time immemorial. For he has personally known the people living within his
barangay, including petitioners and other Iraya-Mangyan IPs. When asked about petitioners,
he positively identified these persons by their names and confirmed they are Iraya-Mangyan
IPs. He is fully knowledgeable of the territory and the people of his barangay. He too is a
member of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs. These matters were not refuted by the prosecution.
The second evidence that petitioners are indeed Iraya-Mangyan IPs is the fact that the
NCIP - Legal Affairs Office has been representing them from the initiation of this case until
the present. Records show that the NCIP- Legal Affairs Office signed the motions and
pleadings filed in petitioners' defense before the trial court, the Court of Appeals.
Under the IPRA, the NCIP is the lead government agency for the protection,
promotion, and preservation of IP/ICC identities and rights in the context of national
unity.46 As a result of its expertise, it has the primary jurisdiction to identify ICCs and IPs.
Its Legal Affairs Office is mandated to represent and provide legal assistance to them.
In Unduran v. Aberasturi, the Court held that the NCIP may acquire jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving lands of ancestral domain only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICCs or IPs. If the dispute includes parties who are non-
ICCs or IPs, the regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is no reason to doubt that petitioners are
Iraya-Mangyan IPs.
2. NO. Section 77 of PD 705, as amended, punishes, among others, "[a]ny person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority
... shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code...."
Illegal cutting and removal of forest products. — [a] Any person who unlawfully cuts
or gathers forest products in any forest lands without license or if under license, in violation
of the terms hereof, shall, upon conviction for each act or omission, be fined for not less than
ten thousand pesos but not more than one hundred thousand pesos or imprisoned for a term
of not less than four years and one day but not more than six years, or both.
Construing the original iteration of Section 77, as then Section 68 of the original
version of PD 705, People v. CFI of Quezon held that the elements of this offense are: 1) the
accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) the timber
or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or
to any private individual; and 3) the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without
any authority granted by the State. Note that CFI of Quezon (Branch VII) included the
ownership of the timber or other forest products as the second element of this offense. In the
same decision, however, the Court also ruled that -
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 68 of P.D.

No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products
is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or
license from the government.
Hence, we do not consider the ownership of subject timber or other forest products
as an element of the offense under Section 68 of PD 705, now Section 77 of PD 705, as
amended.
3. There is, however, reasonable doubt that the dita tree was cut and collected
without any authority granted by the State.
It is a general principle in law that in malum prohibitum case, good faith or motive is
not a defense because the law punishes the prohibited act itself. The penal clause of Section
77 of PD 705, as amended, punishes the cutting, collecting, or removing of timber or other
forest products only when any of these acts is done without lawful authority from the State.
In Saguin v. People, the prohibited act of non-remittance of Pag-Ibig contributions is
punishable only when this act was done "without lawful cause" or "with fraudulent intent."
According to this case law, lawful cause may result from a confusing state of affairs
engendered by new legal developments that re-ordered the way things had been previously
done. In Saguin, the cause of the confusion was the devolution of some powers in the health
sector to the local governments. The devolution was ruled as a "valid justification"
constituting the "lawful cause" for the inability of the accused to remit the Pag-Ibig
contributions. The devolution gave rise to reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
offense's element of lack of lawful cause.
This doctrine in Saguin is reiterated in Matalam v. People. Matalam affirmed the

doctrine that when an act is malum prohibitum, "it is the commission of that act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated."
To have a strict interpretation of the term "authority" under Sec. 77 of P.D. 705
despite the clear evolution of its text would amount to construing a penal law strictly against
the accused, which cannot be countenanced. To stress, "only those persons, offenses, and
penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the
statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the
statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person
accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of
those from whom the penalty is sought."
More importantly, to construe the word "authority" in Sec. 77, P.D. 705 as excluding
the rights of ICCs/IPs already recognized in the IPRA would unduly undermine both the text
and the purpose of this novel piece of legislation and significantly narrow down the rights
recognized therein.
Two. It is an admitted fact that petitioners relied upon their elders, the non-
government organization that was helping them, and the NCIP, that they supposedly
possessed the State authority to cut and collect the dita tree as IPs for their indigenous
community's communal toilet. Thus, subjectively, their intent and volition to commit the
prohibited act, that is without lawful authority, was rendered reasonably doubtful by these
pieces of evidence showing their reliance upon these separate assurances of a State
authority. As Justice Zalameda explains:
The peculiar circumstances of this case require the same liberal approach. The Court
simply cannot brush aside petitioners' cultural heritage in the determination of their
criminal liability. Unlike the accused in People v. De Gracia, petitioners cannot be presumed
to know the import and legal consequence of their act. Their circumstances, specifically their
access to information, and their customs as members of a cultural minority, are substantial
factors that distinguish them from the rest of the population.
Q: An information was filed against petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No.
705. PO3 Ranee testified that on March 15, 2005, his team comprised of police officers
and representatives of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
surveilled Barangay Calangatan, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro to address illegal
logging operations in the area. While patrolling the mountainous area of Barangay
Calangatan, they heard the sound of a chainsaw and saw a tree slowly falling down.
They immediately crossed the river and traced the source of the sound. In the area
where the sound was coming from, they caught the accused in the act of cutting a dita
tree. They also saw a bolo stuck to the tree that had been cut. The team inquired from
the accused if they had a license to cut down the tree. The latter replied they had none.
After informing the accused of their violation, the team invited them to the police
station for further investigation. The team left the illegally cut tree in the area because
it was too heavy. Pictures of the accused and the cut down tree were also taken. Are
the petitioners members of Indigenous Communities?
A: YES. The first evidence that petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs is the testimony of
Barangay Captain Aceveda of Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro. He testified in clear and
categorical language that petitioners are Mangyans and the dita tree was grown on the land
occupied by the Mangyan. The second evidence that petitioners are indeed Iraya-Mangyan
IPs is the fact that the NCIP - Legal Affairs Office has been representing them from the
initiation of this case until the present. Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is
no reason to doubt that petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs. (Sama y Hinupas v. People, G.R.
No. 224469, January 05, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
EMILY ESTORES y PECARDAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
“When a prohibited drug is found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied
by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs
in violation of law. The fact of finding the said illegal drug is sufficient to convict.”
FACTS
The Executive Judge of the RTC issued a search warrant against the petitioner and the
accused. On the following day, PCI Tambungan conducted the search upon the house and
searched the room on the third floor in the presence of the petitioner and the accused. SPO2
Conlu found a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance in one of the drawers of the
cabinet. Subsequently, petitioner and accused were charged and convicted with violation of
Petitioner argues that there is no concrete evidence presented by the prosecution that
she indeed placed the illegal drugs in her room or knew of its existence. She insists that she
had no knowledge of the presence of said illegal drugs in her room and there is no evidence
showing her personal knowledge or her involvement in any drug activity.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
RULING
YES. The elements of Illegal Possession are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had intent to possess the drugs.
Possession includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. The latter
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place. Exclusive possession is not necessary.
Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the
place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed
from the fact that the dangerous drugs are in the house over which the accused has control
or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Q: By virtue of a search warrant, the police conducted a search upon the house of the
accused Emily. SPO2 Conlu found a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance
in one of the drawers of the cabinet. Emily argues that the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence that she indeed placed the illegal drugs in her room or knew of its existence.
She insists that she had no knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs in her room and
that there is no evidence showing her personal knowledge or involvement in any drug
activity. Is Emily’s defense proper?
A: NO. Possession includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. The
latter exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has
the right to exercise dominion and control over the place. Exclusive possession is not
necessary. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the
place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed
from the fact that the dangerous drugs are in the house over which the accused has control
or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. (Emily
Estores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021, as penned by J.
Hernando)
RUEL POQUIZ and REY VALENCIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 238715, January 11, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
“In cases of Robbery, the crime is considered complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Intent to gain
is presumed from the unlawful taking of the things.”
FACTS
At around 1:00 am, private complainant Police Inspector Belver was alighting from a
bus in front of Bicol Express Eater when he was approached by three men, later identified as
Poquiz, Valencia, and Olerfenes. The three men declared a robbery. Valencia then snatched
Belver’s backpack while the other accused attempted to take his hanger bag, but the latter
failed to do so. Poquiz then attempted to thrust a knife towards Belver, but Belver was able
to evade. The other accused started punching and kicking Belver. Acting in self-defense,
Belver then took his service pistol and fired at the feet of Valencia and Poquiz.
The accused argues that the third element of intent to gain is wanting because there
is no actual taking since Belver was never totally dispossessed of his possessions.
ISSUE
Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of Robbery.
RULING
YES. The elements of Robbery under Article 293 of the RPC are: (1) there is a taking
of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with
intent to gain; and (4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with
force upon things.
In People v. Hernandez, the Court held that the crime of Robbery is considered
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. In the present case, Belver’s bag was already forcibly
taken and was dispossessed of the same when Poquiz and Valencia left the scene of the crime.
It is of no moment that Belver was able to subsequently recover the items forcibly taken from
him. Such instance does not preclude the presence of intent to gain on the part of the accused.
Q: Police Inspector Belver was alighting from a bus in front of Bicol Express Eater
when he was approached by three men, later identified as Poquiz, Valencia, and
Olerfenes. The three men declared a robbery. Valencia then snatched Belver’s
backpack while the other accused attempted to take his hanger bag, but the latter
failed to do so. The accused argues that the element of intent to gain is wanting since
Belver was never totally dispossessed of his possessions. Is their contention correct?
A: NO. The crime of Robbery is considered complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. In the present
case, Belver’s bag was already forcibly taken and was dispossessed of the same when Poquiz
and Valencia left the scene of the crime. It is of no moment that Belver was able to
subsequently recover the items forcibly taken from him. Such instance does not preclude the
presence of intent to gain on the part of the accused. (Ruel Poquiz and Rey Valencia v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238715, January 11, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
RAFFY TULFO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS SO
G.R. No. 187113, January 11, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Under the actual malice test, a public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood on their official conduct unless they prove that the statement was made with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
FACTS
On April 12, 1999, after the ninth publication in Abante Tonite about his purportedly
dubious activities at the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So filed a Complaint-Affidavit for nine
counts of libel against the three accused for their abusive and malicious imputations against
him. He later filed two more Complaint-Affidavits in connection with several issues of Abante
Tonite, when Tulfo refused to stop his alleged defamatory statements.
The bulk of the Informations accuses Tulfo of writing columns that maliciously
impute Atty. So, for his “shady dealings in the Bureau of Customs”. Tulfo also wrote about
Atty. So allegedly having an affair with a married woman. For his defense, Tulfo contended
that the statements he used in his articles were merely reported to him by brokers-
complainants whose identities he could not reveal. He argued lack of malicious intent to
publish as both he and Atty. So had not known each other before the complaints were filed.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner Tulfo is liable for libel.
RULING
NO. In construing libel laws, regard must always be made to the guarantees provided
by the Constitution. Criminal prosecutions for libel must undergo the rigorous and exacting
standard of ensuring that they do not violate the right to free expression and the press. Libel
laws must not be broadly construed as to deter comments on public affairs and the conduct
of public officials.
Reading the articles as a whole, the statements indicate Atty So’s alleged use of
connections to stay in position and conceal his misconduct. The impugned articles fall within
the purview of qualified privileged communications since it relates to Atty. So’s exercise of
his official functions. Hence, the burden shifts to the prosecution that actual malice exists.
The prosecution is duty bound to show that the alleged defamatory statements were made
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”.
Unless the prosecution proves that the defamatory statements were made with actual
malice – that is, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not” – a criminal case for libel involving a public officer’s exercise of official
functions cannot prosper.
Q: Atty. So filed a Complaint-Affidavit for nine counts of libel against the three accused
for their abusive and malicious imputations against him. The bulk of the Informations
accuses Tulfo of writing columns that maliciously impute Atty. So, for his “shady
dealings in the Bureau of Customs”. Tulfo also wrote about Atty. So allegedly having
an affair with a married woman. For his defense, Tulfo contended that the statements
he used in his articles were merely reported to him by brokers-complainants whose
identities he could not reveal. He argued lack of malicious intent to publish as both he
and Atty. So had not known each other before the complaints were filed. Is Tulfo’s
defense proper?
A: YES. The impugned articles fall within the purview of qualified privileged communications
since it relates to Atty. So’s exercise of his official functions. Hence, the burden shifts to the
prosecution that actual malice exists. The prosecution is duty bound to show that the alleged
defamatory statements were made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not”. (Raffy Tulfo v. People of the Philippines and Atty.
Carlos T. So, G.R. No. 187113, January 11, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
MELVIN ENCINARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 252267, January 11, 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Section 5(b) specifically applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children,
which includes lascivious conduct, whereas Section 10(a) punishes other forms of child
abuse not covered by particular provisions of RA 7610. Evidently, the offense will not fall
within the purview of Section 10(a) if the same is specifically penalized by a particular
provision of RA 7610.”
FACTS
The petitioner was the Vice President of the High School General Parents Teachers
Association while AAA, then sixteen years old, was the CAT Corps Commander. Petitioner
invited AAA to a drinking spree in his house. Although AAA does not drink alcohol, petitioner
offered him one. Later that night, petitioner told him to sleep in the bedroom since there
were no more available means of transportation for AAA to go home.
While AAA was sleeping, petitioner put AAA’s penis into his mouth. AAA tried to resist
but failed since he was too drunk. Consequently, an Information charging petitioner with
violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610 was filed before the RTC. The RTC and the CA convicted
the petitioner of the crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of
violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
RULING
YES. It has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review,
and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment, whether assigned or unassigned. Guided by this consideration, the Court
finds that based on the established facts and evidence, petitioner’s conviction should be for
a violation of Section 5(b), instead of Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
Section 5(b) specifically applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children,
provision, such as Section 5(b).
In light of the clear definition of lascivious conduct vis-à-vis the evidence presented,
the Court finds that petitioner’s acts of putting AAA’s penis inside his mouth constitute
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Hence, it was error for the courts a quo to
have convicted him under Section 10(a) of the same Act.
Q: Melvin, the Vice President of the High School General Parents Teachers Association,
invited AAA, a student, to a drinking spree in his house. Although AAA does not drink
alcohol, Melvin still offered him one. Later that night, Melvin told him to sleep in his
house since there were no more available means of transportation for AAA to go home.
While AAA was sleeping, petitioner put AAA’s penis into his mouth. AAA tried to resist
but failed since he was too drunk. The RTC convicted him for violation of Section 10(a)
of RA 7610. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. Section 5(b) specifically applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children,
provision, such as Section 5(b). Melvin’s act of putting AAA’s penis inside his mouth
constitute lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Hence, it was error for the
courts a quo to have convicted him under Section 10(a) of the same Act. (Melvin Encinares v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 252267, January 11, 2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIUS CAPONGOL and ARWIN BIO
G.R. No. 239783, January 12, 2021, FIRST DIVISION (Zalameda, J.)
DOCTRINE
“In reviewing criminal cases, the Court’s duty is to determine not only on whether the
elements of the crime were committed but also on whether the assailants were legally and
credibly identified.”
FACTS
At around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 20 May 2013, Josephine was dining at Pancake
House when the accused-appellants entered the restaurant. Capongol approached the bar
area and ordered iced tea, while Bio sat at a table near the door, opposite Josephine’s table.
Suddenly, Capongol shot Josephine twice. Bio acted as a lookout. However, the prosecution’s
witness, Honrubia, was uncertain about the identity of Capulong’s companion and alleged
lookout. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted both Capongol and Bio for the crime of Murder.
ISSUE
Whether both the accused are liable for the crime of Murder.
RULING
NO. In reviewing criminal cases, the Court’s duty is to determine not only on whether
the elements of the crime were committed but also on whether the assailants were legally
and credibly identified. After perusal of the records, the Court affirms Capongol’s conviction,
but acquits Bio for the crime of murder.
One of the prosecution’s witnesses, Honrubia, was consistent in pointing Capongol as

the gunman who shot Josephine. While Honrubia was candid and consistent about the
appearance and identity of Capulong, he was uncertain about the identity of Capulong’s
companion and alleged lookout.
From his own testimony, he only glanced at the alleged lookout and his focus was on
Capongol because the latter had ordered iced tea. Evidently, the brief period to view the
supposed conspirator, while his attention was elsewhere, coupled with the length of the
ordeal, engenders reasonable doubt on whether it was indeed Bio who was with Capongol
at the time of the shooting.
Q: At around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 20 May 2013, Josephine was dining at
Pancake House when the accused-appellants entered the restaurant. Capongol
approached the bar area and ordered iced tea, while Bio sat at a table near the door,
opposite Josephine’s table. Suddenly, Capongol shot Josephine twice. Bio acted as a
lookout. However, the prosecution’s witness, Honrubia, was uncertain about the
identity of Capulong’s companion and alleged lookout. Nevertheless, the RTC
convicted both Capongol and Bio for the crime of Murder. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. In reviewing criminal cases, the Court’s duty is to determine not only on whether the
elements of the crime were committed but also on whether the assailants were legally and
credibly identified. From Honrubia’s own testimony, he stated that he only glanced at the
alleged lookout and his focus was on Capongol because the latter had ordered iced tea.
Evidently, the brief period to view the supposed conspirator, while his attention was
elsewhere, coupled with the length of the ordeal, engenders reasonable doubt on whether it
was indeed Bio who was with Capongol at the time of the shooting. (People of the Philippines
v. Julius Capongol and Arwin Bio, G.R. No. 239783, January 11, 2021, as penned by J.
Zalameda)
RICHARD BALINA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205950, January 12, 2021, First Division (Gaerlan, J.)
DOCTRINE
“It is elementary that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not
on the weakness of that of the defense.”
FACTS
The prosecution alleges that on the evening of 27 June 1998, a certain Ortacido,
together with others, arrived at a disco pub. They were ushered by a guest relation officer,
Katrina Lovino, also known as “KC”. Later that night, petitioner arrived at the bar. While
inside the bar, Ortacido was irked every time KC leaves their table and goes to talk to
petitioner. As a result, a quarrel ensued between him and petitioner and they began trading
punches. Petitioner, however, found himself unable to hold his own, drew his gun and fired
a shot at Ortacido. Petitioner missed, but the bullet hit the victim, Aileen, the cashier in the
club. Ortacido and his companions fled the scene, while petitioner brought the victim to
Pasay General Hospital where Aileen succumbed to her death.
On the other hand, the defense alleged that during the fistfight, Ortacido suddenly
grabbed his gun, then the two wrestled and grappled for the gun. When Ortacido got hold of
the gun, petitioner kicked him, and that was the time the gun went off. Petitioner then heard
that Aileen was shot. Petitioner picked her up and brought her to the hospital where Aileen
was pronounced dead due to excessive blood loss.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is liable for the crime of Homicide.
RULING
NO. After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, the Court is inclined to rule
that there is reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of Homicide. During the
trial a quo, the prosecution presented three witnesses, all employees of the disco pub at the
time of the incident. Records show that the two witnesses narrated that the petitioner drew
his gun and shot Ortacido. The last witness, on the other hand, deviates from the testimonies
of his co-witnesses.
The last witness testified that when petitioner was being outboxed by Ortacido, he
pulled out his gun, then the two grappled therefor; and during the scuffle, the gun fired
hitting Aileen. Based on the testimony, it was not clear as to who between the petitioner and
Ortacido pulled the trigger. Such material inconsistency, without a doubt, dilutes the
prosecution witness’ credibility and the verity of their testimonies. Further, the three
defense witnesses are one in narrating that the gun fired while the two were wrestling to
obtain possession thereof. Since the identity of the accused is unclear, the element of intent
to kill is likewise wanting.
Q: A quarrel ensued between Ortacido and Balina and they began trading punches.
Balina, however, found himself unable to hold his own, drew his gun and fired a shot
at Ortacido. Petitioner missed, but the bullet hit the victim, Aileen, the cashier in the
club. Ortacido and his companions fled the scene, while petitioner brought the victim
to Pasay General Hospital where Aileen succumbed to her death. The witnesses for the
prosecution and for the defense testified that at the time Aileen was shot, the two were
still wrestling for possession of the gun. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Balina for the
crime of Homicide. Is the RTC correct?
A: NO. Based on the testimonies, it was not clear as to who between the petitioner and
Ortacido pulled the trigger. Such material inconsistency, without a doubt, dilutes the other
prosecution witness’ credibility and the verity of their testimonies. Further, the three obtain
possession thereof. Since the identity of the accused is unclear, the element of intent to kill
is likewise wanting. (Richard Balina v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205950, January 12,
2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
GALILEO MAGLASANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 248616, January 12, 2021, FIRST DIVISION (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
“A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, and not on the
weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. Without the letter, there is no basis to find the
accused guilty of libel.”
FACTS
Galileo was charged with libel for allegedly writing a letter addressed to the office of
Commodore Velasco, Commander of the Philippine Coast Guard Region X, in relation to a
case pending before the Office of the Executive Director of the Commission on Higher
Education. The letter allegedly contains malicious imputations against Rene and Engr. Allan,
the President and Registrar of MIT-Ozamis City, respectively.
Upon Rene’s request, Engr. Allan obtained a copy of the letter and gave it to Rene.
Feeling insulted and maligned by the letter, he filed a complaint-affidavit for libel against
Galileo. Galileo did not present evidence but submitted a memorandum arguing that the
original letter was not presented as evidence. Hence, he argues that the case should be
dismissed, and he should be acquitted.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming that Galileo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
libel.
RULING
YES. The conflict of Rene and Galileo originated from their competing claims over the
management of MIT. This allegedly led Galileo to send a letter to Commo Velasco containing
malicious imputations against private complainants. Thus, proof of the letter is necessary for
the conviction of Galileo.
The letter is not a public document; it is a private document which must be

authenticated before it may be received in evidence. Moreover, respondent also failed to
justify its submission of photocopies of the letter instead of its original. The testimonies
presented by the prosecution show that the witness does not have any personal knowledge
of the original letter. Hence, the genuineness of the copy of the letter brought to the court is
questionable.
Aside from the testimony, respondent did not present any other evidence of the
existence and receipt of the letter. Rene himself did not see the original letter. Anyone who
may have had personal knowledge of the receipt of the letter, such as Commo Velasco, was
not presented as a witness.
Q: Upon Rene’s request, Engr. Allan obtained a copy of the allegedly libelous letter and
gave it to Rene. Feeling insulted and maligned by the letter, he filed a complaint-
affidavit for libel against Galileo. Galileo did not present evidence but submitted a
memorandum arguing that the original letter was not presented as evidence. Hence,
he argues that the case should be dismissed, and he should be acquitted. Is the
contention of Galileo correct?
A: YES. Proof of the letter is necessary for the conviction of Galileo. The letter is not a public
document; it is a private document which must be authenticated before it may be received
in evidence. Moreover, respondent also failed to justify its submission of photocopies of the
letter instead of its original. The testimonies presented by the prosecution shows that the
witness does not have any personal knowledge of the original letter. Hence, the genuineness
of the copy of the letter brought to the court is questionable. Aside from the testimony,
respondent did not present any other evidence of the existence and receipt of the letter. Rene
himself did not see the original letter. Anyone who may have had personal knowledge of the
receipt of the letter, such as Commo Velasco, was not presented as a witness. (Galileo
Maglasang v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248616, January 12, 2021, as penned by J.
Carandang)
CONCHITA DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021, First Division (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
“The issue on liability of private individuals under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has already
been settled. Private individuals who have been shown to have participated in conspiracy with
public officials must be held equally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.”
FACTS
The accused are high-ranking public officials and employees of the DPWH and private
individuals, who allegedly forged and falsified documents to cause the payment of fictitious
repairs and purchases of spare parts from public funds. The amounts paid covered 409
transactions purportedly for the emergency repairs of 39 DPWH service vehicles, 274 of
which were made in the name of accused Martinez, while others were made in the name of
petitioner Borje and other co-accused. The spare parts were supplied by J-CAP owned by
accused Capuz, and DEB owned by petitioner Dela Cruz.
The prosecution presented witnesses who were DPWH officers and employees
narrating that they were assigned a service vehicle, an investigation by the Internal Audit
Service, and a statement denying, not recognizing and/or not authorizing some or all of the
said repairs made as described in the disbursement vouchers. The Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioners Borje and Dela Cruz of Estafa through falsification of documents and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are liable of Estafa through Falsification of Documents and
the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING
YES. Estafa was committed through falsification of public documents by the accused
public officers/employees taking advantage of their official positions and making untruthful
statements in the narration of facts. First, there were false pretenses in that it was made to
appear, through the use of falsified documents, that the DPWH service vehicles underwent
emergency repairs. Second, the falsification of documents was employed prior to the
commission of the fraud. Third, the government was induced to pay the claims relying on the
false pretenses and that it suffered damages in the sum total of the false claims paid.
As to the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the accused, other than Dela Cruz, were
undoubtedly public officers discharging administrative or official functions. All were in
conspiracy with one another and with petitioner Dela Cruz, acted with evident bad faith in
falsifying the documents to deceive the DPWH into paying the claims for the fictitious
emergency repairs. The actions of the accused caused undue injury or damage to the
government in the sum total of the amounts paid.
Q: High-ranking public officials and employees of the DPWH and private individuals,
allegedly forged and falsified documents to cause the payment of fictitious repairs and
purchases of spare parts from public funds. The spare parts were supplied by J-CAP
owned by accused Capuz, and DEB owned by petitioner Dela Cruz. Petitioner Dela Cruz
argues that the elements of the violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be
considered against her as she is not a public official. Is the contention of Dela Cruz
correct?
A: NO. The issue on liability of private individuals under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has already
been settled. Private individuals who have been shown to have participated in conspiracy
with public officials must be held equally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. All were in
conspiracy with one another and with petitioner Dela Cruz, acted with evident bad faith in
falsifying the documents to deceive the DPWH into paying the claims for the fictitious
emergency repairs. The actions of the accused caused undue injury or damage to the
government in the sum total of the amounts paid. (Conchita Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
RAUL LEE v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 234664-67, January 12, 2021, First Division (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
“The term “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable
or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action.
Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above
another.”
FACTS
In two occasions, Governor Lee took the lead in purchasing 2,000 liters of liquid
fertilizer in the amount of P3,000,000 and 133 liters of liquid fertilizer in the amount of
P199,500, for distribution to small and marginal farmers. However, in the annual audit
report prepared by the COA, it was observed that certain transactions did not comply with
the laws, rules, and regulations. The said fertilizers were procured through direct
contracting and there was no showing that a public bidding was conducted. There was no
prior BAC resolution, notice of award, and notice to proceed.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Lee is guilty of a violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019.
RULING
YES. As aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, before direct contracting can be resorted
to, it is required that the requirements under Section 50(c) of RA 9184 must first be met.
Considering that the same liquid fertilizers bought had suitable substitutes available in the
market at very much lower prices compared to the ones procured indeed extended
unwarranted benefit to the supplier. The petitioner failed to justify the direct purchase from
the supplier at an unconscionable price of more than 500% to at least 900% more of the
suitable substitutes. Thus, the procurement resulted in undue injury to the government.
Q: Governor Lee took the lead in purchasing 2,000 liters of liquid fertilizer in the
amount of P3,000,000 and 133 liters of liquid fertilizer in the amount of P199,500, for
distribution to small and marginal farmers. However, in the annual audit report
prepared by the COA, it was observed that certain transactions did not comply with
the laws, rules, and regulations. The said fertilizers were procured through direct
contracting and there was no showing that a public bidding was conducted. There was
no prior BAC resolution, notice of award, and notice to proceed. Is Governor Lee liable
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?
A: YES. Before direct contracting can be resorted to, it is required that the requirements
under Section 50(c) of RA 9184 must first be met. Considering that the same liquid fertilizers
bought had suitable substitutes available in the market at very much lower prices compared
to the ones procured indeed extended unwarranted benefit to the supplier. The petitioner
failed to justify the direct purchase from the supplier at an unconscionable price of more
than 500% to at least 900% more of the suitable substitutes. Thus, the procurement resulted
in undue injury to the government. (Raul Lee v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234664-67, January 12, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO TALAUE
G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021, First Division (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
“A violation of Section 52(g) of RA 8291 is malum prohibitum, as such, it is the
commission of the act as defined by law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether the provision has been violated.”
FACTS
The Branch Manager of GSIS Cauayan, Araceli Santos, alleged that she coordinated
with their Billing and Collection Unit and requested a copy of the Statement of Account of the
Municipality of Sto. Tomas. She prepared a Cover Letter with attached Notice on Past Due
Compulsory Premiums covering the period of January 1997 to December 2005. Based on the
MOA between the GSIS and the municipality, Santos stated that the municipal government
failed to remit the total amount of P22,436,546.10, inclusive of interests.
On the other hand, the defense argued that he was municipal mayor only from January
1997 to June 1998 and from June 2001 to January 2004. He asserted that it is the municipal
treasurer who is primarily responsible for the payment of the municipality’s obligations.
However, he claimed that the treasurer failed to make arrangements and reconcile the
amounts with the GSIS.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is liable under Section 52(g) of RA 8291.
RULING
YES. To ensure compliance with the collection and remittance of contributions,
Section 52(g) of the GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the political
subdivisions, among others, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the
collection of contributions, amortizations, and other accounts due the GSIS, who fail, refuse,
or delay the payment, turnover, remittance, or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within
30 days from the time the same have become due and demandable.
Appellant, as municipal mayor, is unquestionably the head of office as the chief

executive officer thereof. As head of office, he and other employees involved in the collection
of contributions are responsible for the prompt and timely payment and/or remittance of
the said premiums to the GSIS. Considering that a violation of Sec. 52(g) is malum
prohibitum, it is the commission of the act as defined by law that determines whether the
provision has been violated. What the law punishes is failure, refusal, or delay without lawful
or justifiable cause in paying the required contributions. Rather than inspiring confidence
that he proactively ensured compliance with the law, his testimony reveals a pattern of
passing the buck to the municipal treasurer. He likewise failed to prove a justifiable cause
for his failure to remit the contributions.
Q: The Municipality of Sto. Tomas failed to timely remit to the GSIS the premium
contributions of its employees. The municipal mayor negates his liability on the
ground that it is the municipal treasurer who is primarily responsible for the payment
of the municipality’s obligations. Is the contention of the municipal mayor correct?
A: NO. Section 52(g) of the GSIS Act of 1997 penalizes the heads of the offices of the political
subdivisions, among others, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the
collection of contributions, amortizations, and other accounts due the GSIS, who fail, refuse,
or delay the payment, turnover, remittance, or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within
30 days from the time the same have become due and demandable. The municipal mayor is
unquestionably the head of office as the chief executive officer thereof. As head of office, he
and other employees involved in the collection of contributions are responsible for the
prompt and timely payment and/or remittance of the said premiums to the GSIS. (People of
the Philippines v. Antonio Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021, as penned by C.J.
Peralta)
CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et. al.
G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Mere delay, by itself, is not indicative of malice. It must be shown that such delay is for
the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit, gaining advantage in favor of an
interested party, or discriminating against another.”
FACTS
Camp John Hay Development Corp (CJH) entered into a lease agreement with the
Basses Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) within the John Hay Special Economic
Zone. Thereafter, the parties executed several Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) adjusting
the initial lease period, manner of rental payments, and restructuring its obligations. Finally,
a Restructuring MOA (RMOA) was entered into by the parties where CJH acknowledged its
prior rental obligations.
Under the RMOA, CJH was obliged to pay its restructured obligations. The BCDA, in
turn, promised to maintain a One-Stop Action Center (OSAC) to expedite the issuance of
certificates and licenses from all government agencies. CJH allegedly failed to pay its rental
obligations despite BCDA’s repeated demands. However, CJH countered that BCDA’s failure
to set up the OSAC caused the long delays in its project implementation to its prejudice.
Thereafter, CJH filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the BCDA officials for violation of Sec. 3(e)
and (f) of RA 3019, among others, before the Ombudsman which dismissed the same.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint
for lack of probable cause.
RULING
NO. There is no question as to the existence of the first element of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019, the officials being charged in the performance of their official functions. However,
there is doubt as to the second and third elements of the offense charged. Other than bare
allegations, petitioner did not present evidence to prove that the BCDA was not compliant
with its obligations in the RMOA. Petitioner forgets that the issuance of permits, certificates
and licenses is not an absolute obligation of BCDA since their issuance is still premised on
the complete submission of required documents by CJH. Without submission of complete
documentary requirements, petitioner had no right to demand the issuance of permits and
licenses. Hence, its allegation that it suffered undue injury has no leg to stand on.
Meanwhile as to Section 3(f) of RA 3019, the alleged delay in responding to

petitioner’s letter, by itself, is not sufficient to establish malice since there must be
intentional inaction or a deliberate refusal to act on the part of the public officer to do what
is incumbent upon him. Moreover, the inaction or refusal must be unjustified. In this case, no
discriminatory motive can be inferred from respondents’ action since its duty to issue the
permits and clearances did not even arise in the first place.
Q: Under the Restructuring Memorandum of Agreement, CJH was obliged to pay its
restructured obligations. The BCDA, in turn, promised to maintain a One-Stop Action
Center (OSAC) to expedite the issuance of certificates and licenses from all
government agencies. CJH allegedly failed to pay its rental obligations despite BCDA’s
repeated demands. However, CJH countered that BCDA’s failure to set up the OSAC
caused the long delays in its project implementation to its prejudice. Thereafter, CJH
filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the BCDA officials for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f)
of RA 3019, among others, before the Ombudsman which dismissed the same. Is the
Ombudsman correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause?
A: YES. Other than bare allegations, petitioner did not present evidence to prove that the
BCDA was not compliant with its obligations in the RMOA. Petitioner forgets that the
issuance of permits, certificates and licenses is not an absolute obligation of BCDA since their
issuance is still premised on the complete submission of required documents by CJH.
Without submission of complete documentary requirements, petitioner had no right to
demand the issuance of permits and licenses. Hence, its allegation that it suffered undue
injury has no leg to stand on. As to Section 3(f) of RA 3019, the alleged delay in responding
to petitioner’s letter, by itself, is not sufficient to establish malice since there must be
intentional inaction or a deliberate refusal to act on the part of the public officer to do what
is incumbent upon him. Moreover, the inaction or refusal must be unjustified. In this case, no
discriminatory motive can be inferred from respondents’ action since its duty to issue the
permits and clearances did not even arise in the first place. (Camp John Hay Development
Corporation v. Office of the Ombudsman, et. al., G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021, as penned
by J. Leonen)
G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Psychological violence is considered an indispensable element in violation of Section
5(i) of RA 9262. To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to show proof of commission
of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. To establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal
to her.”
FACTS
Private complainant YYY is the legal wife of the petitioner. Sometime in October 2010,
petitioner started a fight with YYY, as it is his usual habit when he is intoxicated. Petitioner
drove YYY and her four children out of the house. However, the spouses’ eldest child
convinced his three sisters to return to their house. Later on, one of their daughters, AAA,
reported to YYY through text messages that petitioner was always drunk, and that he
brought them to a videoke bar and introduced one Pearl Manto. She thereafter learned that
the same woman was already living in their house for two months.
ISSUE
Whether the XXX is guilty of violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.
RULING
YES. Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence inflicted against
women and their children. The elements are: (1) the offended party is a woman and/or her
child or children; (2) the woman is either the wife or former wife, or a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode; (3) the offender causes on the woman and/or child
mental or emotional anguish; and (4) the anguish is cause through acts of public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody or
access to the children or similar acts or omissions.
All the elements of the crime charged are present in the instant case, it is duly
established that petitioner committed psychological violence through marital infidelity and
public ridicule or humiliation, which caused mental anguish and emotional suffering upon
his wife. While petitioner sorely attempts to downplay the effect of his marital infidelity, the
pain and suffering is without a doubt real and raw and far from being imaginary. Just because
the wife was not bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband, it does not
negate the emotional pain and anguish his infidelity caused her.
Q: Sometime in October 2010, petitioner started a fight with YYY, his legal wife, as it is
his usual habit when he is intoxicated. Petitioner drove YYY and her four children out
of the house. However, the spouses’ eldest child convinced his three sisters to return
to their house. Later on, one of their daughters, AAA, reported to YYY through text
messages that petitioner was always drunk, and that he brought them to a videoke bar
and introduced one Pearl Manto. She thereafter learned that the same woman was
already living in their house for two months. Is petitioner liable for violation of Sec.
5(i) of RA 9262?
A: YES. Section 5(i) of RA 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence inflicted
against women and their children. All the elements of the crime charged are present in the
instant case, it is duly established that petitioner committed psychological violence through
marital infidelity and public ridicule or humiliation, which caused mental anguish and
emotional suffering upon his wife. While petitioner sorely attempts to downplay the effect
of his marital infidelity, the pain and suffering is without a doubt real and raw and far from
being imaginary. Just because the wife was not bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness
of her husband, it does not negate the emotional pain and anguish his infidelity caused her.
(XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021, as penned by J. Delos
Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON REVILLA, JR., et. al.
G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021, Second Division (M.V. Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Unless there is a clear showing that the petitioners are actually suffering from a
medical condition that requires immediate and specialized attention outside of their current
confinement, they must remain in custody and isolation incidental to the crimes for which they
were charged, or for which they are being tried or serving sentence. Only then can there be an
actual controversy and a proper invocation of humanitarian and equity considerations that is
ripe for this Court to determine.”
FACTS
On December 7, 2018, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused Cambe and Napoles
of Plunder relative to the utilization of Senator Revilla’s Priority Development Assistance
Fund. After having been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, both separately appealed their
conviction before the Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the appeal, Napoles is detained
at the Correctional Institution for Women.
In her Motion, Napoles alleges that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the
prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying COVID-19 health condition. She invokes the Court’s
rulings in De La Rama and Enrile to be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds.
ISSUE
Whether Napoles is allowed to post bail pending her conviction of a capital offense.
RULING
NO. Bail should be denied to an accused who is convicted of a capital offense. In that
instance, the Court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong, which
would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction; it would have likewise ruled
that the accused’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Both De La Rama and Enrile are exceptional, if not isolated cases, wherein the Court
considered the special and compelling circumstances of the accused who needed continuing
medication to preserve their health throughout the criminal proceedings, and to guarantee
their appearance in court. In contrast, the allegation of Napoles is a question of fact, which is
not within the province of this Court to determine, and even assuming that she is indeed
suffering from diabetes, that, in itself, is not sufficient to grant her provisional liberty, post-
conviction.
Q: On December 7, 2018, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused Cambe and
Napoles of Plunder relative to the utilization of Senator Revilla’s Priority
Development Assistance Fund. After having been sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
both separately appealed their conviction before the Supreme Court. Pending
resolution of the appeal, Napoles is detained at the Correctional Institution for
Women. In her Motion, Napoles alleges that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19
inside the prison due to her Diabetes, an underlying COVID-19 health condition. She
invokes the Court’s rulings in De La Rama and Enrile to be provisionally released on
humanitarian grounds. Is Napoles allowed to be provisionally released pending her
conviction of a capital offense?
A: NO. Bail should be denied to an accused who is convicted of a capital offense. In that
instance, the Court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong, which
would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction; it would have likewise ruled
that the accused’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Both De La Rama and
Enrile are exceptional, if not isolated cases, wherein the Court considered the special and
compelling circumstances of the accused who needed continuing medication to preserve
their health throughout the criminal proceedings, and to guarantee their appearance in
court. In contrast, the allegation of Napoles is a question of fact and even assuming that she
is indeed suffering from diabetes, that, in itself, is not sufficient to grant her provisional
liberty, post-conviction. (People of the Philippines v. Ramon Revilla, Jr. et. al., G.R. No. 247611,
January 13, 2021, as penned by J. M.V. Lopez)
LUIS QUIOGUE v. BENITO ESTACIO, JR. and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 218530, January 13, 2021, Second Division (M.V. Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
“It is not enough to simply allege the presence of bad faith. The facts themselves must
demonstrate evident bad faith. This connotes not only bad judgment but entails a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage.”
FACTS
Upon recommendation of then President Arroyo to the Chairman of the PCGG, Estacio
was elected as member of the board of Independent Realty Corporation, a sequestered
corporation surrendered by former Marcos’s crony Jose Campos to the government. Prior to
the expiration of his term, Estacio and other IRC board members passed a resolution granting
separation benefits to IRC officers.
Based on the resolution, he received a separation pay, 14th month pay, and an extra
bonus. This prompted the filing of a Complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman by
petitioner Quiogue, IRC’s General Manager on the ground that Estacio’s receipt of the
emoluments caused undue injury to the government in violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it refused to file the
Information against Estacio for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING
NO. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that Estacio’s act of
participating in the approval of the resolution and his receipt of the emoluments resulted in
direct violation of the said provision.
In issuing the resolution, the IRC board simply recognized that it is equitable to grant
the same separation benefits being enjoyed by the employees to its officers. Thus, Estacio’s
participation in the approval of the board resolution cannot be construed as bad faith. Any
benefit which he may have derived from the board resolution is purely incidental to the
position he was then occupying and cannot be deemed as an act which is intended to cause
undue injury to any party or the government.
Q: Prior to the expiration of Estacio’s term, Estacio, and other board members of
Independent Realty Corporation (IRC), a sequestered corporation, passed a
resolution granting separation benefits to IRC officers. Based on the resolution, he
received a separation pay, 14th month pay, and an extra bonus. This prompted the
filing of a Complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman by petitioner Quiogue, IRC’s
General Manager on the ground that Estacio’s receipt of the emoluments caused
undue injury to the government in violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Did the Ombudsman
gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint?
A: NO. In issuing the resolution, the IRC board simply recognized that it is equitable to grant
the same separation benefits being enjoyed by the employees to its officers. Thus, Estacio’s
participation in the approval of the board resolution cannot be construed as bad faith. Any
benefit which he may have derived from the board resolution is purely incidental to the
position he was then occupying and cannot be deemed as an act which is intended to cause
undue injury to any party or the government. (Luis Quiogue v. Benito Estacio, Jr. and Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 218530, January 13, 2021, as penned by J. M.V. Lopez)
ELPIDIO LOCSIN, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 221787, 221800-02, January 13, 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Lazaro-
Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officer; (b) he or she acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his or her action caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage,
or preference in the discharge of his functions.”
FACTS
Petitioner Locsin was the President of the Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF)
from 1993 to 2005. He was charged with four counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
for appointing his three children as student laborers and facilitating the release of their
salaries by signing their Daily Time Record (DTRs) though they never actually performed
labor services.
The defense contended that there were two types of Student Labor Program in ISCOF:
first, the special program under the DOLE which had an income level criterion, and second,
the regular program governed by DBM Circular Letter 11-96 which had no income criteria.
His children availed of the latter program. Although it was his duty to approve appointments,
he relied on his subordinates for these things and no longer reviewed their work.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING
NO. The petitioner acted in good faith when he appointed his children as student
laborers. Petitioner was merely following a decade of practice in ISCOF when he appointed
student laborers under the regular program. At the very least, this only shows that petitioner
was not impelled by any ill-motive, nor did he act in gross inexcusable negligence in
appointing his children as student laborers. He simply believed that the decade of practice
was aboveboard, considering too, DBM Circular Letter 11-96.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that petitioner acted in gross

inexcusable negligence when he signed his children’s DTR. The cardinal rule is that
conviction must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not
on the accused to prove his innocence.
Q: Locsin was the President of the Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) from 1993
to 2005. He appointed three of his children as student laborers under the regular
program covered by DBM Circular Letter 11-96. He also signed their Daily Time
Records which facilitated the release of their salaries. The defense contended that
although it was his duty to approve appointments, he relied on his subordinates for
these things and no longer reviewed their work. The defense also relied upon the
practice in ISCOF in implementing the regular program since 1981. The
Sandiganbayan found Locsin guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Did the
Sandiganbayan err in rendering a verdict of conviction against Locsin?
A: YES. The petitioner acted in good faith when he appointed his children as student laborers.
Petitioner was merely following a decade of practice in ISCOF when he appointed student
laborers under the regular program. At the very least, this only shows that petitioner was
not impelled by any ill-motive, nor did he act in gross inexcusable negligence in appointing
his children as student laborers. He simply believed that the decade of practice was
aboveboard, considering too, DBM Circular Letter 11-96. Moreover, the prosecution failed to
establish that petitioner acted in gross inexcusable negligence when he signed his children’s
DTR. The cardinal rule is that conviction must rest not on the weakness of the defense but
on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. (Elpidio Locsin, Jr. v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 221787 and 221800-02, January 13, 2021, as penned by J. Lazaro-
Javier)
EMILIO AGUINALDO IV v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Notwithstanding the finality of a criminal conviction, the Court has the power to
correct the penalty imposed against an accused-convict, if it finds the same to be outside the
range prescribed by law. A sentence which imposes upon the defendant a penalty in excess of
the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense is void for want or
excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.”
FACTS
In a Resolution dated October 10, 2018, the Court affirmed the Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The CA sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional, as minimum, to reclusion temporal, as maximum. Aggrieved, the
petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied with finality, and entry of judgment
was issued on an even date.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner still filed the two motions: first, insisting
on his innocence and praying for his acquittal from the crime charged; and second, praying
that his sentence be readjusted in accordance with RA 10951.
ISSUE
Whether the penalty may be readjusted in accordance with RA 10951.
RULING
YES. Notably, the computation of the penalty was based on the schedule of penalties
stated in Article 315, prior to the enactment of RA 10951. However, due to the enactment of
RA 10951, the prescribed penalty for Estafa involving the aforementioned defrauded amount
was significantly lowered. Thus, notwithstanding the finality of a criminal conviction, the
Court still has the power to correct the penalty imposed against an accused, if it finds the
same to be outside the range prescribed by law.
Q: On October 2018, the Court of Appeals found Aguinaldo IV guilty of the crime of
Estafa and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional to reclusion
temporal based on the schedule of penalties under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The verdict of conviction attained finality and entry of judgment was issued on
even date. Nevertheless, Aguinaldo IV filed a motion before the Supreme Court
praying that his sentenced be readjusted in accordance with RA 10951. May the
penalty be modified notwithstanding the finality of the judgment?
A: YES. Notably, the computation of the penalty was based on the schedule of penalties stated
in Article 315, prior to the enactment of RA 10951. However, due to the enactment of RA
10951, the prescribed penalty for Estafa involving the aforementioned defrauded amount
was significantly lowered. Thus, notwithstanding the finality of a criminal conviction, the
Court still has the power to correct the penalty imposed against an accused, if it finds the
same to be outside the range prescribed by law. (Emilio Aguinaldo IV v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
FERNANDO PANTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
“A finder under Article 308, par 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of
the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the
property found. One who receives property from the finder assumes, by voluntary substitution,
as to the property and the owner, the relation occupied by the finder, placing himself in the
finder’s stead.”
FACTS
Dawson Word placed a bundle of money on his lap between his legs while driving
back to his apartment. He parked his car in front of his residence and forgot the money that
he placed on his lap. Apparently, upon alighting from the car, the bundled money fell on the
road near his vehicle.
The following morning, one of Pante’s co-accused, a minor, noticed the bundle of
money and picked it up before going home. Word learned that Pante’s minor co-accused
picked up the bundled money near his car. Word sought the help of the police and went to
the minor’s residence where the accused minor admitted that he found the bundle of money
under Word’s car. He also averred that the money was shared among his other co-accused,
also a minor, and Pante.
Thereafter, the police went to the residence of the other co-accused and Pante, who
also admitted that they received their share of the lost money. Pante denies liability on the
ground that he was not a finder in law since the one who found the lost money was the co-
accused minor.
ISSUE
Whether Pante is guilty of the crime of theft.
RULING
YES. Under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the Revised Penal Code, Theft is also committed
by one’s failure to deliver lost property to its owner or local authorities. In this kind of Theft,
it is essential to prove: (1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure of the finder to
deliver the same to the local authorities.
In fine, a finder under Art. 308 is not only limited to the actual finder since the gist of
the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found. Though not the
actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused minors
did not own the subject money. Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced his co-
accused minors not to return and to divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante
placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual finder.
Q: While driving on the way to his apartment, Dawson placed a bundle of money on his
lap. Upon alighting from the car, the bundled money fell on the road near his vehicle.
A minor noticed the bundled money and picked it up before going home. Pante and
two other minors shared the lost money and divided the same among themselves.
They were all charged with the crime of Theft. Pante denied liability on the ground
that he is not a finder in law since the one who found the lost money was his co-accused
minor. Is his contention tenable?
A: NO. A finder under Art. 308 of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder since the gist
of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found. Though not
the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused
minors did not own the subject money. Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced his
co-accused minors not to return and to divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante
placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual finder. (Fernando Pante v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS TAMAYO Y UMALI
G.R. No. 234943, January 19, 2021, First Division (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
“It is well-settled that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and unless the
State succeeds in proving by overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused, the constitutional
presumption of innocence applies.”
FACTS
AAA was heading to her house when she saw an individual, later identified as Tamayo,
urinating at the side of a footbridge. Allegedly, Tamayo suddenly put his arms around her
shoulder and poked a knife on her side. Thereafter, Tamayo brought AAA back to the dark
portion of the side of the footbridge, made her sit and took her personal belongings.
AAA added that after Tamayo took her belongings, he put them aside and started
molesting her, and allegedly inserted his penis into her vagina. After two hours, BBB then
looked for AAA at the footbridge and found Tamayo forcing AAA to do sexual acts. When BBB
confronted Tamayo, the latter stood up and stabbed BBB. BBB and AAA jumped into the river
while Tamayo got AAA’s bag and fled the scene. Tamayo was charged with Robbery with
Rape and Frustrated Homicide in two separate Informations.
Tamayo denied the charges invoking the “Sweetheart Theory”. He narrated that AAA
told him to meet her at the footbridge. After some time, BBB arrived shouting at them. BBB
attacked Tamayo but AAA stood between them. They wrestled for the knife where BBB was
accidentally stabbed. AAA then told Tamayo to run. Tamayo claimed that no one knew about
their relationship except him and AAA.
ISSUE
Whether Tamayo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
RULING
NO. Noticeably, in the police blotter made immediately after the incident, AAA did not
disclose that he inserted his penis into her vagina. She belatedly introduced her new claim
that Tamayo forced her to have sexual intercourse with him only during direct examination.
It is contrary to ordinary human experience to omit such a pivotal piece of information if the
charges against Tamayo are really true.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to rebut the evidence presented by Tamayo

establishing that they knew each other prior to the incident. AAA also did not identify the
perpetrator during the first opportunity to report the incident to the authorities. The
constantly changing statements of AAA and the apparent gap in her narration of facts cast
doubt on the veracity and truthfulness of her statements. The subsequent statements given
by AAA from the initial blotter entry and her testimony in court do not even complement nor
furnish supporting details to elaborate on her initial statements.
Q: AAA was heading to her house when she saw an individual, later identified as
Tamayo, urinating at the side of a footbridge. Allegedly, Tamayo suddenly put his arms
around her shoulder and poked a knife on her side. Thereafter, Tamayo brought AAA
back to the dark portion of the side of the footbridge, made her sit and took her
personal belongings. AAA added that after Tamayo took her belongings, he put them
aside and started molesting her, and allegedly inserted his penis into her vagina. After
two hours, BBB then looked for AAA at the footbridge and found Tamayo forcing AAA
to do sexual acts. When BBB confronted Tamayo, the latter stood up and stabbed BBB.
BBB and AAA jumped into the river while Tamayo got AAA’s bag and fled the scene.
Tamayo was charged with Robbery with Rape and Frustrated Homicide in two
separate Informations. Tamayo denied the charges invoking the “Sweetheart Theory”.
He narrated that AAA told him to meet her at the footbridge. After some time, BBB
arrived shouting at them. BBB attacked Tamayo but AAA stood between them. They
wrestled for the knife where BBB was accidentally stabbed. AAA then told Tamayo to
run. Tamayo claimed that no one knew about their relationship except him and AAA.
Is his contention tenable?
A: YES. Noticeably, in the police blotter made immediately after the incident, AAA did not
disclose that he inserted his penis into her vagina. She belatedly introduced her new claim
that Tamayo forced her to have sexual intercourse with him only during direct examination.
It is contrary to ordinary human experience to omit such a pivotal piece of information if the
charges against Tamayo are really true. Moreover, the prosecution failed to rebut the
evidence presented by Tamayo establishing that they knew each other prior to the incident.
AAA also did not identify the perpetrator during the first opportunity to report the incident
to the authorities. The constantly changing statements of AAA and the apparent gap in her
narration of facts cast doubt on the veracity and truthfulness of her statements. The
subsequent statements given by AAA from the initial blotter entry and her testimony in court
do not even complement nor furnish supporting details to elaborate on her initial
statements. (People of the Philippines v. Carlos Tamayo, G.R. No. 234943, January 19, 2021, as
penned by J. Carandang)
MANUEL TIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 230132, January 19, 2021, FIRST DIVISION (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
“Although the government did not suffer any undue injury due to the fact that the project
was completed despite irregularities in the procurement process, the public officer may be held
liable under the second mode, which is by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference.”
FACTS
Tio and Cadiz used to be mayor and municipal accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Luna – a component of the Province of Isabela. The Municipality and Province
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where the province undertook to provide
funds for the construction of a road project while the municipality obligated itself to
implement such road concreting project, by administration, in accordance with the MOA.
Without any prior public bidding, Tio approved and caused the issuance of a
Disbursement Voucher (DV) authorizing the release of P2.5 million in favor of Double A
Corporation for partial payment of construction materials and equipment to which the latter
supplied and rented to the municipality. The DV bore the signature of Cadiz, who certified
that an allotment was obligated for the purpose indicated, and that the documents were
complete. On even date, the municipality drew a check in favor of Double A.
The members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) passed a resolution declaring
that they were unaware of the road project. They concluded the resolution by expressing
their mass resignation from the BAC. Perez, then vice mayor, filed a Complaint before the
Ombudsman against Tio and Cadiz for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
ISSUE
Whether Tio and Cadiz are guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING
YES. The acts imputed against Tio are: (1) awarding the contract to Double A without
public bidding, and (2) causing the partial payment despite the absence or lack of supporting
documents. When Tio awarded the contract without public bidding, he acted with manifest
partiality. He failed to justify his reason for selecting Double A, showing his clear bias over
the corporation. Moreover, there was gross inexcusable negligence on Tio’s part when he
approved the DV despite the lack of supporting documents. Being the mayor, it is his duty to
ensure that public funds are disbursed only after having complied with the law.
As for accused Cadiz, the prosecution was not able to prove that Cadiz participated in
the award of the contract to Double A. Nevertheless, it was able to establish her participation
in the release of the payment. In this case, Cadiz should not have signed the DV in the absence
of supporting documents. As a result, there was failure on the part of Cadiz to perform her
duty as Municipal Accountant which constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.
Q: Tio and Cadiz are the mayor and municipal accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Luna. The municipality implemented a road construction project by
administration. Without any prior public bidding, Tio approved and caused the
issuance of a Disbursement Voucher (DV) authorizing the release of P2.5 million in
favor of Double A Corporation for partial payment of construction materials and
equipment to which the latter supplied and rented to the municipality. The DV bore
the signature of Cadiz, who certified that an allotment was obligated for the purpose
indicated, and that the documents were complete. On even date, the municipality
drew a check in favor of Double A. The members of the Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) passed a resolution declaring that they were unaware of the road project. They
concluded the resolution by expressing their mass resignation from the BAC. Perez,
then vice mayor, filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman against Tio and Cadiz for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. Did Tio and Cadiz commit a violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019?
A: YES. The acts imputed against Tio are: (1) awarding the contract to Double A without
public bidding, and (2) causing the partial payment despite the absence or lack of supporting
documents. When Tio awarded the contract without public bidding, he acted with manifest
partiality. He failed to justify his reason for selecting Double A, showing his clear bias over
the corporation. Moreover, there was gross inexcusable negligence on Tio’s part when he
approved the DV despite the lack of supporting documents. Being the mayor, it is his duty to
ensure that public funds are disbursed only after having complied with the law.
As for accused Cadiz, the prosecution was not able to prove that Cadiz participated in
the award of the contract to Double A. Nevertheless, it was able to establish her participation
in the release of the payment. In this case, Cadiz should not have signed the DV in the absence
of supporting documents. As a result, there was failure on the part of Cadiz to perform her
duty as Municipal Accountant which constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. (Manuel Tio v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230132, January 19, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELVIN PEREIRA
G.R. No. 220749, January 20, 2021, THIRD DIVISION (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes
only if satisfactorily proven. All three elements of self-defense must concur; however, it relies
first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on part of the victim. If no unlawful
aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.”
FACTS
On the evening of January 18, 2009, Bagan was watching television when Pereira
surreptitiously entered the house through the unlocked screen door, positioned himself
behind Bagan, wrapped his left arm around Bagan’s neck and stabbed him with a knife in the
chest. Bagan was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The
barangay authorities eventually arrested Pereira at the house of his aunt and turned him
over to the police.
For his part, Pereira invoked self-defense claiming that Bagan was the aggressor who
attacked him. In addition, he claimed that in the event he is found guilty of killing the victim,
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in his favor.
ISSUE
Whether Pereira is guilty of murder.
RULING
YES. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that offers exculpation from liability for
crimes only if satisfactorily proven. All three elements of self-defense must concur; however,
it relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. In this case,
Pereira utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of
the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was not accorded any credence by the
trial court.
As uniformly found by the lower courts, the elements of treachery were present.
While Bagan was seated on the floor with his back towards the screen door, Pereira
surreptitiously entered the Bagans’ house and immediately wrapped his left arm around the
latter’s neck and repeatedly stabbed him in the chest. The facts show that treachery was
employed by Pereira, the attack being sudden and unexpected.
In the same tenor, Pereira is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The barangay authorities had to search for Pereira and go the place where he fled
to. Only then was he arrested.
Q: Bagan was watching television when Pereira surreptitiously entered the house
through the unlocked screen door, positioned himself behind Bagan, wrapped his left
arm around Bagan’s neck and stabbed him with a knife in the chest. Bagan was
brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The barangay
authorities eventually arrested Pereira at the house of his aunt and turned him over
to the police. For his defense, Pereira invoked self-defense claiming that Bagan was
the aggressor who attacked him. In addition, he claimed that in the event he is found
guilty of killing the victim, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be considered in his favor. Is his contention tenable?
A: NO. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that offers exculpation from liability for
crimes only if satisfactorily proven. All three elements of self-defense must concur; however,
it relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. In this case,
Pereira utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of
the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was not accorded any credence by the
trial court. Moreover, Pereira is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The barangay authorities had to search for Pereira and go the place where he fled
to. Only then was he arrested. (People of the Philippines v. Melvin Pereira, G.R. No. 220749,
January 20, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. AVELINA MANALANG a.k.a. TESS ROBLES, a.k.a.
ALVINA MANALANG
G.R. No. 198015, January 20, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
In view of the foregoing, Manalang is also liable for the crime of Estafa. Jurisprudence is
settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the latter,
it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of payment that renders the
recruitment activity as unlawful.
FACTS
Manalang was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale in violation of Section
6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, and Estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
She, for a fee, recruited and promised employment/job placement to the following persons:
As Chamber Maid in Australia: Ma. Teresa P. Marañon, Erlie Lorrico y Lavado, Leizel Miguel
y Leria , Gemma L. Ortiz Lolita V. Tura; As Factory Worker in South Korea: Jhun M. Labarento,
Edwin L. Geronimo; As Waiter in Australia: Edgardo R. Cawas.
The Prosecution presented private complainants Lolita V. Tura (Tura), Ma. Teresa P.
Marañon (Marañon), and Edgardo R. Cawas (Cawas), as witnesses. The defense, on the other
hand, presented Manalang and Madilyn Masagca (Masagca) as its witnesses. Among other
things, they testified that Manalag was introduced to them as “Tess Robles” who deploys
workers to Australia. They all paid placement fees and awaited their deployment yet nothing
happened.
Manalang denied knowing "Tess Robles" or using said name in any of her
transactions. She averred that (a) she is the owner of Honte Travel and Tours, which
processes applications for passports as well as visas; (b) she also owns Mirilyn Training
School, which offers training for hotel and restaurant services, such as food service,
housekeeping, and bartending; (c) both offices are located at Room 221 of the Trade Center
Building, and both cater to walk-in trainees as well as applicants referred by agents; (d) both
offices have permits from the Department of Trade and Industry and from the Office of the
Mayor; (e) as of the time of her testimony, their registration with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) was still being processed; (f) private complainants underwent training in her office;
(g) however, she did not process their application forms or offer them employment abroad;
and (h) she agreed to reimburse half of the placement fees supposedly paid by private
complainants in order to appease them and to avoid trouble.
The Regional Trial Court found Manalang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in Large-Scale, and three (3) counts of Estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the RPC. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Manalang for the crimes
of Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale under RA 8042 and three (3) counts of Estafa under Art.
315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC.
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that Manalang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large- Scale under RA 8042.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code provides that illegal recruitment encompasses
recruitment activities for both local and overseas employment. However, Article 38 of the
same Code limits said recruitment activities as those undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority.
Thus, based on the foregoing provisions of the Labor Code, the essential elements of
Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment
and placement of workers as defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or in any
prohibited activities listed under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; (2) that he/she had
not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of DOLE with respect to the
requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that she
committed the unlawful acts against three or more persons.
On the other hand, RA 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas
employment and increased the penalties. Thus, while Article 38 of the Labor Code limits
illegal recruitment to recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority, Part II of RA 8042 defines and penalizes illegal recruitment for employment
abroad, regardless of whether it was undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority or by a licensee or holder of authority.
Thus, Section 6 of RA 8042 provides for the definition of illegal recruitment, as

follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad for two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non- holder, licensee or holder of
authority: (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment; and …
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed
by a syndicate or in large-scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large-scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
This Court found that the elements for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale
were sufficiently established in the instant case.
Firstly, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant engaged in acts of recruitment

and placement of workers. She promised to deploy the private complaints for work abroad
upon payment of their placement fee. Secondly, it was duly established that Manalang was
neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment, as
evidenced by the POEA Certification dated January 23, 2002. Thirdly, the illegal recruitment
was committed in large-scale because the accused-appellant defrauded at least three
persons, namely, Tura, Marañon and Cawas, who are the private complainants in the instant
case.
The Supreme Court also ruled that Manalang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par 2 (a) of the RPC.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or

concealment, are the following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended
party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he
was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage are present. We note that the
accused-appellant, without any license or authority to do so, promised private complainants
overseas employment, then required them to undergo training and collected fees or
payments from them, while continually assuring them that they would be deployed abroad,
but failed to do so. Persuaded by these assurances given by Manalang, the private
complainants paid their placement fees, albeit partially. Thus, her representation induced
the victims to part with their money, resulting in damage. This Court also finds that when
private complainants paid their placement fees, Manalang issued receipts using the fictitious
name of "Tess Robles." In view of the foregoing deceitful and illegal acts of Manalang, the
private complainants undoubtedly suffered damage.
In view of the foregoing, Manalang is also liable for the crime of Estafa. Jurisprudence
is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the
latter, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of payment that
renders the recruitment activity as unlawful.
Q: Manalang was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale in violation of
Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, and Estafa under Article 315 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code. Manala contended that she cannot be held liable for Estafa
for the same acts since they have different elements. Rule on her contention.
A: Manalang’s contention is without merit. Manalang can also be held liable for the crime
of Estafa. Jurisprudence is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted
separately for Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the
latter, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of payment that
renders the recruitment activity as unlawful. (People v. Manalang, G.R. No. 198015, January
20, 2021, Third Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
JOURNEY KENNETH ASA y AMBULO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021, (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
The private complainant’s counter-offer does not make it "with her consent," as the
same was made as a result of petitioner's existing and continuing threat of posting the private
photos on Facebook. In effect, when petitioner accepted private complainant's counter-offer of
P5,000.00 instead of sex, his demand was merely amended or changed from sexual into a
monetary one.
FACTS
Petitioner, using the Facebook account name “Indho Than”, sent Alyanna a private
message by way of Facebook Messenger, threatening to post provocative photos of her
friend, private complainant. Alyanna immediately contacted private complainant. Using
Alyanna's Facebook account, private complainant sent a private message to petitioner,
asking him to take down the fake Facebook account with her photo as profile. Instead of
doing what private complainant requested, petitioner threatened private complainant that
he would make a public post on Facebook of her private and post-coital photos with her
partner.
Private complainant and petitioner exchanged a series of private messages, where the
former begged the latter not to release her photos because a lot of people would be affected.
In desperation, private complainant told petitioner that she would do anything to get back
her photos. Petitioner then told her that he would delete all the photos in his possession and
take down her fake Facebook account if she would agree to have sex with him. Private
complainant did not agree and instead offered to pay P5,000.00 in exchange of the pictures
and petitioner agreed.
Private complainant told her mother about the situation and they went to Dasmariñas
City Police Station to ask for assistance. The police immediately created a team to conduct
an entrapment operation against petitioner.
Private complainant and petitioner met. After verifying that the memory card indeed
contained her private photos, private complainant handed to petitioner an envelope
containing the marked money amounting to P5,000.00. Petitioner counted the money in
front of private complainant before removing his phone's memory card and giving it to the
latter. Private complainant then removed her glasses to alert the entrapment team, who then
rushed to the scene and immediately arrested petitioner. Afterwards, the entrapment team
brought petitioner to Dasmariñas City Police Station.
Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery by means of Intimidation of Persons under Article 293
of the RPC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's Decision
convicting petitioner of the crime of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons.
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court held that all the elements of Robbery with Intimidation of
Persons. The Court emphasized that that private complainant's counter-offer does not make
it "with her consent," as the same was made as a result of petitioner's existing and continuing
threat of posting the private photos on Facebook. It is worthy to note that petitioner did not
offer to voluntarily and unconditionally return the photos of private complainant but instead
asked for something in exchange for him not to post the same on Facebook. In effect, when
petitioner accepted private complainant's counter-offer of P5,000.00 instead of sex, his
demand was merely amended or changed from sexual into a monetary one. Thus the second
element in the crime of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons is present in this case — that
there is unlawful taking of property belonging to another.
Further, the Court also noted that the fourth element of the crime charged anent the
presence of intimidation of persons, as petitioner's threat to post the subject private photos
on Facebook if his demand is not met produced fear in the mind of his victim, private
complainant, so that the latter was forced to give to petitioner the amount of P5,000.00,
against or without her consent.
Q: A messaged B threatening to post provocative photos of her. B begged the latter not
to release her photos because a lot of people would be affected. In desperation, B told
A that she would do anything to get back her photos. A then told her that he would
delete all the photos in his possession and take down her fake Facebook account if she
would agree to have sex with him. B did not agree and instead offered to pay P5,000.00
in exchange of the pictures and petitioner agreed.
1. Did the counter-offer constitute as consent?
A: NO. B’s counter-offer does not make it "with her consent," as the same was made as a
result of A’s existing and continuing threat of posting the private photos on Facebook. It is
worthy to note that A did not offer to voluntarily and unconditionally return the photos of B
but instead asked for something in exchange for him not to post the same on Facebook. In
effect, when A accepted private complainant's counter-offer of P5,000.00 instead of sex, his
demand was merely amended or changed from sexual into a monetary one. (Asa y Ambulo v.
People, G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
2. What is the crime committed?
A: The crime committed is Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. (Asa y Ambulo v. People,
G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEDRITO VALENZONA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203785, January 20, 2021, (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
Following the doctrine of variance, even though the crime charged against petitioner is
for Attempted Rape, he can be convicted of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC without violating his constitutional rights because the latter is necessarily included
in the crime of Attempted Rape.
FACTS
The instant case stemmed from nine (9) Informations charging petitioner with
Attempted Rape. The Informations, except for the date of the commission of each crime,
similarly read as follows:
On June 10, 1998, in Baybay, Leyte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with lewd and prurient desires, laid
on top of 11-year old AAA upon whom he exercised moral ascendancy she being his
grade sixth pupil, after he pulled down her underwear up to below her knee, and
executed some pumping acts and motions with his male organ on her pubic area while
at the same time embracing and kissing her, but accused's male organ was not able to
penetrate nor touch the labia of the pudendum, accused performed overt acts but did
not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the crime of rape due to the fact
that the victim's thighs remained close together thereby protecting her female organ,
although accused ejaculated by reason of the excitement at the moment. Contrary to
law.
Such acts were done on 9 separate days by AAA’s Grade VI teacher. Both the Regional
Trial Court and Court of Appeals The RTC convicted petitioner of nine (9) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in convicting petitioner of nine (9) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 when
the information was for the crime of attempted rape
2. Whether the CA erred in giving credence to AAA's statements which are incredible
considering that the alleged nine incidents occurred in the same place, at the same time,
and in the same manner.
3. Whether petitioner’s contention faulting AAA for not immediately revealing the
alleged incidents to her friends, classmates, teachers or school personnel after their
commission should prosper
RULING
1. NO. Even though the crime charged against petitioner is for Attempted Rape, he
can be convicted of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC without
violating his constitutional rights because the latter is necessarily included in the crime of
Attempted Rape. This is following the doctrine of variance.
2. NO. The precise date and time of the incidents are not among the elements of sexual
abuse. It is also recognized that lust is no respecter of time and place. Sexual abuse can thus
be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within
school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room
where other members of the family are also sleeping.
3. NO. There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the
misfortune of being sexually molested. Without a doubt, neither does AAA.'s silence
immediately after the incidents nor her failure to shout during the commission of the crimes
affect her credibility as a witness. Victims of sexual abuse, like AAA, react differently to
different situations. There is no standard form of reaction for a woman when facing a
shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual abuse.
Q: BBB is AAA’s Grade VI teacher. An information was filed against BBB for attempted
rape, viz: “BBB, with deliberate intent, with lewd and prurient desires, laid on top of
11-year old AAA upon whom he exercised moral ascendancy she being his grade sixth
pupil, after he pulled down her underwear up to below her knee, and executed some
pumping acts and motions with his male organ on her pubic area while at the same
time embracing and kissing her, but accused's male organ was not able to penetrate
nor touch the labia of the pudendum, accused performed overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which constitute the crime of rape due to the fact that
the victim's thighs remained close together thereby protecting her female organ,
although accused ejaculated by reason of the excitement at the moment. Contrary to
law.”
When adjudged by the Court, the Court convicted BBB of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. BBB insists that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him
was violated. Rule on BBB’s contention.
A: BBB’s contention is incorrect. Following the doctrine of variance, even though the crime
charged against petitioner is for Attempted Rape, he can be convicted of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC without violating his constitutional rights
because the latter is necessarily included in the crime of Attempted Rape. (Valenzona v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203785, January 20, 2021, as penned by J. Inting)
ALLAN DE VERA Y ANTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 246231, January 20, 2021, (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
The act of masturbation is punishable under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Taking into
account the special circumstances surrounding the case at bench, the act of masturbating in
the presence of the minor is considered a lascivious conduct and constitutes psychological abuse
on the minor victim. The act of masturbation then falls within the scope of R.A. No. 7610 and
not the RPC.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Violation of Section 5, paragraph (b) of R.A.
No. 7610. When AAA, a 16-year-old, AAA enrolled at the XXX University as a first year college
student. When AAA was taking an exam, petitioner was standing approximately less than a
meter away to the left of AAA and was facing a bookshelf.
While taking the exam, AAA heard a tapping sound. When she looked up and saw the
petitioner masturbating. AAA calmly packed her things, got up from the couch and told
petitioner that she would continue her exam at the reception area of the Filipino
Department.
AAA immediately ran out of the office and told her classmate CCC what she saw in the
Mini-Library. Upon the advice of CCC, AAA called her mother, BBB, who instructed her
daughter to report the matter to the University Security Office. When BBB arrived at the
university, she was told that the petitioner was already brought to the police station. BBB
and AAA then went to the police station to file a formal complaint against the petitioner.
Petitioner, on his part, denied the accusations of the private complainant. He alleged
that there was a vertical tear along the right sideline of the zipper. Since he is only required
to work half-day on a Saturday and he lived in Antipolo, petitioner decided to pull the pants
upward and his clothes downward as it is too impractical to go home and change clothes. He
also alleged that he had one hand arranging the books on the shelf while the other hand was
carrying books to be shelved. Further, he alleged that he was surprised upon the arrival of
the university's security officers, who arrested him based on the allegations of AAA that he
masturbated in her presence while she was taking the exam.
The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty of the crime of violation of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The RTC held that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, masturbating is considered a lascivious
conduct.
The Court of Appeals held that while petitioner cannot be convicted under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the elements under Section 10(a) were duly established in this case.
The CA held that the act of masturbating in the presence of the child is considered another
act of abuse because it is prejudicial to the development of the child. The CA further opined
that even if the Information did not specifically charge petitioner with child abuse under
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, he may still be convicted of the said offense considering that
the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the said crime.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of violation of Section
19(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
RULING
YES. The act of masturbation is punishable under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Taking into account the special circumstances surrounding the case at bench, the act of
masturbating in the presence of the minor is considered a lascivious conduct and constitutes
psychological abuse on the minor victim. The act of masturbation then falls within the scope
of R.A. No. 7610 and not the RPC.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines "lascivious
conduct" as: The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. It is
emphasized that what constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the
circumstances of each case.
The Court concurred with the CA that even if the Information did not categorically
state that petitioner is charged with Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, he may still be convicted
of the same. The failure to specifically indicate the aforesaid provision is not deemed fatal so
as to violate petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.
In the case at bench, the Information alleged sufficiently all the elements constituting
the crime of other forms of child abuse penalized under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610,
namely: (a) the minority of the victim; and, (b) the acts constituting physical or psychological
abuse committed by petitioner against the victim — petitioner fondled his penis and
masturbated in the presence of the victim thereby prejudicing her psychological and physical
development and further debasing, degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and
dignity.
Thus, despite the absence of the attendance of coercion and influence in petitioner's
act to constitute other sexual abuse, which is punishable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
the CA properly ruled that the act is still punishable as other forms of child abuse under
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
As regards petitioner's insistence that he should be convicted with the crime of unjust
vexation, this contention is utterly without merit. The purpose of the crime of unjust vexation
is to cause annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person
to whom it was directed. The act of masturbating is not just an act to vex the minor victim,
but such was done intentionally to excite crude sexual desire on account of the minor victim.
The law specifically classifies masturbation as a lascivious conduct, which basically

aims to satiate the sexual desire of the doer. The effect of masturbation on the minor victim
or the "audience" is far from only evoking emotions of irritation or annoyance. In this case,
the lascivious act of masturbating caused the minor victim to suffer anxiety and trauma. This
specie of psychological abuse is basically one of the acts aimed to be punished under R.A.
No. 7610.
The fact that the act of masturbation was done by him (an employee of an educational
institution) while the student was taking an examination clearly establishes that the act was
intentional and directed towards the minor victim. Notwithstanding that the lewd act was
done without the participation of the minor victim and even if petitioner was facing the
bookshelf, it is worthy to emphasize that petitioner was fully aware that the minor victim
was only an arm's length away from him in a small room. This leads to the conclusion that
the act of masturbating was not merely a personal and private act of pleasure on the part of
the petitioner nor can it be deemed to have been done to cause vexation or annoyance on the
victim, rather it was done with lewd designs.
In Lucido v. People, the Court held that the crime committed under R.A. No. 7610 is
mala prohibita, thus, the intent to debase, demean, and/or degrade is not a defining mark.
Any lascivious conduct that results to the debasing, demeaning, and degrading of the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child is deemed to constitute the offense, as in this case.
As regards penalty, Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that for persons who
committed other acts of child abuse, the penalty is prision mayor in its minimum period,
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of imprisonment. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, a penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum was imposed.
The Supreme Court set moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 each. The Court
emphasized that in awarding moral damages, there is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of the fair and equitable amount considering that each case is governed by its
unique facts. Further, exemplary damages was awarded set a public example and to serve
as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth.
Q: While taking the exam alone, AAA, a 16-year-old heard a tapping sound. When she
looked up and saw her teacher-proctor masturbating. AAA calmly packed her things,
got up from the couch and told petitioner that she would continue her exam at the
reception area of the Filipino Department. When AAA reported the incident, an
information was filed against her teacher-proctor viz: “That on or about the 7th day of
July 2012 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully commit acts of lascivious conduct upon the person of AAA, a minor, 16
years of age, by then and there fondling his penis and masturbating while he was
beside the complainant who was then taking her examination at the XXX University,
thereby prejudicing her psychological and physical development and further
debasing, degrading, or demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of said AAA, as
human being, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. CONTRARY TO
LAW.” The teacher proctor contended that he should be convicted with the crime of
unjust vexation, and not under R.A. No. 7610. Rule on his contention.
A: The teacher-proctor’s contention is without merit. As regards petitioner's insistence

that he should be convicted with the crime of unjust vexation, this contention is utterly
without merit. The purpose of the crime of unjust vexation is to cause annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed. The act
of masturbating is not just an act to vex the minor victim, but such was done intentionally to
excite crude sexual desire on account of the minor victim.
The law specifically classifies masturbation as a lascivious conduct, which basically

aims to satiate the sexual desire of the doer. The effect of masturbation on the minor victim
or the "audience" is far from only evoking emotions of irritation or annoyance. In this case,
the lascivious act of masturbating caused the minor victim to suffer anxiety and trauma. This
specie of psychological abuse is basically one of the acts aimed to be punished under R.A.
No. 7610. (Allan De Vera y Ante v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246231, January 20, 2021,
as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELY POLICARPIO y NATIVIDAD alias "DAGUL”
G.R. No. 227868, January 20, 2021, Special Second Division (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
The search warrant is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that although the search area
indo merely "Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago City," the deponents in the application for the search
warrant, there was no doubt as to the location of the intended subject of the search and seizure
operation. This is sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched, which they in fact did. Verily, the deficiency in the address
stated in the search warrant is not of sufficient gravity that would spell the invalidation
thereof.
The Court also found that the phrase "Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as shabu; Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu" as stated
in the Search Warrant No. 0085 has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on particularity
of description of the items to be seized. Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the
objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant, and thus, it prevents exploratory
searches.
FACTS
The prosecution provided: IO3 Asayco testified that he was a member of the PDEA
team that implemented Search Warrant No. 0085 at the house of Policarpio located at No. 29
Purok 4, Barangay Malvar, Santiago City on April 12, 2007 at about 12 o'clock noon. The
PDEA agents knocked on the door of Policarpio's house, and when Policarpio came out, their
team leader, Police Senior Inspector Jaime De Vera (PSI De Vera) read to him the contents of
the search warrant and gave him a copy thereof. The search of the house was conducted by
him and agent Sanchez in the presence of accused-appellant's mother, Perla Policarpio,
Barangay Chairman Tangonan and Barangay Kagawad Ohmar Zodiac Calimag. Policarpio
was outside the house when the search was being conducted. In the process of implementing
the search warrant, they confiscated nine (9) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, eleven (11) deposit slips and cash in the total amount of P17,700.00, which were
all found inside a blue clutch bag; several pieces of drug paraphernalia, which were found in
between the dura box and the wall of the room; and one (1) .45 caliber Colt pistol bearing
Serial No. 452857 with magazine and live ammunitions, found beneath the bed cushion.
The confiscated items were marked with IO3 Asayco's and agent Sanchez' initials before
turning them over to their Chief Investigator Danilo Natividad (CI Natividad). The marking
was done at the room of Policarpio in the presence of said accused, his mother, the barangay
officials, the media and CI Natividad. He placed his initials "DBA" as his marking on the
seized items. Policarpio signed the confiscation receipts at the place of search in
the presence of his mother, the media and the operating team. The other witnesses also
affixed their signatures on the confiscation receipts. Policarpio was immediately arrested
and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Agent Sanchez corroborated the testimony of IO3 Asayco in its material points and
added that he placed his initials "SDS" on the seized items. He clarified that Jay-R Policarpio
alias Dagul, indicated in the search warrant as the name of the subject thereof, and Ely
Policarpio are one and the same person. He recounted that their team leader, PSI De Vera,
already knew the exact address of Policarpio even before the implementation of the search
warrant. Also, the barangay officials pointed to them the house of Policarpio. He recalled that
Policarpio did not show any form of resistance during the implementation of the search
warrant against him, and gave no reaction when they showed him the items seized. After
marking the confiscated items, he turned over the same to their Chief Investigator, SPO1
Natividad, in the presence of Policarpio and the barangay officials
When Barangay Chairman Tangonan was called to the witness stand, the prosecution
and the defense entered into a stipulation that she was present during the inventory of the
confiscated items and that she signed the confiscation receipt. After which, the trial court
dispensed with her testimony.
The testimony of Forensic Chemist Agcaoili was, likewise, dispensed with after the
parties stipulated that: (1) the nine (9) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance, subject matter in Criminal Case No. 35-5586 for illegal possession of shabu, were
submitted to her for examination on April 12, 2007; (2) the nine (9) plastic sachets with
white crystalline substance tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu; and (3) her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-20-
2007
The defense vehemently denied the charges against him. Policarpio narrated that on
April 12, 2007 at 6 o'clock in the morning, he was awakened by knocks on the door of his
house. When he opened the door, two (2) police officers pointed their guns at him. The police
officers then ordered him, his wife and children to go out of the house. And thereafter, the
police officers asked him if he is Junior Policarpio, to which query he answered in the
negative because his name is Ely Policarpio. They asked him to sign a search warrant and
then they entered his house. The contents of the search warrant were not explained to him.
When the police officers were done searching his house, they showed him something, but he
had no idea what it was and where it came from. After awhile , Barangay Chairman Tangonan
arrived and signed a document. Thereafter, he was brought to the police station and later on,
to the court. He denied having signed a confiscation receipt. He alleged that her mother, Perla
Policarpio, was not a resident of his house at the time the search was conducted.
Thus, Policarpio was indicted for Violation of Section 261 (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, for possession of a .45 caliber pistol
without authority from the Commission on Elections during the election period (COMELEC
Gun Ban). Policarpio was also charged with Violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, for unlawful possession of 21.07 grams of shabu and illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia, which cases were docketed before the RTC.
The Regional Trial Court guilty of all the three charges: possession of illegal drugs,
possession of drug paraphernalia, for violation of the COMELEC gun ban. The Court of
Appeals acquitted Policarpio for his alleged violation of the COMELEC gun ban but held
Policarpio’s guilty possession of illegal drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. The
Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Thus, on Motion for Reconsideration, Policario alleged: 1) that Search Warrant No.
0085 is invalid because it failed to specify the exact address of the place to be searched as
well the items to be seized; 2) that the searching officers failed to comply with the procedure
laid down in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 because: (1) the allegedly seized items
were not photographed immediately after confiscation and seizure, or even thereafter; and
(2) the inventory of the allegedly seized items were not conducted in the presence of a
representative of the media and DOJ officials. He assails the prosecution evidence for its
failure to establish the proper chain of custody of the subject plastic sachets of shabu and
drug paraphernalia. Policarpio concludes that he is entitled to acquittal of the foregoing
charges leveled against him.
ISSUES
1. Whether the search warrant is invalid for failing to specify the exact address of the place
to be searched as well the items to be seized.
2. Whether there was failure to establish the proper chain of custody of the subject plastic
sachets of shabu and drug paraphernalia
RULING
1. NO. The search warrant is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that although the search area
indo merely "Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago City," the deponents in the application for the search
warrant, there was no doubt as to the location of the intended subject of the search and
seizure operation. This is sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place to be searched, which they in fact did. Verily, the deficiency
in the address stated in the search warrant is not of sufficient gravity that would spell the
invalidation thereof.
The Court also found that the phrase "Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as shabu; Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu" as
stated in the Search Warrant No. 0085 has satisfied the Constitution's requirements on
particularity of description of the items to be seized. Said warrant imposes a meaningful
restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant, and thus, it
prevents exploratory searches.
2. YES. There was failure to establish the proper chain of custody in the present case.
Records of the case at bench failed to disclose that photographs of the allegedly seized shabu
and drug paraphernalia were taken after their confiscation in the presence of the above-
mentioned four persons. Neither of the two PDEA agents testified anent such photographing
of the confiscated narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Agent Sanchez testified that they took
photograph and place markings only on the .45 caliber pistol. The prosecution did not submit
any photos as proof that this requirement had been complied with.
Further, the Court observed that the physical inventory of the confiscated narcotics
and drug paraphernalia was not witnessed by a representative from the media and by a DOJ
official.
The Supreme Court also noted that the confiscation receipts did not bear the
signature of the representative from the media, which cast serious doubt as to whether the
latter was indeed present during the inventory. Further, no DOJ official attended the
inventory of the allegedly confiscated shabu and drug paraphernalia. Lastly, there is no clear
showing that Policarpio was given a copy of the nine confiscation receipts.
To the mind of the Court, the credibility and trustworthiness of the April 12, 2007
search and seizure, as well as the incrimination of appellant Policarpio, have not been
adequately protected. Thus, Policarpio was aquitted for both crimes.
Q: AAA was arrested by virtue of a search warrant stating:
“TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
Greetings:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court after examining under oath the witnesses
Fred Manabat and PSI Jaime De Vera that there is a probable cause to believe that AAA
@ Dagul of Purok 4, Malvar, Santiago City committed and that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that the respondent has in possession and control the
following items:
a.) Undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as shabu;
b.) Several drug paraphernalia used in repacking shabu.
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any
time in the day of the house of the respondent stated above and forthwith seize and
take possession of the above-described grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
known as shabu and drug paraphernalia, bring them before me to be dealt with as the
law directs. SO ORDERED. “
On trial, AAA alleged that the search warrant is invalid for failing to specify the exact
items to be seized. Rule on AAA’s contention.
A: AAA’s contention is without merit. The phrase "Undetermined quantity of

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as shabu; Several drug paraphernalia used in
repacking shabu" as stated in the Search Warrant satisfies the Constitution's requirements
on particularity of description of the items to be seized. Said warrant imposes a meaningful
restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant, and thus, it
prevents exploratory searches. (People of the Philippines v. Policarpio "Dagul", G.R. No.
227868, January 20, 2021, as penned by C.J.Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANILO TORO y DIANO @ "OTO",
G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021, Second Division (M.V. Lazaro-Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
To constitute treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the
aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's
death began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from
circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the
killing with treachery or evident premeditation.
Evident premeditation cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance when there

are no facts to show when the assailants decided to commit the offense and the lapse of
sufficient time from such decision until the commission of the offense, necessary for the
assailants to have reflected on their actions.
FACTS
By Information dated May 31, 2005, appellant and Salvador Cahusay @ Adol
(Cahusay) were jointly charged with Murder for the death of Pascualito Espiña. His autopsy
report showed that Espiña, Sr. suffered 33 stab wounds — ten (10) of which were fatal,
located in the left side of his body where his heart was. Meanwhile, three (3) stab wounds in
the right side of his body punctured his lungs. The assailant and the victim were near each
other and the instrument used was a knife. But he could not say if there were more than one
(1) assailant
Prosecution presented then 16-year old Pascualito Espiña, Jr. (Espiña, Jr.), the
victim's son, testified that Cahusay invited his father to a drinking spree around 4 o'clock in
the afternoon until 7 o'clock in the evening in their house. After 7 o'clock, appellant invited
them to move to his own house just 900 meters away to continue their drinking spree.
By midnight, Espiña, Jr. decided to fetch his father at appellant's house. There, he saw
his father at the "suy-ab" (extension of the house) being held by Cahusay by the arms while
appellant was stabbing him. Since a gas torch illuminated thesuy- ab, he clearly saw the
attack on his father and the assailant's identity. Too, he was only two (2) armslength away
from them. Though his father had a knife in a scabbard tucked on his waist, he had no chance
to defend himself.
Out of fear, he ran toward the house of their neighbor Barangay Tanod Dodoy and
sought help, but he was refused. Thus, he asked Dodoy to accompany him to his aunt at
Barangay Trujillo. They got there around 2 o'clock in the morning.
The following day, his aunt sought assistance from the Barangay Council of Calantiao
to retrieve Espiña, Sr.'s lifeless body. Inside appellant's house, they saw his father's lifeless
body seated on the floor.
The defendant, on the other hand, testified that they did drink at his house at around
7 o’clock. After two (2) hours, Espiña, Sr. and Cahusay decided to go home as there was no
more tuba left to drink. After his visitors left, he and his family went to sleep. The following
morning, his wife was shocked when she saw Espiña, Sr.'s lifeless body at the suy-ab. He
noticed that Espiña, Sr. sustained several stab wounds. Afraid, he and his family went to their
house in Barangay Salvacion.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the defendant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it found the defendant guilty beyond
RULING
YES. To sustain a conviction of murder, the prosecution must establish the following
elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the third element is lacking. To constitute
such, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it
began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the
aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and
developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior
to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.
Certainly, the number of wounds inflicted reveals a determined intent to kill. Of the
33 stab wounds inflicted, 10 of which were fatal as they got inflicted near the heart while the
other three (3) ruptured the victim's lungs. But Espiña, Jr. was not able to witness the
commencement of the aggression or initial attack, hence, he was not able to testify thereon.
He did not give an account either on how the attack resulted in the victim's death. As it was,
his eyewitness account was limited to the stabbing incident itself. There was no mention at
all that the attack was sudden and expected, leaving the victim totally unable to defend
himself or even ran away. Treachery, therefore, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing
to murder.
Records, too, do not show evident premeditation. The elements of evident

premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; (3) a lapse
of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
Here, the Court of Appeals erroneously appreciated the presence of evident

premeditation in the killing of Espiña, Sr. The eyewitness account of the incident simply
failed to establish when the assailants decided to commit the offense and the lapse of
sufficient time from such decision until the commission of the offense, necessary for the
assailants to have reflected on their actions. Sans any of the circumstances to qualify Espiña,
Sr.'s death to Murder, appellant may only be convicted of Homicide.
Q: On trial, 16-year old Pascualito Espiña, Jr. (Espiña, Jr.), the victim's (Espiña Sr.) son,
testified that Cahusay invited his father to a drinking spree around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon until 7 o'clock in the evening in their house. After 7 o'clock, appellant
invited them to move to his own house just 900 meters away to continue their
drinking spree. By midnight, Espiña, Jr. decided to fetch his father at appellant's house.
There, he saw his father at the "suy-ab" (extension of the house) being held by Cahusay
by the arms while appellant was stabbing him. Since a gas torch illuminated the suy-
ab, he clearly saw the attack on his father and the assailant's identity. Too, he was only
two (2) armslength away from them. The victim’s autopsy report showed that Espiña,
Sr. suffered 33 stab wounds — ten (10) of which were fatal, located in the left side of
his body where his heart was. Meanwhile, three (3) stab wounds in the right side of
his body punctured his lungs.
Thereafter, Cahusay was charged with murder alleging that he willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
stabbed Espiña Sr. Will the charge prosper?
A: The charge will fail. To sustain a conviction of murder, the prosecution must establish
the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the third element is lacking. To constitute
such, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it
began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the
aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and
developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior
to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery
or evident premeditation.
In the present case, there was no mention at all that the attack was sudden and
expected, leaving the victim totally unable to defend himself or even ran away. Treachery,
therefore, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder.
Further, there were no facts to show when the assailants decided to commit the
offense and the lapse of sufficient time from such decision until the commission of the
offense, necessary for the assailants to have reflected on their actions. Evident premeditation
therefore, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. (People v. Toro y Diano, G.R.
No. 245922, January 25, 2021 as penned by J. M.V. Lazaro-Javier)
EDGARDO T. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
G.R. No. 171054, January 26, 2021, First Division, (Gaerlan, J.)
DOCTRINE
A freeze order cannot be issued for an indefinite period as such would violate one’s right
to due process. The Court fixed the maximum allowable extension on the freeze order's
effectivity at six months.
FACTS
Through a letter dated February 1, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
forwarded to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) a copy of the OMB's complaint for
perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 and R.A. No. 3019 against Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot (Gen. Ligot) and members of his
immediate family. The OMB recommended the conduct of further investigation on Gen. Ligot
for possible violation of R.A. No. 9160 or the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 2001, as
amended. The OMB's recommendation resulted from its finding that Gen. Ligot and his
family had accumulated wealth that is grossly disproportionate to their income.
The OMB found that Gen. Ligot and his spouse, Erlinda Yambao Ligot (Erlinda), have
investments and other properties registered in their names that were not declared in Gen.
Ligot's SALNs. The OMB's records further disclosed that the Ligots' children were able to
acquire substantial assets when, at the time of the acquisition, they could not be reasonably
considered to have the financial capacity to do so.
The OMB likewise found that Edgardo Tecson Yambao, Erlinda's younger brother,
(petitioner) is a mere dummy and/or nominee of the spouses Ligot. He claimed to be a
private employee where he had no substantial salary when he was employed in the private
sector and owner of Mabelline Foods, Inc. However, SEC records reveal that the company
was not generating considerable income to enable petitioner to acquire substantial assets.
In fact, petitioner has no record with the Bureau of Internal Revenue of filing his annual
individual income tax return from 1999 up to the date of the OMB complaint.
These, along with the fact that Mabelline Foods, Inc. uses as its principal address the
residential address of Gen. Ligot and family, buttressed the OMB's conclusion that petitioner
and his wife are mere nominees of Gen. Ligot and all properties registered in petitioner's
name are actually owned by Gen. Ligot and his family.
Taking cue from the OMB's findings, the AMLC conducted its own investigation and
eventually found reasonable grounds to believe that the monetary instruments and
properties in the name of Gen. Ligot and his family, including petitioner, are related to
unlawful activities as defined under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, in relation to
Section 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Finding the existence of probable cause that the monetary instruments and
properties enumerated in the ex-parte application are related to an unlawful activity, the
Court of Appeals, through a Resolution dated July 5, 2005, issued a Freeze Order over the
subject monetary instruments.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Freeze Order Against the Monetary
Instruments and Properties of Edgardo Yambao with Prayer Requests [sic] for Setting of an
Oral Argument but such was denied by the Court of Appeals on September 20, 2005.
On November 18, 2005, this Court promulgated A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC or the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful
Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, which
became effective on December 15, 2005
Asserting the applicability of the aforesaid Rule — specifically its provisions on a

summary or post-issuance hearing within the 20-day period of effectivity of a Freeze Order
and the limitation on an extension thereof to a period of not exceeding six months — to his
case, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Limit Effectivity of Freeze
Order and/or to Declare Expiration of Freeze Order. This was denied by the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled that A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC is inapplicable in petitioner's case because the issues
of extending and lifting the Freeze Order issued against his monetary instruments and
properties were already resolved through the July 4, 2005 and September 20, 2005 CA
Resolutions.
ISSUE
Whether the Freeze Order against petitioner Edgardo T. Yambao's monetary
instruments and properties enumerated in the July 5, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals should be lifted.
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court noted that Gen. Ligot, Erlinda, and their children filed a
separate petition for certiorari before this Court also challenging the subject January 4, 2006
Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 90238. On March 6, 2013, the Second Division of the
Court promulgated a Decision (Ligots' case) granting the Ligots' petition, and, accordingly,
lifting the Freeze Order issued by the CA. Thus, its ruling there was applied in the present
case.
It was indicated in Ligot’s case that “A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim
relief issued by the CA to prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are
suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3 (i)
of RA No. 9160, as amended
xxx The relief is pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing
his property and thwarting the State's effort in building its case and eventually filing civil
forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner xxx
xxx Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 , as amended, from
the point of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the
maximum period of time that the freeze order can be extended by the CA xxx
xxx The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Court's own power
under the Constitution to 'promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights . . . and procedure in all courts.' Pursuant to this power, the Court issued
A.M. No. 05-11-04 SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six months — to
otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which may extend
a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time — carries serious
implications on an individual's substantive right to due process. This right demands that no
person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any governmental action that
amounts to a denial. The right to due process, under these terms, requires a limitation or at
least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the governmental action. xxx “
From the foregoing, the lifting of the subsisting Freeze Order against the monetary
instruments and properties of petitioner is in order, more so in view of the fact that a petition
for forfeiture (Civil Case No. 0197) — where petitioner is named as one of the respondents
— has already been filed by the Republic before the Sandiganbayan sometime in September
2005. Indubitably, the charges against petitioner and the Ligots are anchored on the same
facts and their defenses are necessarily intertwined.
Q: Finding the existence of probable cause that the monetary instruments and
properties enumerated in the ex-parte application are related to an unlawful activity,
the Court of Appeals, through a Resolution dated July 5, 2005, issued a Freeze Order
over the subject monetary instruments of Gen. Ligot and Edgardo Tecson Yambao, the
Ligot’s brother in-law who is alleged to be the Ligot’s dummy.
On November 18, 2005, this Court promulgated A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC limiting the
effectivity of an extended freeze order to six months.
Asserting the applicability of the aforesaid Rule — specifically its provisions on a

summary or post-issuance hearing within the 20-day period of effectivity of a Freeze
Order and the limitation on an extension thereof to a period of not exceeding six
months — to his case, Yambao filed an Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Limit
Effectivity of Freeze Order and/or to Declare Expiration of Freeze Order. This was
denied by the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC is inapplicable
in petitioner's case because the issues of extending and lifting the Freeze Order issued
against his monetary instruments and properties were already resolved through the
July 4, 2005 and September 20, 2005 CA Resolutions.
Rule on the proprietary of the CA’s denial to limit/ declare the expiration of the freeze
order.
A: The CA erred in denying Yambao’s Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Limit
Effectivity of Freeze Order and/or to Declare Expiration of Freeze Order.
The relief is pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his
property and thwarting the State's effort in building its case and eventually filing civil
forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner. The Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04
SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six months should be applied in
Yambao’s case.
To otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which
may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time — carries
serious implications on an individual's substantive right to due process. This right demands
that no person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any governmental action
that amounts to a denial. The right to due process, under these terms, requires a limitation
or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the governmental
action. (Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 171054, January 26, 2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYMAR MASILANG y LACISTE
G.R. No. 246466, January 26, 2021, First Division, (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
An accused is convicted, not on the basis of the number of witnesses against him, but on
the credibility of the testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt
of the accused beyond a shadow of a doubt; in other words, not quantitatively but qualitatively.
Further, must be stressed that executing an affidavit of desistance is not one of the
modes of extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the RPC. Private complainants are
not allowed to compromise or to waive the criminal aspect of a case, which affects public
interest.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Masilang was charged with the murder of Rose Clarita A. Yuzon
(Rose Yuzon) a minor of 17 years old. While the victim was inside the cemetery with the
accused and while being blind-folded, and her back was turned against the accused, unarmed
and completely unaware that she will be the subject of an attack by the accused, thereby,
placing said victim in no position to defend herself from the sudden and unexpected attack,
suddenly was attacked by the accused with the use of the said bolo by hacking the victim
several times, hitting the latter on different parts of her body and banging her head in the
steel gate, thereby inflicting upon her person mortal wounds which directly caused her
death, to the damage and prejudice of the family of said victim.
This was witnessed by Edgardo Gamboa. He and his two companions, Ivan Perez and
John Mark Torres. They went to the cemetery to watch ("namboboso") couples engaging in
sexual intercourse by peeping through tombs and mausoleums. Gamboa saw the couple go
inside a concrete structure housing a tomb, and accused-appellant closed its iron door
slightly. Gamboa and Torres moved closer to the back portion of the tented tomb. Gamboa
heard accused-appellant telling the girl that he had a surprise for her. Torres made a hand
signal which meant that accused-appellant and the girl were about to engage in sex. Gamboa
peeped through a hole in the "tent." He saw accused-appellant hacking the girl with a small
bolo. The girl's hands were on both sides of her face, while her eyes were covered with a red
handkerchief. He heard the girl cry for help. Shocked at what he just saw, Gamboa had to lean
against a concrete wall. When he looked again, he saw accused-appellant holding the girl's
head and banging it against the front portion of the tomb. Gamboa and his companion ran
away.
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, gave a different version and put up the
defense of denial and alibi. He testified that he gave Rose a hamburger and told her of his
plan to visit his grandfather's tomb, but she refused to let him leave because she was afraid
of a suspicious man who seemed to be following her when she entered the cemetery. When
the revealing of the surprise took longer than expected, Rose exclaimed "lintik," which
irritated appellant. He walked away to look for his grandfather's tomb. Less than five minutes
later, he heard Rose shouting and crying for help. When appellant went to see Rose, he saw
another man, later identified as Marcelo Perez, told him not to move or run away from where
he was standing. Marcelo Perez, while holding a piece of wood, brought appellant to the
location of Rose who was slumped on the floor. Thereafter, the policemen arrested appellant
and seized his handbag with his bolo inside and brought him to the police station
The Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder qualified by treachery. The RTC did not award damages to the heirs of the victim
because of the separate affidavits of desistance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the RTC with modification as it awarded civil, moral and exemplary damages to the heirs
of the victim.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision that
accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
RULING
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond
Accused-appellant asserts that his identification as the culprit is doubtful as it was

established only through the lone testimony of prosecution witness Edgardo Gamboa, with
no other corroborating evidence. The Supreme Court, however, found this untenable. An
accused is convicted, not on the basis of the number of witnesses against him, but on the
credibility of the testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt
of the accused beyond a shadow of a doubt; in other words, not quantitatively but
qualitatively. Although prosecution eyewitness Edgardo Gamboa did not know accused-
appellant before the incident, Gamboa was able to identify the accused-appellant because of
the length of time he watched the accused-appellant and the victim in broad daylight and his
proximity to them.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the killing occurred in broad daylight and Edgardo
Gamboa was only four (4) meters away from accused-appellant and the victim when he was
peeping through a small hole at the back of the mausoleum. Before the incident, Gamboa also
watched accused-appellant and the victim conversing for 30 minutes. Thus, Gamboa was
able to recognize the face of accused-appellant.
The Supreme Court also upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals when it held that
Edgardo's failure to state Reymar's name when he executed his Malaya at Kusang Loob na
Salaysay does not diminish his credibility as a witness. It only shows that at the time of the
execution of the sworn statement, Reymar's name was not yet known to Edgardo. However,
during Edgardo's direct testimony, he positively and categorically identified Reymar as the
person who killed Rose Clarita. Indeed, although Gamboa failed to stated accused-appellant's
name in his affidavit; nevertheless, he knew him by face and positively identified appellant
in court as the one who was with Rose Yuzon in the cemetery and the one who hacked her.
The contention of the accused-appellant claims that Gamboa's testimony is not
credible was held as unmeritorious by the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized the rule
that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The trial court gave credence
to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Edgardo Gamboa who positively identified the
accused-appellant as the one who killed Rose Yuzon.
It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the
trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth.
The accused-appellant’s argument that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was

not proven by the prosecution did not persuade the court. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person being attacked. Here, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC
which said “… instead of giving the girl a gift, he hacked her with a bolo and then banged her
head against a concrete tomb. Clearly, the victim did not even know what hit her. There was
no way the girl could have defended herself from the sudden and unexpected attack on her
person. She did not even have the chance to run away because she was blindfolded.”
Lastly, the Court found accused-appellant contention that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt unmeritorious because the prosecution established
the essential elements of murder: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed
him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution proved the first element that Rose Yuzon was killed by
submitting in evidence her death certificate, and presenting eyewitness Edgardo Gamboa
who testified that he saw the killing of Rose Yuzon. The accused-appellant admitted the death
of the victim during pre- trial. The prosecution also proved the second and third elements
that the accused-appellant killed Rose Yuzon and that the killing was attended by treachery
through the testimony of eyewitness Edgardo Gamboa, which was given credence by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court. The fourth element of murder
was proved by the prosecution through the stipulation of the prosecution and the defense at
the pre-trial that accused-appellant and the victim were sweethearts, which was also
admitted by appellant during his testimony; hence, their relationship would show that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. In fine, the prosecution established all the essential
elements of murder to warrant the conviction of appellant.
Accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi is weak and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the prosecution eyewitness that accused-appellant killed the victim.
Moreover, the Court held that the non-flight of accused-appellant is not proof of his
innocence.
As regards the award of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly rectified the trial
court's failure to award damages to the heirs of the victim because of the separate affidavits
of desistance. It must be stressed that executing an affidavit of desistance is not one of the
modes of extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the RPC. Private complainants
are not allowed to compromise or to waive the criminal aspect of a case, which affects public
interest.
Q: AAA a minor of 17 years old was killed by her lover at a cemetery. Her lover was on
trial for murder. During the trial, an affidavit of desistance was executed by the
victim's parents, BBB and CCC. The affidavits stated that they were desisting from
continuing with the case against accused- appellant upon knowing the whole story
about the death of their daughter and the filing of the case against appellant was due
to a misunderstanding of what truly happened. With this, the Reginal Trial Court did
not award damages to the heirs of AAA. Was the trial court correct?
A: NO. It must be stressed that executing an affidavit of desistance is not one of the modes
of extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the RPC. BBB and CCC are not allowed
to compromise or to waive the criminal aspect of a case, which affects public interest.
(People v. Masilang y Laciste, G.R. No. 246466, January 26, 2021, First Division, as penned by
C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. EFREN T. TABIEROS and JOHN DAVID INFANTE
G.R. No. 234191, February 1, 2021, Third Division, (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
Trafficking is qualified when the trafficked person is a child.
FACTS
On November 21, 2012, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp
Crame, Quezon City received a human trafficking report from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development. PSI Cruz and several personnel from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development and the Department of Justice departed for Ilocos Sur to entrap
the bar's owner and rescue AAA.
At around 8:30 p.m. on even date, the team arrived at the bar. PSI Cruz and two CIDG
Ilocos personnel occupied a room where they ordered beer and asked for services of "bar
girls," while the rest of the team remained outside. Three women attended to their table, one
of whom was AAA. Confirming that the women provide sexual services, AAA also informed
PSI Cruz that he should "ask permission from the owner, Efren Tabieros and if he approves,
she will go." Tabieros agreed and instructed PSI Cruz to pay Infante. PSI Cruz handed Infante
three P500.00 bills, two of which were marked. As soon as the transaction occurred, PSI Cruz
placed a missed call to the raiding team, who rushed to the scene. Tabieros and Infante were
arrested.
Tabieros and Infante were charged with committing acts of qualified trafficking in
persons in relation to Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003. Such prohibits any person “[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography[.]" Trafficking is qualified when "the trafficked person is a
child[.]"
AAA narrated that Baby Velasco (Velasco), a neighbor who is also Tabieros' relative,
convinced her to work as a kasambahay in Ilocos. However, AAA was instead forced
to work as a prostitute in a videoke bar run by Tabieros and Infante. She once attempted to
escape, but Tabieros' wife hit her. She also rarely earned money since her debts accumulated
from buying personal needs from Tabieros' wife.
The defense claimed that AAA hid her minority and real name, and applied to work
as a waitress in ___ Bar. They testified that since she was of age and tested negative from any
communicable disease, she was hired in a legitimate business. They contended that they only
found out AAA's real name and age when the entrapment transpired.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Tabieros and Infante of qualified trafficking in
persons under Section 4 (e) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Infante's conviction. It found that all the elements of trafficking in persons were
established.
Arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant points out the lack of evidence that he conspired with Tabieros. He claims
that PSI Cruz's testimony about giving accused-appellant money does not establish
conspiracy. He adds that he had no hand in AAA's hiring either
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant John David Infante is guilty of qualified trafficking
in relation to Section 4 (e) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.
RULING
YES. Here, the offense was committed on November 22, 2012, prior to the
amendment. Thus, the original provisions of Republic Act No. 9208 apply.
The Information charged accused-appellant with violation of qualified trafficking, in

relation to Section 4 (e) of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. Section 4 (e) prohibits any
person "[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]"
Trafficking is qualified when "the trafficked person is a child[.]" AAA's birth certificate
establish that she was only 16 years old when she was victimized. This is undisputed.
The Supreme Court emphasized that AAA, clearly recounted how accused-appellant
and Tabieros used her for illicit transactions. AAA clearly recalled her suffering and
positively identified accused-appellant as the bar's cashier who would instruct her to go with
the supposed clients. Thus, AAA’s contention overcomes the accused-appellant’s contention
that PSI Cruz's failed to establish his participation in the trafficking of minors.
Further, the Supreme Court scrutinized the witness presented by defense, Manolo
Tobias, the Rural Health Center employee who issued AAA's medical certificate, to prove that
she hid her minority. The Supreme Court voiced its suspicion on why a business claiming to
be legitimate would require a medical examination to prove that an applicant is not a carrier
of communicable disease. As the Court of Appeals put it, “Common sense dictates that
waitresses, who only serve foods and drinks, need not prove that she is free from any
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Unless, she also serves her customers' sexual pleasure
and satisfaction.”
The Supreme Court also ruled that Tabieros and accused-appellant were conspiring
in exploiting AAA's person. The victim was hired by Tabieros in his bar, not only as a
waitress, but also as a prostitute; PSI Cruz asked Tabieros and accused-appellant Infante if
he could avail of the sexual service of the victim and the latter replied in the affirmative; and
accused-appellant, who works in the bar as cashier, received Php1,500.00 payment from the
CIDG personnel for the sexual services of [AAA]. The foregoing established facts, albeit
circumstantial, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inevitable conclusion that
Tabieros and Infante conspired to use the minor victim for sexual favors in exchange for
money
Q: AAA, a minor, narrated that Baby Velasco convinced her to work as a kasambahay
in Ilocos. However, AAA was instead forced to work as a prostitute in a videoke bar
run by Tabieros and Infante. Upon arrest, the information stated: “… for the purpose
of exploitation, such as prostitution, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly hire, maintain and manage said victim to engage in prostitution through
sexual services or lascivious conduct, in consideration of the payments and benefits
given to her by customers, to her damage and prejudice.” What crime did Tabieros and
Infante commit?
A: Tabieros and Infante committed acts of qualified trafficking in persons in relation to

Section 4 (e) of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. Such
prohibits any person “to maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography.”
Trafficking is qualified when "the trafficked person is a child. (People v. Infante, G.R. No.
234191, February 1, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HELEN LAPENA
DOCTRINE
Trafficking is qualified when the trafficked person is a child.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Shirley Navarro (Navarro), Janelyn Dela Cruz (Dela
Cruz), and Lapena, charging them with violating Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Only Lapena was
arraigned, as Navarro and Dela Cruz remained at large throughout the trial court
proceedings.
The prosecution presented the minor victims as witnesses. All three testified
regarding their respective birth dates, which made them all minors at the time they worked
at the bar. All three also encountered Mommy Jojie who was one of the floor managers with
Lapena.
CCC was taken to the VIP room at least three (3) times, where customers would touch
her private parts, and she would perform fellatio on them, in exchange for payment. CCC
worked at the bar for less than a month.
FFF testified that customers would choose a guest relations officer to sit beside them,
then kiss her, and touch her private part and that a certain "Mommy Isabel," paying
P3,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with FFF, but FFF refused and told Mommy
Isabel to find another girl for the job.
DDD testified that she was recruited by a friend to work at the bar. Mommy Jojie was
managing the bar when DDD first visited, and told her that her job was to: (1) entertain
customers; (2) accompany them as they drank; (3) kiss them; and (4) allow herself to be
touched intimately. DDD accompanied customers to the VIP room more than 10 times. The
floor managers knew that she had sexual intercourse with customers, and would get angry
when she refused. She saw Mommy Jojie and Mommy Shirley in the bar every day, but rarely
saw Lapena there.
The three witnesses, including Lapena herself, all testified that Lapena only sells
barbecue outside in the vicinity of the bar and that she does not work there.
The Regional Trial Court found Lapena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Upon appeal, Lapena insisted that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. She maintained there was no evidence showing that she recruited or harbored the
minor victims for prostitution, and that the records show that the minor victims were all
hired by a certain "Mommy Jojie," and not Lapena. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed
the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court and found Lapena guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged
ISSUE
Whether or not Lapena is guilty of qualified trafficking
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court quoted: “The first element of trafficking in persons was
present. As one of the Floor Managers of ___, appellant Lapena harbored, received, and
maintained the minors-complainants in ___, for the purpose of prostitution and sexual
exploitation.
The appellant Lapena, together with the two other accused who were at large, were
the Floor Managers of ___. The testimonies of [CCC], [FFF], and [DDD] proved that appellant
Lapena was the Floor Manager of ___(where [CCC], [FFF], and [DDD] worked as GROs), and
that appellant Lapena offered the services of minors-complainants to the male customers,
thus: appellant Lapena spoke to the male customers and introduced the minors-
complainants to the men, and encouraged the minors-complainants to entertain the male
customers by drinking with them, and performing physical and sexual acts (i.e.: kissing;
fondling of breasts and sex organs; masturbation; fellatio; sexual intercourse).
The second element of trafficking in persons was present. Appellant Lapena achieved
the consent of the minors-complainants [CCC], [FFF], and [DDD] to work as GROs at __, by
taking advantage of the vulnerability and minority of the complainants.
The third element of trafficking in persons was present. The purpose of recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring, and trafficking, was exploitation and prostitution, as
already discussed in the two preceding paragraphs.”
The Supreme Court also noted that Accused-appellant was positively identified as one
of the floor managers of the bar, and would speak to male customers and instruct the
witnesses to perform sexual acts with the customers, in exchange for payment. The
baptismal certificate and birth certificates offered in evidence proved that the victims were
minors at the time of the commission of the crime.
Q: CCC, FFF, and DDD, all minors, worked in ABC Bar. Their private parts were touched
in exchange for payment. FFF and DDD were offered to have sexual intercourse with
the customers but only DDD did it.
DDD testified that she was recruited by a friend to work at the bar. Mommy Jojie was
managing the bar when DDD first visited, and told her that her job was to: (1) entertain
customers; (2) accompany them as they drank; (3) kiss them; and (4) allow herself to
be touched intimately. DDD accompanied customers to the VIP room more than 10
times. The floor manager Lapena knew that she had sexual intercourse with
customers, and would get angry when she refused. What crime is committed by
Lapena?
A: Lapena is guilty of qualified trafficking. The first element is present. As Floor Manager
Lapena harbored, received, and maintained the minors for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation.
The second element of trafficking in persons was present. Lapena achieved the
consent of the minors CCC, FFF, and DDD to work as GROs, by taking advantage of the
vulnerability and minority of the complainants.
The third element of trafficking in persons was present. The purpose of recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring, and trafficking, was exploitation and prostitution, as
already discussed in the two preceding paragraphs.
Lastly, trafficking is qualified when the trafficked person is a child. (People v. Lapena,
G.R. No. 238213, February 1, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MCMERVON DELICA AGAN
a.k.a. "Butchoy" and "Sadisto"
G.R. No. 243984, February 1, 2021, Third Division, (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
FACTS
Agan with aliases "Butchoy" and "Sadisto" was charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
prosecution in the present case presented 5 witnesses.
Reyes testified that Agan was tinkering with the door lock ("parang may sinusundot"
and "may kinukutkot siya sa lock ng tindahan"). Since he knew Agan as a relative of the store
owner, he did not interfere and continued walking towards the mahjong session. Shortly
after arriving at the mahjong session, he learned that a nearby store had been robbed and
the persons inside had been stabbed and killed. Reyes immediately suspected Agan as the
person responsible for the crime.
Manibale testified that she saw her neighbor, Agan, dressed in a black t-shirt and
shorts, running from a nearby store and heading towards them. Agan ran inside his house
and slammed the door shut. A few moments later, Agan came out with a white shirt over his
shoulder then walked away. Thereafter, some of their neighbors began shouting for help.
Manibale attested that according to the neighbors, Maricar and her grandmother, Erlinda
Verano Ocampo (Erlinda), had been stabbed inside their store and needed to be brought to
the hospital. Then they saw a bloody knife outside Agan's house, situated just a few houses
away from the store.
Mendoza testified that he heard shouts coming from inside a nearby store. They
walked to the store and saw two women come out, embracing one another. When one of
them fell down, he noticed that they were bleeding. Mendoza asked them what happened.
One of the women told him that the door was open and the culprit was still inside. At that
moment, a male individual dressed in a black sando, whom he later identified as Agan, came
out from the store and then ran away.
Maricar and Erlinda were brought to the hospital, but they did not survive the attack.
After the eyewitnesses at the scene identified Agan as the perpetrator of the crime, Mandreza
went to the police and reported the incident.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Agan of the offense charged and this was affirmed
with modification by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in finding Agan guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide based on circumstantial evidence.
RULING
NO. The CA correctly found Agan guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide
A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. The killing, however, may
occur before, during, or after the robbery.
In the present case, there were no eyewitnesses to the actual taking of Mandreza's
personal property consisting of P20,000.00 in cash. However, the prosecution was able to
establish Agan's guilt through circumstantial evidence.
Under certain circumstances, the Rules of Court recognizes that circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
In this case, we agree with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the circumstantial
evidence proven by the prosecution sufficiently established that Agan committed the offense
charged. The prosecution demonstrated that: (1) Agan was the houseboy or "bantay" of
Maricar at the store; (2) Maricar and Erlinda were at the store on the evening of November
24, 2008; (3) Agan was the last person seen at the store immediately prior to the incident;
(4) Agan was seen picking the door lock ("parang may sinusundot" and "may kinukutkot siya
sa lock ng tindahan"); (5) the victims, who were stabbed, were seen struggling to get out of
the store and moments later, Agan was seen departing from the same store; (6) Agan ran
away from the store; (7) upon being confronted by Manibale, Agan was evasive and exhibited
odd behavior; (8) Agan hurriedly went inside his house; and (9) Agan came out of the house
again with a shirt hanging from his shoulder.
Further, the substantial amount of cash hidden inside the store served as a motive for
Agan to commit robbery and in the process, killed two innocent and unarmed victims.
Truly, all the elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide were
present: First, Mandreza testified that after learning about the incident, he immediately went
and inspected the store and found that the cash in the amount of P20,000.00 was found to
be missing from the cash register. Agan took the cash and on the occasion of the robbery,
used violence by stabbing Maricar and Erlinda. Second, the said cash, which was reserved to
be used for purchases for the store, belonged to Mandreza. Third, Agan's acts of tinkering the
store's door and picking the lock, ransacking the place to look for the cash hidden inside,
running away from the scene and changing his clothes immediately thereafter showed his
intent to gain. The substantial amount of money impelled Agan to take another's property
without the latter's consent. Last, Maricar and Erlinda, who were stabbed by reason of the
robbery, met their untimely demise. Thus, Agan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It is
clear that Agan's defense of denial is a weak and self-serving defense which cannot be
accorded greater weight given the relative importance of the combination of all
circumstances presented and proven during the trial. Certainly, Agan should be held liable
for his awful and grievous acts.
Q: Agan was charged of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The prosecution was able to establish that 1) Agan was the
houseboy or "bantay" of Maricar at the store; (2) Maricar and Erlinda were at the store
on the evening of November 24, 2008; (3) Agan was the last person seen at the store
immediately prior to the incident; (4) Agan was seen picking the door lock ("parang
may sinusundot" and "may kinukutkot siya sa lock ng tindahan"); (5) the victims, who
were stabbed, were seen struggling to get out of the store and moments later, Agan
was seen departing from the same store; (6) Agan ran away from the store; (7) upon
being confronted by Manibale, Agan was evasive and exhibited odd behavior; (8) Agan
hurriedly went inside his house; and (9) Agan came out of the house again with a shirt
hanging from his shoulder.
Agan, however, said that all the established facts are mere circumstantial evidence
and thus, he cannot be convicted for such. Rule on Agan’s contention.
A: Agan’s contention must fail. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld,
provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. Thus, in the present case, Agan can be convicted for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). (People v. Agan, G.R. No.
243984, February 1, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
VENER D. COLLAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)
G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021, Third Division, (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE:
Callao is a public officer (Chairman of Barangay) who demanded from Espiritu a
commission equivalent to 30% of the contract price amounting to P40,000.00 in connection
with the delivery of supplies and equipment for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Thus, he is guilty
for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019.
FACTS:
Collao was the Chairman of Barangay 780, Zone 85, District V of the City of Manila
(Barangay 780), for three (3) terms, more particularly during the time material to this case.
3 During Collao's term, he transacted with Franco G.C. Espiritu (Espiritu), a businessman,
doing business under the name and style of FRCGE Trading (FRCGE), which is a business
entity engaged by several barangays to contract their projects. Sometime in March 2012,
Espiritu entered into a contract with Barangay 780 for the delivery of supplies for the
construction of a basketball court, as well as the supply of school and sports equipment for
the Sangguniang Kabataan in the amount of P134,200.00. Unexpectedly, Collao demanded
from Espiritu a commission equivalent to 30% of the contract price amounting to P40,000.00
which the latter acceded.
Thus, Collao was indicted in an Information dated January 16, 2014 for violation of
Section 3 (b) of RA 3019.
The defense, on their part, presented Collao as its lone witness. Collao maintained
that he did not demand and receive from Espiritu any commission in connection with the
contract. When confronted with the acknowledgment receipt, he claimed that the same was
not in his handwriting and that his purported signature was forged.
The RTC convicted Collado for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019. The
Sandiganbayan found Collao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, affirmed in toto the assailed Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Collao of the crime of violation
of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019.
RULING:
YES. The elements of violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 are as follows: (1) the
offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a
percentage, or benefit; (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection
with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an
official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
At the time material to the case, Collao was the barangay Chairman of Barangay 780.
As barangay Chairman, his signature in the presented Purchase Order No. 01-12, was
necessary to effect payment to the contractor, FRCGE, for the delivery of construction
materials for a basketball court, school supplies and other sports equipment for the
Sangguniang Kabataan. This being the case, the right of Collao to intervene in his official
capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements 1, 4, and 5 of the imputed offense are present.
Anent elements 2 and 3, suffice it to say that the prosecution was able to establish
that Collao requested for a share or commission in the said barangay project for his behalf.
The Court emphasized the ruling of the Regional Trial Court viz: “As the court
observed, the driver's license number consisted of a total of nine (9) digits. Surely, an
ordinary [impostor] would not have known, much less memorized such a number, would he?
More succinctly put, he would not have access to Collao's driver's license… his impostor had
somehow again managed to "forge" Collao's driver's license, meant he has access of it.
Notably, Collao never mentioned that his driver's license was, at any time, lost.”
Q: Collao was the Chairman of Barangay 780, Zone 85, District V of the City of Manila
(Barangay 780), for three (3) terms, more particularly during the time material to this
case. 3 During Collao's term, he transacted with Franco G.C. Espiritu (Espiritu), a
businessman, doing business under the name and style of FRCGE Trading (FRCGE),
which is a business entity engaged by several barangays to contract their projects.
Sometime in March 2012, Espiritu entered into a contract with Barangay 780 for the
delivery of supplies for the construction of a basketball court, as well as the supply of
school and sports equipment for the Sangguniang Kabataan in the amount of
P134,200.00. Unexpectedly, Collao demanded from Espiritu a commission equivalent
to 30% of the contract price amounting to P40,000.00 which the latter acceded. What
crime did Collao commit?
A: Callao committed crime of violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019. The elements of violation
of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 are as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) who
requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or benefit; (3) on behalf of the
offender or any other person; (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right
to intervene.
Callao is a public officer (Chairman of Barangay) who demanded from Espiritu a

commission equivalent to 30% of the contract price amounting to P40,000.00 in connection
with the delivery of supplies and equipment for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Thus, he is guilty
for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019. (Vener Collao v. People And The Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 242539, February 1, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
LORETO TABINGO y BALLOCANAG, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 241610, February 1, 2021, First Division, (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
The law provides that a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be
witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that
it is only upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality; otherwise, the search becomes unreasonable,
thus rendering the seized items inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
Here, although the petitioner was in his house, he did not witness the actual search
because he was ordered to stay at the main door while the search in his bedroom was on-going.
It is as if the search was conducted without his presence.
FACTS
Police officers implemented Search Warrant No. 2013-115 against the petitioner
Loreto Tabingo (Tabingo) at his residence. When Tabingo opened the door for them and was
going to enter, he was ordered to stay at the main door of his house.
During the search, conducted with 2 barangay kagawads, the police officers found
Rose Cabanilla (Cabanilla) hiding under the bed in one of the rooms in the house of
Tabingo. The police officers ordered her to step out of the room and stay at the main door of
the house where petitioner Tabingo was.
The search yielded a glass tooter, a glass pipe, an improvised burner, and six (6)
opened transparent plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residue. After qualitative
examination, PC/Insp. Roderos issued Chemistry Report No. D-241-2013L, finding the
specimens positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals found Tabingo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged.
Tabingo contends that, among other things, the police officers failed to comply with
the mandatory provisions of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court in their implementation
of the Search Warrant 2013-115
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it found Tabingo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses charged.
RULING
YES. The law provides that a a search under the strength of a warrant is required to
be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be
stressed that it is only upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2)
persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality; otherwise, the search
becomes unreasonable, thus rendering the seized items inadmissible under the exclusionary
rule.
Here, although the petitioner was in his house, he did not witness the actual search
because he was ordered to stay at the main door while the search in his bedroom was on-
going. It is as if the search was conducted without his presence.
The contention of the CA that the petitioner, while at the main door, had an
unobstructed view of the entire interior of the bungalow house when the police officers were
searching the house. Evidently, the bedroom of the petitioner had walls and a door. Records
show that the police officers even requested him to open the bedroom's door for them. them.
Thus, Tabingo was effectively precluded from witnessing the search conducted by the police
officers in his bedroom where the illegal drugs and paraphernalia were allegedly found.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of
custody of the seized shabu residue and paraphernalia from the time they were recovered
from the petitioner up to the time they were presented in court.
In the present case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thus, putting into question the integrity
and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs and paraphernalia allegedly seized from the
petitioner. The required witnesses were not present at the time of apprehension. The
physical inventory of the allegedly seized items was done only in the presence of the two (2)
Barangay Kagawads. Furthermore, the physical inventory of the seized articles was not
witnessed by the petitioner or his representative or counsel, by a representative from the
media, and a representative from the DOJ. Hence, the mandate of Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165
was not complied.
Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must
be proven as a fact in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. A stricter adherence to Section
21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. Thus, Tabingo was acquitted.
Q: During the implementation of a search warrant, the home owner, Tabingo, was
ordered to stay at the main door of his house. The search yielded a glass tooter, a glass
pipe, an improvised burner, and six (6) opened transparent plastic sachets containing
suspected shabu residue. After qualitative examination, PC/Insp. Roderos issued
Chemistry Report No. D-241-2013L, finding the specimens positive for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, thus he was arrested.
On trial, Tabingo alleged that the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory
provisions on the implementation of the Search Warrant because was made to stay
outside the main door.
The defense, however, alleged that while at the main door, Tabango still had an
unobstructed view of the entire interior of the bungalow house when the police
officers were searching the house. If you were the judge, decide.
A: Tabango’s contention is correct. Here, although the petitioner was in his house, he did
not witness the actual search because he was ordered to stay at the main door while the
search in his bedroom was on-going. It is as if the search was conducted without his
presence. Evidently, the bedroom of the petitioner had walls and a door. Thus, Tabingo was
effectively precluded from witnessing the search conducted by the police officers in his
bedroom where the illegal drugs and paraphernalia were allegedly found. (Loreto Tabingo y
Ballocanag v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241610, February 1, 2021, as penned by C.J.
Peralta)
RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and
EDGAR C. GAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021, En Banc, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is evident that there were irregularities in the procurement of the subject vehicles, in
violation of the applicable procurement laws. However, it must be noted that a violation of the
procurement laws does not ipso facto lead to a violation of R.A. 3019.
The demand for accountability should not be at the expense of well- meaning public
officials who may have erred in the performance of their duties but have done so without a
criminal mind. While the Constitution exacts a higher standard of accountability with respect
to public officers, as indeed public office is a public trust, the constitutional right of presumption
of innocence in criminal prosecutions is likewise enjoyed by public officers who stand accused.
Therefore, in order to justify conviction, their guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
with any other person who stands accused.
FACTS
The instant case revolves around the procurement of five motor vehicles for the use
of the Governor and Vice Governor of Davao del Sur (the Province). Through Purchase
Requests, all signed by Bautista as then Governor of the Province, the Office of the Governor
requested the acquisition of five specific vehicle brands and makes for the purpose of
providing service vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice Governor, i.e., two units of
Toyota Hilux 4x4 SR5 (Toyota Hilux), one unit of Mitsubishi L300 Exceed DX2500 Diesel
(Mitsubishi L300 Exceed), and two units of Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 (Ford Ranger) (collectively,
the subject vehicles).
The procurement of the subject vehicles was not subjected to competitive public
bidding as it was effected through direct purchase.
Subsequently, a letter dated September 2, 2003 was filed by the Concerned Citizens
for Good Governance (CCGG) before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao
(Ombudsman). The CCGG alleged that petitioners procured five motor vehicles for the use of
the Governor and Vice Governor of the Province in a manner violative of procurement laws.
The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan four Informations charging

petitioners with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. After trial on the merits, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan found that the
procurement of the subject vehicles violated procurement laws and that all the elements of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 were present when the procurement of the subject vehicles was
undertaken by petitioners.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
In order to convict the accused for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions
The first element is established in this case. As for the second element, the Surpeme
Court noted that there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad
faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.
To discuss the presence of the second element, the Supreme Court discussed the two
relevant laws.
As to the first subject procurement, i.e., the procurement of two units of Toyota Hilux
4x4 SR5, the Purchase Request was signed and issued by petitioner Bautista, Jr. on January
24, 2003, or two days prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9184. Hence, the procurement law
applicable to the first subject procurement is primarily the LGC. The second law, which is the
prevailing law on government procurement is R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act. This law was signed by the President on January 10, 2003. Upon the effectivity
of R.A. 9184 on January 26, 2003, Title VI, Book II of the LGC was expanded. Hence, with
respect to the three subsequent procurements which involve Purchase Requests that were
signed and issued beyond January 26, 2013, R.A. 9184 should be considered together with
the pertinent provisions of the LGC.
Both laws provide that procurement shall be done through Competitive Bidding.
However, the general rule of competitive public bidding under both the LGC and R.A. 9184
admits of exceptions.
Petitioners justify the eschewing of competitive bidding in procuring the subject

vehicles on the reasoning that these were goods of foreign origin that may only be procured
directly from the exclusive Philippine distributors or agents. It was established, however,
that the procurement of the subject vehicles was for the general need pf the Governor and
Vice Governor. Hence, the resort to direct contracting would have been legally permissible
only if there were no other vehicles that may have served the general need of the Governor
and Vice Governor for pick-up trucks aside from the specific vehicle brands and makes
purchased.
In asserting that there are no other suitable vehicles that satisfy the abovementioned
purpose, petitioners primarily relied on certifications issued by the three suppliers of the
subject vehicles, i.e., Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford Davao.
However, at most, these certifications merely state that the aforesaid car dealers are
the exclusive dealers of Toyota Hilux, Mitsubishi L300 Exceed, and Ford Davao. These
certifications do not purport to show whatsoever that there are no other suitable and more
affordable vehicle brands and makes that may serve as viable service vehicles of the
Governor and Vice Governor.
It must be noted that when the LGU undertakes the process of requisition of supplies
or properties, which the procurement law defines as the formal requesting of supplies or
property made through a written request or order, only the technical description of the
supplies or properties shall be indicated. The particular brand names of the goods cannot be
specified in the requisition. Here, in the requisition of the subject vehicles, the specific brands
and makes of the subject vehicles were indicated; but the technical descriptions of these
vehicles, such as the engine displacement, braking system, and other exact specifications,
were not identified in the Purchase Requests. In essence, the procurement laws were
violated.
Violation of procurement laws does not ipso facto give rise to violation of R.A. 3019.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there were irregularities in the
procurement of the subject vehicles, in violation of the applicable procurement laws. Be that
as it may, it should be emphasized that petitioners were charged and convicted for violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
It must be noted that criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly
scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be
proper. For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had
been rigged, this pronouncement alone does not automatically result in finding the act of
petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the
documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not
only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not
presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or
manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and
repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his
knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a well- grounded
and reasonable belief that petitioner perpetrated these acts in the criminal manner he is
accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause
While these two cases involve the existence of probable cause for violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the pronouncements therein are still applicable in this case. Accordingly,
it is through the lens of the anti-graft and corruption law, and not the procurement laws, that
the guilt of the accused for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 must be determined. The
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) the violation of procurement
laws caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident bad
faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. This the prosecution failed to do.
Specifically, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence
in relation to the subject procurements.
The prosecution failed to establish evident bad faith.

Because evident bad faith entails manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to do wrong or to cause damage, it must be shown that the accused was "spurred by any
corrupt motive." Mistakes, no matter how patently clear, committed by a public officer are
not actionable "absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith."
Applying the foregoing, while petitioners may have violated the pertinent laws and
rules on procurement, there is reasonable doubt that they consciously and intentionally did
so in order to commit fraud, to purposely commit a crime, or to gain profit for themselves so
as to amount to fraud.
The testimony of the prosecution's witness was able to demonstrate that violations
of procurement law were committed by the petitioners. However, that was all that the
evidence proved. There was no evidence presented whatsoever showing that petitioners
were animated by fraudulent motives. On the contrary, the evidence shows that petitioners
honestly believed that their resort to direct purchase was proper.
It cannot be said that petitioners were spurred by any ill or corrupt motive in
resorting to direct purchase of the subject vehicles. After studying the previous procurement
experiences of the Provincial Government, which were all not questioned by the COA despite
having been done through direct purchase, petitioners deemed direct purchase to be a viable
and allowed mode of procurement for the subject vehicles in this case.
The prosecution failed to establish manifest partiality. Likewise, there is no sufficient

evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners acted with manifest partiality
in relation to the subject procurements.
There is manifest partiality "when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or

predilection to favor one side or person rather than another." It should be remembered that
manifest partiality, similar to evident bad faith, is in the nature of dolo. Hence, it must be
proven that the accused had malicious and deliberate intent to bestow unwarranted
partiality upon Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford Davao. As already explained, the testimony
of the prosecution's witness did not establish in any manner any deceitful intent and
motivation behind the procuring of the subject vehicles from the three car dealers.
While there appears to be a degree of preference for a specific brand, a preference for
the brand's performance record and reliability, this preference does not rise to the level of
manifest partiality that would show an ulterior motive or purpose on the part of petitioners.
Therefore, the conviction of petitioners based on manifest partiality cannot stand as the
required threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt was not met by the prosecution.
The prosecution failed to establish gross inexcusable negligence.

The commission of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 through gross inexcusable negligence
requires more than simple negligence. The negligence committed must be both gross and
inexcusable, characterized by the want of even slight care, wherein the accused was
consciously indifferent as to the compliance with his or her duty as a public officer. More
than committing a breach of a legal duty, it is necessary that in committing the said breach,
the public officer was inattentive, thoughtless, and careless.
The records show that petitioners, as BAC members, did conduct a study, albeit
limited and not reduced to writing. Moreover, as earlier discussed, they no longer considered
public bidding based on their past experiences and the belief that direct purchase was
availing. While it is arguable that a more thorough study would have led petitioners to
conclude that direct purchase was not proper for the subject procurements, their actions
cannot be characterized as without even slight care and conscious indifference as to the
compliance with their duties so as to make them liable for gross inexcusable negligence.
Hence, they cannot be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on this account.
Violations of R.A. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the prosecution failed to establish
evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of
petitioners to satisfy the second element for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
In criminal cases, it is hornbook principle thatall the elements of the crime must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused.
In the instant case, petitioners' act of pursuing the subject procurements was
motivated not by any corrupt intent to favor one car dealer over another or to unduly receive
any pecuniary benefit. Based on the evidence on record, petitioners' actuations were simply
based on their honest belief that direct procurement was legally permissible.
Indeed, while public office is a public trust, the Court is called upon to refrain from
interpreting the laws to effectively be a disincentive to individuals in joining the public
service. It is simply absurd to criminally punish every minute mistake that incidentally
caused a benefit to private parties even when these acts were not done with corrupt intent.
Q: The LGU procured five motor vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice
Governor of Davao del Sur (the Province). Through Purchase Requests, all signed by
Bautista as then Governor of the Province, the Office of the Governor requested the
acquisition of five specific vehicle brands and makes for the purpose of providing
service vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice Governor. The procurement of
the subject vehicles was not subjected to competitive public bidding as it was effected
through direct purchase.
Subsequently, a letter was filed by the Concerned Citizens for Good Governance
(CCGG) before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao (Ombudsman). The CCGG
alleged that petitioners procured five motor vehicles for the use of the Governor and
Vice Governor of the Province in a manner violative of procurement laws. The
Sandiganbayan found that the procurement of the subject vehicles violated
procurement laws and that all the elements of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 were present
when the procurement of the subject vehicles was undertaken by petitioners.
The Governor, upon appeal, alleged that violation of the procurement laws do not ipso
facto give rise to violation of R.A. 3019. Rule on his contention.
A: The contention of the Governor is correct. It must be noted that criminal liability
does not depend solely upon the allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure
for which prosecution may perhaps be proper. For even if it were true and proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been rigged, this pronouncement alone does
not automatically result in finding the act of the governor similarly culpable. It is presumed
that he acted in good faith in relying upon the documents he signed and thereafter
endorsed. To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e),
RA 3019, the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a
circumstance which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith,
gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on
the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates
despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a
well- grounded and reasonable belief that the governor perpetrated these acts in the
criminal manner he is accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable
cause. (Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. HEIRS OF ANDRES FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 244115, February 3, 2021, Third Division, (Delos Santos, J. )
DOCTRINE
The initial payment made by DSWH only represents the provisional value of the subject
properties which "serves the double-purpose of (a) pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed." It does not, in
anyway, constitute the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated properties for it is the court
which can judicially determine the same.
FACTS
On October 19, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation against Andres
Francisco and Socorro Luna’s residential lot for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link
Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9).
Upon their death, the spouses Francisco were substituted by their children Alejandro
Francisco and Sonia Francisco Soriano (respondents).
On November 23, 2012, petitioner deposited with the RTC Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) Manager's Check No. 698188 in the amount of P1,559,560.62,
representing the equivalent of 100% of the cost of the improvements found in the subject
lots. On December 13, 2012, it also deposited with the RTC LBP Manager's Check No.
1185752 in the amount of P2,647,050.00, representing the equivalent of 100% of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal value of the subject lots .
On February 8, 2013, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner. On

April 17, 2013, the RTC ordered the replacement of the LBP manager's checks after they
became stale while in the trial court's custody. On August 29, 2013 and February 21, 2014,
petitioner issued the replacement checks and deposited the same with the trial court.
On June 20, 2013, the parties agreed to execute a compromise agreement to

determine the valuation of the subject properties. On February 3, 2014, respondents
declared that they are no longer amenable to enter into a compromise agreement.
In their position paper, respondents claimed that they should be paid the just
compensation computed at P7,500.00 per sq. m. and P1,000,000.00 as consequential
damages. But petitioner countered that the just compensation should be fixed at P400.00 per
sq. m. and P2,100.00 per sq. m.
The RTC pegged the amount of just compensation at P7,500.00 per sq.m. It opined
that petitioner's valuation at P400.00 and P2,100.00 per sq. m. for the subject lots cannot be
applied in a complaint for expropriation filed in 2012.
The CA remanded the case to the RTC because of the absence of reliable and actual
data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned properties. It declared that the RTC
seemed to have overlooked that the classification and use for which the properties are suited
are not the only criteria for the determination of the just compensation. The CA upheld the
12% interest imposed by the RTC on the unpaid balance of the just compensation clarifying
that it should be reckoned from the time of taking, which is on February 8, 2013. The 12%
per annum interest rate applies until June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, the interest rate shall be
at 6% per annum.
Now petitioner is questioning the CA's imposition of the interest rate of 12% per
annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 considering that the subject lots were
taken after the payment of the just compensation. Petitioner argues that the subject lots were
taken after the payment of the just compensation. Since there was no delay in the payment
of the value of the condemned properties, it asserts that the CA erred in holding it liable to
pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation
computed from the time of taking until July 1, 2013, and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per
annum.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the just compensation in expropriation
cases earns interest and that petitioner is liable therefor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the award of interest on the unpaid compensation is proper.
RULING
YES, the award of interest is proper. Jurisprudence defines just compensation as
the full and fair equivalent of the property subject of expropriation. It is ascertained based
on the owner's loss and not the taker's gain. The just compensation in condemnation
proceedings envisages timely or prompt payment in full of the just compensation as finally
determined by the courts.
In Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic, the Court noted that the just
compensation contemplated in R.A. No. 8974 contemplates the completion of two payments
to the property owner, to wit: (1) the initial payment of the amount equivalent to the sum of
100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant BIR zonal valuation and the
value of the improvements and/or structures thereon, which is made upon the filing of the
complaint; and (2) the payment of the difference between the amount already paid and the
just compensation as determined by the court, which is made after the trial court's decision
becomes final and executory. Upon initial payment of the so-called provisional value of the
condemned property, the court shall issue a writ of possession in order to provide the
government the "flexibility to immediately take the property pending the court's final
determination of just compensation" and commence the implementation of the
infrastructure project.
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA showed that after the filing of
the expropriation complaint, petitioner deposited the amounts of P1,559,560.62 and
P2,647,050.00 which correspond to 100% of the cost of the improvements found on the
subject lots and 100% of the value of the subject lots based on its BIR zonal valuation,
respectively. Thereafter, a writ of possession was issued in favor of petitioner. At this
juncture, the full and fair equivalent of the properties have yet to be determined with finality
by the court. On February 22, 2016, the RTC pegged the amount of just compensation at
P7,500.00 per sq. m. or in the total amount of P9,453,750.00, exclusive of the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as consequential damages which petitioner was directed to pay. Obviously,
the amount of petitioner's initial deposit is much less than that adjudged by the RTC. Hence,
petitioner must pay the difference between the final amount as fixed by the RTC and the
initial payment made by petitioner coupled with legal interest as a forbearance of money, in
line with vergreen Manufacturing.
It cannot be overemphasized that the initial payment made by petitioner only

represents the provisional value of the subject properties which "serves the double-purpose
of (a) pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the
proceedings are dismissed." It does not, in anyway, constitute the full and fair equivalent of
the expropriated properties for it is the court which can judicially determine the same. Here,
it is crystal clear that when the RTC adjudged the amount of just compensation, petitioner
has already taken the condemned properties and respondents have already been deprived
of the income that their properties would have made. There was already a delay in fully
satisfying the payment of the just compensation. "Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered 'just' inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."
Accordingly, the difference between the final amount to be adjudged by the RTC and the
initial payment made by petitioner should earn interest.
Petitioner instituted the complaint for expropriation on October 19, 2012 and was
issued the writ of possession on February 8, 2013. The just compensation shall be appraised
as of October 19, 2012 as it preceded the actual taking of the properties. The legal interest at
12% per annum on the difference between the final amount to be adjudged by the RTC and
the initial payment made shall accrue from February 8, 2013 until June 30, 2013. From July
1, 2013 until the finality of the RTC Decision, the difference between the initial payment and
the final amount to be adjudged by the RTC shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
Thereafter, the total amount of just compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
Q: On October 19, 2012, Department Of Public Works And Highways (DPWH) filed a
complaint for expropriation against AAA and BBB’s residential lot for the construction
of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9).
On November 23, 2012, DPWH deposited with the RTC Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) Manager's Check No. 698188 in the amount of P1,559,560.62, representing the
equivalent of 100% of the cost of the improvements found in the subject lots. On
December 13, 2012, it also deposited with the RTC LBP Manager's Check No. 1185752
in the amount of P2,647,050.00, representing the equivalent of 100% of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal value of the subject lots
On February 8, 2013, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner. On

April 17, 2013, the RTC ordered the replacement of the LBP manager's checks after
they became stale while in the trial court's custody. On August 29, 2013 and February
21, 2014, DPWH issued the replacement checks and deposited the same with the trial
court.
On June 20, 2013, the parties agreed to execute a compromise agreement to determine
the valuation of the subject properties.
In their position paper, AAA and BBB claimed that they should be paid the just
compensation computed at P7,500.00 per sq. m. and P1,000,000.00 as consequential
damages. But DPWH countered that the just compensation should be fixed at P400.00
per sq. m. and P2,100.00 per sq. m. as originally agreed upon. If you were the judge,
decide.
A: AAA and BBB’s contention is correct. Just compensation contemplated in R.A. No. 8974
contemplates the completion of two payments to the property owner, to wit: (1) the initial
payment of the amount equivalent to the sum of 100% of the value of the property based on
the current relevant BIR zonal valuation and the value of the improvements and/or
structures thereon, which is made upon the filing of the complaint; and (2) the payment of
the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined
by the court, which is made after the trial court's decision becomes final and executory. Upon
initial payment of the so-called provisional value of the condemned property, the court shall
issue a writ of possession in order to provide the government the "flexibility to immediately
take the property pending the court's final determination of just compensation" and
commence the implementation of the infrastructure project.
The initial payment made by DSWH only represents the provisional value of the
subject properties which "serves the double-purpose of (a) pre-payment if the property is
fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed." It does
not, in anyway, constitute the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated properties for it is
the court which can judicially determine the same.
There was already a delay in fully satisfying the payment of the just compensation.
"Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' inasmuch as the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss." Accordingly, the difference between the final amount to be
adjudged by the RTC and the initial payment made by petitioner should earn interest.
(Republic v. Heirs Of Andres Francisco, G.R. No. 244115, February 3, 2021, as penned by J.
Delos Santos)
STEWART G. LEONARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 246451, February 3, 2021, Second Division, (Lazaro-Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
Petitioner acted with both manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he took
advantage of his public office to secure unwarranted benefits for himself, allowing Quezon's bid
deposit to be credited to his personal purchase price; and causing the equipment he personally
bought to be transported using the transport arrangement of Quezon without him spending
anything therefor.
FACTS
On February 11, 2010, the Sangguniang Bayan of Quezon, Bukidnon issued Resolution
No. 10th SB 2010-27 authorizing then Municipal Mayor petitioner to cause the procurement
of trucks and heavy equipment in behalf of the Municipality of Quezon (Quezon).
Quezon, through petitioner, joined the auction conducted by United Auctioneers,

Inc. It paid the bid deposit of P100,000.00, to be deducted from the purchase price in case
of a successful bid
Using the bid book and bid deposit of Quezon, petitioner bid for five (5) trucks in the
total amount of P6,387,500.00 in behalf of Quezon. He also bid for two (2) small equipment
(hydraulic excavator and front cut unit cabin) amounting to a total of P1,670,000.00, for
himself. Quezon was eventually declared the winning bidder of all seven (7) equipment
On January 14, 2011, Gregorio Lloren Gue and Noel Goopio filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) a complaint against petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to the aforesaid transaction.
The OMB found probable cause against petitioner. The Sandiganbayan found
petitioner guilty as charged.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner guilty for violation of Section
3 (e), RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
RULING
NO. The elements of the offense are: (1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his or her action
caused injury to any party, including the government, or giving any party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her official functions.
The following facts are undisputed: Petitioner, then Quezon's Municipal Mayor, was
expressly authorized to represent Quezon at the auction sale of trucks and heavy equipment.
As it was, he did not only bid for Quezon, but also for himself. He merged the bid of Quezon
and his own bid to make it appear that they all pertained to Quezon. He also rode on Quezon's
bid deposit and transport arrangement for his own personal advantage.
"Manifest partiality" means clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to

favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes
not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
Here, petitioner acted with both manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he
took advantage of his public office to secure unwarranted benefits for himself, allowing
Quezon's bid deposit to be credited to his personal purchase price; and causing the
equipment he personally bought to be transported using the transport arrangement of
Quezon without him spending anything therefor.
Petitioner’s contention that he did not know that the P100,000.00-bid deposit was
credited to him, that’s why he was able to join the bidding, was not given the merit by the
Supreme Court since he personally participated during the auction. his bolsters the
conclusion that he acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality.
The Court also emphasized that although the deeds of sale were made in Quezon's
name, two (2) receipts were issued: one amounting to P6,387,500.00 for the items bought
by Quezon, and one amounting to P1,570,000.00 for petitioner's equipment. Petitioner,
therefore, kept a receipt for his own equipment while fronting the purchase of the same
under the deeds of sale in Quezon's name. Again, this is a badge of petitioner's evident bad
faith or manifest partiality. Indeed, there is no doubt that petitioner manifestly, unjustly, and
intentionally took advantage of his public office to gain unwarranted benefits for himself, to
the prejudice of Quezon.
Finally, Quezon sustained damage when money was taken from its coffers for
petitioner's personal use without paying interest therefor and without any authority.
Although petitioner eventually refunded Quezon the bid deposit of P100,000.00, he did so
only five (5) months after public funds had already been disbursed for his own personal
advantage or gain and after repeated demands from the Municipal Accountant.
Since petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding
him guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals.
Q: On February 11, 2010, the Sangguniang Bayan of Quezon, Bukidnon issued
Resolution No. 10th SB 2010-27 authorizing then Municipal Mayor petitioner to cause
the procurement of trucks and heavy equipment in behalf of the Municipality of
Quezon (Quezon).
Quezon, through Municipal Mayor Leonardo, joined the auction conducted by United
Auctioneers, Inc. It paid the bid deposit of P100,000.00, to be deducted from the
purchase price in case of a successful bid.
Using the bid book and bid deposit of Quezon, Municipal Mayor Leonardo bid for five
(5) trucks in the total amount of P6,387,500.00 in behalf of Quezon. Municipal Mayor
Leonardo also bid for two (2) small equipment (hydraulic excavator and front cut unit
cabin) amounting to a total of P1,670,000.00, for himself. Quezon was eventually
declared the winning bidder of all seven (7) equipment. What crime, if any, did
Municipal Mayor Leonardo commit?
A: Municipal Mayor Leonardo violated of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The elements of the offense are: (1) the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his or her action
caused injury to any party, including the government, or giving any party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her official functions.
The following facts are undisputed: Municipal Mayor Leonardo, then Quezon's
Municipal Mayor, was expressly authorized to represent Quezon at the auction sale of trucks
and heavy equipment. As it was, he did not only bid for Quezon, but also for himself. He
merged the bid of Quezon and his own bid to make it appear that they all pertained to
Quezon. (Leonardo v. People, G.R. No. 246451, February 3, 2021, as penned by J. Lazaro-
Javier)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE - REVENUE INTEGRITY PROTECTION SERVICE v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO GERMAR
G.R. No. 238660, February 3, 2021, First Division (Zalameda, J.)
DOCTRINE
To warrant conviction for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the offender
makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (3) the facts narrated by him
are absolutely false.
FACTS
Private respondent was a security guard of the Bureau of Customs who assumed
office on 01 April 1979 and resigned on 16 October 2015. Pursuant to an Investigation
Authority petitioner Department of Finance — Revenue Integrity Protection Service (BOF-
RIPS) conducted a lifestyle check on private respondent's assets, liabilities, net worth,
business interests and financial connections.
The DOF-RIPS compared private respondent's Statements of Assets, Liabilities and

Networth (SALNs) from 2002-2014 which revealed that for the years 2002 until 2014,
private respondent Germar failed to declare in his SALNs several properties under his name
and one property he donated in 2015 to his daughter, Michelle Germar.
It was found that private respondent declared in his SALNs, for the years 2002 to
2014, only three (3) out of the seven (7) properties registered in his name. It also noted that
a criminal information for robbery was filed against private respondent by the Provincial
Prosecutor of Malolos Bulacan which was eventually provisionally dismissed. However,
private respondent Germar still made an untruthful statement when answered Item 37(a) in
his 2014 Personal Data Sheet (PDS) "NO" to the question, "Have you ever been formally
charged."
On May 2016, the DOF filed a complaint against private respondent Germar for
violation of Section 7 of RA 301918, Section 8 of RA 671319, Article 17120 for Falsification
by a Public Officer and False Testimony, and Article 18321 for Perjury under the RPC22
before the OMB.
The OMB have then decided that, among others, private respondent Germar may only
be prosecuted for failure to disclose the properties in his SALNs only for the years 2008 to
2014.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not there is probable cause for the crime of Falsification under
Article 171 (4) of the RPC for failure to disclose several of his properties in his
SALN.
2. Whether or not the charges for violation of R.A. No. 6713 for the years 2002-
2007, and for perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for the years 2002-2005
have prescribed.
RULING
1. NO. The third element of the crime, i.e., that the statements made are absolutely
false, was wanting. Under the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, the following
elements must be established: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
(2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) he falsifies a document by committing
any of the acts enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

statements in a narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (3) the facts narrated
by him are absolutely false.
In this case, the element of taking advantage of one's position is patently lacking.
There is no showing that private respondent had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise,
to intervene in the preparation of the SALNs,35 or he had the official custody of the same.
The preparation and filing of a SALN is not a special duty of any particular office. It is
not based on rank or salary grade. The preparation and filing of a SALN is required of all
public officers and employees "except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and
casual or temporary workers." Hence, when it comes to the preparation of SALNs, no office
has an advantage over the other.
Here, private respondent Clemente Germar is a security guard. The SALN is a

document he is required to prepare not because of the specific duties of a security guard, but
by virtue of private respondent being a government employee. Hence, private respondent's
failure to disclose in his SALNs several other real properties is not tantamount to taking
advantage of his position as customs security guard.
2. YES. R.A. No. 6713 is a special law, thus, the computation of prescriptive periods
for violation of R.A. No. 6713 is governed by Act No. 3326 which provides for an 8-year
In Act 3326, there are two (2) situations when prescriptive periods should be
reckoned. Generally, the prescriptive, period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, wherein the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action.
In this case, the prescriptive period of eight years should be counted from the date of
commission, specifically, the date of filing of the SALN. Since the case against private
respondent Clemente Germar was filed in May 2016, there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the OMB when it dismissed the complaint for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6713 with respect to private respondent Germar's SALNs for the years 2002-2007.
On the other hand, the prescriptive period for violation of Article 183 of the RPC, or
perjury is ten (10) years upon filing of the SALN. The prescriptive period for crimes
punishable under the RPC are counted from the time of discovery pursuant to Article 91 of
the RPC.
In this case, however, discovery should be reckoned from the time of filing of the SALN
because upon filing, perjury is deemed consummated. Once the SALN is filed, it is subject to
review by the proper authorities. It is during the conduct of the review that errors or
inaccuracies in the SALN may be determined. Ten (10) years is more than enough time to
discover any such errors or inaccuracies.
Under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713 in relation to the SALN states that any statement filed
shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement,
and after such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
investigation.
In this case, the lifestyle check on private respondent was commenced in 2015, and
the Joint Complaint-Affidavit was filed on 30 May 2016. Since more than (10) years had
lapsed, prosecution for perjury for private respondent Germar's SALNs for the years 2002-
2005 is now barred by prescription.
Q: Clemente, a security guard of the Bureau of Customs, has declared in his SALNs, for
the years 2002 to 2014, only three (3) out of the seven (7) properties registered in his
name. Furthermore, a criminal information for robbery was filed against him which
was eventually provisionally dismissed. However, he made an untruthful statement
when answered in his 2014 Personal Data Sheet (PDS) "NO" to the question, "Have you
ever been formally charged." A complaint against him was filed for violation of Section
7 of RA 3019, Section 8 of RA 6713, Article 171 for Falsification by a Public Officer and
False Testimony, and Article 183 for Perjury under the RPC before the OMB.
A. Did Clemente commit Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts under Article 171?
B. Has prescription already set in for the violation R.A. No. 6713 for the years
2002-2007, and for perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for the years 2002-2005?
A: NO. The third element of the crime, i.e., that the statements made are absolutely false, was
wanting. Under the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, the following elements must
be established: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he takes
advantage of his official position; and (3) he falsifies a document by committing any of the
acts enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
statements in a narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (3) the facts narrated
by him are absolutely false.
In this case, the element of taking advantage of one's position is patently lacking.
There is no showing that private respondent had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise,
to intervene in the preparation of the SALNs,35 or he had the official custody of the same.
B. YES. R.A. No. 6713 is a special law, thus, the computation of prescriptive periods for
violation of R.A. No. 6713 is governed by Act No. 3326 which provides for an 8-year
In Act 3326, there are two (2) situations when prescriptive periods should be
reckoned. Generally, the prescriptive, period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, wherein the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action.
In this case, the prescriptive period of eight years should be counted from the date of
commission, specifically, the date of filing of the SALN. Since the case against private
respondent Clemente Germar was filed in May 2016, there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the OMB when it dismissed the complaint for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6713 with respect to private respondent Germar's SALNs for the years 2002-2007.
On the other hand, the prescriptive period for violation of Article 183 of the RPC, or
perjury is ten (10) years upon filing of the SALN. The prescriptive period for crimes
punishable under the RPC are counted from the time of discovery pursuant to Article 91 of
the RPC.
In this case, however, discovery should be reckoned from the time of filing of the SALN
because upon filing, perjury is deemed consummated.
Under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6713 in relation to the SALN states that any statement filed
shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement,
and after such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
investigation.
In this case, the lifestyle check on private respondent was commenced in 2015, and
the Joint Complaint-Affidavit was filed on 30 May 2016. Since more than (10) years had
lapsed, prosecution for perjury for private respondent Clemente's SALNs for the years 2002-
2005 is now barred by prescription. (Department of Finance - Revenue Integrity Protection
Service v. Office of the Ombudsman and Clemente Germar, as penned by J. Zalameda)
BEETHOVEN QUIJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021, First Division, (Gaerlan, J.)
DOCTRINE
To support a conviction for frustrated murder, the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the victim's wound would have been fatal without timely medical
intervention. Without this crucial fact, the accused may only be convicted of attempted murder.
FACTS
Quijano was charged with frustrated murder. The antecedent facts reveal that at 3:30
o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1997, Atilano Andong (Andong) was sleeping at home with
his common- law wife Marilou Gamboa (Gamboa) and their child. Suddenly, Quijano started
banging on their door and shouting Andong's name. When Andong rose from the bed, he was
surprised to see Quijano standing 60 centimeters away from him, beaming a flashlight at
him. Then, Quijano suddenly shot Andong on his right shoulder. Gamboa pleaded for Quijano
to stop.
Meanwhile, Andong's neighbors saw Quijano holding a hand gun. Frightened, they
rushed back inside and hid. Thereafter, they saw Andong blood-stained and with a wound
on his right shoulder
Subsequently, Andong was rushed to the hospital where he underwent an operation

and was confined for more than two weeks.
During the trial, Quijano vehemently denied the charge leveled against him. He
claimed that in the evening prior to the incident, he was at home drinking with his co-
workers. The Regional Trial Court convicted Quijano of frustrated murder and such was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether Quijano was properly convicted for frustrated murder.
RULING
NO. Upon a scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court finds that Quijano is guilty
of attempted murder.
The Supreme Court first noted that Quijano's attack against Andong reeks of
treachery. Quijano was indicted for frustrated murder qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation. The Court ruled that treachery was established.
Quijano attacked Andong in an unexpected and rapid manner. This sudden intrusion
occurred at the dead of night, while Andong and his family were asleep. In fact, Quijano
swiftly shot Andong immediately after the latter rose from the bed. The onslaught was so
sudden and swift that Andong had no chance to mount a defense. He had no inkling that an
attack was forthcoming and was completely unaware of the imminent peril. Quijano
deliberately and consciously adopted such vicious mode of attack. He used a firearm to easily
neutralize Andong and fired from a position of relative safety. Moreover, he had a flashlight
to ensure the success of his attack. Thus, there can be no denying that Quijano's assault reeks
of treachery.
Quijano claims that his alleged act of banging on the door and calling Andong's name
sufficiently forewarned the latter of the onslaught but such contention was not given merit
by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that treachery shall still be appreciated even if the
victim was forewarned of the attack. The decisive factor is that despite the warning, the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
As applied to the case at bar, even assuming that Andong was forewarned of the attack
through Quijano's banging and shouting, the former was still caught off-guard and
defenseless. Worse, the events transpired in a rapid and successive sequence that deprived
Andong of any chance to retaliate, defend himself, or at the very least, escape from the
onslaught.
In the same regard, the existing animosity between the parties does not negate
treachery. It has been ruled that treachery is not dispelled by a prior grudge between the
parties if the victim had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming, or was not in a position
to defend himself.
Although treachery was established, evident premeditation was not. In the instant
case, the prosecution failed to identify the time when Quijano decided to shoot Andong.
Without this crucial data, it is impossible to conclude that indeed, there was a sufficient
period of time that passed between the former's determination to kill and his actual
execution, which allowed him to meditate and reflect on his plans.
The Court also ruled that Quijano is guilty of attempted murder, not frustrated
murder. Indeed, Quijano's intent to kill Andong is evident from the treacherous manner of
his assault. It is likewise glaring from his choice of weapon, and his conduct at the time of the
attack. In addition, he hit Andong at a vital spot in his body. However, it is important to note
that in frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound inflicted would
have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.
As ruled by Court in Serrano v. People: “When nothing in the evidence shows that the
wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the
realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be
resolved in favor of the petitioner.”
In the present case, the evidence fails to prove with moral certainty that Andong
would have died from the gunshot wound without timely medical intervention.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to present Dr. Manubag, the physician who treated
Andong and administered the alleged life-saving procedure. The Medical Certificate alone,
without the testimony of Dr. Manubag is inadequate proof of the nature and extent of
Andong's injury.
Lastly, the Court ruled that Quijano was positively identified as the malefactor. In this
regard, Quijano's defenses of denial and alibi falter against the witnesses' positive
identification of him as the perpetrator. It bears stressing that it was not physically
impossible for Quijano to have been at the scene of the crime. By his own admission, his
house is only within walking distance to Andong's home.
Q: At 3:30 o'clock in the morning, Atilano Andong (Andong) was sleeping at home with
his common- law wife Marilou Gamboa (Gamboa) and their child. Suddenly, Quijano
started banging on their door and shouting Andong's name. When Andong rose from
the bed, he was surprised to see Quijano standing 60 centimeters away from him,
beaming a flashlight at him. Then, Quijano suddenly shot Andong on his right
shoulder. Gamboa pleaded for Quijano to stop. Subsequently, Andong was rushed to
the hospital where he underwent an operation and was confined for more than two
weeks. What crime did Andong commit?
A: Quijano is guilty of attempted murder. Andong’s acts were performed with treachery.
Even assuming that Andong was forewarned of the attack through Quijano's banging and
shouting, the former was still caught off-guard and defenseless. Worse, the events transpired
in a rapid and successive sequence that deprived Andong of any chance to retaliate, defend
himself, or at the very least, escape from the onslaught. The decisive factor is that despite the
warning, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate, which can be observed in present case.
Such commission of the crime is only in the attempted stage because no evidence is
provided which would show that Andong would have died from the gunshot wound without
timely medical intervention. To support a conviction for frustrated murder, the prosecution
must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim's wound would have been fatal
without timely medical intervention. Without this crucial fact, the accused may only be
convicted of attempted murder. (Quijano v. People, G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021, as
penned by J. Gaerlan)
XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021, First Division, (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE:
If a person did not intend to perpetrate an act which has been defined by law to be the
crime itself, then he is not guilty of the act. Here, the evidence shows that XXX could not
provide support because: (1) AAA prevented him from doing so by refusing what he could
offer; and (2) he was suffering from an incurable mental illness which, though not sufficient to
be considered a form of insanity, was to a degree that effectively incapacitated him from
earning.
FACTS
In 1997, AAA and XXX lived together in BBB’s house in Tenejero, Balanga City. CCC
was born to them.
The prosecution alleges the following:

Before CCC's birth up to the time this case was filed, AAA had no source of income and
was entirely dependent on either XXX or her sister for support. XXX continued to live in
BBB's house with AAA and CCC until 2004. As a mechanic in Makati City, XXX worked for five
days a week and would only go home to Balanga on Saturdays. He gave AAA and CCC
anywhere between P1,000 to P2,000 per month. Sometime in 2005, XXX suddenly stopped
coming home and providing support. During the barangay conciliation proceedings, it was
agreed that XXX would provide monthly support in the amount of P4,000.00. He did not full
his promise to give P4,000.00 per month and gave AAA only P1,000.00 once.
In 2016, AAA filed the criminal complaint against XXX because her sister BBB was
already too sick to support her and CCC. Thus, XXX was charged for alleged violation of
Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti- Violence against
Women and Children Act of 2004.
BBB testified that she is AAA's sister. BBB owns a four-bedroom house in Tenejero,
Balanga where XXX and AAA had lived since before they got married.
After XXX suddenly disappeared in 2005, BBB observed that AAA was always crying.
It fell upon BBB to financially support her niece, paying for the latter's schooling and medical
expenses, remitting to them US$1,000.00 per month out of her US pension. BBB decided to
enroll Aubrey in Bataan Montessori in 2003, a private school.
It was at BBB's behest that AAA did not work so that she could take care of their father
who had suffered from a stroke and then later on, to also look after BBB when she was
confined at hospital. BBB admitted that she had no knowledge of XXX's financial situation.
The defense however alleged the following:

XXX promised to take responsibility for the child, on the understanding that AAA
would not interfere with XXX's personal life. XXX maintains that he provided money to AAA
and CCC whenever he could, such as when he gave P15,000 after one of AAA's siblings died;
P3,000 so that AAA can have false teeth; and also for CCC's tuition fee at Bataan Montessori
School in 2006.
After XXX left AAA, they met at the barangay for conciliation proceedings, where XXX
offered to provide P1,000.00 to P2,000.00 per month and to pay for CCC's education. BBB,
however, wanted CCC to go to Bataan Montessori, a private school. AAA refused XXX's offer
and proceeded to file a case for abandonment against him.
XXX also averred that he worked and earned as a mechanic in his father's shop from
2005 until 2010 when the shop closed. In 2011, he was diagnosed of having hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, for which he is taping maintenance drug. On November 29, 2013,
only one month after XXX's father had passed away, AAA again complained before the
prosecutor's office. XXX again offered to give what he could, but AAA refused. XXX also
mentioned that lives with his mother, is without a job, and is being supported by his siblings
and his mother for his day to day living.
XXX and his witnesses testified that AAA tried to reach an amicable settlement but
such was not reached because AAA abruptly ended the conciliation proceedings by furiously
storming out.
XXX’s last witness was a licensed counseling psychologist and psychometrician who,
after conducting structured clinical interviews and screening instruments on the XXX, XXX
has been showing symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and that he could not
be effectively perform minimal work expectations because of the paranoid and the avoidance
symptoms.
The RTC gave full weight to the prosecution evidence and found that it was sufficient
to prove all the elements of a violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262. This was affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC's judgment finding
XXX guilty of violating Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262.
RULING
YES. The law will not punish a person when he suffers from a mental debilitation
which deprived him of the mental faculties necessary to perform an obligation. In this case,
while the prosecution established that XXX failed to provide adequate support to his
daughter, there is no evidence that he did so intentionally. Moreover, there is convincing
evidence that XXX's Post- Traumatic Stress Syndrome and paranoid ideations were of such a
nature and degree that he could not bring himself to work and provide for his family even
though it may have been proved that he has the physical capacity to do so.
To begin with, the Court emphasized that what distinguishes Section 5 (i) from the
other violations of Section 5 of R.A. 9262, are the indispensable requirements of (1)
psychological violence; and (2) emotional anguish or mental suffering. The "focus of this
particular criminal act [Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262] is the causation of non-physical
suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor
on the offended party."
It is basic that in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
by establishing the existence of the elements of the crime charged. In this case, while the
prosecution was able to prove that XXX denied support for CCC, the Court did not think there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt that such constituted psychological violence or that it was
the cause of AAA's mental and emotional distress. The records show that XXX was willing to
provide support and in 2005, had attempted to negotiate with AAA as to the amount both at
the barangay and before the City Prosecution Office.
The Supreme Court found that XXX was not unwilling to provide support per se, but
could not do so because the amount he could offer was not sufficient for AAA to realize the
aspirations she had set for CCC, e.g., that the latter be schooled privately. While the Court
cannot fault AAA for setting such aspirations for her child, it remains that XXX was not in a
position to meet such. XXX attempted to find a way to provide support within his means
indicates that he did not willfully set out to cause psychological violence upon AAA, even
when the latter was constantly harassing him, which later on caused his PTSD. Consequently,
the Court cannot conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he caused AAA's emotional
distress.
Further, the Court found that XXX’s PTSD and paranoia incapacitated him from
performing normally. Thus, XXX could not be effectively perform (sic) minimal work
expectations because of the paranoid and the avoidance symptoms.
Lastly, the Court held that if a person did not intend to perpetrate an act which has
been defined by law to be the crime itself, then he is not guilty of the act. Here, the evidence
shows that XXX could not provide support because: (1) AAA prevented him from doing so by
refusing what he could offer; and (2) he was suffering from an incurable mental illness which,
though not sufficient to be considered a form of insanity, was to a degree that effectively
incapacitated him from earning.
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court agreed with XXX's contention that the
third and fourth elements of a violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262 were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Q: XXX and AAA are husband and wife, respectively, and have a child, CCC. When XXX
left AAA, he provided money to AAA and CCC whenever he could. After XXX left AAA,
they met at the barangay for conciliation proceedings, where XXX offered to provide
P1,000.00 to P2,000.00 per month and to pay for CCC's education. BBB, however,
wanted CCC to go to Bataan Montessori, a private school. AAA refused since he can only
give enough to send CCC to a public school.
XXX averred that he worked and earned as a mechanic in his father's shop from 2005
until 2010 when the shop closed. In 2011, he was diagnosed of having hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, for which he is taping maintenance drug. XXX’s licensed
counseling psychologist and psychometrician also found that XXX has been showing
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and that he could not be
effectively perform (sic) minimal work expectations because of the paranoid and the
avoidance symptoms. XXX also mentioned that lives with his mother, is without a job,
and is being supported by his siblings and his mother for his day to day living.
On November 29, 2013, only one month after XXX's father had passed away, AAA again
complained before the prosecutor's office. XXX again offered to give what he could, but
AAA refused. XXX and his witnesses testified that AAA tried to reach an amicable
settlement but such was not reached because AAA abruptly ended the conciliation
proceedings by furiously storming out.
AAA filed the criminal complaint against XXX. Thus, XXX was charged for alleged
violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence against Women and Children Act of 2004. Will the complaint prosper?
A: NO, the complaint will not prosper. The facts show that XXX was willing to provide
support had attempted to negotiate with AAA as to the amount he can give. XXX was not
unwilling to provide support per se, but could not do so because the amount he could offer
was not sufficient for AAA to realize the aspirations she had set for CCC, e.g., that the latter
be schooled privately. XXX attempted to find a way to provide support within his means
indicates that he did not willfully set out to cause psychological violence upon AAA.
Further, as the facts state, XXX’s PTSD and paranoia incapacitated him from
performing normally. Thus, XXX could not be effectively perform minimal work expectations
because of the paranoid and the avoidance symptoms. If a person did not intend to
perpetrate an act which has been defined by law to be the crime itself, then he is not guilty
of the act. Here, the evidence shows that XXX could not provide support because: (1) AAA
prevented him from doing so by refusing what he could offer; and (2) he was suffering from
an incurable mental illness which, though not sufficient to be considered a form of insanity,
was to a degree that effectively incapacitated him from earning (XXX v. People, G.R. No.
252087, February 10, 2021, as penned by J. Carandang)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO SALAZAR y GRANADA
DOCTRINE
People react differently to distressing situations. In rape cases, victims are not burdened
to show physical resistance when they are intimidated. Intimidation is addressed to the victim's
perception and is, therefore, subjective. This Court will not burden victims of rape of proving
physical resistance, especially when their assailants assaulted them and coerced them with a
lethal weapon.
FACTS
Salazar was charged with the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in
relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
During trial, AAA, a 15 year-old minor, testified that she in a fiesta when Salazar
approached her and invited her to go with him to meet Jimmy. Jimmy was AAA's then
boyfriend. When they arrived at Salazar's house, Salazar forced AAA to go inside. He poked
her waist with a four (4) inch long and one (1) inch thick metal, closed the door, and ordered
her to lie down. AAA pleaded for Salazar to stop, but he ordered her to keep quiet. When she
tried to stop him from removing her clothes, Salazar punched her abdomen.
While AAA was in pain, Salazar removed her shorts and underwear and pulled up her
blouse and bra. Salazar then caressed her breast and licked her vagina. Thereafter, he
removed his pants and repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA testified that she
was not able to fight back because Salazar was too strong and she feared for her life since a
pair of scissors was just lying around.
Salazar denied the accusations. He narrated that at around 1:00 p.m., he and his wife
were cooking at their house when AAA asked him to accompany her to Gilbert's house as
planned. Later, his brother arrived at 2:00 p.m. He then left them and went home. At around
3:00 p.m., Salazar went to Becka's house alone where he had a drinking spree until 5:00 p.m.
with his relatives. Afterwards, he went home to sleep
The Regional Trial Court found Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape penalized under Article 266(a) in relation to paragraph 1 of Article 266(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Salazar questioned AAA's credibility, because her supposed demeanor during and
after the rape was contrary to human conduct. AAA did not shout for help even though it
could be heard from the room that someone was taking a bath at the house, and that a
woman knocked on the door. Throughout the duration of the incident, AAA neither made an
attempt to get away, nor did she try to get the scissors while Salazar talked to the woman.
Moreover, Salazar questioned AAA's assertion that she was punched in the abdomen
as such negated by the lack of external signs of injury based on the Medico-Legal Report.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the Report showing that the lacerations were caused by
the alleged rape, considering that the lacerations were already healed. At most, the report
only proves that AAA had a previous sexual intercourse, which she admitted to have
occurred sometime in October 2012.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused- appellant is guilty of rape.
RULING
YES. The elements of rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code are the following: "(1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat[,] or
intimidation."
In rape by force, threat, or intimidation, the prosecution must establish that there is
no consent or voluntariness on the part of the victim, and that the accused employed force,
threat, or intimidation to consummate the crime. As an element of rape, force must be
"sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind." On the other hand,
"intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of
the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she
is threatened with death if she reports the incident."
In cases where the accused used a knife to threaten the victim, the Supreme Court
held in People v. Bertulfo that this strongly suggests force, or at least intimidation, which is
clearly adequate to bring the victim to submission.
Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that in rape cases, victims are not burdened
to show physical resistance when they are intimidated. Intimidation is addressed to the
victim's perception and is, therefore, subjective.
In the present case, the testimony of AAA reveals that she was forced, threatened,
and intimidated, rendering her subservient to accused-appellant's control. The alleged
absence of resistance is belied by the fact that accused-appellant had to punch AAA in the
abdomen for him to be able to remove her clothes. Fearing for her life, accused-appellant
was able to have carnal knowledge with AAA against her will. Her failure to call for help is
not because she consented to the sexual intercourse, but because she was paralyzed by
terror. Although the pair of scissors was not pointed at her, accused- appellant's actions
leading to the incident already created fear in the mind of AAA.
Clearly, accused-appellant was able to have sexual intercourse with AAA because he
forced and intimidated her. AAA's subsequent failure to scream for help or run away cannot
be taken against her. As clarified by jurisprudence, people react differently to distressing
situations. This Court will not burden victims of rape with the proof of physical resistance,
especially when their assailants assaulted them and coerced them with a lethal weapon.
On the topic of credibility of testimonies, the Supreme Court noted that the testimony
of the victim is paramount in rape cases. If it is credible, it may be the only basis for the
accused's conviction, considering that the nature of rape generally limits the evidence to the
testimony of the victim. Thus, the role of the trial court is essential, because it is in the best
position to assess the credibility of the victim. Absent any proof that the judge erred in
appreciating the testimony, the credibility of the testimony stands.
In this case, accused-appellant attempts to discredit the prosecution in claiming that

AAA's testimony is incredible. However, he failed to prove that the testimony of AAA was
misappreciated by the trial court.
Further, the defense of accused- appellant anchors that AAA's testimony is

unsupported by the Medico-Legal Report, particularly that there is no finding of fresh
laceration, physical mark of assault, and spermatozoa was not given consideration by the
Court.
In several cases, the Court has held that the absence of fresh hymenal laceration does
not disprove rape and that the following are not elements of rape: 1) proof of physical
injuries; 2) the absence of spermatozoa. Thus, the lack of evidence showing the 2
aforementioned, does not discredit AAA's testimony.
Ultimately, the paramount consideration in rape cases is the victim's testimony and
not necessarily the medical findings. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape.
In this case, the lower courts found AAA's testimony credible. The trial judge held that
AAA's testimony is candid, categorical, and straightforward. She revealed in detail how the
accused-appellant brought her to a house and raped her. Her testimony is consistent on
material points. Thus, absent any irregularity, her testimony should be given full faith and
credit.
Q: AAA testified that she in a fiesta when Salazar approached her and invited her to
go with him to meet Jimmy. Jimmy was AAA's then boyfriend.
When they arrived at Salazar's house, Salazar forced AAA to go inside. He poked her
waist with a four (4) inch long and one (1) inch thick metal, closed the door, and
ordered her to lie down. AAA pleaded for Salazar to stop, but he ordered her to keep
quiet. When she tried to stop him from removing her clothes, Salazar punched her
abdomen. While AAA was in pain, Salazar removed her shorts and underwear and
pulled up her blouse and bra. Salazar then caressed her breast and licked her vagina.
Thereafter, he removed his pants and repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA testified that she was not able to fight back because Salazar was too strong and
she feared for her life since a pair of scissors was just lying around.
Salazar denied these allegations and questioned AAA's credibility, because her
supposed demeanor during and after the rape was contrary to human conduct. AAA
did not shout for help even though it could be heard from the room that someone
was taking a bath at the house, and that a woman knocked on the door. Throughout
the duration of the incident, AAA neither made an attempt to get away, nor did she try
to get the scissors away from Salazar. Salazar also noted that is no finding of fresh
laceration, physical mark of assault, and spermatozoa to establish rape against
him. Rule on Salazar’s contention.
A: Salazar’s contention must fail. As established by jurisprudence, People react

differently to distressing situations, thus AAA’s reaction to the situation should still be given
credence. Further, in several different cases, the Court has held that the absence of fresh
hymenal laceration does not disprove rape and that the following are not elements of rape:
1) proof of physical injuries; 2) the absence of spermatozoa. Thus, the lack of evidence
showing the 2 aforementioned, does not discredit AAA's testimony.
Ultimately, the paramount consideration in rape cases is the victim's testimony and
not necessarily the medical findings. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape. (People v. Joselito Salazar Y Granada, G.R. No. 239138, February 17,
2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
LEONIDES QUIAP Y EVANGELISTA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 229183, February 17, 2021, Second Division, (Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence provides that in case the presence of any or all the insulating witnesses
was not obtained, the prosecution must allege and prove not only the reasons for their absence,
but also the fact that earnest efforts were made to secure their attendance.
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of
any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165
must be adduced.
FACTS
On March 4, 2011, Police Officer (PO) 2 Jerome Garcia (PO2 Garcia) received a phone
call from a confidential asset, who was following one alias "Kacho." Later, the asset called
PO2 Garcia again and said that he and Kacho were on board a passenger jeepney with "Touch
Mobile" signage going to Calamba Crossing. The asset described that Kacho was the small
and slightly bald man seated in front of him.
When the entrapment team proceeded, the identified passenger jeepney arrived and
was flagged down after five minutes. PO2 Garcia boarded the jeepney and directed his
attention to the man seated in front of the confidential asset. At that time, Kacho was about
to throw out of the window a small object wrapped with electrical tape but PO2 Garcia held
his hand.
Moreover, PO2 Garcia asked Kacho to unwrap the object which yielded a small plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Garcia confiscated the sachet and brought
Kacho to the police station. Thereat, Kacho was identified as petitioner Leonides Quiap y
Evangelista (Leonides). PO2 Garcia marked the sachet with "LQE-1" and gave it to SPO1 Sales
who prepared a request for laboratory examination. PO2 Garcia and SPO1 Sales delivered
the seized item to the crime laboratory. SPO2 Macabajon received the item and the request.
Afterward, PSI Grace Bombasi (PSI Bombasi) conducted qualitative examination on the
specimen which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. As a result, Leonides
was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 before the
RTC.
Leonides denied the accusation, and elevated the case to the CA questioning the
validity of his arrest and raised the failure of the police officers to comply with the proper
handling and custody of dangerous drug, i.e. the marking was not made at the place of
seizure, the insulating witnesses were absent during the physical inventory, and no
photograph of the confiscated item was taken.
Leonides sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a valid compliance with the chain of custody of dangerous
drug.
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court held that it is too late for Leonides to question the legality of
his warrantless arrest in view of his arraignment and active participation at the trial. Neither
did he move to quash the information, hence, any supposed defect in his arrest was deemed
waived.
In Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the contraband itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense, and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.
Thus, it is essential to ensure that the substance recovered from the accused is the same
substance offered in court. The prosecution must satisfactorily establish the movement and
custody of the seized drug through the following links: (1) the confiscation and marking of
the specimen seized from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the
seized item by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the investigating
officer's turnover of the specimen to the forensic chemist for examination; and (4) the
submission of the item by the forensic chemist to the court. Here, the records reveal a broken
chain of custody.
As to the identity and credibility of the confiscated evidence, the operatives failed to
provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been
preserved. In People v. Lim, it was explained that in case the presence of any or all the
insulating witnesses was not obtained, the prosecution must allege and prove not only the
reasons for their absence, but also the fact that earnest efforts were made to secure their
attendance. It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se
render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section
21 of RA 9165 must be adduced.
Q. A police officer (PO2 Garcia) received a phone call from a confidential asset who
was following one alias "Kacho." Later, the asset called the police officer again and said
that he and Kacho were on board a passenger jeepney. When the entrapment team
proceeded, the identified passenger jeepney arrived and was flagged down after five
minutes. PO2 Garcia boarded the jeepney and directed his attention to the man seated
in front of the confidential asset. At that time, Kacho was about to throw out of the
window a small object wrapped with electrical tape but the PO2 Garcia held his hand.
Thereafter, the police officer asked Kacho to unwrap the object which yielded a small
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, and then confiscated the sachet
and brought Kacho to the police station. PO2 Garcia marked the sachet with "LQE-1"
and gave it to SPO1 Sales who prepared a request for laboratory examination. PO2
Garcia and SPO1 Sales delivered the seized item to the crime laboratory. SPO2
Macabajon received the item and the request. Afterward, PSI Grace Bombasi (PSI
Bombasi) conducted qualitative examination on the specimen which tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. As a result, Kacho was charged with violation
of Section 11 of RA 9165. Was there a valid compliance with the chain of custody rule?
A. NO. In Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the contraband itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense, and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.
Thus, it is essential to ensure that the substance recovered from the accused is the same
substance offered in court. The prosecution must satisfactorily establish the movement and
custody of the seized drug through the following links: (1) the confiscation and marking of
the specimen seized from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the
seized item by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the investigating
officer's turnover of the specimen to the forensic chemist for examination; and (4) the
submission of the item by the forensic chemist to the court. Here, the records reveal a broken
chain of custody.
As to the identity and credibility of the confiscated evidence, the operatives failed to
provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been
preserved. In People v. Lim, it was explained that in case the presence of any or all the
insulating witnesses was not obtained, the prosecution must allege and prove not only the
reasons for their absence, but also the fact that earnest efforts were made to secure their
attendance. It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se
render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section
21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. (Leonides Quiap y Evangelista v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 229183, February 17, 2021, as penned by J. Lopez)
ERNESTO JOAQUIN y ARQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 244570, February 17, 2021, First Division (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
Failure to designate the proper offense in the Information will not necessarily invalidate
it. What is important is that the facts alleged constitute the crime charged.
FACTS
Joaquin was charged with violation of Sec. 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, entitled the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Acy, in an
Information. Joaquin committed acts of abuse upon AAA, a nine-year-old minor, by kissing
her and licking her breast, thus placing the minor in conditions prejudicial to her normal
growth and development.
AAA testified that Joaquin licked her breast and vagina. He would remove her shorts
and upper garments whenever he did this. She took offense so she told her mother about it.
Joaquin denied the allegations. Joaquin claimed that he was cleaning his multicab on March
22, 2014. He did not recall the occurrence of any untoward incident that day.
The RTC found him guilty of said crime. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding the conviction of Joaquin for violation of R.A.
7610.
RULING
NO. The elements of Section 10 (a) are: (1) the victim's minority; (2) the acts
constituting physical abuse committed against the victim; and (3) the fact that the said acts
are clearly punishable under RA 7610.
In Escalante v. People, the SC held that "Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 specifically applies
in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas, Section 10 (a) thereof punishes
other forms of child abuse not covered by other provisions of RA 7610." Section 10 does not
cover child prostitution and other sexual abuse because it is specifically penalized under
Section 5.
A reading of the information shows that the acts imputed against Joaquin is
punishable under Section 5 (b) and not under Section 10 (a). When the victim is under 12
years of age, such as in this case, the proper designation of the crime should be Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5 (b)
of R.A. 7610.
The Information against Joaquin made no mention of either Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
or Article 336 of the RPC. Nonetheless, failure to designate the proper offense in the
Information will not necessarily invalidate it. What is important is that the facts alleged
constitute the crime charged.
The Information stated that Joaquin "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts
of abuse upon [AAA], a nine (9)-year old minor, by kissing her and licking her breast, thus
placing said minor complainant in conditions prejudicial to her normal growth and
development." Said information alleges the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b). It accused Joaquin of sexually abusing nine-year
old AAA by committing lascivious acts against her.
Joaquin was therefore informed of the nature of the charge against him. Further,
evidence proves that Joaquin sexually abused AAA. He took advantage of AAA and forced
himself upon her, a minor by his own admission. The CA is correct in upholding the said
conviction.
Q: The Information states that Joaquin "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of abuse upon [AAA], a nine (9)-year old minor, by kissing her and licking her
breast, thus placing said minor complainant in conditions prejudicial to her normal
growth and development." Imputed upon him is Sec. 10 (a) and not Sec. 5 (b) of RA
7610 or Article 336 of the RTC, which is the proper offense that should have been
designated. Is the Information invalid?
A: NO. While the Information against Joaquin made no mention of either Section 5 (b) of RA
7610 or Article 336 of the RPC, failure to designate the proper offense in the Information will
not necessarily invalidate it. What is important is that the facts alleged constitute the crime
charged. (Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244570, February 17, 2021, as penned
by J. Carandang)
G.R. No. 242684, February 17, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult
activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
FACTS
The accused XXX was charged with two counts of Qualified Rape. At the time of the
rape incidents, the 23-year-old victim, AAA, lived with her siblings. She suffers from epilepsy
and mild mental retardation. Her highest educational attainment is Grade Six.
In Feb. 2004, told AAA “para gumaling ang epilepsy mo, may gagawin lang ako sa iyo.”
AAA was perplexed and unwilling. However, the accused undressed her, took off his own
clothes, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while they were on a wooden bed. AAA felt
pain in said part. The second rape occurred on July 2004. Inside the kitchen, the accused
forcibly undressed AAA, took off his own clothes, and inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina.
The accused employed the same pretest that AAA would be cured of her disease once she
allowed the accused to do something to her.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The CA affirmed
the decision with modifications. The CA found him guilty of Qualified Rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two courts of Qualified Rape.
RULING
NO. As correctly held by the RTC and CA, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish all the elements of the crime of Rape. However, considering that AAA is a mental
retardate and Ms. De Guzman, a witness, determined that her mental age is equivalent to that
of an eight-year old child, the accused-appellant should be guilty of the crime of Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of the RPC as held by the
CA.
Jurisprudence provides that if a mentally retarded or intellectually disabled person
whose mental age is less than 12 years old is raped, the rape is considered committed under
paragraph 1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the RPC.
A person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an

adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-
A (l) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.
As shown in the Psychological Report submitted by Ms. De Guzman, AAA was found
to be suffering from mild mental retardation with an IQ of 54. Her mental age is equivalent
to that of an eight-year-old child.
Q: Accused-appellant was found guilty of two counts for Qualified Rape for raping a
23-year-old mentally retarded woman against her will and consent. Said woman was
clinically found to have a mental age equivalent to that of an eight-year-old child. Is
the designation of the offense proper?
A: NO. A person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an

adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-
A (l) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
disability is established. As shown in the Psychological Report submitted by Ms. De Guzman,
AAA was found to be suffering from mild mental retardation with an IQ of 54. Her mental
age is equivalent to that of an eight-year-old child. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
242684, February 17, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDITO CORITANA and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 209584, March 3, 2021, First Division (Gaerlan, J.)
DOCTRINE
Whether the accused-appellant sexually assaulted the victim is irrelevant. The accused
may still be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape as conspiracy to commit
the crime exists in this case. When two or more persons are charged as co-conspirators in the
crime of robbery with rape, it is irrelevant whether one or all of them committed the rape. For
as long as conspiracy to rob is proven, all will be treated as principals in the crime of robbery
with rape.
FACTS
The accused-appellant and one John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with
rape. The victim, AAA, 24 years old, works as a cashier at an eatery in Tacloban City. At
around 5 AM of March 3, 2001, the victim ordered her co-worker Teresita to go to the market,
leaving the former alone to tend to the eatery.
The victim was preparing La Paz Batchoy for the two men who arrived at the said
eatery when the old man approached her, poked a knife at the right side of her waist, and
threatened her. The accused-appellant closed the main door, and took P1,100 from a drawer.
The old man directed the victim to go to the bathroom. The old man pulled down her pants
and panty, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions for about five
minutes.
The old man called on the accused, who then lavished the victim in the same way the
old man did. The accused and the old man then left the victim in the comfort room, still tied.
The RTC found Coritana guilty with the Special Complex Crime of Robbery with Rape.
The CA affirmed with modification (civil liability) the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC convicting accused-
appellant of the crime.
RULING
NO. The crime of robbery with rape is a special complex crime penalized by Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of RA 7659. As defined, it requires
for its existence the following elements: a) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; b) the property taken belongs to another; c) the
taking is done with intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and d) the robbery is accompanied by
rape.
The crime of rape is deemed complexed with robbery and is treated not as an
independent crime when the true intent of the accused is to take with intent to gain the
property of another; and rape is committed only as an accompanying crime. It is irrelevant
when rape is committed for as long as it is contemporaneous with the commission of
robbery, the crimes are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery
with rape.
Here, the attendant facts clearly establish that the primary objective of the accused-
appellant and his companion was to rob the eatery, which they accomplished through
violence and intimidation, that is, with the use of a knife to threaten the victim.
Whether the accused-appellant sexually assaulted the victim is irrelevant. The

accused may still be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape as
conspiracy to commit the crime exists in this case. When two or more persons are charged
as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery with rape, it is irrelevant whether one or all of
them committed the rape. For as long as conspiracy to rob is proven, all will be treated as
principals in the crime of robbery with rape.
Consequently, it is irrelevant in this case whether the accused-appellant himself

participated in raping the victim. It being indubitably established by the testimony of the
victim as well as the result of the medical examination that the victim was raped.
Q: In the complex crime of robbery with rape, is the fact showing that one person
charged as co-conspirator sexually assaulted the victim relevant?
A: NO. Whether the accused-appellant sexually assaulted the victim is irrelevant. The
accused may still be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape when
conspiracy exists. When two or more persons are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of
robbery with rape, it is irrelevant whether one or all of them committed the rape. For as long
as conspiracy to rob is proven, all will be treated as principals in the crime of robbery with
rape. (People of the Philippines v. Coritana, G.R. No. 209584, March 3, 2021, as penned by J.
Gaerlan)
ADRIANO TOSTON y HULAR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Under the current law on illegal recruitment, a person who commits acts constituting
illegal recruitment may be held liable not only for the crime of illegal recruitment but also for
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa under said
provision are (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
FACTS
Toston, among others, was charged with estafa and illegal recruitment in separate
Informations. The prosecution presented the private complainant Mary Ann O. Soliven as its
sole witness. She met Toston in 2010, when she went to the office of Steadfast International
Recruitment Corporation to apply for a job as waitress in Singapore.
She went to Steadfast’s office in Malate, Manila, where she transacted with Toston and
Runas. Toston then gave her leave to go home and told her to wait for their call if she passed
the interview. Toston told Mary Ann that she passed. Gutierrez, who was the General
Manager of Steadfast, phoned Mary Ann that she also passed the medical examination and
that she should pay a placement fee.
Mary Ann made regular follow-ups with Toston for confirmation, but she was never
deployed. She saw a few social media posts saying that Steadfast is an illegal recruiter. Mary
Ann filed her complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.
The RTC found the accused guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa. The CA sustained
the verdict.
ISSUE
Whether or not Toston is guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa.
RULING
NO. Toston was validly documented employee of a validly registered recruitment
agency at the time he transacted with the complainant and Mary Ann’s non-deployment was
not only partly attributable to her own fault but also based on a justified reason.
Under the current law on illegal recruitment, a person who commits acts constituting
illegal recruitment may be held liable not only for the crime of illegal recruitment but also
for estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa under
said provision are (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused
to the offended party or third person.
While Mary Ann did suffer pecuniarily estimable damage in the form of the
P50,000.00 placement fee she paid to Gutierrez and Runas, the element of fraud by abuse of
confidence or deceit with respect to Toston is negated by the fact that, at the time of the act
complained of, Toston was an employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency.
Assuming Mary Ann was indeed defrauded when Gutierrez lied to her about the result
of her medical examination, such fraudulent act cannot be attributed to Toston, absent any
proof that he directly participated in or abetted the commission thereof.
However, the prosecution was unable to prove that Toston knew about the result of
Mary Ann's medical examination or that he was privy to the concealment of this fact from
Mary Ann by Gutierrez, the general manager of Steadfast.
Likewise, the defense was able to prove that Toston was not present and had no
participation whatsoever in the payment of the placement fee, which was handled by
Gutierrez and Runas.
Thus, the charge of estafa against Toston has no basis.

Q: Toston, was a validly documented employee of a validly registered recruitment
agency at the time he transacted with complainant Mary Ann. Toston was charged with
estafa after complainant was not deployed after payment of placement fee. Is Toston
guilty of estafa and illegal recruitment?
A: NO. While Mary Ann did suffer pecuniarily estimable damage in the form of the
P50,000.00 placement fee she paid to Gutierrez and Runas, the element of fraud by abuse of
confidence or deceit with respect to Toston is negated by the fact that, at the time of the act
complained of, Toston was an employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency. Assuming
Mary Ann was indeed defrauded when Gutierrez lied to her about the result of her medical
examination, such fraudulent act cannot be attributed to Toston, absent any proof that he
directly participated in or abetted the commission thereof. (Toston v People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 232059, March 3, 2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
ANTONIO M. SUBA v. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021, First Division (Peralta, J.)
DOCTRINE
Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable for violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Bad faith must be evident and must partake the nature of fraud. That is,
it is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage.
FACTS
Suba was the Acting Vice President for Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul Service while
Roberto Navida was the President and CEO of the Philippine Aerospace Development
Corporation, as attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communications.
Navida requested then DOTC Secretary Mendoza for authority to travel for a conference in
Beijing. The DOTC Assistant Secretary Cruz denied the request citing an order holding
foreign travels due to certain suspensions.
Suba requested cash advances for their travel, which Navida approved. Vouchers
were consequently prepared and issued in Suba’s name. Both flew to Beijing and attend the
event. The COA found deficiencies in Suba’s cash advances. The COA issued a Notice of
Disallowance holding Navida, Suba, and three others liable for the amount of P241,478.
The Sandiganbayan found Suba guilty of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly found petitioner guilty of violating Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
RULING
NO. Under Section 3 (e) (corrupt practices of public officers) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prosecution must prove the following to sustain a conviction: the offender is a public officer;
the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative, or judicial
functions; the act was done through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive, or ill will.
In People v. Bacaltos, bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable
for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Bad faith must be evident and must partake the
nature of fraud. That is, it is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do
wrong or to cause damage.
Suba did not act with evident bad faith. There was a prior and general approval by the
PADC board. There was a verbal assurance from his superior and travel companion that they
have the approval of the DOTC Secretary. Suba also returned the disallowed amount after his
appeal was denied, which in some cases was deemed a badge of good faith.
Q: Suba, the Acting Vice President for Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul Service of the
Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation, was charged before the
Sandiganbayan of violation of Section 3 (e) (corrupt practices of public officers) of R.A.
No. 3019 after the COA found irregularities on the cash advances made for his travel
to Beijing. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the offense and claimed that there
is evident bad faith on Suba’s part, an element of said crime. Is the Sandiganbayan
correct?
A: NO. Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive, or ill will. Suba did not act with evident bad faith. There was a prior
and general approval by the PADC board. There was a verbal assurance from his superior
and travel companion that they have the approval of the DOTC Secretary. Suba also returned
the disallowed amount after his appeal was denied, which in some cases was deemed a badge
of good faith. (Suba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021, as penned by J.
Peralta)
BENJAMIN M. OLIVEROS, JR., OLIVER M. OLIVEROS and MAXIMO Z. SOTTO v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder
or Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide.
FACTS
An information for Frustrated Murder was filed against petitioners, namely Benjamin
and Oliver. On October 30, 2013, inside the public market of Población, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, the accused in conspiracy with each other assaulted Glenn Apostol. Oliver held
on the back (sic) of the said victim while Benjamin hacked the face of Apostol.
Apostol fell to the ground. The said accused together with John Doe mauled him. As a
result of said assault on the unarmed victim, he suffered a “Hacking wound 9 cm zygomatic
area left, Hacking wound 5 cm, shoulder right, Lacerated wound 3 cm., frontal area.”
The RTC found the accused guilty of Frustrated Murder as co-conspirators. The CA
affirmed with conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of petitioners for the crime of
Frustrated Murder.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of petitioners but only for the crime of
Attempted Murder, not Frustrated Murder. Petitioners should be liable for Attempted
Murder and not Frustrated Murder, as the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim were
not proven by the prosecution to be fatal.
First, the medico-legal officer testified that the injuries may only possibly cause the
victim's death. Second, if ever the victim would die because of the wounds he sustained, his
death would not be caused by the wounds themselves, but his injuries might cause blood loss
or he might possibly die due to infection or tetanus if timely medical attention had not been
given.
It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide.
Q: Oliver and Benjamin hacked the face of Apostol causing the latter to sustain the
following wounds: (1) Hacking wound (9 cm zygomatic area left), (2) Hacking wound
5 cm, shoulder right, (3) Lacerated wound 3 cm., frontal area. Is the conviction of
Frustrated Murder proper?
A: NO. It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide. First,
the medico-legal officer testified that the injuries may only possibly cause the victim's death.
Second, if ever the victim would die because of the wounds he sustained, his death would not
be caused by the wounds themselves, but his injuries might cause blood loss or he might
possibly die due to infection or tetanus if timely medical attention had not been given.
(Oliveros, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242552, March 3, 2021, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
RODOLFO "SONNY" D. VICENTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 246700, March 3, 2021, First Division (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
Considering the absence of the first element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation
in this case, it would be futile to discuss the presence of the remaining elements. The absence of
the first element alone sufficiently shows respondent's failure to prove that petitioner is guilty
of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b). As such, he must be acquitted.
FACTS
Vicente was charged with estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC in an
Information. In June 2008, the accused received in trust from Roxaco Land Corporation the
amount of P42,600.00 for the purpose and under the express obligation of delivering and
turning over the same to Winner Sign Graphics, as herein represented by its Account Officer
Bethea Liwanag, as payment for services rendered by the latter to Roxaco Land Corporation.
However, the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with
his aforesaid obligation, misappropriated the amount and converted it to his own personal
use. The RTC found Vicente guilty of said crime. The CA affirmed the conviction but with
reduction of the penalty imposed.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Vicente for estafa.
RULING
YES. The elements of estafa by misappropriation are: (1) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
it; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.
The first element of estafa under paragraph 1 (b), Article 215 of the RPC is absent in
this case. There is no question that Vicente had an agreement with Roxaco. Vicente presented
a letter regarding his proposal for the supply of the creative design and printing of the
marketing materials. Roxaco’s VP wrote “OK” and signed the letter. The parties likewise
admitted that Roxaco issued checks to Vicente as payment for the billboards. However,
respondent failed to prove that Winner was a party to this contract or that there was any
contract between Winner and Roxaco.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature. Winner is not entitled to any benefits of
the contract since it is not a party to the contract.
Accordingly, Vicente did not receive the money from Roxaco in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return to Winner. Vicente received for his own account the payment from
Roxaco. Vicente's obligation to pay Winner P35,400.00 is separate and distinct from
Vicente's contract with Roxaco.
Considering the absence of the first element of the crime of estafa by

misappropriation in this case, it would be futile to discuss the presence of the remaining
elements. The absence of the first element alone sufficiently shows respondent's failure to
prove that Vicente is guilty of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b). As such, he must be acquitted.
Q: Vicente was charged with estafa due to his alleged misappropriation of P42,600
given to him in trust from Roxaco Land Corporation and under the express obligation
of delivering and turning over the money to Winner Sign Graphics. Is the CA correct in
affirming Vicente’s conviction?
A: NO. Vicente did not receive the money from Roxaco in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
to Winner. Vicente received for his own account the payment from Roxaco. Vicente's
obligation to pay Winner P35,400.00 is separate and distinct from Vicente's contract with
Roxaco. Considering the absence of the first element of the crime of estafa by
misappropriation in this case, it would be futile to discuss the presence of the remaining
elements. The absence of the first element alone sufficiently shows respondent's failure to
prove that Vicente is guilty of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b). As such, he must be acquitted.
(Vicente v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246700, March 3, 2021, as penned by J.
Carandang)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO DECHOSO y DIVINA
DOCTRINE
In a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue. The
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are normally involved demands
that the testimony of the private complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution.
Conviction frequently rests on the basis of the testimony of the victim which must be credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
FACTS
AAA was walking near the railroad track where she was working as a street sweeper.
She was then four months pregnant. Dechoso approached her, blocked her path, and hugged
her. He dragged AAA towards the railroad track, removed her uniform, and sucked on her
nipples. He inserted his private part into AAA’s vagina and had carnal knowledge of her.
AAA noticed Dechoso’s wallet protruding from his waist. AAA grabbed the same and
threw it towards a grassy area along the railroad track. When Dechoso left, AAA examined
an ID inside the wallet. Dechoso returned and grabbed the ID from AAA. However, Dechoso
could not find the wallet anymore.
Upon inspection back at the barangay hall, the wallet contained another ID belonging
to Dechoso, whom BBB and CCC recognized because Dechoso was a former junior volunteer
for the rescue team of the barangay. AAA identified Dechoso as the rapist.
The RTC found Dechoso guilty of the crime of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Dechoso of the crime of Rape.
RULING
NO. The arguments of Dechoso crumble in the face of the evidence of the prosecution
which, did, in fact, establish his guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape. The
elements of rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are: (1) The act is committed
by a man; (2) That said man had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) That such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.
The first element is uncontroverted. The second is shown by the narration of AAA
showing sexual intercourse. Notably, while the Medico-Legal Report shows no injuries
sustained by AAA on her genitalia, the examining physician clarified that this circumstance
does not negate rape as it was possible that no injuries arose as a result thereof because: (a)
the rapist could have lubricated his penis and/or the victim's vagina; or (b) the vaginal wall
of the victim had already widened after giving birth. In fact, AAA, during the incident of rape,
was already a mother of five children. Regarding the third element, AAA is categorical that
her life was repeatedly threatened by Dechoso if she continued to resist the rape.
About the assessment of the credibility of AAA as a victim, the Court assessed the
records and the testimony of AAA and therefrom, can only affirm the conclusion of RTC and
CA that same is credible and positive.
In a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue. The
Conviction frequently rests on the basis of the testimony of the victim which must be
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.
AAA’s testimony shows that she had several opportunities, and the crime scene was
illuminated enough for her, to not only see the aggressor, but also observed what he was
wearing, and thereafter found and recovered Dechoso’s ID.
Q: Dechoso, who allegedly raped AAA, contends that AAA could not have properly seen
her aggressor during the commission of the offense due to lack of illumination at the
crime scene. Is the claim valid?
A: NO. In a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue. The
Conviction frequently rests on the basis of the testimony of the victim which must be
things. AAA’s testimony shows that she had several opportunities, and the crime scene was
illuminated enough for her, to not only see the aggressor, but also observed what he was
wearing, and thereafter found and recovered Dechoso’s ID. (People of the Philippines v.
Dechoso, G.R. No. 232059, March 3, 2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICHARD PUGAL y AUSTRIA
G.R. No. 229103, March 15, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of
the fire and its intentional causation. Intent, being a mental act, is deduced from the external
acts performed by a person. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences
of his act.
FACTS
Pugal was charged with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.
At about 11 PM of December 31, 2008, brothers Ferdinand and Franklin were attending to
their store in Vigan City. FQ Grocery, the store, was licensed to sell firecrackers and
pyrotechnics devices.
Two men, Benjieboy and Pugal, arrived on board a motorcycle. Pugal, while holding a
firework slanted towards the fireworks display in front of the store, lights its fuse, and said
“Happy New Year!” The sparks flown towards the mother rocket which caused the FQ
Grocery to be razed by fire.
The RTC convicted Pugal of destructive arson. The CA directed the elevation of the
records to the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the intent to commit the crime of destructive arson was proven
RULING
YES. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare
occurrence of the fire and its intentional causation. Intent, being a mental act, is deduced
from the external acts performed by a person. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act. Here, it was shown that accused-appellant deliberately lit a
mother rocket, which was directed and flew towards the fireworks displayed at the store
and caused an explosion that burned the building to the ground.
Accused-appellant's very act of lighting the rocket in front of the store and pointing it
towards the mother rocket and other fireworks on display show a "reckless disregard for
human lives" and property.
Q: Pugal, while holding a firework slanted towards the fireworks display in front of
the store, lights its fuse, and said “Happy New Year!” The sparks flown towards the
mother rocket which caused the FQ Grocery to be razed by fire. Was his intent to
commit the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt?
A: YES. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence
of the fire and its intentional causation. Intent, being a mental act, is deduced from the
external acts performed by a person. There is a presumption that one intends the natural
consequences of his act. Here, it was shown that accused-appellant deliberately lit a mother
rocket, which was directed and flew towards the fireworks displayed at the store and caused
an explosion that burned the building to the ground. (People of the Philippines v. Pugal, G.R.
No. 229103, March 15, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
G.R. No. 241787, March 15, 2021, Third Division (Lopez, J., J.)
DOCTRINE
Testimonies of victims given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
manner are considered worthy of belief, for no woman would concoct a story of defloration,
consent to an examination of her private parts, and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in
a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.
FACTS
Two Informations were filed against the accused-appellant for allegedly raping his
own daughter AAA.
AAA, assisted by her uncle EEE, reported to the PNP that her father attempted to rape
her. During the investigation, she narrated to the police that she was raped by her father
twice. She was then barely nine years of age. At that time, her mother was in Qatar and she
was living with her father. On the first occasion, her father told her to lie down then he
removed her pajama and panty. He would forcibly insert his penis into her genitals. On the
second occasion, he raped her again. He told her “if you report the matter, I will kill you.”
On March 29, 2011, her father tried to rape her again but she resisted. She, together,
with uncles EEE and FFF, and aunt GGG, went to the police station to report the matter.
The RTC found accused guilty of Qualified Rape. The CA found the accused guilty of
two counts of Qualified Rape.
ISSUE
Whether the CA correctly convicted the accused-appellant of two counts of Qualified
Rape.
RULING
YES. The unimpeached testimony of AAA satisfactorily proved the animalistic acts of
accused-appellant. Her testimony clearly proved all the elements of the crime as well as the
qualifying circumstances. AAA’s testimony was candid, straightforward, and worth of belief.
Based on AAA’s testimony, she was nine-years old when she was raped. AAA claimed
that XXX told her to lie down and the latter inserted his private part on the former’s vagina.
The Court held that XXX’s attempt to question the credibility of the victim should be
ignored. Testimonies of victims given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank manner are considered worthy of belief, for no woman would concoct a story of
defloration, consent to an examination of her private parts, and thereafter allow herself to
be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished.
It is highly improbable for an innocent girl of tender years like the victim, who is naive
to the things of this world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but also to
her family.
Q: XXX on two occasions raped her own 9-year-old daughter, AAA. The accused-
appellant questions the credibility of the testimony of AAA. Is the contention proper?
A: NO. Based on AAA’s testimony, she was nine-years old when she was raped. AAA claimed
that XXX told her to lie down and the latter inserted his private part on the former’s
vagina. The Court held that XXX’s attempt to question the credibility of the victim should be
ignored. Testimonies of victims given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank manner are considered worthy of belief, for no woman would concoct a story of
defloration, consent to an examination of her private parts, and thereafter allow herself to
be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.241787, March 15, 2021,
as penned by J. J. Lopez)
MAYBEL A. UMPA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 246265-66, March 15, 2021, Third Division (J.Y. Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
Generally, courts view recantations or affidavits of desistance, if executed after
conviction of the accused, with suspicion and reservation because these can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
FACTS
Complainant Malibiran consulted the wife of his bestfriend, Umpa, on how he can
obtain the approved plan, tax declaration, and the Certificate of Title on Mamaril’s 7.2
hectare property located in Rizal. Malibiran, who is incidentally also te godfather to eldest
daughter, consulted her because he knew that she was working with the Land Registration
Authority.
Umpa assured Malibiran that she can produce the documents. She asked for a sketch
plan and the amount of P20,000 as research fee from Malibiran. Thereafter, Umpa
introduced Malibiran to Castillo, who was also working at the LRA as an accounting clerk.
Umpa asked for another P620,000 to facilitate release of the documents. Unfortunately,
Umpa failed to deliver any document.
The RTC found Umpa guilty of estafa as penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
The Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the courts a quo are correct in ruling that the petitioner is guilty of estafa.
RULING
YES. First, she took advantage of Malibiran's misunderstanding that she had the
authority and the capacity to facilitate the issuance of the approved plan, tax declaration, and
the certificate of title on Fernando Mamaril's land when she had neither. Petitioner claimed
in her petition that she referred Malibiran to Castillo, whom she knew could have the said
property titled.
Then again, Castillo was only an accounting clerk and also had no authority to process
the documents requested by Malibiran. Second, petitioner committed the fraudulent
representation prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud. Third, relying on
petitioner's representations, Malibiran paid petitioner the total amount of Six Hundred Forty
Thousand Pesos (P640,000.00). Fourth, petitioner failed to deliver the documents requested
by Malibiran. Neither did she return the amount that he paid. Consequently, Malibiran
suffered actual damages in the total amount of Six Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos
(P640,000.00).
Petitioner was also charged for violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). All the elements were proven. First, petitioner was then working as
Records Officer I for the LRA at the time of the commission. Second, petitioner made it appear
to Malibiran that she had the authority and the capacity to facilitate the issuance of the
approved plan. Third, petitioner asked Malibiran to pay her the total amount of Six Hundred
Forty Thousand Pesos relying on petitioner's misrepresentations Malibiran handed over to
the petitioner the total amount of Six Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P640,000.00), to his
undue injury.
Malibiran, however, executed an Affidavit of Desistance before he testified before the

RTC. He explicitly stated in his affidavit that he is no longer interested in prosecuting the case
against Castillo. Generally, courts view recantations or affidavits of desistance, if executed
after conviction of the accused, with suspicion and reservation because these can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration.
Here, Malibiran's affidavit does not partake of a recantation, as he has yet to testify in
court. All the same, Malibiran's unequivocal declaration that he will no longer testify against
Castillo precluded the prosecution from effectively obtaining the required evidence to
sustain his conviction. On that account, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Castillo.
Q: Mabiliran filed a complaint of estafa against Umpa and Castillo. Malibiran, however,
executed an Affidavit of Desistance before he testified before the RTC. He explicitly
stated in his affidavit that he is no longer interested in prosecuting the case against
Castillo. Does Malibiran’s affidavit partake of a recantation?
A: NO. Generally, courts view recantations or affidavits of desistance, if executed after

conviction of the accused, with suspicion and reservation because these can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Here, Malibiran's affidavit does not partake of a recantation, as he has yet to
testify in court. All the same, Malibiran's unequivocal declaration that he will no longer
testify against Castillo precluded the prosecution from effectively obtaining the required
evidence to sustain his conviction. (Umpa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246265-66,
March 15, 2021, as penned by J. J.Y. Lopez)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANOLITO RIVERA y SUAREZ a.k.a. "DOC
AGA" and MARY GRACE ESTANISLAO a.k.a. "GRACE"
G.R. No. 252886, March 15, 2021, Second Division (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized
drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.
FACTS
Three separate Informations were filed charging accused-appellants of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and (b)
Estanislao of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a certain Doc Aga (Rivera) and Grace
(Estanislao) were selling illegal drugs at their residence in Marikina City, members of the
Marikina Police Station prepared to conduct a buy-bust operation against them.
PO3 Basang recovered from Rivera the buy-bust money, and from Estanislao, her
green bag containing five plastic sachets with a total weight of 2.80 grams of while crystalline
substance, one empty transparent plastic sachet and other drug paraphernalia.
During the trial, the parties opted to dispense with PCI Libres’ (forensic chemist)
testimony, and in lieu thereof, entered into stipulations as to its supposed contents.
Before the RTC, Rivera was found guilty while Estanislao was acquitted. The CA
affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, acquitting Rivera.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
RULING
NO. Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the
seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over
the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
As held in Dela Riva v. People, the chain of custody is divided into four (4) links: first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
As regards the fourth link, case law provides that ''it is of paramount necessity that
the forensic chemist testifies on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the
dangerous drug submitted for examination.
It appeared that while the parties stipulated as to the manner the seized items were
received by the chemist and as to the results of the examination thereof, there were no such
stipulations as to the manner the seized items were managed, stored, preserved or handled
at the crime laboratory after it was examined by PCI Libres and before it was delivered to
the trial court for identification.
Absent these required stipulations, the fourth link of the chain of custody could not
be reasonably established.
Q: During the trial, the parties in an illegal drug case opted to dispense with PCI Libres’
(forensic chemist) testimony, and in lieu thereof, entered into stipulations as to its
supposed contents. Can this be a ground of acquittal of the accused?
A: YES. Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized
drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same. It appeared that while the parties stipulated as to the manner the
seized items were received by the chemist and as to the results of the examination thereof,
there were no such stipulations as to the manner the seized items were managed, stored,
preserved or handled at the crime laboratory after it was examined by PCI Libres and before
it was delivered to the trial court for identification. (People of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R.
No. 252886, March 15, 2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO VILLALON, JR. y PABUAYA alias
"JUNJUN"
G.R. No. 249412, March 15, 2021, Second Division (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
In drug related cases, "it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on
the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for
examination, i.e., when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying
labels or other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in.
FACTS
The case stemmed from three Informations filed before the RTC charging accused-
appellant with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, as well as Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Sec. 5, 11, and 12, Article II of RA 9165 respectively.
Acting on confidential information regarding the alleged illegal drug-peddling

activities of accused in a rented room of a house owned by a certain Mrs. Cabus in Negros
Occidental, the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group conducted a buy-bust
operation thereat with PO2 Mahinay as poseur-buyer.
PO2 Mahinay from the accused the marked money, three plastic sachets containing a
total of 5.298 grams of white crystalline substance, two pieces of lighter, and one improvised
tube tooter. The items were brought to the Escalante City Police Station where the items
were marked, inventoried, and photographed.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged. The CA affirmed in
toto the RTC ruling.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
RULING
NO. It is essential that the identity of the seized drug and/or paraphernalia be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti.
In this case, while the prosecution successfully established the first to the third links
of chain of custody, it however failed to show compliance with the fourth link of the chain of
custody.
Records show that during the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the
intended testimony of prosecution witness P/SInsp. Pascual, thus: (a) that he is an expert
witness; (b) that pursuant to the Request for Laboratory Examination from the Escalante
City Police Station, P/SInsp. Pascual conducted the qualitative examination on the specimens
submitted to them; (c) that after conducting the required examination, he reduced his
findings in Chemistry Report No. D-549-2015; and (d) that he can identify the specimens
which he subjected to examination.
However, in dispensing with his testimony, the prosecution failed to prove the
manner by which the specimens were handled before P/SInsp. Pascual received them, how
he examined the items, and how these were stored or kept in custody until they were brought
and presented in court as evidence.
In drug related cases, "it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies
on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for
labels or other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was
in.
Q: In a criminal proceeding involving possession of drugs, the prosecution failed to
prove the manner by which the specimens were handled before Police Inspector
Pascual received them, how the items were examined, and how these were stored or
kept in custody until they were brought and presented in court as evidence. Can this
be a ground of acquittal of the accused?
A: YES. In drug related cases, "it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies
on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for
labels or other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was
in. It is essential that the identity of the seized drug and/or paraphernalia be established with
moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti. (People of the Philippines v. Villalon, Jr., G.R. No. 249412, March 15, 2021, as penned
by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WESLEY
RAMOS y MOSCA @ "KAMBAL," MA. LEA RAMOS y BALILA @ "BING" and MOSES
MANANSALA y LUALHATI @ "OYE"
G.R. No. 243944, March 15, 2021, Second Division (Gesmundo, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is essential that the identity of the seized drug be established with moral certainty and
must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is
exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. This requirement is known as
the chain of custody rule under R.A. No. 9165 created to safeguard doubts concerning the
identity of the seized drugs.
FACTS
An information was filed before the RTC against accused-appellant with the crime of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA No. 9165.
In 2016, a confidential informant (CI) of the Anti-Drug Abuse council of Pasic reported
to Police Inspector Castillo that there was rampant selling of illegal drugs at Pasic City.
According to the CI, a shabu pusher known as “Balaw” allowed drug users to use his house
for pot sessions. The officers then planned a buy-bust operation.
The buy-bust team and the CI proceeded to the target area. The CI whispered to PO3
Caponga that the man standing at the front door of Balaw’s house was “Kambal,” Balaw’s
cohort.
Kambal was arrested. Recovered from Kambal was the buy-bust money and three
other plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. He asked for the name of Kambal to which
the latter answered, “Wesley Ramos alias Kambal.” At the place of arrest, Caponga marked
the item subject of the sale.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of said offense. Ramos and Manansala,
both also arrested on the scene, were acquitted. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
ISSUE
Whether the guilty of the accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been proven
RULING
NO. It is essential that the identity of the seized drug be established with moral
certainty and must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust
operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. This
requirement is known as the chain of custody rule under R.A. No. 9165 created to safeguard
doubts concerning the identity of the seized drugs.
As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. In the instant case, since the offenses charged were committed on
January 8, 2016, the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 10640 shall apply. Thus, the two
witnesses mandated by law to be present during the inventory and taking of photographs
must be complied with.
The apprehending team’s blatant disregard of the provision of Sec. 21 of RA No. 10640
is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Based from testimony, no representative from the NPS or
the media was present at the time of the physical inventory, marking, and taking of
photographs of the evidence seized from accused-appellant.
In this case, however, the prosecution offered no justification as to the absence of a

representative from the media or the NPS. By failing to follow even the simplest witness
requirement under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 10640, the police officers cannot be presumed to have
regularly exercised their duties during the buy-bust operation.
Q: In a proceeding regarding a drug case, testimony revealed that no representative
from the National Prosecutors Office or media was present at the time of the physical
inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the evidence seized from the
accused-appellant. Is this fatal to the prosecution’s case?
A: YES. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. In the instant case, since the offenses charged were committed on
January 8, 2016, the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 10640 shall apply. Thus, the two
witnesses mandated by law to be present during the inventory and taking of photographs
must be complied with. The apprehending team’s blatant disregard of the provision of Sec.
21 of RA No. 10640 is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Based from testimony, no
representative from the NPS or the media was present at the time of the physical inventory,
marking, and taking of photographs of the evidence seized from accused-appellant. (People
of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R. No. 243944, March 12, 2021, as penned by J. Gesmundo)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAE ALSAAD y BAGKAT
G.R. No. 242414, March 15, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt. The
lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the accused-appellant's guilt
cannot be proved. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct
evidence and therefore, also prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Arson. In 2010, Abdul was at their
house, together with Ibrahim, Sarah, Ameerah, Leila, Grace, and Al-Saad’s house help. At
around 1 a.m., Abdul was sleeping in his room with his younger sibling, when he was
awakened by Grace who was asking money from him buying milk for Leila. He gave the maid
P1,000 and went back to sleep.
He was awakened the second time around when the house was already on fire, there
was smoke in their room and he flames in the sala. Abdul was able to get out and saw Mae
and Leila, his half-sister, and Grace watching their burning house. His siblings Ibrahim and
Ameerah died, while his other sister Sarah suffered injuries.
Abdul and Mae were not on good terms because Mae was into drugs and was a
drunkard.
Mae was found guilty by the RTC of the crime of Arson penalized under PD 1613. The
CA affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting her of Arson with Homicide even though her guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. Arson is present when: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Here, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found that the prosecution
positively proved that accused-appellant deliberately set fire to their house which resulted
in the deaths of its two inhabitants. The case records clearly showed that accused-appellant's
acts before, during, and after the fire established beyond reasonable doubt her guilt of
committing the acts alleged in the Information. The prosecution sufficiently established an
unbroken chain of events which led to the fair and reasonable conclusion that she
intentionally set the house on fire.
Accused-appellant argues that the corpus delicti rule in arson was not satisfied and
that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict her of the crime charged. The SC,
however, held that resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by law.
The Court concedes that there is no direct evidence to link accused-appellant to the
alleged act, there being no eyewitness as to how the fire started. However, jurisprudence
holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt. The lack or absence of
direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the accused-appellant's guilt cannot be
proved. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence
and therefore, also prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of the witnesses all point to the fact that Mae started the fire. The
gasoline attendant of a gasoline station positively identified Mae as having purchased
gasoline from their store. The lead Fire Investigator also testified that the dirty kitchen area
where Mae reported to have seen a spark and smelled something burnt was not even
damaged by the fire.
Q: Mae allegedly started a fire which gutted Al-Saad’s house and killed two other
people. Mae argues that there is no direct evidence pointing out that she started the
file. Can this lead to her exoneration from the crime of Arson with homicide?
A: NO. Jurisprudence holds that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt.
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the accused-
appellant's guilt cannot be proved. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the
absence of direct evidence and therefore, also prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimonies of the witnesses all point to the fact that Mae started the fire. The gasoline
attendant of a gasoline station positively identified Mae as having purchased gasoline from
their store. The lead Fire Investigator also testified that the dirty kitchen area where Mae
reported to have seen a spark and smelled something burnt was not even damaged by the
fire. (People of the Philippines v. Alsaad, G.R. No. 242414, March 15, 2021, as penned by J.
Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOUIE C. VILLENA @ ISIT
G.R. No. 236305, March 17, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is clear that as regards rape of a mental retardate, the Court now holds that, following
People v. Quintos, when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person
below 12 years old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended.
FACTS
In 2011, Villena was charged with rape of an intellectually disabled girl before the
RTC of Agoo, La Union. The testimony of Dr. Kalaw stated that she issued a medico-legal
certificate finding proof of blunt force or penetrating trauma in AAA’s vagina.
AAA was lying alone in her room when Villena, drunk, suddenly came in. He strangled
her neck with his left hand and removed her clothes. He then fondled her breast, inserted his
penis inside her for a long time and threated to kill her.
According to Dr. Tangalin’s testimony, the private complainant was diagnosed to have
a mild mental retardation and she has a mental level of a 9-12 years old, meaning AAA can
understand questions that a child between 9-12 years old can understand.
The RTC found Villena guilty of Qualified Rape in relation to Sec. 266-A, Paragraph 1
of the RPC, as amended. The CA held Villena shall be guilty of simple rape.
ISSUE
Whether Villena’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-
A (1) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
disability is established.
It is clear that as regards rape of a mental retardate, the Court now holds that,
following People v. Quintos, when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental age is that
of a person below 12 years old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended.
It then follows that apart from the fact of sexual congress between the accused and
the victim, the latter's deficient mental condition, corresponding to a mental age of less than
12 years old, should similarly be proven to secure a conviction for statutory rape under
Article 266-A, Paragraph 1 (d). Here, this Court is convinced that these elements were
sufficiently established.
Q: The CA found Villena guilty of Simple Rape due to the latter’s act of raping AAA, a
mental retardate with a mental level of a 9-12 years old. Should Villena be found guilty
of Simple Rape?
A: NO. It is clear that as regards rape of a mental retardate, the Court now holds that,
following People v. Quintos, when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental age is that
of a person below 12 years old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended. It then follows that apart from the fact of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, the latter's deficient mental condition,
corresponding to a mental age of less than 12 years old, should similarly be proven to secure
a conviction for statutory rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1 (d). Here, this Court is
convinced that these elements were sufficiently established. (People of the Philippines v.
Villena, G.R. No. 236305, March 17, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO PANIS, LARRY CILINO FLORES,
AURELIO SANTIAGO AND JERRY MAGDAY GALINGANA
G.R. No. 234780, March 17, 2021, Third Division (Hernando J.)
DOCTRINE
Discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details and not actually touching upon
the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of weakening the
testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because they discount the
possibility of their being rehearsed.
FACTS
Panis, Flores, and Galingana were charged with the crime of murder. Artemio, Jr.
testified that in 2008 at Isabela, his father died as a result of a shooting incident. He narrated
that he was having coffee at around 5 a.m. when he heard gunshots coming from the house
of his brother Jhonny. He went to check what happened and saw his father lying down on the
ground. Artemio Sr. was able to identify the persons who shot him before he died.
The RTC found Santiago guilty of Murder but acquitted Flores. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether the CA correctly found Santiago guilty of Murder.
RULING
YES. To be convicted of the crime of Murder, the following elements must be
established, to wit: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) as amended; and (4) the killing constitutes neither parricide nor
infanticide. Here, the elements were duly established by the prosecution. Artemio, Sr. was
killed. Santiago was positively identified as one of the assailants in the killing of Artemio, Sr.
Moreover, the killing was not parricide or infanticide.
The SC held that treachery attended the commission of the crime thus qualifying the
offense to Murder. The Court enumerated the following elements that must be established
for treachery to be appreciated: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
Jhonny's straightforward testimony positively and categorically identified Santiago

as having shot Artemio, Sr. suddenly and without any provocation at all, hitting the victim at
the back. Undoubtedly, this showed that the attack was treacherous.
Moreover, Santiago's argument that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses

should not be given credence as they are inconsistent and contradictory fails to persuade.
Jurisprudence provides that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details and not
actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of
weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility,
because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, Jhonny's testimony was straightforward, categorical, and sufficient to convict
Santiago. The minor inconsistencies refer merely to collateral matters which do not touch
upon the fact of the commission of the crime.
Q: In a murder trial, accused-appellant Santiago argues that the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses should not be given credence as they are inconsistent and
contradictory. Is the argument tenable?
A: NO. Jurisprudence provides that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details

and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility.
Instead of weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility, because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, Jhonny's testimony was straightforward, categorical, and sufficient to
convict Santiago. The minor inconsistencies refer merely to collateral matters which do not
touch upon the fact of the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Panis, G.R. No.
234780, March 17, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEBERT TAROMA ZAPATA
G.R. No. 241952, March 17, 2021, Third Division (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
Once the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to
the defense and as such, the accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of Murder. Tambua testified that in
2008, at around 9:30 p.m., Nuevo and Ranien when to his house for a drinking spree. Zapata
passed by and Tambua invited the former to join them.
While drinking, Ranien and Zapata had a conversation about their respective IDs.
Ranien made a joke about Zapata’s ID. Ranien pointed out that the ID indicated Crime
Monitoring Section. Ranien claimed that he had been to Camp Aguinaldo, but it was his first
time to see such an ID. Accused-appellant got mad and went home, which is near Tambua's
house.
Tambua further testified that accused-appellant returned after a few minutes,

carrying a bolo with his left hand but hidden behind his back. Accused-appellant rushed
towards Ranien, transferred the bolo from his left hand to his right hand, and hacked Ranien
several times. After hacking Ranien, accused-appellant went on to hack Nuevo. Ranien and
Nuevo died. Zapata invokes self-defense.
The RTC found Zapata guilty of two counts of the crime of Murder. The CA affirmed
said ruling.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. Once the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts from the
prosecution to the defense and as such, the accused must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
In order to successfully invoke self-defense, accused-appellant must prove the

concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The SC agrees with the CA and the RTC that accused-appellant did not act in self-
defense. As between the self-serving allegations of accused-appellant and the
straightforward testimony of Tambua, the latter deserves more credence. In his defense,
accused-appellant merely alleged that the two persons inside the house of Tambua were
about to attack him; thus he hacked them. This version of accused-appellant is way contrary
to the positive statements of Tambua, who categorically testified that accused-appellant
went home after his argument with Ramen and returned a few minutes later holding a bolo,
which he hid behind his back.
Q: Zapata invokes self-defense after allegedly killing Nuevo and Ranien during a
drinking spree. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and CA that self-
defense is not attendant to this case. Hence, he was found guilty of two counts of
murder. In criminal cases where self-defense is invoked, who shall have the burden of
proof that there indeed was self-defense?
A: Once the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to
the defense and as such, the accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence. In order to successfully invoke self-defense,
accused-appellant must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent
or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. (People of the Philippines v. Zapata, G.R. No. 241952, March 17,
2021, as penned by J. Inting)
MICHAEL CASILAG y ARCEO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and
that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose,
i.e., to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Casilag for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
of The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.
PO1 Ramos and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Gutierrez and Police Officer De Leon
were conducting a monitoring and surveillance operation of persons involved in illegal drug
activities in San Pedro, Laguna, after receiving information that drugs were sold rampantly
in said place.
While they were walking towards an alley, Ramos noticed two men talking to each
other and who seemed to have an ongoing transaction. One of them was holding in his left
hand a transparent plastic sachet, which appeared to contain grounded candy.
Ramos approached them. The two men ran away but Ramos was able to catch the one
holding the two plastic sachets. He then seized and marked the sachets. They prepared a
Certificate of Inventory and photographed appellant and sachets. A forensic chemist
conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen yielding positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Casilag was convicted by the RTC of the crime charged. The CA affirmed his
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Casilag of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Casilag for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt. The
Court emphasized that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory is
mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an
essential purpose, i.e., to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of
the seized drug.
Only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the inventory, as
shown by the Certification of Inventory wherein only Mr. Nick Luares from The Laguna
Expose Star signed as a witness to the inventory. That only a media representative witnessed
the inventory was likewise confirmed by the testimonies of both Ramos and De Leon.
Here, the police officers and the prosecution were unable, nor did they attempt to
explain the deviations from the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the
prosecution simply failed to establish the integrity of the seized items — the corpus delicti
of the crime in drugs cases such as this one. The acquittal of the Casilag must thus perforce
follow.
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 provides for the procedure in conducting required

inventory immediately after the arrest of a person involved in dangerous drugs:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Q: Subsequent to the arrest of Casilag concerning his alleged violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 of The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended,
only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the inventory, as
shown by the Certification of Inventory. Did the prosecution commit an error that
militates against a finding of guilty of Casilag?
A: YES. Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 provides for the procedure in conducting required
inventory immediately after the arrest of a person involved in dangerous drugs: The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] Here, only a representative from the media was
present in the conduct of the inventory, as shown by the Certification of Inventory wherein
only Mr. Nick Luares from The Laguna Expose Star signed as a witness to the inventory. That
only a media representative witnessed the inventory was likewise confirmed by the
testimonies of both Ramos and De Leon. (Casilag v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213523,
March 18, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
ANTHONY JOHN APURA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 222892, March 18, 2021, First Division (Peralta, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be
a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
FACTS
On July 18, 2003, the victim, Enriquez, his cousin Bobit, and Mark Pua were at
Unibeersities Resto Bar in Cebu City. When Enriquez offered Labay, a waiter at the same bar,
a shot of beer, the latter saw that petitioner Apura walked behind Enriquez and struck the
latter with a bottle on his head. Subsequently, Apura stepped aside and three other persons
who were with accused, Que, struck Enriquez with beer bottles.
Thereafter, accused Que approached Enriquez and shot the latter. The gun, however,
misfired. On the second attempt, after accused Que turned on his side to fix the gun, Enriquez
was hit in the head and fell to the ground. A commotion then followed, with the rest of the
customers running. It was then that Apura, accused Que, and the three other companions
who struck Enriquez with beer bottles, walked through the big exit towards the gate and into
the direction of Grand Convention Center where they boarded a white van with plate number
GJM-961.
The victim, Enriquez was brought to the hospital and was attended to by Dr. Briones,
and the former eventually died, the immediate cause of which was the injuries he sustained
from the gunshot wound in the head. An Information was then filed against Apura, Ques, and
their companions for the crime of Murder.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner should be held liable as an accomplice of the crime.
RULING
YES. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there
be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
A close analysis of the events that took place prior and simultaneous to the crime
committed shows that Apura is indeed an accomplice. He struck the victim in the head with
a beer bottle, an act that indicates that he cooperated in the execution of the crime by a
previous act that is not indispensable in the killing of the victim, but, nevertheless, aided
accused Que in pursuing his criminal design.
Thus, all the elements for one to be an accomplice are present in this case. The
cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed,9 and
the prosecution was able to prove such cooperation. The unity of purpose with that of the
accused Que was also proven by the prosecution.
Q: Petitioner Apura walked behind Enriquez and struck the latter with a bottle on his
head. Subsequently, Apura stepped aside and three other persons who were with
accused, Que, struck Enriquez with beer bottles. Thereafter, Enriquez was shot dead.
Is petitioner Apura liable as an accomplice?
A: YES. A close analysis of the events that took place prior and simultaneous to the crime
committed shows that Apura is indeed an accomplice. He struck the victim in the head with
a beer bottle, an act that indicates that he cooperated in the execution of the crime by a
previous act that is not indispensable in the killing of the victim, but, nevertheless, aided
accused Que in pursuing his criminal design. Thus, all the elements for one to be an
accomplice are present in this case. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed,9 and the prosecution was able to prove such
cooperation. The unity of purpose with that of the accused Que was also proven by the
prosecution. (Apura v. People, G.R. No. 22892, March 18, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AURELIO LIRA y DULFO, ATANACIO
BARNOBAL y LIRA and RUDRIGO TEDRANES y MNU
DOCTRINE
The accused therein may still be validly convicted of the crime despite the insufficiency
of the Information. Likewise, if an Information is defective, such that it fails to sufficiently
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, then it is the
accused's duty to enforce his right through the procedural rules created by the Court for its
proper enforcement.
FACTS
Accused-appellant seeks to appeal the CA decision finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, but downgrading the crime from Murder to Homicide. Lira and his
companions were indicted for two counts of Murder as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the RPC.
The witness for the prosecution presented that in the afternoon of December 31, 2010
in Northern Samar, Dagsa saw the two victims lying on the ground who were later on
identified as Carlos Dulfo and his wife Elisa. Dagsa looked for Rhea, the daughter of the
victims to inform her of what he saw along the highway. Based from the postmortem
examinations, Elisa died from a single gunshot wound, while Carlos expired due to multiple
gunshot wounds. The prosecution claims that the possible reason why Carlos and Elisa were
killed, another witness, Arnel attributed it to politics because Carlos defeated Lira in the
barangay elections. The defense denied the allgations, claiming that accused was in his house
the whole day of December 31.
The RTC convicted Lira of the crimes charged, to which the CA modified on appeal by
downgrading the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that the Informations did not
give the particular acts constituting the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength.
ISSUE
Whether the CA’s modification of downgrading the offense from Murder to Homicide
is proper.
RULING
NO. The accused failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing the
remedies provided under procedural rules, therefore he is deemed to have waived any of the
defects in the Information filed against him.
The CA adhered to the ruling in the case of People v. Valdez where it was settled that
to discharge its burden of informing the accused of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the
crime. Meanwhile, there is a separate line of cases in which an allegation in the Information
that the killing was attended "with treachery" is already sufficient to inform the accused that
he was being charged with Murder instead of simply Homicide.
The Court thus convicts Lira of Murder instead of Homicide. The Court maintains that
the right to question the defects in an Information is not absolute. In fact, defects in an
Information with regard to its form may be waived by the accused. In the instant case, Lira
has waived his right to question the defects in the Informations filed against him. In People
v. Palarca, the Court held that the accused therein may still be validly convicted of the crime
despite the insufficiency of the Information. Likewise, in People v. Solar, citing People v.
Razonable, the Court held that if an Information is defective, such that it fails to sufficiently
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, then it is the
accused's duty to enforce his right through the procedural rules created by the Court for its
proper enforcement.
In the present case, Lira did not question the supposed insufficiency of the
trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Informations,
circumstances. In other words, Lira is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against
him by the Information. The CA therefore erred in modifying Lira's conviction in the way that
it did when he had effectively waived the right to question his conviction on that ground.
Q: The RTC convicted Lira of the crimes charged against him. This was modified by the
CA, ruling that the offense be downgraded from Murder to Homicide because the
Informations did not give the particular acts constituting the circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength. Is the CA’s modification correct?
A: NO. Lira did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information filed against him
through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his
plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived
any of the waivable defects in the Informations, including the supposed lack of particularity
in the description of the attendant circumstances. The Court thus modifies the decision of
the CA, finding Lira guilty of Murder instead of Homicide, maintaining that the right to
question the defects in an Information may be waived by the accused. In the instant case,
Lira has waived his right to question the defects in the Informations filed against him. (People
v. Lira y Dulfo, G.R. No. 235991, March 18, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUGENE SEGUISABAL
DOCTRINE
To sustain a conviction for rape through sexual intercourse under Article 266-A, the
prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the man had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or
intimidation.
FACTS
Accused-appellant seeks to reverse the CA decision finding him guilty of rape. The
facts laid down by the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant AAA, then 21 years old when the alleged crime was committed,
testified that at around 11 o'clock in the evening of November 1, 2009, she and her boyfriend
Nathaniel Seguisabal (Nathaniel) visited the cemetery for All Saints' Day. After which, they
decided to go to his house. While on their way, they went to a nipa hut, settled on a bamboo
beach, and got intimate with each other.
Roger Seguisabal (Roger) and accused-appellant Eugene Seguisabal (Eugene)

arrived. AAA did not know that Roger and Eugene were cousins of Nathaniel. They informed
AAA that her parents were furiously looking for her. Nathaniel offered to bring AAA to her
home, but decided otherwise because of his fear of AAA's father. Instead, Nathaniel
instructed Roger to use his motorcycle and to bring AAA to her house. Roger and AAA left.
On the pretext that AAA's father was chasing them, Roger drove past AAA's house and took
her to a different Barangay.
Roger told AAA that since he was able to stave her off from her father's wrath, she
should return the favor by having sexual intercourse with him. When AAA refused, Roger
embraced her and only released her when she promised to cooperate. She was then able to
free herself from Roger so she ran away. She chanced upon Eugene, and tried to ask for his
help. In turn, Eugene dragged her towards a nearby school building where he was able to
have carnal knowledge of her. Afterwards, he threatened to kill AAA if she would report the
incident to the police or to Nathaniel.
Later on, AAA told Nathaniel of the incident. She, together with Nathaniel and his
mother, went to the barangay captain and to the Police Station to report the matter, and to
the hospital for examination. Based on the results, AAA suffered from extragenital injuries
consistent with blunt force inflicted by non-accidental means, but there were no injuries
found in AAA's genitalia. Although accused-appellant admits that he and AAA had sexual
intercourse, he raised that AAA consented to it.
The RTC convicted the accused for the crime of rape, giving full weight to the
testimony of AAA. The CA defers the assessment of the RTC, ruling that it had the opportunity
to observe her demeanor while she was testifying.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting Eugene for the crime of Rape under Article 266-
A.
RULING
NO. AAA was able to narrate how the accused succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her through force and intimidation. To sustain a conviction for rape through sexual
intercourse under Article 266-A, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the man had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished
this act through force, threat or intimidation.
Eugene employed force and threat, for him to succeed in having carnal knowledge of
AAA. He dragged and carried AAA towards the school, pushed her body to wall, and pushed
her to lie down. He forcibly removed AAA's pants and underwear, while AAA tried to pull up
her pants. When AAA ran away, Eugene was able to catch her. He covered her mouth and
threatened to box and kill her, if she shouted. While covering her mouth, he choked her.
The Court takes judicial notice that rape victims may have different reactions to the
shock and trauma of a sexual assault. There is no standard form of reaction expected from a
victim in such a horrendous event. The human mind, while under emotional stress, is
unpredictable. Some may offer strong resistance, while others none at all.
Q: Private complainant AAA and her boyfriend Nathaniel went to visit the cemetery
for All Saints' Day. After which, they decided to go to his house. While on their way,
they went to a nipa hut, settled on a bamboo beach, and got intimate with each other.
Accused-appellant together with one Roger arrived, telling AAA that her parents are
furiously looking for her. Afraid of the parents, Nathaniel instructed that Roger and
the accused take AAA home. The accused then took her to a nearby Barangay where
he was able to have carnal knowledge of her, employing force and threat. Is the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape based on the reliance
of the Courts on the testimony of AAA?
A: YES. AAA was able to narrate how the accused succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her through force and intimidation. To sustain a conviction for rape through sexual
intercourse under Article 266-A, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the man had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished
this act through force, threat or intimidation. AAA testified that he dragged and carried her
towards the school, pushed her body to wall, and pushed her to lie down. He forcibly
removed her pants and underwear, while she tried to pull up her pants. When she ran away,
Eugene was able to catch her. He covered her mouth and threatened to box and kill her, if
she shouted. While covering her mouth, he choked her. (People of the Philippines v. Eugene
Seguisabal, G.R. No. 240424, March 18, 2021, as penned by J. Peralta)
CICL XXX, CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
While the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for
a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today we simply cannot be stuck to the
Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We should stay away from
such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today.
FACTS
CICL XXX is charged for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. In the evening of August
30, 2012, private complainant AAA was walking inside a campus. Then suddenly, CICL XXX
grabbed and pulled her towards a comer. He poked an icepick on the right side of her body
and uttered: "Wag ka sisigaw." CICL XXX kissed AAA on the lips down to her neck while
unbuttoning her blouse. He proceeded by taking off her sando and bra.
Uncontented, he pulled down her panties and mashed her breasts. When a teacher
passed by, CICL XXX ran away, giving AAA the chance to escape. She immediately went home.
She was so afraid, but a week after the incident, she mustered courage and confessed her
ordeal to a priest who encouraged her to report what happened to her. She informed her
aunt, BBB, about what CICL XXX did to her. They reported the incident to the school
authorities but nothing happened so they referred the matter to the barangay office. In turn,
they were told to proceed to the Women's Desk of the Batasan Hills Police Station.
As for CICL XXX’s defense, it denied having done the acts imputed on him, testifying
that he was attending classes that day. After their dismissal he immediately proceeded to
their service vehicle. He arrived home in the evening without quarreling with AAA or her
family.
The RTC found CICL XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness. He then filed an appeal with the CA, to which was also denied.
ISSUE
Whether the woman’s honor doctrine should be followed, thereby finding CICL XXX
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. CICL XXX alleges that the RTC essentially applied the Maria Clara doctrine in
giving credence to AAA's testimony, which he argues has been abandoned in People v.
Amarela. At the onset, the Court clarifies that it did not completely abandon the women's
honor doctrine in the case of People v. Amarela, but has tempered the application of the
doctrine according to the times.
The Court in People v. Nocido explained that the doctrine of women’s honor
recognizes the "well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they
have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened, because it is their natural instinct
to protect their honor."
However, as discussed in People v. Amarela, the opinion enshrined under the

Women's Honor doctrine borders on the fallacy of non-sequitur, that while the factual setting
back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in
disclosing a sexual assault; today we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of
a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We should stay away from such mindset and accept
the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today.
Thus, considering the Court’s pronouncements in People v. Nocido and People v.

Tulagan, there is no error in the RTC giving credence to complainant AAA's testimony while
recognizing the circumstances of her womanhood and youth. In any case, the RTC did not
base its findings solely on those circumstances, but on its finding that complainant AAA's
testimony is credible.
Secondy, CICL XXX’s argument that there are doubts as to the credibility of AAA’s
testimony given that the students at the time of the incident must have immediately seen the
same or its aftermath. However, the Court states that CICL XXX's argument fails to impress.
The number of students present at the school grounds, or other circumstances of time and
place have no bearing on the probability of the crime having been committed.
The Court has emphasized that "lust is no respecter of time and place." The graver
offense of "rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along
the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where there are other
occupants or where other members of the family are also sleeping."
The alleged discrepancies raised by petitioner refer only to minor details and
collateral matters, which do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility
of complainant AAA's declarations. As the Court held in People v. Tulagan, "what remains
paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the
positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.”
Lastly, as to the nomenclature of the crime, following the guidelines discussed in the
case of People v. Tulagan, that considering that petitioner committed acts of lasciviousness
on complainant AAA, who was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, the
nomenclature of the crime should be Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b)of R.A. No. 7610.
Q: In the evening of August 30, 2012, private complainant AAA was walking inside a
campus. Then suddenly, CICL XXX grabbed and pulled her towards a comer. He poked
an icepick on the right side of her body and uttered: "Wag ka sisigaw." CICL XXX kissed
AAA on the lips down to her neck while unbuttoning her blouse. He proceeded by
taking off her sando and bra. Uncontented, he pulled down her panties and mashed
her breasts. When a teacher passed by, CICL XXX ran away, giving AAA the chance to
escape. This was reported to the Women's Desk of the Batasan Hills Police Station. RTC
found CICL XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as affirmed by the CA. CICL XXX
contends that the RTC essentially applied the Maria Clara doctrine in giving credence
to AAA's testimony, which he argues has been abandoned in People v. Amarela. Should
the women’s honor doctrine apply in this case?
A: NO. At the onset, the Court clarifies that it did not completely abandon the women's honor
doctrine in the case of People v. Amarela, but has tempered the application of the doctrine
according to the times. The Court in People v. Nocido explained that the doctrine of women’s
honor recognizes the "well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit
that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened, because it is their
natural instinct to protect their honor."
However, as discussed in People v. Amarela, the opinion enshrined under the

Women's Honor doctrine borders on the fallacy of non-sequitur, that while the factual setting
back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in
disclosing a sexual assault; today we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of
a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We should stay away from such mindset and accept
the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today. (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 246146,
March 18, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AAA
DOCTRINE
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve years
(12) of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Basic in the prosecution
of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following elements: (1) the victim is
a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and (2) the offender has carnal knowledge of
the victim.
FACTS
Accused-appellant is indicted for the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. It was alleged
that in 2007, accused-appellant committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his finger in
the vagina of, and thereafter had carnal knowledge to one BBB, a 7-year old minor. The
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that the accused AAA arrived at their
house before BBB and her siblings had their supper. AAA frequented their house and slept
there for many nights. One evening, AAA was left alone in the living room watching
television.
Later, BBB was awakened and found herself with AAA in the banana plantation near
her house. Next, AAA put BBB on the ground, opened his zipper and showed his penis to BBB.
There, AAA proceeded to touch BBB’s vagina, after which AAA had carnal knowledge with
BBB. AAA left and went home. BBB also returned to their room, trying to wake up DDD to
borrow the latter’s jogging pants. AAA heard this, and warned her not to make any noise, so
BBB went to sleep because she was afraid.
AAA immediately told CCC that BBB had a nightmare that she was brought to the
banana plantation and that her jogging pants and panty were removed. CCC did not mind
what he heard because BBB had previous nightmare episodes. The following morning, BBB,
who was then crying, approached EEE and confided to the latter that AAA brought her to the
banana plantation and that the latter removed her jogging pants and panty.
EEE, CCC and BBB immediately reported the incident to the police. They proceeded
to the NBI, Caraga to report the abuse and to execute an affidavit-complaint against AAA.
BBB was also submitted to medical examination, where it was found that she sustained
recent lacerations on her hymen. BBB also testified that she was very sure that her sexual
molester was AAA because she was able to see his face through the aid of the light, and his
voice she also recognized. AAA argued as defense that BBB’s testimony was merely
fabricated.
The RTC sustained the prosecution’s testimonies, declaring that they were able to
establish with certitude and credibility that AAA had carnal knowledge of BBB. This was
affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. The Court held that AAA’s conviction must stand. The provision of law that
defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse is Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC.
Specifically, Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory
rape.
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve years
(12) of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Basic in the
prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following elements:
(1) the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and (2) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim. Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is
imperative for the prosecution to prove that the age of the victim is under 12 years and that
carnal knowledge took place.
In the case at bench, the element of carnal knowledge was primarily established by
the testimony of BBB, which the CA and the RTC found to be unequivocal and deserving
credence. The trial court found BBB's testimony to be "very credible" as it was made in a
"categorical and straightforward" manner. Notably, the CA agreed with the RTC on this point
and saw no reason to overturn the same. After approximating the perspective of the trial
court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the records, the Court likewise finds no justification to
disturb the lower courts’ findings.
Q: It was alleged that in 2007, accused-appellant committed an act of sexual assault by
inserting his finger in the vagina of, and thereafter had carnal knowledge to one BBB,
a 7-year old minor. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that the
accused AAA took BBB to the banana plantation, took off her pants and touched her
vagina. Afterwards, accused-appellant inserted his penis and had carnal knowledge
with BBB. Is the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged?
A: YES. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve years
(12) of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Basic in the
prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following elements:
(1) the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and (2) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim. Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is
imperative for the prosecution to prove that the age of the victim is under 12 years and that
carnal knowledge took place. In the case at bench, the element of carnal knowledge was
primarily established by the testimony of BBB, which the CA and the RTC found to be
unequivocal and deserving credence. The trial court found BBB's testimony to be "very
credible" as it was made in a "categorical and straightforward" manner. Notably, the CA
agreed with the RTC on this point and saw no reason to overturn the same. After
approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the records,
the Court likewise finds no justification to disturb the lower courts’ findings. (People v. AAA,
G.R. No. 247007, March 18, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENANTE TRASONA
DOCTRINE
Undoubtedly, treachery can be appreciated against accused-appellant because the
manner of attack was "deliberate, sudden and unexpected,” when he stabbed Marvin from
behind while the latter was obliviously dancing. His actions satisfied the two elements for
treachery which are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
FACTS
In 2008, the victim Jose Marvin B. Candol (Marvin), and his cousins Rolando, Kindred,
Yulmar and Gacho, attended a disco event at the basketball court of Barangay Uling, Naga,
Cebu City. While dancing, Rolando observed that Marvin inadvertently elbowed and stepped
on accused-appellant. Rolando and Kindred, thereafter, noticed that accused-appellant was
seemingly incensed at Marvin as he kept nudging and staring at the latter. Accused-appellant
later positioned himself behind Marvin and suddenly stabbed him from behind.
Martinez, who was on duty as barangay tanod at the time of the incident, saw
accused-appellant exiting the basketball court with bloodied hands. Martinez immediately
reported what he witnessed to the councilor on the apprehension that someone might have
been stabbed at the disco. Later, Martinez recounted the incident to Barangay Captain Dakay
and the same was entered in the barangay blotter.
Rolando brought Marvin to the South General Hospital in Naga City, but the latter
expired. Marvin's Certificate of Death stated that cause of death was "ACUTE MASSIVE
BLOOD LOSS, SECONDARY TO STAB WOUND, RIGHT UPPER QUADRANT."
PO2 Cabrera of the Naga City Police learned of the stabbing incident at late afternoon
of the same day. He, together with several other police officers, went to Dakay to identify the
perpetrator. Dakay called Martinez, and Martinez led them to accused-appellant's house,
which happened to be his neighbor. The team saw accused-appellant in the neighborhood
and caused his arrest after reading his rights. PO2 Cabrera brought accused-appellant to the
Naga Police Station where he was identified by Rolando and Kindred as the one who stabbed
Marvin.
Accused-appellant denied the crime and stated that he was just sleeping at home at
the time of the stabbing incident, as he was too tired after working overtime as a carpenter
for Carmen Copper Corporation. Accused-appellant also narrated that he went to work, and
he was apprehended once he got home by a group of policemen when Martinez pointed at
him as the perpetrator of a crime. He denied that Martinez was his neighbor, but said that he
knew the latter because Martinez threatened him with "One day I will get even with you,"
when he refused to bring Martinez's bio-data to his office.
The RTC upheld the version of the prosecution after determining that its witnesses
were credible. The RTC also found that the testimonies of Kindred and Rolando, as
eyewitnesses for the prosecution, were corroborated by Martinez.
ISSUE
Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of murder.
RULING
YES. Accused-appellant Renante T. Seguisabal is found guilty of the murder of Jose
Marvin Candol, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court finds
no reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that accused-appellant's weak defense
of denial and alibi cannot defeat the positive identification of eyewitnesses, whose
testimonies were strengthened by the corroborative testimony of Martinez. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi is negative, self-serving and
undeserving of any weight in law. Thus, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime,
and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission.
Undoubtedly, treachery can be appreciated against accused-appellant because the

methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
Thus, the Court finds accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder for which
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
correctly modified the award of damages by increasing the civil indemnity to P75,000.00,
moral damages to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P75,000.00, in line with the Court's
pronouncement in People v. Jugueta.
Q: In 2008, the victim Jose Marvin B. Candol (Marvin), and his cousins Rolando,
Kindred, Yulmar and Gacho, attended a disco event at the basketball court of Barangay
Uling, Naga, Cebu City. While dancing, Rolando observed that Marvin inadvertently
elbowed and stepped on accused-appellant. Rolando and Kindred, thereafter, noticed
that accused-appellant was seemingly incensed at Marvin as he kept nudging and
staring at the latter. Accused-appellant later positioned himself behind Marvin and
suddenly stabbed him from behind. Is the accused-appellant guilty of murder?
A: YES. Undoubtedly, treachery can be appreciated against accused-appellant because the

methods, or forms of attack employed by him. Thus, the Court finds accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of murder for which Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. (People v. Seguisabal y Trasona, G.R. No. 250330, March 18, 2021, as
penned by J. Peralta)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KARLO GUARIN y BAÑAGA
DOCTRINE
As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure
and confiscation of the same. The law now only requires two (2) witnesses to be present during
the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items, namely: (a)
an elected public official; and (b) either a representative from the Department of Justice or the
media.
FACTS
Appellant is charged in two Informations for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The testimonies from the prosecution established that one
afternoon, Police Chief Inspector Pasamonte called for a briefing for the conduct of a buy-
bust operation against appellant. After the buy-bust operation, the team was able to bring
appellant to the Police Station, and the plastic sachets submitted for examination.
On the other hand, appellant denied the charges, claiming that in the morning of
March 23, 2015, he went to the house of a certain Jessie Domingo to have a tattoo. Jessie told
him to wait as the former's wife went to buy an ink. While he was about to leave the house
since Jessie still went to fetch his wife, two men wearing helmets came and pushed him back
to the house. One of them poked a gun at him and ordered him to bring out the drugs. They
frisked him and confiscated his cellular phone and a P500.00 bill, and he was later brought
to the Camiling Police Station.
At the police station, the police officers called a Barangay Kagawad. When the
kagawad arrived, they all went back to the house of Jessie where he was ordered to point at
the three plastic sachets and a P500.00 bill placed on the ground and photographs were then
taken. He was then brought back to the police station and was subsequently subjected to a
drug test in Tarlac.
He was convicted by the RTC, finding all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of
shabu were proven. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto and was positively identified
by PO1 Corpuz, the poseur-buyer, as the same person who sold him a sachet of shabu for a
consideration of P500.00. The RTC also ruled that all the elements of illegal possession were
present in appellant's case. Appellant appealed with the CA, but the appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant should be convicted of illegal sale and possession of prohibited
drugs.
RULING
YES. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot
be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and
sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. In all
drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation.
The governing law in this case is R.A. No. 10640, which amended R.A. No. 9165.
Section 21 of the law provides for the procedural safeguards to be followed by the arresting
officers in the handling of seized drugs. It provides that in establishing the identity of the
dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link
of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.
As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the
marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately
after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law now only requires two (2) witnesses to
be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the
seized items, namely: (a) an elected public official; and (b) either a representative from the
Department of Justice or the media.
Here, while it was not shown to whom the seized drugs were transferred to after his
laboratory examinations, however, the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the
identity, integrity and probative value of the seized drugs had been properly preserved.
Thereby, the case is dismissed.
Q: Appellant is charged in two Informations for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. After a buy-bust operation headed by the Police Chief
Inspector, the team was able to bring appellant to the Police Station, and the plastic
sachets submitted for examination. It was found that these tested positive for drugs.
Should the appellant be convicted of illegal sale and possession of prohibited drugs?
A: YES. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. In all drugs cases, therefore,
compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such
operation. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the
marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately
after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law now only requires two (2) witnesses to
be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the
seized items, namely: (a) an elected public official; and (b) either a representative from the
Department of Justice or the media. Here, while it was not shown to whom the seized drugs
were transferred to after his laboratory examinations, however, the prosecution was able to
sufficiently show that the identity, integrity and probative value of the seized drugs had been
properly preserved. Thereby, the case is dismissed. (People v. Guarin y Bañaga, G.R. No.
252857, March 18, 2021, as penned by C.J. Peralta)
EUFROCINA N. MACAIRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; IMELDA Q.
AGUSTIN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIP F. DU v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS, MD. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
HORACIO D. CABRERA and ENRIQUE L. PEREZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
ANTHONY M. OCCAMPO and PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 215104, 215120, 215147, 215212, 215354-55, 215377, 215923 &
215541, March 18, 2021, First Division (CAGUIOA, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. in a catena of cases decided by the Court, it has
been consistently ruled that a mere signature or approval appearing on a document does not
meet the required quantum of proof to establish the existence of conspiracy.
FACTS
The consolidated petitions involve the purchase made by the DOH-NCR sometime in
May 1996 of 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol Suspension and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid. The Office of the Ombudsman received an
Anonymous Letter complaining about the alleged irregularity in these purchases of DOH-
NCR and implicating four pharmaceutical companies including Aegis Pharmaceuticals
(Aegis) and Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory (Lumar).
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioners of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Subsequently, an Information
charging petitioners Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Du, Agustin, Perez, and Ocampo for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to the purchase of 10,000 bottles of
Paracetamol Suspension by the DOH-NCR from Aegis, was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Majarais, Cabrera, Du, Agustin, Perez and Ocampo for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It found that all elements of the crime were present.
The Sandiganbayan held that Majarais and Cabrera, acted with evident bad faith in
purchasing 10,000 bottles of overpriced Paracetamol Suspension at PP25.00 from Aegis,
owned by Ocampo, when the January 1996 to June 1996 price list for 11 hospitals issued by
the DOH Central Office indicates that the price of Paracetamol Syrup/Suspension is P5.63.
According to the Sandiganbayan, their actions gave Aegis unwarranted benefits and caused
undue damage to the government in the amount of P193,700.
It further held that Du, Perez and Agustin acted in conspiracy with Majarais, Cabrera
and Ocampo, with the exception of Camposano. It explained that the signatures of Du, Perez
and Agustin on the Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIV), Purchase Orders (PO) and
Disbursement Vouchers (DV), which made possible the payment to Aegis, unquestionably
signify their assent to the transaction, a conspiracy to disburse public fund despite the fact
that there was no necessity to purchase the same at that time and despite the overprice.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave and serious error in finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. In a previous case, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and
corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders
punished. However, this objective can only be accomplished if the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which must closely be scrutinized under the lens of the spirit that animates R.A.
No. 3019, passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is
mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the
accused.
First, the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy among the petitioners. Allegedly
conspired and confederated with one another in giving unwarranted benefits to Aegis and
Lumar to the damage and prejudice of the government. The prosecution hinges its theory of
conspiracy solely on petitioners' respective signatures appearing on the following
documents: RIVs, POs, Certificate of Acceptance, DVs. To the Sandiganbayan, this was
sufficient to make petitioners liable as co-principals by reason of conspiracy.
However, the Court disagrees. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. in a catena of
cases decided by the Court, it has been consistently ruled that a mere signature or approval
appearing on a document does not meet the required quantum of proof to establish the
existence of conspiracy.
The Court explained in the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan that conspiracy cannot
solely be predicated on the very functions that a public officer had to discharge in the
performance of his official duties, especially when there is no indication that he had
foreknowledge of the irregularity committed by his co-accused. Indeed, a public officer may
have been lax and administratively remiss in his duty by relying too much on the reports
submitted by his co-accused, "but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be
a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality on the part of cohorts.
Second, the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime penalized under
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court finds that the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, as well as the element of causing undue injury to any party including the
Government, is wanting in this case. Even if it were to be conceded that the failure to conduct
the requisite public bidding for the questioned transactions was unjustified, no other
evidence was presented to establish that petitioners' actions were animated by malicious
motive or fraudulent intent to defraud the government. Since there is no bad faith and
manifest partiality on the part of petitioners, the purchase of the Paracetamol Suspension
and Ferrous Sulfate cannot be reasonably said to have given unwarranted benefits.
Q: The consolidated petitions involve the purchase made by the DOH-NCR
sometime in May 1996 of 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol Suspension and 1,500 bottles
of Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid. The Office of the
Ombudsman received an Anonymous Letter complaining about the alleged
irregularity in these purchases. The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of the
crime charged. Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding petitioners guilty of the crime
charged?
A: YES. The prosecution hinges its theory of conspiracy solely on petitioners'

respective signatures appearing on the following documents: RIVs, POs, Certificate of
Acceptance, DVs. However, the Court explained in the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan that
conspiracy cannot solely be predicated on the very functions that a public officer had to
discharge in the performance of his official duties, especially when there is no indication that
he had foreknowledge of the irregularity committed by his co-accused. Second, the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The Court finds that the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality, as
well as the element of causing undue injury to any party including the Government, is
wanting in this case. (Macairan v. People, G.R. Nos. 215104, 215120, 215147, 215212, 215354-
55, 215377, 215923 & 215541, March 18, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
RANULFO C. FELICIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 219747, March 18, 2021, First Division (GAERLAN, J.)
DOCTRINE
The basis of the criminal charges against the petitioners is the authorization and
release of increase of salary in favor of Feliciano as General Manager of LMWD. Nonetheless, it
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the authorization of such increase in the salary
of petitioner and the processing of documents which facilitated the payment was tinged with
manifest partiality; evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
FACTS
Two Informations were filed charging petitioners, along with other individuals for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds.
The Local Waters Utilities Administration (LWUA) is an agency attached to the NEDA,
tasked to promote and oversee the development of water supply systems in areas outside
Metro Manila through the grant of assistance through loans. Under its supervision is the
Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), of which petitioner Feliciano served as the
General Manager since 1975.
The LWUA took over LMWD on account of the latter's failure to pay its debt to the
former in 1990. Under the direction of LWUA, LMWD was placed under the leadership of an
Interim General Manager, and an interim set of BOD.
During the takeover, an administrative case was filed against petitioner Feliciano
before the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) for his "unlawful approval of
the disbursement of his backwages during which he has not rendered service to LMWD."
After investigation, the OGCC recommended the dismissal of petitioner Feliciano, which the
LWUA approved.
The takeover was then lifted by the LWUA, after which a new set of BOD was
appointed, including herein petitioner Aquitania. The new BOD of LMWD approved
Resolution No. 98-002, containing a statement that it maintains to be the sole authority to
appoint or dismiss the regular General Manager of LMWD. Thus, on motion of its members,
petitioner Feliciano was appointed as LMWD's General Manager. Then, the BOD passed
Resolution No. 98-33, which adjusted the monthly salary of petitioner Feliciano from
P18,749 to P57,146. And so, petitioner claimed and received from LMWD the amount of
P506,246.26, representing the increase in his salary as approved by the BOD.22 Such
payment is evidenced by Disbursement Voucher.
On post-audit, the COA disallowed the payment of the increased salary in favor of
petitioner. Because of this, the Informations above mentioned were filed against the
petitioners.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged therein. It found that all the elements of the crimes charged were present. It opined
that the LMWD, a local water district, is a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. As such, the compensation of
LMWD's officers and personnel must conform to the salary schedule under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. As for the charge of malversation, it
held that by virtue of his position, petitioner Feliciano claimed, approved, and received the
amount of P506,246.26 which he knew he was not entitled to receive.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Malversation
of Public Funds.
RULING
NO. The Court finds the second element of the crime wanting in the case at bar. The
elements for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 are the following:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
The basis of the criminal charges against the petitioners is the authorization and
release of increase of salary in favor of Feliciano as General Manager of LMWD. Nonetheless,
it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the authorization of such increase in the
salary of petitioner and the processing of documents which facilitated the payment was
tinged with manifest partiality; evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
As defined, Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed by means of dolo, that is
through bad faith or manifest partiality, or by means of culpa, that is through gross
inexcusable negligence. However, in the present case, the Court finds that the BOD acted on
the "honest belief" that the BOD of LMWD has the authority to increase the salary of
petitioner Feliciano as General Manager pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 or the
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
Notably, at the time of passage of Resolution No. 98-33, there was no categorical
pronouncement as to whether the salary of the General Manager of a water district is covered
by the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It was only in 2013, in the case of Engr. Mendoza v.
Commission on Audit that the Court was able to examine and reconcile the grant of authority
in favor of water districts to fix the compensation of its General Manager under P.D. No. 198
vis-a-vis the coverage of the SSL.
It is also significant to note that he took no part in the passing of the Resolution which
ordered the increase of his salary. In approving the release of funds, he merely acted on the
basis of the authority given by Resolution No. 98-33, which was passed by the BOD of LMWD
on the honest belief that it had absolute authority to fix the salary of its General Manager.
Clearly, petitioners cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 3019.
Q: Petitioner Feliciano served as the General Manager of the LMWD. LMWD was taken
over by the LWUA, during which an administrative case was filed against petitioner,
resulting to his dismissal from service. The takeover was then lifted, and a new set of
BOD was appointed. The new BOD of LMWD approved Resolution No. 98-002,
maintaining that it has the sole authority to appoint or dismiss the regular General
Manager of LMWD. Thus, on motion of its members, petitioner Feliciano was
appointed as LMWD's General Manager. His salary was also increased in another
resolution issued by the BOD. COA disallowed the payment and Informations were
filed against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Malversation of
Public Funds. Should the case against petitioner prosper?
A: NO. The Court finds the element of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence is wanting in the case at bar. The basis of the criminal charges against the
petitioners is the authorization and release of increase of salary in favor of Feliciano as
General Manager of LMWD. Nonetheless, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence in his
re-appointment as General Manager, as well as the increase in his salary.
The Court also finds that the BOD acted on the "honest belief" that the BOD of LMWD
has the authority to increase the salary of petitioner Feliciano as General Manager pursuant
to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. Clearly, petitioners
cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 3019. (Ranulfo C. Feliciano v. People of The Philippines,
G.R. No. 219747, March 18, 2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
TITO S. SARION v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 243029-30, March 18, 2021, First Division (Gaerlan, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is a basic principle that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be
entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor which is sufficient to cover the proposed
expenditure. Correspondingly, no revenue funds shall be paid out of the public treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation law or specific statutory authority.
FACTS
A Contract Agreement was entered into by herein petitioner in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of Daet, Camariners Norte, and one Billy Aceron, the General Manager of
Marbilt Construction. The construction of the Daet Public Market for P71,499,875.29 to be
completed in 365 calendar days is the subject matter of the agreement.’
A Notice to Commence Work was already approved by petitioner, authorizing

Markbilt to commence the construction project. Meanwhile, the petitioner's term ended and
Elmer E. Panotes (Mayor Panotes) was elected as the new Municipal Mayor of Daet.
Markbilt wrote a letter to Mayor Panotes, requesting the verification and proper
evaluation of therein attached monthly computation of variation in the prices of materials.
Sometime in 2006, the construction of the Public Market was completed. After which, the
Office of Mayor Panotes received a request for the processing and payment of the contract
price escalation in the amount of P5,222,903.75, in relation to the Daet Public Market.
However, Mayor Panotes, refused to act on the demand.
In 2007, Mayor Panotes was re-elected in the local elections. After a similar demand
was made by Markbilt with an additional imposition of a 15% interest per annum on their
claim. Panotes instructed Municipal Administrator Nagera to look for sources of fund to
satisfy Markbilt's claim.
This gave rise to the creation of Supplemental Budget No. 1 which was submitted to
the Sangguniang Bayan, appropriating the amount of P11,222,088.00 of the municipality's
internal revenue allotment, and designating under the Special Account, P4,400,000.00 for
the Construction of Market. An obligation request was then prepared by the proper
authority, and the documents were properly certified. A partial payment was made to
Markbilt, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Norte declared as operative the
Supplemental Budget of Daet.
In 2008, Zenaida Baluca, a resident of Daet filed a Complaint against the petitioner
charging a violation of Section 3€ of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to the payment of price
escalation in the construction of Daet Public Market. With this, the Sandiganbayan found that
the prosecution was able to establish the elements of Malversation. Further, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that the contract price escalation during the implementation of the
contract is expressly prohibited except under extraordinary circumstances, to be
determined by NEDA, and approved by the Government Procurement Policy Board.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner for the crime of
Malversation under Article 217 of the RPC, and violation of R.A. No. 3019.
RULING
NO. The Court ruled that there is no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan. The general rule is that these factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
conclusive upon the Court, save for certain exceptions which are not attendant in this case.
With respect to the crime of malversation, the petitioner posits that he cannot be
convicted of the offense as the elements of official custody of funds and accountability
therefor, and the act of misappropriation are missing. The elements common to all acts of
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are the following: (a)
that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated
or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.
Applied in this case, it is undisputed that the petitioner is a public officer, being then
elected Municipal Mayor of Daet and that the funds involved are public in character, as they
belong to the Municipality of Daet. Local government officials are accountable public officers
either because of the nature of their functions, or on account of their participation in the use
or application of public funds.
Moreover, it is a basic principle that no contract involving the expenditure of public

funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor which is sufficient to
cover the proposed expenditure. Correspondingly, no revenue funds shall be paid out of the
public treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation law or specific statutory authority.
In this case, the funds paid to Markbilt form part of the internal revenue allotment of
the Municipality of Daet and are by virtue thereof, “under the collective custody of the
municipal officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal
use." Consequently, they are public funds for which the petitioner as Municipal Mayor is
accountable. Here, the act of petitioner in approving the documents and signing the
Landbank Check in violation of the said elementary principles is a flagrant and palpable
breach of duty tantamount to gross negligence.
Q: Petitioner entered into a Contract Agreement with Markbilt for the construction of
the Daet Public Market. After the completion of the project, the Office of Mayor
Panotes received a request for the processing and payment of the contract price
escalation. And so, the mayor instructed the municipal Administrator to look for
sources of fund to satisfy Markbilt's claim. This gave rise to the Supplemental Budget
No. 1 which was submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan. The payment for the price
escalation was then allotted from the municipality's internal revenue allotment. A
concerned citizen filed a complaint against petitioner for malversation. Is petitioner
guilty of the said crime?
A: YES. It is undisputed that the petitioner is a public officer, being then elected Municipal
Mayor of Daet and that the funds involved are public in character, as they belong to the
Municipality of Daet. Local government officials are accountable public officers either
because of the nature of their functions, or on account of their participation in the use or
application of public funds. Moreover, it is a basic principle that no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor
which is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure. Correspondingly, no revenue funds
shall be paid out of the public treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
specific statutory authority.
In this case, the funds paid to Markbilt form part of the internal revenue allotment of
the Municipality of Daet and are by virtue thereof, “under the collective custody of the
municipal officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal
use." Consequently, they are public funds for which the petitioner as Municipal Mayor is
accountable. (Tito S. Sarion v. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 243029-30, March 18, 2021,
as penned by J. Gaerlan)
LYNNA G. CHUNG v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN-FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE
DOCTRINE
While the Court has a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers, this should be weighed against the purpose of a preliminary
investigation, which is securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and protecting one from an open and public accusation of crime from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial.
FACTS
The PNR Bids and Awards Committee passed BAC Resolution recommending Direct
Contracting with Pandrol Korea in the procurement of 170,000 sets of rail fastenings and
50,000 pieces of clips and insulators for the repair of rail tracks and replacement of parts in
the Quezon Province and in the Bicol Region. As basis for the procurement, PNR BAC relied
on the IRR of R.A. 9184. The prices indicated were quotations by Pandrol Korea.
Petitioner was among the members of the PNR-BAC, particularly the Department
Manager of Administrative and Finance. However, she inhibited herself from the
proceedings of the procurement. Through its General Manager, Andal, PNR entered into a
contract with Pandrol Korea. Petitioner was then directed to effect the payment for the
supplies, to which she complied with.
Respondent OMB-FIO then filed a complaint against members of the PNR-BAC and
several other individuals for violation of R.A. 3019 and 6713, alleging that she and Andal
were responsible for the unusually hasty payments to Pandrol Korea. All payments to
Pandrol Korea were made in full without adhering to the 15% and 85% schedule of
payments. The Ombudsman found petitioner and other PNR officials liable for the said
violation.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause
against petitioner for violation of R.A. 3019.
RULING
YES. While it may appear that the acts of all the defendants in this case are connected
in that they sprang from the same transactions, the act taken against petitioner is distinct
and severable from the acts of her co-defendants. It should hold no sway, therefore, whether
the case of petitioner before the Sandiganbayan has been consolidated with the other cases
involving the PNR-BAC members, or that those against Andal have recently been decided by
the anti-graft court with a finding of his guilt.
While, indeed, the Court has consistently recognized and generally deferred to the
plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman, the Court has, at the
same time, been quick to step in when the conduct of the Ombudsman of the preliminary
investigation was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court, sitting en banc, had the occasion to once again uphold this exception in the
very recent case of Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, wherein it was held that it will not shirk
from its duty to intervene upon proof of commission of grave abuse of discretion by the
Ombudsman as it is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a
grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be
invoked. Even at the probable cause stage, it is already evident that not every element of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is present in this case. In particular, there is no showing that the act
of petitioner was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, or that she gave any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to another,
or that undue injury was caused to the government.
Evident bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, but of having
a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.” Here, petitioner clearly explains,
and evidence show that she made the letters upon the instructions of Andal, and that they
merely authorize the opening of a Letter of Credit, which was in accordance with the
stipulation in the contract. Thus, she is not liable for violation of R.A. 3019.
All told, while the Court has a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise
of its constitutionally mandated powers, this should be weighed against the purpose of a
preliminary investigation, which is securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and protecting one from an open and public accusation of crime
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
Q: PNR entered into a contract with Pandrol Korea for the procurement of supplies for
the repair of rail tracks and replacement of parts in the Quezon Province and in the
Bicol Region. The General Manager of PNR directed petitioner to effect the payment
for the supplies, which she complied with. A Complaint was filed against her and other
PNR Officials for violation of R.A. 3019. The Ombudsman found petitioner liable. Is the
Ombudsman correct?
A: NO. While, indeed, the Court has consistently recognized and generally deferred to the
plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman, the Court has, at the
same time, been quick to step in when the conduct of the Ombudsman of the preliminary
investigation was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Even at the probable cause stage,
it is already evident that not every element of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is present in this case.
In particular, there is no showing that the act of petitioner was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, or that she gave any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to another, or that undue injury was caused
to the government. (Chung v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239871, March 18, 2021, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS PAUL TOLEDO y BURIGA
DOCTRINE
The exempting circumstance of insanity is based on a crucial temporal parameter: the
accused must be proven to be insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
FACTS
Accused is charged with rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610 in an Information filed
against him. He was arrested in 2004, and detained at the Quezon City Jail. After being
diagnosed by the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) that he is incompetent to stand
trial due to Schizophrenia, his case was archived until such time that he is deemed fit to
undergo trial.
During the trial, it was disclosed by the prosecution that one noontime in 2004, AAA,
who was then eight years of age and her brother BBB, six years old, were approached by the
accused, and invited to go with him to his house in exchange for money and food. The
children went with the accused to his house where he brought BBB inside a room to play
with a computer, while he let AAA go to another room, instructing her to lie down on the bed
to sleep. Afterwards, accused proceeded to undress AAA by removing her blouse, short pants
and panty. He held her hands and inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, accused
inserted his finger into AAA’s vagina and threatened her that if she will shout, he will let his
dog bite her and BBB. Accused likewise told AAA he will kill her and BBB and they will not
be able to get out of his house alive.
Not contented with what he has done, the accused dragged AAA and brought her
inside the comfort room, and did the same. AAA pleaded with the accused to let her and BBB
go home. Accused did so, with the condition that she bring to him her older sister. As soon as
accused opened the door of the comfort room, AAA ran to where BBB was. They ran towards
the door but the same was locked so AAA pleaded with accused to let them leave, to which
he reminded her to bring her older sister to him. The two went to the back of a Chowking
Restaurant where AAA removed her bloodied panty and threw it away.
Upon arriving home, AAA’s parents saw the blood on the towel she used after taking
a bath. They checked her vagina and saw that it was bleeding. It was only then that AAA told
them that she was raped. They reported the incident to the barangay authorities in their
place of residence. They were advised to go to Camp Crame for medical examination.
The Medico-Legal Officer found that AAA’s hymen has a deep fresh laceration,
concluding that there is a recent loss of virginity. Accompanied by the tanods of Barangay
Pinyahan, accused was apprehended and identified in open court. The defense argued that
Dennis was insane when the alleged crime was committed.
The lower court found accused guilty as charged. It gave full credence to AAA's
testimony, which it found to be candid, straightforward, and detailed. Furthermore, AAA's
testimony was corroborated by the medico-legal findings which prove the fact of
penetration. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the NCMH reports on Dennis’ insanity suffice to exempt him from criminal
liability.
RULING
NO. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code exempts insane persons from
criminal liability, unless it is shown that they acted during a lucid interval. Under our present
legal regime, persons are presumed to be sane and to have intended the ordinary
consequences of their voluntary acts. Thus, the accused who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance is deemed to have admitted or confessed to the criminal act. The
commission of the crime having been established through admission, the pivotal issue shifts
to the fact of insanity; and the burden of proving such fact must be borne by the accused who
invoked it. Moreover, the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime. Proof of the insanity of the accused after the commission of the
crime, especially during trial, is immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity is
continuous or recurring.
In the case at bar, both courts a quo found that the defense failed to prove Dennis'
mental state at the time of the commission of the crime charged against him. Crucially, the
defense did not present Dennis himself; or anyone who may have known him long enough to
testify about his character, demeanor, or behavior, before or immediately after the incident
or prior to his arrest. Instead, the defense relied solely on the psychological examinations
conducted on Dennis by the NCMH staff, and the reports prepared in connection therewith.
The exempting circumstance of insanity is based on a crucial temporal parameter: the

accused must be proven to be insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
Consequently, this Court cannot accept the NCMH reports as sufficient proof of Dennis'
mental state during the incident with AAA, since these reports pertain only to his mental
state at the time of the examinations, which were both conducted months after the incident
and after he had been attested.
Q: After being diagnosed by the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) that he is
incompetent to stand trial due to Schizophrenia, his case was archived until such time
that he is deemed fit to undergo trial. During the trial, it was proven that he raped AAA
one noontime. However, the defense submits that he was insane at the time the crime
was committed. Does the NCMH reports on Dennis’ insanity suffice to exempt him from
criminal liability?
A: NO. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code exempts insane persons from
criminal liability, unless it is shown that they acted during a lucid interval. Proof of the
insanity of the accused after the commission of the crime, especially during trial, is
immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity is continuous or recurring. The
exempting circumstance of insanity is based on a crucial temporal parameter: the accused
must be proven to be insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Consequently, this
Court cannot accept the NCMH reports as sufficient proof of Dennis' mental state during the
incident with AAA, since these reports pertain only to his mental state at the time of the
examinations, which were both conducted months after the incident and after he had been
attested. (People v. Toledo y Buriga, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021, as penned by J. Gaerlan)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TAMIL SELVI VELOO and N. CHANDRAR
NADARAJAN
DOCTRINE
In the transport of illegal drugs, intent and proof of ownership of the prohibited
substances, much less of the receptacles thereof, are not essential elements of the crime. The
crime is complete when it is shown that a person brings into the Philippines a regulated drug
without legal authority. The crime of transporting illegal drugs being malum prohibitum, the
accused's intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown.
FACTS
Both accused were charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. One afternoon, both accused, of Malaysian decent were seated
beside each other in a flight to NAIA Terminal 2 from Hong Kong. At the conveyor belt, Veloo
took a black Dibola luggage, thinking that it was hers, while Nadarajan took a black Phoenix
bag. Afterwards, they queued at adjacent lanes at the Customs Area of the airport.
Customs Examiner Buenconsejo apprehended Veloo and checked the contents of her
luggage containing many peanut brittles. This prompted Buenconsejo to search the false
bottom of the luggage where she felt a bulging hard rough object. She then opened the zipper
at the bottom, yielding a small clear plastic pack containing crystallized granules. After
seeing the plastic pack, Veloo pointed to Nadarajan, calling him “my husband.” Special Agents
were then instructed to apprehend Nadarajan, and brought the two to the Exclusion Room
for further examination. There, it was found that more clear plastic packs were inside their
bags totaling ten packs weighing four kilos. These yielded positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The inventory of the seized items was done in the presence of the accused, SAII
Punzalan, Kagawad Abasola, and ABS-CBN/DWIZ Media Reporter Raoul Esperas.
Buenconsejo then turned the bags over to the PDEA who, subsequently, delivered the same
to Forensic Chemist Arcos for analysis before turning them over to the trial court.
The RTC found both the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
separately charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 in relation to the
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs. The CA then affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto, and
denied the accused’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the accused should be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal
transportation of drugs.
RULING
YES. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 punishes the transportation of prohibited
drugs. The essential element for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the
movement of said drugs from one place to another. To establish the accused's guilt, it must
be proven that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the prohibited
drug exists.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR require that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) that the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice, all of whom shall be
As to the chain of custody, the Court has consistently ruled that the following links
must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
In this case, the Court finds that the chain of custody rule must be determined in
relation to the contents of each individual luggage. With regard to the first link on the seizure
and marking of the two bags, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to show the
preservation of the contents of the Phoenix bag. The second link on the turnover from the
Apprehending Officer to Investigating Officer was complied with as the bags were turned
over by Buenconsejo to 102 Lucero of the PDEA. The Court ruled the same with the third link
on the turnover from the Investigating Officer to the Forensic Chemist. As for the fourth link
on the turnover from the Forensic Chemist to the Court, the latter is convinced that only the
integrity of the drug specimens from the Dibola bag was preserved.
On the question whether the accused are guilty of transporting illegal drugs, the Court
rules that in the affirmative. In the transport of illegal drugs, intent and proof of ownership
of the prohibited substances, much less of the receptacles thereof, are not essential elements
of the crime. The crime is complete when it is shown that a person brings into the Philippines
a regulated drug without legal authority. The crime of transporting illegal drugs being malum
prohibitum, the accused's intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown.
As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, the CA gave credence to the
prosecution’s reasoning that “law enforcement authorities operate under varied conditions,
and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.” In the case of People v. Sanchez, it was made clear that in order for
non-compliance to be excusable, two requirements must be met: (1) there must be justifiable
ground for non-compliance, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have been preserved. However, the records of this case are bereft
of any testimony showing that the customs officials attempted to secure the presence of a
DOJ representative, nor of any justifiable reason for their failure to do so.
While the totality of circumstances in this case did not render the absence of a DOJ
representative fatal to the prosecution's case, the Court remind law enforcement agents that
the same has not always been the case and that the Court will not hesitate to enjoin strict
compliance, as it has done many times in the past, should the circumstances so warrant. It
bears stressing that the chain of custody procedure is not merely a procedural technicality
but a matter of substantive law. This is because the law has been "crafted by Congress as
safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty
imposed may be life imprisonment."
In the end, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA, finding the accused guilty of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in one criminal case. But it acquitted the
other charge for the same violation for failure of the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt
Q: Respondents were apprehended during their flight from Hong Kong to NAIA
Terminal 2. Customs Examiner Buenconsejo searched the false bottom of the luggage
where she felt a bulging hard rough object. She then opened the zipper at the bottom,
yielding a small clear plastic pack containing crystallized granules. The inventory of
the seized items was done in the presence of the accused, SAII Punzalan, Kagawad
Abasola, and ABS-CBN/DWIZ Media Reporter Raoul Esperas. Buenconsejo then turned
the bags over to the PDEA who delivered the same to Forensic Chemist for analysis
before turning them over to the trial court. Are the accused guilty of illegal
transportation of drugs?
A: YES. The essential element for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is
the movement of said drugs from one place to another. To establish the accused's guilt, it
must be proven that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the
prohibited drug exists. In the transport of illegal drugs, intent and proof of ownership of the
prohibited substances, much less of the receptacles thereof, are not essential elements of the
crime. The crime is complete when it is shown that a person brings into the Philippines a
regulated drug without legal authority. The crime of transporting illegal drugs being malum
prohibitum, the accused's intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown. (People of The
Philippines v. Tamil Selvi Veloo and N. Chandrar Nadarajan, G.R. No. 252154, March 24, 2021,
as penned by J. Peralta)
AILEEN CYNTHIA M. AMURAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANBAYAN SIXTH DIVISION
G.R. No. 249168, April 26, 2021, Third Division (Lopez, J. J.)
DOCTRINE
There is grave abuse of discretion when there has been an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty prescribed by law or to act in accordance with law, such as
when a judgment was rendered not on the basis of law and evidence, but on caprice, whim, and
despotism.
FACTS
An Affidavit was executed alleging the petitioner and her co-accused, as tourism
officers of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, solicited money and other gifts
from private individuals and entities for the purpose of tourism activities. The money and
gifts solicited then went to the personal and individual accounts of the petitioner and her co-
accused.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution

pursuant to Section 4, Rule VIII of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. The
Order directed petitioner to show cause why she should not be suspended pendente lite in
accordance with Section 13 of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner claimed that she should not be suspended because R.A. 3019 only applies
to those charged with violation under the same law and the provisions under the RPC on
bribery, and not to violations of R.A. 6713 of which she was charged.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the offense charged against petitioner is covered by
the rule on preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019. It noted that the imposition
of preventive suspension is applicable not only to those charged with violation of R.A. 3019
and Title 7, Book II of the RPC, but also to those charged with any offense involving fraud
upon the government and any offense involving public funds or property. The
Sandiganbayan held that fraud upon the government was committed when the money
received from solicitations was deposited in petitioner's personal bank account and
allegedly used for the latter's personal consumption. Without moving for reconsideration,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ordered her suspension pendente lite.
RULING
NO. There is grave abuse of discretion when there has been an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty prescribed by law or to act in accordance with law,
such as when a judgment was rendered not on the basis of law and evidence, but on caprice,
whim, and despotism.
Here, the Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the
Sandiganbayan in the assailed Resolution, the same having been issued on cogent legal
grounds. The suspension pendente lite ordered in the assailed Resolution finds basis in
Section 13 of R.A. 3019.
Verily, and contrary to petitioner's contention, the rule on preventive suspension is

not limited to cases where there has been a violation of R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the
RPC. The same Rule applies for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property.
As to whether there is fraud upon the government or public funds or property, the
Court has settled in Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan that the term "fraud," as used in Section 13 of
R.A. 3019, is understood in its generic sense, that is, referring to "an instance or an act of
trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation."
It is clear from the Information filed against petitioner that their act involves fraud
upon public funds as such money and gifts solicited were collected for the purpose of funding
the tourism activities of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Since the
petitioner is charged with an offense that clearly falls under Section 13 of R.A. 3019, her
suspension pendente lite is justified. The Sandiganbayan has no other option but to order the
suspension of the petitioner when it is convinced that the information charges her with acts
of fraud involving government funds.
Q: Petitioner was charged with an offense that falls under R.A. 3019. She was then
ordered by the Sandiganbayan to show cause why she should not be suspended
pendente lite in accordance with Section 13 of the same law. Petitioner claimed that
she should not be suspended because R.A. 3019 only applies to those charged with
violation under the same law and the provisions under the RPC on bribery, and not to
violations of R.A. 6713 of which she was charged. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the
offense charged against petitioner is covered by the rule on preventive suspension
under Section 13 of R.A. 3019. Is the Sandiganbayan correct?
A: YES. Having been issued on cogent legal grounds, the suspension pendente lite ordered in
the assailed Resolution finds basis in Section 13 of R.A. 3019. Verily, and contrary to
petitioner's contention, the rule on preventive suspension is not limited to cases where there
has been a violation of R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the RPC. The same Rule applies for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. (Aileen Cynthia M.
Amurao v. People of The Philippines and Sandiganbayan Sixth Division, G.R. No. 249168, April
26, 2021, as penned by J. J. Lopez)
JASPER TAN y SIA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 232611, April 26, 2021, Second Division (M. Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search
warrant makes the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any evidence
obtained in violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with two informations for the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Sections 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No.
6425. During trial, it was testified by the witnesses for the prosecution that they have been
conducting surveillance operations against Jasper beginning the last week of May 2002. They
conducted a buy-bust operation where Jasper was handcuffed and served with a search
warrant.
Thereafter, they searched Jasper's room in the presence of Barangay Captain Velasco.
Recovered were the marked money, amounting to P2, 100.00, drug paraphernalia, and white
crystalline substance inside six big plastic sachets and two small plastic sachets, which were
brought to the crime laboratory for examination, and tested positive for shabu. For his part,
Jasper offered the defense of denial and frame-up. The RTC convicted Jasper of the charges
against him. The CA affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the arrest of the petitioner is valid.
RULING
NO. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a
constitutionally protected right. To overturn this presumption, the prosecution must proffer
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty as to convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment.
If there is doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused in order to give
flesh and bones to this constitutionally-protected right. Applying this precept in the case at
bar, this Court is convinced that the prosecution failed to prove Jasper's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, hence, he must be acquitted.
To determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, the Court has consistently applied
the "objective test." In People v. Doria , the Court explained that the "objective test" requires
the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation to be clearly and
adequately shown. All these details must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure that
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Here, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the details of the purported sale.
Nothing in the records shows the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the seller,
and the manner by which the initial contact was made. The offer to buy, the willingness to
sell, and the agreed purchase price were not satisfactorily shown. What is more, considering
that PO2 Jose admitted that it was the confidential informant who transacted with Jasper, he
was not privy to the entire transaction. There was no indication that PO2 Jose directly saw
an illegal drug being sold to the poseur-buyer.
Further, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. In cases

involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drugs constitute the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of their existence is necessary to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with
moral certainty.
But as to one of the cases charging petitioner, it is unclear how the item subject of the
buy-bust operation was turned over to the police officers. P02 Jose did not testify that he
received the item subject of the sale at the place of the buy-bust operation as the next time
the poseur-buyer was mentioned in P02 Jose's narration was when the police officers
brought Jasper to the police station and the poseur-buyer was there as well.
As to the other Criminal Case, PO2 Jose testified that they turned over the confiscated
shabu to the person who issued the warrant, meaning, their office made a compliance and
returned the search warrant to the Court that issued the search warrant. However, upon
cross-examination, P02 Jose could not clarify who made the handwritten entries on the
certification as to the weight of the shabu. He said the entries were made by someone who
worked at Elma Bacho's Pawnshop, but he also stated that the entry was made at the police
station. Aside from this, the markings made on the substances were not preserved and
identified correctly during the trial.
Accordingly, whatever evidence the police officers recovered from Jasper lose their
integrity and evidentiary value because of the violation of the mandatory requirements of
the law. The irregular conduct of buy-bust operation as well as the procedural lapses the
police officers committed created significant doubt as to Jasper's guilt of the crimes of Illegal
Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Sections 15 and 16, Article III of RA
No. 6425.
Lastly, the search conducted and the admissibility of the seized items is not in
accordance with the safeguards provided by law. There is no evidence on record showing
that Jasper was brought to his room to observe the search of the premises. The evidence
points to only the barangay captain witnessing the search. Such a procedure violates Section
8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that "no search of a house, room
or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality."
Only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of
his family can the search be observed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. The police officers do not have the discretion to substitute their
choice of witness, the barangay captain in this case, for those witnesses prescribed by the
rules.
Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search
warrant makes the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any
evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. Without the confiscated shabu, no evidence is left to convict
Jasper. An acquittal for both charges is warranted.
Q: The witnesses for the prosecution testified that they have been conducting
surveillance operations against Jasper beginning the last week of May 2002. They
conducted a buy-bust operation where Jasper was handcuffed and served with a
search warrant. Thereafter, they searched Jasper's room where they saw white
crystalline substances that tested positive for shabu. Is the arrest of the petitioner
valid?
A: YES. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a
constitutionally protected right. To overturn this presumption, the prosecution must proffer
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty as to convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment. the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the details of the purported sale. Nothing in the
records shows the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the seller, and the manner
by which the initial contact was made. (Jasper Tan y Sia v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
232611, April 26, 2021, as penned by J. M. Lopez)
RUBEN DE GUZMAN y LAZANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 248907, April 26, 2021, First Division (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
Possession covers not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or
the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. In addition, possession must be
coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on
attendant events in each case and may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of
the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm under P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8249. He was arraigned in 2011 where he pleaded not guilty.
Respondent testified that one Christmas day, Dionisio was watching television at
home when his son Jones told him that the accused, Ruben, and one other Jose threatened to
shoot him. Dionisio went after them at the highway, where he confronted the two about the
threat. The accused said they were only joking, but Dionisio noticed a baby armalite hanging
on Ruben’s body so he tried to get it. The two grappled over the firearm. Dionisio was able
to take the firearm through Ramil, but Ruben was able to run away.
Dionisio and Ramil proceeded to the pulisya ti umili (PTU) in Roma and turned over
the firearm to PO I Callueng. The firearm was then turned over to another officer, was
marked in the presence of Dionisio and Ramil, and recorded in the police blotter after being
brought to the Enrile Police Station. When Ruben arrived in the evening, he was arrested.
As for Ruben’s defense, he testified that he was roving as the Chief Brgy. Tanod in
their area together with Brgy. Tanod Jose. He saw Dionisio talking to Silverio. After they
passed by, Dionisio poked a caliber .45 gun at him and threatened to kill him. One George
and Roman then proceeded to maul and strike him with a long firearm. Dionisio only ordered
them to stop when he saw blood oozing down Ruben's face. Brgy. Captain Lozano brought
Ruben to the hospital. Thereafter, Ruben went to the police station to report the incident.
However, he was arrested for illegal possession of a firearm that was surrendered by
Dionisio. It was further argued that Dionisio held a grudge against him because he was a
supporter of Brgy. Captain Lozano who defeated Dionisio in the barangay elections.
Dr. Danao testified that upon examination, he found a two-centimeter lacerated

wound on the right eyebrow of Ruben. He issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating his
findings.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of violation of P.D. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, giving weight to the testimonies of Dionisio and Ramil. It noted that Ruben
never categorically denied that he owns the firearm and that it was taken from him during
testimony. When he was at the Enrile Police Station, he did not confront Dionisio and Ramil.
In addition, he did not file any case against them or execute a counter-affidavit. This was
affirmed by the CA, although it modified the penalty, it held that all elements for illegal
possession of firearms were present.
ISSUE
Whether Ruben is guilty of the crime charged.
RULING
NO. The unauthorized possession of an M16 baby armalite with caliber 5.56mm and
ammunition is penalized under paragraph 2 of PD 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294. The
essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under the
foregoing provision are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
However, in this case, the second element is missing. This element requires to factors:
(1) the accused possessed or owned the firearm; and (2) he or she does not have the
corresponding license for it. Possession covers not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. In
addition, possession must be coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part
of the accused. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which
is largely dependent on attendant events in each case and may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
While it was admitted by the parties that the firearm is unlicensed, the Court is not
convinced that Ruben was in possession of the subject firearm. Ruben's account of what
transpired on December 25, 2010 is more credible than that of the respondent's. Ruben was
on his way home when Dionisio, George, and Roman attacked him. Silverio witnessed this
incident. Felisa likewise said that Ruben came home with blood on his face. All told,
respondent failed to prove the guilt of Ruben for the crime charged against him.
Consequently, Ruben must be acquitted.
Q: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm under P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8249. He was roving as the Chief Brgy. Tanod in their area together
when he saw Dionisio talking to Silverio. After they passed by, Dionisio poked a caliber
.45 gun at him and threatened to kill him. Then a George and Roman proceeded to
maul and strike him with a long firearm causing blood to ooze down his face. Brgy.
Captain Lozano brought Ruben to the hospital. Thereafter, Ruben went to the police
station to report the incident. However, he was arrested for illegal possession of a
firearm that was surrendered by Dionisio. Is Ruben guilty of the crime charged?
A: NO. The second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms is missing. This
element requires to factors: (1) the accused possessed or owned the firearm; and (2) he or
she does not have the corresponding license for it. Possession covers not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control
and management. In addition, possession must be coupled with animus possidendi or intent
to possess on the part of the accused. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or
determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case and may be
inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. (Ruben De Guzman Y Lazano v. People of The Philippines, G.R. No. 248907, April
26, 2021, as penned by J. Carandang)
WILBERTO BROZOTO y DE LEON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 233420, April 28, 2021, Third Division (LOPEZ, J., J.)
DOCTRINE
It is well to note that “a child is resumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any sexual intercourse.” “The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the
use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own
free will.”
FACTS
AAA, who was then 14 years old had a misunderstanding with her mother and ran
away from home. She stayed with a friend named Marivic and transferred to a childhood
friend named Dianne. While staying there, AAA helped out in household chords in exchange
for food.
She met petitioner through a common friend. During such encounter, petitioner asked
AAA if she is willing to engage in sexual intercourse for money. Since she needed money, AAA
agreed. Petitioner then instructed AAA to tell her future clients that she is already 18 years
old.
The next day, AAA had her first encounter with her client whom she had sexual
intercourse with for P2,000. Days after, AAA found out that her sister together with some
personnel from CIDG was looking for her so she moved to the house of another friend.
Finally, her mother was able to find her. AAA then told her everything she went through.
They immediately reported the incident to the Police Station. Dr. Cabral of the Regional
Hospital examined AAA and found finger-like lesions around labia minora and healed lesions
at her hymen.
The RTC convicted petitioner of the crimes charged based on the sole testimony of
AAA, which was then affirmed by the CA, ruling that the lone uncorroborated testimony of
the offended victim because it was clear, positive, and categorical.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner is guilty of the crime charged despite obtaining consent from AAA.
RULING
YES. Petitioner is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons. The term trafficking in
persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 as the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or position, or taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons.
Meanwhile, Section 4(a) of the same law enumerates the acts that fall under the term
“trafficking” in persons. In addition, the same law provides that the crime is qualified when
the person trafficked is a child. Further, in People v. Casio, the Court defined the elements of
trafficking in persons, the gravamen of which is the act of recruiting or using, with or without
consent, a fellow human being for sexual exploitation.
Here, the RTC found AAA’s testimony to be straightforward and consistent, which the
CA affirmed on appeal. While AAA admitted that she acceded with the petitioner’s offer to
find means to provide for herself, her consent may not be used by petitioner as a valid
defense. It is well to note that “a child is resumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any sexual intercourse.” “The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even
without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out
of his or her own free will.”
AAA’s declaration established that petitioner exploited her in prostitution when he

procured a customer to engage in sexual intercourse with her for a fee, from which he also
benefited. Petitioner merely denied the charges against him, which if pitted against the
positive testimony of AAA, the latter would prevail. The Court has consistently ruled that
denial cannot prevail against positive identification.
Q: AAA, who was then 14 years old met petitioner who offered her to engage in sexual
intercourse for money. Since she needed money, AAA agreed. Petitioner then
instructed AAA to tell her future clients that she is already 18 years old. She had her
first client, to which she was paid P2,000 in exchange for sexual intercourse. Is
petitioner guilty of qualified trafficking in persons despite obtaining consent from
AAA?
A: YES. Petitioner is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons. While AAA admitted that
she acceded with the petitioner’s offer to find means to provide for herself, her consent may
not be used by petitioner as a valid defense. It is well to note that “a child is resumed by law
to be incapable of giving rational consent to any sexual intercourse.” “The victim’s consent is
rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.” (Brozoto y De Leon v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233420, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. J. Lopez)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEOPOLDO VIÑAS y MANIEGO and MARICEL
TORRES y GONZALES
G.R. No. 234514, April 28, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
A conviction for rape may be upheld based on a complainant's testimony when it is
things. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, medical examinations are not
indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case. The finding of healed lacerations did not
weaken AAA's credibility and disprove her claim that accused-appellants had raped her.
FACTS
AAA, a 17-year-old cousin of Maricel Torres' sister-in-law BBB, visited her at her
house in Pampanga. Later that day, AAA, Maricel and her common law spouse and co-accused
Leopoldo Vinas together with an unnamed male person decided to drink liquor. After the
drinking session, AAA then laid down to rest beside the children of the appellants. The
appellants went inside their room while the unnamed male person went home.
Afterwards, Leopoldo called AAA into their room. When AAA was inside, she saw the
appellants naked and using shabu. She hurriedly went out of the bedroom to lie down in the
living room. Leopoldo followed AAA and tried to pull her inside the room. When she resisted,
Leopoldo hit her causing her to collapse. Leopoldo then carried her inside the room, dropped
her into the concrete floor and attempted to remove her clothes. Since AAA was resisting and
kicking him, Leopoldo asked Maricel for help.
Maricel held AAA's hands and gagged her while Leopoldo removed AAA's short pants.
Leopoldo told AAA to stop creating noise or else he would stab her. Then, while Maricel was
sucking AAA' s breasts, Leopoldo inserted his penis in AAA's vagina. Leopoldo had carnal
knowledge with AAA until dawn. He threatened AAA not to tell anyone what they did to her
or else he will kill her.
It was only after the appellants left the house to go to work that AAA was able to leave.
Immediately thereafter, AAA went to the house of her cousin BBB and recounted what
happened to her. BBB accompanied AAA to the police authorities to report the rape incident.
AAA went to the Jose B. Lingad Memorial Regional Hospital, where she was medically
examined by Dr. Luzviminda G. Guevara.
The RTC convicted Viñas and Torres of the crime of rape. This was affirmed by the
CA, citing People v. Espejon, where the Court noted that in a prosecution for rape, the material
fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its
commission. It added that such can be based on the complainant’s testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and consistent on material matters, which is applicable in this
case.
ISSUE
Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of double rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC.
RULING
YES. Accused-appellants are guilty of double rape. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code provides the elements of rape. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
found that the prosecution was proved that accused-appellants committed the crime of rape
under Article 266-A(1). In particular, the force, threat, or intimidation against AAA were
shown in accused-appellant Viñas's threats of bodily harm if she resisted, and accused-
appellant Torres's physical restraint of AAA.
The Court does not see any reason to overturn the lower courts' findings. A trial
court's factual findings, especially on the credibility of the complainant, are accorded great
weight and respect.
Accused-appellants were unable to point to any material facts or circumstances that

either the RTC or the CA overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated. A conviction for
rape may be upheld based on a complainant's testimony when it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Moreover, as
the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, medical examinations are not indispensable in
the prosecution of a rape case. The finding of healed lacerations did not weaken AAA's
credibility and disprove her claim that accused-appellants had raped her. Thus, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape.
Q: AAA, a 17-year-old girl, Maricel Torres and Leopoldo Viñas, together with an
unnamed male person decided to drink liquor. After the drinking session, Leopoldo
called AAA into their room. When AAA was inside, she saw the appellants naked and
using shabu. She hurriedly went out of the bedroom to lie down in the living room.
Leopoldo followed AAA and tried to pull her inside the room. There, Maricel held
AAA's hands and gagged her while Leopoldo removed AAA's short pants. Leopoldo told
AAA to stop creating noise or else he would stab her. Then, while Maricel was sucking
AAA' s breasts, Leopoldo inserted his penis in AAA's vagina. Leopoldo had carnal
knowledge with AAA until dawn. He threatened AAA not to tell anyone what they did
to her or else he will kill her. Are accused-appellants are guilty of double rape?
A: YES. Accused-appellant are guilty of double rape. Accused-appellants were unable to point
to any material facts or circumstances that either the RTC or the CA overlooked,
misunderstood, or misappreciated. A conviction for rape may be upheld based on a
complainant's testimony when it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, medical examinations are not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case. The
finding of healed lacerations did not weaken AAA's credibility and disprove her claim that
accused-appellants had raped her. Thus, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Viñas y
Maniego and Maricel Torres y Gonzales, G.R. No. 234514, April 28, 2021, as penned by J.
Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO CANILLO and ANTHONY CANILLO
G.R. No. 244051, April 28, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
Treachery must be present at the inception of an attack to qualify a killing to murder. A
treacherous act that happens during an attack or subsequent to it cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance.
FACTS
An Information for murder was filed against he accused and his son Anthony
sometime in 2009. During the trial, the prosecution presented Estrellanes as an eyewitness,
and the medico-legal officer.
Estrellanes testified that on the evening of September 3, 2009, in Bayawan City, he

was resting in his living room when he saw Alberto Bohol arrive at the house next door
where Nene and An lived. Bohol was driving a trisikad owned by accused who was then
sitting in the passenger car. The two went inside the house. A commotion was heard in the
house. Right then, Estrellanes saw how Bohol ran out of the house and straight into Anthony
who hacked Bohol’s head with a bolo.
Bohol staggered backwards and fell onto Eduardo, who had followed him. Using his
own bolo, Eduardo proceeded to hack Bohol's neck. Bohol fell face down on the ground and
Eduardo stabbed him from behind. Anthony went inside the house and came out with a mat,
which he wrapped around Bohol's dead body. Father and son each took one end of the mat
and took the body to the back of their house, toward the rice field.
The following day, Estrellanes heard people talking about a dead body near the rice
field. He went there and saw Senior Police Officer 4 Louie T. Batuto, to whom he eventually
confided what he saw the night before. And so, Eduardo and Anthony were arrested at An
an’s house.
The defense presented the accused himself, Anthony, and Eduardo’s sister Nene as
witnesses. Eduardo testified that he drank tuba with Bohol in front of a store, then they went
home to his house. Bohol then asked if he could borrow the trisikad of Eduardo, but when he
said no, Bohol got mad and pushed him, causing him to fall on his bed. Bohol then punched
him in the jaw twice, causing him to black out from the blows. After regaining consciousness,
he went outside to see Bohol’s body lying on the floor. Standing over it was his son, Anthony.
They hid the body afterwards.
Anthony testified that he awoke to loud voices coming from his father’s room. He also
heard sounds of struggle, so he quickly got his bolo and rushed to the room. When he saw
Bohol hitting his father, he hacked Bohol with his bolo. After he had killed Bohol, Eduardo
told him to hide the body, and so they dragged the cadaver near the rice field.
The RTC brushed aside Anthony's assertion of defense of relative, pointing out that
even if Bohol hit Eduardo, the unlawful aggression ceased when Bohol fled after Anthony
first hacked him. The trial court also held that Anthony's act of waylaying the fleeing Bohol
and swiftly hacking him on the head amounted to treachery. An appeal was then made, but
was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
employed treachery.
RULING
NO. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
hacked Bohol to death. However, it failed to prove that father and son reflected on the means
or form of their attack to ensure lack of retaliation from their victim. It likewise failed to
prove that treachery attended the commencement of the attack on Bohol.
In People v. Abadies, the Court explained that "[t]he essence of treachery is the swift
and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part."
There, this Court provided the two conditions that the prosecution must establish for a
killing to be qualified by treachery to murder: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him."
Both prosecution and defense evidence show that the altercation began inside the
house. But clearly in this case, the attack on Bohol outside the house was a continuation of
the altercation inside the house. It cannot be seen as a separate act which was attended by
treachery, because treachery cannot happen midstream of an attack. Thus, accused-
appellant Anthony's act of waylaying an escaping Bohol out on the street, even if he appeared
to have deliberately positioned himself right in Bohol 's path to catch him off guard, cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
People v. Tigle instructs that for treachery to qualify a killing to murder, it must be
present at the inception of the attack. When a treacherous act is first committed during the
attack, this would not constitute treachery or alevosia, as the treacherous act must have been
present before the attack.
The prosecution thus failed to prove that treachery attended Bohol's killing.
Nonetheless, accused-appellants were still properly convicted of murder, as the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage
of superior strength.
Q: Information for murder was filed against he accused and his son Anthony sometime
in 2009. An eyewitness testified that he heard a commotion in his neighbor’s house.
Right then, he saw Bohol ran out of the house and straight into Anthony who hacked
Bohol’s head with a bolo. Is there treachery in this case?
A: NO. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants hacked
Bohol to death. However, it failed to prove that father and son reflected on the means or form
of their attack to ensure lack of retaliation from their victim. It likewise failed to prove that
treachery attended the commencement of the attack on Bohol. People v. Tigle instructs that
for treachery to qualify a killing to murder, it must be present at the inception of the attack.
When a treacherous act is first committed during the attack, this would not constitute
treachery or alevosia, as the treacherous act must have been present before the attack.
Nevertheless, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. (People of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Canillo and Anthony Canillo, G.R. No. 24051, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
LETLET CARPIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211691, April 28, 2021, First Division (Zalameda, J.)
DOCTRINE
Nonetheless, petitioner’s intent to kill was not alleged and established. There is no
evidence showing that petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically
drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus interficendi must
be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the
crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
In 2007, petitioner and her sister Abadieza Gabelino (Gabelino) were charged with
illegal discharge of firearm under Article 25 of the RPC. During the arraignment, both
petitioner and Gabelino pleaded not guilty to the charge aand posted bail.
The prosecution presented for its defense, Clarion, a neighbor of Gabelino who
testified that petitioner passed by Clarion’s house and uttered demeaning words towards the
latter’s mother. Clarion confronted her. Enraged, petitioner went to Gabelino’s house to get
a gun. Gabelino then urged petitioner to shoot Clarion and said, "Barila, Barila" (Shoot her,
shoot her). Petitioner eventually fired the gun but missed Clarion, who immediately dropped
to the ground. She attempted to fire the gun anew but failed. Some people then intervened.
Additionally, Estrella Fuentes (Fuentes) testified that her grandchild was playing near
Clarion’s house at the time of the incident, where they heard a gunshot. She then ran towards
Clarion's house where she saw petitioner pointing a gun at Clarion who was, by then, on the
ground.
As for the defense, they presented the testimonies of petitioner and one Leticia Las
(Las). Petitioner insisted that neither she own nor know how to use a gun. According to her,
at the time of the incident, she was tending to her mother's stall at the public market, which
was corroborated by another witness.
Meanwhile, Gabelino testified that she was roused from her sleep due to a loud noise.
When she looked outside, she saw Clarion and her sons throwing stones at her roof. The
police then came and brought her and Clarion to the police station where the police
suggested that she file charges against the latter.
The MTCC found petitioner and Gabelino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charge of illegal discharge of firearm, and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment and
payment of costs. This was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s
findings.
ISSUE
Whether the CA correctly affirmed the petitioner’s conviction for illegal discharge of
firearm.
RULING
YES. There is no reason to reverse the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. It is
settled that he factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
entitled to great weight and respect. Particularly, the evaluation of witnesses' credibility is
"best left to the trial court because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor during the trial.”
As correctly found by the RTC and CA, the prosecution was able to establish the crime
beyond reasonable doubt. Under the Revised Penal Code, the elements of illegal discharge of
firearm are: ( l) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to kill that person.
In this case, the Court is convinced that Clarion and Fuentes sufficiently established
that petitioner fired her gun at Clarion. The trustworthiness of one of the witnesses’
testimony is apparent from her testimony. From this, it is clear that Fuentes arrived
immediately after the first gunshot and was able to see petitioner still pointing her gun at
Clarion. She candidly explained where she was in reference to petitioner and Clarion and
why she did not run after seeing the incident. Evidently, the failure to give the exact time it
took for her to run from her house to the Clarions' did not diminish the veracity of her
identification of petitioner and her narration of what she saw when she arrived at the scene.
Absent a showing of ill-motive on her part, this Court gives her testimony full credence.
Nonetheless, petitioner’s intent to kill was not alleged and established. There is no
evidence showing that petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus
interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: In 2007, petitioner passed by Clarion’s house and uttered demeaning words
towards the latter’s mother. She then went home to get a gun. Her sister Gabelino then
urged her to shoot Clarion and said, "Barila, Barila" (Shoot her, shoot her). Petitioner
eventually fired the gun but missed Clarion, who immediately dropped to the ground.
This was seen by several witnesses, including one Fuentes. But petitioner argues that
there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. Is Fuentes’
testimony enough to convict petitioner for illegal discharge of firearm?
A: YES. the Court is convinced that Clarion and Fuentes sufficiently established that
petitioner fired her gun at Clarion. The trustworthiness of one of the witnesses’ testimony is
apparent from her testimony. From this, it is clear that Fuentes arrived immediately after the
first gunshot and was able to see petitioner still pointing her gun at Clarion. She candidly
explained where she was in reference to petitioner and Clarion and why she did not run after
seeing the incident. Evidently, the failure to give the exact time it took for her to run from her
house to the Clarions' did not diminish the veracity of her identification of petitioner and her
narration of what she saw when she arrived at the scene. Absent a showing of ill-motive on
her part, this Court gives her testimony full credence. (Letlet Carpio v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 211691, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Zalameda)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZZZ
G.R. No. 232329, April 28, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the
information with ultimate precision.
FACTS
ZZZ was charged with two (2) counts of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 3 (RA 7610) in two Informations, which
start: "That sometime in the early part of 2008..." and "That sometime in the afternoon of
May 3, 2008..."
During trial, AAA testified that on two separate occasions in 2008, her grandfather,
ZZZ, forcibly took her out of their house, brought her to a secluded place and raped her. The
trial court rendered its Judgment convicting ZZZ of the charges of rape which the Court of
Appeals sustained.
ZZZ maintained his innocence and decried the finding of guilt despite the
prosecution's failure to establish with particularity the date of commission of the rape and
the inconsistent testimony of AAA.
ISSUE
Whether the failure to establish with particularity the date of commission is material
in prosecuting rape.
RULING
NO. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is
the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has
no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in
the information with ultimate precision.
Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA's testimony are understandable

considering that she was still only a minor, 16 years old, at the time she testified before the
trial court.
The testimony of AAA is consistent on material points. Slightly conflicting statements

will not undermine her credibility or the veracity of her testimony. They in fact tend to
buttress rather than impair their credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.
Q: ZZZ was charged and convicted with two counts of rape. On appeal, he raised as
issue the failure of the prosecution to establish with particularity the date of
commission. Will the appeal prosper?
A: NO. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the
information with ultimate precision. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232329, April
28, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
JAN VICTOR CARBONELL Y BALLESTEROS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 246702, April 28, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
For a conviction under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, there must be confluence
of the following requisites: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and, (3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
FACTS
CCC, AAA's mother, held a birthday party at their house in the evening of November
28, 2015. Accused-appellant, who was then the boyfriend of AAA's older sister, BBB, was one
of the attendants.
AAA stayed in her room the entire night. During the festivities, AAA was surprised
when accused-appellant entered her room and locked the door. Accused-appellant confided
in her that he might have impregnated her sister.
Upon hearing this, AAA gave accused-appellant some contraceptive pills and asked
him to give to her sister. Accused-appellant then asked AAA to remove her shirt otherwise
he would tell her friends that she has contraceptive pills.
Worrying that this could ruin her reputation, AAA complied. Accused-appellant then
mashed her breast, which prompted AAA to push him out of her room. Almost a month after
the incident, AAA learned that accused-appellant was spreading false rumors about her.
AAA then decided to tell her mother about what accused-appellant did to her. CCC
then assisted AAA in filing a criminal complaint against accused-appellant.
RTC convicted accused-appellant of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the

RPC. The CA modified the RTC Judgment, and convicted accused-appellant of Acts of
Lasciviousness defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
underscoring that AAA was 15 years old, or a child at the time of the incident.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is properly convicted under R.A. 7610
RULING
YES. For a conviction under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, there must be
confluence of the following requisites, thus: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and, (3) The child, whether male or female,
is below 18 years of age.
"Lascivious conduct," is defined as "the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person."
By "other sexual abuse" is meant to cover not only a child who is abused for profit,
but also in cases where a child was engaged in a lascivious conduct through the coercion,
influence or intimidation by an adult. In this case, petitioner, who was senior to the child
victim by four years, manipulated and subjected AAA to his lascivious conduct, under the
threat of ruining her reputation.
It bears emphasis, as well, that consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of

Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The law being malum prohibitum, the mere act of
committing lascivious conduct with a child subjected to sexual abuse already constitute the
offense
While the Information against petitioner made no particular mention of Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, this omission is not fatal to petitioner's right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. What controls are the actual facts recited in the
Information as constituting the offense charged, not its caption or designation
Q: AA asked BB to remove her shirt otherwise he would tell her friends that she has
contraceptive pills. He then mashed her breast, which prompted BB to push him out
of her room. AA was convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
in RTC. On the Court of Appeals, the judgment was modified and he was convicted of
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Is it proper?
A: YES. For a conviction under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, there must be
confluence of the following requisites, thus: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and, (3) The child, whether male or female,
is below 18 years of age. While the Information against petitioner made no particular
mention of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, this omission is not fatal to petitioner's
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. What controls are the
actual facts recited in the Information as constituting the offense charged, not its caption or
designation. (Jan Victor Carbonell y Ballesteros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246702,
April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
SPOUSES RICARDO TAYAMEN JR. and CARMELITA TAYAMEN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In Estafa under Article 316(2) of RPC, criminal liability is brought about by the deceit in
the selling of the property where the seller expressly represented that such real property is free
from any encumbrance. A cursory reading of the questioned Information would readily show
that there was no allegation that petitioners made an express representation in the second
Deed of Sale with Margarito G. Pacia that the subject real property is free from any
encumbrance.
FACTS
Petitioners sold to private complainant Ma. Mildred G. Bangit (Bangit) for
P800,000.00 a 120-square meter parcel of land. Despite full payment of the purchase price,
petitioners failed to surrender the title to Bangit.
Due to Bangit's repeated demands, petitioners issued an undertaking dated

December 22, 2011 to turn over the title to Bangit. Still, petitioners reneged on their promise.
Upon inquiry with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, Bangit discovered that petitioners
had subsequently sold the subject parcel of land to Spouses Margarito and Virginia Pacia.
Aggrieved, Bangit demanded the return of the P800,000.00 from petitioners. Upon
failure of petitioners to return the purchase price, Bangit filed a complaint for Estafa against
them. However, the Information failed to indicate that the accused expressly represented
that the property was free from any encumbrance.
ISSUE
Whether the case for Estafa will prosper.
RULING
NO. Section 6 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by
reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.
In this case, for petitioners to be criminally liable for Estafa under Article 316 (2) of
the RPC, the prosecution is burdened to allege in the Information and prove the following
essential elements of the crime: (1.) That the thing disposed of be real property; (2). That the
offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is
recorded or not; (3.) That there must be express representation by the offender that the real
property is free from encumbrance.; and (4.) That the act of disposing of the real property
be made to the damage of another.
Criminal liability is brought about by the deceit in the selling of the property where
the seller expressly represented that such real property is free from any encumbrance. A
cursory reading of the questioned Information would readily show that there was no
allegation that petitioners made an express representation in the second Deed of Sale with
Margarito G. Pacia that the subject real property is free from any encumbrance. A person
cannot be convicted of a crime not charged in the body of the Information.
Q: AA brought a property from BB. However, AA learned that BB eventually sold the
same property to CC. AA demanded the payment he had given to BB but the latter
failed to do so. Thus, AA filed a case for Estafa against BB. However, the Information
failed to indicate that the accused expressly represented that the property was free
from any encumbrance. Will the case prosper?
A: NO. Section 6 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. In this case, for
petitioners to be criminally liable for Estafa under Article 316 (2) of the RPC, the prosecution
is burdened to allege in the Information and prove the following essential elements of the
crime: (1.) That the thing disposed of be real property; (2). That the offender knew that the
real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3.) That there
must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from
encumbrance.; and (4.) That the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage
of another. Criminal liability is brought about by the deceit in the selling of the property
where the seller expressly represented that such real property is free from any
encumbrance. (Spouses Ricardo Tayamen, Jr. and Carmelita Tayament v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
JESUS LORETIZO NIEVES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 237432, April 28, 2021, Third Division (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution in violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. First, petitioner was indisputably
a public officer at the time of the commission of the offense, discharging his administrative and
official functions as the Regional Director of DepEd-RO IX, Zamboanga City. Second, he acted
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the procurement of Felta's products due to the
absence of a competitive bidding as well as his defiance of the DepEd's moratorium on the
purchase of IT packages.
FACTS
DepEd Regional Director Nieves was charged for give unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to Felta Multi-Media, Inc. (Felta) by falsifying the DepEd RO 9's
Bids and Awards Committee to make it appear that the BAC recommended direct contracting
as the mode of procurement of IT package materials worth P4,776,786.00
Upon investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman, the genuineness and due
execution of the BAC Resolution was questioned when the concerned signatories denied any
participation thereto.
Petitioner Nieves insisted that he did not falsify the BAC Resolution because the
document was brought to his office and was already signed by the members of the BAC. He
said he did not and could not have forged the signatures therein because he was not familiar
with the members' signatures.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification of
Public Document under Article 171 of the RPC.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner for violating Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification of Public Document
RULING
NO. The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are: (1) that the accused is
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (2) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. First, petitioner
was indisputably a public officer at the time of the commission of the offense, discharging his
administrative and official functions as the Regional Director of DepEd-RO IX, Zamboanga
City.
Second, he acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the procurement of
Felta's products due to the absence of a competitive bidding as well as his defiance of the
DepEd's moratorium on the purchase of IT packages.
Petitioner was also found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents
punishable under Article 171 of the RPC.
The elements of falsification under the aforesaid provision are as follows: (1) the
offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of
his or her official position; and (3) offender falsifies a document by committing any of the
acts of falsification under Article 171 of the RPC.
The BAC Resolution appears to have been signed and made to appear that they
recommended to petitioner the use of the alternative methods of procurement for the IT
packages which shall be distributed to some local schools. However, as stated by the
witnesses and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, there is no truth to these circumstances.
Q: DepEd Regional Officer AA is alleged to have preferred the procurement of
Company AA’s products without competitive bidding after he allegedly falsified a
document recommending such. Will a case for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
prosper?
A: YES. The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are: (1) that the accused is a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (2) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. First, petitioner
was indisputably a public officer at the time of the commission of the offense, discharging his
administrative and official functions as the Regional Director of DepEd-RO IX, Zamboanga
City.
Second, he acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the procurement of
Felta's products due to the absence of a competitive bidding as well as his defiance of the
DepEd's moratorium on the purchase of IT packages. (Jesus Loretizo Nieves v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 237432, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Inting)
DANTE LOPEZ y ANATACIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 249194 April 28, 2021, First Division (Zalameda, J.)
DOCTRINE
The prosecution cannot, and should not, merely depend on the operation of the
presumption of fencing to establish moral certainty for convicting the accused. More
importantly, the courts should be mindful in applying such presumption, subject to a careful
scrutiny of the facts of each case. This, considering that unjust convictions result to forfeiture
of life, liberty, and property.
FACTS
The prosecution provides that private complainant Rafael Mendoza saw his bicycle at
the corner of Katipunan and Ordoñez Streets. He commanded the driver of said bicycle,
Magno Lopez to halt and asked him where he got the bicycle. Magno answered that the same
was given to him by petitioner.
They then went to the barangay for the blotter of the incident. At the barangay, it was
agreed that the subject vehicle be turned over to Mendoza, but the following day the same
was taken back as ordered by the barangay captain.
Mendoza alleged that the said vehicle was stolen from him on January 15, 2011, which
was reported in a police blotter the day after the incident. He insisted that he is the owner of
the bicycle, having bought the same abroad.
Petitioner Lopez insisted that he used to own the subject bicycle. According to him,
he bought it from Bicycle Works located in Katipunan, Quezon City. He could not present the
receipt for the purchase of the bike since he bought it from Bicycle Works twenty years ago.
He also presented two notarized affidavits from Bicycle Works, one from its President,
Leopoldo De Jesus, another from its Chief Mechanic, Carmelito Gomez as proof.
The RTC ruled that the claim of ownership by Mendoza prevails over that of
petitioner. According to RTC, considering it was established that Mendoza owns the subject
bicycle, the burden now shifted on the part of petitioner to overcome the presumption of
fencing.
In affirming the RTC, the CA underlined that petitioner failed to destroy the
presumption of fencing.
ISSUE
Whether the presumption of fencing applies against the petitioner.
RULING
NO. The identity of the bicycle in issue was not established; hence, the presumption
of fencing did not arise.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the instant case, We find that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the bicycle in issue. Apart from the police blotter of the
alleged robbery, no evidence was presented to prove Mendoza's ownership of the bicycle in
issue.
The photos presented did not show any distinctive features to identify the bike.
Worse, the evidence at hand did not establish that the bicycle given by petitioner to Magno
is the same bicycle stolen from Mendoza. The features of the bicycle allegedly stolen from
Mendoza and the one owned by petitioner are principally different from each other.
The color of the fork of the bike owned by private complainant is aluminum or silver,
while that of petitioner is blue. The composition or the material used for the frame is also
different. Mendoza's is magnesium while petitioner's is aluminum.
The lower courts put much emphasis on the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612
which states that mere possession of any object which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. However, this presumption was overcame
by petitioner upon presentation of the notarized affidavits of the President and Chief
Mechanic of Bicycle Works that indeed, petitioner bought the bicycle subject of the case from
their store.
Disputable presumptions do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to

support them as in this case.
Q: AA saw his alleged stolen bicycle being used by BB. BB said CC had given the bicycle
to him. CC showed notarized affidavits of the President and Chief Mechanic of Bicycle
Works that indeed, he bought the bicycle subject of the case from their store. However,
CC was still found guilty of fencing, applying the presumption on fencing. Is the
judgment proper?
A: NO. The identity of the bicycle in issue was not established; hence, the presumption of
fencing did not arise. There were disparities between the stolen bicycle from AA and the
bicycle of CC. Furthermore, the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612 which states that
mere possession of any object which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing, was overcame by CC upon presentation of the notarized
affidavits of the President and Chief Mechanic of Bicycle Works that indeed, petitioner
bought the bicycle subject of the case from their store. (Dante Lopez y Atanacio v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 249196, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Zalameda)
ROMEO DAWAT, JR. y HARME v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or
weight of their testimony. On the contrary, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility
of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or
rehearsed.
FACTS
The prosecution provides that in the evening of September 22, 2011, Emily Aloc,
Sherly Abanto, Robert Oliva, and Wenceslao Flores were having a drinking spree. Wenceslao
excused himself from the group to answer the call of nature. The group noticed that
Wenceslao had not returned yet. Emily started looking for him and she saw petitioner Dawat
holding Wenceslao by neck. She witnessed petitioner slit Wenceslao's neck. Petitioner
released Wenceslao and grabbed Emily. She pleaded for her life and fortunately petitioner
Dawat yielded.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. He said that Robert and Wenceslao demanded

petitioner to come outside. Wenceslao then jumped over the fence of petitioner’s house and
threw a stone at him once but missed. Petitioner noticed that Wenceslao was holding a knife
so he grabbed a bolo. While petitioner was poking the bolo at Wenceslao's neck, the latter
moved causing his neck to against the bolo. As a consequence, Wenceslao got injured.
RTC convicted petitioner of homicide. The CA affirmed.
Petitioner is of the position that the inconsistency in the testimonies of both witnesses
with respect to Wenceslao's presence/absence during the drinking spree on September 22,
2011 is sufficient to discredit their entire testimonies against him.
ISSUE
Whether a single inconsistency in the testimonies of the witnesses could discredit the
entire testimonies of both witnesses.
RULING
NO. Petitioner attacks the credibility of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Emily and Robert. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor
the veracity or weight of their testimony. On the contrary, these minor inconsistencies
enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies
were contrived or rehearsed.
Here, the inconsistency pointed out by petitioner merely refers to minor details that
have nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged. Wenceslao's presence
or absence during the drinking spree does not negate the fact that he was present in or near
the area and was fatally injured by petitioner. The Court did not find such minor
inconsistency sufficient to disbelieve the testimonies of Emily and Robert pertaining to
material details surrounding the commission of the crime charged against petitioner.
Furthermore, by invoking self-defense, petitioner effectively admitted having

inflicted the fatal injury which caused Wenceslao to suffer hemorrhagic shock which
eventually resulted in the latter's death, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would
have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to him to show that
the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of victim Wenceslao; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his (petitioner) part - the person
invoking self-defense.
Among the three (3) aforementioned elements, the first one is indispensable. Without
the element of unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete, as a
justifying circumstance, or incomplete, as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
In the present case, the Court notes that Wenceslao threw a stone at petitioner only
once and did not use the knife as if to strike the latter. In fact, petitioner was not actually hit
by the stone. There was also no description of the stone's size for the Court to conclude that
the throwing of the stone was in fact an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for
purposes of appreciating self-defense.
The logical conclusion is that petitioner left and ran to get a bolo. The moment that he
left, unlawful aggression on the part of Wenceslao had already ceased to exist, there being
no showing that Wenceslao followed him and continued with his unlawful aggression.
Q: AA was having a drinking spree with his friends when he had to excuse himself to
answer the call of nature. Noticed that he has not come back yet, his friend BB started
looking for him. BB saw CC hold and slit AA’s neck which resulted to the latter’s death.
CC invoked self-defense and assailed the consistency in the testimony of BB. Will the
case of homicide prosper ?
A: YES. CC attacks the credibility of the testimonies of prosecution witness BB.

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight
of their testimony. On the contrary, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of
the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or
rehearsed. The inconsistency pointed out by CC merely refers to minor details that have
nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged. AA's presence or absence
during the drinking spree does not negate the fact that he was present in or near the area
and was fatally injured by CC. (Romeo Dawat Jr. y Harme v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
241126, April 28, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
ELPIDIO RUEGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ANTHONY M. CALUBIRAN
G.R. No. 226745, May 3, 2021, Third Division (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
Serious physical injuries contemplate physical deformity or the loss of a body part
resulting in the alteration of one's physical appearance. The loss of a tooth, may, in most cases,
be later repaired or replaced with an artificial tooth by a competent dentist. Thus, for the loss
of a tooth to be considered within the scope of serious physical injuries, the circumstances
surrounding its loss and whether it caused a physical deformity or permanent alteration of
one's physical appearance must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
FACTS
Witnesses for the prosecution testified that on September 5, 2005, at around 10:30
p.m., June Alfred Altura, Anthony M. Calubiran, Raden Selguerra, and Selguerra's father were
waiting for a jeepney along Paho Road, Barangay South Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City when
Ruego's group passed by. Ruego said to Calubiran, "[guina] kursunadahan mo kami?" (You
took interest in us?) and suddenly punched him.
Elpedio Ruego was charged with serious physical injuries under Article 263 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Per medical examination of Dr. Owen Jaen Libaquin, Calubiran sustained injuries in
the head region and a fractured upper right central incisor, causing permanent deformity.
Calubiran presented his fractured tooth in trial but it had "already been repaired by means
of a modern dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in the evidence."
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo found Ruego guilty of serious physical
injuries under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which the RTC and CA affirmed.
Petitioner points out that Calubiran's tooth was only fractured, not extracted; hence,
he should not have been convicted of serious physical injuries.
ISSUE
Whether the conviction of serious physical injuries is the proper charge for causing
the victim to suffer a fractured front tooth that has since been repaired by "modern dental
technological procedure.
RULING
NO. The physical injury, as stated in the Revised Penal Code, must be of such serious
nature that it cannot be restored through medical means. It can readily be concluded that the
serious physical injury contemplated by law should alter one's physical appearance
permanently.
Deformity or the loss of any other part of the body under Article 263 (3), therefore,
should be properly interpreted to mean the loss of an eye, an ear, or any of the limbs — all
of which would visibly alter one's physical appearance and body functions.
The loss of an eye results in blindness that artificial eyes cannot restore. The loss of
an ear will alter one's head shape and may result in deafness. Persons with artificial limbs
will have different postures and gaits.
In contrast, artificial teeth are so common that they are known to the general public
by its colloquial term: pustiso.
In determining whether or not the loss of a tooth could be considered a serious

physical injury under Article 263, there must first be a factual determination during trial that
the loss of the tooth resulted in a visible deformity. Where deformity is not apparent at trial,
whether as a result of a lesser injurious act or through medical intervention, a lesser penalty
should be imposed
The trial court observed that Calubiran's tooth had "already [been] repaired by means
of a modern dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in the evidence." In
other words, Calubiran's face had no visible disfigurement that would warrant petitioner's
conviction of serious physical injuries under Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: AA punched BB that resulted to latter to suffer fractured tooth which has been
repaired by “modern dental technological procedure” . BB filed a case for serious
physical injuries. Will it prosper ?
A: NO. In determining whether or not the loss of a tooth could be considered a serious
physical injury under Article 263, there must first be a factual determination during trial that
the loss of the tooth resulted in a visible deformity. Where deformity is not apparent at trial,
whether as a result of a lesser injurious act or through medical intervention, a lesser penalty
should be imposed. It is observed that BB’s tooth had "already [been] repaired by means of
a modern dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in the evidence." In
other words, BB's face had no visible disfigurement that would warrant AA’s conviction of
serious physical injuries under Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. (Elpidio Ruego v.
People of the Philippines and Anthony M. Calubiran, G.R. No. 226745, May 3, 2021, as penned
by J. Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN PADILLA y ESPIRITU
G.R. No. 247603, May 5, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper
prison term.
FACTS
Prosecution provides that in the evening of November 3, 2014, Barangay Captain
Arnulfo Martin received a call from accused-appellant's sister, Helen Casugo, who informed
him about a quarrel at the house of accused-appellant. Minutes after the call, accused-
appellant's son, Richard Padilla, went to Martin's house and informed him that accused-
appellant was having a quarrel with Marcelina.
Upon being told that accused-appellant was carrying a weapon, Martin called for
assistance from the Municipal Police Station. After a few minutes, accused-appellant came
out of his house and walked towards them. When asked what happened inside the house,
accused-appellant answered, "Hindi ko alam ang nangyari pare[,] napatay ko yata ang aking
asawa."
In his defense, the accused-appellant said the victim revealed to him that she was
having an affair with another man. Furious, accused-appellant went to the kitchen, where he
found a knife. Accused-appellant could no longer remember what ensued next, except that
he might have killed Marcelina.
RTC convicted accused-appellant of Parricide which the CA affirmed.
As regards the invoked mitigating circumstances, the CA did not consider passion and
obfuscation, holding that accused-appellant failed to establish clear and convincing proof
that Marcelina confessed to him about her alleged infidelity, from which passion and
obfuscation on his part may be produced.
Also, the CA did not appreciate intoxication as mitigating, holding that accused-
appellant failed to establish that he was in such state of intoxication as would blur his reason
at the time of the incident. It observed that accused-appellant keenly noticed details when
he came home on the fateful night i.e., that the door of their house was open and that there
was no light, and that he managed to check the room of his two children to verify if they were
home.
Lastly, the CA considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender finding

the same to be spontaneous.
ISSUE
Whether all the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, intoxication,
and voluntary surrender must be appreciated.
RULING
NO. Accused-appellant insists that the mitigating circumstances of intoxication,
voluntary surrender, and passion or obfuscation should be appreciated in his favor.
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the

presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper
prison term.
Here, considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two indivisible penalties
— reclusion perpetua to death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper regardless of the
mitigating circumstances invoked by accused-appellant, there being no aggravating
circumstance that would call for the imposition of the maximum penalty of death. Otherwise
put, even if it may be contended that both the CA and the RTC erred in considering the
mitigating circumstances of intoxication and passion and obfuscation, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua remains. This is clear from Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that the exclusion of said mitigating circumstances does not result to a different
penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary
surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, as in this case, is sufficient for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term.
Q: AA was convicted of parricide for killing his wife alleging the latter had an affair.
However, in imposing the proper penalty, he invoked the appreciation of the
mitigating circumstances of intoxication, voluntary surrender, and passion or
obfuscation. Will it prosper?
A: NO. As correctly ruled by CA, it did not consider passion and obfuscation, holding that
accused-appellant failed to establish clear and convincing proof that his wife confessed to
him about her alleged infidelity, from which passion and obfuscation on his part may be
produced. Also, the CA did not appreciate intoxication as mitigating, holding that accused-
appellant failed to establish that he was in such state of intoxication as would blur his reason
at the time of the incident. It observed that accused-appellant keenly noticed details when
he came home on the fateful night i.e., that the door of their house was open and that there
was no light, and that he managed to check the room of his two children to verify if they were
home. Lastly, the CA considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender finding
the same to be spontaneous. As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary
surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as the proper prison term. (People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Padilla y Espiritu,
G.R. No. 247603, May 5, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GABRIEL CAMPUGAN CABRIOLE
G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In prosecuting for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt not only every element of the crime or offense charged but must also
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized drugs. It is, therefore, the duty of the
prosecution to prove that the drugs seized from accused-appellant were the same items
presented in court. The chain of custody requirement performs this function by ensuring that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the drugs seized are removed.
FACTS
In October 2016, PO1 Doño was at the Intelligence Section of Gingoog City Police
Station attending a briefing regarding the buy-bust operation to be conducted against
Accused-appellant Gabriel Campugan Cabriole and accused Daniel Gumanit Abad.
At the said briefing, PO1 Doño was designated as poseur-buyer. It was agreed that the
prearranged signal would be the removal of his sunglasses.
During the operation, PO1 Doño gave the 500-peso bill to Daniel who in turn gave it
to accused-appellant as payment for one sachet of shabu. Accused-appellant handed over the
shabu to Daniel who in turn handed it over to PO1 Doño.
Upon receiving the shabu, PO1 Doño removed the sunglasses, the pre-arranged signal
for consummation of the sale of drugs. Immediately, the other police officers came in and
pursued Daniel and accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was arrested but Daniel got away.
PO3 Javier searched accused-appellant and found in his lower middle pocket three
(3) plastic sachets believed to contain shabu, a 500-peso bill with Serial Number EX265351,
and aluminum foil strips.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the accused appellant is guilty for violating both Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165.
RULING
NO. The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
are: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
While the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 are: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
In both offenses, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt not only every
element of the crime or offense charged but must also establish the identity of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the seized drugs. It is, therefore, the duty of the prosecution to prove that the
drugs seized from accused-appellant were the same items presented in court.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function by ensuring that

unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the drugs seized are removed.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms accused-
appellant's conviction in violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The Court finds that the
prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crime
charged as well as the identity and integrity of the three sachets of drugs seized from
accused-appellant.
However, the accused-appellant is acquitted for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
it can be gleaned that the confiscated item subject of the sale was not immediately marked
upon seizure. Worse, PO1 Doño failed to ventilate the precautionary measures taken in
preserving the identity of the seized item given that he did not mark it when he left the area
where the buy-bust operation took place, to the area where he dropped the confidential
informant in a safe location, to the time when he blended in with the crowd, until he finally
delivered the seized item to PO3 Javier. In other words, the confiscated item remained
unmarked while in the custody of PO1 Doño. Clearly, the probability that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti being compromised existed, as it was easily
susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution.
PO1 Doño admitted that he placed the plastic sachet seized from accused-appellant
inside his right pocket before handing it over to PO1 Javier for marking and inventory. This
calls into question the identity of the item that was later marked and inventoried, for the
third-party witnesses would not have known whether the seized item delivered by PO1 Doño
being marked and inventoried in their presence was actually confiscated from accused-
appellant.
The belated marking adversely affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug subject of the sale.
Q: AA was apprehended in a drug buy-bust operation. However, police BB admitted
that he placed the plastic sachet seized from AA inside his right pocket before handing
it over to police CC for marking and inventory. Can AA be convicted in violating
Section 5 of RA 9165?
A: NO. The probability that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti being
compromised existed, as it was easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution.
The belated marking adversely affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug
subject of the sale. (People of the Philippines v. Gabriel Campugan Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418,
May 5, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH LUIGI POLVUS ORDANEZA
G.R. No. 250640, May 5, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
Slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or
the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime of statutory rape.
FACTS
Appellant brought AAA to his house, where he undressed himself and ordered AAA to
massage his back. After the massage, appellant removed AAA's underwear and told her to lie
down. He then lay on top of her, kissed her neck and licked her vagina.
Appellant cried and pleaded appellant to stop, but to no avail. Appellant covered her
mouth, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
Worried that AAA had not returned home, her mother BBB went to the billiard hall.
Finding that she was not there, BBB proceeded to appellant's house, where her children
would sometimes go.
Outside appellant's house, BBB saw her daughter's slippers. She then called out AAA's
name. Upon hearing her mother's voice, AAA went out of appellant's house and ran towards
her mother. She was trembling and crying, while telling her mother how appellant sexually
violated her.
Upon medical/physical examination of the child victim, the doctor found the
following: "[labia minora] was reddish, which was abnormal considering that it should be
pinkish in color. x x x AAA's labia minora could have come in contact with a blunt object, such
as an erect penis, which may have caused the reddening."
Consequently, the medico-legal report stated: "reddish [labia minora] 2 [degrees]

secondary to alleged rape."
RTC convicted appellant of statutory rape which the CA affirmed.
Appellant asserted that there was no consummated rape.
ISSUE
Whether there is a consummated statutory rape on the basis of lack of actual
penetration.
RULING
YES. To hold the accused guilty of statutory rape, two (2) elements must be
established namely: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (2) the woman
is below 12 years of age or demented. Proof of force, threat, intimidation, or lack of consent
is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape, where the only subject of
inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. In this case, both
elements attend.
Appellant could only raise the defense of lack of actual penetration, relying heavily on
AAA's testimony that he tried inserting his penis into her vagina, and that in doing so, he told
her "he cannot insert it.
Said utterance, however, does not conclusively negate rape on the basis of lack of
actual penetration.
The Court declared that the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its
slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates
the crime of rape.
In this case, as found by the CA, the fact that appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina
is supported by the medico-legal report stating that her labia minora was reddish in color,
which could have been caused by introduction of a blunt object like an erect penis
Q: AA asserted that there is no consummated rape because he only tried to insert his
penis into the child’s vagina. Upon medical/physical examination of the child victim,
the doctor found that the labia minora was reddish which had come in contact with a
blunt object, such as an erect penis. Is the defense of lack of actual penetration valid?
A: NO. To hold the accused guilty of statutory rape, two (2) elements must be established
namely: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (2) the woman is below 12
years of age or demented. The slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest
contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime
of rape. The fact that AA’s penis touched the child’s vagina is supported by the medico-legal
report stating that her labia minora was reddish in color, which could have been caused by
introduction of a blunt object like an erect penis (People of the Philippines v. Joseph Luigi
Polvus Ordanez, G.R. No. 250640, May 5, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JODEL ROMERO y TARIMAN A.K.A “ONE EYE”
G.R. No. 252253, May 5, 2021, Second Division (Notice)
DOCTRINE
Denial, being negative self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over affirmative allegations
of the victim. For it easily crumbles in the face of her positive and categorical identification of
the appellant as her molester.
FACTS
On the night of June 3, 2012, AAA was walking home from the plaza when appellant
offered her a ride home on his bicycle. She initially declined, but due to his insistence, she
rode the bike with him. He brought her to a dark and secluded area where he sexually
ravaged her by pinning her down on a grassy portion of the ground, taking off her shorts and
underwear, physically subduing her, and eventually inserting his penis into her vagina.
Afterwards, he warned her to keep quiet about the incident by placing his finger on
his lips with the "shush" sound and drawing his other finger across his neck, threatening her
that she would get killed otherwise.
Appellant's defense that AAA failed to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime
because of the single occasion that she had him confused with other men who had raped her.
ISSUE
Whether the case of simple rape will prosper.
RULING
YES. TAs both the trial court and the Court of Appeals keenly noted, AAA's testimony
was credible, categorical, and straightforward on how appellant, through force and threat,
pinned her down, subdued and gagged her, and inserted his penis into her vagina
As it was, AAA's testimony did not stand alone. It was solidly corroborated by physical
evidence in the form of the medico-legal report noting healed laceration which could have
been caused by the penetration of a hard object into her vagina.
AAA's voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo

public trial where she could be compelled to give out the sordid details of the assault on her
dignity cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
It is highly improbable that AAA would have known and narrated the traumatic
details of her sexual ravishment if she did not truly experience the same in the hands of
appellant.
Appellant's defense that AAA failed to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime
does not impress. AAA had in fact consistently and positively named appellant as the one
who raped her throughout the course of her testimony. Thus, the single occasion that she
had him confused with other men who had raped her does not negate the fact that it was
appellant who sexually ravished her in this instance.
In light of AAA's positive identification of appellant as the person who sexually

ravished her, appellant's denial must fail. Denial, being negative self-serving evidence,
cannot prevail over affirmative allegations of the victim. For it easily crumbles in the face of
her positive and categorical identification of the appellant as her molester.
Q: Convicting him of crime of simple rape, RPST raised a defense that victim AAA failed
to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime because of the single occasion that she
had him confused with other men who had raped her. Will the case of simple rape
against RPST prosper?
A: YES. AAA had in fact consistently and positively named RPST as the one who raped her
throughout the course of her testimony. Thus, the single occasion that she had him confused
with other men who had raped her does not negate the fact that it was appellant who sexually
ravished her in this instance.
In light of AAA's positive identification of appellant as the person who sexually

ravished her, appellant's denial must fail. Denial, being negative self-serving evidence,
cannot prevail over affirmative allegations of the victim. For it easily crumbles in the face of
her positive and categorical identification of the appellant as her molester. (People of the
Philippines v. Jodel Romero y Tariman a.k.a “One Eye”, G.R. No. 252253, May 5, 2021, as
provided for in the Notice)
RAMON H. DEBUQUE v. MATT C. NILSON
G.R. No. 191718, May 10. 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of
Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or
Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and, (c) defraudation results in
the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
FACTS
Nilson alleged that he and Atty. Debuque developed a professional relationship and
eventually became friends. Atty. Debuque, who was also acting on behalf of the other
accused, invited Nilson to join them in a business venture, which the former alleged would
yield large profits. He promised Nilson shares of stock in Investa Land Corporation (ILC), a
corporation then to be formed, equivalent to the value of the numerous personal loans
extended to him by Nilson.
Atty. Debuque also induced Nilson to purchase various commercial lots in

partnership with him, stating that the value of the lands will rise exponentially, and that
these will be transferred in the name of ILC.
Nilson paid Atty. Debuque sums of money as his share in the purchase price of
commercial lots. However, he claimed that the lots were not commercial lands and were
represented as such to induce him to pay a higher price.
Atty. Debuque then pledged TCT No. 203836 in exchange for the release of the P3
million. The Land Registration Authority, however, reported that the said title was
questionable. Nilson further contributed P8 million as initial operational funds of ILC. In
turn, Atty. Debuque promised to give Nilson ILC shares of stock in the total amount of P76
million.
Nilson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Syndicated Estafa against Atty. Debuque,

Ramon, and the other accused. Nilson alleged that they neither gave him the promised ILC
shares of stock nor returned the funds that he contributed to the venture.
Assistant City Prosecutor Florante R. Ramolete found probable cause to charge Atty.
Debuque and the other accused with Syndicated Estafa in relation to PD 1689. He also
dismissed the counter-charges of Falsification and Perjury against Nilson.
Aggrieved, Atty. Debuque and the other accused elevated the finding to the DOJ
Secretary.
Meanwhile, an Information for Syndicated Estafa was filed before RTC against Ramon,
Atty. Debuque, and the other accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-06-141941.
After reversing itself many times, the DOJ ruled that only Atty. Debuque was to be
held liable for Estafa. The appellate court reversed the last Resolution of the DOJ Secretary
and reinstated the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor finding probable cause for
Syndicated Estafa against all accused.
In 2013, Ramon filed a manifestation stating that the RTC, in an Order dismissed
Criminal Case No. Q-06-141941 against him, Margarita, and Luz pursuant to a demurrer to
evidence. The RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
participation and culpability of Ramon, Margarita, and Luz. The RTC ordered: (a) the
dismissal of the criminal case against Ramon, Margarita, and Luz for failure of the
prosecution to establish guilt pursuant to a demurrer to evidence; (b) the dismissal of the
criminal case against Atty. Debuque due to his death; and, (c) the archival of the criminal case
against Antonio and Manuel, who are still at large.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was probable cause to indict Ramon for the crime of Syndicated
Estafa.
RULING
NO. It has become moot considering the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of the
case against petitioner Ramon H. Debuque based on a demurrer to evidence which
effectively amounted to an acquittal, and in view of the death of the principal accused Atty.
Ignacio D. Debuque, Jr.
If the Supreme Court were to uphold the assailed CA Decision and sustain the finding
of probable cause against Ramon for the crime of Syndicated Estafa, the fact remains that the
RTC had already dismissed the case as against him based on a demurrer to evidence, which
effectively amounted to an acquittal. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court were to reverse
the CA Decision and reinstate the Resolution of the DOJ Secretary, an information for Estafa
may only be filed against Atty. Debuque to the exclusion of Ramon. And since Atty. Debuque
has already passed away, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability, a new information then
may not be filed.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court deem it necessary to rule on the merits if only to lay
to rest the conflicting resolutions of the Secretary of Justice and more importantly, determine
the liability, if any, of petitioner Ramon.
The DOJ Secretary was correct in resolving that only Atty. Debuque should be held
liable for Estafa.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of
Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or
Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five [5] or more persons; and, (c) defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
The Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and the other accused had any
participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty. Debuque acted on his own, without the
participation or involvement of Ramon or the other accused. Atty. Debuque was never
authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused, to transact with
Nilson. There is simply no proof that all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC
in defrauding Nilson.
Q: Atty. AA, BB and other accused were charged for syndicated estafa after the
Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause for alleged defrauding CC. Atty AA, BB
and the other accused elevated the finding to the DOJ Secretary who after flip-flopping
many times ruled that only Atty. AA is liable for estafa. Meanwhile, an Information for
Syndicated Estafa was filed before the RTC which was dismissed pursuant to a
demurrer to evidence. Will the case for syndicated estafa prosper?
A: NO. It has become moot considering the dismissal by the RTC of the case against petitioner
BB based on a demurrer to evidence which effectively amounted to an acquittal, and in view
of the death of the principal accused Atty. AA. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court deem it
necessary to rule on the merits if only to lay to rest the conflicting resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice and more importantly, determine the liability, if any, of petitioner BB. The elements
of Syndicated Estafa are as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five [5] or more persons; and, (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation
of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon[s]," or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.
The Court finds no existing syndicate in which BB and the other accused had any
participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty. AA acted on his own, without the
participation or involvement of BB or the other accused. Atty. AA was never
authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., BB and the other accused, to transact with CC. There
is simply no proof that all of the accused, including BB, acted through ILC in defrauding CC.
(Ramon H. Debuque v. Matt C. Nilson, G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021, as penned by J.
Hernando)
JOEL DAVID y MANGIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 253336, May 10, 2021, Second Division (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized
from David were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal. Compliance with
the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely
as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law."
FACTS
The prosecution alleged that in the evening of September 8, 2012, Bertilla David went
to Bacolor Municipal Police Station to report that her son petitioner David had punched her
several times, and was engaged in scandalous acts in their place.
Responding to this report, PO3 Gerald Flores, together with PO1 Viernes and PO1
Aguinaldo, were dispatched to the area with Bertilla leading the way. As they reached
Bertilla's house, they heard David shouting and challenging anyone to a fight. At that point,
PO3 Flores proceeded to arrest David.
The officers brought David back to the police station to conduct a follow-up
investigation. PO3 Flores noticed that David's right hand was inserted inside his shorts, but
not in the pocket thereof, which prompted him to ask David what he was hiding.
Bertilla then informed PO3 Flores that David was hiding marijuana. PO3 Flores asked
David to show his right hand which revealed one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing
dried leaves. PO3 Flores confiscated the item and thereafter informed David that he
committed illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
After qualitative examination, the contents tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
RTC, as affirmed by CA, convicted David for crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner should be acquitted for lapses in the chain of custody rule.
RULING
YES. A thorough review of the records of the case reveals that there were unexplained
lapses in complying with the witness requirement in the chain of custody rule which cast
doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime. In cases for Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165 it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of
custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same.
In this case, there was a deviation from the required witnesses rule as the conduct of
inventory and photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ, a fact
admitted to by the arresting officer himself in his testimony.
Notably, the seizure of the marijuana occurred on September 8, 2012, prior to the
amendment introduced by RA 10640. Consequently, the applicable law then requires the
presence of the following witnesses: (a) a representative from the media; (b) a
representative from the DOJ; and (c) an elected public official. While the inventory and the
accompanying photographs show the presence of two (2) elected public officials and a
representative from the media, it is clear that there was no representative from the DOJ.
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by

presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. Here,
while PO3 Flores did attempt to secure all three witnesses, he did not offer any justification
for the eventual absence of the DOJ representative, much less any explanation or detail as to
the exact efforts exerted to secure their presence. In view of this unjustified deviation from
the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from David were compromised, which
consequently warrants his acquittal.
Q: Police AA noticed that while he was conducting a follow-up investigation of BB, the
latter’s right hand was inserted inside his shorts, but not in the pocket of it, which
prompted AA to ask BB what he was hiding which revealed one transparent plastic
sachet containing marijuana. Should BB be acquitted for lapses in the chain of custody
rule?
A: YES. In cases for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165 it is essential that
the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove
the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal. In this case,
there was a deviation from the required witnesses rule as the conduct of inventory and
photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ, a fact admitted to by the
arresting officer himself in his testimony. (Joel David y Mangio v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 253336, May 10, 2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PROSPERO PICHAY JR. v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR
G.R. Nos. 241742 and 241753-59, May 12, 2021, Third Division
(Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
While there is no law particularly vesting the Sandiganbayan the authority to issue
HDOs, the same is not necessary for it to exercise this power. The Sandiganbayan is "given the
full disposition of all the powers inherent in all courts of justice to effectuate the exercise of its
jurisdiction, including the issuance of HDOs, if in its good judgment, it finds necessary in the
administration of justice."
FACTS
On July 18, 2016, the Sandiganbayan motu proprio issued a Hold Departure Order
(HDO) Resolution, directing the Bureau of Immigration to prohibit Pichay and his co-accused
from leaving the country for any destination abroad, except by prior written permission duly
secured from and granted by the Sandiganbayan.
On February 14, 2018, Pichay filed a Motion to Lift HDO which was denied.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the issuance of a HDO was considered as a valid
restriction on Pichay's right to travel, as it was done in the exercise of the Court's inherent
power to preserve and maintain its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
It also stated that by posting bail for his provisional liberty, Pichay assumed the
responsibility to appear in court whenever required by the Court or the Rules, which
constituted a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Pichay insists that the general rule is that the right to travel shall not be impaired and
may be restricted only in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. Pichay asserts that none of the allowable limitations on the right to
travel are present in this case. Moreover, he maintains that the mere posting of bail does not
operate as a waiver of the requisites prescribed by the Constitution for the
curtailment of the right to travel.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to
Lift HDO and in sustaining the HDO's validity.
RULING
NO. While there is no law particularly vesting the Sandiganbayan the authority to
issue HDOs, the same is not necessary for it to exercise this power. The Sandiganbayan is
"given the full disposition of all the powers inherent in all courts of justice to effectuate the
exercise of its jurisdiction, including the issuance of HDOs, if in its good judgment, it finds
necessary in the administration of justice."
Thus, the HDO issued by the Sandiganbayan is but an exercise of its inherent power
to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
Pichay.
When by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
process, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.
Further, in this case, Pichay posted bail under the obligation that he will hold himself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court. Pending trial, the objective is
to relieve Pichay of imprisonment and the State of the burden of keeping him. This puts
Pichay under the power of the court and secures his appearance to answer the call of the
court and do what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon Pichay to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
An accused in a criminal case may be issued an HDO, as a valid restriction on their

right to travel, so that they may be dealt with in accordance with law.
Q: The Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO) Resolution against AA
who was charged for various violations. AA insists that the general rule is that the right
to travel shall not be impaired and may be restricted only in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Is he correct?
A: NO. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the issuance of a HDO was considered as a valid
restriction on Pichay's right to travel, as it was done in the exercise of the Court's inherent
power to preserve and maintain its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
It also stated that by posting bail for his provisional liberty, AA assumed the responsibility
to appear in court whenever required by the Court or the Rules, which constituted a valid
restriction on his right to travel. (Prospero Pichay Jr. v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division) and People of the Philippines as represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
G.R. Nos. 241742 and 241753-59, May 12, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELINA BAWALAN y MOLINA, BBB, and CCC
G.R. No. 232358, May 12, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of Trafficking in Persons: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders"; (2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and (3) The purpose of
trafficking is exploitation which includes" exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs."
FACTS
AAA testified 8 that in January 2009, she was residing with her mother, BBB, and the
latter's live-in partner, CCC. She also explained that she calls CCC as her "Papa CCC."
The victim narrated that BBB and CCC would pimp her every time their family had
nothing to eat.
On the night of January 29, 2009, she was at the park in front of the store of Bawalan
when a man suddenly arrived and approached the latter. AAA saw the man handing money
to Bawalan. Upon receipt of the money, Bawalan instructed AAA to go with the client.
Meanwhile, BBB, CCC and Samud were also in the area, about six meters away from AAA and
Bawalan.
When AAA and the man were about to board a tricycle, the police officers arrived and
arrested Bawalan, BBB, CCC and Samud. Thereafter, AAA and all the accused were taken to
the police station.
The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the accused are guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
RULING
YES. The elements of the offense of trafficking in persons were sufficiently
established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, AAA categorically stated
that Bawalan instructed her to go with PO1 Intoy, who was then acting as a poseur customer,
after Bawalan received money from the latter.
The elements of Trafficking in Persons: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation,

transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders"; (2) The means used which include "threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and (3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs."
With respect to the circumstances which qualify the offense, it is undisputed that BBB
is the mother of AAA, and CCC is her fatherly figure whom she calls "Papa CCC." Taking into
consideration the circumstances on how AAA was sexually exploited, all three accused-
appellants conspired and acted together in perpetrating the crime.
Evidently, accused-appellants took advantage of her vulnerability when she was

made to engage in sexual activities with customers in exchange for money.
Q: AAA narrated that her mother BBB and “Papa CCC” would pimp her every time their
family had nothing to eat. Are BBB and “Papa CCC” liable for Qualified Trafficking in
Persons?
A: YES. The elements of Trafficking in Persons: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders"; (2) The means used which include "threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and (3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." Accused-appellants took advantage of her vulnerability when
she was made to engage in sexual activities with customers in exchange for money (People
of the Philippines v. Belina Bawalan y Molina, BBB, and CCC, G.R. No. 232358, May 12, 2021, as
penned by J. Hernando)
ZENAIDA LAYSON VDA. DE MANJARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under Article
315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is
conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his
part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another;
and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property. On the first element, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received."
The Court finds that Zenaida only had material possession, and not juridical possession, of the
goods delivered to her for sale in Alson's Polangui. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against
the owner.
FACTS
Based on the testimonies of both petitioner Zenaida and Paulo Ballesteros, the former
was initially engaged in the business of buying-and-selling of appliances, furniture, and other
products. She would buy from Ballesteros' business —Alson's Trading in Iriga City — around
once a month. Because she had become a regular customer, she and Ballesteros had an
agreement that her store would be used to establish Alson's Polangui and that she would be
its branch manager.
According to Ballesteros, Zenaida had the following obligations as the branch

manager: "1) receive the stocks; 2) sell and document them properly, following the standard
pricing for cash or installment; 3) hire and terminate employees; 4) document and deposit
collections in the bank the next banking day; and 5) be accountable for any
shortages in the collection."
Meanwhile, Ballesteros' obligation was to pay the monthly salaries of Zenaida and the
other employees.
Ballesteros narrated in his testimony that he visited Alson's Polangui one time and he
did not find any cash there. He grew suspicious, so he asked auditor Rafael Pan to conduct a
preliminary audit. The preliminary audit revealed a shortage of around P65,000.00 per
month of operation. He confronted Zenaida about this, and she allegedly promised to pay the
shortages back within 15 days.
Based on Pan's audit, Zenaida's total accountability was allegedly P730,811.59.

Zenaida was found guilty of Estafa by the RTC which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE
Whether the salary of a water district's general manager is covered by the Salary
Standardization Law.
RULING
NO. The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2)
that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it
or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to
the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Anent the first element, when "the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received."
The Court, however, finds that Zenaida only had material possession, and not juridical
possession, of the goods delivered to her for sale in Alson's Polangui. It is undisputed that
Zenaida was the "branch manager" of Alson's Polangui.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Ballesteros had control over the operations of Alson's Polangui through his verbal
instructions. To the mind of the Court, these testimonies establish that Zenaida was a mere
employee —not an agent — of Ballesteros and Alson's Polangui.
An agent can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous,
right to retain goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without
his fault.
The Court cannot find anything which indicates that Zenaida would
have independent title over the goods as against Ballesteros. Ballesteros had (1) the power
to control the operations of Alson's Polangui, (2) the power to control what Zenaida could
and could not do, and (3) the responsibility to pay the salaries of all Alson's Polangui's
employees, including Zenaida. The foregoing indicates the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Ballesteros and Zenaida. Thus, the Court holds that Zenaida did not
have juridical possession of the goods delivered to her.
Q: AA and BB were initially engaged in the business of buying-and-selling of
appliances. Because AA had become a regular customer, she and BB had an agreement
that her store would be used to establish Appliance Shop XYZ-Katipunan and that AA
would be its branch manager. When BB visited Appliance Shop XYZ-Katipunan branch,
he did not find any cash there. He grew suspicious, so he asked the auditor to conduct
a preliminary audit. The preliminary audit revealed a shortage of around P65,000.00
per month of operation. Is BB liable for Estafa?
A: NO. The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under

Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2)
that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it
or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to
the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Anent the first element, when "the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received."
The Court, however, finds that BB only had material possession, and not juridical
possession, of the goods delivered to her for sale in Appliance Shop XYZ-Katipunan.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. (Zenaida Layson Vda. De
Manjares V. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDILBERTO MANUEL, JR. y MANGALINDAN
G.R. No. 247976, May 14, 2021, First Division (Gesmundo, J.)
DOCTRINE
For a successful prosecution of the crime of rape as punished under Art. 266-A,
paragraph (1) (d), the following essential elements must be alleged and proven: the fact of
sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental age is that of a person
below 12 years old.
FACTS
AAA was born on March 11, 1997. Her biological mother is CCC and her birth
certificate indicated that her father was unknown. When she was 6 years old, she was found
to have a global pattern of developmental delay and had a developmental age of 3 to 3.5 years
old. At 9 years old, she was diagnosed to have mental retardation with a developmental age
of a 5-year old. On her follow-up visit at the age of 16 years old, she was diagnosed to have a
developmental age of 5 to 5.5 years old. Initially, it was her grandparents who took care of
her, but upon their death, BBB took over. Accused-appellant is the live-in partner of CCC.
According to AAA, sometime in January 2013, herein accused-appellant, whom the former
referred to as "Kuya Boy" or "Charles" touched her vagina, inserted his penis into her vagina,
and kissed her on the cheek and the lips. Thereafter, he hit her at her thighs. RTC convicted
the accused-appellant of rape which CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the accused is liable for Qualified Statutory Rape.
RULING
YES. Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that rape is committed: 1)
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental age is that of a
person below 12 years old.
It was undisputedly proven that AAA, at the age of 16 years old, was diagnosed to
have a developmental age of 5 to 5.5 years old. This was testified to by her doctor as well as
her family members.
In the face of AAA's testimony, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi fails.
There is no showing that she was impelled by any improper motive. As the Court previously
held, "considering the mental retardation of AAA, The Court find it highly improbable that
she would fabricate the rape charge against appellant. It is likewise unlikely that she was
instructed into accusing appellant given her limited intellect. Due to her mental condition,
only a very traumatic experience would leave lasting impression on her so that she would be
able to recall it when asked."
Q: At the age of 16 years old, AAA was diagnosed to have a developmental age of 5 to
5.5 years old. According to AAA, BBB would touch her vagina, insert his penis into her
vagina, and kiss her on the cheek and the lips. Thereafter, he hit her at her thighs. Will
a case for Qualified Statutory Rape prosper?
A: YES. Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that rape is committed: 1) By a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latter's mental age is that of a
person below 12 years old.
It was undisputedly proven that AAA, at the age of 16 years old, was diagnosed to
have a developmental age of 5 to 5.5 years old. This was testified to by her doctor as well as
her family members. (People of the Philippines v. Edilberto Manuel, Jr. y Mangalindan, G.R. No.
247976, May 14, 2021, as penned by J. Gesmundo)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND BENJAMIN
ABALOS
DOCTRINE
The "finality-of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of
acquittal unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
FACTS
This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the
National Broadband Network Project (NBN Project) between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment, Inc. (ZTE), a Chinese corporation
doing business in the People's Republic of China.
In September 2006, ZTE filed a proposal with the Commission on Information and
Communications Technology (CICT) for the implementation of an NBN project in the
country.
In October 2006, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) conducted a presentation before

the NEDA on its own proposed version of an NBN project.
According to the prosecution's theory, Abalos, for a fee or commission, brokered in

favor of ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, a project of the Philippine
Government and requiring approval by the NEDA; hence, he directly or indirectly had
financial or pecuniary interest therein despite being prohibited from doing so by the
Philippine Constitution.
In support of this theory, the prosecution presented evidence which tended to

establish that Abalos attended meetings where the NBN Project was discussed. Abalos also
purportedly offered bribes to NEDA Sec. Neri in relation to approving ZTE's NBN
proposal and to Jose C. De Venecia, Jr., in consideration of the withdrawal of AHI's NBN
proposal.
Abalos denied offering bribes to JDV III and Sec. Neri. The Sandiganbayan found that
the prosecution's evidence was only able to prove that Abalos was brokering the
collaboration between AHI and ZTE, but not that he brokered the contract between ZTE and
the Philippine Government for a fee. While Abalos’ presence at meetings with officers from
ZTE and the Philippine Government was established, evidence on what was taken up during
the said meetings was "minimal or sketchy" and the Sandiganbayan refused to rely on such
evidence to conclude that Abalos asked for favors from government officials as regards the
contract between ZTE and the government.
Abalos' alleged brokering between the government and ZTE was the basis of the
prosecution's theory that he had financial interest in the NBN-ZTE contract. In turn, Abalos'
alleged financial interest is the cornerstone of the charge of violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A.
No. 3019. Because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was acquitted of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the decision of the Sandiganbayan can be reversed without violating double
jeopardy.
RULING
NO. Petitioner's failure to adequately establish grave abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan not only takes this case out of the purview of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari; it also makes the reversal of the Assailed Decision — one of acquittal — repugnant
to Abalos' constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The requirements for double jeopardy to exist are as follows: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The case at hand meets all the foregoing requirements. Abalos was charged with
violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an information
dated July 15, 2010. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty on August 10, 2010. On May
11, 2016, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed Decision acquitting Abalos
of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. This was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division in its Assailed
Resolution dated September 29, 2016, which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-
of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable
and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty.
The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the Court
which rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited
whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is
denied the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a
mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void.
Q: Comelec Chairman AA was alleged to have brokered a contract between ABC
Broadband and the Philippine government for a fee or commission for the
implementation of a national broadband project. He also purportedly offered bribes
to key government officials in relation to the approval of the project. He was acquitted
by the Sandiganbayan because the prosecution's evidence was only able to prove that
AA was brokering the collaboration between ABC Broadband and another broadband
company also interested in the national broadband project. The prosecution was not
able to prove that AA brokered the contract between ABC Broadband and the
Philippine Government for a fee. Can the Supreme Court reverse the Sandiganbayan
ruling without violating double jeopardy?
A: NO. The requirements for double jeopardy to exist are as follows: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The case at hand meets all the foregoing requirements. AA was charged with violation
of Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an information dated July
15, 2010. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty on August 10, 2010. On May 11, 2016,
the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed Decision acquitting AA of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This
was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division in its Assailed Resolution dated
September 29, 2016, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-
of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable
and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the Court
which rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited
whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is
denied the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a
mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void. (People of the Philippines v. Honorable
Sandiganbayan and Benjamin Abalos, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL SABATER y ULAN
G.R. No. 249459, June 14, 2021, Second Division (Lazaro-Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
A plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the
approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
FACTS
Under Information dated December 19, 2016, the Naga City Prosecutor's Office
charged respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. (RA)
9165.
Approximately five (5) months after the prosecution had formally offered its
evidence, respondent, on June 28, 2018 filed a motion for plea bargaining, proposing to plead
guilty to a lesser offense ,i.e., violation of Section 12, RA 9165 for possession of equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, citing A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC entitled Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.
The prosecution opposed, citing DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26, 2018. It provides
that when an accused is charged with selling less than five (5) grams of shabu in violation of
Section 5, RA 9165, as here, he or she may plead guilty to the lesser offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 (3) of RA 9165, but not under Section 12 of
the same law.
By Order, the trial court granted respondent's motion, nullifying DOJ Circular No. 027
in the process for encroachment on the Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
Petitioner appealed to CA but it dismissed the petition for late filing.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for approving the accused's
proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense despite the vehement objection of the
prosecution.
RULING
YES. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on plea bargaining.
Verily, the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may validly
plead guilty to a lesser offense.
The prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently,
it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
Where the prosecution withholds its consent, the trial court cannot proceed to
approve a plea bargain.
The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction when
despite the vehement objection of the prosecution, it peremptorily, in clear violation of
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, approved respondent's proposal to plead guilty to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165.
A plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to
the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Q: AA was charged for violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. Five months
after the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, AA filed a motion for plea
bargaining, proposing to plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e., violation of Section 12,
RA 9165. The prosecution opposed, citing DOJ Circular No. 027. RTC granted the plea
bargain and in effect nullified DOJ Circular No. 027. Did the RTC commit grave abuse
of discretion?
A: YES. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on plea bargaining. Verily,
the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may validly plead
guilty to a lesser offense. the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or without
jurisdiction when despite the vehement objection of the prosecution, it peremptorily, in clear
violation of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, approved respondent's proposal to
plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165.
A plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to
the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the
sound discretion of the trial court. (People of the Philippines v. Noel Sabater y Ulan, G.R. No.
249549, June 15, 2021, as penned by J. Lazaro-Javier)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZALDY SORIANO y BLACER A.K.A “MODE”
G.R. No.247631, June 14, 2021, Third Division (J.Y. Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
The unimpeached testimony of AAA satisfactorily proved the two elements under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2)
the offender accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve (12) years of age
or was demented.
FACTS
AAA was alone in their home because her live-in partner BBB went to his uncle to
order charcoal.
Accused-appellant entered AAA's house under the pretext that he was looking for his
uncle. AAA noticed that accused-appellant was drunk at the time because she smelled the
scent of alcohol from him. After looking around in her house, accused-appellant suddenly
pulled AAA, embraced her and kissed her. AAA shouted for help and tried to extricate herself
from his hold, but to no avail
AAA tried to struggle, but accused-appellant was holding a bolo which he poked at
her neck.
Knowing that her live-in partner BBB, who was his acquaintance, might be arriving
soon, accused-appellant changed his plans and instead brought AAA to a nearby pasture land
with barbed wire and fence. There were no neighbors nearby. Both accused-appellant and
AAA were already clad in shorts before going there.
Accused-appellant told AAA to stop at the big tree in the pasture land. After kissing
her from her face to her breasts, accused-appellant forcibly spread her legs and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain, but she did not move because of the bolo still pointed at
her. After finishing the act, accused-appellant told AAA not to tell BBB what had just
happened or else he would kill her.
AAA went to the parents of BBB to tell them what had just happened.
RTC convicts accused-appellant of rape which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting the accused-appellant of rape.
RULING
NO. he unimpeached testimony of AAA satisfactorily proved the two elements under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when the victim
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve (12) years
of age or was demented.
AAA's testimony was candid, straightforward, and worthy of belief.
The denial of the accused-appellant's flimsy defense. alibi is an inherently weak

defense. Unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot prevail over the
positive declaration of a victim who, in a natural and straightforward manner, convincingly
identifies her assailant.
Q: AA was alone in their home because her live-in partner BB went outside to buy
charcoal. Drunk CC arrived in AA’s home in the pretext that he was looking for a
relative. CC then pulled AA, embraced, and kissed her. Knowing that BB may arrive
soon, CC brought AA to a pasture land where CC forcibly spread AA’s legs and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Is CC liable for rape?
A: YES. The unimpeached testimony of AA satisfactorily proved the two elements under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when the victim
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve (12) years
of age or was demented. The denial of the accused-appellant's flimsy defense. alibi is an
inherently weak defense. Unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of a victim who, in a natural and straightforward
manner, convincingly identifies her assailant. (People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Soriano y
Blacer a.k.a “Mode”, G.R. No. 247631, June 14, 2021, as penned by J.J.Y Lopez)
MICHAEL JOHN DELA CRUZ y SODELA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 245516, June 14, 2021, Third Division (Lopez, J.Y., J.)
DOCTRINE
A child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610
when the child is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion and influence of any adult.
The intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party.
As laid down in People v. Errojo and People v. Clado, the vast difference in age between the
victim and the offender is indicative of coercion and intimidation. Moreover, it is doctrinal that
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. Here, the fact that
Dela Cruz was the subject teacher of AAA, a minor, played a great role for the former to satisfy
his dastardly desires. Clearly, AAA was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by
an attacker who is not only a grown man, but is also someone exercising moral influence or
ascendancy over her.
FACTS
Petitioner Michael John Dela Cruz was charged with five counts of violation of Section
5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in five separate
informations.
AAA, who was only 13 years old at that time, testified that on January 26, 2016, Dela
Cruz, her teacher, asked her to stay after class. Upon AAA’s refusal, Dela Cruz followed her,
suddenly kissing her on the lips while fondling her breasts. He also suggested to have sex.
Meanwhile, BBB, also 13 years old during the incident, testified that Dela Cruz
requested if he could court her, which she declined as her father did not allow her to have
suitors. On August 18, 2016, in the school’s welding room, with the class present, Dela Cruz
approached her and touched her legs. She immediately moved away, with Dela Cruz
suddenly removing his hand.
For her part, CCC, also a 13-year-old minor at the time of the incident, cited an
instance on August 18, 2016, at the school’s welding room, during which Dela Cruz directed
her and her former boyfriend to kiss each other. She also recalled that Dela Cruz went as far
as coaxing another girl and another student to go inside a room and have sex.
________, 16 years old at the time of the incident and one of Dela Cruz’s students as well,
corroborated that on August 18, 2016, she bore witness to Dela Cruz’s act of encouraging his
former male students to perform sexual acts with their respective girlfriends. When _________
was about to leave, Dela Cruz suggested that she kiss her boyfriend on the lips. Upon her
refusal, Dela Cruz alternatively suggested that she just unbutton her blouse and let her
boyfriend caress her breasts.
The students reported the incidents to their teacher and guidance counselor. Later
on, Dela Cruz was informed of the complaints against him and the cases were referred to the
City Social Welfare and Development Office.
The RTC convicted Dela Cruz as charged. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction of Dela Cruz. The CA found that Dela Cruz, having moral ascendancy or influence
over AAA, coerced the latter into engaging in such lascivious conduct. Dela Cruz also
committed child abuse in ordering CCC and her boyfriend to kiss in front of him. Such act
undoubtedly degraded and debased the intrinsic worth of CCC, not only as a human, but also
as a child. The acts of knowingly courting BBB and touching her thighs in front of her
classmates demeaned her humanity, are likewise tantamount to child abuse.
ISSUE
Is Dela Cruz’s conviction proper?
RULING
YES. In instances when the victim is exactly 12 years of age, or more than 12 but
below 18 years of age, or is 18 years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself
or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as
“Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610” and the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. R.A. No. 7610 finds application
when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or those “persons
below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.” As it is undisputed fact that at the time of the commission
of the crime charged, AAA was below 18 years of age, Section 5 (b) is necessarily called into
application.
Before an accused may be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) must be satisfied in addition to the requisites
for sexual abuse under the cited section as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that child, whether male or female,
is below 18 years of age.
All the elements to sustain a conviction is obtained in the present case. Records
indicate that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. The courts a quo found the
testimony of AAA to be straightforward, categorical, and convincing when she testified that
petitioner forcibly kissed her while touching her breasts, tantamount to lascivious conduct
as defined under the law. Worthy to mention is that the RTC observed that AAA was crying
while testifying. Crying is but a natural display of emotion indicating the pain that the victim
feels when asked to recount a traumatic experience; the tears indicate truth and sincerity.
Further, a child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610 when the child is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion and
influence of any adult. Case law clarifies that intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible; it is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or
subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case
of young, innocent, and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of
disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under
the same circumstances to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
It cannot be denied that the presence of coercion and intimidation is attendant in this
case. The fact that Dela Cruz is the subject teacher of AAA played a great role for the latter to
satisfy his dastardly desires. As laid down in People v. Errojo and People v. Clado, the vast
difference in age between the victim and the offender is indicative of coercion and
intimidation. Clearly, AAA, a minor, was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated
by an attacker who is not only a grown man but is also someone exercising moral influence
or ascendancy over her. It is doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.
In the same vein, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the ruling of the
RTC and the CA in finding Dela Cruz guilty of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No.
7610. Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that “a person who shall commit any other
acts of child abuse, cruelty, or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the child’s development shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
Verily, a person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable for
above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7610.
While it may be true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child would
constitute child abuse, Dela Cruz’s intention can be inferred from the manner in which he
committed the act complained of. It bears stressing that coercion and intimidation is not a
material element for an accused to be held culpable under this section. On this score, Dela
Cruz’s acts of courting BBB, and on another occasion, touching her thighs in front of her
classmates, while also ordering CCC and her boyfriend to kiss in front of him surely debase,
degrade, and demean their intrinsic worth and dignity as children. These acts are manifestly
prejudicial to their normal development, in light of their mental capacity and emotional
maturity as minors. Given that the perpetrator was no less than someone who was expected
to raise his students as responsible members of society, the incidents only made the school
a hostile environment, where complainants are no longer able to freely learn and maximize
their education. Even more perplexing, being asked to kiss or being subjected to
inappropriate touching in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all
persons regardless of age.
In sum, Dela Cruz is guilty for two counts of lascivious conduct defined and penalized
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and three counts of child abuse defined and penalized
under Section 10 (a) of the same law.
Q: AAA, who was only 13 years old at that time, narrated that sometime in January
2016, Dela Cruz, her teacher, asked her to stay after class. Upon AAA’s refusal, Dela
Cruz followed her, suddenly kissing her on the lips while fondling her breasts. He also
suggested to have sex. This is only one of the lewd acts that Dela Cruz committed in
school, the other acts done toward at least three more minor students. Dela Cruz was
convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, which provides
that a child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” when the child is subjected to
lascivious conduct under the coercion and influence of any adult. Are coercion and
influence present in the case?
A: YES. Case law provides that the intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is
sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free
exercise of the will of the offended party. The vast difference in age between the victim and
the offender is indicative of coercion and intimidation. Moreover, it is doctrinal that moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. Here, the fact that Dela
Cruz was the subject teacher of AAA, a minor, played a great role for the former to satisfy his
dastardly desires. Clearly, AAA was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by
an attacker who is not only a grown man but is also someone exercising moral influence or
ascendancy over her. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 245516, June 14, 2021, as penned by J.
Lopez, J.Y.)
HERMINIO T. DISINI v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021, En Banc (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
Under the Best Evidence Rule in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document. The rule’s purpose is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought
before the court, to act as an insurance against fraud, and to protect against misleading
inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a
larger set of writings. Here, the Republic’s witnesses did not specifically quantify the amount of
Disini’s commissions but referred to certain documents which were not only mere photocopies
but were also not properly authenticated. Hence, these documents are inadmissible and have
no probative value. Also, Vergara and Jacob’s testimony that Disini was paid 3% and 10% of
the Westinghouse and B&R contracts as commissions clearly warrants the review of the terms
of the contract which is covered by the Best Evidence Rule. The Court cannot give credit to these
declarations without violating a basic evidentiary rule.
FACTS
This case involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Herminio Disini, a close
associate of former President Ferdinand Marcos, in relation to the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant (BNPP) project. The BNPP project is a nuclear power plant project awarded to
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Burns & Roe, Inc. (B&R), as main contractor and
architect-engineer, respectively, in 1976. The BNPP remains inoperable to this day.
On July 23, 1987, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
and damages against Disini, President Marcos and Imelda Marcos, for amassing ill-gotten
wealth during President Marcos’ term. Among others, the Republic alleged that Disini
received special concessions from President Marcos in relation to the award of the BNPP
contract to Westinghouse and B&R, for a scandalously exorbitant amount. Allegedly, Disini
received substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for the award of the contract
and its execution. During trial, only the Republic presented evidence since Disini was a party
in default.
The Republic claimed that Westinghouse solicited the influence of Disini, a known
close associate of President Marcos, to become its special sales representative (SSR) to
ensure its appointment as the main contractor for the BNPP project, for a fee of 3% of the
contract price as commission. The Republic also alleged that Disini unduly took advantage of
his close association with President Marcos to obtain favorable terms for Westinghouse by
requesting President Marcos to issue orders or directives to the National Power Corporation
(NPC) to accept Westinghouse’s proposals in relation with the BNPP project. Meanwhile,
Asia Industries, Inc. (AII) and Westinghouse entered into an agreement wherein the former
would act as the latter’s SSR in the Philippines for a fee of $3,000,000. PCI was 40% owned
by AII.
Thereafter, Disini, through his company Herdis, acquired AII’s 40% interest in PCI to
gain and benefit from PCI’s contract with Westinghouse and the SSR agreement. The
Republic claimed that all commissions due to AII was directly paid by Westinghouse to Disini,
through Herdis, and not to AII, which resulted in the latter’s financial distress.
On the other hand, B&R had a written agreement with Technosphere Consultant
Group, Inc. (TCI), a company owned by Herdis. Pursuant to their agreement, TCI would
receive a commission of 10% of the contract price of B&R as the architect-engineer in the
BNPP project. This commission was for the services rendered by Disini in influencing
President Marcos to award the BNPP project to B&R as architect-engineer. Both
Westinghouse and B&R made their payments to Disini beginning 1976. However, these
commissions were not recorded in the books of Herdis, AII, or TCI. Instead, they were
remitted by Westinghouse and B&R to a certain Rene Pasche in Switzerland, who deposited
the money in Disini’s Switzerland bank accounts. However, in 1978, Westinghouse started
to remit the commissions through the International Corporate Bank (Interbank) in the
Philippines in which Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, former president of Herdis, were the
authorized signatories. A substantial portion of the Interbank account was then deposited in
the overseas bank accounts in Switzerland under the account names “965 Summa” and “735
Phil” with Disini’s wife, Pacencia, and Jacob as the authorized signatories.
In a decision in April 2012, the Sandiganbayan declared the commissions in the

amount of $50,562,500 received by Disini to be ill-gotten wealth and ordered him to account
for and reconvey the said amount to the Republic. The Sandiganbayan accorded great weight
to Exhibit E-9, or a tabulation of commissions allegedly typewritten on Disini’s stationery,
which was attached to the affidavit of Angelo Manahan, former executive vice president and
chief operating officer of Herdis, to arrive at the amount of $50,562,500.
ISSUES
1. Does the Republic, through the PCGG and the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), have a cause of action against Disini in relation to the recovery of substantial
commissions he received from Westinghouse and B&R?
2. Is Disini liable to reconvey the amount of $50,562,500 in commissions, as
determined by the Sandiganbayan?
RULING
1. YES. Section 1 (d) of the Freedom Constitution mandates the President to continue
the exercise of legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a New
Constitution. It vests in the President the power and duty to enact measures to achieve the
mandate of the people, among others, “the [recovery] of ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of accounts.” Hence, then President Corazon
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the PCGG.
Contrary to Disini’s contention, the Republic, through the PCGG, has a valid cause of
action against him. EO No. 1, founded on the Freedom Constitution, explicitly tasked the
PCGG to assist in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. EO Nos. 2, 14 and 14-A further defined
and bolstered the duties of the PCGG in the exercise of its mandate. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the Republic, through the PCGG, has a clear-cut cause to file the present suit
against Disini in view of his alleged involvement in the BNPP project through receipt of
substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for influencing President Marcos in
their favor.
The allegations in the amended complaint clearly show that Disini is being sued for
amassing ill-gotten wealth. Ill-gotten wealth encompasses those that are derived indirectly
from government funds or properties through the use of power, influence, or relationship
resulting in unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino
people and the Republic. The alleged subject commissions may not have been sourced
directly from the public funds but it is beyond cavil that Disini would not have amassed these
commissions had he not exerted undue influence on President Marcos.
Disini indirectly and unjustly enriched himself through his influence and close
association with President Marcos by ensuring that the BNPP project would be awarded to
Westinghouse and B&R. Besides, his alleged receipt of commissions from Westinghouse and
B&R is clearly within the definition of ill-gotten wealth under the PCGG Rules and
Regulations, that is, the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission from an entity in
connection with any government contract or project.
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986) provide that ill-gotten wealth may be recovered from
President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates,
notwithstanding their private status. Undoubtedly, the Republic may recover ill-gotten
wealth not only from President Marcos, Imelda, and his immediate family but also from his
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates whether or not
President Marcos is also found liable together with them. In light of the above issuances
authorizing the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, there is no doubt that the Republic has a valid
cause of action against Disini founded in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986).
2. NO. Under the Best Evidence Rule in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document. The rule’s purpose is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, to act as an insurance against fraud, and to protect
against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings. However, when the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution, or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such
case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without presenting the original.
In the present case, to prove the amount of the total commissions received by Disini,
the best evidence would be the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their corresponding
commission agreements, especially considering the Republic’s claim that the commissions
received by Disini were based on 3% and 10% of the total contract price of the Westinghouse
and B&R contracts, respectively, which clearly requires an inquiry into the specific terms and
contents of the contracts. However, the Republic offered no justification as to their non-
presentation thereof. As to the secondary evidence, i.e., Exhibit E-9 and the affidavits of
Manahan, former AII president Jesus Vergara, and Jacob, the Republic offered no explanation
why they should fall under any of the exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule. The
Sandiganbayan nevertheless accorded great weight to Exhibit E-9 or a tabulation of
commissions allegedly typewritten on Disini’s stationery, which was attached to Manahan’s
affidavit, to arrive at the amount of $50,562,500.
Patently, Exhibit E-9 is a certified xerox copy. The Republic intends to prove the total
amount of commissions received by Disini by presenting his typewritten tabulation of
commissions on his stationery. However, under the Best Evidence Rule, when the subject of
inquiry is the content of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself subject to certain exceptions. Here, the Republic failed to offer any plausible
reason or justification why it presented a mere photocopy instead of the original. Mere
attestation by the affiant that he saw the original copies of the documents and that the
photocopies are faithful reproductions of the original will not suffice without the Republic
offering proof that the presentation of the secondary evidence is within the exceptions
contemplated under Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Absent such justification, the
certified xerox copy of Exhibit E-9 attached to Manahan’s affidavits cannot be given any
evidentiary value for the purpose for which it was offered, i.e., to establish the amount of
commissions received by Disini.
To add, a review of the records shows that Exhibit E-9 was not authenticated. Its due
execution and genuineness were not proved by the Republic in accordance with Section 20
of Rule 131. Notably, during the presentation of Manahan, he only authenticated his affidavit,
and not Exhibit E-9. Since Exhibit E-9 was unauthenticated, and thus inadmissible in
evidence as proof of the fact stated therein, the Sandiganbayan should not have relied
thereon in determining the exact amount of commissions received by Disini. By doing so, it
relied on a documentary evidence whose due execution and genuineness were not
established.
While it is true that the Republic failed to prove the amount of commissions received,
this does not mean, however, that Disini is free from any liability under this civil action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages. Thus, under the principle of
unjust enrichment, the Court upholds the Republic’s right to recover these commissions in
favor of the Filipino people. No one should unjustly enrich himself by receiving commissions
in connection with a government project when clearly he has no right for it nor entitled to
retain the same. Nonetheless, since recovery thereof cannot be effected due to the absence
of a definite amount, the Court deems it proper to award the Republic temperate damages
for the pecuniary loss and the Filipino people suffered on account of Disini’s illegal
acquisitions of substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R, albeit the amount
thereof not being proven with certainty. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be determined with certainty. Considering the relevant
circumstances of this case, the amount of one billion pesos (P1,000,000,000) as temperate
damages is reasonable and justified.
Q: The Republic, through the PCGG, filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages against Disini for amassing ill-gotten wealth
during President Marcos’ term. Among others, the Republic alleged that Disini
received special concessions from President Marcos in relation to the award of the
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant contract to Westinghouse and B&R, for a scandalously
exorbitant amount. To prove the amount of the total commissions received by Disini,
the Republic referred to a document attached to the affidavit of one of its witnesses,
Manahan. However, the document, which was a tabulation of the commissions
allegedly typewritten on Disini’s stationery, was a mere photocopy of the original and
was not properly authenticated. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan accorded great
weight to the tabulation to arrive at the amount of $50,562,500 as commissions
received and to be reconveyed by Disini to the Republic. Is Disini liable to reconvey
the amount of $50,562,500?
A: NO. Under the Best Evidence Rule in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document. The rule’s purpose is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing
are brought before the court, to act as an insurance against fraud, and to protect against
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings. Here, the Republic’s witnesses did not
specifically quantify the amount of Disini’s commissions but referred to certain documents
which were not only mere photocopies but were also not properly authenticated. Hence,
these documents are inadmissible and have no probative value.
Nonetheless, while it is true that the Republic failed to prove the amount of
commissions received, this does not mean that Disini is free from any liability under this civil
action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages. Thus, under the
principle of unjust enrichment, the Court upholds the Republic’s right to recover these
commissions in favor of the Filipino people and grants the Republic’s claims for temperate
damages. The amount of P1 billion as temperate damages is reasonable and justified
considering the relevant circumstances of the case. (Disini v. Republic, G.R. No. 205172, June
15, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CELIA DELA CRUZ y BUCALING
DOCTRINE
Section 3 (a), paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 9208, as amended, expressly articulates that when
the victim is a child, the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption, or receipt
for the purpose of exploitation need not involve “threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another.” In other words, one can be held liable for
qualified trafficking in persons even if she did not employ threat, force, intimidation, or any
other forms of coercion upon the minor victims. Here, Dela Cruz employed AAA and BBB as
GROs/waitresses in her resto bar on the belief that they were already 18 years old, when in fact,
they were still minors. Hence, even when Dela Cruz did not employ threat or exerted force,
intimidation, or any other forms of coercion upon AAA and BBB, she cannot be exonerated from
criminal liability for qualified trafficking in persons given that the victims were minors.
FACTS
AAA and BBB, at the time 17 and 15 years old, respectively, started working at a resto
bar owned by accused-appellant Celia Dela Cruz, whom they called, “Mommy Celia.” AAA was
recruited by a friend to work as a waitress and guest relations officer (GRO) at the resto bar.
She also submitted a bio-data indicating that she is already 18 years old. As part of her work,
she would sit and drink with male customers. However, if the customer would tell Dela Cruz
that they want VIP service, she will have sex with the customer at the second floor of the
resto bar. AAA explained that the fee for the VIP service is divided in half between the
waitress and Dela Cruz. In any case, they are given P500 each.
On April 14, 2014, AAA reported for work when two male customers—who were
actually the police officers who will rescue the victims—arrived. At first, Dela Cruz
entertained the customers. Thereafter, AAA and BBB were told by Dela Cruz that the
customers wanted to have them in their table. They sat in one table and the customers asked
them if they were giving VIP service. When they answered in the affirmative, BBB told Dela
Cruz that the customers wanted a VIP. Subsequently, AAA and BBB were instructed by Dela
Cruz to go upstairs where the customers were waiting inside their respective rooms.
Subsequently, AAA and BBB were rescued by the police officers posing as customers. Dela
Cruz, was brought to a hospital for a medical checkup, and then to the police station for the
filing of a case for qualified trafficking in persons against her. The two minor victims were
brought to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
For her part, Dela Cruz argued she did not know that the two girls were minors as
their bio-data stated that they were already 18 years old. Dela Cruz also denied that she hired
the girls for prostitution or sexual exploitation in exchange for money.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Dela Cruz of two counts of qualified
trafficking in persons under Section 4, paragraph (a), as qualified under Section 6, paragraph
(a), of Republic Act No. 9208. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Dela Cruz now comes before the Court, averring that the prosecution failed to prove
the second element of qualified trafficking in persons because there is no evidence showing
that she used the means of threat or exerted force, intimidation, or any other forms of
coercion upon AAA and BBB. The decision whether or not to have sex with the VIP customers
depended on the will of AAA and BBB, and not through her control or manipulation. She
further laments that the third element of the crime is absent as the prosecution failed to
adduce other evidence to corroborate its claim that she hired AAA and BBB for exploitation,
prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation.
ISSUE
Is Dela Cruz liable for qualified trafficking in persons?
RULING
YES. The elements of trafficking in persons under R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A.
No. 10364, are the following: (1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,
offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders”; (2) The
means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person”; (3) The purpose of trafficking
includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”
In conjunction with this, Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, as amended, provides that the
crime is qualified when the trafficked person is a child, which is defined as a person below
the age of 18 years old or above 18 years old, but is unable to fully take care of or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
Anent the first element, the clear and categorical testimonies of the AAA and BBB have
sufficiently established that they were hired by Dela Cruz in her resto bar. They referred to
her as “Mommy Celia” who hired and employed them as GROs/waitresses and were tasked
to entertain their customers to the extent of having sexual intercourse with them in exchange
for money. Prior to their hiring, they even submitted a bio-data to Dela Cruz, which the latter
admitted. While Dela Cruz claims that she was not aware that private complainants are
minors as they falsely represented that they were 18 years old in their bio-datas, the same
would not exonerate her from criminal liability. Qualified trafficking in persons is punished
by a special law. Hence, it belongs to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita where good
faith and absence of criminal intent are of no moment.
Relative to the second element, Dela Cruz took advantage of the youth and
vulnerability of the minor victims when she lured them into prostitution in exchange for
financial gain. Here, the minority of the AAA and BBB was sufficiently alleged in the
Information and convincingly established by their respective certificate of live births.
Correlatively, Section 3 (a), paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 9208, as amended, expressly articulates
that when the victim is a child, the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption
or receipt for the purpose of exploitation need not involve “threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another.” This implies that
Dela Cruz can be held liable for qualified trafficking in persons even if she did not employ
threat, force, intimidation, or any other forms of coercion upon the minor victims. Neither
can she evade criminal liability by claiming that the decision to have sexual intercourse with
the customers depended on the will of the private complainants. In fact, regardless of the
willingness of the minor victims, the crime of qualified trafficking in persons can still be
committed.
In People v. Casio, the Court considered the minor’s consent to the sexual transaction
as irrelevant to the commission of the crime. It held that knowledge or consent of the minor
is not a defense under R.A. No. 9208. The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to
the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.
Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given
out of his or her own free will.
As to the third element, it has been sufficiently established that the purpose of
trafficking is for prostitution. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 9208, as amended, defines prostitution
as “any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.”
Here, both AAA and BBB testified that as part of their work, they were engaged by Dela Cruz
to render VIP service to male customers which involved having sexual intercourse with them
in exchange for money. It was Dela Cruz who transacts with the customers and upon
payment of the service fee, they are instructed to go to the VIP room located at the second
floor of the resto bar. When a customer wants VIP service, there is already an understanding
that sexual intercourse will happen between them and the customer.
While no sexual contact took place between AAA and BBB and the police officers, the
same would not affect Dela Cruz’s criminal liability. What consummates the crime of
trafficking is the fact that Dela Cruz transacted with the police officers and peddled AAA and
BBB for sex in exchange for money. The crime is also qualified in view of the established fact
that the persons being trafficked are children. Taken collectively, all the foregoing supports
the conclusion that the guilt of Dela Cruz for two counts of qualified trafficking in persons
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: AAA and BBB, both minors, were employed by Dela Cruz as GROs/waitresses in her
resto bar allegedly because they misrepresented in their bio-datas that they were
already 18 years old. Dela Cruz peddled AAA and BBB to male customers for sex in
exchange for money. Dela Cruz was subsequently charged with and convicted of two
counts of qualified trafficking in persons. She argued that she did not employ threat
or exerted force, intimidation, or any other forms of coercion upon AAA and BBB in
order for them to have sexual intercourse with customers. Is Dela Cruz’s conviction
proper?
A: YES. Section 3 (a), paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 9208, as amended, expressly articulates that
when the victim is a child, the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption, or
receipt for the purpose of exploitation need not involve “threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another.” In other words, one
can be held liable for qualified trafficking in persons even if she did not employ threat, force,
intimidation, or any other forms of coercion upon the minor victims. Here, Dela Cruz
employed AAA and BBB as GROs/waitresses in her resto bar on the belief that they were
already 18 years old, when in fact, they were still minors. Hence, even when Dela Cruz did
not employ threat or exerted force, intimidation, or any other forms of coercion upon AAA
and BBB, she is still guilty of qualified trafficking in persons given that the victims were
minors. (People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 238754, June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Lopez, J.Y.)
JOSEPHINE G. BRISENIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 241336, June 16, 2021, Third Division (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
Before the amendment by Republic Act No. 10951, the penalty for the crime of estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is prision correccional, in its maximum
period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00,
but does not exceed P22,000.00. If such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty is in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000. Now, the prescribed penalty as
provided under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods if the amount does not exceed P2,400,000. In the present case, the penalty for
estafa under R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive effect considering that it is more
favorable to Brisenio.
FACTS
Sometime in February 2003, petitioner Josephine Brisenio asked her sister, private
complainant Clarita Mason, to enter into a business venture with her and a certain Manuel
Dino. They agreed to contribute P1,666,666.70 each to the venture involving a parcel of land
in Quezon City.
Believing that the title showed by Brisenio was genuine, Mason and her husband
withdrew P1,440,000 from the bank and gave it to Brisenio. Mason also signed a deed of
assignment stating that for and in consideration of P1,666,666.70, she was assigning,
transferring, and conveying all her rights and interest over her 1/3 portion of the land in
favor of Brisenio and another 1/3 in favor of Dino.
In December 2003, Brisenio asked Mason to return all the documents in her
possession and promised her to return the amount of P1,666,666.70 plus interest. Later on,
Mason found out that the title given to her was spurious as the serial number appearing on
its face referred to titles issued not to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City but
to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon Province. She also discovered that per the
genuine title, the subject land was sold to one Benito Chan as early as May 2, 2003.
Despite demands, Brisenio failed to return the money to Mason. Consequently,

Brisenio was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents.
In 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Brisenio of the crime charged. The
RTC sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The RTC further ordered her to indemnify Mason in the amount of P1,666,666.70.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Brisenio’s conviction. Brisenio moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion. Brisenio elevated the case via a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court. In a Resolution in 2018, the Court denied the petition
for failure of Brisenio to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error.
Not satisfied with the disposition of the Court, Brisenio filed the instant motion for
reconsideration, asking the Court to apply Republic Act No. 10951, enacted in 2017, in her
favor and modify the penalty imposed against her.
ISSUE
Should R.A. No. 10951 be applied to Brisenio?
RULING
YES. Under Article 315 of the RPC, before the amendment, the penalty for the crime
of estafa is prision correccional, in its maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000, but does not exceed P22,000. If such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty is in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional P10,000. With the passage of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty as
provided under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the RPC is now prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods if the amount does not exceed P2,400,000.
Thus, the penalty for the crime of estafa under R.A. No. 10951 should be given
retroactive effect considering that it is more favorable to Brisenio.
With regard to the crime of falsification, the penalty of imprisonment imposed is the
same for both paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC and R.A. No. 10951 which is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. But under the RPC, the penalty of fine to
be imposed is not more than P5,000, while under R.A. No. 10951, the penalty of fine to be
imposed shall not exceed P1,000,000.
Evidently, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under R.A. No. 10951 is
now lighter compared to the penalty of imprisonment for falsification under paragraph 1,
Article 172 of the RPC. Applying the provisions of Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the
graver offense should be imposed in the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for falsification
by private individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the RPC should be
imposed in the maximum period, being the more serious crime than estafa. However, the
penalty of fine of not more than P5,000 under the old law should be imposed against Brisenio
because this is more favorable to her than the penalty of fine of not more than P1,000,000
under the present law.
Based on the considerations, the Court modified the indeterminate sentence to be

imposed on Brisenio so that the minimum term should come from the penalty next lower in
degree, that is, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period with a range of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. Meanwhile, the maximum
term should come from prision correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in
its maximum period which is four 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to six 6 years. The actual
damages of P1,440,000 must also be subjected to legal interest at 6% per annum from the
date of finality of the present Resolution until full payment.
Q: Brisenio asked Mason to enter into a business venture with her and another person.
They agreed to contribute P1.6 million each to the venture involving a parcel of land
in Quezon City. Believing that the title showed by Brisenio was genuine, Mason
withdrew P1.4 million from the bank and gave it to Brisenio. Later on, Mason found
out that the title given to her was spurious. Despite demands, Brisenio failed to return
the money to Mason. Brisenio was charged with estafa through falsification of public
documents. In 2016, the RTC convicted Brisenio of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the conviction. In 2018, the Court also affirmed Brisenio’s conviction. Brisenio filed a
motion for reconsideration before the Court, asking it to apply R.A. No. 10951, enacted
in 2017 and lowering the penalty for estafa, in her favor. Should R.A. No. 10951 be
applied to Brisenio’s case?
A: YES. Under Article 315 of the RPC, before the amendment, the penalty for the crime of
estafa is prision correccional, in its maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000, but does not exceed P22,000. If such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty is in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional P10,000. With the passage of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty as provided
under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the RPC is now prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods if the amount does not exceed P2,400,000. Thus, the penalty for the crime
of estafa under R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive effect considering that it is more
favorable to Brisenio. (Josephine Brisenio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241336, June 16,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL ANDANAR y SIENDO
alias “KOKAK” AND MARY JANE GARBO y MARIPOSQUE
DOCTRINE
In R.A. 9165 cases, the stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist
should include: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he
placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered with pending trial.
Here, the stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist did not contain the
vital pieces of information required. The chain of custody of the said illegal drug, therefore,
could not be reasonably established.
Moreover, the prosecution must establish that the alleged drug den is a place where
dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the maintainer of the den.
Here, the prosecution had only presented a singular occurrence of the so-called illegal drug
activity in Garbo’s house. Garbo, therefore, cannot be considered a maintainer of drug den.
FACTS
In July 2010, a confidential informant reported to the office of Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Task Force, Taguig City, about illegal drug activities on a street in the city. A buy-bust
operation was set in the target area. SPO2 Noel Antillon, Jr. was assigned as poseur-buyer
while the rest, as back-up members. He was also handed 10 pieces of P100 bills as buy-bust
money.
The buy-bust team proceeded to the area. There, SPO2 Antillon and the confidential
informant saw accused-appellant Mary Jane Garbo in front of her house. The confidential
informant greeted her and introduced SPO2 Antillon as someone who wanted to buy shabu.
The confidential informant then asked Garbo where accused-appellant Michael Andanar
was. She said that Andanar was fetching something and then invited them inside her house
to wait. Inside the house, they met Moriel Gutierrez, who was also waiting for Andanar.
Andanar arrived and asked SPO2 Antillon how much shabu he wanted to buy. The latter
answered P1,000 worth. Since he only had two plastic sachets with him, Andanar agreed to
sell P500 worth of shabu to SPO2 Antillon while the other, to Gutierrez. SPO2 Antillon
handed the P500 buy-bust money to Andanar while the latter, in turn, gave him a plastic
sachet with white crystalline substance.
Garbo told SPO2 Antillon, Jr. that he could already use the drug for an additional P20.
He declined, saying he had his own pipe in the car. SPO2 Antillon instructed the confidential
informant to go outside and signal the team. Garbo and Andanar were arrested. The team
brought them and Gutierrez to the police station where the marking, inventory, and
photographing were done. The team had to leave the situs criminis because a crowd had
already gathered around. SPO2 Antillon, Jr. handed the seized items to the case investigator,
PO3 Vergelio Del Rosario, who prepared the necessary documents. The specimen was
brought to the crime laboratory where it was received by PO2 Elmar Manuel. Both the
defense and the prosecution stipulated on the qualifications of the forensic chemist, Police
Chief Inspector Abraham Tecson, and the fact that he received subject specimens which he
tested and found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The
parties also stipulated that PCI Tecson had no personal knowledge of the source of the drugs.
Andanar was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, while Garbo was charged with the crime of illegal
maintenance of a den, dive, or resort under Section 6, Article II of the law. Gutierrez, who
was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, died. Thus, the case against him was
dismissed.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Andanar and Garbo guilty as charged. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Were Andanar and Garbo’s respective convictions proper?
RULING
NO. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.
The prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally sold by the
accused is the same substance eventually presented in court. To ensure the integrity of the
seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each link in its chain of custody: first, the
seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
One, the venue for making the inventory and photograph was not properly complied
with. Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations requires that the inventory
and photograph be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, thus, it must be
done at the place of the arrest. SPO2 Antillon testified that upon Andanar and Garbo’s arrest,
they were immediately brought to the police station where an inventory and photographing
of the seized items were conducted. He explained that a crowd had already gathered at the
situs criminis, thus, they had to go back to the police station. In People v. Dumanjug, the Court
rejected the buy-bust team’s argument that that it failed to conduct the marking, inventory,
photography of the seized drug immediately at the place of arrest because a crowd of 200
people have gathered creating a dangerous environment. Indeed, bare invocation of
inconvenience does not translate to compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Two, the physical inventory and photography were not done in the presence of a
Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, a media representative, and a local elected
official. People v. Lim stressed the importance of the presence of the three insulating
witnesses or in the alternative, the prosecution must allege and prove the reasons for their
absence and show that earnest effort were made to secure their attendance. Here, while the
prosecution admitted that marking, inventory, and photographing were not made in the
presence of a DOJ representative, a media representative, and a local elected official, it made
no effort, at all, to explain or justify why these required witnesses were absent nor did it
show that earnest efforts were exerted to secure their attendance.
Three, the prosecution was conspicuously silent on what happened to the confiscated
drugs after SPO2 Antillon and PO3 Del Rosario delivered them to the crime laboratory. PO2
Manuel received the specimen from PO3 Del Rosario. However, there was a break in the
chain of custody of the seized drug because PO2 Manuel who handled the specimen was not
presented as witness.
Four, there was nothing in the records regarding the custody of the seized drug from
the time it was turned over to the laboratory up to its presentation in court. Notably, the
parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of PCI Tecson and instead stipulated that he
was a qualified forensic chemist and that he had no personal knowledge about the source of
the drug items but only conducted laboratory examination thereon.
People v. Miranda, citing People v. Cabuhay, ordained that the stipulation to dispense
with the testimony of the forensic chemist should include: (1) that the forensic chemist
received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after
examination of the content; and (3) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure
that it could not be tampered with pending trial. Here, the stipulation to dispense with the
testimony of the PCI Tecson did not contain the vital pieces of information required. Absent
any testimony regarding the management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drug
allegedly seized herein after its qualitative examination, the fourth link in the chain of
custody of the said illegal drug could not be reasonably established. Andanar should,
therefore, be acquitted.
Meanwhile, the crime of illegal maintenance of a drug den charged against Garbo
requires the following elements: a) that the place is a den—a place where any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored
for illegal purposes, distributed, sold, or used in any form; and b) that the accused maintains
the said place. It is not enough that dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalias were found in
the place. More than a finding that the dangerous drug is being used there, it must also be
clearly shown that the accused is the maintainer or operator or the owner of the place where
the dangerous drug is used or sold.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Garbo is
maintaining a drug den.
First, a drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used
in any form or are found. Its existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may
also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general
reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The prosecution
must establish that the alleged drug den is a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold
to and/or used by customers of the maintainer of the den. The word “regular” means doing
the same thing in uniform intervals, or something that is a common occurrence. Here, PO2
Antillon testified that Garbo invited him inside her house where the sale of illegal drugs
between him and Andanar took place. Thereafter, Garbo offered him that he could already
use the drug he just bought for an additional fee. If at all, this only proves an isolated illegal
drug transaction involving SPO2 Antillon, Andanar, and Garbo. There was nothing on record,
however, showing that Garbo’s house was frequently used as a drug den. Neither did the
prosecution prove that Garbo’s house had a general reputation as such. Garbo, therefore,
cannot be considered a maintainer of drug den. Garbo is acquitted.
Q: SPO2 Antillon was assigned as poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation set on a street
in Taguig City. In the target area, SPO2 Antillon and the confidential informant saw
Garbo in front of her house. The confidential informant introduced SPO2 Antillon as
someone who wanted to buy shabu. Inside the house, they met another person who
was also waiting for Andanar, the one who allegedly sells shabu. Andanar eventually
sold shabu to SPO2 Antillon. Garbo told SPO2 Antillon that he could already use the
drug for an additional fee, to which the officer declined. Garbo and Andanar were later
on arrested. The buy-bust team had to leave the situs criminis because a crowd had
already gathered around. Andanar was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs
while Garbo was charged with illegal maintenance of a den, dive, or resort. The
defense and the prosecution stipulated on the qualifications of the forensic chemist
and the fact that he received subject specimens which he tested and found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Both Andanar and Garbo were
convicted by the lower courts as charged. Were their respective convictions proper?
A: NO. The stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist should include:
(1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and
intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he placed his own
marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered with pending trial. Here, the
stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist did not contain the vital
pieces of information required. The chain of custody of the said illegal drug, therefore, could
not be reasonably established. Moreover, the prosecution must establish that the alleged
drug den is a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers
of the maintainer of the den. Here, the prosecution had only presented a singular occurrence
of the so-called illegal drug activity in Garbo’s house. Garbo, therefore, cannot be considered
a maintainer of drug den. (People of the Philippines v. Andanar, G.R. No. 246284, June 16, 2021,
as penned by J. Lazaro-Javier)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILLIAM CALLEJA y CAGANDA
DOCTRINE
In establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. 9165, it is essential to prove that
there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. In fact, it is futile to proceed
in determining the existence of the elements of the crime if the corpus delicti had not been
proven beyond moral certainty. Here, the prosecution never bothered to prove any justifiable
ground accounting for the buy-bust team’s deviation from the prescribed procedure, such as
when it called the required representatives only after the buy-bust operation and not before
Calleja’s arrest, even when the police officers were given sufficient time to prepare for the
operation. Hence, Calleja must be acquitted.
FACTS
Accused-appellant William Calleja was charged with illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
As per prosecution witness Senior Police Officer (SPO) II Albert Joven, Calleja had
been under police surveillance for suspected drug-related activities since December 2010.
On June 30, 2011, at around 7:30 p.m., he was on Fabricante St., South Centro, Sipocot, to
conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap Calleja, along with a team of three groups. SPO2 Joven
further testified that PO1 Opello Abala and PO2 Marrion Serdon, together with an asset, acted
as poseur-buyers, while the rest hid at a distance of around 20 meters, waiting for a pre-
arranged signal.
Upon hearing PO1 Abala shouting out loud, “positive na, positive na,” which was the
signal to alert the team of the successful transaction, they immediately rushed to the scene.
When they arrived, PO1 Abala and SPO2 Serdon had already apprehended Calleja. SPO2
Joven was shown the two sachets filled with material that looked like shabu, which was
recovered from the transaction. He then proceeded to handcuff Calleja while reading his
rights. The conduct of a body search thereafter yielded a black wallet with four sachets
containing shabu, as well as the pre-marked money worth P1,000. After the body search, he
personally recorded the inventory of all the seized items. He also had Calleja and witnesses
Barangay Kagawad Evelyn Mancera, Barangay Kagawad Ariel de Leon, and media
practitioner Jose Vivar affix their signatures thereon. SPO2 Joven said that the witnesses
were not present in the actual operation itself. Instead, they remained in the Kababayan
Center or police outpost.
The testimony of Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Jun Malong was dispensed with, as
both the prosecution and defense stipulated that he was an expert on forensic chemistry;
that he conducted the initial laboratory examination; and that the specimen submitted to PSI
Malong yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Calleja as charged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Should Calleja’s conviction be upheld?
RULING
NO. Basic is the rule that in all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an
accused as a fundamental constitutional guarantee must be upheld at all times. In line with
this constitutional imperative, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that the accused
must be acquitted and set free. “A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence, not on the weakness of the defense.”
For there to be a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be established, namely: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is important is that the sale
transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly
presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
Meanwhile, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11 of the same
Act, it must be established that: (1) the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (2)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.
Of equal significance in establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165 is
proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. In fact, the
Court finds it futile to proceed in determining the existence of the elements of the crime if
the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty. In People v. Moner, the Court
explained that “chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Succinctly, the links that must be established in the chain of custody are: (1) the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turn-over of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer;
(3) the turn-over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and (4) the turn-over and submission of the illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court. More specifically, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 10640 in 2014, embodies the procedure to be followed by a buy-bust
team in the seizure, custody, handling, and disposition of confiscated illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia. Given that the incidents in the present case occurred in 2011, the old law
would necessarily apply.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states in part: “[I]mmediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.” Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 added provisos to Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
regarding the place of inventory and allowable deviations from the otherwise strict
observance of the statutory requirements under justifiable grounds. Notably, it includes a
saving clause, which provides that “non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21—
under justifiable grounds—will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
seized items, so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Thus, the saving clause
provided in the IRR applies only “where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses
and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.” After which, “the prosecution must
show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.”
In other words, there must be a showing on the part of the police officers that they “intended
to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason.”
In this case, the conduct of the buy-bust operation was laden with defects far from
minor. They are major deviations for the above-mentioned statutorily-mandated procedure.
First, it is readily apparent that the rule requiring three witnesses—a media representative,
a DOJ representative, and an elected official—was not complied with. While marking and
inventory was done, the same is rendered defective, as the only witnesses present were two
barangay officials, Mancera and De Leon, and a media representative, Vivar.
Second, it appears that the required witnesses were not present at the time when
Calleja was apprehended. As admitted by no less than SPO2 Joven, the witnesses were not
present in the actual operation itself. Instead, they remained in the Kababayan Center or
police outpost. To reiterate, this requirement could have been easily complied with by the
buy-bust team, considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
Notwithstanding the conduct of a pre-operation meeting prior to the actual operation, the
witnesses were only called in after the apprehension and only after SPO2 Joven had secured
possession of the sachets. Again, the arresting police officers did not offer any explanation,
which would have excused their failure to comply with this requirement. Ostensibly, having
third-party witnesses present only during the subsequent physical inventory and
photographing renders the whole requirement of their presence futile. Given their absence
in the most crucial stages of the operation, it is clear that the required witnesses themselves
had no personal knowledge of the supposed sale and subsequent apprehension, search, and
seizure.
Lastly, the fourth link in the chain referring to the turnover and submission of the
dangerous drug from the forensic chemist to the court was broken. In drug-related cases, it
is of paramount importance that the chemist testifies on the details pertaining to the
handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination, i.e., when and from
whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things
accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. Equally important,
the forensic chemist must also identify the name and method of analysis used in determining
the chemical composition of the subject specimen. The testimony of PSI Malong was
dispensed with, as the defense admitted his proposed testimony. His testimony, however,
contains inadequate stipulation, as it only covered his findings on the drug sample submitted
by PO2 Joven. Verily, he did not discuss how he handled the dangerous drug from the time it
was received until it was presented in court. Neither does the initial laboratory report
proffered in evidence bear a description of the method utilized in analyzing the chemical
composition of the drug sample.
In fine, the prosecution never bothered to prove, let alone pled, any justifiable ground
accounting for the buy-bust team’s deviation from the prescribed procedure. Given the
unexplained major procedural lapses that manifestly cast doubt on the substantiation of the
elements of illegal drug sale and possession under Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the
Court is compelled to acquit Calleja for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence in favor of Calleja stands.
Q: Calleja was apprehended during a buy-bust operation, and sachets of what looked
like shabu were recovered from him. The arresting officer personally recorded the
inventory of all the seized items. He also had Calleja and witnesses Barangay Kagawad
Mancera, Barangay Kagawad De Leon, and media practitioner Vivar, affix their
signatures thereon. SPO2 Joven said that the witnesses were not present in the actual
operation itself. Instead, they remained in the Kababayan Center or police outpost.
Calleja was subsequently charged with illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
The RTC convicted Calleja as charged. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Should
Calleja’s conviction be upheld?
A: NO. First, it is readily apparent that the rule requiring three witnesses—a media
representative, a DOJ representative, and an elected official—was not complied with. While
marking and inventory was done, the same is rendered defective, as the only witnesses
present were two barangay officials, Mancera and De Leon, and a media representative,
Vivar. Second, it appears that the required witnesses were not present at the time when
Calleja was apprehended. This requirement could have been easily complied with by the
buy-bust team, considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
Notwithstanding the conduct of a pre-operation meeting prior to the actual operation, the
witnesses were only called in after the apprehension and only after SPO2 Joven had secured
possession of the sachets. The arresting police officer did not offer any explanation, which
would have excused their failure to comply with this requirement. Ostensibly, having third-
party witnesses present only during the subsequent physical inventory and photographing
renders the whole requirement of their presence futile. Given their absence in the most
crucial stages of the operation, it is clear that the required witnesses themselves had no
personal knowledge of the supposed sale and subsequent apprehension, search, and seizure.
(People of the Philippines v. Calleja, G.R. No. 250865, June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Lopez, J.Y.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELFORD BRILLO y DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 250934, June 16, 2021, Third Division (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the
victim is under 12 years of age. Here, Brillo had sexual intercourse with AAA when she was
asleep and still under the influence of alcohol, as established by the prosecution. The case, thus,
falls under the second instance of rape: “when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious.” It is now immaterial for the prosecution’s evidence to establish the
presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as earlier evidence shows, Brillo
raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman.
FACTS
In October 1, 2010, AAA, who was then 15 years old, accompanied her friend, EEE, to
meet the latter’s boyfriend, FFF. Upon AAA and EEE’s arrival at the meeting place, they were
greeted by FFF who was with his friends, namely: “GGG,” “HHH,” “LLL” and “JJJ.” KKK, who
was also a friend of FFF, joined the group, and along with KKK was accused-appellant
Melford Brillo, who was then 21 years old. Afterwards, they all proceeded to the house of
LLL to have a drinking spree.
As soon as they arrived at the said house, AAA and EEE rested while GGG and LLL
went out to buy liquor. When they returned, the group drank the liquor, particularly
Emperador Brandy, while AAA opted to drink juice. However, GGG, HHH, LLL and Brillo
forced AAA to drink the liquor by placing the glass half-filled with it in her mouth. The
drinking spree started at around 4:00 p.m. and lasted for two hours. After some time, AAA
got dizzy, which prompted her to go to a bedroom wherein she passed out. At around 9:00
p.m., AAA awakened and found herself naked inside the room. She saw that Brillo was also
naked and on top of her. Worse, Brillo then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her.
Upon realizing what was happening, AAA tried to push Brillo away but the latter
punched her making her lie down. Brillo, thereafter, held both of AAA’s hands up and forced
himself into her. Meanwhile, FFF, GGG, HHH and LLL, who were then talking and laughing,
were beside the bed with their cellular phones on and it appeared that they were taking a
video of both AAA and Brillo. When AAA regained control of her faculties, she tried to look
for her things but was informed that EEE took them with her. She then left the house and
proceeded to a friend’s house.
AAA recalled that she was able to recognize Brillo, FFF, GGG, HHH, and LLL inside the
room through the lights of their cellular phones and from the light emanating from the
kitchen, as the room was partitioned by a curtain which was slightly open. Although AAA met
Brillo only that day, AAA is familiar with him, as she often sees him in school. She knew Brillo
to be homosexual. After all of the companions of Brillo fled out of the room, Brillo still forced
himself into AAA while the latter continually resisted, albeit vain.
Three days after the incident, AAA submitted herself to a medico-legal examination.
She was examined by Dr. Rolando Ortiz, who diagnosed her to have lacerations in the 4, 6
and 8 o’clock positions.
Brillo was charged with rape under Article 266-A, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC convicted Brillo as charged. It said,
among others, that if indeed AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have
opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial and the humiliation that goes with
it, go to the length of going to the police to narrate her harrowing experience and allow an
intrusion into her private parts. The victim’s moral character in rape cases is immaterial
where it was shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious
through intoxication to enable an accused to have sexual intercourse with her. Moreover,
AAA’s claim of sexual assault was further bolstered by the medico-legal certificate. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Should Brillo’s conviction for rape be upheld?
RULING
YES. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under 12 years of age.
The Court finds that Brillo did have sexual intercourse with AAA when she was asleep
and still under the influence of alcohol as duly established by the prosecution. The case, thus,
falls under the second instance of rape: “when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious.” It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution’s evidence needs to
establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as the evidence at
bar shows, Brillo raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman—a fact that was
duly alleged in the information and duly established by the prosecution’s evidence during
the trial. Here, physical force, threat, or intimidation is not necessary for the simple reason
that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily give her
consent to engaging in sexual intercourse. Accordingly, the Court only needs to contend with
sufficient establishment of the first element—whether Brillo had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The carnal knowledge was proven through AAA’s categorical testimony,

corroborated by medical findings. It must be emphasized that, in the review of rape cases,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guiding principles: (a) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering that, in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of
the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The RTC found AAA’s testimony to be clear and unequivocal. She positively identified
Brillo as the man who raped her. Her recollection of the material details of her harrowing
experience at the hands of the Brillo was consistent. Dr. Ortiz, who conducted the medico-
legal examination on AAA, also stipulated on the medico-legal certificate that he diagnosed
AAA to have lacerations. In any case, as long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and
intrinsically believable as a whole, discrepancies of minor details and collateral matters do
not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of the witnesses’ declarations.
In fact, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that
is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Notably, Brillo was not able to establish any ill motive that could have compelled AAA to
falsely accuse him of rape. This only serves to further strengthen AAA’s case since the Court
has consistently held that a rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where
she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.
Brillo’s attempt to question the finding of the RTC that the sexual assault of AAA was
supported by the medico-legal certificate, cannot be given weight and credence. The accused
argues that since the examination was done three days after the incident, the lacerations
found on AAA’s vagina only prove that she had sexual intercourse but not that she was
assaulted. It is settled, however, that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations
does not negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or
hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of injuries
are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape. As held in People v. Campos,
a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. In fact, there can be
rape even if the medical examination shows no vaginal laceration.
Q: AAA, who was then 15 years old, had a drinking spree with Brillo and six other
people. AAA initially opted to drink juice, but Brillo and the others forced her to drink
liquor. After some time, AAA got dizzy, which prompted her to go to a bedroom
wherein she passed out. At around 9:00 p.m., AAA awakened and found herself naked
inside the room. She saw that Brillo was also naked and on top of her. Brillo then
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA tried to push Brillo away but the
latter punched her making her lie down. Thereafter, Brillo held both of AAA’s hands
up and forced himself into her. Three days after the incident, AAA submitted herself
to a medico-legal examination. Is Brillo liable for rape despite absence of evidence on
the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation?
A: YES. Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the elements or rape are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through
force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under 12 years of age. Here, Brillo had sexual intercourse with AAA when
she was asleep and still under the influence of alcohol. The case, thus, falls under the second
instance of rape: “when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious.” It is now immaterial for the prosecution’s evidence to establish the presence
of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as said earlier, Brillo raped an unconscious
and intoxicated woman. (People v. Brillo, G.R. No. 250934, June 16, 2021, as penned by J.
Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ALEXANDER ESTABILLO y PALARA
DOCTRINE
Objections against the lawfulness of an arrest which are not raised through a motion to
quash before the accused enters his or her plea are deemed waived, for the voluntary
submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during the trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. Here,
Estabillo questioned the validity of his arrest only on appeal before the Court of Appeals. By
that time, he was already estopped from raising any objection against the legality of his
warrantless arrest. To be sure, Estabillo willingly stipulated during the pre-trial that the trial
court had jurisdiction over his person. He is, therefore, barred from claiming otherwise.
FACTS
On June 13, 2010, Police Senior Superintendent Eduardo Acierto received a report
from a confidential informant regarding the drug activities of a certain “Alex,” a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
According to the confidential informant, “Alex” operated in Makati City and had in his
possession a huge amount of cocaine. Acting on the information, P/SSupt. Acierto instructed
Police Superintendent Ismael G. Fajardo, Jr. to conduct a buy-bust operation against “Alex.”
Thus, P/Supt. Fajardo designated Police Inspector Jay James Nepomuceno as the team leader,
SPO2 Taldo as the poseur-buyer, and SPO3 Miguel Ngo and PO3 Lawrence Perida as the
arresting officers.
Meanwhile, the confidential informant arranged a test buy with “Alex” for the
following day. On June 14, 2010, around 8:20 in the evening, the buy bust team, together with
the confidential informant arrived at Makati Avenue, Makati City. There, the confidential
informant introduced SPO2 Taldo to “Alex,” later identified as appellant SPO1 Alexander
Estabillo. Estabillo informed SPO2 Taldo that the price of cocaine was P1,500,000 per kilo.
SPO2 Taldo ordered four kilos of cocaine and asked for a sample. Estabillo gave SPO2 Taldo
a gram of suspected cocaine. Before they separated, they agreed that Estabillo would contact
the confidential informant once the four kilos of cocaine becomes available.
SPO2 Taldo brought the sample to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which
yielded positive for cocaine. On June 15, 2010, around 10:30 in the morning, SPO2 Taldo
received news from the confidential informant that the four kilos of cocaine he ordered from
Estabillo was already available. SPO2 Taldo was also to pay Estabillo P6,000,000 at 11 o’clock
that evening. Thus, the buy bust team prepared for the operation. SPO2 Taldo was given six
P500 bills dusted with ultraviolet powder. The buy bust team agreed that SPO2 Taldo would
dial SPO3 Ngo’s number once the transaction had been consummated. They also coordinated
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) after the final briefing.
At around 9 p.m., the team proceeded to the area of operation. About two hours later,
Estabillo arrived. He stopped in front of SPO2 Taldo and told the latter to board the front
passenger seat of his car. Inside the vehicle, Estabillo handed to SPO2 Taldo a maroon-brown
shoebox labeled Otto containing two bricks of suspected cocaine. In exchange, SPO2 Taldo
handed Estabillo the boodle money. Before Estabillo could start counting its contents, SPO2
Taldo dialed SPO3 Ngo’s number. The other members of the team rushed to the vehicle and
arrested Estabillo. The boodle money was recovered from Estabillo and SPO2 Taldo
proceeded to mark the two bricks of suspected cocaine in the Otto shoebox together with his
signature.
Upon further search of the vehicle, a yellow Mario D’Boro box containing two more
bricks of suspected cocaine was recovered from behind the driver seat which was also
marked. The seized items were then placed in front of the vehicle for the witnesses to see.
The marking was done in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Felix Santos and two
representatives from the media, Erika Tapalla and Dennis Perillo. An inventory of the seized
items was then prepared in the presence of Estabillo and the witnesses. Photographs were
taken during the marking and inventory. No prosecutor from the Department of Justice (DOJ)
was available to witness the inventory that night.
After the marking and inventory, SPO2 Taldo and PO3 Perida turned over the seized
items to the investigator SPO3 Glenn Caluag. Upon concluding his investigation in half an
hour, SPO3 Caluag turned over the two boxes containing two bricks each of suspected
cocaine to Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Paul Ed Ortiz of the PNP Crime Laboratory. All these
happened at the place of arrest. Subsequently, PCI Ortiz turned over the suspected cocaine
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. All four bricks tested positive for cocaine.
Estabillo was consequently charged with illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs, in violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, respectively.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Estabillo as charged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Estabillo was validly arrested without a
judicial warrant as he was caught in flagrante delicto selling two bricks of cocaine. The
consequent search of his vehicle that yielded two more bricks of cocaine was, therefore, legal.
The prosecution was also able to establish the elements of illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs through an unbroken chain of custody over the seized items.
Estabillo now comes before the Court, arguing, among others that he was illegally
arrested, and that the absence of a representative from the DOJ warrants his acquittal.
ISSUE
Is Estabillo’s conviction proper?
RULING
YES. Objections against the lawfulness of an arrest which are not raised through a
motion to quash before the accused enters his or her plea are deemed waived, for the
voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active
participation during the trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an
arrest. Here, Estabillo questioned the validity of his arrest only on appeal before the CA. By
that time, he was already estopped from raising any objection against the legality of his
warrantless arrest. To be sure, Estabillo willingly stipulated during the pre-trial that the trial
court had jurisdiction over his person. He is, therefore, barred from claiming otherwise.
Moreover, all the elements of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs are
present in the case. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. Based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Estabillo was the seller and
SPO2 Taldo was the buyer in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs subject of this case. SPO2
Taldo was supposed to purchase four kilos of cocaine but only two bricks were delivered to
him before the buy bust team arrested appellant. In exchange for these two bricks of cocaine,
SPO2 Taldo handed appellant a bag containing six P500 bills and 60 bundles of boodle money
dusted with ultraviolet powder as payment. The sale of illegal drugs was, therefore,
consummated. The arresting officer’s failure to test Estabillo for ultraviolet powder is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case for the law does not require buy-bust money and boodle
money used in anti-drug operations to be dusted with ultraviolet powder for purposes of
proving delivery of payment. The second element may be established through other means,
such as the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, as here. To reiterate, SPO2 Taldo
categorically testified that he had delivered payment to appellant. Both the RTC and the CA
found this testimony to be credible. The Court will not depart from the said factual finding.
Meanwhile, in a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be

shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Possession
under the contemplation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165 may either be actual or constructive.
Here, Estabillo had possession of the two bricks of cocaine recovered from behind the driver
seat of his vehicle upon his arrest. Though he did not have immediate physical possession of
these items, he had constructive possession thereof. Only he had dominion of these items.
The two bricks of cocaine were under his control and disposal. Estabillo cannot deny
knowledge of the two additional bricks of cocaine inside his car. Obviously, he was about to
sell them to SPO2 Taldo to complete the latter’s order of four kilos of cocaine.
The prosecution was also able to sufficiently establish all the links in the chain of
custody of the seized items. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution
must account for each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.
a. First link – Marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items which enter the
chain of custody. After marking the seized items, the apprehending team shall conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. Failure to comply with this three-witness rule, however, does not ipso facto
invalidate or render void the seizure and custody over the items as long as the prosecution
is able to show that there is justifiable ground for noncompliance and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Here, SPO2 Taldo immediately marked the two bricks of cocaine in the Otto shoebox
he received from Estabillo together with his signature at the place of operation. Meanwhile,
PO3 Perida recovered a yellow Mario D’Boro box containing two more bricks of suspected
cocaine from behind the driver seat which he, too, immediately marked. The marking was
done in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Santos and two representatives from the media.
An inventory of the seized items was then prepared in the presence of Estabillo and the
witnesses. Photographs were taken during the marking and inventory.
The arresting officers offered adequate explanation for the absence of a DOJ
representative during the inventory. SPO1 Taldo, PO3 Perida and SPO3 Ngo explained that,
although they exerted efforts to secure the presence of a representative from the DOJ, there
was no duty prosecutor at the time when they conducted the buy-bust operation. The Court
notes that it was close to midnight when the operation took place. Verily, there was simply
no prosecutor from the DOJ who was available to witness the inventory at that very late hour
in the evening. The Court also considers the immediacy of performing the marking and
inventory of seized items which ought not be delayed. The arresting officers were likewise
able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which were marked,
inventoried, and photographed in front of an elected official and two media representatives.
To be clear though, a media representative is no substitute for a DOJ representative under
R.A. No. 9165 prior to its amendment. However, the arresting officers’ decision to invite
additional witnesses than required is cogent proof of their good faith, if not, earnest efforts
to comply with the witness requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, and more
important, to ensure transparency and dispel any kind of suspicion on the legitimacy of the
operation.
b. Second link – The second link pertains to the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Here, SPO2 Taldo and PO3 Perida
turned over the seized items to SPO3 Caluag, the designated investigator for the case. This
was established through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as well as the Turn-
Over of Confiscated/Seized Evidence. At any rate, Estabillo did not raise any specific argument
against the second link which is, therefore, deemed proved.
c. Third link – The third link is the turnover of the seized drugs by the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist for examination. Records show that on June 16, 2010, at 1:30
in the morning, SPO3 Caluag turned over the seized items to PCI Ortiz of the PNP Crime
Laboratory who was present at the operation. Thereafter, PSI Mark Ballesteros received the
seized items from PCI Ortiz for laboratory examination at 2:55 that same morning. Per
chemistry report, all four bricks tested positive for cocaine. Estabillo claims, however, that
the third link was not sufficiently established considering that the prosecution did not
present PCI Ortiz as witness.
The prosecution’s failure to present the testimony of PCI Ortiz did not diminish the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration of evidence. But this is not the case here
where Estabillo was caught with four bricks of cocaine weighing about 1 kilo each. What
makes the seized items here even more peculiar was that they were wrapped in masking
tape and distinctly marked during the operation together with the signature of the arresting
officers. In any event, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
operates in favor of the arresting officers, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the police officers were inspired by any improper motive or did not properly perform their
duty.
d. Fourth link – The final link is the turnover and submission of the seized items by
the forensic chemist to the court. Here, PSI Ballesteros brought the seized items to the trial
court during the pre-trial conference and hearing on Estabillo’s petition for bail. Said items
were marked as exhibits in open court in the presence of Estabillo himself and counsel.
The failure of the trial court to perform an ocular inspection within 72 hours from the
filing of the Informations as required by Section 21 (4) of R.A. No. 9165 does not, in any way,
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The purpose of the provision is
to allow the PDEA to destroy the seized drug items even before they are presented in court
to reduce the risk of these items ending up back in the streets. Meanwhile, ocular inspection
allows the trial court to personally see the seized items before they are destroyed by the
PDEA. It ensures that the representative sample brought to court as proof of the corpus
delicti actually came from the items seized from the accused. Section 21 (4) of R.A. No. 9165
bears upon the integrity and evidentiary value of representative samples only. Non-
compliance with the provision would not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
entirety of the seized items when said items themselves are presented in court, not just their
representative samples, as here.
Q: Estabillo was arrested in a buy-bust operation after he sold two bricks of what was
later on proved as cocaine to SPO2 Taldo. He did not question the validity of his arrest
during trial but did so for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Can
Estabillo still claim that his arrest was illegal?
A: NO. Objections against the lawfulness of an arrest which are not raised through a motion
to quash before the accused enters his or her plea are deemed waived, for the voluntary
submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during the trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. Here,
Estabillo questioned the validity of his arrest only on appeal before the CA. By that time, he
was already estopped from raising any objection against the legality of his warrantless
arrest. To be sure, Estabillo willingly stipulated during the pre-trial that the trial court had
jurisdiction over his person. He is, therefore, barred from claiming otherwise. (People v.
Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Lazaro-Javier)
REX SORONGON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by payment,
indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or by
the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or bilateral
agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, novation may serve to either
prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability happens when there is novation
before an Information is filed in court. Here, Nelly and Sorongon entered into an amicable
settlement before the former’s filing of Information for estafa against the latter. There, the
parties agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the future. Hence, Sorongon
should not be held liable for estafa.
FACTS
In January 2006, petitioner Rex Sorongon was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Private complainant Nelly Van der Bom testified that she and her husband hired
Sorongon, a civil engineer, to put up a water system for their water refilling business.
Sometime in July 2004, after the project was completed, Sorongon asked to borrow the
subject cement mixer for his project in Iloilo City. Nelly agreed to lend the cement mixer on
the condition that Sorongon would return it as soon as his project is completed. Nelly claimed
that Sorongon, however, failed to return her cement mixer when she demanded for it after
several months had passed. She then asked her lawyer to write a formal demand letter to
Sorongon, but the same went unheeded.
For the defense, Barangay Kagawad Rudy de la Torre testified that Nelly and her
husband filed a complaint in the barangay against Sorongon about unpaid accounts, which
included a cement mixer valued at P40,000. Considering that Nelly failed to present any
receipts for her claims, Rudy purportedly advised her to just settle the case amicably. Nelly
eventually agreed and the parties signed an amicable settlement in March 2005. Sorongon
corroborated the testimony of Rudy that he and Nelly reached an amicable settlement before
the barangay. Thereafter, however, he received the complaint in the instant case.
The amicable settlement provided that the parties agreed that there will be no
countercharges “related to this case” to be filed “in the future.” Nelly also agreed therein to
waive her ownership of the properties subject of their dispute in favor of Sorongon, and one
of these properties was the cement mixer.
Sorongon also testified that in January 2005, he filed a labor case against the Van der
Borns where he submitted the amicable settlement he and Nelly agreed to before the
barangay. The National Labor Relations Commission allegedly took note of Sorongon’s
indebtedness contained in the settlement agreement and deducted the same from the award
it granted in his favor.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Sorongon as charged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. The appellate court held that the amicable settlement between
Sorongon and Nelly did not exonerate him from criminal liability, as nowhere in the said
settlement did Nelly relinquish her rights or interests over her claims. At any rate, a
compromise or amicable settlement entered into after the commission of a crime does not
extinguish an accused’s criminal liability since the offense is against the State.
ISSUE
Was Sorongon’s conviction for estafa proper?
RULING
NO. The general rule is that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by payment,
indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or
by the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, novation may serve
to either prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability happens when there
is novation before an Information is filed in court.
As the Court first held in People v. Nery: The novation theory may perhaps apply prior
to the filing of the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that
time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-
debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust.
But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in
court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the
criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state,
only the latter can renounce it.
The Court further emphasized in Nery that in order for novation to effectively prevent
the incipience of criminal liability, its concept under the Civil Code has to be followed as well.
Novation in the Civil Code is found in Article 1291, which provides that novation arises when
there is a substitution of an obligation by a subsequent one that extinguishes the first, either
by changing the object or the principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the
debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. For a valid novation to
take place, there must therefore be: (a) a previous valid obligation; (b) an agreement of the
parties to make a new contract; (c) an extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a valid new
contract. Novation, likewise, is never presumed. For it to be effective, it is imperative that the
extinguishment be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations
be on every point incompatible with each other. In case of only slight modifications, the old
obligation would still prevail.
In the present case, the Court finds that the original contract of commodatum between
the herein parties was effectively novated when they entered into an amicable settlement
before the barangay in March 2005, which amicable settlement came about before the
Information for estafa against Sorongon was filed in January 2006. To reiterate, the subject
of the amicable settlement were the unpaid accounts which Sorongon supposedly owed
Nelly and her husband. The purpose of the proceedings, in other words, was to settle these
monetary or civil liabilities of Sorongon to the spouses Van der Born. These unpaid accounts
included the value of the cement mixer and some other personal properties, as well as
alleged loans and cash advances which Sorongon and his wife had borrowed from the
couple.
Correlatively, in January 2005, or prior to the barangay proceedings in March 2005,

the lawyer of the Van der Borns wrote a demand letter to Sorongon about the supposed
monetary liabilities which he incurred from the couple. The amount of P25,000 representing
the amount of the cement mixer which Sorongon obtained from the couple in 2004 was
among those listed, along with other sums which were all included in the unpaid accounts
made subject of the barangay proceedings. Also, in his testimony before the trial court, De la
Torre affirmed that the cement mixer was included as a subject matter before the barangay
proceedings. The amicable settlement stipulated, in no uncertain terms, that the parties
agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the future. The minutes of the
proceedings further revealed that Nelly agreed to waive her ownership of the properties
subject of their dispute in favor of Sorongon. Unmistakably, one of these properties was the
cement mixer.
Moreover, the waiver made by Nelly was on the condition that Sorongon would not
file any case or countercharge against Nelly in the future. Sorongon kept to his end of this
bargain. The labor case which he filed against the couple was not a violation of the agreement
since it was filed in January 2005, or prior to the barangay proceedings in March 2005. With
Nelly waiving her ownership over the cement mixer in favor of Sorongon in exchange for the
concession that he would refrain from filing any case against her in the future, there was
clearly an implied novation of the original contract of commodatum between her and
Sorongon. The waiver effectively extinguished the original contract of Sorongon and Nelly
and, in its stead, a new contract in the form of the amicable settlement they executed before
the barangay, emerged. The intention to extinguish the old obligation might not have been
done expressly, but considering that the new contract of the parties was, by all accounts,
incompatible with their original contract of commodatum, novation had effectively occurred.
In plain terms, prior to the filing of the Information in court, Nelly had already
renounced or relinquished her ownership over the property subject of the criminal case in
favor of Sorongon. Consequently, therefore, the elements of the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC became nonexistent. In particular, there is no longer any duty
or obligation on the part of Sorongon to deliver or return the cement mixer to Nelly or to any
other person for that matter because the ownership thereof had already been transferred to
Sorongon by Nelly’s waiver and renunciation in his favor. It follows, too, that there is no
longer any prejudice caused to another. Perforce, with the new obligation under the amicable
settlement between Nelly and Sorongon having the effect of novating their old obligation,
Nelly is now estopped from insisting on the latter. Sorongon is acquitted of estafa.
Q: In March 2005, Nelly and Sorongon entered into an amicable settlement over the
latter’s unpaid accounts to the former. The settlement provided that the parties
agreed that there will be no countercharges related to the case to be filed in the future.
Nelly also agreed to waive her ownership of the properties subject of their dispute in
favor of Sorongon, one of these properties being a cement mixer that was allegedly
borrowed by Sorongon from Nelly. In January 2006, Nelly filed a complaint for estafa
against Sorongon after the latter failed to return the cement mixer despite demand.
Sorongon invoked the amicable settlement to negate his liability. Is Sorongon correct?
A: YES. The general rule is that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by payment,
indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or
by the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, novation may serve
to either prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability happens when there
is novation before an Information is filed in court. Here, Nelly and Sorongon entered into an
amicable settlement before the former’s filing of Information for estafa against the latter.
There, the parties agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the future.
Hence, Sorongon should not be held liable for estafa. (Sorongon v. People of the Philippines,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOVIC PANTANOSAS AMPER
G.R. No. 239334, June 16, 2021, Third Division (Lopez, J. J.)
DOCTRINE
There is no clear-cut behavior that can be expected of one who is being raped or has
been raped. Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations
dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident as the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. Here, Amper forced Agnes to have sexual intercourse with him by pointing a
sharp object at the latter’s back. Although Agnes told Amper that she would satisfy his lust, “so
please throw your weapon and don’t stab me,” such cannot be considered consent on the part
of Agnes. It was borne out of fear for her safety, not a sign of approval. The intercourse was not
consensual and was committed through threat, force, or intimidation. Hence, Amper is guilty of
rape.
FACTS
Agnes Cabiltes, together with her husband and their two minor children, travelled
from Davao City to Purok 3, Barangay Boyugon, Medina, Misamis Occidental. The purpose of
their visit was to take care of Agnes’ ailing father-in-law, who at that time was confined in a
hospital. Upon their arrival in Medina, they were fetched by accused-appellant Jovic Amper,
a close friend of Agnes’ husband. Amper accompanied them to the house of Agnes’ father-in-
law and prepared lunch for them. After eating, Agnes and her husband visited her father-in-
law in the hospital. When they went back home, Amper helped Agnes in fixing the ceiling fan
in the room where Agnes and her family will be staying. Amper also stayed for the evening
to join the conversation of Agnes’ husband and two other persons. At around 10 in the
evening, Agnes received a call from a doctor informing her that her father-in-law had already
died. Despite being drunk, Agnes’ husband immediately proceeded to the hospital, leaving
Agnes and her two minor children at home.
At around 1:05 in the early morning of August 5, 2015, Agnes was surprised when she
saw a man inside the house, whose face was covered with a t-shirt, exposing only his eyes.
The man switched off the lights in the living room and in the bedroom. Suddenly, the man
grabbed Agnes’ hair. Agnes then asked the intruder, “What do you want kuya? You want to
steal, just get what you want and please don’t hurt me and my children.” Instead of
answering, the man just said, “What took you so long to come back, I have been waiting for
you.”
Agnes tried to fight back while she was being dragged by the man from the bedroom
to the sala. However, Agnes stopped resisting when she felt a sharp object pointed at her
back and when the man said, “Fight back, run and ask for help, I will kill your children.”
Agnes was then forcibly dragged out of the house until they reached a place near the
mango trees. Thereat, the man took off her shorts and panty, and ordered her to bend over.
Agnes told the man, “This is all you want? You should only tell me. If it is lust you are looking
for, I will satisfy you so please throw your weapon and don’t stab me.” The man told Agnes
to keep quiet and don’t tell her husband because they are close friends. Agnes repeatedly
told the man that she will satisfy his lust so he should throw his weapon. Instead of throwing
the weapon, the man used the same to play with Agnes’ vagina and then inserted his penis
into her vagina. Unsatisfied, the man dragged Agnes near the septic tank and forced her to
lie down. Thereafter, the man inserted his penis inside Agnes’ vagina for the second time. At
this juncture, the shirt, which concealed the face of the man was slowly removed. Agnes then
recognized that it was Amper.
After Amper left, Agnes immediately entered the house to check on her children. The
incident was later on reported to the police. In a police line-up, Agnes initially identified a
certain Noel Cabiltes as the one who raped her. She said she did not identify Amper, who was
then standing behind her husband, as her rapist for fear that Amper might make good of his
threat of killing her husband. The following day, Agnes decided to positively identify Amper
as her rapist.
Amper was charged with rape under Article 226-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The Regional Trial Court convicted
Amper as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Amper now argues that there is no evidence showing that Agnes resisted, and that
she consented to the sexual intercourse. Amper also questioned Agnes’ failure to identify him
as her rapist during the police line-up. He said the force or intimidation, if there was any, had
already ceased because of the presence of police officers. Thus, the failure of Agnes to point
to him as the assailant goes against every grain of human experience.
ISSUE
Is Amper’s conviction for rape proper?
RULING
YES. For a charge of rape under Article 226-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC to prosper,
the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a female, and (2) the same was committed by using force, threat, or
intimidation.
As to the first element, the categorical and steadfast testimony of Agnes has
sufficiently established that Amper succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her when he
inserted his penis in her vagina on two instances. First, near the mango trees, and second,
near the septic tank. By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, the
victim said all that was necessary to prove rape. It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that
the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain
a verdict of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only the offended
party’s testimony.
Anent the second element, records disclose that Amper employed force and
intimidation to carry out his salacious desires. Amper forcibly dragged Agnes out of the
house and pointed a sharp object at her back to intimidate her. Amper also threatened to kill
Agnes and her minor children if she fights back, run, or ask for help. Feeling hapless, Agnes
could only recoil in fear and succumb to the beastly demands of accused-appellant. It is
settled that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or
be of such character as could not be resisted—it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. What
is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and
vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.
On Amper’s claim that Agnes consented to the sexual intercourse, such as when she
said she will satisfy his lust so he should throw his weapon, the Court finds that Agnes uttered
the aforesaid statements only to convince Amper to throw his bladed weapon and not to
signify her consent or willingness to the sexual confrontation. It was borne out of fear for her
safety, to say the least, not a sign of approval. With fear instilled in her mind, she cannot be
faulted for behaving as she did. There is no clear-cut behavior that can be expected of one
who is being raped or has been raped. Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to
similar situations dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted
by a shocking incident as the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable. It is, thus, unreasonable to expect or demand a standard behavioral
response from Agnes, who was confronted with such startling and traumatic experience.
Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she
did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. What needs
only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.
Furthermore, the failure of Agnes to immediately identify Amper as her assailant

during the police line-up does not diminish the plausibility of her claims nor taint her
credibility as a witness. While it may be true that they were already in the presence of police
officers at that time, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of the victim. Moreover, Agnes satisfactorily explained that
Amper was standing behind her husband. Fearing for the safety of her husband, she was
forced to point to someone else instead of Amper. Thus, her initial reluctance to point to the
real culprit is perfectly understandable and in accord with human nature. It was brought
about by fear not only for her own safety but for the safety of her loved ones. In any case,
records disclose that Agnes pointed to Amper as her rapist the day after the police line-up
and again at the witness stand. Her categorical identification of Amper as the malefactor was
given full faith and credence by the trial court and the Court perceives no reason to rule
otherwise.
Q: Amper forced Agnes, mother of two minors, to have sexual intercourse with him by
pointing a sharp object at the latter’s back. Agnes told Amper, “I will satisfy you, so
please throw your weapon and don’t stab me.” Amper was subsequently charged with
and convicted of rape. He argued that Agnes consented to the sexual intercourse. Is
Amper correct?
A: NO. There is no clear-cut behavior that can be expected of one who is being raped or has
been raped. Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations
dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident as the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. Here, although Agnes told Amper that she would satisfy his lust, such cannot
be considered consent on the part of Agnes. The statement was uttered only to convince
Amper to throw his weapon. The statement was borne out of fear for Agnes’ safety, not a sign
of approval. The intercourse was not consensual and was committed through threat, force,
or intimidation. Amper is not correct. He is guilty of rape. (People v. Amper, G.R. No. 239334,
June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Lopez, J.)
RAMON C. RENALES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 231530-33
LCDR ROSENDO C. ROQUE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION)

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 231603-08, June 16, 2021, First Division (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
In order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, based
on violation of the procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the fact that a
violation of the procurement laws was committed. Rather, the prosecution must still prove
beyond reasonable doubt the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Here,
although Renales and Roque were public officers discharging official functions at the time of
the questionable purchase of medicines, the prosecution was not able to establish that they
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and that their
action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their functions. What was
merely alleged was that Renales and Roque, together with other accused, purchased medicines
without the benefit of public bidding, and there was failure to prove the presence of an
emergency justifying the resort to direct procurement of medicines from the five suppliers
involved in this case.
FACTS
The Commission on Audit (COA) audited the Philippine Navy for its selected
transactions from 1991 to June 1992 in order to determine whether its transactions for the
said period are compliant with government rules and regulations. The COA audit team
examined numerous documents including disbursement vouchers, official receipts,
purchase orders, purchase requisition, certificate of availability of fund, certificate of
emergency purchase, certificate of exclusive distributorship issued by the supplier, and
certificate from the manufacturer in relation to the questioned transactions of the Navy.
The audit team compared the prices of the medicines. The team found that drugs and
medicines were purchased through emergency mode of procurement. However, COA
Director Mary Adelino claimed that at the time of the purchase, there was no emergency
because the medicines were for stock purposes only. Even assuming that emergency
purchase was justified, Adelina said the canvass requirement from three suppliers under
COA Circular No. 85-55-A was nevertheless not followed. A total amount of approximately
P2,900,000 was used to purchase the medicines from five different suppliers.
The accused Ramon Renales and Rosendo Roque, both public officers and members
of the Philippine Navy, allegedly conspired with each other and with private individuals in
certifying the need for emergency purchase of certain medicines without the conduct of
public bidding. Renales was the head of the Price Monitoring Office at the time the medicines
were purchased while Roque was the Naval Procurement Officer of the Navy in 1991. It was
additionally alleged that Renales and Roque, together with other members of the Navy, took
advantage of their official positions as members of the Bids and Awards Committee and/or
Procurement Committee, and with manifest partiality and acting with evident bad faith,
caused undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to the suppliers of
the medicines.
For his part, Renales testified that his duties include conducting price comparison
checks on all purchases made by the Navy through a continuously updated computerized
price listing and actual independent canvasses. He said his findings depended upon the
availability of prices registered in the database program and the documents attached to the
purchase orders. He claimed that his duty is only ministerial, as he merely compared and
noted prices based on the updated computerized listing and the documentary record in his
possession. He has no authority to change what has been requested by the proper offices.
Meanwhile, Roque argued that at the time the transactions took place, he was just a
junior officer newly assigned to his post in the naval procurement office and therefore, he
was bound by the process. Roque emphasized that the technical personnel composed of
doctors certified that the purchase of medicines was urgent, while the staff personnel and
logistics division reiterated such request. Having no background in medicine, he relied on
the certifications of his superiors.
Renales and Roque, together with other members of the Navy, were charged with a
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan convicted them of the
same. The court emphasized the failure of Roque, Renales, and their co-accused to prove the
presence of an emergency justifying the resort to direct procurement of medicines from the
five suppliers involved in the case. The Sandiganbayan likewise pointed out that even if the
emergency mode is justified, the accused still failed to canvass the prices of medicines from
at least three suppliers, contrary to the COA Circular prevailing at the time of procurement.
ISSUE
Are Renales and Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019?
RULING
NO. In the case of Martel v. People, citing Sabaldan, Jr. v. Ombudsman, the Court
emphasized that in order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019, based on violation of the procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely rely on
the fact that a violation of the procurement laws was committed. Rather, the prosecution
must still prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Again, the essential elements for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 are the
following: (1) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (2) that the accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) that the action of the accused caused
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused. Here, it is
undeniable that Renales and Roque were public officers discharging official functions at the
time of the questionable purchase of medicines. However, the second and third elements are
lacking.
Partiality is synonymous with bias, which “excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.” Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will;
it partakes of the nature of fraud. In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Court held that “mere bad faith or
partiality are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or
partiality must be evident or manifest, respectively.” For an act to be considered as exhibiting
“manifest partiality,” there must be a showing of a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side rather than the other. “Evident bad faith,” on the other hand,
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design, or some motive of
self-interest or ill will for ulterior purpose. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest and
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.
Here, Renales and Roque’s reliance on the certification and specification issued by the
doctors from the Medical Therapeutic Board as well as the technical personnel division, who
have medical background and are more familiar or knowledgeable with pharmaceutical
products, cannot be stretched to mean that they acted in evident bad faith and/or with
manifest partiality. Reliance on the expertise of appropriate personnel cannot be equated
with fraudulent and corrupt design. In the absence of clear evidence showing the elements
of evident bad faith and/or manifest partiality, Renales and Roque cannot be convicted of
the crime charged.
Moreover, there are two ways by which a public official violates Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or both. In the
informations filed against Renales and Roque, the prosecution alleged both modes of
committing the crime.
“Undue injury” is consistently interpreted as “actual damage.” Thus, in Rivera v.

People, the Court said that unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established.
Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In this case, the prosecution
failed to prove any undue injury suffered by the government because of the emergency
purchase of the medicines from the five suppliers. The Sandiganbayan itself even
acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of overpricing in the medicines
purchased by the accused. To be able to show that indeed the government suffered damage,
the prosecution should have canvassed and should have compared the prices of the branded
medicines purchased by the accused to the exact brands sold by other suppliers. The
difference of the prices, if any, would prove the presence of undue injury to the government.
However, this was not done. Hence, there is no actual basis for Sandiganbayan to conclude
that the government suffered undue injury because of the emergency purchase of the subject
medicines.
Even under the second mode, which is by giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference, the prosecution failed to prove that the five suppliers of
the subject medicines were favored. “Unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons.
“Advantage” means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of
any kind; benefit from course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation
or desirability; choice or estimation above another. In this case, it cannot be said that Renales
and Roque, by undertaking their specific duties as price monitoring officer and procurement
officer, respectively, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the medicine
suppliers. Renales and Roque merely relied on the certifications of the doctors from the
Medical Therapeutic Board and the technical division. They did not personally choose from
whom to purchase the medicines. The prosecution did not even attempt to show any
connection between Roque, Renales, and their co-accused, on one hand, and the medicine
suppliers, on the other, to back the claim that the accused preferred the suppliers. Renales
and Roque, therefore, should be acquitted.
Q: The COA audited the Philippine Navy for its selected transactions from 1991 to June
1992 in order to determine whether its transactions for the said period are compliant
with government rules and regulations. The audit team found that certain drugs and
medicines were purchased through emergency mode of procurement. However, COA
claimed that at the time of the purchase, there was no emergency because the
medicines were for stock purposes only. Even assuming that emergency purchase was
justified, the canvass requirement from three suppliers under a COA circular was
nevertheless not followed. Accused Renales and Roque, both public officers and
members of the Navy, allegedly conspired with each other and with private
individuals in certifying the need for emergency purchase of certain medicines
without the conduct of public bidding. For his part, Renales said his duty is only
ministerial, as he merely compared and noted prices based on the updated
computerized listing and the documentary record in his possession. He has no
authority to change what has been requested by the proper offices. Meanwhile, Roque
argued that at the time the transactions took place, he was just a junior officer newly
assigned to his post in the naval procurement office and therefore, he was bound by
the process. Having no background in medicine, he said relied on the certifications of
his superiors that the medicines were urgent. Renales and Roque were convicted for
a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Is their conviction proper?
A: NO. In order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
based on violation of the procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the fact
that a violation of the procurement laws was committed. Rather, the prosecution must still
prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Here, although Renales and Roque were public officers discharging official functions at the
time of the questionable purchase of medicines, the prosecution was not able to establish
that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence,
and that their action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their
functions. What was merely alleged was that Renales and Roque, together with other
accused, purchased medicines without the benefit of public bidding, and there was failure to
prove the presence of an emergency justifying the resort to direct procurement of medicines.
Renales and Roque should be acquitted. (Renales v. People, G.R. No. 231530-33 & G.R. No.
231603-08, June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Carandang)
CHRISTOPHER PACU-AN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Slight inconsistencies in the declarations of witnesses hardly weaken the probative value
of the witnesses’ open court testimony. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate
one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Furthermore, sworn statements taken ex parte are, as a general rule, considered to be inferior
to the testimony given in open court. Here, the discrepancy in Alicia’s statement in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay did not diminish the probative value of her open court testimony in
positively identifying Pacu-An as the perpetrator of the crime of homicide.
FACTS
On July 29, 2003, at around 8:30 p.m., Alicia Milad, wife of victim, Zaldy Milad, was at
Delos Reyes Street, Tibag, calling her son to go home. While at a nearby alley, Alicia heard a
commotion at her house. She then went back to her house and saw petitioner Christopher
Pacu-An stabbing somebody. When the man fell on the ground, she recognized that it was
Zaldy. She then shouted and told them to stop but the group of men, including a certain
Rommel, did not heed and hit Zaldy’s head. She approached Zaldy and turned his body over.
She cried for help and somebody responded. Together, they brought Zaldy to the hospital
where Zaldy was pronounced dead on arrival. Alicia testified that at the time she saw Pacu-
An stabbing Zaldy, she was five meters away. She identified the double-bladed weapon which
measured about a foot. She alleged that the location where the incident happened was
illuminated because there was light coming from the front door and from the house of a
neighbor.
Alvin, son of Zaldy, said that on July 29, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., he was
in front of the house of Rey Cabatuando who was living across Pacu-An’s house when a
commotion ensued. Alvin claimed he saw Pacu-An holding a knife and running towards the
small alley. He also saw Zaldy lying on the ground covered in blood while being held by his
mother, Alicia. Alicia then asked him to call his aunt to bring his father to the hospital. Alvin
described that the place of the incident was illuminated by a light coming from the house of
Cabatuando and from the door of the house of Pacu-An. According to Alvin, the light was
coming from inside the house of Pacu-An because the front door was open.
Pacu-An and Rommel were charged with homicide for the death of Zaldy. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquitted Rommel and convicted Pacu-An. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Pacu-An now comes before the Court, arguing that the CA gravely erred when it
upheld his conviction despite weak, inconsistent, and unreliable identification by the
prosecution’s witnesses. Particularly, Pacu-An points to the inconsistency in Alicia’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay taken during the night Zaldy was stabbed where Alicia stated that a
witness informed her that Pacu-An was the one who stabbed Zaldy. However, in her open
court examination, Alicia testified that she herself saw Pacu-An stab Zaldy.
ISSUE
Is Pacu-An guilty of homicide?
RULING
YES. A careful review of the testimony of Alicia shows that the said discrepancy in her
statements in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and her open court testimony was explained by her
during her cross-examination. There, she said that Cabatuando witnessed the incident and
told her what happened. When further asked, Alicia said that apart from Cabatuando, she
herself witnessed Pacu-An stabbing somebody.
The discrepancy in Alicia’s statement in her Sinumpaang Salaysay did not diminish
the probative value of her open court testimony in positively identifying Pacu-An as the
perpetrator of the crime of Homicide. In Madali v. People, the Court held that slight
inconsistencies in the declarations of witnesses hardly weaken the probative value of the
witnesses’ open court testimony, thus: Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its
incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and
variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value.
In Avelino v. People, the Court reiterated the ruling in Madali and held that “as long as
the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do
not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.” In People v. Manigo, the Court ruled
that as between a sworn statement or affidavit and an open court testimony, courts must
always give more weight to the open court declarations since “affidavits being taken ex parte
are usually incomplete and inaccurate.” Furthermore, in People v. Dayaday, the Court ruled
that sworn statements taken ex parte are, as a general rule, considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in open court.
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of both the CA and RTC as to
the credibility of Alicia as a witness. The CA was correct in sustaining the ruling of the RTC
regarding the probative value of Alicia’s testimony in positively identifying Pacu-An as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Court agrees that the minor inconsistencies in Alicia’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay were not sufficient to damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. Alicia’s positive identification prevails over
Pacu-An’s defenses of denial and alibi since the latter can be easily fabricated and is
essentially unreliable. Further, Alicia’s positive identification was duly corroborated by
Alvin’s testimony in which Alvin narrated that he saw Pacu-An holding a knife and running
towards the alley. In fact, in his testimony, Alvin even described what Pacu-An was wearing
during the incident.
Q: Alicia saw Pacu-An stabbing somebody who later on turned out to be her husband,
Zaldy. Pacu-An was subsequently charged with and convicted of homicide. The CA
affirmed the conviction. Pacu-An argues that the CA erred in upholding his conviction,
pointing out specifically to inconsistency in Alicia’s Sinumpaang Salaysay taken
during the night Zaldy was stabbed. In that Salaysay, Alicia stated that a witness
informed her that Pacu-An was the one who stabbed Zaldy. However, in Alicia’s open
court examination, she testified that she herself saw Pacu-An stab Zaldy. Is Pacu-An’s
conviction proper?
A: YES. Slight inconsistencies in the declarations of witnesses hardly weaken the probative
value of the witnesses’ open court testimony. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy
their credibility. Furthermore, sworn statements taken ex parte are, as a general rule,
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Here, Alicia was able to
positively identify Pacu-An as the perpetrator of the crime of homicide. The discrepancy in
Alicia’s statement in her Sinumpaang Salaysay did not diminish the probative value of her
open court testimony. Pacu-An is, therefore, properly convicted for homicide. (Pacu-An v.
People, G.R. No. 237542, June 16, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO BAUTISTA,
ROGER BAUTISTA, RONNIE BAUTISTA and ROLLY BAUTISTA
DOCTRINE
For abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, the evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Here, there was an
ensuing fight between a certain Eric and the accused-appellants. Upon hearing Eric’s cry for
help, victim SPO1 Rufino responded. Later on, the accused-appellants simultaneously stabbed
SPO1 Rufino through the use of knives, screwdriver, and a broken bottle. However, there is no
clear showing that the accused-appellants deliberately and specifically sought the use of said
weapons so as to be able to take advantage of their superior strength against SPO1 Rufino.
Hence, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. The
crime committed is only homicide, not murder.
FACTS
Eric Pajarillo went to a basketball court in Barangay Cabaroan Daya, Bantay, Ilocos
Sur. There, accused-appellant Roger suddenly ran towards him and punched him several
times, causing him to fall on the ground. After a while, Roberto, Ronnie, and Rolly—brothers
of Roger—ganged up on Eric. When Ronnie attempted to stab Eric with a screwdriver, Eric’s
uncle came to his rescue, and immediately prevented accused-appellants from hurting him.
Eric’s cry for help was heard from a nearby house where the victims, husband and wife
Senior Police Officer I (SPO1) Rufino Rapacon and SPO1 Florence Rapacon, were residing.
SPO1 Rufino immediately rushed towards the basketball court. He was followed by his
pregnant wife SPO1 Florence, who carried her 9mm service firearm.
On her way, SPO1 Florence met Eric and his sister who were in a hurry to go home.
From a distance of about 3 to 5 meters from a well-lighted area, SPO1 Florence saw her
husband in a kneeling position, with his hands held up by Ronnie and Roberto. All four
accused-appellants were simultaneously stabbing SPO1 Rufino. Ronnie stabbed SPO1
Rufino’s head with a screwdriver, while Roberto and Rolly used a knife in stabbing the
victim’s torso, and Roger abruptly thrust a broken bottle into the victim’s body.
SPO1 Florence fired warning shots, pleading for the accused-appellants to stop. When
she saw Ronnie stab her husband mercilessly, she shot Ronnie in the lower portion of his
body. Out of nowhere, Rolly stabbed her from behind. Immediately, SPO1 Florence held
Rolly’s hand, deterring him from further squeezing the knife into her body. In the ensuing
struggle, both of them fell on the ground. Eventually, SPO1 Rufino was able to contain Rolly’s
attack, stabbing him in his right shoulder using the knife which she pulled from the right side
of her body.
After a few minutes, responding police officers arrived. SPO1 Rufino was brought to
the nearest hospital but was declared dead on arrival. On the other hand, SPO1 Florence
stayed at the hospital for four days. She had a forced labor through caesarean procedure. The
following day, the newly-born infant died.
All accused-appellants were charged with murder with direct assault for the killing of
SPO1 Rufino, and frustrated murder with direct assault for the fatal wound inflicted on SPO1
Florence.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the all the accused-appellants of murder,
qualified by abuse of superior strength, in the killing of SPO1 Rufino. The element of direct
assault was not considered by the trial court for failure of the prosecution to prove that SPO1
Rufino was in the performance of his official duty as a police officer at the time he was killed.
One the other hand, Rolly alone was additionally convicted of frustrated murder with direct
assault for the fatal wound inflicted on SPO1 Florence. The RTC held that treachery attended
the assault on SPO1 Florence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUES
1. Were the accused-appellant properly convicted of murder for the killing of SPO1
Rufino?
2. Was Rolly properly convicted of frustrated murder with direct assault for the fatal
wound inflicted on SPO1 Florence?
RULING
1. NO. To warrant a conviction for murder, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) that a person was killed, (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. One of the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 that qualifies the killing of the victim to murder is
abuse of superior strength.
While the prosecution successfully proved that accused-appellants conspired to kill

SPO1 Rufino, it failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
The fact that accused-appellants, all armed with dangerous weapons, ganged up on SPO1
Rufino does not automatically merit the conclusion that the victim’s killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Jurisprudence provides that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, “the

evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had
the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.”
In this case, there is no clear showing that accused-appellants deliberately and

specifically sought the use of knives, screwdriver, and a broken bottle, so as to be able to take
advantage of their superior strength against SPO1 Rufino. As can be gleaned from the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, there was already an ensuing affray between Eric
and accused-appellants. One of the accused-appellants stepped on his neck, while Ronnie
attempted to stab him with a screwdriver. The prosecution also established that SPO1 Rufino
came to the crime scene after hearing Eric’s cry for help. In fact, SPO1 Florence categorically
declared that she met Eric on her way to following her husband SPO1 Rufino to the crime
scene. By this turn of events, it cannot be reasonably deduced that accused-appellants
deliberately and specifically sought the use of deadly weapons so as to be able to take
advantage of their superior strength. As accused-appellants’ conviction cannot be made to
rest on such possibility, the killing of the victim cannot be qualified by abuse of superior
strength, which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, accused-appellants are
guilty of only homicide, not murder.
2. NO. Just because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it does not always follow
that it is tainted with treachery. There is treachery when the offender, in the commission of
any of the crimes against a person, employs means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Reduced to its elements,
treachery presupposes the following: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of
the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. While the first element was met, the second requisite is wanting.
The prosecution in this case merely showed that Rolly stabbed SPO1 Florence from
behind suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove that he consciously adopted such
mode of attack without risk to himself. As established by the prosecution, Rolly, upon seeing
SPO1 Florence shoot Ronnie, quickly went at the back of the basketball court and then
stabbed SPO1 Florence from behind. Considering these prior and simultaneous
circumstances, there are no indications that Rolly deliberately planned to stab SPO1 Florence
at that moment and place. The quickness of his act in defending his brother confirms that the
attack he made on the victim was neither preconceived nor deliberately adopted. Such
swiftness necessarily negates that he reflected on the means, method, or form of the attack
to secure his unfair advantage. Following the rule that treachery must be indubitably proved
beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself, Rolly cannot be convicted of the crime charged
in its qualified form. The crime committed is the complex crime of frustrated homicide with
direct assault.
Q: There was an ensuing fight between a certain Eric and accused-appellants Rolly,
Ronnie, Roberto, and Roger. One of the accused-appellants stepped on Eric’s neck,
while Ronnie attempted to stab him with a screwdriver. SPO1 Rufino came to the
crime scene after hearing Eric’s cry for help. Later on, the accused-appellants
simultaneously stabbed SPO1 Rufino through the use of knives, screwdriver, and a
broken bottle, causing the latter’s death. The accused-appellants were convicted of
murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength, for the killing of SPO1 Rufino. Is the
conviction proper?
A: NO. For abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, the evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Here, there was
an ensuing fight between Eric and the accused-appellants. SPO1 Rufino came to the crime
scene only after hearing Eric’s cry for help. Hence, there is no clear showing that the accused-
appellants deliberately and specifically sought the use of said weapons so as to be able to
take advantage of their superior strength against SPO1 Rufino. The qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Accordingly, crime committed is only
homicide, not murder. The conviction is not proper. (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961, June
16, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
DOCTRINE
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information must only charge
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses. The remedy of the accused is to move to quash the information before entering
his plea. If the accused fails to move to quash the duplicitous information, it would be considered
as a waiver. Thus, the Court could convict the accused on all the charges alleged in the
information. Here, the information against XXX charged two crimes: statutory rape and rape
by sexual assault. XXX failed to file a motion to quash the information. Hence, he was validly
convicted by the lower court for the two crimes charged.
FACTS
On June 8, 2014, BBB, mother of 7-year-old AAA, was at the house of her employer
preparing lunch when she saw accused-appellant XXX and her child alone near the poultry
farm. When she made a second look, they both suddenly disappeared. This prompted her to
rush towards the poultry farm and called for AAA. When AAA descended from the stairs of
the poultry house after being called for the third time, she was looking nervous and scared
and the two went home after. AAA then narrated to her mother in detail her ordeal. She said
XXX called her and directed her to go upstairs in the poultry house where he forced her to sit
down on his lap, then made her lie down on the floor, removed her short pants and
underwear and thereafter inserted his penis in her vagina, and subsequently his middle
finger. This prompted BBB to check the genitalia of AAA which she noticed was reddish. The
incident was then reported by AAA’s parents to police officers and XXX was arrested. Under
one information, XXX was charged with statutory rape and rape by sexual assault, in violation
of Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). XXX did not object to the
information during arraignment.
The Regional Trial Court convicted XXX of statutory rape only. The Court of Appeals
(CA), on the other hand, convicted XXX of both statutory rape and rape by sexual assault. The
CA noted that the real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts recited in the
complaint or information. Having reviewed the records of the case, the CA ruled that XXX
may be convicted for both statutory rape and rape by sexual assault based on one
information because there was no procedural challenge made during the arraignment stage.
ISSUE
Can XXX be convicted of statutory rape and rape by sexual assault under one
information?
RULING
YES. Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, the crime of rape may be committed in two ways: 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: xxx d) When the offended
party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present; 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
The prosecution sufficiently established the elements of statutory rape under

paragraph 1 (d): (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation
or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there
was sexual intercourse. Here, it is undisputed that AAA was a minor below 12 years of age
when XXX had sexual intercourse with her on June 8, 2014.
The Court also finds XXX guilty of rape by sexual assault committed on the same
occasion. As stated in Pielago v. People, Article 266-A (2) of the RPC explicitly provides that
the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or
anal orifice. The unimpeached testimony of AAA about the fact of insertion of XXX’s fingers
in her vagina is sufficient to convict the latter of the crime.
The CA aptly convicted XXX for rape by sexual assault despite such issue not being
raised on appeal. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment,
or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
The provision of Section 13, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
was lifted from Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, proscribes the
filing of one information containing multiple offenses. The prohibition of filing an
information with multiple offenses is predicated in the protection of the constitutional right
of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. If two or
more offenses are alleged in the information, the remedy of the accused is to file a motion to
quash as provided in Section 3 (f), Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
failure to object to the information before the arraignment would result in a waiver to
challenge the procedural infirmity. As in this case, XXX failed to file a motion to quash the
information. Thus, the CA correctly convicted him for statutory rape and rape by sexual
assault. Further, XXX could also file a motion for bill of particulars, if he felt that the
allegations in the information are vague, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for
trial. Unfortunately, he did not avail of these procedural remedies. On the contrary, he
actively participated in the trial. Hence, he is estopped to challenge the defective information.
Q: Under one information, XXX was charged with the crimes of statutory rape and rape
by sexual assault. XXX failed to object to the information during arraignment. Despite
the rule that an information must only charge one offense, as provided in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, can XXX be convicted of the two crimes charged?
A: YES. In case an information charges multiple offenses, the remedy of the accused is to
move to quash the information before entering his plea. If the accused fails to move to quash
the duplicitous information, it would be considered as a waiver. Here, XXX failed to file a
motion to quash the information during arraignment. Hence, he can be validly convicted of
both statutory rape and rape by sexual assault. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 240750, June 21, 2021,
as penned by J. Lopez, J.Y.)
DARREL JOHN PINGA y TOLENTINO alias “DJ” v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 245368, June 21, 2021, Second Division (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as
the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law. Nonetheless, anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be
permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear.
Here, while the inventory shows the presence of the barangay captain, an elected public official,
there was neither a representative from the National Prosecution Service nor the media. The
arresting officers were not able to detail the earnest efforts actually exerted to coordinate with
and secure the presence of the required witnesses. Hence, Pinga was acquitted of the crime of
FACTS
Police Officer 1 Rodrigo Jose Nidoy, Jr. and PO2 Marvin Santos were assigned to
monitor certain areas of Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, where the selling of illegal drugs
was rampant.
On May 1, 2015, at around 12:30 a.m., PO1 Nidoy and PO2 Santos proceeded to
conduct surveillance on board a motorcycle. While cruising along Yakal Street, they noticed
a man, later on identified as petitioner Pinga, around four to five meters away, who was
playing with a balisong or fan knife. The officers approached Pinga who immediately hid the
knife behind his back. PO1 Nidoy introduced himself as a police officer and questioned Pinga
regarding his possession of the knife. Pinga responded that it was for self-defense. PO1 Nidoy
asked Pinga to raise his hand, confiscated the knife, informed him that his act constituted the
crime of illegal possession of a deadly weapon, and then informed him of his constitutional
rights.
PO1 Nidoy then frisked Pinga and felt a bulge in his right front pocket. PO1 Nidoy
ordered Pinga to empty his pockets, thus, revealing 10 plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance. Upon seeing the sachets, PO1 Nidoy informed Pinga that he was
committing the crime of illegal possession of drugs and again informed him of his
constitutional rights. Immediately after this arrest, and in the presence of Pinga, PO1 Nidoy
marked the knife; he also marked the 10 plastic sachets.
PO2 Santos called over Barangay Captain Mario Concepcion of Maybunga to witness
the inventory of the seized evidence at the place of the arrest. Both Concepcion and Pinga
signed the inventory. Later on, the plastic sachets were turned over to Police Chief Inspector
Rhea Fe Alviar, the forensic chemist. The contents tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Alviar then prepared and signed a report and resealed the
specimen samples with masking tape and affixed her markings and signature thereon.
Pinga was charged of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined
and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Pinga of the crime charged, holding that
Pinga was validly arrested while he was then committing a crime within view of the arresting
officers. Likewise, the drugs were seized in a valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming Pinga’s conviction for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs?
RULING
YES. At the outset, the Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA which
upheld the validity of Pinga’s arrest, as well as the search and seizure of the plastic sachets
incidental thereto. As observed by both the RTC and the CA, at the time Pinga was arrested,
he was committing a crime, i.e., the illegal possession of a bladed weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as amended, within the view and in the presence of both PO1
Nidoy and PO2 Santos. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, Pinga’s arrest was lawful,
thus, making the search incidental thereto valid. Consequently, the seized plastic sachets are
admissible in evidence.
This notwithstanding, a judicious review of the records of the case reveals that there
were unexplained lapses in complying with the witness requirement in the chain of custody
rule which cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. To convict
an accused for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants
an acquittal.
In other words, as a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is
strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but
as a matter of substantive law. Nonetheless, anent the witness requirement, non-compliance
may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine
and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed
to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis,
the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was
reasonable under the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent
actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time—beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest—to prepare for a
buy-bust operation, and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand,
knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule.
Notably, the seizure of the 10 plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride
occurred on May 1, 2015, or after the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 10640.
Consequently, the applicable law now requires the presence of the following witnesses: (a)
an elected public official; and (b) a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS)
or the media. While the inventory shows the presence of Barangay Captain Concepcion, an
elected public official, it is clear that there was neither a representative from the NPS nor the
media, a fact admitted to by the arresting officer himself in his testimony. Therefore, there
was a deviation from the required witnesses rule.
Undoubtedly, the instant case differs from the usual drugs cases wherein the seizure
of the drug was done through the conduct of a pre-arranged buy-bust operation. There was
no sufficient time to make prior arrangements to comply with the requirements under
Section 21 of the law. In fact, what is clear from the records is that upon the unplanned and
spontaneous discovery and confiscation of the drug from Pinga, the arresting officers,
specifically PO2 Santos, tried to substantially comply with the chain of custody rule by
requesting the presence of the barangay captain.
However, as earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the
absence of any of the required witnesses by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the
very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending
officers to secure their presence. Here, PO1 Nidoy explained that they were unable to call
representatives from the DOJ and the media because the arrest and the inventory were made
in the early morning of May 1, 2015 and that they could not coordinate with the media
because they only chanced upon the arrest of Pinga. However, in People v. Lim, the Court held
that the fact that the arrest occurred late in the evening was not, by itself, sufficient
justification to exempt the presence of the required witnesses under the law. The
prosecution must still detail the earnest efforts actually exerted to coordinate with and
secure the presence of the required witnesses. In view of this unjustified deviation from the
chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Pinga were compromised, which
consequently warrants his acquittal.
Q: On May 1, 2015, PO1 Nidoy and PO2 Santos were assigned to monitor certain areas
of a barangay where the selling of illegal drugs was rampant. At around 12:30 a.m.,
while cruising along a street, they noticed Pinga who was playing with a balisong. PO1
Nidoy informed Pinga that his act constituted the crime of illegal possession of a
deadly weapon. PO1 Nidoy then frisked Pinga and found 10 plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. PO1 Nidoy marked the knife and the 10 sachets. PO2
Santos called over the barangay captain to witness the inventory of the seized
evidence. However, there was neither a representative from the National Prosecution
Service (NPS) nor the media. The officers explained that they were unable to call the
required representatives because the arrest and the inventory were made in the early
morning. Was Pinga properly convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs?
A: NO. As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined
as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law. Nonetheless, anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be
permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to
appear. Here, while the inventory shows the presence of the barangay captain, an elected
public official, there was neither a representative from the NPS nor the media. In People v.
Lim, the Court held that the fact that the arrest occurred late in the evening was not, by itself,
sufficient justification to exempt the presence of the required witnesses under the law. The
prosecution must still detail the earnest efforts actually exerted to coordinate with and
secure the presence of the required witnesses. Failure to prove such earnest efforts, Pinga
should, therefore, be acquitted. (Pinga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 245368, June 21,
2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
G.R. No. 243191, June 21, 2021, Third Division (Lopez, J., J.)
DOCTRINE
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when
the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. Here, AAA was raped by her mother’s common-law spouse,
XXX, on four different occasions. Hence, the Court modified XXX’s crime from simple rape to
qualified rape.
FACTS
On four different occasions, AAA, born on December 16, 1993, was allegedly raped by
her mother’s common-law spouse, accused-appellant XXX. The evidence for the prosecution
showed that AAA was 12 years old when she was first raped on February 3, 2006. The three
other incidents of rape—committed on May 28, June 4, and August 26 of the year 2008,
respectively—were perpetrated when AAA was 14 years old.
On August 29, 2008, AAA reported to the Office of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development that she was raped by XXX. She executed an affidavit detailing the rape and
underwent medical examination. Dr. Dante Mirasol, city health physician, issued a medical
certificate stating “that medical evaluation shows definite evidence of sexual contact.”
XXX was consequently charged with four counts of simple rape. He proffered the
defense of alibi and denial.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted XXX of the crime charged. The RTC found
that XXX had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will through force, threat and
intimidation; that as XXX exercised moral ascendancy and parental authority over AAA, such
factors would be substituted for violence and intimidation; and that the birth certificate of
AAA proved that she was 12 years old when the first rape was committed by XXX. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming XXX’s conviction?
RULING
NO. Settled is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation and conclusion on the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and,
at times, even finality, and that its findings are binding and conclusive on the appellate court,
unless there is a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily, or it appears from the records
that certain facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated by the lower court and, which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case.
In the present case, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding on the truthfulness of AAA’s
testimony. The Court sees no reason to deviate from the trial and appellate courts’ factual
findings that BBB had carnal knowledge of AAA on four occasions. There is no evidence that
will show that the trial court overlooked or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the trial court acted arbitrarily. Thus, the
Court is bound by the findings of the trial court.
XXX, moreover, did not impute any improper motive on AAA’s part to falsely testify
against him. AAA’s testimony of the horrific incidents of rape was also corroborated by Dr.
Mirasol who found definite evidence of sexual contact. It is settled that when a rape victim’s
account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, the testimony is sufficient to support a conviction.
The trial court correctly brushed aside the defense of alibi and denial of XXX. The
positive identification of the perpetrator of the heinous acts is far more superior in weight
compared to the unsubstantiated defenses proffered. XXX was aptly convicted based on the
testimony of AAA and the corroborating medical findings of Dr. Mirasol.
The Court, however, modifies the crime committed by XXX in the four criminal
indictments from simple rape to qualified rape. The evidence showed that AAA was 12 years
old when she was first raped on February 3, 2006. The three other incidents of rape were
committed when AAA was 14 years old. The age of the victim was established by the
presentation of her birth certificate. The records also established that XXX was the common-
law spouse of BBB. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be
imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 which
prohibits the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines, the Court imposes on the
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count of rape.
Q: On four different occasions, AAA was allegedly raped by her mother’s common-law
spouse, XXX. The evidence for the prosecution showed that AAA was 12 years old when
she was first raped on February 3, 2006, while the three other incidents of rape were
committed when AAA was 14 years old. XXX was consequently charged with four
counts of simple rape. The RTC convicted XXX of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. Was the crime committed by XXX merely simple rape?
A: NO. While the Court upholds the conviction of XXX, the crime he committed should be
modified from simple rape to qualified rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The records
established that XXX was the common-law spouse of BBB, mother of AAA. Hence, XXX’s crime
should be qualified rape, not simple rape. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 243191,
June 21, 2021, as penned by J. Lopez, J.)
ROSELLA BARLIN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207418, June 23, 2021, Third Division (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
A violation of trust receipt agreements would make the accused criminally liable for
estafa under paragraph (1) (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as expressly provided
in Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law. Here, Barlin personally received in her name the items
which were covered by the trust receipt agreements she signed. However, despite demand, she
denied receipt of the items and failed to pay in full.
FACTS
Private complainant Ruth Gacayan and petitioner Rosella Barlin were both dealers of
Triumph products in San Juan, Metro Manila. After Barlin’s store was gutted by a fire,
Gacayan agreed to place orders of Triumph products in Barlin’s behalf through Gacayan’s
credit line. Their transactions were covered by trust receipt agreements (TRAs). The parties
agreed that Barlin would either pay for the items or return them if unsold after 30 days from
receipt thereof. Out of the 22 TRAs presented by the prosecution, only two were signed by
Barlin herself while the others were signed by her salespersons.
On the other hand, Gacayan admitted that she also purchased Avon items from Barlin
covered likewise by TRAs. The value of the Avon merchandise as well as the returned unsold
Triumph products were off-setted from the amount due from Barlin. From March to
December of 1999, Barlin religiously returned the unsold items to Gacayan. However,
Gacayan claimed that Barlin failed to pay on time for the other items with a total value of
P74,955. Barlin thus issued checks to pay her obligations to Gacayan but the checks bounced
for having been drawn against a closed account. Hence, Gacayan filed a criminal complaint
for estafa against Barlin.
For her part, Barlin argued that out of the 22 TRAs submitted by the prosecution, she
received the items covered by two TRAs only as per her signature thereon. Barlin also
claimed that Gacayan received Avon products from her with a total value of P25,900 but this
amount was not deducted from her payables to Gacayan. Neither did Gacayan sign any TRA.
Barlin insisted that she already returned all unsold products to Gacayan with a total value of
P43,000. Thus, she no longer had any liability to Gacayan.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Barlin of estafa. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming Barlin’s conviction for estafa?
RULING
NO. All the essential elements of estafa are present in this case. The elements of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (a) that money,
goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same; (b) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (c) that the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.
First, there is no dispute that Barlin received merchandise from Gacayan as evidenced
by the two TRAs signed and executed by Barlin herself. The two trust receipts clearly stated
that Barlin received in trust the merchandise from Gacayan to: (a) hold the goods in trust;
(b) dispose or sell them for cash and to receive the proceeds in trust; (c) turnover and remit
the proceeds of the sale of goods on or before the due date less Barlin’s commission; and (d)
return the goods in the event of non-sale within period specified or upon demand. Upon
default or failure of Barlin to comply with any of the terms and conditions, Gacayan may
cancel the trust receipt and take possession of the goods subject of the trust or the proceeds
realized therefrom.
The agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’
rights, duties and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention. Barlin
obligated herself to dispose the goods and receive the proceeds of sale in trust for Gacayan.
In case the goods were not sold, she must return them to Gacayan. Although, admittedly,
Gacayan testified that she likewise procured Avon merchandise from Barlin through the
same TRA, the said transactions will not negate Barlin’s obligation under the two subject
TRAs. Their offsetting agreement did not modify, amend, or novate Barlin’s obligations
under the TRAs.
Second, Barlin failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the products she
procured from Gacayan under the two TRAs upon the latter’s demand. Barlin even admitted
that a similar case with respect to the same transactions were the subject matter of a criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan
for an amount of P50,000. She apparently attempted to pay Gacayan post-dated checks
worth P50,000 which eventually bounced for having been drawn against a closed account.
This fact alone proves Barlin’s culpability that she misappropriated or converted the
proceeds of the sale of the items she held in trust for Gacayan.
Third, Barlin’s misappropriation or conversion of the proceeds of the sale of

Gacayan’s products caused damage to the latter in the total amount of P8,275. Gacayan is
deemed to have suffered damage when she parted with her goods and did not receive the
proceeds of the sale thereof or the unsold items were not returned despite demand.
Lastly, Gacayan demanded payment from Barlin under the two TRAs which went
unheeded.
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts
Law, clearly provides that when the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods, documents, or instruments by a trust receipt or to return the goods, documents, or
instruments if unsold or not disposed of shall be liable for the crime of estafa under Article
315 paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC.
Q: Gacayan and Barlin were both dealers of Triumph products. After Barlin’s store was
gutted by a fire, Gacayan agreed to place orders of Triumph products in Barlin’s behalf
through Gacayan’s credit line. Their transactions were covered by trust receipt
agreements (TRAs). The parties agreed that Barlin would either pay for the items or
return them if unsold after 30 days from receipt thereof. From March to December of
1999, Barlin religiously returned the unsold items to Gacayan. However, Gacayan
claimed that Barlin failed to pay on time for the other items with a total value of
P74,955. Barlin thus issued checks to pay her obligations to Gacayan but the checks
bounced for having been drawn against a closed account. Hence, Gacayan filed a
complaint for estafa against Barlin. The RTC convicted Barlin of estafa. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Is Barlin guilty of estafa?
A: YES. A violation of TRAs would make the accused criminally liable for estafa under
paragraph (1) (b) of Article 315 of the RPC as expressly provided in Section 13 of the Trust
Receipts Law. Moreover, all the essential elements of estafa are present in the case. The
elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the RPC are: (a) that money, goods,
or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same; (b) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (c) that the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.
First, Barlin received merchandise from Gacayan as evidenced by the two TRAs signed and
executed by Barlin herself. Second, Barlin failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
products she procured from Gacayan under the two TRAs upon the latter’s demand. Third,
Barlin’s misappropriation or conversion of the proceeds of the sale of Gacayan’s products
caused damage to the latter in the total amount of P8,275. Gacayan is deemed to have
suffered damage when she parted with her goods and did not receive the proceeds of the
sale thereof or the unsold items were not returned despite demand. Lastly, Gacayan’s
demand for payment from Barlin under the two TRAs went unheeded. (Barlin v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 207418, June 23, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENATO DE GUZMAN, ROMEO CABICO, MICHAEL
DOMINGO, RENELITO VALDEZ, BRINGLE BALACANAO AND BOBOY TAMONANG,
MICHAEL DOMINGO AND BRINGLE BALACANAO
G.R. No. 241248, June 23, 2021, (Delos Santos, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.”
FACTS
Accused Renato De Guzman (De Guzman), Romeo Cabico (Cabico), Boboy Tamonang
(Tamonang), Valdez, Domingo, and Balacanao (collectively, accused) were initially charged
under two (2) Informations for the crimes of Robbery with Rape and Robbery with Homicide
before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 35-5695 and 35-5696, respectively.
However, in an Order dated September 3, 2008, the trial court ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 35-5695 and the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. 35-
5696. Thus, on September 15, 2008, the Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela
issued an Amended Information.
On January 13, 2009, accused Domingo and Valdez pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Robbery with Homicide and Rape. On September 15, 2009, accused Balacanao also pleaded
not guilty to the crimes charged, while the rest of the accused remained at large.
Version of the prosecution

On April 2, 2007, at around 9:00 in the evening, AAA was in their home, sewing
clothes, while her husband, BBB was watching television together with a four-year-old child
named CCC, when Valdez followed by Cabico suddenly entered their house. Valdez pointed
a knife at AAA while Cabico pointed a gun at BBB. They were able to take P2,500.00 from
AAA's belt bag and BBB's wristwatch worth P1,000.00. Thereafter, Valdez dragged AAA to a
room and raped her several times. AAA cried for help. BBB's brothers, DDD and EEE, arrived
and tried to help in bringing BBB to the hospital. However, when the barangay captain
arrived, he told AAA that her husband is already dead.
Version of the defense

According to Balacanao, on the evening of April 2, 2007, he was at home in Raniag,
Ramon, Isabela, with his wife, child, and De Guzman, his father-in-law. He went to bed at
around 9:00 in the evening and woke up at 5:00 in the morning the following day. He claimed
that he did not recall any unusual incident in the morning of April 3, 2007.
Valdez, on the other hand, claimed that he was at home with his children in Bugallon
Proper, Ramon, Isabela, on the night of the incident. He also alleged that he slept at around
8:00 in the evening and woke up at 5:00 the following morning.
As to Domingo, he also claimed that he was at home in Centro Ramon, Isabela, with
his son and sister-in-law, watching television. After watching the news, he went to bed at
around 8:00 in the evening and woke up at around 5:00 the following morning.
The RTC found all the accused guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Rape.
In so ruling, the RTC held that the fact that all the accused were together that fatal night of
April 2, 2007 at the crime scene is indicative of their common criminal design to commit the
crime charged against them. Therefore, all the accused should be held liable for the
consequences of their criminal acts taken together because, evidently, they connived and
conspired with each other to commit the crime charged against them.
The CA affirmed the Decision and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of
the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was conspiracy attended in the commission of the crime
charged.
RULING
NO. The court held that knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate
is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
In this regard, We have discoursed in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People:

We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious
one. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to conspiracy, absent any
common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but
by positive and conclusive evidence.
Thus, the trial court and the CA concluded that accused-appellants' flight from the
scene of the crime together with the other accused clearly indicated that they conspired to
commit the crime charged. However, the act of running away from the crime scene can be a
subject of various interpretations. As correctly argued by the OSG, [o]wing to AAA's
inconclusive testimony, accused-appellants' presence at the house of AAA and BBB may be
due to various reasons. It is thus, possible that the trial court is correct that their presence is
indicative of a joint criminal design, but this is just one possibility among others.
Although there was a positive identification of accused-appellants, there was no

conclusive evidence to prove the existence of conspiracy among the accused, or was there
any overt act on the part of accused-appellants as to the commission of the crime. As testified
by AAA, she only saw accused-appellants running away after De Guzman shot her husband.
As We have said, conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
crime scene does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Since the prosecution failed to establish
conspiracy with positive and conclusive evidence, necessarily, herein accused-appellants
must be acquitted of the crimes charged.
Q: At around 9:00 in the evening, W and H were at home with their child watching
television when A suddenly entered their house, followed by B. A pointed a knife at W,
and B pointed a gun at H. Thereafter, A and B were able to steal money and jewelry
from the spouses. When A and B were about to leave, A shot H. The spouses identified
C and D, who were waiting outside their house, and thereafter, all the accused ran
away. Collectively, the accused were charged with two information of Robbery with
Rape and Robbery with Homicide. The plaintiff claims that all the accused were in a
conspiracy to commit the crime. Is the claim tenable?
A: NO. We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious
one. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to conspiracy, absent any
common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but
by positive and conclusive evidence.
In the case at bar, although there was a positive identification of accused-appellants,

there was no conclusive evidence to prove the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
The spouses only saw C and D running away after A shot H. As We have said, conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the crime scene does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Since the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy with positive and
conclusive evidence, necessarily, herein accused-appellants must be acquitted of the crimes
charged. (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 241248, June 23, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
AQUILINA MARQUEZ MARAJAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
“In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must
concur: (1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment
and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and (2) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.”
“Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208 provides for the acts that promote trafficking of persons, such
as: (e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at
international and local airports, territorial boundaries and seaports who are in possession of
unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons.”
FACTS
Petitioner Aquilina M. Marajas (petitioner) and her co-accused Myrna Melgarejo
(Melgarejo), were charged with violation of Illegal Recruitment under Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995", as
amended by R.A. No. 10022 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
Marajas, Melgarejo and co-accused Raymond Marquez Pilac (Pilac) were also charged
for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208, or the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,"
before the same trial court. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged against her. Trial then ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution

Sometime in May 2012, private complainant Tag-at went to Myron Travel Agency,
owned by Melgarejo, to seek employment abroad as a domestic helper. Subsequently, on May
31, 2012, private complainant again went to Myron Travel Agency where she met petitioner.
Petitioner then handed to her a Letter of Invitation and Support dated May 15, 2012 signed
by a certain Johnelyn Daquigan (Daquigan), together with copies of Daquigan's passport and
certificate of live birth. In the same afternoon, private complainant, accompanied by
petitioner, went to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3 after being
told that she would be departing for Beijing, China later that afternoon.
At that time, Members of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) were roaming around the Departure Area of NAIA Terminal 3
when they noticed petitioner and private complainant. Then proceeded to the Immigration
counter and ordered private complainant to proceed to the Bureau of Immigration Travel
Control and Enforcement Unit (TCEU) for secondary inspection of her travel documents.
Petitioner left as soon as private complainant was subjected to secondary inspection.
During the interview, private complainant admitted that her real purpose for
traveling to Beijing, China was for employment. Private complainant also admitted to Agent
Chiong that the Letter of Invitation and Support, as well as the latter's birth certificate, were
both fake. When the investigation was over, the agents were convinced that petitioner
committed violations of R.A. No. 9208 and R.A. No. 8042, as amended. They then placed
petitioner under arrest.
Evidence for the Defense

For the defense, petitioner vehemently denied the charges of Illegal Recruitment and
Illegal Trafficking in Persons hurled against her. According to her, she met private
complainant at the office of Myron Travel Agency, owned by Melgarejo, where she was also
an applicant herself.
Petitioner was told by the private complainant that she was leaving that same day.
Private complainant asked petitioner to accompany her to the airport to which petitioner
agreed. According to petitioner, she agreed to the request of the private complainant to know
if private complainant would be allowed to leave and thus, ascertaining the legitimacy of the
travel agency in the process as she herself was an applicant as well.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the offenses of Illegal Recruitment, and
violation of R.A. No. 9208 in its April 13, 2015 Decision.
On June 6, 2018, the CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the ruling of
the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. Likewise, it also affirmed
the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208. The CA found the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove the presence of all the elements constituting
both offenses.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in finding petitioner guilty of Illegal Recruitment under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 and Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208.
RULING
NO. After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to deny the petition for
failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in
rendering its Decision as to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Thus,
the Court sustains petitioner's conviction for the crime of Illegal Recruitment under Section
6 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022, and Trafficking in Persons under Section
5(e) of R.A. No. 9208.
In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must
and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a
third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and
placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
In this case, the only disputed element is the first element. As to the second element,
it was already proven by the presentation of a Certification from the POEA stating that
petitioner is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. This
fact was not denied by the petitioner.
For the first element, petitioner contends that she did not impress upon private
complainant that she had the power to send workers abroad for employment. However, such
contention is without merit. It must be noted that while private complainant mentioned in
her testimony that petitioner did not promise her employment in Beijing, petitioner,
nevertheless, told her that there would be work for her upon arrival in Beijing. This shows
that petitioner gave private complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to send her abroad for employment.
Anent the crime of Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208, we also
sustain the ruling of the CA that petitioner is guilty.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208 provides for the acts that promote trafficking of persons, such as:
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at
international and local airports, territorial boundaries and seaports who are in
possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found — through the consistent, direct,
unequivocal, and thus, credible testimony of private complainant and the other witnesses —
that the prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements of violation of
Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208, as evinced by the fact that petitioner facilitated and assisted
the private complainant in her foiled attempt to depart from the country through NAIA
Terminal 3, after providing her with fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of her
employment in Beijing, China.
Q: Petitioner X went to Myron Travel Agency, owned by M, to seek employment abroad
as a domestic helper. M told X to wait for Y. When Y arrived, X introduced herself and
his desire to seek employment to which Y replied saying that the agency would
arrange for a sponsor in Beijing, China to help X travel and engage as domestic helper.
Y assisted X at the airport, thereafter, X and Y were apprehended by the Bureau of
Immigration Travel Control and Enforcement Unit (TCEU) for investigation and
inspection of documents. The agent found out that the travel documents were fake and
that Y was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Y
was charged with the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons. Is Y
liable for the crime charged?
A: YES. In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must
and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code or any of the prohibited practices
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment on a large scale,
a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and
placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group. In this case, all the
elements of Illegal recruitment are present. While Y mentioned in her testimony that X did
not promise her employment in Beijing, Y, nevertheless, told her that there would be work
for her upon arrival in Beijing. This shows that Y gave X the distinct impression that she had
the power or ability to send her abroad for employment.
On the other hand, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9208 provides for the acts that promote
trafficking of persons, such as:
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at
international and local airports, territorial boundaries and seaports who are in
possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons.
In the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9208 are
present, as evinced by the fact that petitioner facilitated and assisted the X in her foiled
attempt to depart, after providing her with fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of
her employment abroad. (Marajas v. People, G.R. No. 244001, June 23, 2021, as penned by J.
Delos Santos)
ASELA BRINAS Y DEL FIERRO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
“Section 10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not covered by
the Revised Penal Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be convicted of
grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. “
“In Escolano v. People, which involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held
that the mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger, frustration,
or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 absent evidence
that the utterance of such words were specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean the
victim's intrinsic worth and dignity.”
FACTS
On or about the 25th day of January 2010 in the afternoon, at the Challenger
Montessori School, Inc. in Brgy. Zone VI, Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent of bringing 16-year old Micolie Mari Maevis S. Rosauro and 16-year old
Keziah Liezle D. Polojan, into discredit, disrepute and contempt, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and publicly utter the following defamatory words, to wit:
"pinakamalalandi, pinakamalilibog, pinakamahadera at hindot," "Mga putang ina kayo.” and
other words similar thereto, which debased, degraded and demeaned Micolie Mari Maevis S.
Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan of their intrinsic worth and dignity, and to the grave
humiliation, embarrassment, damage and prejudice of said minors Micolie Mari Maevis S.
Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan.
Briñas was charged with the crime of Grave Oral Defamation in relation to R.A. 7610
in an Amended Information. Upon arraignment, Briñas pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
In its Decision dated April 13, 2018, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
testimonies, found Briñas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but
appreciated in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Briñas appealed to the CA. Thereafter, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), and the private complainants filed their respective appeal briefs. In the
assailed Decision, the CA affirmed, with modification, the RTC's Decision. The CA concluded
that the prosecution was able to establish that Briñas had publicly defamed the private
complainants, with intention to debase, degrade, and demean their intrinsic worth as human
beings. It gave no credence to the claim of Briñas that she merely acted in the heat of anger
and intended to discipline the students
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Briñas of the crime of grave
oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610.
RULING
YES. Section 10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not
covered by the Revised Penal Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be
convicted of grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610.
From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished
under the RPC are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are
excluded from the coverage of Section 10(a). Thus, the Court holds that the CA and the RTC
erred in finding Briñas guilty of violation of Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of
R.A. 7610.
In Escolano v. People, which involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held
that the mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger,
frustration, or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA
7610 absent evidence that the utterance of such words were specifically intended to
debase, degrade, or demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity.
A study of relevant jurisprudence reveals that a specific intent to debase, degrade or

demean the intrinsic worth of a child as a human being is required for conviction under
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 in relation to Section 3(b)(2). This is especially true if the acts
allegedly constituting child abuse were done in the spur of the moment, out of emotional
outrage.
"Debasement" is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of

something; "degradation," on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character
or quality while "demean" means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character.
Hence, the prosecution must not only prove that the acts of child abuse under Section
3(b)(2) were committed, but also that the same were intended to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the minor victim as a human being.
Here, the Court, upon an assiduous and careful review of the records, finds that the
lower courts misinterpreted vital facts that demonstrate merit in Briñas’ contentions. In
simple terms, there was a failure to establish the specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean required in child abuse cases punished under Section 10(a) in relation to Section
3(b)(2) of R.A. 7610.
Indeed, the evidence presented shows that Briñas' acts were only done in the heat of
anger, made after she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used
her daughter's name to send a text message to another student, in what Briñas thought was
part of a bigger and harmful scheme against the student body.
Q: Mrs. K is the owner of Challenger Montessori School, Inc. One afternoon, Mrs. K
learned that A and B, students of Montessori School, used her daughter's name to send
a text message to another student, in what Mrs. K thought was part of a bigger and
harmful scheme against the student body. Thereafter, she immediately went to A and
B. Aggrieved, she publicly utter the following defamatory words, to wit:
"pinakamalalandi, pinakamalilibog, pinakamahadera at hindot," "Mga putang ina
kayo.” and other words similar thereto, which debased, degraded and demeaned A and
B. Due to humiliation, A and B never went back to the school again. The parents of A
and B filed a complaint against Mrs. K charging the latter with the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation in relation to R.A. 7610 (Child abuse). Is the crime charged tenable?
A: No. In Escolano v. People, which involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held
that the mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger, frustration,
or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 absent
evidence that the utterance of such words were specifically intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity.
In this case, the defamatory words uttered by Mrs. K does not constitute grave oral
defamation in relation to child abuse. Mrs. K’s act was shown only out of anger when she
learned that the A and B had deceivingly used her daughter's name to send a text message to
another student, in what Mrs. K thought was part of a bigger and harmful scheme against the
student body. Thus, there is no intention to debase, degrade, or demean the student’s
intrinsic worth and dignity. (Brinas y Del Fierro v. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NICK CANDELARIO Y SABADO
G.R. NO. 231378, JUNE 23, 2021, (BTUNG MD III)
DOCTRINE
“Treachery is present when the following elements are present: (a) the employment of
means, methods or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the offender from defensive or
retaliatory ads of the victim and (b) the deliberate adoption by the offender of such means,
methods or manner of execution. “
“The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an

unsuspecting victim who gave no provocation, without affording the latter any real chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.”
FACTS
That on or about the 26th day of December 2010, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused with intent to kill, qualified by Treachery, and evident premeditation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully aud feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of one Elmer Tion y Pelaez, by then and there stabbing him on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his ultimately death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the and
Elmer Tion (Tion).
Accused planned the commission of the crime prior to its execution until its
commission and consciously adopting sudden and unexpected attack upon the victim to
ensure that victim will not be able to defend himself thus, accused committed that attending
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Candelario pleaded not guilty to the crime charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. PO2 Padua, PO3 Santiago, Joel Careno and Dr. Angelie Oropilla testified for the
prosecution while the defense presented the accused-appellant himself as its lone witness.
On November 4, 2014, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting Candelario of
Murder. The trial court found that the accused-appellant, without any warning, punched and
stabbed Tion five times. The suddenness of the assault provided no opportunity for Tion to
defend himself. He immediately fell to the ground yet the accused-appellant continued to
stab him. Hence, the RTC held that Tion 's killing was Murder qualified with treachery. The
trial court did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
In its assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant's appeal. According to the

appellate court, the totality of evidence established with moral certainty all the elements of
the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. Careno personally witnessed the stabbing
incident and identified the accused-appellant as the person who stabbed Tion. There was
treachery because the attack was sudden and without the slightest provocation on the part
of Tion, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Tion had no reason to expect that he
would be assaulted by accused-appellant and stabbed with a knife. The appellate court
ultimately affirmed the November 4, 2014 Decision of the trial court but with modification
as to the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Murder qualified with Treachery.
RULING
YES. The court sustained the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that
treachery attended the commission of the crime. Treachery is present when the following
elements are present: (a) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution to
ensure the safety of the offender from defensive or retaliatory ads of the victim and (b) the
deliberate adoption by the offender of such means, methods or manner of execution.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an

unsuspecting victim who gave no provocation, without affording the latter any real chance
to defend himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor.
Evidence on record shows that Tion was totally unaware of the sudden and
impending attack as he already turned his back after buying cigarette from the accused-
appellant Unexpectedly, the accused-appellant punched Tion in the face. When the victim fell
to the ground, accused-appellant went on top of him and once immobilized, he continuously
stabbed the victim on his chest with a knife. At the moment Tion fell to the ground, he was in
no position to defend himself as the latter immediately pinned him down by going on top of
him. Candelario never afforded his victim any chance to defend himself. By pinning Tion
down and stabbing him on his chest, accused-appellant ensured the commission of the crime
without any risk to himself. Evidently, no altercation took place between Tion and accused-
appellant prior to the stabbing incident and Tion gave no provocation whatsoever. All these
circumstances indicated the employment of treachery in the commission of the crime.
Q: X was buying a cigarette when suddenly he was attacked by Y, a stranger. X was
punched in the face and fell on the ground. While X was on the ground, Y continuously
stabbed him on the chest with a knife. Thus, X never afforded to defend himself. Prior
to the stabbing incident X gave no provocation and there was no altercation that took
place between the two. Is the crime qualified by treachery?
A: YES. There was employment of Treachery in the commission of the crime. Treachery is
present when the following elements are present: (a) the employment of means, methods or
manner of execution to ensure the safety of the offender from defensive or retaliatory ads of
the victim and (b) the deliberate adoption by the offender of such means, methods or manner
of execution.
In this case, there was a sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on X who gave
no provocation, without affording the latter any real chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Thus, Y is guilty of
Murder qualified by Treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Sabado, G.R. No. 231378, June 23,
2021)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MILA SOMIRA A.K.A. "MILA"
DOCTRINE
“Significantly, Mila was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs on June
22, 2015, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug. including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person. who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in
such transactions.”
FACTS
That on or about the 22nd of June 2015, in Pasay City. Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur buyer or to
another, 1099.66 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride ("shabu''), a dangerous drug.
An Information filed before the RTC accusing Mila with the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Upon
arraignment, Mila pleaded not guilty to the charge against her. Subsequently, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Agent Rosalie Sarasua (Agent Sarasua)
and stipulated the testimony of Forensic Chemist Sweedy Kay Perez (Forensic Chemist
Perez). On the other hand, the defense presented Mila as their sole witness.
In a Decision dated August 28 2018, the RTC found Mila guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Crim. Case No. R-PSY-15-10179-CR, for
illegal sale of shabu. The RTC held that all the elements for the prosecution of sale of
dangerous drugs, namely: the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment therefore, were established.
In its November 29, 2019 Decision, the CA affirmed Mila's conviction. The CA found
no circumstance that would cast doubt on the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mila is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
RULING
YES. Significantly, Mila was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
on June 22, 2015, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug. including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person. who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and
essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In this regard, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody of the items
seized. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody of dangerous drug from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
As culled from the assailed Decision of the CA, after recovering the plastic bag of shabu
from Mila, the buy-bust team decided to conduct the marking and inventory at the PDEA
Office to avoid any commotion since Mila was then already hysterical. Upon arrival at the
PDEA Office, Agent Sarausa marked the seized item, "EXH A-2 RGS 6/22/15" with her
signature. Furthermore, the inventory of the seized item was conducted in the presence of
Brgy. Kagawad Maritess Palma of Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City and Alex Mendoza of Hataw
media. After the inventory, Agent Sarausa brought the seized item to Forensic Chemist Perez
to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. Forensic Chemist Perez conducted an
examination of the specimen, the results of which showed that the seized item contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
In this case, the Court finds that the PDEA operatives committed justified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby preserving the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Mila.
Applying the foregoing provisions of RA 9165, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, is proper. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s
attending Mila's violation of the law, the penalty to be imposed is life imprisonment.
Considering that the weight of the shabu confiscated from Mila is 1099.6 grams, the amount
of P800,000.00 imposed by the court a quo, being in accordance with law and upheld by the
appellate court, is similarly sustained by the Court.
Q: A confidential informant arrived at the PDEA officer regarding Illegal drug activities
of a certain “X”. Thereafter, a team was formed for the conduct of buy-bust operation.
The poseur buyer and the confidential informant proceeded to G’s Restaurant to meet
the accused. When the accused arrived at the meeting place, X pulled out a plastic bag
containing the illegal drugs. After the conduct of buy and sell, the arresting officers
rushed to the place and X tried to run but was caught. X was arrested and upon
reaching the PDEA office, an inventory of the seized evidence was conducted in the
presence of the accused as well as representatives from the media and an elected
official. X was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Is X guilty of
the crime charged?
A: YES. The crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs on June 22, 2015, defined and penalized
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
In this regard, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody of the items
seized. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody of dangerous drugs
from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
In this case, X was guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs for selling
dangerous drugs to a poseur buyer during the buy-bust operation. The arresting officer was
able to establish an unbroken chain of custody when the items seized were immediately sent
to the PDEA office in the presence of the accused as well as representatives from the media
and an elected official. Thus, PDEA operatives committed justified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the items purportedly seized from X. (People of the Philippines v. Somira, G.R. No. 252152, June
23, 2021, as penned by J. Delos Santos)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NESTOR DE ATRAS Y ELLA, ET AL.,; WENLITO
DEPILLO Y BIORCO @ "WEWEN" AND LOLITO DEPILLO Y DEHIJIDO @ "LITO"
G.R. No. 197252, June 23, 2021, (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is

totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.”
“Likewise, the civil action instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is also
ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. The rationale behind this rule
is that upon an accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action
is deemed extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.”
“In People v. Layag, the Court explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of
immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists special or compelling circumstances
therefor, as in this case, when the Court was belatedly informed of Lolito's supervening death
pending his appeal.”
FACTS
In a Resolution dated June 15, 2016, the Court affirmed with modification the
Decision dated October 28, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding accused-appellants
Wenlito Depillo y Biorco @ "Wewen" (Wenlito) and Lolito Depillo y Dehijido @ "Lito" (Lolito;
collectively, accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, it appears that Lolito died on March 16, 2015, as evidenced by a Letter
dated August 24, 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections and the Certificate of Death5 attached
thereto. Notably, this means that Lolito had passed away during the pendency of the criminal
case against him, since the same was resolved by the Court only through the aforesaid
Resolution dated June 15, 2016, which attained finality on February 27, 2017, but only
insofar as Wenlito is concerned.
ISSUE
Whether Lolito’s death prior to his conviction by the court should have resulted in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him.
RULING
YES. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally

occurs before final judgment.
Likewise, the civil action instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is
also ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. The rationale behind
this rule is that upon an accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is deemed extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused.
Therefore, had the Court been timely made aware of Lolito's supervening death in the
interim, his conviction would not have been affirmed as his criminal liability and civil liability
ex delicto in connection therewith had already been extinguished. Given the foregoing, while
the Court acknowledges that the Resolution dated June 15, 2016 affirming Lolito's criminal
and civil liabilities had already attained finality, and hence, covered by the doctrine on
immutability of judgments, the Court deems it apt to rectify the situation by modifying the
said Resolution.
In People v. Layag, the Court explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of
immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists special or compelling circumstances
therefor, as in this case, when the Court was belatedly informed of Lolito's supervening death
pending his appeal.
Finding the aforesaid exception to be applicable, the Court therefore sets aside its
Resolution dated June 15, 2016 and consequently, dismisses Criminal Case No. 03-63-A
before the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 as against Lolito by
reason of his supervening death prior to his final conviction.
Q: X and Y was charged with the crime of Murder. During the pendency of the criminal
case, X died. The case attained finality but only insofar as Y is concerned. However, the
case of X was dismissed by reason of his supervening death prior to his final
conviction. Is the death of X prior to his conviction by the court be dismissed?
A: YES. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally


occurs before final judgment.
Likewise, the civil action instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is also
ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. The rationale behind this
rule is that upon an accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is deemed extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused. In this case, the case of X was dismissed by reason of his supervening death prior to
his final conviction. (People of the Philippines v. Atras y Ella, G.R. No. 197252, June 23, 2021, as
penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX and YYY
G.R. NO. 225288, June 28, 2021, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Jurisprudence has listed the elements of the offense derived from the definition under
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208:
1. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
2. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another" ; and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”
FACTS
On May 31, 2005, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the International Justice Mission (IJM) conducted a
rescue and entrapment operation where sex workers who were minors were rescued and
the proprietors thereof arrested.
That on May 31, 2005, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused,
including XXX who is a member of a law enforcement agency, conspiring and confederating
as a syndicate, willfully and unlawfully, did then and there, recruit and hire in large scale,
guest relation officers who are young women numbering around eleven ( 11 ), including AAA,
a minor at seventeen (17) years of age, for the purpose of and to engage in prostitution and
sexual exploitation, transportation and transfer them from other bars/clubs, harbor, receive
and employ them, and provide and sell the sexual services of four (4) of the women for
Twenty Thousand (Php20,000.00) Pesos to BBB and company who posed as customers, to
the damage and prejudice of said women.
At their arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The trial court found accused-appellants XXX and YYY guilty of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons under Sections 4 and 6 of RA 9208 in relation to Section 3 thereof and Sections 3
and 6 of RA No. 9231 amending Sections 12 and 16 of RA 7610. Contrary to XXX's and YYY's
disavowal of knowledge and participation in the trafficking of young girls, the RTC ruled that
the two accused-appellants, consistent with Section 4 (a and e), qualified by Section 6 (a, c
and f) of RA 9208, knowingly recruited, maintained and employed under-age girls for
prostitution and sexual exploitation.
The appellate court also ruled that all the elements of the offense of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208 were established and proven by the prosecution
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellant are guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
under RA 9208 which were qualified by the minority of one of the victims and the status of
XXX as a police officer.
RULING
YES. As found and ruled by the lower courts, the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants XXX and YYY committed acts of Trafficking in
Persons under RA 9208 which were qualified by the minority of one of the victims and the
status of XXX as a police officer.
Jurisprudence has listed the elements of the offense derived from the definition under
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208:
1. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders."
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another" ; and
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
From the foregoing provisions, we map out the elements of the offense of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons established and proven by the prosecution in this case.
First. AAA was recruited by YYY and hired by XXX to work for the purpose of
prostitution or sexual exploitation. AAA and other young girls working, danced on stage and
performed other sexually exploitative acts to lure customers to go to the VIP rooms. The girls
working at were offered to customers and patrons of the bar to perform sexual services in
exchange for a fee.
Second. At the time AAA was hired in April 2005 until her rescue during the
entrapment operation on May 31, 2005, she was a child, below 18 years of age. AAA's
minority was never challenged or refuted by accused-appellants.
Third. XXX was a police officer, a fact that was stipulated on Pre-Trial before the RTC.
XXX was likewise the owner-proprietor of Bar.
Fourth. YYY and XXX similarly offered the sexual services of AAA and other girls to
customers. BBB and PO3 Ong both testified that YYY, on separate occasions, offered BBB and
PO3 Ong, who were posing as customers, the use of the VIP rooms for all kinds of sexual
entertainment and pleasure with girls whom they fancied.
Plainly, the elements of the offense of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section
4 (a and e) in relation to Section 6 (a, c and f) of RA 9208 were established by the prosecution.
The lower courts based their conviction of XXX and YYY on the presence of all these elements.
Q: X, is a member of a law enforcement agency, conspiring and confederating as a
syndicate to recruit and hire in large scale, guest relation officers who are young
women including M, a minor, for the purpose of and to engage in prostitution and
sexual exploitation. X provides and sells sexual services for Php25,000 to customers,
to the damage and prejudice of said women. Is X guilty of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under RA 9208 which was qualified by the minority of one of the victims and
the status of XXX as a police officer?
A: YES. Jurisprudence has listed the elements of the offense derived from the definition
under Section 3 (a) of RA 9208:
1. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders."
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another" ; and
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
In this case, all elements of the offense of Qualified Trafficking in Persons are present. X
recruited women to the damage and prejudice of the women. He received payments and
benefits from customer in exchange for sexual activities which is considered as a exploitation
or prostitution punishable under the law. Thus, X is guilty of such crime. (People v. XXX, G.R.
NO. 225288, June 28, 2021, as penned by J. Hernando)
CARLOS PAULO BARTOLOME y ILAGAN AND JOEL BANDALAN y ABORDO v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 227951, JUNE 28, 2021, (Inting, J)
DOCTRINE
"Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeited only if
the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires
the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent
of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused's
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test
of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged.”
FACTS
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the RuleS of
Court is the Decision dated August 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court Imus, Cavite convicting Carlos Paulo Bartolome
y Ilagan (Bartolome) and Joel Bandalan y Abordo (Bandalan) (collectively, petitioners) for
violation of Section 4h) of Republic Act No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law).
Sometime on October 22, 2009 or thereabouts at Area. C, Dasmarifias, Cavite, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, being members of
the TAU GAMMA PHI FRATERNITY, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conduct initiation rites and
practice and subjected neophyte JOHK DANIEL SAMPARADA y Lhmera to physical suffering
while undergoing said initiation rites or practice, which is a prerequisite for -admission into
the said fraternity, that led to the untimely death of JOHN DANIEL SAMPARADA y Llamera,
to the damage and prejudice of his legal and lawful heirs.
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. Convicting

petitioners for violation of Section 4(a) of RA 8049. It ruled that the circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution is sufficient for the conviction of petitioners. Aggrieved,
petitioners brought the case to the CA. They argued that the elements of Section 4(a) RA
8049 were lacking. Further, they maintained that the material requirements of
circumstantial evidence sufficient for a conviction were wanting.
The CA affirmed the petitioners' conviction and modified the award of damages. It
held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the chain of
circumstances incrir1inating beyond reasonable doubt [petitioners] for the death of
[Samparada]. It also ruled that the prosecution had sufficiently established the following
material facts: (1) that petitioners are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity; and (2) that
Samparada's injuries were brought about by hazing; thus, the inevitable conclusion is that
petitioners participated in the hazing of Samparada.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the offense charged
may be proven by circumstantial evidence, which is sometimes referred, to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. It contended that "the prosecution's evidence, including the
testimonies of its witnesses, collectively formed. a chain of circumstances that absolutely
incriminated petitioners in the killing of [Samparada]." Thus, it maintained that the CA
rightfully sustained the RTC's finding that the prosecution’s evidence sufficed for the
conviction of petitioners.
Petitioners argued that both the RTC and the CA resolved the case based on erroneous
and inadmissible circumstantial evidence. They averred that the circumstances established
during the trial were not sufficient to conclude that they were the perpetrators of the offense
They further argued that the application of the presumption of guilt as provided in 'RA 8049
violated their constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Hazing Law.
RULING
NO. The Court is not convinced that petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of hazing. Thus, the Court resolves to reverse the appealed decision and acquit
petitioners.
It must be emphasized that in this jurisdiction, no less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required to support a judgment of conviction. While the law does not require
absolute certainty, the prosecution's evidence must produce in the mind of the Court a moral
certainty of the accused's guilt. Where there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must
acquit.
In the present case, it is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented to link
petitioners to Samparada's death. In fact, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted
petitioners through circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence that

produce legal consequences. The difference between the two involves the relationship of the
fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the
probative value of the evidence. Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without having to
draw any inference proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference
or reason from circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is not always necessary as it has
become a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. This
is but a recognition of the reality that it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence in
certain instances due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime.
Evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven
by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt. Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides three requisites in order to sustain a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, to wit:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leanen also underscores the difficulty of proving rl1e
violence inflicted by fraternities because of the culture of silence, secrecy, and blind loyalty
dictated among fraternity members.
Thus, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Marvic M.VF. Leonen and as earlier
discussed, hazing, like any other felony, need not be proven by direct evidence; it may be
sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence. Moreover, conviction for hazing is still
possible through a single, credible witness.
However; without intending to bring to naught the purpose of the Anti-Hazing Law, the
Court especially finds important the legal principle that every person accused of any crime
is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. This presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused is a right guaranteed by the Constitution. and should not be brushed aside.
For this reason, in all criminal prosecutions, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required in order to attain a conviction.
Interestingly, apart from the circumstantial evidence, the Court in the Dungo case also
considered the presumption in paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049 which provides that the
presence of any person during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his participation as
principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is
unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender
during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent
the commission of hazing. Thus, a person who is found to be present in the commission of
hazing may be convicted as a principal thereof when he fails to rebut the prima facie
presumption found under paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049.
The prima facie presumption under paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049, however, finds no
application in the present case. To begin with, the prosecution failed to prove that a hazing
incident occurred. Thus, even if petitioners were proven to be present when Samparada
suffered the injuries that led to his death, there can be no prima facie presumption of their
participation in the conduct of hazing. In other words, before the Prima facie presumption
can apply against petitioners, there is a need to first satisfy the elements of hazing which,
unfortunately, the prosecution failed to do.
Regrettably, the Court finds reasonable doubt on the guilt of petitioners for violation of
the Anti-Hazing Law. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient for the conviction of petitioners. The Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioners Carlos Paulo Bartolome y Ilagan and Joel Bandalan y Abordo are
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8049.
Q: A was charged and convicted for violation of R.A. 8049 anti-hazing law, with
circumstantial evidence and prima facie evidence presumption that the A was present
during the execution of the said hazing. Can A appeal the decision that the evidence
were not enough to suffice the conviction of proof beyond reasonable doubt?
A: YES, anti-hazing law may not require direct evidence to suffice conviction, still all indirect
or circumstantial evidence must link or tie up together solidly to the victim or crime itself,
otherwise in this jurisdiction, no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to
support a judgment of conviction. While the law does not require absolute certainty, the
prosecution's evidence must produce in the mind of the Court a moral certainty of the
accused's guilt. Where there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit. (Carlos Paulo
Bartolome y Ilagan and Joel Bandalan y Abordo v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 227951,
June 28, 2021, as penned by J. Inting)
NOILA SABAN Y BANSIL @ "NAWILA" A.K.A. "NAWILA SABAN Y CARABAO," v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 253812, June 28, 2021, (Perlas-Bernabe, J)
DOCTRINE
“In cases for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that
the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove
the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal.”
FACTS
This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC charging Saban of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 11
(3), Article II of RA 9165. That on or about December 17, 2014, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in her possession and under her
custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets.
The prosecution alleged that, when Saban arrived to visit her husband who was
incarcerated in said jail. That in the course of searching Saban, JO1 Lominio noticed that she
appeared to be chewing something. JO1 Lominio's co-searchers then advised Saban to
comply and spit out what she was chewing. She was able to recover two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. The searchers then called Senior Jail Officer 2
Dominic M. Selibio (SJO2 Selibio), the investigator on-duty. They tried to call for a barangay
official but no one came. They then proceeded to mark the seized sachets with "N.B.S. 1
12/17/14" and "N.B.S. 2 12/17/14," prepare an inventory, and photograph the same. JO1
Lominio turned over the seized items to SJO2 Selibio who prepared the necessary reportorial
documents, including the Request for Laboratory Examination. PCI Yee (forensic chemist of
PDEA) then prepared and signed Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DDO 14-252. The specimens
remained in her custody until she brought the same to court for presentation. Saban, in here
defense, denied the charge against her. She claimed that she was visiting her husband in the
Manila City Jail and was subjected to a body search in the comfort room but nothing was
recovered from her.
RTC found Saban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and,
accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00. The RTC found that
the prosecution, through the testimonial and documentary evidence it presented, had
established beyond reasonable doubt that Saban illegally possessed two (2) transparent
plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved notwithstanding the law enforcers'
failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. On the other hand, the RTC
did not give credence to Saban's defenses of denial and frame up for being uncorroborated.
The CA affirmed Saban's conviction. It held that all the elements of the crime charged
against Saban were proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the chain of custody remained
unbroken despite the failure to faithfully observe the procedural requirements under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
ISSUE
Whether or not the charge against Saban were proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
that the chain of custody remained unbroken.
RULING
NO, in cases for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential
that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to
prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal. To
establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody
procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the same.
As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined
as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law. Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the
prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to
secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the
earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching
objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under
the given circumstances. Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.
Here, there was no attempt to secure either a representative of the NPS or the media
contrary to the clear requirements of the law. In view of the complete and unjustified non-
compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Saban were
compromised, which warrants her acquittal.
Q: X was at checkpoint was suspected of carrying illegal substance was charged of
violating RA 9165 or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and without conducting
due process of examining the said substance was later on convicted of possession of
illegal drugs. Did the court conferred a proper decision?
A: NO, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Therefore, in the absence of due process and proper chain of custody and
for failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants
an acquittal. (Noila Saban y Bansil @ "Nawila" a.k.a. "Nawila Saban y Carabao," v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. no. 253812, June 28, 2021, as penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
CESAR P. ALPAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 140402-20, June 28, 2021, (Inting, J)
DOCTRINE
“It is a basic tenet that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law. The Court does not review the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan that are generally conclusive upon the Court. Question
of law exists "when a doubt or a difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants.” “Meanwhile, the question of fact emerges "when the query
necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering mostly foe credibility of
witnesses, existence, and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each
other and the whole, and probabilities of the situation “
FACTS
Petitioner was accused in thirty-nine (39) Information under article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portion of Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM—0045
states: That on or about 30 June 2004, or Sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Unisan, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CESAR P. ALPAY, a high ranking public official, being the Municipal Mayor of Unisan,
Quezon, taking advantage of his official position and while in the discharge of his official
functions, and committing the offense in relation thereto, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 40l-
2004-06-154 dated 30 June 2004 and its supporting documents by making it appear that a
certain Florencio Taperc, received financial assistance in the amount of Sixty-three thousand
eight hundred thirty pesos (Php 638,000.00) under the ]sang Bayan, isang Produkto, isang
Milyong Pisong Programa ni GMA, when in truth and in fact, and as the accused knew fully
well that said person did not receive such financial assistance but instead was given a hand
contractor purchased by the Municipality of Unisan without the benefit of public bidding and
in violation of the terms of the isang Bayan, isang Produkto, isang Milyong Pisong Programa
ni GMA, to the damage and prejudice of the said municipality and the intended beneficiary.
According to Teresita Musca (Musca), Municipal Accountant, she processed

disbursement vouchers for PGMA's livelihood project. She received 42 disbursement
vouchers from the Office of the Municipal Mayor, all of which bore petitioner's signature
certifying that the expenses/cash advances were necessary, lawful, and incurred under his
direct supervision. 'She then affixed her signature certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents. The vouchers were accompanied by an unsigned
Sinumpaang Salaysay where it was stated that a certain beneficiary received a certain
amount. The Sinumpaang Salaysay was to be signed by the recipient upon release of money.
Soon after, Bemardita de Jesus, municipal Treasurer, received 42 disbursement

vouchers from the Office of the Municipal Accountant. She noticed that the vouchers she
received already bore the signatures of Petitioner and Musca. De Jesus asserted that the
disbursement vouchers she received did not follow the normal procedure as she had yet to
first sign and certify as to the availability of the funds. Because she knew that the project was
funded and that the vouchers were already signed by petitioner and Musca, she issued the
checks and sent them to peti1:oner for signature. However, contrary to the procedure, both
de Jesus and Musca testified that the checks were not returned to the Office of the Treasurer
for distribution. To which the Petitioner denied the allegations.
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Case Nos. SB-1O-CRM-0045 to 0083

as follows: the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner in some Criminal Cases, but it found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case and for the crime of Falsification by Public
Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastic Minister under Article 171 of the RPC and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay a fine of PS,000.00 in each of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in finding him guilty of 19 counts of
falsification under Article 171 of the RPC; and that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
denying his Motion for Reconsideration for lack of interest on his part to prosecute the
motion.
RULING
NO, the Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the
inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty of falsification. Petitioner' s denial,
unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence. It deserves no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. It is a basic tenet that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law. This Court does not review
the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan that generally conclusive upon the Court. The
sufficiency of evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to support a conviction of a crime is a
factual is the determination of which is better left to the lower court. Such factual
determinization is respected and rendered conclusive as an acknowledgment of the court' s
intrinsic competence .to experientially evaluate evidence.
Under the 2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, the following
requisites must be shown to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, to wit:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Also, the circumstances being considered must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is the author of the crime.
Recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. They are not reliable and
deserve only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious. Affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable as there is always the
probability that it will later be repudiated.
Q: Mr. X a municipal or city accountant signed several documents which stipulates that
500,000 was disbursed to certain residents of the municipality as financial aid due to
being stricken with the COVID-19 virus; when Mr. X knows full-well that no such
disbursement of any kind happened and when asked about it, his mere defense was
denial. If charged with violating of Article 171 (Falsification of public documents) of
the RPC, would the suit prosper?
A: YES, Mr. X’s s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence. It deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial
evidence pointing to the inevitable conclusion that petitioner is indeed guilty of falsification
(Cesar P. Alpay v. People Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 140402-20, June 28, 2021, as penned by
J. Inting)
JERICHO CARLOS y DELA MERCED v. AAA AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 243034, June 28, 2021, (Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
“SECTION 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.”
FACTS
In the present case, a petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the ruling of the CA affirming the RTC decision of finding Jericho D. Carlos (Carlos) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for three (3) counts of violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
That sometime in the month of December year 2009, in the Municipality of _ , Province
of _ , Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA],
a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, said act is considered by law as "other condition
prejudicial to the child's development" for which the accused is responsible, to her damage
and prejudice. (Criminal Case No. (10)-7361-SPL); That sometime in the month of December
year 2009, in the Municipality of _ , Province of _ , Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor, thirteen (13) years of age, said act is
considered [by law] as "other condition prejudicial to the child's development" for which the
accused is responsible, to her damage and prejudice. (Criminal Case No. [10)-7362-SPL); and
That on or about January 10, 2010, in the Municipality of_ , Province of _ , Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor, thirteen
(13) years of age, said act is considered [by law] as "other condition prejudicial to the child's
development" for which the accused is responsible, to her damage and prejudice. (Criminal
Case No. [10]-7363-SPL) To which Carlos entered a plea of not guilty during the arraignment.
As a consequence, trial on the merits then ensued.
The RTC Laguna rendered a Decision convicting the accused of three counts of
violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610. It observed that the prosecution had sufficiently
established the guilt of Carlos beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. The
culpability of Carlos was clearly established by prosecution witness AAA. The RTC Laguna
further stated that there is nothing in the records to show that the testimony of AAA was
motivated by any other reason than her sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished. She has not shown to have any ulterior motive to falsely testify against Carlos. The
CA modified the conviction of Carlos for three (3) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610, instead for Section 10 (a) of the same law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC in convicting of
Carlos of Child Abuse
RULING
NO, the CA correctly convicted Carlos for violation of Section 5 (b) instead of Section
10 (a). First, the three separate indictments sufficiently alleged the punishable acts and its
elements punished by Section 5 (b). The elements of Section 5 (b) for sexual abuse are: (a)
the commission by the accused of the act of sexual intercourse (b) the act is performed on a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age. And, second, as can be gleaned from the above-
mentioned provisions of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual
abuse committed against children; whereas, Section 10 (a) thereof punishes other forms of
child abuse not covered by other provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Parenthetically, the offense will
not fall under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 if the same is specifically penalized by a
particular provision of the law such as Section 5 (b) for sexual abuse.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Carlos should be sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (eight years and one day to fourteen years and eight months), as minimum,
and reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua in its medium period
(seventeen years, four months and one day to twenty years), as maximum.
Q: X had carnal knowledge with Y, a minor, who is thirteen years of age. X was charged
of Sexual Abuse filed under RA 7610 would the case prosper?
A: YES, provided under Section 5 of RA 7610 sexual abuse is the commission by the accused
of the act of sexual intercourse; or when the act is performed on a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and the child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age. Therefore, X could be penalized for sexual abuse under RA 7610.
(Jericho Carlos y Dela Merced V. AAA and People Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 243034, June 28,
2021, as penned by J. Lopez)
G.R. No. 221370, JUNE 28, 2021, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
“We stress that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, as
this Court is not a trier of facts. Since the instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions which would warrant the review of questions of fact, this Court is solely limited to
pass upon questions of law.”
“Economic abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent. In this case, specifically Sec. 5, par. (e)(2) of P.A 9262 penalizes the deprivation of
financial support legally due the woman or child, which is a continuing offense”
FACTS
An Information was filed against petitioner for violation of Section 5, paragraph
(e)(2) of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2005 and subsequent thereto, in __ the above-
named accused, who is the husband of the compluinantAAA7 and with whom he has a child
BBB,8 a five (5) year old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and
deliberately deprive said complainant and their child of sufficient financial support legally
due them. Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The RTC found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It found
that XXX deliberately deprived AAA and their child of sufficient financial support to be used
for their son's medical and educational expenses. It was not convinced that petitioner only
told AAA that he had a new family for leverage since pictures of petitioner with his alleged
"special friend" while hugging and holding hands were presented during trial. Such pictures
were even publicly shared on social media by petitioner. Also, the support previously given
by petitioner insufficient for the sustenance, education, and medical needs of BBB, who
suffers from a medical condition that requires special treatment. 1t also held that XXX's
constant refusal to provide financial support caused AAA pain and suffering. CA upheld the
conviction of XXX for Violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2 of RA 9262.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding that there was no payment for
support has been fully documented as argued by the Petitioner and that he deliberately
denies giving of financial support.
RULING
YES, in a catena of cases, We have held that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect, especially if these findings were affirm by the appellate court. While this is
not an absolute rule as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the present case does not fall
under any of the recognized exceptions under the law, At any rate, the findings of the courts
a quo are supplied by the evidence on record.
Economic abuse is one of the acts of violence punished by RA 9262: Economic abuse
refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent. In this case,
specifically Sec. 5, par. (e)(2) of P.A 9262 penalizes the deprivation of financial support
legally due the woman or child, which is a continuing offense, to wit:
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or
child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct xxx (2)
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family.
As correctly found by the courts a quo, all the elements of a violation of Section 5
(e)(2) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) XXX and AAA were married after
being pregnant with BBB; (b) XXX acknowledged BBB as his child; (c) he failed to provide
sufficient support for BBB; (d) he withheld financial support for BBB due to the ire he felt
towards his wife; (e) he only provided financial support after the complaint against him in
the Prosecutor's Office was filed.
There is also no merit in petitioner's argument that the absence of malice on his part
should warrant his acquittal. Crimes mala in se are those "so serious in their effects to society
as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members." On the other hand, crimes
mala prohibita are "violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society." Generally, the term mala in se pertains to felonies
defined and penalized by the RPC while mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal
by special Jaws. In acts which are declared to be mala prohibita, malice or intent is
immaterial. Since RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 is a special law, the act of deprivation of financial support is considered malum
prohibitum. Petitioner's argument of absence of malice or intent is immaterial and the only
inquiry to be made is whether or not XXX committed the act.
Q: Mr. Y ordered his wife to quit her job to be able focus on their family and to have
time in properly raising their children, therefore X (the wife) became financially
dependent on Y for their livelihood. Y also forbid X from entering or having a business
of her own while raising the kids, he only gives exact amount of money to X for the
bills, should the wife asks for money for schooling of their children or other personal
matters, Y gets mad and still forbids X from securing her own funding. Is this already
a form of abuse?
A: YES, it is in a form of economic abuse. Provided under RA 9262 (VOWC Law) Economic
abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent and is
therefore penalizing the deprivation of financial support legally due the woman or child,
which is a continuing offense. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221370, June 28, 2021,
as penned by J. Hernando).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MENDOZA a.k.a MENDOZA, "WILFREDO MENDOZA,"
and “SAMAL," RODEL DE GUZMAN a.k.a. "ITEW," CENTENO "ASIAN," BEREZO . a.k.a.
"BANONG," MENARD. FERRER, DEXTER GRAMATA OCUMEN, BERNARDO P ALISOC
a.k.a. "NOGNOG," and RODERICK "PANGAL" DE GUZMAN and RODERICK GUZMAN
G.R. No. 237215, JUNE 28, 2021, (Lopez, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The task of taking on the issue of credibility is a function properly lodged with the trial
court. This is because the trial judge is in a better position to ascertain the conflicting
testimonies of witnesses after having heard them and observed their deportment and mode of
testifying; drilling trial. When the issue is one of credibility of witness, this Court will generally
not disturb the trial court's findings especially when affirmed in full by the Court of Appeals, as
in this case.”
FACTS
Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of murder with the use of unlicensed
firearm in an Information, which reads as follows: That on or about December 15, 2003, in
the morning, at Poblacion, Municipality of Malasiqui, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Tambac, Malasiqui, Pangasinan
with said unlicensed firearm and with the use of a motor vehicle, inflicting upon him
GUNSHOT WOUND per autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings (Xeros(sic) . copy issued by
Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, M.D., Medico-Legal Officer, National: Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Manila which is attached to the record of the case, which caused the death of said Brgy.
Captain Leonides Bulatao, aka Leo Bulatao, as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice
of his legal heirs. Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659
in relation to R.A. 8294
The RTC found the accused-appellants, together with Mendoza and Ocumen guilty of
murder. Further, that the accused conspired, confederated, and mutually aided each other in
killing Bulatao. It gave full credence to the testimony of state witness Viray, which it found
was given in a straightforward manner and with conviction commonly observed in persons
who have actually witnessed the commission of a crime. RTC held that the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation qualified the crime to murder, while the use of a motor
vehicle was a generic aggravating circumstance. However, the use of'unlid:1hsed firearm
was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to lack of proof during trial. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification to damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred m affirming accused-appellants' conviction for murder.
RULING
NO. The Court affirms accused-appellants' conviction for murder, but modifies the
award of damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. After a careful review of the
records, this Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA. According to the RTC and the CA, Viray's testimony was credible and
more reliable than accused-appellants' defenses of alibi and denial. This is because Viray's
testimony was given in a straightforward manner and with conviction commonly observed
in persons who have actually witnessed the commission of a crime.
In order for the charge of murder to prosper, the following elements must be
established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him
or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248; and (4) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide
In the present case, the prosecution was able to adequately establish all the elements
of murder: (1) Bulatao was killed; (2) Viray positively identified Mendoza as the one who
shot Bulatao; (3) the killing was attended by treachery and evident premeditation; and (4)
the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide as there was no relationship between
Bulatao and accused- appellant.
From the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the RTC and
the CA as they properly convicted accused-appellants of the crime of murder. Accordingly,
this Court affirms the lower courts' imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
accused-appellants.
Q: Accused was convicted of the crime of murder after denial of motion for
reconsideration, accused appealed the same to the appellate courts, which therein
affirmed the resolution of the lower courts. Accused appealed to the Supreme Court
arguing an error to the witnesses presented during trial. Will the petition of the
accused prosper regarding the said testimonies of the witness?
A: NO, the task of taking on the issue of credibility is a function properly lodged with the trial
court. This is because the trial judge is in a better position to ascertain the conflicting
testimonies of witnesses after having heard them and observed their deportment and mode
of testifying; drilling trial. When the issue is one of credibility of witness, this Court will
generally not disturb the trial court's findings especially when affirmed in full by the Court
of Appeals. If after a careful review of the records and the Courts finds no compelling reason
to deviate from the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, then it will not disturb such.
(People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 237215, June 28, 2021, as penned by J.
Lopez)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN GALICIA y GALICIA, ROGER DEMETILLA y
GONZALES, LEOPOLDO SARlEGO y GENITO, ELISEO VILLARINO y RIVERAL, ROGER
CHIVA y NAVAL, and NAPOLEON PORTUGAL y MALATE
G.R. No. 238911, JUNE 28, 2021, (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victim's liberty such that the
prosecution must prove actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such
deprivation was the appellant's intention. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained
to extort ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment
of the victim's liberty need not involve any, physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is
not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly.”
FACTS
The case stemmed from an Information charging accused- appellants and their co-
accused with Kidnapping for Ransom, the accusatory portion of which reads: "That on or
about 7:30 in the evening of May 8, 2003 in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City and [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away, kidnap and deprive VENILDA HO Y MARCELO of her liberty
against her will, by blocking the path of the said victim while on board a Mitsubishi L300 van,
forcibly pulling her out from the said vehicle and trar1sferring her to a red Kia sedan with
plate no. CRW- 833, and by bringing her to a safe house in Las Pifi.as City and later to another
safe house located at No. 71 K-8 Street, East Kamias, Quezon City until her rescue on May 22,
2003. That the abduction of VENILDA HO Y MARCELO was for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the family of the victim as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition
for her release amounting to fifty (50) million (Php50,000,000.00) pesos, which was later
reduced to five hundred thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos, wherein two hundred twenty
four thousand five hundred (Php224,50G.00) pesos was paid on May_ 14, ~003 along South
Expressway, near Alabang Exit, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. That another demand for ransom
in the amount of five (5) million (Php5;ooo,000.00) pesos, later reduced to two hundred fifty
five thousand (Php255,000.00) pesos was made, but no payment ensued as the victim was
subsequently rescued, to the damage arid prejudice of said victim Venilda Ho.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding accused- appellants and Ugat, Jr. as principals;
and Billones as an accomplice, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom. The CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the appeal. It agreed with the
RTC that all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom were proven by the
prosecution. It likewise gave more weight to Venilda's testimony and positive identification
of the kidnappers. Furthermore, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling that accused Billones is
merely an accomplice in the commission of the crime. However, the CA modified the
monetary awards imposed by the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellants' conviction for
Kidnapping with Ransom.
RULING
NO. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the uniform factual findings of the RTC
and the CA as there is no indication that they overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It is settled that findings of the trial court
which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with
respect, if not finality by the appellate court, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension
of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings.
The crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the RFC, as amended, viz.:
Article 2C:. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to deal:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threa1s to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female, or a public officer.
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused was a private person; (2) he or she kidnapped
or detained, or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (3) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (4) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victim's liberty such that the
prosecution must prove actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such
deprivation was the appellant's intention. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained to extort ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the
curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any, physical restraint upon the latter's
person and it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated
him harshly.
In the case, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all
elements of Kidnapping for Ransom. Accused- appellants are private persons. Venilda
categorically narrated how they deprived her of her liberty from the time the kidnappers
forcibly abducted and detained her in two safehouses up until her rescue by the PACER
agents. The fact that Venilda was free to roam around the premises of the two safehouses is
of no moment. That is material is the curtailment of her liberty and the demand of money for
her release.
As a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the accused who appealed his or her
conviction. However, when an appellate court renders a favorable judgment, the effects of
such favorable judgment extend even to those who did not appeal, to the extent that such
effects apply to their specific contexts.
Q: In the Supreme Court upon appeal, and on its resolution, does it deviate from the
lower and court’s factual finding?
A: NO. Generally, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the uniform factual findings of
the RTC and the CA as there is no indication that they overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It is settled that findings of
the trial court which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are
accorded with respect, if not finality by the appellate court, when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings. (People of the Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28,
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN-ROSERO v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION,
BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, and ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, REYNALSO D. GAMBOA,
JOSE A. GANGAN, VIOLETA J. JOSEF, JOSE V. RAMOS, and ANTONIETA FORTUNA-IBE
GR No. 220378, June 30, 2021 (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court recognizes that the right to information is not absolute as it is limited to
“matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitation as may be provided by
law.” Similarly, “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.”
“For right to information to be compellable by mandamus, a petitioner must establish

the following requisites: 1) the information sought must be in relation to matters of public
concern and public interest; and 2) it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.”
FACTS
In October 1997, petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations conducted
by the BOA. Unfortunately, when the list of passers were released, the petitioner did not
make it and found out that she received failing grades in four of the seven subjects. Petitioner
then wrote to Domondon, the Acting Chairman of the BOA and requested for copies of: (a)
the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects; (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys
to the questionnaires; and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject so
that she could refer them to an expert for checking.
However, Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds: 1) Section 36,

Article III of the Rule and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals
as amended by the PRC Resolution No. 332, Series of 1994 only permitted access to
petitioner’s answer sheet and that a reconsideration of her examination results is only
proper under the ground that there was mechanical error in the grading of her answer
sheets; and 2) BOA is precluded from releasing the examination documents, other than
petitioner’s answer sheet, by Section 20 of PRC Resolution No. 338, Series of 1994.
Thus, Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the RTC against
the Board of Accountancy. The pleading’s cause of action for access to the documents
requested was pursuant to her constitutional right to information
ISSUE
WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus on the ground that the
petitioner’s constitutional right to have access to the examinations documents is restricted
RULING
NO. The court finds no merit in the petition. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern is enshrined under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that:
Section 7. the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern, together with
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, promotes full disclosure and transparency in the
government. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
On the other hand, Section 5(e), RA 6713 provides for the obligation of public officials
and employees to make public documents accessible to the public, thus:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. – In the performance of
their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:
Xxxx
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. – All public documents must be
made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by the public within
the reasonable working hours.
Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that the right to information is not absolute as
it is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law.” Similarly, “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.”
For right to information to be compellable by mandamus, a petitioner must establish

constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test that can be applied in determining
whether a particular information is of public concern or public interest. The courts must
determine on a case-to-case basis whether the information sought is of public concern or
interest as it relates or affects the public. In this case, the Court conceded in Antolin that
national board examinations, such as the CPA Board Exams, are matters of public concern.
As to the second requisite, petitioner must show that the information sought is not
exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Section 5(e) of RA 6713
does not give the petitioner the absolute tight to access information and documents. Such
law recognizes that not all kinds of information in the possession of public officials and
employees may be made available to the public. Further, Section 7(c) of RA 6713 prohibits
public officials and employees from disclosing and misusing confidential information. Thus,
confidential information is exempt from the mandate of making public documents available
for inspection within reasonable working hours.
In this case, the court finds that Section 20 of PRC Resolution No. 338 constitutes a
valid limitation to petitioner’s right to access and inspect public documents within
reasonable working hours under Section 5(e) of RA 6713 and her constitutional right to
information under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution. Thus, for failure to establish the
condition outlined in Section 20 of the PRC Resolution No. 338, an administrative regulation
promulgated pursuant to the powers vested upon the PRC by PD 223, the court finds that the
examination documents are confidential and exempt from the constitutional guarantee of
the right to information. Specifically, the test questions sought by petitioner fall within the
concept of established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or
settled policy or jurisprudence under Section 7(c), RA 7613.
Thus, the court affirms the RTC’s dismissal of the petition for mandamus as to all of
the respondents.
Q: X took the accountancy licensure exam but did not pass due to 7 failing grades. X
wrote to Y who is the Acting Chairman of the BOA and requested copies of her answer
sheet, answer keys, and the grading system for each subject. However, it was denied
that according to Section 36, Article 3, as amended only permitted access to
petitioner’s answer sheet and that a reconsideration of her examination results is only
proper under the ground that there was mechanical error in the grading of her answer
sheets. Thus, X filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the RTC against the
Board of Accountancy. The pleading’s cause of action for access to the documents
requested was pursuant to her constitutional right to information. Decide.
A: NO. X does not have the right to access those records pursuant to her constitutional right
to information. The right to information is not absolute as it is limited to “matters of public
concern,” and is further “subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.” Similarly,
“transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law.”
For right to information to be compellable by mandamus, a petitioner must establish
constitutional guarantee.
In this case, X must show that the information sought is not exempt by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. Thus, for failure to establish the condition outlined
in Section 20 of the PRC Resolution No. 338, an administrative regulation promulgated
pursuant to the powers vested upon the PRC by PD 223, the documents are confidential and
exempt from the constitutional guarantee of the right to information. (Antolin-Rosero v. PRC,
GR No. 220378, June 30, 2021, as penned by J. Inting)
DANIEL G. IMPERIAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 230519, June 30, 2021 (Gaerlan, J)
DOCTRINE
“The crime is deemed consummated when the following elements are present: (1) taking
of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking is done
with intent to gain; (4) absence of the owner's consent; (5) that it is accomplished without the
use of violence, intimidation, nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse
of confidence”
“In the crime of theft, corpus delicti has two elements: 1) that personal property is lost
by its owner, and 2) that it was lost through felonious taking
No less than the highest quantum of proof is required in criminal cases, as the life and
liberty of a person are at stake. In these cases, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt. In so evaluating, courts must consider every circumstance in favor of the accused's
innocence.”
FACTS
Petitioner Imperial as Head of the Maintenance Department of NTC-MPC was charged
with the crime of qualified theft for the missing roll of Royal Cord (electric conductor).
The RTC charged petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
the RTC held that the prosecution established the elements of the crime charged. The RTC
ruled that the logbook entries proved that it was the petitioner who requested purchase of
the Royal Cord 14/3 wires, for which he was responsible as head of the maintenance
department. Further, the RTC noted that what the petitioner returned to the warehouse was
a Royal Cord wire 16/2, which is different from that purchased by the company and as such,
this cannot absolve him from liability. Finally, the RTC found that the petitioner's intent to
gain is evident from his actuations.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s decision. In essence,
the CA affirmed the factual findings and conclusions of law by the RTC. The CA ruled that the
inconsistencies cited by the petitioner do not affect the veracity and weight of the testimony
of the prosecution's witnesses inasmuch as all the elements of the crime i of qualified theft
have been proven. The CA found that the material possession of the missing Royal Cord size
14/3 was with the petitioner; that he unlawfully took the same; that intent to gain is
presumed from such unlawful taking; and that in the course thereof petitioner committed
grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by NTC-MPC as head of its Maintenance
department.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision
which convicted the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
RULING
YES, the Court rules in the affirmative. After a careful review of the records of the case
at bar, the Court is convinced that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, as its factual
findings are not supported by the required quantum of evidence that 1s sufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction.
The crime of qualified theft is defined and penalized under Article 310 in relation to
Articles 308 and 309 of the RPC. The crime is deemed consummated when the following
elements are present: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking is done with intent to gain; (4) absence of the owner's consent;
(5) that it is accomplished without the use of violence, intimidation, nor of force upon things;
and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence
Herein, the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of theft.
Corpus delicti, in its legal sense, refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or
to the body or substance of the crime. In the crime of theft, corpus delicti has two elements:
1) that personal property is lost by its owner, and 2) that it was lost through felonious taking
To establish the element of taking, actual or constructive possession of personal

property must be proven- first; by its owner or lawful possessor and second, the subsequent
unlawful acquisition of thereof by the accused. In the case of Roque v. People, the Court citing
an earlier case, noted that the crime of theft as defined by the RPC lays great stress on the
first element, "which is the taking away, that is, getting possession, laying hold of the thing
without the consent of the owner." Thus, when the delivery of a thing did not have the effect
of transferring possession, it is regarded that possession remains with the owner and the act
of disposing such thing without the latter's consent constitutes the crime of theft. Conversely,
when delivery to another was made with the intention of transferring ownership or
possession, the subsequent disposition by the transferee does not constitute theft. "The
crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no theft when the
owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. Indeed, a taking which is done
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious.
The RTC and the CA blindly relied on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The fact that petitioner is the head of NTC-MPC's maintenance department does not
automatically mean constructive possession without proof of actual transfer of
accountability or possession over the missing royal cord. If at all, the petitioner's position
charges him of administrative, not criminal liability.
Verily, without proof that petitioner acquired possession of the missing royal cord at
any time, there is no taking. There can be no occasion in which the petitioner can appropriate
for himself the subject Royal Cord and for the crime of theft to occur.
Q: Mr. X is the Head of the Maintenance Department of NTC-MPC. Mr. X requested Y to
purchase one roll of Royal Cord 14/3 for the company’s use. As requested, Y purchased
the same. As per logbook entry, the purchased item was brought to the warehouse.
However, Mr. X instructed Y to place the purchased item in his car and headed toward
the national road. Mr. A, another employee of the company, asked the security guard
if the Royal Cord was still inside X’s car. The guard found none. Mr. A asked Y if the
latter had purchased the item, to which Y answered in affirmative. After that, Mr. A
reported that the cord ordered was missing. Mr. X was dismissed from work and was
charged with the crime of qualified theft for the missing roll of Royal Cord. Is Mr. X
guilty of the crime charged?
A: NO. The crime of qualified theft is defined and penalized under Article 310 in relation to
Articles 308 and 309 of the RPC. The crime is deemed consummated when the following
elements are present: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking is done with intent to gain; (4) absence of the owner's consent;
(5) that it is accomplished without the use of violence, intimidation, nor of force upon things;
and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In this case, the fact that Mr. X is the head of NTC-MPC's maintenance department
does not automatically mean constructive possession without proof of actual transfer of
accountability or possession over the missing royal cord. If at all, the petitioner's position
charges him of administrative, not criminal liability. Verily, without proof that petitioner
acquired possession of the missing royal cord at any time, there is no taking. There can be no
occasion in which the petitioner can appropriate for himself the subject Royal Cord and for
the crime of theft to occur. (Imperial v. People, GR No. 230519, June 30, 2021, as penned by J.
Gaerlan)
DENNIS OLIVER CASTRONUEVO LUNA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 231902, June 30, 2021 (Caguioa, J)
DOCTRINE
“Concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 goes beyond
mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise, an unsuspecting person
who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly prosecuted based on the sheer fact
that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It must be proven that the person in whose
possession the drug specimen was found knew that he/she was possessing illegal drugs.”
“Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by

taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.”
FACTS
On July 10, 2005, Police Superintendent Acierto of the PNP together with his team
conducted a buy-bust operation when they received and information from a confidential
informant concerning Peter Angeles and other Chinese members belonging to his group, who
were allegedly involved in drug trafficking activities. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
a certain "Sexy", known as the negotiator of Peter Angeles, called the mobile number of the
confidential informant, who was then at Camp Crame. "Sexy" then discussed the details
regarding the delivery of the "shabu" and that the designated poseur-buyer disguised as
"Mike", as regards the manner of payment.
At around 4:30 in the afternoon "Sexy" called the informant's mobile phone again and
told them to proceed to Hap Chan Restaurant instead, which is also located along Quezon
Avenue, and look for a silver-colored Toyota Revo with plate number XHY 278. As regards
the payment, "Sexy" instructed them to give the money to the driver and take the drugs found
thereat.
When they arrived and saw the Toyota Revo, SPO3 Parreno alighted and walked
towards the parked car. When he opened the door, he saw petitioner Luna to whom he asked
where "Sexy" is. Instead of giving a responsive answer, Petitioner asked him if he is "Mike"
to which he answered in the affirmative.
Forthwith, Petitioner told him to get the blue bag at the back seat and leave the money
there as instructed by "Sexy". At once, SPO3 Parreno took the blue bag from the Toyota Revo
and opened it. He then saw six (6) brown envelopes containing white crystalline substance
inside a plastic bag which he suspected to be "shabu". Promptly, he disembarked from the
Toyota Revo and left the boodle money, which was dusted with ultraviolet light, at the back
seat. He immediately waved his right hand signaling his team of the consummation of the
buy bust operation. At that point, POI Caluag and POI Nepomuceno approached the Toyota
Revo and apprehended Petitioner.
On petitioner’s version of facts, He denied ownership or knowledge of the confiscated

shabu. According to him, the car is owned by Susan Lagman, his former neighbor, who often
hires him to drive for her. He also happened to drive several times for a certain "Sexy", a
woman introduced by Susan to him. During those instances, "Sexy" would contact Susan and
the latter would go to his house to ask him if he can drive for someone the following day.
On that day, "Sexy" at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, told him to proceed to Hap Chan
along Quezon Avenue by himself. "Sexy" instructed her that if "Mike", whom she was
supposed to meet, will arrive early at Hap Chan, he will have to tell "Mike" to get the bag at
the rear passenger's seat and if "Mike" has something to leave for "Sexy", he will just have to
leave it at the back of the Toyota Revo. Afterwards, he drove towards Hap Chan and waited
inside the vehicle. At around 4:30 in the afternoon, a man approached the Toyota Revo,
introduced himself as "Mike" and asked where "Sexy" was. In reply, he told "Mike" to get the
bag placed at the back seat and wait for "Sexy" because she was on her way. As instructed,
"Mike" took the bag. Suddenly, "Mike" announced that he is arresting him for carrying illegal
drugs.
On September 23, 2005, an Information was filed against petitioner Luna for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of2002," as amended.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. the CA held that since petitioner Luna was driving the
vehicle where the bag, which supposedly contained the seized packs of drug specimen was
retrieved, he constructively possessed the alleged packs of drug specimen.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting petitioner Luna for violating
Section 11 Article II of R.A. No. 9165
RULING
YES, the appeal is meritorious and the Court hereby acquits petitioner Luna for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts
mala prohibita. In other words, "intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown.” Nevertheless, despite the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs being malum prohibitum, "this, however,
does not lessen the prosecution's burden because it is still required to show that the
prohibited act was intentional." 11 In cases involving the illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, "the prosecution is not excused from proving that possession of the prohibited act
was done 'freely and consciously,' which is an essential element of the crime.”
Hence, a critical element of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is the
element of intent to possess or animus possidendi. The Court has held that in criminal cases
involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the
accused knowingly, freely, intentionally, and consciously possessed the prohibited articles
in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article. To prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal drugs, it is
not enough to show that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or
receptacle that contained illegal drugs. The prosecution must go beyond and provide
evidence that the accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally possessed illegal
drugs.
In this case, the Court believes that the surrounding factual circumstances, as
established by the evidence on record, fail to clearly establish that there was animus
possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna. The testimony of petitioner Luna establishes that
the bag retrieved from the vehicle during the buy-bust operation did not come from and was
not owned by petitioner Luna. In short, the person who effectively wielded control over the
bag was Sexy and not petitioner Luna.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of
evidence that would show that petitioner Luna had knowledge as to the contents of the bag
seized by the police. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there
was animus possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna. Therefore, petitioner Luna is acquitted
of the crime charged against him.
Q: X, professionally employed as a driver, was occasionally hired by Y. Instructions
were specifically given to X to drive to a Chinese Restaurant and if someone
approaches him, to ask if he is Z. If the latter agrees, X will tell Z to get the bag placed
at the back seat and wait for Y because she was on her way. On that day, X followed the
orders of Y, and when Z took the bag, it subsequently led to his arrest because Z, a
police officer, was conducting a buy-bust operation. Both the RTC and the CA found X
guilty beyond reasonable for constructively possessing the alleged packs of drug
specimens found inside the bag. Is X guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165?
A: No. X is not guilty and should be acquitted. A critical element of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs is the element of intent to possess or animus possidendi. There
can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly, freely,
intentionally, and consciously possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus
possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article.
Concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 goes beyond
mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise, an unsuspecting
person who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly prosecuted based on
the sheer fact that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It must be proven that the
person in whose possession the drug specimen was found knew that he/she was possessing
illegal drugs.
In this case, X had no knowledge of the contents of the bag because he was merely
hired as a driver and followed orders given to him by X. Personal effects of his employers are
not within his authority to check and speculate. Thus, he had no intention to possess and the
prosecution failed to establish that X knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally
possessed illegal drugs. (Luna v. People, GR No. 231902, June 30, 2021, as penned by J.
Caguioa)
CLAUDIO DAQUER, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 206015, June 30, 2021 (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
“This Court has imposed a higher standard for criminal libel where the complainant is
a public figure, particularly a public officer. Actual malice-knowledge that the defamatory
statement was false, or with reckless disregard as to its falsity- must be proved. It is the burden
of the prosecution to prove actual malice, not the defense's to disprove.”
FACTS
Daquer was charged with libel under two November 3, 2003 Informations over two
articles he wrote which were published in the newspaper Palawan Mirror. The first
Information, subject of Criminal Case No. 18814, pertained to an April 4, 2003 article titled
"KUTO NA NAIS MA GING KALABA W SA CITY HALL" in the column "Nitpicks." The second
information was for the follow-up article dated April 11, 2003, also published under the
"Nitpicks" column, entitled "Unsolicited advice para sa 'media pracs'."
The RTC found petitioner guilty of two counts of Libel under Article 353 to 355 on the
premise that the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and finding that the accused believes that he acted pursuant to a duty
against the acts of the complainant who was then a public officer.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It found that the prosecution
successfully proved the elements of the crime of libel: (1) the allegation of a discreditable act
or condition concerning another; (2) publication of the charge; (3) identity of the person
defamed; and (4) existence of malice. The Court of Appeals did not give credence to Daquer's
claim that the presumption of malice did not apply because articles were fair commentaries
on matters of public interest, which would have made them "qualifiedly privileged
information" under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Daquer meant to discredit,
dishonor, and subject Grande to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Daquer also failed to
show that he had any good intentions or a justifiable motive for writing and publishing these
statements.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Claudio Daquer, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of libel.
RULING
NO, petitioner is not guilty of libel and is acquitted. This Court has recognized that the
law on libel is tempered by the fundamental right of freedom of expression.
This is especially true under our Constitution, which not only protects comments on
the acts of public officials as exercises of the right to free speech, but equally as
manifestations of the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty and the trust reposed
in public office. Accountability to the people is demanded by the Constitution itself. The
checks on governmental power are not confined to the three branches of government. The
people-as citizens, electors, taxpayers- have an equal stake in participative democracy,
which includes holding public officials rigorously answerable to their oaths of service.
On behalf of the people, the press serves as a constant watchdog, relieving the
"abscesses of officialdom" with its biting scrutiny. At times, in the face of the outrages
perpetrated by public officers, people may resort to intemperance and impertinence, but a
milquetoast sentiment is not a prerequisite for constitutional protection.
"Reckless disregard" is determined on a case-by-case basis. There is reckless

disregard if the accused was found to have entertained serious doubts of the truth of the
published statements, or if the statements were of a matter not determined to be a legitimate
topic in the area. Errors or misstatements by themselves are insufficient to be considered
reckless disregard, unless shown that the accused possessed a high degree of awareness of
the falsity. Mere negligence is not enough.
Q: X, as a journalist wrote on the column of a newspaper about Y, a public official, and
made statements such as "mokong," "ahas," "kuto," "gaga," and "utak tukmol."
Subsequently, Y charged X for libel for statements made upon him. Is X guilty of libel?
Decide.
A: NO. X is not guilty of libel. The law on libel is tempered by the fundamental right of
freedom of expression. There is a higher standard for criminal libel where the complainant
is a public figure, particularly a public officer. Actual malice-knowledge that the defamatory
statement was false, or with reckless disregard as to its falsity- must be proved. It is the
burden of the prosecution to prove actual malice, not the defense's to disprove. On behalf of
the people, the press serves as a constant watchdog, relieving the "abscesses of officialdom"
with its biting scrutiny. (Daquer v. People ,GR No. 206015, June 30, 2021, as penned by J.
Leonen)
ISAGANI Q. LISACA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 251131, July 6, 2021 (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
“In establishing the first element of estafa through misappropriation, the prosecution
has to show proof of receipt of the money, goods, or other personal properties by the offender
in trust, or on commission or for administration or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same. The CA relied on the Summary of Unreported
Forms. However, these do not establish that petitioner actually received money, good or
personal property on behalf of Imperial.”
“It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish, through proof beyond reasonable
doubt, that the accused committed the crime being charged. There being no proof of the receipt
of the premiums on the unreported insurance forms and the amount of the premiums in the
insurance policies of the claimants settled or paid by Imperial issued/sold by Al Niño, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of estafa through
misappropriation”
FACTS
This case stemmed from two Information against petitioner charging him
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC
According to the prosecution, petitioner was the Chief Executive Officer and/or
President of Al Niño Ruis Insurance Agency Inc. (Al Niño), a commissioned agent of private
complainant Imperial Insurance Inc. (Imperial). Imperial is engaged in the insurance
business. As commission agent, Al Niño is contracted to sell insurance policies to owners of
motor vehicles on behalf of Imperial. Al Niño is given blank insurance forms by Imperial
which it sells to clients. As a consequence, Al Niño receives the premium payment for the sale
of the insurance policies, reports the completed insurance forms and remits the premiums
less deductions to Imperial
Imperial alleges that from May 9, 1996 up to December 1999, Al Niño failed to return
a total of 2,998 blank insurance forms with an estimated valuation of P96,984,047.65. From
these unreturned insurance forms, Imperial contends that it settled several insurance claims,
despite the fact that it was Al Niño that issued them without remitting the corresponding
premiums to these insurance policies, to the damage and prejudice of Imperial. Further,
Imperial avers that Al Niño collected and received premiums from the sale of its insurance
policies in the total amount of P20,035,067.97. However, it failed to remit the said premiums
to Imperial, despite several demands made to it by Imperial, the last of which was on
February 26, 2001.
Imperial presented the following witnesses:

•
Agapay (in charge of the accountable insurance forms, including its release,
safekeeping and accounting) = petitioner requested, on behalf of Al Niño, for the
accountable insurance forms as evidenced by the requisition slips petitioner filled up.
However, petitioner failed to return 2,998 sets of accountable insurance forms, to the
damage and prejudice of Imperial.
•
Tasic (stock clerk who was in charge of posting entries in the subsidiary ledger of the
company) = petitioner had unreported accountable insurance forms/policies.
•
Mancilla (underwriting manager of Imperial in the Motor Car Division) = she was in
custody of the production reports of Al Niño which reflects the accountable insurance
policies petitioner requested to be issued to policyholders with the express obligation
on his part to remit the collected premiums to Imperial. She also testified that
Imperial paid several claims from petitioner's unreported accountable insurance
forms.
•
Castillo (agency manager in charge of collection) = Al Niño failed to remit the
P20,035,067.93 premiums collected as evidenced by the Statement of Accounts she
prepared.
•
Suba (Vice President for Finance) = corroborated the statements of the other
prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, the petitioner vehemently denies the charges against him. He
presented the following witnesses to support his defense: Victorino S. Villanueva
(Villanueva), Maria Milagros R. Lisaca (Milagros), Atty. Salvador Britanico (Atty. Britanico)
and himself.
Petitioner presented the following witnesses:

•
Villanueva (general manager) = Al Niño replied to the demand letter sent by Imperial
wherein it claims that it has an over remittance to Imperial amounting to
P2,505,112.02 and thus, Al Niño cannot be held liable for the alleged unremitted
P20,035,067.93 premium collections.
•
Milagros (accountant in charge of issuing checks for the payment of expenses and
remittances, coordinating with banks on deposits and of other accounting matters) =
she prepared the remittance of premiums or payment of accounts to Imperial as
evidenced by the summary of transactions for January to December 1998.
•
Atty. Britanico (external legal counsel) = testified that he was the one who advised
petitioner to deny and ignore the demand letter sent by Imperial and instead, for
them to file a complaint against Imperial for Declaratory Relief, Accounting, Sum of
Money and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which petitioner
followed.
•
Petitioner = he nor Al Niño received in trust, for account, or on commission,
insurance policies for private cars, commercial vehicles and Land Transportation
Office (LTO) Operators from Imperial in the amount of P96,984,047.65. The
accusations against him were bereft of any supporting evidence and were made
merely to harass him and destroy his reputation. The valuations of the unused
insurance forms were made without any basis.
The RTC ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for estafa. he RTC
found that all the elements of estafa were duly established and proven by the
prosecution. The RTC found, through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that
petitioner received in trust, for account and commission, accountable insurance policies
from Imperial with the express obligation on his part to report the sale of the insurance and
remit the collected premiums to Imperial. However, petitioner failed to do so. The RTC gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses establishing that petitioner had
unreported accountable insurance forms which he received from Imperial. Second, that
petitioner received the premiums paid by the buyers of the insurance policies on behalf of
Imperial but failed to remit the same, as evidenced by the Summary of Unreported Forms
prepared by Tasic and certified correct by Suba.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The CA found
that petitioner is guilty of estafa wherein petitioner failed to return the unused insurance
forms to which Imperial settled several insurance claims from policyholders. However, the
CA ruled that Imperial cannot put value on the blank insurance forms without knowing
whether they were sold or not. Hence, petitioner cannot be held liable for the 2,998 blank
insurance forms but only for the sold insurance policies. Upon review of the list of
unreported insurance forms, the CA found that only 8 of the 17 insurance claims were
unreported to Imperial with a total claim amount of P1,094,281.50. Petitioner was held
criminally liable for his failure to report the insurance policies and remit the insurance
premiums thereof, which the CA considered as misappropriation, an element of the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
RULING
NO. the Court reverses the Decision of the CA and acquits petitioner of the crime
of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the
offended party that the offender return the money or property received
In establishing the first element of estafa through misappropriation, the prosecution

has to show proof of receipt of the money, goods, or other personal properties by the
offender in trust, or on commission or for administration or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same. The CA relied on the Summary
of Unreported Forms. However, these do not establish that petitioner actually received
money, good or personal property on behalf of Imperial.
However, the CA erred in concluding that petitioner could be held liable for estafa for
the 8 claims paid by Imperial in the total amount of P1,094,281.50. The basis of estafa is the
money, good or personal property received in trust or on commission or for administration
by an accused which he converts or misappropriates. The amount of P1,094,281.50
represents the claims paid by Imperial and not the premium payments received by petitioner
or Al Niño in trust or on commission or for administration. The CA misconstrued the amount
of claims paid with the amount of premium payments received as basis for the conviction.
Hence, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for the P1,094,281.50 since this amount
does not represent the premiums he or Al Niño actually received on behalf of Imperial.
Having established that Al Niño, through petitioner, only received blank insurance forms and
not the accountable insurance policy or the premiums thereof, the prosecution has failed to
show that petitioner received any money, good, or personal property in trust, or on
commission or for administration.
With respect to the second element, the CA relied on the legal presumption of
misappropriation when petitioner failed to report the insurance policies and remit the
insurance premiums thereof. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds
of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts. However, the evidence on record does not support the finding that petitioner
failed to remit the premiums to Imperial or that he failed to report sold insurance policies.
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish, through proof beyond reasonable

doubt, that the accused committed the crime being charged. There being no proof of the
receipt of the premiums on the unreported insurance forms and the amount of the premiums
in the insurance policies of the claimants settled or paid by Imperial issued/sold by Al Niño,
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty
of estafa through misappropriation. The CA erred in holding that petitioner is criminally
liable for the P1,094,281.50 insurance claims paid for by Imperial from the alleged
unreported insurance forms from Al Niño.
In the absence of the first three elements, there can be no crime of estafa through
misappropriation. Petitioner's acquittal must follow as a matter of course.
Q: X, the Chief Executive Officer of XYZ Agency Inc., is a commissioned agent of ABC
Insurance Inc. who is engaged in the insurance business. Y is contracted to sell
insurance policies to owners of motor vehicles on behalf of Z. Y is given blank
insurance forms by Z which it sells to clients. As a consequence, X receives the
premium payment for the sale of the insurance policies, reports the completed
insurance forms and remits the premiums less deductions to Z. However, 2
informations were filed against Y for the crime of estafa because Z alleges that he
failed to return a total of 2,998 blank insurance forms with an estimated valuation of
P96,984,047.65. From these unreturned insurance forms, Z contends that it settled
several insurance claims, despite the fact that it was Y that issued them without
remitting the corresponding premiums to these insurance policies, to the damage and
prejudice of Z. Both the RTC and the CA found X is guilty of estafa wherein petitioner
failed to return the unused insurance forms to which Z settled several insurance
claims from policyholders. Is X guilty of estafa? Decide.
A: No, X is not guilty of estafa.
The elements of estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the
offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
In this case, the prosecution has to show proof of receipt of the money, goods, or other
personal properties by the offender in trust, or on commission or for administration or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same. Hence, X
cannot be held criminally liable since the amount does not represent the premiums Y or X
actually received on behalf of Z. Having established that X, through Y, only received blank
insurance forms and not the accountable insurance policy or the premiums thereof, the
prosecution has failed to show that Y received any money, good, or personal property in
trust, or on commission or for administration. (Lisaqa v. People, G.R. No. 251131, July 6, 2021,
as penned by J. Carandang)
JEOFFY GEROBIESE ALEMANIA alias “JEFF” v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 221006, July 7, 2021 (Leonen, J.)
DOCTRINE
“Petitioner may not qualify for probation if he has previously been convicted with
finality, under RA No. 10707 or the Act amending PD No. 968”
FACTS
In 2001, Gerobiese was charged for violating Republic Act No. 82944 by illegally
possessing 12 pieces of caliber .38 live ammunitions, and for violating Section 16 of Republic
Act No. 64255 by possessing illegal drug. Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bato-Matalom,
Leyte subsequently found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Unlawful Possession of
Ammunition and was sentenced to Four (4) years, Two (2) months and One (1) day to Six
(6) years of prision correccional and a Fine of Fifteen thousand pesos (P 15,000.00).On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC but reduced the penalty to six ( 6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Gerobiese filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on November 14, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court which was denied
On September 17, 2012, Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte
found Gerobiese guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
On September 20, 2012, Gerobiese filed an application for probation. The Chief
Probation and Parole Officer of Baybay City Parole and Probation Office filed a motion to
deny the petition for probation, arguing that Gerobiese is disqualified due to his previous
conviction for illegal possession of ammunition.
On December 19; 2013, Gerobiese filed a Joint Omnibus Motion before the Regional
Trial Court, praying that the case for illegal possession of ammunition be dismissed, and that
the Order denying the application for probation be reconsidered. The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision in denying the Joint Omnibus
Motion. It held that the ruling in Criminal Case No. H-1201 for illegal possession of
ammunition had attained finality, and must be laid to rest in accordance with the principle
of immutability of judgments. Thus, under Section 9(c) of Presidential Decree No. 968,
Gerobiese is disqualified for probation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s application for probation should be granted.
RULING
NO, the petitioner is not qualified for probation. In this case, the charges against
petitioner were tried by different courts. The complaint for illegal possession of ammunition
under Republic Act No. 8294 was filed before a Municipal Circuit Trial Court, while the
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
was filed before a Regional Trial Court.
While this Petition was pending before this Court, Republic Act No. 1070790 came
into effect. It amended Presidential Decree No. 968 as follows:
SECTION 9. Disqualified Offenders. - The benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six ( 6)
years;
(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day
and/or a fine of not more than one thousand pesos (Pl,000.00);
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof. (Emphasis
supplied).
Here, petitioner is not qualified for probation since he had previously been convicted
with finality and was sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months and one ( 1) day to four
( 4) years and two (2) months.
We are aware of Republic Act No. 10591, which repealed certain provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Republic Act No. 8294. Republic Act No. 10591 increased
the penalty to prision mayor:
SECTION 28. Uniawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. -

The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be
penalized as follows:
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small
arm or Class A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by
the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small
arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
However, since Republic Act No. 10591 is not beneficial to the petitioner, this Court
cannot give it retroactive effect for this particular case.
Q: X was charged for illegally possessing 12 pieces of caliber .38 live ammunitions, and
for possessing illegal drugs. 2 separate cases ensued and the first case (illegal
possession of drugs) led to the conviction of X. While the second case (illegal
possession of firearm) was pending, X applied for probation but was subsequently
denied. Should X’s application for probation be denied? Decide.
A: YES. X is not eligible for probation. Republic Act No. 1070790, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 968 disqualifies offenders who have previously been convicted by final judgment
of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or
a fine of not more than one thousand pesos (Pl,000.00). In this case, X he had previously
been convicted with finality and was sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Hence, X cannot apply for probation. (Gerobiese
y Alemania v. People, GR No. 221006, July 7, 2021, as penned by J. Leonen)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX
G.R. No. 252351, July 07, 2021, Second Division, (Lazaro-Javier, J.)
DOCTRINE
While the general rule is that the follo prevails over the body of the decision, this rule
does not apply where it is clear from the body of the decision that there was a glaring error
made in the dispositive portion, in which case, the body of the decision will control.
In order for an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, it is essential that the special
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship are properly alleged in the Information
and duly proven during the trial. This is to comply with the constitutional right of the accused
to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is
to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial.
Under Section 3 (b) paragraph 2 of RA 7610, child abuse may be committed by deeds or
words which debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being.
FACTS
AAA was raped by XXX who is the common law spouse of her mother BBB. On March
11, 2004, around 7pm, XXX raped her and warned that he would kill her mother and her
siblings if she would make any sound and if she resisted. On March 13, 2004, AAA did not go
home after school and went to her aunt’s house and narrated to the latter her harrowing
experience with appellant. Her aunt accompanied AAA to the police station to report the rape
incident.
On March 27, 2004, AAA, accompanied by her aunt and two barangay tanods went to
AAA's house to get her belongings. It was appellant who opened the door. Appellant, upon
noticing that AAA was accompanied by barangay officials, he slapped AAA's left cheek which
caused the latter to fall on her knees. Appellant was then handcuffed and brought to the
police station where he was detained. When AAA underwent medical examinations, the
Medico Legal Report found hymenal lacerations and contusions resulting from hematoma.
Appellant vehemently denied the accusations against him. He narrated that on March
11, 2004, AAA ran away from home because he scolded her. When she suddenly showed up
with men whom he did not know, he slapped her. He suspects that it was a certain "kambal"
who actually raped AAA. Even before the alleged date of the rape incident or on March 11,
2004, AAA already had a "traumatic experience" with this Kambal who caused her vaginal
injuries.
Two Information were lodged against XXX. In Criminal Case No. 04-2755, appellant
was charged with rape as follows: “…did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one xxxxxxxxxxx, a minor, 15 years of age, against her will, xxx
Rolando is the stepfather of xxxxxxxxxxx.” In Criminal Case No. 04-2754, he was charged
with violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610 as follows: “…willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and slap one xxxxxxxxxxx minor, 15 years of age, inflicting injury
on her face, conditions prejudicial to the development of said child.”
The trial court found appellant guilty of rape and violation of Section 10 (a), Article
VI of RA 7610 (Child Abuse). The trial court found AAA to have positively identified appellant
as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on the night of March 11,
2004. As for violation of Section 10 (A), Article VI of RA 7610, the trial court notes appellant's
own admission that he slapped AAA in the face in the presence of the AAA's aunt and
barangay tanods as he claimed to have been enraged when AAA did not come home for days
without asking his permission.
On appeal, the CA rendered judgment against XXX. The body of the CA’s decision
determined that XXX is guilty of the crime of “qualified rape” and violation of Section 10 (a)
of RA 7610. However, in the dispositive portion of the CA’s decision, the CA convicted XXX
guilty of violation of RA 71610 but convicted him for “simple rape” only.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the body of a decision prevails over the dispositive portion when it
was evident that an error was made in the dispositive portion of the decision. (YES)
2. Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified rape. (NO)
3. Whether or not appellant was guilty of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7610? (YES)
RULING
On conflict between body of decision and dispositive portion:
While the general rule is that the follo prevails over the body of the decision, this rule
made in the dispositive portion, in which case, the body of the decision will control.
This exception applies to the present case. The Court of Appeals extensively discussed
how AAA's minority and her relationship with appellant. It also discussed at length why in
view of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), appellant may only be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole instead of death. It further increased the
award of damages to conform with the prescribed amounts set by prevailing jurisprudence
for the crime of qualified rape.
Verily, while the dispositive portion bears appellant's conviction only for simple rape
and the imposition of reclusion perpetua, sans the phrase "without eligibility for parole,” we
consider this to be mere typographical errors. For the body of the decision clearly
pronounced appellant guilty of "Qualified Rape" which carries the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.
On qualified rape:
Appellant is guilty of simple rape under ART. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Rape is qualified when: a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and b)
committed by the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the
victim's parent.
In order for an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, it is essential that these

special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship are properly alleged in the
Information and duly proven during the trial. This is to comply with the constitutional right
of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The purpose is to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises
during the trial.
The prosecution adduced in evidence the birth certificate of AAA showing that she
was born on November 23, 1988, which means that she was only 15 years old when she got
raped on March 11, 2004. On the other hand, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution and
the defense both disproved the allegation that appellant is the stepfather of AAA. In truth, he
and AAA's mother are not married. They are just common law spouses.
Here, since the Information erroneously alleged that appellant is the stepfather of
AAA, appellant is only liable for simple rape and not for qualified rape.
On violation of RA 7610:
Under Section 3 (b) paragraph 2 of RA 7610, child abuse may be committed by deeds
or words which debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being. As keenly observed by the courts below, the act of appellant in slapping AAA
in front of the latter's aunt and two barangay tanods debased, degraded, or demeaned AAA's
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. It was an act of cruelty which certainly
humiliated and traumatized this fifteen-year-old girl.
Q: AAA was raped by XXX who is the common law spouse of her mother BBB.
Thereafter, two Information were lodged against XXX. In Criminal Case No. 04-2755,
appellant was charged with rape as follows: “…did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one xxxxxxxxxxx, a minor, 15 years of age,
against her will, xxx Rolando is the stepfather of xxxxxxxxxxx.” In Criminal Case No.
04-2754, he was charged with violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610 as
follows: “…willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and slap
one xxxxxxxxxxx minor, 15 years of age, inflicting injury on her face, conditions
prejudicial to the development of said child.”
The trial court found appellant guilty of rape and violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI
of RA 7610 (Child Abuse). The trial court found AAA to have positively identified
appellant as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will. As for
violation of Section 10 (A), Article VI of RA 7610, the trial court notes appellant's own
admission that he slapped AAA in the face in the presence of the AAA's aunt and
barangay tanods as he claimed to have been enraged when AAA did not come home for
days without asking his permission.
On appeal, the CA rendered judgment against XXX. The body of the CA’s decision
determined that XXX is guilty of the crime of “qualified rape” being the stepfather of
AAA, and guilty of violation of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610. However, in the dispositive
portion of the CA’s decision, the CA convicted XXX guilty of violation of RA 71610 but
convicted him for “simple rape” only. Is XXX liable for qualified rape?
A: NO. While the general rule is that the follo prevails over the body of the decision, this rule
made in the dispositive portion, in which case, the body of the decision will control. This
exception applies to the present case. The Court of Appeals extensively discussed how AAA's
minority and her relationship with appellant.
However, XXX is guilty of simple rape under ART. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
only. In order for an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, it is essential that these special
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship are properly alleged in the
Information and duly proven during the trial.
The testimonial evidence of the prosecution and the defense both disproved the
allegation that appellant is the stepfather of AAA. In truth, he and AAA's mother are not
married. They are just common law spouses. Here, since the Information erroneously alleged
that appellant is the stepfather of AAA, appellant is only liable for simple rape and not for
qualified rape. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 252351, July 07, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J.
Lazaro-Javier)
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ET AL. V. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
G.R. No. 229440, July 14, 2021, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is settled that "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense."
In jurisprudence, "malice" connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses with the
proof of malice when words that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is
also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the other hand, malice
in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant
was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real
malice, true malice, or particular malice.
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious. This is malice in law. The presumption of malice,
however, does not exist in the following instances: 1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2. A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged
communications. The enumeration under Art. 354, however, is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair
reports on matters of public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged
communications, and are thus included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications. In order to successfully claim that an utterance covered under qualifiedly
privileged communications is libelous, the plaintiff must prove the existence of malice in fact.
FACTS
On December 4, 2001, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on its front page a news
article with the heading: "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" co-written by Cueto and
Pazzibugan.
In the said news article, the following statements were made: “In her public statement
since the controversy on the settlement erupted last week, Yorac said the settlement would
allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited from the coco levy fund, particularly businessman
Eduardo "Danding" [Cojuangco], Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat and former
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot. xxx The present terms of the
compromise agreement brokered by Dante Ang for an unknown client will neither provide
economic relief for millions of coconut farmer nor attain the equally important policy of
recovering ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses, Danding Cojuangco, Clara Lobregat, Juan
Ponce Enrile and the Accra lawyers who helped them plunder the coco levy fund, Yorac said.”
After reading the news article, Enrile through his counsel, wrote to Commissioner
Yorac to confirm whether she uttered the defamatory words attributed against her. In
response, Commissioner Yorac issued a Letter denying the statements attributed to her by
the Inquirer. In another Letter, Commissioner Yorac called the attention of the Inquirer to
correct the news article.
Enrile repeatedly demanded that the news article be corrected but his demands
proved futile as no correction was made. Left with no recourse, he filed a Complaint for
Damages against Defendants-Appellants alleging that the news article imputed upon him
defamatory acts of (a) having benefited from the coco levy fund, (b) accumulating ill-gotten
wealth, and (c) being a Marcos crony.
In their Answer, Defendants-Appellants contended that the Complaint failed to state

a cause of action against them. They claimed that if the questioned paragraphs in the news
article are to be read in its entirety, it will disclose that it did not impute any crime, anomaly
or wrongdoing against Enrile. They insisted that the news article only narrates or reports
what the PCGG, through its Commissioner, has stated to be the reason for objecting to, or
finding as unacceptable, the reported compromise agreement on the coconut levy funds.
Defendants-Appellants added that the news article is a true and fair report on a matter of
public interest and concern, and hence, privileged in nature.
Cueto testified that one of her editors called her up seeking clarification on the matter
because Commissioner Yorac was denying that she made those statements and because
Enrile was threatening to file a libel suit. After hearing this, she was surprised because she
thought all the while that Commissioner Carranza had the go signal of Commissioner Yorac.
She then confronted Commissioner Carranza and asked him why did this happen. He told
her not to worry and that he was going to make a sworn affidavit. He assured her that there
would be no problem and the case will be later on dismissed because it was privileged
communication.
In a Decision dated October 30, 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Enrile. The RTC held
that the article in question did defame Enrile by imputing to him the following acts: (a)
having benefitted from the coco levy funds; (b) accumulating ill-gotten wealth and (c)
committing the crime of plunder. The RTC added that the publication of the subject article
was undoubtedly malicious, for the newspaper attributed the words to the late PCGG
Chairperson Haydee Yorac (Yorac) who, in turn, denied making the said statements.
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC's findings. The CA held that the statements uttered
in the article clearly imputed upon Enrile the following disparaging remarks: "plunderer,"
"looter," "possessor of ill-gotten wealth" and "Marcos crony." The CA added that the news
article was published with malice, for it was shown "to have been written and published with
the knowledge that they are false.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the questioned article was libelous.
RULING
NO. Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead." Consequently, the following elements constitute
libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The presence of the second and third elements are not in dispute; the article in
question was admittedly published by Inquirer in its newspapers, and Enrile was
undoubtedly mentioned in the article. Hence, the Court's analysis will only focus on the
presence of the first and fourth elements of libel, namely, (1) the imputation of a
discreditable act or condition; and (2) the existence of malice.
On imputation of a discreditable act or condition:
It is settled that "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense."
A closer look at the article involved in this case reveals that it was not Cueto, the
author of the article, who was asserting that Enrile was a "plunderer" or a "Marcos crony."
In both of the paragraphs complained of, the author was merely repeating a supposed
statement from PCGG Chairperson Yorac. It is true that Yorac subsequently disclaimed
ownership of any of such statements, but the foregoing fact did not thereby make the
defamatory imputations automatically from Inquirer or Cueto.
Both the RTC and the CA committed the error of discontinuing its analysis on whether
the article imputed defamatory remarks against Enrile. Courts, in deciding libel cases, should
always bear in mind that "[w]hether or not it is libelous depends upon the scope, spirit and
motive of the publication taken in its entirety."
Here, both courts did not consider that the article, read in its entirety, clearly just
reports the statements supposedly made by Yorac. More importantly, both courts failed to
view the article from the perspective of the reader, doing which would have led them to the
conclusion that the article merely impresses on the reader that "Yorac said the following"
instead of "Enrile is a plunderer and a Marcos crony."
To reiterate, the fact that Inquirer failed to verify if the statements were indeed made
by Yorac did not make the imputations in the article as its own. To stress, the perspective of
the reader — or how the words are used in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural
and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing or reading
them — remain the judicial guiaepost in determining whether an utterance is libelous.
Applying the foregoing in this case, the subject article was a mere replication — a plain
report that "a person said this" — albeit inadvertently attributed to the wrong person. Hence,
it is certainly not libelous.
On the existence of malice:
In jurisprudence, it is provided that "malice" connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses with the proof of malice when
words that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as
constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the other hand, malice in fact is a
positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was
actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice,
true malice, or particular malice.
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. This is malice in law. The presumption
of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged
communications. The enumeration under Art. 354, however, is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair
reports on matters of public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged
communications, and are thus included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications.
In order to successfully claim that an utterance covered under qualifiedly privileged

communications is libelous, the plaintiff must prove the existence of malice in fact.
The subject matter of the article is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. As the RTC
itself correctly observed, "these are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, talcing into account the public character of the funds involved." The Court itself,
in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic, characterized the coco levy funds as
"special public funds."
Enrile is likewise unquestionably a public figure. A public figure has been defined as
a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity.
From the foregoing, it could be indisputably inferred, therefore, that the presumption
of existence of malice does not arise for the article, as the same is considered a "fair report
on matters of public interest" — and thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. While,
generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then
lies on Enrile.
The Court, however, holds that Enrile failed to discharge the said burden. It was error
for the CA to conclude that the article was published with the knowledge that they were false.
To recall, the article was published on December 4, 2001, while the letters of Chairperson
Yorac disclaiming ownership of the statements were executed only on December 6, 2001.
What constitutes malice is not the fact that the articles contain matters which are
false. For there to be malice, it must be that the articles were published with the
knowledge that the matters in the article were false. It could not be said, however, that at the
time of the article's publication on December 4, 2001 that petitioners already knew that the
statement did not, in fact, come from Yorac.
In Villanueva vs PDI, it was held that the failure of news outlets to counter-check or
verify their reports, which may later on turn out to be false, does not per se make the
publication of such reports done with malice. To reiterate Villanueva, "a reporter may rely
on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided
the reporter does not entertain a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.'"
To the mind of the Court, the reporter, Cueto, could not have had a "high degree of
awareness" that the statement contained falsities when the same was handed to her by no
less than a PCGG Commissioner.
In the present case, there is likewise no proof that the publication of the subject article
was made to harass, vex, or humiliate Enrile. Also, as previously discussed, the article was a
straightforward narration: a plain report that "a person said this," although it was
erroneously attributed to a person who did not utter the statements.
Q: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published on its front page a news article with the
heading: "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" co-written by Cueto and Pazzibugan.
In the said news article, the following statements were made: “In her public statement
since the controversy on the settlement erupted last week, Yorac said the settlement
would allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited from the coco levy fund, particularly
businessman Eduardo "Danding" [Cojuangco], Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara
Lobregat and former Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot.”
After reading the news article, Enrile through his counsel, wrote to Commissioner
Yorac to confirm whether she uttered the defamatory words attributed against her. In
response, Commissioner Yorac issued a Letter denying the statements attributed to
her by the Inquirer. Enrile repeatedly demanded Inquirer to correct the said news
article but his demands proved futile as no correction was made. Left with no
recourse, he filed a Complaint for Damages against Defendants-Appellants alleging
that the news article imputed upon him defamatory acts of (a) having benefited from
the coco levy fund, (b) accumulating ill-gotten wealth, and (c) being a Marcos crony.
Will the case filed by Enrile prosper?
A: NO. Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair reports on matters of
public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged communications, and are
thus included under the protective mantle of privileged communications. In order to
successfully claim that an utterance covered under qualifiedly privileged communications is
libelous, the plaintiff must prove the existence of malice in fact.
The subject matter of the article is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. As the RTC
itself correctly observed, "these are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, talcing into account the public character of the funds involved." Enrile is likewise
unquestionably a public figure. A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a
"public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity.
From the foregoing, it could be indisputably inferred, therefore, that the presumption
of existence of malice does not arise for the article, as the same is considered a "fair report
on matters of public interest" — and thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. While,
generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then
lies on Enrile. The Court, however, holds that Enrile failed to discharge the said burden.
What constitutes malice is not the fact that the articles contain matters which are
false. For there to be malice, it must be that the articles were published with the
knowledge that the matters in the article were false. It could not be said, however, that at the
time of the article's publication that petitioners already knew that the statement did not, in
fact, come from Yorac. (PDI v. Enrile, G.R. No. 229440, July 14, 2021, First Division, as penned
by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ROBERTO G. CAMPOS
G.R. No. 252212, July 14, 2021, Second Division, (Lopez, M., J.)
DOCTRINE
In determining the admissibility and reliability of their out-of-court identification, the
Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors, namely:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional
requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification, and prevent the
contamination of the integrity of in-court identification.
FACTS
On April 20, 2003, around 8pm, Emeliza was inside her house with boyfriend Eric and
neighbor Marilou. At that time, Emeliza and Eric were having dinner while Marilou was about
to use the telephone when an armed man suddenly barged into the house and took Emeliza's
cellphone on top of the center table in the living room. Emeliza shouted to stop the man while
Eric and Marilou froze upon seeing the incident. Thereafter, the man pointed a gun to
Emeliza and shot her on the chest causing her death. The man quickly fled the scene.
Immediately, Eric and Marilou reported the matter to the police station and described
the suspect as "[m]edyo malaki katawan," The police officers then received an information
that the suspect was seen at Mangahan St. Pasig City. The authorities went to the target area
and saw a man who matched the description. The police officers approached the man who
tried to run. The authorities arrested the man and recovered from him a .38 caliber firearm.
The man was identified as accused-appellant Roberto.
At around 3am the following day, Eric and Marilou confirmed in a police lineup that
Roberto was the one who robbed and killed Emeliza. Roberto was charged with the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City.
Roberto pleaded not guilty and denied the accusation.
The RTC rendered a judgement against Roberto. It gave credence to Eric and
Marilou’s narrration of the incident and the positive identification of Roberto as the
perpetrator of the crime. The CA affirmed the decision and found no irregularity in the police
lineup and noted that the lack of specific description does not lead to erroneous
identification.
ISSUE
Whether or not Eric and Marilou’s out-of-court identification absent sufficient
description of the suspect is valid.
RULING
The court held in the affirmative. Witnesses, during criminal investigations, assist law
enforcers in narrowing their list of suspects. In many instances, the perpetrator is not
personally known to a witness but can be reasonably identified. One mode of out-of-court
identification is the police lineup where the witness selects a suspect from a group of
persons. It is undisputed that Eric and Marilou identified Roberto through a lineup at the
police station.
In determining the admissibility and reliability of their out-of-court identification, the

Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors,
namely: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the
constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification, and
prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification.
Here, the eyewitnesses' out-of-court identification of Roberto, satisfied the totality of

the circumstances test. First, the Court recognizes that Eric and Marilou had a good view of
the gunman. There was close proximity between the witnesses and the perpetrator. Second,
Eric and Marilou's corroborating testimonies indicate a high degree of attention. They have
total focus on the sole perpetrator of the crime and no competing event took place to draw
their attention from the incident. Third, Eric and Marilou immedialely described the assailant
as "[m]edyo malaki katawan" before the authorities. In this case, the description that Eric
and Marilou gave to the police investigators matched the physique of the suspect during the
lineup. Fourth, there is only a time lapse of seven hours between the commission of the crime
and the out-of-court identification. The Court has considered an identification made two (2)
days after the commission of a crime acceptable.
Taken together, there is no ground to discredit Eric and Marilou's out-of-court and in-
court identifications. The Court fails to see any ground that would invalidate the
eyewitnesses' positive identification of Roberto.
Q: On April 20, 2003, around 8pm, Emeliza and Eric were having dinner while Marilou
was about to use the telephone when an armed man suddenly barged into the house
and took Emeliza's cellphone on top of the center table in the living room. Emeliza
shouted to stop the man while Eric and Marilou froze upon seeing the incident.
Thereafter, the man pointed a gun to Emeliza and shot her on the chest causing her
death. The man quickly fled the scene.
Immediately, Eric and Marilou reported the matter to the police station and described
the suspect as "[m]edyo malaki katawan." The police officers then received an
information that the suspect was seen at Mangahan St. Pasig City. The authorities
arrested the man and recovered from him a .38 caliber firearm. The man was
identified as accused-appellant Roberto.
At around 3am the following day, Eric and Marilou confirmed in a police lineup that
Roberto was the one who robbed and killed Emeliza. Roberto was charged with the
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City. Roberto pleaded not guilty and denied the accusation. He assails the
validity of the out-of-court identification of Eric and Marilou. Is Roberto’s defense
tenable?
A: NO. In determining the admissibility and reliability of their out-of-court identification, the
Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors,
namely: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the
constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification, and
prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification.
Here, the eyewitnesses' out-of-court identification of Roberto, satisfied the totality of

the circumstances test. First, the Court recognizes that Eric and Marilou had a good view of
the gunman. There was close proximity between the witnesses and the perpetrator. Second,
Eric and Marilou's corroborating testimonies indicate a high degree of attention. They have
total focus on the sole perpetrator of the crime and no competing event took place to draw
their attention from the incident. Third, Eric and Marilou immedialely described the assailant
as "[m]edyo malaki katawan" before the authorities. In this case, the description that Eric
and Marilou gave to the police investigators matched the physique of the suspect during the
lineup. Fourth, there is only a time lapse of seven hours between the commission of the crime
and the out-of-court identification. The Court has considered an identification made two (2)
days after the commission of a crime acceptable.
Taken together, there is no ground to discredit Eric and Marilou's out-of-court and in-
court identifications. The Court fails to see any ground that would invalidate the
eyewitnesses' positive identification of Roberto. (People of the Philippines v. Campos, G.R. No.
252212, July 14, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Lopez)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIOSDADO G. PALLASIGUE
G.R. No. 248653-54, July 14, 2021, First Division, (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative
or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
To justify a conviction under Section 3(f) of RA 3019, the prosecution must prove the
following: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the said officer has neglected or has refused to
act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him; (3)
reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having
acted on the matter pending before him; and (4) such failure to so act is for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against
another.
FACTS
On September 14, 2007, Mayor Pallasigue reassigned Engr. Elias S. Segura, Jr. to the
Office of the Municipal Mayor to conduct a feasibility study on the re-establishment of the
Municipal Economic Enterprise and Development Office (MEEDO), and relieving him of his
functions as Municipal Planning Development Coordinator (MPDC). Segura claimed that he
complied with the directive, only to find that the office lacks the necessary equipment and
personnel. Segura further averred that Pallasigue designated a certain Freddie G. Tiosing
(Tiosing) as Acting MPDC. He appealed his reassignment to the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office (CSCRO) No. XII. The CSC rendered judgment in favor of Segura and held that
the reassignment was technically a demotion and a violation of the Rules on Reassignment
because it relieved him of his supervisory functions. Meanwhile, on September 22, 2008,
Pallasigue issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 23 Series of 2008 ordering that Segura be
dropped from the rolls effective immediately for incurring more than 30 days of absence
without official leave (AWOL) from July 31, 2008 up to the date of the order.
The CSC rendered judgment in favor of Segura and ruled that his reassignment is a
diminution in his rank, status, and salary. The CSC further ordered for his immediate
reinstatement as Municipal Planning and Development Coordination of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat. However, Pallasigue did not reinstate Segura because he believed that a writ of
execution must first be secured before he can implement the reinstatement.
On June 18, 2014, Segura filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Pallasigue before the
Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao (OMB-MIN) for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A.
No. 3019. He averred that Pallasigue refused to reinstate him despite rulings of the CSC and
the CA nullifying his orders reassigning and dropping him from the rolls.
On April 20, 2015, recognizing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the RTC
issued, Pallasigue instructed the immediate reinstatement of Segura as head of the MPDO.
On July 6, 2015, the OMB-MIN issued its Resolution finding probable cause and
ordering the filing of Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A. No. 3019 against
Pallasigue. Later on, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding Pallasigue guilty of
violation of the said provisions.
ISSUE
Whether or not Pallasigue is guilty of violations of Section 3 (e) and Section 3 (f) or
RA No. 3019.
RULING
NO. The prosecution failed to sufficiently establish all the elements for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The third and fourth elements of the offense were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) are: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The
third element (that the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence) was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Evident bad faith and
manifest partiality were not competently established.
Pallasigue cannot be held guilty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It is
settled that decisions of the CSCROs and the CSC shall be immediately executory after 15
days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review is
seasonably filed, in which case the execution of the decision shall be held in
abeyance. Though he was mistaken in his understanding that a writ of execution was
necessary to implement the reinstatement order, he believed in good faith that he validly
issued Segura's order of reassignment and that a writ of execution was necessary before
implementing Segura's reinstatement. Here, there is no corruption nor self-interest that can
be attributed to Pallasigue.
Furthermore, evident bad faith was negated when Pallasigue ordered the immediate
reinstatement of Segura before the two Information against him was filed in the
Sandiganbayan. On April 20, 2015, recognizing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
the RTC issued, Pallasigue ordered the immediate reinstatement of Segura as head of the
MPDC. There is insufficient evidence to establish manifest partiality. In this case, it must be
proven that Pallasigue had deliberately intended to give unwarranted preference to favor
himself or any other party in ordering the reassignment of Segura and in failing to
immediately reinstate him to his former position. Here, other than the self-serving claims of
the prosecution, no evidence was presented to establish how Pallasigue benefitted from
reassigning Segura and from refusing to implement his reinstatement without a writ of
execution.
In the present case, any purported injury Segura may have suffered as a result of the
delay in the release of his salary were not quantified and does not not satisfy the element of
undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by
evidence on record, cannot be considered.
Pallasigue is not guilty of violation of Section 3(f) of R, A. No. 3019. It was

not proven that Pallasigue derived any pecuniary or material benefit, or
advantage in favor of an interested party, much less discriminate against Segura in
refusing to implement his reinstatement without a writ of execution.
To justify a conviction under the quoted offense, the prosecution must prove the
following: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the said officer has neglected or has refused
to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him; (3)
reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having
acted on the matter pending before him; and (4) such failure to so act is for the purpose of
material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against
another.
To satisfy the fourth element of the offense, the law requires that the accused's
dereliction, apart from being without justification, must either be for the purpose of: (1)
material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party; or (2) discriminating against
another interested party.
Pallasigue believed in good faith, albeit erroneous, that a writ of execution was
necessary to implement Segura's reinstatement. This conduct does not automatically give
rise to evidence that Pallasigue intended to discriminate against Segura. Other than the
alleged refusal to implement the reinstatement order, the records of the case are bereft of
evidence tending to show that Pallasigue was favored by the alleged dereliction or that he
intended to discriminate against Segura. Therefore, the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of establishing the guilt of Pallasigue for violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019
Q: Mayor Pallasigue reassigned Engr. Segura to the Municipal Economic Enterprise
and Development Office (MEEDO) of the Office of the Municipal Mayor and relieved
him of his functions as Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator. However,
upon complying with the order, Segura found that the office lacks the necessary
equipment and personnel. He appealed his reassignment to the CSC Regional Office.
CSC rendered judgment in his favor and held that the reassignment was a demotion
and a violation of Rules on Reassignment. However, Pallasigue did not reinstate
Segura because he believed that there must be a writ of execution before he can
implement the reinstatement. Segura filed an affidavit-complaint against Pallasigue
before the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao for violation of Section 3 (e) and (f) of
RA 3019. He averred that Pallasigue refused to reinstate him despite rulings of the CSC
and the CA nullifying his orders reassigning and dropping him from the rolls.
Meanwhile, recognizing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the RTC issued,
Pallasigue instructed the immediate reinstatement of Segura as head of the MPDO. On
July 6, 2015, the OMB-MIN issued its Resolution finding probable cause and ordering
the filing of Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A. No. 3019 against
Pallasigue. Later on, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding Pallasigue
guilty of violation of the said provisions. Is Mayor Pallasigue guilty of the said
violations?
A: NO. The prosecution failed to sufficiently establish all the elements for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The third and fourth elements of the offense were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) are:
(1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's
official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. Pallasigue cannot be held guilty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. Though he was mistaken in his understanding that a writ of execution was
necessary to implement the reinstatement order, he believed in good faith that he validly
issued Segura's order of reassignment and that a writ of execution was necessary before
implementing Segura's reinstatement.
Pallasigue is not guilty of violation of Section 3(f) of R, A. No. 3019. It was

not proven that Pallasigue derived any pecuniary or material benefit, or
advantage in favor of an interested party, much less discriminate against Segura in
refusing to implement his reinstatement without a writ of execution. Pallasigue
believed in good faith, albeit erroneous, that a writ of execution was necessary to implement
Segura's reinstatement. This conduct does not automatically give rise to evidence that
Pallasigue intended to discriminate against Segura. Other than the alleged refusal to
implement the reinstatement order, the records of the case are bereft of evidence tending to
show that Pallasigue was favored by the alleged dereliction or that he intended to
discriminate against Segura. Therefore, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of Pallasigue for violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 beyond
reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines. Pallasigue, G.R. No. 248653-54, July 14, 2021, First
Division, as penned by J. Carandang)
LUISITO G. PULIDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021, En Banc, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy, even without
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense
in bigamy, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
FACTS
On September 5, 1983, 16 year old petitioner Luisito Puldo married his teacher, then
22 year old private complainant Nora S. Arcon in a civil ceremony at the Municipal Hall of
Rosario, Cavite. They had a child born in 1984. They lived together until 2007 when Pulido
stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. Pulido admitted to Arcon that he has an affair
with Rowena Baleda. Arcon learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31,
1995.
Arcon filed a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda on December 4, 2007. In his
defense, Pulido insisted that he could not be held liable for bigamy because both his
marriages were null and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon was null and void for
lack of a valid marriage license while his marriage with Baleda was null and void for lack of
marriage ceremony. Baleda claimed that she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage with Arcon
sometime in April 2007. Even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed a
petition to annul her marriage with Pulido. On October 25, 2007, the RTC declared her
marriage with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature.
On June 22, 2009, the RTC convicted Pulido of bigamy and acquitted Baleda. Pulido
appealed his conviction to the CA. He averred that the his first marriage to Arcon is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is void because there was
no marriage ceremony performed. Also, the marriage with Baleda has already been declared
as void ab initio even before the filing of Information for Bigamy.
The CA sustained the petitioner’s conviction for bigamy. They ruled that even
assuming that the first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license, one may still be held
liable for bigamy if he/she enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. Likewise, the subsequent declaration of
nullity of his second marriage with Baleda would not exonerate him from criminal liability.
Meanwhile on June 29, 2016, in a different case, the RTC declared Pulido’s marriage
to Arcon void from the beginning. It issued a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judicial declaration of absolute nullity necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy prosecution?
RULING
NO. The Court held in the negative.
A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy, even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is
considered a valid defense in bigamy, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies retroactively on marriages celebrated before the
Family Code insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Thus, a
judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity
of the Family Code but only for purposes of remarriage.
Applying the foregoing, Pulido may validly raise the defense of a void ab initio
marriage in the bigamy charge against him. Pulido and Arcon applied for a marriage license
on August 8, 1983 with Registry No. 198. The Registrar noted that there was no record of
entry of: (a) the date of issuance of a marriage license; and (b) the marriage license number
in the record book for marriage application. The original documents of the marriage license
and marriage application cannot be retrieved nor found in their custody. However, the
Registrar states that these documents could possibly be among those unnumbered marriage
application and marriage license that were destroyed due to termite infestation.
With the absence of a valid marriage license, a reasonable doubt arises as to existence
of a prior valid marriage, i.e. Pulido’s first marriage with Arcon, which is one of the elements
of bigamy. The marriage contract is the prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
However, while Pulido and Arcon’s Marriage Contract bears a marriage license number
issued on September 5, 1983, there is doubt as to the fact of its existence and issuance as per
Certification dated December 8, 2008, which essentially affects the validity of their marriage.
More importantly, during the pendency of this case, a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of Pulido’s marriage with Arcon due to the absence of a valid marriage license was
issued and attained finality on May 11, 2016. The Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
effectively retroacts to the date of the celebration of Pulido and Arcon’s marriage, i.e.
September 5, 1983.
Lacking an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. a prior valid marriage, and
the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Pulido and Arcon’s marriage, the prosecution
failed to prove that the crime of bigamy is committed. Therefore, the acquittal of Pulido from
the bigamy charge is warranted.
Q: On September 5, 1983, Luisito Puldo married his teacher Nora S. Arcon in a civil
ceremony at the Municipal Hall of Rosario, Cavite. They had a child born in 1984. They
lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling.
Pulido admitted to Arcon that he has an affair with Rowena Baleda. Arcon learned that
Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31, 1995.
Arcon filed a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda on December 4, 2007. In his
defense, Pulido insisted that he could not be held liable for bigamy because both his
marriages were null and void. Baleda claimed that she only knew of Pulido’s prior
marriage with Arcon sometime in April 2007. Even prior to the filing of the bigamy
case, she already filed a petition to annul her marriage with Pulido. On October 25,
2007, the RTC declared her marriage with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous
in nature. On June 29, 2016, the RTC declared Pulido’s marriage to Arcon void from
the beginning.
The RTC convicted Pulido of bigamy and acquitted Baleda. Pulido appealed his
conviction to the CA. He argued that he should not be liable for bigamy and averred
that the his first marriage to Arcon is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license while
his marriage with Baleda is void because there was no marriage ceremony performed.
Also, the marriage with Baleda has already been declared as void ab initio even before
the filing of Information for Bigamy. Is the defense of Pulido tenable?
A: YES. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy, even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is
considered a valid defense in bigamy, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
The marriage contract is the prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. However,
while Pulido and Arcon’s Marriage Contract bears a marriage license number issued on
September 5, 1983, there is doubt as to the fact of its existence and issuance as per
Certification dated December 8, 2008, which essentially affects the validity of their marriage.
More importantly, during the pendency of this case, a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of Pulido’s marriage with Arcon due to the absence of a valid marriage license was
issued and attained finality on May 11, 2016. The Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
effectively retroacts to the date of the celebration of Pulido and Arcon’s marriage, i.e.
September 5, 1983.
Lacking an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. a prior valid marriage, and
the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Pulido and Arcon’s marriage, the prosecution
failed to prove that the crime of bigamy is committed. Therefore, the acquittal of Pulido from
the bigamy charge is warranted. (Pulido v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220149, July 27,
2021, En Banc, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YYY
G.R. No. 252865, August 04, 2021, Second Division, (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is committed when: (1) the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of
whether there was force, threat, or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or
consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority.
It is elementary that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of the

rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. The prime consideration in the prosecution
of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings.
FACTS
Five separate Information charged the accused-appellant, 17 years old, with 5 counts
of the crime of Statutory Rape defined and penalized under ART. 266-A paragraph (1)(d) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by RA 8353, committed against the siblings AAA,
two years old, and BBB, eight years old. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the
charges.
On January 24, 2007, AAA and BBB were in the house of accused-appellant, their
uncle. While they were on the second floor of accused-appellant’s house, accused-appellant
removed his clothes as well as BBB's shorts and panty. Accused-appellant then placed
himself on top of BBB, and inserted his penis into her vagina. BBB kept on pushing accused-
appellant until the latter stopped. Thereafter, accused-appellant went to AAA, undressed her,
and laid on top of her. BBB tried to pull accused-appellant from AAA, who was already crying.
Then, accused-appellant left.
On January 25, 2007, while their parents were away harvesting copra, accused-
appellant raped AAA and BBB. On January 26, 2007, BBB was at accused-appellant’s house
to look for her mother. When BBB entered the door, accused-appellant pushed her inside the
house and placed her on top of the table. Accused-appellant was not able to fully penetrate
his penis as BBB kept on pushing him until he got up and left.
After several days, AAA informed her mother what accused-appellant did to them. In
the medico-legal reports of Dr. Alcantera, he noted that both AAA and BBB had no recent
extragenital physical injury and no sign of either recent or previous injury to the hymen. In
his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations and argued that the reason for filing
the instant criminal cases against him is the quarrel between his parents and the victims’
parents over a parcel of land.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of
statutory rape, but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 09-1413. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Accused-appellant appealed to the SC. He reiterates that the RTC erred in
convicting him despite: (1) the failure of the prosecution to prove that he acted with
discernment considering that he was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crimes; (2) the insufficiency of prosecution's evidence against him; and (3) the credible
defense of denial.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because the
medico-legal reports no injury to the hymen of the victims.
RULING
NO. First, accused-appellant's claim of minority is purely self-serving. It is well to
stress that aside from accused-appellant's claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the act, there was no other corroborating evidence to prove his date of birth.
The defense could have raised accused-appellant's minority during the trial if indeed he was
a minor when the crimes were committed, knowing that his age, if he were truly 17 years
old, could mitigate the penalty to be imposed. Hence, the Court rules that accused-appellant's
claim of minority is self-serving and unsupported by any shadow of proof.
Second, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. Records disclose that accused-appellant is guilty of Statutory Rape
committed against BBB and Qualified Statutory Rape committed against AAA.
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is committed when: (1) the offended
party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless
of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of
reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority.
In Statutory Rape, it is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse, for the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is
below the age of 12.
In the case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all elements of Statutory Rape. Undeniably, BBB was eight
years old, while AAA was only two years old when they were raped by accused-appellant.
Likewise, during the trial, AAA and BBB positively identified accused-appellant as the person
who raped them.
Further, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss and elaborate upon the
contention of accused-appellant that he deserves an acquittal as the medico-legal certificate
reveals that the victims' respective hymens were not lacerated or ruptured. It is elementary
that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of the rape case, it being
merely corroborative in nature. At this point, the fact of rape and the identity of the
perpetrator were already proven by the consistent testimonies of both AAA and BBB. The
credible statements of the rape victims are the material proof of the commission of rape,
rather than the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Alcantara. The prime consideration in
the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings.
Q: On January 24, 2007, AAA and BBB were in the house of accused-appellant, their
uncle, when he raped them. On January 25, 2007, while their parents were away
harvesting copra, accused-appellant raped AAA and BBB. On January 26, 2007, BBB
was at accused-appellant’s house to look for her mother. When BBB entered the door,
accused-appellant pushed her inside the house and placed her on top of the table.
Accused-appellant was not able to fully penetrate his penis as BBB kept on pushing
him until he got up and left. After several days, AAA informed her mother what
accused-appellant did to them. In the medico-legal reports of Dr. Alcantera, he noted
that both AAA and BBB had no recent extragenital physical injury and no sign of either
recent or previous injury to the hymen. Five Information for statutory rape were filed
against accused-appellant.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of statutory rape,
but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 09-1413. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Accused-appellant appealed to the SC and averred that the medico-legal reports
shows that there were no injury to the hymens of the victims. Should the accused-
appellant be acquitted based on the medico-legal report?
A: NO. It is elementary that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of

the rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. At this point, the fact of rape and the
identity of the perpetrator were already proven by the consistent testimonies of both AAA
and BBB. The credible statements of the rape victims are the material proof of the
commission of rape, rather than the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Alcantara. The
prime consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the
medical findings. (People of the Philippines v. YYY, G.R. No. 252865, Augsut 04, 2021, Second
Division, as penned by J. Inting)
SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III AND ELENA DULAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021, Second Division, (Hernando, J)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence has long established the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined
under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC: (1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by

false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
FACTS
Sometime in January 1999, Marilou, the daughter-in-law of the spouses Dulos met
petitioner Elena who proposed to sell the subject property to either Marilou or her in laws.
During a meeting at the Dulos' house in San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union, petitioners presented a
photocopy of TCT No. T-2135 registered in the names of Isidro and Virginia Dulay covering
the subject property. When complainants inquired, why a different name was indicated in
the title, i.e., Virginia Dulay instead of Elena, the latter explained that she and Virginia are one
and the same person. Consequently, the spouses Dulos confirmed their interest to purchase
the subject property, subject to inspection prior to finalizing the sale.
The parties agreed on the terms of sale: purchase price of P950,000.00; a down
payment of P150,000.00 and the balance to be paid on a monthly installment of P30,000.00
within a two-year period. The parties further agreed that the spouses Dulay will hand over
title to the subject property once the spouses Dulos' monthly payments have reached half
the amount of the purchase price, i.e., P450,000.00.
When the spouses Dulos' monthly payments reached the total amount of P707,000.00
without receiving the promised title or a copy thereof from petitioners, they made further
inquiries on the subject property and learned that: (1) the registered owners indicated in
TCT No. T-2135 are different persons from petitioners; (2) the Isidro Dulay named in TCT
No. T-2135 is petitioner Isidro's uncle and namesake; and (3) the long deceased spouses
Isidro and Virginia Dulay has a daughter, Carmencita. The spouses Dulos stopped paying the
monthly installments.
The RTC found petitioners guilty of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. The CA
likewise affirmed the conviction. The lower courts uniformly found that petitioners sold the
subject property to the spouses Dulos under false pretenses of ownership. Petitioners
misrepresented to the spouses Dulos that they were the Isidro and Virginia Dulay indicated
as registered owners in TCT No. T-2315. In the belief that petitioners were the owners, the
spouses Dulos purchased the subject property on installment. Overall, the CA ruled that the
misrepresentations and false pretenses of petitioners were made prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of fraud which impelled the spouses Dulos to part with the total amount
of P707,000,00.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime Estafa by means of deceit.
RULING
YES. Jurisprudence has long established the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as
defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:
(1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because
of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
First. Petitioners made false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations to

complainants, the spouses Dulos. Second. As found by the lower courts, the second, third and
fourth elements of the offense are likewise present. Petitioners' false pretense of ownership
which could transfer valid title to the subject property, was committed prior to and
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. Private complainants' reliance on this false
pretense induced and impelled them to purchase the subject property from sham owners
who do not hold any color of title and pay them the total amount of P707,000.00.
On several occasions, we have defined deceit as the false representation of a matter

of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another
so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Here, petitioners employed a scheme of dissembling against the spouses Dulos by

withholding from the latter the true registered owners of the subject property under TCT
No. T-2135. Petitioners took advantage of the demise of the real registered owners, the
spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay and more importantly, the similarity in the names of the
two Isidros who are related and share the exact same name, i.e., Isidro Dulay.
Q: During a meeting at the Dulos' house in San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union, Isidro and Elena
Dulay (Spouses Dulay) presented a photocopy of TCT No. T-2135 registered in the
names of Isidro and Virginia Dulay covering the subject property. When complainants
inquired, why a different name was indicated in the title, Elena explained that she and
Virginia are one and the same person. Consequently, the spouses Dulos confirmed
their interest to purchase the subject property, subject to inspection prior to finalizing
the sale.
The parties agreed on the terms of sale: purchase price of P950,000.00; a down
payment of P150,000.00 and the balance to be paid on a monthly installment of
P30,000.00 within a two-year period. The parties further agreed that the spouses
Dulay will hand over title to the subject property once the spouses Dulos' monthly
payments have reached half the amount of the purchase price, i.e., P450,000.00.
When the spouses Dulos' monthly payments reached the total amount of P707,000.00
without receiving the promised title or a copy thereof from petitioners, they made
further inquiries on the subject property and learned that: (1) the registered owners
indicated in TCT No. T-2135 are different persons from petitioners; (2) the Isidro
Dulay named in TCT No. T-2135 is petitioner Isidro's uncle and namesake; and (3) the
long deceased spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay has a daughter, Carmencita. The
spouses Dulos stopped paying the monthly installments. Are the Spouses Dulay liable
for Estafa by means of deceit?
A: YES. Jurisprudence has long established the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as
defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC: (1) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by

false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
First. Petitioners made false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations to

complainants, the spouses Dulos. Second. As found by the lower courts, the second, third and
fourth elements of the offense are likewise present. Petitioners' false pretense of ownership
which could transfer valid title to the subject property, was committed prior to and
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. Private complainants' reliance on this false
pretense induced and impelled them to purchase the subject property from sham owners
who do not hold any color of title and pay them the total amount of P707,000.00. (Sps. Dulay.
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021, Second Division, as penned
by J. Hernando)
PATRICIO G. GEMINA v. HEIRS OF GERARDO V. ESPEJO JR.
G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021, Second Division, (Hernando J.)
DOCTRINE
When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall
not ipso facto result in the plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence.
FACTS
According to Gemina, he purchased, owned, occupied with his family, and possessed
the subject property openly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of an owner since
1978. On the other hand, the heirs of Espejo averred that they are co-owners of the subject
property which is covered by TCT 93809 in the names of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. (Gerardo) and
Nenafe, and with Tax Declaration No. B-139-03384 also in the names of Gerardo and Nenafe.
On December 15. 2004, the Espejo heirs, through their representative, sent Gemina a
demand letter asserting their ownership over the subject property, and demanding him and
his family to vacate said property because they have been unlawfully occupying the lot where
the latter's house was built. Since Gemina refused to heed the demand to vacate the property,
the heirs of Espejo filed an action for recovery of possession.
On the scheduled date of pre-trial, Gemina was present but his counsel failed to
attend. The trial court allowed the heirs of Espejo to present their evidence ex parte in its
November 26, 2012 Order. Gemina’s counsel filed a withdrawal of counsel with attached
Motion for Reconsideration citing health reasons as justification for his withdrawal, and
invoking the trial court’s compassion so as not to prejudice Gemma’s cause due to the heirs
of Espejo’s ex parte presentation of evidence.
In an Order dated January 22, 2013, the trial court granted the withdrawal of
Gemma’s counsel and directed him to secure the services of a new counsel. The MR was
considered a mere scrap of paper because it lacked the requisite notice of hearing. The heirs
of Espeje was allowed ex parte presentation of evidence.
Through the PAO, Gemina filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders dated
November 26 and January 22 arguing that Gemina learned about the orders only on March
26, 2013 when he followed up the case without receiving any notice. The public defender
argued that Gemina should have been personally notified and served with the order that
granted his counsel's withdrawal and denied the motion for reconsideration, which would
have enabled him to protect his rights and object to the ex parte presentation of evidence.
The said MR was denied.
The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs of Espejo based on preponderance of
evidence. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Gemina
could no longer question the propriety of the trial court's Order allowing the Espejos to
present evidence ex parte since he already filed a motion for reconsideration albeit it was
denied by the court a quo for lack of notice of hearing.
ISSUE
Whether or not the presence of party-defendant, and absence of his counsel, will
result in the ex parte presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs?
RULING
NO. The Court held in the negative. When the party-defendant is present, the absence
of his counsel during pre-trial shall not ipso facto result in the plaintiffs ex parte presentation
of evidence.
Pre-trial serves a significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates

and expedites the trial, if not the entire process of administering and dispensing justice. For
this reason, the parties and their counsels cannot take this stage for granted as it is more
than just a part of procedural law or its technicality.
In Paredes v Verano, this Court categorically concluded that the absence of

defendants' counsel would not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant in
default and cause the ex parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence.
With the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said Section 5 has been clarified by already
including the word counsel and putting the conjunctive word and, to the effect that it is only
when both the party-litigant (plaintiff or defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in pre-
trial that there be the concomitant consequence of either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel
were absent), or presentation of evidence ex parte (defendant and counsel were absent).
Simply, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-
appearance of his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously
appearing in the course of the proceedings, including during the pre-trial. Gemina should
have been given the chance to establish the merits of his defense rather than lose the subject
property based on technicalities or upon a stringent application of the rules.
In view of the procedural infirmities of this ease to the prejudice of Gemina (who
essentially was deprived of his chance to present the merits of his defense as a result of the
order assenting to the ex parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence and the eventual
resolution of the case on the basis thereof), We deem it appropriate to remand the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, to hear and receive evidence.
Q: According to Gemina, he purchased, owned, occupied with his family, and possessed
the subject property openly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of an owner
since 1978. On the other hand, the heirs of Espejo averred that they are co-owners of
the subject property which is covered by TCT 93809 in the names of Gerardo V. Espejo,
Jr. (Gerardo) and Nenafe, and with Tax Declaration No. B-139-03384 also in the names
of Gerardo and Nenafe. Since Gemina refused to heed the demand to vacate the
property, the heirs of Espejo filed an action for recovery of possession.
On the scheduled date of pre-trial, Gemina was present but his counsel failed to attend.
The trial court allowed the heirs of Espejo to present their evidence ex parte in its
November 26, 2012 Order. Gemina’s counsel filed a withdrawal of counsel with
attached Motion for Reconsideration citing health reasons as justification for his
withdrawal, and invoking the trial court’s compassion so as not to prejudice Gemma’s
cause due to the heirs of Espejo’s ex parte presentation of evidence.
In an Order dated January 22, 2013, the trial court granted the withdrawal of Gemma’s
counsel and directed him to secure the services of a new counsel. The MR was
considered a mere scrap of paper because it lacked the requisite notice of hearing. The
heirs of Espeje was allowed ex parte presentation of evidence. Was the trial court
correct in granting the ex-parte presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs?
A: NO. When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall
not ipso facto result in the plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence. Pre-trial serves a
significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and expedites the trial, if
not the entire process of administering and dispensing justice. For this reason, the parties
and their counsels cannot take this stage for granted as it is more than just a part of
procedural law or its technicality.
In Paredes v Verano, this Court categorically concluded that the absence of

defendants' counsel would not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant in
default and cause the ex parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence.
Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-appearance of
his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously appearing in the
course of the proceedings, including during the pre-trial. Gemina should have been given the
chance to establish the merits of his defense rather than lose the subject property based on
technicalities or upon a stringent application of the rules. (Gemina v. Heirs of Espejo Jr, G.R.
No. 232682, September 13, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUVENAL AZURIN Y BLANQUERA
G.R. No. 249322, September 14, 2021, First Division, (Caguioa, J)
DOCTRINE
The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to
the Sandiganbayan Rules.
The elements of the crime charged are that (1) the offender threatened another person
with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3)
the threat was not subject to a condition. This felony is consummated "x x x as soon as the
threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."
FACTS
According to Jaime Clave, on November 13, 2013, at around 12mn, he received a
phone call from Azurin, then Regional Director of the PDEA Regional Office II. In the
conversation, Azurin asked Clave “may sama ka ba ng loob sa akin” to which Clave replied
none. Azurin uttered the remark “Clave, papatayin kita!” several times during the
conversation.
Clave suspected that Azurin was upset because Clave had sent a text message to the
PDEA Deputy Director General for Administration (DDGA) regarding some office issues
pertaining to operational funs.
Clave feared for his life as he knew that Azurin, being a PDEA RD who had an office-
issued firearm, a former Navy officer and a member of the Magdalo group, was capable of
carrying out his threats.
Later, Clave went to the police station to report the incident and took photographs of
his cell phone to record the calls he received, the name of the callers and the duration of the
calls. Thereafter, he filed an administrative complaint against Azurin before the Internal
Affairs Services Office of the PDEA and a criminal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB).
Clave testified that during the subject phone call, Azurin informed him that he was
being relieved as team leader and designated him to PDEA Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya. IO2
Mendoza also testified that Clave narrated to him the phone call made by Azurin and that his
life was threatened. IO1 Agleham also testified that Azurin mentioned that Clave would be
relieved because of an incident which occurred between them. Calbaza also testified that she
received a missed call from Azurin around the time of the subject phone call of Azurin to
Clave. After the incident, she was likewise informed by Clave of the subject phone call made
to him by Azurin.
Azurin admitted to place the phone call to Clave on the night of the incident, but it
was only to inform him of his reassignment to Nueva Vizcaya. He admitted that he was
informed by the PDEA DDGA about a complaint on some operational issues made thru text
messages and that this upset and disappointed him.
The Sandiganbayan found Azurin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Threats. The Sandiganbayan found all three elements of grave threats present. It gave
credence to the version of facts of the prosecution and ruled that although the threats were
only made in a telephone conversation, hence with no independent corroboration, the
immediate reaction of Clave after the conversation coupled with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on antecedent and succeeding events were sufficient to support a
finding of guilt against Azurin.
Azurin filed an appeal to the Court through an Appellant's Brief dated June 22, 2020,
wherein he maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt because, at most, what
was proven by the prosecution was merely the occurrence of the phone conversation
between him and Clave, but not the substance of said conversation.
The People, through the OMB Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed its Plaintiff-
Appellee's Brief (Appellee's Brief) dated August 26, 2020. It argues that Azurin should have
availed a petition for review on certiorari filed with the Court. Further, the Sandiganbayan
correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Azurin availed of the correct mode of appeal by filing a notice of appeal
with the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
RULING
1. YES. The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules.
The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules as it is a later set of rules and a special
statute specifically providing for modes of review of judgments and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over
a general law. As it is, the Sandiganbayan Rules effectively amended the relevant provisions
of the Rules and the latter apply only in a suppletory manner. Hence, Rule 45 of the Rules
being invoked by the People is unavailing in the present case.
2. YES. Nevertheless, Azurin's appeal, although proper, must fail on its merits. From the
records, the prosecution was able to prove his guilt for Grave Threats (without a condition)
The elements of the crime charged are that (1) the offender threatened another
person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime;
and (3) the threat was not subject to a condition. This felony is consummated "x x x as soon
as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."
Applying these parameters to the instant case, it is evident that Azurin's threats to kill
Clave are wrongs amounting to the crime of either homicide or murder. The crime was
consummated as soon as Clave heard of the threats during their telephone conversation.
It is clear that what Azurin is assailing are the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
and the credence it gave to the prosecution witnesses over the defense's. Without doubt,
Azurin can raise questions of fact in the present ordinary appeal.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance

that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings
of the trial court, owing to the latter's peculiar position of observing, first hand, the witnesses
as they testified.
The Sandiganbayan’s findings already addressed the factual issues raised by Azurin.
Contrary to Azurin's claim, the statements made by the witnesses are admissible as they are
considered independently relevant statements under the Rules, not being intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement but presented only for the purpose
of placing the statement in the record to establish the fact that the statement was made or
the tenor of such statement.
Q: According to Jaime Clave, on November 13, 2013, at around 12mn, he received a
phone call from Azurin, then Regional Director of the PDEA Regional Office II. In the
conversation, Azurin asked Clave “may sama ka ba ng loob sa akin” to which Clave
replied none. Azurin uttered the remark “Clave, papatayin kita!” several times during
the conversation. Clave suspected that Azurin was upset because Clave had sent a text
message to the PDEA Deputy Director General for Administration (DDGA) regarding
some office issues pertaining to operational funs. Clave feared for his life and went to
the police station to report the incident and filed an administrative complaint against
Azurin before the Internal Affairs Services Office of the PDEA and a criminal complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Clave and other witnesses testified about
the phone conversation.
The Sandiganbayan found Azurin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Threats. Azurin filed an appeal to the Court through an Appellant's
Brief wherein he maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt because, at
most, what was proven by the prosecution was merely the occurrence of the phone
conversation between him and Clave, but not the substance of said conversation. The
People filed its Appellee's Brief arguing that Azurin should have availed a petition for
review on certiorari filed with the Court. Further, the Sandiganbayan correctly found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Is the contention of the
People tenable?
A: PARTLY GRANTED. The contention regarding the proper remedy is untenable while
the contention regarding Azurin’s guilt for the crime of grave threat is tenable.
The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal pursuant
to the Sandiganbayan Rules. The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules as it is a later
set of rules and a special statute specifically providing for modes of review of judgments and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that a special
law prevails over a general law. As it is, the Sandiganbayan Rules effectively amended the
relevant provisions of the Rules and the latter apply only in a suppletory manner.
The elements of grave threat are that (1) the offender threatened another person with
the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) the
threat was not subject to a condition. This felony is consummated "x x x as soon as the threats
come to the knowledge of the person threatened." Applying these parameters to the instant
case, it is evident that Azurin's threats to kill Clave are wrongs amounting to the crime of
either homicide or murder. The crime was consummated as soon as Clave heard of the
threats during their telephone conversation. The statements made by the witnesses are
admissible as they are considered independently relevant statements under the Rules, not
being intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement but presented only
for the purpose of placing the statement in the record to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement (People v. Azurin, G.R. No. 249322, September 14,
2021, First Division, as penned by J. Caguioa)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESSIE BANCUD Y CAUILAN
G.R. No. 249853, September 14, 2021, First Division, (Lopez J, J.)
DOCTRINE
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of drugs in a buy-bust operation, these
must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. It is the delivery of the dangerous drug to
the poseur-buyer by the accused as the seller, and the receipt by the latter of the marked money
during the buy-bust transaction which consummate the crime of illegal sale of the dangerous
drug.
As to the charge of illegal possession of shabu, the following elements must be

established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug.
In cases of illegal sale and/or possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, as amended
by RA 10640, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti
of the crime. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
FACTS
In August 6, 2017, around 8:15am, PSI Quintin Baquiran received information from a
confidential informant (CI) that a shabu peddler going by the alias “Jes” (accused-appellant)
was looking for buyers. PSI Baquiran asked the CI to call Jes and inform him that a friend
wanted to buy shabu. The CI called accused-appellant and arranged for the purchase of
PHP1,000 worth of shabu at accused-appellant’s house in Bancud St, Atulayan Norte,
Tuguegarao City, around 10:30am.
PSI Baquiran organized the buy-bust team. PO3 Tumaneng was designated as the
poseur-buyer, while PO3 Angoluan and PO2 Cusipag were assigned as arresting officers.
They agreed that to signal a completed sale, PO3 Tumaneng would call PO2 Cusipag’s mobile
phone.
PO3 Tumaneng and the CI went to Jes’ house and the exchange of the shabu and the
marked money had been consummated. Upon receiving the signal, PO3 Anguluan, PO2
Cusipag, and the rest of the buy-bust team rushed to where the trio were and introduced
themselves as police officers to accused-appellant. Jes ran inside his house and tried to hide
inside the bathroom where he was cornered.
With the representative from DOJ and the barangay captain as witnesses, PO3
Tumaneng marked with his initials the two plastic sachets subject of the buy-bust, while PO2
Cusipag placed his own markings on the packet he confiscated. Pictures were taken of the
proceedings as well as the items subject of the buy-bust. When they finished, they brought
the accused-appellant to the Tuguegarao Police Station for processing and investigation by
SPO2 Cornelio who examined the confiscated plastic sachets. PSI Baccay prepared the
Request for Laboratory Examination for the suspected shabu packets and for the drug testing
of accused-appellant.
PO3 Tumaneng and PO2 Cusipag brought accused-appellant and the three plastic
sachets to the Regional Crime Laboratory office for testing. PI Odasco conducted a qualitative
examination of the contents of the plastic sachet. After examination, the white substance
were all confirmed to be shabu. The shabu packets were later re-sealed and surrendered to
SPO2 Carag, the evidence custodian. SPO2 Carag delivered the evidence to the RTC pursuant
to a subpoena.
The RTC rendered judgment finding Bancud guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II
and Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The CA upheld the RTC judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s judgment finding the accused
guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
RULING
NO. The Court held in the negative. To successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of
drugs in a buy-bust operation, these must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. It
is the delivery of the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer by the accused as the seller, and
the receipt by the latter of the marked money during the buy-bust transaction which
consummate the crime of illegal sale of the dangerous drug.
A dissection of the evidence of the prosecution patently shows beyond doubt that
accused-appellant was caught red-handed in selling the dangerous drug, shabu. The
prosecution witnesses gave definitive recollections of the incidents which led to the arrest
of accused-appellant.
As to the charge of illegal possession of shabu, the prosecution also established the
elements of the offense: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Here, the straightforward testimonies lead the Court to conclude beyond reasonable
doubt that when he was subjected to the search that was a consequence of his valid
warrantless arrest, accused-appellant was revealed to be in possession of another plastic
sachet containing the same white crystalline substance as the ones subject of the buy-bust.
In cases of illegal sale and/or possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, as

amended by RA 10640, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
court for destruction.
The essential aspects of the rule on chain of custody are the (1) immediate marking,
inventory, and taking of photographs of the recovered items; (2) the examination of the
forensic chemist attesting that the seized items yielded positive results for the presence of
illegal drugs; and (3) the presentation of the same evidence in court. These all address the
primordial concern that the integrity and evidentiary rule of the seized items have been
properly safeguarded as these would be used as the evidence in determining the liability of
the accused-appellant.
There is no doubt that these aspects in the chain of custody were complied in the case
at bar. The testimonies of PO3 Tumaneng and PO2 Cusipag are straightforward. After
arresting the accused, PO3 Tumaneng marked the two plastic sachets while PO2 also marked
the packet he retrieved from accused-appellant. As to the inventory, PO3 Tumaneng and PO2
Cusipag were uniform in testifying that the marking and inventory happened outside of
accused-appellant’s house after his arrest. The inventory was, likewise, conducted in the
presence of accused-appellant, a representative from DOJ, and the barangay captain, with
the two witnesses signing the Receipt and Inventory of Evidence Sheet. Then PSI Baccay
prepared the laboratory request forms for the drug testing of accused and the items
confiscated from him. These were delivered by PO3 Tumaneng and PO2 Cusipag to the crime
laboratory. PI Odasco examined the contents of the three plastic sachets upon her receipt
and she recorded her findings that the specimens were positive of shabu. The evidence was
received by the evidence custodian and was kept inside the evidence cabinet until it was
subpoenaed by the RTC.
Accused-appellant harps that the prosecution committed a grievous mistake when it

failed to present the police investigator and the evidence custodian who supposedly should
have handled they handled the confiscated items. This contention is unavailing since it is a
well-established rule that the prosecution has the sole discretion in the presentation of its
case and the witness it will present in court. The integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence remained intact. What matters is there was a definite chain in the handling of the
pieces of evidence such that their integrity and identity remain unquestionable.
Q: In a buy-bust operation, the accused was apprehended by the police officer. With
the representative from DOJ and the barangay captain as witnesses, PO3 Tumaneng
marked with his initials the two plastic sachets subject of the buy-bust, while PO2
Cusipag placed his own markings on the packet he confiscated. Pictures were taken of
the proceedings as well as the items subject of the buy-bust. When they finished, they
brought the accused-appellant to the Tuguegarao Police Station for processing and
investigation by SPO2 Cornelio who examined the confiscated plastic sachets. PSI
Baccay prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination for the suspected shabu
packets and for the drug testing of accused-appellant. PO3 Tumaneng and PO2
Cusipag brought accused-appellant and the three plastic sachets to the Regional Crime
Laboratory office for testing. PI Odasco conducted a qualitative examination of the
contents of the plastic sachet. After examination, the white substance were all
confirmed to be shabu. The shabu packets were later re-sealed and surrendered to
SPO2 Carag, the evidence custodian. SPO2 Carag delivered the evidence to the RTC
pursuant to a subpoena. Were the apprehending officers able to preserve the integrity
of the dangerous drugs in the case at bar?
A: YES. In cases of illegal sale and/or possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
court for destruction.
There is no doubt that these aspects in the chain of custody were complied in the case
at bar. The testimonies of PO3 Tumaneng and PO2 Cusipag are straightforward. After
arresting the accused, PO3 Tumaneng marked the two plastic sachets while PO2 also marked
the packet he retrieved from accused-appellant. As to the inventory, PO3 Tumaneng and PO2
Cusipag were uniform in testifying that the marking and inventory happened outside of
accused-appellant’s house after his arrest. The inventory was, likewise, conducted in the
presence of accused-appellant, a representative from DOJ, and the barangay captain, with
the two witnesses signing the Receipt and Inventory of Evidence Sheet. Then PSI Baccay
prepared the laboratory request forms for the drug testing of accused and the items
confiscated from him. These were delivered by PO3 Tumaneng and PO2 Cusipag to the crime
laboratory. PI Odasco examined the contents of the three plastic sachets upon her receipt
and she recorded her findings that the specimens were positive of shabu. The evidence was
received by the evidence custodian and was kept inside the evidence cabinet until it was
subpoenad by the RTC. (People v. Bancud, G.R. No. 249853, September 14, 2021, First Division,
as penned by J. J Lopez)
VICTOR BONGHANOY ET AL, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 231490/231566, September 15, 2021, Second Division, (Inting, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 5 (d) of PD 449 provides that: (1) cockfighting may only be held (a) on Sundays,
legal holidays, and local fiestas in a licensed cockpit for not more than three days, or (b) during
provincial, city or municipal, agricultural, commercial, or industrial fairs, carnivals or
expositions for a similar period of three days, (2) but not within the month of a local fiesta or
for more than two occasions a year in the same city or municipality. Such event must be (3)
authorized by a resolution of the province, city, or municipality where such fair, carnival, or
exposition is to be held, (4) subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized
representative.
On the other hand, Section 5 (e) provides that: (1) subject to the provisions of Section 5
(d), cockfighting is allowed (2)(a) for the entertainment of foreign dignitaries or for tourists,
or for returning Filipinos, commonly known as “Balikbayan,” or (b) for the support of national
fund-raising campaigns for charitable purposes as may be authorized by the Office of the
President; (3) upon resolution of a provincial board, city or municipal council; (4) with the
approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative; (5) to be held in a
licensed cockpit or in playgrounds or parks; and (6) with such privilege being extended for only
one time, for a period not exceeding three days, within a year to a province, city, or municipality.
FACTS
On November 6, 2013, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Ubay, Bohol
passed and approved Resolution No. 205, s. 2013, requesting the Municipal Mayor to allow
the Sangguniang Bayan to hold 3-win cockfights on February 1 and 2, 2014 at the Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Gymnasium.
On January 4, 2014, the Sangguniang Barangay of Union, Ubay, Bohol passed and
approved Resolution No. 06, s. 2014, requesting favorable endorsement for the approval of
the request of the Sangguniang Bayan to hold 3-win cockfights on January 28, 29, and 30,
2014 at the covered court of Union, Ubay, Bohol.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Ubay amended the date and venue of Resolution 205 from
February 1 and 2 to January 28, 29, 30, 2014 and the venue from Ramon Magsaysay Gym to
Barangay Union Gym (Union Cultural Sports Center).
Upon the Sangguniang Bayan’s request, PSSupt. Agustin of the Bohol Provincial Police
Office issued a Special Permit dated January 9, 2014 to hold the 3-day special cockfight on
the dates and place above-mentioned on the occasion of the entertainment of tourists and
balikbayans during the annual town fiesta of Ubay, Bohol.
Then Mayor Atup issued a special permit for the holding of the cockfighting on the
date and venue requested, subject to the conditions that the regulatory fees shall be complied
with and that the municipal ordinances and existing laws governing cockfights shall be
strictly followed. The 3-win cockfighting event was subsequently held.
Private complainant Cesar Arro Sr filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas a complaint-affidavit for violation of PD 449 against the public officials who
approved the holding of a 3-win cockfighting event at the Union Cultural Sports Center,
which is an unlicensed cockpit.
After its fact-finding investigation, the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman
filed a formal complaint against petitioners for violation of PD 449, as amended by PD 1602.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict herein petitioners for violation of PD 449
and applied Section 5 (d) of the law because the purpose of holding the cockfighting event
was to celebrate the local town fiesta.
Petitioners contend that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in

finding probable cause for the filing of Information for violation of PD 449 against them and
that the applicable provision of law is not Section 5 (d) but Section 5 (e) of PD 449, which
allows the holding of cockfighting for the entertainment of balikbayans in places other than
a licensed cockpit; hence, there is no probable cause for their indictment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or jurisdiction in finding the existence of probable cause for the filing of Information
against petitioners for violation of PD 449, as amended.
RULING
YES. Section 5 (d) of PD 449 provides that: (1) cockfighting may only be held (a) on
Sundays, legal holidays, and local fiestas in a licensed cockpit for not more than three days,
or (b) during provincial, city or municipal, agricultural, commercial, or industrial fairs,
carnivals or expositions for a similar period of three days, (2) but not within the month of a
local fiesta or for more than two occasions a year in the same city or municipality. Such event
must be (3) authorized by a resolution of the province, city, or municipality where such fair,
carnival, or exposition is to be held, (4) subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary
or his authorized representative.
On the other hand, Section 5 (e) provides that: (1) subject to the provisions of Section
5 (d), cockfighting is allowed (2)(a) for the entertainment of foreign dignitaries or for
tourists, or for returning Filipinos, commonly known as “Balikbayan,” or (b) for the support
of national fund-raising campaigns for charitable purposes as may be authorized by the
Office of the President; (3) upon resolution of a provincial board, city or municipal council;
(4) with the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative; (5) to be
held in a licensed cockpit or in playgrounds or parks; and (6) with such privilege being
extended for only one time, for a period not exceeding three days, within a year to a province,
city, or municipality.
The Court finds that petitioners’ case falls under Section 5 (e) of PD 449 for the
following reasons:
First, the Sangguniang Bayan of Ubay passed the resolution requesting the Mayor to
allow the holding of 3-win cockfights for the entertainment of balikbayans and local tourists.
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan asked for a special permit from the Provincial
Director for the holding of the cockfights. Considering that the main purpose in holding the
cockfighting was to entertain tourists and balikbayans, the Sangguniang Bayan found it
necessary to secure a Special Permit from the Provincial Director of the PNP. As the
cockfighting is to be held for the purpose stated in the special permit, i.e. to entertain tourists
and balikbayans, the Provincial Director made it clear that he can no longer issue another
permit for that purpose in the same year which is in compliance with Section 5 (e) of PD 449.
Third, Section 5(e) allows cockfighting for the entertainment of tourists or

balikbayans to be held in licensed cockpits or in playgrounds or parks. It is admitted that
there was no licensed cockpit arena operating within the Municipality of Ubay, Bohol, at the
time the cockfighting was held in 2014. PD 449 does not specifically provide for a definition
of playground or park. Merriam Webster defined it as a piece of land used and usually
equipped with facilities for recreation especially for children; or an area known or suited for
activity of a specified sort. A playground is a place for recreational activities to improve the
physical and mental well-being of children and people of all ages. The cockfighting was held
in Union Cultural and Sports Center which may fall within the same category as a playground.
A gymnasium is a place where people can gather for athletic and recreational activities as
well as for the holding of special and social events.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioners
for violation of Section 5(d) of PD 449, as amended.
Q: The Sanggunian Bayan of Ubay, Bohol and the Sangguniang Barangay of Union,
Ubay, Bohol passed and approved two resolutions requesting the Mayor to allow the
them to hold a 3-win cockfights on January 28, 29, 30, 2014 at the Union Cultural
Sports Center. Upon the Sangguniang Bayan’s request, PSSupt. Agustin of the Bohol
Provincial Police Office issued a Special Permit dated January 9, 2014 to hold the 3-
day special cockfight on the dates and place above-mentioned on the occasion of the
entertainment of tourists and balikbayans during the annual town fiesta of Ubay, Bohol.
Then Mayor Atup likewise issued a special permit for the holding of the cockfighting
on the date and venue requested.
Private complainant Cesar Arro Sr filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas a complaint-affidavit for violation of PD 449 against the public officials who
approved the holding of a 3-win cockfighting event at the Union Cultural Sports
Center, which is an unlicensed cockpit. The Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict herein petitioners for violation of PD 449 and applied Section 5 (d) of the law
because the purpose of holding the cockfighting event was to celebrate the local town
fiesta. Petitioners contend that the applicable provision of law is not Section 5 (d) but
Section 5 (e) of PD 449, which allows the holding of cockfighting for the entertainment
of balikbayans in places other than a licensed cockpit; hence, there is no probable
cause for their indictment. Is the contention of the petitioners tenable?
A: YES. Section 5 (e) of PD 449 provides that: (1) subject to the provisions of Section 5 (d),
cockfighting is allowed (2)(a) for the entertainment of foreign dignitaries or for tourists, or
for returning Filipinos, commonly known as “Balikbayan,” or (b) for the support of national
fund-raising campaigns for charitable purposes as may be authorized by the Office of the
President; (3) upon resolution of a provincial board, city or municipal council; (4) with the
approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative; (5) to be held in a
licensed cockpit or in playgrounds or parks; and (6) with such privilege being extended for
only one time, for a period not exceeding three days, within a year to a province, city, or
municipality.
The Court finds that petitioners’ case falls under Section 5 (e) of PD 449 for the
following reasons: First, the Sangguniang Bayan of Ubay passed the resolution requesting
the Mayor to allow the holding of 3-win cockfights for the entertainment of balikbayans and
local tourists. Second, considering that the main purpose in holding the cockfighting was to
entertain tourists and balikbayans, the Sangguniang Bayan found it necessary to secure a
Special Permit from the Provincial Director of the PNP. Third, Section 5(e) allows
cockfighting for the entertainment of tourists or balikbayans to be held in licensed cockpits
or in playgrounds or parks. PD 449 does not specifically provide for a definition of
playground or park. Merriam Webster defined it as a piece of land used and usually equipped
with facilities for recreation especially for children; or an area known or suited for activity
of a specified sort. A playground is a place for recreational activities to improve the physical
and mental well-being of children and people of all ages. The cockfighting was held in Union
Cultural and Sports Center which may fall within the same category as a playground.
(Bonghanoy et al v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 231490/231566, September 15, 2021,
Second Division, as penned by J. Inting)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX AND YYY
G.R. No. 242474, September 16, 2021, Third Division, (Carandang, J.)
DOCTRINE
In determining whether the killing was committed with treachery, two conditions must
be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means or method of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted.
Case law teaches us that there is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the
hostility of the assailant towards the former. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows
were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and
that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
Conspiracy was also established by the evidence on record because of the concerted
efforts of both the accused. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be deduced from the
manner in which the offense is committed, as when the accused act in concert to achieve the
same objective.
FACTS
Witness Del Mundo narrated that on December 24, 1999 at around 9pm, while he was
driving his tricycle, he saw XXX, YYY, Leonard, and Jason angrily going towards the direction
of Rolando. He heard one of the accused say “Papatayin kita” and saw XXX stab Rolando in
the chest and right eye, while YYY held Rolando’s arms at the back. He was 1 arm’s length
away from the incident; he stopped his tricycle but did not turn off the engine when he
witnessed the stabbing. He did not help Rolando because he feared for his life. On his way to
Aglipay Church, he met Rolando’s father and told him that his son was stabbed. In open court,
he identified XXX and YYY and executed a sworn statement regarding the incident.
Witness Austria also positively identified XXX and YYY. He was inside his house
watching TV when he heard the commotion at around 10:30pm of December 24, 1999. When
he went outside his house to check, he saw XXX stab Rolando while YYY was holding
Rolando’s arms at the back. He was at a distance of 6 meters from the stabbing incident.
When Austria shouted, the accused-appellants ran away. He recounted that the place was
lighted by an incandescent bulb and the light coming from Del Mundo’s tricycle.
Witness Amonelo testified that around 8:30pm, he was with his friends across the
store of Aling Choleng. XXX, YYY, Jason and Leonard, who were all intoxicated, approached
Amonelo’s group and challenged them to a fight. Rolando, the son of Aling Choleng, went out
of their house to pacify them. After appeasing both parties, Rolando told them to leave.
However, XXX threw a stone at Amonelo and Rolando which hit the latter. XXX warned
Rolando that they will return and they will kill him. He recounted that an angry Rolando ran
after XXX’s group. Amonelo followed Rolando and saw him engaged in a fist fight with XXX.
However, Leonardo went after Amonelo causing him to ran away. Amonelo’s uncle and aunt
pacified Leonardo and Amonelo. Thereafter, he went home with his parents and it was at
that time when he learned that Rolando was killed by accused-appellants.
Abetria, Rolando's father, narrated that on the day of the incident, he was sleeping at
their house when his friend arrived and informed him that his son was stabbed. He went to
Laguna Doctor's Hospital where he saw his son being revived. He then reported the incident
to the police station and accused-appellants were apprehended.
The RTC convicted XXX and YYY of murder and dismissed the case against Leonard
and Jason for failure of prosecution to present evidence. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
witnesses' positive identification that XXX, in conspiracy with YYY, stabbed Rolando with a
knife is superior than accused's claim of self-defense and denial.
The CA affirmed the conviction for murder with modification as to the penalty
because of the minority of accused-appellants when they committed the crime. The CA
affirmed the findings of the RTC that the eyewitnesses positively identified XXX and YYY as
the assailants of Rolando. Although their testimonies did not perfectly fit each other as to the
weapon used or the number of stabbing incident, it did not dilute their credibility, nor the
verity of their testimonies. It held that what is important is that their testimonies
corroborated each other on material points. It also found that conspiracy existed because of
the concerted acts of accused-appellants in the killing of Rolando.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of murder.
RULING
NO. The Court held that accused-appellants can only be convicted of Homicide,
instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing
of the victim.
In determining whether the killing was committed with treachery, two conditions
must be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means or method
of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that treachery was present in the
killing of the victim. As testified by Amonelo, there was an altercation prior to the stabbing
incident, although it was only Austria and Del Mundo who saw the actual stabbing.
Case law teaches us that there is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a
heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware
of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. The existence of a struggle before the
fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the
impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
To be sure, the attack made by accused-appellants was neither sudden nor
unexpected. Even assuming that the version of the defense is to be considered, XXX and YYY
narrated that there was a fistfight between them and Rolando's group on December 24, 1999
at around 10:00 p.m. As such, YYY's holding of Rolando's arms was just a part of the ongoing
fight. Hence, this should have made Rolando aware that there was an impending attack on
him. In another case, the Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated against accused-appellants because the victim was forewarned of the impending
attack and he could have in fact escaped had he not stumbled.
Conspiracy was also established by the evidence on record because of the concerted
efforts of both the accused. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be deduced
from the manner in which the offense is committed, as when the accused act in concert to
achieve the same objective.
In this case, Austria testified that YYY held Rolando from behind while XXX stabbed
him. Thus, YYY's participation in the commission of the crime charged is clear. Certainly, XXX
and YYY cooperated with one another to achieve their purpose of killing the victim. It is
sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, that
they had the same purpose or common design, and that they were united in its execution.
Accordingly, because conspiracy was established, there is no need to determine who

among the accused delivered the fatal blow. All of the accused are liable as principals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation, for in conspiracy the act of one
is the act of all.
Therefore, without appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime

is Homicide and not Murder. Under Article 249 of the RPC, any person found guilty of
Homicide shall be meted the penalty of reclusion temporal, a penalty which contains three
(3) periods.
Considering that XXX committed the crime when he was just 17 years and 7 months
old, and YYY when he was just 15 years and 8 months old, they are entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2)77 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed upon them shall be the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period. Thus, the imposable penalty
must be reduced by one degree from reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. 79 Given that there is no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall
be prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum penalty shall be prision
correcional in any of its periods. Thus, accused-appellants are to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years ofprision mayor,
as maximum.
Q: Witness Amonelo testified that around 8:30pm, he was with his friends across the
store of Aling Choleng. XXX, YYY, Jason and Leonard, who were all intoxicated,
approached Amonelo’s group and challenged them to a fight. Rolando, the son of Aling
Choleng, went out of their house to pacify them. After appeasing both parties, Rolando
told them to leave. However, XXX threw a stone at Amonelo and Rolando which hit the
latter. XXX warned Rolando that they will return and they will kill him. He recounted
that an angry Rolando ran after XXX’s group. Amonelo followed Rolando and saw him
engaged in a fist fight with XXX. However, Leonardo went after Amonelo causing him
to ran away. Amonelo’s uncle and aunt pacified Leonardo and Amonelo. Thereafter,
he went home with his parents and it was at that time when he learned that Rolando
was killed by accused-appellants. Likewise, Witness Del Mundo and Austria positively
identified XXX and YYY as perpetrator of the crime. They saw XXX stab Rolando while
YYY was holding Rolando’s arms at the back. The RTC and the CA found XXX and YYY
guilty of murder committed with treachery. Is the RTC and the CA correct?
A: NO. The Court held that accused-appellants can only be convicted of Homicide, instead of
Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of the
victim.
In determining whether the killing was committed with treachery, two conditions
must be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means or method
of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that treachery was present in the
killing of the victim. As testified by Amonelo, there was an altercation prior to the stabbing
incident, although it was only Austria and Del Mundo who saw the actual stabbing.
Case law teaches us that there is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the
hostility of the assailant towards the former. The existence of a struggle before the fatal
blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending
attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
To be sure, the attack made by accused-appellants was neither sudden nor

unexpected. Even assuming that the version of the defense is to be considered, XXX and YYY
narrated that there was a fistfight between them and Rolando's group on December 24, 1999
at around 10:00 p.m. As such, YYY's holding of Rolando's arms was just a part of the ongoing
fight. Hence, this should have made Rolando aware that there was an impending attack on
him. In another case, the Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated against accused-appellants because the victim was forewarned of the impending
attack and he could have in fact escaped had he not stumbled. (People of the Philippines v.
XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 242474, September 16, 2021, Third Division as penned by J. Carandang)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REX FUSINGAN DAPITAN
G.R. No. 253975, September 27, 2021, Second Division, (Perlas-Bernabe, S.A. J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of Malversation are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he
has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds
or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has
appropriated, taken, or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted the taking by another person of such funds or property.
Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the mere failure of
the public officer to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even the prima
facie case. In fine, conversion must be proved. However, an accountable officer may be
convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as
there is evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable to explain.
The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or

funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At
best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil liability, and may be
credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. This is
because damage is not an element of malversation.
FACTS
Sometime in October 2010, Dapitan, then Vice President for Finance, Administration,
and Resource Generation of Sultan Kudarat State University (SKSU), prepared a training
design for the Lakbay Aral of the SKSU’s key officials and employees to Surigao del Sur State
University (SSSU), which was approved by SKSU President Cambel.
Dapitan requested for a cash advance in the amount of P70,000.00 to cover

their transportation expenses. Subsequently, two (2) travel orders were issued
authorizing a number of SKSU's employees to participate in the activity on October 27 to 29,
2010.
It was alleged that the 27 participants visited the Tandag and Cantilan Campuses of
SSSU and stayed at the Pacific View Resort in Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. However, on
October 28, 2010, Dapitan and the other participants went on a side trip to attend the
wedding of a co-employee held also in Carrascal, the reception of which was held in
the aforesaid resort. On October 29, 2010, they failed to visit the Surigao del Norte College
of Agriculture and Technology (SDNCAT), as suggested by Cambel, allegedly due to bad
weather.
Only P50,625.00 was spent for the transportation, food, accommodation, and
cellphone load, while the excess of P19,375.00 was returned by Dapitan to University State
Auditor Jose Mercado (Mercado). In the Audit Observation Memorandum issued by
Mercado, he stated that the expenses incurred in the activity were irregular and
excessive since the training design was not followed. He also concluded that the
educational tour was only used by the participants to facilitate their attendance in the
wedding of their co-employee which was held in Carrascal. Accordingly, a Notice of
Disallowance was issued disallowing the amount of P50,625.00.
A criminal complaint for malversation of public funds against Dapitan was then filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, which in turn, found probable cause against him. The
Sandiganbayan found Dapitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
ordered him to pay the amount PHP50,625, representing the total value of the amount
malversed. He was likewise meted with the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification from holding any public office.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dalitan is guilty of malversation of public funds as defined under ART.
217 of the RPC.
RULING:
YES. The elements of Malversation are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c)
the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken, or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of such funds or
property.
In this regard, case law instructs that in the prosecution of this crime, the prosecution
is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence,
that the public officer appropriated, misappropriated or consented, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take public property or public
funds under his custody. Absent such evidence, the public officer cannot be held criminally
liable therefor. Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the
mere failure of the public officer to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make
even the prima facie case. In fine, conversion must be proved. However, an accountable
officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable
to explain.
Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Dapitan was a public officer at the time
material to the case, being then the VP of Finance, Administration, and Resource Generation
of the SKSU.
As to the second and third elements, as SKSU's VP of Finance, Administration, and

Resource Generation who admittedly received the funds intended for the Lakbay Aral
amounting to P70,000.00, Dapitan is indeed an accountable officer who was in custody of
public funds.
As to the fourth element, it has been established that Dapitan appropriated, took, and
misappropriated for personal use the funds intended for the Lakbay Aral amounting to
P50,625.00 when it was proven that: (a) the educational tour was deliberately scheduled to
coincide with the date of the wedding of their co-employee to ensure their attendance; (b)
they actually attended the wedding in Carrascal using public funds and on official time; and
(c) Dapitan paid for the participants' food, accommodation, and other incidental expenses
despite the provision in the training design to the contrary.
Dapitan's restitution of the amount malversed does not remove the fact that he
committed the crime of Malversation when he used public funds for the Lakbay Aral for some
other purpose, particularly, to ensure their attendance at their colleague's wedding.
In this regard, case law instructs that payment or reimbursement is not a defense for
exoneration in malversation. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or
compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission
of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from
the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the
offender's civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Q: XXX, then Vice President for Finance, Administration, and Resource Generation of
a state university, prepared a training design for the Lakbay Aral of the university’s
key officials and employees to another state university. XXX requested for a cash
advance in the amount of P70,000.00 to cover their transportation expenses.
However, it was alleged that the 27 participants stayed at the Pacific View Resort in
Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. XXX and the other participants went on a side trip to attend
the wedding of a co-employee held also in Carrascal, the reception of which was held
in the aforesaid resort. They failed to visit one of location of their itinerary allegedly
due to bad weather.
Only P50,625.00 was spent for the transportation, food, accommodation, and
cellphone load, while the excess of P19,375.00 was returned by XXXX to University
State Auditor. In the Audit Observation Memorandum issued by State Auditor, he
disallowed the expenses and concluded that the educational tour was only used by the
participants to facilitate their attendance in the wedding of their co-employee which
was held in Carrascal. A criminal complaint for malversation of public funds against
Dapitan was then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, which in turn, found
probable cause against him. Can XXX be held liable for malversation of public funds?
A: YES. The elements of Malversation are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b)
he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the
funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d)
he has appropriated, taken, or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of such funds or
property.
Anent the first element, it is undisputed that XXX was a public officer at the time
material to the case, being then the VP of Finance, Administration, and Resource Generation
of a state university. As to the second and third elements, as VP of Finance, Administration,
and Resource Generation who admittedly received the funds intended for the Lakbay Aral
amounting to P70,000.00, XXX is indeed an accountable officer who was in custody of public
funds. As to the fourth element, it has been established that XXX appropriated, took, and
misappropriated for personal use the funds intended for the Lakbay Aral amounting to
P50,625.00 when it was proven that: (a) the educational tour was deliberately scheduled to
coincide with the date of the wedding of their co-employee to ensure their attendance; (b)
they actually attended the wedding in Carrascal using public funds and on official time; and
(c) XXX paid for the participants' food, accommodation, and other incidental expenses
despite the provision in the training design to the contrary.
Dapitan's restitution of the amount malversed does not remove the fact that he
committed the crime of Malversation when he used public funds for the Lakbay Aral for some
other purpose, particularly, to ensure their attendance at their colleague's wedding. (People
of the Philippines v. Dapitan, G.R. No. 253975, September 27, 2021, Second Division, as penned
by J. Perlas-Bernabe)
ILDEFONSO TV PATDU JR ET AL. v. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES AND FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE-OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021, Second Division, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
With respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an aggrieved
party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause
is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the petition should be
filed not before the CA, but before the Supreme Court.
FACTS
Representative Syjuco informed Secretary Mendoza that the DBM issued special
allotment release orders (SARO) in the total amount of P6,249,528.00 for the purchase of
communications equipment for Region VI. She also requested to avail of an alternative
method of procurement allowed by the implementing rales of RA 9184. The BAC issued a
resolution recommending the purchase of communications equipment for Region VI through
direct contracting. This was approved by Secretary Mendoza.
Ng submitted his quotation for 1,582 units of Nokia 1100 cellphone model. In his
quotation, Ng enclosed a Distribution Certification issued by Smart Communications, Inc.
(Smart) stating that West Island was assigned as its exclusive distributor in areas that
include the entire Second district of Iloilo. However, West Island was not Smart’s exclusive
distributor. The documentary requirements were also prepared in haste in order to beat the
deadline, otherwise, the SAROs will expire and the allotment will revert to the general funds.
West Island received the purchase order. Inspection Reports and a certificate of
acceptance of the units were issued. West Island, for its part, issued a delivery receipt and a
charge invoice for the cellphone units in the amount of P6,248,900.00. It was claimed,
however, that Ng received payment without delivering the cellphone units.
The OMB found probable cause to charge petitioners together with Representative
Syjuco, Secretary Mendoza, Reyes, Soneja, Santidad, Desiderio, Dela Rosa, and Ng, with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Malversation through Falsification. The OMB found
that these individuals, conspired with each other through seemingly separate but
collaborative acts to defraud the government. It found that the elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were present. The first and second elements were not in
issue, while the third and fourth elements were shown by the concerted acts of the charged
individuals.
Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition outright for
having been filed with the wrong court. It reasoned that the remedy to assail the OMB’s
findings of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing an original action for certiorari with
the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari for lack
of jurisdiction.
RULING
NO. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright. The proper
mode to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing a petition
for certiorari before the SC — which petitioners failed to do.
The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-
administrative cases is still by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court, and not with the
CA. This doctrine has never been struck down or abandoned by the case in Carpio-Morales.
This is supported by a more recent case, Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon (Yatco). Yatco also assailed the OMB's ruling in a criminal case for lack of probable
cause before the CA, which the latter likewise dismissed. As this case was also further
appealed, the Court, in its disposition, reiterated Gatchalian, and stated:
Meanwhile, with respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of
probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cf the Rules of Court and the
petition should be filed not before the CA, but before the Supreme Court.
It follows then that petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of
probable cause against them when they elevated the case before the wrong forum, Similar
with how the Court proceeded in Gatchalian and Yatco, it is not proper for this Court to
just assume jurisdiction and rule on the merits of the instant case given petitioners'
availment of the wrong remedy.
Q: Representative A informed Secretary B that the DBM issued special allotment
release orders (SARO) in the total amount of P6,249,528.00 for the purchase of
communications equipment for Region VI. She also requested to avail of an alternative
method of procurement allowed by the implementing rales of RA 9184. The BAC
issued a resolution recommending the purchase of communications equipment for
Region VI through direct contracting. C submitted his quotation for 1,582 units of
Nokia 1100 cellphone model. The documentary requirements were prepared in haste
in order to beat the deadline, otherwise, the SAROs will expire and the allotment will
revert to the general funds. C received the purchase order. Inspection Reports and a
certificate of acceptance of the units were issued. C, for its part, issued a delivery
receipt and a charge invoice for the cellphone units in the amount of P6,248,900.00. It
was claimed, however, that C received payment without delivering the cellphone
units.
The OMB found probable cause to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, and Malversation through Falsification. The OMB found that these
individuals, conspired with each other through seemingly separate but collaborative
acts to defraud the government. Petitioners appealed the finding of probable cause to
the CA. The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong
court. It reasoned that the remedy to assail the OMB’s findings of probable cause in
criminal cases is by filing an original action for certiorari with the SC. Is the CA correct
in dismissing the said petition?
A: YES. The proper mode to assail the OMB's finding of probable cause in criminal cases is
by filing a petition for certiorari before the SC — which petitioners failed to do. Case law
instructs that with respect to criminal charges, the Court has settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of
probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cf the Rules of Court and the
petition should be filed not before the CA, but before the Supreme Court.
It follows then that petitioners have lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of
probable cause against them when they elevated the case before the wrong forum, Similar
with how the Court proceeded in Gatchalian and Yatco, it is not proper for this Court to
just assume jurisdiction and rule on the merits of the instant case given petitioners'
availment of the wrong remedy. (Patdu Jr et al v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September
27, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABDUL RACMAN OSOP OMAR AND EDDIE RASCAL Y
SARAPIDA
G.R. No. 238870, October 6, 2021, First Division, (Lopez J, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence provides that in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused
charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.
An accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the Court has
provided that the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant conviction: (a)
the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.
In the crimes of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, case law instructs that it is essential for the identity of the prohibited drug to be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral
part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the
drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
FACTS
PO2 Vildosola testified that while he was at the public market doing patrol work
around 10am on February 13, 2013, he received a report from a civilian asset that 2 persons
known as alias Abdul (Omar) and Eddie (Rascal) were selling drugs at Barangay San
Francisco, Panabo City, Davao del Norte. Immediately, the police organized a buy bust team,
where PO2 Vildosola was designated as a poseur buyer.
After the exchange of the shabu and the marked money, PO2 Vildosola shouted loudly
to Omar and Rascal that they were police officers and pulled out his firearm and directed
them to drop to the ground. They read to Omar and Rascal their rights and frisked them.
They recovered 79 sachets containing the alleged shabu, a lighter, a cellphone, and other
personal items from Rascal while they seized the marked money, a cellphone and other
belongings from Omar.
PO2 Vildosola marked the seized sachets of the alleged shabu at the crime scene in
the presence of Omar and Rascal, DOJ representative, a media representative, and a barangay
kagawad. An inventory of the seized items then followed. Photographs were taken during
the inventory. PO2 Vildosola took custody of the seized sachets and brought Omar and Rascal
and the sachets to the crime laboratory. PO2 Sapul corroborated the material aspects of the
account given by PO2 Vildosola.
On the part of the defense, Omar and Rascal alleged a frame-up. They testified that on
the day of their arrest, they were looking for a family member who had eloped. Omar went
to a store to buy shampoo and cellphone load when the police arrested him. Rascal followed
Omar to the store when he realized that Omar was taking a long time to return. They were
both arrested and brought across a cemetery, where they saw the items purportedly seized
from them already prepared. Their pictures were taken in front of a cemetery.
The RTC convicted Omar and Rascal for illegal sale and for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the illegal sale and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs.
RULING
YES. Jurisprudence provides that in order to properly secure the conviction of an
accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment.
The first element is met in this case. As found by the CA, PO2 Vildosola, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, categorically identified Omar and Rascal as the ones who sold him P1,000
worth of shabu. The second element was likewise met. PO2 Vildosola testified that he handed
Omar the buy-bust money and the latter pocketed it. Rascal, on the other hand, took one of
the sachets of shabu from his blue belt bag and handed the sachet he though was worth
P1,000 to Omar, who also handed the same to PO2 Vildosola. His testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Sapul and substantiated with the evidence of
laboratory examination, buy-bust money, inventory of property witnessed by relevant
officers, marked sachets of the prohibited drugs, and several photographs taken during the
operation.
An accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the Court has
provided that the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant conviction:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
For the first element, it is worth pointing out that 79 sachets of shabu were recovered
from Rascal. For the second and third elements, Rascal did not make any assertion that such
possession was authorized. His free and conscious possession of the drug was manifested
when he did not utter words denying his possession of shabu at the time of his arrest nor
shouted for help for the wrong accusation thrown at him by the police officers.
In the crimes of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
Here, the prosecution was able to account for every link in the chain of custody. The
first link was established when PO2 Vildosola marked the sachet sold to him by Omar and
Rascal with the other 79 sachets marked likewise. The second and third links were
established when PO2 Vildosola testified that after he marked the items, he took custody of
the same and brough them to Panabo Police Station. From Panabo, accused and the seized
items were brought to crime laboratory. The fourth link was established when the 80 sachets
were brought to court.
Further, the numerous sachets of drugs seized diminished the possibility of planting
or tampering of evidence. The prosecution likewise complied with the three witness rule
(any media representative, any DOJ representative, any elected public official).
Q: Upon receiving an information of sale of drugs against the accused, the police
organized a buy bust team, where PO2 Vildosola was designated as a poseur buyer.
After the exchange of the shabu and the marked money, the police officers
apprehended Omar and Rascal. They read to Omar and Rascal their rights and frisked
them. They recovered 79 sachets containing the alleged shabu, among others. PO2
Vildosola marked the seized sachets of the alleged shabu at the crime scene in the
presence of Omar and Rascal, DOJ representative, a media representative, and a
barangay kagawad. An inventory of the seized items then followed. Photographs were
taken during the inventory. PO2 Vildosola took custody of the seized sachets and
brought Omar and Rascal and the sachets to the crime laboratory. PO2 Sapul
corroborated the material aspects of the account given by PO2 Vildosola. Did the
police officers acted properly to warrant the finding that the accused are guilty of
illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs?
A: YES. In the crimes of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
Here, the prosecution was able to account for every link in the chain of custody. The
first link was established when PO2 Vildosola marked the sachet sold to him by Omar and
Rascal with the other 79 sachets marked likewise. The second and third links were
established when PO2 Vildosola testified that after he marked the items, he took custody of
the same and brough them to Panabo Police Station. From Panabo, accused and the seized
items were brought to crime laboratory. The fourth link was established when the 80 sachets
were brought to court. Further, the numerous sachets of drugs seized diminished the
possibility of planting or tampering of evidence. The prosecution likewise complied with the
three witness rule (any media representative, any DOJ representative, any elected public
official). (People of the Philippines v. Omar and Rascal, G.R. No. 238870, October 6, 2021, First
Division, as penned by J. J Lopez)
DOMINADOR G. MARZAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 226167, October 11, 2021, Second Division, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the
offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the
offenser allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act; (3) the act
performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection
with the official duty of the latter.
The crime of violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the
following modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer
to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer; or
(2) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to perform
said act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer.
The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer. It is immaterial whether the
one who induced him was likewise a public officer or a private individual.
FACTS
In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan, Marzan and Atty. Rupisan were
charged with violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019. The Information stated that Provincial
Legal Officer Basilio Pascual Rupisan willfully, unlawfully, and criminally persuade, induce
or influence accused Senior Jail Officer 3 Marzan to relase from detention Cyrus Dulay and
Wendell Pascua without Court Order and in violation of existing rules and regulations. Atty
Rupisan made representation that the commitment and detention were unlawful since there
were no warrants issued for their arrest and he had obtained a recognizance document
which was not in proper form and without Court approval. Jail Chief Inspector Tapiru was
informed that Cyrus and Pascua were released from detention without any court order. He
ordered Marzan to rearrest Cyrus and Pasuca.
In view of the foregoing, administrative charges and criminal complaints were filed
against Marzan and Atty Rupisan with the Office of the Ombudsman. After preliminary
investigation, they were both charged with violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019. The
Sandiganbayan convicted both Marzan and Atty Rupisan of the crime charged.
Marzan argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he allowed himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty Rupisam. He asserts that he released them from
detention pursuant to the instruction of his superior, Goyo, and not by virtue of Atty.
Rupisan’s inducement or influence. If indeed, he was persuaded, induced, or influenced to
release Cyrus and Pascua, it was through a private individual Ciriaco, the father of Cyrus,
who was a relative of the town’s Vice Mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner despite the
prosecution’s alleged failure to prove all the elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
NO. The Court held in the negative. The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are: (1)
the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another
public officer to perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit an act; (3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed
by the offender constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter.
Here, the prosecution duly established the existence of the foregoing elements. First,
it is undisputed that Marzan was a public officer at the time of the commission of the crime.
Second, the crime of violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either
of the following modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces, or influences another
public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the public officer; or (2) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations
the public officer.
Atty Rupisan is found guilty under the first mode of Section 3(a) in view of his
unauthorized intervention in the processing of the release of Cyrus and Pascua. Marzan is
liable for the second mode of Section 3 (a) for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced by Atty Rupisan. The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the
offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer,
such as Marzan. It is immaterial whether the one who induced him was likewise a public
officer or a private individual such as Ciriaco.
Lastly, Marzan unlawfully released Cyrus and Pascua. Cyrus and Pascua were lawfully
detained pursuant to a duly issued commitment order of a court of law and yet they were
released pursuant to an improperly issued Recognizance, without an accompanying Court
Order, in violation of the law and the BJMP rules and Regulations.
Q: In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan, Marzan and Atty. Rupisan were
charged with violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019. The Information stated that
Provincial Legal Officer Basilio Pascual Rupisan willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
persuade, induce or influence accused Senior Jail Officer 3 Marzan to release from
detention Cyrus Dulay and Wendell Pascua without Court Order and in violation of
existing rules and regulations. Atty Rupisan made representation that the
commitment and detention were unlawful since there were no warrants issued for
their arrest and he had obtained recognizance document which was not in proper
form and without Court approval.
Marzan argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he allowed himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty Rupisam. He asserts that he released them
from detention pursuant to the instruction of his superior, Goyo, and not by virtue of
Atty. Rupisan’s inducement or influence. If indeed, he was persuaded, induced, or
influenced to release Cyrus and Pascua, it was through a private individual Ciriaco, the
father of Cyrus, who was a relative of the town’s Vice Mayor. Is the contention of
Marzan tenable?
A: NO. The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2)
the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the
offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act; (3) the act
performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection
with the official duty of the latter.
First, it is undisputed that Marzan was a public officer at the time of the commission
of the crime. Second, the crime of violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 may be committed in
either of the following modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces, or influences
another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
the public officer; or (2) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations
the public officer. Marzan is liable for the second mode of Section 3 (a) for allowing himself
to be persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty Rupisan. The law is clear that the second
mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced, is a public officer, such as Marzan. It is immaterial whether the one who induced
him was likewise a public officer or a private individual such as Ciriaco.
Lastly, Marzan unlawfully released Cyrus and Pascua. Cyrus and Pascua were lawfully
detained pursuant to a duly issued commitment order of a court of law and yet they were
released pursuant to an improperly issued Recognizance, without an accompanying Court
Order, in violation of the law and the BJMP rules and Regulations. (Marzan v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 226167, October 11, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
ELIZABETH HORCA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 224316, November 10, 2021, Second Division, (Hernando, J.)
DOCTRINE
Under ART. 308 of the RPC, the crime of theft is committed when the following elements
concur: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be one with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence, intimidation, or
force upon persons or things.
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender and can be presumed from the unlawful taking.
civil aspect of the criminal case can survive an acquittal when it is based on reasonable
doubt. In this scenario, even though the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the
crime with moral certainty, the civil action can still prevail as long as preponderant evidence
tilts in favor of a finding of liability.
FACTS
Sister Linda Jo Reynolds, a member of the Sisters of Providence, procured the services
of petitioner and Expert Travel to be the group’s travel agent for a trip to Rome, Italy
scheduled in October 2001. A couple of months before the trip, Sister Reynolds ordered from
petitioner 19 airline tickets and issued two BPI checks amounting to P502,813.25 each, or in
the total amount of P1,005,626.50 as payment.
Although the agency, through Horca, acknowledged and issued an official receipt for
the payment of the 19 tickets, Sister Reynolds only received four and was informed that the
other 15 tickets were stolen. The 4 tickets could not be used and had to be returned to
petitioner because the flight covered by the said tickets was cancelled.
Sister Reynolds made several demands for petitioner to return the amount. However,
despite her promise to pay back Sister Reynolds the full amount, petitioner was only able to
return P90,000. Thus, Sister Reynolds filed a complaint before the RTC.
Petitioner averred that she was not able to deliver all of the tickets to the Sisters of
Providence because the airline company which issued them filed for bankruptcy and the
flight was eventually cancelled. The Swiss Air refunded the value of the checks to Expert
Travel but she was unable to get the money from the agency. Wanting to save face, and
thinking that the travel agency would reimburse her, petitioner voluntarily refunded Sister
Reynolds the amount of P90,000, with the rest of the amount to be paid on installment and
the interest amortized. However, Expert Travel did not reimburse petitioner because it was
already going to close and stop operations.
The RTC rendered its decision holding that all the elements of the crime of theft were
present. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Theft under ART. 308 of the Revised Penal Code. (NO)
2. If petitioner is acquitted of the crime of theft, whether or not petitioner is
civilly liable to the Sister of Providence. (YES)
RULING
Under ART. 308 of the RPC, the crime of theft is committed when the following
elements concur: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs
to another; (3) that the taking be one with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without
the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things.
The Court found that there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioner because
the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the crucial element of taking with intent to gain.
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender and can be presumed from the unlawful taking. In this case,
however, the prosecution failed to adduce any concrete evidence which would show that
Horca had taken the cash for her own personal gain. On the contrary, the records show that
Horca actually used the money covered by the checks for its intended purpose, i.e. to
purchase the airline tickets, albeit only four were initially delivered to Sister Reynolds.
In the complaint, Sister Reynolds claimed that Horca deceived her when she told her
that the 15 tickets were stolen from one of the agency’s employees who was tasked to deliver
them and that Horca never intended to deliver all of the tickets. However, this was not
adequately proven during trial or was it even discussed at all. It is thus unclear from the
prosecution evidence how these tickets were stolen or if Horca had taken the money
intended for the purchase of the tickets and that she kept it for her own benefit.
For her part, Horca explained that the tickets were not delivered because of Swiss Air
bankruptcy and not because it was stolen. From the foregoing, it cannot be conclusively
stated that Horca took the money for her own account when there is evidence which suggests
that she used the checks for the purpose it was given.
It is also not established if Horca took or received the money after Swiss Air
reimbursed the amount to the travel agency. Per Horca’s account, when the flight was
cancelled, Swiss Air refunded the money to Expert Travel and not to petitioner. There was
no clear evidence presented to prove that the money reimbursed by Swiss Air landed in the
hands of Horca.
However, her acquittal does not necessarily amount to her absolution from civil
liability. The civil aspect of the criminal case can survive an acquittal when it is based on
reasonable doubt. In this scenario, even though the evidence presented does not establish
the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action can still prevail as long as
preponderant evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability.
There is reason for the Court to believe that Horca should be held civilly liable to the
Sisters of Providence. The fact remains that Sister Reynolds and her congregation was
prejudiced when they paid for the tickets but did not get reimbursed when the flight was
cancelled. This is also supported by Horca’s own acts when she acknowledged the need to
return the money and when she actually paid Sister Reynolds the amount P90,000 to
partially cover for the tickets. This essentially amounts to an admission of her liability to
return the said amount.
Q: The Sisters of Providence procured the services of A and Expert Travel to be the
group’s travel agent for a trip to Rome, Italy scheduled in October 2001. They ordered
from petitioner 19 airline tickets and issued two BPI checks amounting to
P1,005,626.50 as payment. However, they only received 4 tickets and was informed
that the other 15 tickets were stolen. The 4 tickets could not be used and had to be
returned to petitioner because the flight covered by the said tickets was cancelled.
They made several demands for A to return the amount. However, despite A’s promise
to pay back the full amount, A was only able to return P90,000. Thus, a complaint for
theft was filed before the RTC. A averred that she was not able to deliver all of the
tickets to the Sisters of Providence because the airline company which issued them
filed for bankruptcy and the flight was eventually cancelled. The Swiss Air refunded
the value of the checks to Expert Travel but she was unable to get the money from the
agency.
The RTC rendered its decision holding that all the elements of the crime of theft were
present. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Is A liable for theft? If not,
is A civilly liable to return the amount?
A: NO. A is not liable for theft, but A is civilly liable to return the amount.
Under ART. 308 of the RPC, the crime of theft is committed when the following
elements concur: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs
to another; (3) that the taking be one with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without
the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things. In this case, however, the prosecution failed to
adduce any concrete evidence which would show that Horca had taken the cash for her own
personal gain. On the contrary, the records show that Horca actually used the money covered
by the checks for its intended purpose, i.e. to purchase the airline tickets, albeit only four
were initially delivered to Sister Reynolds.
However, her acquittal does not necessarily amount to her absolution from civil
liability. The civil aspect of the criminal case can survive an acquittal when it is based on
reasonable doubt. In this scenario, even though the evidence presented does not establish
the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action can still prevail as long as
preponderant evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability.
There is reason for the Court to believe that Horca should be held civilly liable to the
Sisters of Providence. The fact remains that Sister Reynolds and her congregation was
prejudiced when they paid for the tickets but did not get reimbursed when the flight was
cancelled. This is supported by Horca’s own acts when she acknowledged the need to return
the money and when she actually paid Sister Reynolds the amount P90,000 to partially cover
for the tickets. This essentially amounts to an admission of her liability to return the said
amount. (Horca v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224316, November 10, 2021, Second
Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN BATINO Y EVANGELISTA
DOCTRINE
The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs are as follows: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and, (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. In a buy-bust operation, the receipt by the poseur-buyer
of the dangerous drug and the corresponding receipt by the seller of the marked money
consummate the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. What matters is the proof that the sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus
delicti, as evidence.
The elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs are as follows: (a)
the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.
In both offenses of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession, related to establishing the identity
of the dangerous drugs is the chain of custody rule. It must be shown that the items presented
and identified in court during trial are the very same items that were sold and seized from the
accused during the buy-bust operation. The marking, taking of photographs, and inventory of
the seized items must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items in the
presence of two witnesses (as compared with the previous requirement of three witnesses): an
elected public official, and a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media.
The provision allows for the marking, taking of photographs, and inventory be conducted in the
nearest police station or office if practicable in case of warrantless seizures. It further provides
that the seized items must be immediately brought to the forensic laboratory for examination.
FACTS
An information from a confidential agent about the illegal drug activities of Batino
prompted the Philippine National Police of Bay, Laguna to conduct a buy-bust operation. At
the same time, the police officers were able to procure a search warrant from the RTC of San
Pablo City to search the house of Batino. PO1 Bassig was designated as the poseur buyer.
In the operation, PO1 Bassig and the informant approached Batino. The informant
then asked Batino if he had something on hand at that time as his (informant) companion
(referring to PO1 Bassig) wanted to buy five packs. Batino replied in the affirmative. PO1
Bassig then gave him the marked money as payment. Batino in turn handed PO1 Bassig a
plastic sachet containing suspected illegal drug, which he took out from a small metal
container from his pocket.
PO1 Bassig then carried out their pre-arranged signal by pulling out the key of
Batino's motorcycle. He then introduced himself as a police officer and informed Batino of
his rights and nature of the offense. PO1 Bassig subsequently conducted a preventive search
on the body of Batino; he inspected the small metal box and found three more plastic sachets
containing suspected illegal drugs. The evidence were immediately marked. The marking
was witnessed by a barangay chairman and media representative. An inventory was
prepared by the police and signed by the witnesses.
The police officers together with Batino and the witnesses proceeded to Batino's
house to implement the search warrant. The search yielded 11 more plastic sachets
containing suspected illegal drugs. PO1 Bassig immediately marked the items in the presence
of the witnesses, Batino, and Batino's relatives. Another inventory was prepared by the
police officers for the items from the search of the house. This was also signed by
the barangay chairman and media representative as witnesses. Batino also signed a
document on good conduct search.
PO1 Bassig testified that he was in possession of all the seized items until their
turnover to the crime laboratory. The investigating officer prepared a request for laboratory
examination. Thereafter, they went to the crime laboratory and PO1 Bassig personally
turned over the seized items to the chemist. The laboratory test conducted showed that the
seized items were positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Three Information were filed against Batino for 1 count of illegal sale under Section 5
of RA 9165 and 2 counts of illegal possession under Section 11 of RA 9165.
The RTC convicted Batino for the illegal sale and 1 count of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. However, he was acquitted from 1 count of illegal possession because the
drugs recovered from his house was due to an invalid search warrant for lack of particularity
of the description of the place to be searched. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not Batino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Sale
and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
RULING
YES. The Court held in the affirmative. The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
are as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and, (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In a buy-bust
operation, the receipt by the poseur-buyer of the dangerous drug and the corresponding
receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. What matters is the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
are as follows: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.
The prosecution was able to establish the consummation of the sale of dangerous
drugs. Also, the preventive search conducted after the buy-bust sale established that Batino
was further in possession of dangerous drugs with intent to possess and without authority
of law. Therefore, there is no dispute and there is no shade of doubt that Batino sold to PO1
Bassig and was in possession of dangerous drugs.
In both offenses of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession, related to establishing the
identity of the dangerous drugs is the chain of custody rule. The rule on chain of custody
establishes the identity of the object of the sale or the item possessed by the accused without
authority. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized dangerous drugs in order to fully remove doubts as to its identity. It must be shown
that the items presented and identified in court during trial are the very same items that
were sold and seized from the accused during the buy-bust operation. The marking, taking
of photographs, and inventory of the seized items must be done immediately after seizure
and confiscation of the items in the presence of two witnesses (as compared with the
previous requirement of three witnesses): an elected public official, and a representative
from the National Prosecution Service or the media. The provision allows for the marking,
taking of photographs, and inventory be conducted in the nearest police station or office if
practicable in case of warrantless seizures. It further provides that the seized items must be
immediately brought to the forensic laboratory for examination.
In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the requirements of chain of custody
were sufficiently observed. The marking, inventory, as well as the taking of photographs of
the seized items were immediately done after the arrest and seizure in the presence of two
required witnesses, barangay chairman Dungo and media representative Chavez, who
likewise signed the inventory. Pursuant to RA 10640, having two witnesses, an elected public
official together with a representative from the National Prosecution service or the media,
during the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the seized items would be
compliant. After marking (and before proceeding to Batino's house for the search), PO1
Bassig placed the seized items in an evidence bag. He was then able to present the very same
items to the investigating officer when they returned to the police station. Therefore, it can
be safely concluded that the seized items remained in his possession during the whole
operation, from seizure to the forensic laboratory.
Q: In a buy-bust operation, PO1 A and the informant approached B. The informant then
asked B if he had something on hand at that time as his (informant) companion
(referring to PO1 A) wanted to buy five packs. B replied in the affirmative. PO1 A then
gave him the marked money as payment. B in turn handed to PO1 A a plastic sachet
containing the illegal drug. A then introduced himself as a police officer and informed
B of his rights and nature of the offense. A subsequently conducted a preventive search
on the body of B; he inspected the small metal box and found three more plastic
sachets containing suspected illegal drugs. The evidence were immediately marked.
The marking was witnessed by a barangay chairman and a media representative. An
inventory was prepared by the police and signed by the witnesses. A testified that he
was in possession of all the seized items until their turnover to the crime laboratory.
The investigating officer prepared a request for laboratory examination. Thereafter,
they went to the crime laboratory and PO1 A personally turned over the seized items
to the chemist. The laboratory test conducted showed that the seized items were
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The
RTC convicted B for the illegal sale and the illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Are the police officers compliant with the chain of
custody rule?
A: YES. In both offenses of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession, related to establishing the
identity of the dangerous drugs is the chain of custody rule. It must be shown that the items
presented and identified in court during trial are the very same items that were sold and
seized from the accused during the buy-bust operation. The marking, taking of photographs,
and inventory of the seized items must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation
of the items in the presence of two witnesses (as compared with the previous requirement
of three witnesses): an elected public official, and a representative from the National
Prosecution Service or the media. The provision allows for the marking, taking of
photographs, and inventory be conducted in the nearest police station or office if practicable
in case of warrantless seizures. It further provides that the seized items must be immediately
brought to the forensic laboratory for examination.
In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the requirements of chain of custody
were sufficiently observed. The marking, inventory, as well as the taking of photographs of
the seized items were immediately done after the arrest and seizure in the presence of two
required witnesses, barangay chairman and media representative, who likewise signed the
inventory. Pursuant to RA 10640, having two witnesses, an elected public official together
with a representative from the National Prosecution service or the media, during the
marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the seized items would be compliant. After
marking A placed the seized items in an evidence bag. He was then able to present the very
same items to the investigating officer when they returned to the police station. Therefore,
it can be safely concluded that the seized items remained in his possession during the whole
operation, from seizure to the forensic laboratory. (People of the Philippines v. Batino, G.R. No.
254035, November 15, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Hernando)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KEVIN CASTILLO Y GALANG
DOCTRINE
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The State bears the burden of
not only proving the elements of the offense of sale of dangerous drugs, but also of proving the
corpus delicti, the body of the crime. The dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the
violation of the law.
To establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, the proper handling
of the confiscated drug must be shown. When substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody as
to raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court, the prosecution does
not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the corpus delicti.
Deviations from the clear-cut procedure may be allowed, the same however (1) must be
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution; (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had been preserved; and (3) the justifiable ground for noncompliance is proven as a
fact. Moreover, it must be alleged and proved that earnest efforts were made to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses.
FACTS
On December 11, 2015, around 9am, a walk-in male confidential informant reported
to P.Insp. Yap the illegal drug activities of a certain “Kevin” at Barangay Bagong Silangan,
Quezon City. The confidential informant and alias Kevin agreed to meet at 11:30pm for the
informant’s order of shabu. A buy-bust operation was then planned whereby PO3 Lazo
would act as the poseur-buyer while PO3 Alieger would be the backup officer.
Castillo arrived at the target area and was introduced by the confidential informant
to PO3 Lazo. Castillo showed 5 small transparent sachets containing the suspected shabu.
PO3 Lazo gave the buy-bust money. In exchange, Castillo gave PO3 Lazo the 5 sachets
containing the suspected shabu. Afterwards, the police officer arrested Castillo. The buy-bust
money was recovered from Castillo. The team left the place of arrest and immediately
proceeded to their office since there had been several shooting incidents in the area. PO3
Lazo alleged that the plastic sachets were in his custody while in transit back to their office.
Upon arrival at the office, PO3 Lazo marked the seized items. Around 2am, December
12, PO3 Lazo then turned over the seized items to the police investigator, PO3 Mataverde.
The marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized items were conducted in the
presence of Castillo, a barangay kagawad, and a media representative. Around 3:40pm, PO3
Mataverde delivered the seized items to the crime laboratory for examination. The report
yielded a positive result for shabu.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The RTC held that the prosecution established the elements
of the crime and that the chain of custody of the subject drugs had not been broken. The CA
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not Castillo is guilty of Illegal Sale of shabu.
RULING:
NO. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the following elements must
be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The State
bears the burden of not only proving the elements of the offense of sale of dangerous drugs,
but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. The dangerous drug itself is the
very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
In this case, the testimony of PO3 Lazo and the physical evidence presented in trial
confirms the presence of the first two elements of illegal sale. There is no doubt that Castillo
delivered the shabu to PO3 Lazo, who in exchange gave the marked bills as consideration.
However, the prosecution failed to establish the apprehending team’s compliance

with the chain of custody rule, particularly regarding the required witnesses.
To establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, the proper
handling of the confiscated drug must be shown. When substantial gaps occur in the chain of
custody as to raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court, the
prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the corpus
delicti.
Case law teaches that the seized item must be immediately marked at the place of
arrest to obviate any possibility of tampering or switching. This measure was blatantly
disregarded by the police officers. The records clearly show that the police officers did not
immediately mark the seized items at the place of the arrest. Instead, they brought the
unmarked seized items to their office on the pretext that they felt uneasy marking the items
at the place of arrest considering the happening of several shooting incidents thereat.
Deviations from the clear-cut procedure may be allowed, the same however (1) must
be satisfactorily explained by the prosecution; (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had been preserved; and (3) the justifiable ground for noncompliance is
proven as a fact. Moreover, it must be alleged and proved that earnest efforts were made to
secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses.
In this case, the apprehending team’s explanation is hardly satisfactory. There was no
showing of an imminent danger to their life. Also, the law enforcers’ allegation that the place
was unsafe was self-serving. It was not established as a fact. Hence, it does not merit any
credence.
In fine, the failure of the apprehending team to observe the procedural requirements
in RA 9165 puts into serious doubt the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
casting reasonable doubt on Castillo’s guilt. Thus, the Court acquitted Castillo.
Q: A buy-bust operation was planned and conducted against A. A arrived at the target
area and was introduced by the confidential informant to B, a police officer. A showed
5 small transparent sachets containing the suspected shabu. B gave the buy-bust
money. In exchange, A gave B the 5 sachets containing the suspected shabu.
Afterwards, the police officer arrested A. The buy-bust money was recovered from A.
The team left the place of arrest and immediately proceeded to their office since there
had been several shooting incidents in the area. B alleged that the plastic sachets were
in his custody while in transit back to their office. Upon arrival at the office, B marked
the seized items. Around 2am, December 12, B then turned over the seized items to
the police investigator. The marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized items
were conducted in the presence of A, a barangay kagawad, and a media
representative. Around 3:40pm, the police investigator delivered the seized items to
the crime laboratory for examination. The report yielded a positive result for shabu.
Did the police officers observe the chain of custody rule which would prove A’s guilt
for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
A: NO. To establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, the illegal drug,
the proper handling of the confiscated drug must be shown. Case law teaches that the seized
item must be immediately marked at the place of arrest to obviate any possibility of
tampering or switching. This measure was blatantly disregarded by the police officers. The
records clearly show that the police officers did not immediately mark the seized items at
the place of the arrest. Instead, they brought the unmarked seized items to their office on the
pretext that they felt uneasy marking the items at the place of arrest considering the
happening of several shooting incidents thereat.
Deviations from the clear-cut procedure may be allowed, the same however (1) must
be satisfactorily explained by the prosecution; (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had been preserved; and (3) the justifiable ground for noncompliance is
proven as a fact. Moreover, it must be alleged and proved that earnest efforts were made to
secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses. In this case, the apprehending team’s
explanation is hardly satisfactory. There was no showing of an imminent danger to their life.
Also, the law enforcers’ allegation that the place was unsafe was self-serving. It was not
established as a fact. Hence, it does not merit any credence. (People of the Philippines v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 242520, November 15, 2021, Second Division, as penned by J. Hernando)

Dean S Circle Criminal Law With Qna

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

EDDIE OLAZO, MIGUEL CORDIS, CHARITO

Taking advantage of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance was also

In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Dandito questioned AAA’s

SB convicted the Petitioners for the crime of Malversation through Falsification of

Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala, South Cotabato on

Version of the Defense

Version of the Prosecution

Raytos failed to establish the elements of self-defense. To exonerate himself, the

On the contrary, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently established

Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger -

The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable

1. The offender is a public officer;

In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or

The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable

A: YES. In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or

The purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the

A: NO. The purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the

As correctly observed by the CA, Ruben's flimsy defense of consensual sexual

Duran invoked self-defense. According to him, on January 9, 2009 at around 2:15 to

Even if Duran's account of an attempted robbery against him is to be believed, his

The testimonies of both witnesses, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:

G.R. No. 196094 (second petition)

x x x [T]he Information in the case at bar categorically stated the address of

Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

Bareng's identification of accused-appellant is also questionable given his

Against the inconsistent statements of the lone eyewitness, accused-appellants’

1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or

A buy-bust operation was conducted. The informant introduced PO3 Rivera to

Police Senior Inspector Christopher N. Luyun, the Chief of SAID-SOTG, thereafter

As confirmed by the testimonies presented by the prosecution, SAID-SOTG's lone

However, with respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the

Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent

On the matter of treachery as a qualifying circumstance of Murder, the courts a quo

Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required of the mandatory

To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be

Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in

A: YES. For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade

As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence

A: NO. As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence

Statutory Rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the

Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

Furthermore, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of

As stated, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a

As stated, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a

The accused-appellant was thus subjected to a drug test as a result of his

On cross examination, SPO1 Lumabao testified that he placed markings on the

The RTC convicted accused- appellant De Leon of violating Section 5, Article II of RA

In his defense, accused-appellant Mario Bulutano denies participation in the crime

Furthermore, the absence of evidence as to improper or ill motive on the part

For his part, the accused-appellant interposed the defense of frame-up.

The RTC convicted Guerrero of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Aggrieved,

The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA