The Israeli Military and The Origins of The 1967 War

Downloaded by [INFLIBNET Centre] at 05:22 29 August 2012
The Israeli Military and the

Origins of the 1967 War
This new book examines the relationship between the Israeli armed forces,
the government and the origins of the 1967 war. It analyses the effect of
the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defence policy between 1963
and 1967, against the backdrop of developments in the Middle East, and
Israeli decision-making immediately preceding the Six Day War in June
1967. A watershed event in the Arab–Israeli conflict, the war has had a
profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the
character of Israel over the past four decades.
Making extensive use of original documents, including protocols of
meetings of the general staff and the government, discussions between the
Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, as well as testi-
monies by IDF generals, this volume sheds new light on the dramatic
tension between the army and the Israeli government in the weeks preced-
ing the conflict and the army’s intervention in diplomatic initiatives. It also
discloses the steps taken by the US Administration and its fluctuating pol-
icies during the crisis: from firm opposition to a pre-emptive Israeli strike,
to support for such an operation.
This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern poli-
tics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
Ami Gluska lectures in history and political science at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem and the Ashkelon Academic College. In 2005 he won the
Yitzhak Sadeh prize for his book Eshkol, Give the Order! of which the
present book is a translation. Formerly, he served in the IDF and held a
number of senior positions in the ministries of defence and public security.
Middle eastern military studies
Series Editors: Barry Rubin
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel
The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War

Government, armed forces and defence policy 1963–1967
Ami Gluska
The Israeli Military and
the Origins of the 1967
War
Government, armed forces and

defence policy 1963–1967
Ami Gluska
First published 2007

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
© 2007 Ami Gluska
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN 0-203-96596-5 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0–415–39245–4 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0–203–96596–5 (ebk)
ISBN13: 978–0–415–39245–7 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978–0–203–96596–2 (ebk)
For my wife Shuli and our children Einat, Ittai and Orit
‘The Israeli army is called a “defense force” but it is not a defensive

army. . . . The Sinai campaign (1956), the reprisal acts and the raids
across the border were purely offensive operations, and were of decisive
value. . . . Not only the actions which were actually carried out but also
the IDF’s prevailing conception is offensive. . . . The most significant
technical expression of the new approach . . . is the absence of fortifica-
tions and fencing along the country’s borders. Although the Govern-
ment’s policy is, politically speaking, essentially defensive – those
responsible for the armed forces have refrained from adopting defensive
measures. Their response to Arab provocation has been counter-attacks,
raids on enemy bases, transferring the war to the Arab countries . . . to
put it simply: the IDF is a characteristically offensive army as regards
theory, planning and execution, in body and spirit.’
Major-General Moshe Dayan, April 1967
Contents
List of illustrations ix
Preface xii
Acknowledgements xviii
Introduction 1
1 Personnel changes in the defence establishment 14
2 Basic security issues 22
3 Escalation – Stage 1: from skirmishes in the

demilitarized zones to aerial sorties 40
4 Escalation – Stage 2: diversion 48
5 The dispute with Syria worsens 59
6 Escalation – Stage 3: ‘harassment’ 66
7 The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’ 74
8 Israel–Jordan: the Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian

dilemma 84
9 The clash with Syria approaches 92
10 Conflagration 98
11 The trigger 108

viii Contents
12 The start of the crisis 121
13 The era of diplomacy 131
14 The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift

to offensive planning 142
15 Casus belli 152

16 The army pressures the government 160
17 The politicians’ quandary 173
18 The height of the diplomatic campaign – and the

outcome 180
19 Waiting 194
20 Establishment of a national unity government:

the military aspect 204
21 The strategic turning point: the Egypt–Jordan

defence pact 216
22 The decisive meeting in the Pit: the Ministerial

Committee versus the General Staff 223
23 The decisive stage: war 238
Afterword 257
Appendix: what happened to Yitzhak Rabin? 262

Biographical notes 269
Notes 272
Select English bibliography 313
Index 317
Illustrations
Plates
1 Ben-Gurion takes his leave of the Ministry of Defence
2 Zvi Zur welcoming the new CO of the UN Truce
Supervision Organization, Norwegian General Odd Bull
3 Prime Minister Eshkol announces the handover of command of the
IDF from Zvi Zur to Yitzhak Rabin
4 Eshkol presents Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres to President
Lyndon Johnson at the White House
5 The Eshkol government with President Shazar after taking the oath
of office in the Knesset
6 Ezer Weizman handing over command of the IAF to Motti Hod
7 Eshkol and CO Northern Command David Elazar examining the
damage by Syrian shelling of Kibbutz Gadot
8 Observers from the UNEF dismantling the Erez border point
9 Israeli tank crews mounting tanks in the Negev
10 Eshkol addressing the Knesset before the blocking of the Tiran Straits
11 Eshkol, Allon and Rabin touring IDF divisions in the Negev
12 Barlev, Sharon and Gavish during the ‘waiting period’
13 Rabin, Barlev and Weizman
14 The new ministers in the National Unity government
Maps
1 Israel and its neighbours – pre-1967 borders xi
2 The demilitarized zones along Israel–Syria border 41
3 The Arab diversion plan 50
Tables
1 Composition of the Israeli government – 1967 11
2 Composition of the IDF General Staff – 1967 12
x Illustrations
3 Border incidents by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June

1967 38
4 Terrorist attacks by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June
1967 38
5 Reprisal raids by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June 1967 38
LEBANON
SYRIA
Beirut
Damascus
Mediterranean Sea
IRAQ
West
Tel Aviv Bank Amman

Jerusalem
Gaza Strip
JORDAN
Cairo
Sinai
Eilat
SAUDI ARABIA
EGYPT
Sharm al-Sheikh
0 50 100 miles
Straits of Tiran
0 50 100 150 200 kms
Red Sea
Map 1 Israel and its neighbours – pre-1967 borders.

Preface
The Arab–Israeli war of 1967 transformed the Middle Eastern political

reality in one fell swoop and left a profound imprint on the character of the
State of Israel, its relations with its neighbours and the evolution of the
Palestinian question. Most of the events in Israel and the Middle East in the
years which followed were influenced by its outcome. It begat additional
warfare and acts of terror, and at the same time created the basic con-
ditions for negotiations between the parties to the Arab–Israeli dispute and
for peace treaties. It revived and greatly exacerbated the internal Israeli con-
troversy on the partition of the country between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea and its political and demographic future. The extensive
Israeli settlement in the area conquered during the war established facts
which seemed to rule out a return to the borders of 4 June 1967, but parti-
tion of the country in accordance with a similar outline to that which
existed before the Six Day War remained the starting point for any discus-
sion of a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
The third military confrontation between Israel and the Arabs (after
1948 and 1956) was the direct result of the tension stemming from Arab
opposition to the establishment of Israel and their refusal to accept the
outcome of the 1948 war, of Egypt’s desire to erase Israel’s achievements
in the 1956 war and of the proclaimed Arab commitment to restoration of
the rights of the Palestinians. The Six Day War has been researched from
various angles but no satisfactory answer has as yet been provided to a
crucial query: How did a war, which none of the parties involved appar-
ently wanted or planned for, nonetheless occur? The puzzling fact is not
that the Arab-Israeli dispute once again erupted in war but that the
decision-makers appear to have lost control of the situation.
Ostensibly, the facts are known: from 1966 on, Syria, which always
claimed to be the standard-bearer of authentic Arab nationalism and the
leader of the struggle against Israel, favoured a strategy of ‘a popular
struggle’ and backed the guerrilla warfare or – as Israelis saw it – ‘hostile
terrorist activity’ of the Palestinian organizations against them. In spring
1967, due to the intensification of this activity, the Soviet Union claimed
Preface xiii
that Israel was planning to launch an attack on Syria. Egypt hastened to

flex its muscles in Sinai in order to deter Israel. From then on events pro-
ceeded under their own momentum and ran out of control. This version of
events, however, does not supply a full historical explanation for the
events which generated the crisis. The question of what led to war
remains, therefore, unanswered.
This book attempts, on the basis of primary source material in Israel, to
elucidate the way in which events proceeded on the Israeli side, with
emphasis on the relations between military and political leaders. Its subject
is the army’s influence on Israel’s security policy and its contribution to the
downhill slide into war.

It does not aspire to be a comprehensive study of the roots of the Six
Day War or to analyse the complex processes which led to war, but is,
rather, focused on a specific angle: namely, how Israel’s military command
and political leadership reacted to the country’s security problems between
1963 and 1967, and how their reactions affected the escalation of the con-
flict. Various other perspectives on the situation – inter-Arab, Egyptian,
Syrian, Palestinian or international – deserve separate attention. To the
extent that this book touches on them, it is usually from the inside view-
point of the Israeli General Staff and the government.
The crucial question is: How did it happen that the State of Israel sud-
denly found itself at war, in total contradiction to the intentions of the
government? Was Israel an innocent victim of the crisis evoked by Presid-
ent Nasser’s decision to bring his army into Sinai and to bar Israel from
free shipping? Or did Israel itself play a part in the escalation?
There is little doubt that in 1967 Israel had no desire for war.1 The
civilian leadership had no motive for wanting it. Levi Eshkol’s government
was moderate and most of his ministers were opposed to military activism.
Confronted with serious problems of basic security, it allocated consider-
able resources to the security establishment. The objective was to preserve
Israel’s deterrent capacity, to equip the IDF and to enhance its qualitative
advantages in order to forestall hostilities. The IDF, subject to the govern-
ment’s authority, was called upon to provide a solution which would
avoid escalation and involvement in hostilities. Yitzhak Rabin, a measured
and cautious Chief of Staff, bowed to the authority of the government, as
did his senior officers, and enjoyed the confidence of the government.
What, then, went wrong?
The basic underlying assumption of this study is that the possible expla-
nation should be sought in perusal of the discussions, stances, decisions
and activities of the military and political leadership relating to the security
problems which Israel faced in the four-year period preceding the outbreak
of war. The answer may lie in the built-in tension between the military and
political echelons in crisis situations. In the absence of effective political
alternatives for dealing with these situations, a government has no choice
xiv Preface
but to rely on the army and the influence of the latter increases. The
aggressively oriented military leaders may then exert pressure on the polit-
ical leadership to approve military measures or expand military action
beyond the limits intended by the civilian decision-makers. This study will
attempt to show that this was in fact the case.
This study attempts to cast new light, from the Israeli angle, on the
historical process which led to the Six Day War. No previous study has
penetrated the round-table discussions of the IDF general staff or the
government sessions held during May and June 1967. The intention is not
to provide a revised version of the Six Day War events or to refute known
historical facts, but rather to illuminate events from a new angle and,
hopefully, to offer a richer perspective and better understanding of the
historical process. The book surveys the period between Israel’s founding-
father David Ben-Gurion’s final resignation in June 1963 and the outbreak
of war on 5 June 1967.
The Arab states

In the four years leading up to the Six Day War, Nasser’s star was on the
wane. The original aim of Nasserism, which won its place in the inter-
national arena from 1955 under Nasser’s charismatic leadership, was to
respond to the challenges and dilemmas facing the Arab world in its con-
frontation with the superior power of the West. As a messianic movement,
non-religious but with Islamic contents and symbols, Nasserism held out
the promise of salvation through an all-embracing revolution which would
produce a new Arab society and a new Arab individual. Nasser set the
goals of his country and the entire Arab world far beyond the dispute with
Israel.
Consequently, and in light of the lessons of the Sinai Campaign, Nasser
suspended the active conflict with Israel after the Sinai Campaign, and
ordered the total cessation of guerrilla activities. While he never aban-
doned his commitment towards the Palestinians, he deferred implementa-
tion to the distant time when the Arab world would unite, undergo a
social and technological revolution, and prepare the political and military
instruments which would ensure Arab victory.
Two obstacles to the achievement of Nasser’s aims vis-à-vis Israel were
Syria, which seceded in 1961 from the union with Egypt and demanded
war immediately, and Palestinian elements, which, inspired by the struggle
and success of the FLN in Algeria, began to rally for guerrilla warfare
against Israel.
But above all, Nasser’s plans were frustrated by the waning of his per-
sonal influence and of the messianic fervour of Nasserism in the Arab
world. His response to the dissolution of the union with Syria was radical-
ization of Egypt’s internal and external policies, which entailed inter-
Preface xv
vention in the Yemen war and in the internal affairs of other Arab states.
From 1962 on, the Nasserist movement was at a standstill and rhetoric
could no longer conceal failure. The impressive progress in economic
development at the beginning of the 1960 to 1965 five-year plan had
ceased. The slowdown of agricultural progress, the vast investments in mil-
itary might and the elephantine bureaucracy were all sources of internal
difficulties. Thanks to Nasser’s policy of ‘positive neutrality’, aimed at
exploiting rivalries between the Great Powers for Egypt’s benefit, the
Soviet Union had succeeded in its efforts to infiltrate the region. When
President Lyndon Johnson expressed US censure of Nasser’s strategies by
halting the large-scale dispatch of surplus foodstuffs to Egypt, the latter’s

dependence on the Soviet Union increased.2
A different reason for Nasser’s troubles was his position as one of the
leading figures of the declining non-aligned bloc of nations, which from
the outset was less powerful than it appeared. Lacking real power and a
firm social and economic infrastructure, stability and modern technology,
it could not consolidate its status. In 1964 to 1966 the bloc also suffered
the loss of some of its prominent leaders, through the death of Jawaharlal
Nehru of India and the overthrow of Ahmed Sukarno in Indonesia,
Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Ahmed ben-Bella in Algeria.
The dispatch of a large Egyptian force to Yemen in 1962 with the aim
of extending Egyptian hegemony to the oil-rich Persian Gulf also
entrapped Nasser. By 1967 he was dragged deeper and deeper into the
Yemeni mud. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia established a front of conservat-
ive pro-Western states to check Nasserism. The rivalry between the Powers
in the region was related to the polarity between the revolutionary and
conservative Arab regimes, and Egypt–US relations were further strained.
By spring 1967 Nasser’s situation was considered desperate.3 It was
undoubtedly this predicament which impelled him to adopt new measures
to rehabilitate his standing and leadership in the Arab world by compelling
even his sworn adversaries to rally behind him. The only issue on which
there was an ostensible pan-Arab consensus was the dispute with Israel.
The Soviet Union, fearful for its foothold in Syria, served as the catalyst.
Did Nasser intend to instigate an armed conflict with Israel when he
moved his forces into Sinai? It is generally agreed that he was borne on the
swift current of events he precipitated and the fervour he roused, and that
Israel was faced with a grave dilemma – capitulation or war? The other
Arab states, both conservative and revolutionary, were taken totally by
surprise but hastened to rally to the Egyptian standard, some eagerly and
others having no alternative. The dynamics of the situation – the mass psy-
chosis, concentration of forces and Egyptian blockage of the Tiran Straits
– rendered war inevitable. Israel, haunted by Holocaust memories, gripped
with existential panic and a sense of total isolation, felt forced to deal the
first blow.
xvi Preface
The Powers and the UN

The rivalry between the Great Powers played a vital part in the evolution
of the Arab–Israel conflict, and it has been claimed that the 1967 war was
the outcome of power struggles within the Kremlin. While the United
States and the USSR were indeed battling for influence, it is not likely that
they wanted to fan the flames since they usually directed their efforts at
avoidance of direct confrontation. This was also the view of the Israeli
Intelligence bodies at the time. It is, however, true that the conflicting
interests and mutual suspicion of the Great Powers and their political and
military support for the two sides complicated the situation and influenced
decision-making. While the attitude of the United States towards Israel
was complex, because of Washington’s relations with other countries of
the region, the policy of the Soviet Union was consistently one-sided,
highly critical of and hostile towards Israel.4
The UN played a modest role in the evolution of the conflict. The UN
Truce Supervision Observers’ force on the Israel–Syrian border had little
impact on events. The UN Emergency Force in Sinai was relieved of its
duties on the Israel–Egyptian border due to a hasty decision by the UN
secretary-general at a time when its presence was vital. Nasser’s proclama-
tion of the Blocking of the Tiran Straits while the UN secretary-general
was on his way to Cairo served to demonstrate the limited impact of the
international body on peace-keeping.5
Documentation
This study is based on primary source material which has not previously been
utilized for historical research purposes. The main sources are the files of the
IDF’s History Department, General Staff protocols and discussions of senior
forums. They have been supplemented by secondary, non-confidential mater-
ial: press reports, minutes of seminars and personal interviews. I believe that
the weekly sessions of the IDF’s General Staff forum provide the most accur-
ate picture of the evolving situation, the Intelligence assessments and the
general mood of the senior command. They also reflect the attitude of the
General Staff towards the government and the differences of opinion between
them. It is important to note that the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
attended some of the more important meetings of the General Staff.
It should be noted that, due to limitations in the documentation at my
disposal, the first half of the book focuses mainly on the military, while the
standpoint of the politicians is reflected in the military documentation or
in the external and secondary sources. The second half, however, which
deals with the May–June 1967 crisis, is based on an abundance of primary
sources relating both to the General Staff and the government, and offers a
more balanced picture.
Preface xvii
A semantic comment
While I deal in the wider sense with military–civil relations against the
background of the security issues of the time, and the main references are
to the General Staff and the government, this should be taken in most
cases as relating to more limited groups: the Chief of Staff, and Chiefs of
Intelligence and Operations versus the Ministerial Committee on Security
Affairs. In many cases, the protagonists are the Chief of Staff and the
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
Acknowledgements
The English version of this book, whose Hebrew edition was issued in
2004 by Ma’arakhot-Misrad Ha-Bitahon, is appearing with the generous
aid of the Ashkelon Academic College. I owe a debt of gratitude to the
President of the College Professor Moshe Mani, the Vice-President for
Academic Affairs Professor Shimon Sharvit, the Director-General Adv.
Pinhas Haliwa, the Head of Academic Administration Mr Zeev Vadas and
the Head of the Political Science Department Dr Shmuel Tzabag. I would
also like to express my appreciation to my teachers and colleagues at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and in particular Professor Uri Bialer,
who supervised my Ph.D. thesis, and Professor Gideon Shimoni, Professor
Benjamin Kedar and Professor Allon Kadish. My thanks also to my good
friends Professor Avner Cohen, Dr Moti Golani, Dr Isabella Ginor and
Gideon Remez for their recommendations and encouragement.
The research which generated this book required access to documents
which had not yet been opened to the public, many of them classified, in
army, state and private archives. I would like to note in particular the
assistance extended to me by the staff of the IDF History Department and
the Air Force History Branch, and the generosity of Miriam Eshkol,
widow of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who placed his rich private archive
at my disposal. All photographs included in this book were purchased
from the Israeli Government Press Office.
The translation was carried out by Chaya Galai, who, in her skill,
insight and experience, provided me with helpful advice and illuminating
comments.
To the editor of the series, Professor Barry Rubin, I owe my contacts
with Routledge. His accessibility whenever I communicated with him, his
rapid reactions, efficient treatment, wise guidance and important advice,
helped to remove various obstacles and errors, and contributed to the
quality of the book. Many thanks also to my good friend Uri Maydan for
his great technical help.
And above all, my love and gratitude go out to my wife Shuli and my chil-
dren Einat, Ittai and Orit, for their support and faith in me all along the way.
Introduction
The crushing of the two Judaean revolts against the Romans, in the first
and second centuries CE, marked the end of Jewish military efforts for
nearly two millennia. When the first uprising (66–70 CE) concluded in
catastrophic defeat and the destruction of Herod’s Temple in Jerusalem,
the last of the Jewish zealots, led by Elazar Ben Yair, took refuge at
Masada on the Dead Sea shore and, after a lengthy siege, chose to commit
suicide with their families rather than fall into enemy hands. The outcome
of the second revolt (131–135 CE), led by Bar Kochba, was even more
calamitous; the Jewish community was annihilated in a bloodbath and the
Romans expunged even the name of Judaea, renaming the province
Palestina (after the Philistines who had lived on the coast between Gaza
and Ashdod about a millennium earlier). Jerusalem became the Roman
city of Ilia Capitolina and a shrine for Jupiter was built on Temple Mount.
As a result of these traumatic events, the central trend in Jewish thought
was marked by a strong aversion to military activity. Ancient military
leaders, such as the Hasmoneans who triumphed over the Selucid forces
and won independence or leaders of the abortive uprisings against the
Romans, were not glorified in the Holy Scriptures, the Mishnah and the
Talmud, and throughout the centuries-long exile, the Jewish dream of
the return to their homeland ‘Eretz Israel’, expressed in prayer and liter-
ature, was devoid of military implications. It was to be achieved by divine
intervention when the Messiah arrived.
The Zionist movement emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in
the era of nascent nationalism. The vision of establishing a Jewish state in
Eretz Israel, as expounded by its founder Theodore Herzl, also lacked all
military implications. The early Zionists believed, naively, that the nations
of the world would grant the Jews a ‘charter’ over their promised land,
and that the Arab inhabitants of the country would welcome the Jews with
open arms for bringing them the message of progress.1 Herzl failed in his
efforts to gain the charter, but after his death another Zionist leader,
Chaim Weizmann, won a guarantee from the British government (The
Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917) that it would ‘view with favour’
2 Introduction
the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine,

then still partly under Ottoman rule. During the First World War, Jewish
volunteer battalions were established in the British army, one of which
took part in the occupation of the country. These units, however, were dis-
banded soon after the war. In 1922 the League of Nations entrusted the
mandate over Palestine to Great Britain.
The illusion that the Palestinians would calmly accept the trans-
formation of their country into a national home for the Jewish people was
soon dispelled by violent anti-Jewish riots which occurred in 1920, 1921
and 1929. They culminated in the Arab revolt of 1936 to 1939, which
erupted against the background of a wave of Jewish immigration from

Eastern Europe and especially Germany, in the wake of Hitler’s rise to
power. In late 1920, in response to Arab violence, the Jewish community
(the Yishuv) established the semi-clandestine Haganah defence organi-
zation, which became subject to the authority of the Zionist leadership. In
1931 the Hagana ranks were split when a group – which later took the
name Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) and was associ-
ated with the opposition Revisionist Party – seceded in protest against the
Haganah’s policy of restraint. The Haganah received de facto recognition
from the Mandate government and many of its members were recruited
into British-run auxiliary police units. Charles Orde Wingate, a young, tal-
ented British officer who was an ardent advocate of Zionism, was
appointed to train a special unit of young Jewish fighters for action against
Arab terror.
In 1939, when war was imminent, the British government, in an effort
to win Arab support, published a White Paper which drastically restricted
Jewish immigration and proclaimed its intention to establish a state within
a decade. There were half a million Jews in Palestine at the time and more
than double that number of Arabs. The Jewish leaders were shocked by
this volte-face, but when war broke out they felt obliged to cooperate with
Britain in the fight against Nazism. Thousands of young Jews from the
community (Yishuv) volunteered for service in the British army and
towards the end of the war a Jewish Brigade was established within the
British army. In 1941, when it was feared that German forces were about
to invade the Middle East from the north through the Caucasus and from
the south through Egypt, the British helped to establish elite units (the
Palmach) within the Haganah to conduct guerrilla warfare against the
Germans. Two years later, however, after the battles of Stalingrad and el-
Alamein, when fears of a German invasion had faded, the British aban-
doned the initiative. The Palmach remained operative, funded by the
Jewish Agency and kibbutz movement, and became the Haganah’s crack
force. Its young fighters later rose to senior ranks in the Israel Defence
Forces. In 1967 most of the General Staff were graduates of the Palmach.
Wingate’s Special Night Squads and the Palmach units represented a
Introduction 3
new generation of ‘sabras’ (native-born Jews), with a militant activist

approach, reflecting the growing realization that the Zionist movement
could not achieve its objectives without resorting to force. The transition
within the Zionist movement from a defensive to an offensive ethos was by
no means simple and was accompanied by internal conflict and bitter dis-
putes, particularly between the forceful chairman of the Jewish Agency
David Ben-Gurion and the ageing president of the World Zionist Organi-
zation Chaim Weizmann.
The dispute was resolved after the Second World War when the Labour
government in Britain continued to adhere to the 1939 White Paper policy.
In the post-Holocaust Jewish community the prevailing mood was militant

and a struggle was launched to open the country’s gates to mass immigra-
tion of refugees from Europe. The Irgun, the Lehi (Lohamei Herut Yisrael
– Israel Freedom Fighters), an even more radical organization which
seceded from the Irgun, and for a time the Haganah as well, waged a mili-
tary campaign, which included acts of terror against the British authorities.
The moderate Weizmann was deposed from the presidency of the World
Zionist movement and Ben-Gurion led the Yishuv in the vital stage of the
struggle for statehood.
In 1947 the British government decided – in light of the continuing viol-
ence, international pressure on the refugee question and its failure to
achieve a compromise between Jews and Arabs – to submit the issue to the
UN for resolution. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution partitioning the country into two states – Jewish and
Arab – and internationalizing the Jerusalem area. The Palestinians and the
Arab states categorically rejected the resolution, and fighting broke out
between armed Arab groups, reinforced by volunteers from the neighbour-
ing Arab countries, and the Jewish military organizations. On 14 May
1948, Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel at a
session of the National Council, and in response the armed forces of
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon invaded the Jewish state on the
following day. The Israel Defence Force was established in the course of
the war on the foundations of the Haganah. After bitter fighting, it
repelled the invaders while expanding the territory of the Jewish state
beyond the borders of the UN partition resolution. During the hostilities,
Ben-Gurion forced the Palmach, Etzel and Lehi to disband in order to
create a sovereign unified armed force unconditionally subordinate to the
civilian authority.
The war ended in 1949 with the signing of armistice agreements
between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. When the war
ended, Israel controlled some 75 per cent of the area of the country (as
against 55 per cent allocated to the Jewish state by the UN), while the
Palestinian state had not come into existence due to Arab opposition.
Jordan took over the West Bank, Egypt seized the Gaza Strip, and
4 Introduction
Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan. Some 700,000 Palestin-
ian refugees left the State of Israel. After the war, Israel took in an even
larger number of Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, but the issue of
the Palestinian refugees remained at the core of the Arab–Israel conflict.
Infiltration of Palestinians into Israel to perpetrate acts of revenge, sabo-
tage and terror was the main cause of the escalation which led to the 1956
and 1967 wars.
Civil–military relations
A number of researchers have studied the Israeli military, its operations

and history.2 The question of the armed forces’ relationship to the civilian
leadership is one of particular interest.
The first crisis between the military command and the civilian leader-
ship occurred during the 1948 War of Independence,3 and, as this book
will show, tension broke out again on the eve of the Six Day War. The
subordination of the army to the political leadership was never questioned
at any stage, but as early as the 1950s the army was carrying out reprisal
operations on a scope beyond that approved by the government.
As the security situation deteriorated between 1963 and 1967, the gap
between the aspirations of the army and the intentions of the civilian
leadership widened. The IDF wanted maximum freedom of action in order
to solve Israel’s security problems in its own way and there were occasions
when it permitted itself to interpret the wishes of the political echelons in a
liberal operational fashion. In other words, the senior command believed
that their task was to influence government policy and guide the civilian
authorities into more activist and offensive paths of action. Years later,
this approach was expressed unequivocally by a then member of the
General Staff General Ariel Sharon, in an interview marking the thirtieth
anniversary of the Six Day War:
In a democracy there is a division of functions: the politicians examine

all the options while the role of the army is to present the military
option. . . . In general, one cannot expect the politicians to be more
daring than the military. The latter must stamp their feet, and the
politicians must be aware of the full range of political options.4
In the 1950s, it was this attitude which impelled the Chief of Staff,
Major-General Moshe Dayan, to exert pressure on Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence David Ben-Gurion to launch a pre-emptive strike
against Egypt. Dayan believed that he bore equal responsibility with the
politicians for national security and that it was incumbent on him to guide
the country’s political leaders towards the right policy as he perceived it.
This situation led to the 1956 Sinai Campaign. In 1967 as well, though
Introduction 5
under entirely different circumstances, the army did not stand by idly
waiting for the government to decide but played an active part and
brought heavy pressure to bear in favour of a pre-emptive strike.5
Security theory and security policy

Israel’s security theory is ‘the basic and constant national programme of
preparedness, deployment and war in defence of the national existence of
the State of Israel’.6 In the period under discussion, this was based on the
conviction that the state faced an existential threat, under conditions of
critical inferiority as regards quantity, territory and resources, and that the
conflict could not be resolved by political or military means. This meant
that the Israeli economy and infrastructure needed to be ready to confront
emergencies and the majority of the national manpower needed to be
trained and prepared for security tasks. The buildup of military force was
mainly aimed at preparing a trained striking force, well equipped and
infused with fighting spirit, capable of conducting decisive offensive
warfare on enemy soil, with military superiority based on the quality of
the fighting men, swift movement and concentrated effort.
Security policy implies ‘the translation of security theory into everyday
language’ within the framework of dynamic political and military develop-
ments and processes, as demanded by national needs. If indeed, as
Major-General Israel Tal claims, Israel’s security theory may be regarded
as ‘one of the pinnacles of military thinking’,7 the same cannot be said of
its security policy. In the period under consideration, it did not achieve its
supreme aim – deterrence and prevention of war – and in the final analysis
it expedited the outbreak of hostilities. As we shall see, the military leader-
ship contributed to the failure of security policy, and Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin accepted responsibility for this failure.
The Israeli government was unanimous in its desire to maintain the
status quo, but was not of one mind on other issues. Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence Levi Eshkol was torn between the dovish majority in
his government – including most of the Mapai (moderate socialist Israel
Workers Party) ministers, and the representatives of the National Religious
Party, Mapam (radical socialist) Party and the Independent Liberals – and
the hawkish minority, consisting mainly of the left-wing Ahdut Haavoda
ministers. The influence of the activist minority was enhanced by the mili-
tary background and experience of the Ahdut Haavoda ministers Yigal
Allon, Yisrael Galili and Moshe Carmel. These three, and Allon and
Carmel in particular, concurred entirely with the assessments provided by
Rabin, who was now a permanent participant in government meetings
dealing with security.
6 Introduction
Existential dread – and public faith in the army

The army’s major influence on security policy stemmed, first and foremost,
from the existential dread which was a basic component of the Israeli
collective consciousness. Borne out of the historical experiences of the
Jewish people, the recent trauma of the Holocaust, fresh memories of the
1948 Arab invasion and constant awareness of the proximity of a hostile
border – this dread fluctuated in intensity but never vanished. It was
particularly acute in the critical stages of the War of Independence and
intensified again as a result of the 1955 ‘Czech arm deal’ between the
Soviet Union and Egypt and the deterioration of the security situation on
the borders. It abated after the Sinai Campaign and rose to new heights on
the eve of the Six Day War.8
In early June 1967 the American administration was aware of Israel’s
fears. In a missive to US ambassadors in the Arab states, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk noted that the United States could not order Israel not to fight
and stressed succinctly the psychological aspects of the situation: ‘The
“Holy War” psychology of the Arab world is matched by the apocalyptic
psychology within Israel.’9
Israel’s conduct before the Six Day War cannot be comprehended
without understanding that this dread was a central factor in the thinking
of the policy-makers10 and in the consolidation of the standing of the army
in society and the shaping of its objectives and actions. At the basis of
Israel’s security policy lay a dread of annihilation which was shared by
many military men.11 They feared catastrophic losses (the accepted estim-
ate was 10,000 dead, and one source anticipated 100,000!12), and Egypt-
ian deployment of poison gas (as had occurred in Yemen)13 or some secret
weapon.14 The government eventually accepted the army’s view that
failure to launch a pre-emptive attack would create an existential threat
graver than that entailed in launching a strike.
Existential dread was also one of the major reasons for the ‘sanctifica-
tion’ of the IDF, perceived as a value in its own right. The ‘politicidal’ atti-
tude of the Arabs towards Israel and their incessant belligerent
proclamations of intent to annihilate the ‘Zionist entity’ touched a sensi-
tive nerve in Israeli society. Any item of information about the equipping
of Arab armies with Soviet weaponry or some new military development
shook Israeli nerves (ground-to-ground missiles or chemical and biological
weapons in Egypt with the aid of German scientists evoked a particularly
hysterical reaction in Israel). Consequently, Israeli society chose to place its
trust totally in the IDF to the point where it was almost beyond and above
criticism of any kind. The army, for its part, internalized these expecta-
tions and responded to them, and regarded itself as committed to and
capable of providing a military solution to every problem.
In a 1997 interview, Ariel Sharon drew a critical comparison between
Introduction 7
the views of the senior command in 1967 and the situation three decades
later, when senior officers conceded that the solution to terror was polit-
ical and not military.
‘When I served in the army’, he declared, ‘I don’t recall a single

instance when the commanding officer said that the only possible solu-
tion to the mission entrusted to him was political rather than military.
A commander who made such a statement in Ben-Gurion’s day would
have been thrown out of the army in an instant’.15
The total confidence in the armed forces can also explain the generous
allocation of national resources for security purposes16 even – and perhaps
in particular – by a government as moderate as that headed by Levi
Eshkol. The majority of the ministers was innocent of any military pattern
of thinking or desire to change the political and territorial status quo by
force, and were anxious to maintain the relative calm and not to disturb
the equilibrium. However, they gave the senior command whatever it
wanted in order to maintain security and prevent hostilities. On the eve of
the Six Day War, in the course of an acrimonious confrontation with
several generals who demanded an immediate order to go to war, Eshkol,
who wanted time for political manoeuvring and stressed the need for
patience, addressed them bluntly:
You need more weapons? OK. You wanted 100 aircraft? You got
them. You wanted tanks. You got them so that we can win if it
becomes necessary. You didn’t get all that so that we could get up one
day and say: ‘Now we can destroy the Egyptian army – and we’ll do
it’. . . . Deterrence doesn’t mean that one has to act. . . . I believe that
deterrent force should be capable of waiting and enabling exploration
of all other possibilities. . . . This may irritate the generals, who have
been trained all their lives for attack, for war, but we [the government]
talked of deterrence [to prevent war]. . . . Are we to live on our swords
all our lives’!?17
The government’s approach to security policy during this period was

basically preventive,18 aimed at averting the subverting of Israel’s security
and vital interests and maintaining effective deterrent power in order to
forestall war. This approach was one of the main reasons why civilian
supervision of the army was so ineffective, in particular as regards opera-
tional planning. Since the army perceived itself as answerable to the
government and accepted supreme civilian authority, the government did
not deem it necessary to issue directives to the army and to define, at the
strategic level, the objectives of the war (which in any case was to be
avoided). Thus, in effect, strategic and operative planning was left entirely
8 Introduction
in the hands of the army. Even when war was imminent and the army
urged that a pre-emptive attack be launched, neither the government nor
the Ministerial Committee on Security held a single strategic debate on the
objectives of the war or perused the army’s operative plans.
Ben-Gurion vs. Eshkol; Eshkol vs. Rabin

It was Ben-Gurion who determined the pattern of relationships between
the army and the defence establishment on one hand and the civilian polit-
ical establishment on the other. His proclaimed objective, as noted above,
was to detach the army from politics and to turn it into the executive arm,
under the exclusive authority of the government as wielded by the Minister
of Defence. Ben-Gurion’s stamp on the security establishment and his iden-
tification with the IDF created a unique link between himself and the army
in the public consciousness, and he was perceived as its father-figure. His
abrupt resignation (in June 1963; see below) evoked considerable unease
in the army and certain senior officers even appealed to him emotionally to
change his mind.19
However, Eshkol’s subsequent entry into the Ministry of Defence was
smooth. He was not revolutionary by nature and acted with circumspec-
tion. At first, he consulted Ben-Gurion on every important issue – senior
army appointments, for example.20 The General Staff soon came to the
conclusion that it would be easier to work with Eshkol, whose style was
open and flexible, than with the authoritative Ben-Gurion. The army now
had direct and frequent access to government institutions.
The Chief of Staff, and often the heads of Intelligence and Operations
as well, became regular participants in sessions of the Ministerial Commit-
tee on Defence and sometimes attended government sessions as well. The
Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee began to play an effect-
ive role and the inner circle of those informed on security matters widened.
Important security issues were discussed by Mapai’s ministerial forum
(Sareinu) and the political council of the Alignment (Maarach) – estab-
lished in 1964 as an amalgamation of Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda.21
In the present context, it is important to note that Eshkol’s easygoing
style enabled the IDF to extend its influence, with clear operative implica-
tions. The CO of the IAF (Israel Air Force), for example, was amazed at
the ease with which Eshkol approved photo reconnaissance flights, unlike
Ben-Gurion.22 This situation enhanced Rabin’s position and influence on
matters pertaining to security policy, and had a positive impact on his rela-
tions with the Minister of Defence and with the government.
This was not the first time that a Chief of Staff had been on close terms
with the minister; Dayan probably wielded stronger influence over Ben-
Gurion than did Rabin over Eshkol.23 However, Rabin’s relations with the
Prime Minister set a precedent. Eshkol bowed to Rabin on security issues
Introduction 9
and allowed him direct and constant access to the government, to the
point where the latter gradually gained quasi-ministerial status24 and
became a popular and ‘political’ figure, overshadowing Eshkol to a degree
which the latter resented.25 On one occasion (see below), Eshkol repri-
manded Rabin for exceeding his authority, and, some sources claim, even
contemplated deposing him.26
As Minister of Defence, Eshkol played the major role in drawing up the
security budget, and was involved in all decisions regarding security policy
and the security establishment, arms purchases and weapon developments.
His greatest achievement was gaining access to the American arms market.
‘If he had done this one thing alone, it would have sufficed to record his
name in golden letters in the pages of Israel’s history’, wrote Rabin.27 He
was particularly concerned with the army’s need for equipment, spare
parts and ammunition reserves.28 He was also involved in professional mil-
itary matters. Rabin always reported to him in minute detail, and Eshkol
questioned him closely and on occasion rejected his recommendations.
No military operation was ever carried out without his knowledge
and approval. Rabin, despite the special status he enjoyed, did not act
independently.
However, it is questionable whether Eshkol in fact was endowed with
independent judgement and a comprehensive view of the military setup
and the doctrine and objectives of warfare. As far as the strategic dimen-
sion, tactical calculations and operative issues were concerned, he acted on
the basis of intuition and common sense but, since he lacked professional
know-how and advisers, he was dependent on Rabin.
This dependence, coupled with Eshkol’s easygoing nature, predilection
for compromise and his apologetic admission of his lack of military know-
how, left Rabin a wide scope for expressing his views. He enjoyed a high-
profile media presence and was ‘amazingly popular’, evoking Eshkol’s
envy. His evident authority undermined Eshkol’s standing and created the
impression of weakness.29 Nadav Safran believes that the crisis of confi-
dence in Eshkol stemmed in part from his collaboration with the army,
which was so close that several of his ministers began to think that he had
waived his own independent judgement on security matters.30
Viewing matters from within, Israel Tal claims that the standing of the
Minister of Defence weakened after Ben-Gurion’s departure not only
because his forceful personality was lacking, but also due to basic struc-
tural changes. Ben-Gurion, writes Tal, ‘commanded the IDF in the name of
the Government’, the Chief of Staff of the IDF functioned as the head of
his staff, and the entire General Staff was at the disposal of the minister.
After Ben-Gurion’s departure, the division heads (with the exception of the
Intelligence chief) ceased to play this role and the minister was neutralized
and became dependent on the Chief of Staff, lacking his own professional
instruments for decision-making.31
10 Introduction
Eshkol was also weakened by his gradually evolving rancorous dispute

with Ben-Gurion, who hurled serious accusations at him, claiming he was
totally unfit for his position. The rivalry between them, in which the press
played an active and enthusiastic part, also had a detrimental effect on
Ben-Gurion’s standing,32 and in 1965 led to a split in Mapai and the estab-
lishment of the Rafi (Israel’s Workers List) Party, headed by Ben-Gurion.
The continuous censure of Eshkol by Ben-Gurion and his associates in
Rafi, particularly Shimon Peres, focused mainly on security matters. The
most damaging accusation levelled by Ben-Gurion was related vaguely to
some mysterious ‘security blunder’.33 Safran claims that the verbal attacks
impelled Eshkol to move to the other extreme and yield excessively to the
demands of the military.34
The General Staff vs. the government

Under Major-Generals Zvi Zur (up until December 1963) and Yitzhak
Rabin (up until the Six Day War), the General Staff focused on building up
military might and preparing for war, evolving a strategic theory and plan-
ning. The government, on the other hand, was preoccupied with political,
economic and social problems. Security was not necessarily the main prior-
ity, at least as long as calm prevailed.35
The crisis of confidence between the General Staff and the government
reached its peak shortly before the Six Day War, but tensions existed
between them throughout the period, as government policy appeared to
the senior command to be increasingly restrictive.36 Israel’s main security
problem was the guerrilla activity of Palestinian terror units, most of them
affiliated to Fatah, which began to operate in January 1965. At first, the
army denoted these activities ‘harassment’ and subsequently began to refer
to them as ‘hostile terrorist activity’. The IDF would have preferred to take
the offensive while the government, fearing escalation, preferred to invest
in defence. Senior officers abhorred the idea of defensive action, and tried
to persuade the government that this strategy was ineffective. They
believed, erroneously as it turned out, that offensive action would not
necessarily lead to escalation.
There were considerable differences between the civil and military
leaders, which help explain their disparate standpoints. The average age of
Eshkol’s government was sixty-four, of the senior command, forty-three.
They differed, too, in background, origin, experience, mentality and lan-
guage. Almost all the ministers had been born outside Israel and, although
they had been living in the country for decades, their formative years had
been passed abroad. As noted, only two of them – Yigal Allon (the only
native-born Israeli) and Moshe Carmel – had military experience. The
views they advocated on security accorded with their background. Most
members of the government, with the exception of the Ahdut Haavoda
Introduction 11
ministers, were veteran politicians who had been engaged for many years
in Zionist and party activity, remote from military experience.
Most of the General Staff, on the other hand, were native-born and vet-
erans of the Palmach. They represented the second generation, the sons:
the transition to a Zionism based on the realization that its aims could not
be achieved without an armed struggle, and the transition from a defensive
ethos to an offensive ethos.37 Interestingly enough, at General Staff meet-
ings the government ministers were often referred to collectively as ‘the
Jews’.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when the crisis worsened and tensions
reached new heights, the generals viewed those ministers who opposed war
as elderly, confused and timid nuisances (General Rehavam Ze’evi referred
to them collectively as ‘all kinds of Wahrhaftigs’, after a particular timid
minister38), whose inability to take decisions was endangering the country.
And yet, although they brought heavy pressure to bear on the government,
the generals did not force it to decide on war. It was rather the failure of
political efforts, together with the aggravation of the objective threat and
Table 1 Composition of the Israeli government – 1967
Name Party Portfolio Year of Country

birth of origin
Levi Eshkol* Mapai PM and Minister of 1895 Ukraine

Defence
Pinhas Sapir* Mapai Finance 1909 Poland
Abba Eban* Mapai Foreign Affairs 1915 South Africa
Zalman Aranne* Mapai Education 1899 Russia
Yisrael Galili* Ahdut ha-Avodah Without portfolio 1911 Poland
Moshe Haim Shapira* Nat. Religious Party Interior 1902 Poland
Yaakov Shimshon Mapai Justice 1902 Russia
Shapira*
Yigal Allon*⫹ Ahdut ha-Avodah Labour 1918 Native born
Zerah Wahrhaftig* Nat. Religious Party Religious Affairs 1896 Poland
Moshe Kol* Indep. Liberals Tourism 1911 Poland
Yisrael Barzilai* Mapam Health 1913 Poland
Eliyahu Sasson* Mapai Police 1902 Syria
Haim Gvati Mapai Agriculture 1901 Poland
Yisrael Yeshayahu Mapai Postal Communications 1910 Yemen
Moshe Carmel Ahdut ha-Avodah Transport 1911 Poland
Yosef Burg Nat. Religious Party Welfare 1909 Germany
Mordechai Bentov Mapam Development 1900 Poland
Zeev Sherf Mapai Trade and Industry 1906 Poland
Notes
* Member Ministerial Committee on Security
⫹ Ex-Palmach
Average age: 63.9
Native born: 1
Born abroad: 17
12 Introduction
Table 2 Composition of the IDF General Staff – 1967
Yitzhak Rabin⫹ Chief of Staff 1922 Native born

Haim Barlev⫹ Deputy Chief of Staff 1924 Austria
Ezer Weizman Chief Operations Branch 1924 Native born
Aharon Yariv Chief Intelligence Branch 1920 Russia
Shmuel Eyal Chief Manpower Branch 1922 Russia
Mattatyahu Peled⫹ Chief Q Branch 1923 Native born
David Elazar⫹ CO Northern Command 1925 Yugoslavia
Uzi Narkis⫹ CO Central Command 1925 Native born
Yeshayahu Gavish⫹ CO Northern Command 1925 Native born
Yisrael Tal CO Armoured Corps 1924 Native born

Ariel Sharon Head Training Dept 1928 Native born
Rehavam Ze’evi⫹ Asst. Chief Operations 1926 Native born
Mordechai Hod⫹ CO IAF 1926 Native born
Shlomo Erel CO Navy 1920 Poland
Elad Peled⫹ CO National Defence College 1927 Native born
Yitzhak Hofi⫹ Head Operations Dept 1927 Native born
Yaakov Hefetz⫹ Financial adviser 1923 Native born
Amos Horev Deputy Chief Scientist, 1924 Native born
Ministry of Defence
Notes
⫹ Ex-Palmach
Average age: 42.8
Native born: 13
Born abroad: 5
the subjective dread of that threat, which tipped the balance and left the
government no alternative but to place its trust in the army.39
Paradoxically, the army’s prestige was undermined by the crisis and its
pressure on the government became less effective. Not only were most of
the ministers anxious to avoid war at any cost, but the senior command
had lost face in the eyes of the ministers due to the brewing crisis. Hence,
at this critical time, a degree of equilibrium was restored to IDF–
government relations.
A note on Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan

Four days before war broke out, Eshkol gave up the defence portfolio and
handed it over to Moshe Dayan, whose military background transformed
the pattern of civilian supervision and control of the army which had
existed under Eshkol. Dayan, like Allon, was a sabra, member of the
second generation, and a standard-bearer of the offensive ‘ethos of the
fighter’ as Anita Shapira calls it. His appointment on 1 June 1967 (under
circumstances which will be detailed below), which received massive
public backing, was not a simple administrative move, but rather the
victory of the military concept over the civilian. Only a day after Dayan’s
appointment, it was clear to Eshkol that Israel was going to war.40
Introduction 13
Another interesting point: three days before the crisis erupted, Maariv,
the Israeli newspaper with the widest circulation, published a lengthy
article by Yosef Lapid under the heading: ‘Is there a danger that the IDF
will seize power?’ Lapid listed a number of important arguments against
such an eventuality, which together constituted a guarantee that demo-
cratic rule would endure. He noted, however, several undesirable phenom-
ena: the senior officer level functioned like an exclusive ‘sect’; Ben-Gurion
had endowed the IDF with an ‘aura of sanctity’; there was insufficient
public criticism of the army. A very senior officer, when asked by Lapid
whether the IDF might in fact attempt to take over, replied that any fool
who tried would not find anyone to follow him. Lapid’s article was a
protest against the idealized image of the IDF in contrast to the impotent
and ineffectual image attributed to the government and the Knesset. He
feared that the absence of criticism could endanger democracy.41
A few days later the senior command, the apple of Israel’s eye, found
itself in direct conflict with a confused government which seemed to have
lost the confidence of the public, facing what appeared to be a threat to
national survival. The army, nonetheless, did not adopt undemocratic
measures and it was the government which eventually took the decision to
go to war. In hindsight it was evident that the hesitations and manoeuvres
of the government at the time were grounded on greater political wisdom
than the decisive approach of the military command.
Chapter 1
Personnel changes in the

defence establishment
David Ben-Gurion’s last government, in which he again served as Prime

Minister and Minister of Defence, was presented to the Knesset and given
a vote of confidence on 2 November 1961. It remained in power for less
than twenty months until his resignation on 16 June 1963.1
Ben-Gurion’s final term of office in the Ministry of Defence was a
period of relative calm where current security was concerned, but which
towards its end was marked by three affairs related to basic security issues,
which were apparently among the reasons for his decision to resign.
The first was the affair of the Egyptian missiles developed with the aid
of German scientists. Ben-Gurion’s advocacy of a policy of restraint, which
stemmed from his fear of a rift in Israeli–German relations, was fiercely
opposed by Isser Harel, who headed the Mossad. Harel resigned, evoking
public and political uproar.2
The second affair was the short-lived tripartite Union, which was pro-
claimed in April 1963 but was never really formed, between Egypt, Iraq
and Syria.3 It shocked Ben-Gurion, who subsequently launched a wide-
ranging and somewhat embarrassing correspondence with a large number
of international leaders on this matter.4
The third affair was President John Kennedy’s emphatic demand for
regular supervision and control of the atomic reactor at Dimona.5 Rela-
tions with the United States were strained further by initiatives of the US
administration aimed at finding a solution to the Palestinian refugee
problem.6 In addition, Ben-Gurion attempted, without success, to schedule
a meeting with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the hope of
arriving at a political settlement.7
Ben-Gurion resigns and is succeeded by Eshkol

In spring 1963, in light of the upheavals in the Kingdom of Jordan in
favour of joining the tripartite Arab Union, and the fear of a pro-Nasserite
coup there, the IDF began to ready itself for the eventuality of inter-
vention.8 Ben-Gurion was apprehensive at the possibility, which conflicted
Personnel changes in defence establishment 15
with his desire to stabilize Israel’s security on the basis of the status quo,
and to suspend the conflict with the Arabs, as long as it seemed insoluble,
through conventional and non-conventional deterrent measures. The
threat to the Jordanian regime was the central theme in Ben-Gurion’s
letters to President Kennedy and other world leaders. The stabilization of
the Jordanian situation and the disintegration of the Egyptian–Syrian–Iraqi
Union restored relative calm at the beginning of the summer, and fears of
an imminent unification of the Arab world under Nasserist hegemony were
dispelled. However, the affair of the German scientists continued to evoke
anxiety in Israel and behind the scenes it was estimated that a very serious
crisis was brewing in relations with the United States due to US opposition
to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and Kennedy’s demand for effect-
ive supervision of the Dimona reactor. Ben-Gurion’s counter-demand for
formal and not merely declarative American guarantees of Israel’s security
– to include joint operative planning and supply of weapons systems – was
rejected by the US administration.9 It was under these circumstances that
Ben-Gurion tendered his resignation.
Levi Eshkol, Finance Minister and one of the most prominent figures
in the ruling Mapai Party, was a natural and undisputed choice as
Ben-Gurion’s successor as Prime Minister, but this was not the case
where the Ministry of Defence was concerned. Although he had served as
Deputy Minister of Defence responsible for financial matters, equipment
and weapons purchase, Eshkol was regarded by Ben-Gurion’s ‘young
guard’ as unfitted for the task. They preferred to separate the two posts
and entrust the defence portfolio to someone of more suitable background
from the Ben-Gurionist school of thought, such as Moshe Dayan or
Shimon Peres. Their criticism of Eshkol’s appointment was scathing and
offensive.10
Eshkol described his government as ‘a continuing Government’ and in
his first few months in office he proceeded with circumspection under the
long shadow of his predecessor. Changes were introduced later and gradu-
ally as Eshkol increasingly consolidated his position. In 1964, his
independent political moves led to a confrontation with Ben-Gurion,
which culminated a year later in a split within Mapai and the establish-
ment of the Rafi Party. In the defence sphere as well, Eshkol succeeded in
freeing himself from the shadow of the ‘old man’. His ‘declaration of
independence’ was his successful visit to the United States in 1964 and his
achievements there, his decision to abandon Ben-Gurion’s strategy and
utilize the IAF in routine operations, and the success of his defence policy
during the 1965 water dispute (see below). Ben-Gurion’s ‘young guard’,
Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan and Deputy Minister of Defence
Shimon Peres, resigned in November 1964 and May 1965 respectively.
Peres’ resignation and the appointment of Zvi Dinstein as his successor led
to organizational changes in the defence establishment.11
16 Personnel changes in defence establishment
The impact of all these changes was gradually felt by the IDF as well.
Eshkol, as noted above, was an easygoing minister, more responsive than
his predecessor to military initiatives. The Chief of Staff Zvi Zur did not
alter his mode of operation towards the political establishment. His succes-
sor (from January 1964), Yitzhak Rabin, soon found that Eshkol was
giving him unprecedented free rein.
Eshkol and the General Staff – first encounters

On 24 June 1963, eight days after Ben-Gurion’s resignation, Eshkol pre-
sented his government to the Knesset. In his address to the plenum, he

assured them that the new government would strive for peace and respect
the independence and territorial integrity of all the countries of the region.
The Arab states, their internal disputes notwithstanding, he declared, were
united in their hostility towards Israel and desire to annihilate it. He
demanded that the Great Powers provide assurances that the armament
balance would not be disturbed to Israel’s detriment, and added: ‘We will
act for constant improvement of the professional, pioneering and moral
standards of the IDF. . . . We will preserve the democratic nature of the
IDF.’12
In July 1963 the General Staff invited Eshkol to a series of three
comprehensive and illuminating staff meetings,13 at which the Chief of
Staff and several generals not only surveyed the overall military picture
but also expounded their views on issues beyond the military sphere,
and in particular the question of Israel’s borders. The discrepancy between
the civil approach, based on preservation of the status quo, and the
military approach, was immediately evident. The generals believed that
a unique opportunity had opened up, which had not existed in Ben-
Gurion’s day,14 namely to realize their secret territorial aspirations. It
was a clear attempt to influence the security policies of the new premier,
so as to gain more freedom for the achievement of military objectives.
Eshkol, for his part, showed no enthusiasm for border adjustments, apart
from the desire to include the Lebanese Litani River waters within Israeli
territory.15
Rabin, the Deputy Chief of Staff, who opened the proceedings, apolo-
gized for ‘invading’ the political sphere. He explained that he and his
fellow officers were merely voicing their ‘thoughts’ and that the final
decision naturally rested with the elected civil representatives. He declared
that when it came to the conventional arms race – both qualitatively and
quantitatively – Israel would, in the final analysis, be the loser, but overall,
when non-conventional measures were also taken into account, time was
on Israel’s side. His conclusion was that ‘there is no need to expedite
matters [and initiate hostilities which will change the strategic balance] due
to the assumption that time is against us’. On the other hand,
If we were to conclude that time is not in our favour, we might then

decide that it would be to our advantage to bring about such geopolit-
ical changes as would alter the balance of power, which is influenced
not only by military, economic and political might but also by
borders.
However, Rabin’s formula was not as simple as it sounded; it transpired

that he did not rule out Israeli military action to adjust the borders, and
even considered it desirable, though not essential. He defined the ideal
borders as follows: ‘The Jordan line, the [Suez] Canal line and the Litani
line.’ But if Israel has no territorial goals, it would be advisable to build up

deterrent power in order to prevent armed hostilities. The IDF, in any
event, did not perceive itself merely as a defensive and deterrent force. It
was also ‘a violent instrument for the achievement of political objectives
initiated by the political level, whether destruction of enemy forces or con-
quest of territory’.
Rabin’s phrasing was tortuous but his intention was clear. The IDF did
not intend to exert pressure for military action to improve borders, but in
the event that such action proved possible – it would be beneficial. In any
event, the government should be aware that the army also regarded itself
as an instrument for achieving political goals.
The commander of the IAF Ezer Weizman was blunter. ‘Whether it fits
in with the political approach or not, the IDF should aim to expand the
country’s borders, for security reasons.’ Weizman went on to expound his
vision of peace in the region, but added that, if Israel’s goal was
a state [within the divinely promised borders] as our forefathers saw it

– then it may well be that between the present day and the peace we
are all yearning for, there are a few things to be done [in order to
expand the borders] because afterwards, when we have peace, we
won’t be able to do them.16
Shimon Peres: ‘Today technology has replaced

geography’
Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres represented a different viewpoint.
‘Today technology . . . has replaced geography and military thinking,’ he
said. ‘The forces dealing with the atom, electronics, etc. are vehicles which
cannot be halted. . . . If Israel does not follow this path it will be abandon-
ing its destiny to the unknown.’ Peres shared the view expressed by Rabin
that in a conventional arms race, Israel would not have the upper hand in
the long run. But whereas Rabin considered border changes to be a pos-
sible means of maintaining the balance of power, Peres was convinced that
it was incumbent on Israel to ground its security on its independent and
non-conventional deterrent capacity and to pursue a political path which

would facilitate this policy.17
Summing up the discussion, Eshkol rejected the views that it was neces-
sary to seize considerable areas of the neighbouring countries. He warned
explicitly against ‘The thought of a preventive war and border modifica-
tions. . . . I don’t want to swear that we will never [launch a preventive
attack],’ he said. ‘It may well be that you arrive at such a situation when
there is a sword at your throat.’ But even so, he argued, they should not
rely on the possibility of adjusting borders. Because of his close association
with agriculture and the water issue, Eshkol coveted the Litani waters. As
for peace, he hinted that it was not the task of the army but the exclusive
responsibility of the government ‘to turn the world upside down’, although
‘it may sound quixotic today’.
The General Staff as lobbyists for border

expansion
On the face of it, the views expressed by the generals in their meeting with
Eshkol bear out the claim that the General Staff functioned as a territorial
lobby and that several of the senior officers, who advocated war from the
outset, urged the government in May to June 1967 to launch a pre-emptive
strike with the intention of expanding Israel’s borders.18
As we shall see below, the General Staff under the Eshkol government
and under Rabin adhered to its offensive doctrine and adopted a more
activist stance than the government, the majority of whom favoured a cau-
tious defensive policy. At General Staff meetings, some of the generals sup-
ported occupation of the West Bank or part of the Golan Heights and the
water sources. This view, however, met with a sober and realistic response,
born out of the lesson of the forced withdrawal from all the territory occu-
pied during the 1956 Sinai campaign. ‘The problem,’ it was argued, ‘is not
the IDF’s ability to conquer territory but the state’s ability to hold on to
it.’19 The generals, remembering the trauma of withdrawal in 1957, were
well aware that it would be pointless to spill blood for the sake of short-
lived territorial gains. For the same reasons, operative planning placed
greater emphasis on the need to destroy enemy forces than on the occupa-
tion of territory.
Some of the General Staff officers thought that crisis situations should
be exploited in order to achieve border adjustments, particularly on the
Jordanian front. However, they voiced these views in closed forums, and
there was certainly no consensus within the General Staff on this issue; nor
was there a ‘lobby’. While such aspirations did exist,20 Rabin, as Chief of
Staff, apparently never voiced a demand for territorial modifications. The
only occasion on record was the above-mentioned meeting of the General
Staff with Eshkol, on 6 July 1963, when Rabin, then Deputy Chief of
Staff, expressed his (qualified) support on principle for the expansion of

borders. The General Staff unreservedly accepted the authority of the
political level in this period, and there is no indication of pressure on their
part for operations aimed at conquering territory.
Notwithstanding, it is a fact that the General Staff chose to raise the
question of borders in their first meetings with the new Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence. This was not ‘lobbying’ on their part but rather a
clear expression of the army’s offensive and activist predilections.
The new Chief of Staff: Rabin’s credo

In Ben Gurion’s day, no ex-Palmachnik was appointed Chief of Staff,
because the Palmach had been associated with the radical Zionist Left. The
delay in Rabin’s promotion to the highest position in the army was gener-
ally attributed to his past in the Palmach and to the well-known incident
when he disobeyed an order from his superiors and participated in the
Palmach get-together of 1949, rousing Ben-Gurion’s fierce disapproval.21
However, it was Ben-Gurion who appointed Rabin in 1960 as deputy
Chief of Staff, thereby essentially guaranteeing that he would be the next
Chief of Staff.22 On the other hand, Ben-Gurion was of the opinion that it
was not a good idea for ‘Yitzhak, who will certainly make a good Chief of
Staff, to have [another ex-Palmachnik, Haim] Barlev as his deputy’,23 and
hence he supported the candidacy of Ezer Weizman for the post of deputy,
although he was known to be close in views to the right-wing opposition
Herut Party.
The affair was complicated by Weizman’s insistence on handing on the
command of the IAF to Colonel Motti Fein (Hod), rather than to Gideon
Elrom, the veteran candidate, who was Rabin’s choice. Haim Barlev, who
regarded himself as a worthy candidate for the post of deputy Chief of
Staff, was offered Northern Command but turned it down. Eshkol con-
sulted Ben-Gurion, who considered Rabin to be ‘an honest and intelligent
fellow’ who could be relied on, but ‘slightly too cautious’, so that it was
preferable to appoint Weizman as his deputy.
Ben-Gurion advised Eshkol to impose his decision on Rabin and
to appoint Fein as CO of the IAF: ‘The Minister of Defence,’ he argued,
‘is not obliged to accept the opinion of the Chief of Staff vis-à-vis
appointments.’24 Eshkol, however, refrained from imposing his views on
Rabin and, in the end, Weizman’s insistence cleared the way for Barlev,
who was appointed Chief of Operations, though without the title of
deputy Chief of Staff. Weizman remained in the IAF for another three
years.25
On 1 January 1964, Yitzhak Rabin became Chief of Staff and on the
same day he convened his fellow members of the General Staff forum and
explained his credo in his new position. There were two underlying
motives for the Arab desire to annihilate Israel, he said: hostility towards
Israel, shared by most Arabs, because Israel was an alien factor in the
region, whose very existence was an affront to Arab pride and nationalist
sentiment. The second motive was the fact that Israel constituted a
geographical obstacle to Egyptian ambition to unite the Arab world and
dominate it.
Turning to the role of the army in promoting peace, he said: ‘The IDF
can bring peace closer by readying itself for war.’ And he added a
comment which hinted at a more activist approach. Greater preparedness
and ‘a greater momentum for operational activity’ would help to bring
peace. Referring to the danger of an Arab attack, Rabin pointed to Egypt

as the main adversary, without which there would be no hostilities.
The present balance of power, he added, precluded war and it could
be maintained in the future. Time was on Israel’s side and not on that of
Arab union under Egyptian hegemony. Israel was becoming an established
fact, even in the consciousness of the Arab world, and was capable of
preserving its qualitative edge in conventional warfare for the coming
ten to fifteen years. In the more distant future, the answer lay in non-
conventional measures, a sphere in which Israel was considerably ahead of
Egypt and the other Arab states, but ‘this is not a subject for the present
forum’.
Rabin discussed the possibility of an Israeli pre-emptive strike with a
twofold aim:
1 To destroy the enemy force. This step should be considered if it was

known that the enemy was planning an attack in the near future. He
went on: ‘It seems to me that if these circumstances arise, it will be the
task of the IDF to explain [to the civil level] the meaning of failure to
act in order to forestall an Arab attack.’
2 Occupation of territory. He saw ‘no moral flaw in thinking that
the State of Israel must be large. I would say that the reverse is true.
But I think that the problem today is not the ability of the IDF to
conquer territory but the State’s ability to hold on to it.’ The Chief of
Staff recalled the pressure which had forced Israel to retreat from Sinai
and Lebanon in the 1948 war, while ‘all the territory we captured
within Palestine-Eretz Israel remained within Israel’s borders’. In this
respect, withdrawal from the Gaza Strip after the Sinai Campaign had
created a grave political precedent. This did not necessarily have
implications for the future, but under certain conditions a pre-emptive
strike might occur on the Jordanian front to conquer territory ‘for
temporary occupation’. Israeli military intervention on the West Bank
would not necessarily be aimed, therefore, so he argued, at improving
the border lines, but rather would be exploited as a lever for political
gain.
He concluded by assuring the General Staff forum that they would take
part in future in formulating the IDF’s basic stances before presenting
them to the politicians.26 In practice this did not always happen. Rabin felt
free to represent the IDF’s viewpoint when he saw fit, even when his views
were not in accord with the mood of the General Staff. This tendency was
particularly evident during the May 1967 crisis.
Chapter 2
Basic security issues

The underlying cause of the escalation which led up to the Six Day War, in
contrast to the 1956 Sinai Campaign, was not disturbance of the balance
of conventional armament between Israel and its neighbours. In the period
under study, the arming of the Egyptian and Syrian armies by the Soviet
Union1 was counterbalanced by Western supply of weapons to Israel, and,
above all – for the first time in Israel’s history – US-made weapons
systems: ground-to-air missiles followed by tanks and fighter planes.2 The
objective of the buildup of the IDF was to enhance Israel’s deterrent capa-
bility, and emphasis was placed on upgrading the skills of the fighting
units in accordance with the army’s offensive doctrine.
Israel’s political effort to gain access to the US arms market began in the
early years of statehood, but the United States adhered to its traditional
reluctance to become the main arms supplier to the region. However, at
the beginning of the period under discussion, there were conflicting views
in Israel as to which source was preferable, the United States or Europe,
due to fears that the former could impose restrictions on Israel’s freedom
of military and technological capability. When Israel constructed a large
nuclear reactor at Dimona (in addition to a smaller reactor at Nahal
Soreq, supplied to Israel through President Dwight Eisenhower’s scheme
‘Atoms for Peace’), it was suspected in the United States and the Arab
states that it was planning to manufacture atomic weapons. Israel denied
this. At the time, Egypt was investing effort in developing ground-to-
ground missiles and also attempting to establish a nuclear infrastructure,
but it failed where Israel succeeded. This is one of the reasons cited for the
outbreak of war in 1967.3
The doctrine
From the military viewpoint, the fact that Israel launched a pre-emptive
strike on 5 June 1967 was the direct outcome of the IDF’s offensive doc-
trine, crystallized in the early 1950s. After the War of Independence,
Israel, having achieved almost all its strategic goals,4 was anxious to main-
Basic security issues 23
tain the status quo stipulated in the armistice agreements. Since the two
sides had absolutely conflicting views – Israel refused to take back Palestin-
ian refugees or to return captured territory lying beyond the borders of the
1947 UN partition plan while the Arab states demanded the opposite – the
conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, held at Lausanne in
1949, ended in an impasse.5 In addition, separate and clandestine contacts
between Israel and Egypt, as well as with Jordan and Syria, produced no
results. Hence the nature of the Arab–Israeli conflict was fixed and peace
was no longer at hand.6 The Arab states constantly reiterated their inten-
tion to initiate a ‘second round’ in order to alter the status quo by force
and liberate Palestine.

The facts demonstrate that the disparity between Arab declarations and
actions was great. Their belligerent pronouncements notwithstanding, the
divided leaders of the post-1948 Arab world never managed to formulate a
coordinated plan for an all-out onslaught on Israel, with one exception:
the third summit conference in Casablanca in 1965 (see below), but then,
too, the inter-Arab harmony soon disintegrated due to bitter internal rival-
ries. Nonetheless, fear that the Arab world might unite and launch a
coordinated attack haunted Ben-Gurion throughout his terms of office as
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.7 The IDF was called on to supply
the operative answer for defence of the country in the event of the worst
scenario. This scenario – referred to in the IDF as the ‘all-out event’ – did
not appear a likely eventuality until the eve of the Six Day War.
In the first few years of statehood, the basic premise of the General Staff
was that Israel would never initiate hostilities, a premise which dictated
the ‘defensive-offensive’ doctrine; initially, the IDF would be deployed in a
defence layout in order to block the enemy, and in the second stage it
would launch a counter-attack and transfer the fighting to enemy territory.
The first stage was to be grounded on the regular army and a highly
developed system of regional defence, and from then on, on the reserve
forces. This conception was, to a large extent, the continuation of the
underlying concept of the War of Independence strategy.8
The transition within the Israel Defence Forces to an alternative ‘offen-
sive-defensive’ doctrine occurred at a very early stage and stemmed from
the conviction of the IDF’s planning echelon that there was no certainty
that the IDF could hold fast if faced with the ‘all-out’ scenario. An all-out,
coordinated Arab attack might inflict irreversible damage in the first stage
due to the proximity of the border to population concentrations and to the
difficulty in deploying the armed forces for defence on all fronts simultan-
eously. It was feared that the outcome would be resolved in the critical
arenas before the reserve forces could be mobilized in full.
This outcome would be achieved through infliction of severe damage on
population centres and infrastructures and on Israel’s few air force bases,
the cutting off of the southern Negev, occupation of the Galilee panhandle,
24 Basic security issues
the cutting off of the Jerusalem corridor or splitting the country into two
at its narrowest point on the coastal plain. In October 1952, before his
retirement from the armed forces, the Head of the IDF’s Planning Depart-
ment Colonel Shalom Eshet, at Ben-Gurion’s request, prepared a compre-
hensive report on the existing balance of forces and on the IDF’s ability to
fulfil its mission and to safeguard Israel’s existence and territorial integrity
in the face of an Arab onslaught. Eshet recommended replacing the basic
premise of the security doctrine:
Only one premise of . . . the security doctrine needs to be changed, as I

see it, namely the assumption that the initiative for initiating hostilities
lies with the enemy. Comparison of the balance of forces and of time
and spatial factors does not indicate the possibility [that the IDF can
carry out its mission] if the enemy takes the initiative.9
Eshet’s successor, Lt. Colonel Yuval Neeman, collected extensive data

which was summed up in August 1953 in a document entitled: ‘Order of
battle in wartime: evaluation 1953–1960’, which confirmed the change-
over to an ‘offensive-defensive’ doctrine.10
Ben-Gurion, who held a pessimistic, almost deterministic, view of the
Arab–Israel conflict, was easily convinced. In December 1953, when he
first retired to Sdeh Boqer, Ben-Gurion appointed Moshe Dayan as Chief
of Staff. Dayan was the man who implanted the new doctrine in the IDF,
serving as the agent of change for the political echelon.11
The practical implication of the new doctrine was that Israel must not
leave the initiative in enemy hands. This was a revolutionary and not
uncontroversial conclusion,12 and was certainly unacceptable to Foreign
Minister Moshe Sharett. But once adopted, the new doctrine was almost
irreversible. The IDF now refrained from large-scale investment in border
fortification, the regional defence layout was weakened, and military pur-
chases were earmarked mainly for the assault forces. The offensive doc-
trine engendered two terms which represented two separate approaches:
preventive war and pre-emptive attack. The former, more radical concept
was identified with Moshe Dayan, and the second with ex-Palmach com-
mander Yigal Allon.
Before the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Chief of Staff Dayan, convinced that
another war was inevitable, argued that Israel could not wait idly for the
Arabs to achieve their proclaimed aim of launching a ‘second round’ for
the annihilation of Israel under conditions and timing convenient to them;
the IDF should choose the conditions and timing and initiate the fighting,
thereby dictating the operative framework and the objectives. Allon, too,
thought that Israel could not permit itself to fight a war launched on pan-
Arab initiative, but should commence hostilities only if an imminent threat
of Arab attack loomed or if Israel’s security ‘red lines’ were crossed.13
The concept of a preventive war, originating in a more pessimistic view of

the dispute and of the gravity of the threat, essentially evaporated after being
put to the test in 1956. The subsequent bolstering of Israel’s confidence and
the lesson of the post-war political efforts left the pre-emptive strike theory
as the ruling concept. The Sinai Campaign had demonstrated the tremen-
dous military advantages to Israel of being the initiator, and at the same
time had allayed fears of a military confrontation. The calm which now pre-
vailed on the borders eliminated the immediate pretext for a preventive war.
Now all Israel wanted was to preserve the status quo and to maintain
effective deterrence, pointing to war prevention as the goal of Israel’s
security policy. Only if deterrence failed and Israel was confronted with
the real and imminent danger of Arab aggression or the undermining of its
vital interests (through diversion of water sources, or the blocking of the
Tiran Straits) would it feel entitled to deal the first blow. The theory of the
pre-emptive strike, although never officially sanctioned, was from now on
the cornerstone of the security doctrine.14 During the May to June 1967
crisis it was the basis for the army’s eagerness to deliver the first blow and
for the government’s decision to approve this move.
Orientation – Europe or the United States?

As noted, when Levi Eshkol took over, there was controversy as to which
source of weapons supply was preferable – Europe or the United States. In
light of President Kennedy’s 1962 decision to accede to Israel’s request to
the previous administration to purchase anti-aircraft Hawk missiles15 –
which were clearly defensive weapons – it was hoped that the United
States would now be willing to supply other weapons. The most urgent
need was to update and expand the IDF Armoured Corps.16 The dispute
related to Israel’s political orientation, and Deputy Minister of Defence
Shimon Peres, architect of the security ties with France and Germany, was
isolated in his efforts to foster the pro-European orientation. His view-
point reflected the desire to bring Israel into Europe. He argued that
because of the great distance between them, the United States could not
comprehend the Middle Eastern situation. He predicted the establishment
of a European union, directly involved in the Middle East, to which
Israel’s future would be linked.17
At the same time, Peres was mainly motivated by considerations con-
nected to the Dimona reactor, the apple of his eye and his major achieve-
ment. The pressure exerted by the Kennedy administration on this issue
stirred his anxiety. The willingness of the United States to guarantee
Israel’s security, its readiness to sell Israel weapons’ systems or the idea of
basing Israel’s security on a defence treaty with the United States could not
counterbalance that pressure so far as he was concerned.18 He claimed that
the world in general, and the region in particular, were on the brink of a
technological revolution, and Israel could not permit itself to lag behind in
this race and to remain dependent on others. This situation called for a
total rethink of the situation. The weapons of the new era would erase
Israel’s qualitative advantage in manpower; the new formula would be
technology versus technology. The development of missiles and nuclear
weapons had rendered anachronistic all the classic strategic theories based
on time, space and quantity.19
Peres endeavoured to recruit public and parliamentary support for his
advocacy of the European orientation.20 On 24 June 1963, the day Eshkol
presented his new government to the Knesset, Peres, the Deputy Minister
of Defence,21 attended a General Staff meeting and delivered a political

and defence survey. Peres tried to recruit support among the military for
his standpoint, which was not shared by Eshkol. The generals listened,
asked several questions but did not voice opinions. Chief of Staff Zur, who
was a close associate of Peres, was about to end his term of office, and his
successor, Rabin, had reservations about the deputy minister, but tended
to be pragmatic rather than ideological.
Peres explained that, while France had proved its reliability in supplying
arms to Israel, the support of the United States was conditional. He added
that Kennedy was liable to step up pressure on issues vital to Israel. A new
focus of power was emerging in Europe in competition with the United
States, headed by France and Germany, and both were supportive of
Israel. Hence Israel should give priority to its ties with them. Relations
with Europe would enable Israel to develop its independent deterrent
nuclear capability. On this issue not only did the United States have
nothing to offer Israel, but it was acting against Israeli interests.22
Eshkol: ‘I doubt whether a rift with the United

States would strengthen us’
A week later, in the presence of the generals, Eshkol took issue with Peres
on the weapons supply issue, and voiced his skepticism as to the advantage
of security links with Europe. The importance of the large Jewish
community in the United States and of US aid dictated consideration for
the views of the United States. Eshkol emphasized that he had no intention
of conceding to Kennedy on vital issues (such as Israel’s nuclear pro-
gramme), but, he added, ‘I simply want you to know: there are limits . . . in
disputes with the West.’ Israel, he admitted, was ‘in a certain bind’. Not
only were $150 million of US aid in danger, but the Americans ‘have many
whips to wield against us’, and the situation could lead to alienation of the
West, including Germany, from Israel. Israel had the moral right to do
everything in its power to safeguard its existence in light of Arab schemes
to destroy it, but ‘I doubt if a rift with the United States would strengthen
us. I would not hesitate to assert that it would weaken us.’
Eshkol added that despite his analysis, he had
doubts about the Christian world. I am not in the habit of seeing anti-
Semitism everywhere but I am acquainted with the fear that perhaps
on a day of wrath, the Arabs might, Heaven forbid, exterminate us
and then the Christian world will breathe a sigh of relief. We are a
thorn in the side of the West as well.23
The General Staff were to a large extent bystanders while this polemic
was being conducted. The generals were not preoccupied with this issue
and if Peres had expected support, he was disappointed. Rabin’s view was
that Israel should not place its trust in any country but should use any
contact with or willingness of any country whatsoever to strengthen the
State of Israel and its army.24 This detached attitude was rooted in the fact
that the IDF was not in a position of influence on this matter. Eshkol
encountered no obstacles from the army when he decided to opt for the US
weapons supply and to invest political effort in acquiring tanks and air-
craft from the United States.25 The reverse was true.
The Dimona reactor and Israeli–US relations

The objectives and essence of Israel’s nuclear programme are beyond the
scope of the present context. Numerous studies have been devoted to the
relevance of this subject in the pre-Six Day War period, and its possible
impact on the developments which led to war.26 Aronson offers a theory
which perceives the nuclear issue as the core of the considerations and
decision-making which preceded the 1967 war (as it was in 1956).27 But
the documents do not validate his theory.
The basic facts are as follows. In Autumn 1957, in the wake of the Sinai
Campaign, when relations between Israel and France were at their best,
the two countries signed an agreement for the construction of a nuclear
reactor. The reactor, of some 40-megawatt capacity, was constructed
under secrecy in the Negev near the town of Dimona and its exposure in
late 1960 evoked an emphatic US demand that Israel clarify its intentions.
On 21 December 1960, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion delivered a statement
in the Knesset, denying any plan to manufacture nuclear weapons and
asserting that the nuclear power was to be used for research purposes and
for development of the Negev, as well as for the training of scientists for
the future construction of an atomic power-station.28
Ben-Gurion’s announcement and the change of administrations in
Washington calmed the atmosphere and a visit to Dimona by two scien-
tists from the US Atomic Commission yielded no evidence of military
intentions. On 30 May 1961, some two weeks after the visit, Ben-Gurion
met with Kennedy in New York and assured him that the reactor would be
used solely for peaceful purposes. He had no objections, he said, to the

Arabs being briefed on the conclusions drawn by the two scientists. At the
same time, he pointed out that Israel would follow developments in
the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, and that there was no knowing
what the future would bring.29
For more than two years, the reactor was not a major issue in Israel–US
relations, and was unconnected to the Kennedy administration’s decision
in 1962 to supply Israel with Hawk ground-to-air missiles. But Kennedy
regarded the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a personal mission
and a vital element of his global policy, and several months after the reso-
lution of the missile crisis in Cuba, he stepped up his pressure on Ben-

Gurion to permit regular effective supervision of the Dimona reactor. At
the height of this pressure, on 16 June 1963, Ben-Gurion tendered his final
resignation from the premiership and handed over responsibility to Levi
Eshkol.30
In his missives to Kennedy, Eshkol displayed willingness, however
vaguely phrased, to accede to the US demand. Kennedy responded by reit-
erating his country’s informal commitment to Israel’s security and readi-
ness to discuss Israel’s defence needs and launched a strategic dialogue
between the two countries. Israel’s political and military leadership vacil-
lated between advocacy of a defence treaty (though it was universally
agreed that there was no prospect of gaining US consent) and various
financial, political and security demands, and in particular weapons
supply.31 In mid-November 1963, an Israeli military deputation, headed by
Rabin and the Deputy Chief of Intelligence Aharon Yariv, set out for the
first strategic dialogue in Washington, at which Israel’s security needs were
discussed. The Dimona reactor was not mentioned.32
Kennedy’s assassination did not remove the Dimona issue from the
agenda, but the views of his successor, Lyndon Johnson, were much less
emphatic. American scientists visited the Israeli atomic reactor in January
1964, and again in January 1965, April 1966 and April 1967, and found
no evidence of arms manufacture. In June 1964, when Eshkol paid the first
official visit by an Israeli premier to the United States, he assured the
President that ‘Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into
the Middle East’. This slogan, apparently first voiced by Ben-Gurion in
1962 in a discussion with the committee of Israeli newspaper editors, and
reiterated by Peres in an unplanned meeting with Kennedy in 1963,33 now
became the cornerstone of Israel’s proclaimed nuclear policy. This promise
more or less reassured Johnson. The Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not
withdraw the demand that Israel consent to supervision by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Commission, but the President no longer brought
his full weight to bear on this matter.34 Eshkol’s requests from the United
States for conventional weaponry – at this stage mainly tanks – met with a
sympathetic response. Israel’s refusal to accept international control and
the delaying tactics employed with regard to the visits of US scientists in

Dimona did not have a negative impact on this response.
Talks on weapons supply: the visit of Harriman

and Comer
The US vacillated for some time before agreeing to supply Israel with US-
manufactured tanks and they were eventually supplied indirectly: the US
sent Germany 150 state-of-the-art Patton M48A3 tanks in return for dis-
patching the older model M48A1 to Israel. The implementation began in
early 1965 and encountered problems after one of the tanks broke down
on its way to an Italian port. Publicity on this incident led to German
withdrawal from the deal. The US administration then decided to supply
the tanks directly and it was with this in mind that Under-secretary of
State Averell Harriman was dispatched to Israel at the end of February
together with National Security Council member Robert Comer.
Encouragement for direct supply of US arms was provided meanwhile
by an unexpected source: the Arab summit conferences, held in Cairo and
Alexandria in January and September 1964, decided to thwart Israel’s
water development schemes by diverting the sources of the Jordan River
and reinforcing the armies of the countries involved in the diversion. The
United Arab Command, established after the conference, allotted Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon the sum of £154 million for military purchases.35
Jordan was pressured to purchase Soviet arms and King Hussein appealed
to the United States for weapons so that he would not be forced to turn to
the USSR. The US agreement to sell arms to Jordan prepared the ground
for direct sale of arms to Israel.
The mission of Harriman and Comer was aimed, among other things,
at softening Israel’s resistance to the supply of 100 American tanks to
Jordan. It was agreed that: Israel would not conduct a diplomatic cam-
paign against the sale of tanks to Jordan; Jordan, for its part, would guar-
antee to position the tanks on the East Bank alone; the tanks would be of
an inferior type (M48A1) to those sold to Israel (M48A2); the United
States would finalize the tank deal with Israel and add 100 tanks and
upgrading systems. The question of supply of fighter aircraft to Israel and
Jordan was also discussed but no decision was taken at this stage.
Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his book Service Notebook that the US emis-
saries demanded three guarantees: that Israel was committed not to launch
a preventive war; that it would try to solve the Jordan water crisis by
peaceful means; and that it would not equip itself with nuclear weapons.
Israel rejected the first demand; on the water issue, it agreed to explore all
other avenues before resorting to military intervention, and on the ques-
tion of nuclear weapons, its response remained vague and unaltered.36
Harriman and Comer’s objective, therefore, was to finalize a package deal
to include an Israeli promise to exercise restraint in reaction to security

challenges, silent consent to the supply of US arms to Jordan and abandon-
ment of the nuclear path.
In return, the US administration offered guarantees of Israel’s security
in the event of an Arab attack and reinforcement of Israel’s conventional
arsenal by supply of US weapons. Israel’s reply to the US demands was
generally intractable and the Americans threatened to torpedo the talks.37
The Israelis were eager to derive the maximum advantage from the change
in US policy and from the desire of the United States to sell weapons to
Jordan. However, on the nuclear issue, Eshkol remained adamant and his
standpoint was in fact accepted with tacit understanding by President

Johnson.
Israel’s obduracy in the course of the talks was ostensibly surprising. US
arms supply to Jordan was, in the final analysis, commensurate with Israeli
interests, and its readiness to become Israel’s main arms supplier represen-
ted a fundamental, even historic, change of direction. Israel was naturally
eager to acquire US weapons, but was apprehensive and even suspicious of
US intentions and of its global and regional interests, which dictated
restriction of Israel’s freedom of military action. The conditions stipulated
by the United States bore this out. Consequently, Israel rejected most of
the demands. It waived its objections to the US–Jordanian arms deal, but
refused to provide assurance that it would not launch a pre-emptive strike
if a critical threat arose, and refused to consent to avoid, under any cir-
cumstances, the use of force to frustrate attempts to divert the Jordan river
sources.
The Harriman–Comer talks with Israel lasted almost a month. Their
reports to Washington indicate that the negotiations were tough and wide-
ranging and that the US tried to extract far-reaching Israeli guarantees,
particularly with regard to supervision of nuclear installations and a
restrained Israeli response to Arab water diversion schemes. In the end, the
Americans were obliged to make do with a limited memorandum of under-
standing, which included only implicit Israeli consent to the sale of tanks
to Jordan and a US guarantee to sell tanks and a small quantity of aircraft
to Israel.38
On 10 March 1965, the memorandum of understanding was signed
between Eshkol and Comer (Harriman had left for India). It included a US
commitment to Israel’s security and territorial integrity, and Israel’s assur-
ance – for the first time in writing – that it would not be the first to intro-
duce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.
As regards the request for fighter planes, the Americans demanded that
Israel first exhaust the possibilities of acquiring aircraft from European
sources. Israel, however, wanted US-manufactured aircraft, particularly
Phantoms, and announced that it had not succeeded in finding suitable air-
craft in Europe. In October 1965, IAF Commander Ezer Weizman visited
Washington and presented a very ambitious shopping list which included

forty-five Phantoms and 165 Skyhawks, far beyond what the administration
was willing to consider. In February 1966, the Americans approved the dis-
patch of twenty-four Skyhawks and the option for purchase of an additional
twenty-four aircraft. This decision was indirectly linked to Israel’s reiterated
guarantee not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region and to permit
US scientists to inspect the reactor. Shortly afterwards Israel signed an agree-
ment for the purchase of fifty Mirage M5 aircraft from France.39
Missiles
On 21 July 1962, on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Free Officers’
revolt in Egypt, four ground-to-ground missiles of two different types were
launched in the Egyptian Western Desert – el-Kahr (The Conquerer), with
a range of 560 kilometres, and el-Zaf’r (The Winner), with a range of 280
kilometres. President Nasser announced that the Egyptian missiles were
capable of reaching any target ‘south of Beirut’.40 Israel, which had dis-
patched the Shavit 2 into the atmosphere for ‘meteorological research pur-
poses’ a year previously,41 was taken by surprise by the launching of the
Egyptian missiles. The fact that they had been developed with the aid of
German scientists working in Egypt sparked off political and public hyste-
ria in Israel, and Ben-Gurion’s pro-German policy was sharply attacked by
both the right- and left-wing opposition, and even within his own party.
The furore aroused by the ‘German scientists’ affair’ lasted up until Ben-
Gurion’s resignation in June 1963 and only gradually died down subse-
quently. A French source reveals that, in parallel and clandestinely, Israel
arrived at an agreement with the Dassault concern in France for the accel-
erated development of ground-to-ground missiles of type MD620.42
The missiles race between Egypt and Israel was of great concern to the
United States. The Americans did not attribute great significance or logic
to the manufacture of missiles with conventional warheads, but regarded
the combination of missile development and nuclear capability as a new
and dangerous stage in the Middle Eastern arms race.43
Fear of the Egyptian missiles haunted the IDF General Staff at the
beginning of the period under discussion, and this fear found expression in
frequent Intelligence reports, evaluations and assessments. Although they
were equipped with conventional warheads, these missiles rendered Israel’s
urban hinterland vulnerable and indefensible. High-level Egyptian ballistic
capability was also liable to hamper Israeli ability to react to unilateral
moves (such as the blocking of the Tiran Straits) for fear of reprisals
against civilian populations and infrastructures.44 It gradually became
clear, however, that Egypt’s ambitious project was encountering obstacles,
and it received less frequent mention at General Staff meetings. Ground-to-
ground missiles played no part whatsoever in the Six Day War.
Abortive American initiatives

Israel’s shocked response to the launching of Egyptian missiles apparently
impelled the Kennedy administration to take steps to pacify and
reassure the Israelis. In August 1962, Kennedy’s adviser on Israeli and
Jewish affairs, Meyer Feldman, was sent to Israel to inform the govern-
ment of the President’s decision to respond to Israel’s request for
Hawk ground-to-air missiles, which had been submitted in 1961 by Ben-
Gurion to Eisenhower. It is noteworthy that the IDF senior command
was divided on the issue of missile purchase. Weizman was strongly
opposed for fear it would subvert the offensive doctrine. One of the
important reasons why missiles were necessary was defence of the Dimona
reactor.45
The official announcement of the sale of Hawk missiles was published
on 27 September 1962, and the missiles were introduced into the IAF
(after a dispute with the Artillery Corps) in April 1965. The Kennedy
administration failed in its attempt to render the agreement to supply
Israel with missiles conditional on Israeli consent for a proposal that Israel
would absorb 10 per cent of the refugees and the remainder would be
absorbed by the Arab countries in a ten-year-long process funded by the
Americans. The plan did not include Arab recognition of Israel or a peace
settlement and Ben-Gurion opposed it, but was pressured by the United
States into agreeing to negotiations. Events in the region and the assassina-
tion of Kennedy put an end to the plan.46
Another abortive US initiative was the attempt to base an indirect deal
with Egypt and Israel on the missiles and the reactor. The Kennedy admin-
istration realized that its pressure on Israel must be accompanied by some
form of compensation in the defence sphere. It was decided to attempt to
formulate bilateral US–Egypt and US–Israel agreements. In return for
Israel’s consent to halt all nuclear development and missile purchase and
to accept international control of the reactor, the United States would try
to persuade Egypt to abandon its missile development programme and to
permit supervision of its installations by the International Atomic Energy
Commission. While stepping up the pressure on Israel, Kennedy also dis-
patched his personal emissary John McCloy to Egypt in June 1963.
McCloy, who had negotiated with Nasser several years earlier on the ship-
ping of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal,47 was authorized to
arrange the deal.
Johnson, too, tried to concoct a deal through his emissaries to Nasser –
Philip Talbot (March 1964) and McCloy again (September 1964) – for the
same purpose. Nasser, however, was suspicious of US intentions and
voiced his objections to an indirect deal with Israel, totally rejecting any
form of foreign supervision of the missile project as a violation of Egypt’s
sovereignty.48 The US administration was thus forced to abandon its
original scheme and to pay Israel in US rather than Egyptian currency, in

return for consent to US inspection of the reactor.
Due to global calculations, the United States was reluctant to enter into
a defence treaty with Israel and hence was forced to make do with Israel’s
guarantee not to be the first to introduce nuclear weaponry into the region
and to consent to US periodic inspection of the reactor. In practice, due to
Israeli delaying tactics, inspections took place at twelve- to eighteen-month
intervals and were discontinued entirely in 1969. Israel’s consent was
based on US agreement to supply arms, maintain the strategic dialogue,
and the continued informal commitment of the United States to Israel’s
security. In essence, Israel benefited from Egypt’s inflexibility: it received

payment in ‘hard’ currency – tanks and aircraft – and paid out ‘soft’ cur-
rency’ – ambivalent consent on the nuclear issue. The Egyptian missile
project, on the other hand, died a natural death due to technological prob-
lems and budgetary restrictions.
Israel’s nuclear image in Arab eyes

The nuclear issue as such did not greatly preoccupy the IDF General Staff.
The Intelligence Branch closely followed Egyptian efforts to develop non-
conventional weapons, and the head of Intelligence and his deputy
reported from time to time on current developments to the General Staff
meetings, but the senior command was more concerned with the implica-
tions of Israel’s nuclear image in Arab eyes and its impact on the short-
term conventional threat. What they feared was an Egyptian surprise
attack on the Dimona reactor aimed at obliterating what the Arabs per-
ceived to be the Israeli atomic menace.
Public references by the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, to the pur-
ported development of Israel’s nuclear capacity were not frequent in this
period, but the subject was always on the agenda. The Egyptian statements
were usually blunter and more threatening than those of Syria, which
played down the issue. The Palestinian organizations favoured expediting
the Arab confrontation with Israel before the latter’s nuclear power
became an established fact.49
The IDF senior command and the political echelon estimated that
the Dimona reactor constituted a prime target for an Arab attack, whether
through a concentrated air strike or in the framework of an overall
military confrontation. At the strategic level, the answer lay in effective
conventional deterrence and decisive capability. The construction of
the reactor, therefore, provided an additional reason for reinforcing the
conventional capability of the armed forces. At the tactical and operative
level, this entailed establishment of a strong defensive disposition around
the reactor consisting of ground and artillery forces, including Hawk mis-
siles, and efforts to ensure that, at any cost, Israel would be the first to
inflict a crushing blow on the Arab air forces in the event that hostilities
began.
Despite Israel’s assurances that it would not be the first to employ
nuclear weapons in the Middle East, its unsupervised nuclear development
never received international recognition and consequently the Israelis
feared that an Arab attack on the reactor would be sanctioned. Rabin
declared: ‘If the Egyptians bomb Dimona and we want to go to war, we
will receive an ultimatum from the whole world.’50 Israel had no corre-
sponding response to offer to the destruction of the reactor. It could react
by launching an all-out war, destroying air forces or conquering territory,
but it was questionable whether it had anything to gain thereof. Destroyed

aircraft could be replaced, and all-out warfare and conquest could prove
very costly. Moreover, the fruits of victory could be negated by inter-
national pressure, as had occurred after the Sinai Campaign. The loss of
the reactor, on the other hand, would be irretrievable.
Israel’s defence establishment was greatly concerned, therefore, by the
prospect of a sudden Arab attack on the reactor. Egypt’s threats to launch
a preventive war because of the reactor did not seem likely to be imple-
mented in light of the circumstances and the balance of power, but a con-
centrated air strike on the reactor was considered a feasible possibility.
This was also the view of the Chief of Staff. Hence the government’s hesi-
tation to approve reprisal operations against Syria as demanded by the IDF
(see below). Rabin explained to his fellow officers:
There is an object in the south of the country, the ideal object for
limited reaction [on the part of Egypt] for which it would receive the
total support of the whole world. Dimona. [Ministers] claim that
Egypt can refrain from transferring forces to Sinai or Syria but to deal
with Dimona, that’s not considered war. It is a limited operation.51
Fears of this eventuality increased during the crisis on the eve of the Six
Day War and served as an important (though not decisive) motive for the
Israeli pre-emptive strike.
The nuclear issue and the Six Day War

To what extent, if at all, was the nuclear issue the casus belli of the Six
Day War? The Dimona reactor was, at most, a secondary factor which
emerged in the final act.
Israel’s nuclear developments greatly concerned the Arabs, and particu-
larly Egypt, and the reactor was undoubtedly marked out by the Egyptians
as a prime target. Egyptian reconnaissance flights over the reactor on 17
and 26 May 1967 were signs of this.52 However, Nasser’s conduct was
curious: first, if he precipitated the crisis initially in order to destroy the
reactor, or to neutralize it before Israel could consolidate its nuclear mili-

tary capacity, why did he try to deter Israel from attacking Syria? He was
depriving himself thereby of the pretext for reacting to such an attack by
destroying the reactor.
Second, if the target was indeed the reactor, and such an attack would
have been greeted with understanding, if not sanctioned, by world
opinion, why did he entangle himself in an international imbroglio because
of the Straits? Third, after blocking the straits, why did he expose himself
to the danger of a confrontation with the United States instead of render-
ing the reopening of the Straits conditional on supervision of the Israeli
reactor by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a demand which the

United States would have found it hard to oppose?
It may never be known what role the nuclear issue played in the calcula-
tions of the Egyptian President, and whether the crisis and the way it was
tackled were premeditated. In any event, in the course of the crisis the
reactor issue did not apparently surface in diplomatic contacts, and cer-
tainly not in the public statements of the parties involved. Even after the
war, no Egyptian source ever claimed that the reactor was the reason for
the Egyptian-initiated crisis.
In feverish deliberations in the government and the Ministerial Commit-
tee on Security in the three weeks preceding 5 June 1967, fear of Egyptian
attack on the reactor was constantly voiced, mainly by the hawkish minis-
ters, who supported the army’s demand for a pre-emptive strike. Several of
the doves, on the other hand, argued that even an attaching on the reactor
did not necessarily mean that Israel must respond in warlike fashion. In
the end, the government decision to permit the IDF to launch an onslaught
was inspired, not by the looming threat to Dimona, but by important con-
siderations (to be detailed below), and the safety of the reactor was not in
itself the major reason.
Peres’ fears for the reactor, the pinnacle of his achievements, and for the
future of Israel’s nuclear effort, may explain his hectic efforts to persuade
the decision-makers during the May to June 1967 crisis to refrain from
war. Peres went so far as to claim that the IDF was not ready for war,
thereby heightening the anxieties and doubts of ministers and party leaders
and arousing the resistance of Eshkol and other ministers. Warfare was
liable to void the strategy championed by Peres aimed at deterring the
Arabs from launching a decisive battle against Israel. Not only would such
a war be costly and superfluous since Israel had nothing to gain thereby,
but it would place the Dimona reactor in danger, since it was undoubtedly
an operative target for the Egyptian air force.
The Director of Rafael (The Israel Armament Development Authority),
Monia Mardor, described in his memoirs Rafael’s intensive efforts on the
eve of the Six Day War to complete a weapons system, whose nature he
did not specify. He described it, however, as of ‘perhaps critical value’.53
Peres himself wrote that ‘after Dayan became Minister of Defence [1 June
1967] I put a certain proposal to him which would have deterred the
Arabs and prevented war’.54 Is there any connection between the two
facts? Was Peres’ proposal connected in any way to the nuclear issue? If
so, then Eshkol and Dayan, very wisely, chose to reject it.
Arms purchase and strategic buildup

The buildup of the IDF in the period under discussion was linked, as we
have shown, to the dialogue with Washington on the reactor, which for
the first time had placed Israel in a bargaining position vis-à-vis America.
The dialogue conducted with the Johnson administration, Israel’s guaran-
tee not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, and US pressure for
more frequent inspection of the reactor, produced concrete results, which
culminated in US consent to supply Israel with tanks and later also air-
craft. The US commitment to Israel’s security was now more emphatic.
And yet, most of the arms purchase deals signed with the United States
had not been implemented in the early summer of 1967.
The IDF fought the Six Day War with weapons purchased mostly from
France. The Armoured Corps had only one operative Patton battalion (the
79th). In 1966 contracts were signed for the purchase of 100 French- and
US-manufactured front-line aircraft, which were due to transform the IAF,
but these Skyhawks and Mirage 5s were still on paper at that stage. This
period also witnessed a new scheme for updating the navy with small,
rapid, missile boats. However, the plan for reorganization had not reached
the implementation stage before the Six Day War and the navy was still in
poor shape, which was reflected in its performance during the war.
Naturally enough, the turnaround in US policy on the sale of weapons’
systems to Israel was not only motivated by the nuclear issue. It also
stemmed from the altering of circumstances in the Middle East: the
increasing Soviet infiltration of the region after Nikita Khrushchev’s visit
to Egypt in May 1964; the growing rift in the Arab world between the
conservative pro-Western, and the revolutionary countries; the deteriora-
tion of US-Egyptian relations due to Egypt’s intervention in the war in
Yemen and other reasons noted above. To all these was added the Arab
summit decision to allocate funds for the arming of Jordan, and the sub-
sequent US decision to sell Jordan US weapons. In the background was the
involvement of the United States in Vietnam. The Johnson administration
chose to equip Israel and leave it to fend for itself and thus avoid a sce-
nario where it would be forced to make good its commitment to Israel’s
security in the event of an all-out Arab onslaught. This was also the case in
May to June 1967.55
It should be emphasized that the buildup of the IDF, which did not lag
behind the Arab armies, played a vital role in bolstering the IDF’s confi-
dence and deterrent capability. The priorities in allocation of resources for

weapons purchase were based on the needs of the forces required for
implementation of the offensive doctrine. The first priority was the air
force, followed by the armoured units and paratroop units. Efforts to
develop the navy were considered of secondary importance. Due to bud-
getary limitations, the air force and armoured units could not be developed
concomitantly. Under Chief of Staff Zur (and Rabin as Chief of the Opera-
tions Branch), emphasis was placed on aircraft. Later, as Chief of Staff,
Rabin initially accorded priority to the purchase of tanks, and only at a
later stage to the purchase of new aircraft.
In 1964 to 1967, some 140 aircraft were purchased (including forty-

eight Skyhawks from the United States and fifty Mirages, twenty-five
Ouragan and twelve Super Frelon helicopters from France as well as some
500 US tanks and a dozen missile boats from France. The Artillery Corps
capability was greatly improved after it absorbed 155 mm mobile guns and
the introduction of heavy mortars. The equipping was carried out in
accordance with the 1963 Bnei Or programme which was based on the
assumption that war was unlikely in the foreseeable future. The most dra-
matic increase was in the armoured power and its quality, and by the end
of 1966 the IDF had 1,300 tanks.
Comparison of the IDF’s buildup and that of the Arab armed forces in
1964 to 196756 helps to explain the confidence prevailing in the Israeli
General Staff at the time. It was mainly due to the military might of the
IDF that Nasser (up until mid-May 1967) consistently asserted that the all-
out war on Israel should be postponed until the Arab armies were ready
and there was no danger of another defeat. This was also the reason for
the assessment of US Intelligence bodies on the eve of the war that the IDF
could defeat any Arab military coalition.
Conclusion
The central issues of the period – the arms race, the reactor, the missiles –
do not appear to have been the underlying factors leading to the Six Day
War. It was the current security problems which led to escalation.
However, Israel’s basic decisions on national security were connected to
fundamental security issues. The reliance of the IDF on US supply of its
main weapons systems began during this period, and entailed signing
memoranda of understanding with the United States and Israeli guarantees
not to cross the nuclear threshold. The accompanying strategic dialogue
and the change of direction in US policy under Johnson enhanced the US
commitment to Israel’s security. As a consequence, when the crisis broke
out in May 1967, Israel turned to Washington. The US administration did
not deny its commitment but tried initially to stop the crisis and check it.
When it failed, it essentially gave its tacit consent to an independent Israeli
Table 3 Border incidents by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June 1967
Period Total Sector
Syria Jordan Egypt Lebanon
Total 288 182 100 3 3

1 January to 30 April 1964 7 3 4 – –
1964/1965 88 62 26 – –
1965/1996 64 31 31 2 –
1966/1967 123 81 39 1 2
1 April to 5 June 1967 6 5 – – 1
Table 4 Terrorist attacks by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June 1967
Period Total Sector
Total 125 26 69 5 25
1 January to 30 April 1964 – – – – –
1964/1965 7 1 6 – –
1965/1996 37 4 27 3 –
1966/1967 64 18 30 1 15
1 April to 5 June 1967 17 3 6 1 7
Table 5 Reprisal raids by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June 1967
Period Total Sector
Total 12 4 7 – 1
1 January to 30 April 1964 – – – – –
1964/1965 1 1 – – –
1965/1996 7 2 4 – 1
1966/1967 4 1 3 – –
1 April to 5 June 1967 – – – – –
Source: Periodic Survey – Major-General Yitzhak Rabin (1 January 1964 to 31 December 1967)
pre-emptive attack, and after the war supplied Israel with firm political
support.
Israel’s pro-US security and political orientation was consolidated in
this period, but was, to some extent, the paradoxical outcome of the prior
orientation towards Europe. The Dimona reactor, built with the help of
France, provided Israel with a bargaining card in its relations with the
United States, for whom the restriction of nuclear weapons development
was of supreme interest. The Americans could not sign a defence pact with
Israel in return for the latter’s total abandonment of development of

nuclear capability, but did something similar: it agreed for the first time to
sell Israel weapons’ systems and to reinforce its commitment to the secur-
ity of the Jewish state in return for a vague promise by Israel not to go
nuclear.
Chapter 3
Escalation – Stage 1
From skirmishes in the demilitarized
zones to aerial sorties
The Six Day War broke out ostensibly as a direct result of the growing
tension between Israel and Syria, which reached its height in spring 1967,
but the border dispute between them was not new. It was a protracted
local skirmish. The traditional Syrian commitment to the Arab struggle
against Israel had become increasingly radical, advocating and backing a
‘popular war of liberation’. Israel for its part responded by launching
massive aerial operations.
One fact is clear: the army promoted a forceful approach to the Syrians
and later also recommended stepping up the confrontation to the point
where a ‘frontal clash’ with Syria would take place. The government was
opposed to escalation but the deterioration of the security situation forced
it to seek answers which only the army could supply. As a rule, the IDF
operated only within the framework dictated to it, but in several cases it
permitted itself to interpret the intentions of the civil echelon in a wider
fashion. This was particularly true of the IAF.
The demilitarized zones

Chronic instability prevailed along the Israel–Syria border up until 1967.
The roots of the problems lay in the armistice agreement between the two
countries signed on 20 July 1949, which designated certain areas west of
the international border between Mandatory Palestine and Syria, a total
area of some 65,000 dunams (a dunam ⫽ a quarter of an acre), as demili-
tarized zones. Sovereignty over these zones was not explicitly defined, mili-
tary presence was banned, citizens who had fled due to the fighting were
permitted to return and the employment of a limited number of Israeli and
Arab police was allowed. A Mixed Armistice Commission was established,
headed by the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization.1
The basic dispute between Israel and Syria related to the question of
sovereignty. The Israeli position, which was not sanctioned by the UN,
was that the entire area west of the international border was under Israeli
sovereignty. This claim was made during the negotiations on the armistice
Map 2 The demilitarized zones along Israel–Syria border.

42 From skirmishes to aerial sorties
agreement, but Israel finally consented to downplay the demand in order

to achieve an agreement. When the Israelis began the development of the
area, the sovereignty claim was raised again more emphatically, and Israel
now demanded that the Syrians be denied any authority in the area,
particularly where Israeli water and settlement projects were concerned.
The demilitarized zones thus became the focus of incessant disputes
between Israel and Syria over water issues, land cultivation, pasture and
fishing rights in Lake Galilee.
This was the situation at the beginning of the period under discussion.
The problem was now chronic, and although there were no indications of
escalation, there was also no solution in sight in the foreseeable future. If

the problem had not been compounded in 1964 to 1967 by the ‘War over
Water’, the ‘Popular War’, the radical nature of the Syrian regime
and Israel’s determination, it is questionable whether the tension around
the demilitarized zones would have constituted a pretext for a military
flare-up.
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Levi Eshkol was deeply
involved in and knowledgeable about the details of agricultural and mili-
tary activity in the demilitarized zones. Eshkol relied on Rabin, who dis-
played discretion and understanding towards both political problems and
political sensitivities, and whose approach, as reflected in the documents,
was measured and reasoned. At the same time, Eshkol lacked military
expertise and relied on data submitted to him by the Chief of Staff, having
no Intelligence sources of his own. Even when a military secretary to the
Prime Minister was selected, the appointee, Colonel Yisrael Lior, was –
and apparently this was no accident – of a rank and authority which could
not counterbalance that of the Chief of Staff.2 Hence, Eshkol could rely
only on his own judgement and political acumen for day-to-day supervi-
sion of military activities.
On the other hand, basic issues and important decisions which were
pending were brought before the Ministerial Committee on Security,
which in the two and a half years before the war could boast only one
member – Yigal Allon – with a military background. However, Allon,
unlike most of his fellow committee members, was a sworn activist, and
served more as a catalyst than a brake on the army’s offensive trends.3 In
practice, therefore, it was the army to a large extent which determined
policy.4
With time, as tension mounted on the border with Syria and the IDF
took the opportunities offered to hit out at the Syrians, Eshkol became
uneasy about the IDF’s initiatives. He knew that cultivation of the dis-
puted areas in the demilitarized zones was not profitable and apparently
favoured suspending cultivation in order to prevent incidents and save
lives, but he yielded to the military.5 Eshkol maintained direct contact with
the head of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Odd Bull, with
From skirmishes to aerial sorties 43
the aim of achieving an agreement on the demilitarized zones.6 The Syrians

indicated some willingness for a settlement when they introduced an
unconditional ceasefire and even agreed in practice to hold direct negotia-
tions with Israel under the aegis of the UN (see below).
However, Syria’s policies were fraught with contradictions: its willing-
ness to formulate a practical solution to the problems of the demilitarized
zones was at odds with its ideological nationalistic stance and demand for
immediate war for the annihilation of Israel, its efforts to implement the
scheme for diversion of the Jordan waters, and in particular its support for
the popular war of the Palestinians against Israel. Under these conditions
there was no likelihood that Eshkol’s approach would prevail and the
tough military approach won the day. If the public atmosphere in Israel
was blatantly anti-Syrian it seemed that Syria was supplying good reasons.
Perusal of the Israeli press in the pre-war period reveals endless news
items on shooting incidents on the Syrian border, in which Syrians opened
fire on IDF patrols or on Israelis working in the fields, and sometimes also
inflicted damage on settlements. These news items, in addition to militant
Syrian pronouncements, the diversion activities and the guerrilla raids, had
a cumulative effect on Israeli public opinion, evoking anger, hostility and
the desire for revenge. The IDF version of the incidents was accepted
without question, until Moshe Dayan, years later, cast new light on it,
asserting that at least 80 per cent of the incidents were initiated by the
IDF.
In a 1976 interview, only published twelve years later, Dayan stated:
We [the IDF] used to send a tractor to plough some land where

nothing could be grown, in the demilitarized zone, knowing in
advance that the Syrians would start shooting. If they didn’t fire, we
would order the tractor to advance until the Syrians finally got angry
and fired on it. And then we brought in artillery and later the air force
as well.7
The skirmishes in the demilitarized zones arose from an issue which,

given minimal conditions of dialogue and trust, could have been solved in
a pragmatic fashion. Israel staged incidents to undermine Syrian efforts to
divert the Jordan waters so that they could not be used by Israel. The IDF
also fired at Syrian farmers and shepherds who infiltrated the demilitarized
zones, and there can be no doubt that in most cases the IDF was the first
to open fire.
As noted above, the problem of the demilitarized zone in itself was not
sufficiently grave to lead to the outbreak of war. It was the combination of
circumstances which worsened the situation. The turning point which ele-
vated a local dispute to new heights was Israel’s decision to bring the air
force into its border conflict with Syria.
A new stage: the IAF goes into action

Only once in the 1950s were aerial forces employed to attack Syrian
targets during incidents connected to the demilitarized zones – during the
al-Hama incident of 5 April 1951.8 The sharply-worded condemnation of
the incident by the Security Council and the negative international reac-
tion, particularly on the part of the United States, ruled out, for all prac-
tical purposes, further aerial operations.9
The topographical facts which gave the Syrians the tactical advantage,
and the vulnerability of the population centres in the Huleh Valley and
east of Lake Galilee, led the senior command to the conclusion that only
the IAF could provide an effective and deterrent response to Syrian gunfire.
This was their regular recommendation to the political echelon, but so
long as Ben-Gurion was in office he rejected it for fear of undesirable
escalation and entanglement in a war. In March 1962 Ben-Gurion never-
theless put through a resolution authorizing him to deploy the IAF in the
event of bombardment of civilian settlements; this resolution was not
implemented until action was approved two years later by his successor,
Eshkol.
The decision to employ the IAF was preceded by a series of discussions
at the General Staff and the Ministerial Committee on Security inspired by
the deteriorating situation on the Israeli–Syrian border. On 10 June 1964,
Israel’s National Water Carrier, a proclaimed Arab casus belli, was inau-
gurated with relative discretion.10 However, it exposed Arab impotence to
prevent the consolidation of the Jewish state and was interpreted as an
additional defiant challenge to the Arab world. At the Cairo summit con-
ference in January of that year, where Arab leaders resolved to divert the
Jordan sources, Syria had adopted the most militant stance and demanded
immediate war. A second summit conference in September approved the
diversion schemes for immediate implementation. Chief of Staff Rabin
proposed the restoration of a patrol path leading to the Dan spring inside
Israel, the most important tributary of the Jordan. Rabin explained at a
government meeting that the Syrians had expressed reservations as to the
exact location of the border line, claiming that a section of the patrol path
passed through their territory. Any adjustment might bring the Dan into
joint Israeli–Syrian sovereignty.11
The question of whether it was essential to engineer a clash with the
Syrians over the Dan is still open. Experience had shown that the Syrians
would resort to force to halt work on the path which, so they asserted,
passed through their territory. The Dan waters were flowing into the
Jordan without disturbance; the Arab diversion schemes did not, in any
case, include the Dan tributary, and effective control of its sources was in
Israeli hands. Nor was there any information at the time about unusual
Syrian activity which might threaten the status quo.
The explanation lies in the change in the psychological climate due to

the diversion challenge, which set the Jordan river at the core of the
Arab–Israel conflict. The senior command wanted a display of strength
which would reflect Israel’s determination to defend its water interests,
and they felt that there was a prospect of obtaining a green light for
employment of the IAF, which could provide a resounding counter-
response to the tactical advantage of the Syrian army in most of the sectors
of the border. Levi Eshkol, who was strongly committed to the water issue
(he had founded the national water corporation Mekorot many years
before), gave the army the necessary backing.
On 2 November 1964, David Elazar (Dado), a young, energetic, offen-

sive-oriented officer, took up the post of CO Northern Command. His per-
sonal impact on events was not insignificant. His deputy in the early days
was an officer whose personality was no less tempestuous – Colonel Ariel
Sharon.12
Elazar’s biography describes the incident which occurred on 3 Novem-
ber 1964 as the fruit of his decision on his first day as Commander to
ensure Israeli sovereignty over the Dan sources. ‘We’ll take this path
tomorrow’, he ordered. One officer at headquarters questioned the
decision to assert control over an area with such poor agricultural poten-
tial. Said Lt. Col. Pinhas Lahav, ‘Why are we doing it again and again? It
would be cheaper to fly grains of wheat wrapped in cotton wool and
packed in cellophane from California, and it would not cost lives.’13
Friday the 13th – escalation

On 3 November 1964, after forces had been deployed in the sector on
both sides of the border, work began on the controversial section of the
path leading to the Dan. In the course of the (anticipated) incident which
ensued, the IDF tanks, despite their tactical advantage, failed in their
mission to destroy the Syrian tanks at Nuheila; this failure was regarded as
a ‘fiasco’.14 Within a day, though, the path was completed and the IDF
sent patrols along it for several days, reinforcing the units and preparing
for further action. The patrols proceeded for a week without Syrian reac-
tion, but at noon on Friday, 13 November 1964, the Syrians opened fire
on a patrol descending from Tel Dan to the patrol path, and then opened
fire from mortars, recoilless guns and tanks from positions at Nuheila, Tel
Hamra, Tel Azaziat and the Banias Heights on Tel Dan and Kibbutz Dan.
This time Israeli armour succeeded in hitting several Syrian tanks, but it
was the shelling of the Kibbutz which led to bringing in the IAF.
Rabin telephoned Eshkol, reported on the Syrian bombardment and
requested permission to launch an aerial attack on Syrian targets. Eshkol
consented at once. The Chief of Staff ordered IAF commander Ezer
Weizman to carry out the mission, but to avoid harming civilians. Weizman
sent up fifty fighter planes of various types, nineteen of which participated

in the assault on Syrian positions and artillery emplacements.15
It is hard to believe that Eshkol would have approved the unprece-
dented employment of dozens of aircraft in so casual a fashion. It seems
more feasible that Eshkol envisaged a more limited attack. It appears that
Rabin himself, giving the order by telephone to Weizman, did not go into
detail, and he too did not set limits to the number of aircraft or the types
of ammunition. The Head of the Operations Department of the General
Staff, Colonel Mota Gur, explicitly attested to this during the investigation
of the incident: ‘There was no limitation as regards the type and volume of
the aircraft fire, whether bombs, napalm or sniping, etc. It was left to the
discretion of the CO of the Air Force.’16 Hence Weizman decided for
himself what the scope would be.
In this fashion, Israel raised the stakes in its confrontation with the
Syrians. The operation was successful and for a time there was calm along
the sector, but the situation had repercussions whose culmination occurred
two and a half years later, on 7 April 1967 (see below).
Political calculation or lack of control?

At the government meeting of Sunday, November 15 1964, Eshkol, faced
with criticism, defended his decision to approve an aerial operation. He
described his conversation with Rabin as follows: ‘I asked: don’t we have
any other means of halting them? His reply was: none. I agreed to approve
the use of the Air Force.’17
At the Ministerial Committee on Security, the Minister of Religious
Affairs Zerah Wahrhaftig claimed that the Prime Minister should have
convened the Committee and wondered if the employment of aircraft had
been justified. Eshkol replied that the shelling of the Kibbutz did not
permit him to wait for the committee meeting, and if the IAF had not
intervened immediately ‘we would have had crushed settlements’. The
Minister of Education, Zalman Aranne, asked why it had been necessary
to employ so many aircraft and if it had been essential to employ napalm.
Rabin explained that it had been necessary to silence four targets and to
exploit the advantage of napalm to cover a wide area.18
The criticism within the government was engulfed in the waves of praise
in the press and public opinion. Eshkol, whose relations with Ben-Gurion
were at breaking-point, found that his decision had enhanced his political
image as a leader who did not hesitate to employ force. There is no proof
that Eshkol’s decision was motivated by internal political calculations but
he was a man with sharp political instincts and certainly never missed an
opportunity to gain points with his party and with the general public.
Only nine days previously, Dayan had resigned from Eshkol’s government,
calling for an end ‘to the deBen-Gurionization of our security doctrine’.
Two days before the incident, the Mapai Central Committee held a
stormy meeting at which Ben-Gurion furiously attacked Eshkol, charging
that the party was on the verge of collapse. Two days after the incident,
Eshkol again found himself in direct confrontation with Ben-Gurion at the
same venue, where the agreement for the establishment of the Alignment
Party with Ahdut ha-Avoda was to be approved. It was convenient timing
for Eshkol to display resolve and activism, and thereby to neutralize the
criticism of the Ben-Gurionites.
It would not be true to claim that Eshkol wanted to escalate the dispute
with Syria. While his positive response to Rabin was based on resolutions
passed by the government under Ben-Gurion, the fact is that Ben-Gurion

never approved the implementation while Eshkol did so, almost casually,
and without restrictions.19 Ben-Gurion displayed great caution in employ-
ing the IAF, and the government was well aware that to bring in aircraft
was ‘a warlike act’.20 The lengthy debates in the government on this issue
dealt, and rightly so, with the basic question of whether and under what
circumstances a Minister of Defence and a Chief of Staff would be empow-
ered to employ the IAF during border incidents rather than with the scope
and nature of the operation. This was left to the professional consideration
of the army21 and the supervision of the Minister of Defence. However,
this indecision and the reluctance of the government to involve the IAF in
border incidents indicate a clear intention, though not necessarily explicitly
stated, to use it only in extreme cases and in minimal fashion. It seems that
on 13 November, under pressure of time and circumstances, Eshkol and
Rabin failed to exercise sufficient control over the officer commanding the
IAF.
The incidents on 3 and 13 November 1964, stemming from the
preparation of the patrol path, were essentially border incidents which
took place outside the demilitarized zones. In any event, from this stage on
up until the Six Day War, the question of the demilitarized zones was
interwoven with the struggle for water and the problems of Palestinian
guerrilla warfare against Israel.
Chapter 4
Diversion
Israel’s water shortage and the disproportional distribution of its limited

sources between the country’s north and south generated various schemes
for development. In the early 1950s, Israel began to establish large-scale
water projects, among them the reclamation of the Huleh Lake and the
planning and building of the National Water Carrier to convey water
southward.1 On 19 June 1964, for the first time, water flowed continu-
ously from Tabha in the north to Rosh ha-Ayin in central Israel, the
linkage point to the Yarkon–Negev pipeline.
The dispute between Israel and Syria over utilization of the Jordan
waters sparked serious clashes in the early 1950s after which relative, and
temporary, calm prevailed. The two sides maintained regular dialogue
both within the Armistice Commission and through direct, high-level con-
tacts between the CO Northern Command Moshe Dayan and senior
Syrian officers in attempts, albeit unsuccessful, to resolve border disputes.
In 1953, when Israel began work in the demilitarized zone in order to
divert some of the Jordan water as part of the first stage of the National
Water Carrier project, Syria complained to the UN Security Council. The
US responded by appointing a special envoy, Ambassador Eric Johnston,
to deal with the Jordan water issue.2 Johnston conducted shuttle diplo-
macy among the countries of the region and, in 1955, he submitted a plan
which allotted to Israel some 38 per cent of the Jordan water, the remain-
der to go to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Israel had to halt the pumping of
water from the upper Jordan and adopted an alternative, more expensive
plan to pump water for the Carrier from Lake Galilee.
This water dispute marked the beginning of the deterioration in
Israel–Syrian relations. Ten years later the situation had changed radically:
the Israel–Syria Armistice Commission had been suspended, the avenues of
dialogue were blocked and the United States was no longer the mediator.
Whereas in 1953 to 1954, Israel had the option of pumping from Lake
Galilee, in 1964 to 1965 the choice lay between foiling the Arab diversion
plan by force or giving up the water project entirely. Whereas in 1953 to
1954 the Water Carrier scheme was in its infancy, in 1964 to 1965 it had
Diversion 49
been completed and put into operation. Israel agreed to exploit only the
water quota allocated to it by the Johnston Plan, and Eshkol announced
that water was as vital for Israel ‘as the blood in our veins’.3 In return,
Syrian President Amin Hafez threatened a ‘suicide war’.4 A clash was
inevitable.
But Israel was clearly the victor in the struggle over water. The con-
struction of the Water Carrier and its uninterrupted operation was a
resounding success in the face of militant Arab rhetoric.5
The Cairo summit conference

Syria’s secession from the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961 led to a
deep and protracted rift in its relations with Egypt despite a brief apparent
rapprochement with a ‘revolutionary’ Syria after the coups of February
and March 1963 which brought the Baath to power in Baghdad and Dam-
ascus.6 The negotiations between Baathist Syria and Iraq with Nasserist
Egypt culminated in the Tripartite Agreement of 17 April 1963, which
evoked great enthusiasm in the Arab world and upheaval in Jordan.
The agreement was essentially a cover for profound differences of
opinion, but outwardly it seemed that a consensus prevailed, at least with
regard to the conflict with Israel. Ben-Gurion saw this move as an existen-
tial threat to Israel. By the summer, however, the atmosphere of unity had
been completely dispelled, and President Nasser fiercely attacked the
‘fascist’ Baath regime, which had massacred Nasserists in Syria, and broke
off all relations with that country.7 The bitter rivalries within the ‘revolu-
tionary’ camp in the Arab world, and between that camp and the ‘conserv-
atives’, further exacerbated relations between Egypt and Syria.
Towards the end of the year, unexpectedly, Nasser took a step which
surprised both the Arab world and Israeli Intelligence services, calling for a
summit conference of all Arab heads of state in Cairo. The background
was the imminent completion of Israel’s national water project, which the
Arabs had repeatedly declared an act of aggression to which they would
react with force. Nasser wanted to avoid a situation whereby Syria would
drag him into a war against Israel whose timing would not be under his
control, while much of his military force was bogged down in the Yemen
civil war.8
In Israel Nasser’s initiative was interpreted, rightly, as a transparent
stratagem to disguise Arab helplessness. Israeli Intelligence, however, erred
in evaluating the conference’s long-term outcome and two of its main reso-
lutions: to divert Jordan river tributaries originating in Lebanon and Syria
and to organize the Palestinians, a decision which led to creating the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO). A third resolution set up a joint Arab
military command.9
Map 3 The Arab diversion plan.

Diversion 51
Deployment for war

Towards the end of 1964 it became evident that the diversion scheme was
more serious than had previously been estimated, and that work on it had
begun. Rabin believed that the IDF would recommend to the political
echelon that Israel deal the first blow while Egypt was still occupied in
Yemen. He realized that military action called for political preparation and
a decision on the part of the political echelon, but thought that the army
should exert pressure to act before the Arabs established facts.10 The Chief
of Staff expressed his fear that the Lebanese would first carry out a small-
scale diversion, which would not constitute a sufficient pretext for Israeli
action, and that the United States would then persuade Israel to exercise
restraint.11 He proposed a tough Israeli stance based on refusal to accept
the diversion or to rely on Lebanon’s ability to withstand Egyptian, Syrian
and Iraqi pressures.12 Rabin proposed increasing pressure on the Syrians
and assaults on personnel carrying out the diversion work. Even when the
political circumstances were not conducive to immediate response, Rabin
believed that the IDF should provoke shooting incidents until the politi-
cians were obliged to sanction military action.13
At the end of January 1965 Knesset Member Moshe Dayan published
an article in Haaretz in which he declared that if Israel’s deterrent capabil-
ity proved insufficient to halt the diversion work, military action would be
required. To concede on this issue, Dayan argued, would be a double
mistake: on the one hand, the Arab project would deprive Israel of more
than a hundred million cubic metres of water annually, salinate Lake
Galilee and threaten the water project; on the other hand, the disturbance
of the status quo would aggravate the situation and lead to a resumption
of acts of hostility against Israel, which had ceased since the Sinai
Campaign.14
At this stage the Chief of Staff was speaking specifically of the need to
prepare the Israeli public (and the government) for the possibility of hostil-
ities initiated by Israel, and to foster awareness that there was ‘no altern-
ative’. To his fellow officers on the General Staff, Rabin said:
‘The question is what is the correct path to pursue . . . to involve the

[government ministers] in a small- or large-scale war . . . any one
thinking seriously about a clash must give the Jews the feeling that it
is inevitable. The [government] will not choose a clash if there is
some way out of it . . . the only way . . . is to present the thesis of “no
alternative”.’15
The task of the army, according to Rabin, was to guarantee operational

capabilities and maximal readiness in order to grant the government the
freedom to take decisions.16 But Rabin went further: the army should
52 Diversion
‘try to expedite’ action. This was, therefore, an additional expression of

the typical General Staff conviction that its role was not restricted to
preparing the armed forces for war and providing backing and room for
government policy, but to serve as the catalyst for offensive military
action.
The General Staff prepared four possible scenarios for thwarting the
diversion scheme, which were presented by the Chief of the Operations
Branch Haim Barlev:
1 Limited military action for deterrent purposes, namely a raid or fire

directed at mechanical and engineering equipment.

2 A large-scale attack on the weak points of the diversion project
(pumps, dams, etc.).
3 Occupation of demilitarized zones controlling the diversion areas,
particularly the Banias Heights and Tel Azaziat.
4 Occupation of demilitarized areas and areas under Syrian sovereignty
overlooking the diversion areas – Tel Hamra, Tel Azaziat and the
Banias Heights as far as the Ram pool.17
It transpires from Barlev’s remarks that the army regarded the first altern-
ative, which was later preferred by the government, as the minimal choice,
marred by numerous drawbacks and dubious effectiveness, which was
unlikely to solve the problem but could serve as the introduction to a
wider scale operation. This may explain the General Staff’s subsequent
amazement when this minimal method succeeded in foiling the diversion.
The standpoint represented by the American negotiators Harriman and
Komer, said Rabin, was a serious obstacle to any Israeli plans for a mili-
tary operation. The Americans claimed that there was as yet no proof that
the Arabs would take more than had been allotted to them by the John-
ston plan and, even if they did, this was not a casus belli. Diplomatic
efforts, the Chief of Staff clarified, were aimed at arriving at an agreement
with the United States as to the ‘red line’; for example, the conveyance of
water from Lebanon to Syria would constitute justification for an Israeli
preventive strike. Hence military action would be subject to political con-
straints, unless the government decided that the IDF could act without
prior coordination with the United States.18 The Chief of Staff’s remarks
undoubtedly reflected the controversy within the government between sup-
porters of independent military action against diversion and those who
insisted on prior coordination with the US. The official version conveyed
to the US administration was that if no peaceful means could be found of
preventing implementation of the Arab diversion scheme, Israel would
resort to force.19
A reconnaissance flight over the diversion area which the Chief of Staff
conducted with the two US emissaries was intended to make it clear to
Diversion 53
them that Israel could damage heavy diversion equipment without crossing
the border. The two, Rabin reported to Eshkol, listened to what he had to
say but did not react. Rabin’s interpretation was that a small-scale military
action to disrupt the diversion works in Syria would not be disapproved by
Washington. Eshkol agreed to submit Rabin’s proposal to the Ministerial
Committee on Security for approval.20
Plan (A) is put into action

The Israeli decision to use force to prevent the diversion was immediately
put into action, surprisingly soon after the end of the talks with the US
emissaries. The pretext was an incident which occurred on 16 March
1965, when the Syrians opened fire on Israeli farmers cultivating a plot of
land at Hirbet Kara, near Korazim in the central demilitarized zone, killing
an Israeli tractor driver. The land had not been under cultivation since
May 1951 and it was only to be expected that the Syrians, anxious to
prevent any change for the worse in the status quo, would react.
By that stage, the Syrians had already prepared 5 kilometres of the
route of the diversion channel west and south of the village of Banias. On
the following day, the IDF engineered another incident, by sending out a
patrol on the controversial patrol path alongside Tel Dan. Two platoons
of tanks were placed on alert, as was the IAF. When the Syrians opened
fire from Nuheila, the tanks returned fire, aimed at the source of the
gunfire and at the heavy construction equipment, damaging eight tractors.
The Syrians were taken by surprise and did not respond, and the IAF was
not sent into action.21
In the wake of this first action, the Chief of Staff made clear the inten-
tion to initiate additional military actions in order to disrupt the diversion
project. Inside Syria, said Rabin, ‘wherever we see tractors we will immedi-
ately go into action . . . if the conditions are right’.22 The original objective
was to take action against equipment inside Lebanon as well, where the
work was continuing, but for political reasons, in light of the imminent
visit to France of the Lebanese President Charles Helou, it was decided to
postpone the operation.23
Secret negotiations were being held concomitantly between Israel and
Lebanon at which Israel made it clear that the water issue was a casus
belli. The Lebanese proposed a secret settlement based on the principle
that ‘not a drop of Lebanese water would go either to an Arab country or
to Israel’, a principle which reflected Lebanese suspicion that Israel coveted
the Litani waters. In light of the Arab pressure on Lebanon to fulfil its part
in the diversion plan, Eshkol was sceptical as to the possibility of arriving
at a settlement.24
On 13 May 1965, the IDF staged an additional incident with the aim of
damaging equipment working on the diversion track, since the Syrians had
54 Diversion
renewed work in the central sector of the Golan Heights. Several hours
before the operation, the Chief of Staff submitted the plan to the Minister
of Defence: the intention was to send out a patrol south of Mishmar ha-
Yarden, which would open fire at a spot which was not visible to the
UN Observers, thereby provoking the Syrians to return fire. Subsequently
the Israeli tanks positioned at the firing positions would destroy the
equipment.25
The operation was prepared well in advance. Tank and artillery forces
were lined up, the settlements were alerted to take shelter, traffic east of
Lake Galilee was halted on the pretext of road repairs, and during the inci-
dent aircraft were launched to deter the Syrians from shelling settlements.
The Syrians did not in fact react, but the tank fire missed the diversion
equipment and after half an hour of gunfire only one or two tractors had
been hit. ‘The operation ended in a miracle,’ the Chief of Staff summed up.
‘If we had not hit that tractor we would have been in the worst position a
Chief of Staff can be in vis-à-vis his Government, with all the implications
for the future and for similar operations.’26 Rabin, who had worked hard
to gain approval for the operation, was afraid of losing face, which would
cause difficulties in gaining the approval of the political echelon for future
action.27
Buffer fire
Another mode of operation now adopted by the IDF, after the 16 March
incident in the Korazim sector which exacerbated tension on the border
with Syria, was the use of light weapons with the aim not of causing
damage but of driving Syrian shepherds and fellahin out of the cultivated
and grazing areas in the demilitarized zone. The method was simple and
effective, and did not usually require more than a few rounds of ammuni-
tion. Hence, the objective was achieved easily and ‘cheaply’, but it altered
the status quo and aggravated the Syrians. This was Israel’s way of taking
a forceful stance in the face of Syrian militancy: Syria’s determination to
continue the diversion work and its links with guerrilla activity which was
now a source of harassment for Israel.
The employment of buffer fire was not a new method,28 but henceforth
it was employed by the IDF systematically and along a wide front. For ten
days the Syrians refrained from reaction, apparently in the hope that the
IDF would desist, but they then returned fire from light weapons.29
However, they did not actually possess the suitable means of response,
apart from retaliatory disruption of Israeli farming in the demilitarized
zones. The buffer fire ceased in June 1966 in light of Syrian initiative for
an ‘unconditional ceasefire’ under UN mediation (see below).
Diversion 55
Egypt withdraws
Israel’s move constituted a challenge to the Arabs. The Chief of the Intelli-
gence Aharon Yariv assessed that Egypt might feel obliged to respond in
some way in order to maintain its prestige but that it was not ready for
war against Israel and would act to restrain the Syrians. The Syrians, for
their part, complained that the United Arab Command, established by the
Cairo summit, had left them to struggle alone against Israel, and argued
again that a solution to the Palestinian problem would not be achieved
through diversion but only through all-out warfare.
Yariv described the struggle over water and the consequent Arab dilem-
mas as a three-round boxing match. In the first, Israel scored a technical
knock-out by opening the National Water Carrier. In the second, the
Syrians scored with their diversion. But in the third, Israel disrupted the
Syrian work. In response, Syria turned the issue into an all-Arab issue in
order to ‘enhance their prestige’, demonstrate their nationalist credentials,
‘and to be absolved of exclusive responsibility’. This, in turn, created a
dilemma for the Egyptians who do not wish to become embroiled in a war
with Israel but cannot escape their need to prove devotion to the Arab
cause. Their problem, then, ‘is how to double-cross the Syrians’ by not
becoming bogged down in the diversion effort while not giving away too
much to the Syrians in exchange for this escape.30
Rabin understood that the noose should not be pulled too tightly. The
Israeli move had led to temporary cessation of the diversion work and to
frantic Arab activity, but it had also evoked protest on the part of the
United States, which said that the Israeli action contravened the agreement
underlying US readiness to supply Israel with weapons.31 Rabin therefore
ordered a policy of ‘pacification and not exacerbation’ on the Syrian front,
aware that Israel must not cross the narrow line that would force the
Arabs into providing united backing for Syria and disrupt the sensitive
negotiations for purchase of weapons from the United States.
Nasser clarified his position on the diversion scheme: namely, as long as
his army was occupied in Yemen, he had no intention of being lured into a
premature war with Israel because of ‘a Syrian tractor’. In a speech to the
second conference of the PLO in Cairo on 31 May 1965, he declared:
‘Fifty thousand of our soldiers are now in Yemen. How am I to attack
Israel? First I must bring those fifty thousand back. We don’t want a repe-
tition of 1948. If we can’t carry out the diversion today, let’s postpone the
diversion works until we can defend them.’ Nasser claimed that an imme-
diate assault on Israel would mean doing what Israel wanted: ‘They say to
us, expel the UN Emergency Force [from the Egypt–Israel border] . . . and
what then? If Syria is attacked, then I have to attack Israel. This means,
therefore, that Israel can dictate to me when to attack it. They will destroy
a tractor in Syria and then I will be forced to attack. . . . Only we ourselves
56 Diversion
should decide the timing.’ Nasser dismissed Syrian criticism and informed
the Syrians that they should not expect Egyptian aid and should refrain
from diversion work on dangerous sites.32
The immediate conclusion of Nasser’s startling statement was that the
IDF had gained a surprisingly easy victory without cost to itself, and had
succeeded in disrupting the Arab diversion scheme by a simple, cheap and
effective method of inflicting local damage without risking an all-out mili-
tary confrontation. The conviction which had prevailed among the Israeli
General Staff several months previously, to the effect that Israel should
brace itself for the possibility of war in autumn 1965 or summer 1966 and
prepare the public for this, now evaporated. It was evident that Nasser had
no plans for war in the near future. The diversion problem was still on the
agenda but Israel had discovered a simple and effective solution. Declared
the Chief of Staff, sounding surprised at the fact: ‘There is a real dispro-
portion between what we did and what is happening . . . after two such
[minor] actions, Nasser stands up and talks in that way!? I would never
have believed it!’33
Nasser’s unexpected statement provided firm confirmation for the
Israeli Intelligence assessment that he would not permit himself to be
dragged into a confrontation with Israel if the time and circumstances
were not under his control. Rabin’s remarks indicate how amazed the
senior command was at the fact that two small-scale local actions against a
few tractors had resulted in what seemed to be Nasser’s sweeping repudia-
tion of the entire diversion project.
The fading of the diversion scheme

Nasser’s proclamations notwithstanding, the liquidation of the diversion
plan was not yet complete. Continuation of work in Lebanon confronted
Israel with a challenge, but its hands were tied due to international diplo-
matic pressure. Rabin reported that the United States, France and Britain
had made it clear ‘that a military operation against Lebanon would be a
catastrophe for Israel and [its relations with] the three Powers’. Simultan-
eously, pressure was brought on Lebanon, which suspended work.34 In
October 1965, after a wave of sabotage infiltrations from Lebanon, the
IDF blew up the home of the mukhtar in the village of Huleh and damaged
water installations in Mis el-Jabal.35 These actions also deterred Lebanon
from continuing diversion work.
Syria, in contrast, continued the diversion work, but shifted the focus to
sites deep within its territory. Northern Command readied itself to damage
mechanical engineering equipment at the work site east of Gamla, about 7
kilometres from the border. To this end, Israel resumed cultivation of the
disputed area of land at Hirbet Kara in the central demilitarized zone, in
the Korazim sector. The Head of the Operations Branch reported: ‘We
Diversion 57
have resumed work in the Hirbet Kara area, where it may be assumed that
there will be an incident when the Syrians open fire, which we can expand
in order to damage tractors working on Syrian diversion further in.’36 The
incident took place on 12 August.37 The Syrians, however, apparently
apprehensive of Israeli provocation, acted with restraint. IDF tanks, which
had been deployed earlier in firing positions, opened fire on Syrian tanks in
the sector and scored hits on three of them. This developed into an
exchange of artillery fire, with Israel hitting two tractors. Although the
incident did not proceed according to the scenario Rabin had anticipated,
he reported with satisfaction that the main objective had been achieved,
providing ‘further proof that we are ready to screw up the diversion

work’.38
All in all, in this period there were four Israeli actions against the diver-
sion scheme, in all of which the aim was to destroy heavy mechanical
equipment: three tank raids on 17 March 1965 in the northern sector, on
13 May 1965 in the central sector and on 12 August 1965 in the southern
sector, and one aerial attack on 14 July 1966 in the central sector.39
The Israeli initiatives led to the gradual abandonment of the diversion
project, and the problem eventually disappeared from the IDF agenda. In
the autumn, Rabin claimed that the diversion would not advance much for
many years.40 In spring 1966 the Chief of Intelligence described the slow
pace of work. ‘The Arabs are not treating it very seriously’, he said, and
the United Arab Command was incapable of providing military protection
for the project.41 From time to time there were Intelligence reports that
work in Syria had been accelerated,42 but the issue was no longer of great
concern to the General Staff.
Was the war in June 1967 the continuation of the War over Water? Not
necessarily. The struggle over water in 1965 to 1966 may have aggravated
the Arab–Israel conflict but it was not the direct cause of the war. At most,
it was a background factor.
The surprising Israeli success in thwarting the diversion scheme by
simple measures and without military or political embroilment, along with
a resounding triumph in the battle for water bolstered the confidence of
the General Staff in its ability to solve Israel’s security problems by launch-
ing military initiatives without necessarily escalating the situation. The
success also reinforced the Intelligence Branch’s evaluation that Nasser
was clinging to his security doctrine, namely avoidance of entanglement in
another war with Israel at a time when the conditions were not favourable
for Egypt. This meant that Israel had considerable freedom of manoeuvre
for offensive action. And above all: the government now increasingly put
its trust in the Chief of Staff, and his operative proposals.
It should be pointed out that Nasser’s unexpected moderation may also
be explained in light of his attempt at that time to improve his relations
with the United States. Egypt needed continued US economic aid, and
58 Diversion
particularly consignments of food, but encountered a cool response. The

administration and Congress contemplated sanctions against Egypt
because of its intervention in the war in Yemen, Nasser’s support for the
rebels in Congo, his anti-Western policy and his refusal to cooperate with
Washington’s initiative to check the missile and nuclear race in the Middle
East.43 At that time (May 1965) Nasser still hoped for American consent
to Egypt’s requests for aid, and consequently displayed moderation in his
attitude to Israel. Two years later (May 1967) when he had despaired of
the United States, he permitted himself a more aggressive stance.
Chapter 5
The dispute with Syria

worsens
Syria was the last of the Arab states to sign an armistice agreement with
Israel after the 1948 war, and the first in which the civil regime was
replaced by the military in the wake of the war. The coup in March 1949,
whereby Colonel Husni al-Zaim seized power, was the first in a long series
of frequent changes of government in Damascus, the great majority of
them military coups.1
The connection between the chronic instability of the Syrian regime and
its relations with Israel and border disputes is not straightforward. The
regimes of Colonel al-Zaim (March–August 1949), Colonel Sami al-
Hinawi (August–December 1949) and Adib al-Shishakli (December
1949–February 1954) were not characterized by strong hostility towards
Israel. Al-Zaim even put out feelers regarding a peace settlement with
Israel, and al-Shishakli conducted lengthy negotiations with Israel for
allotment of the demilitarized zones and exploitation of the Jordan waters.
Arye Shalev divides the period between the signing of the armistice agree-
ment (20 July 1949) and the Six Day War into three periods: up until
March 1951 – the quiet period; March 1951 to September 1953 – the
period of struggle and settlement; from early 1954 to June 1967 – the
period of violent clashes. The reasons for the escalation from 1954 on
were: (1) exhaustion of the possibilities for diplomatic negotiations for
division of the demilitarized zones; (2) deterioration of the situation along
Israel’s borders with Jordan and Egypt, leading to acts of terror and
reprisal raids; (3) the deposing (in February 1954) of Shishakli from the
Syrian leadership, spelling the end of the pragmatic policy.2
It seems that the main reason for the deterioration in Syrian–Israeli rela-
tions should not necessarily be sought in the frequent coups in Damascus,
but rather in the change in Syria’s orientation after the downfall of
Shishakli and its open alignment with Egypt and neutralist stand in the
controversy on the West’s defence schemes for the Middle East in 1954 to
1955. The dramatic rise of the Baath Party in the autumn 1954 elections
and its subsequent representation in the government also marked a radical-
ization of Syria’s policy trends.3 After details of the Egyptian–Czech arms
60 The dispute with Syria worsens
deal became known, Syria and Egypt signed a defence pact in October
1955. The IDF action in December 1955 against Syrian positions in the
north-east sector of Lake Galilee, which had not been preceded by any
particular Syrian provocation, again focused Syrian hostility on Israel. The
1956 Sinai Campaign greatly exacerbated the Arab–Israel conflict, and in
the period of unity with Egypt (1958–1961) the Syrian members of the
United Arab Republic urged adoption of a militant approach towards
Israel compared to Nasser’s cautious policy. After seceding from the UAR,
Syria continued to brandish the banner of confrontation with Israel in
order to score points against Egypt. The coups in Damascus in March
1963 and February 1966, which brought the Baath to power, strengthened
this trend.
The third summit

The third Arab summit conference was convened in Casablanca (13–17
September 1965). Shortly afterwards, on 24 August, an agreement was
signed in Jedda between President Nasser of Egypt and the Saudi monarch
Feisal for solution of the Yemen problem and evacuation by stages of
Egyptian forces from that country. This agreement, which neither endured
nor was ever implemented, could not disguise the widening rift in the Arab
world.
The failure of the diversion scheme in light of armed Israeli resistance,
and the accusations which the Syrians hurled at Egypt in this respect, over-
shadowed the summit. Bitter disputes raged around the Egyptian demand
that the other Arab states break off diplomatic ties with West Germany
and impose an economic boycott because of its decision to establish full
diplomatic relations with Israel.4
An additional affair which saw the Arab world in an uproar in the
months preceding the Casablanca conference was connected to the public
declarations of the Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, who suggested
that the Arabs reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence and accept the UN
partition resolution and the resolution on the return of the refugees as a
means of solving the Palestinian problem in stages. The polemics led to
fierce verbal clashes between Bourguiba and Nasser, and the former
decided to boycott the Arab summit.5
In essence, the resolutions of the summit conference sanctioned the sus-
pension of the diversion work, at least in places which were vulnerable to
Israeli attack. The resolution calling for strengthening of the United Arab
Command essentially implied that all military confrontation with Israel
was to be postponed until military preparations were completed.6
However, Israeli Intelligence learned that the leaders of the Arab states
convened at Casablanca had also discussed a secret plan for the annihila-
tion of Israel.7 The conference also decided to shorten the period of prepa-
The dispute with Syria worsens 61
rations for war from five to three years.8 It seems that acknowledgement of
the failure of the diversion scheme, their sense of impotence and Syrian
pressure persuaded the participants to accelerate their preparations for the
all-out confrontation with Israel.
Several months after the Casablanca summit, a change occurred across
the Syrian border, whose outcome was to have a far-reaching impact on
acceleration of the processes leading the region to war.
The Damascus coup

On 23 February 1966 a violent military coup took place in Damascus, the

thirteenth since 1949, deposing General Amin al-Hafez. The coup was
executed by young officers from the Baath ‘military committee’ headed by
Salah Jadid, a forty-year-old army officer of radical socialist orientation
from the Alawite minority in Syria. Jadid appointed to key positions in the
administration three physicians who held similar views, who had served as
volunteers in the FLN guerrilla war against the French occupation of
Algeria: Dr Nur a-din al-Atassi was appointed President, Dr Yusuf Zueyn
as Premier, and Dr Ibrahim Makhous as Foreign Minister. An additional
prominent member of the military committee, the Commander of the air
force Hafez al-Assad, a thirty-five-year-old Alawite, was appointed Minis-
ter of Defence. As Chief of Staff, Jadid chose Ahmad al-Suidani, a Sunni
Muslim, who had served previously as military attaché in Peking and had
been influenced by Maoist theory regarding guerrilla warfare struggles.9
Israeli Intelligence at first concluded that the Syrian coup would have no
impact on Israel. The Chief of the Intelligence Branch defined the new
rulers as a more extreme group with a more aggressive approach to Israel,
but surmised that coming to power would have a moderating effect on
them.10
It soon became clear that the new regime in Damascus was not the
direct continuation of its predecessor, but had characteristics of its own
which would have a detrimental effect on the conflict with Israel. The
main problem, so far as Israel was concerned, was not necessarily the
border clashes in the demilitarized zones or the struggle for water, but
the backing for, organization and operation of the ‘popular struggle’
against Israel which Syria now undertook.
In the inter-Arab arena, the ruling junta in Syria was regarded as an
irresponsible and provocative element,11 eager to foment ‘revolution now’
in the Arab world and to expedite its unification and struggle against
imperialism and Israel. The concept of an immediate popular struggle was
the strategic antithesis of Nasser’s policy, namely to postpone the clash
with Israel until the armies were ready and conditions were ripe for Arab
victory.12 It was the implementation of this alternative strategy which
eventually expedited the military clash in 1967.
Between Damascus and Moscow

The regime of Jadid, Assad and Suidani might have been a fleeting episode,
one of many, in the series of incessant military coups in Syria, but for the
fact that this regime received Great Power backing which no previous
Syrian regime had enjoyed. The Israeli Chief of Intelligence perceived the
increasingly close links between Moscow and Damascus as the result of
the Soviet decision to stabilize its standpoint in the region, in the face of
what seemed to the Russians to be a US-led offensive against the revolu-
tionary regimes in Afro-Asian countries. Coups and attempted coups in
Ghana and Nigeria, Indonesia and Congo, and the Saudi initiative for the
establishment of an ‘Islamic alliance’, roused the Soviets, who feared that
the CIA was behind all these developments, to adopt countermeasures to
defend their strongholds in the Middle East.
Israel was perceived as the spearhead of imperialism in the region and
the US arms deals with Israel and Jordan were assumed to be part of a
general scheme, endangering the Soviet hold on Syria. Syria’s value was
enhanced after the Communist Party began to be represented in the
government.13 Yariv feared therefore that closer relations between Syria
and the Soviet Union would hamper Israel’s freedom of movement, both
political and military, on the Syrian border. At the same time, the Chief of
Intelligence reported that the Soviet–Egyptian arms deal, signed in Septem-
ber 1965, was of ‘giant’ proportions, and would involve the dispatch of
1,500 Soviet experts to Egypt.14 In other words, Soviet involvement in the
region had taken on a new dimension.
The deep Soviet involvement and the backing it gave the Syrians in the
international arena enabled the radical regime in Damascus to conduct an
activist policy and to give practical expression to its ideological commit-
ment to the idea of a ‘popular struggle’. The Soviets did not spur the
Syrians on to more extreme action; in fact they even tried to moderate
their reactions, but in any event they rallied to their support and provided
them with diplomatic backing, arms and training. Soviet patronage
restricted Israel’s freedom of action. From then up until the Six Day War
the government did not permit the IDF, despite the accumulating reasons
and the increasing pressure on the part of the General Staff, to launch a
ground operation against Syria. However, in the final analysis, Soviet
involvement was, without deliberate intent, apparently the direct cause of
the development which led to war.
An ‘unconditional ceasefire’
For a time it seemed that the moderating influence of the Soviet Union was
having an impact not only on Israel but also on Syria. The Syrian Chief of
Staff Ahmad al-Suidani met with the commander of the UN forces General
Odd Bull, and informed him that his country was interested in easing the
tension. He proposed an ‘unconditional ceasefire’ and joint supervision of
the border as the first stage in problem resolution, particularly in the
Almagor sector. Bull conveyed the message to Israel, which responded pos-
itively. Rabin deduced that the initiative had stemmed from the Soviet
Union. While he did not trust the Russians and the Syrians, the govern-
ment had hopes of the new trend.15
It soon became clear that the formula promising an unconditional
ceasefire had not eliminated the misunderstandings. Syrian peasants infil-
trated the disputed area and the IDF refrained from ‘buffer fire’ on orders
from the political echelon. Rabin defined the situation as a trap from
which the army must extricate itself. He urged the politicians to test Syria’s
intentions by instigating cultivation of controversial plots of land in the
demilitarized zones, thus forcing the Syrians to either exercise restraint or
violate the ceasefire. The moderate policy vis-à-vis the Syrian border was
seen in the IDF as a move intended to tie Israel’s hands and prevent it from
employing buffer fire, and, on the other hand, to enable the Syrians to
back the ‘popular struggle’ against Israel from inside Jordan and Lebanon.
At the beginning of July 1966, the Deputy UN Secretary-General Dr
Ralph Bunche visited the region and met with Prime Minister Eshkol and
Foreign Minister Eban.16 Bunche wanted to reduce the UN Emergency
Force in Sinai, and in particular at Sharm al-Sheikh, for budgetary reasons.
Rabin favoured retaining the existing deployment, but with fewer UN
troops, although some support was also voiced for removal of the UN
altogether.17
Operation ‘Wind’: the air force goes into action

again
On 13 July 1966, an Israeli command car hit a mine south-east of
Almagor, very close to the spot where, two months previously, two
employees of the Jewish National Fund had been killed in a terrorist
attack. This time the mine killed two soldiers and a civilian. On the same
day the Ministerial Committee on Security was convened again, and the
Chief of Staff declared that Israel could not remain silent. He tried to
dispel the ministers’ fears of entanglement. He stressed the lack of unity in
the Arab world, and dismissed the possibility of Soviet intervention. On
the contrary, an IDF operation could, he said, strengthen the ‘Russian
argument that it is not worth becoming involved with Israel unnecessarily
and at the wrong time’. He proposed that the air force be dispatched to
damage heavy equipment at Ain Sufira, south-east of Almagor. After a
debate in which, as usual, the Minister of the Interior Moshe Haim
Shapira and the Minister of Labour Yigal Allon represented opposite opin-
ions, the Committee decided to approve an immediate reprisal raid against
Syria, and to empower the Minister of Defence to decide on the form the
reprisal would take. The decision enabled the Minister, if no other form of
reaction was possible, to employ aircraft against the equipment. On the
following day (14 July) Israeli French-made Mystere and Vautour planes
destroyed eight pieces of heavy engineering equipment working on the
diversion route at Ain Sufira and the anti-aircraft unit defending them
(Operation ‘Wind’). The Syrians launched Mig 21s, and one of the
Mirages patrolling the air space scored a hit on a Mig and brought it
down. It was the first ever downing of a Mig 21 by a Mirage.18
At the government meeting of 17 July, Eban described the international
reaction to the Israeli operation as ‘balanced. . . . They all emphasized the

Syrian provocations as leading to this attack.’ Eshkol explained: ‘Perhaps
the world is accepting our claims this time, namely that the topographical
situation is such that if we do not respond, we are the victims.’ He added:
‘An aircraft is now considered less than a cannon two years ago. . . . The
United States is occupied with its war in Vietnam and is not in a position
to preach to others.’19 And indeed, even at the Security Council, Israel
escaped condemnation, while the discussion of Syria’s complaint turned
into a Soviet–US verbal clash on Vietnam, and the Americans thwarted the
Arab proposal.
At the General Staff debriefing on the IAF operation conducted three
days later, the Chief of Staff explained that the intention was to restore to
the IDF the freedom of action which had been gained as a result of
employment of the IAF on 13 November 1964, and had been restricted
again when the Syrians adopted the rules of the game according to which
civilian settlements were not to be shelled. As Rabin saw it, the attack on
the diversion work in the hinterland carried out by the IAF also had a
deterrent effect on other countries which were seeking an ‘alibi’ in order to
refrain from implementing the diversion work, according to Rabin’s esti-
mation. He admitted that the demonstrative employment of the IAF could
have ‘aggravated the escalation’. It was difficult to explain this to the polit-
ical echelon, he said, but the action had been essential in order to confront
the Syrians with the threat of a wide-scale clash and induce them thereby
to stop provoking Israel. As for the downing of the Mig, the Chief of
Staff’s remarks indicate that this act exceeded the aims of the operation,
and hence was criticized by the government, which feared a breach in rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
Together with the praise he lavished on the Israeli pilots, Rabin
commented:
‘I know that fighter pilots are trained like paratroopers, tank crews, to
sink in their teeth and not let go, like a bulldog with its prey. But, gen-
tlemen, we operate according to rules and laws and must observe them
without question. Because it is an order and we are an army. I know
that everyone is enthusiastic and it was a historic opportunity to down

a Mig. . . . There were incidents here which I would not like to describe
as failure to carry out orders, but I would not like them to be repeated
in the future.’20
It appears that once again the IAF had exceeded its approved brief and
escalated the dispute with Syria.
The IAF operation of 14 July 1966 should be regarded as an additional
milestone, more important even than the Tel Dan incident of 13 Novem-
ber 1964. It would seem that the military and diplomatic success this time
freed up the government and the IDF from constraints on the employment
of aerial forces in border incidents. The rule, that Israel would only react
with aerial bombardment to the shelling of settlements, was broken. From
now on, Israel dared to employ the IAF with greater frequency, and US
backing at the United Nations became a commonplace.
The border dispute between Syria and Israel was therefore growing
increasingly complex. Syrian readiness to maintain calm in the demilita-
rized zones was tactical. The chosen strategy was to conduct a guerrilla
struggle against Israel, and this goal was accorded priority. Soviet diplo-
matic backing extended Syria’s space for manoeuvre. Rabin was concerned
at Syria’s calculated moves, which combined moderate policy on the
borders with support for guerrilla warfare against Israel, based in Syria
and carried out through ‘two wings’: Lebanon and Jordan.21
As a result of the new Syrian strategy, the main problem which preoccu-
pied Israel from now on was no longer connected to the diversion work or
to incidents in the demilitarized zones, but rather to Palestinian guerrilla
activity.
Chapter 6
‘Harassment’
If there is one factor which seemingly may be isolated and regarded as the
main catalyst for the escalation which led to the Six Day War, it is the
guerrilla activities of the Palestinian organizations, and in particular the
Fatah, against Israel. This form of warfare, which found expression pri-
marily in acts of sabotage and mine-laying, began in early 1965, and
gained momentum until it became – from Israel’s viewpoint – intolerable.1
It confronted the IDF senior command with a serious challenge, and
despite endless discussions and indecision among the General Staff, they
did not succeed in formulating an effective response which would end the
incidents. Israel’s pre-war borders, and in particular the Jordanian border,
were easily penetrable and difficult to block. In the absence of a direct way
of tackling the problem, Israel cast responsibility on any country through
whose borders the terrorists infiltrated. Jordan and Lebanon, from which
most of the saboteurs came, tried to prevent the infiltrations, while Syria,
which supported the Fatah, was generally careful to ensure that the attacks
did not stem directly from its territory, and tried to implicate Jordan.
Israel felt the need from time to time to provide Jordan with ‘incentives’
for fighting the Fatah by means of acts of reprisal, but was also anxious to
preserve the stability of King Hussein’s regime in Jordan and of the
Lebanese government, and the fact that those two countries enjoyed firm
Western backing restricted Israel’s freedom of action. Syria, on the other
hand, as noted above, strengthened its links with the USSR from 1966 on,
and enjoyed Soviet diplomatic support and military supply. In the back-
ground was Egypt, which opposed the Fatah’s mode of action for most of
this period for fear of hostile involvement with Israel before the time was
ripe. At the same time, in light of its widening rift with Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, Egypt was in favour of undermining the Hashemite regime in
Jordan, and eventually also gave its silent consent to the launching of
attacks on Israel from inside Jordan.
The Israeli General Staff and political echelon were divided in their
views on this intricate situation. Both bodies took a severe view of the
escalation in terrorist attacks and concurred on the need to halt them
‘Harassment’ 67
before they disrupted everyday life in Israel. However, whereas the army
emphasized offensive solutions, the government wanted the military to
focus more on defensive and preventive activities, a policy which was
anathema to senior officers. Because of political constraints and fear of
deterioration into war, the government was reluctant to sanction opera-
tions across the border, and gave its approval only in isolated cases. It
imposed stringent restrictions on the scope and objectives of such actions.
On the only occasion when the government approved a large-scale opera-
tion inside Jordan in November 1966, the operation extended beyond its
original aims, and the outcome almost caused the collapse of Hussein’s
regime.
The PLO
The initiative for the reorganization of the ‘Palestinian entity’, its evolve-
ment from a mere refugee problem into a national body with representat-
ive institutions, had stemmed from Egypt as early as 1959, at a time when
the prestige of Nasserism in the Arab world was at an all-time high. The
intiative did not reach maturity until 1964, and it was only the resolution
of the Cairo Arab summit which provided the impetus. In the wake of that
resolution, the first Palestinian congress was convened in May 1964 in
East Jerusalem. It culminated in the declaration of the establishment of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to be headed by the Palestinian
representative on the Arab League Ahmad Shukeiri. The second Arab
summit welcomed the establishment of the PLO and also ratified the
organization’s decision to set up the Palestine Liberation Army.2
Until the Six Day War, the PLO was closely linked to Egypt, although it
had been founded on Jordanian soil and with the ostensible cooperation of
the regime. King Hussein, who, as a result of the ‘summit atmosphere’, did
not see any possibility of objecting to the establishment of the PLO, tried
to control the inevitable process through supervision of the election of
members of the Palestinian National Congress. However, as time passed
and the atmosphere was dissipated and the gap between the ‘revolution-
ary’ and ‘conservative’ Arab camps widened, the anticipated rift between
the PLO and Jordan materialized, and fierce, open hostility ensued. Only
on the very eve of the Six Day War was a constrained conciliation
achieved between the two camps. On 30 June 1967, when King Hussein
‘went to Canossa’ and signed the defence pact with Egypt in Cairo (see
below), Nasser forced him to take his sworn enemy, the head of the PLO,
Ahmad Shukeiri, back with him on his flight to Amman.
Until June 1967, the PLO followed the Egyptian line, and, in accord
with Egypt’s policies, did not perpetrate acts of sabotage against Israel.
Its main activity was intra-Palestinian organization and institutionalization
of the Palestinian presence at pan-Arab and international forums.
68 ‘Harassment’
The ‘Palestine Liberation Army’ also took shape, in particular thanks to

Egyptian support, and in spring 1967 it comprised three infantry brigades.
At the same time, from 1966, in light of the rapprochement between Egypt
and Syria and the rift with Jordan, the PLO too began to back terrorist
activity against Israel emanating from Jordan. An important reason for
this was the growing popularity of a rival Palestinian organization, the
Fatah, whose guerrilla warfare against Israel gained wide support and won
it considerable prestige among the Palestinian public.
Fatah
Unlike the PLO, which was to a large extent the product of inter-Arab
politics, Fatah (initials in reverse of Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filas-
tini – Palestinian National Liberation Movement) was an authentic out-
shoot of the Palestinian diaspora in camps, universities and refugee
concentrations. It represented a new and militant Palestinian generation,
who had experienced the trauma of uprooting at an early age in 1948 and
had undertaken the mission of repairing the injustice by annihilating the
State of Israel and by achieving the ‘return’ (al-‘Awda’) to Palestine. The
strategy which evolved, to no small extent inspired by the successful
struggle of the FLN in Algeria and the spirit of the times, was a ‘popular
war’, its objective to undermine Israel’s security, restore the pride of the
Palestinian people and recruit the young generation into the ranks, and
accelerate the all-out confrontation between the Arabs and Israel, which
would lead to achievement of their goals. The organizational efforts began
in the second half of the 1950s, among members of the Association of
Palestinian Students headed by Yasser Arafat, Isa Hamud and Halil al-
Wazir, in Egypt and in Kuwait. Their organ, ‘Filastinuna’ (Our Palestine),
advocated the establishment of an independent movement of Palestinian
‘fidaiyyun’ (‘those who sacrifice themselves’) movement, which would ded-
icate itself to the armed struggle, and no longer rely on the Arab states.3
The operational activity of the Fatah against Israel did not commence
until the beginning of 1965. The total surprise evinced by the IDF at its
emergence and early activities testified to the hithertoo over-casual attitude
of the Intelligence Branch towards the Palestinian entity in general.4
Fatah activities were initially independent and relatively amateurish,
and made an impact mainly in the propaganda sphere and on Palestinian
morale. However, with time, Syria, loyal to the ‘popular struggle’ ideo-
logy, extended its patronage to the organization, and the methods of oper-
ation and implementation gradually improved and became more
professional and daring. The Fatah successes5 led to the emergence of addi-
tional small Palestinian guerrilla organizations, but until the Six Day War
Fatah remained the dominant organization and a central factor in the esca-
lation process which led to war.6
‘Harassment’ 69
The primary objectives of the Fatah were initially related to Israel’s

water installations7 and at first it seemed that this was a new type of oper-
ation as part of the ‘War for Water’. It soon transpired that the Fatah was
not restricting its objectives to water installations. From then on, almost
unconsciously, the IDF launched a new stage in its methods of tackling
routine security problems. After more than eight years of calm in the
sphere of border infiltration and terror activities, the IDF was again
required to find solutions to the problem, which was now referred to as
‘harassment’ and later as ‘hostile sabotage activity’.
It is noteworthy that the term ‘terror’ or ‘terrorists’ hardly ever appears
in references by the Israeli military at the time to Fatah activities. More

commonly used are the terms ‘guerrilla’ or ‘guerrilla warfare’ and some-
times even the loaded term used by the other side: ‘popular struggle’. But
the most common phrase was the neutral definition – ‘harassment activity’,
or, in brief: ‘harassment’. This definition possibly implied a certain con-
tempt for the phenomenon and its depiction as a nuisance and a minor
problem which the army was forced to deal with, rather than a true mili-
tary challenge. However, this ‘nuisance’ soon became a major issue which
preoccupied the IDF increasingly and proved insoluble.
By March 1965 the Intelligence Branch already regarded the Fatah as
an important factor, which was operating independently and complicating
the situation. The Chief of Intelligence depicted Fatah’s objectives as
follows: ‘They have an approach which claims that since the State of Israel
will have an atom bomb in the nineteen seventies, the final test must occur
before then. Since the Arab Governments cannot be relied on [to solve the
Palestinian problem on their own initiative], we must create provocation
and drag them into war.’8 In hindsight it seems that the Fatah achieved
their aim of instigating warfare between the Arab states and Israel,
although the outcome of the war did not come up to its expectations.
Operation Cliff
After five months of consecutive, though ineffective activity on the part of
the Fatah, mainly across the Jordanian border, the political echelon finally
approved an IDF reprisal operation against Jordan, for the first time since
October 1956. The restrictions imposed on the operation were stringent. It
was intended to serve as a caution and incentive to the Jordanian authori-
ties to utilize more effective methods of deterring the population from col-
laborating with the Fatah. The immediate pretext for the IDF operation
was the laying of demolition charges in two buildings in kibbutz Ramat
ha-Kovesh in the Sharon Valley on the night of 25/26 May 1965, and in a
house in Afula on the following night, incidents in which seven Israeli
civilians were injured. The IDF reacted immediately and in close proximity
to the sites of the incidents. On the night of 27/28 May, infantry and
70 ‘Harassment’
paratroop forces operated against inanimate objectives: they blew up

water pumps and a building in Qalqiliya, a flour mill and ice factory in
Jenin and three buildings in a Fatah training camp at Hirbet Shuna. The
army was far from happy at the restrictions imposed on it. Some members
of the General Staff believed that so limited an operation would not only
fail to deter but even encourage the Fatah.9
The General Staff vacillates

In July 1965 the General Staff devoted two consecutive meetings to a ‘free
debate’, in the course of which the Chief of Intelligence surveyed the Intel-
ligence picture, and the generals exchanged views and evaluations. The
ideas ranged from drastic reprisal operations, occupation of territories on
the West Bank and taking over the demilitarized zones on the Syrian
border to counter-terror operations. At the time it was already evident that
the diversion issue had decreased in importance and that terrorist activity
was now becoming the central problem.
The ‘free debate’ was of particular importance, since it exposed for the
first time views which later intensified and began to prevail among the
senior command – namely that it was time to strike a severe blow at Syria
and Jordan, as the preferred method of putting a stop to Fatah activity.
Passive defence against infiltrations was costly, exhausting and ineffective,
and above all at odds with the spirit of an army raised on the offensive doc-
trine. Experience had proved, so the senior officers believed, that there was
only one effective measure for ending infiltration for sabotage purposes,
and that was a wide-scale military operation such as the 1956 Sinai Cam-
paign. This was the type of exercise that the army had learned and trained
for and knew how to execute. The discussion was conducted against the
background of the rising tension on the border with Syria because of the
diversion work and the incidents in the demilitarized areas, but also in light
of Nasser’s retreat from his backing for the diversion, a fact which
expanded Israel’s freedom of action. The deliberations reflected the desire
to exploit the Fatah attacks as a pretext for conducting a reckoning with
Syria, with which Israel had a lengthy account. There also surfaced from
time to time in the course of the discussions the territorial aspirations of
some members of the General Staff, particularly towards Jordan.
Chief of Staff Rabin summed up the discussions by saying that he was
not concerned about the balance of power between the IDF and the Arab
armies, and that the IDF had devised a solution to the diversion problem
which did not entail a serious clash. His main concern was the guerrilla
warfare. He confessed that he had no satisfactory answer to propose, and
‘if I were an Arab, I would choose this method’. The IDF had achieve-
ments to its credit in undermining Arab unity and in the ‘water war’, but
the Fatah was endangering those achievements. Rabin saw no escape from
‘Harassment’ 71
the employment of diverse methods: on the one hand, to try to hit on

Fatah members, despite the difficulty in locating them; on the other hand,
to undertake various deterrent and punitive actions. To those who sought
territorial gains, the Chief of Staff explained that the development of wide-
scale actions against Syria, Lebanon and Jordan with the aim of occupa-
tion was a lengthy process which could endanger the IDF’s arms purchases
and modernization plans.10
The General Staff was therefore obliged against its will, by Fatah activ-
ity, to focus on routine security issues. The IDF was not accustomed to
tackling guerrilla warfare, and Rabin defined its functioning against terror
and infiltration as ‘B minus’, despite all the budgetary and operational

investment.11
Operations ‘Jewel’ and ‘Scales’

The continuing Fatah raids from Jordan12 forced the government to
approve an additional IDF operation, carried out on the night of 4/5 Sep-
tember 1965. Once again, severe restrictions were imposed on the opera-
tion, carried out by a battle team of the Parachute Brigade. The objectives,
namely eleven wells in the Qalqiliya region, met with the disapproval of
the Chief of Staff. The fact that it was a clean operation, with no casual-
ties, brought him praise, but Rabin did not delude himself that it would
put an end to Fatah operations. His remarks indicate that he did not
believe in the efficacy of small-scale actions but was ready to try this
method if he could obtain approval for a long series of them.13 This
method might have proved itself, but the government showed no intention
to approve further reprisal actions of this kind.
An additional focused action conducted by the IDF in immediate
response was directed against Lebanon. After a series of infiltrations for
sabotage purposes into the village of Margaliyot and damage inflicted on
the water pipe of Kibbutz Manara, the IDF, on the night of 27/28
October, blew up the house of the mukhtar of Hula village from which the
saboteurs had come, and damaged three wells and water reservoirs in the
village of Mis al-Jabal. As a consequence, the Lebanese Intelligence author-
ities and army stepped up their supervision of the concentrations of Pales-
tinians in southern Lebanon and increased their own deterrent activity
along the border.
A further serious discussion at the General Staff forum in October 1965
again exposed the misgivings of the IDF senior command as to ways of
dealing with Fatah activities in general, and those stemming from Jordan
in particular. Examination of the statements reveals that in practice
there were two alternative plans of action which could be presented to the
political echelon: the first plan was to react to sabotage from Jordan by a
protracted consecutive series of local punitive small-scale actions, which
72 ‘Harassment’
would spur the Jordanian authorities to boost their struggle against the
Fatah. The second alternative was to instigate a large-scale reprisal opera-
tion, to include, for example, occupation of a village and demolition of its
houses, in a manner which would shock the Jordanian authorities into
taking drastic steps to check the Fatah. The other proposals, which ranged
from ‘counter-terror’ to occupation of the West Bank, were irrelevant,
because they had no prospect of approval by the government.
On the face of it, the Israeli government, in light of its composition and
moderate tendencies, should have chosen the first alternative. The paradox
is that it was precisely the government’s moderation which drove it in the
second direction. The government was not eager to approve reprisal

actions, and when it did so, this step was usually taken after vacillation
and stringent constraints were imposed. And since it had refrained for a
long period from approving small-scale operations, it was finally obliged,
when the terrorist squads which had crossed the Jordanian border finally
reached Jerusalem, to approve a wide-scale operation, which almost
caused Hussein’s downfall and was a source of serious political embarrass-
ment to Israel’s government. Eshkol’s method, which he later defined suc-
cinctly as ‘the book is open and it is all being recorded’, created a lengthy
reckoning, and in the end the government was forced to react on a large
scale. As will be shown below, both in the IDF and outside it, the govern-
ment was charged with having encouraged terrorist action by its very
failure to react.
Operations ‘Alpha’ and ‘Joseph’

At General Staff meetings held between October 1965 and January 1966
the Chief of Intelligence reported on the increasingly bitter struggle
between Jordan and the PLO, and on the other hand noted information on
the Fatah’s intention to hit vital targets deep inside Israel.14 In practice,
however, there was a certain easing of Fatah activity during this period.15
The relative calm lasted for some five months, and the Intelligence Branch
attributed this to the firm line adopted by the Jordanian authorities against
the Fatah.
In April 1966 Fatah squads which infiltrated from Jordan perpetrated a
series of acts of sabotage, including an attack on Kibbutz Beit Yosef,
which damaged three homes and injured two civilians, and the laying of a
mine between Arad and Massada.16 In reaction, on the night of 29/30
April, infantry and paratroop forces raided the village of Kal’at in the
north of the eastern Jordan Valley and Hirbet Rafa in the southern
Hebron mountains, and detonated twenty-eight houses. The pattern was
still identical to that of previous operations, and the force was given strict
instructions to avoid harming civilians. Notwithstanding, eleven Jordanian
civilians lost their lives.17 It was an omen for the future.
‘Harassment’ 73
In the course of 1966, the new regime in Syria gradually took control of
the Fatah and determined its policies. The organization, expelled from its
bases in Jordan and Lebanon by action of the authorities there, required a
base in Syria, and the regime there supplied ideological and practical
backing. Syria’s self-image as pioneer of the Arab struggle against Israel
obliged it to grant backing and support to a Palestinian organization con-
ducting guerrilla warfare in enemy territory. However, the Syrians
exploited the Fatah in the inter-Arab struggle, in order to undermine the
‘reactionary’ Jordanian regime and embarrass the Egyptians. The change
in Syria’s attitude under the new radical Ba’ath regime was fundamental.
Whereas in the past Syria had advocated an immediate pan-Arab frontal

clash with Israel, from now on it preferred the longer path of a patient
‘popular liberation war’. In response, the IDF senior command reached the
conclusion that Syria must not be permitted to determine the rules of the
game, and should be forced into a frontal confrontation which would lead
to the downfall of the regime or its abandonment of support for a popular
war. The political echelon, however, was still far from accepting this
conclusion.
Chapter 7
The General Staff wants a

‘frontal clash’
In summer 1966 the IDF General Staff arrived at the conclusion that the
only way to halt terrorist activity was to inflict a resounding military blow
on Syria. From the moment the Damascus regime had ‘adopted’ Fatah and
began to activate it, there was a consensus among Israeli generals on the
need to impose a ‘frontal clash’ on Syria which would shake the radical
regime, perhaps even cause it to collapse and, in any event, force it to
abandon the idea of a ‘popular struggle’. The model which they envisaged
was based on the 1956 Sinai Campaign which had put a stop to ‘fidaiyyun’
raids from the Gaza Strip. Egypt was now embroiled in Yemen, the Arab
world was polarized and split, and Nasser was constantly proclaiming that
he would not be lured into a war before the time was ripe. The situation
appeared opportune for decisive action against Syria. While the close rela-
tions between Damascus and Moscow aroused some apprehension, it
seemed reasonable to assume that if the Israeli blow was swiftly delivered,
it would achieve its objectives without inducing the Soviet Union and
Egypt to intervene.
The senior command of the IDF had long desired to ‘teach the Syrians a
lesson’.1 This aspiration stemmed in part from the fact that the Syrian
army was the only one of the forces that invaded the Jewish state in 1948
which was not defeated or driven back. The border skirmishes in the
demilitarized areas and around Lake Galilee, the protracted obstinate
battle over each plot of land, the shooting incidents which often claimed
lives and caused severe damage to settlements, the diversion work which
the Syrians continued doggedly even after suffering punishing blows,
Syria’s open militancy towards Israel in the inter-Arab arena – all these
had evoked fury and frustration in the IDF command, which sought an
outlet. The brutal treatment of Israeli prisoners at the hands of the Syrians,
the 1955 suicide of the soldier Uri Ilan in Syrian captivity and the public
hanging of the Israeli spy Eli Cohen in 1965 heightened hostility towards
Syria. Yitzhak Rabin himself had bitter memories of his period as head of
the Northern Command, and the current head, David Elazar, was also
highly antagonistic towards Syria.2
The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’ 75
The Israeli government did not see eye to eye with the army. It was
ready to invest more and more resources in defensive and preventive meas-
ures, and insisted that the IDF do more in this sphere, its aversion to such
measures notwithstanding. The IDF’s efforts in this direction had scant
success in checking terrorist activity, which was on the increase. In the
end, the government had no choice but to accept the army’s recommenda-
tions in one way or another. What the IDF did not take into consideration
was the possibility that the Soviet Union and Egypt would intervene even
before Israel and Syria clashed.
By summer 1966, the IDF Intelligence Branch was reporting on the con-
solidation of Fatah activity in Syria and the dispatch of squads to Lebanon

and Jordan. However, the Syrians appeared to be outsmarting Israel: they
moderated their border policy and even proposed an ‘unconditional cease-
fire’ and negotiations on cultivation arrangements, a proposal which came
as a pleasant surprise to Israel. The IDF was ordered to cease the ‘buffer’
fire, thus enabling Syrian fellahin and shepherds to return to the fields and
pastures in the demilitarized areas. At the same time, the Syrians did not
totally abandon diversion works, and continued to emphasize the need for
a ‘popular struggle’ against Israel by means of organizing and dispatching
Fatah squads through Jordan and Lebanon. This popular struggle was
based, on Syria’s part, on the indirect approach, which advocated neutral-
ization of the focal points of frontal friction in order to deprive Israel of the
pretext for direct attack on Syria. The Israeli General Staff, as noted above,
regarded the situation as a snare from which Israel needed to free itself.3
At General Staff deliberations, the Chief of Intelligence dwelt on the dif-
ference between the Syrian approach, which favoured a popular struggle
immediately and the Egyptian school of thought, which had no objections
to guerrilla warfare but feared, out of experience, that Israel would react
militantly before the Arabs were ready.4 His conclusion was that the IDF
had the option to initiate ‘a large-scale clash’ with Syria (Yariv later
explained that he had been referring to ‘seizing a significant area of land
with large forces’) and thereby undermine the regime in Damascus,
without becoming involved in hostilities with Egypt. Egypt’s reluctance to
go to war with Israel before the conditions were ripe provided Israel with
freedom of action against Syria, according to the Intelligence Branch.
Israel’s proclaimed aim of realizing this option would appear to have
generated the May 1967 crisis, in the course of which the Intelligence con-
ception fell apart.
The Chief of Staff noted to his fellow generals that the IDF could not
evade preventive activities, such as guarding and ambushes, despite their
dubious effectiveness, in order to ensure that settlements along the border
were not abandoned by their residents. But defence was not enough, Rabin
emphasized. The solution which could end Syrian backing for Fatah was
‘to impose a frontal clash on Syria’.
76 The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’
Most of the participants expressed emphatic views as to the inefficacy

of partial actions and the need for wide-scale measures. The Commander
of the IAF, Motti Hod, argued that the Golan Heights should be occupied:
the head of Northern Command, David Elazar, proposed a multi-stage
operation, to culminate in occupation of the area inside Syria which served
as a home base for the Fatah, but reminded his fellow officers that it was
essential to operate against Lebanon and Jordan as well, since they must
bear responsibility for raids originating in their countries. The Chief of the
Training Department, Ariel Sharon, declared that the only solution was
war, its objectives being to make territorial changes along the borders with
Syria and Lebanon. He also favoured escalating the situation with Jordan
in order to move the border back because ‘in the long run we can’t main-
tain the State of Israel as a fifteen kilometre-wide strip’; the head of the
National Security College, Elad Peled, also advocated war with Syria and
noted the lessons of the Sinai Campaign, which had ensured quiet along
the Egyptian border for a decade and had convinced the Egyptians ‘that
it’s not worth dealing with those Jews on a small scale [i.e., terrorist activ-
ity]’. None of the speakers rejected a frontal clash with Syria. The Direc-
tor-General of Rafael, the Israeli Armament Development Authority,
Monia Mardor, warned that Fatah activities could eventually be targeted
against vital installations. Mardor was against linking the struggle against
Fatah to border adjustments and said that the prospect that Egypt might
exploit a clash with Syria to inflict a one-time aerial blow on Dimona
should be taken into account.5
Rabin summed up the discussion and focused on the concrete objective,
namely ‘annihilation of Fatah’. He dismissed the proposals regarding occu-
pation of territory inside Syria, because, he said, it would be costly in
terms of casualties and the political reality would prevent Israel from
holding on to its gains (‘if we retreated from the Gaza Strip [after the Sinai
Campaign], we will certainly retreat from Kuneitra [a town on the Golan
Heights]’, he explained). He was not spoiling for a fight, and if he thought
it possible to end terrorist activity by technological means and passive
defence, he would support such measures. But Rabin was convinced that
‘through defence alone we will not eradicate the Fatah . . . we have been
dealing with this for a year and a half [with] a B minus record’. He, too,
believed that, in light of the inter-Arab situation (and Egypt’s hesitation to
enter into a war), Syria had been left alone and was incapable of tackling
Israel. The implied conclusion was therefore that there was no escape from
a frontal clash with the Syrians and that the conditions were favourable.
The main problem, according to the Chief of Staff, was to instil this con-
viction in the government.6
The Lake Galilee incident – August 1966

At 03:30 on 15 August 1966, a vessel of the Israeli navy, patrolling close
to the north-eastern shore of Lake Galilee, was grounded on a shoal some
eighty metres from shore, opposite Syrian positions. The mishap occurred
due to an error on the part of a corporal who violated a standing order to
maintain a distance of at least 250 metres from shore. At about 09:00,
four Syrian Mig 17s strafed the stranded vessel. One of the aircraft was hit
by anti-aircraft fire from the vessel and fell into the Lake.7
Word of the attack was immediately transmitted to the Chief of Staff,
who ordered ‘unrestricted pursuit’ of the Syrian aircraft. A pair of

Mirages, which had been launched previously, identified two Mig 21s
approaching the sector. One of the Migs was downed by Mirage fire. The
Chief of Staff then ordered the IAF to conduct a bombing flight against
targets on the Syrian shore but to avoid damaging houses in the nearby
village of Massadia. The bombardment, carried out by Vautour aircraft,
missed the Syrian position, and several bombs fell on the village, causing
casualties.
Attempts to rescue the patrol vessel were made under UN mediation on
that day and the following one, but without success. The Syrian demand
for permission to recover the aircraft and the body of the pilot was
rejected by Israel, which claimed that since they were located in sovereign
Israeli territory, Israel would recover them but would be ready subse-
quently to hand them over to the Syrians. Israel also responded negatively
when asked by the Syrians if the recovery would be conducted in the pres-
ence of UN observers and if they would be handed over immediately on
the eastern shore. The Syrians therefore announced that they would
prevent the rescue of the Israeli boat.
As a result of a meeting between Prime Minister Eshkol and General
Odd Bull, Chief of the UN Truce Supervisory Force, it was agreed that
rescue of the vessel and recovery of the plane would be carried out
simultaneously in the presence of UN observers. The IDF made prepara-
tions to renew rescue efforts on the morning of 17 August, but the Syrians,
who meanwhile had concentrated a large force on the shore, announced
that they would oppose the rescue until their conditions for recovery of the
plane and corpse were met.
On the nights of 17/18 and of 19/20 August, Israeli navy divers attempt-
ing clandestinely to recover the corpse of the pilot and the plane succeeded
in dragging sections of the aircraft to the shore. An abortive attempt to
rescue the stranded boat was made by the navy on the night of 23/24
August. A further open attempt, also unsuccessful, was made on 25 August,
after intensive mediation activity by the UN, and after Israel had consented
to move navy patrol boats further back. The Chief of Staff denoted this
move ‘a slight lowering of the flag’ which had been dictated by the Syrians
as a result of the failure of the rescue effort. By this stage, the Chief of Staff
and the head of Northern Command had lost confidence in the ability of
the navy to carry out the task, and it was assigned to the Engineering
Corps. The method they proposed appeared complicated and lengthy, and
consequently Rabin acceded to the request of the Commander of the navy
to make another attempt. A force under the command of Lt. Col. Bini
Telem of the navy finally rescued the vessel on the evening of 26 August,
and it was towed to a dock at Genossar after twelve days on the shoal.8
Entirely by chance, an additional drama, which attracted worldwide
attention, took place at the height of the Lake Galilee incident. Protracted
efforts on the part of the Mossad finally bore fruit, and on 16 August an
Iraqi Mig 21, piloted by an Iraqi named Munir Radfa, landed in Israel. For
the first time this advanced Soviet fighter plane was in the hands of a
Western country. This acquisition provided the IAF with highly valuable
information, which was reflected in the aerial fighting in the Six Day War.
On the other hand, the pilot’s desertion exacerbated the already fraught
relations with the Soviet Union. The Mapam ministers in the government
demanded that the plane be returned to the Russians. Eshkol yielded to US
pressure and the Mig was handed over to the Americans for one month,
after the Israelis had studied it thoroughly.9
The vessel incident, and the abortive rescue attempts, aroused rigorous
self-criticism in the army. Investigation of the incident exposed many flaws
and mishaps in the implementation methods and the chain of command.
What are significant for our purpose are the conclusions Israel drew from
the surprising audacity of the Syrians, evinced in the aerial attack on the
Israeli vessel on Lake Galilee, and the undisturbed penetration by Syrian
aircraft five kilometres inside Israel. It is almost certain that the Syrian
aerial operation was conducted in response to the Israeli air attack a
month previously against the diversion equipment at Ain al-Sufira.10 Rabin
himself defined the Syrian assault as a ‘reprisal action’, and regarded the
very fact of penetration of Israel’s air space for attack purposes as a dan-
gerous precedent. The Chief of Staff noted that the possibility of extricat-
ing the vessel by military action, and occupation of the eastern shore of the
Lake, had been examined and rejected, not for political reasons but
because the area might have been shelled by high-trajectory fire. Rabin was
undoubtedly aware that the government would not approve a military
operation costly in human life in order to rescue the boat.
Rabin’s gravest concern was the danger that the army’s credibility
would be undermined in the eyes of the politicians. It was he who had
urged the ministers to permit the IDF to attempt clandestine rescue of the
vessel without the aid of the UN. ‘They gave us the chance and we failed,’
said Rabin, ‘and the failure had implications beyond the fact, because until
now whenever I appeared before the political echelon and gave them my
opinion that a certain plan should be executed, everyone knew that if the
IDF said i“t can be done” , it was in the bag, sealed and delivered. But this
time it’s as if we’ve lost the trust they showed in us when they said g“o
and do it” , because we went and we didn’t do it.’ He placed the blame for
the failure on the navy, which had given an unrealistic assessment on the
prospects of rescue, which he had presented to the government.11
The General Staff meeting of 22 August was conducted under the
impact of the Lake Galilee incident, which had begun a week previously
and was ongoing. The IDF senior command had been particularly sur-
prised by the fearlessness displayed by the Syrians, who for the first time
dared to attack an Israeli target from the air. The Chief of Intelligence
regarded this as a new stage in the confrontation with Syria, the outcome
of the events of 14 July. ‘We discussed the need for escalation with the
Syrians,’ he said, ‘and here is the escalation, and it was the Syrians who
initiated it.’ Yariv tried to explain the Syrian ‘philosophy’ to his fellow
officers. The Syrian Ba’ath, he noted, considered that it bore the main
responsibility for warfare against Israel and claimed the crown of progres-
sive, revolutionary, socialist Arab doctrine, deriving inspiration from
Algiers and Hanoi. The regime regarded itself as the object of persecution
and the target of international onslaught on the part of imperialism, spear-
headed by Israel. It was precisely the weakness of the regime and its isola-
tion which rendered its military reactions so extreme. Yariv did not rule
out the possibility of an additional Syrian offensive. He commented that
the Soviets avoided exerting too much pressure on Syria, and were ready
to support it to the point where they would even break off relations with
Israel in the event of a severe clash, but would avoid military involvement.
In theory, the IDF now had a golden opportunity to instigate the
‘frontal clash’ with Syria which the entire General Staff thought to be
essential. However, not only was the political echelon not yet ready to
agree, but even within the General Staff itself there were those who real-
ized that the Syrians, too, were capable of inflicting a blow.
Weizman was worried: ‘Now that we’ve had an air attack from the
Syrians . . . there’s no way of knowing how those idiots [will act], what
they might do when they’re angry.’12 Rabin, too, was not interested at that
particular moment in a wide-scale clash, but wanted to rescue the stranded
vessel in the most discreet fashion possible. He regarded the affair as a test
of the IDF’s ability to implement Israeli sovereignty over Lake Galilee. An
extensive aerial attack on targets inside Syria, after which the vessel would
remain stranded and exposed to fire, would be interpreted, the Chief of
Staff feared, as a Syrian victory. On the other hand, an attempt to conquer
the north-eastern shore of the Lake could cost lives and invite heavy
artillery fire against settlements. Apart from this, the United Nations
was involved, and in theory there was still an ‘unconditional ceasefire’ in
the demilitarized zones and ongoing negotiations on cultivation arrange-
ments. And, in general, Rabin added, the circumstances had changed.
The discussion at the previous two General Staff meetings had been based
on the assumption that the Syrians were not interested in a frontal clash,
and the trend was to impose it on them in order to put an end to Fatah
activity, which was the burning problem. Now it transpired that, in prac-
tice, the confrontation with the Syrians had been sparked off by the events
of 14 July, and the Fatah problem was now secondary.13
Thus, the Lake Galilee incident had a twofold effect: it indubitably
enhanced the IDF belief that the Syrians needed ‘to be taught a lesson’. On
the other hand, it reinforced the view within the military – and even more
so among the politicians – that action against Syria could lead to painful
reaction, including aerial and artillery bombing of Israeli targets near the
border. The result was a temporary moderation of the tone of the General
Staff demand to hit the Syrians, and the fading of the possibility that this
option would be approved by the political echelon.
The Chief of Staff speaks out – and is reprimanded

The September 1966 (Jewish New Year) issue of Bamahaneh, the army
magazine, included a special interview with the Chief of Staff. Rabin
referred to the problem of hostile enemy activity and distinguished
between Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, which opposed terrorist action, and
Syria, which supported it. He said:
‘The components of the situation now prevailing between Israel and

Syria are different, and call for a different mode of action on our part
. . . the reaction to Syrian activities – whether expressed in sabotage,
diversion or aggression along the border – must be targeted against
those who carry out the sabotage and against the regime which sup-
ports them . . . the objective should be to change that regime’s
decisions and remove the motives for action. The problem with Syria
is therefore essentially the clash with the regime.’14
This declaration was in accord with the assertions and charges of Moscow
and Damascus that Israel was plotting to overthrow the revolutionary
regime in Syria. However, it sorely embarrassed Israeli diplomats, who had
always dismissed such accusations, explaining that the internal regimes of
Arab countries were of no interest to Israel. The negative reverberations
throughout the world, and the criticism in the Israeli press and political
establishment, forced Eshkol to respond. He sent Rabin a private letter of
severe reprimand.15 Publicly, after the 18 September government meeting,
the Prime Minister issued a delicately worded statement, which merely
hinted at his reservations, but again cast responsibility for terrorist action
on the Syrian government. Rabin ordered his generals to refrain from par-
ticipating in any discussion or debate on this subject with the press.16
The Prime Minister’s statement began as follows: ‘A certain section of

the interview with the Chief of Staff granted to Bamahaneh on the eve of
the New Year was wrongly interpreted, and contravenes our intentions. I
have talked to the Chief of Staff on this subject, and I feel it necessary to
reiterate that the State of Israel does not interfere in the internal affairs and
regimes of other countries.’ Eshkol’s military attaché, Yisrael Lior, notes in
his memoirs that Eshkol’s reprimand to Rabin was not free of other calcu-
lations. Eshkol envied Rabin’s popularity and ordered him to submit all
requests for interviews for his prior approval.17
It should be noted that this was not the first time that Eshkol had felt
the need to put Rabin in his place. Two years previously, on 24 September
1964, in a ‘private and personal’ letter to Rabin, Eshkol wrote: ‘Recently I
have frequently encountered in the press and on the radio political pro-
nouncements attributed to you. It seems to me that such pronouncements
should be avoided, and if they are essential they should be coordinated
with the relevant bodies.’18
After the Lake Galilee incident, there was a brief lull interrupted by a
series of attacks. The two gravest incidents were the laying of three explo-
sive devices on the night of 7/8 October in the Romema district of
Jerusalem, which damaged two houses and injured four civilians, and the
detonation of a mine in the plantations of Kibbutz Sha’ar ha-Golan on the
night of 8/9 October, which killed four border policemen and injured two.
Visiting the site of the Jerusalem attack, Eshkol made his famous
announcement: ‘The book is open and the pen is recording.’19 The terrorist
squads had infiltrated Jerusalem through Jordan, but the Intelligence
Branch had no doubt that the Syrians were behind the attacks. Yariv
offered a possible explanation, namely that in the absence of an Israeli
reaction, the Syrians sensed that ‘it was no big deal’.20
Rabin’s remarks at the General Staff meeting reflected the difficulties he
had encountered in persuading the government of the need for a wide-scale
operation against Syria. Soviet backing of the Syrians was a cause of
concern to the ministers. Not all of them were persuaded that the aerial
operation on 14 July had produced the desired result, and the bravado dis-
played by Syria in attacking the naval vessel on Lake Galilee was an addi-
tional reason for fear among the ministers of Syrian reprisals.21
An additional concern of the government was the prospect of a focused,
but highly damaging, Egyptian response to Israeli action against Syria.
‘There is an object in the south of Israel which is the ideal object for a
limited response which would win the total support of the whole world.
Dimona. [Ministers] say, Egypt can refrain from moving forces but to deal
with Dimona, that is not considered war, it’s a limited action.’ Rabin pre-
sented these facts as if he did not share the anxieties, but his remarks indi-
cate clearly that he understood why the political echelon preferred
diplomatic activity at that stage. He was convinced, at the same time, that
the government was becoming increasingly aware that in the final analysis
there would be no escape from a serious clash with the Syrians.22
The tracks of the mine-layers at Shaar ha-Golan led to the Syrian
border. This fact seemingly again provided the occasion for acting against
Syria, which the General Staff had been eager to do for some time. The
government, however, did not consent to approve such an operation and
decided, under US pressure, to act through diplomatic channels. Israel
complained to the Security Council. Although proof of Syrian respons-
ibility was clear-cut, the UN deliberations lasted for many weeks. The
Soviet Union opposed any condemnation of Syria and finally imposed a
veto, although the draft resolution had been very mildly worded.23 Israel’s
restraint following the October attacks and its despair of the UN were
among the underlying reasons for the reprisal operation at Samu on 13
November 1966 (see below).
At the General Staff meeting of 17 October, Yariv quoted a report on a
meeting two days previously between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Vladimir Semyonov and the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow. Semyonov
informed the Syrian of a meeting between the Soviet Ambassador to Israel
Dimitri Chubakhin and Eshkol, and said that his government had no
information about Israeli aggression. He advised the Syrians to maintain
calm and to cool down their emotion. Such a tone, said Yariv, was inca-
pable of curbing the Syrians. The fact that such information had reached
Israeli Intelligence in ‘real time’ is, of course, testimony to the excellence of
its sources. The IAF Commander, Motti Hod, asked Yariv a ‘speculative
question’. Could the Soviet Union actually be interested in an
Israeli–Syrian clash in order to increase its hold in the region? Yariv
replied that he believed ‘that this is not a case of Russian Machiavellism’.
He estimated that the Soviet Union was apprehensive at the prospect of
serious deterioration of the Middle Eastern situation, which could lead to
confrontation with the United States. The Soviets were not pressuring the
Syrians because they were anxious ‘not to rock the boat’ for fear of a mili-
tary coup against the regime in Damascus.
The continuing terrorist activity of Fatah and other Palestinian organi-
zations24 and the restraint ordered by the government evoked strong criti-
cism among the general public and within the military. Rabin was
uncomfortable at the restriction of the army, but was also afraid that the
resentment voiced in army circles towards the government could have a
negative impact on morale. He was convinced that, with time, the govern-
ment would be won over and would permit the IDF to act, but he warned
that in the interim ‘we must bite our tongues and grit our teeth, but not
give free rein to our mouths’.25
The Egyptian–Syrian defence pact

Israeli Intelligence received another surprise in November 1966. Egypt and
Syria overcame their rivalries and unexpectedly signed a bilateral defence
pact. The clauses of this pact were very explicit, and included the viewing
of any ‘armed aggression’ against one of the two as aggressive action
against both. There were, however, also qualifications: the defence policy
of both sides must be the outcome of ‘joint consultations’, and in the event
of a brief surprise onslaught on one of the two countries the response
would be conditional on mutual consultations and consent.26 The signing
was preceded by indicators which were not correctly assessed by the IDF
Intelligence Branch. But what was more important was that the implica-
tions of the agreement had little effect on the Intelligence perception of the
Egyptian stance and of Egypt’s commitment in the event of a ‘frontal
clash’ between Israel and Syria. On the contrary, Intelligence perceived the
signing as an Egyptian move aimed at curbing the Syrians and forcing
them to coordinate moves with Egypt and avoid entanglement with Israel.
With regard to Egypt’s response if Israel acted against Syria, Intelligence
sources continued to believe that avoidance of war before the time was
ripe would remain the guiding principle for Egypt, the pact notwithstand-
ing. It is possible that the direct impetus for signature of the pact was
Rabin’s imprudent statement, which was interpreted in Moscow and Cairo
as the proclaimed intention of military circles in Israel to overthrow the
‘revolutionary’ regime in Damascus. The pact could have been a twofold
move on Egypt’s part, encouraged by the Soviet Union, an attempt to
restrain Syria’s conduct and simultaneously to deter Israel from acting
against that country. Future events were to prove that the enhanced Egypt-
ian commitment, anchored in the defence pact with Syria, was pregnant
with consequences far beyond the assessment of Israeli Intelligence.
Chapter 8
Israel–Jordan
The Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian
dilemma
The period under discussion witnessed the beginning of a direct diplomatic

dialogue, at the highest level, between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom
of Hussein ibn Talal, which was to culminate thirty-one years later, in
1994, in the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries.1
However, these years were also marked by rising tension along their long
shared border and by two acute crises: the first was the IDF reprisal opera-
tion at Samu in the southern Hebron mountains on 13 November 1966
whose consequences threatened to destabilize Hussein’s rule; the second
was Hussein’s decision to become part of the military alignment against
Israel by signing a mutual defence pact with Nasser on 30 May 1967 and
placing his armed forces under Egyptian command. This move accelerated
the outbreak of hostilities, in the course of which Israel occupied the West
Bank and Jordan reverted to its original dimensions as Transjordan.
The contacts between the Jewish agency and Israeli government on one
side and the Amman monarchy on the other began in the 1930s, but the
ties established and the intensive contacts with King Abdullah on the eve
of the Arab invasion in May 1948 did not deter the Transjordanian
‘Legion’ from participating in the Arab invasion of Israel upon its birth.2
The 1948 fighting and the 1949 armistice agreement left a long and highly
problematic border between the two countries, and Jerusalem was criss-
crossed by tactical positions, fortifications, mines and by barbed wire
fences along the ‘urban line’. The most sacred places to Jews – Temple
Mount, the Western Wall and the Mount of Olives as well as the Jewish
Quarter of the Old City – remained in Jordanian hands.3 On the other
hand, Mount Scopus – consisting mainly of the buildings of the Hebrew
University and the Hadassah hospital – remained an Israeli enclave in the
east of the city. A guard force of Israeli ‘policemen’ (in fact, soldiers) was
assigned to the Mount and a supply convoy wended its way through the
Mandelbaum Gate fortnightly, under UN supervision, to and from the
Mount.4
At the end of the War of Independence, it seemed that the IDF was now
in a position to occupy east Jerusalem and the West Bank and to shift the
The Israeli and Jordanian dilemmas 85
border back to the Jordan River. The Israeli government was dissuaded by
political and demographic considerations from carrying this out. Contacts
with King Abdullah, who annexed the West Bank to his kingdom, were
intended to replace the armistice agreement by a peace settlement. These
contacts were cut short by Abdullah’s death in July 1951 in Jerusalem at
the hands of a Palestinian assassin.
As far as Israel was concerned, and in light of the alternatives, the
Kingdom of Jordan was a convenient neighbour, a ‘status quo country’ as
regards the character of the regime. But Jordan had always, and particu-
larly up until 1967, been marked by acute tension between the Western-
oriented policies of the Hashemite rulers and the widespread popular

sentiment of the Palestinian majority, who favoured Nasser and yearned
for ‘the liberation of Palestine’. Moreover, Jordan was also the undisguised
target of ‘revolutionary’ elements encouraged by Syria, Iraq and Egypt. For
all these reasons, Jordan was frequently in a state of upheaval. Israel, for
its part, threatened that it would not sit idly by in the event of a coup or
the movement of foreign forces into the West Bank. The Israeli stance
undoubtedly had a restraining effect, which helped to prevent a coup in
Jordan.
After the Sinai Campaign, David Ben-Gurion relinquished all territorial
aspirations and limited the IDF’s contingency plans for intervention in the
event of a coup in Jordan, to safeguard the connection with Mount Scopus
alone.5 Up until 1958, Ben-Gurion had contemplated the possibility of a
division of Jordan between Israel and Iraq, but following the military coup
and the rise to power in Baghdad of the radical regime of Abdel Karim
Qassem, he became convinced that preservation of the integrity and
independence of Jordan were in Israel’s strategic interest.6
As noted above, the riots in Jordan in spring 1963, following the
proclamation of the Egyptian–Syrian–Iraqi ‘Tripartate Union’, shocked
Ben-Gurion, and he urged US President Kennedy and the other Western
leaders to guarantee the stability of the Hashemite regime and the integrity
and independence of Jordan. This was apparently the background to the
first Israeli–Jordanian diplomatic encounter, which took place in the
autumn of that year between King Hussein and the Director-General of the
PM’s office, Dr Yaakov Herzog. A second meeting was held two years
later with the participation of Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Herzog.7
Concomitantly, meetings were held at senior military level between the
sides, including the chiefs of Intelligence, and counter-terrorist information
was transmitted.8
The delicate fabric of relations between Israel and King Hussein was
severely damaged by the IDF operation at Samu in November 1966.9 The
King and the Jordanian establishment had always suspected that Israel
coveted the West Bank and was plotting to occupy it.10 The shattering of
the fragile trust which had grown up between them may have had some
86 The Israeli and Jordanian dilemmas
effect on Hussein’s decision in late May 1967 to jump on the Nasserite

bandwagon.
Samu
Border relations between Israel and Jordan in this period were far from
tranquil, despite the intention of both governments to maintain calm
insofar as possible. Infiltration into Israel and locally initiated shooting
incidents occurred from time to time and there was friction around
various, often petty issues in Jerusalem, in the Latrun enclave and else-
where.11 The Israel–Jordan Armistice Commission was kept busy.12 But the
real problems commenced with the onset of Fatah activity in January
1965. Most of the infiltrators for sabotage purposes came through the long
border with Jordan, beyond which lay a hostile Palestinian population.
The Jordanian authorities attempted to check the Fatah organization in
their area and stop the penetrations into Israel, but with only partial
success, mainly due to the tense relations between the Amman government
and the Palestinian population and the former’s efforts to avoid the
appearance of collaboration with Israel. The latter, for its part, cast blame
for the penetrations on the countries from which the terrorist squads
entered, usually Jordan. Syria, which had become the patron of the
‘popular struggle’ against Israel, was happy to involve Jordan in the con-
frontation. Israel felt it necessary to provide Jordan with ‘incentives’ from
time to time in the form of limited reprisal raids. The army had reserva-
tions about the operations approved by the political echelon, considering
them too small in scale, too few and of dubious effectiveness. In autumn
1965 the General Staff began demanding a demonstrative punitive action
against Jordan, to be conducted in daylight and with a large force, in order
to conquer a village and blow up its houses.13
The unusual decision of the Ministerial Committee on Security to
approve a daylight large-scale operation by a combined armoured para-
troopers force was influenced by the cumulative impact of the preceding
events, in particular since the beginning of October 1966, and frustration
at the Security Council’s failure, due to the Soviet veto, to charge Syria
with responsibility. In June 1966 a serious shooting incident on the Jor-
danian border at Beit Mirsim in the southern Hebron mountains claimed
two Israeli lives,14 but no Israeli reaction ensued. On the night of 7/8
October, as mentioned above, explosive devices were detonated in two
houses in the Romema district of Jerusalem and four civilians were
injured. On the following night, four members of the Border Police were
killed and two injured by a mine in the plantations of Shaar ha-Golan. The
government decided to exercise restraint and to try to achieve results on
the diplomatic plane, an attempt which proved unsuccessful. On the night
of 11/12 November, three paratroopers from the 890 Battalion were killed
and six injured when their vehicle hit a mine in the southern Hebron
mountains, where they were engaged in setting ambushes against terrorist
activity. It was the subsequent public fury at these attacks, one of them in
the heart of the capital, which persuaded the Ministerial Committee on
Security to accept the recommendation of the Chief of Staff to permit an
immediate large-scale operation in the Hebron mountains (Operation
‘Crusher’) in the village of Samu. The Prime Minister, however, ordered
Rabin to restrict the size of the assault force, a restriction which the army
did not observe.
At dawn on the following day, 13 November, a combined armoured
paratrooper force set out to Samu. The main paratrooper force captured
the village and blew up fifty of its houses, while the armoured force acted
against secondary objectives: a police building and two Bedouin villages
near the border. In contrast to prior assessments, Jordanian army units
intervened and suffered heavy casualties: fourteen dead and thirty-seven
wounded troops, and another four dead and seventeen wounded civilians.
A Jordanian Hunter plane was downed. The Israelis had one fatality and
four wounded. The operation was brief and effective. At 06:00 the forces
crossed the border and at 10:00 crossed it on their way back, having com-
pleted the mission. However, the consequences were of a gravity far
beyond the intentions of the political echelon.15 There were strong reper-
cussions in the Hashemite Kingdom which placed the future of the regime
at risk for several weeks.16 International criticism of Israel was widespread
and very harsh.
That evening the Chief of Staff met with the Newspaper Editors’ Com-
mittee, and found it difficult to explain why the operation had been tar-
geted against Jordan. It was even harder to justify the scope of the
operation to the political echelon. Rabin admitted that he had erred in his
appraisals, particularly regarding the intervention of the Jordanian army
and the quality of their fighting, which had included an aerial battle con-
ducted with inferior aircraft.17
At the General Staff meeting the day after the Samu operation, there
was evident embarrassment in light of the unanticipated dimensions of the
action and the number of Jordanian casualties. The Chief of Intelligence
apologized for not having cautioned against Jordanian military movements
in the region, and for not having accompanied the Chief of Staff to South-
ern Command to oversee the operation.18
Rabin explained that the decision to act against Jordan was intended as
a ‘statement to the world’ that things could not go on as they were. He
blamed the Jordanian army for the complications in the course of the oper-
ation, but did not spare himself criticism for his erroneous assessment of
the scope of Jordanian opposition. Rabin admitted that he should have
contemplated an intimidation flight over the area by the Air Force in order
to curb the Jordanians.19
Operation ‘Stratum’
The fears of Jordanian military response to Samu waned as the days
passed, but, after a two-week delay, the United Arab Command reacted by
ordering the movement of forces in a display of strength. The IDF response
was cautious but alert. The mustering of forces and preparations for
mobilization in order to anticipate the threat was denoted ‘Operation
Stratum’ and served as a kind of preliminary exercise in miniature for the
May 1967 events. When it became clear at the end of November that the
Egyptians were not moving forces into Sinai, the IDF force concentrated in
the south was withdrawn on the night of 29/30 November, to prevent a

‘chain reaction’ of mobilization.20
The stunned reaction in the Hashemite Kingdom to the IDF raid on
Samu was of considerable concern to the West. The Chief of Intelligence
Aharon Yariv claimed that King Hussein was deliberately instilling ‘panic’
in the Americans in order to obtain financial aid and advanced weaponry,
particularly aircraft. The US Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour,
met with the Chief of Staff on his own initiative on 20 November. The
main question posed by the Americans was whether Israel intended to
occupy the West Bank. Rabin hastened to reassure the ambassador.21 The
international denunciations and the criticism voiced inside Israel had
placed the government in a difficult situation. Eshkol ordered that defen-
sive activity on the borders be intensified in order to reduce the need for
reprisal operations in the future.
The political echelon: Defence! The military

echelon: Attack!
Three weeks after the Samu operation, Rabin felt that both public opinion
and the politicians had calmed down. He was convinced that the operation
would be remembered in hindsight ‘as one of the better operations’, and
that its importance lay in the attention it had focused on the grave Fatah
problem. He attributed the government’s diplomatic predicament to the
ineffectiveness of official information activity.22 Rabin feared that from
now on it would be even more difficult for the military to gain permission
for offensive action and that he would be forced to resort to passive
defence. ‘We will struggle against the psychology which is beginning to
gain ground . . . which suggests that there is a [defensive] solution to the
[terror] problems. They will construct electrified fences and set up another
ghetto in the State of Israel . . . we cannot turn the defensive method into
the central axis of [our] doctrine.’23 Rabin was also concerned at US eager-
ness to assist Israel in finding technological solutions for the prevention of
border penetration lest this restrict Israel’s freedom of action.
The Israeli military attaché in the United States, Brigadier-General
Yosef Geva, who conducted the negotiations in Washington for American

technological aid to prevent border infiltration, represented the Chief of
Staff’s viewpoint faithfully, but not necessarily the wishes of the govern-
ment. Static defence was unimportant, Geva said, and Israel must avoid
creating the impression that it had waived its right to act in different ways.
Excessive emphasis on technology could create a defensive and defeatist
‘ghetto psychology’ and encourage Arab attacks. US support for passive
defence, Geva declared, encouraged the aggressor and at the same time
demanded that the victim limit his own freedom of action.24
In the wake of Samu, the United States did in fact offer Israel defensive
and warning systems against border infiltration, but the range offered was
initially so disappointing that Rabin defined it as a ‘mark of discredit to
American technology’. A US expert, Alexander Rabinowitz, was subse-
quently dispatched to Israel. He toured the borders accompanied by the
assistant to the Chief of the Operations Branch, and eventually ‘pulled out
of his hat several interesting devices for pinpointing border penetrations,
night vision, and early warning’. The Americans, however, adopted delay-
ing tactics. Rabin abhorred the appeal to a foreign country for the solution
to a security problem and was afraid that it would extract a political
price.25
On 12 December 1966, a month after Samu, Eshkol attended a meeting
of the General Staff forum in order to discuss problems stemming from
terrorist activity. The meeting illustrated the widening gap between the
defensive and offensive approaches.
The Chief of the Operations Branch, Ezer Weizman, surveyed the
army’s deployment for defensive activity against terrorist infiltrators. The
course of the discussion indicates that Eshkol’s main objective was to press
the military to intensify defensive activity and to forget about offensive
action. Having been castigated both internally and internationally for the
Samu operation, Eshkol was anxious to learn what the IDF was doing in
order to guard and protect against terror. He was determined to invest
increased resources and effort in defence and prevention, in order to pre-
clude the need for severe reprisals, whose outcome could not be predicted.
Weizman described the defensive deployment: fortified positions, patrols,
guard rosters and ambushes, the assignment of forces and the scope of
planned operational activity. He went on to list the various technical meas-
ures the army was employing for lighting, protection and early warning,
and the fencing of border settlements.26
Summing up, Rabin emphasized that what the Prime Minister had
heard touched only on the ‘defensive aspect’. He wanted to explain how he
perceived the problem as a whole.
Terrorism had confronted Israel with a grave problem, said Rabin.
It was not just a question of ‘a few bandits’,27 but a serious attempt on
the part of the Arab states to harm the State of Israel by undermining its
security. If this method proved successful, it could even change the

approach of the ‘responsible leadership’ (namely Nasser). Rabin was of the
view that Israel should not place too much faith in the assumption that
Nasser would not become embroiled in a clash with Israel until the con-
ditions were propitious, and therefore would refrain from licensing and
initiating terrorist activity against Israel. Hence, the approach of the mili-
tary was explicit: it was necessary to act in the international diplomatic
arena and to invest in defensive activity, but these efforts alone could not
suffice to root out terror. The solution was to grant the IDF the opportun-
ity to take such action as would make it abundantly evident to the Arab
states, and in particular Egypt, that if the terrorist acts continued they
were liable to find themselves embroiled in a war with Israel against their
will.
Rabin ostensibly acknowledged the need to step up defensive efforts on
the Jordanian and Lebanese borders, and demanded generous funding for
this purpose: ‘I think that the cash faucet should be turned on.’ ‘Millions’
were needed, he told Eshkol, but ‘the question is if we build a Maginot line
of fences, is that a sufficient solution?’ His tone made it clear that he did
not believe in defensive tactics and knew that the government could not
allocate the ‘millions’ he was demanding at a time of economic recession.
This was Rabin’s way of telling Eshkol that the government would eventu-
ally have to accept the army’s point of view.
Eshkol concluded the discussion with a brief statement, explaining why
the army must increase its defensive and preventive efforts. He sympa-
thized with their aversion to reliance on defence measures, he said, but this
was essential in light of the situation and the political considerations. He
regretted that in the past two years, not enough resources and efforts had
been invested in this sphere. To appease his audience, he explained that
more vigorous defensive activity could also serve as the background to
future offensive action: ‘It will be much easier to explain, if we again need
to carry out serious acts, that we did this and that, but without success.’
He requested that the army’s demands be concentrated, so that the cost of
all the ‘instruments’ needed for defence could be assessed, and gave his
promise: ‘If I receive the figures within the next few days, I will sit down
with the Ministry of Finance people. I don’t think that [we will save on]
things we all regard as valuable, whether preventing killing or preventing
undesirable complications – because we don’t want war.’ Eshkol pointed
out ironically that reprisal operations were also very costly: ‘I didn’t ask
but I can imagine how much the Samu battle cost.’
One sensitive issue worried Eshkol in particular, namely the vulnerabil-
ity of Jerusalem to terror and sabotage, along both the ‘urban line’ and the
exposed border to the north and south. The terrorist act perpetrated by the
‘Heroes of the Return’ in Romema in October disturbed him considerably.
Eshkol asked himself whether there was a certain disproportion in the
assignment of a small force to defend and protect Jerusalem, in compari-

son to other sectors. An act of terror in Jerusalem, ‘in the heart of the
country’, was a ‘disgrace’ which ‘makes one’s blood boil’, said Eshkol. His
dialogue with the Chief of Staff on Jerusalem revealed not only the Prime
Minister’s sensitivity at the prospect of future attacks on the capital, but
also Rabin’s conviction that there was no way to close off the borders, so
that only the solution put forward by the military could solve the
problem.28
The Israeli operation at Samu was regarded by the political echelon as a
grave mistake. It constituted a real threat to the survival of the Hashemite
regime in Jordan, which the Israeli government had been anxious to pre-
serve for the past decade, and caused a rift in the delicate fabric of rela-
tions with that country. It played into the hands of Syria and Egypt and
the PLO, which were interested in the overthrow of the Amman regime
and proved to them that Israel could be provoked into attacking Jordan in
order to achieve their objective. It also exposed Israel to savage criticism
on the part of the West, and spurred the United States to send Jordan addi-
tional military aid. On the other hand, there is logic in the assertion of the
Intelligence Branch that the Samu operation expedited the inevitable clash
between Hussein’s regime and the PLO before the Palestinian organization
was ready, the outcome of which, in the final analysis, was the bolstering
of Hussein’s standing.
One fact is clear: the government realized that it had erred in yielding to
the military’s demands, and the differences between the defensive predilec-
tions of the political echelon and the offensive doctrine of the military
were intensified as a result. Until shortly before the Six Day War, the
government refrained from approving any further offensive initiatives or
reprisal operations, although hostile enemy activity continued. It was only
the cumulative effect of the terrorist acts which eventually led even the
politicians to the conclusion that there was no escape from acting against
Syria.
Chapter 9
The clash with Syria

approaches
Despite the proclamations of its leaders over the years, it is highly unlikely
that Syria was really seeking a confrontation with Israel in 1967. On the
contrary, the concept of a ‘popular struggle’ was grounded on patience,
staying power and sustained action. The reverse of the Egyptian strategy,
which entailed waiting for the right moment to arrive and meanwhile amass-
ing military might and equipment and preparing the ground for victory, it
advocated a constant and tenacious fight employing simple means and guer-
rilla methods. The Syrian Chief of Staff Suidani rejected the idea of a pur-
poseless arms race: ‘We must not pursue the path of conventional warfare
with conventional armament, but rather that of a popular war of liberation,
based primarily on the individual and his faith, and on the rifle, which is
preferable to all heavy weapons.’1 Syria’s leaders had no ideological objec-
tions to attempts to achieve a practical settlement with Israel for the cultiva-
tion of the disputed land in the demilitarized zones, but their national pride
and obstinacy barred them from summoning up the necessary flexibility. On
the other hand, the Syrians had no alternative but to support the Palestinian
guerrilla struggle against Israel, because it was a central tenet of their revolu-
tionary ideological conception. It was by no means certain that any other
country, not even Egypt, would hasten to their aid in the event of a war with
Israel. The crisis and the war came as a total surprise to Syria and Nasser
failed to coordinate his moves with the Damascus leaders, who were rele-
gated to the sidelines in the role of ‘anxious bystanders’.2
The border heats up

As the traumatic impact of the IDF operation at Samu faded due to the
stabilization of the situation in Jordan, and Syrian-inspired terrorist activ-
ity was resumed, the IDF, backed by public opinion, resumed its pressure
on the government to approve a punitive action against Syria. The pressure
bore fruit. Despite strong misgivings in the government, the IAF was
employed on a massive scale several weeks later, a decision which led to
critical escalation.
The clash with Syria approaches 93
At the end of December 1966 the IDF renewed its buffer fire in the
demilitarized zones, after a six-month lull due to the ‘unconditional cease-
fire’ initiated by the Syrians. The Chief of Staff persuaded the Minister of
Defence that the prevailing situation served Syrian interests since it tied the
hands of the Israeli military and facilitated uninterrupted infiltration by
Syrian farmers and shepherds into the demilitarized zones, while Syria was
continuing to back the ‘popular struggle’ against Israel. The Syrians
reacted instantly to the renewal of buffer fire by firing across the border at
Israeli tractors, and deploying tanks and heavy mortar, while at the same
time dispatching terror squads directly from Syria into Israel.
The heating up of the border on IDF initiative, though approved by

Eshkol, was fiercely criticized in government circles. Thus the Ministerial
Committee on Security decided on 3 January 1967 that the IDF was to
refrain in future from returning Syrian tank fire. The army was forced to
obey this decision, even when Syrian tanks fired on Israeli workers in the
vicinity of kibbutzim ha-On and Tel Katzir on 6 January. The Chief of
Staff voiced his resentment on the following day at a meeting of the Com-
mittee, claiming that a dangerous precedent had been established, which
would be interpreted as weakness. Rabin repeatedly proposed that aircraft
be launched against Syrian tank positions. Among the Committee
members, opinions were as usual sharply divided: the National Religious
Party leader, Moshe Haim Shapira, vehemently opposed Rabin’s proposal,
while Yigal Allon of Ahdut ha-Avoda – a consistent champion of the mili-
tary’s standpoint – favoured employment of the IAF even in the event that
Syrian fire was targeted at tractors and farmers rather than at settlements.
‘We know that the employment of aircraft is an open invitation to a more
serious clash, which is liable to lead to war’, Shapira declared. The Minis-
ter of Health, Yisrael Barzilai of Mapam, was adamant in his opposition
to changing the rule that the IAF be brought in only in response to the
shelling of settlements. He warned that Egypt’s commitment to Syria under
their mutual defence pact ‘could escalate the situation and nobody can
foresee how it will end’.
Eshkol and several of the ministers thought it necessary to bring in the
IAF, but the objections of the National Religious Party and Mapam were
so emphatic that they bordered on an ultimatum and a threat to resign
from the coalition. The Committee refrained therefore from deciding on
involvement of the IAF. It approved the continuation of work only in
undisputed areas, and decided that if the Syrians continued to fire on
workers, the IDF would return fire, and if Syrian tanks were spotted at
firing positions, the IDF armour could launch pre-emptive fire.3
Long-term provocation on the borders was not in Syria’s interest, and
consequently the Syrians – who wanted to enable uninterrupted access of
fellahin and shepherds to their fields in the demilitarized zones – again
proposed negotiations to restore calm on the border, and displayed
94 The clash with Syria approaches
uncommon willingness to meet Israeli representatives face to face under

UN auspices. Their proposal was formulated by General Odd Bull and
conveyed to Israel.
On 23 January 1967 Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Levi
Eshkol and Deputy Minister of Defence Zvi Dinstein attended a meeting of
the General Staff to continue the deliberations on routine security prob-
lems. The Chief of Staff and the generals insisted again that defensive strat-
egy was not sufficient, and demanded planned escalation along the Syrian
border and a ‘smashing blow’ even to the point of war, in order to force
the Syrians to suspend their support for the ‘popular struggle’. There was
not a single case in history of the problem of guerrilla activity being solved
by defensive methods, claimed the Assistant Chief of Operations Rehavam
Ze’evi, and Israel lacked the capacity to withstand a lengthy ‘popular
struggle’. First, the IDF was small in proportion to the length of the
borders, and was not built for this type of warfare. Second, the staying
power of the immigrant villages along the border was not great, and the
inhabitants were liable to flee. Third, the serious burden on the economy
of increased reserve mobilization and the reduction in tourism due to the
security situation must not be permitted to continue for long. The model
to be emulated as he saw it was the 1956 Sinai Campaign which had
forced the Egyptians to halt all fidaiyyun activity because they had realized
that ‘there is no such thing as a half-war’. A war with Syria, Ze’evi
emphasized, would solve the three main problems between that country
and Israel: the demilitarized zones, the diversion and, gravest of all, terror.
He warned that the greatest danger of terrorist activity was the fact that it
was ‘contagious’, and in the absence of an Israeli reaction, the other Arab
states were liable to join in. Rabin expressed his full support for Ze’evi’s
outlook.
Levi Eshkol put a damper on the General Staff’s proposal. He had come
to discuss the improvement of defensive measures against terrorism, and
the senior command had argued in return that only by inflicting a ‘smash-
ing blow’ and occupying territory in Syria could the problem be solved,
just as the Sinai Campaign had put an end to terror from Gaza, and the
Samu operation had impelled the Jordanians to make a concentrated effort
to check the Palestinian organizations on the West Bank. Eshkol rejected
this analogy. As far as he was concerned, only defensive measures could
yield definite results, even if they did not provide a complete solution. On
the other hand, the military action which the army advocated could not
only cause political complications but its outcome was by no means
certain. It was not impossible, Eshkol argued, that the worst possible sce-
nario would ensue in the wake of a severe blow to Syria, namely the ‘all-
out scenario’, the rallying of all the Arab states, including Jordan, for the
overall attack on Israel.4
Despite Eshkol’s unequivocal remarks, the generals continued to present
a united front in favour of offensive activity against Syria, their proposals

ranging from war, ‘massive reprisal’, a forceful blow against the Syrian air
force to a counter-terror attack. Following this discussion, and for an addi-
tional two and a half months, the army was not permitted to act as it
wished, despite the continued attacks.5 When the go-ahead was finally
given to the IDF, on 7 April 1967, it did in fact act against the Syrian air
force, but without the anticipated result, and the later repercussions bore
out Eshkol’s fears.
Futile talks with Syria

At the end of January and the beginning of February 1967, meetings took
place between Israeli and Syrian representatives, under UN auspices, as
part of what was denoted ‘an extraordinary convening’ of the Joint
Armistice Commission.6 The objective of the talks was to try to achieve a
settlement in the demilitarized zones which would enable farming and
grazing by both sides without harassment. However, the talks resembled a
dialogue of the deaf and were totally futile.
Moshe Sasson, then Head of the Armistice Committee Department of
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who headed the Israeli delegation to
the talks with the Syrians, later related that the atmosphere was chilly. At
a meeting on the Syrian side of the border, the hosts did not even serve
water to their guests, and the Syrian representative addressed the Chair-
man without ever glancing in the direction of the Israeli delegation. When
a meeting was held on the Israeli side, Sasson asked the IDF to erect three
large tents: one for talks, a second for refreshments and the third for the
Syrians, if they chose to isolate themselves. The Syrians did in fact keep to
their separate tent during the intermissions in the talks and did not touch
the refreshments.7
The first session was held on 25 January 1967 on the Syrian side in the
customs house east of the Bnot Yaakov bridge. It was agreed that the
Chairman, General Bull, with the consent of both parties, would read out
a summary reconfirming the non-aggression clauses of the armistice agree-
ment. Sasson, as head of the Israeli delegation, presented the Israeli stand
regarding a practical settlement in the demilitarized areas, the crux of
which was abstention from any aggressive action, including border cross-
ing and terrorist activity, and arrangements to be based on the status quo
in those areas. The Syrian representative accepted the agenda, but rejected
the Israeli claim to sovereignty over the demilitarized areas. The second
meeting was held on 29 January on the Israeli side, adjacent to the
Mahanayim airfield, with the same participants. The Syrian representative
read out a long speech about Israeli violations of the armistice agreement,
rejected direct talks, and proclaimed Syria’s commitment to the restoration
of the Palestinians’ rights to their stolen land. He demanded the removal of
all forces and military positions from the demilitarized areas and a rever-
sion to the 1949 ceasefire line, as well as the return of the Arab population
and their property to these areas. He referred to the expulsion of the Arab
villagers from the southern demilitarized area and to the UN resolutions
calling for their return, which Israel had ignored. He went on to state that
Syria had views of its own on the cultivation of land in the demilitarized
zones, which he would present when the time came. General Bull’s
attempts to persuade the Syrians to adhere to the agenda proved fruitless.
The third session was held on 2 February on the Syrian side. General
Bull again appealed to the sides to follow the agreed agenda. However, the
Syrian representative reiterated the main points of his previous speech and
claimed that they were in accord with the agenda. As a precondition for
any settlement, the Chairman of the Syrian delegation Colonel Abdullah
demanded that Israel obey the Security Council resolutions and withdraw
to the ceasefire line. Before they discussed any particular area, he said, the
Arab inhabitants must be allowed to return to their land. He also argued
that Israel’s demand for non-aggression was beyond the scope of the
agenda.8
The talks reached an impasse and were on the verge of breaking up.
After the third meeting, Bull decided to suspend the meetings in order to
conduct quiet bilateral contacts and ensure that future contacts would be
more productive. Rabin was of the opinion that the Syrians ‘have manoeu-
vred themselves into a corner’ and that the failure of the talks could
provide a convenient background for Israeli military action. He referred to
the large-scale clash with Syria as a certain prospect, for which the right
pretext must be found.
Yariv: ‘Until the Syrians are given a “good shake-

up” they won’t stop’
In the second half of January 1967 the Chief of Intelligence Aharon Yariv
visited several Western European countries, including Great Britain,
France and Germany. On his return, he reported to the General Staff his
impression that the ‘gentiles’ were preoccupied with larger issues such as
the Vietnam war, events in China – where the ‘cultural revolution’ was
being waged – and the problems of Europe, and not with the Middle East.
It transpired that one of the objectives Yariv had set himself on this trip
was to prepare the background for an Israeli military strike against Syria.
He had been criticized for the Samu operation, he said, but his audience
had ‘bought’ the ‘Syrian theory’. The main point of this theory was that
‘until they [the Syrians] are given a good shake-up they won’t stop [terror-
ist activity]’. The Europeans had merely asked that the ‘shake-up’ be
carried out in such a manner that ‘there won’t be too much commotion’.
Yariv predicted, therefore, that ‘our swipe at the Syrians, if it’s done prop-
erly with a suitable background, naturally won’t win us compliments, but

there won’t be great excitement either’.9
The infiltrations from across the border for terror purposes continued in
February, and Syria’s handiwork was evident.10 However, the differences
of opinion between the military and the government on the required reac-
tion endured. Yet, as time passed and more and more terror acts were per-
petrated, the government weakened on this point. Its hopes that
intensifying the defensive and preventive efforts would check terrorism
were dashed. The talks with the Syrians had led nowhere, and in any event
the Syrians were not willing to abandon their support for the ‘popular
struggle’. The government had no political alternatives and the IDF alone
proposed a method which ostensibly guaranteed success. The conflagration
was inevitable.
Chapter 10
Conflagration
On 27 February 1967, the senior command of the IDF (from the rank of
colonel upwards) convened in Tel Aviv in the presence of the Prime Minis-
ter and Minister of Defence. As usual, the Chief of Intelligence and the
Chief of Staff surveyed the security situation and the IDF’s deployment.
Underlying their remarks was the Intelligence appraisal that no war was to
be anticipated until at least 1970. In his address to the senior officers,
Eshkol deviated from his prepared text and questioned the categorical
nature of this appraisal. He employed the Yiddish expresion ‘Tomer
efsher’, in other words, ‘Is it perhaps possible that you are wrong?’1
At the time, Eshkol was under considerable pressure: the negative psy-
chological impact of the economic recession; the deterioration in the secur-
ity situation; the unsparing criticism of the opposition – and in particular
the Rafi Party and Ben-Gurion – which went so far as to imply that he was
unfit to serve and to accuse him of a ‘security blunder’ – all these under-
mined Eshkol’s standing in the eyes of the general public and of the mili-
tary in particular.
As the terrorist incidents multiplied, the senior command’s conviction
that the sole solution was to launch a wide-scale punitive action – which
would topple the Syrian government or at least force it to withdraw its
support for the ‘popular struggle’ – gained validity. Its officials claimed
that reliance on defensive measures alone could not solve the problem and
that Eshkol’s doctrine of ‘the open notebook and the recording hand’,
which had been based on moderation and patience, could not prevail in
the long run. The ‘notebook’ was rapidly filling up and the public mood in
Israel in the first few months of 1967 was such that a military clash with
Syria seemed only a matter of time. Suddenly, on 7 April, without prior
official decisions or General Staff planning, a relatively routine incident on
the Syrian border was inflated to unanticipated proportions, and the IAF
was brought into play on a massive scale.
This uncalculated and unconsidered development proved to be an addi-
tional leap forward to the brink of war. This event did not deter the
Syrians, who continued defiantly to back terrorist action and even
Conflagration 99
increased their support. Israel, for its part, continued to caution Syria. The
expectation was that Israel would launch an even more massive strike
against Syria. The problem now was that on 7 April the hurdle had been
set too high, and there was little room for manoeuvre between an opera-
tion of this kind and full-scale warfare. Under these circumstances, the
Soviet Union intervened to halt the downward course of events and to
deter Israel by activating the Egyptian–Syrian defence pact signed in
November 1966 under Soviet pressure for this precise purpose.
However, as is well known, the deterioration continued and none of the
aims were achieved. The IDF’s actions produced the opposite result to
what the Israeli government had intended and Israel found itself unwill-
ingly embroiled in full warfare. Although Israel won a resounding military
victory it failed to achieve the modest goal of the planned escalation with
Syria – namely the end of hostile terrorist activity.
Rabin: ‘We must never again divert attention from

the source and focus of the problem – Syria’
Towards the end of the winter, infiltrations from Jordan for sabotage pur-
poses were renewed,2 and on 12 March there was a serious attempt at sab-
otage when a mine was laid on the Tel Aviv–Beersheba railway track near
Kibbutz Lahav. It was discovered in time and dismantled. The Command-
ing Officer of Southern Command, Brigadier General Yeshayahu Gavish,
demanded a reprisal raid against Jordan, but Rabin was firmly resolved
not to divert attention from the core of the problem. He tried to persuade
the political echelon that the only way to solve the problem of terror was
to hit hard at Syria, and was apparently confident that Eshkol was close to
being convinced. Rabin focused therefore at this stage on plans for a large-
scale move against Syria, and was strongly opposed to marginal operations
which might disrupt these plans. The public mood in Israel was ripe for a
punitive action against Syria.3
The number of terror incidents increased in the spring. Most of the infil-
trators came from Jordan and Lebanon, despite the efforts of those two
countries to check them. The army, following instructions from the polit-
ical echelon, invested greater effort in ambushes and passive defence meas-
ures. The United States proposed a collaboration agreement for research
and development of defensive and preventive measures. The government,
under pressure from the army, hesitated to sign such an agreement for fear
that it would restrict its freedom of action.4 Rabin feared that US interfer-
ence would both reinforce the demand of the politicians that the military
focus efforts on defensive measures, and undercut the army’s demand for
an offensive move for solution of the problem.
However, the Chief of Staff’s fears proved to be in vain. Eshkol too
came to the conclusion that what was required was a ‘strong blow’ which
100 Conflagration
would inflict damage on the Syrian army and regime, but not on civilians,
and would be conducted with great care to avoid loss of life. Rabin natu-
rally agreed with Eshkol and declared that ‘a few serious knocks’ would
indeed teach the Syrians a lesson. He proposed exploiting the opportunity
the next time the Syrians heated up the border in order to hit back.5 The
opportunity soon arrived.
7 April 1967: The CO of the IAF starts a war

The events of 7 April 1967 had served, so it transpired, as the spark which
five weeks later was to ignite a crisis which culminated in war. On that day
the IDF struck at the Syrian army from the air, something the senior
command had long been eager to do. This large-scale operation by most of
Israel’s fighter aircraft, in which six Syrian Migs were brought down and
Israeli planes circled over Damascus, was neither planned in advance nor
submitted for prior approval to the Ministerial Committee on Security. If
such a plan had indeed been submitted, it is inconceivable that it would
have been sanctioned.
The situation developed as follows: the air force was placed on alert in
anticipation of the renewal of work on land in the southern demilitarized
zone close to Kibbutz Ha-On.6 It was to be expected that the Syrians, who
since the beginning of January had been reacting to buffer fire, would
respond this time as well. The Chief of Staff, discussing the renewal of
work with the Minister of Defence, ‘gave him to understand that it could
lead to employment of the IAF’, but Eshkol, according to the evidence of
his military secretary, ‘took it calmly’ and gave the go-ahead for the work.7
Work began Friday morning, 7 April, and shortly afterward the Syrians
opened fire at the tractors with light weapons from the position at Imarat
Izz al-Din on the Golan Heights. The IDF responded with tank fire, and
exchanges of artillery and mortar fire soon followed. When stray shells fell
on Kibbutz Tel Katzir, Rabin informed Eshkol at noon that the choice lay
between suspending work or continuing it and bringing in the IAF to
silence the Syrians. Eshkol gave orders not to stop the work, and said that
‘if there is no alternative then I approve the employment of the air force’.8
The go-ahead to the IAF was conditional on the continuation of Syrian
shelling of Tel Katzir. The shelling ceased, but since the Syrians continued
to fire at tractors, permission was granted nonetheless for a sortie against
the Syrian positions.9
The Syrian air force launched Mig 21 interceptor aircraft against the
Israeli assault aircraft. As a result, the IAF Control Centre ordered that the
attack be halted and sent up Mirages against the Syrian Migs. The dog
fights commenced at 14:00 hours over Kuneitra and continued until two
Migs had been downed to the west and east of Damascus. As a result calm
was restored, and Israeli aircraft returned to base to be refuelled.
Conflagration 101
Suddenly, at 14:45, when there were no Israeli planes in the air, Syrian
artillery launched a heavy bombardment on Kibbutz Gadot in the central
demilitarized zone, at some distance from the previous arena. The IAF was
summoned again, and from 15:25, for an hour, Israeli aircraft strafed
Syrian artillery positions in the area. The shelling of Gadot lasted fifteen
minutes, but the damage was great. Another aerial battle commenced, in
which a third Mig 21 was downed. Additional Mirages, which were
patrolling the area, pursued a foursome of Migs and brought down three
of them inside Jordanian territory.10
This sequence of events indicates that, although the IDF had contem-
plated the possibility that the air force would be sent in, no plans had been
formulated for inflicting the longed-for ‘smashing blow’ on that occasion.
If the Syrians had not sent up aircraft, if they had not shelled Gadot, the
event would have been limited to a local incident in the southern demilita-
rized zone, in the course of which the IAF would have been sent into
action locally and on a small scale. However, at an early stage in the
events Israel took aberrant action: for the first time the IAF was employed
before an Israeli settlement had actually been shelled (with the exception
of stray shells which fell in Tel Katzir) and Israeli planes penetrated as far
as Damascus.
At noon that day, Eshkol visited the IAF Control Centre. Rabin was at
Northern Command at the time. The IAF commander Motti Hod appar-
ently exploited Eshkol’s presence in order to obtain his direct permission
to launch a large-scale air operation. According to Hod, Eshkol ‘gave it the
nod without other considerations apart from tactical considerations which
had dictated my request at the time. He may have been influenced by the
atmosphere, but the fact is – that there in the Control Centre there was no
problem in obtaining approval’.11 According to this testimony, Eshkol,
under the impact of the exhilarated mood in the Centre, abandoned his
‘other considerations’ – political, diplomatic and strategic – in favour of
the tactical considerations of the IAF commander.
Thus, Hod claimed to have received full ‘cover’ from the political
echelon for the decisions he took in the course of the incident. But did
Eshkol really grasp at the time the implications of a massive employment
of aircraft? Had he thought it out? This seems most unlikely. Eshkol was
undoubtedly aware that his government would never have approved so
massive an air operation if a prior discussion had been held. Hod may
have been right in claiming that Eshkol was swayed by the prevailing
mood and hence decided not to put a damper on the proceedings. It seems
more likely to assume that he did not realize the true scope of the opera-
tion and lacked the qualifications to gauge the full implications. He had
nobody to consult at the time and, having no alternative, gave his passive
backing with a nod of the head. Eshkol wanted Syria to receive a ‘smash-
ing blow’ but left it to the discretion of the army to determine its scope.
102 Conflagration
It would be hard to overestimate the significance of this incident in pre-

cipitating the events which were to lead five weeks later to the brink of
war. The massive employment of the air force was unprecedented. All the
IDF’s fighter squadrons, and more than half of the frontline aircraft, took
part in the operation. The IAF carried out 171 sorties (eighty-four for
attack and fifty-two for interception and patrolling) and dropped sixty-five
tons of bombs, apart from rockets, air-to-air missiles and sniping fire.12 All
of this occurred without prior discussion or decision on the part of the
Israeli government or the Ministerial Committee on Security. At most, the
operation was covered by previous decisions empowering the Minister of
Defence to approve the employment of aircraft in extraordinary situations

in order to silence artillery shelling of settlements. Under no circumstances
did government forums contemplate the possibility of such extensive use of
the air force, including in the skies over Damascus. The mood among the
ministers was such that they would never have permitted such drastic
aerial response, and this was reflected in the criticism voiced at the 11
April meeting of the Ministerial Committee.13
Thus the military ignored the restrictions defined and dictated by the
political echelon, and acted on their own initiative. Moreover, it is doubt-
ful whether the Chief of Staff exercised control over the scope of the IAF
operation. What seems to have occurred was a repetition of the pattern of
events of 13 November 1964, when the air force was summoned in the
course of a shooting incident which got out of hand, and its commander
alone decided on the scope and objectives of the action and the ammuni-
tion to be employed, without the intervention of the Chief of Staff.
If this assumption is correct, as it appears to be, then Motti Hod fol-
lowed in the footsteps of his predecessor Ezer Weizman, and acted on his
own initiative and as he saw fit at the height of a border incident, without
restrictions. What is relatively evident is that Hod did not request the
Chief of Staff’s approval as to how the IAF was to operate.14 The actual
decision to bring in aircraft was taken by Eshkol on Rabin’s request,15 but
from that moment on, there is no indication that Rabin intervened in
Hod’s decision-making.16
Thus, almost casually and without prior discussion and consideration, a
local border incident was upgraded into a move of strategic significance.
Israel’s readiness to employ the air force on such a scale was undoubtedly
perceived in Moscow, Cairo and Damascus as an indication of a far-reaching
Israeli decision to bring down the Syrian regime. Nobody could have con-
ceived that the scope of the operation was determined by the ad hoc
decision of an Israeli colonel (Hod’s rank at the time), rather than being
the outcome of a measured policy, of analysis, and of clearly defined polit-
ical and military goals. It is no wild exaggeration, therefore, to state that
Motti Hod was, to a large extent, the single individual who, on 7 April
1967, inadvertently led the State of Israel to the brink of war, while the
Conflagration 103
political and military echelons above him did not exercise the necessary
control over his actions.17 This is not, of course, to denigrate the leadership
qualities displayed by Hod, who brought the air force to the pinnacle of its
achievements in its finest hour during the Six Day War.
If one can point to a failure of the political, military and Intelligence
systems which drove the State of Israel, against its wishes, into the June
1967 war, it was most clearly manifested on 7 April. The IDF took a step
which was neither discussed nor approved by the political echelon, nor
were its implications analysed accurately either before the event or subse-
quently. The Intelligence Branch was fixated on its conviction that nothing
had changed, and neither the Soviet response nor Nasser’s moves were
anticipated or evaluated correctly.
Rabin: ‘The confrontation theory has received

strong corroboration’
As a result of the clash with the Syrians on 7 April, euphoria reigned in the
General Staff, but while the objective of the action had been to end terror-
ist attacks stemming from Syria, the immediate Syrian response was defi-
ance. By 9 April sabotage squads had already been dispatched to
Margaliyot and Maayan Barukh.18
The Chief of the Intelligence Branch briefed his colleagues on the reac-
tions of the Arab world. Egypt had raised the military alert level, in
particularly in aerial defence units, but this move was no more than a
routine cautious measure. The Egyptian Prime Minister Sidki Suleiman
and a high-level Egyptian air force delegation were about to leave for
Damascus. Yariv emphasized the moderation of the Egyptian reaction. The
Egyptians had sent congratulations to the Syrian army and people for their
courageous stand, and this, according to Yariv, was meant to imply that if
the Syrians had put up a good show, there was no need to come to their
aid. In the international arena, Yariv noted the minor-key Soviet reaction,
possibly due to embarrassment at the downing of the Migs, and the satis-
fied response of the West.19 He thought that the Syrians and Egyptians
possibly believed that the blow inflicted by the IDF was only the begin-
ning, and that a larger scale onslaught should be expected. This could
explain the delegation to Syria.20
The Chief of Staff summed up the situation. It would be a good thing, he
said, if the Syrians gained the impression ‘that this is not the end, but only a
stage . . . although I know that there are several Jews who are not happy at
the idea’, he added, hinting at the views held by several ministers. The main
significance of the action, he believed, was in the changing of the rules of the
game so far as the IAF was concerned. The rule that aircraft were only
employed in response to the shelling of settlements had been broken this
time. No longer would the Syrians be able to exploit the rules to their advant-
104 Conflagration
age, said the Chief of Staff. ‘They must be kept worried and not know what
our rules are. . . . It’s none of their business when and why we employ the air
force.’ Rabin attributed great significance to the fact that the IAF had oper-
ated openly above Damascus, thereby revealing to one and all the impotence
of the Syrian army and its inferiority in comparison to the IDF.
But above all, he believed, it had been important to prove to the polit-
ical echelon that it was possible to act against Syria without activating the
Egyptian–Syrian pact. He declared:
‘I think that this action will gain us, as far as the consciousness of all
sorts of [ministers] is concerned, the conviction that it is possible to

act against the Syrians. Anyone who needed proof of this, and there
were quite a few who did, have got it now.’
For the future, it was essential to adopt a tougher line with the Syrians,
extend the buffer fire, increase the display of strength in the demilitarized
areas, and initiate frontal clashes in order to put at end to terror. On this
point, Rabin added: ‘For me the confrontation theory has received strong
corroboration.’21
Dayan: ‘Have you gone crazy? You’re leading the

country into war!’
The aerial onslaught on Syria was accepted by the Israeli public with great
satisfaction and even enthusiasm. But not everyone shared in the euphoria,
and there were those who were apprehensive at the worsening of the secur-
ity situation. The most stringent critic was the former Chief of Staff,
Knesset member Moshe Dayan, who angrily asked the Operations Chief
Ezer Weizman: ‘Have you gone crazy? You’re leading the country into
war!’22 Several weeks later, when Nasser moved his forces into Sinai in
order to foil a planned Israeli attack on Syria, or so he claimed, the criti-
cism resurfaced with greater force in political circles in Israel.
At the 11 April meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security, the
Chief of Staff recommended, in accordance with his customary approach,
that the success be exploited in order to establish additional facts in the
demilitarized areas. He proposed that work commence on the controver-
sial Khirbet Kara lands and his proposal was accepted. In reaction, Minis-
ter of Health Yisrael Barzilai of Mapam demanded an urgent meeting of
the government plenum, which was in fact convened. Barzilai was troubled
at the possibility ‘of considerable escalation, both embroilment in a minor
war and international complications’. The government did in fact decide,
against Rabin’s recommendation, not to cultivate the Khirbet Kara land
for the time being and to discuss policy with regard to employment of the
air force on another occasion.23
Conflagration 105
The Intelligence evaluation is unchanged: Egypt

will not become involved
The conviction of the Intelligence Branch with regard to Egypt’s intentions
did not waver even in light of the senior-level military-political dialogue
between Egypt and Syria in the wake of the 7 April events. Israeli Intelli-
gence had ‘authentic’ information on the talks in Damascus with the
Commander of the Egyptian air force General Sidki and Prime Minister
Sidki Suleiman. The Syrians claimed that the Israeli operation had been
only the first stage, and the next would be an attack on the town of
Kuneitra on the Golan Heights with the aid of ‘imperialism’. However,

they rejected the Egyptian offer to station two Egyptian fighter squadrons
on Syrian soil under Egyptian command and to undertake responsibility
for the entire aerial arena. Both the commander of the Egyptian air force
and the Egyptian premier made it abundantly clear that Egypt would inter-
vene ‘only in the event of a total Israel onslaught’24 against Syria. The
Deputy Chief of Intelligence David Carmon, declared: ‘The basic tenet in
Egypt today is not to become involved in a war with Israel.’25
Towards the end of April and at the beginning of May, incidents of
terror increased.26 On 7 May the Ministerial Committee on Security
decided that if Syria did not cease its attacks and its support for hostile
action, the IDF would launch a limited reprisal attack. The political
echelon, therefore, had now accepted the army’s stand even if only par-
tially: a limited operation, but no ‘smashing blow’ or ‘frontal clash’.27
The efforts of General Odd Bull to renew the Israel–Syria talks at the
Armistice Commission reached an impasse at the beginning of May. Bull
announced that he no longer saw any possibility of convening the Com-
mission.28 A military clash between Israel and Syria now appeared
inevitable.
In light of the rising tension, the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee met on 9 May during the parliamentary recess for an extra-
ordinary meeting attended by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
and the Chief of Staff. There was unanimity of opinion on this occasion
between the government and the opposition that it was essential to take
action against Syria. Rabin surveyed the increase in sabotage incidents
since 7 April.29 Elimelech Rimalt of the Gahal-Liberal Party demanded an
‘impressive’ military action like that of 7 April. His colleague, Haim
Landau (Gahal-Herut), warned that without a deterrent response the situ-
ation would deteriorate into classic guerrilla warfare which would also
recruit ‘local elements [i.e. the Israeli Arab minority]’. Even Moshe Dayan,
who in the past had displayed restraint and underplayed the severity of the
hostile action,30 now took a firm stand and proposed occupying the demili-
tarized areas. Only Yaakov Hazan of Mapam expressed reservations and
suggested that the government and the military first formulate their stand
106 Conflagration
and present it to the Committee. Eshkol summed up the general mood:

‘We all admit that the day of retribution must arrive.’31 It is only against
this background that one can understand the evolvement of the crisis of
mid-May 1967. The Soviet, Egyptian and Syrian Intelligence services had
no difficulty pin-pointing Israel’s intention to act against Syria in the near
future. Moscow cautioned, Cairo responded and the situation went rapidly
downhill.
Interim summary
In spring 1967 the State of Israel was on the brink of war without having
wanted it. Its security policy, which was aimed at deterrence and the pre-
vention of war, had produced the opposite effect, and the events described
above explain how this came about.
In the period under discussion Israel could see no way of solving the
conflict with the Arab world. Israel’s objective in this period was to main-
tain the status quo. The proclaimed aim of the Arabs, on the other hand,
was to alter it. Israel chose to defend the status quo by maintaining the
weapons balance and fostering deterrent military capability, and to this
end also made every effort to develop nuclear capacity. For the decade
after the Sinai Campaign, Israel succeeded as regards the status quo, in
part because this aim was in tune with the strategy of Nasser who was
anxious to postpone the confrontation with Israel. The problem was that
the Arab world was not united behind this strategy, and Syria and the
Palestinians took steps to undermine the status quo. Israel’s reactions to
their activities helped to shatter it.
Did Israel have any other choice? As noted above, there was no promis-
ing diplomatic alternative, but there may have been a military alternative.
The three security problems which aggravated the conflict in this period
were the diversion of the Jordan sources, the dispute over the demilitarized
areas and terrorist activity. The measures employed to deal with the diver-
sion problem were low-key, focused and highly effective. In contrast,
Israel’s stand on the demilitarized zones was not imperative because this
was not a vital issue; greater flexibility on Israel’s part could have lowered
the level of friction on the border.
The main problem, however, was Israel’s conduct with regard to terror-
ist activity. Here in particular we can observe the tension between the
defensive and offensive doctrines. Eshkol tried to find the middle way
through his strategy of ‘the open notebook’ but it missed the mark and led
to escalation. The alternative which was never tried, and which could
perhaps have prevented escalation, was acceptance of the fact that there
could be no rapid and total solution to this problem, and that Israel would
have to live with it for some time and hence should reduce it to tolerable
dimensions. In hindsight, a better path to avoid escalation and war could
Conflagration 107
have been a combination of increased investment in sighting and preven-

tion device, border systems and active defence measures, together with
low-key, localized and continuous offensive action. The problem was that
the political echelon denied the IDF permission to launch offensive retalia-
tion until Eshkol’s ‘notebook’ was full, and only then did it permit a large
retaliatory action (such as on 13 November 1966 or 7 April 1967) which
generated escalation.
Israel did not follow the alternative path, because the government was
fixated on the defensive approach while the military were focused on
offensive doctrine. The ministers, for the most part, had no stomach for
offensive action. The General Staff, on the other hand, abhorred the idea
of defensive measures alone and advocated a drastic solution similar to the
Sinai Campaign.
In the absence of a coherent approach and agreement between the eche-
lons on ways of combating terrorism, and because of the ineffective civil
control of the army and the rigid Intelligence conception, the IDF often
acted in ways which promoted escalation, and were at odds with the
supreme objective of the security policy: prevention of war.
Chapter 11
The trigger
In early summer – suddenly, war! Although for three weeks before the out-
break of hostilities the atmosphere had been growing increasingly
ominous, the war itself was totally unexpected. Neither side had planned it
for that particular time and none of those caught up in it had wanted it.
And yet, as events occurred in rapid succession and at a dizzying pace, all
the participants were swept helplessly into the vortex.
Conspiracy?
Was the situation the outcome of a conspiracy, a plot concocted by the
Kremlin, the CIA, the Mossad or the IDF General Staff, as some
researchers claim?1 Or was the entire scenario dictated from the outset by
covert considerations connected to the nuclear sphere?2
The known facts and the extant documentation do not appear to
support a conspiracy theory, nor does the nuclear theory have a solid
factual basis. Moreover, the numerous documents available to me, relating
to the most senior levels of the military and political echelons, rebut the
charge of a deliberate Israeli scheme to kindle the flames of war. On the
contrary, the stunned shock and confusion displayed by some of the major
figures both in the government and the army attest clearly the absence of
such a plot.
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Six Day War, a fascinating
meeting was convened at Roslyn, Virginia. It brought together people –
from the United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and
the United Nations – who played active and major roles in the events
which led to war, together with prominent scholars in various related
fields. The participants gave first-person testimony, compared various
viewpoints and cross-checked sources. Among other subjects, the conflict-
ing conspiracy theories were discussed, and no convincing evidence was
revealed.3
Conspiracy theories are naturally intriguing and fire the imagination.
Nonetheless, it is more feasible to postulate that what occurred was a
The trigger 109
chain of miscalculations on the part of all those involved: Egypt, Syria,

Jordan, the Palestinians, the Soviet Union, the United States and the UN,
and of course – Israel. If each and every one of these players had acted dif-
ferently at the various stages, the chain reaction might have been inter-
rupted and war prevented.4
On one issue, in any event, there is no controversy: the immediate crisis
which kindled the flames began with a spurious Soviet report to Egypt to
the effect that Israel was ‘concentrating a large force’ on the Syrian border
in preparation for an imminent attack on Syria. The Soviet motive has
never been satisfactorily clarified.5
Since the extensive literature on the origins of the Six Day War discusses
the role of the various above-mentioned factors in great detail, it will not be
dealt with here. But, to the best of our knowledge, none of them have exam-
ined whether an additional important country in the region, which seemed
to have been uninvolved, played any part in activating the process which led
to war. The country to which I am referring is Iran.6
The Iranian–Israeli connection

The close cooperation between Israel and Iran was reflected in visits to
Iran by senior Israeli political figures and the army. The two countries
maintained strong and intimate clandestine ties in the Intelligence sphere,
in sharp contrast to the official diplomatic sphere, where relations were
cool and reserved.
At the end of 1966 the Iranian Premier Abbas Hoveyda and Chief of
Staff General Baharam Aryana visited Israel. Aryana invited Yitzhak
Rabin to pay a return visit to his country. Rabin arrived in Teheran on 14
April 1967 accompanied by his wife Leah and his bureau chief, Lt. Col.
Rafi Efrat, and two days later had an audience with the Shah. He also
visited Persepolis, Shiraz and Isfahan. The meetings were coordinated by
the IDF attachéin Teheran, Colonel Yaakov Nimrodi. 7
Rabin’s secret visit to Iran took place only four weeks before the out-
break of the crisis which led to the Six Day War. Rabin met with the
senior military, toured military installations and held talks with leaders,
including Hoveyda and the Shah. These talks were of a strategic nature,
and on his return he reported to the General Staff forum.8 It may be
assumed that he also reported to Eshkol.
Rabin pointed out Israel’s interests: first and foremost the supply of oil;
85 per cent of Israel’s oil supplies came from Iran. Negotiations were being
held at the time on the expansion of the oil pipeline from Eilat to
Ashkelon, so that Persian oil could be exported through Israeli ports
without having to pass through the Suez Canal. Iran was also a large
potential market for Israeli industry and agriculture and a partner for joint
economic enterprises. And finally – and this was the crux of the matter so
110 The trigger
far as Rabin was concerned – there were security and political interests.
Since Iran was ‘a Middle Eastern Moslem country with a strong anti-
Nasserist stance . . . by virtue of this shared anti-Nasserist interest, there is
a basis for identity and for all kinds of joint enterprises between the two
countries’.
According to Rabin, he had presented the following thesis in his talks
with the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and the Shah:
‘There is a bad troika in the Middle East, which is anxious to alter the
status quo and is not content with the present situation. It is headed
by Nasser’s Egypt – and its other branches are Syria and Iraq. It is in
the interest of both our countries to deal with this troika. The method
must be containment of Nasser in the southern Arab peninsula [i.e.
Yemen] (so as to create the conditions for bringing him down), the
neutralization of Iraq and a strike against the Syrians.’
Rabin found the Iranians to be seriously concerned by Nasser’s moves in

the southern Arab peninsula. They regarded themselves as partners with
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in an axis aimed at blocking the spread of
Nasserism towards the Persian Gulf. The Iranians acknowledged the
shared interests with Israel, Rabin said, but demanded categorically that
Israel play its part by pinning Nasser’s forces to the Israeli border. ‘That is
their interest in us,’ Rabin explained to the generals, ‘and a deal which is
not based on interests – is not serious.’ He summed up the Iranian
demands as follows:
‘And where are you?! You want them [the Egyptians] to clash with us
while you stand aside and lick your fingers? You are the ones who can
hold them down and threaten them; you can restrict Nasser’s freedom
of action in the southern Arab peninsula [and you are not doing it].’
In contrast to their fear of Egypt, the Iranians were not concerned about
Iraq. They believed that Aref’s regime was weak, and that the great major-
ity of Iraqis did not sympathize with Nasser. The Shah, Rabin said, ‘knows
how to play’ the Kurdish card in order to exert pressure on Iraq and neu-
tralize it. On the other hand, the Syrian regime ‘is abhorred’ by the Irani-
ans. They were ‘delighted’ at the Syrian debacle on 7 April, and hoped that
the skirmishes between Israel and Syria would continue, forcing Egypt to
intervene, thereby easing the pressure in southern Arabia. This was the
fervent hope of the Iranians ‘which they would like more than anything’. If
Egypt did not rush to Syria’s aid against Israel, Nasser’s prestige would be
damaged, and this too would gratify the Iranians. Rabin’s hosts ‘almost all
wondered how we see the significance of the Egyptian–Syrian [defence]
pact and under what conditions Egypt will come to Syria’s aid’.
The trigger 111
Rabin concluded that there was no prospect of the Iranians dispatching

military units to southern Arabia. They were not willing to take such
action nor was their army prepared for it. The Shah and the Premier told
Rabin: ‘Our problem is that we prepared for a war [against the Soviet
Union] which we did not fight, and found ourselves unprepared for the
problems confronting us . . . we have many partners against the Russians,
but that should not be the main focus of our military preparations. Today
we are not ready for a war against Nasser.’ They told Rabin that the
Saudis also lacked an effective military response to Nasser, and the
bombing of the Saudi town of Najran by the Egyptians had deterred King
Feisal, who had discovered that the British and Americans would not
hurry to his aid. Iran and Saudi Arabia were building up military capabil-
ity so that, within three or four years, they would no longer have to rely
on the United States, which had disappointed them.
Rabin reminded the IDF generals of the various export deals between
Israel and Iran, including the defence industries, and noted that the Irani-
ans ‘have faith in us like in God. It’s incredible.’ In the political sphere,
Iran ‘is the axis for contacts with the Arab [and] Moslem states’, even
though ‘the hatred of Arabs is extraordinary’ there. Iran, he added, ‘is not
a particularly enlightened country according to our concepts, but such is
the Middle East, and we have to examine the matter from the aspect of
interests, and less from other aspects.’
The visit to Iran, the meetings with the Shah and political and military
leaders in Teheran, evidently left a strong impression on Yitzhak Rabin.
During his visit he understood even more clearly that Israel’s economic,
political and strategic interests required the consolidation of ties with this
large Muslim country. He did not say explicitly that Israel should respond
to the Iranian demand to ‘pin down’ Nasser’s forces and lure his army to
Sinai, but neither did he state the reverse. He merely said: ‘That is their
interest in us, and a deal which is not built on interests is not serious’, and
left it to his audience to interpret his meaning. At the same time, his
remarks suggest that the Iranian expectations called for some response if
Israel wanted to maintain and strengthen the strategic connection between
the two countries.
Only a month after Rabin’s visit to Iran, his hosts’ great wish was ful-
filled: Israel’s threats to inflict another blow on Syria forced Nasser to
honour his commitment under the defence pact, move his army into Sinai
and even transfer units from Yemen to the Israeli border. The ensuing mili-
tary flare-up ended Nasser’s five-year Yemenite escapade, which was
regarded by the Gulf States as a far-reaching strategic threat. Israel’s
victory in the Six Day War was also the victory of the two monarchs, Reza
Pahlevi and Feisal, owners of the oil reserves on the Gulf coast. Rabin had
lived up in full to the expectations of his Iranian hosts.
The details of Rabin’s visit to Iran in April 1967 may gratify the
112 The trigger
advocates of conspiracy theories, who can now argue that the key to the
crisis which led to war lies therein. They can also interpret Israel’s threats
against Syria (see below) on the eve of Israeli Independence Day not as
routine pronouncements characteristic of this period, but as deliberate
moves. Perhaps the ‘off-the-record’ briefing of foreign correspondents by
the Chief of Intelligence Aharon Yariv on 11 May (see below) was
intended to exert pressure on Nasser (at which it succeeded).
One can also find additional confirmation of the hypothesis that Rabin
merely wanted to repay his courteous hosts, on behalf of their joint inter-
ests and in order to reinforce their unwritten strategic alliance, and, unin-
tentionally, ‘found himself at war’. In the initial stages of Egypt’s

involvement in Yemen in 1963, Rabin, then still Deputy Chief of Staff, in
an appearance before Prime Minister and Minister of Defence David Ben-
Gurion, Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister Golda Meir
at the General Staff forum, voiced his discontent at the fact that the IDF
was not forcing the Egyptian army to remain in Sinai. He said then: ‘I
must admit that the present situation whereby Egypt can dispatch nine to
ten brigades 1,000 miles from Egypt – it’s as if we were to dispatch forces
to Rome – while Israel is not a threat [causing him to] pin down his force.
I don’t feel good about that, I am even ashamed of it.’ He had a concrete
proposal to offer: to pin down Egyptian forces in Sinai ‘not by action’ but
‘by threats’, in order to foil a possible Nasserite victory in Yemen and to
weaken Nasser’s standing.9
The Iranians, therefore, did not have to work hard in April 1967 in
order to persuade Rabin of the need to ‘pin down’ Nasser’s force. They
were preaching to the converted. All that was needed now was for him to
implement the scheme ‘by threats’. Syria’s conduct and the
Egyptian–Syrian pact provided the pretext. His statement in September
1966 about the regime in Damascus, which, as noted above, won him a
reprimand from Eshkol, was proof that, in word if not in deed he allowed
himself to go beyond the permitted bounds as a military man and beyond
what was acceptable to the government. This assumption may perhaps
explain Rabin’s remorseful remark to the Head of Operations, Ezer
Weizman, at a time of crisis (see below): ‘I complicated things for Israel.’
The facts, as we know them, disprove the theory of an Israeli ‘conspir-
acy’. Moreover, they offer no evidence to support the theory that Rabin, in
the few days between his return from Teheran and the outbreak of the
crisis, acted in any way under Iranian inspiration. The sequence of events,
where Israel was concerned, may be explained without recourse to con-
spiracy theories. Rabin’s character and patterns of behaviour were such
that he would not have taken a provocative step against Egypt without the
approval of the political echelon. It is inconceivable that the Ministerial
Committee on Security would have sanctioned such a move. Israel’s fear of
an attack on Dimona and the closing of the Straits undoubtedly carried
The trigger 113
weight against such a move. Israel derived satisfaction from the Egyptian
entanglement in Yemen (no longer fearing that Nasser might succeed in
occupying the entire Persian Gulf area). There were even those who
believed that Nasser was seeking a way of extricating himself from Yemen
without losing face10 and that it would be a foolish mistake on Israel’s part
to provide him with the excuse. The luring of Egyptian forces into Sinai
was liable to create problems for Israel and hamper its freedom of action
against Syria. And, in general, the above-mentioned declarations about
‘pinning down’ Egyptian forces in Sinai were too few and far between to
enable one to draw far-reaching conclusions. This was not Rabin’s ‘line’,
and perusal of the documents reveals no discussion of or additional refer-

ence to this issue.
Israel did not want war. The aim of its security policy was to avoid war
through deterrence and to maintain as calm a status quo as possible. The
ongoing terrorist activity and the incidents on the Syrian border called for
solution, but, as noted above, the intention was to inflict a blow on Syria
without bringing in Egypt and subsequently fighting on two fronts. The
reverse was true: in order to strike at the Syrians, Israel required calm on
the Egyptian border and the deployment of the Egyptian forces in Yemen
rather than Sinai. Moreover, in principle, in analysing conspiratorial theo-
ries, one should perhaps recall the Ockams Razor principle, namely that
the best explanation for any puzzle or phenomenon is almost always the
one involving the least complexity. I have seen fit, however, to raise the
theoretical possibility which could be deduced from the few statements
mentioned above, if only in order to refute it.
The Iranian–Soviet connection

Nonetheless, Rabin’s remarks offer a broad hint which can help explain
the conduct of the Soviets rather than the Israelis in precipitating the crisis.
The prevailing view since 1967 has been that the warning dispatched to
Egypt by the Soviet Union regarding a concentration of Israeli forces and
an imminent Israeli attack on Syria stemmed from the Kremlin’s anxiety
about the future of the Damascus regime. This assumption has a sound
logical basis: the events of 7 April severely damaged the prestige of the
Syrian military establishment and undermined its stability. Shortly after-
wards the Baath regime was shaken by the publication of an atheistic
article in the army journal Jaish el-Shaab which sparked off widespread
riots in Syria.11 On 21 April a coup took place in Athens which toppled the
socialist regime. On 25 April a conference of communist parties was con-
vened at Karlovi Vari in Czechoslovakia to discuss the impact of a world
‘imperialist’ attack, headed by the CIA, against the ‘progressive’ regimes.
On 21 and 25 April a harshly worded protest was conveyed to the Israeli
ambassador in Moscow.12 It was no secret that in Israel the prevailing
114 The trigger
conviction – not only among the General Staff – was that a strike against
Syria was inevitable because terror attacks were continuing, and that the
goal should be the downfall of the Syrian regime. Soviet Intelligence
sources must have been aware of this fact, particularly after Israel’s leaders
uttered threats and declarations against Syria on the eve of Israeli
Independence Day, and the Chief of Intelligence, in a briefing for foreign
attachés, referred explicitly to a wide-scale Israeli strike against Syria (see
below). Thus, in mid-May 1967, the Soviets had good reason to believe
that if they wanted to save the Damacus regime, their protég,é they needed
to act swiftly. They therefore called on Nasser to exert pressure on Israel
from the south and thereby prevent Israel from operating in the north.
This is the logical and acceptable explanation for the conduct of the Soviet
Union, which did not envisage that events would spin out of control and
deteriorate into war. While it is apparently correct, it is not necessarily the
sole explanation. It transpires that the Soviet Union apparently had an
additional, hitherto unknown motive, which is in fact linked to its rela-
tions with Iran.
In March 1967, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a sur-
prise visit to Cairo, the reason for which was not evident at the time. All
the Israeli Chief of Intelligence could say was that it was connected mainly
to the southern Yemen issue,13 and that Gromyko’s message to Nasser
was: ‘Go slow!’14 On the agenda were not only the civil war in Yemen,
which was then dying down, but also, and mainly, Britain’s anticipated
departure from Aden at the beginning of 1968 and the establishment of
the shaky federation of South Yemen, which FLOSY, the Marxist Front
for the Liberation of South Yemen, was threatening to take over, with
Nasser’s backing. The Gulf States feared the entry of Egyptian forces into
Aden and the Federation as a vitally important strategic stronghold and a
launching pad for Egyptian hegemony over the region.
The question arises: What was the underlying reason for the Soviet initi-
ative aimed at restraining Egyptian involvement in southern Yemen and
curbing Nasser’s ambitions, at a time when the British were due to with-
draw from Aden and the strategic stronghold of southern Yemen was
about to fall into Nasser’s hands like a ripe fruit? The answer may lie in
what Rabin was told in Teheran by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlevi.
Rabin reported their conversation as follows:
‘On the Russian question, the Shah took an unusual step which sur-
prised even the Americans. He signed extensive commercial agree-
ments with them [with the Russians] for the sale of oil, gas, the
construction of large Russian factories as well as commercial agree-
ments. He says the following: I want to face the Russians with a
dilemma concerning their relations with me as against their relations
with Nasser – what do they have to gain from Nasser and what do
The trigger 115
they gain from me, and the calculation in the struggle between me and
Nasser in Russian eyes will be – what reward will they receive from
relations with us and what from their relations with the Egyptians?’15
The obvious conclusion is that the Shah, whose main concern was the pos-
sible expansion of Nasserism into the Gulf States, had decided that he
could not rely on the United States, which was bogged down in the
Vietnam mud, to check the Egyptian President’s dangerous aspirations. He
therefore turned to the Soviet Union, to the surprise and undoubtedly the
displeasure of the Americans, and held out the offer of considerable eco-
nomic benefits. His intention was to prove to the Soviets that their interest
in Iran was as weighty as their interest in Egypt. In return he demanded
that Nasser be stopped. The same consideration which prompted the Irani-
ans to exert pressure on Rabin to pin Egyptian forces to Sinai in order to
subvert Egypt’s efforts in southern Yemen, impelled them to bind the
Soviet Union to Iran with bonds of strong interests in order to curb
Nasser. There are even indications that, during his surprise visit to Cairo,
Gromyko discussed the evacuation of the UN Emergency Force from Sinai
and the transfer of Egyptian forces from Yemen to Sinai.16
According to this view of events, it transpires that the Soviets had an
additional strong motive which even justified use of disinformation in
order to ‘lure’ Nasser out of southern Arabia and direct him against Israel.
This is not to suggest that the Soviets deliberately fomented war. There can
be little doubt that this was not their intention. However, if this interpreta-
tion is valid, it can cast new light on the actions of the Soviet Union which
ignited the crisis.
Israel’s threats
The Soviet message to Egypt referred to deployment of at least eleven
brigades, a totally spurious and even absurd figure.17 Almost certainly, the
Soviets were aware that the information was false. A short tour of the
Galilee panhandle would have sufficed in order to ascertain the facts.
What led them to provide such blatantly false information? Was it for an
‘Iranian reason’ or out of sincere concern for the Damascus regime, or pos-
sibly for both reasons?
What is clear is that the Soviets acted in immediate response to the pro-
nouncements by senior Israeli military and political leaders. They may
have wanted at one and the same time to prevent Israel from attacking
Syria and to sabotage the Egyptian effort in southern Arabia in order
to appease the Iranians. To this end they were ready to feed Nasser
exaggerated and implausible information. On the other hand, as
noted above, there is no evidence that the USSR wanted war, and their
conduct in the course of the crisis apparently indicates an attempt to
116 The trigger
prevent it. The Soviets were well aware of their strategic inferiority in the
Mediterranean arena due to the permanent presence of the US Sixth Fleet,
and hence were reluctant to intervene, since such a move could have led to
a Superpower confrontation.18
What then was the nature of the Israeli declarations which disturbed the
Soviets, or alternatively, provided them with the pretext to alert Nasser?
From the Israeli press in the spring of 1967 we learn that the Syrian
leadership was panic-stricken at what it saw as an imperialist plot to bring
down the Baath regime in Damascus, a plot which would culminate in an
Israeli assault liable to occur at any moment. Before the regime had recov-
ered from the blow it had suffered on 7 April, severe riots broke out, insti-
gated by the Muslim Brothers (after the publication of an anti-religious
attack in the army magazine on 25 April), and the ferment continued until
the mid-May crisis broke out.19 ‘The situation in Syria is on the verge of
explosion’, cried the banner headlines.20 Nor was Syria better off in the
political arena. An Israeli diplomatic campaign against Syria proved unex-
pectedly successful. On 9 May Israel dispatched a missive to the UN
Secretary General and the Security Council, listing the terror incidents
originating in Syria or inspired by that country. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs conveyed a message to the members of the Security Council to the
effect that Israel could no longer refrain from action if the sabotage con-
tinued. On 10 May Eshkol met with General Bull and cautioned that the
Israeli government would regard itself as free to act against Syria in self-
defence. The Israeli campaign was interpreted, and rightly so, as prepara-
tion for the military strike against Syria. In a preventive move, the UN
Secretary General issued a statement on 11 May condemning Fatah activ-
ities and demanding that the governments take every possible step to end
them.21
The most striking fact is that, despite the internal situation in Syria, the
blow the regime had suffered on 7 April and the fear of a wide-scale Israeli
action, the Damascus leadership did not put a stop to forays against Israel,
and these even became more frequent.22 For the Baath regime, defiance
was a basic tenet and support for the ‘popular struggle’ a major principle.
Representatives of the Security Council member states were summoned on
13 May to the Syrian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Makhous, who asserted
that Syria was not responsible for fidaiyyun activity. They were warned
that Israel was planning ‘aggression on a wide scale’ against Syria, and
that in such an event, the Egyptian–Syrian defence pact would be put into
motion.23
If the impact of the Israeli air force operation on 7 April had not suf-
ficed, the ensuing provocative Israeli declarations24 and diplomatic cam-
paign, which was seen to be preparing the ground for a military action,
and the Independence Day declarations of Israeli political and military
leaders added fuel to the fire. There was certainly no deliberate plan to
The trigger 117
heighten the tension, but in the prevailing strained atmosphere, these dec-
larations seemed to result from a dearth of wisdom and an excess of rash-
ness, which was realized too late.25
The Israeli press traditionally publishes Independence Day interviews
with the country’s leaders, and it is the latter’s habit of issuing headline-
catching statements. Most of the statement this time were relatively
routine. Eshkol declared: ‘Quiet cannot prevail on only one side of the
border’;26 ‘If there is no escape, we will take action against the hubs of
terror and those who encourage it’;27 ‘If the Arab states try to stir up our
border – their own border will be stirred up’.28 However, it was an incau-
tious statement by Eshkol at a party meeting which caught the headlines:

‘We may be forced to adopt measures no less serious than those adopted
on 7 April.’29
It seems, however, that the most extreme declarations came from the
military, apparently without authorization. The Chief of Staff was saying
nothing new when he declared that terrorist action could not be sup-
pressed by defensive measures,30 although his statement was not compati-
ble with Eshkol’s attitude. However, its implications were serious because
he was reiterating an earlier statement (in an interview in the [Jewish] New
Year issue of Bamahaneh), for which he had been reprimanded by Eshkol.
Again he said that action such as was taken against Jordan and Lebanon
was suited to countries which were not interested in encouraging terror.
‘In Syria, there is a different problem because it is the regime that activates
the terrorists. Hence, an operation against Syria has a different objective to
operations against Jordan and Lebanon.’31 In other words, quite explicitly
and despite the reprimand he had received, Rabin was again advocating
the overthrow of the Damascus regime.
Even more explicit was Chief of Intelligence Yariv, in his off-the-record
briefing of foreign journalists and military attachés on 11 May. UPI
reported on the following day that a senior Israeli source had claimed that
‘Israel will take limited military action with the aim of overthrowing the
military regime in Damascus, if Syrian terrorists continued to enter Israel
for terror purposes. Military observers said that such an attack would not
reach the proportions of general warfare but would teach the Syrian
Government a lesson.’ Elsewhere there is a partial direct quotation from
the recording of the briefing: ‘I can state that we are obliged to use force in
order to compel the Egyptians to persuade the Syrians that it is not worth-
while [to permit the Palestinians to cross the border for terror purposes]
. . . I believe that the only secure answer to the problem is a military opera-
tion on a large decisive scale.’ In reply to a question as to what such an
operation would entail, the Chief of Intelligence said that ‘there are
various alternatives ranging from counter-guerrilla action to a widescale
invasion of Syria and occupation of Damascus’. In a more detailed version,
where the remarks are attributed to the ‘army spokesman’, it is stated that
118 The trigger
Israel must act so as to make the Syrians understand that they are in
danger of ‘an immediate general military confrontation’ with Israel.32
It is interesting that the Egyptians attributed to Rabin and Eshkol an
explicit threat to invade Damascus and overthrow the regime.33 I have
found no evidence of this and they may have misunderstood, attributing
Yariv’s statement that ‘there are alternatives ranging from counter-
guerrilla action to a widescale invasion of Syria and occupation of Damas-
cus’ to Rabin. Yariv was thinking of something ‘in between’, as United
Press reported. It is not impossible that the Soviets, fearing that it was the
intention of ‘military circles’ in Israel to strike at Syria, conveyed an edited
version of Yariv’s remarks to the Egyptians, attributing them to Rabin, in

order to spur Nasser to action. The Soviets also reported, as noted above,
that Israel was concentrating between eleven and thirteen brigades near the
Syrian border. Thus all the Soviet reports were disinformation for a
specific purpose: to deter Israel from striking at Syria.34
Even more interesting is the fact that the Egyptians checked immedi-
ately and discovered that the information given by the Soviets was false.
Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi left for Syria on 14 May
by order of Deputy President Abdel Hakim Amer to verify the informa-
tion. Fawzi toured the border area, conducted observations, examined
aerial photographs, and found no evidence to support the information. His
visit was brief, only twenty-four hours, but his report arrived too late,
after the wheels had begun to turn.35
The question is whether the pronouncements by the military were
authorized by and coordinated with the political echelon. Rabin’s remarks
in an interview to Lamerhav were certainly not approved by Eshkol, who
had already reprimanded him for a similar statement.36 Yariv’s briefing of
foreign journalists may have been directed at Syria as a final warning. If he
did indeed hint at the intention to overthrow the Syrian regime, as UPI
reported, then he too was exceeding his authority.
The profusion of anti-Syrian declarations and threats prior to Independ-
ence Day may have added fuel to the blaze, but the fire had already been lit,
the terrorist activity under Syrian auspices was continuing and the feeling in
Israel was that military action against Syria was imminent.37 While the
flood of threats possibly acted as the catalyst and determined the timing of
the crisis, under the circumstances, it had been due to erupt anyway. In any
event it is clear that the Soviet assessment from mid-May 1967 that Israel
was about to strike at Syria was correct and well founded, and was not
merely based on the public threats issued by Eshkol, Rabin and Yariv.38
The ‘mini-parade’ in Jerusalem

The story of the ‘mini-parade’ in Jerusalem on Israel’s nineteenth
Independence Day (15 May 1967) deserves to be mentioned, although it is
The trigger 119
connected only tenuously to the events which led to war. Since the early
years of statehood, a military parade had been the central happening on
Independence Day, and it was held from time to time in different cities. To
hold it in Jerusalem was problematic because the armistice agreement with
Jordan restricted the size of the military forces and prohibited entry of
certain types of weapons into the city, including aircraft and armoured
military vehicles. The last parade had been held in Jerusalem in 1961
under Ben-Gurion’s premiership, in contravention of the armistice agree-
ment (Israel claimed that Jordan too had contravened the agreement by
denying the Israelis free access to the Holy Places in the Old City, regular
use of the institutions on Mount Scopus and passage along the Latrun
road). At the time there were international objections to holding a parade
in Jerusalem, reflected in Security Council resolution No. 162. Now, six
years later, the atmosphere was fraught with tension, and the internal
political mood had changed. It had long since been Jerusalem’s ‘turn’ to
host the parade, and in 1965 the government had even decided to allow
the Chief of Staff to choose: a small-scale parade in Jerusalem under the
restrictions of the armistice agreement, or a full parade in Tel Aviv. At the
time, Rabin chose the latter.39
In late 1966 the government decided to hold the next parade in
Jerusalem and to observe the armistice agreement restrictions. The IDF
made preparations accordingly, but the government was inundated with
external and internal pressures. The United States, Britain, France and
other countries, as well as the UN Secretary General, urged Israel not to
hold the parade in Jerusalem. When the government did not acquiesce, the
entire diplomatic corps, with the exception of several military attachés,
boycotted the parade.40 On the domestic front the government was fiercely
criticized, and the most furious onslaught came from Ben-Gurion, who
even returned his invitation to the parade. He claimed that the government
was undermining the standing of the capital and that a ‘feeble and
pathetic’ parade was ‘an insult to Jerusalem . . . I don’t care what the
Superpowers say and whether or not ambassadors will come. The parade
is held so that the nation and the neighbouring countries can see the might
of the IDF.’41 From the moment the government decided on Jerusalem, it
was unable to retreat even in the face of heavy international pressure.
However, the modest scope of the parade attested to the government’s
cautious approach and reluctance to heighten the tension. Under the con-
ditions prevailing in April 1967, this was a balanced and feasible decision,
and Ben-Gurion’s criticism was unfair. In fact, he contradicted himself
several days later when he accused the Eshkol government of irresponsible
escalation of the security situation.
A final relevant point on this issue: at the dress rehearsal of the public
rally at the Hebrew University stadium on Independence Day eve (an event
introduced two years previously in order to ‘compensate’ the Jerusalemites
120 The trigger
for being deprived of the parade), the programme included recitation of a

verse from a poem by the poet Natan Alterman: ‘Arabia, Arabia, ponder
your path in good time!/The thread is growing tauter, growing tauter/. . .
Awake from your fanciful dreams/Perhaps this is the final hour!’ Someone
in the audience commented that the text sounded excessively threatening
and it was replaced at the event itself by another verse: ‘Arabia, Arabia,
before the die is cast/Before the sun is darkened for us both/Hold back,
and do not open/The latch on the gates of war!/And you will see the dif-
ference/Between a nameless malediction/And a peaceful greeting and blos-
soming era/Such as the sons of Shem have never known!’42
It cannot be claimed that the decision to hold the parade in Jerusalem

had a tangible impact on the sequence of events, but it increased the exist-
ing tension. The Arabs were convinced that no heavy weapons had been
displayed at the parade because the Israelis were concentrating forces
along the border.43 The parade itself took place several hours after Egypt-
ian units began to move towards Sinai. The Chief of Staff received the first
reliable information on the movement of Egyptian forces on the dais at the
parade.44
Chapter 12
The start of the crisis

In the decade between the withdrawal from Sinai in 1957 and the Six Day
War, border relations between Israel and Egypt were generally stable and
uneventful. The organized infiltrations through the Egyptian border and the
Gaza Strip for sabotage purposes ceased completely. The UN Emergency
Force (UNEF), deployed at control points along the border and at Sharm
al-Sheikh, was mostly idle, and in 1966 the UN Secretariat even contem-
plated reducing the force drastically. This was not carried out due to Israeli
objections. The main role of UNEF, so far as Israel was concerned, was to
ensure free shipping through the Straits of Tiran at the entrance to Eilat
(Aqaba) Bay. Eilat was Israel’s maritime gateway to Africa and Asia, and
above all a vital port for the Iranian oil on which Israel was dependent.
The relative lull on the border did not reflect the depth of the basic con-
flict between the two countries, which became increasingly acute after the
Sinai Campaign.1 Nasser now had two defeats to revenge on Israel: 1948
and 1956. He had been occupied since then with other problems both
internal and external, but he never forgot.
Towards the end of his term of office, Ben-Gurion pinned hopes on
efforts to conduct a dialogue with Nasser through the editor of the Sunday
Times, Charles Hamilton, but they proved unproductive.2 However, in
1965 to 1966, a seemingly promising connection was established through
the Mossad with General Mahmoud Khalil, former Deputy Head of Intel-
ligence in the Egyptian air force. The head of the Mossad, Meir Amit, and
Deputy Defence Minister Zvi Dinstein were invited by Khalil to pay a
clandestine visit to Cairo for a possible meeting with Vice-President Abdel
Hakim Amer.
Isser Harel, the Prime Minister’s adviser on Intelligence affairs, who
was Amit’s bitter rival, pointed out Khalil’s dubious character and claimed
that the invitation might be a trap. He proposed that the meeting take
place at a neutral location, and the Prime Minister accepted his advice.
Amit regarded the frustrating of his plan to visit Cairo as a missed historic
opportunity,3 but Egypt’s refusal to hold the meeting on neutral ground
cast doubt on the whole matter.
122 The start of the crisis
Another aberrant event which occurred in February to March 1960 on

the Egyptian front was a ‘trial run’ in miniature for May 1967. This event,
which had a traumatic impact on the General Staff, was known as
‘Rotem’. On 31 January/1 February 1960, after a series of shooting inci-
dents on the Syrian border in the southern demilitarized area, a force from
the Golani infantry brigade carried out the first reprisal mission since the
Sinai Campaign. The force attacked the village of Khirbet Tawafik on the
southern outskirts of the Golan Heights and the adjacent Syrian position.
At the time, Syrian and Egypt were linked in the United Arab Republic.
The Soviet Union fed the UAR false information on concentrations of
Israeli forces on the Syrian border, and on 18 February Egyptian forces

began to cross the Suez Canal secretly and to concentrate in northern
Sinai.
It will be recalled that, under Ben-Gurion’s premiership, the IAF rarely
conducted reconnaissance sorties across the border. It was only six days
later, after an American alert, that the IDF General Staff learned of the
presence of the Egyptian force, which now numbered some 500 tanks, as
against the thirty or so tanks in Israel’s Southern Command. ‘We were
caught with our pants down,’ wrote the Chief of Operations Yitzhak
Rabin to the IAF commander Ezer Weizman. ‘For the next 24 hours every-
thing depends on the air force.’ The IDF rallied hastily and launched Oper-
ation ‘Rotem’, concentrating large regular and reserve forces in the Negev.
Ben-Gurion adopted a policy of pacification, announcing his forthcoming
visit to Washington, and three weeks later Nasser withdrew his forces
beyond the Suez Canal and announced that the objective – to deter Israel
from attacking Syria – had been achieved.4
Initially, Gamal Abdul Nasser’s decision of May 1967 to move his
army into the Sinai Peninsula (this time, in contrast to 1960, it was done
openly) was reminiscent of the Rotem situation. In hindsight it became
evident that this was the first in a sequence of fateful decisions which were
to change forever the face of the Middle East and the Arab–Israeli conflict.
It created a new dynamics, and from then on nothing could turn back the
clock.
The General Staff is alert and cautious

The Egyptian move took the IDF General Staff by surprise. None of the
Intelligence evaluations had forecast it. At most, they had predicted the
possibility of Egyptian intervention in the event of a ‘total’ Israeli
onslaught against Syria. All the Intelligence Branch experts opined that
Egypt would not permit Syria to drag it unwillingly into an untimely war
with Israel, a view which had a firm basis. Even in the more unlikely
case of Egyptian intervention after a major Israeli operation against Syria,
the view was that the Egyptians would only intervene after the event as a
The start of the crisis 123
reaction. The possibility of prior intervention in order to foil an Israeli

scheme was never taken into account.
However, even more remarkable is the very fact that Israeli Intelligence
bodies were taken by surprise. It had apparently known by the end of
1966 about Egyptian Vice-President Abdel Hakim Amer’s message to
Nasser, dispatched while he was en route to a visit to Pakistan, urging that
the Egyptian army move into Sinai and block the Tiran Straits.5 The
underlying motive was probably the IDF operation at Samu and the strong
criticism of Egypt’s failure to act. The fact that Amer’s recommendation
was rejected may have reinforced the Intelligence estimation that Nasser
would not risk war so long as his army was in Yemen.

In fact, the Egyptian move may also be viewed as a reaction, delayed by
five weeks, to the IAF operation of 7 April. This pattern of delayed reac-
tion was not new. It recalled the situations of February 1960 when the
main Egyptian force was moved into Sinai two to three weeks after the
IDF operation at Tawafik, and of November 1966 when the United Arab
Command, headed by Egypt, reacted only two weeks after the Samu
attack. The IDF Intelligence Branch should have assumed on the basis of
experience that some form of Egyptian response to a significant Israeli
attack on an Arab country was a feasible prospect. Instead, they clung to
the concept that avoidance of entanglement with Israel was so basic an
Egyptian principle that Israel was still free to act against Syria again on a
large scale without much fear of Egyptian intervention.
At first, the IDF calculated, and this was also the general impression,
that Egypt’s intention was to deter Israel from taking action against Syria
and also to bolster Nasser’s standing as the leader of the Arab world and
its shield against Israel.
The concentration of forces recalled the Rotem operation,6 with one
important difference: at that time, the movement of Egyptian forces into
Sinai had been clandestine and discreet, while now it was carried out
openly, in the light of day and in front of TV cameras, in a manner which
evoked widespread popular enthusiasm in the Arab world. It was feared in
the military that the Egyptian move might tie Israel’s hands in its struggle
against terrorist activity which would increase, thanks to the backing of
the Egyptian force. In any event, the IDF’s first move was to concentrate a
regular armoured force in the south, and to conduct patrols, observations
and mining of sensitive sectors. The day after Independence Day, due to
the accelerated movement of forces into Sinai, it was decided to strengthen
the IDF defensive deployment along the Egyptian border. All the Israeli
moves were carried out cautiously in the first instance to avoid heating up
the situation. The Chief of Staff believed that Israel’s actions should be dic-
tated not necessarily by evaluations of Egypt’s intentions but by the possi-
bilities inherent in the concentration of forces in Sinai.7 For reasons of
caution, Israel had to consider the possibility, however unlikely, of a more
drastic Egyptian move: the blocking of the Straits of Tiran, the bombing of
the Dimona reactor, and concentrating Egyptian forces in Sinai in defen-
sive deployment in preparation for a possible Israeli attack.
The Operations Branch of the General Staff, headed by Colonel Yitzhak
Hofi, was now to become the ‘nerve junction’ of the army, coordinating
staff activity throughout the crisis. It ordered that IDF forces be moved to
their destinations in the hours of darkness and that all field security rules
be strictly observed. The objective was to maintain a low profile and a dis-
creet defensive deployment without provoking the other side and causing a
chain reaction. Due to the continuing flow of Egyptian troops into Sinai,
Eshkol acceded to Rabin’s request to mobilize a reserve brigade. On 16

May the Operations Branch issued a mobilization order for 520 Armoured
Brigade.8
Inside the government: 5 per cent danger of

escalation
The Israeli government convened on 16 May 1967, just after Independence
Day, for a routine session. No military representatives were present, but
Eshkol opened the meeting with a survey of the security situation. He
made brief mention of five terrorist attacks perpetrated the previous week
and then read out the Intelligence evaluation:
It is estimated that, in light of Syrian reports and appeals to Egypt

regarding Israel’s intention to take major action against Syria; in light
of declarations and warnings issued by Israel in the past few days; and
Egypt’s predicament since 7 April, Egypt has come to the decision that
in the present circumstances it cannot sit by idly. It has therefore
decided, in the face of the Israeli threat, to demonstrate readiness to
come to Syria’s aid within the framework of the mutual defence pact.
At the same time, it may be assumed that the Egyptians hope that their
actions and demonstration will achieve the practical effect of deterring
Israel from implementing its threat. This Egyptian move is to a certain
degree an achievement for Syria, which has succeeded in drawing
Egypt unwillingly into openly backing it, and therefore providing indi-
rect support for Damascus’ extreme policy towards Israel.
At that stage according to this evaluation, the size of the Egyptian force
and its activity attested to the buildup of a defensive deployment in Sinai.
The transition to offensive would require an increase in the number of
tanks and the movement of additional forces into northern Sinai, and of
this ‘there are no indications’. As for the intentions of the Egyptians, ‘It
seems feasible that they will intervene only in the event of a major [Israeli]
attack [on Syria], to include the conquest and holding of territory.’9 Hence
the first evaluation submitted to the government was not a cause for
alarm: Israel continued to hold the winning cards. The Egyptians would
intervene only if Israel invaded Syria for purposes of conquering territory.
The implication was that the government had no intention of ordering the
army to occupy territory in Syria, and consequently Israel’s freedom of
action would not be restricted.
The government’s discussion of the matter was brief, and the mood did
not seem to be particularly anxious. Foreign Minister Abba Eban was
praised for his diplomatic triumphs in the campaign against Syria: the US
administration had asked Israel to refrain from taking action against
Jordan, but ‘as for Syria – they were purposely vague’. UN Secretary
General U Thant had condemned the Fatah operations, although he was
later forced by Arab pressure to clarify that he did not condone Israeli
reprisals. ‘There can be no doubt,’ Eban summed up, ‘that our proclama-
tions and warnings were taken seriously . . . and were on target.’10 Only
the Minister of Education, Zalman Aranne, was apprehensive, saying that
wherever there were large concentrations of soldiers and weapons ‘sooner
or later something starts up’, and asked if steps were being taken to antici-
pate ‘even a 5 per cent threat of escalation’. Eshkol assured him that this
was so, but hinted at the need to conciliate and to lower the tone: ‘This
week has been filled with warnings and threats on our part.’ It was not
necessary, he said, to react immediately to the latest terror attacks.11
The government’s fears of escalation at this stage were therefore
minimal – ‘5 per cent’ according to Aranne. But there was a note of self-
criticism in Eshkol’s comment, suggesting that the numerous declarations
and threats issued prior to Independence Day had heightened the tension,
and indicating a desire to reduce it.
The crisis gathers momentum

Whereas a feeling of déjàvu, a conviction that the Rotem events were
repeating themselves, had prevailed among the IDF senior command up
until now, this feeling was swiftly dispelled at dawn on 17 May. Radio
Cairo announced that Egypt was demanding the evacuation of UNEF
forces from their positions along the border with Israel back to the Gaza
Strip.12 Rabin, however, assumed that the evacuation of the UNEF and the
concentration of Egyptian forces in Sinai in themselves neither committed
Israel to go to war nor enabled it to do so from the political aspect, so long
as it had not been attacked and the Straits of Tiran had not been closed.
The view at the time, according to Rabin, was that ‘the Arabs have gone
into a state of frenzy’ which could lead to war.13
In the afternoon of 17 May, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff
attended a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.
The continuous flow of forces into Sinai and the Egyptian demand for the
evacuation of the UNEF charged the atmosphere. At the beginning of the

meeting, Rabin said that the Egyptians were not contemplating a con-
frontation with Israel and that their defensive deployment in Sinai was due
to anticipation of a large-scale attack against Syria. But the remarks of the
Committee members reflected their fear that Israel’s hands would be tied
in its struggle against Syrian-inspired terror because of the Egyptian
deployment.
The severest critic was Moshe Dayan. He had not been surprised, he
said, by the Egyptian move. The short-sighted policy of the government
had led up to this situation. ‘Anyone who sends up smoke signals must
understand that the other side . . . is liable to think that a fire has been lit.’
The extension of compulsory military service (from twenty-six to thirty
months as of November 1966 as a result of the worsening security situ-
ation), the deployment of 130 aircraft on 7 April, the penetration of the
skies over Damascus and the downing of Migs had shocked the Syrians.
Dayan did not underestimate the significance of the Egyptian move, which
he regarded as a ‘promissory note’ on Nasser’s part, liable to commit him
to intervention if Israel retaliated against Syria. If Egypt had been firmly
resolved not to be lured into military activity, it would have conducted its
policies differently and told the Syrians to ‘forget it’. The anticipated
Egyptian action, Dayan suggested, would take the form of ‘either bombing
of Dimona [atomic reactor] or the closing of the Straits’. At the same time,
he believed that Nasser’s goal was diplomatic and that his order to evacu-
ate the UN force was intended to exert international pressure on Israel to
refrain from reprisals. It was his view, conflicting with Eban’s, that the
UNEF would leave if the Egyptians insisted. He himself would regard this
as a blessing since the prospect of arriving at a settlement with the Egyp-
tians would be greater without ‘all the UN concoctions in the middle’.14
Eshkol disputed Dayan’s evaluation, and reminded Dayan that he had
once proposed at a Committee meeting that the IAF be employed against
the Syrians. He explained the difficulty: ‘If the Syrian border is swarming
with 120–130 guns and mortars, our settlements are beneath them, and in
10–15 minutes they can d “eal with” almost all the settlements then
perhaps we should have employed 80 planes and not 130. In any event,
you can’t fix things with only 12 planes.’ Dayan responded that when he
had suggested using aircraft ‘I was talking against the occupation of the
Heights, about complete localization, local employment of aircraft . . .
throughout the Sinai Campaign we employed 130 aircraft. This is an act
on a scale far in excess of the dispute.’ Later, at the same meeting, Dayan
repeated his criticism of the Samu action which, so he said, had led to the
severance of direct ties with Jordan. Eshkol hinted in reply that the ties
had not been completely severed, and yet ‘that doesn’t mean that I can rely
on this, and I’m not sure, if there is war, whether he [King Hussein] will
not join our enemies’.15
Other members of the Committee also criticized the scope of the 7 April
action, but the main subject of concern was the intensification of terrorist
activity, as was evident from the tone of all the participants. ‘The Egyptian
move was intended to render us passive with regard to terror in the north’,
said the Chairman David Hacohen, and expressed his fear that the terror-
ist incidents would increase and Israeli Arabs would join in.16
Eshkol summed up the situation by giving a not uncritical report
on ‘how we arrived at this situation with the Syrians’. At the same time,
he lauded his ‘open notebook’ policy and defined it as ‘supreme political
wisdom’. His policy in the face of the present crisis, he said, was aimed
at maintaining the status quo for ‘fifty years’, preventing war, and
manoeuvring accordingly.17
Eshkol reiterated this view at a meeting of the Ministerial Committee
on Security, which was convened immediately afterwards. The ‘doves’ on
the Committee set the tone of the meeting. Eban proposed a policy
of ‘increasing security alertness and insofar as possible political de-
escalation’. At the time, he still sounded unruffled. He distinguished
between the security approach, which must be based on the gravest contin-
gency, and the political assessment, according to which Egypt had not
wavered from its ‘deep-rooted policy of avoiding military confrontation
with Israel’. He interpreted Egypt’s conduct as the result of ‘genuine panic’
in Syria since the 7 April operation. Israel’s warnings, said Eban, had
achieved their aim and made clear to the Syrians that the continuation of
terror would lead to an Israeli reaction ‘of a high degree’.18
Within a day the mood had changed, particularly at the civilian
echelon, from a certain degree of complacency to anxiety. It was fostered
by the dramatically overt character of the movement of Egyptian forces,
the militant proclamations from across the border, the press headlines, and
the Arab radio and TV broadcasts.19 Above all, the demand for the evacu-
ation of the UNEF had created a new psychological climate of concern by
exposing the border to a possible imminent clash.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the views of both the military and
the political echelons remained unchanged at this early stage: namely that
Egypt was not interested in war with Israel right now and its moves were
not directed at starting a war. The major security problem was Syrian-
backed terror. The Intelligence Branch was still convinced that Egypt
would intervene only in the event of a massive ‘total’ Israeli action against
Syria. In other words, despite the movement of Egyptian forces into Sinai,
Israeli Intelligence still had difficulty abandoning its conceptions.
However, there were subtle indications of dispute between the army and
the government: Rabin thought that the anticipated continuation of
Syrian-based terror attacks called for an appropriate Israeli response, while
Eshkol advocated restraint together with intensified defensive and deter-
rent measures. At most, in the event of a drastic terrorist incident, Eshkol
was ready to consider a very limited response. The disparity between the
views of the military and political echelons was evident again.
An Egyptian sortie over Dimona

At the above-mentioned meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Security Com-
mittee on 17 May, Rabin estimated that three possible paths of action
were open to the Egyptians: to exert pressure on Israel; to close the Tiran
Straits, and to strike at Dimona. While he was speaking, at 16:00 hours,
he was handed a report from the IAF commander that a pair of Egyptian
Mig 21s had penetrated Israeli air space from Jordan and flown over
Dimona, and the air force had not succeeded in intercepting them. Rabin
immediately informed Eshkol, who was present.20
After the meeting, the General Staff branch chiefs met in the Chief of
Staff’s office to analyse the significance of the sortie. Aharon Yariv
believed that an operation directed solely against Dimona was unlikely.21
He apparently thought that the Egyptians would prefer to launch simulta-
neous attacks on Dimona and on airfields in order to derive the maximum
advantage. It was decided to proclaim a Level 3 alert in the IAF. The possi-
bility of mobilizing an additional reserve armoured brigade for Southern
Command was also discussed.
The question of the evacuation of UNEF became a vital issue at that
stage, when Israel learned that the UN Secretary-General was of the
opinion that if Egypt insisted on evacuation it should be full and perman-
ent. U Thant’s response to Egypt’s demand to move UNEF from the border
to the Gaza Strip, which was conveyed to the participants at the meeting,
was unanimously interpreted as a further deterioration of the situation.
Immediately after the meeting, Rabin met with Eshkol to discuss the
implications of the constant influx of Egyptian reinforcements into Sinai,
the sorties by Egyptian aircraft and U Thant’s reply. Eshkol approved the
mobilization of IAF reserve units at the request of the IAF Commander, as
well as the mobilization of Armoured Brigade 200.22
Thus, by the end of the third day of the crisis, 17 May, there was
increasing awareness that the crisis was worsening. The Dimona reactor
had always been perceived as a major target for Egyptian aerial attack, but
the foolhardiness and skill demonstrated by Egypt in the flight over the
reactor sharpened the sense of danger. The impact of the anticipated evac-
uation of the UN force, the inflamed emotions in the Arab world, the
continuing Egyptian troop movements into Sinai and the propaganda war,
were enhanced by the dramatic news that Dimona had been photographed
from the air, which the Chief of Staff received at the height of the Knesset
meeting.
The mood was now sombre, but the Intelligence Branch’s basic tenet
was unaltered: the Egyptians were not interested in a military clash with
Israel. They were preparing the option of a limited military move in

response to a large-scale Israeli strike against Syria, but their main objec-
tive was to deter Israel and gain a diplomatic and propaganda victory.
According to this theory, Israel was still in control of the situation.
At 23:30 a stage-two alert was declared throughout the IDF.23
On the morning of 18 May, a further meeting took place between the
General Staff branch heads and the Chief of Staff. According to the
summary: (1) if Dimona was attacked, IDF planes could chase the enemy
aircraft across the border to intercept them; (2) the IAF would not auto-
matically be granted permission to attack Egyptian airfields after an attack
on Dimona; (3) if the Egyptians attacked airfields the IAF would immedi-
ately counter-attack Egyptian airfields.24
These instructions to the IAF require further explanation. Fear of an
Egyptian air attack on the nuclear reactor always loomed in the back-
ground, but no decision had ever been taken at the political level as to how
Israel should react to such an attack. On the face of it, any attack on a
target inside Israel was a warlike act, and Israel had the right to respond.
But this particular case was by no means simple. The development of
nuclear military capability, of which Israel was suspected although it did
not admit to it, was liable in the eyes of the world to justify a ‘legitimate’
Egyptian preventive strike. Even the United States, with its proclaimed
stand on nuclear issues, would be obliged to display a modicum of under-
standing of such an Egyptian move. If Israel reacted automatically by
launching hostilities, it would find itself isolated and engaged in a costly
and bloody war, with no guarantee of a positive outcome.
If the reactor was destroyed by an Egyptian attack, the damage would
be irremediable. On the other hand, it was unlikely that Israel would
calmly accept an Egyptian attack and permit Nasser to bask in glory
unscathed. Such a failure to act would have far-reaching implications for
Israel’s standing and deterrent capability. The dilemma was clear to the
senior command, but it required a decision on the part of the political
echelon, since the army had no authority to act without it. Hence, the
order to the IAF was neither a ‘yes’ nor a ‘no’ with regard to attacking
Egyptian airfields in retaliation for the bombing of the reactor. It merely
established that the IAF did not have an automatic go-ahead for action.
The government would decide the matter. If, however, the Egyptian air
force attacked Israeli airfields simultaneously with its bombing of the
reactor or without connection, Israel would have the legitimate right to
launch a counter-attack.
During that day, the Chief of Staff’s office received reports that the
UNEF evacuation had begun. The aircraft carrying the UNEF Commander
Indian General Indar Jit Rikhye penetrated Israeli air space. IAF planes,
suspicious of its intentions and nervous in the wake of the Egyptian flight
over Dimona, tried to intercept it and even fired warning shots at it.25 In
the evening word was received that Sharm al-Sheikh had been occupied by
an Egyptian force, and UN positions there had been abandoned. The Intel-
ligence Branch reported that an Egyptian brigade had been brought back
from Yemen and that the Lebanese army was now deployed along the
border with Israel. In light of this information, the Chief of Staff held a
third meeting that night with Eshkol and the participation of Ministers
Yisrael Galili and Moshe Haim Shapira. Rabin estimated that the Egyp-
tians might close the Straits within two or three days, a challenge which
could lead to war. He also said that the Egyptians intended to maintain
their force in Sinai for a lengthy period, and this could create a new situ-
ation to which Israel was unaccustomed.26

Rabin’s remarks attested to a change in the army’s reading of the situ-
ation. At first, events had been perceived in the context of terrorist activity,
continuing the pre-crisis line of thought. Now the Chief of Staff raised the
problem which the army was subsequently to view as the main issue: the
possibility of protracted, unlimited concentration of Egyptian forces along
the border with Israel.
From Egypt’s viewpoint, this was merely a logistic problem. For Israel,
it was an existential question. The presence of a long-term direct and
immediate threat on the border would require the IDF to mobilize its
reserves and stand ready, thus severely disrupting normal life in Israel at
intolerable economic cost. We shall see below that the army shifted its
main focus to this issue of Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai. This
situation, together with Nasser’s challenge to Israel and Israel’s fear of the
grave consequences of potential loss of deterrent capability, and above all
the possibility that the Egyptians would anticipate the IDF and launch a
pre-emptive strike, were to become the lever for military pressure on the
political echelon.
That same night and on the following day, 19 May, the General Staff
moved into emergency mode, and the supreme command post (or ‘pit’ in
military slang), went into full action until the end of the war.
Chapter 13
The era of diplomacy

Diplomacy played a major role in the crisis, although it failed to avert

war.1 The Israeli government put its faith in diplomacy but the military,
from a very early stage, displayed growing impatience with the diplomatic
process, which appeared to be protracted and useless, merely playing into
enemy hands. But while diplomatic efforts failed to prevent war, they were
not without results. In retrospect, it is clear that the IDF and the State of
Israel derived great advantages from them.
In the end, though not necessarily through prior intent, it transpired
that Israel had managed the crisis sagaciously, thereby preparing the
ground, from the diplomatic aspect, for military action. The army’s ‘noble
steeds’2 stamped their hooves restlessly but were forced to wait until the
diplomatic carriage, with precise timing, had cleared the course for them.3
The American role

The key to understanding the developments which led to war should be
sought, perhaps above all, outside the region in Washington. American
involvement in the crisis has been investigated and well documented since
most of the archival material was made available for study.4 Egypt’s rela-
tions with the United States were clouded during Johnson’s administration
due to Egypt’s involvement in Yemen, Nasser’s general anti-Western
foreign policy, the Soviet Union’s growing influence in the Middle East,
and the cold personal relations between Nasser and Johnson.
Nasser tended to see an American conspiracy by the CIA in every move
against him, and his suspicious attitude to the US was undoubtedly also
fostered by the Kremlin’s attitude to Johnson.5 In light of the tension and
mistrust between Egypt and the United States, US influence on Egypt’s pol-
icies could be expected to lessen. Indeed, the Americans did not succeed in
dissuading Nasser from blocking the Straits of Tiran or inducing him to
accept a compromise which would prevent the flare-up.
On the other hand, it may have been precisely the fact that Nasser ‘ven-
tured to the brink’ in closing the Straits, US efforts notwithstanding, which
132 The era of diplomacy
barred him from taking additional aggressive steps against Israel. When
Israel informed the United States that a surprise Arab attack was anticip-
ated (see below), the US administration saw fit, despite its doubts as to the
reliability of the information, to issue a grave warning to Egypt. If Nasser
harboured aggressive intentions – against the Dimona reactor, airfields or
the southern Negev – he was forced to abandon them for the time being,
for fear that the United States would take action.6
The bottom line is that the United States tried initially to pinpoint the
crisis and prevent escalation by exerting pressure on Israel to refrain from
unilateral moves, and on Egypt not to restrict freedom of shipping. When
Egypt announced the blocking of the Straits, the US continued to urge

Israel to abstain from military action, cautioned Egypt against attacking
Israel, and concomitantly tried to recruit international support for action
to guarantee free shipping through the Straits. When it became clear to
Washington that international backing was not forthcoming, that the plan
of action was complicated and impractical, and that the threat against
Israel was growing, it relaxed the pressure on Israel. Thus there is a certain
degree of truth in the Egyptian claim that the United States misled it, and
that while putting clamps on Egypt, it released Israel for action. While
there was no premeditated conspiracy, US assistance undoubtedly helped
to create convenient conditions for an Israeli attack. In hindsight, this was
the great success of Israeli diplomacy.
On 18 May Eshkol received, through US Ambassador Walworth
Barbour, a message from President Lyndon Johnson. The President assured
Eshkol that he was ‘following very closely’ developments and that his
government had expressed its concern to Damascus and Cairo. But, he
warned,
I would like to emphasize in the strongest terms the need to avoid any
action on your side which would add further to the violence and
tension in your area. I urge the closest consultation between you and
your principal friends. I am sure that you will understand that I cannot
accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations
which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted.7
This study does not focus on the diplomatic arena, but let it be noted
briefly that from now on where Israel was concerned, there were two goals
to the diplomatic efforts: one was to curb the crisis by bringing inter-
national pressure to bear on President Nasser, in particular in order to dis-
suade him from barring free shipping through the Straits of Tiran and –
once he had blocked the Straits – wielding international pressure to compel
him to open them. The second target was to guarantee freedom of action
for Israel, with passive backing on the part of the US, so as to counteract
Soviet backing of Syria and Egypt. The former effort failed, while the latter
The era of diplomacy 133
succeeded. However, US readiness to ‘unleash Israel’ (according to officials

in Washington) was not immediately evident, but only emerged two weeks
later, and then was implied (‘yellow light’, in the words of W.B. Quandt)
rather than explicit (‘green light’).8
In his reply to Johnson, Eshkol emphasized that the source of the
trouble was terrorist action stemming from Syria. He demanded that the
UNEF should not be evacuated without the approval of the General
Assembly, and requested an American declaration of support for Israel as
a counterweight to the Soviet support for the Arabs.9 The Americans did
not hasten to respond.
The chosen option: quiet diplomacy

In the evening hours of 18 May, Eshkol convened the committee of editors
of the Israeli press10 for what was denoted an off-the-record ‘background
talk’. The emphasis was still on the problem of hostile terrorist action, but
he also expressed concern at the possibility that the Straits would be
blocked. Surveying terrorist action since 7 April, he placed the blame
squarely on Syria.
Among other things, the Prime Minister referred to an incident which
was not reported at the time. On 8 May a Palestinian infiltrator, fluent in
Hebrew and a university graduate, had been apprehended south of Kiryat
Shmona carrying tweleve kilograms of explosives, a forged British passport
and letters addressed to Eshkol, Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir and newspaper
editors. His mission was to penetrate population centres and perpetrate a
wide-scale terror attack around Independence Day.
Eshkol explained that Israel did not want war, but the continuation of
terror could not go unanswered. He described the Egyptian deployment in
Sinai as defensive, but capable of transition into offensive within a day or
two. In answer to a query from the editor of Haaretz, Gershom Schocken,
about the possibility that the UN force would be evacuated from Sharm al-
Sheikh, the Prime Minister said: ‘If they leave and we [i.e. Israeli shipping
through the Straits] are not harassed – that’s one thing. If they harass us, I
am sorry to say, as they say in the army, there could be a lively situation –
of all the issues, this is the decisive one . . . if they disturb us from using
that water [for shipping].’ His remarks also implied concern at the unclear
stand of the Soviet Union: ‘It’s not clear whether the Soviets have guaran-
teed to support Egypt and Syria in the event of a military clash.’11
On 19 May, at a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Chubakhin,
Foreign Minister Eban tried and failed to clarify the Soviet standpoint or
to influence it. Eban told him: ‘There will be no war unless our territory is
attacked or our freedom of shipping affected.’ Chubakhin was impervious
to Eban’s arguments, and cast full responsibility on Israel. ‘It was Israel
that attacked Syria. It was Israel’s planes that flew over Damascus. Have
Syrian planes flown over Tel Aviv? . . . We hear all the time about terror-
ists and mines . . . but we have seen no evidence so far that the Syrians are
responsible and not CIA agents’, he retorted.12
Israel’s dilemma was how to conduct the diplomatic campaign to safe-
guard its freedom of shipping. In retrospect it seemed apparent that Nasser
had been more impressed by Israel’s public silence than by clandestine
efforts conducted through diplomatic channels.13 But from the outset polit-
ical sagacity seemed to indicate that the Egyptian President should not be
provoked by threats, and that he be offered a dignified way out, namely to
bow to international pressure rather than ostensibly to capitulate to Israeli
threats. The government, ‘once bitten, twice shy’ after the excess of decla-
rations on Independence Day eve which had sparked off the crisis, now
tended to avoid public statements. The Prime Minister even asked the
newspaper editors to cooperate by making no mention ‘of mobilization, of
freedom of shipping, or Dimona or of the mining question’. Minister
Yisrael Galili praised the ‘deliberate moderation’ of official statements
since Independence Day and emphasized that this policy had been insti-
tuted by the Prime Minister ‘who was strongly backed by the Chief of
Staff’.14 Eshkol and Eban decided on 19 May to conduct a discreet diplo-
matic campaign. Eban stressed this decision at the Ministerial Committee
on Security and warned against public pronouncements because ‘life and
death are now decided by the tongue’.15
The Americans, too, advised a low profile on the issue of free ship-
ping.16 Israel’s UN Ambassador Gideon Raphael was instructed to convey
a personal communication from Eban to U Thant in complete secrecy and
was also instructed not to mention the shipping issue if asked by the media
about the reason for his visit to the Secretary-General’s office. In his
message, Eban charged U Thant with heavy moral responsibility for the
evolution of the crisis. It was vital, he wrote, that the Secretary-General, in
his contacts with Cairo, be aware of the Israeli government’s resolute
stand to the effect that freedom of shipping was a supreme national inter-
est, that Israel would defend it at any price and any sacrifice.17 Through
clandestine channels, Israel conveyed the information to Nasser that there
were no Israeli army concentrations on the Syrian border and that Israel
had no intention of overthrowing the Damascus regime; it did not warn
specifically against the blocking of the Straits.18
Israel’s political ‘anchor’ in its efforts to prevent any disruption of
freedom of shipping through the Straits was a statement by then Foreign
Minister Golda Meir at the UN Assembly on 1 March 1957, while
announcing her government’s decision to respond to the demand for with-
drawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, to the effect that Israel would view
disruption of free shipping through the Tiran Straits as an act of aggres-
sion and would reserve the right to react in accordance with Clause 51 of
the UN Charter.
In Israel’s eyes, this declaration, made after consultations with France in

the wake of the understanding that the US would support freedom of ship-
ping in the Bay,19 provided the moral sanction for its two demands: first,
support of the Western Powers for its demand for free shipping; second,
their acknowledgement of Israel’s right to act if shipping in the Bay of
Eilat (Aqaba) was disrupted.
In a message to President Charles de Gaulle on 19 May, Eshkol cited
Golda Meir’s statement. He accused Egypt of violating the security balance
by increasing its force in Sinai and evacuating the UNEF, but promised
that Israel would not initiate hostilities and would not attack the Egyptian
forces at Sharm al-Sheikh unless they blocked the Tiran Straits. The
message indicated considerable Israeli flexibility: it did not include a
demand for the return of the UNEF or the withdrawal of Egyptian military
presence from the Straits. The government recognized that such a demand
was unrealistic. The objective now was therefore only to ensure freedom of
shipping in the Bay of Eilat, and no more than that. At the same time, the
Israeli government was well aware that a constant Egyptian military pres-
ence in the Tiran Straits meant, as Eban phrased it, ‘that the sword of
Damocles will be suspended day and night [and] the threat [to block the
Straits] will never disappear’.20
Israel is disappointed by the US stance

From the beginning of the crisis, the main arena of Israeli diplomatic effort
was, naturally enough, the United States. The Israeli government believed
that only firm US backing could counter what was interpreted as full
Soviet backing for Egypt and Syria. Only unequivocal, and preferably
public, clarification from the White House and the State Department as to
the US commitment to Israel’s security and freedom of shipping, could
deter Nasser from aggression and from blocking the Straits.21 Only a res-
olute US stand could avert the danger, however remote, of Soviet military
intervention on the side of the Arabs in the event that war broke out.
However, so far as Israel was concerned, the US stand at this stage was
initially disappointing and the State Department even tended to delay sup-
plies of military equipment agreed on prior to the crisis. This attitude was
in striking contrast to the readiness displayed by France and Great Britain
to expedite supplies of vital equipment.22 Johnson’s first message to Eshkol
was blatantly non-committal, and merely stipulated constraints on Israel.
The practical implication of the ‘consultation’ which the US President
demanded before any Israeli action, and above all, any military move, was
essentially a US right to veto any operative Israeli decision and primarily
military action. But there was also another, positive, aspect to the demand
for ‘consultation’. It implied US readiness for involvement and
coordination of moves. Later this approach was famously expressed in the
phrase which Johnson reiterated to Eban and Eshkol: ‘Israel will not be
alone, unless it decides to go alone.’
US policy, up until the stage when the Egyptian President announced
the closing of the Straits, and to a large degree afterwards as well, was a
cause of concern for Israel. The reports from the embassy in Washington
made it clear that the United States was seeking an outlet from the crisis
and a way of averting a military clash in the region, even at certain cost to
Israel. The Americans did not deny their commitment to freedom of ship-
ping, but clarified to Israeli representatives that it would honour it only if
Israel refrained from acting without prior consent. Ambassador Avraham
Harman estimated that the aim of the United States was to avoid military
involvement and, since it saw no prospect of inducing Nasser or the
Soviets to display flexibility, it would pressure Israel to concede.
The Americans did not respond to Israel’s demand that they issue a
peremptory statement. They preferred quiet diplomacy, and in fact placed
their trust at this stage in the UN Secretary-General’s mission to Cairo.
Nobody could have guessed that Nasser would once again play his cards
and announce the blocking of the Straits while U Thant was on his way to
Egypt. The assumption was that the Secretary-General’s mission was a
vital ‘time-out’ during which a solution might be found or indicated.
Among themselves, and at the UN, the Americans had already discussed
such possibilities as renewal of the activity of the Israel–Egypt Armistice
Commission and the stationing of a UN force on the Israeli side of the
border. These ideas were unofficially raised in their contacts with Israel.23
Despite the official US stand, as conveyed to Ambassador Harman,
there is evidence that, on a less official plane, the US conveyed different
messages to Israel. At the Ministerial Committee on Security, Eban quoted
a communication from the Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow: ‘We
advise you . . . after the entry of an Egyptian force into Sharm al-Sheikh
not to act against the Egyptian army until and unless the Egyptians block
the Straits.’ Eshkol commented that the negotiations with the US were top
secret.24 The Americans may have believed at this stage that Nasser would
not give the order to close the Straits, but the message essentially acknow-
ledged Israel’s right to act if and when the Straits were closed.
Israeli emissaries in the United States endeavoured to sway US policy,
and not only by conventional diplomatic means. Prominent Jews with
clout in the administration, in the Democratic Party and in Johnson’s circle
were asked to operate as an effective lobby on behalf of Israel. Jerusalem
encouraged its representatives to step up efforts in this direction in order
to create in the United States a climate of public sympathy for Israel which
would persuade the administration, and in particular the President, to
back Israel. There is reason to assume that these efforts had some impact.25
Israel’s stand on the UN force

Israel was not particularly troubled by the evacuation of the UNEF in
itself. There were some who even thought that it would be to Israel’s
advantage. But evacuation of the UNEF together with the influx of mili-
tary forces into Sinai, the propaganda drama and the inflaming of emo-
tions on the Arab side, had a profound psychological impact. It was felt
that the blocking of the Straits was liable to occur at any minute and
would be a casus belli. U Thant was about to leave for Cairo in order to
seek a solution to the crisis. It was manifest that in the international arena
nobody believed that the status quo ante could be restored, and the pre-
vailing opinion was that the crisis could only be resolved by appeasing
Nasser.
The idea of stationing a UN force on both sides of the border, which
was raised in diplomatic circles, paid mere lip-service, since there was no
practical prospect of its acceptance by Nasser. The solution seemed to be
to station a force on the Israeli side alone, and Israel objected to this
because it would not solve the Straits problem but would merely restrict
Israel’s freedom of action and expose it to humiliation and charges that it
was sheltering in the UN’s shadow for fear of Egypt. The political assess-
ment in Jerusalem was that U Thant would not succeed, perhaps would
not even try to remove the Egyptians from Sharm al-Sheikh. At most, he
would succeed in obtaining Egyptian consent to some form of UN pres-
ence in the Straits alongside the Egyptian presence, but this would require
parallel Israeli consent to the stationing of a UN force inside Israel. Eban
was of the opinion that this was precisely what U Thant would propose to
Nasser, and Nasser would agree. Israel, Eban thought, would find it diffi-
cult to withstand such a compromise despite its grave implications. Nasser,
he believed, ‘has not decided to disrupt shipping. He has decided to be in a
situation where he can brandish this sword [at any time].’26
Consequently, a day before Nasser’s proclamation of the barring of the
Straits to Israeli shipping, the prevalent view in the Israeli government was
that he was in no hurry to do so. Political logic, as perceived in Jerusalem,
would impel Nasser to optimize the Egyptian achievement by forcing Israel
to agree to a UN presence on its soil in return for a corresponding presence
in the Tiran Straits (but not along the Egyptian side of the border) and
revival of the Armistice Commission from which Israel had withdrawn
unilaterally.27 Egyptian military presence at Sharm al-Sheikh, it was
assumed, would serve from now on as a ‘whip’ for Egypt to deter Israel
from attacking Syria or any other Arab country, and under these con-
ditions the ‘popular struggle’ would continue and even intensify – not only
from Syria but from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip as well.
The main points of Eshkol’s remarks at the Ministerial Committee
on Security on 21 May, which were set out on a typewritten sheet,
summarized the evaluation of the situation and the government’s object-

ives at that stage:
Egypt’s strategic aims could be: (a) to destroy Dimona and Israel’s
capability to develop nuclear weapons. (b) the blocking of shipping in
the Bay of Eilat. (c) an all-out onslaught aimed at defeating Israel. This
last aim, according to both military and political data, does not appear
likely even to the Egyptians. . . . Our political objectives: (a) to achieve
the withdrawal of concentrations on the borders. (b) to ensure that a
UN force or presence remains in the Straits. (c) to obtain clarification
as to the US commitment towards Israel. (d) to ensure maximum inter-

national pressure on Damascus and Cairo so that Fatah activity will
not be repeated. (e) to ensure that America clarifies to the Soviet
Union that it will not permit harm to Israel. (f) to act simultaneously
in London and Paris to achieve these ends. (g) to activate Jews and
friends throughout the world to help achieve these aims.28
The Dimona issue

While Israel conducted a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign on the block-
ing of the Straits, discussions on the delicate issue of the Dimona nuclear
reactor were held in the utmost secrecy. The underlying theme in all gov-
ernmental deliberations, and at the General Staff as well, was fear that
Nasser’s main intention was to destroy Israel’s nuclear capability, thereby
eradicating what was, for Egypt, an intolerable strategic threat, as Nasser
often phrased it. The Egyptian reconnaissance sorties over Dimona29 pro-
vided ostensible proof of this intention. It was evident to the government,
as Israel Galili said,30 ‘that the Dimona subject is a special problem as
regards international relations’. Rabin too believed that the most logical
move so far as Egypt was concerned would be to attack Dimona, an act
which would gain international understanding.31
Operationally speaking, the most critical eventuality would be a sur-
prise air raid conducted simultaneously against the reactor and Israeli air-
fields.32 This was the ‘nightmare scenario’ and the prospect of its
occurrence spurred the senior command several days later to urge the
government to take pre-emptive action. Israel had not warned that it
would react with war against an attack on the reactor33 but in practice
there had been no need. It was clear enough that a military onslaught on
any target whatsoever within Israel’s sovereign territory would constitute a
declaration of war. Ministers Pinhas Sapir, Zalman Aranne and Moshe
Kol were opposed to this automatic formula.
The government decided nonetheless that ‘if Egyptian aircraft penetrate
Israeli air space and bomb any target whatsoever, the IAF will react with
full force’. What weighed the balance was the need to guarantee Israel’s
supremacy in the air. Eshkol explained: ‘We have fewer airfields than they
do. We have always said that the first five minutes determine the outcome,
who is first to bomb airfields.’ In any case, Eshkol reassured the ‘doves’, ‘if
there is any fundamental issue [i.e. if Dimona is bombed] we will meet
again’. But he demanded a decision and it was taken.34
In the absence of diplomatic activity in this respect, all that was left was
to anticipate the danger to the reactor by reinforcing the anti-aircraft
defence measures and the security around the site against possible attack
by an airborne Egyptian commando force. However, as noted above, the
military preferred not to take risks and favoured a pre-emptive move to
achieve decisive aerial superiority as the best guarantee of the safety of the
reactor.
Indeed, the question of the reactor was particularly sensitive. Israel was
well aware that the prospect of Israeli nuclear capability was regarded by
Nasser as a clear ‘red line’. An attack on the reactor might be considered
‘legitimate’ in international eyes. Even the United States would have found
it difficult, in light of its emphatic stand against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and against Dimona, to view the destruction of the reactor as an
unjustified act of aggression. Moreover, an attack on the reactor might
even justify a parallel attack on Israel’s airfields in order to neutralize an
Israeli counter-attack from the air.
It seems feasible to assume that the reactor was a central objective of
Egyptian operative planning. The reconnaissance sorties over the reactor
bear this theory out. Why then did Nasser eventually decide to block the
Straits and become involved in the issue of free shipping instead of directly
attacking a ‘legitimate’ strategic target? It seems that he erred in his calcu-
lations. He preferred to provoke Israel to attack first, confident of his
ability to contain the blow and launch a counter-strike in which Dimona
would be the prime target.
The government: concern and caution

The mood in Israel in the first week of the crisis was one of alertness and
apprehension, but until the closing of the Straits the fear of imminent war
was not acute. Abroad, on the other hand, Israeli legations reported
growing expressions of solidarity. Eban considered them ‘slightly panicky’
and his reaction indicates that he was concerned that Israel would be per-
ceived as weak and intimidated, ‘the sheep trembling with fear of the
wolf’. This image could undermine the credibility of Israel’s deterrent
power, and therefore it was essential, he said, ‘to cause them to believe
more strongly that disruption of shipping means war’. Among the other
‘dovish’ ministers there were already signs of anxiety at the prospect of
war.35 An additional reason for concern was the fact that Britain and
France had retreated from the 1950 declaration of the three Western
powers guaranteeing the existing borders in the Middle East, and now
announced that it was the UN’s responsibility to maintain peace in the
region.36
Despite the political ‘time-out’, while the outcome of U Thant’s mission
was awaited, some ministers did not hide their anxiety and demanded
maximum restraint in order to avert war. The ‘dovish’ trend was generally
led by the leader of the National Religious Party, Minister of the Interior
Moshe Haim Shapira. He proposed approaching the United States and
Britain and ‘charging them with responsibility for our fate here . . . sparing
nothing, neither money nor dignity’, so that they would expedite the dis-
patch of tanks, aircraft and ammunition to Israel, and ‘demanding of them

this basic aid on which our very survival depends’. He feared that the
IDF’s existing ammunition reserves would not suffice and that ‘if we don’t
destroy their air force . . . who knows what will happen to us in the end’.
Other ministers supported Shapira and dermanded the reinforcement of
the defensive deployment and restraint insofar as possible with regard to
terrorist activity. Zalman Aranne declared: ‘I am not willing to accept that,
because of sabotage, there will be a war. I am not ready for this, either
intellectually or emotionally.’ Mordechai Bentov rejected the very idea of a
pre-emptive strike: ‘I want to assume that all those around this table do
not want war. The time is past when it was thought that if there is danger
it is best to anticipate it.’ Even if the Egyptians bombed Dimona no
decision should be taken in advance as to how to respond, Bentov
declared. Pinhas Sapir demanded maximum circumspection and proposed
that Israel should not rely on Western aid: ‘I always think,’ he explained,
‘that although Israel is not the sole problem in the Middle East, there are
certainly some enlightened nations who would be happier if the problem
called Israel did not exist.’
In the absence of Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour, who was on a visit to
the Soviet Union, Moshe Carmel was the only minister of senior (reserve)
military rank. He advocated a forceful approach and demanded discussion
without delay of the various possibilities and the formulation of lines of
action so that Israel would not be caught unprepared in the event of an
unexpected military development, and take hasty decisions.
Eshkol summed up the discussion: the main issue now revolved around
Sharm al-Sheikh, but ‘for the time being we should not talk too much
about this . . . it would be better not to allow the Arabs the pleasure of
seeing the Jews standing and wailing’. Eshkol found the proper balance
between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’. He stressed: ‘My principle is that we do not
want war. We are all agreed on this. . . . We have mobilized in order to
prevent it.’ But ‘if the Egyptians fly over Israeli territory and bomb it,
whatever they bomb [even Dimona alone] . . . we must take action with the
planes that we have, and cause them as much damage as possible’.37
At this 21 May session of the government, time was allotted to a survey
of the civil emergency measures, which were described as satisfactory. The

Minister of Commerce and Industry, Zeev Sherf, surveyed the basic food
reserves, quantities which would suffice for five to ten months. The Deputy
Defence Minister Zvi Dinstein described the potential output of power-
stations, the oil reserves (sufficient for increased consumption for four
months) and the state of transport (the Achilles heel was transportation
due to the mobilization of a large number of civilian vehicles for the war
effort) and also discussed communications and hospitalization needs.38 In
light of the fact that the crisis had been so unexpected, the problems were
surprisingly few.
On 22 May in the afternoon, the Prime Minister addressed the Knesset.

His speech was cautious and almost conciliatory. Eshkol listed 113 acts of
sabotage for which Syria was responsible and thirty-four protests conveyed
by Israel to the Security Council. Referring to the Arab states, he declared:
‘We are not aiming at attack . . . we have no interest in striking against

their security, their territory or their legal rights. Nor will we intervene
in any way in their internal affairs, in their regimes, their regional or
international relations. We demand of them on the basis of reciprocity
that they honour the same principles where we are concerned.’
Eshkol announced that as a result of Egyptian concentrations of forces on

the border and the evacuation of UNEF he had ordered, with the assent of
the government, restricted mobilization of reserve forces, and this had
already been implemented in full.39
Chapter 14
The revision of Intelligence

evaluations and the shift to
offensive planning
On the morning of 19 May, the Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier-General

Aharon Yariv, who a day previously had claimed that the Egyptian
deployment was defensive, changed his mind and said that it should be
regarded ‘as offensive as well’. The continuing deployment of Egyptian
forces, the evacuation of the UN Emergency Force, the advance of Egypt-
ian bombers into Sinai, the photo reconnaissance sortie over Dimona and
the stationing of Egyptian troops at Sharm al-Sheikh had created a cumu-
lative effect which forced Israel to modify its Intelligence evaluations.
Yariv also reported that the Egyptian minister of war was visiting the Gaza
Strip with the intention, among others, of curbing any local initiative for
terrorist action which might hinder the operational plans of the Egyptian
army. Rabin ordered that preparations be made for mobilization of addi-
tional brigades, and that the emergency logistic disposition be activated.1
That morning, for the first time, the General Staff forum2 heard that the
Intelligence evaluation which had served as the basis for all long-term
planning was no longer valid. The Chief of Intelligence defined the most
recent Egyptian steps as ‘a most drastic change in the line they pursued till
now’. It was true, said Yariv, that in the absence of effective inter-Arab
cooperation, it could not be assumed that the Egyptians had abandoned
their basic view that the time was not yet ripe for a confrontation with
Israel. At the same time, the recent Egyptian moves were evidence ‘at least
of readiness to go very far towards such a confrontation, and perhaps even
readiness to initiate it themselves’.
It was Yariv’s opinion that it was not only concern for Syria that had
changed Egypt’s viewpoint and he offered two possible explanations: (1)
Egypt had received information or evaluations that Israel was about to
implement its nuclear programme and that all the American reassurances
on this matter were hollow; (2) the Egyptians believed that a wider con-
spiracy was afoot, aimed at striking at their efforts in Yemen by combined
action, initially against Syria, and perhaps even direct action against Egypt
while its main force was involved there. Yariv had gained the impression
that ‘there is apparently Soviet backing for Egypt and Syria in this situ-
The shift to offensive planning 143
ation, although it is not clear how far it is willing to go’.3 At this stage
Israeli Intelligence did not know that Soviet disinformation had sparked
off the crisis, but there were apparently some indications of this. As we
shall see below, Yariv’s evaluation of the role of the Soviet Union weighed
heavily on the political decision-makers.
Yariv described the constant expansion of the Egyptian force in Sinai4
and listed Egypt’s possible strategic objectives: (1) Conducting a ‘preven-
tive war’ with the aim of destroying the Dimona reactor and the Israeli
threat of nuclear weapons. They might also seek to achieve additional aims
such as a strike against IAF bases and perhaps also occupation of limited
areas. (2) Ending Israel’s freedom of action and undermining its ‘deterrent
image’. (3) Halting Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. (4)
Launching an all-out attack with the aim of annihilating Israel. This objec-
tive, according to military and political information, ‘apparently does not
seem feasible even to the Egyptians’.5
Thus, after three days of crisis, the Intelligence Branch admitted that the
firm conviction it had held for some years was no longer valid, namely that
Nasser would not involve himself in a war when the timing was not under
his control, so long as the crack forces of his army were bogged down in
Yemen, the Arab world was deeply divided, and the balance of forces
could not guarantee Arab victory. The contention of the military that the
struggle against Syria could be permitted to escalate without serious fear of
Egyptian intervention had been based on that same inflexible evaluation,
which had now suddenly been refuted. It now seemed that Egypt was pre-
pared for a military confrontation, perhaps even prepared to initiate it.
Yariv’s readiness to admit to all this is noteworthy.6
Rabin: ‘If it were only possible to turn back . . .’

After Yariv had delivered his evaluation, Rabin commented: ‘The time has
come for us to stop deluding ourselves that someone will come to our aid. I
suggest that anyone who is relying on someone else should consider that he is
wrong.’ Rabin noted that the ideal objective for Israel would be ‘first of all, if
it were only possible, to turn back’; in other words, to restore the military
status quo ante. But since this was mere wishful thinking, it was necessary to
deploy a suitable force in the south against Egypt and in the north against
Syria. In the centre of the country, facing Jordan, an alert without mobil-
ization of reserve forces would suffice, because it was unlikely that Jordan
would attack. Egypt, Rabin declared, would be the target for IDF action, but
only if it attacked. At this stage, the Chief of Staff was still contemplating
reaction in the event of an Arab onslaught, and not an offensive initiative.
The Chief of Staff demanded that officers and soldiers be made aware
‘that we are readying ourselves for war’, and that the complacent mood be
dispelled. ‘We did not choose this war, but . . . the situation now is the
144 The shift to offensive planning
most serious I can recall since the War of Independence.’ He feared that
the Egyptians might employ gas, and admitted that the IDF was not effect-
ively prepared for this contingency. He also noted that bombardment of
densely populated areas could be anticipated in wartime and stressed the
need for the civil defence system to be on the alert. The IDF’s small navy,
he said, was not capable of providing effective coastal defence against the
Egyptian navy and hence he placed his trust in the air force in this respect.7
Wide-scale mobilization
Later in the day, Rabin met with Eshkol, together with the chiefs of
Operations and Intelligence. They discussed the possibility of issuing a
statement that Israel would go to war if the Straits were closed, the aim
being to deter the Egyptians from taking this step. Thus it is evident that
within the senior command there were those who doubted the wisdom of
‘quiet diplomacy’.8
Since it was now believed that Egypt’s intentions were offensive, Rabin
demanded a go-ahead for a major mobilization, which Eshkol gave. Also
approved were the photo reconnaissance sorties requested by Intelligence
and by the IAF. The IAF was even granted a priori permission to attack
Egyptian airfields if the Egyptians bombed the reactor. Thus the change in
Intelligence evaluations drastically affected the attitudes of both the Chief
of Staff and the Minister of Defence, and the direct outcome was a dra-
matic increase in the call-up of reserve forces. Some 18,000 reserve troops
had already been mobilized, and now instant approval was given for an
additional 45,000.9 Mobilization on this scale could not be concealed. For
the first time since the crisis had broken out, the atmosphere reflected
awareness that Israel was on the brink of war.
The decision to mobilize on a wide scale was, so far as Israel was con-
cerned, ‘a quantum leap’. On the following day, 20 May, the General Staff
began to formulate an operational plan for an offensive against Egypt, no
longer content with the deployment of Southern Command in accordance
with the defensive plan, code-named ‘Sadan’ (Anvil). This marked a new
stage, namely no longer discreet and cautious moves, but the bustle of
preparations for a military clash. The mobilization was bitterly censured
by former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who argued that Israel was escalat-
ing the crisis by its own actions and increasing the danger that war would
ensue.10 There is no evidence that Nasser’s moves were motivated by
Israel’s mobilization of reserves. They were apparently influenced mainly
by calculations of prestige in the Arab world, by the frenzied popular
response in the Arab countries, which restored Nasser’s standing, by the
expectations aroused by his actions and by what seemed to be a triumph in
his gamble in the face of Israel’s ostensible display of weakness. In that
case, Ben-Gurion’s criticism was unjustified.
The mood of heightened tension eased somewhat in the afternoon,

when reports were received of the UN Secretary-General’s intention to visit
Cairo. A lull could now be anticipated, after which the direction of events
would become clearer. On the morning of 20 May, after receiving an Intel-
ligence report from Yariv, Rabin set out on a tour of Southern Command
with the Prime Minister. During the tour he told Eshkol that there were
two possible paths of action for the IDF: one was a major attack in order
to destroy the main Egyptian force in Sinai. The second was a limited
onslaught for the occupation of the Gaza Strip as a ‘bargaining card’ in
case Nasser closed the Straits. In any event, Rabin explained, the ground
operation would be preceded by an air operation aimed at paralysing the

Egyptian air force.11 Eshkol was not enthusiastic about the idea of occupy-
ing the Gaza Strip,12 but did not impose his opinion. Of particular interest
is the fact that such a vital issue as the IDF’s plans for war was discussed
between the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister informally during a tour
rather than at a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security, where it
was never raised.
Offensive planning
The fact that offensive operational planning was initiated only on 20 May
demonstrates that Israel’s fears of a sudden deterioration in the situation
and a surprise Egyptian initiative notwithstanding, the prospect of war had
not been taken seriously until then.
It is self-evident that within the General Staff and its various branches,
operational plans to cover a wide range of situations were filed away,
ready to be brought out, examined and updated when the ‘moment of
truth’ arrived. The question to be asked before analysing the plans them-
selves is whether the IDF’s operational planning was based on the direc-
tives of the political echelon or whether it was the exclusive product of the
inner logic of the military.
The answer was supplied by Yitzhak Hofi, Chief of the Operations
Department in the General Staff in 1965 to 1967, in a lecture to students
of the IDF Staff College:
‘As a rule, logic requires that in a democratic country, like the State of
Israel . . . the strategic objectives of the state be determined by the
political authority since it is generally accepted that the military
authority is the executive authority and not the authority that deter-
mines or should determine the country’s political goals. . . . In our case
the order was generally reversed. The army made up its own opera-
tional plans and made its own political assumptions as to those plans.
In each of the operational files and operational plans, the first page
contained basic hypotheses which the army, in practice, accepted as
political hypotheses. In general, once a year the General Staff pre-

sented its plans to the political echelon and received its approval and
sometimes its comments. But the sole, exceptional case where a polit-
ical conception preceded an operational plan was the [1956] Sinai
Campaign.’13
Theoretically, it could be deduced from Hofi’s remarks that the army

made its own decisions and planned its own moves and objectives without
reference to the standpoint of the political echelon. However, this would
be too sweeping a conclusion and should be qualified. First, the IDF’s
operational plan was not ‘forced’ on the political echelon. It is true that
the relevant minister did not convey instructions to the military on opera-
tional planning. The army formulated its own political assumptions from
which its plans derived, but eventually the plans were submitted for the
approval of the Minister.
Second, examination of the concrete political hypotheses of the army
reveals that they did not deviate from accepted theories. It may be, there-
fore, that the reason why the Minister remained uninvolved was due not
only to Eshkol’s unfamiliarity with military matters but also because the
army operated from an accepted starting point.
Third, and most important, the actual planning process did not
necessarily determine what would be done in practice when the time came,
and the army never questioned the right of the political echelon to decide
when it would take action and against which objectives.
Notwithstanding, this was undoubtedly a case of distortion of the
proper order and defective civil control and supervision of the army. This
resulted not only from the ‘civil’ nature of Eshkol’s government and his
lack of military knowledge, but also from the fact that the government
essentially perceived the army as the guardian of security and not as an
instrument for achieving political or territorial aims. This was the determi-
nant factor: the government, during this period, did not aspire to territor-
ial gains of any kind beyond the borders of the state. Hence, it did not
think it necessary to instruct the IDF to pursue any aim other than the fun-
damental, self-evident aim of defending Israel’s territorial integrity, the
security of the population and vital national interests. The IDF was
required to achieve these aims on the basis of professional considerations
and the government considered that its obligation was to supply the mili-
tary with the necessary instruments, without examining the operational
plans.
Therein lay the catch: since the narrow dimensions of the state dictated
a doctrine of ‘transferring hostilities to enemy territory’ the conduct of
warfare according to a strategically defensive and operationally offensive
approach was, in the final analysis, of territorial significance. The opera-
tional principles of offensive warfare called for occupation of territory
across the border, which, in retrospect, had far-reaching political implica-

tions. The government did not take sufficient note of the significance of the
operative planning and left it to the army. During the crisis, the govern-
ment never held discussions on the objectives of the war, either in plenum
session, at the Ministerial Commttee on Security, or in any ministerial or
civilian authorized forum. The army debated and wrestled with the ques-
tion, modifying and altering the operational plan, which received its final
form at the very last moment, by then under the penetrating gaze of the
new Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan, who was both knowledgeable and
involved, and hence exerted some influence on the final version of the
operational plan. In the end, as the dust of war settled, the military con-
fronted the political echelon with territorial facts which the latter had
never contemplated and for which it was completely unprepared.
‘Kardom’ (the Axe)

On the morning of 20 May a new stage began in the General Staff – offen-
sive planning. The ‘Kilshon’ (Pitchfork) plan was now revised and
renamed ‘Kardom’ (the Axe).14 It was a wide-ranging plan aimed at
enveloping the forward Egyptian force by wide pincer movements, the
shorter arm – Division 31 under Avraham Yoffe – to be dispatched
through the northern routes of the Sinai Peninsula to the rear of the Egypt-
ian force, and the longer arm – the 84th Division under Yisrael Tal – to
close it off from the south, and in between, the 38th Division – com-
manded by Ariel Sharon – would check and immobilize the enemy’s main
stronghold in the central route of Sinai.
It is noteworthy that the capture of Sharm al-Sheikh which controls
the Straits of Tiran was not included in the Pitchfork plan and that the
occupation or cutting off of the Gaza Strip was a mere addendum to the
plan. Although the defined objective was to take over all of Sinai and sta-
bilize the line at the Suez Canal within six days, inherent in the plan was
the assumption that the fighting was likely to cease in the early stages due
to international intervention, and hence maximum gains should be
extracted in the initial stage of the attack. The gain would not necessarily
be measured by the size of the captured area, although this too would be
an important factor, illustrating the extent of the Egyptian defeat and
serving as a political bargaining card. When the IDF’s objectives were
weighed in the balance – from occupation of territory to destruction of
enemy forces – the greater weight was clearly attributed to the latter.
Israel, in the final analysis, had no territorial demands on Egypt and the
unwritten assumption was that any area in Sinai captured by the IDF
would be restored to Egypt (as was the case in the wake of the 1956 Sinai
Campaign). On the other hand, the main objective, according to the plan,
was annihilation of the Egyptian army. The IAF, which was assigned the
mission of achieving superiority in the air, undertook the mission of

destroying the Egyptian air force and aiding ground forces by crushing the
Egyptian army in Sinai.
The Kardom plan was intended to trap the Egyptian army in northern
Sinai, blocking its paths of escape and forcing it into battle, particularly by
armoured forces. If the prime intention had been to achieve maximum ter-
ritorial gains in the briefest possible time, before external factors inter-
vened, military logic would have dictated that the Egyptians be enabled
and perhaps even lured into rapid retreat by employing threatening flank-
ing moves and leaving escape routes open. However, as noted above, since
territorial gain was of secondary significance, not likely to endure for polit-
ical reasons, destruction of the enemy’s force was accorded priority and
was to be considered the most important strategic gain of the war. The
lesson of the 1956 Sinai campaign was that even the loss of territorial
assets acquired during the war would not cancel out the long-term impact
of the military victory which won Israel years of quiet on the Egyptian
front. The conclusion was that the more resounding the military victory
and the greater the débâcle of the enemy force, the longer the enemy
would desist from military confrontation with the IDF and the greater
would remain Israel’s effective deterrent power.
The Kardom plan entailed complex logistic problems related to the con-
centration, movement, activation and provision of supplies to the southern
‘long arm’ which was to include the main armoured brigades of the IDF.15
The plan had been based on an envisioned situation which for the time
being actually existed, whereby the Egyptian rear in Sinai was void of
significant forces. Within two or three days, as the Fourth Division, the
main Egyptian armoured reserve, moved into Sinai, the existing format of
Kardom became impractical. In the new circumstances, the IDF’s ‘long
arm’, in the course of difficult and exhausting movement up from the
south for deep flanking of the forward Egyptian forces, was liable to find
itself face to face with a strong and fresh Egyptian force. Moreover, later
on, as fears grew that war would break out on other fronts as well, and in
particular the Jordanian front, the possibility of moving forces from arena
to arena along the shortest possible lines had to be taken into account.
Thus, to deploy the crack force in the distant south became a less attract-
ive option. For these reasons, the role of the southern arm of Kardom
dwindled as planning proceeded and the IDF now focused its efforts on the
northern and central axes of Sinai. In the final plan, Nakhshonim, all that
was left of the southern arm of Kardom was a secondary move and a
deceptive action, important in themselves but by no means decisive.
At noon on 20 May the Head of the Operations Department presented
the plan for assault to the Chief of Operations,16 and the plan was subse-
quently submitted to the Chief of Staff. After a lengthy discussion of the
various aspects of the plan, Rabin approved it, but added, in the margins,
an order which generated alternative and controversial operational plan-

ning in the IDF. Rabin said: ‘We need also to plan the possibility of annihi-
lating the Egyptian air force and taking the [Gaza] Strip.’17
Atzmon
The alternative offensive plan for the Egyptian front was given the code-
name Atzmon and was the reverse of the Kardom plan. In effect, it advoc-
ated the continuation of the defensive ground plan with a minor offensive
addition: the occupation of the Gaza Strip.
Rabin’s order on 20 May to prepare a limited alternative plan stemmed

from the difficulty in adapting instantly to the swift transition from
defence to comprehensive war. In contrast to his fellow senior officers, the
Chief of Staff was exposed to the reluctance of the political echelon to con-
template war and to the gamut of foreign and internal political considera-
tions discussed by the government. He could not therefore confine himself
to purely military calculations. Atzmon was a minimal plan for a ‘small’
war. Rabin knew that the government did not want war of any kind but
he also knew that there would be no escape from a military response to an
offensive Egyptian move or the blocking of the Straits if Israel wanted to
preserve its deterrent power. Atzmon was a hard-pressed possible solution
in such a situation for those who wanted to avert all-out hostilities but
who were required to provide some answer to the Egyptian challenge. The
idea was simple: simultaneously with destruction of the Egyptian air force
(the IAF ‘Moked’ plan), the IDF would conquer the Gaza Strip and
thereby inflict a blow on Nasser’s prestige and provide the Israeli govern-
ment with a ‘bargaining card’ against the blocking of the Straits and the
concentration of forces in Sinai.
The great advantage of Atzmon lay in its simplicity, the ability to imple-
ment it with relative ease and brevity and the immediate political gain it
ensured, which could serve as a lever for achieving the desired political
objective: restoration of the status quo ante, namely dispersal of the forces
and guarantee of freedom of shipping. And all this without involvement in
large-scale hostilities and with high probability that the other fronts would
remain calm.
The drawback of Atzmon was liable to be the ‘squandering’ of the
air strike on a minimal ground gain which would not produce the desired
result. Nasser was liable to be unimpressed by the Israeli ‘bargaining
card’, the Tiran Straits would remain blocked, Israel would be ‘stuck’ with
the Gaza Strip, with its vast and hostile refugee population, the political
situation would not permit Israel to launch another offensive operation
with the aim of opening up the Straits, Nasser might exploit the passing
of time for purchase of massive military supplies from the Soviet Union
and rehabilitation of the Egyptian air force, and launch a counter-attack
when it suited him in coordination with the other Arab states. Meanwhile
the concentrations of forces in Sinai would remain unchanged and
might even be reinforced, and Israel would be forced to maintain a high
level of alert and mobilization at an intolerably heavy economic and moral
cost.
This was apparently the reasoning behind the fierce resistance among
the senior military command to the Atzmon plan. The only general who
supported the Chief of Staff was Yisrael Tal, whose division was ear-
marked for action. Tal argued that the occupation of the Gaza Strip was
an operative target which could be achieved within twenty-four hours, so
that if the fighting was stopped by then due to external intervention Israel
would retain ‘a tangible gain . . . and Nasser who is presented as the
warrior of Islam and the shield of the Palestinians will now appear as
someone who has not succeeded in defending even those who were under
his direct protection in the Gaza Strip’.18
With the exception of Tal, the General Staff was overwhelmingly
opposed to Atzmon. The relevant criticism was accompanied by a feeling
of affront. It was generally believed that underlying the plan was a
total lack of confidence in the capability of the IDF. The Commander
of Southern Command claimed that he and all the division commanders
had been ‘shocked. . . . We had the feeling that the IDF was being shamed
. . . that they don’t believe in the power of the IDF.’19 A weighty supporter
of the critics was Major-General (res.) Moshe Dayan, who on 20 May
asked for and received the permission of the Minister of Defence to
tour the IDF front. During his tours of Southern Command, Dayan voiced
his reservations about the plan to its Commander and the division
commanders.20
Because of the strong objections to Atzmon, the plan was later
expanded while the Chief of Staff was indisposed and without his know-
ledge, so as to encompass not only the occupation of the Gaza Strip but
also an advance along the Sinai northern coast to el-Arish and beyond. In
hindsight, this was only a stage in the evolution of the new, wider plan for
the Egyptian front, an alternative to Kardom, which shifted the main effort
from the southern axis to northern Sinai. The expanded plan was known
as ‘the extended Atzmon’ or Kardom 2 and in its final version as
‘Nakhshonim’.
The change in the Intelligence evaluation of the General Staff and the
transition to an offensive plan at the end of the first week of the crisis
were, naturally, interconnected. Where the Chief of Staff’s relations with
the political echelon were concerned, it was no less than an ‘earthquake’.
After years of rigid Intelligence evaluations to the effect that Nasser was
not intent on war, Yitzhak Rabin was now obliged to admit to Eshkol and
the Ministerial Committee on Security that the conception had collapsed:
Nasser was bent on confrontation, and Israel should prepare for war.
The tension left its mark on Rabin. The first sign was his instruction to
draw up the Atzmon plan, which reflected his desire to avoid an all-out
war even if Nasser blocked the Straits. This new way of thinking accorded
with the stance of the majority of the government, but was totally at odds
with the mood of the General Staff. Rabin’s distress deepened when
Nasser announced the blocking of the Straits, and the dilemma took on
substance.
Chapter 15
Casus belli
On the evening of 22 May, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, accompanied

by Vice-President Abdel Hakim Amer, visited the Egyptian air force base
at Bir Gafgafa in Sinai and addressed the pilots and officers. Nasser sur-
veyed the events which had led to his decision to move Egypt’s army into
Sinai and to evacuate the UNEF. He noted, among other things, that
‘Israeli commanders’ had proclaimed their intention of conquering Damas-
cus and overthrowing the Syrian regime, and that Eshkol, too, had threat-
ened Syria in the belief that Egypt would not intervene because it was
bogged down in Sinai. The bombshell was contained in a single phrase in
his long speech, namely: ‘Under no circumstances will we permit the Israeli
flag to pass through the Bay of Aqaba.’1
As significant as the content was the style of the speech, both contemp-
tuous and provocative, throwing down the gauntlet to Israel. ‘The Jews are
threatening war – we say to them ahlan wa-sahlan (welcome)!’ Mocking
Israel and questioning its military power, Nasser revealed that Israel had
agreed to participate in 1956 in the British–French conspiracy against
Egypt only on condition that a French squadron was posted to defend
Israeli air space, and claimed that he had ordered his army to retreat in
order to confront the French and British forces, and hence the claim that
the IDF had beaten the Egyptian army in Sinai was baseless. Nasser added
challengingly: ‘Perhaps war will be an opportunity for the Jews, for Israel,
for Rabin, to test their strength against our force and to discover that
everything they have written about the 1956 battle and the conquest of
Sinai is a collection of rubbish.’2
The speech was broadcast after midnight on Radio Cairo, and on the
following morning, 23 May, was headlined in the press. All the Egyptian
papers published alongside the item a photograph of Nasser and Amer
laughing heartily together with the pilots. Radio Cairo and the Egyptian
press emphasized that the blockade would apply not only to vessels
bearing the Israeli flag but also to those conveying ‘strategic materials’,
such as oil. The psychological impact of the news item was very strong: it
whipped up the popular mood in the Arab world to frenzied dimensions,
Casus belli 153
and intensified Israeli fears and awareness that there was almost no escape
from war.
The discussion with Eshkol in the Pit

At 03:45 on 23 May, shortly after retiring for the night, Rabin received
word from the Chief of Intelligence that, according to Reuters, Nasser had
proclaimed the closing of the Straits of Tiran to vessels bearing the Israeli
flag. The Chief of Staff’s bureau chief informed Eshkol’s military secretary,
who immediately left for the supreme command post and telephoned Levi
Eshkol from there.3 Shortly afterwards, the Chiefs of Operations and Intel-
ligence, the Commander of the IAF and the head of the Operations
Department met with the Chief of Staff in the ‘pit’, in the course of which
they received information that the blockade would also apply to tankers
carrying oil to Israel.
The implications, so far as the General Staff was concerned, were clear
and self-evident: war. The view that such an Egyptian move would mean
war was an axiomatic assumption in the army and had been the pro-
claimed casus belli of Israeli governments for the past decade. The evident
conclusion was that Nasser’s proclamation amounted to a declaration of
war on Israel. This was also the feeling among the general public.4
At the same time there were several reasons why Israel could not, for
the time being, react automatically with military force to the Egyptian
President’s declaration: (1) the declaration had not yet been put to the
practical test; (2) the US President had urgently requested a ‘time-out’; (3)
members of the Israeli government were reluctant to go to war; (4) the
Chief of Staff, the supreme commander of Israel’s armed forces, whose
response was anxiously awaited, was by no means in a bellicose spirit.
Yitzhak Rabin started the day in a state of exhaustion as a result of a
long and nerve-racking week, drained by lack of sleep and tension, suffer-
ing the side-effects of heavy smoking and burdened by guilt feelings. The
information on the blockade reached him in the early morning hours when
he was emotionally and physically burnt-out and close to collapse. In the
course of that critical day he was far from being at his best, and was inca-
pable of instilling confidence in others and displaying the required decisive
leadership and composure. All eyes were upon him, and his apparent hesi-
tation and apprehension had an intimidating effect on some of the minis-
ters, enhancing their dread of war. In the end, Rabin collapsed under the
pressure and the intolerable burden of responsibility and fell sick. He
recovered and began to function again only thirty-six hours later.
In discussions he held from the morning onward in the supreme
command post, in which Eshkol, the Deputy Minister of Defence Zvi Din-
stein and the head of the Mossad Meir Amit joined him, Rabin emphas-
ized the risks of fighting on at least two fronts. In particular he constantly
154 Casus belli
reiterated his fears of the Soviet Union.5 In the course of the discussions
Eshkol received a message from the US President, conveyed from the
Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow to Ambassador Avraham
Harman and Minister Ephraim Evron, in which Johnson urged the Israeli
government not to act for the coming forty-eight hours. The US adminis-
tration wanted to gain time in order to weigh up the situation and decide
what line to adopt to contain the crisis. The discussion in the ‘pit’ there-
fore revolved around the significance of Johnson’s message in light of the
new situation and of a previous secret message from Washington which
implied that the US administration was reaffirming Israel’s right to react
with force in the event that Nasser closed the Straits.6

Analysing the situation, Rabin concluded that there was no escape from
war, but he dwelt on its cost and dangers: (1) if hostilities broke out, they
would undoubtedly be waged on two fronts and might even expand to a
third front;7 (2) in the anticipated war, ‘We will have to act alone, and it
will be a life and death war, a war of to be or not to be’; (3) the main
problem, he claimed, was not the Arabs but the Soviets; (4) the settlements
in the north would undoubtedly suffer heavy Syrian bombardment which
would inflict ‘tremendous damage’.8
Eshkol, to the dissatisfaction of most of the senior officers, decided not
to precipitate matters. ‘We have another week until the next oil tanker is
due in Eilat,9 and until then we should exploit the time for political activ-
ity.’ Thus, Eshkol did not consider Nasser’s declaration to be a pretext for
war so long as no ship bound for Israel was blocked en route. Summing up
the discussion, he said: ‘I understand that the army is of the opinion that
we should wait no longer.’ He was evidently implying that the army’s
viewpoint would be presented to the government, but that he personally
was against immediate warfare, both in light of Johnson’s message and
because, until the Straits were actually blocked, there was respite for diplo-
matic action.10
Discussion at the Ministerial Committee on

Security
After leaving the ‘pit’, the Prime Minister convened the Ministerial Com-
mittee on Security at 09:00 for a decisive discussion in the Prime Minister’s
Office in Tel Aviv. It was clear that the question on the agenda was
whether to go to war. The tension was high and several of the ministers
were in a very nervous state.11
The Prime Minister opened the proceedings: ‘On our front there is
news. . . . It requires consultations and not only consultations but my
impression is that it calls for action as well.’ With this brief introduction,
Eshkol, as Minister of Defence, seemed to be placing himself on the side of
the army, though perhaps not decisively so. Immediately afterwards he
Casus belli 155
yielded the floor to the Chief of Staff Rabin, who reported that the Egypt-
ian force at Sharm had been instructed to block the Straits from 12:00 that
day, but not to damage in any way vessels escorted by US warships.
He posed the question of ‘whether or not to accept this’ to the minis-
ters, without himself stating his position, but noted that failure to respond
would undermine Israel’s deterrent capability. It would be impossible, he
explained, to limit the fighting to Sharm al-Sheikh, ‘because that means
starting the war in the most difficult and worst place for us’. The only pos-
sibility was to strike at the Egyptian air force and to advance forces into
Sinai. It could be assumed, he added, that the Syrians would intervene with
air and artillery attacks, and Israel should take into account that for the
first few hours the IDF would not be free to silence Syrian fire. ‘The choice
is not easy,’ Rabin told the ministers. ‘I am not suggesting that it will be a
stroll in the park.’ After observing the anxious expressions of the minis-
ters, Rabin felt the need to qualify his remarks: ‘I may have been too pes-
simistic.’
Foreign Minister Eban spoke after Rabin. He proposed that he be sent
on a mission to Washington immediately in order to obtain unequivocal
clarification from President Johnson as to whether his government would
honour its commitment to Israel and US warships would escort shipping
through the Straits. The historical weight of the moment dictated this
move, Eban emphasized, even if the prospect of a positive response was
very slim. ‘I think that for generations to come we will not be able to
explain to ourselves and to others [how we missed the opportunity to avert
war] without putting this to the test.’ Eban interpreted the Chief of Staff’s
viewpoint as support for a military operation, but argued that his own trip
did not rule out this possibility but merely postponed it in order to clarify
whether or not there was an alternative.
Once again the ‘doves’ set the tone at this discussion. Moshe Haim
Shapira supported Eban’s proposal. If the US escorted Israeli vessels, he
said, ‘it will be a very grave warning for Nasser’, and the longer it was
possible to postpone war the better. Yisrael Barzilai feared that a Soviet
commitment had motivated Egypt’s conduct. He was afraid that Israeli
cities would be bombed, and was not confident ‘both from the military
viewpoint and as regards internal defence’. Zalman Aranne commented
that ‘this secret of bombing airfields is not an Israeli patent’ and feared
that the Israeli assault aircraft ‘will be so battered by this’ that they would
be unable to provide protection in Israel’s air space. Pinhas Sapir and
Yisrael Galili, casting all the weight of responsibility on Rabin, asked him
whether a postponement of forty-eight or sixty hours would critically
affect the surprise element. Rabin hesitated and his reply was wavering: ‘It
is a difficult question,’ he said. ‘It isn’t a surprise move. They are ready for
this move. They may be more nervous today in anticipation of our
response . . . to say that 48 hours is fateful. . . . I can’t undertake to answer
156 Casus belli
that.’ After Rabin’s reply, Galili steered the rest of the discussions: ‘Since I
hear from the Chief of Staff that a 48 hour postponement, and it will cer-
tainly be more, does not mean a decisive failure’, Eban’s trip should be
approved.
After the meeting, the following resolutions were adopted: (1) that the
Ministerial Committee on Security regarded the closing of the Straits of
Tiran as an act of aggression against Israel; (2) to postpone the decision on
this act for forty-eight hours, in the course of which the Foreign Minister
would clarify the US stand; (3) to empower the Prime Minister and Minis-
ter of Defence to decide on the Foreign Minister’s meeting with the US
President.12
Discussions with the opposition

At the beginning of its session, the Ministerial Committee decided, on the
advice of the Prime Minister, that several members would meet the same
day with representatives of the opposition. Also invited were the Secretary
of Mapai Golda Meir, and the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee Chairman David Hacohen, and, from the opposition – Knesset
members Menahem Begin, Aryeh Ben-Eliezer, Yosef Serlin and Elimelekh
Rimalt of Gahal (Herut–Liberals Bloc) and Moshe Dayan and Shimon
Peres of Rafi (Ben-Gurion’s ‘Israel Workers’ Party).
Eshkol asked the Chief of Staff to brief the participants. Rabin
described the dilemma: loss of the IDF’s deterrent capability or bitter
warfare, perhaps on all fronts. Again he pointed out the danger of expos-
ing the settlements in the north to Syrian artillery. His recommendation
did not sound decisive: ‘It seems to me . . . there is almost no alternative
but to try and strike a blow at Egypt.’
Eshkol was not pleased with the US stand but explained the problem
facing the government, namely whether to accede to Johnson’s request to
postpone reaction for forty-eight hours lest a refusal cause him to wash his
hands of Israel. Eshkol was probably hinting at the possibility that Israel
would have need of US aid in order to check Soviet intervention or in the
event that the military situation deteriorated. None of the participants at
the meeting objected to acceding to Johnson’s request. Ben-Eliezer and
Hacohen were taken by surprise and were particularly concerned at
Rabin’s statement, from which they gathered that the IDF was not ade-
quately prepared for a war on several fronts and that the civilian popu-
lation was liable to remain exposed to attack for a number of hours.
Golda Meir, Begin and Ben-Eliezer, however, opposed the idea that US
warships should escort Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. Moshe
Dayan, on the other hand, argued for a permanent US presence in the
Straits, which would guarantee free shipping. He said: ‘More power to
them. I’m willing to put my Israeli pride on hold.’13
Casus belli 157
Lior to Eshkol: ‘He’s not the same Yitzhak’

At noon Rabin again met with Eshkol who approved the mobilization of
another 30,000 reserve troops.14 An additional meeting with the Prime
Minister later in the afternoon exposed the differences of opinion between
Rabin and Weizman. The Chief of Operations favoured an immediate mil-
itary operation to culminate in a shattering blow to the Egyptian air force,
while the Chief of Staff claimed that war entailed bloodshed which he was
anxious to avoid, and hence, so long as there was a prospect of regulating
passage through the Straits by diplomatic means, military action should be
delayed. Rabin preferred, therefore, to refrain from fighting until diplo-

matic efforts had been exhausted, and in any event focused only on the
minimal plan, Atzmon.15
Rabin reported that the Egyptians were constantly reinforcing their
units in Sinai, so that it was essential for the IDF to deliver the first blow
by employing air power. At the same time, he added, ‘The war will not be
easy and a great deal of blood will be spilled, and we will have many losses
– are we ready for this?’
The Chief of Staff’s standpoint apparently instilled a minimalist mood
in the other participants as well. Commander of the Southern Command
Yeshayahu Gavish said that it was essential to decide which plan was to be
pursued: Atzmon or Kardom. Gavish recommended that the IDF start by
occupying the Gaza Strip before achieving dominance in the air, and once
the latter had been achieved ‘to take another serious chunk [of Sinai]
without going too far south’. This operation would be code-named
‘limited Kardom’, He supported General Yisrael Tal’s proposal to proceed
along the northern axis to el-Arish. This was apparently the first hint of
what was to develop into an interim plan, to be called ‘extended Atzmon’
or Kardom 2, its crux to be the occupation of the Gaza Strip and northern
Sinai, a plan which was to gather momentum in the days to come.
Following Gavish, Rabin said:
‘It’s not pleasant to contemplate, but it’s a fact that it is not easy to
start a war – not only as such but also because of the enemy’s deploy-
ment. The main condition for success is to achieve superiority in the
air and this cannot be achieved rapidly. And it may become necessary
to divert air power to Syria.16 . . . Hence our aim is not conquest of
Sinai but a blow to the Egyptian air force and armour, while capturing
the Strip.’
Rabin was making it clear that the reference was to Atzmon and no
more than that.
The notes recorded by the head of the IDF History Department
Avraham Elon on the deliberations in the afternoon hours of 23 May,
158 Casus belli
from which the above statements are cited, reflect Rabin’s minimalist
mood but not his despondency. Yisrael Lior, Eshkol’s military secretary,
was so troubled by Rabin’s weary and stumbling performance that he felt
it necessary to drive to Jerusalem and report to the Prime Minister. ‘It’s
hard to define what’s going on with the Chief of Staff,’ he said, ‘but his
behaviour has changed. . . . It’s not the same Yitzhak.’17
Weizman, who was frustrated by Rabin’s viewpoint, wondered whether
in light of the government decision to exhaust the diplomatic possibilities,
it was still urgent to mobilize almost all of the reserve forces. Rabin gave
the order to mobilize. In the early evening he met tête-à-tête with Weizman
and they apparently discussed what task to assign to Brigadier General

Haim Barlev, who was summoned back from his studies in Paris when the
closing of the Straits became known. After a talk with Yisrael Galili, Rabin
went home. Efrat, his bureau chief, left for the airport to greet Barlev. ‘The
Chief of Staff is not feeling well and has gone home’, Efrat told him.18 (See
Appendix: ‘What happened to Yitzhak Rabin’.)
In the evening the Prime Minister addressed the Knesset to sum up the
political discussion. In referring to the events of the past day, he spoke in a
minor key. He described the blocking of the Straits as ‘an act of aggression
against Israel’, and revealed that the government was in close contact with
the countries which had supported the principle of free shipping in the
Gulf of Aqaba in 1957, and that ‘international support for those rights is
serious and quite extensive’. Eshkol appealed to the Superpowers to ‘act
without delay to maintain the right to free shipping to our southern
port’.19
Under the new circumstances, and in the absence of effective pressure
from the military for an immediate military operation in response to the
Egyptian blockade, the Prime Minister had no difficulty in taking time for
political and diplomatic action. Without further thought, he dispatched
Eban on his diplomatic mission to clarify the degree to which the United
States was ready to take action to guarantee freedom of shipping and the
practical significance of its commitment to Israel’s security. Eban expanded
his mission to include Paris and London. The US President had asked for
forty-eight hours and Eban’s mission doubled the period of time in which
the government could not take decisions, and the army could not, of
course, take action. During the interval, fears of an initiated Egyptian
strike grew in the IDF, and the senior command began to urge Eshkol and
the government to permit a pre-emptive Israeli move which would foil the
dangerous prospect of an Arab attack.
The stagnation as a result of Eban’s mission evoked profound frustra-
tion among the senior command. The international diplomatic effort was
focused entirely on the problem of free shipping. This problem was,
politically speaking, a casus belli and, diplomatically speaking, a lever for
recruiting international support. But from the military point of view this
Casus belli 159
was of marginal importance. The existential threat to the State of Israel

did not stem from the blocking of the Straits but from the massing of
forces along its borders and the prospect of a pan-Arab onslaught. Even
without an Arab attack, this deployment of forces called for a parallel
deployment of the IDF, which meant wide-scale mobilization of reserves
and disruption of everyday life, a situation which would prove intolerable
in the long run.
The diplomatic effort, therefore, from the point of view of the General
Staff, was focused on a barren issue. Even if it succeeded it would not
solve the main problem that the IDF faced. But so long as the diplomatic
campaign was in full force, and the breaking of the blockade by inter-
national force seemed possible, Israel ostensibly had no pretext for war,
and the ‘dovish’ sector of the government foiled decisions on military
action. Hence the senior command, as we shall see below, decided to inter-
vene in the diplomatic moves in order, at least, to shift the focus of diplo-
macy from the secondary issue of the Straits to the main problem: the
concentration of forces. They did not succeed in this, but gradually
instilled in the political echelon awareness that the tangible threat to
national security lay in the latter and not in the former. It was this aware-
ness which eventually impelled the government to decide to go to war.
Chapter 16
=
The army pressures the
government
Gamal Abdul Nasser’s declaration about the blocking of the Tiran Straits
was greeted in Israel with astonishment. The possibility of a blockade had
been contemplated, but nobody had imagined that it would occur while
the UN Secretary-General was on his way to Cairo. On the contrary, U
Thant’s trip had eased the tension and aroused expectations that the diplo-
matic stage in the crisis was about to ensue. The impact of the shock was
manifested in the mood of panic at the civilian level and of indecisiveness
at the senior military level. While the most dramatic expression was the
physical collapse of the Chief of Staff, the precipitous decision to dispatch
the Foreign Minister on a mission to Western capitals was also an instinc-
tive reaction to shock and indicated disarray rather than judicious
consideration. Within a day or two the atmosphere in Israel would change.
Rabin would rally, the army would adopt a decisive stand and Eshkol
would be persuaded that Israel must deliver the first blow against Egypt.
However, by then Eban’s mission was a diplomatic fact and a liability for
the government and its ability to decide on a pre-emptive strike.
The sharp change was wrought by the Intelligence evaluation that
Nasser’s decision to block the Straits and the subsequent enthusiastic
response in the Arab world possibly implied that Nasser no longer feared
the prospect of war and might even set it in motion at any moment. But
another reason was the return of Minister of Labour Yigal Allon and of
Brigadier General Haim Barlev, who had been out of the country since the
beginning of the crisis, and whose presence was vitally important to both
the government and the General Staff.
From 24 May the military began to exert increasing pressure on the
civilian echelon to launch a pre-emptive strike.1 The evaluation that Nasser
was ready for a military clash with Israel and would not rescind his
decision to block the Straits meant that war was now inevitable. Since
nobody in the General Staff pinned real hopes on international action,
Eban’s mission was viewed by it as harmful, liable to bind Israel’s hands
and give the Egyptian army respite to consolidate its positions in Sinai or
perhaps even to initiate offensive action. Moreover, military Intelligence
The army pressures the government 161
= was concerned at the growing activity between the Arab states and at the
frenetic mood of the Arab world, now rallying around Nasser’s leadership
and call for war against Israel.
In view of the continual escalation, it was feared that as time passed
and the Arab deployment along Israel’s borders consolidated, Israel’s mili-
tary situation would become more difficult. The nightmare scenario of the
General Staff was the establishment of a coordinated pan-Arab offensive
force, to include an Iraqi expeditionary force on the West Bank, and a con-
certed aerial attack on Israel’s few airfields, on the Dimona reactor, and on
civilian concentrations and infrastructures. Another possibility was a large-
scale renewal of terrorist activity on all the borders, including the Gaza
Strip, under cover of the Arab military deployment, forcing Israel to attack
and thereby providing the pretext for a pan-Arab onslaught. Even if no
Arab action was taken, the presence of an offensive and threatening mili-
tary concentration, however static, along Israel’s borders, would force
Israel to maintain mobilized reserves in the long term, thereby paralysing
the economy. In order to interrupt this dangerous development in good
time, the army considered it essential to take the initiative as soon as pos-
sible, and above all to ensure dominance in the air.
Weizman’s day
In the absence of Yitzhak Rabin, 24 May was the day of Ezer Weizman,
his second-in-command. It may also have been the day which sealed his
fate and determined that he would never serve as Chief of Staff. Weizman
testified that after visiting the ailing Rabin late on 23 May he had spent a
sleepless night.2 Then he decided that morning ‘to take command’ and to
put the army into action. He had gallantly spurned Rabin’s suggestion that
he take over command of the IDF, but his instincts told him that he must
take immediate initiative, move the forces and send them into action.
Weizman probably feared that the atmosphere of inaction and uncertainty
would filter down from the General Staff to the field units. He did not
share the hesitations and guilt feelings which tormented Yitzhak Rabin,
and had been far less exposed than Rabin to political considerations and
deliberations of the government and the Ministerial Committee on Secur-
ity. Moreover, by nature he was decisive, self-confident, impetuous and
trigger-happy.
Weizman acted rapidly in order to draw up an operative plan that same
day, submit it to the Prime Minister and order a quick movement of units
in the south that night to new deployment areas so that they would be
ready for battle the next day. However, the outcome was the reverse of
Weizman’s intention. The government was unable to take a decision
during the forced political ‘time-out’ provided by Eban’s mission. The
orders issued by the General Staff on Weizman’s instructions for urgent
162 The army pressures the government
futile cross-movements between the divisions stationed in the Negev =

created a strong impression of disorder and panic. The commanding
officer of Southern Command and the division commanders criticized
Weizman, and the demand was voiced for the appointment of Haim Barlev
as Rabin’s deputy.
Weizman resented Rabin’s drastic curtailing of the operational plan
from Kardom to Atzmon. The latter essentially overturned the objective of
the IDF’s operational planning, namely to destroy the Egyptian army, and
confined itself to the effort to win a dubious territorial ‘bargaining card’ in
the form of the Gaza Strip. Not a single member of the General Staff, with
the exception of Yisrael Tal, supported Atzmon. Hence Weizman decided

on his own responsibility not to discuss it with the Chief of Staff (whom he
visited again that morning), but to formulate an interim plan, whose basic
points had been suggested by Gavish and Tal to Rabin the previous day
before his collapse – something in between Kardom and Atzmon. This was
the ‘extended Atzmon’ plan or ‘Kardom 2’. Its main gist was an aerial
attack (Moked) on the Egyptian air force simultaneously with capture of
the Gaza Strip and a breakthrough on the northern axis towards el-Arish
as the main thrust. Implementation was scheduled for 25 May. The objec-
tive was to achieve an immediate ‘bargaining card’ for political negotia-
tions, to guarantee freedom of shipping and withdrawal of Egyptian
forces, on the assumption that the Superpowers would soon impose a
ceasefire. The Eighty-fourth (regular) Division, under Yisrael Tal, was
assigned to the northern axis. The Thirty-first Division, under Avraham
Yaffe, which was to operate on the northern axis, was now ordered to
engage in a secondary effort on the southern axis. Only the mission of the
Thirty-eighth Division, under Ariel Sharon, remained unchanged – to
check and immobilize the massive Egyptian deployment in the Abu Ageila-
Quseima sector.
On the morning of 24 May Weizman discussed the new operational
plan with a limited General Staff forum. He ordered the IAF Commander
to put the force on alert, ready to carry out Moked. By 08:30 the Opera-
tions Department had issued a standby order for Kardom 2, including the
necessary movement of forces to be carried out on the night of 24/25 May.
Generals Gavish and Tal wondered ‘If the orders are implementable and if
they are not too densely timed’. But there was no time for debate.
Weizman wanted the IDF attack to begin the next morning, and he
intended to conclude the matter without delay with Eshkol and to submit
the operational plan for his approval that day.3
By noon Weizman had met twice with Eshkol and reported to him on
the condition of the Chief of Staff and on the orders issued in connection
with the IDF plan, and it was agreed that the plans would be submitted in
the late afternoon for approval by the Prime Minister.4 Prior to that, the
Chief Medical Officer Dr Eliyahu Gilon had reported in private to the
= Prime Minister on Rabin’s condition and apparently assured him that the
Chief of Staff was expected to recover within twenty-four hours.5
The plans were presented to the Prime Minister between 17:30 and
20:00 in the supreme command post, and the meeting was attended by
most of the generals, including Haim Barlev.6 It was Eshkol’s first meeting
with the senior command since the crisis had begun, and in contrast to
their future encounters there were no indications of a rift between the
General Staff and the Minister of Defence. However, there were initial
signs of tension. The generals complained about the attitude of the polit-
ical echelon and emphasized that the success of an IDF attack was condi-
tional on the go-ahead for war at the earliest possible opportunity. The
feeling in the ‘pit’ was that Israel was on the brink of war. Eshkol knew
that it would not be possible to obtain a government decision to launch
hostilities while the Foreign Minister was in Washington, but chose not to
say this to the senior commanders. Weizman and other generals demanded
that Eshkol convene the government that night and that a decision be
reached,7 but the Prime Minister gave no indication that the operation
would be approved for the following day. On the other hand, he did not
explicitly rule out the possibility.8 Eshkol left the meeting heartened by the
self-confidence of the generals, which contrasted with the hesitations of the
Chief of Staff.9
On the night of 24/25 May, the forces in the Negev were moved in
accordance with Weizman’s order (in particular the 200th and 520th
Armoured Brigades), but movement was halted towards morning, when it
transpired that no go-ahead had been received from the political echelon,
and the forces were ordered to move back.10 The erratic movement con-
vinced the units that the senior command had lost their heads. Weizman’s
prestige sank to a new low.
The events of the night were described by the Commander of the Thirty-
eighth Division, Ariel Sharon, as ‘a crazy race of intersecting forces’. He felt
‘that everything is collapsing there [in the General Staff]. What particularly
affected me was to see those convoys crossing one another and there was
mayhem. . . . I had no idea if the General Staff knew what was going on,
and we didn’t know what was going on up there.’ Sharon tried to contact
the Chief of Staff but Rabin’s secretary, Ruhama Tzafrir, answered that he
was ill. Sharon’s request to visit Rabin at home was refused. On 25 May in
the morning Sharon wrote a note to Avraham Yaffe, Commander of the
Thirty-first Division: ‘It seems to me that the army is very sick.’ Yaffe
replied: ‘The war yesterday was conducted by our mutual friend [Weizman]
and that’s exactly what it looks like.’ The Command CO, Yeshayahu
Gavish, reported that the pointless movements had infuriated him. ‘It
wasn’t simple to move all the units in a single night. It was just someone’s
lunacy.’ The next day Gavish told Rabin: ‘I’m sorry, but you need to hurry
and appoint Haim Barlev as Deputy Chief of Staff.’11
Why did Weizman act so hastily without consulting the Chief of Staff, =
although they had met that same morning? There were apparently three
reasons:
1 Weizman, like most of his colleagues in the General Staff, and unlike
Rabin, believed that it was essential to act without delay and to strike
at Egypt in reaction to the blockade, in order to maintain the IDF’s
deterrent capability. As he saw it, from the moment the Egyptians had
crossed the ‘red line’ there was no escape from a clash, and it would
be preferable to act while the Egyptian force was unorganized, and to
preclude the danger that Egypt would attack first.

2 Weizman felt that in Rabin’s present emotional state, when he was
even contemplating resigning, it was pointless to discuss the operative
plan with him. Weizman must have been shocked by the fact that, at
this critical stage, the IDF was suddenly left without a leader, and
decided that it was vital to send the army into action at once to over-
come the leadership void.
3 On that same day, Weizman became aware of the threatening shadow
cast by Haim Barlev, his rival for the post of next Chief of Staff, who
had just returned from studies in France and spent the day in the ‘pit’
studying the plans.12 Thus, Weizman had an additional motive for
taking over command in order to consolidate his status.
There may have been an additional, covert reason for Weizman’s desire
to send the IDF into action as fast as possible. Unlike his ‘ground force’
colleagues, he believed wholeheartedly in the IAF. Under his command, the
Moked plan for destruction of the Arab air forces had been developed and
streamlined, and he must have been eager to put it to the test.13 Its success,
as the war in fact demonstrated, would lay the foundation for ground
action and determine the direction the fighting would take.
To say that Weizman’s independent moves did not gratify Yitzhak
Rabin would be an understatement. In his memoirs Rabin described his
emotions with circumspection, merely commenting that ‘Ezer acted
impetuously’.14
The urgent cables: the military intervenes

When the senior command realized that there was no chance of approval
for a military move before the diplomatic endeavours had been exhausted,
they decided that it was necessary to intervene in order to divert the focus
of attention from the issue of free shipping to the main military threat –
the concentration of enemy forces and the fact that time was running out.
The first sign of active IDF intervention can be identified in the initi-
atives of Shlomo Argov, the Foreign Ministry’s liaison officer to the
= General Staff. Argov criticized the tactics of his ministry, thereby echoing
the stance of the General Staff.15 He even met, on his own initiative,
with US Ambassador Barbour, stressed the importance of the time factor
and hinted that an IDF operation was imminent, which came as a shock
to the ambassador.16 However, Argov’s initiative was merely the overture
to direct intervention in the diplomatic process on the part of Yitzhak
Rabin.
On 25 May, Rabin returned to his post. His standing had apparently
been undermined in the eyes of the political echelon although this was
never stated explicitly. In any event, it was important, both for the army
and for the general public, to restore effective functioning, even if only to
outward appearances. In practice, Rabin was deposed (or perhaps it would
be more accurate to say released) from his semi-ministerial status, and
from now on was able to represent the army’s point of view without
‘pangs of conscience’. Nonetheless, the prevailing conviction among the
General Staff was that he was not presenting persuasively the decisive
demand of the military echelon to take the initiative and launch a pre-
emptive strike immediately.17
The situation to which Rabin returned was complicated: on the one
hand, Weizman had reached agreement, or thought he had reached it, with
Eshkol on an operational plan to be put into action without delay once
approved by the government. On the other hand, first reports had been
received of Eban’s meeting on 24 May in Paris with President de Gaulle,
which intensified the feeling that the decision to send Eban had been a
mistake as a result of which Israel’s hands were tied. Third, there was now
a greater possibility, in light of the movement of Egypt’s Fourth Division
into Sinai and additional Intelligence reports,18 that Nasser was aiming for
a coordinated pan-Arab offensive move. Under these circumstances, the
military echelon felt it vital to intervene in the diplomatic negotiations and
to steer them in the direction they preferred.
After Rabin and Eshkol had met briefly tête-à-tête,19 they were joined
by Weizman, Yariv and Barlev. The Intelligence Chief dwelt on the deteri-
oration in the situation and the possibility of an Arab attack. ‘The time
factor is vital,’ Yariv noted. ‘There is reason to assume that Nasser thinks
he needn’t wait any longer.’ He added: ‘The problem is no longer the
Straits.’20 His comments underlined the two main arguments which the
senior command had presented to the politicians:
1 In view of the real danger of an Arab attack, the IDF must deliver the
first blow and launch a pre-emptive strike before the enemy completed
preparing its forces. Any delay would not only increase the critical risk
of a pan-Arab attack but would improve the logistic and operational
organization of enemy forces, thereby placing the IDF at a disadvan-
tage and endangering the success of its efforts even if it acted first.
2 Israeli and international diplomatic efforts, which were at any rate =

being conducted ineffectively and focusing attention on the wrong
issue (the Straits), could not offer a solution to the central problem:
the concentration of forces threatening Israel.
The first cable: ‘Intentions to launch an all-out

Arab onslaught . . .’
The Prime Minister accepted the recommendation of the senior officers to
intervene in the diplomatic moves and divert it to the proper channels.
Moreover, details of the conversation reveal that Eshkol was persuaded

that the IDF would be forced to act and the diplomatic conditions should
be prepared accordingly.21 Eshkol decided to cable instructions immedi-
ately to Eban.
Eshkol’s cable to Eban began: ‘There has been a far-reaching change in
the situation of the Egyptian forces and the inter-Arab military situation’,
and went on to describe the amassing of forces and the military
coordination and buildup in the Arab countries, which indicated that ‘the
objective now evolving is not the Straits but a total and decisive effort
against Israel . . . we are receiving word of intentions to launch an all-out
Arab onslaught on Israel.’
The cable cited the mission of the Egyptian Minister of War to
Moscow22 as evidence of Soviet–Egyptian coordination, and claimed that
‘the deterioration in the Western stance so far has served as a catalyst for
this development’. Therefore,
it should be made clear to President Johnson that the question is no

longer the opening of the Straits alone, but first of all the danger to
Israel’s very existence . . . every passing hour strengthens their [the
Arab] forces and increases their appetite, insolence and daring in both
the diplomatic and the military arena, to the point of involvement in a
total, I repeat, total military struggle. Can the US President tell us, at
this eleventh hour, what practical, I repeat, practical steps he is ready
to take on his part in order to prevent the explosion which is coming
closer by the hour?23
This dramatic cable was dispatched on the morning of 25 May. It is very

likely that the content was influenced not only by the military develop-
ments it described but also by the troubling impression gained from the
Eban-de Gaulle meeting, and the pressure which the French President
exerted on Israel not to open fire.24 It was feared that Eban’s diplomatic
mission, which some had thought from the outset to be a mistake,25 would
impose further constraints on Israel. The ‘dovish’ Foreign Minister may
have been suspected by the military of deliberately inviting pressure on
= Israel to refrain from military action and to conduct the campaign through
diplomacy. The diplomatic path, even if it won a vague assurance as to
freedom of shipping, would not check the dangers to Israel’s existence
stemming from the weakening of its deterrent capability, the threatening
concentration of forces on its borders, and the inter-Arab militant trends
led by Egypt. The military, therefore, thought that Eban should not be
content with reassuring slogans and diplomatic procrastination, but must
insist on explicit answers and practical moves on the part of the United
States, while clarifying that Israel perceived itself as facing an immediate
existential threat. The significance of this clarification was, of course, that
if the United States was unwilling to guarantee that it would take ‘practical
steps’ at once, Israel would be obliged to act alone, and would then expect
the United States to display understanding and to provide full international
diplomatic backing.
The second cable: ‘Essential immediate

implementation of US guarantee . . .’
As if his previous cable had not sufficed, the same evening the Prime
Minister, under pressure from the Chief of Staff, sent off a second cable to
the Foreign Minister, even more urgent and strongly worded than the first.
In the wake of developments in the past day, we fear an Egyptian-

Syrian surprise attack at any moment. Hence the following message
must be conveyed urgently to the US Government: there is danger of a
total attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria. In this situation it is essential
to obtain immediate implementation of the US guarantee, by declara-
tion and immediate, repeat immediate, action, namely, a statement by
the US Government to the effect that any attack on Israel will be
regarded as an attack on the United States. This statement should be
accompanied by instructions to US forces in the region to coordinate
action with the IDF against any possible attack. On any response you
receive, confine yourself to answering that you will report their
response to your Government. In light of the urgency of the situation
this information must be conveyed immediately to the highest US eche-
lons, if possible to the President or, in his absence, to Rusk.26
These two cables, dispatched urgently on the same day several hours apart,
are evidence of the atmosphere of tension, almost panic, in the senior
command on 25 May. The fear of immediate attack on the one hand, and
the need to await the outcome of the meeting with Johnson on the other,
created an intolerable situation. The cables reflected a desperate attempt
to extricate Israel from the trap, based on the evaluation in the General
Staff that a surprise Egyptian attack was not only possible but likely.
The touchstone for Egypt’s offensive schemes was the entry of the Fourth =
Division into Sinai. Egypt’s decision to close the Straits had to take an
Israeli military response into account, and it was logical to assume that the
Egyptians would not wait for Israel to move but would choose to launch a
surprise air attack. The obvious objective was the Dimona reactor, but an
even greater fear was severe damage to Israel’s few airfields, whose
implications in wartime would be inestimably graver.
Particularly interesting was the metamorphosis of the Chief of Staff.
Before his collapse, Rabin seemed to be wrestling with the question of
which side of the military–political ‘seam line’ he supported. His semi-
ministerial status had accustomed him to the political way of thinking. The
pressure from both directions had precipitated his breakdown, but once he
recovered he could only take up a position on the military side. His bureau
chief testifies to Rabin’s close ties with Minister Yigal Allon. Allon’s
assured and activist views and the reassuring presence of Haim Barlev
instilled greater confidence in Rabin and rescued him from his state of
isolation.27
Rabin displayed greater decisiveness this time in the face of speculations
that an Egyptian attack was imminent. He challenged Eshkol:
‘We are on the verge of an explosion. The question is – what are we

waiting for and for how long? The problem is not the Straits. The
problem is willingness or unwillingness to decide. The Straits have
become a secondary issue. If the Americans are ready to issue a decla-
ration that any attack on us is an attack on the United States, that
might be a reason to wait. Otherwise – no!’28
The key point in the second cable was the forlorn hope that the US admin-
istration would announce that an attack on Israel would be considered an
attack on the United States and accompany the announcement by orders to
the Sixth Fleet to coordinate its activities with the IDF. Eshkol and Rabin
knew only too well that this was unlikely to happen. Hence the cable had
a twofold objective: first, to curb the Foreign Minister so that he would
not accept a diplomatic formula which would impose restraints on Israel.
Second, to release Israel from its commitment to the United States if and
when the Israeli demand was rejected.
Genuine anxiety or a diplomatic manoeuvre?

The perplexing question is: What evoked the atmosphere of critical emer-
gency on 25 May?
One possible answer may be sought in the testimony of Egyptian Chief
of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack
was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been
= signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26

May.29 If this evidence is reliable, there must have been some military
activity in Egypt on 24 and 25 May which served Israeli Intelligence as
‘indicators’ of a possibly imminent Egyptian onslaught. The agitated mood
of the senior command on 25 May was certainly no coincidence, and was
probably based on firm evidence.30
It was not without good reason that Rabin warned: ‘we are on the verge
of an explosion!’; not without good reason that Eshkol decided to dispatch
urgent cables to Eban about the events of 24 and 25 May noting ‘inten-
tions to launch an all-out Arab onslaught on Israel’, ‘the explosion which
is coming closer by the hour?’ and ‘the danger of a total attack on Israel by
Egypt and Syria’. These moves cannot be perceived as mere diplomatic
manoeuvres without factual backing. It is more feasible to assume that the
Eshkol–Eban cables were not only intended to ease US pressure on Israel
but also expressed genuine distress and authentic fears.
The American threat

If Nasser did in fact plan to attack on 27 May, as Fawzi claimed, what
caused him to change his mind and cancel the attack at the last moment?
The answer should be sought in Washington, where Eban received the
cables, was stunned, and hastened to alert the Americans.31 They took the
warning seriously and acted swiftly, instantly assigning military experts
and Intelligence bodies to examine and evaluate the information. Concur-
rently, on instructions from the President, they took immediate drastic
steps in the diplomatic sphere: Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow
urgently summoned Egyptian Ambassador to Washington Mustafa Kamel
late at night on 25 May and conveyed, on behalf of the President, a grave
warning to his government. According to information transmitted by the
Israelis, said Rostow, the Egyptians were about to attack Israel. The
Egyptian government should be aware that such an attack would impel the
United States to activate its commitment to Israel’s security, and this
would amount to ‘suicide’ on the part of Egypt.32
This grave warning, with its almost explicit threat of US military action
against Egypt, must have had an impact on Nasser’s calculations, particu-
larly in view of the deep suspicion and mistrust which prevailed between
Nasser and Johnson and Johnson’s ‘wild’ reputation as a president capable
of anything.33
The most likely scenario is as follows: after the decision to evacuate the
UN Emergency Force on 18 May and the announcement of the blocking of
the Straits of Tiran on 22 May, the Egyptian President decided to go one
step further (perhaps with the intention of forestalling Israel’s anticipated
reprisal attack), and to launch a surprise strike against Israel on 27 May.
The timing was probably no random decision: the Egyptians could not
have taken action before then while Eban was on his mission and the UN =
Secretary General had not yet returned from his trip to Cairo. They did
not want to wait any longer after that for fear that Israel would steal a
march on them and attack.
The core of the Egyptian attack was apparently intended to be an aerial
operation against the Dimona reactor and Israeli airfields. As backing,
Nasser moved the Fourth Division into Sinai on 24 May in order to secure
the rear in Sinai, in addition to the mass forward deployment of forces
along the Israeli border. The aim of this deployment was to absorb the
anticipated IDF counter-blow. In Israel there were increasing indicators on
25 May of an imminent enemy attack, but the government was unable to

act because of the mission of the Foreign Minister, who had already
arrived in Washington but had not yet met with the President. In these cir-
cumstances, an Israeli pre-emptive strike would have been perceived as a
treacherous act, a kind of ‘Pearl Harbor’. The only way out of the trap
was to alert the United States that Israel was under imminent threat of
attack and to demand that the US immediately honour its commitment to
Israel’s security. The US administration could not have acted before exam-
ining the information provided by Eban, and even if it had been convinced
of the authenticity of the data, US military intervention would have
entailed complicated constitutional procedures in view of the Vietnam situ-
ation. The administration could not, of course, declare that an attack on
Israel would be considered tantamount to an attack on the United States,
as Israel requested. It did, however, do something relatively close and no
less effective. Together with the urgent scrutiny of the information by
army and Intelligence bodies, it dispatched a grave warning to the Egypt-
ian government, which implied that the US would intervene in support of
Israel in the event of an Egyptian attack, and that this would amount to
‘suicide’ for Egypt. It is doubtful whether this threat would have been put
into full effect, but it did the job: Nasser retreated from his intention to
attack, cancelled the attack scheduled for 27 May and decided to change
tactics. He would wait in defensive deployment while continuing to amass
forces on Israel’s borders and would increase pressure, in the hope that
one of two things would happen: either international intervention would
enforce a solution which would extract a price from Israel and grant
Nasser a prestigious diplomatic triumph, or Israel would attack and then
the Egyptian army would contain the blow and launch a coordinated all-
Arab onslaught under political conditions advantageous to the Arabs.
There is no way of knowing if the above-described scenario is an
accurate reflection of events. It may well be that Nasser took his secrets
with him to the grave. However, it is highly feasible. If indeed such was
the chain of events, then the Israeli military’s intervention in the diplo-
matic process had dramatic results, far beyond the original intentions of
Israel’s Chief of Staff. It would have denied Egypt military initiative and
= provided the IDF with the chance to deliver the first decisive blow several
days later.
Meanwhile, on 26 May, the urgent dispatch of cables appeared to be an
embarrassing fiasco resulting from unjustified Israeli hysteria. In Washing-
ton, military and Intelligence experts, headed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, pored over the data in parallel
teams, and arrived at the joint conclusion that the Israeli evaluation of an
imminent Arab attack was unfounded. Eban had the impression that they
suspected Israel of having handed over erroneous information with the aim
of involving the United States. The US experts declared that even if the
Arabs were the first to attack, the IDF could still prevail over any possible
coalition of Arab armies.34
Abba Eban, both in reports to the government and in his memoirs, did
not conceal his incredulity at and criticism of the hysterical cables he
received, whose refutation by the Americans he considered personally
humiliating.35 He was not fully aware of the fact that the greatest gain of
his trip – the grave US warning to Egypt (which he defined in his memoirs
as ‘a superfluous diplomatic gesture’!) – was achieved thanks to that same
‘hysteria’. US deterrence ‘compensated’ entirely for the undermining of
Israel’s deterrent capability in the course of the crisis and apparently pre-
vented an initiated Egyptian attack.36
Is it surprising, therefore, that the Egyptians accused the United States
of a plot against them? As far as they were concerned, when the US admin-
istration laid a heavy restraining hand on them it freed Israel of restraints
and enabled it to exploit the vast advantage of dealing the initial blow.
This fact, which is true in itself, was the basis for the charges against the
United States of a ‘conspiracy’ with Israel against the Arabs, claims in
which the Egyptians believed wholeheartedly.37
The brewing crisis atmosphere and Israel’s intensive diplomatic efforts
accelerated diplomatic activity between the two Superpowers.38 As a result,
urgent personal messages from Soviet Premier Alexai Kosygin were handed
to Nasser and Eshkol simultaneously during the night of 26/27 May.
Eshkol received an additional message from Lyndon Johnson, who made
him privy to his own secret correspondence with Kosygin, and urged him
to refrain from initiating action. The Soviet message, when added to the
direct US warning, apparently had a restraining effect on Egypt.39 The
Israeli government was deeply influenced, as we shall see below, by the US
message, and decided to wait and hope for an international solution of the
crisis.
The reasonable conclusion is that Eban’s diplomatic mission and the
intervention of the IDF in the diplomatic efforts had weighty con-
sequences. They led to urgent Superpower intervention at the highest levels
aimed at curbing both sides to the Middle East crisis. At the same time, as
will be seen below, developments in Washington and in the region several
days later led to the relaxing of US pressure on Israel. Israel gained =

thereby; Egypt felt betrayed.
At the time, and from the viewpoint of the IDF General Staff, Eban’s
mission was a mistake from the outset, brought no advantage, and caused
nothing but harm by restricting Israel’s freedom of action. The Foreign
Minister, so it seemed, had failed abysmally. Not only had he weakened
Israel’s deterrent capability by appearing to plead for international protec-
tion, failed to win Israel space for manoeuvre, or to prepare the ground for
IDF action, but he had also clung to the dubious promise of an inter-
national solution. He had given Nasser precious time for organization and
consolidation, improvement of deployment and tightening of the siege

around Israel, thereby limiting the IDF’s options and increasing the danger
of an all-Arab attack.
As if this was not enough, Eban had failed even in the important
mission of shifting the focus of attention from open shipping routes, which
the army considered secondary, to the concentration of forces, which it
perceived as the main problem. The message Eban brought back with him,
namely that the United States seriously intended to guarantee freedom of
shipping through the Straits, was regarded by the army as insignificant and
missing the target. His diplomatic efforts had been conducted, according
to the army, on marginal issues, supplying a confused government with the
excuse to evade the vital decision, and interfering with the IDF’s desire to
act against the main, existential danger.
Chapter 17
The politicians’ quandary

Yitzhak Rabin writes that on 25 May, Eshkol rejected decisively the pres-
sure being brought to bear by the IDF.1 The extant documents contradict
Rabin’s version of events, and reveal that Eshkol did not reject the pres-
sure on that day. On the contrary, he was persuaded by the senior
command and by Yigal Allon’s arguments that Israel was under immediate
and critical danger of attack and hence it was vital for the IDF to strike the
first blow. Eshkol wrestled with the issue and contemplated convening an
urgent session of the government to take the necessary decision. However,
there was no way of escaping the trap created by Eban’s mission, and there
was now no alternative but to wait until he returned or, at least, until after
his meeting with the US President. The senior commanders gritted their
teeth and waited, believing that every passing hour increased the danger
and would make it harder for the IDF to conduct itself in the inevitable
confrontation. When Eban eventually returned, and the government
decided to go on waiting, a full-blown crisis erupted between the political
and military echelons.
The activist front – Yigal Allon and the military

leaders
Thus, on 25 May, Israel was on the verge of deciding to go to war, and if
Eban’s mission had not complicated the situation, Eshkol might have mus-
tered a majority for such a resolution. The sharp change of direction
stemmed from the Intelligence evaluation, stance of the military, and shift
in the balance of opinions in the Ministerial Committee on Security as a
result of Allon’s return. Since he was considered to be the government’s
greatest authority on military and security matters, his resolute and
uncompromising views tipped the balance.
Immediately after arriving in Israel, Allon plunged into the thick of
events, met with the Chief of Staff and members of the General Staff, and
advocated an assertive activist policy. At the same time, the General Staff
had been reinforced by the presence of Haim Barlev, who shared the views
174 The politicians’ quandary
of Allon, his former commander in the Palmach. Rabin was no longer iso-
lated and could share responsibility with those who agreed with him. The
activist front consisted of Rabin, Barlev, Weizman and Yariv in the mili-
tary as well as, in the Ministerial Committee, Yigal Allon, backed to some
degree by Yisrael Galili and Eshkol. Allon regarded himself as a greater
authority than his colleagues and set the tone at ministerial deliberations
and at the political committee of the Mapai-Achdut Ha-Avoda Alignment
Party. He strongly disapproved of the decision to dispatch Eban to the
Western capitals, and proposed that Israel take immediate offensive action.
The leader of the ‘doves’, National Religious Party leader Moshe Haim
Shapira, was greatly troubled by the change in the internal balance of the
government and plunged into feverish activity in order to check what he
regarded as a dangerous, foolhardy line of thinking. The sole authoritative
counterbalance to Ahdut ha-Avoda in matters of national security was the
Ben-Gurionist Rafi Party. Shapira’s fear that the ‘hawks’ would win the
day impelled him to confront Eshkol with what was almost an ultimatum
in order to ensure that the government was expanded. Shapira wanted
Ben-Gurion himself to take the helm, since he trusted him to counteract
the Ahdut ha-Avoda hawks, but was willing to settle for the appointment
of Ben-Gurion’s trusted disciple Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defence.
That Shapira wanted to see Gahal (the right-wing Herut-Liberals)
represented in the government was ostensibly surprising in view of his
dovish views. In practice, however, since the beginning of the crisis, Gahal
had displayed considerable restraint, and its Chairman, Menahem Begin,
also favoured entrusting the premiership to Ben-Gurion though the latter
made no secret of his opinion that Israel should avoid becoming involved
in hostilities. Thus, in the general turmoil in the political arena, part of the
Left was more hawkish in its views than the Right, and the representative
of the most important dovish central party sought right-wing reinforce-
ment in order to counterbalance the shift towards the army’s viewpoint.
Shapira’s efforts to curb the domination of the Palmach veterans
extended beyond the political sphere into the military arena. He objected
to the appointment of Haim Barlev as Deputy Chief of Staff and
demanded that Weizman be appointed to the post. Weizman was no less
of a hawk than Barlev, but he was not a ‘Palmachnik’ and hence was not
suspected of being a blind follower of Allon. In view of Rabin’s difficulties,
Allon proposed on 25 May the immediate appointment of Barlev as
Deputy Chief of Staff. Allon had apparently already discussed the matter
with Eshkol, since the latter responded that ‘it has almost been arranged’,
but had not yet been finally settled with Rabin. Weizman appealed to
Shapira for backing, but without success.2
The day after Allon’s return from abroad, he accompanied Eshkol,
Rabin and Barlev on a tour of the headquarters of the Eighty-fourth Divi-
sion in the south, close to Ofakim. The Prime Minister had just concluded
The politicians’ quandary 175
a tense meeting with Shapira,3 the demand for the appointment of Dayan
as Minister of Defence was gaining momentum, and Eshkol was still res-
olutely opposed to yielding the position. His appearance in the field,
accompanied by Allon, the hero of the War of Independence and former
Commander of the Palmach, was intended to instil in the Israeli public
confidence that Israel’s security was in reliable hands.4
Although Allon told the senior officers that there was no choice but to
wait until after Eban’s meeting with President Johnson,5 this was not exactly
the viewpoint he presented to civilian forums where he called for immediate
action. At an evening meeting of the Alignment Party political committee6
on 25 May, Allon explained that Egypt had already supplied the pretext:
two German ships passing through the Tiran Straits that day en route for
the Jordanian port of Aqaba had been examined by an Egyptian patrol. ‘So
the blockade is in operation’, Allon said. Nasser’s motive was clear, he said.
‘I think that Nasser is perturbed by the state of the Dimona reactor’ – and he
was evidently preparing an attack. Allon concluded that it was essential to
launch a pre-emptive strike the next morning, or at the latest immediately
after the Eban-Johnson meeting, in order to destroy the Egyptian air force
on the ground and to commence a ground attack simultaneously. He was
not as concerned for the fate of the settlements in the north as were the
‘dovish’ ministers. Settlements close to the Syrian border ‘will get a hard
knock and go into the shelters’, and then the IDF could attack the Syrians as
well. As for the Superpowers, Allon claimed that ‘once we start acting, and
not a moment sooner, we should inform [them] that we have received reli-
able information that the Egyptians were about to launch a total onslaught
within an hour or two. We had no choice and we took action.’
The urging of the senior command convinced Eshkol, and he considered
convening the government and even representatives of the opposition in
order to take a crucial decision. ‘The army claims that for every hour that
we delay we are playing with Israeli lives’, he told his colleagues. But the
main dilemma he faced was related to Eban’s mission. If Johnson
demanded time in order to convene the Security Council, Israel would be
in danger. ‘We are in an unfortunate situation,’ he said. ‘It has even been
suggested that I summon the government tonight, that we act tomorrow
and tell Eban to return home.’ Eshkol’s misgivings and hesitations reflected
the degree of pressure being exerted by the military: ‘If the army agrees to
the day after tomorrow perhaps that will be easier for Eban as well
[because his visit will end by then]. But there is certainly danger that by
then the Egyptians will have launched their attack on us.’
Despite representation of the army’s viewpoint by Allon and, to a lesser
degree Eshkol, the feeling of entrapment lingered. Shaul Avigur said that
‘Eban should not have been sent. But if he’s there, we must not act before
he sees Johnson.’ Allon retorted: ‘Let’s assume that it’s definite that the
Egyptians are going to attack. Wouldn’t you act then? That’s what we
must do! Let Eban stay there and explain that meanwhile the situation has
changed.’7
Eshkol is undecided
Eshkol’s hectic consultations that day reflected his state of uncertainty.
Anxious to convene the government, he told his close advisers that the
General Staff ‘are pleading with us not to waste a single hour’.8 Foreign
Ministry Director-General Aryeh Levavi cautioned against the ‘Pearl Harbor
syndrome’ if Israel acted while Eban was caught up in his mission to the
United States. The Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, Yaakov

Herzog, opined that Eban could not inform Johnson without minimal notice
that Israel was about to act. This implied that the IDF would not be able to
go into action immediately after the Eban–Johnson meeting. Eshkol won-
dered if the government had not erred when Nasser announced the closure
of Tiran in acceding to the US request to wait for forty-eight hours.9
The possibility was discussed of dispatching an Israeli vessel to the
Straits both in order to test the Egyptian declaration and to ensure that
blame for aggression would clearly fall on Egypt. The head of the Mossad,
Meir Amit, quoted a CIA representative who had asked Israel to postpone
its decision and to act only if the Egyptians actually barred an Israeli vessel
from passing through the Straits.10 Levavi said that a ship should be sent to
the Straits: ‘If it’s stopped – well and good, that’s a casus belli. If not – too
bad, but we will have lifted the blockade.’ However, Rabin rejected the idea
for fear that Nasser would view it as provocation and launch an attack ‘not
necessarily at Tiran, but all over the country’.11 Yariv also dismissed the
idea of sending a test vessel to the Straits in order to prepare the ground for
the IDF operation. The generals argued, with considerable logic, that this
would serve as a clear indication to Nasser of Israel’s intention to attack.
The threat of aerial attacks

The literature on the 1967 war has not dwelt sufficiently on the dread of
Arab aerial attacks evinced in Israel by both ministers and generals during
the waiting period. After the event, the pre-war panic was seen as excessive
and unrealistic, and few admitted to its existence. Yet study of the Minutes
of government sessions, the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and
the General Staff indicates unquestionably that there was considerable
trepidation.
In the absence of strategic surprise, tactical surprise remained a vital
element of the IDF’s operational planning and it was on this that the IAF’s
Moked plan was based. The ground forces’ representatives in the General
Staff recognized the crucial importance of Moked and the zero hour for the
ground attack was scheduled at the request of the IAF. Since, however,
there was some scepticism as to the degree of success which could be

anticipated, special forces were put on stand-by for a complementary
ground operation (Operation ‘Bluebird’) which was to target airfields in
Sinai. The Chief of Intelligence even voiced his suspicion that the Moked
plan might have been leaked to the Egyptians by Soviet Intelligence. Due to
its small number of airfields and dense concentration of population and
infrastructures in a narrow strip of territory close to the border, Israel
would be highly vulnerable if it did not gain complete supremacy in the air.
The second Egyptian aerial incursion

On 26 May Eshkol held a government meeting, during which a dramatic
development altered the atmosphere and instantly restored the mood of
anxiety and urgency. The Chief of Staff received a report of an infiltration
of Israel’s air space by four Mig 21s flying at a great height. One pair of
aircraft performed a photographic sortie over Dimona and a second pair
turned south. Rabin conveyed the content of the report to the ministers in
brief and left the meeting. The ministers began to discuss the next item on
the agenda – the proposal to expand the government. At this stage, only
the National Religious Party favoured coopting Rafi and Gahal on to the
government and appointing Ben-Gurion or Dayan as Minister of Defence.
Shapira said that this would equip the government with ‘broad shoulders’,
irrespective of whether it decided to go to war or not. The other ministers
were ready to bring in the opposition to take part in the consultations and
share the responsibility but without changing the composition of the
government. Finance Minister Sapir labelled the National Religious Party
proposal ‘ousting’ and said it would ‘undermine the government instead of
reinforcing it’ while Agriculture Minister Gvati called it ‘a crime’. Eshkol
complained that while Egyptian aircraft were photographing Dimona,
‘here we are, sitting and discussing Ben-Gurion’.12
The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations returned to the meeting
to give a more detailed report on the infiltration, and Rabin requested an
immediate discussion with the Prime Minister. Eshkol left the meeting in
order to confer with him.13 Rabin reported to Eshkol that a ‘strange and
worrying broadcast referring to coordination between bombers and fighter
planes’ had been monitored and could be connected to a planned Egyptian
attack on Dimona. He noted, at the same time, that Egyptian ground
forces were not at that moment deployed for offensive action. Weizman
was blunter: ‘All the signs indicate that they intend to attack Dimona’.
Eshkol asked: ‘Can it be understood that you want to attack today?’ (i.e.
without waiting for the Eban-Johnson meeting). In view of the political
constraints, Rabin proposed waiting until after the Washington meeting.
Weizman too realized ‘that at the moment we can’t take action’, but pro-
posed that the latest date for action be ‘tomorrow morning’.
Back at the government meeting, Minister of Education Zalman Aranne

spoke with great emotion, and his remarks deserve to be quoted because of
his frank admission of the fears of the ‘doves’. Aranne was afraid of the
Soviet Union, which he described as a ‘cosmic force’. While the United
States was submerged in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was enjoying freedom
of action. Aranne’s misgivings were profound and agonizing: ‘It may well
be,’ he confessed,
‘that with a broken heart, I, a member of this government, will be

obliged to agree that we have to shift over to the offensive. . . . I shall
mourn this, because all the time inside I can feel what war in 1967 will
mean for us, with what we have, with what we don’t have, with what
the other side has, and the other side in not just one side, it is a wall of
steel and fire. Russia is behind them. . . . I can envisage before me our
cities, our settlements, perhaps civilians, civilian victims perhaps
several times more than the number of victims in the front line. All
those who keep urging us, can they arrange it all in three days?!’
Aranne argued that the viewpoint of the army did not represent the feel-
ings of the troops. ‘I can’t believe that the army of civilians standing at this
moment on the border is raring to go into battle’, he declared. Alluding to
the demand for changes in the government, he said that the cry ‘Bring us a
saviour’ did not reflect the wishes of the army, because ‘this is an army of
the people, not professionals’. Aranne objected vehemently to handing
over the conduct of affairs to Ben-Gurion or Dayan. That would mean a
change-over of government and would weaken its status both externally
and internally. And, he added bitterly, the situation was not ‘ripe for a dic-
tator’. He suggested that the government confine itself to appointing mili-
tary advisers to Eshkol, namely Allon, Yadin and Dayan.
Now came the turn of the ‘hawkish’ ministers, Ahdut ha-Avoda’s Yigal
Allon and Moshe Carmel. Under the impact of the incursion by Egyptian
aircraft, Allon emphasized the urgency of a decision. He protested the fact
that at such a critical time, the subject on the agenda was the expansion of
the government. ‘I envy you,’ he told his colleagues, ‘for being so courageous
as to think that this [the decision to go to war] can be discussed in twenty-
four or forty-eight hours’ time . . . while the other side is now in a state of
ecstasy.’ He explained that the side which was the first to shatter the air
force of the other side would win the war. ‘And I don’t know if [the Egyp-
tians] won’t decide to do it tonight, in an hour’s time, tomorrow, whoever is
first by even half an hour, which means that their aircraft won’t be on the
ground when the attack comes, will win the day.’ Allon said he was afraid
that, while the government was in session, it would become clear ‘that the
Egyptian air force has taken off, and when it takes off – it will be too late’.
He urged the ministers: ‘Leave ideology aside. We’re not divided into a
peace party and a war party, into heroes and cowards. On this matter, I’m a
coward.’ Allon ‘begged’ the Prime Minister to empower three or four minis-
ters after the meeting to take decisions in light of developments.
Moshe Carmel supported Allon. He warned against a surprise Egyptian
air attack on Dimona and various airfields, after which achievement of an
Israeli victory would entail ‘intolerable bloodshed’. He demanded that the
government ‘formulate now’ the order to the Minister of Defence and the
Chief of Staff to take action, because, ‘Whoever says that we should post-
pone the discussion to Saturday evening or Sunday doesn’t know what
world he’s living in’. When it came to military matters, he claimed, the
worst scenario and not the best should be contemplated.

Shapira tried in a conciliatory tone to persuade his colleagues to accept
Ben-Gurion: ‘This isn’t an expression of non-confidence’, he said, but
rather a demand for a unification of forces. He begged them to set aside
reckonings of prestige and of ‘Ben Gurion – yes or no’. His remarks,
however conciliatory, nevertheless angered Eshkol, who claimed that
Shapira had treated all his explanations ‘like chaff before the wind’. He
read out a note he had received from Dayan, asking to be recruited for
active service ‘so that my presence in military units will be entirely kosher’.
As for Ben-Gurion, Eshkol was unequivocal: ‘I will not be part of a
Government with him in it . . . until the very last moment there was talk of
a deceptive Government, of cheats, of liars, and tomorrow or in a week’s
time we are supposed to conduct a war together?! . . . Nobody can demand
of me that I turn myself into a doormat.’
One resolution passed at the end of the meeting was to empower Eshkol
to coopt representatives of Gahal and Rafi on to the Ministerial Commit-
tee on Security. And on the most crucial issue on the agenda, the govern-
ment’s resolutions reflected the dovish stand. It was decided: (1) to
authorize the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff to decide to take
action if Israel was attacked; (2) that if the Minister of Defence wanted to
launch a strike he would convene the Ministerial Committee on Security;
(3) the government would be convened again on Eban’s return.14
That evening the Chief of Staff met with Yigal Allon and senior Foreign
Ministry officials Moshe Bitan and Yosef Tekoah, to evaluate a message
from the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, intercepted by Israeli Intelli-
gence, reporting that an official in the State Department had informed
them that the United States would not fight in order to open the Straits.15
Later, the Chief of Staff held a ‘fateful’ conversation with Eshkol and
Allon at which they weighed up the possibility of convening the govern-
ment that same night in order to take the decision to attack the next
morning, 27 May.16 However, the postponement of the meeting between
Eban and Johnson, whose outcome would only be known in the early
morning hours, again foiled this possibility.17 Everyone was now awaiting
the report on the White House meeting.
Chapter 18
The height of the diplomatic

campaign – and the outcome
It was a day of tense anticipation when the Foreign Minister met with
President Lyndon Johnson on 26 May. Reports received from the embassy
in Washington on contacts of Eban and senior Israeli representatives with
White House and State Department officials made it clear that the Ameri-
cans were unconvinced by the Israeli estimate that an Egyptian attack was
imminent, and were even suspicious of Israel’s motives.1 Eban conferred
with Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. The latter dismissed the Israeli evaluation and, on behalf of the
President, voiced uncompromising objections to preventive action on
Israel’s part and rejected the Israeli demand for a US declaration that any
attack on Israeli would be tantamount to an attack on the United States.
Eban pointed out to Rusk that he needed to return home urgently in order
to attend the decisive government session. The government’s decisions, he
emphasized, would be based on whatever Johnson told him, and the only
thing that could prevent war would be ‘the President’s assurance that he
has taken a resolute and unconditional decision to open the Straits, includ-
ing a declaration and a detailed letter to the Prime Minister’.2
The White House was irritated by the attempt to pressure the President.
Walt Rostow told Evron that the President was contemplating postponing
the meeting with Eban for several hours and that he was not happy with
‘the theatrical atmosphere’ surrounding the meeting. He also cited the need
to study the UN Secretary-General’s report on his visit to Cairo and his
conclusions.3 The Americans exerted themselves in order to persuade the
Israeli representatives that they were firmly resolved to open the Straits
and to promote efforts, together with Britain and other countries, to
organize an international maritime task force for this purpose. However,
not all the reports received in Israel confirmed the US statements. In
London Ambassador Aharon Remez met with Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs George Thomson, and deduced that not only was there no
consensus among the maritime nations with regard to the need for action,
but no vessels were ready if it was decided to act immediately.4 The Israeli
military attaché in Washington, General Yosef Geva, cabled the Chief of
The height of the diplomatic campaign 181
Staff his impression that ‘there is almost no chance of independent Amer-

ican action on the Straits, and it is not even clear to the military people
here that they will hasten to our aid if the Egyptians attack. General
Wheeler . . . clarified that we are capable of defeating the Egyptians alone
even after suffering the first blow.’5 The Pentagon, so it appeared, was not
eager to risk an additional military involvement at the time and was
anxious to convey this message to Israel.
Johnson: ‘Israel will not be alone unless it decides

to go alone’
At 19:00 hours (Washington time), President Johnson received Eban in the
White House for a talk which lasted close to two hours. Also present were
McNamara, the Rostow brothers (Walt, the President’s Special Assistant,
and Eugene, Under-Secretary of State), Assistant Secretary of State Joseph
Sisko and Press Secretary George Christian. Eban was accompanied by
Ambassador Avraham Harman and Minister Ephraim Evron.6
In Israel the problem of the Straits was now considered secondary, and
the urgent cables Eban received had related to the immediate military
threat. Notwithstanding, Eban focused almost entirely on the problem of
the Straits in his talk with Johnson. This was probably not because he had
decided to ignore instructions from Jerusalem, but because, after what the
Secretaries of State and Defence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had said concerning the threat to Israel, he felt that there was no
point in discussing the matter further with the President.
Eban explained to Johnson that on the question of freedom of shipping
Israel had to choose between capitulation and fighting and, while deter-
mined not to yield, wanted first to examine the possibility of an inter-
national solution to the blockade and whether the United States was
resolved to promote such a solution. He asked, ‘Will we fight alone or are
you with us?’ and what practical form the US commitment to Israel would
take.
Johnson promised to bring the full influence and efforts of the
United States to bear in order to open the Straits but emphasized that he
required the backing of Congress and of the public. He did not hold a high
opinion of the effectiveness of the UN, but it was essential initially to
exhaust all possible moves there and meanwhile to put together an effect-
ive force in order to lift the blockade. As for the US commitment to Israel,
he said:
‘We reviewed everything that this country has said in relation to Israel.
Truman through Eisenhower and Kennedy and what I have said. All
this is important but I tell you that this is not worth five cents unless I
have the people with me.’
182 The height of the diplomatic campaign
Johnson reassured Eban that the time for action was not far off, but, he
said, ‘Would it be wise at this moment, as we say in the language of poker,
to call Nasser and raise his hand?’
The President was unwilling to provide Israel with the ultimate commit-
ment it requested and described as unrealistic the proposal that he declare
that an attack on Israel would be tantamount to an attack on the United
States. On the other hand, Johnson was resolute in his commitment to
open the Straits to Israeli shipping: ‘I’m not a feeble mouse or a coward
and we’re going to try. What we need is a group, five or four or less, or if
we can’t do that then on our own.’
At the same time, the President pointed out to Eban that constitutional
constraints obliged him to recruit the support of Congress for any warlike
move. ‘I’m not a king’, he said.
Only towards the end of the meeting did Eban raise the main subject on
the agenda in accordance with the cable from Jerusalem. He asked: What
if the Israeli assessment was true, and stressed that Israel had to take the
matter seriously since Nasser had made it clear that the UAR objective was
the destruction of Israel. McNamara replied that all the Intelligence agen-
cies had assessed the situation and could see no indication of ‘imminent
offensive action’ on the part of the Arabs.
At the end of the meeting, Johnson handed Eban a written note, con-
taining the essence of the US stand: the United States was bound by certain
constitutional procedures, efforts at the UN had not yet been exhausted,
and the United States intended to take vigorous action to guarantee that
the Straits would remain open. The concluding paragraph was the most
important.
I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible
for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides
to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.7
The outcome of Eban’s mission

What were the results of Eban’s mission? He had seemingly achieved
nothing and merely accumulated ‘prohibitions and tribulations’ as opposi-
tion leader Menachem Begin put it. De Gaulle’s stand was negative,
Harold Wilson was sympathetic but not influential, while Johnson had
merely reiterated the US standpoint and rejected the possibility of
independent Israeli action.
Practically speaking, however, the mission had one very important
result: it essentially forced the Israeli government to take a ‘time-out’ and
thus precluded a pre-emptive Israeli strike around 25 to 26 May. At this
time, as noted above, Eshkol seemed likely to succumb to the pressure of
the military and to approve a pre-emptive strike (it is another question
whether he would have won a majority in the government for such a step,
or whether he would have been content with a narrow majority, which is
by no means certain). The main reason for the postponement of the
decision was Eban’s mission. Not only was Eban’s meeting with Johnson a
senior-level direct, personal and vital dialogue at a critical moment, but it
also sharpened the commitment of the US and of the President in particu-
lar. As a result, the government decided after Eban’s return to take a risk
and give diplomatic efforts a chance to resolve the crisis.
Eban’s mission was also significant so far as Egypt and other Arab
countries were concerned. It created the impression that the Israeli govern-
ment was hesitant and was courting international protection in order to

evade Arab fury. This further strengthened Nasser’s standing and Arab
cohesion. The strong warning dispatched by the United States to Nasser
apparently served as a powerful deterrent and important consideration in
Nasser’s decision not to open fire first, but it certainly did not enhance
Israel’s image in his eyes. He could assume that Israel feared confronta-
tion. As a possible result, Nasser preferred for Israel to initiate hostilities
and isolate itself, while Egypt would contain the first onslaught and launch
a crushing counter-attack which would defeat Israel.
To sum up, therefore, Eban’s mission had a profound impact on the
timetable of the crisis, and its most important consequence, as it now
appears, was the postponement of both Israeli and Egyptian military
moves. This conclusion suggests that the implications of the mission were
far-reaching: if Israel had initiated hostilities on 25 to 26 May, the war
would probably have been confined to the Egyptian front, and then only to
the northern Sinai sector and the Gaza Strip (this was the IDF’s operative
plan at the time). Jordan would most probably have remained outside the
fray, and on the Syrian border there would have been at most a few skir-
mishes and an attempt to occupy the demilitarized zone. The IDF might
even have confined itself (according to the Atzmon plan) to a strike against
the Egyptian air force and occupation of the Gaza Strip alone as a dubious
‘bargaining card’. On the other hand, if the Egyptians had been first to
launch an aerial and ground onslaught, the war would undoubtedly have
taken a different turn.
The urgent messages sent to Eban, instigated by the IDF, read like SOSs
and added a touch of drama to the mission, spurring the Americans to vig-
orous action, pregnant with consequences, both towards Egypt and in the
Superpower arena.
Washington’s aim was to achieve an understanding with Moscow as
swiftly as possible in order to check the crisis before it veered out of
control. The United States hoped initially that the UN Secretary-General
would find the magic remedy, even though Nasser had already announced
the blockade. But before U Thant’s return and before he could report on
his talks with the Egyptian President, Eban arrived at the White House
armed with alarming information on an imminent Egyptian attack.

Although US experts did not verify the data, the administration felt the
need not only to direct a grave warning at Egypt, but also to establish a
dialogue with Moscow at the highest level. Johnson and Kosygin reached
agreement to the effect that each side would restrain its own ‘client’. The
equation, however, was not symmetrical. The United States curbed Israel
and severely cautioned Egypt. The Soviet Union proved effective in
restraining Egypt but much less so as far as Israel was concerned.
The Soviet message

Very late on the night of 26/27 May and in parallel to Dimitri Pojidaev,
his counterpart in Cairo, the Soviet Ambassador to Israel Sergei
Chubakhin brought an urgent personal note from Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin to Prime Minister Eshkol. According to information in the posses-
sion of his government, Kosygin wrote, the situation in Israel was ‘sharp-
ening as though there was no alternative to acts of war’. Kosygin’s style
was firm rather than blunt, and the impact of the message was, in the end,
paradoxically, placatory rather than deterrent. The inevitable comparison
was with Premier Nikolai Bulganin’s brutal and alarming missive of 5
November 1956,8 and the difference was great.
‘It would be a tremendous error,’ Kosygin warned, ‘if circles eager for
battle and unrestrained by serious political thought had the upper hand in
such a situation, and arms were to begin talking’, He called for all possible
measures in order to prevent a military conflict and cautioned that ‘it is
easy to ignite a fire but putting out its flame may not be nearly as simple
as those pushing Israel to the brink of war imagine’. The demand to
Israel not to be the party responsible for launching hostilities was phrased
in a moderate and minor key: ‘We hope that following a serious considera-
tion of the evolving situation and of the responsibility lying on the shoul-
ders of that side which will initiate the aggression, the Government of
Israel will do everything in its power to avoid a military conflict in the
Middle East.’9
The Soviet stance on the crisis evoked various questions and surmises in
Israel. It was manifest that Moscow’s policy was hostile, but its motives
were not clear, and its tepid reaction roused suspicions that a Soviet plot
was afoot. The Israeli Embassy in Moscow was isolated and its reports
were sombre. It was unable to supply reliable information on the mood of
the Kremlin. On 27 May, Ambassador Katriel Katz sent a cable, which
was not grounded on concrete information, reporting that the situation
was
the outcome of a joint conspiracy and plan of the Soviets and Syria,
Egypt, Iraq and Algeria to drive the West away from the oil resources
and from the vicinity of Turkey and Iran. Israel is intended to be the
victim of this crusade, on the assumption that the Arab–Israel war will
restore the revolutionary states to leadership of the entire Arab world,
and UN intervention will be paralyzed by a Soviet veto and the
Western powers will hesitate to intervene both for fear of Soviet inter-
vention and because they themselves are occupied elsewhere.
The Ambassador proposed a campaign to expose this conspiracy.10

However, most of the evaluations of the Soviet Union’s role from other
Israeli legations, particularly Paris, London and Washington, pointed to a
cautious Soviet approach, granting the Arabs diplomatic backing while

striving to consolidate the Egyptian achievement and stem the downward
slide into armed conflict.11
Nasser: our fundamental objective – the

destruction of Israel
On 26 May, Gamal Abdel Nasser voiced the most direct, explicit threat
against Israel since the crisis had begun. Appearing in Cairo before the rep-
resentatives of the Arab Trade Union Confederation, the Egyptian Presid-
ent sounded determined to take the risk of a full frontal clash with Israel,
in full confidence of victory:
‘The Arab world today is different from the Arab world of ten days
ago, and the same is true of Israel. The Arabs are firmly resolved to
realize their rights and they will restore the rights of the Arabs of
Palestine. We are confident of victory over Israel . . . the blocking of
the Straits means entering into an all-out battle with Israel. This
requires preparations. When we felt ourselves to be ready, we did
this. . . . If we are attacked, it will be war and our fundamental objec-
tive will be the destruction of Israel.’12
On the same day, Nasser’s associate, Muhammad Hasanin Heikal, editor

of the daily al-Ahram, published an article which made a strong impres-
sion in Israel. Heikal showed a profound understanding of the psychologi-
cal element in Israel’s security conception and his conclusion was that
Israel had to go to war. If we can trust General Mahmoud Fawzi’s testi-
mony that Egypt was about to inflict a surprise blow on Israel on 27 May,
and Nasser cancelled it at the last moment due to the US warning, then
Nasser’s speech may be interpreted as handing on the US caution. The
United States had warned Egypt that an attack on Egypt’s part would be
tantamount to ‘suicide’. Nasser readdressed the same threat to Israel. If the
US threat was intended to enable Israel to deal the first blow, that would
constitute suicide on Israel’s part, Nasser cautioned.
From the viewpoint of Israel where the atmosphere was one of acute
tension and anxiety, Nasser’s threat was interpreted literally as a ‘declara-
tion of intent’. The feeling was that the country’s leadership was confused,
astray and helpless, concentrating on lobbying efforts and displaying
weakness and cowardice, and thereby spurring Nasser to escalate his
threats and to challenge the very existence of the state. Nasser was escalat-
ing the crisis a step at a time, and there was reason to fear that he did not
intend to halt and that the next step would be a surprise attack on Dimona
and IAF airfields. The jingoistic atmosphere in the Arab world, the
continuing influx of forces and the increasing inter-Arab coordination had
rendered the existential threat tangible and critical.

Israeli diplomacy was endeavouring to neutralize the UN as a mediatory
factor in view of Israel’s basic mistrust of that organization and in order to
avoid freeing up the United States from its direct commitment to Israel’s
security. The efforts were focused mainly on Washington.
After the Eban–Johnson meeting, Ambassador Harman and Minister
Evron conferred with Eugene Rostow, and Evron reported to Jerusalem on
the talks, and on the anticipated scenario: publication of an international
declaration on the right to freedom of shipping, organization of an inter-
national maritime force concurrently with recourse to the various proce-
dures at the Security Council. All this was to occur in the course of two or
three weeks during which the two sides would be required to agree to a
‘moratorium’: the Egyptians would not activate the blockade and Israel
would not try to challenge it. Rostow even added a bonus: an Israeli naval
vessel would be invited to join the international expeditionary force. He
also promised that immediate steps would be taken to ensure liaison in the
sphere of military Intelligence.13 The idea of the ‘moratorium’ had already
been proposed by U Thant at his meeting with Nasser, who agreed
instantly.14 In Israel the whole ‘moratorium’ idea was greeted with deri-
sion: Israel was asked not to send vessels through the Straits so that Nasser
could display ‘benevolence’ and not prevent passage.
The night of 27/28 May: the government is split

The government was convened again on Saturday night, 27 May, as an
extended ministerial committee on security. The meeting took place in the
Minister of Defence’s office in Tel Aviv and lasted all night. Foreign Minis-
ter Eban, whose report was awaited, arrived straight from the airport
shortly after the meeting began.15 At this tense marathon meeting the
government was split between the ‘hawks’, who supported the army’s
views, and the ‘doves’, who were adamantly opposed.
Yariv’s survey at the meeting was intended to lead the government to an
inevitable conclusion. He reported that the influx of forces into Sinai and
the Straits was continuing and the Egyptians were investing effort in
obtaining a large supply of weapons, and were trying meanwhile to play

for time with Soviet support. On the other hand, he pointed out, there had
been no explicit Soviet guarantee of military intervention on Egypt’s side.
Yariv explained that the Egyptian deployment in Sinai had been built up
hastily and was not yet balanced, but as time passed it would be improved
and reinforced, and more Arab expeditionary forces would join it. He
added: ‘We know for certain that their decision is first of all to send the air
force into action. It is also clear what the significance will be if they
succeed in employing their air force before we put ours into action.’
Yitzhak Rabin was more explicit. He spoke of ‘a noose which in my
opinion is tightening around us’, and the increasing difficulty of removing

it as time passed. Rabin had already hinted that there were indications of
US courtship of Nasser.16 The Chief of Staff noted that he was not suggest-
ing an easy alternative. But to wait idly meant in fact to help the enemy to
deploy their forces and thus to intensify the danger to the State and
increase the number of casualties and the scope of devastation which the
inevitable war would cause. ‘If we go into action tomorrow – we will spare
ourselves casualties’, Rabin said. Zalman Aranne disagreed and thought
that Johnson’s courtship of Nasser was intended rather ‘to dissuade him
from warlike action’.
At this stage, Abba Eban arrived. His report was intended to create the
opposite effect to that produced by the reports of the military. Eban told
the ministers that de Gaulle had been ‘shocked and alarmed’, and had cau-
tioned: ‘It will be a tragedy, a tragedy, if you are the first. Never be the
first. You must fight only if others attack you. You cannot imagine the dis-
aster for you and your lives if you don’t observe that rule.’
Eban’s remarks reflected his disapproval of the urgent cables he had
received. The Americans, he said, had dismissed all the evaluations they
contained and had even suspected Israel of slanting the reports in order to
prepare the ground for an Israeli attack and perhaps even to entangle the
United States. Eban described Johnson’s viewpoint as persuasive, and
the various stages of the proposed solution, without specifying the time
framework: (1) efforts to win the backing of Congress (‘This stage is
almost complete’); (2) full exploitation of the procedures at the Security
Council; (3) and simultaneously, a declaration by the maritime nations to
be followed by the assemblage of a flotilla of vessels to break through the
blockade.
The ‘dovish’ ministers were greatly encouraged by Eban’s report, which
seemed to bear out their own views. Minister of Religious Affairs Zerah
Wahrhaftig said that it was evident that an initiated military action would
isolate Israel. ‘It would be an adventure, simply an adventure.’ On the
other hand, international action in the Straits would damage Nasser’s pres-
tige and Israel would suffer no losses. Housing Minister Mordechai Bentov
and Health Minister Yisrael Barzilai concurred.
Yigal Allon was the strongest champion of the army’s cause. If it were a
matter of the Straits alone, he would not rule out international action, but
the issue was the realization of an existential threat to Israel, namely a
massive onslaught on all fronts. He dwelt on the critical significance of
granting offensive initiative to the enemy and of the destruction of the IAF
and asked a rhetorical question: ‘Does anyone around this table imagine
that we, under any circumstances, will permit the enemy to be first, merely
in order to prove to the world that they began?!’ Allon noted that the
United States had not yet had the final word on the Dimona reactor and
the refugee issue. ‘And I’m not sure if the Egyptian alert is not also con-
nected to their assumption – which need not necessarily be true – that we

have arrived at a critical stage at the reactor.’ He did not rule out a
coordinated bombing attack on the reactor and – simultaneously – in
order to forestall reaction – the bombing of IAF bases, ‘and Nasser will
even emerge as a hero who saved the Middle East, as it were, from nuclear
weapons’. Allon was anxious to persuade the irresolute ministers that he
had examined the situation with the eyes of a military expert and had no
doubt that the IDF was capable of inflicting a heavy blow on the Egyptian
air force and armour, whose rehabilitation would require years. ‘And if
this job is done by purely Hebrew labour, without pretensions of occupy-
ing Sinai and annexing of Sinai, but just the necessary minimum in order
to shatter the enemy’s power, to hold on to the minimum territory as a
bargaining card for a settlement to prevent war – then all the Powers will
sing a different tune.’
Allon’s confident remarks impressed but did not convince the ‘doves’.
Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir defined himself ‘as someone who has
been torn in the past four days between yes and no’, but his remarks
implied a relatively conclusive ‘no’. ‘It was very hard for us to win our-
selves a state, to lose it – would be very easy’, Sapir said. He protested
against the excessive self-confidence of Allon’s statement at a time when
the fate of the country was being weighed in the balance. ‘It is all con-
structed on the fact that we have X planes and we can sweep the skies
clean. What happens if, Heaven forbid, someone else sweeps the skies?’
Sapir admitted that, unlike Allon, he understood nothing of military
matters, but as an expert in the security economy he understood ‘that if we
destroy 100–150 planes, within two or three weeks they will have Mig 21s
instead of Mig 17s and 19s’. Sapir envisaged a remorseless scenario of
bombing of civilian settlements. He described his meeting with Shimon
Peres prior to the government meeting.17 Peres had spoken with great
emotion and warned that, militarily speaking, Israel was facing disaster,
‘and this is not mere party tactics’, Sapir commented.
Minister of Agriculture Haim Gvati, one of the ‘hawks’ in the govern-
ment, said that the advocates of waiting were not thinking of forty-eight or
seventy-two hours, because even after a month the conditions would
remain unchanged. There was no country in the world which wanted war
to break out here, said Gvati, and all of them were ready for Israel to pay
the price. Johnson’s proposals, he thought, were meaningless. ‘Nothing
will happen. Time will pass, there will be discussions, and they will grow
accustomed to it all.’ He was afraid that a decision not to act would be a
grave turning point for the country’s destiny and would turn it into a pro-
tectorate. Nasser’s prestige was rising, and he might even take over Jordan
‘while we sit and argue whether it is permissible for us to be first’. Gvati
referred to the danger of demoralization:
‘Today the nation is mobilized. . . . I don’t know when we can repeat

this and how the people will respond. I want to warn against missing
this hour, squandering the vast effort. . . . Let us not delude our-
selves. . . . We must decide tonight if we are taking action or bringing
the forces back home. I am in favour of taking the risk. To me it seems
much smaller than the danger of dispersing our forces today.’
The most emphatically dovish line was led, as usual, by Moshe Shapira of
the National Religious Party. He reminded his colleagues that Israel had
never gone to war alone, and that during the War of Independence it had
been backed by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Israeli initiative
meant that the United States would adopt a negative stance and the Soviet
Union would support the Arabs. He did not believe that Israel would be
able to withstand this. Israel would lose planes, ammunition would run
out, and, on the other hand, the IDF would not conquer Cairo or destroy
the Egyptian army and air force, and Russia was even liable to send ‘vol-
unteers’ to Egypt. The Americans must be trusted to open the Straits and
not to play into the hands of Nasser, who was waiting for the IDF to
attack so as to isolate Israel. Shapira demanded patience and reliance on
diplomatic tactics.
The Chief of Staff intervened at this stage of the discussion and reported
a personal note he had received from the Italian Chief of Staff, according
to which in the next four or five days no Arab attack should be expected,
but ‘anything could happen’ after that. Rabin may have been trying to say
that although he was in favour of an immediate Israeli strike the hourglass
would not run out in the coming forty-eight or seventy-two hours. But he
cautioned against the danger of leaving the initiative to Nasser. Regarding
the ‘doves’, he commented that they were implying that the State of Israel
could not survive through its own efforts. On an offended note, he added:
‘If the State of Israel thinks that its existence is conditional on an American
commitment and not on its own might – I have nothing to add.’ The
army’s sense of affront was voiced even more clearly by Operations Chief
Ezer Weizman, who reminded the ministers that the IAF had downed
eleven enemy aircraft without losing a single aircraft of its own. He had no
doubt, he said, ‘that this is the bitterest war that this nation has ever
fought, in the air as well. If I had to choose a confrontation with Egypt, I
would want to catch them under more propitious conditions, but war does
not always occur the way you plan it.’ He expressed his complete confi-
dence in the ability of the IAF to break the Egyptian air force. ‘It is doing
an injustice [to the IDF] – which may stem from lack of knowledge – not
to trust in our strength’, Weizman declared.
Eshkol sided with the army. He pointed out that Johnson was now
focusing on the Straits and asking for time. If it was only a case of the
shipping issue so be it, Eshkol said; Israel could have waited a week or
two. But the problem was Israel’s deterrent capability. Minister without
Portfolio Yisrael Galili also sided with the advocates of immediate military
action, mainly on the grounds that Israel’s regional and international
standing and deterrent capability would be weakened if it failed to act, and
due to the imminent prospect of an all-out Arab attack aimed at annihilat-
ing Israel. Transport Minister Moshe Carmel argued that to refrain from
action would inevitably lead to the worsening of the security situation ‘and
total collapse of Israel’s element of deterrence’. The closing of the Straits
would be followed by disruption of Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean,
and Israel would be forced to fight under much worse conditions. ‘I have
heard what is going on here now in Arab villages [in Israel]’, Carmel
added. And echoing the Chief of Staff, he added: ‘Whoever says that we
cannot stand alone is saying that we will not survive here.’
The Minister of Justice, Yaakov Shimshon Shapira, favoured waiting
forty-eight hours for action so that it would not occur too soon after
Eban’s return. ‘How can we withstand all the Arab states?’ he sighed.
Eshkol closed the meeting at 04:00 with the proposal that the government
reconvene a few hours later. Aware that the ministers were exhausted, he
said: ‘I would not like to take a vote now, but to let colleagues sleep on
it. . . . Eban too will do some thinking. As to what [Yaakov Shimshon]
Shapira said [that we should not act immediately after Eban’s return] –
there is something in it.’ Every day was vital, but ‘I would not want to
antagonize the US President too much’.
The balance is tipped: Johnson’s note

On 28 May at 05:30, an hour and a half after the government meeting
ended, US Ambassador Walworth Barbour brought Eshkol a personal note
from Johnson, dated 27 May. In it Johnson made Eshkol privy, discreetly
and on a personal basis, to the content of a message he had received from
Soviet Premier Alexai Kosygin. The Soviets had received information that
Israel was preparing a military operation. The Arabs did not want a mili-
tary clash. Therefore, if Israel took action, the Soviets would extend aid to
the countries under attack. The Soviet Union asked the United States to
take all the necessary steps to prevent such a clash, and gave its assurance
that it too would take steps in that direction. Johnson added: ‘As your
friend, I repeat even more strongly what I said yesterday to Mr. Eban.
Israel just must not take any pre-emptive military action and thereby make
itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities.’
To underline these remarks, Barbour added a message dictated by
Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the effect that the United States and
Britain were continuing feverishly to prepare the military aspects of an
‘international naval escort plan’, and hence ‘with these assurances of inter-
national determination to make every effort to keep the Straits open to the
flags of all nations – unilateral action on the part of Israel would be irre-
sponsible and catastrophic’.
It seems that Rusk’s veiled threat had more impact than Johnson’s con-
fidential message. It served, perhaps, as a counterweight to the grave
warning that the Administration had addressed to the Egyptians. The
statement that unilateral action on Israel’s part would be ‘irresponsible
and catastrophic’ could not be ignored.
The communications from the United States tipped the balance, and
changed the stance of the government and the balance of views within it.
Indirectly, it also determined the future composition of the government.
Within four days Eshkol was to give up the defence portfolio, but during
this brief period other developments affected the attitude of the United
States.
The government meeting was resumed on 28 May at 15:00.18 The IDF
representatives present were Rabin, Barlev, Weizman and Yariv. Opening
the proceedings, Eshkol asked the Foreign Minister to report on the notes
from the US President and from the Embassy in Washington. Under the
strong impact of Johnson’s and Rusk’s words, Eban argued that a decision
to postpone military action was self-evident, and Eshkol advanced the
obvious conclusion: in view of what Johnson had told Eban, Kosygin’s
message to Johnson and the latter’s personal message to him, ‘I don’t think
we can fail to take note’. It was evident to all that something was being
done to ensure free passage through the Straits of Tiran, Eshkol emphas-
ized, despite fears that it would ‘melt away’. On the other hand, a time
limit should be set ‘for us and for them’ of two or three weeks, so that
there would be no foot-dragging procedures, such as submission of the
freedom of shipping issue to the International Court of Justice in The
Hague,19 and at the same time the army should remain mobilized in order
to forestall danger. The waiting period should be exploited for a major
fund-raising campaign to finance military needs, and the fact ‘that we are
good little children’ should be exploited to expedite military purchases,
particularly of aircraft and ammunition.
In contrast to the meeting of the previous night, there was now almost
complete unanimity of opinion. The ‘doves’ breathed a sigh of relief, and
even Yigal Allon did not challenge them. He supported Eshkol’s stand,
albeit unenthusiastically, well aware that the reinforced commitment of the
United States obliged Israel ‘to give the US, as far as possible, the chance to
honour its commitment’, but Allon had grave doubts ‘as to how this exer-
cise will end’. He feared that at the very last minute the Americans would
stipulate conditions unacceptable to Israel, such as international inspection
of Dimona. Allon’s ‘interim conclusion’ was gloomy: it was an impressive
Arab diplomatic gain and a heavy blow for the prestige and deterrent
capability of the IDF.
The Chief of Staff tried in vain to alter the balance. ‘I am not saying
that the alternative is easy,’ Rabin asserted, ‘but I do say that in my

opinion to delay the blow against Egypt will take us back to the pre-1956
situation, because I don’t believe that the world will open the Straits
for us. I am convinced that in two or three weeks we will face the
same problem under worse political circumstances and worse military
conditions.’
Eshkol responded peremptorily and put Rabin in his place: ‘I don’t
want to do what I did with regard to others [i.e. the ministers], bring pres-
sure to bear on you and ask you a simple question, yes [respond to
Johnson’s appeal] or no? Even if you say yes, I’m not interested in that!’
He was making it abundantly clear, therefore, that Rabin’s viewpoint was
irrelevant. Eshkol wanted the civilian echelon to decide the matter. His
remarks clearly indicate his resentment at the intervention of the military
in the decision-taking process and their pressure for action.
The only minister who fully supported the army’s stance was Moshe
Carmel. He cautioned that the government was making a grave and dan-
gerous mistake, and would eventually face the need to confront the Egyp-
tians under much graver conditions. Carmel understood the sense of relief
at the postponement of the confrontation, ‘but relief is not a solution and
doesn’t and won’t provide a solution for Israel’s survival and security
unless we shatter the Egyptian forces. From this point of view I think that
now is the best time and the opportunity will not return in the near
future.’ Carmel explained that he had met with officers who gave him
details of the Israeli deployment and spoke of the excellent and unique
prospects for success. He was aware, he said, that he had no chance of
changing the opinions of most of his colleagues, but asked that his views
be recorded in the Minutes.
Eban attacked Allon and Rabin scathingly. The rule was, he said, that
one did not conduct a war over prestige (i.e. the IDF’s deterrence capabil-
ity) but over vital interests. ‘There are no widows and orphans of prestige,’
said Eban, ‘and I am afraid that if we carry out this blow, since we are not
living alone in this world, by acting today we will be isolating ourselves
from all our existing and possible allies, with everything this entails as
regards supplies of arms and equipment.’ He agreed with the Chief of Staff
that the government was taking a risk by deciding not to act, but the
decision to act was also risky, and what was required was ‘to measure
the relative weight of the risks’. At this stage, Eban said, he believed that
the danger of action was greater, but the situation could change within a
week or ten days, and ‘if it turns out that all this is deception or illusion –
then we will sober up’.
After the meeting, at 17:15, it was resolved that ‘in view of the
prospects for the activity of the US Government, together with other Gov-
ernments or on its own, to open the Straits, Israel will refrain from taking
initiated military action until a new decision is taken, within three weeks
of the present meeting’.

Chapter 19
Waiting
On 26 and 27 May both the General Staff and the government nervously
awaited the results of the Foreign Minister’s meeting in Washington. The
basic operational plan remained unchanged at this stage – Moked in the
air and Kardom 2 on the ground – but at the suggestion of the Operations
Department the possibility was contemplated that Arab forces might move
into the West Bank, thereby turning the Jordanian front into a theatre of
war. Additional plans were also drawn up for the Egyptian front. The
planned transfer of an Egyptian armoured assault force, under General
Saad a-Din a-Shazli, from the northern sector of the front to the south,1
and the border patrols conducted by Egypt in order to locate breaching
points, suggested an Egyptian intention to cut off the southern Negev. The
Egyptian propaganda machine prepared the ground for this move by
claiming that the conquest of Eilat by the IDF in 1949 had been illegal,
because it had occurred after the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli armistice
agreement.2 An Egyptian attempt to cut off the southern Negev triangle
appeared to be the logical strategic move: it could create the desired terri-
torial continuity between Egypt and the eastern Arab expanse, deny Israel
its outlet to the Red Sea, and render the Straits issue irrelevant. Such a ter-
ritorial bridge would reflect Egypt’s intention to win direct access to
Jordan, Syria and Iraq, to encircle Israel and to impose Egyptian hegemony
over the entire Fertile Crescent.3
Tactically speaking, on the other hand, the IDF was anxious to lure
Egyptian forces away from the northern axis – where the main effort was
to be focused according to Kardom 2 – southward, in order to facilitate
the breakthrough into Sinai. This was the task of a special unit named ‘the
fraudulent division’, whose aim was to mislead the enemy into thinking
that the IDF was planning to launch its main effort on the southern axis
into Sinai. However, the luring of the Egyptian forces to the south created
a threat to Eilat, which greatly concerned the General Staff and was exac-
erbated by the signing of the Jordanian–Egyptian defence pact on 30 May
(see below) which put the Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian
command.4
Waiting 195
Yigal Allon was the only minister who, undoubtedly with Eshkol’s per-
mission, was in constant contact with the General Staff, and in particular
with Rabin, Barlev and Yariv. At a meeting with the latter two in the Pit
on 27 May, Allon examined the operative plans and noted the need to
make it appear as if the enemy had opened hostilities. He surmised that on
the following day, after Eban’s return, the government would adopt a
positive resolution, and added: ‘If the Syrians intervene – we should go up
on the [Golan] Heights and dig in.’5 Under Allon’s influence, Eshkol took
Barlev into his confidence and was greatly impressed by his unique qual-
ities and by his confidence and cool demeanour in sharp contrast to the
confusion and anxiety all around him.

On 27 May Eshkol invited Barlev to a private lunch, and heard his
evaluation of the situation. Barlev apparently supported an early Israeli
attack, but did not try to pressure the Prime Minister. An additional issue
which must have arisen in the course of the meeting was Eshkol’s inten-
tion, voiced the previous day at the political committee of the Alignment
Party, to appoint Barlev Deputy Chief of Staff. After the lunchtime
meeting, Eshkol held a private talk on the same subject with Ezer
Weizman.6
Eshkol broadcasts to the nation

The government decision of 28 May to allow a three-week period for
international efforts to solve the crisis was, as noted above, completely at
odds with the army’s position on the matter. The Chief of Staff, who was
aware of the mood of the General Staff, asked the Prime Minister to meet
with the generals immediately and explain the government decision to
them. The senior commanders were summoned urgently to a meeting in
the Pit without being told why.7 However, while en route to the meeting,
Eshkol was obliged to perform another important task: to broadcast to the
nation and explain the government’s decision.8
Tremendous significance has been attributed to Eshkol’s ill-fated
address, which was broadcast live from the Kol Israel radio studios in Tel
Aviv during the main 20:30 evening news.9 It is indisputable that the
broadcast had a detrimental impact on morale. Eshkol had never been a
skilled orator, and his weary tone and hesitant and faltering delivery of an
obviously unfamiliar text depressed his listeners. The Israeli public as a
whole, in the front line and at home, were pinned to their radio sets,
waiting tensely for the Prime Minister’s message, and what they heard was
severely discouraging.
Eshkol did not grasp the gravity of the mishap at first. It was only the
savage criticism in the press of the following day which brought it home to
him. However, the problem apparently lay in content no less than in deliv-
ery. The Prime Minister had no uplifting message to offer. The danger was
196 Waiting
great, Eshkol said. The blocking of the Straits was an act of aggression.
The government had heard the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ report –
particularly on his talks in the US capital – and had formulated instruc-
tions for further diplomatic efforts in the international arena. Eshkol’s
speech was replete with such phrases as ‘the IDF is completely ready’ and
‘the firm resolve of the people’,10 but this alone could not suffice to conceal
the fact that the Israeli government had placed its trust in foreign elements
and not in the IDF’s might.
It was this fact, more than Eshkol’s hesitant speech, that determined the
response. The entire Zionist Israeli ethos was on trial: independence, self-
reliance, national pride and, above all, the invincible IDF which had been
elevated to the status of myth. All this appeared to have been abandoned
in an instant in light of the threat, and the new Jew seemed to be reverting
to being the old, Diaspora Jew, namely helpless, and begging for protec-
tion by foreigners.
This now was the image of Eshkol’s government, and it was in sharp
contrast to the self-image of Israelis, particularly of the IDF commanders
and soldiers in the field. Intolerable tension was created between the pale,
elderly, confused and seemingly panic-stricken civilian leadership, engaged
in a desperate effort to avert war, and the IDF, the supreme expression of
the new Israeli essence that was young, daring, belligerent. The confronta-
tion between the military and political echelons was now inevitable.
The Israeli press did not spare Eshkol and was harshly critical of his
stammered address. One newspaper wrote that the speech ‘evoked horror
in Israel . . . it surprised a nation, whose nerves and muscles were strained
to breaking point. It was in a pathetic tone, accompanied by inarticulate
and disgraceful mumbling, like some bad provincial theatre.’ Another
described the speech as ‘The most shameful symptom of the Government’s
lack of talent . . . the listener received the impression that his Government
is headed by a broken man, stammering out with difficulty a text written
by someone else . . . at this fateful emergency hour, when all nerves are
stretched, this is a terrible thing.’11
Confrontation in the Pit

Eshkol came to the Pit, accompanied by Yigal Allon, immediately after the
broadcast to the nation from the nearby Kol Israel studio. The generals
awaited him, already aware that the government had decided not to
approve the pre-emptive strike. The group dynamic must have intensified
their sense of affront and fury, but beyond this they were convinced that
the government, in its confusion, had acted irresponsibly, thereby placing
the very survival of the State at risk. Eshkol had no idea what was await-
ing him. Rabin, on the other hand, sensed the atmosphere and, against
custom, did not open the meeting with his own remarks.12
Waiting 197
There was international readiness to solve the Straits problem, Eshkol

explained, unaware that he was not touching on the main concern of an
audience which did not consider freedom of shipping to be the main issue.
Eshkol described his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador and the note he
had received from the Soviet Premier, de Gaulle’s negative response, the
top-secret message from Johnson about the Soviet decision to extend aid to
the Arabs if Israel attacked, and Johnson’s caution that preventive action
on Israel’s part would be catastrophic.
He dwelt on the preparations of the ‘maritime powers’ for organization
of a maritine expeditionary force to pass through the Straits of Tiran, and
mentioned the US promise (which was based on half a sentence which

Eban had heard from Johnson but not really confirmed) that if the inter-
national effort failed the US would act alone. Under these conditions, he
emphasized, it would not be politically, diplomatically and morally logical
to launch warfare. He expressed his understanding of the disappointment
of the generals, but demanded of them ‘military and political maturity’.
The senior officers who took the floor all attacked the government
decision. No one, neither Rabin nor Allon, came to Eshkol’s rescue. Gen-
erals Gavish, Ze’evi, Yaffe, Tal, Matti Peled, Narkis and Elazar did not
question the government’s authority, but emphasized that the problem was
not the Straits but the existential threat to Israel. They spoke of the loss of
deterrent capability, of the critical significance of inflicting the first blow,
of the inability to maintain a mobilized reserve army in the long term, and
insisted that the IDF would prevail only if permitted to take action in good
time. Their remarks reflected the affront and frustration of the army, pre-
vented from carrying out its supreme task due to the vain hope that others
would do the job for them and save the country.
The bluntest of all was Ariel Sharon: ‘Today we have sawed away the
IDF’s deterrent power with our own hands’, he said. The IDF was capable
of destroying the Egyptian army, but in the future this would extract a
much more costly price, and to concede now would open up the prospect
of Israel’s demise. The people were ready to fight a just war, and the
government decision had disheartened them. This decision, he cautioned,
could also lead to a renewal of fidaiyun terror attacks. Sharon denounced
the diplomatic efforts to open up the Straits by means of an international
force. The damage to Israel from the Sinai Campaign, he argued, had
stemmed from collaboration with France and Britain. Pleadings for help
(he used the Hebrew word ‘shtadlanut’ which has negative connotations
originating in the Diaspora Jewish communities’ pleas to the authorities)
were mere demonstrations of weakness, and the government’s decision not
to send the IDF into action was a manifestation of impotence, presenting
Israel as an empty vessel, as a powerless country which had never before
suffered such degradation.
Eshkol was infuriated by this criticism and his response was sharp,
198 Waiting
reflecting the chasm between the views of the military and the civilian
echelons.
Eshkol attacked the impatience of the senior command. ‘We need a long
breath. Nobody ever said we are a preventive army.’ On the contrary, he
stressed, the concept of preventive war was unacceptable to the govern-
ment. The fact was that the Sinai Campaign – a preventive war – had left
Israel with empty hands, apart from the passage through the Straits, as the
result of international pressure. Eshkol even hinted that, so far as he was
concerned, the Straits issue was not critical.13 Particularly significant was
Eshkol’s reply to the claim of the generals that Israel had forfeited deter-
rent capability. He retorted that the generals had received everything they
demanded in order to build up deterrent power, with the central objective
of preventing war. He was implying that the IDF – and not the govern-
ment – had failed to actualize its deterrent power, and in any event the test
of deterrence now was to allow the government room for manoeuvre, and
not automatically to initiate hostilities.
‘You need more weapons? OK. You wanted 100 aircraft? You got
them. You wanted tanks. You got them so that we can win if it
becomes necessary. You didn’t get all that so that we could get up one
day and say: “Now we can destroy the Egyptian army – and we’ll do
it”. . . . I never imagined that if there was a large Egyptian army close
to our border, we would get up at night [immediately] and destroy
it. . . . Deterrence doesn’t mean that one has to act. . . . I believe that
deterrent force should be capable of waiting and enabling exploration
of all other possibilities. . . . This may irritate the generals, who have
been trained all their lives for attack, for war, but we [the government]
talked of deterrence [to prevent war]. . . . Are we to live on our swords
all our lives?’
The Prime Minister’s military secretary, who was present, described the
atmosphere as fraught with tension, almost intolerably so. The tone of the
generals’ statements reflected not only criticism but also mistrust and even
contempt for the government. The situation was on the verge of explosion.
At this stage, Yigal Allon intervened and proposed that the meeting be sus-
pended. Rabin, tactlessly, immediately requested a meeting with the Prime
Minister ‘to take decisions’. Eshkol refused angrily.14
The General Staff discusses the military

significance of waiting
When Eshkol and Allon left the meeting, the General Staff members were
left to discuss the military significance of waiting. The first problem was
the morale of the army. ‘What do we say to the troops?’ asked Rabin.
Waiting 199
‘The decision [of the civilian echelon] is [the conclusive] decision, but
what will keep the country going or bring about its downfall is the
IDF. Our problem – how to maintain the IDF [in a high state of readi-
ness and morale]. . . . The present situation is a crisis [of morale] much
greater than the withdrawal from Sinai [in 1957]. . . . If there is any
prospect for this army it is in maintaining its morale.’
The fear, therefore, was that morale in the army might slacken while the
danger of a surprise Arab attack remained. General Yisrael Tal suggested
that any release of reserve troops should be postponed. ‘We need to say [to
the soldiers] that the danger has not passed. For political reasons we were
not allowed to act at this stage, but the situation has not changed.’ The
Chief of Staff adopted General Tal’s view and ordered that the brigade
commanders be convened the next day and briefed accordingly.15
As a result of the government’s decision to wait, the Prime Minister had
approved the immediate demobilization of 30,000 reserve soldiers, but
their release was delayed and mobilization continued. In view of the crisis
of confidence between the General Staff and the government, the Prime
Minister’s office regarded this as a serious contravention by the military of
the orders of the political echelon.16 However, Rabin’s discussion with the
generals after the meeting with Eshkol, which focused on the negative
impact on morale of a waiting period, revealed that the delay in releasing
reserve units was not a rebellious move but one due to fears that such a
step would weaken the armed forces. The senior command invested con-
siderable effort in the maintenance of morale and readiness.17 The demobi-
lization was implemented subsequently in stages, and by the time war
broke out some 50,000 reservists had been demobilized, the great majority
of them older veterans.18 In retrospect, it transpired that their demobiliza-
tion helped to promote the element of surprise when hostilities were even-
tually launched.
The day after the government decision and the stormy meeting with the
Prime Minister, the General Staff held a lengthy discussion on the military
implications of waiting. As usual, the Chief of Intelligence began with a
briefing on the enemy’s deployment. He explained that, if the IDF waited
for two to three weeks, the Egyptian deployment in Sinai would be consol-
idated, reinforced and strengthened. The Egyptian hold on Sharm al-
Sheikh would improve and large consignments of weapons would flood in
from the Soviet Union and be absorbed rapidly. Yariv particularly feared
additional aircraft purchases, the improvement of the absorption capacity
of the Egyptian air force and the supply of sophisticated electronic equip-
ment to the Egyptian army. The longer the crisis, said Yariv, the more
intense the wave of extreme nationalist emotion sweeping the Arab states
and the greater the danger to Hussein’s regime in Jordan.
According to top-secret information, Hussein had informed Nasser that
200 Waiting
day that he was ready to establish a ‘national government’ and had pro-
posed a meeting between them. Nasser had agreed to a meeting on several
conditions, including the non-entry of Saudi troops into Jordan. Yariv sur-
mised that the Egyptians were liable ‘to initiate large-scale action, even if
not within two or three weeks’, and to precede it with terrorist activity.
Egyptian action, he estimated, would begin with an attack on Dimona and
on Israel’s airfields. Yariv described the Egyptian forces in northern Sinai
as in a state of ‘total chaos’ due to frequent changes of objective, but this
situation would end, he argued, if the Egyptians had time to organize.
The Egyptians assumed, Yariv said, that the IDF would attack along the
northern and southern axis, and hence had reinforced their units on both
of these axes. The Egyptian deployment did not permit an immediate shift
to attack mode, apart from limited missions such as the occupation of
Eilat, but the introduction of additional units into Sinai and evacuation of
additional forces from Yemen would change this situation. Yariv added
that a training course for operators of tactical Soviet-made Frog surface-
to-surface missiles was due to end and expressed the fear that the Egyp-
tians would dispatch missiles for exhibition purposes and psychological
effect. He also feared that the Egyptians might employ poison gas. He con-
cluded: ‘As regards the military and political picture of the enemy, it is
clear that postponement of action will make things very difficult for us.’ In
response to the question of how soon the Egyptians could switch over to
attack, Yariv said: forty-eight hours.
The Chief of Staff wanted to sharpen his remarks so that they would be
understood by the political echelon, and to clarify the grave implications
of waiting for another two to three weeks, since the delay was liable to
reinforce the Egyptian deployment in Sinai and lessen the IDF’s ability to
confront it. He had already admitted to the government, he said, that ‘we
cannot open the Straits of Tiran . . . but we can perhaps deliver a blow’.
The discussion reflected the profound frustration of the military in view
of what appeared to them to be lack of comprehension on the part of the
political echelon which was missing the opportunity to deliver a resound-
ing blow to the Egyptians. The generals expressed various views on what
might be expected to happen in the interval, but all of them predicted that
severe restraints would be imposed on Israel, obliging it to make do with a
partial gain such as occupation of the Gaza Strip.
Hod feared that an aerial attack would be more difficult to carry out in
two or three weeks’ time, but his greatest fear was provocation and an ini-
tiated attack on the part of the Egyptian air force. Elazar said that he had
told the Prime Minister ‘that the day will come when, if we attack, it will
be a question of a pyrrhic victory’. He thought that the army ‘unlike the
Government, should think ahead’. The conduct of the United States was
also a cause for concern. The Commander of the IAF feared that the Sixth
Fleet might be withdrawn while Rabin feared that the United States might
Waiting 201
impose an embargo on Israel. In view of the possibility that the regime in

Jordan might collapse, Ze’evi and Horev proposed conquering the West
Bank and preparing for defence against an Egyptian attack.
Yariv commented: ‘It’s good that the politicians aren’t here, because the
problem is what impression they gain – and they don’t always understand.’
Rabin backed him: ‘The economic ministers didn’t understand the implica-
tion of keeping an army mobilized [in the long term] and they voted
against action.’ And Yariv added:
‘What we need to present [to the government] is that the army thinks
that we need to attack now. The two weeks will cast a heavy question
mark on [our status and on] our prospects for the future [to survive in
this region] not only with regard to the Arabs, but also the Turks, the
Persians, the Africans and the West.’
Ezer Weizman was the bluntest of all. He argued that the General Staff
should force the government to act. ‘We need to attack and we need to
discuss in a smaller forum how to guarantee that we will attack within a
week . . . at that forum we need to find a solution as to how to bring the
Government to a decision.’ Weizman’s prediction was accurate. Exactly a
week later the IDF went to war.
The waiting period: the Intelligence appraisal

In the wake of the government’s decision, it was decided that the Intelli-
gence Branch would draw up a document analysing the grave implications
of the decision to wait another ‘two or three weeks’. This unsparing docu-
ment attributed weighty responsibility to the political echelon. Its prepara-
tion, by order of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Intelligence,19 was
intended to exert pressure on the government to alter its decision, but since
it was an internal document – in which the professional military echelon
made recommendations to the decision-making politicians – this was a
legitimate move. If these were in fact the views of the senior command, and
there is no evidence to the contrary, it was their professional duty to point
out to the government the possible grave consequences of its decision.20
The gist of the document is that, when it came to a direct clash with
Arab armies, Israel had nothing to gain from ‘freezing’ the situation. On
the contrary, drastic changes could be anticipated in the coming few weeks
in the military deployment of the enemy and the general political situation,
and this would be to Israel’s detriment. The main points were as follows:
1 In the coming few weeks, the Egyptian deployment in Sinai and Sharm
al-Sheikh would soon be organized, reinforced, equipped and consoli-
dated through entrenchment, mining and fortification. Additional
202 Waiting
forces would be transferred from Yemen, additional divisions would

be built up and new equipment would be absorbed. A highly effective
organization of the Egyptian air force and rapid supply of new aircraft
and electronic systems would increase its offensive and absorptive
capacity, and every passing day would weaken the prospects of the
IDF to achieve supremacy in the air. Strengthening the Egyptian mar-
itime deployment in the Suez Canal and at Sharm al-Sheikh could also
be expected.
2 The more protracted the crisis, the greater the damage to Israel’s pres-
tige, its deterrent capacity would wane, and the regional standing of
the West, particularly the United States, would be undermined. A

wave of nationalist fervour was sweeping the Arab masses, and
Hussein’s regime in particular was in danger. In light of the evolving
inter-Arab situation, the United States might find itself totally isolated
in the arena alongside Israel, and this would sap its readiness to act
independently and forcefully in order to lift the blockade or to hasten
to Israel’s aid in the event of a military clash.
3 In the course of two or three weeks, it was unlikely that Egypt would
initiate terrorist activity from the Gaza Strip, but in the longer term
this policy could change. On the other hand, the stepping-up of spor-
adic terror on the part of Palestinian organizations could be anticip-
ated, due to the popular mood and the decreased readiness of the
Jordanian and Lebanese authorities to curb it. Syria was liable to con-
tinue its basic path of ‘popular struggle’ and to seek to involve Egypt
by means of terrorist activity directed against Israel.
4 The possibility of movement by Iraqi ground and aerial forces into
Jordan and Syria, and Jordanian military intervention on Egypt’s side,
was becoming increasingly likely.
5 ‘Egypt’s finest hour’ and a wave of uninterrupted gains could persuade
its leaders to ‘exploit the success’ and launch additional action, such as
promoting serious fidayeen activity or inflicting a blow on the Dimona
reactor and Israel’s airfields.
The document detailed the Egyptian ground deployment vis-à-vis the IDF’s
possible modes of operation and the additional forces and military equip-
ment which were expected to flood into Sinai. Special emphasis was placed
on the operational readiness of the Egyptian air force, its modernized
equipment, intensive training, successful photo reconnaissance flights and
anticipated reinforcement. ‘In practice, there are more than 20 indicators
of the readiness of the Egyptian air force for attack’, the document noted,
and it was also stressed that a tactical early warning would not be easily
achieved in the event of an initiative on the part of the Egyptian air force.
A detailed clause in the document was devoted to the highly sensitive
situation in Jordan, and cast considerable doubt on the ability of the
Waiting 203
regime there to survive. The document also listed the possible paths of
action for the Syrian and Iraqi armies, and noted the possibility of employ-
ment of non-conventional weapons by Egypt: chemical weapons (gas) and
even ‘primitive radio-active weapons’, all this to be accompanied by
developed psychological warfare methods.21
Thus the IDF senior command greeted the government decision to wait
with deep frustration, anger and affront. The universal feeling among the
generals was that the government was placing the very existence of the
state at risk and the ability of the IDF to win the inevitable war. The Intel-
ligence evaluation was intended to detail the dangers and to bring home to
the government the gravity of the responsibility it was undertaking when it

rejected the General Staff’s proposal to launch a pre-emptive strike. These
feelings and evaluations indubitably seeped from the senior military
command to the political establishment, because Israel’s military and polit-
ical elites had never been detached from one another. Eshkol was not yet
aware of the fact, but he was about to lose the basis of his political power
and his grasp on the defence portfolio.
Chapter 20
Establishment of a national
unity government
The military aspect
Having decided to wait three weeks to test the international efforts under
US leadership to open the Straits, the government might have been
expected to be exempt for the time being from the army’s unremitting
pressure to attack at once. Once a decision was taken, the army was
obliged to obey it, albeit unwillingly. However, the pressure did not ease,
and the government, and in particular the Prime Minister, were not
accorded a single moment of grace. They were flung together with the
entire political establishment into a vortex of growing public demands for
a government of national emergency. The government’s decision, the veil
of secrecy over its considerations and Eshkol’s faltering speech to the
nation, robbed it of its remaining credit. The demand focused on the
replacement of the Minister of Defence, and the remainder was of sec-
ondary importance. The idea of establishing an emergency government
began to take shape on 22 May, and gathered momentum as the crisis
deepened, and Eshkol and his ministers appeared increasingly baffled and
helpless. The political leadership tried for ten days to manoeuvre between
various possibilities: bringing in the opposition, establishing an advisory
security team for the Prime Minister, exchanging portfolios among minis-
ters, reinforcing the government, and finally even entrusting the defence
portfolio to Yigal Allon. It was all to no avail. The pressure was coming
from below, from the street, from the ranks of the army, and it focused on
one charismatic personality: the man with the eye-patch, the hero of the
Sinai Campaign – Major General Moshe Dayan. Four days after the
decision was taken to wait, and after every effort and manoeuvre to avoid
it had failed, Eshkol bowed to the inevitable.1
On 1 June at 16:15 he summoned Moshe Dayan and offered him the
defence portfolio. The national unity government was established on the
same day. Moshe Dayan of the Rafi Party became Minister of Defence.
Menahem Begin, the Gahal (Herut) leader, and Yosef Sapir of the Liberal
Party, were appointed ministers and members of the Ministerial Commit-
tee on Security. The appointment of Dayan was greeted with great enthusi-
asm by the public and the army. Four days later Israel went to war.
A national unity government 205
We are not concerned here with the political crisis which generated the
national unity government,2 but rather with the influence and involvement
of the army, if such there was, in the political crisis which led to Dayan’s
appointment.
Moshe Haim Shapira attempts to restrain the

army
The strangest phenomenon in the process of establishment of a national
unity government and the appointment of Dayan was the fact that its
strongest advocate, National Religious Party leader Moshe Haim Shapira,

the Minister of the Interior, was the most consistent and vehement oppo-
nent of the IDF’s activist tendencies. The drafting of ‘hawks’ into the
government appeared to be blatantly inconsistent with Shapira’s efforts, as
one of the chief ‘doves’ in the government (others were his fellow party
member Zerah Wahrhaftig, Mapai ministers Zalman Aranne, Abba Eban
and Pinhas Sapir and Mapam and Independent-Liberal ministers) to curb
the army and prevent war. Shapira himself provided the answer to the
riddle, in response to a direct question from Eshkol.3 Only an activist
public figure, he trusted, could tell the public the unpopular truth, namely
that it was impossible to go to war under prevailing conditions and it was
essential to find a political solution and guarantee international and Super-
power backing. The figure Shapira was thinking of was David Ben-Gurion,
who had already voiced his emphatic views to that effect. If it was not pos-
sible to bring him in, then his loyal protégé and member of his party
Moshe Dayan could replace him.4 Shapira apparently thought that Dayan
would accept Ben-Gurion’s authority, and may have been impressed by
Dayan’s trenchant criticism of the IAF operation of 7 April and his accep-
tance of the government’s decision to wait.5
Shapira even asked former Chief of Staff Haim Laskov, who came to
see him on 28 May, to recommend the establishment of an emergency
government with Ben-Gurion and Dayan, if Dayan did not tend to be
hasty in his decision-making and what Dayan’s stand was on diplomatic
moves. Laskov assured him that, first and foremost, Dayan supported
diplomatic efforts.6 However, Dayan was not necessarily Shapira’s ideal
choice. He wanted to bring the Rafi Party into the government as a coun-
terbalance to the strong support of Ahdut ha-Avoda (especially Allon and
Carmel) for the activist trends of the IDF senior command. He was ready
to accept any arrangement which would expand the government and
achieve that goal.
Shapira did not want Eshkol as Minister of Defence for the simple
reason that he did not trust him on military matters. Eshkol was neither a
‘dove’ nor a ‘hawk’ but, to Shapira’s mind, he had leaned towards the
army too often and had entangled Israel in a risky situation. What was
206 A national unity government
needed, therefore, was an authoritative security figure who could restrain

the army, and the only candidates were Ben-Gurion or Dayan. Shapira did
not consider Allon to be a suitable candidate, not necessarily because he
lacked the public aura of the other two, but because Allon totally identi-
fied with the stance of the General Staff. ‘Allon is too extreme’, Shapira
claimed in explaining his strong objections to Allon’s appointment as
Minister of Defence.7
Hence, on 31 May and 1 June, when the proposal to appoint Allon was
on the agenda, Shapira cast a veto. He informed Eshkol that if the port-
folio was not entrusted to Dayan, the National Religious Party would
leave the government. This was no idle ultimatum. Eshkol’s coalition

rested on the support of seventy-two of the 120 Knesset members, and the
departure of the eleven NRP members would have almost certainly led to
the coalition’s collapse and the government’s fall, particularly since within
Mapai itself there was increased support for a response to the public
demand for Dayan’s appointment. All Eshkol’s attempts to persuade
Shapira, emphatically (‘strongly advise . . . it’s impossible to accept dictates
on your part all along the line’) and imploringly (‘respected Moshe
Shapira, help me. I am the one who has been injured . . . help me, we can
go forward together’) were unsuccessful. Shapira was impervious to
Eshkol’s reproaches and pleas.8
As for Menahem Begin, who had always been regarded as an extremist
‘hawk’, his participation in the government would not necessarily alter the
balance, according to Shapira. First, Begin was not earmarked for a posi-
tion in the leading political and security team, apart from membership of
the expanded Ministerial Committee on Security. Second, the Begin of
May 1967, leader of Gahal, was poles apart from the Herut leader of the
1950s. Throughout the crisis Begin maintained a low profile, issued no
militant declarations, and even tried to secure the appointment of his great
rival David Ben-Gurion, opponent of war, as Prime Minister or Minister
of Defence.9 In any event, the most critical front was the Egyptian front,
where even the Herut movement had no significant territorial aspirations.10
Nonetheless, Shapira should have anticipated that if not Dayan then cer-
tainly Begin would sympathize with the military’s viewpoint after joining
the government.11
Was it the IDF’s senior command, as some argue, which plotted to strip
Eshkol of his position as Minister of Defence and bring in Dayan?12 No
proof could be found of such a plot, and the composition of the General
Staff (most of whose members were Palmach veterans) suggests that, if
asked, their probable choice would have been Yigal Allon – not Dayan.13
The only direct evidence of recommendation of Dayan by a general on
active service was that of OC Central Command Uzi Narkis, on a personal
basis. Narkis had been closely associated with Dayan when he served as
Head of the Operations Department, and Chief of Staff Dayan tended to
sidestep his deputy Haim Laskov and the Chief of Operations Yosef
Avidar to work directly with Narkis.14 On the morning of 1 June, Dayan
visited him at Central Command. Shortly afterwards Narkis was asked in
a telephone conversation with the Mapai Central Office (perhaps by his
father-in-law, Knesset member David Hacohen) whether to prefer Allon or
Dayan. He recommended Dayan, arguing that ‘the problem today is to
check the wave of extreme nationalism, the Arab self-confidence, and only
one man can do that. Nobody knows Yigal Allon. So – it’s Dayan. Vote
Dayan!!!’15
To conclude that the military meddled improperly in politics for
Dayan’s sake16 would be an overstatement. In general one can say that the
army chiefs were concerned not with personalities but with issues. They
wanted to overturn the government’s decision to wait, and they succeeded
in doing so.
Ben-Gurion fears a military coup

The crisis of confidence between the military and the political echelon
influenced Ben-Gurion’s standpoint and he cited it as the reason for his
change of opinion and eventual agreement to the appointment of Dayan as
Minister of Defence in Eshkol’s government. Ben-Gurion, whose relations
with his successor had been clouded since 1964, was uncompromising in
his total invalidation of Eshkol, and the emergency situation intensified his
savage criticism rather than moderating it. ‘It would be disastrous and
impossible for the Government of Israel to be headed by a liar’, the ‘old
man’ declared. ‘We must rid ourselves of this man who is a political and
military danger. . . . It will be an unparalleled sin against the nation if we
do not continue to urge for the removal of this prime minister. . . . If we do
not remove this disgrace which is hanging over the country.’17 This cate-
gorical approach negated any possibility of inviting Ben-Gurion to join a
unity government, whether as Prime Minister or Minister of Defence, and
left the road open for Dayan. The ‘old man’ remained adamant till the
very last moment in his demand for the removal of Eshkol as a condition
for Rafi’s joining the government, but when he realized that the majority
of his faction were in favour of Dayan’s appointment, he changed his mind
and explained that it was necessary to instil in the army confidence in the
civilian leadership.18
It seems, nonetheless, that Ben-Gurion was sincerely and deeply dis-
turbed at what appeared to him to be the danger of a military coup. The
day after the generals met with Eshkol in the Pit, Ben-Gurion told the
former head of the Mossad, Isser Harel: ‘There is some talk of [a military
coup] . . . that would be the final disaster. That’s all we need. It’s a kind of
mood in the army, and it worries me. I am very anxious.’19 Later that day
Ben-Gurion convened a press conference in the Knesset and read out a
statement without answering questions. He said: ‘To our gratification we

have an army we can trust . . . but two things of fateful significance should
be remembered:
1 The army in a democratic state does not act on its own initiative or
that of its military commanders, but with the knowledge of the civilian
government and according to its instructions. . . .
2 War is not conducted solely through military activity. A defensive war
– and Israel will not become involved in any campaign which is not
defensive – is not conducted merely by military force, particularly
in the case of a small nation like Israel. It also requires diplomatic

activity.’20
In practice, Ben-Gurion was supporting the decision of the Eshkol

government to opt for diplomacy, despite his sweeping and indiscriminate
criticism of Eshkol. But more than this, the venerable leader was defending
Israeli democracy against the danger of a military take-over or unautho-
rized action by the army. Two days later, in the Rafi faction, Ben-Gurion
again voiced his profound concern at the developments he anticipated
within the IDF. On the basis of information he had received on the gener-
als’ meeting with Eshkol on 28 May, he predicted grave events in reaction
to the omissions of the political leadership. Ben-Gurion said that if his
forecast proved correct, the result would be ‘a stain on the State of Israel
from which it will never cleanse itself’. It was his opinion that there was
only one way of saving the situation and that was the appointment of
Dayan as Prime Minister.21
On the evening of 1 June, the Rafi Knesset members met in Ben-
Gurion’s home and discussed the question of joining the coalition and
Dayan’s appointment as Minister of Defence representing Rafi in the
expanded government, as Eshkol proposed.22 Ben-Gurion announced that
he had considered the question and now supported Dayan’s appointment.
He continued to demand that Eshkol be deposed from the premiership, but
it was clear that this was a hopeless demand, and that the die had been
cast. Ben-Gurion explained that his change of attitude stemmed from
anxiety in view of the prevailing mood in the IDF. ‘Who knows what will
happen and what will occur within the army. We need an army with trust
[in the leadership] and that is what it will be when Moshe is minister of
defence.’23
Allon’s hour
The final and decisive stage of the hectic debates within the political estab-
lishment concerning the establishment of an emergency government raged
in the forty-eight-hour period between Tuesday (30 May) and the after-
noon of Thursday (1 June). It began with a meeting of the Mapai-Achdut

ha-Avoda Alignment faction in the Knesset, where Eshkol realized that a
‘coup’ was being conducted against him by his most loyal colleagues, as
the majority of the faction supported Dayan’s appointment. Eshkol still
emphatically refused to relinquish the portfolio.24 The next day, 31 May,
the leaders of the Alignment discussed the issue at length and sought a
solution. Eshkol stuck to his guns and insisted on the appointment of four
security advisers (Allon, together with former Chiefs-of-Staff Dayan,
Yigael Yadin and Laskov). He tried to persuade his colleagues that ‘if we
let Dayan in we are opening the gates . . . to Rafi, who will claim that they
saved the country with the force we prepared’. The Mapai Secretary-
General, Golda Meir, was even blunter. ‘We are not going to be the first
party which hands over rule to fascism without a fight’, she said. But now
Eshkol understood that even his senior ministers thought that he should
yield the defence portfolio. Most of them supported the appointment of
Yigal Allon to the post. Eshkol himself gave them the pretext when he
said: ‘It would be more convenient and desirable for me to work with
Allon than with Dayan.’ He was referring explicitly to the idea of making
Allon privy to security matters rather than to handing over the portfolio to
him. However, Zalman Aranne seized on the statement and proposed that
Allon be appointed ‘full minister of defence’. Aranne explained that ‘we
need a minister of defence who is a professional’. He argued the need for
‘recovery from the psychological state of the nation’ (i.e. the lack of con-
fidence in Eshkol as Minister of Defence), but referred also to Rabin’s
difficulties:
‘For the Chief of Staff as well, this crisis seems to be too much. He also
gave the strong impression that he has doubts as to whether we can
endure it. When the situation is that our Chief of Staff, who should be
made of steel, is not steel, and when our Minister of Defence is the
Prime Minister and not a professional, I started thinking.’
Additional advocates of Allon’s appointment were Shaul Avigur, Zeev

Sherf, Yisrael Galili and Moshe Carmel. Only Knesset Speaker Kadish Luz
supported Dayan and only in lukewarm fashion. Among the Alignment
ministers and the Mapai leadershp there was a consensus that it was essen-
tial to bring in Dayan one way or another in view of the pressures of the
political establishment and of public opinion. Yaakov Shimshon Shapira
proposed appointing Dayan as Foreign Minister and Eban as Deputy
Prime Minister. Eshkol, for his part, had an original suggestion: he pro-
posed Allon as Deputy Prime Minister and Dayan as ‘minister of the
army’, emphasizing that ‘this has nothing to do with the Minister of
Defence and the Ministry of Defence’. From here on a strange discussion
ensued on the possibility Eshkol had cited, until Avigur stated decisively:
‘There is no clarity in the Prime Minister’s proposal.’ The hierarchy, he said,

was unclear, and, considering Dayan’s personality, ‘it will start being Hell.
Who will give the orders?’ It would be preferable for Dayan to be appointed
Minister of Defence than ‘minister of the army’, Avigur declared.
In the end, Allon addressed Eshkol directly: ‘If you offer me the Min-
istry of Defence – I will accept with responsibility and loyalty’. This was a
hint that he would be more loyal than Dayan. Allon rejected the proposal
that Eban be relieved of the Foreign Affairs portfolio. His view was that
Dayan should be offered the deputy premiership and participate with the
Prime Minister in all war efforts. He believed that Dayan would agree.25
After the meeting, Eshkol and Avigur met with Moshe Dayan and pro-
posed that he join the government as Deputy Prime Minister. Dayan
rejected the offer, saying that he was ‘a man of action’. He was angered to
learn from Eshkol that Allon was earmarked for Minister of Defence. He
expressed the opinion that Yigal Allon was more suitable than he for an
advisory position. Dayan also spurned the proposal that he become
Foreign Minister and said that he preferred to be ‘commander of the
southern arena’. In any case, he added, even ‘if you make me minister of
defence I want you to know that I will leave Tel Aviv and go down to the
Negev and pass the war there’. Dayan recommended that his appointment
to a position on active service should not be publicized, lest it be inter-
preted in Egypt as a challenge.26
Shaul Avigur proposed that Allon be appointed Minister of Defence
immediately and that Dayan’s proposal be accepted, and he be drafted ‘for
special tasks in the General Staff’, the underlying intention being to
appoint him eventually as commander of the southern front. Eshkol grum-
bled to his associates: if the Dayan matter was settled, what was the point
of depriving him of the Defence portfolio? But this sounded like a faint
protest. Eshkol was beginning to resign himself to the fact that he must
give up the Defence portfolio. All that remained was to arrange the matter
with the Chief of Staff.
Rabin offers Dayan the post of Chief of Staff

Although he had served under Allon in the Palmach, Yitzhak Rabin was
not on close terms with his former commander. Nonetheless, Allon usually
backed Rabin at government meetings, supporting the army’s viewpoint.
When Allon returned to Israel on 24 May he immediately plunged into the
thick of events, updated himself on the Intelligence picture and the opera-
tional plans and held frequent meetings with Rabin, Barlev and Yariv. This
being so, it is easy to suppose that Rabin preferred Allon as Minister of
Defence over Dayan, with whom he had never had ‘chemistry’.
When Eshkol summoned Rabin in the middle of a meeting with the
Alignment ministers in order to sum up the details of Dayan’s appointment
as commander of the southern front, Rabin did not reject the idea out-
right, although it was liable to come as a shock to the CO of Southern
Command, Yeshayahu Gavish.27 It is unlikely that Rabin was trying
thereby to blaze the trail for Allon. It is more feasible to assume that
Rabin, who was certainly aware of the political furore and the pressures
brought to bear on Eshkol, did not dare to refuse the Prime Minister.
There is no evidence to suggest that Rabin did not have full confidence in
Gavish. Be that as it may, Rabin did not take a forceful stand in defence of
the CO Southern Command. This was apparently one of the manifesta-
tions of Rabin’s weakness during the crisis.28
Rabin asked Eshkol to summon Dayan for a joint talk before he gave
his answer. In the course of the conversation, to Eshkol’s aggravation,
Rabin asked Dayan again and again ‘sincerely’ if he wanted to become
Chief of Staff in his stead. Dayan rejected this and stressed that he was
interested only in the southern front, would act under the command of the
Chief of Staff, and was willing for Gavish to be his deputy. After the
meeting, Rabin said that if the government took the decision and he
received the order, he would carry it out despite the unpleasantness
involved with regard to Gavish. He expressed the hope that Gavish would
agree to work alongside Dayan.29
The proposal to Dayan that he take over as Chief of Staff was the most
striking manifestation of Rabin’s condition. Whereas his offer to Weizman
on 23/24 May that he take over as Chief of Staff was made at a time when
he was exhausted and depressed, the proposal to Dayan was the outcome
of sober calculation, merciless towards himself, but perhaps based on his
sense of responsibility. Rabin knew that he was not at his best and that the
burden resting on his shoulders was intolerable.30 He was apparently ready
‘to sacrifice’ himself for the good of the cause, both because of his sense of
guilt and because he was aware that in his condition he was not entirely
qualified to command the army in wartime.
The end of the race: Dayan wins

Once the Chief of Staff had agreed, the picture appeared complete: Eshkol,
Prime Minister; Allon, Minister of Defence; and Dayan, Commander of
the southern front. Eshkol convened the government late that night in
order to announce the decision, though with a heavy heart. But his trou-
bles were not yet over. There was fierce opposition in the government to
Eshkol’s proposal, particularly on the part of the National Religious Party
ministers, which developed into a sharp exchange of words between the
ministers and in particular between Eshkol and Moshe Haim Shapira. The
latter presented an ultimatum, his main argument being that so long as
Eshkol was opposed on principle to separating the portfolios of Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence, his standpoint made sense. But once
Eshkol had agreed to waive the Defence portfolio, Shapira argued, why
had it not been offered to Dayan, thereby facilitating the establishment of
a government of national unity?31
The next morning, 1 June, the Mapai Secretariat convened for a stormy
marathon session where a bitter debate raged between the supporters of
Allon and Dayan’s champions, in which the latter won the day.32 At noon,
Eshkol and a team of coalition representatives met with the Gahal leaders,
who – having meanwhile coordinated their moves with the Rafi leaders –
declared that they would only join the government if Dayan served as
Minister of Defence.33 Now the Independent Liberals as well added their
voices to the demand for Dayan’s appointment.34 Street demonstrations

and petitions also made an impact.35 An additional difficulty arose from
the direction of the army. Rabin summoned Gavish in the morning and
informed him of the intention to appoint Dayan over him. Gavish
responded on the spot that he was not ready to serve as deputy to Dayan
and would immediately resign from his post. The rumour of the new
‘arrangement’, which meant the deposing of the CO Southern Command,
spread like wildfire through the army and evoked angry responses. Rabin
told Eshkol that he was finding it difficult to make the changes.36 Eshkol,
realizing that he had no room left for manoeuvre, felt it necessary to
consult the Mapam leader Yaakov Hazan, who assured him that his
faction would back him even if he decided to entrust the portfolio to
Moshe Dayan.37 Eshkol decided to summon Dayan and ask him to join the
government as Minister of Defence.
Weizman’s outburst
While Dayan was on his way to Eshkol’s office, the Chief of Operations,
Ezer Weizman, burst into the office in a state of great emotion. The
description provided by Eshkol’s military secretary Yisrael Lior, who was
an eyewitness, may seem melodramatic, but there is no reason to doubt its
reliability. The very fact that Weizman burst in without scheduling a
meeting or coordinating it with the Chief of Staff was an extraordinary
move.
Weizman already knew that Barlev had been promoted over his head to
the post of deputy Chief of Staff and would be the next Chief of Staff. He
felt deeply injured. Only a week previously, when Rabin collapsed and he
had taken over for him, Weizman had appeared to be within arms’ length
of the position. He was now, as he himself said, ‘in the mood of a beaten
cur’.38 His outburst was undoubtedly an expression of his personal dis-
tress, but more than that it reflected the cumulative pressure within the
General Staff directed at the political echelon, at a time when the military
threat was increasing. The impulsive Weizman could no longer bottle up
his emotions, and in any event had nothing to lose.
Lior relates that Weizman broke into the office of the Prime Minister,
who was lunching at the time with the Minister of Justice Yaakov
Shimshon Shapira. Weizman burst into tears. ‘The country is being
destroyed. Everything is destroyed’, Weizman roared into the astonished
faces of Eshkol and Shapira. He shouted: ‘Eshkol, give the order and the
IDF will go to war! Why do you need Moshe Dayan? Who needs Yigal
Allon? We’ve got a strong army and it’s only waiting for your order. Give
us the order and we will win. We will win and you will be the Prime
Minister of the victory government.’ At that moment, Shapira also burst
into tears, and Weizman, still agitated, left the room and tried to tear his
brigadier general’s insignia off his shoulder. The emotion in the office was
high. This dramatic episode marked the very peak of the crisis.39
The establishment of the national unity

government
Once Eshkol had decided to offer the Defence portfolio to Moshe Dayan,
events proceeded at a dizzy pace. Within a few hours the government of
national unity had been established and met the same evening for its first
session.
At first, Eshkol conferred with Dayan and invited him to join the
government as Minister of Defence. Dayan agreed, but asked Eshkol if he
was being invited on an individual basis or as a member of Rafi. Eshkol
replied that he was being invited as a representative of Rafi,40 but if Rafi
refused to join the government he would invite Dayan personally.41 The
Rafi faction met in Ben-Gurion’s home, and in the course of the meeting
the ‘old man’, as noted above, changed his mind and agreed to Dayan’s
participation in the government. Dayan paid lip-service to the venerable
leader, and declared that he would act under Ben-Gurion’s close guid-
ance.42 The Gahal leadership met concurrently to decide who to send to
the government of unity.43 Eshkol summoned the members of the political
committee and the Alignment ministers, who already knew that they were
facing a fait accompli.44 As the meeting began, Allon announced that he
was withdrawing his candidacy and Eshkol thanked him warmly.45
The government convened at 21:30 and began the meeting by dis-
cussing the planned expansion of the government.46 Dayan and Begin
joined them after half an hour. Eshkol opened the first session of the
expanded government in ceremonious fashion. ‘We will call it the Govern-
ment of national cohesion’, he said.47
First discussion of the military situation

Finally, after four days of political upheaval during which the government
and Ministerial Committee on Security had no respite to discuss the
military situation, Eshkol proposed that the government convene next

morning in the supreme command post.48 The Chief of Staff and the Chief
of Intelligence attended this first meeting of the new government. Rabin
described the deployment of the Egyptian army in Sinai and noted that, for
the time being, it was defensive. The Syrian army had moved two addi-
tional brigades forward to the Golan Heights and steered its armoured
‘shock force’ in the direction of the Jordan Valley. The Jordanian army,
Rabin said, was still in its usual deployment, but an Iraqi divisional force
had begun to concentrate in the border area and was liable to enter Jordan
within five to ten days. ‘The question now arises: What is the significance
of the entry of foreign forces into Jordan?, he asked, implying that a pre-
emptive move should be considered.49
The Chief of Staff went on to give details about the deployment of
Israel’s mobilized forces. He emphasized the time element, in particular
where the IAF was concerned, and explained that the key to ground action
was the achievement of supremacy in the air. The IAF enjoyed a qualitat-
ive advantage at the present time, he said, despite its quantitative inferior-
ity. However, the Egyptian air force was engaged intensively in
preparations for absorption of new planes and in offensive organization
and planning. ‘I think that in the past one or two weeks the Egyptian air
force has trained for offensive action more than in the entire past year’, he
noted. Rabin wanted to emphasize the central point in the army’s demand
for a pre-emptive strike: real concern lest the Egyptians make the first
move and attack from the air, leaving the IDF with poor opening con-
ditions. Eshkol reinforced Rabin’s statement about the importance of the
time element by adding that the morale of the troops would be damaged if
they were mobilized for a lengthy period and remained idle. The enemy, he
explained, was exploiting the time in order to consolidate and reinforce its
deployment in a manner which would greatly hamper an IDF attack.
Moshe Dayan, speaking for the first time as a member of the govern-
ment, analysed the situation, ostensibly without taking a stand. He
explained that the Egyptians had blocked the Straits by offensive action
and were deployed for defence with large forces in order to anticipate any
Israeli attack. Now the Israeli government must decide how to deal with
the situation: ‘Whether or not we need to swallow the Straits affair
without going into battle.’ This was a political question and the army
should not voice an opinion on the matter, Dayan emphasized. He was
thereby putting the army in its place and preventing it from pressuring the
government. What the army should do was to bring before the political
echelon its evaluation of the balance of forces, military data and considera-
tions of space and time. On these matters, Dayan said, a separate discus-
sion should be held at the earliest possible opportunity.
However, Dayan was also indicating clearly what his stand would be.
He explained that if the government did not intend to decide on attack,
half of the reserve force should be released and the remainder should dig in
and be prepared in defensive positions. On the other hand, ‘if there is any
thought that we want to attack’, every day that passed made a great dif-
ference and rendered the assignment increasingly difficult, because the
more the enemy improved its deployment, the more difficult it would be
for the IDF to break them. ‘And I think that we are arriving at a fantasti-
cally absurd situation because we are not setting ourselves an objective’, he
asserted.
The Foreign Minister, surveying the political situation, also refrained
from adopting a stand. He spoke of ‘two clocks’ with no coordination
between them: the diplomatic clock ticking in Washington, which in the

next two weeks could lead to international action for opening up the
Straits, and the local military clock moving forward at a faster pace.
Dayan, in a question, emphasized the pointlessness of diplomatic effort
focused on the Straits. What did the Israeli government expect the United
States to do about the 1,000 tanks and 80,000 Egyptian soldiers
entrenched in Sinai? he asked. Eban replied that the Americans were con-
vinced that Israel was capable of defending itself and winning.
The Prime Minister described the dilemma of the government, which
had decided only four days before to allow three weeks for exhausting the
international options and had informed the powers of this decision. ‘How
can we extricate ourselves [from the trap] so that they will not complain to
us that we promised to wait?!’
Due to the lateness of the hour, Eshkol decided to close the meeting and
convene the expanded Ministerial Committee on Security the following
morning in the supreme command post.50
Chapter 21
The strategic turning point

The Egypt–Jordan defence pact
On 30 May a dramatic development occurred which expedited the polit-

ical and military timetable and very soon overturned the government
decision of 28 May to await the outcome of the diplomatic efforts. King
Hussein succumbed to intense internal pressure and ‘went to Canossa’ to
his sworn adversary, the Egyptian President.
He flew his own royal plane from Amman to Cairo, accepted all the
conditions stipulated by Nasser, and the two leaders signed a bilateral
defence pact identical in content to the Egyptian–Syrian pact. The agree-
ment placed the Jordanian army under Egyptian command and Hussein
was forced to agree to the entry of Egyptian and Iraqi forces into Jordan
and to reconciliation with his bitterest enemy in the inter-Arab arena, PLO
Chairman Ahmed Shukeiri.1 This exceptional development further vali-
dated the standpoint of the military and civilian opponents of the govern-
ment’s approach. It heightened the level of anxiety of the Israeli public and
the feeling that the noose was tightening. Within two days, as mentioned
above, Eshkol was obliged to hand over the Defence portfolio to Moshe
Dayan.
The risk that Jordan would intervene in the event of war had always
been taken into consideration. However, the deep rift between Jordan and
Egypt and Jordan’s Western orientation gave Israel reason to hope that
Hussein would remain aloof from the hostilities. At most, he would be
content with a few ‘gun salutes’ as a gesture of solidarity. The
Jordanian–Egyptian agreement made it clear that the Jordanian arena
would be active in the event of a flare-up. The placing of the Jordanian
army under Egyptian command and the anticipated movement of Iraqi
troops into Jordan created an ominous potential strategic threat to Israel,
whose ‘green line’ border was extremely vulnerable and left it no choice
but to launch a pre-emptive counter-attack.2
Thus it appears that it was on 30 May, and not before, that Israel faced
up to its lack of an alternative. The influx of Egyptian forces into Sinai had
generated the crisis and impelled Israel to mobilize its reserve forces, bring-
ing the national economy to a virtual standstill which could not be sus-
The strategic turning point 217
tained for long; the blocking of the Straits was less an act of military and
economic significance than a challenge to Israel’s deterrent capability, a
proclaimed casus belli; fear of an initiated Egyptian air attack on the
reactor and airfields prompted the military to exert pressure on the govern-
ment to give the go-ahead to a pre-emptive attack. None of these develop-
ments, however, sufficed to force the government to yield to pressure. The
Nasser–Hussein pact turned the tables on the government. The nightmare
scenario of massed Iraqi, Egyptian and Jordanian forces on the West Bank,
facing Israel’s ‘soft belly’ – its dense population concentrations and infra-
structure – was intolerable. It was the combination of all of these factors
which finally spurred Israel to take action, but the Jordanian–Egyptian

defence pact of 30 May was the final straw. It could even be claimed, with
a slight degree of exaggeration, that it was Hussein’s initiative which
ignited the Six Day War.3
Hussein’s surprise move, which altered the strategic equation, was
almost certainly the consequence of Israel’s decision to wait. Nasser’s
meteoric rise, Israel’s bewildered and apprehensive appearance, the huge
enthusiasm generated by the Nasserist challenge throughout the Arab
world in general and among Hussein’s Palestinian subjects in particular,
the intoxicating anticipation of ‘the liberation of Palestine’ – all these com-
pelled the King to seek some form of ‘life insurance’ for himself.4 If
Hussein had hoped secretly that Israel would make the first move and
crush Nasser before the Hashemite regime tottered,5 the Israeli govern-
ment’s decision of 28 May dispelled his illusions. He swallowed his pride
in order to save his regime, and perhaps his life as well.
The Hussein–Nasser pact which, in practice, placed the Jordanian army
under Egyptian command, the immediate dispatch of Egyptian commando
battalions to Jordan and the imminent entry of Iraqi expeditionary forces
into that country heightened the sense of emergency in Israel and instantly
put an end to the phony lull in the wake of the government’s decision. Not
only Israel, but the United States as well, was influenced by the new cir-
cumstances. There were sudden indications from Washington that the
administration was no longer so resolutely opposed to an Israeli military
operation.6 The US efforts to set up an international maritime ‘task force’
were proceeding at a snail’s pace, and it was now evident that they would
not keep step with the dizzying pace of events in the region. The Amer-
icans apparently realized that to bind Israel’s hands would shift the heavy
responsibility on to the United States. This might force the US – bogged
down as it was in the Vietnamese morass – to become involved militarily
in an additional region, with all that this implied in the international arena
and for its relations with the Arab world.
For the time being, however, so long as no threatening forces were
amassed on the Jordanian border, the Egyptian front remained the main
priority for the General Staff, and this was still the situation when war
218 The strategic turning point
broke out. Nonetheless, the Jordanian front now replaced the Syrian front
as the second priority.7
The fact that despite the Egyptian–Jordanian pact, the IDF did not shift
the centre of attention from the south to the east is highly significant in
view of the theory that the General Staff was eager from the outset to com-
plete the unfinished business of 1948 and to extend Israel’s eastern
border.8 Both Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, and Moshe Dayan, who was
to be appointed Minister of Defence on 1 June, made it abundantly clear
that the main campaign was to be waged against the Egyptian enemy, and
all the rest was secondary.9 On 5 June when the war began, the Israel
government, with the approval of all its members (including Allon and
Begin!), made a sincere effort to exclude Jordan from the hostilities.10
It was, above all, Hussein’s disregard for Israel’s appeals (whether because
he was misled at the beginning of the war into thinking that Egypt had
the upper hand, because events veered out of his control, or because
he believed – apparently with some justification – that he had no choice
but to join in the fighting) which determined the long-term consequences
of the Six Day War. Israeli action, in response to Jordanian fire, com-
menced with limited offensive moves in the Jerusalem and northern
Samaria sectors in order to achieve local tactical objectives.11 What ensued
was the – unpremeditated – conquest of the entire West Bank. In the last
few days before the war, the General Staff did begin to draw up an opera-
tive offensive plan for the Jordanian front, but it had not been completed
when war broke out, and forces needed for the conquest of the West Bank
had not in fact been shifted to this sector. The IDF continued to face
southward.
Pargol (The Scourge) – planning the conquest of

the West Bank
The first Intelligence reports on Hussein’s overtures to Nasser roused
the General Staff, whose efforts had been almost entirely focused up until
now on the Egyptian front, to pay serious attention to the eastern front as
well. After an inexplicable delay, the General Staff was ‘reminded’ that it
was necessary to prepare a concrete operational plan for the grave contin-
gency that this front would be not only active but perhaps even the main
arena. The underlying assumption was that by the end of the three-week
waiting period decided on by the government, the IDF would face a
combined Jordanian–Egyptian–Iraqi army amassed along Israel’s eastern
border.
On the afternoon of 30 May, before the details of the Jordanian–
Egyptian pact were even known, a preliminary meeting was held at the
Operations Branch to discuss the situation on the Jordanian front. Lt. Col.
Haim Nadel, who chaired the proceedings, opened:
‘Due to the situation, Hussein may fall. Syrian and Iraqi forces are
liable to enter Jordan. This being so, we must plan for the conquest of
the West Bank. The precondition is supremacy in the air. . . . In the
course of occupying the West Bank – it will be necessary to rein in on
the other fronts.’12
This discussion is particularly interesting because for the first time since
the crisis had begun a General Staff forum, though at relatively junior
level, was discussing a plan to occupy the West Bank. The basic operative
plan for conquering the West Bank was code-named Pargol (The Scourge).
This discussion and those which ensued dealt therefore with revising the
plan and deciding which force would carry it out. The planning was based
on an aerial attack on the Arab air force bases in order to ensure
supremacy in the air and on deployment for defence and interception on
the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, during the conquest of the West Bank.
The underlying assumption of Pargol was, therefore, that the Jordanian
front would become the central arena if and when foreign troops moved
in. At this stage, the discussion was defined to planning ‘on paper’ without
actually transferring forces from Southern Command to Central
Command and without affecting the existing operative planning on the
Egyptian and Syrian fronts.
The head of the Jordanian ‘desk’ in the Intelligence Branch, Zeev Bar-
Lavi, estimated that ‘in light of the situation, Hussein fears for his regime –
which is why he has visited Nasser and accepted his conditions. . . . The
conditions that Nasser stipulates will eventually topple Hussein’s regime.’
He surveyed in great detail the deployment of the Jordanian armed forces
and its possible modes of action.13 The head of the Operations Branch
described the proposed order of battle which called for the shifting of
large-scale forces including the regular Thirty-fifth Parachute Brigade and
the regular Seventh Armoured Brigade from the other commands to
Central Command. The composition of the forces stemmed from the view
of the Jordanian arena as ‘the main effort’. The participants went on to
discuss the preferred breakthrough routes from the south, north and west
for conquest of the West Bank.14
It is noteworthy that in addition to the Pargol contingency plan for
occupation of the West Bank, there was also a ‘mini-Pargol’ plan aimed at
breaching the entrenched Jordanian deployment in Jerusalem by employ-
ing infantry and armoured units and linking up to the Israeli enclave on
Mount Scopus. Narkis revealed later that Ben-Gurion’s instruction during
the upheaval in Jordan in the spring of 1963 had been to reinforce Israel’s
standing in Jerusalem in case Hussein was overthrown, by linking up with
Mount Scopus (and not the conquest of the West Bank). Narkis described
in detail how various other plans had evolved from this basic objective,
thereby expanding the ‘mini-plan’. As for the Old City of Jerusalem, it was
to be ‘dealt with separately’. Narkis gained the impression that Ben-

Gurion’s intention was to avoid becoming entangled in the Old City.15
While preliminary plans were being formulated for the Jordanian front
on 30 May, the IDF remained deployed for a lengthy wait. The Operations
Branch issued orders for defensive deployment under the Sadan (Anvil)
plan and for the release of part of the mobilized reserve force. One of the
clauses in the order charged the Eighty-fourth Division, the regular divi-
sion under the command of Southern Command, with the task of planning
offensive deployment in the Jordanian sector, while coordinating between
Southern and Central Commands. It should be emphasized that this order
related to planning alone.16

The following day, 31 May, discussions of the Jordanian arena con-
tinued among the General Staff, with emphasis on Jerusalem. The gamut
of opinions ranged from conquest of the entire West Bank to limited
actions such as ‘skirmishes’ around Jerusalem, as part of the defensive
efforts.17 The Chief of Operations Ezer Weizman led the maximalist line.
He expressed the hope that ‘Out of the strong will come forth sweetness’.
It was his view that ‘war will come at any event, because otherwise the
State of Israel will not survive’. The enemy was gaining strength with every
passing day, but ‘on the other hand, the fruits of victory and international
sympathy will be greater and more profound’.18 Rabin explained that if the
Jordanian–Iraqi threat materialized on the eastern front, the IDF’s opera-
tive targets would be occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and
an attack on the Egyptian air force. However, at this stage he was opposed
to directing the main thrust in the Jordanian arena. For purposes of action
on the Jordanian front, he said, the Central and Northern Commands
would have to make do with the forces allotted to them within the frame-
work of the Sadan defensive plan, with the addition of an armoured
brigade and airborne forces. Rabin summed up the situation: the main
enemy was Egypt. The Eighty-fourth Division (the IDF’s strongest
armoured force) would not be redirected to the Jordanian front.19
On 1 June, the Operations Branch issued an order for the planning of
Operation Pargol which defined the objectives as follows:
The IDF will attack the West Bank within 36 hours of receipt of the
order to act with the aim of precluding a Jordanian attack on
Jerusalem or on the centre of the country, while at the same time car-
rying out Kardom offensive plan in Southern Command and Sadan
defensive plan in the Syrian sector.20
This planning order did not evolve into an operational order until war
broke out, and the IDF’s moves during the Six Day War on the West Bank
were essentially without overall orderly planning.
The change in political circumstances as a result of the Jordanian–
Egyptian pact, the United States’ qualified approach to its commitment to

opening up the Straits, and the faltering of the plan for an international
maritime force, reinforced the army’s demand for a military initiative. In
the late afternoon of 1 June, and also in view of the anticipated changes in
the government’s composition, Rabin was ‘optimistic’ that the government
would soon decide on the IDF initiative. At a meeting with the Chiefs of
Operations and Intelligence, the Quartermaster Branch and CO IAF,
the re-examination of all plans was discussed, as was a possible ‘pretext’
for attack, including the possibility of staging the shelling of an Israeli
settlement.21
The Foreign Minister changes his mind

At 18:30 the Prime Minister informed the Chief of Staff of Moshe Dayan’s
appointment as Minister of Defence, and invited him to attend the govern-
ment meeting planned for the same evening. Before the meeting, Rabin and
Yariv conferred with Eban and the Director-General of the Foreign Min-
istry Arie Levavi to evaluate the situation. After Rabin and Yariv had sur-
veyed the evolving deployment of the Arab armies in the wake of
Hussein–Nasser alliance, Eban announced that he had changed his mind.
He was now persuaded that the diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and
from now on it was necessary to accord priority to operational military
calculations.22 This turn-around by Eban, who until then had headed
diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis, was a milestone which augured the
upheaval in the balance of power in the government.
Eban was the main target, immediately after Eshkol, for criticism of the
government’s policy of waiting. When the generals referred mockingly to
‘humiliation’ and shameful pleading for outside help they were referring to
Eban’s shuttle diplomacy. De Gaulle’s bluntly negative approach had come
as a shock to Israel and had been perceived, unjustly, as a failure on
Eban’s part. Even de Gaulle’s embargo on arms consignments to Israel was
attributed, apparently erroneously, to the fact that Eban had expressed
gratitude to the French President for supplying arms to Israel, thereby
drawing his attention to the issue.23 It was as if Eban had undertaken the
mission to seek an audience with the Western heads of state on his own
initiative. There were those who thought that it would have been prefer-
able to send someone of unofficial status, such as former Foreign Minister
Golda Meir,24 but Eban refuted the proposal emphatically and hastened to
establish facts. His trip was frowned on not only by the army, but also by
those in government and opposition circles.25 In hindsight, it can be deter-
mined that the mission was a correct diplomatic move which prepared the
political conditions for an IDF attack and imposed greater constraints on
Egypt than on Israel. However, at the time it was believed to be working
against Israel’s supreme interest, as seen by the army – namely to deliver
the first blow. Eban’s standing was undermined to such a degree that at a
certain stage the proposal was raised to dismiss him and appoint Moshe
Dayan in his place.26 The mission angered the advocates of immediate
action to the point where they hurled accusations not only at the decision
to send him but also at the contents of his reports.27 There is no evidence
to support the charge that Eban deliberately misled the government. Even
if his report dwelt on de Gaulle’s declarations of amity, it did not gloss
over the President’s strong objections to Israeli action.28 Eban could not
have envisaged that de Gaulle would take such a drastic step as imposing
an embargo on Israel. As for Johnson’s commitment to Israel, while he had
indeed told Eban that if no international maritime task force could be

assembled the United States would act alone, he had said so halfheart-
edly,29 and was not voicing the explicit stand of the administration. On
this point, there is apparently some justification for the claim that Eban’s
report was over-optimistic. Indeed, when Eshkol, in a communication to
Johnson, tried to pin down that commitment, he encountered disappoint-
ing reservations which cast serious doubts on US resolve and did not gain
Eban additional credit.30 Eban presented the messages he had received
from de Gaulle and Johnson in a fashion which reinforced his own anti-
war stance and that of the other ‘doves’ in the government. It was only
natural for the ‘hawks’ to be highly critical of him.
It seems feasible that the change in circumstances due to the
Hussein–Nasser pact and the evident change in Washington’s stance
would, in any case, have led the government to alter its standpoint and
order the IDF to act, particularly since, after expansion, it was now more
‘hawkish’ in character. But it is indeed noteworthy that Foreign Minister
Eban was the first to sense, with accurate timing, that the time had come
to put diplomacy on the back burner and hand over the helm to the secur-
ity leadership.
Chapter 22
The decisive meeting in the

Pit
The Ministerial Committee versus the
General Staff
On Friday, 2 June 1967 at 09:25 the expanded Ministerial Committee

on Security met with the General Staff forum in the Pit war room.
The government decision five days earlier to agree to a respite for inter-
national action under US leadership was still in force. The second meeting
of the week between the military and civilian echelons (following the
General Staff meeting with Eshkol on 28 May) also developed into an inci-
sive clash between the two sides. What the generals had to say instantly
dispelled the celebratory mood of the ministers, who only the evening
before had raised their glasses to the establishment of a government of
national unity.
They were now faced with the demand for an immediate decision to
send Israel to war. Before the meeting, the Prime Minister appeared
relaxed and told the ministers ‘that for the time being things are going to
ease up’.1 However, by the end of the intriguing encounter the general
feeling was that the die had been cast.2 Two days later the government
voted by a large majority to go to war the following day.
Yariv: ‘The United States will not constitute the

main obstacle to our action’
The Chief of Staff opened the meeting and said that the aim was ‘to
display the picture to the Government the way it appears to the IDF’.3
The Chief of Intelligence read out the main points of the Intelligence
Research Department’s evaluation dated 31 May. He went on to analyse
the American stand on the basis of reports from the Israeli Embassy
in Washington and media sources. Yariv concluded that the United
States had no intention of taking serious action to lift the maritime
blockade by force and in fact, he said, the Americans were increasingly
convinced that Israel must act alone. The US had no desire to
become entangled in regional hostilities and many members of the admin-
istration would consider Israeli action as a convenient solution to the
problem. In Washington, unlike Paris, Israel could wield influence on the
224 The decisive meeting in the Pit
administration.4 He believed, on the basis of ‘hints’ received, that if Israel

acted judiciously and speedily, the ‘United States will not be the main obs-
tacle to our action’.
Rabin described the situation in all its gravity, and distinguished
between the problem of the Straits, whose significance lay in the effect on
Israel’s deterrent capability and what he saw as the main problem, namely
‘the military and political situation evolving around us, in which time is
not on our side’. He spoke in terms of a dynamic process of a massing of
military forces on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts and increased inter-
Arab cooperation. He anticipated the possibilities of Egyptian attacks, ter-
rorist action, renewal of the water diversion efforts, and even prevention
of the passage of the fortnightly convoy to Mount Scopus. ‘The members
of this forum [the IDF General Staff], and I first of all . . . don’t want war
for its own sake’, Rabin stressed, but, he added, the noose was tightening
around Israel, the enemy had proclaimed their objective of annihilating
Israel and time was on their side. Israel’s leaders did not have the right to
wait until the enemy had gained decisive superiority, thereby placing
Israel’s survival at grave risk. It was crucial to act immediately and to
inflict ‘a resounding blow’ on Nasser, which would transform the entire
Middle Eastern situation. The implications of taking the initiative, particu-
larly where the IAF was concerned, would be critical for the outcome.
Today, Rabin declared, the IDF could still do the job, even if forced to act
on a limited scale, and to suffer some damage on the Syrian and Jordanian
fronts.
In answer to a question from Eshkol, Rabin emphasized once more that
every additional day of inaction ‘impedes the implementation [of the IDF
plan] and makes it more costly’. The CO Southern Command illustrated
this viewpoint by depicting three scenarios: the situation on the day the
blockade was announced (‘if we had taken the offensive then, it would
have been a walkover’); the situation ‘on the day it was decided [28 May]
not to carry out the attack’, and the current situation. Still, Gavish
explained, ‘an attack launched tomorrow will differ significantly from an
attack in four days’ time when the situation will be much more serious’.
Yariv backed Gavish, noting that ‘Cairo is urgently cramming forces into
Sinai. In some cases, the troops go without food and water for 48 hours
because the urgency and disorder are so great. That’s not bad for us, and
again it’s all a question of time.’
Rabin summed up this section of the meeting: ‘Mr Prime Minister, we
have presented the matter to you. The question is, what does the Prime
Minister want to happen here at this forum?’ Eshkol did not reply and an
open discussion ensued in which the senior command again voiced their
views unrelentingly and imperatively. In a desperate attempt to gain time,
Minister of the Interior Moshe Haim Shapira further exasperated the gen-
erals by asking a question which seemed to rebut all their explanations: If
The decisive meeting in the Pit 225
in any case the Egyptians had already concentrated almost all of their
army in Sinai, ‘what difference can it make [if we launch an attack] now,
in a week or ten days? . . . On the other hand, we are liable to lose the
political campaign . . . if we act immediately.’
Sharon: ‘Who is more qualified than we are to tell

you that the army is ready for war?’
Brigadier General Avraham Yaffe, the first speaker in the discussion,
emphasized the need to take the initiative:
‘I have been sitting in the Negev for 14 days with the units and the
reserve forces. . . . Our feeling there . . . is that we have failed to seize
the initiative all along the front. . . . We must snatch the initiative from
the Egyptians. If we can gain it by diplomatic means – well and good
. . . but so far all our initiative is in the shape of the Foreign Minister’s
trip to the United States.’
Yaffe did not rule out the idea of confining action to an IAF attack
without bringing any other forces into play. The main thing, he said, was
‘to do something, to exploit our initiative and to change this situation
where we can see the clouds gathering and approaching and we are sitting
idle’.
Yaffe’s minimalist approach was anathema to Ariel Sharon. He started
out by declaring that ‘the IDF forces are readier and abler than ever before
to destroy and to repel an Egyptian attack’. The objective, Sharon clarified,
‘is no less than total annihilation of the Egyptian forces’. The gravest issue,
as he perceived it, was the loss of Israel’s deterrent capability, which was
weakening day by day due to ‘the hesitations and foot-dragging [of the
government]’. He tried to persuade the ministers, who were afraid of
heavy casualties, that due to the situation’s gravity, ‘there is moral justifi-
cation for the decision-taking echelon to approve an operation which will
entail more losses’. Sharon objected in particular to Israeli dependence on
the Superpowers:
‘Any link-up on our part with other powers is a mistake of the first
order. Our aim is to make sure that in the coming ten or twenty years
or generation or two, the Egyptians will not want to fight us. Any
link-up on our part with other powers or action against marginal
objectives [e.g. attacks on Egyptian airfields and conquest of the Gaza
Strip alone] instead of focusing on the central objective of destroying
the Egyptian army will prove that we are weak. That was the main
damage caused by the Sinai Campaign. We could have gone it alone.
The fact that we linked up with others showed us up as helpless.’
Sharon emphasized that only a resolute stand in defence of Israel’s rights,

one of which was freedom of shipping, could guarantee the state’s long-
term survival. He alluded mockingly to Eban’s mission: ‘Our scurrying
about – and I won’t use the word “shtadlanut” – [begging for help from
rulers] among the Superpowers and pleading for rescue are not part of our
stand in protection of our rights.’ Sharon rounded off his remarks by
assuring the ministers that the IDF was ready for action, equipped with a
sturdy fighting spirit and decisive military superiority. ‘Who is more quali-
fied than we are to come and tell you that the army is ready for war?’ he
asked. He warned that any attempt to postpone the date of the attack in
hope of receiving more tanks and aircraft would be a grave error. ‘Today
nothing can have any effect except for a rapid and courageous, timely
decision on the part of the government. The rest can be left to our forces. I
can assure you that it will be carried out in the best possible fashion.’
Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan now took the floor. He said little but
it was evident that he was siding with the General Staff although, ostens-
ibly, he confined himself to a ‘technical explanation’. He explained to
Moshe Haim Shapira the connection between the consolidation of enemy
forces, and the high number of casualties which would result from an
attack on their fortified positions. Dayan claimed that the IDF would have
limited time at its disposal until the fighting was halted by anticipated
international intervention. The deeper the Egyptian entrenchment, the
more time would be needed to defeat them. Dayan added that even if
everything went well, there would still be the need for a second stage to
conquer Sharm al-Sheikh and open up the Straits, since this could not be
achieved at an early stage. If the first stage was drawn out due to Egyptian
entrenchment, there might not be enough time for the second stage, and
the Straits would remain blocked when the ceasefire was imposed.
Peled: ‘We are entitled to know why we are

suffering this disgrace’
The Chief of the Quartermaster Branch, Brigadier-General Matti Peled,
was the bluntest of all in his attack on the government. For two weeks,
morning, noon and night, he said, the army had been contending that time
was working against Israel. But the General Staff had not received a single
word of explanation for the wait. ‘I can understand that we are waiting for
something to happen. If so, let us in on the secret and then we will know
why we are waiting!’ Peled denied the importance of international action
for lifting the blockade: ‘We have heard something regarding Tiran, which
lost its significance long ago. It was not important to start with and is even
less important now.’ The entry of an Egyptian force into Sinai was nothing
new for the IDF, having been anticipated and planned for in various exer-
cises and war games. The only surprise, he stressed, was Nasser’s audacity,
since it was well known that his army was not ready for war. Peled had an
explanation to offer for Nasser’s moves:
‘In my opinion he was relying on the hesitation of the Israeli govern-

ment. He acted in the confidence that we would not dare to hit at
him. . . . Nasser moved an army which was not ready to the border
and he derived full advantage from the move. One fact is acting in his
favour and that is the fact that the Israel government is not ready to
act against him.’
Peled interpreted the questions the ministers had raised during the meeting
and on previous occasions as manifestations of a lack of confidence in the
IDF. ‘What has the IDF done wrong to deserve these doubts as to its capa-
bility? What more does an army need in order to win the confidence of the
government but to win every battle?’
As the officer responsible for logistics, Peled permitted himself to bran-
dish the economic argument and point out the impact of the deteriorating
economic situation on the morale of the troops:
‘The economy is in an intolerable condition. Food supplies scarcely

manage to reach the places where they are needed. How long will it be
before our soldiers in the frontline are affected by the situation in the
home front? . . . How long can they sit there when everything we left
behind is collapsing? . . . The State of Israel does not have infinite
stamina. The IDF will be able to beat the enemy in three weeks’ time as
well, but I don’t know what will happen in the interior. . . . It is not
clear to me if the government has an accurate picture of what is going
on internally. I now meet with directors of government ministries on an
almost routine basis, and their representatives know what is going on.
If you only knew . . . you would ask why we are not acting faster. The
enemy is digging in and growing stronger and the economy is growing
weaker and all this for an aim which nobody can explain to us.’
Peled concluded on a sharp note: ‘We deserve to know why we are suffer-
ing this disgrace. Perhaps, on this occasion, we will receive an explanation.
Why are we waiting?’
The Prime Minister hastened to sum up the discussion and to defend the
government. It was clearly evident that Sharon and Peled had infuriated
him. Having already resolved to send the IDF into action, he did not want
to be misunderstood. Hence, he began by declaring: ‘What I am about to
say is not intended to explain what we are going to do tomorrow or the
next day.’
First, he replied to Sharon, who had denoted the diplomatic efforts
‘scurrying about’. ‘Everything we have vis-à-vis the material strength of
our army came as a result of this scurrying about,’ he said in reproof.

‘Let’s not forget that and let’s not regard ourselves as Goliaths as a result.
Barefisted, unequipped and unarmed – we have no strength.’ He was
reluctant to place unqualified faith in the army’s evaluations. ‘With all the
evaluations and data of Intelligence there are several things of which it can
be said that they could end in this way or that’, in particular what the
Soviet Union was liable to do.
In a country of two million citizens, he told the generals, a man needed
to ask himself:
‘Let us assume that we break the enemy’s might today. Tomorrow we

need to start building up our power anew, because we too will have
lost forces . . . and then, if every ten years we need to fight we will
have to consider whether we have an ally who can aid us. . . . Some-
times the difference of a day and an hour can be decisive in the sense
that not everyone in the world will fall on us us like a pack of wolves.’
Eshkol noted in particular the importance ‘of whispering in Johnson’s ear

so that he won’t claim that we cheated him, because we may still need
him. Let’s hope we won’t need him in the middle of the fighting’. At the
same time Eshkol hinted that there was a limit to waiting and the hour of
action was close at hand.
The Prime Minister was apparently deeply hurt by Peled’s remarks and
answered him in a defiant spirit:
‘I permit myself to think that you know no more than we do about

what is going on in government ministries, what this country has and
what our reserves are . . . in the civilian sphere. I don’t think we are
less equipped now than ten years ago [during the Sinai War] and
perhaps even more. Therefore, one can say that two days more or one
day less will not decide the campaign.’5
Eshkol, as the greatest authority on economic affairs insisted that the

Achilles heel was not the economic situation and that it was important to
preserve Israel’s relations with its friends throughout the world so that the
IDF’s strength could be built up after the war. A military victory would
not end the dispute ‘because the Arabs will still be here’, he argued.
Rabin expressed the hope that the government would convene that
same day and make a decision, but Eshkol declared that a government
meeting would be held, as usual, on Sunday. Thus the meeting ended on a
similar note to the meeting in the Pit five days previously. Eshkol may have
replied in this fashion in order to give vent to his resentment at the IDF’s
pressure but in fact he had resolved to wait no longer.
At noon Eshkol conferred with a limited forum consisting of Dayan,
Eban, Allon, the Director-General of the PM’s office Yaakov Herzog, and
Rabin. It was decided unanimously that the time had come to go to war.
Dayan and Allon favoured an immediate attack,6 as did Rabin. Eshkol was
already leaning in this direction, and Eban voiced no objections. The
impact of the meeting with the General Staff had decided the issue.
However, it was agreed that the attack would not begin ‘before Monday
[5 June]’.7
The army’s influence: legitimate, borderline

legitimate or illegitimate?
This is the place to sum up and evaluate the role which the army comman-
ders played in persuading, or perhaps forcing, the government to decide to
go to war. Was the pressure they exerted beyond the bounds of the
legitimate constitutional framework, or did the IDF act within the permiss-
ible framework in accordance with the rules of conduct in a ‘mature’
democratic political culture?8
In order to answer this question it should be noted that, as we have
shown, the military perceived the situation as acute and feared that they
were liable to face the difficult choice between constitutional loyalty,
which dictated full submission to the elected civilian authority, and a
higher loyalty to the very existence of the state and their duty to protect it
and the lives of its citizens. Such a situation is liable to evoke activist
symptoms even among a professional officer class.9
The General Staff was entirely convinced that the government was
endangering the country. From 22 May, the date on which Nasser pro-
claimed the closing of the Straits of Tiran, the senior command was united
in the belief that there would be no escape from a military confrontation.
The government’s indecision, so it seemed, was encouraging Nasser to act
even more audaciously and granting his army time for organizing, consoli-
dating, reinforcing and re-equipping its own army as well as rallying allied
Arab armies around Israel’s borders. The most feasible assumption, based
on ‘indicators’, was that Nasser would direct an initial blow at the atomic
reactor and IAF airfields. It was feared also that concentrations of popu-
lation and infrastructure would be bombed and that the Arab armies,
enjoying air superiority, were subsequently liable to launch a coordinated
offensive simultaneously on all fronts, thereby forcing the IDF to split its
defensive efforts. This nightmare scenario included the possibility of wide-
scale terrorist attacks and an uprising of Israel’s Arabs. A situation might
develop, the generals asserted, whereby the IDF would not be able to win
the inevitable fight.
Moreover, a crisis of confidence now became apparent between the mil-
itary and political echelons. On the one hand, the government’s confidence
in the army was shaken, due to the rebuttal of the Intelligence evaluation,
the collapse of the deterrent capacity, the unexpected downward slide to

the verge of war, and Rabin’s hesitations and breakdown.10 On the other
hand, and above all, the army did not trust the government to act judi-
ciously, and considered it to be confused, panic-stricken, spineless and
incapable of making decisions. It was not only the army which had lost
confidence in the civilian leadership but also the anxious general public at
home and the mobilized troops on the front line.11
The paternal, anti-charismatic and irresolute image of Levi Eshkol did
not answer the psychological need for confident and persuasive leadership.
The frenzied atmosphere in the Arab world, the blunt threats that Israel
would be destroyed and its citizens slaughtered, had touched a very sensi-
tive nerve in Jewish consciousness. Eshkol’s standing was at its lowest ebb
due to the economic recession which had created a gloomy atmosphere
well before the crisis,12 the savage criticism levelled against him by the
opposition and the media (and in particular the charge that he was
responsible for a ‘security mishap’), the deterioration of the security situ-
ation due to increased terrorist activity, and finally his faltering address to
the nation which appeared to reflect helplessness, a plea for outside rescue,
and an affront to the Israeli ethos.
The army believed that it held the solution to the situation, that the
nation was pinning its hopes on its fighters, and only the government was
delaying action and casting doubt on the IDF’s ability to save the country
from disaster. Victory depended to a critical extent on the IAF’s ability to
achieve aerial supremacy and this in its turn was conditional on achieving
the vital element of tactical surprise. Hence the government’s ‘delaying
tactics’ and in particular the incomprehensible decision of 28 May were
perceived by the army as potentially disastrous.
In the severe crisis which ensued, the army could have been strongly
tempted, in light of its perception of the circumstances, to seize the initi-
ative, and ‘intervene’ to deliver the nation from danger. The crucial fact is
that this did not occur. The army was confronted with a supreme test of its
loyalty to the laws and constraints of the democratic framework, and that
framework was preserved and did not crumble.
Still, what did the army do and to what extent – if at all – was there
ever a danger of illegitimate ‘intervention’ on its part?
First, it should be pointed out that the tension between the military and
civilian echelons did not extend through the entire three-week period of
the crisis – 15 May to 4 June. It began only after Nasser’s announcement
of the closure of the Straits and the dispatch of Foreign Minister Eban on
his diplomatic mission to seek support from the Western heads of state.
The government’s marathon discussions on 27 and 28 May which resulted
in a decision to wait three weeks, in total disregard for the army’s view,
created a situation which the IDF found unacceptable. The tension
between military and government reached its peak during the four days
that were marked by two highly charged meetings in the Pit: between
Sunday evening, 28 May, when the generals met with the Prime Minister,
and Friday morning, 2 June, when they met the expanded Ministerial
Committee on Security. Between these two dates, the military echelon took
the following steps:
1 Immediately after the meeting with Eshkol in the Pit, Rabin ordered
that steps be taken to forestall inertia (a slackening of alertness) in the
army and to maintain high morale, both through propaganda and
through a strict military routine and intensive training regime.13
2 The Intelligence Branch issued a very sombre evaluation on the mili-

tary and diplomatic implications of a three-week wait.
3 Several of the generals were recruited for a ‘propaganda campaign’ in
order to persuade the political establishment to change the govern-
ment decision. To this end, several meetings took place between senior
officers and political figures.14
Of these three activities, only the third appears to be somewhat problem-

atic, because it seemingly points to IDF intervention in politics, particu-
larly when the demand had been raised to relieve Eshkol of the Defence
portfolio. But even if several officers tried to influence the appointment of
a new Minister of Defence, their impact was infinitesimal and in no way
undermined the supremacy of the political echelon. The move to appoint
Dayan to the post was inspired by pressure of public opinion and the polit-
ical establishment and not necessarily by the urgings of the senior
command.
And yet one may still ask whether there was ever a danger – even if it
came to nothing – of improper intervention by the IDF?
We have already noted Ben-Gurion’s dread of unauthorized action on
the part of the army as the result of its lack of confidence towards the civil-
ian leadership, an act which would constitute ‘a stain on the State of Israel
from which it will never cleanse itself’. It is noteworthy that there is no
evidence that at any stage whatsoever the General Staff intended to take
action against the government and overrule its decisions. However, the
fact that several generals, in the course of charged encounters with the
political echelon, felt the need to emphasize that the army was subordinate
to the government,15 and the fact that the Prime Minister felt it necessary
to put the military in their place indicates that a certain fear, however
faint, was hovering in the atmosphere.
The generals who led the Israeli army in battle in the June 1967 war are
unanimous in their view that there was never any danger of a ‘putsch’.16
This conviction is clearly verified by what the army did and by what it
refrained from doing. Nonetheless, Ezer Weizman was quoted as having
said that Israel was never closer to a military coup than on the eve of the
Six Day War.17 According to one source, the American Intelligence services
estimated that such a danger existed.18
That the possibility was contemplated and actually broached out loud
at the senior military level during the tense and frustrating encounters with
the political echelon is attested to by only one member of the IDF General
Staff at that time – Ariel Sharon. His exceptional testimony deserves to be
quoted in full:
‘After the first meeting with Eshkol [in the Pit on 28 May] . . . I must
say that I myself, and I also discussed it with the Chief of Staff, for the
first time had the feeling, and this must be admitted, we sometimes
asked whether in the State of Israel a situation was possible whereby
the army would seize power. Could there be a situation where the
army takes decisions without the government . . . and I always said
that it wasn’t possible, that in Israel such a thing couldn’t happen.
And here, after the meeting on 28.5 . . . I told the Chief of Staff and
the other people there that in fact this is the first time where a situ-
ation had arisen where this was possible, and it would be accepted
positively. That means that for the first time a situation had arisen in
Israel where seizing of power [by the army was possible] not for pur-
poses of desire for power but for decision-making. The basic decision
[i.e. to go to war] could be taken without the government, for the first
time. And I don’t remember whether he [Rabin] agreed or not, but I
think that he saw it like that as well. I don’t think that anyone talked
of practical matters, whether it was possible to carry it out, but from
the viewpoint of the situation which existed . . . the first meeting on 28
May . . . we didn’t finish discussing the subject. After the meeting on 2
June [with the expanded Ministerial Committee on Security] . . . we
[the generals] stayed behind to talk afterwards, and I said that if we
had been at a certain stage, what we started talking about afterwards,
we would have stood up and said [to the Ministers], listen, your
decisions are endangering the State of Israel, and since the situation is
now very grave, you are requested to step into the next room and wait
there, and the Chief of Staff will go over to Kol Israel [national radio]
and broadcast an announcement [on a decision taken by the army to
go to war] . . . they [the Ministers] would have accepted it with a sense
of relief. That was my feeling.’19
Sharon’s testimony may be seen as the expression of an individual line of

thought or mood which he shared with the Chief of Staff and colleagues in
the General Staff. It should be noted that this was not a unique thought
because Sharon raised it in the Pit twice within five days. But it was an
aberrant expression, no more than ‘thinking out loud’. A similar thought
may have gone through the minds of other generals, but Sharon was the
only one who voiced it. Perusal of the documentation reveals no evidence
that there was ever any practical outcome.
The question of the limits of obedience of a soldier to the democrati-
cally elected civilian echelon is not a simple one.20 The existence of some
kind of limit is accepted. No soldier is called upon to ‘blindly obey’, and
under extreme circumstances he will be fulfilling a higher obligation if he
gives priority to moral or professional considerations and to his ultimate
responsibility towards the state and the security of its inhabitants.
The outcome of the Six Day War has clouded comprehension of the
extreme situation at the time, because the fact that Israel enjoyed decisive
military superiority became evident only post factum, so that the claim of
the General Staff that it would be disastrous to wait was disproved. In
fact, most of the generals admitted later that the waiting period – in addi-
tion to its vast diplomatic advantages – strengthened the IDF, enabled it to
complete its operative planning, to lay out the logistic deployment, to
organize and train forces, and to transform the reserve forces as well into a
kind of regular army. In retrospect, nobody claimed that the army had
been correct in its evaluations. The way in which Eshkol and his govern-
ment conducted the crisis came to be regarded, in the end, as political
sagacity at its best.
This was not the way things appeared before the war. The General
Staff, as noted, was convinced that the government was endangering the
country. They raged, they exerted pressure, they exhorted, but they did not
take illegitimate or provocative action in order to confront the political
echelon with a fait accompli. There is no way of knowing for sure what
would have happened if the government had persisted in its policy of
waiting despite the deterioration in the military situation (the entry of Iraqi
forces into the West Bank, further reinforcement and consolidation of the
Egyptian force in Sinai and so on), in a manner which would have aggra-
vated the army’s dilemma even further. But there is no reason to assume
that even in that case the army would have acted of its own accord and
not on the basis of the decisions of the government. It is an incontrovert-
ible fact that the IDF began to release reserve forces and to prepare for a
long wait. The shortening of that period from three weeks to one was due
to IDF pressure, promoted by the change in the composition of the govern-
ment, and the ‘yellow light’ from Washington. But the most important
factor was the Hussein–Nasser alliance and its strategic implications,
which tipped the balance.
On 28 May 1967 the Israeli government (with the exception of Moshe
Carmel) voted unanimously to wait. Exactly a week later, on 4 June,
almost the entire government (with the exception of two Mapam minis-
ters) decided unanimously to go to war immediately. The army had
brought pressure to bear and got what it wanted, even though several days
late and only after the existential threat loomed larger. The General Staff
did not need to recourse to unconstitutional measures. This possibility,

even if contemplated for a moment by one general or another, was never
actually on the agenda.
Restricting the powers of the Minister of Defence

Once Dayan was appointed it was necessary to decide on the division of
authority between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence and in
particular the restrictions on the latter’s freedom to issue orders to the
army. The procedures were formulated by Yigael Yadin, former Chief of
Staff, who was trusted by both Eshkol and Dayan.21
1 The Minister of Defence will not act without the approval of the
Prime Minister as regards the following:
• launching general hostile action or war against any country what-
soever;
• taking any military action in the course of war which oversteps
the bounds of action as determined by the government.
• launching military action against any country which has not, until
that moment, participated in hostilities.
• bombing important cities in enemy territory if the act has not been
preceded by bombing of Israeli cities by that same enemy.
• launching retaliatory action in response to incidents.
2 The Prime Minister can, with the knowledge of the Minister of
Defence, summon the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Intelligence, the
Director-General of the Ministry of Defence or the Assistant Minister
of Defence in order to receive information.
This hastily drawn-up procedure can scarcely be regarded as a comprehen-

sive series of instructions for defining the subordination of the Minister of
Defence to the Prime Minister. In any event, all the actions listed in Clause
1 were subject to the approval of the government plenum or the Minister-
ial Committee on Security. This was not an orderly division of authority
but rather a document aimed at dispelling fears, which were not explicitly
expressed, that the Minister of Defence might make his own decisions and
take action after consulting the army, without informing the government
and its head.22 Dayan himself ignored the agreed procedure when he gave
direct orders to the CO Northern Command on 9 June to attack the
Syrians on the Golan Heights, thereby contravening the government’s
decision of the previous night not to launch such an attack (in fact, at the
government meeting of 8 June Dayan was the most vehement opponent of
an attack on Syria).23
‘Presentation of plans’ to the Chief of Staff and Minister

of Defence
That evening the Southern Command’s plans were presented to the Chief
of Staff and a discussion was held with the participation of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Chief of Intelligence, CO Southern Command and southern
divisional commanders Tal (Eighty-fifth Division), Sharon (Thirty-eighth
Division) and Yaffe (Thirty-first Division). An hour later they were joined
by the Minister of Defence, who also perused the plans and took an active
part in the subsequent deliberations and helped determine the outcome.
This discussion was the decisive stage in consolidation of the ultimate

operational plan ‘Nakhshonim’, which was implemented in general lines
on the southern front.
It is seemingly surprising that at this late stage, almost three weeks after
the crisis had begun, and after endless deliberations and planning, the IDF
did not yet have a definite operational plan for a ground offensive on the
Egyptian front. The reasons lay in the rapid changes in the situation which
required flexibility and adaptation of plans as well as allocation of forces
and tasks. Within Southern Command there was an ongoing struggle
between the divisional commanders. Ariel Sharon was pressing and
demanding expansion of his division’s assignments and the aims of the war
in general, while Yisrael Tal, whose division was earmarked for the main
thrust, favoured more modest objectives. In the end, Avraham Yaffe, who
was more passive, was left with a depleted division. His spearhead brigade
(200th Armoured Brigade under Yiska Shadmi) fought in the breakthrough
stage in Sharon’s sector with a brilliant incursion movement in Wadi Harei-
din, and should logically have been under Sharon’s command.24
This was not the first time that operational plans had been presented to
the civilian echelon but, unlike Eshkol, Dayan, as former Chief of Staff
and the man who had waged warfare in Sinai only a decade previously,
had something to say about the planned moves and objectives. The
General Staff was therefore now facing a new situation, in which it needed
to persuade a Minister of Defence with professional experience and back-
ground and to adapt the operational plans to his instructions. Until then
under Eshkol the Chiefs of Staff had been ‘exempt’ from all professional
intervention, and the government had never troubled to define the object-
ives of the war. Its defensive tenet and the ministers’ lack of military
know-how (apart from Allon and Carmel) had left the General Staff
devoid of strategic instruction and without definition of the objectives of
the war. In its present plight, the government wanted only for the army to
remove the threat. Beyond that, it devoted little serious thought to the
tactics of warfare and its possible outcome.
Moshe Dayan issued three basic instructions for the General Staff stem-
ming from the political evaluation. It is noteworthy that they were not
deliberated and decided by a government forum but originated in Dayan’s

own personal perception and were undoubtedly coloured by his experience
as Chief of Staff and inspired to some extent by Ben-Gurion. The issues
were:
1 The Gaza Strip – the debate between the generals on the need to
conquer the Gaza Strip was based entirely on military considerations.
Tal feared that ‘if we do not deal with the Strip it will cause mayhem
in our settlements’. Gavish too was concerned for the fate of the settle-
ments along the border with the Gaza Strip, and Barlev insisted that
the Sixtieth Brigade should be brought in for rapid action to capture

the Strip, where two Palestinian brigades were deployed, within two
hours. Rabin, on the other hand, was ready to forgo the conquest of
the Strip in order to focus the armoured effort on the conquest of el-
Arish and the destruction of the bulk of the Egyptian force. Ariel
Sharon thought that ‘the Strip will fall in any case’ and there was no
need to invest unnecessary effort for that purpose. Only the Assistant
Chief of Operations, Rehavam Ze’evi, exceeded the purely operational
calculations and commented that ‘it would be a pity to forfeit the
headline: Gaza is ours!’25
Moshe Dayan was opposed to the conquest of the Strip but not for
military reasons. ‘The Gaza Strip issue is problematic because of the
refugees’, he said. He was afraid that the capture of the Strip would
force Israel to undertake the burden of supporting the refugees, and he
preferred to leave this to the UN Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA).
Only in one case, Dayan explained, would Israel be obliged to occupy
the Strip – if the Egyptians stationed foreign forces there. This would
be a total violation of the armistice agreements and an excellent ratio-
nale for Israeli action, but in this case as well no action should be
taken against the Strip in the first stage of the fighting, only later.26
2 The Suez Canal – the Suez Canal was not defined as an objective in the
operative plans submitted by the Command, but reaching it was not
ruled out. Dayan now clarified this point: ‘The Canal is not an objec-
tive. We must keep our distance from it after cleaning out the routes
leading there. This is because of its value to the entire world, with
which we must not enter into conflict.’ When the Head of the Opera-
tions Branch commented that ‘to sit beside the Canal could be a bar-
gaining card for Sharm al-Sheikh’, Dayan reiterated his opinion, and
went on to explain: ‘A threat against the Canal can only cause us
harm. Those who are capable of removing us from Sinai will not be
the Egyptians [but the great powers] and it is in their interest that we
should not threaten the Canal. On the contrary, it would be a pretext
for action against us.’ Dayan, therefore, was contemplating the post-
war diplomatic campaign and estimating that Israeli presence on the
banks of the Suez Canal or near it would help to intensify pressure on

Israel to withdraw from Sinai.27
3 Defining the minimal territorial gain necessary – Dayan wanted to
annihilate as many Egyptian forces as possible but he was intensely
aware of the limitations of diplomatic time. He accepted the assump-
tion that within seventy-two hours international intervention would
enforce a ceasefire, and declared that during this period a minimal ter-
ritorial gain should be achieved – the conquest of northern Sinai as far
as el-Arish – even if the blow against the Egyptian armour was not
complete.28
The discussions in the General Staff that night and on the following day
consolidated the final operative plan, which was code-named
‘Nakhshonim’. It was based on Kardom 2, in other words a main thrust
along the northern axis to be executed by the Eighty-fourth Division and
the cream of the armoured forces, but with an additional effort along the
central axis, including a complex breakthrough by the Thirty-eighth Divi-
sion and the penetration of an armoured brigade of the Thirty-first Divi-
sion to destroy the forward Egyptian deployment. Of the southern arm,
which had been earmarked in Kardom 1 to the main thrust, there now
remained only one armoured brigade, the Eighth Brigade, facing Shazli’s
force.
The encounter with the generals in the Pit pushed Eshkol and his minis-
ters to the brink of the fateful decision. The IDF was now consolidating
the final plans under the eye of the new Defence Minister. The scene was
set for war. There was only one last point to clarify and weigh heavily
before the die was cast: the US position on an Israeli pre-emptive strike.
Chapter 23
The decisive stage

War
As noted, the turning point, which induced the Israeli government to

shorten the waiting period, was the signing of the Hussein–Nasser pact on
30 May. This surprising development had an immediate impact on Wash-
ington. Israel’s Intelligence services suddenly received indications (‘hints’,
as Yariv denoted them at the Ministerial Committee on Security) that US
objections to an Israeli pre-emptive strike were less steadfast than before.
These indications were at variance with the official messages transmitted
through diplomatic contacts.
From the outset the Departments of Defence and State had not been of
one mind as regards employment of an international ‘armada’ to open the
Straits of Tiran. President Johnson supported the plan initially, despite the
reservations of the Defence Department, although it is unlikely that he
intended to carry it through. He favoured it mainly as a means of exerting
pressure on Nasser. Due to the altered circumstances in the Middle East,
the President now accepted the recommendation of the Defence Depart-
ment ‘to unleash Israel’. And yet the State Department continued to
caution Israel not to open fire first, and to argue – less and less convinc-
ingly – that they were still investing effort in organizing an international
maritime force.1 There may have been some form of coordination between
the various sectors of the administration, a kind of ‘division of labour’: on
the official diplomatic plane, the United States continued to warn Israel
against taking action and, simultaneously, unofficially and discreetly, con-
veyed different messages.
The American perspective

The decisions taken by the Israeli government during the crisis were closely
connected to the standpoints of the United States. This was also true of the
fateful and historic decision taken by the government of national unity on
4 June 1967 – namely to go to war. The majority of Eshkol’s government,
who were not spoiling for a fight and feared the outcome, were particu-
larly anxious at the prospect that their country might go to war alone and
The decisive stage 239
without Great Power backing. From the moment the Straits were barred to
Israel, the government sought support in Washington and received it on
condition that Israel did not fire the first shot. The restrictions on Israel, at
a time when the existential danger was increasing, imposed a heavy
responsibility on the United States. Eventually the view that it would be
advisable to allow Israel free action prevailed in Washington.
US documents on the period under discussion were recently opened to
the public. This abundant documentation casts light on US diplomacy,
Intelligence evaluations, reports from embassies in the Middle East, discus-
sions and decisions of senior officials and the White House. They also
reveal aspects of Israeli diplomacy from the American angle. This rich
archival material helps to illuminate the background to the change in the
US approach, a change which made it easier for the Israeli government to
make its fateful decision.
Johnson: ‘The transcendent objective: the avoidance of

hostilities’
The objectives of the United States in the first two weeks of the crisis
(15–29 May) were to prevent war, and in the third week (30 May to 4
June) – to be absolved of responsibility for the war which was now
unavoidable. When the crisis erupted, the United States passed pacifying
messages from Jerusalem to Cairo, to the effect that Israel had no intention
of attacking Syria, there were no concentrations of Israeli forces on the
Syrian border, and, if no infiltration and sabotage were perpetrated there
was no cause for concern.2 Israel still perceived the crisis in the context of
terrorist activity, and, in a note to President Johnson on 18 May, Eshkol
expressed concern that the concentration of Egyptian forces in Sinai might
encourage Syria to resume terrorist acts under the false impression of
immunity.3 The hasty decision of UN Secretary-General U Thant to evacu-
ate the UNEF from Sinai took Washington by surprise, and Israel hastened
to caution against blocking shipping in the Bay of Aqaba, a warning which
the United States immediately transmitted to the Soviet representative at
the United Nations.4 Israel’s Ambassador in Washington, Avraham
Harman, asked Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow for confirmation
that the United States’ 1957 commitment to freedom of shipping was still
valid, and Rostow reassured him on that point, but said that it should be
perceived within the framework of the President’s demand for ‘immediate
consultation’ in the event that Egypt interfered with free passage.5 Johnson
dispatched a message of reassurance to Eshkol. He did not mention
freedom of shipping explicitly, but rather his commitment and that of his
predecessors to Israel and his support for retaining an ‘important and
desirable’ UN presence in Sinai.6 Concurrently, Johnson dispatched a con-
ciliatory note to Nasser, urging him ‘to set as your first duty . . . this
240 The decisive stage
transcendent objective: the avoidance of hostilities’, and proposing to send

Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to Cairo.7 On the eve of U Thant’s trip
to Cairo, US Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg conveyed to him his
country’s support for freedom of shipping and views on the need to retain
an effective UN presence at Sharm al-Sheikh and in the Gaza Strip.8
When Nasser announced the closure of the Straits to Israeli shipping
and to ‘strategic materials’ earmarked for Israel, US diplomacy went into
high gear in order to dissuade Israel from starting a war, and to prevent
Egypt from blocking the Straits.
The designated ambassador, Richard Nolte, conferred in Cairo on 23
May with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, while US Ambas-

sador to Moscow Thomas Thompson held an urgent meeting with Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko, who assured him that the Soviet Union
opposed the war and, as anticipated, blamed Israel for the crisis.9 The
President himself appeared that day on radio and TV and declared that the
Bay of Aqaba was an ‘international waterway’, where freedom of shipping
was a vital interest for the international community, and blocking would
be an illegal and destructive act against peace.10 The attempts of the United
States to summon an urgent session of the Security Council encountered
Soviet resistance.11 The Soviet Union also rejected the French initiative,
which Britain favoured though the United States was unenthusiastic, to
hold discussions among the four Powers on a resolution of the crisis.12
The British formula fails

US documents reveal that the idea of opening up the Straits by employing
an international armada was conceived by the British. On 24 May, before
the United States had had time to contemplate possible paths of action,
British Minister of State in the Foreign Office George Thomson landed in
Washington straight from a government meeting in London (Foreign
Secretary George Brown left for Moscow simultaneously) with a plan for
action. It seemed that Abba Eban, who visited London that same day, had
not wasted his time there. The main points of the British plan were:
formulation of a declaration in support of freedom of shipping and recruit-
ment of widespread international support among the maritime nations for
an ‘escort operation’ in the Straits of Tiran, backed by a show of strength
in the Eastern Mediterranean. President Johnson was sceptical as to the
possibility of rallying a multinational force, while Secretary of State Dean
Rusk argued that military action would require the approval of Congress,
which would involve some delay.13 However, in the absence of any other
option, the Americans pinned their hopes on the faint hope of consolidat-
ing international support and participation in the venture, in the vain hope
that they could thereby pressure Nasser into retreating. Rusk presented the
alternatives to Johnson: to permit Israel to act (Rusk himself was vehe-
mently opposed) or to take action in accordance with the British plan,

without final commitment. The need to persuade Israel not to attack,
however, induced the President to present a committed stand to the Israeli
Foreign Minister.14 For a week the British plan was under consideration in
Washington as the sole operative possibility. Officially, it was not shelved
until fighting broke out. In practice, it was defunct from the end of May.
The British–US plan was effective up to a certain stage, only in order to
be brandished at Israel in order to persuade it that the administration was
determined to open up the Straits. Nasser was much less impressed. The
opposition of Egypt and the Arab world, and of the non-aligned nations
and the Eastern Bloc, precluded widespread support for the proposed ‘dec-
laration of the maritime nations’. The text of the declaration was agreed
on and conveyed to US legations in the maritime countries only on 31
May, when the administration was already seeking other solutions.15 On 2
June the Americans and British agreed to defer for the time being military
planning of a joint operation, for fear of leakages. In Congress, which had
learned the lessons of Vietnam, support was expressed for US participation
in military effort but only within the framework of the UN or a multina-
tional coalition, and under no circumstances as unilateral action. The
Department of Defence pointed out the many difficulties and dangers
entailed in a military venture, in the absence of sufficient forces in the Red
Sea arena.16 The plan now seemed less attractive, and the administration
was left with no alternative apart from granting Israel licence to act.
Evaluation: Israel will win

One of the important factors which eventually led the United States to
consent in practice to permit Israel to solve its problems alone was related
to the evaluation by Intelligence sources in the Department of Defence and
the CIA that Israel would prevail. Dean Rusk claimed that the worst even-
tuality from the point of view of the United States would be if the Arabs
defeated Israel and were close to driving it into the sea. Secretary of
Defence McNamara claimed that the reverse was the most likely scenario:
the United States would be in a tight spot if the Soviet Union hastened to
rescue a defeated Egypt from Israel. The Intelligence Services did not
change their attitude throughout the crisis, and continued to assert that the
IDF could beat any Arab military coalition even if the Arabs inflicted the
first blow. Israel’s appeals for aid were ‘a gambit’ intended: (1) to persuade
the United States to provide military supplies; (2) to extract more US
public commitments to Israel; (3) to receive American approval for Israeli
military initiatives; (4) to put more pressure on Nasser.17 The military
deployment in Sinai was perceived by the Americans as defensive in
nature. Without entirely ruling out other calculations on Nasser’s part
(such as bringing forward the inevitable clash with Israel before the latter
had acquired nuclear weapons), the possibility that Nasser was seeking a
‘military show-down’ with Israel was defined as highly unlikely, and Soviet
opposition was also anticipated. The most likely course was that Nasser
would drag out the situation, so that the long-term mobilization of reserve
forces would have an increasingly adverse effect on Israel’s economy.18 At
the same time, the Americans were convinced that Israel was in a state of
great nervous tension and an ‘apocalyptic’ atmosphere (as Abba Eban called
it in his talk with Dean Rusk),19 and could not be restrained for long.
It is interesting to note that the US administration and the Intelligence
appraisals did not attribute malicious intent to the Soviet Union or claim
that it had instigated the crisis and had prior knowledge of Nasser’s
decision to close the Straits. They also ruled out any Soviet intention to
foment a flare-up in the Middle East. The Soviets, it was assumed,
regarded the crisis as ‘a godsend’ and were trying to derive the maximum
political benefit at the expense of the United States in the region, but they
did not want war. Rusk believed, notwithstanding, that if Israel attacked
Egypt and won the day, the Soviets would do ‘something’, though he was
not clear as to what.20
Israeli diplomacy – the view from Washington

Israel’s diplomatic strategies have already been surveyed, but it is worth
noting several points which emerge from the US documents:
1 Foreign Minister Eban endeavoured to boost the American commit-

ment to Israel’s security by asserting that the decisions of the Israeli
government were guided by the requests and guarantees of the United
States.21 His message to the Americans was: it’s your responsibility.
2 Eban permitted himself to take issue with the style Eshkol adopted in
his urgent cables. He told Dean Rusk that the messages would have
been phrased differently if he himself had been in Israel.22
3 Eban was apparently unconvincing in his rejection of the proposal to
station a UN force on both sides of the Israel–Egypt border and
perhaps only inside Israel. Rusk may have gained the impression that
Israel would not reject the idea outright.23
4 The position Eban represented in Washington on 26 May was that the
freedom of shipping issue was the central problem, and was ‘far more
serious than terrorist attacks or troop deployments, for its con-
sequences would be to cut Israel off from one-half of the world and
leave it crippled’. This stance, as noted above, was at variance with the
views of the General Staff. Four days later, Eban told Ambassador
Barbour the opposite: the concentration of forces on the border was
more dangerous than the blocking of the Straits.24
5 The Israeli Minister in Washington, Ephraim Evron, adopted bold,
possibly unauthorized diplomatic initiative on 2 June. He met, at his

own request, with Walt Rostow, the President’s Assistant for National
Security and emphasized that he was not speaking in the name of the
Israeli government. Evron wondered aloud whether, in light of its rela-
tions with the Arab world and the Soviet Union, it would not be more
advantageous for the United States if an Israeli vessel, rather than an
international flotilla, tested the blockade. Egyptian fire directed against
the vessel would trigger an Israeli military reaction and a general flare-
up. Evron asked whether, in such a case, the United States would
honour its 1957 commitment and acknowledge Israel’s right to self-
defence, and whether it would curb Soviet intervention. Rostow

reported this to the President.25 Was Evron acting off his own bat? It is
hard to believe that a senior experienced diplomat would have con-
ceived of such an idea without sanction, but on the other hand, I have
found no evidence that he was ever authorized to convey such a
message to the Americans. The IDF objected to the dispatch of a vessel
to the Straits for fear of exposure of intent, and the government had
not decided on such a move. It is barely conceivable that Evron
received personal instructions from Eban to put out feelers in that
direction. A day previously Eban had met with Rabin and informed
him that the possibilities of diplomatic action had been exhausted and
it was now yielding place to military considerations. Perhaps Eban
wanted to ensure that the now inescapable war would not commence
with Israeli action. As we shall see below, at the pivotal government
session on 4 June, Eban sided with the ministers who advocated
sending a vessel to the Straits so that Israel would not fire the first shot.
6 On the military level, the US documents reveal that apart from the
above-mentioned ‘aid package’, discussions of which began before the
crisis, Israel asked the US for the ‘loan’ of 150,000 to 200,000 gas
masks, in addition to the 20,000 already supplied during the crisis.
The Americans agreed but the masks were never sent.26 Israel also
requested the immediate supply of a Hawk battery and a hundred mis-
siles, 140 M-60 tanks and twenty-four Skyhawk aircraft. The adminis-
tration turned down the request for missiles and planes and agreed to
consider the request for tanks,27 but this too was not implemented by
the time hostilities broke out.
Messages from Arab capitals: the standing of the

US is in danger
A crucial reason for the administration’s eventual decision to abandon the
British–US scheme for opening up the Straits were the messages received
from Arab capitals, which stressed that the United States would pay a
heavy political and economic price for support of Israel, and that there
was no likelihood that Nasser would rescind the blockade. Among the
crucial points were the following:
1 The Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zaki Yamani estimated on

24 May that the crisis would culminate in war. He recommended that
the United States keep its hands off and act only within the UN frame-
work without trying, as he put it, to act the ‘policeman’. He warned
that if the United States supported Israel on the issue of freedom of
shipping, it would be ‘finished’ in the Middle East. Two days later
King Hussein conveyed a similar message, and later declared that
Nasser would not back down from the blockade and proposed that
Washington declare its neutrality and opposition to any party which
started a war.28
2 The designated ambassador to Cairo Richard Nolte conveyed his
recommendation that the United States dissociate itself from appear-
ances of support for Israel, remain neutral and step in only as peace-
maker if hostilities erupted. ‘Otherwise, we foresee heavy cost to the
US for relationships in the Arab world. . . . Equally, see little chance
viable future for Israel save as armed beachhead, guaranteed by US.’29
3 The US Ambassador to Damascus Hugh Smythe expressed his pro-
found dismay at Washington’s disregard for the appraisals and recom-
mendations dispatched by its representatives in the Arab countries for
a ‘hands-off policy’ in the dispute. He claimed that the US must
abandon its guarantee to freedom of shipping in the Straits in view of
the destructive consequences, and sharply criticized his country’s
support for Israel which he described as an ‘unviable client state’.30
4 The Department of Defence and the CIA estimated that the passage
through the Straits of an oil-tanker headed for Eilat flying the US flag
or escorted by American warships would show up the United States as
the enemy of the Arabs and evoke outraged responses and grave polit-
ical and economic damage. ‘The Arabs have smelled blood’, according
to the CIA, and euphoria and victorious emotion were sweeping even
Nasser’s bitterest enemies against their will into his camp. The Arabs
were anticipating that the United States and Britain would hasten to
Israel’s aid and were preparing for that eventuality. The anticipated
reactions included blocking of the Suez Canal, stoppage of oil supplies
to the West, a ban on anchoring of vessels in Arab ports, a commercial
boycott, the closing of the Wheelus US air base in Libya, nationaliza-
tion of oil companies and assets, and attacks on US and British instal-
lations and institutions throughout the Middle East.31
5 Secretary of State Dean Rusk felt the need to write a personal reply to
the US ambassadors in Damascus and other Arab countries and try to
persuade them, citing numerous examples, that US policy in the
Middle East was balanced. The long-term stance of the United States,
he explained, was based on two principles: preserving the independ-

ence and territorial integrity of all countries in the region, and defend-
ing the basic interest of the international community to maintain
freedom of shipping. The United States could not go back on this basic
stand, which had been proclaimed by all its presidents in the past two
decades, particularly since its support for free shipping through Tiran
had been proclaimed in return for Israel’s consent to withdraw from
Sharm al-Sheikh in 1957.32
6 The conclusion drawn by the US administration after receipt of the
message from the pro-Western Arab states was that an Israeli military
operation was to be preferred to US action. Walt Rostow wrote to the

President on 4 June: ‘The moderate Arabs – and, in fact, virtually all
Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of this crisis – would
prefer to have him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external
forces.’33
The American emissaries to Cairo

Two senior US emissaries were dispatched to Cairo during the crisis. The
first was the diplomat Charles Yost, a Middle Eastern expert and former
ambassador to Damascus. He was sent by the Secretary of State to rein-
force the legation in the Egyptian capital, then headed by a new and inex-
perienced ambassador who had not yet submitted his letter of
accreditation. The second – and more senior – emissary was Robert Ander-
son, former Secretary of the Treasury, who had already tried his hand at
mediation between Israel and Egypt in 1956.34 Anderson, who travelled to
the Middle East on business, was asked by President Johnson to visit Cairo
and meet Nasser. The following are the main points of the reports submit-
ted by the two emissaries:
1 Charles Yost, who met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad among
others, reported his impression that Nasser would not back down
from the blockade, was showing no indications of readiness to com-
promise, would not be deterred by threats and might even welcome a
military confrontation with Israel. US support for freedom of shipping
in the Bay of Aqaba would severely undermine if not destroy its stand-
ing in the Middle East, and the forced opening up of the Straits would
only strengthen Nasser. If the US continued to pursue this tactic, Yost
warned, it would suffer the same fate as Britain and France in 1956.
Yost even estimated that Nasser would extend his demands beyond
restoration of the status quo ante the Sinai Campaign. He defined his
recommendations as ‘limiting damage’: stationing a UN force in Israel,
supplying Israel with oil from other ports, and renewed guarantees of
Israel’s existence and integfrity.35
2 Robert Anderson met with Nasser for two hours on the night of 31
May. Nasser explained in detail his motives and moves since the
beginning of the crisis and clarified that he would not be the one to
initiate war. He did, however, voice his fear that Syria was liable to
take military action and involve him in a confrontation, and added
that he had no control over the Palestinian organizations which were
eager to fight. Nasser admitted that any conflict that would break out
on the Syrian or Jordanian border would inevitably lead to Egyptian
intervention. He appeared relaxed and confident as to the outcome of
any military clash between the Arabs and Israel. As for the Tiran
Straits – his sole aim was to revert to the 1956 status quo, which had
been altered as a result of aggression. The Straits, he said, were in
Egyptian territorial waters, and his army would prevent Israeli ship-
ping, oil transportation and weapons supply to Israel through the
Straits. To the question of whether he would agree to direct the issue
to the international court at The Hague (the US commitment to Israel
in 1957 had included the proviso that it should not conflict with
decisions of the international court), Nasser replied that he was not
interested in foot-dragging. He hinted that in effect his hands were
tied: the Arabs as a whole would not accept any consent on his part to
compromise. Anderson asked Nasser if he would agree to accept Israel
as an established fact. Nasser replied that this depended on Israel per-
mitting a million Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. The
refugees, he said, would not be content with compensation and would
insist on returning because the Arabs were deeply attached to their
land. The practical result of the meeting was a decision to dispatch the
Deputy Egyptian President Zakaria Mohi al-Din to Washington. On 2
June Nasser sent a note to President Johnson, expounding his
country’s stand on the dispute with Israel. He noted that he would
welcome a visit by Vice-President Humphrey (as proposed by Johnson
in his note of 22 May). The US Embassy in Cairo reported that Mohi
al-Din would leave for Washington on 7 June, and intended to discuss
with his hosts a range of issues relating to the Palestinian problem, res-
olution of which would make it possible to resolve the Tiran shipping
issue as well.36
Washington’s recipe for compromise

In parallel to the decline of the British–US plan, the administration sought
a compromise formula of some kind, which would not oblige Nasser to
back down completely on the Straits issue, and which Israel could live
with. The formula, in whose devising Israel played no part, was intended
to award Nasser a symbolic victory and to avert substantial damage to
Israel. The idea was to enable free passage of vessels of all countries
through the Bay of Aqaba, including oil-tankers, with the exception of

Israeli vessels. The issue of Israeli shipping would be discussed separately,
possibly at The Hague court, when the crisis ended.37 The assumption was
that the actual damage to Israel from the blockade would stem mainly
from the barring of oil-tankers from Iran, which supplied the bulk of
Israel’s oil requirements. Johnson told Eban that the United States was ‘not
going to say it’s all right if the rest go through, but Israel’s ships cannot’,38
but this was deliberately vague diplomatic talk. The Americans had
received no indication that Nasser would be ready to accept such a com-
promise, and were probably planning to discuss the matter with Mohi al-
Din. They surmised that if Nasser was reconciled to this idea (and the
prospects were very slim), they would be able to exert pressure on Israel to
accept it, even as a provisional arrangement. They were too late.39
The conclusion: let Israel act

Washington never took a formal decision to allow Israel to act. Officially,
the British–American plan was never taken off the agenda. The ‘declara-
tion of the maritime nations’ continued to be discussed through diplomatic
channels until the outbreak of the fighting and signatures were collected,
with scant success. Only two countries – Australia and Holland – dis-
played readiness to participate in the multinational armada. The date for
the commencement of joint military planning was set for 6 June, and
nobody was eager to take part. The administration knew that time was
running out. The Americans estimated that Israel would not wait beyond
11 June, two weeks after it had promised to wait. The recommendation
that Israel be allowed to act was formulated and argued in the best pos-
sible fashion by a member of the National Security Council, Harold Saun-
ders, on 31 May.
The United States, Saunders wrote, had reversed the policy of twenty
years in the Midde East and was now committed ‘to a course that will
more likely than not lead us into a head-on clash with a temporarily united
Arab world’. The US should have allowed Israel to launch a strike on 21
May when Egypt was not yet ready and then intervened as peacemaker. ‘It
seems that the UAR has won all the chips to date, but Israel may really be
the big winner’, having won what the US steadfastly refused to give for
twenty years: a special relationship and a security guarantee. ‘Whoever is
the bigger winner, we are the sure loser,’ Saunders claimed. ‘If we follow
our present course, we stand to lose economically . . . and to suffer sub-
stantial Soviet gains. If we back away from Israel, we’re a paper tiger.’ It
was now clear that Nasser had no intention of backing down. The Arab
world was united in its resolve to take drastic steps against the United
States. Other maritime powers were not willing to join the ‘regatta’. And
Congress would not approve independent action. ‘The other choice is still
to let the Israelis do this job themselves.’ Eshkol had stated that he was
willing to go it alone if the United States did not produce results. He ‘is
correct that we don’t have any right to hold him back longer while his
enemy gets stronger unless we’re willing to take on the Arabs ourselves.
Pretty soon we’ll have Soviet warships in the Red Sea. We ought to con-
sider admitting that we have failed and allow fighting to ensue.’40
The Saunders report was written from a personal viewpoint but it
reflected the mood of the administration at the end of May. Rusk wrote on
3 June to US ambassadors in Arab countries: ‘You should not assume that
the United States can order Israel not to fight for what it considers to be its
most vital interests.’41
The mission of the head of the Mossad

Because of the conflicting messages received from the United States, the
Chief of Intelligence proposed to Eshkol that he send the Mossad head,
Meir Amit, to Washington to ascertain directly the administration’s
stand.42 His mission was interpreted as an expression of non-confidence in
Foreign Minister Eban, who had returned from Washington only four days
previously, and in his ministry.43 This, however, was apparently a misinter-
pretation. Between 26 May, when Eban met with Johnson, and 31 May,
when Amit left Israel, the circumstances had changed entirely with the
signing of the Egyptian–Jordanian pact. The indications of a change in the
US stance called for discreet and clandestine enquiries at the highest level.
This was the goal of Amit’s trip.44
Amit left for the United States on 31 May,45 and on the day he arrived
in Washington, his first meeting was with the CIA’s Intelligence experts for
a comparison of Intelligence data and estimates, which turned out to be
very similar. At a meeting with Richard Helms, head of the CIA, Amit dis-
covered to his surprise that no command had been set up to plan the
blockade-lifting operation. At his request, a brief meeting was scheduled
for the following day with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Accord-
ing to Amit, he exceeded his authority by telling McNamara that Israel
could not wait three weeks, but three to four days at most. Israel did not
want a single US soldier to fight on its behalf, he stressed, but it wanted
three things from the United States:
1 Isolation of the arena from any Soviet attempt to intervene.

2 Diplomatic backing at the UN in the course of the military operation,
in order to enable the IDF to achieve its objectives.
3 To restock the IDF’s arms depots after the war.
McNamara asked only two questions: how long would the fighting last
and what was the anticipated scope of casualties. Amit estimated that the
fighting would last a week and casualties would be lower than in Israel’s
War of Independence (in which it lost about 1 per cent of its population).
‘I read you loud and clear’, said McNamara, who expressed no reserva-
tions whatsoever. During the meeting, he contacted Johnson and reported
to him. A note was passed in to him on Dayan’s appointment as Minister
of Defence. He stood up and embraced Amit. ‘You should go home. Your
place is there’, he told him.
If Amit’s description is accurate, the United States was indicating
through this channel that, so far as it was concerned, Israel had the green
light for a pre-emptive strike. It should be pointed out, however, that the
summary of the conversation as it appears in the US documents is not

identical to Amit’s version, and does not necessarily suggest a hint to
Israel.46
And in fact, the messages from the United States were not yet unequivo-
cal. It was manifest that the US had withdrawn its veto on an Israeli
attack, but the administration feared that this move would appear to be
part of a US–Israel conspiracy. Consequently, the State Department con-
tinued to urge Israel not to fire the first shot. The Americans now thought
it preferable for Israel to send a vessel to the Straits of Tiran so that Egypt-
ian fire would serve as the direct pretext for warfare.
Unlike Defence Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk was con-
sidered by Israeli diplomats in Washington to be aloof and chilly in his
attitude towards Israel.47 In fact, Rusk was entirely fair in his dealing with
the crisis and tried to find a solution which would prevent a conflagration.
As noted above, it was the State Department which broached the plan to
open the Straits by bringing in an international maritime force, while the
Defense Department had misgivings about it. At first, Rusk did not share
the view of the Defense Department that it was preferable to leave it to
Israel to act. The peremptory note he appended to Johnson’s message to
Eshkol, in which he asserted that Israel action would be ‘catastrophic’,
helped persuade Israel on 28 May to decide on a waiting period. On 30
May, however, Washington’s evaluation was amended. The organization
of an international armada (scarcely a serious idea from the outset) and
the moves at the UN and in Congress were proceeding at snail’s pace, and
lagged behind the feverish pace of events in the Middle East. Now the
Secretary of State had no alternative but to acquit the United States insofar
as possible of the responsibility for the inevitable conflagration.
At a meeting on 2 June with Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron,
Rusk and Eugene Rostow tried to gain time and deter Israel from action.
The plan for an armada was proceeding apace, the Americans said, and
the test in the Straits was scheduled for seven to nine days’ time. The
Soviets had promised that the Egyptians would not attack, Rusk noted,
and although this couild not be relied on, ‘if it was necessary to enter
into a military confrontation with the Russians, he would think twice’.
The Ambassador commented that Israel surmised that the Soviet Union
would not intervene, and Rusk responded that ‘a lot depends on the ques-
tion of who starts the war’. 48
The message to Israel was that it should not be the first to open fire.
The American ‘whip’ was the implied threat that if Israel started a war and
the Soviets intervened, the United States would be absolved of the commit-
ment to Israel, which had ignored its advice.
On the following day, 3 June, Eugene Rostow contacted Evron and
asked urgently whether the Israeli ‘test’ vessel (the Dolphin) had in fact left
the Eritrean port of Massawa headed for Egypt (it had not).49 It is possible
that the Americans were trying to hint as to how they thought Israel
should act. The recommendation to Israel to dispatch a vessel flying its flag
to the Straits, so that the Egyptians would fire the first shot, was also con-
veyed directly, though unofficially.50
The Johnson note: ‘A yellow light’

On 3 June Johnson sent Eshkol an additional message, the last before the
war. It seemingly contained nothing new. Johnson reiterated the main
points he had voiced to Eban eight days earlier and the written message he
had given him. He reaffirmed the intention of his administration to con-
tinue its vigorous efforts at the UN and elsewhere to guarantee freedom of
shipping through the Straits of Tiran, and explained his constitutional con-
straints. At the same time, however, there were two important points in
the message. The President emphasized that Israel should not be respons-
ible for launching hostilities (and repeated the mantra that ‘Israel will not
be alone unless it decides to go it alone’). In the second paragraph he con-
veyed a heavy hint that the true message from the United States was being
carried by the head of the Mossad: ‘We have completely and fully
exchanged views with General Amit.’51
Towards evening on Saturday, 3 June, before receipt of Johnson’s note,
Eshkol convened a meeting at his home, attended by Dayan, Allon and
Rabin.52 Analysis of the cables and messages from the United States left the
participants confused. Eshkol complained that Washington was focusing
only on the problem of the Straits and ignoring the main problem – the
massing of forces. Foreign Ministry Director-General Arie Levavi said he
was afraid that if Israel acted, the United States would regard itself as
released from the obligation to extend help, while the Soviets might ‘go
far’.53 Meir Amit’s return was tensely awaited. Close to midnight, Amit
and Harman arrived directly from the airport.
Amit said that he had found no differences between the information
and evaluations of Israeli Intelligence and those of US Intelligence. As for
the maritime task force, he revealed ‘that there is no body dealing with the
matter in serious fashion’, and added that he thought the armada would
never materialize, and in any event ‘the Americans are anxious for us to
unburden them of the armada’. As for independent Israeli action, the head
of the Mossad had gained the impression ‘that the Americans would
welcome any action as long as we succeed in smashing Nasser’. But he had
understood from his interlocutors in Washington that Israel must first
implement the casus belli in the Red Sea (namely, send a vessel through the
Straits, which would come under Egyptian attack). Amit recommended
waiting an additional week (to complete at least a two-week waiting
period) and only then to exploit the pretext for war. In view of the hints
that the Americans were ready to help, the head of the Mossad had asked
his hosts for ‘weapons, money and political backing’. He concluded: ‘If we
launch warfare and succeed – everyone will be with us. If we do not
succeed – things will be hard.’
Ambassador Harman described the political situation in the US capital.
There was considerable support for Israel, he said, and Johnson
would have ‘a political problem’ if he did not succeed in finding a solution
to the crisis. His conclusion was that the President should be granted
a respite of ‘seven to nine’ days before Israel took any decision to act,
and recommended in particular ‘making sure that we do not fire the first
shot’.
Having delivered their reports, Harman and Amit were submitted to a
cross-fire of questions, in particular from Dayan and Allon who attacked
both the idea of sending a ship through the Straits for fear that it would
constitute disclosure of intent, and the recommendation to continue
waiting. Harman and Amit tried to defend themselves and said that the
additional wait was important from the diplomatic viewpoint in order to
win the backing of the US President. Dayan was furious: ‘The true altern-
ative,’ he said, ‘is for [the Egyptians] to attack, but then we lose Eretz
Israel. Anyone who waits for the Egyptians to take action must be aware
that thereby we will lose Eretz Israel. We don’t give a damn about the
Americans. In this situation it would be stupidity to wait!’
The Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin explained that every passing day made
the IDF’s task harder in view of the buildup of Egyptian forces, their con-
solidation and improved disposition. In particular, he pointed to the divi-
sional Iraqi task force and the Egyptian commando battalions and fighter
planes which were arriving in Jordan. Dayan reinforced Rabin’s remarks
and stressed the danger to Eilat and the price of waiting, which he said
would result in a mortality rate of thousands more.54
Finally, Eshkol seemed to be convinced. He asked how long it would
take the IDF to launch an offensive, and even queried if it was possible to
act immediately – ‘this morning’. In the end it was agreed that the decision
to go to war would be submitted to the government at its weekly meeting
due to convene in a few hours’ time, on Sunday morning, 4 June, so that
the attack could commence the following day.55
Johnson’s note reached Eshkol only on 4 June, at the height of the

government meeting,56 and made very little difference. In contrast to the
previous note, it contained nothing which was likely to defer the decision
the government was about to take.
The government debates and decides: War!

The Ministerial Committee on Security convened at 08:30 on Sunday, 4
June.57 The Foreign Minister delivered a political survey in which he noted
that since the signing of the Egyptian–Jordanian pact, the United States
had realized that Israel might act independently,58 while emphasizing that
Israel should not be the first to open fire. The assumption in Washington
was that the Soviet Union would not intervene, although the Secretary of
State was careful not to say so explicitly, in order to leave his country
uncommitted and to pressure Israel not to be the first to fire. President de
Gaulle, who had imposed an embargo on arms consignments to Israel, had
again warned Israel against war (at a chance meeting with Ambassador
Walter Eytan).
The Chief of Intelligence stated that he had ‘a very clear picture of
Egyptian military strategy’: Egypt considered a clash to be inevitable, and
hence was cramming more and more forces into Sinai and investing con-
siderable effort on additional fronts. He referred ‘to de facto [Egyptian]
domination of the Jordanian army’, to the imminent entry into Jordan of a
large Iraqi task force, to the orders issued by General Riad to initiate wide-
scale hostile actions when fighting broke out, and to the danger posed by
the Egyptian commando battalions which had already arrived in Jordan. ‘I
don’t want to create panic’, Yariv emphasized, but his conclusion was
clear: from minute to minute the prospect of Egyptian offensive initiative
was growing, and it was self-evident that the IDF must deliver the first
strike.
Menahem Begin commented at this point that Israel could send a vessel
to Egypt, and if the Egyptians shelled it, Israel would then have the right to
defend itself. Eban underscored this, saying that in such an event, Israel
would enjoy US support. These statements angered the Minister of
Defence.
Dayan: ‘We are at the limit of our ability to win a

war’
Dayan was more categorical: ‘Nasser has to pay the promissory notes he
signs’, he argued, and his offensive intentions were obvious. Nasser’s most
likely targets were airfields (‘to do to us what we want to do to them’) and
Jerusalem and Eilat. If the war began with an enemy air attack, the IDF
would have forfeited its main weapon. If the enemy took the initiative, or
commando battalions attacked in Jerusalem (‘they could go through Bet

Safafa into the heart of Jerusalem and perpetrate a massacre’), or Eilat was
captured (‘it’s a question of one push [for the Jordanian army] in order to
join up with the Egyptian forces’), Israel would lose the initiative, its oper-
ative planning would go awry and it would be driven to defence in the
rear, ‘which is almost all of Israel’s territory’. As time passed, the enemy
forces were building up and consolidating and the cost of fighting would
mount by thousands. Dayan furiously rejected the demand to wait, to dis-
patch a vessel to Egypt and to refrain from firing the first shot: ‘The stu-
pidest thing possible would be to ask us now not to fire the first shot. It
would mean that in the present situation we should allow the other side to
fire the first shot.’ The Egyptians, Dayan stressed, were tracing every vessel
which set out from Massawa and would exploit the early warning in order
to launch hostilities, the scope, location and timing of which they would
choose, while Israel would be abandoning the element of surprise. ‘I am
sitting here listening and I can’t believe what I’m hearing – allow the Egyp-
tians to start the fighting at will, to destroy our air force!’
Dayan added that there was a limit to the IDF’s ability to overcome the
Arab armies, both due to the limited geographic dimensions of the state
and because of the cost in blood. ‘We are at the limit of our ability to win
a war’, he cautioned. He therefore proposed taking the initiative and
acting as soon as possible in order to cut the military noose now tightening
around Israel, even if thereby Israel found itself in a complicated diplo-
matic predicament. ‘Afterwards we will launch our diplomatic campaign
from a poor position, but it will be possible to survive where the military
situation is concerned’, he said.
Eshkol: ‘What will happen afterwards?’

Eshkol, who had not yet received Johnson’s note, said that it was his
impression that ‘something all the same is softening in the President’s
tough stand’. He said he would have wanted to wait another week if he
hadn’t seen ‘the life-and-death danger’ to Israel from the tightening noose.
Eban interrupted Eshkol and reported the content of Johnson’s note
which he had just received. Continuing his remarks, Eshkol did not dis-
guise his fears as to ‘what will happen afterwards?’ if Israel was charged
with aggression and deprived of military supplies. He thought there was a
certain logic in de Gaulle’s question: ‘Assuming that you win, what will
happen in ten to fifteen years’ time?’
Eshkol was in distress59 but saw no way out. If the Americans had been
ready to provide Israel with an overt guarantee openly by means of the
Sixth Fleet, he said, he would have been content with that.60 But in the
absence of such a guarantee he proposed allowing the IDF to decide on
the timing and method of the offensive.
Allon: ‘Better for them to condemn us and for us

to live than for them to lament us’
Allon, who from the outset had favoured a pre-emptive strike, said that
the Johnson note and the reports of Amit and Harman were evidence that
the United States preferred to leave the job to Israel. The diplomatic possi-
bilities had been exhausted, Allon declared, and it was essential to act
because of the mortal danger. ‘Better for them to condemn us and for us to
live than for them to lament us’ he said, and added that the Egyptians had
crossed three red lines: the blocking of the Straits, the concentration of an
offensive force and violation of the status quo in Jordan. He considered

the Jordanian border to be the greatest danger and estimated that an
instant Israeli victory at the beginning of the offensive against Egypt could
deter Hussein from opening up a third front.
There was no serious debate at the Ministerial Committee on Security.
Even Zalman Aranne, the ultimate ‘dove’, now supported early launching
of hostilities. Zerah Wahrhaftig appealed for the dispatch of a vessel to the
Straits, so that Israel would not be the first to open fire. Dayan and Allon,
however, dismissed his proposal. ‘It would be like cabling the Egyptian
command that the Israelis are planning to attack on such and such a date.
It would be total suicide’, said Dayan.
Considerable circumspection was displayed by the new minister,
Menahem Begin. He proposed sending Meir Amit on an additional secret
mission to Paris, London and Washington in order to explain Israel’s
predicament and to seek the understanding of the leaders. His proposal
was apparently greeted with derision, and he agreed to withdraw it if
such a move was liable to have a negative impact on IDF operations.
He too was convinced that the government should give the army the signal
to launch an all-out offensive against the Egyptian army. Such an attack,
he said, should not be immediate but should take place in the coming
week.61
After the Ministerial Committee on Security concluded its meeting, the
government plenum then convened as an expanded Committee, to discuss
the situation.62 Yariv began with an Intelligence survey and concluded:
‘Not only is the picture changing from minute to minute and critically to
our detriment . . . but from hour to hour the possibility of offensive Egypt-
ian, Jordanian and Syrian initiative is growing.’ He was followed by Eban,
who surveyed the political picture. He described the change in the US
stance, but noted that the US advocates of Israeli action were requesting
that events be manipulated so that the Egyptians would fire the first shot.
The view in Washington, he said, was that the Soviet Union would not
intervene in the fighting and lacked the tools to do so, but this was only a
surmise and there was no certainty of this. Eshkol again spoke about the
‘tightening noose’ which must be cut as early as possible.
The dovish ministers Bentov and Moshe Haim Shapira acknowledged

the gravity of the situation but asked for a deferment of action for another
week in order to enable the United States to act, and proposed that Israel
should not be the first to open fire. Their main concern was that an
embargo might be imposed on arms supplies to Israel.63 However, the
majority of the ministers now backed the Israeli offensive initiative. The
most profound impression was made by Dayan’s purposeful remarks.
Dayan explained the critical significance of the first blow in light of
Israel’s lack of reserves and the limitations on its power. He described the
protracted process of buildup and organization of the forces confronting
Israel in terms of thousands of additional Israeli casualties in the inevitable

war. He also dwelt on the danger to Jerusalem, Eilat and the coastal plain
from Arab offensive initiative, which could disrupt any IDF operative
planning. What was on the cards was the first blow, he stressed. A surprise
blow, he explained, could put a hundred enemy planes out of action and
he added mockingly: ‘Those one hundred planes are worth more than all
the additional arms which the Minister of the Interior [M.H. Shapira] or
Knesset Member Ben-Gurion [who opposed going to war] can obtain in
the coming six months.’
Dayan’s strongest argument was the limited ability of the IDF to prevail
if the war was conducted on enemy initiative and in arenas determined by
the enemy. ‘Our only chance of winning a war is to be the initiators and to
conduct it according to our own direction’, said Dayan. ‘There is a limit to
our ability to win’, and in any war conducted on the enemy’s initiative,
Israel was liable to suffer defeat.
‘The government has decided to take military

action’
After Dayan had spoken, there was no further debate within the govern-
ment. All the ministers, excluding the two Mapam representatives, rallied
around Dayan’s draft proposal, the main points of which were:
The government has decided to take military action which will liberate
Israel from the military noose tightening around it . . . the government
hereby empowers the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence to
approve for the General Staff the date of the operation.64
The crisis which led up to the Six Day War lasted for three weeks, and IDF
forces were mobilized almost in full for about two of those weeks. Away
from the feverish activity in the political and diplomatic arenas, the IDF
concentrated on preparations for war. The waiting period was exploited
for training, stock-up of equipment, and logistic and operational planning
– all of which improved the IDF’s fighting capability.65 In contrast to the
apprehensive mood on the home front, the mobilized troops were in high
spirits and confident. The press and radio, of vital importance during the
crisis, generally considered themselves to have been enlisted to the cause in
order to uplift national morale, maintain contact between the front line
and the home front and alleviate anxiety.66 The former chief of Intelligence
Brigadier-General (res.) Haim Herzog was summoned to Kol Israel, the
national radio service, to broadcast reassuring reports and evaluations to
the nation.67 Popular songs were composed to boost the public mood and
the sense of shared destiny was reflected in manifestations of fraternity,
volunteering and mutual aid. The strongest boost for morale was undoubt-
edly the establishment of the national unity government and the appoint-
ment of Moshe Dayan, hero of the Sinai Campaign, as Minister of
Defence.
In short: by the time the government decided to go to war, the nation
was well prepared. The army was tensed like a coiled spring. The home
front was united, and convinced that the war was justified and that there
was ‘no alternative’.68
Towards evening on 4 June, the Operations Branch issued the order for
Operation Nakhshonim. In essence, this order was of mere historical
value, and constituted a general summary of the framework of the planned
IDF operation. The IDF offensive was intended for the Egyptian front
alone. Central and Northern Commands were assigned exclusively defen-
sive missions. The execution of local ‘skirmishes’ on the Jordanian front,
in the event that the Jordanian army opened fire, was to be conditional on
approval of the Operations Branch.69 The zero hour had been chosen in
accordance with the plan for the IAF’s Operation Moked, namely a sur-
prise attack for destruction of the Egyptian air force in its home. The stop-
watches of the air, ground and naval forces were set at 07:45.70
Few were in on the secret; the forces were resting before going into
action and last-minute preparations, communications or troop movements
were avoided as liable to arouse the suspicion of the other side. Con-
sequently, the last night was quiet.
On 5 June at 07:45 as the IAF’s Moked Operation against Egyptian air
bases commenced, the siren alert sounded throughout the country. The
Assistant Chief of Operations, Brigadier-General Rehavam Ze’evi, con-
veyed to the Southern Command the order: ‘Nakhshonim, we wish you
success, action!’71
The war had begun.
Afterword
The war which began on the morning of 5 June 1967 was regarded
by the generation of Israelis who experienced it in the front line and on
the home front, as well as by the government and the IDF General Staff,
as a war of ‘no alternative’. It was born out of authentic feelings of
deep anxiety and existential threat, and its sole purpose was to eliminate
that threat and lift the blockade without territorial aspirations or defini-
tion of political objectives for the post-war future. In fact, the Eshkol
government never discussed the objectives of the war, even when that
war appeared inescapable. All the government wanted was to ward
off hostilities, and when it was compelled to take the decision to fight,
it phrased it in simple terms: ‘The government has decided to take
military action which will liberate Israel from the military noose tightening
around it.’1
The aim, so it was implied, was to restore the status quo ante and no
more than that. The military moves very soon confronted the government
with facts which required it to take decisions for which it was unprepared.
The first day of fighting raised the issue of the conquest – Menahem Begin
asked that it be referred to as ‘liberation’ – of the Old City of Jerusalem.
The government deliberations on the issue reflected, above all, incertitude,
and National Religious Party leader Mosh Haim Shapira advocated inter-
nationalization of the Old City.2 Dayan displayed scant enthusiasm for the
conquest of the Old City, and his secretary Haim Yisraeli reported to Ben-
Gurion: ‘Moshe doesn’t want to conquer it because he doesn’t want to
have to give back the Western Wall.’3
Eshkol summed up the order of priorities: the first priority was the Sinai
front and the occupation of Sharm al-Sheikh, while
‘in the Jordanian sector we are going forward in the prior knowledge
that we will be obliged to leave [East] Jerusalem and the West Bank.
On the Syrian [front] we need to take the Banias [springs]. . . . It is not
worth entering the el-Hamma [enclave in the demilitarized zone]
because it is a “hole” [i.e. too remote], it’s worth [however] finishing
258 Afterword
off [i.e. capturing and controlling] the [other parts of the] demilita-
rized zones [along the Israel–Syria border].’4
The army carried out its tasks on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts in
accordance with operative plans and the nature of the terrain and of the
enemy forces confronting it, irespective of political objectives. The offen-
sive on the Syrian front was postponed to the fifth day of the war, and was
launched on 9 June on the personal initiative of Defence Minister Dayan,
contrary to the uncompromising stand he had held at the previous
evening’s meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security, which had
thwarted the decision to approve such an attack.5 Although the IDF action
was conducted without the framework of orderly political decisions, at the
conclusion of the brief war Israel held all the cards it required to make far-
reaching political decisions and to shape a new political reality in an
attempt to resolve the Arab–Israeli dispute.
On 12 June 1967, a few hours after the fighting ended, Dayan held
‘consultations on the conquered territories’. Senior army officers hastened
to submit various proposals. The Head of the Intelligence Branch’s
Research Department, Col. Shlomo Gazit, opined that Israel had no inter-
est in conquest and in expanding its territory at the expense of the Arabs
and that there was room only for border revisions based on negotiations.
He proposed solving the problem of the Palestinian refugees by establish-
ing a demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza
Strip. Col. Yuval Neeman, who had been recruited as special adviser to the
Intelligence Branch, proposed, on the other hand, delineating ‘natural’
borders for the State of Israel, identical to the ceasefire lines, including the
whole of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza strip, the West Bank and the Golan
Heights. He suggested the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian
state with federative links to Israel and without common borders with any
Arab state.6 The Assistant Chief of Operations, Brigadier-General
Rehavam Ze’evi, proposed establishing an independent Palestinian state in
Samaria, with Nablus as its capital, and even provided a name, ‘Medinat
Yishmael’ (The State of Ishmael). Ze’evi declared that the new state should
be established as soon as possible and warned that ‘protracted Israeli mili-
tary rule will enhance the hatred and deepen the rift between the [Palestin-
ian] inhabitants of the West Bank and Israel, because of the objective steps
it will be essential to adopt in order to ensure order and security’.7
Dayan had already judged at this stage that any Israeli political scheme
would be dependent on the support of the United States. He, who as Chief of
Staff in 1957 had harshly criticized Ben-Gurion’s ‘capitulation’ to American
pressure to withdraw from all territory captured in the Sinai Campaign, now
assumed that Washington would not permit Israel to establish political facts
as it saw fit. The only real debate at the Ministerial Committee on Security
was conducted on the future of the West Bank between ministers who
Afterword 259
favoured the ‘Palestinian option’, namely the establishment of an independ-

ent or autonomous Palestinian state, and those who advocated a settlement
with Jordan. Eshkol wanted Israel to decide rapidly on its position. It was his
view that Israel should annex only East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip,
although he had doubts as to the latter. Due to the controversy, the govern-
ment passed a unanimous secret resolution on 19 June 1967 relating only to
Egypt and Syria. It stated that Israel proposed peace treaties on the basis of
the international border and demilitarizing arrangements in Sinai and on the
Golan Heights, a guarantee of freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal
and the Bay of Aqaba, and non-interference with the flow of the Jordan
source waters. The government decision was transmitted by the United States
to Egypt and Syria. Despite the generous Israeli proposal offering the return
of all the Egyptian and Syrian territories, the uncompromising response was a
demand for unconditional Israeli withdrawal.8 The political initiative of the
Israeli government and the response it received dispelled fears of American
pressure for early withdrawal. Israel now toughened its stand on the future of
the occupied territories and the decision of 19 June was no longer compatible
with the new position. The mood in Israel was euphoric, and Dayan’s decla-
ration that the Arabs should make the first phone call9 turned into a policy.
Levi Eshkol, the ailing Prime Minister, was losing his grip, and Dayan
became the dominant figure in determining Israel’s security policies and how
the occupied territories were to be administered. The pivotal resolution
adopted by the national unity government immediately after the war was the
unification of Jerusalem. The decision to apply the ‘jurisdiction and adminis-
tration of the state to East Jerusalem’ was formulated by 11 June. On 27
June, the government approved the decision and drew the municipal bound-
aries of the united city. The Knesset passed the law on the unification of
Jerusalem the same day.10
In contrast to the prevailing view, I believe that the establishment of the
national unity government on 1 June 1967 did not have a decisive impact
on the decision to go to war or on the way in which that war proceeded.
The Eshkol government would most probably have arrived at its decision
even without the Rafi and Gahal representatives. There was no escape
from war, not necessarily because of pressure from the IDF, but due to a
combination of reasons: Nasser’s resolve to maintain the blockade in Tiran
and the dissolving of the plan for an international armada; the clustering
of hostile Arab forces along Israel’s borders; the exacerbation of the threat
after the signing of the Egyptian–Jordanian pact and the anticipated entry
into Jordan of a large Iraqi task force; the inability to maintain long-term
mobilization of reserve forces; and finally, the indications from Washing-
ton that Israel was free to act as it saw fit. The war would probably have
been conducted in the same fashion even if Dayan had not taken over the
Defence portfolio from Eshkol. On the other hand, the expansion of the
government had an extensive impact on Israel’s post-war policy. It is
260 Afterword
unquestionable that a government without the dominant war hero Moshe

Dayan, and without the influence of the Gahal ministers, would have con-
ducted itself differently, thereby holding out better prospects for the Jor-
danian option.11 It is a moot question whether this path of action would
have tempered the influence of the generals, who had been transformed in
public eyes by the intoxication of victory into all-powerful heroes inca-
pable of error. The disillusion came only six years later, when Israel was
stunned by the outbreak of another war in the middle of the holiest day in
the Jewish calendar: Yom Kippur.
In summing up the facts presented in this book, my conclusion is: in the
four years preceding the Six Day War, the military activism of the General
Staff had a detrimental impact on the attainment of the security policy
goals. While the army was subordinate to the political echelon, it was not
subjected to effective control and often exceeded the bounds of the govern-
ment’s intentions. The senior command did not intend deliberately to
bring about war in order to expand Israel’s borders. In light of the forced
withdrawal in 1957 from all the territorial gains of the Sinai Campaign,
the accepted assumption was that there was little chance of preserving
such gains in 1967. What was required, according to the Chief of Staff,
was forceful action in order to maintain Israel’s deterrent capability and
force the authorities in Amman, Beirut and in particular Damascus to put
a stop to terrorist action against Israel. Hence, the military demanded a
strategic military response to a tactical military problem. In light of the
flawed nature of civilian control and the absence of an effective diplomatic
means of tackling the problem of terrorism, the expansion of military
action was inevitable. Consequently, the army (at Samu and in determin-
ing the scope of aerial operations) slid unintentionally from the tactical to
the strategic sphere. The military triumph of the Six Day War should not
be allowed to obscure the fact that the army failed to achieve the strategic
objective of the government’s security policy – protection of the status
quo, putting an end to the terrorist activity and the prevention of war.
What remains is value judgement: given the circumstances, conditions
and Intelligence evaluations which faced the military command, did it act
fittingly? Did it act properly or improperly?
Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, a sensitive and conscientious man, took
upon himself the full burden of responsibility and admitted honestly: ‘I
entangled the State of Israel because of a series of mistakes I made’ (see
Appendix). There can be almost no doubt that Rabin was referring to the
military operations – in particular the IAF operation of 7 April 1967 –
which led to escalation and embroilment in war. Rabin was the govern-
ment’s trustee on security matters, charged with the task of dealing with
challenges in a manner which would forestall war. This was in fact his inten-
tion, but he failed. The narrow line between increasing deterrence and wors-
ening escalation was crossed unwittingly. Let it be said in Rabin’s defence
Afterword 261
that he was relying on a hidebound Intelligence evaluation to the effect that

Nasser did not want war and hence Israel had considerable leeway for
action against Syria without real danger of becoming involved in war. In the
period under discussion (and later too) the IDF Intelligence Branch enjoyed
a monopoly regarding national evaluations and the collating of databases
and conclusions. The fundamental error did not stem, therefore, from the
level of strategic intentions, but from misguided Intelligence evaluations. The
problem lay not in the abundant raw field of Intelligence material which the
secret services supplied to the IDF, whose quality was vindicated during
the war, but in the ability to foresee the intentions and moves of the other.
The result, as noted above, was total failure of Israel’s security policy,
whose supreme aim had been the deterrence and prevention of war. Rabin
considered himself responsible for this failure. But while there may be some
justification for blaming the military leadership for causing the May 1967
crisis, no fundamental defect can be perceived in the standpoint of the mili-
tary during the crisis and in the pressure it brought to bear on the govern-
ment to launch a pre-emptive strike. The subjective sense of existential
danger was authentic, and not unjustified. Nasser had crossed the ‘red lines’
and posed an insupportable challenge to Israel’s deterrent capability, which
was its main barrier against Arab hostile initiative to alter the status quo and
carry out the proclaimed intention of annihilating Israel. The closing of Arab
ranks around Nasser, the ecstatic bellicose atmosphere in the Arab world
and the gradual buildup of forces around Israel’s long borders dramatized
this danger and created tremendous psychological pressure on Israel. The
many expressions of sympathy and support from world public opinion were
no substitute for the absence of military guarantees on the part of the
Powers for Israel’s security. The diplomatic efforts merely proved that it was
impossible to place trust in external aid. Under these conditions, the decision
to wait seemed disastrous, both because it granted the enemy respite for
further troop buildups, consolidation and organization, and – and this was
the main point – because it left the enemy the initiative for striking the first
blow. The critical significance of the first blow under Israel’s geographic
conditions at the time was self-evident. The balance of forces between Israel
and the Arab states in arithmetic terms was considered potentially critical
and liable to have a crucial effect on the course and outcome of the war if
the Arabs were first to attack. The desire of the senior command to act first
was therefore entirely justified. The war, in the final analysis, bore this out.
One may conclude by stating that the military leadership, to a large
extent, ‘entangled’ the State of Israel (to quote Rabin) in escalation which
generated the crisis which culminated in an unpremeditated war, a war
which from the outset was unwanted and non-essential. But from the
moment the crisis erupted and the threat emerged, the military’s advocacy
of offensive initiative was correct. During the war itself, the IDF, as is well
known, carried out its mission in the best possible fashion.
Appendix
What happened to Yitzhak Rabin?
Yitzhak Rabin was a very strong Chief of Staff. He was authoritative, pro-
fessional, dominant, charismatic,1 and unquestionably had the greatest
personal impact on the military forces which won the 1967 war so
decisively. For eight years (more than any of his predecessors or succes-
sors), as Chief of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff,
Rabin was in charge of all the crucial tasks of preparing the army for war.
If there is one individual, more than any other, who deserves the credit for
the efficient functioning and resounding victory of the IDF in the Six Day
War, it is, without a doubt, Yitzhak Rabin. But while this is true of the
preparations for war, the same cannot be said of the way in which the
crisis and campaign of May to June 1967 were managed by Rabin. He was
not at his best then.
Yitzhak Rabin was more a ‘builder of force’ than a ‘user of force’.2 He
was extremely methodical, calculated, analytical, measured, sensitive and
cautious, but he was not a commander who galvanizes his men and stirs
them for the fight. His lengthy military career notwithstanding, Rabin’s
biography did not include the command of combat divisions in wartime,
apart from a very brief period during Israel’s War of Independence when
he commanded the Harel mini-brigade which battled heroically to save
Jerusalem from falling. During the Sinai Campaign Rabin was CO North-
ern Command and outside the battle area.
As Chief of Staff, Rabin enjoyed unprecedented status. Minister of
Defence Eshkol left the military arena to him. Eshkol’s military secretary,
Yisrael Lior, testified that Eshkol placed his trust in Rabin ‘uncritically’,
abided by his advice almost without discussion and accepted his opinion
‘with closed eyes’. The impression was gradually created that the Chief of
Staff was essentially functioning as a quasi-Minister of Defence. Rabin per-
mitted himself to issue declarations and grant numerous interviews to the
press and on more than one occasion gave free rein to his opinion to an
extent which embarrassed the political echelon and earned him a discreet
private reprimand from the Prime Minister. Among the general public,
however, his prestige was high. He was, as Lior put it, ‘astoundingly
Appendix 263
popular’, and sought after by the media. His handsome appearance, deep
voice, and the professional authority and responsibility which he radiated,
won him great popularity. In these respects, Rabin was a very ‘political’
Chief of Staff and, in the contest for public adulation, he left the Prime
Minister and the political leadership far behind.
Rabin’s quasi-ministerial status, his regular participation in meetings of
the government and the Ministerial Committee on Security, and the fact
that he was the supreme military authority in the eyes of the army and the
civilian echelon, contributed to the blurring of borderlines, which was the
source of his predicament during the crisis.3 In the course of his delibera-
tions with ministers, Rabin was privy to a wide range of government cal-
culations, and internalized not only the complexity and implications of the
security policy and foreign relations, but also apparently some of the anxi-
eties of several senior ministers. Until a certain stage in the crisis, Rabin
responded to the prospect of imminent war with a degree of ‘fear and
trembling’. He particularly dreaded the possibility of heavy casualties, and
his sense of responsibility overpowered him. From this point of view, he
ceased to be the assertive representative of the army’s stand, and began to
share the misgivings of the government. Several of the generals felt that the
message he was conveying to the politicians was not sufficiently emphatic
and clear, and there were also reverberations to that effect in the political
echelon.4
Above all, it seems, Rabin was burdened by a consciousness of failure
due to the fact that Israel was on the verge of a war which the government
did not want and the army had not prevented – in fact, had helped to pre-
cipitate. Despite his quasi-ministerial status, his subordination to the polit-
ical echelon was solid and unshaken. It was precisely his unique status
which intensified his sense of responsibility towards the government.
Rabin was well acquainted not only with the Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence but with all the ministers as well. He knew that the government
relied on him and looked to him to offer solutions to the security problems
which would not embroil the country in war. He had gained their full con-
fidence when he succeeded by simple means in solving the water diversion
problem, which had threatened to plunge the region into a military con-
frontation. He also proposed a solution to the problem of terrorist activity
which seemingly did not involve large-scale hostilities, namely a fierce and
swift blow against Syria. The government was not easily persuaded, both
for fear of exacerbating the situation and because of Soviet patronage for
the Syrian regime. Rabin, equipped with Intelligence evaluations, tried for
months to convince the ministers that there was nothing to fear. Egypt,
Rabin told the ministers, was bogged down in Yemen and the Soviet
Union would not intervene in a local problem. The Syrians would learn
their lesson and stop supporting guerrilla activities or else the regime in
Damascus would collapse. The continuation and worsening of terrorist
264 Appendix
action created expectations in Israel that Syria should be punished, which

in their turn brought pressure to bear on the government. The incident of
7 April 1967 and the seemingly cautious and moderate reaction of Egypt
and the Soviet Union appeared to validate the claim that Syria could be
attacked with impunity. In the absence of any other solution to the terror
problem, the government was on the verge of deciding to accept Rabin’s
viewpoint, on the basis of his firm and well-argued evaluation that such a
move would not lead to war.
When the crisis broke out in mid-May 1967, the general feeling for two
or three days was that Nasser’s moves were a mere ‘exercise’ and the
Egyptians were still loyal to their basic strategy which ruled out war before
the time was ripe. This was initially the Intelligence Branch view. Rabin
was troubled and adopted the necessary cautious measures, but the evalua-
tions continued to rule out war. It was only when the evaluation was
amended on 19 May, to the effect that Egypt was now ready to fight
Israel, that Rabin was shaken. The entire theory which he had constructed
and presented to the government was suddenly debunked and collapsed.
Rabin’s policy of controlled escalation against Syria, which had peaked on
7 April and was intended to isolate the Syrian arena and call a halt to ter-
rorist action, had come to nothing. Not only had it failed to check hostile
terrorist action, but it was about to embroil Israel in a war which the
government did not want and, on the contrary, feared. Yitzhak Rabin felt
that by erring in his evaluation, he had misled the government.5
The Chief of Staff was now obliged to appear before the government
and inform it that the country must prepare for war, and it would be for
the best if the IDF dealt the first blow. The government itself was in a state
of confusion and distress. The ministers were unprepared ‘emotionally and
intellectually’ (to quote Minister of Education Zalman Aranne) for war. In
their resentment, they demanded that the Chief of Staff at least avoid dis-
rupting diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. Although the diplomatic
timetable was out of step with the military timetable, Rabin could not
object to it. Moreover, his attempt to restrict the war, if it proved
inescapable, to a ‘small war’ in order to gain ‘bargaining cards’ was more
congruous with the government’s tendencies than with the military logic
and mood of the General Staff. Rabin, therefore, was trapped in a mesh of
contradictions. He was desperate for a prop, for encouragement, to unbur-
den himself of some of the terrible weight of responsibility.6 In his distress,
he even contemplated resigning and thereby ridding himself of the burden.
On 21 May Rabin requested a meeting with Ben-Gurion.7 Rabin
admired ‘the old man’, and even owed him his promotion to a position
which had guaranteed him the highest IDF post. However, under the cir-
cumstances, Rabin’s initiative was both out of order and inexplicable. Ben-
Gurion had long since become the most unrelenting critic of his successor,
Eshkol. Seeking Ben-Gurion’s advice was an expression of Rabin’s per-
Appendix 265
sonal distress, but perhaps no less an act of defiance of Eshkol, for placing
him in a situation where he was directly exposed to government criticism.
He was now nostalgic for the previous Ben-Gurion model whereby the
Chief of Staff was insulated from the government and received ‘clear
instructions’ conveyed through the Minister of Defence.
Ben-Gurion was blunt in his deprecation of the government and of
Eshkol in particular, and severely criticized the decision to mobilize reserve
forces and also the large-scale IAF operation on 7 April, the cause of the
escalation. ‘You [Rabin and Eshkol] have reduced the country to a very
grave condition, you bear responsibility,’ Ben-Gurion charged and added:
‘We mustn’t go to war. We are isolated.’8 ‘Yitzhak was depressed’, he

wrote in his diary.9
Next day, Rabin, again on his own initiative, met with Dayan. To
Dayan’s query as to his impression of Ben-Gurion, he replied that Ben-
Gurion had not displayed an understanding of military matters, but ‘it was
a pleasure to talk to a man who speaks plainly, in terms of “yes” and
“no”, what to do and what to avoid doing (compared to Eshkol, who is
the complete opposite)’. Rabin, who chainsmoked throughout the meeting,
appeared to Dayan not only exhausted but also confused, indecisive, tense
and depressed, and far from eager for the fray. If this was the impression
he made when he met with his subordinates, it was not a good thing,
Dayan concluded.10
An interesting point which arose at the Dayan–Rabin meeting related to
the causes of the crisis. Rabin argued, which seemed strange to Dayan,
‘that if we had inflicted a heavier blow on Syria [emphasis in original] we
could have avoided the present situation’. Dayan easily refuted the logic of
this argument.11 This suggests that Rabin was still trying, with the last ves-
tiges of his energy, to champion the theory he had been advocating to the
political echelon for some time, although events had now clearly disproved
it. It is not surprising that he did not sound convincing.
On 23 May, after the tense meeting of the Ministerial Committee on
Security, Rabin sought out Moshe Haim Shapira, the most consistent anti-
activist, in the hope of finding a sympathetic ear. Instead, he received a
chilly reception and angry accusations, which discouraged him even
further. Shapira’s stern remarks were particularly painful for Rabin, as he
later admitted, because they targeted his deepest misgivings and hesitations
and his feeling of guilt. He remembered the traumatic exchange in detail,
and described it in his memoirs: ‘How dare you?’ Shapira asked. How
did Rabin and Eshkol dare to do what the Dayan–Ben-Gurion team had
not dared to do, and place the survival of the state at risk by involving the
country in war, possibly on all the fronts, at a time when Israel was totally
isolated. Ben-Gurion, Shapira said, had waited five years after the closing
of the Straits in 1951, and launched a military operation only after -
guaranteeing great power backing and protection of Israel’s air space. The
266 Appendix
blocking of the Straits was not an existential threat, he claimed, and to go

to war in the prevailing circumstances would be madness. ‘Dig in!’ Shapira
enjoined him. Israel should dig in and fortify its positions and repel attack,
but under no circumstances should it fire the first shot.12
This conversation shook Rabin, already exhausted and tormented by
severe misgivings, and his functioning was visibly affected. Eshkol’s mili-
tary secretary, Yisrael Lior, who was present at the General Staff delibera-
tions in the afternoon of that day, was so concerned that he decided to go
up to Jerusalem especially in order to report personally to Eshkol.13
In the investigation conducted by the History Department, the head of
the Chief of Staff’s office Rafi Efrat testified laconically: ‘In the evening the
Chief of Staff felt ill and went home.’14 Leah Rabin mentioned the incident
in her memoirs very briefly. On 23 May in the evening, she wrote, Yitzhak
broke down as the result of a combination of reasons: the distressing con-
versations with Ben-Gurion and Shapira, the doubts gnawing at him, his
sense of heavy responsibility and his extreme exhaustion over the previous
week. According to Mrs Rabin, her husband arrived home that evening
‘dazed with exhaustion’ and told her that he was leaving for Southern
Command. She immediately decided ‘that the time had come to switch off
the engine and above all, let him rest’, and summoned Dr Eliyahu Gilon,
the Chief Medical Officer. Gilon gave Rabin a sedating shot and he slept
until the following afternoon.15 Gilon diagnosed ‘acute anxiety’ and con-
ferred next morning with Weizman and Efrat. It was decided to report to
Eshkol and to disseminate the story that the Chief of Staff was suffering
from nicotine poisoning.16
According to Weizman, Rabin telephoned him at 20:00 on 23 May and
asked him to come to his home immediately. When he arrived (apparently
before Gilon’s visit), he found Rabin ‘broken and very depressed’. They
were left alone and Rabin said to him: ‘I got the State of Israel into a mess
because of a series of mistakes I made [which brought us to the brink of
the] most difficult war Israel has ever known. In this war – everything
depends on the air force. It will decide the outcome of the war. I believe
that whoever has made a mistake, should go. I made a mistake. Will you
take over from me as Chief of Staff?’ Weizman, so he claims, spurned
Rabin’s offer and encouraged him to rally. Next morning he visited Rabin
again and repeated his refusal.17
It is hard to question Weizman’s testimony even if it was written many
years later. This was not the kind of incident one forgets. It is feasible that
Rabin actually said, ‘I got the State of Israel into a mess’, admitted to mis-
takes and declared that ‘whoever has made a mistake should go’. It is true
that he had no authority to offer Weizman his post, but in the given situ-
ation of 23 and 24 May, Weizman was the Number Two in the IDF senior
command, and his rival, Haim Barlev, had only just returned from Paris.
The fact is that Rabin’s resignation would immediately have placed
Appendix 267
Weizman in a favourable position to become the supreme commander of

the IDF.
Rabin’s version of the incident does not contradict Weizman’s, although
he does not mention asking Weizman to replace him. ‘I was very tired, and
in a black mood,’ Rabin wrote. ‘Not often in my life have I permitted
myself this weakness, allowing someone to share my innermost feelings,
trying to ease the heavy burden by exposing my thoughts to someone else.
I am an introvert. This time I felt the urgent need.’ Rabin writes that he
did not tell Weizman about his talks with Ben-Gurion and Shapira, but
said that he felt that he was sharing with the political echelon respons-
ibility for the fact that Israel was now in the worst predicament it had
faced since the War of Independence. ‘Am I perhaps to blame?’ he asked
Weizman. ‘Would it perhaps be better if I resigned?’ Weizman, according
to Rabin, tried to persuade him to stop talking of resignation, and said he
was confident that Rabin could lead the IDF to great victory.18
Rabin’s version suggests that he was contemplating resigning but had
not yet decided and was seeking Weizman’ reassurance,19 which he
received. Seven years later, when the story was published, Rabin thought,
and rightly so, that Weizman had broken faith with him, although he
never claimed that the story was untrue.20
At the time, Rabin’s brief breakdown remained a deep secret among the
military and political elite. It was not leaked to the local or international
press and did not diminish Rabin’s prestige. Only in April 1974, when
Rabin was candidate for the premiership after Golda Meir’s resignation,
did Weizman expose the story, as proof of Rabin’s unsuitability for the
post. The revelation aroused sensation and the pros and cons were debated
in the press, but it did not prevent Rabin’s election for his first term of
office as Prime Minister (1974–1977).
After thirty-six hours’ absence and rest, Rabin recovered and returned
to duty. He was ‘different from in the past’, according to Weizman.21 The
Chief of Staff had undoubtedly been in urgent need of rest in order to
recuperate, but this was not apparently the main reason for his recovery.
The most important reason is connected to the fact that during his
absence, two central personalities had returned home, who provided Rabin
with support and vital reinforcement, in both the military and the political
spheres. Barlev rapidly became the dominant figure in the General Staff,
gradually superseding Weizman, and to a large degree covering for Rabin’s
weakness.22 Allon immediately became the leading figure among the
government hawks, backing the army’s viewpoint. Rabin was rescued
from his state of isolation. He could now cease vacillating between govern-
ment and General Staff and decided where he stood. From now on he was
unequivocally the spokesman for the IDF.
Rabin’s time-out left its mark and affected the standing of the Chief of
Staff.23 This fact was not always stated explicitly, but may be discerned in
268 Appendix
various statements made after his return to duty. There were also several
indications:
• The documents in the IDF archives on the May/June 1967 crisis indi-
cate that Rabin was displaying a lower profile in General Staff deliber-
ations, in his control over subordinates, and the gradual shift of the
focus of power in Barlev’s direction.
• A blunt and untypical remark by Eshkol at a decisive government
debate on 28 May to the effect that he was uninterested in Rabin’s
opinion whether or not to accept Johnson’s plea to Israel not to initi-
ate hostilities.
• Rabin’s request that Eshkol appear before the General Staff forum the
same day and explain the government decision.
• Remarks of various politicians about the Chief of Staff.24
• Rabin’s response to Eshkol’s appeal to appoint Dayan as CO Southern
Command in place of Gavish.
• Rabin’s proposal that Dayan replace him.
• Rabin’s order to Gavish to submit to the new Minister of Defence the
more comprehensive plan, in contradiction of his previous stand.
Dayan’s appointment to the Ministry of Defence spelled the end of Rabin’s

quasi-ministerial standing,25 and during the war he played a secondary role
in decision-making and conducting the campaign. After the war the laurels
of victory sufficed for all those who had been involved, and naturally
enough Dayan and Rabin received the greatest share of glory. But towards
the end of Rabin’s term of office, between June and December 1967,
Dayan was indisputably the more dominant of the two.26 Although the
post-war period is outside the context of this book, it seems that Rabin’s
standing in the General Staff and the IDF in general was not affected by
his difficulties during the crisis. In the eyes of the general public, who at
the time and long after knew nothing about the secrets of the Pit, Rabin
remained, and rightly so, the hero of the war and the champion of the glo-
rious victory.27
Biographical notes
Yitzhak Rabin (born 1921) – completed his term of office as Chief of Staff
on 31 December 1967 and was replaced by his deputy, Haim Barlev. Served
as Ambassador to Washington (1968–1973), Prime Minister (1974–1977),
Minister of Defence (1984–1989), and Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence (1992–1995). Reached an agreement with the PLO (1993) which
established an autonomous Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, and signed the Israel–Jordan peace treaty (1994). Recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize (1994). Assassinated on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish
assassin opposed to his concessions to the Palestinians of territory conquered
during the Six Day War. Was succeeded by Shimon Peres.
Levi Eshkol (born 1895) – continued to serve as Prime Minister until his
death in February 1969. Was succeeded by Golda Meir.
Moshe Dayan (born 1915) – continued to serve as Minister of Defence

until Golda Meir’s government resigned in 1974 as the result of the public
storm around the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry (headed
by Supreme Court Justice Shimon Agranat) on the mishaps of the Yom
Kippur War. When the Likud came to power in 1977, he was invited by
Prime Minister Menahem Begin to serve as Foreign Minister in his govern-
ment. Played an important role in achieving the peace treaty with Egypt
(1979) under which Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula conquered
during the Six Day War. Resigned in October 1979 and died two years
later.
Yigal Allon (born 1918) – appointed Deputy Prime Minister (1967) and
served in this position and as Minister of Education in Golda Meir’s
government (1969–1974) and Foreign Minister in Rabin’s first government
(1974–1977). Died in 1980.
Abba Eban (born 1915) – served as Foreign Minister until 1974. Was
Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee
270 Biographical notes
(1974–1977), then retired from political life and devoted himself to

writing, lecturing and presenting TV documentary programmes and series.
Died in 2002.
Moshe Haim Shapira (born 1902) – continued to serve as National Reli-

gious Party Chairman and Minister of the Interior until his death in 1970.
Menahem Begin (born 1913) – Minister without Portfolio in governments

of Eshkol and Meir. Resigned in 1970 due to his opposition to the cease-
fire agreement with Egypt. Led the Likud Party to victory in the 1977 and
1981 elections and served as Prime Minister. Signed the peace treaty with
Egypt (1979) which included full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and
evacuation of Jewish settlements there. Recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize
(1979). Due to PLO terrorist action from Lebanon ordered the controver-
sial invasion of Lebanon which claimed numerous casualties. As a result he
sank into a depression, resigned in 1983, and remained secluded at home
until his death in 1992.
Haim Barlev (born 1924) – appointed Chief of Staff on 1 January 1968.

The war of attrition between Israel and Egypt was waged during this
period (1969–1970). On retirement from the army he was appointed
Minister of Trade and Industry in Meir’s government (1972–1974) and
later Minister of Police (until 1977). In 1992 he was appointed Israeli
Ambassador in Moscow and served there until his death in 1994.
Ezer Weizman (born 1924) – continued to serve as Chief of Operations

until 1969. On retirement from the army, he joined the Likud Party and
served as Minister of Transport in Meir’s government until the Likud left
the coalition in 1970. When the Likud came to power in 1977, he was
appointed Minister of Defence and played a major role in achieving the
peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. Resigned in 1980. In 1993 he was chosen
as seventh President of Israel and served until 2000. Died in 2005.
Aharon Yariv (born 1920) – continued to serve as Chief of Intelligence

until 1972 and on retirement was appointed Adviser on Intelligence and
Counter-terror to PM Golda Meir (until 1973). Between 1974 and 1975
he served as Minister of Transport and Minister of Information in the gov-
ernments of Meir and Rabin. He then retired from politics and established
the Center for Strategic Research at Tel Aviv University, which he headed
until his death in 1994.
Ariel Sharon (born 1928) – served in the IDF until 1973, retiring as CO
Southern Command (1970–1973). Resigned from the IDF after he was
passed over for the position of Chief of Staff. He then initiated the estab-
Biographical notes 271
lishment of the Likud Party. During the Yom Kippur War (1973) he was a
division commander and played a central role in the crossing of the Suez
Canal and transfer of the fighting to the Egyptian hinterland, a move
which tipped the balance and brought the Egyptians close to defeat. In
1981 he was appointed Minister of Defence and in 1982 initiated the IDF
invasion of Lebanon in order to uproot the PLO terrorist bases. In 1983 he
was forced to resign in light of the conclusion of the commission headed
by Supreme Court Justice Y. Kahan which investigated the massacre of
Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut by Lebanese
Christian militias operating in an Israeli-controlled area. Until 1992, and
again between 1996 and 1999, he served in various ministerial positions

and was the central figure in the widespread establishment of Jewish settle-
ments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, territories conquered during
the Six Day War. In 2001 he was elected Prime Minister, and initiated the
disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria and the
evacuation of the Jewish settlements there, a plan which was implemented
in 2005. Prior to the 2006 elections he seceded from the Likud and estab-
lished the Kadima Party, but in January 2006 he suffered a brain haemor-
rhage and lapsed into a coma. He was replaced by his deputy, Ehud
Olmert.
Notes
Preface
1 See G. Ben-Dor, ‘Israel in 1967: international standing and self image on the eve
of war’ in Asher Sessar (ed.) Shisha Yamim – Shloshim Shana (Six Days – Thirty
Years), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999, pp. 31–44.
2 S. Shamir, ‘Decline of Nasserist messianism’ in S. Shamir (ed.) Yeridat ha-
Nasserism (The Decline of Nasserism), Tel Aviv University, 1978, pp. 1–60. On
Nasser–Kennedy, Nasser–Johnson relations, see M.H. Heikal, The Cairo Docu-
ments, New York: Doubleday, 1973, pp. 187–249.
3 See report of US Ambassador to Cairo, Lucius Battle, April 1967, and in particu-
lar a missive from his deputy David Ness, 11 May 1967. Both predicted that
Nasser would launch a risky undertaking in order to extricate himself from his
predicament. W. Quandt, Peace Process, Washington, DC: The Brooking Insti-
tute, 1993, pp. 26, 508.
4 Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 58–62. See also A. Ben-Zur, Gormim Sovietiim u-
Milkhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim (Soviet Elements and the Six Day War), Tel Aviv:
Sifriyat Hapoalim, 1976, and G. Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from
World War Two to Gorbachev, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.
58–67; J.D. Glassman, Arms for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and War in the
Middle East, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 22–64.
5 A. Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis 1967, New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1968. Odd Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, London: Leo
Cooper, 1973. See also I.J. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, Oxford and New Delhi:
IBH, 1978.
Introduction
1 T. Herzl, Der Judenstaat, Leipzig: M. Breitstein’s Verlags Buchhandlung, 1896.
T. Herzl, Altneuland, Leipzig: Seeman, 1900.
2 See S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, New York: Random House,
1957. M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, New York: Free Press, 1960. S.
Feiner, Ha-Ish al Gav ha-Soos (The Man on the Horse), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot,
1982. A. Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel, London: Frank Cass, 1969.
Y. Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983. See also Y. Peri, ‘The patterns of connection of the IDF to the political
establishment in Israel’ in Milkhemet Breira (A War of Choice), Tel Aviv: Hak-
ibbutz Hameuhad, 1985, pp. 31–55. Y. Ben-Meir, Civil–Military Relations in
Israel, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. M. Lissak (ed.) Israeli
Society and its Defence Establishment, London: Frank Cass, 1984.
Notes 273
3 See A. Shapira, Me-Piturei ha-Rama ad le-Piruk ha-Palmach (From the Dis-

missal of the Head of the National Command to the Disbanding of the
Palmach), Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 118–159. See also in contrast, Y.
Gelber, Lama Pirku et ha-Palmach? (Why Was the Palmach Disbanded?),
Jerusalem: Schocken, 1986. M. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv: Am Oved,
1975, pp. 700–813. See also Peri, Battles and Ballots, pp. 54–57.
4 Ariel Sharon in an interview in Yediot Aharonot, 30 May 1997. For similar
remarks by Ezer Weizman, see Lekha Shamayim Lekha Aretz (Heaven and
Earth are Thine), Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1975, pp. 239–240.
5 See M. Golani, Dayan Leads to War, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independ-
ence Studies) 4, Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion Heritage Centre, 1994, pp. 117–135.
6 Y. Tal, Bitakhon Leumi (National Security), Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996, p. 51. On
security theory, security policy and military doctrine, see ibid., pp. 43–116, and
A. Levite, ha-Doctrina ha-Tzvait shel Yisrael (Israel’s Military Doctrine), Tel
Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1988, pp. 22–90. A. Yaniv, Politika ve-Astrategia
be-Yisrael (Politics and Strategy in Israel), Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Hapoalim, 1994,
pp. 13–34. D. Horovitz, Ha-Tfisa ha-Yisraelit shel Bitahon Leumi (The Israeli
Conception of National Security), Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1973.
7 Tal, ibid., pp. 52–53.
8 The expression is used by Emmanuel Vald in Kilelat ha-Kelim ha-Shvurim (The
Curse of the Broken Vessels), Jerusalem: Schocken, 1987, p. 14. See also pp.
80–81, 84, 193.
9 R. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 245–246.
10 Ben-Gurion said to Rabin on 21 May 1967: ‘We both know that this is the
destruction of the Third Temple.’ This is attested to by Azariyahu Arnan, a
close associate of government minister Galili, in an interview in Maariv, 13
May 1986. Rabin himself does not mention this in his memoirs.
11 Weizman, Heaven and Earth, p. 258. See also Sharon’s reference to the
restricted operational plan ‘Atzmon’ (IDF Archives 192/74/1038).
12 The more pessimistic assessment was apparently given by Brigadier-General
(ret.) Yehoshafat Harkavi, former Chief of Intelligence. D. Kimche and D.
Bavli, Sufat ha-Esh (The Storm of Fire), Tel Aviv: Am ha-Sefer, 1968, p. 102.
See also Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 21 May 1967; Bar-Zohar, Ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh
be-Yoter (The Longest Month), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1965, pp. 140,
153–155. Z. Wahrhaftig, Minister of Religious Affairs in the Eshkol govern-
ment and member of the Ministerial Committee on Security, asked Rabin how
many victims were predicted. Rabin replied: 10,000. Author’s interview with
Wahrhaftig, 24 August 1998.
13 When the May 1967 crisis broke out, efforts were made to purchase gas masks
from Germany, the United States and Great Britain. Bar-Zohar, op. cit. See also
A. Barzilai, ‘Chief Lord of the Flies’, Haaretz, 5 November 1998. The CIA esti-
mated that the Egytians would not use gas. Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service
Card), A, p. 168. And see below.
14 On fears in Israel that Nasser possessed a ‘secret weapon’, see Bar-Zohar,
Longest Month, p. 140. Foreign diplomats in Cairo were of the same opinion.
See Parker, Miscalculation, p. 90.
15 Yediot Aharonot, 30 May 1997. For criticism of this approach within the IDF
(represented by Ariel Sharon), to the effect that ‘all our problems can be solved
through the rifle sights’, see M. Amit, Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), Or-Yehuda:
Hed Artzi, 1999, pp. 41–45.
16 On the defence budget during this period see Y. Greenberg, Kheshbon ve-
Otzma (Calculations and Power), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1997.
274 Notes
17 Haber, Today . . . Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, p. 197.

18 Z. Lanir, ‘The political objectives and military goals of Israel’s wars’, in
Milkhemet Breira (A War of Choice), pp. 126–133. See also Ben-Meir,
Civil–Military, pp. 143–148.
19 Chief of Staff Zvi Zur reported to Ben-Gurion on ‘great anxiety among the mil-
itary’, Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 18 June 1963. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (p. 1556),
relates that Rabin was in tears. Rabin, in Service Card, confesses that he was
very moved. See also Weizman, Heaven and Earth, p. 236.
20 See e.g. Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 17 November 1963 to 25 November 1963.
21 Ben-Meir, Civil–Military, pp. 31–32. On the ‘de-Ben-Gurionization’ of security
under Eshkol, see Peri, Battles and Ballots, pp. 78–80.
22 Weizman, Heaven and Earth, pp. 240–241. Rabin lauded Eshkol’s approach
‘marked by readiness for more varied deployment of IDF might’. Y. Rabin,
‘Eshkol, my Minister of Defence’, Bamahaneh, 14 February 1963.
23 This was Rabin’s claim, and it is borne out by Dayan’s close associates, Meir
Amit and Haim Yisraeli. Ben-Meir, Civil–Military, pp. 107–108.
24 Peri, Battles and Ballots, p. 162. Ben-Meir, Civil–Military, p. 107. Bar-Zohar,
Longest Month, pp. 68–70. Kimche and Bavli, Storm of Fire, p. 99.
25 Peri, Battles and Ballots, ibid. Haber, Today, pp. 146–147. Hanna Zemer at a
study meeting at the Ben-Zvi Institute, 18 February 1997.
26 Peri, Battles and Ballots, p. 160. Haber, Today, pp. 145–146 and see below.
27 Rabin, Service Card, A, p. 114.
28 Author’s interview with Tal, 14 January 1999. A similar story on the require-
ments of the IAF is cited by Weizman, Heaven and Earth, pp. 241–242. See
also p. 254 and Haber, Today, p. 68.
29 Peri, Battles and Ballots, p. 162. M. Peled, ‘How Israel did not prepare for
war’, Maarakhot, 289–290, pp. 25–28. Haber, Today, pp. 41–42, 67, 97,
146–147. For criticism of the excessive power of the Chief of Staff see E. Vald,
Kilelat ha-Kelim ha-Shvurim (Curse of the Broken Vessels), Jerusalem:
Schocken, 1987, pp. 163–169.
30 N. Safran, ha-Imut ha-Aravi–Yisraeli 1948–1967 (The Arab–Israel confronta-
tion, 1948–1967), Jerusalem: Keter, 1960, pp. 258–259.
31 Tal, Bitakhon Leumi (National Security), Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996, pp. 110–111.
Vald, Curse, p. 19 and M. Van-Creveld, ‘The Citizen and the Military Science’,
The Israel Manual of Public Administration, No. 15, Jerusalem, 1976, p. 82.
32 On the deterioration of relations between Ben-Gurion and Eshkol, see Bar-
Zohar, Ben-Gurion, C, pp. 1560–1586.
33 Haber, Today, pp. 43–44. Peres claims that the ‘omission’ to which Ben-Gurion
was referring was Eshkol’s decision to cut down on the missiles project.
Author’s interview with Peres, 29 October 1998. Peri writes that BG was refer-
ring to two ‘blunders’; the greater one was the slowdown of the nuclear pro-
gramme and the more minor blunder was the Ben-Barka affair. Peri, Battles
and Ballots, pp. 78–79, 240–244.
34 Safran, op. cit.
35 Eshkol headed three governments: the continuing government after Ben-
Gurion’s resignation in June 1963; the government of December 1964 after his
resignation due to the dispute with Ben-Gurion and the government he estab-
lished in January 1966 after the November 1965 elections to the Knesset.
36 On the ‘permanent state of tension’ between the military and civil levels, see
Weizman, op. cit., p. 240.
37 A. Shapira, ha-Halikha al Kav ha-Ofek (Walking on the Horizon), Tel Aviv:
Am Oved, pp. 23–71, and, in particular, A. Shapira, Kherev ha-Yona (The
Sword of the Dove), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992.
Notes 275
38 Author’s interview with Ze’evi, 3 September 1998. Zerach Wahrhaftig, Minis-

ter of Religious Affairs and a member of the National Religious Party, was
Polish-born, short and bespectacled, a moderate anti-activist. For the generals,
he personified the Diaspora Jew.
39 See below. See also Yehuda Ben-Meir’s remarks in a discussion (2 March
1978). Gevulot Bitahon (Security Borders) Malle Researches, Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, 1978.
40 After the war, Dayan said: ‘The person who decided, or was forced, to give me
the Defence portfolio, understood that it wasn’t in order to support the policy
of diplomatic meetings without military decisions or a policy of evasion’.
Yediot Aharonot, 16 June 1967.
41 Maariv, 12 May 1967.
1 Personnel changes in the defence establishment

1 Z. Shalom, ‘Ben-Gurion’s resignation from the government’, in Iyunim bi-
Tkumat Yisrael (Studies in Israeli Independence) 5, pp. 608–614. N. Yanai,
Kera Batzameret (A Rift at the Top), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1969, pp.
11–44. See also Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 1554–1559.
2 I. Harel, Mashber ha-Madanim ha-Germanim (The German Scientists Crisis),
Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1982. For a conflicting version see M. Amit, Rosh be-
Rosh (Head On), Tel Aviv: Hed Artzi, 1999, pp. 101–125. M. Bar-Zohar, Ben-
Gurion, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1975. pp. 1529–1545. See also S. Aronson,
ha-Politika veha-Astrategia shel Neshek Garini (The Politics and Strategy of
Nuclear Weapons), Vol. 1, Jerusalem: Akademon, 1994, pp. 221–257,
308–323, and Vol. 2, pp. 43–48. See also M. Bar-Zohar, Tzayd ha-Madanim
ha-Germanim (Hunting the German Scientists), Jerusalem: Schoken, 1965, pp.
199–221.
3 On the ‘tripartite union’, see M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958–1967, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 58–126.
4 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 1550–1554. Ben-Gurion’s missives were sent
without consultation with the professional diplomats in the Foreign Ministry.
See G. Raphael, be-Sod Leumim (In the Confidence of Nations), Jerusalem:
Idanim, 1981, pp. 116–117.
5 A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998,
pp. 99–136. On Kennedy’s policy on the Middle East and Israel: M. Gazit,
President Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and Israel, Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, 1983.
6 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 1524–1526.
7 Ibid., pp. 1526–1529.
8 On the IDF deployment in light of the volatile situation, particularly on the Jor-
danian front, see Minutes of the General Staff meeting of 6 May 1963.
9 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 119–123.
10 Yanai, A Rift, pp. 293–296.
11 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 223–239.
12 Divrei ha-Knesset (Knesset Minutes), Vol. 37, pp. 2158–2162.
13 Quotes are from Minutes of the General Staff meetings 1, 8, 15 July 1963.
14 In an interview shortly before the Six Day War, Ben-Gurion was asked by
Geula Cohen what he would reply to his grandson if asked what the borders of
the homeland were. He replied: ‘I would say, the borders of your homeland, my
child, are the borders of the State of Israel as they are today. That’s it.’ See
interview in Maariv, 12 May 1967. See also Weizman, Lekha Shamayim Lekha
Aretz (Heaven and Earth are Yours), Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1975, pp. 200,
276 Notes
208–209, 243–244. U. Narkis, Khayal shel Yerushalaim (A Jerusalem Soldier),

Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 327.
15 Levi Eshkol had a particular affinity for water questions. He founded the
national water company Mekorot and as Minister of Agriculture and Minister
of Finance devoted considerable attention to promoting Israel’s water projects.
16 Weizman at the General Staff meeting 8 July 1963.
17 Peres believed that ‘modern strategy . . . is the transition from the theory of
decision-making with the aid of the armed forces to the theory of decision-
making without war; how to build up power without using it, so that it will be
effective “in advance”.’ S. Peres, ha-Shlav ha-Ba (The Next Stage), Tel Aviv:
Am Hasefer, 1965, p. 116.
18 Peri, Bullets, pp. 249–250. P. Seal, Assad – ha-Maavak al ha-Mizrakh ha-

Tichon (Assad – the Struggle for the Middle East), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1988,
pp. 141–142.
19 Rabin at the General Staff meeting on his first day as Chief of Staff, 1 January
1964.
20 See e.g. U. Narkis, Akhat Yerushalayim (Jerusalem is One), Tel Aviv: Am
Oved, 1975, p. 44.
21 See e.g. Robert Slater, Yitzhak Rabin – Biografia (Yitzhak Rabin, a Biography),
Jerusalem: Idan, 1977, pp. 54–56.
22 On Rabin’s appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff, see Rabin, Service Card, pp.
109–113. See also Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 11 October 1963.
23 Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 7 November 1963. Without saying so explicitly, Ben-
Gurion was probably implying that it was not desirable for two former Pal-
machniks to head the army.
24 Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 25 November 1963. BG considered 41-year-old Elrom to
be ‘too old’, and wrote of Weizman: ‘I was surprised to hear that he is already
forty.’ Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 3 June 1964. On BG’s campaign to bring younger
men into the senior command and its implementation by Dayan, see Tevet,
Dayan, pp. 402–407.
25 Rabin, Service Notebook, pp. 117–118. Weizman, Heaven and Earth, pp.
233–239.
26 Rabin at the General Staff meeting 1 January 1964.

1 J.D. Glassman, Arms for the Middle East – The Soviet Union and War in the
Middle East, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 22–64.
2 R. Yakar, Yakhasei Yisrael–Artzot ha-Brit: Hebet ha-Rekhesh, 1955–1967
(Israel–US Relations: the Purchase Angle, 1955–1967), Documentation and
Historical Research Unit, Ministry of Defence Publishing House, 1995.
3 S. Aronson, Neshek Gar’ini ba-Mizrakh ha-Tikhon (Nuclear Arms in the
Middle East), B, Jerusalem: Akademon, 1995, pp. 13–166.
4 M. Pa’il, ‘BG’s policy and strategy at the end of the War of Independence’,
Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), 1995, pp. 37–90.
5 S. Golan, Gvul Kham, Milkhama Kara (Hot Border, Cold War), Tel Aviv:
Maarakhot and Ministry of Defence Publishing House, 2000, pp. 320–378.
6 I. Rabinovitz, ha-Shalom she-Khamak (The Peace that Eluded Us), Jerusalem:
Keter, 1991.
7 M. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1975, p. 1365.
8 For theoretical and strategic substantiation of the ‘defensive-offensive’ concep-
tion, see Y. Ber, Bitkhon Yisrael Etmol, ha-Yom, Makhar (Israel’s Security Yes-
terday, Today, Tomorrow), Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966.
Notes 277
9 Golan, op. cit., p. 240.

10 Amiran Oren, ‘Fighting Order of Battle – Situation Estimate 1953–1960 as a
Turning Point in Security Policy and Expansion of the IDF in the Fifties’,
Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), Vol. 12, 2002, pp.
123–145.
11 A. Levite, ha-Doctrina ha-Tzvayit shel Yisrael: Hagana ve-Hatkafa (Israel’s
Security Doctrine: Defence and Attack), Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1988.
12 M. Bar-On, Sha’arei Aza (The Gates of Gaza), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992, pp.
91–106.
13 A. Yaniv, Politika ve-Astrategiya be-Yisrael (Politics and Strategy in Israel), Tel
Aviv: Sifriyat Hapoalim, 1994, pp. 156–158.
14 Ibid.
15 Stuart Cohen, ‘Who needs surface–air missiles?’ in Z. Lachish and M. Amitai
(eds) Asor lo Shaket (An Unquiet Decade), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1995.
16 Y. Goldstein, Eshkol, Jerusalem: Keter, 2003, pp. 460–463.
17 Peres contemplated establishing what he called a European ‘enclave’ in the
Middle East through the Common Market. For his letter to Eshkol containing
the main points of his security outlook, see N. Yanai, Kera ba-Tzameret (Rift at
the Top), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1969, pp. 130–133.
18 Peres confirmed in a private conversation with the author (23 May 1999) that
he was in conflict with Ben-Gurion on this matter. Rabin notes in his memoirs
that Ben-Gurion, unlike Peres, understood the importance of the United States,
and his meeting in March 1960 with Eisenhower resulted in US consent to sell
Israel advanced radar systems. Peres and Weizman tried in vain to delay the
purchase: Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1979,
pp. 105–106.
19 S. Peres, ha-Shlav ha-Ba (The Next Stage), Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1965, pp.
114–117.
20 On his speech in the Knesset on this subject, described as one of the most
important delivered in the Knesset at that time, see Haaretz, 26 June 1963.
21 For Peres’ version of his consent to serve as Deputy Minister of Defence under
Eshkol, see M. Golan, Peres, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1982, pp.
128–129. On Eshkol–Peres relations, see Yanai, op. cit., pp. 128–133,
252–254. On the circumstances in which Peres was forced to resign due to the
rift between Eshkol and Ben-Gurion, see ibid., pp. 217–218.
22 Peres at General Staff meeting, 24 June 1963. See also his remarks at the
meeting of 15 July and 28 October 1963, and Peres, op. cit., pp. 47–48,
135–139.
23 Eshkol at General Staff meeting, 15 July 1963.
24 Rabin at General Staff meeting 1 January 1964. In his memoirs, Rabin
described his standpoint as much more resolute. See Rabin, op. cit., pp.
105–106.
25 Goldstein, Eshkol, pp. 477–482.
26 See mainly: S. Aronson, Nuclear Arms; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
27 Aronson, ibid., and S. Aronson, Israel’s Nuclear Programme,The Six Day War
and its Ramifications, London: Kings College, 1998. See also S. Aronson, ‘The
Sinai Campaign and nuclear arms’, Yahadut Zmaneinu (Contemporary Jewry)
13 (1999), pp. 37–73.
28 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 1388–1394; Zaki Shalom, ‘Reaction of the Great
Powers to revelation of the construction of the Dimona reactor in the sixties’,
Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies) 4 (1994), pp. 136–174.
29 Shalom, ibid., pp. 167–169; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 108–111.
278 Notes
30 Z. Shalom, ‘The Kennedy Administration and its Attitude towards Israel’s

Nuclear Activities’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies) 5
(1995), pp. 126–164; and A. Cohen, ‘Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and the battle for
Dimona, April–June 1963’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence
Studies) 6 (1996), pp. 110–146.
31 See extensive quotes from Eshkol’s consultation with Deputy Prime Minister
Abba Eban, Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Agriculture Moshe
Dayan, Deputy Minister of Defence Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Zvi Zur.
Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (Hebrew edn), pp. 217–220.
32 Ibid., pp. 223–226.
33 Ibid., pp. 159, 197.
34 See FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18 throughout the volume, and particularly Doc.
169, 214, 269, 415.
35 M. Shemesh, ‘The Arab struggle for water against Israel 1959–1967’, Iyunim
bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies) (1997), pp. 103–168; Samir
Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987, pp. 22, 58–62.
36 Rabin, Service Notebook, pp. 128–130.
37 Ibid., p. 128.
38 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 146–185.
39 A. Cohen, ha-Hagana al Mekorot ha-Mayim (Defence of Water Sources), Tel
Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1992.
40 Aronson, Nuclear Arms, A, pp. 232–308. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp.
1529–1545. I. Harel, Mashber ha-Mad’anim ha-Germanim (The German Sci-
entists Crisis), Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1982, pp. 17–18.
41 There were those who charged Peres with launching the Shavit 2 missile on the eve
of the elections for electoral purposes, thereby spurring the Egyptians to accelerate
their efforts to develop ground-to-ground missiles. See Harel, ibid., pp. 19–22;
Monia Mardor, Rafael, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1981, pp. 319–348.
42 Cohen, Defence . . ., p. 155, according to the fiftieth anniversary volume of the
Dassault concern in France. English translation of the relevant chapter: Pierre
Landereux, ‘France: Dassault publication reveals secret Israeli missile program’,
FBIS Report, FBIS-EST-97-008. The item was published in full in the Israeli
press on 11 December 1996. See also Aluf Ben, ‘Missiles on the nudist beach’,
Haaretz, 17 December 1996; see also Aronson, Nuclear . . . A, pp. 269–270;
Peres, Next Stage, pp. 97–100.
43 See e.g. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 7, and Johnson-Eshkol talk, ibid.,
Doc. 65.
44 See Chapter 1, n. 8.
45 S. Cohen, ‘Who needs . . .’ in Lachish and Amitai, pp. 249–282.
46 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, C, pp. 1525–1526. On the Johnson’s administration’s
reconnoitering on the Palestinian refugee question and Egyptian and Israeli
reactions see FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 25, 70, 291, 297, 323.
47 E. Barak, ‘The forgotten struggle: Israel, Egypt and free shipping through the
Suez Canal’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), 1991, pp.
81–131.
48 Cohen, Defence . . ., pp. 176–177, 319–324, 326–327; see also FRUS,
1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 22, 24, 50, 52, 96–98.
49 A. Levite and E. Landau, be-Einei ha-Aravim – Dimuya ha-Garini shel Yisrael
(In Arab Eyes – Israel’s Nuclear Image), Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994,
pp. 39–42, 71–76, 183–184; Cohen, Defence . . ., pp. 315–332.
50 General Staff meeting, 19 May 1965.
51 General Staff meeting, 10 October 1966.
Notes 279
52 The Lebanese newspaper al-Nahar wrote (end of May 1967) that the Dimona
reactor was a prime target for an Egyptian attack – quoted in Davar, 30 May
1967.
53 M. Mardor, Rafael, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1981, pp. 497–499.
54 S. Peres, Battling for Peace, New York: Random House, 1975, pp. 166–167.
See also Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 2 June 1967. Dan Margalit notes that Peres per-
ceived the rejection of his proposal, aimed at preventing war, as one of the two
main failures in his career (the other was the foiling of the London agreement
with King Hussein in 1987). Margalit, I Saw Them, p. 69.
55 See Y. Greenberg, Khesbon ve-Otzma (Calculations and Power), Tel Aviv:
Ministry of Defence, 1997; Yakar, Israel–US Relations; Zohar Levkovitz, be-
Mivkhan ha-Milkhama – ha-Ma’arakh ha-Logisti be-Tzahal be-Milkhemet

Sheshet ha-Yamim u-Milkhemet ha-Hatasha (The Test of War – the IDF’s
Logistic Set-up during the Six Day War and the War of Attrition), Tel Aviv:
Ministry of Defence, 1995.
56 On the full buildup of the Arab armies in 1964 to 1967 see Rabin Report, pp.
11–20. See also Levkovitz, ibid., pp. 29–41, 43–86. Trenchant criticism of the
pace of purchase of aircraft and the considerable investment in the reorganiza-
tion of the navy was voiced by Moshe Dayan at the Foreign Affairs and Secur-
ity Committee of the Knesset – E. Gluska, ha-pikud ha-tzva’i veha-hanhaga
ha-medinit shel Yisrael le-nokhakh baayot ha-bitakhon 1963–1967 (Israel’s
Military Command and Political Leadership Face Security Problems
1963–1967), Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, 2000.
3 Escalation – Stage 1: from skirmishes in the demilitarized

zones to aerial sorties
1 A. Shalev, Shituf Pe’ula be-Tzel Imut: Mishtar Shvitat ha-Neshek Yisrael-Syria
1949–1955 (Cooperation in the Shadow of Confrontation: the Armistice
Regime Israel–Syria 1949–1955), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1989.
2 Lior was Eshkol’s military secretary in the year and a half preceding the Six
Day War. He continued to serve under Golda Meir until her resignation in
1974. His diaries were edited in book form, and were an important source for
the present book. E. Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break
Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1998.
3 In the deliberations of the government and the Ministerial Committee on Secur-
ity, Allon adopted the most hawkish positions. See A. Cohen, Defence, and see
below.
4 Mordechai Kidron, who was Head of the Armistice Department of the Foreign
Ministry from 1963 to 1966, says that policy in the demilitarized zones was
dictated by the IDF. Y. Melman, ‘The hornets’ nest of the demilitarized zones’,
Haaretz, 16 June 1995.
5 Haber, Today, p. 116. On Eshkol’s unease, see ibid., pp. 95–97.
6 Odd Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, London: Leo Cooper, 1973, pp.
51–52.
7 R. Tal, ‘Moshe Dayan – self-reckoning, Yediot Aharonot, 27 April 1997.
8 Cohen, Defence, pp. 13–16.
9 For a survey of the events and discussions where the deployment of aircraft was
discussed before the period under discussion, see Cohen, Defence, 1992, pp.
13–66.
10 M. Greenberg, ha-Ezorim ha-Mefurazim bi-Gvul Yisrael–Syria B (The Demili-
tarized Zones on the Israel–Syria Border B), General Staff, History Deptart-
ment, 1993, pp. 54–55.
280 Notes

12 H. Bartov, Dado, Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Maariv, 1978, p. 115.
13 Bartov, ibid., pp. 106, 109–110.
14 S. Tevet, Khasufim ba-Tzariakh (Exposed in the Turret), Jerusalem and Tel
Aviv: Schocken, 1968, pp. 81–88, 121–126. Rabin, Service Notebook, p. 122.
Bartov, Dado, p. 110.
15 For a detailed description of the operation, see Cohen, Defence . . ., pp.
77–117. See also Rabin, Service Notebook, pp. 122–124.
16 Ibid. and Rabin at the General Staff meeting, 16 November, 1964.
17 IDF Archive, files 103/67/40 and 103/67/140.
19 See comments of Zvi Dinstein, who served as Deputy Minister of Defence

under Eshkol. Peri, Battles and Ballots, p. 162. See also Haber, Today . . .,
p. 43.
20 See Ben-Gurion’s remarks to Dayan, Cohen, Defence, p. 31.
21 Cohen, ibid., p. 47.
4 Escalation – Stage 2: diversion

1 Moshe Shemesh, ‘ha-maavak ha-Aravi al ha-mayim neged Yisrael 1959–1967’
(The Arab struggle over water against Israel, 1959–1967), Iyunim bi-tkumat
Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies) 7 (1997), pp. 103–168; Itamar Rabi-
novitch, ‘Ha-maavak al mei ha-Yarden ke-markiv ba-sikhsukh ha-Yisraeli-
Aravi’ (The struggle over the Jordan waters as a component of the Israel–Arab
conflict), Artzot ha-galil (Land of Galilee) B, Haifa University, 1983, pp.
863–868. S. Golan, ‘Ha-maavak al mei ha-Yarden (The struggle over the
Jordan waters), ibid., pp. 853–862. S. Blass, Mei meriva u-maas (Disputed
Waters), Ramat Gan: Massada, 1973.
2 FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 9, pp. 103–114.
3 Haaretz, 2 January 1965.
4 Rabinovitch, The Struggle over the Jordan Waters, ibid.
5 The significance of Israel’s water scheme was inflated because of inter-Arab
relations. See debate in the UAR government in 1959 between Deputy President
Akram el-Horani of Syria and President Nasser. Quoted in S. Yitzhaki, Be-ainei
ha-Aravim (In Arab Eyes), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1969, pp. 30–31. See
also Shemesh, Arab Struggle. . . .
6 I. Rabinovitch, Syria under the Baath, Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1972.
The basic tenets of the Baath Party are cited in A. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha
Yamim (Six Years, Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968, pp. 274–276.
7 On the ‘Union’ and its collapse, see M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958–1967,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 58–126. On the Arab summit con-
ferences before the Six Day War, see A. Sela, Ahdut be-Tokh Perud ba-
Ma’arekhet ha-Bein-Aravit (Unity in Division in the inter-Arab System),
Jerusalem: Magnes, 1983, pp. 6–7, 26–63.
8 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 127–133. On additional reasons for the conven-
ing of the Arab summit, ibid., pp. 133–136. On the background and prepara-
tions for the first conference in Cairo see Sela, Unity in Division, pp. 26–29.
9 On the discussions and resolutions of the Cairo summit conference, see Kerr,
ibid., pp. 29–37.
10 Rabin at the General Staff meeting, 28 December 1964.
11 Rabin feared, so he said, that the Americans would say to Israel: ‘Friends, why
go to war for 15–30 million cubic meters of water? We can desalinate water for
you!’ Rabin, General Staff meeting, 11 January 1965.
Notes 281
12 On the diversion work in Lebanon under pressure from the Arab states, see
Intelligence Branch document 2 July 1965, IDF Archive 758/67/73. See also
Shemesh, Arab Struggle.
13 General Staff meeting, 25 January 1965.
14 Moshe Dayan, ‘Diversion of the Jordan sources’, Haaretz, 29 January 1965.
15 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 1 February 1965.
16 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 22 February 1965. The General Staff did in fact
hold a detailed discussion at that meeting on readiness of the various branches
of the armed forces. Ibid.
17 Barlev at General Staff meeting, 8 March 1965.
18 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 8 March 1965.
19 Rabin at General Staff, 15 March 1965. See also FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18,
Doc. 170.
20 Rabin, Service Notebook, p. 124. Cohen, Defence, p. 123.
21 Routine security report of Chief of Operations, General Staff meeting, 12 April
1965.
22 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 19 April 1965.
23 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 3 May 1965. On 9 April 1965 the Minister of
Defence had approved Rabin’s plan for attacking the diversion equipment in
Lebanon.
24 Minutes of Eshkol–Rabin conversation of 26 February 1965, Eshkol Archive.
25 Minutes of the Eshkol–Rabin conversation of 13 May 1965, Eshkol Archive.
Rabin’s remarks indicate that if the Syrians, contrary to expectations, were not
provoked into opening fire by the patrol’s fire, ‘then in any case we must stage
something’. Ibid.; and see Shemesh, Arab Struggle, pp. 155–159.
26 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 17 May 1965.
27 Minutes of Eshkol–Rabin conversation, 19 May 1965, Eshkol Archive.
28 Buffer fire was first employed in 1962 and on various occasions after that, on
various sectors, and was ceased due to UN intervention. For details see letter
from Bureau Chief of Head of Operations to Bureau Chief of Staff, 27 January
1967 headed ‘Buffer fire – a historical survey’, IDF Archive, 117/70/63.
29 Head of Operations routine security report, General Staff meeting, 12 April
1965.
30 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 24 May 1965.
31 General Staff meeting, 24 May 1965. The US protest was submitted both
through the ambassador in Tel Aviv and also in Washington. See also FRUS,
1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 219.
32 E. Gluska, ha-Pikud ha-Tzvai veha-Hanhaga ha-Medinit shel Yisrael le-
Nokhakh Ba’ayot ha-Bitakhon 1963–1967 (The Military Command and Polit-
ical Leadership of Israel in Light of Security Problems 1963–1967),
dissertation, p. 81, n. 61. Shemesh, Arab Struggle, pp. 144–158.
33 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 12 July 1965.
34 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 2 August 1965. The Israeli press refrained from
reporting on cessation of work in Lebanon as a result of a request by the IDF to
the editors.
35 Operation Moznayim (Scales), night of 27/28 October 1965.
36 Barlev at General Staff meeting, 2 August 1965.
37 Shemesh, Arab Struggle, p. 159. Report and photographs of the incident of 12
August 1965 in IDF Archive, 758/67/65.
38 Ze’evi and Rabin at General Staff meeting 16 August 1965. See also Cohen,
Defence . . ., pp. 126–127.
39 Rabin Report, p. 33.
40 Rabin, General Staff meeting, 8 November 1965.
282 Notes
41 Yariv, General Staff meeting, 7 March 1966.

42 General Staff meetings, 13 June 1966, 28 March 1966. At the beginning of
1967 the Chief of Intelligence even felt the need to ask his fellow members ‘not
to forget the diversion subject’. Yariv, General Staff meeting, 2 January 1967.
43 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 45, 110–111, 115, 125, 127–128, 192–193,
197–198, 215.

1 P. Seale, Assad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, London: Tauris,
1988.
2 A. Shalev, Shituf Peula be-Tzel ha-Imut (Cooperation in the Shadow of Con-

frontation), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1989, pp. 254–256.
3 Seale, Assad (Hebrew edn), pp. 210–314.
4 S. Segev, Milkhama ve-Shalom ba-Mizrakh ha-Tikhon (War and Peace in the
Middle East), Tel Aviv: Tversky, 1965, pp. 34–40, 49.
5 A. Sela, Akhdut be-Tokh Perud (Unity in Division), Jerusalem: Magnes, 1983,
pp. 50–55. On the Bourguiba affair, see also D. Kimche and D. Bavli, Sufat ha-
esh (The Storm of Fire), Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1968, pp. 22–25. Segev, War
and Peace, pp. 40–42. In a speech in the Knesset, Eshkol responded to Bour-
guiba’s proposals with a peace plan of his own, based on territorial integrity of
all the states and minor border adjustments. Haaretz, 18 May 1965.
6 On the Casablanca summit deliberations, resolutions and results, see Sela,
Unity, pp. 55–63.
7 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 13 December 1965. Later, the Jordanian
premier Wafsi Tal revealed that a detailed plan was drawn up there for the lib-
eration of Palestine. Haaretz, 7 August 1966. See also Shemesh, ‘The Arab
struggle for water against Israel’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independ-
ence Studies), 7 (1997), pp. 103–168.
8 A. Cohen, ha-Hagana al Mekorot ha-Mayim (Defence of the Water Sources),
Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1992, p. 127. Haaretz, 20 September 1965.
9 P. Seale, Assad, pp. 97–123. Rabinovich, Syria under the Baath, Jerusalem:
Israel University Press, 1972, pp. 189–208.
10 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 28 February 1966.
11 Hasnin Heikal described the group which had seized power in Damascus as
‘fanatic and irresponsible’. M.H. Heikal, ha-Sphinx veha-Commissar (The
Sphinx and the Commissar), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1981, p. 149.
12 Segev, War and Peace, pp. 52–53. S. Yitzhaki, be-Einei ha-Aravim (In Arab
Eyes), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1969, pp. 30–38.
13 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 18 April 1966 and 30 May 1966. Rabin at
General Staff meeting, 2 May 1966. Heikal in The Sphinx presents the prob-
lematic relationship between the Soviet Union and the Arabs as stemming to a
large extent from the duality of the Soviet approach: on the one hand a world
power with strategic calculations in the power struggle with the United States,
and on the other hand, the homeland of the revolution, committed to its ideo-
logical and universal mission and its connections with communist parties.
Against this background, the participation of the Communist Party in the Baath
government in Syria was very important for the Soviets. See also Seale, Assad,
p. 17.
14 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 4 July 1966. See also Chapter 2 above.
15 Rabin at General Staff meetings, 13 June 1966 and 27 June 1966.
16 On Bunche’s visit, see O. Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East, London: Leo
Cooper, 1973, pp. 95–96. Eshkol and Eban expressed to him their strong
Notes 283
objections to the intention to reduce the United Nations Emergency Force and
to evacuate it from Sharm al-Sheikh.
17 General Staff meeting, 11 July 1966. Among the supporters of evacuation of
the UNEF was MK Moshe Dayan, at the Foreign Affairs and Security Commit-
tee, 17 May 1967, Chapter 12 (below) and Dayan’s remarks at the American
Zionist Conference, Maariv, 28 November 1966.
18 Debriefing on the air force operation of 14 July 1966 in the IDF Archive,
192/74/1393.
20 IDF Archive, 192/74/1393.
21 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 25 July 1966. The Syrian Chief of Staff called
for ‘a popular war for the liberation of Palestine’. Haaretz, 19 July 1966.
6 Escalation – Stage 3: ‘harassment’

1 The definition ‘intolerable’ from Israel’s viewpoint was, of course, subjective,
but this is the clear impression gained from the General Staff deliberations (see
below in this chapter). See also E. Landau, ‘Four stages in the terror warfare’,
Maariv, 19 May 1967. From the Arab point of view, the acts of sabotage were
not serious, and merely served Israel as an excuse for implementing its expan-
sion aspirations. See e.g. P. Seale, Assad, Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1993, pp.
135–136.
2 M. Shemesh, The Palestinian Entity 1959–1974 – Arab Politics and the PLO,
London: Frank Cass, 1988, pp. 1–94. Y. Arnon-Ohana and A. Yodfat, Ashaf –
Dyokno shel Irgun (The PLO – Portrait of an Organization), Tel Aviv: Maariv,
1985, pp. 29–41.
3 In response to criticism to the effect that terrorist activity would evoke Israeli
military reaction which could end in Arab defeat, the Fatah replied in 1963 in
almost ‘prophetic’ fashion: ‘The revolution will last a year, two years, up to
twenty or thirty years. On the contrary, let the Zionists conquer the West
Bank. . . . History has never yet witnessed the failure of popular revolutions.’ A.
Yaari, Fatah, Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1970, p. 38. Precisely thirty years later,
it was agreed at Oslo to establish an independent Palestinian Authority.
4 Yariv at General Staff meetings, 11 January 1965 and 18 January 1965. The
name Fatah first appeared in the Israeli press on 15 January 1965 (e.g. in
Haaretz), where it was described as an organization established by the Syrians
under Palestinian cover.
5 Yaari attributes the Fatah’s success and Egypt’s withdrawal in 1966 from its
objections to terrorist activity, to the excessive caution of Israel, which confined
itself to very restricted operations and did not punish Syria. Yaari, Fatah, pp.
65–66. He is expressing the standpoint of the Intelligence Branch and the
General Staff.
6 On the Fatah, its structure and aims and the differences between the Fatah and
the PLO, see Yitzhaki, be-Einei ha-Aravim (In Arab Eyes), pp. 38–56. On the
Fatah from the IDF’s viewpoint and details of its activities, see Rabin Report,
pp. 34–68.
7 The Fatah’s first experience of terrorist activity was the laying of detonation
charges in the National Water Carrier, some 3.5 kilometres west of the Ilabun
tunnel. It did not explode and was discovered on 4 January 1965, several days
after it was laid, by a Border Police unit. Rabin Report, pp. 34–84.
8 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 8 March 1965.
9 Yohai Bin-Nun at General Staff meeting, 19 July 1965.
10 General Staff meeting, 19 July 1965.
284 Notes
11 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 27 June 1965.

12 For details of hostile terrorist activity in this period from Jordan, see Rabin
Report, pp. 86–87.
13 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 6 September 1965. In the course of the opera-
tion, an IDF force dispersed warning leaflets in Arabic: ‘We hope we will not be
forced to visit you with stronger punitive measures. You have been cautioned,
and the cautioner had done his duty.’ Photograph of leaflet in Al Hamishmar, 7
September 1965.
14 Yariv at General Staff meetings, 15 November 1965, 13 December 1965.
15 Rabin pointed this out at General Staff meeting on 31 January 1966. See also
Rabin Report, pp. 85–87.
16 Rabin Report, pp. 88–89.

17 General Staff meeting, 2 May 1966, and debriefing on Operations Joseph and
Alpha, IDF Archive, 192/74/1440.

1 See e.g. Matti Peled’s remarks: ‘Syria is standing in line to get the lesson they
evaded in 1948’. General Staff meeting, 4 October 1965; see also testimony of
Lior on the ‘Syrian syndrome’: E. Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today
War Will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, pp. 95–97.
2 A. Cohen, ha-Hagana al Mekorot ha-Mayim (Defence of the Water Sources),
Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1992, pp. 18–27. Y. Rabin, Pinkes Sherut
(Service Notebook) A, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, pp. 97–98.
3 General Staff meeting, 25 July 1966.
4 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 8 August 1966.
5 General Staff meeting, 8 August 1966.
6 Rabin at General Staff meetings, 8 August 1966 and 15 August 1966.
7 For a detailed description of the incident, including background, maps and
details of the General Staff debriefing, see IDF Archive 1192/74/1390 and
192/74/1387. See also A. Cohen, Defence . . ., pp. 149–156, E. Weizman,
Lekha Shamayim Lekha Aretz (Heaven and Earth are Yours), Tel Aviv:
Maariv, 1975, pp. 252–253.
8 In the course of the incident, the Chief of Staff, the CO Northern Command,
the Chief of Operations Branch and other officers, in civilian clothes or swim-
suits, boarded a boat on the Lake, and were caught in the lens of a Syrian
camera. Years later, the photograph was discovered among documents col-
lected by the IDF on the Golan Heights and appeared in the press about a
month after the Six Day War. See, for example, the front page of Yediot
Aharonot, 10 July 1967.
9 The full story of the acquisition of the Iraqi Mig through the Mossad was
exposed more than thirty-one years later. See U. Dan, ‘1966, the Iraqi Mig
lands in Israel’, Maariv, 20 September 1998. It is given in even greater detail in
a book by the then head of the Mossad, Meir Amit, Rosh be-Rosh (Head On),
Tel Aviv: Hed Artzi, 1999, pp. 179–203.
10 See above, Chapter 5.
11 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 22 August 1966.
12 Weizman at General Staff meeting, 22 August 1966.
13 Ibid.
14 Bamahaneh, 18 September 1966.
15 Y. Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983, p. 160. Peri says that Eshkol contemplated deposing Rabin, but did not
want Weizman as Chief of Staff, and the Ahdut ha-Avoda ministers persuaded
Notes 285
him to refrain from this step. It is hard to believe that Eshkol could have
deposed Rabin, who was highly popular, because of his remarks. Neither the
army nor the public would have accepted it.
16 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 26 September 1966.
17 The text of the statement in handwriting (apparently that of Minister without
PortfolioYisrael Galili) in the IDF Archive, 9/96/54; see also Haber, Today, pp.
146–147.
18 File of meetings with the Chief of Staff, Eshkol Archive.
19 Haber, Today . . ., pp. 104–105.
20 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 10 October 1966.
21 Rabin at the General Staff meeting, 10 October 1966.
22 Ibid.
23 The UN deliberations in October to November are well documented in an
unpublished manuscript by Abba Eban, The Six Day War (ms. 1969), pp. 27–29.
24 The Chief of Intelligence listed some twenty various organizations, the domin-
ant among them being Fatah. He said that the PLO had also begun to establish
underground units, despite Egyptian domination of the organization and the
instruction to avoid entanglement. General Staff meeting, 31 October 1966.
25 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 31October 1966.
26 S. Yitzhaki, be-Einei ha-Aravim (In Arab Eyes), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1969,
pp. 76–81. Full text of pact, ibid., pp. 224–226.
8 Israel–Jordan: the Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian dilemma

1 On the history of relations between Israel and Jordan up to the signing of the
peace treaty, see M. Zak, Hussein Oseh Shalom (Hussein Makes Peace), Ramat
Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1966. See also Y. Melman, Shutafut Oyenet – ha-
Ksharim ha-Sodiim bein Yisrael le-Yarden (Hostile Partnership – the Secret Ties
between Israel and Jordan), Tel Aviv: Metam, 1987.
2 A. Sela, mi-Magaim le-Masa u-Matan: Yakhasei ha-Sokhnut ha-Yehudit im ha-
Melekh Abdullah, 1946–1950 (From Contacts to Negotiations: The Jewish
Agency and King Abdullah, 1946–1950), Tel Aviv University, Shiloah Institute,
1985. A Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1988. S. Golan, Gvul Kham, Milkhama Kara (Hot Border, Cold War),
Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 2000, pp. 111–139.
3 On border problems with Jordan in general and the ‘urban line’ in Jerusalem in
particular, see U. Narkis, Akhat Yerushalayim (Jerusalem is One), Tel Aviv:
Am Oved, 1975, pp. 21–55.
4 For a detailed and interesting description of routine activity on Mount Scopus
up to 1967, see M. Gilat, Har ha-Tzofim (Mount Scopus), Ramat Gan:
Massada, 1969.
5 Narkis, Jerusalem, p. 52.
6 M. Zak, Hussein, pp. 39–44. M. Zak, ‘The change in BG’s attitude to the
Kingdom of Jordan’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), 6
(1996), pp. 85–109.
7 Ibid., pp. 58–66. Melman, Hostile Partnership, pp. 56–60. In a private conver-
sation with the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim in 1996, Hussein described and
detailed all the secret meetings from 1963 on with Israelis. A. Shlaim, ‘Hussein
without censorship’, Yediot Aharonot, 6 April 1999.
8 M. Amit, Rosh be-Rosh (Head On), Tel Aviv: Hed Artzi, 1999, pp. 80–82. The
participation of the Chief of Intelligence is mentioned in the summary of the
weekly meeting of the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence on 4 June
1965. File of meetings with the Chief of Staff, Eshkol Archives.
286 Notes
9 Hussein did not forgive Israel for its ‘treachery’ at Samu. Melman, Hostile
Partnership, pp. 61–62. On Samu and the rift with Hussein, see Zak, Hussein,
pp. 83–102. For Hussein’s version of Samu, see E. Kam (ed.) Hussein Poteah
be-Milkhama (Hussein Starts a War), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1974, pp. 37–41.
10 See S. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987, pp. 54–55, 77–78.
11 Narkis, Jerusalem, pp. 21–42. For details of the incidents and raids through the
period in all sectors, see Rabin Report, pp. 47–64, 83–94.
12 Armistice Commission files, IDF Archive, 758/67/65, 758/67/66, 103/67/32,
103/67/40, 9/69/58.
13 General Staff meeting, 4 October 1965.
14 Debriefing on incident, IDF Archive, 9/69/54.

15 A detailed description of the operation and debriefing in the IDF Archive,
192/74/1401, 192/74/1398, 192/74/1410, 9/69/47.
16 See Shemesh, ‘After the Samu raid: nationalist renaissance on the West Bank
and a change in Hussein’s attitude towards Israel and the West Bank’, Iyunim
bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), 10 (2000), pp. 123–164.
17 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 14 November 1966.
18 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 14 November 1966.
19 IDF Archives, 192/74/1401.
20 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 5 December 1966. On the ‘Stratum’ affair see
IDF Archive, 192/74/1415.
21 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 21 November 1966. US President Lyndon
Johnson felt it necessary to dispatch an appeasing message to Hussein on 23
November 1966. See text in Zak, Hussein, p. 57. Washington’s concern for the
stability of Hussein’s regime led to the dispatch of urgent military aid to Jordan
and anger at Israel which was not easily dispelled. Letter from Israeli Minister
in Washington E. Evron to the Deputy Director General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Moshe Bitan on ‘The Pentagon and its attitude to Israel’, 2
January 1967, IDF Archive, 117/701114.
22 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 5 December 1966.
23 Ibid.
24 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 388.
25 General Staff meetings, 13 February 1967, 20 February 1967.
26 Weizman at General Staff meeting, 12 December 1966.
27 Moshe Dayan used this contemptuous term to denote the PLO at the onset of
its activities. Eshkol reminded him of this at a meeting of the Knesset Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee on 17 May 1967. Minutes of meeting, Eshkol
Archive.
28 General Staff meeting, 12 December 1966.

1 Suidani at a briefing for Egyptian journalists in April 1967. E. Yaari, Fatah, Tel
Aviv: Lewin Epstein, p. 78. On the alliance between Suidani and the Fatah,
ibid., pp. 39–40.
2 P. Seale, Assad, p. 137.
3 On the deliberations of the Committee against the background of events along
the Syrian border in January 1967, see A. Cohen, ha-Hagana al Mekorot ha-
Mayim (Defence of Water Sources), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1992, pp.
158–162.
4 General Staff meeting with the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 23
January 1967.
Notes 287
5 Between the end of January and beginning of April 1967 there were ten terror
incidents. For details of terror activity from 1 January 1964 to 15 May 1967
see Rabin Report, pp. 83–94.
6 The talks were held, as noted above, on Syrian initiative, but formally speaking,
the two sides responded to a missive sent on 15 January 1967 by the UN
Secretary-General, IDF Archive, 117/70/114.
7 Moshe Sasson in conversation with the author, 28 July 1997.
8 A summary of the meetings between the Syrian and Israeli delegations appeared
in the Weekly Letter No. 82 of the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on 5 February 1967, IDF Archive, 117/70/114. See also O. Bull, War
and Peace in the Middle East, London: Leo Cooper, 1973, pp. 101–103.
9 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 13 February 1967.

10 Conflagration
1 The prepared text of Eshkol’s speech in the speeches file, Eshkol Archive. Inter-
view with Mrs Eshkol, Yediot Aharonot, 23 October 1998; see also E. Haber,
Ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim,
1988, pp. 133. See Ze’evi’s testimony, M. Sheshar, Sikhot im Rehavam
‘Gandhi’ Zeevi (Talks with Rehavam ‘Gandhi’ Zeevi), Tel Aviv: Yediot
Aharonot, 1992, p. 167.
3 General Staff meeting, 13 March 1967. In the March 1967 activity report of
the Head of Public Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, P. Eliav listed
the lectures and symposia organized by the Ministry throughout the country.
The ‘routine’ question asked was: ‘When will the IDF act against the Syrians?’
IDF Archive, 117/70/114.
4 General Staff meeting, 3 April 1967, IDF Archive, 117/70/114.
5 Minutes of Eshkol-Rabin conversation, 1 April 1967, file of meetings with the
Chief of Staff, Eshkol Archive.
6 Reference is to three plots which were not considered to be particularly prob-
lematical, but the Syrians were in the habit of firing on Israeli workers in the
demilitarized zones at that time, in reaction to Israeli buffer fire. See also A.
Cohen, ha-Hagana al Mekorot ha-Mayim (Defence of the Water Sources), Tel
Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1992, p. 163.
7 Ibid. See Haber, Today, p. 142.
8 A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 164–165. Haber, Today, p. 143. General Staff meeting,
10 April 1967.
9 A. Cohen, ibid.
10 For a full description of the events of 7 April 1967, and particularly the role of
the IAF, see A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 163–180.
11 A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 166, 175.
12 Ibid., p. 173.
13 A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 178–179.
14 Testimony of Brigadier-General Hod, IDF Archive, 192/74/1156.
15 A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 164–165. See also remarks of the Head of the Air
Department, Colonel Menahem Bar, at the debriefing, ibid., p. 175.
16 At the press conference summing up the events of 7 April, the Chief of Staff
said that he had ordered the CO IAF not to restrict his pilots from advancing to
Damascus if the circumstances dictated this. Maariv, 9 April 1967, but there is
no confirmation for such an order, and Rabin was apparently merely providing
Hod with backing in hindsight.
288 Notes
17 What is more, as a gesture to the IAF for its performance on 7 April, Hod’s
promotion to the rank of Brigadier-General was brought forward to 10 April.
General Staff meeting, 10 April 1967. Haaretz, 11 April 1967. Bamahaneh, 19
April 1967.
18 General Staff meeting, 10 April 1967.
19 Rabin commented on fears expressed by several ministers: ‘There are several
Jews here [i.e. ministers] who think they understand the Americans. The Ameri-
cans are not going to say to us: “Go get them!” but when we do get [the
Syrians] – they’re delighted, even if they don’t say so.’ Rabin at General Staff
meeting, 10 April 1967.
20 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 10 April 1967.

22 Weizman, Lekha Shamayim Lekha Aretz (Heaven and Earth are Yours), Tel
Aviv: Maariv, 1975, p. 254.
23 A. Cohen, Defence, pp. 178–179.
24 Carmon at General Staff meeting, 24 April 1967. He could not say whether an
attack on Kuneitra or on Syrian airfields would be considered a ‘total
onslaught’ requiring Egyptian intervention, but his remarks indicate what type
of action was being contemplated.
25 Ibid. The complacency in Israel where an Egyptian reaction was concerned was
in line with the Intelligence Branch assessment, and was reflected in newspaper
headlines. The main headline in Haaretz on 14 April 1967, for example,
announced that the Egyptian delegation had informed Damascus that Egypt
would not launch a ‘second front’ because of the war in Yemen.
26 There were fourteen terrorist incidents between 7 April and 9 May from
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, IDF Archive, 117/70/64.
27 M. Brecher and B. Geist, Decisions in Crisis, Berkeley: University of California
Press 1980, p. 36. On the other hand, on 9 May Eshkol declared in the Knesset
that he could not say how the government intended to deal with the situation
because the matter had not yet been discussed. Minutes of Foreign Affairs and
Security Committee, 9 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
28 Letter from Odd Bull to the Head of the Armistice Commissions Department of
the Foreign Ministry, Moshe Sasson, 4 May 1967, IDF Archive, 117/70/85.
29 Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Minutes, 9 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
30 As early as October 1966 Dayan stated in the Knesset that there was no need to
get excited about ‘a few dozen bandits’ of the Fatah. Quoted in A. Eban, The
Six Day War (manuscript, 1969), p. 25. When the crisis erupted, Eshkol
mocked Dayan: ‘There was a time, not so long ago, when Knesset Member
Dayan said that it was a matter of a few bandits so why were we making a big
deal of it? But it developed and grew.’ Foreign Affairs and Security Committee
Minutes, 17 May 1967.
31 Ibid.
11 The trigger
1 For a description of the Six Day War as the fruit of prior Israeli planning, see
e.g. A. Nutting, Nasser, London: Constable, 1972, pp. 383–424; also M.
Abdel-Kader Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause, London: Longman, pp.
223–230; H. Cattan, Palestine and International Law, London: Longman,
1974, pp. 126–135. On the theory of an Israeli–US conspiracy, see N.H.
Heikal, Ha-sphinx veha-Commissar (The Sphinx and the Commissar), Tel
Aviv: Am Oved, 1981 (in particular pp. 172–189). For a description of the war
as the product of a conspiracy between the Israeli military establishment and
Notes 289
the US administration, against the will of the Israeli government, see Yitzhak
Laor, ‘Creating Corpses’, Kol Ha-Ir, 30 September 1994. A conspiracy between
the Mossad and the CIA is postulated by A. and L. Cockburn, Dangerous
Liaison: The Inside Story of a US–Israeli Covert Relationship, New York:
HarperCollins, 1991, pp. 125–154. The Soviet conspiracy is cited in Abd al-
Rahman Rahmi, The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World, Washington, DC:
University Press of America, 1983, pp. 232–235. A more developed theory of a
Soviet conspiracy against the background of power struggles in the Kremlin is
presented by A. Ben-Zvi, Gormim Sovietiim u-Milkhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim
(Soviet Elements and the Six Day War), Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Hapoalim. A brilliant
satirical description of the war as the outcome of a sophisticated Israeli conspir-
acy appeared during the war in a column by Ephraim Kishon, ‘Had Gadya’,
Maariv, 8 June 1967.
2 A developed ‘nuclear theory’ is presented by Aronson in Neshek garini ba-
mizrakh ha-tikhon (Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East), Jerusalem: Akade-
mon, 1995, in particular Vol. 2, pp. 13–166, and S. Aronson, Israel’s Nuclear
Programme: The Six Day War and its Ramifications, London: Kings College,
1998.
3 The testimony and discussions were published in an illuminating book. See R.
Parker (ed.) The Six Day War – A Retrospective, Gainesville: University Press
of Florida, 1996.
4 See, in particular, R. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 3–122.
5 In both of his above-cited books, Parker made a serious attempt to clarify the
Soviet role. See also A. Ben-Zvi, Gormim Sovietiim u-Milkhemet Sheshet ha-
Yamim (Soviet Factors and the Six Day War), Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Hapoalim,
1976.
6 On the open and clandestine ties between Israel and Iran over the years see S.
Segev, The Iranian Triangle, New York: Free Press, 1988. Meir Ezri, ‘Who is
There Among You of His People’, Or Yehuda: Hed Artzi, 2000; U. Bialer, ‘Oil
from Iran – Zvi Duriel’s mission in Teheran 1956–1963’, Iyunim bi-Tkumat
Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), Vol. 8, pp. 150–180 and Vol. 9, pp.
128–168. Y. Nimrodi, Masa Khayei (My Life’s Journey), Tel Aviv: Maariv,
2003, pp. 308–311.
7 Segev, Iranian Triangle, pp. 27–69. S. Segev, ha-Kesher ha-Irani (The Iranian
Connection), Jerusalem: Domino 1989, pp. 70–71.
8 The details below are from the Chief of Staff’s report of his visit to Iran.
General Staff meeting, 24 April 1967, and cf. Y. Nimrodi, My Life’s Journey,
pp. 308–311; Segev, Iranian Triangle, pp. 68–69.
9 He was speaking at a discussion on Intelligence evaluations, General Staff
meeting, 21 February 1963.
10 This was the view expressed by Minister Eliyahu Sasson at a government
meeting on 21 May 1967.
11 On the riots in Syria in the wake of the article and its attribution to the CIA,
see W. Laqueur, The Road to the 1967 War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1968, p. 77.
12 On the Soviet reaction to the 7 April events, see Y. Govrin, Yakhasei
Yisrael–Brit ha-Moatzot 1953–1969 (Israel–Soviet Relations, 1953–1969),
Jerusalem: Magnes, 1990, pp. 252–257.
13 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 3 April 1967. See also Heikal, ha-Sphinx veha-
Commissar (The Sphinx and the Commissar), pp. 168–169.
14 Yariv at General Staff meeting, 24 April 1967.
290 Notes
16 D. Kimche and D.Bavli, Sufat ha-Esh (The Storm of Fire), Tel Aviv: Am
Hasefer, 1968, p. 43. A. Yariv, ‘The background to war’, Dapei Elazar (Notes
on Elazar), 10, Tel Aviv: 1988, pp. 15–23.
17 At the height of the alert after 7 April the IDF reinforced the line with two tank
companies and all in all there were some seventy tanks on the line. When the
situation calmed down on the eve of Passover the force was reduced. Weizman
at General Staff meeting, 24 April 1967. Yariv at General Staff meeting, 17
May 1967.
18 On 25 April the Communist Party Secretary-General Brezhnev demanded the
withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. Eban, Six Day War (ms.
1969), p. 32.
19 M.A. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamim (Six Years Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am
Oved, 1968, pp. 94–95. See also n. 13 above.
20 See e.g. headline in Lamerhav, 9 May 1967.
21 See headlines of Israeli press on 12 May 1967. In the wake of Arab protests, U
Thant issued a clarification on 13 May whose intention was not to sanction
Israeli use of force. Gilboa, Six Years, pp. 97–98.
22 From April to mid-May 1967 there were sixteen terror incidents, including two
skirmishes with armed infiltrators. Rabin Report, pp. 91–94.
23 Al Hamishmar, 14 May 1967. Gilboa, Six Days, pp. 99–100.
24 Rabin’s remarks at the press conference, Maariv, 9 April 1967. Eshkol’s
remarks in the Knesset, Maariv, 10 April 1967.
25 Abba Eban wrote in his memoirs: ‘If there had been a little more silence, the
sum of human wisdom would probably have remained intact.’ A. Eban, An
Autobiography, New York: Random House, 1977, p. 319.
26 Haaretz, 14 May 1967.
27 Davar, 12 May 1967.
28 Al Hamishmar, 14 May 1967.
29 See e.g. headlines in Lamerhav, Haaretz and Jerusalem Post, 12 May 1967.
30 Maariv and Lamerhav, 14 May 1967.
31 Lamerhav, 14 May 1967, and compare Bamahaneh, 18 September 1966 and
see above, Chapter 7.
32 The text of the UPI report of 12 May 1967 appears in Middle East Journal,
Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 174. The quotation is from the recording in J. Cooley, Green
March, Black September, London: Frank Cass, 1973, p. 160. See also Middle
East Record, Vol. 3, p. 187. On 13 May 1967 the New York Times published a
front-page report, taken from Yariv’s briefing, under the heading ‘Israelis
ponder blow at Syrians’.
33 Mahmoud Riad, Egyptian Foreign Minister in 1967, cites an ostensibly direct
quote from Rabin’s remarks on 12 May. ‘We will conduct a swift operation
against Syria and conquer Damascus. We will topple the regime there and
return.’ M. Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, London: Quartet
Books, 1981, p. 17. Nasser made this claim in his 22 May speech when he
announced the blocking of the Tiran Straits (see below). In 1968 as well Nasser
explained his moves by saying: ‘Eshkol said: We will go to Damascus. Rabin
said: We will go to Damascus, and Egypt had to fulfil its obligation.’ S. Segev,
Milkhama ve-Shalom ba-Mizrakh ha-Tikhon (War and Peace in the Middle
East), Tel Aviv: Tversky, 1968, p. 70.
34 For a thorough investigation of the information the Soviets conveyed to Egypt,
including the various theoretical motives on the basis of existing literature and
interviews with those involved, see Parker, Miscalculation, pp. 3–35.
35 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
36 See above, Chapter 7. In his memoirs Eban expressed veiled criticism of Rabin.
Notes 291
Eban, Pirkei Khayim (Chapters of a Life), B, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978, p. 314.
M. Bar-Zohar, ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The Longest Month), Tel Aviv:
Lewin Epstein, 1968, p. 19.
37 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
38 On the threats as a trigger for the crisis, see also S. Shamir, ‘The origin of the
May 1967 escalation: the claim of the Israeli threat’ in A. Sassar (ed.) Shisha
Yamim – Shloshim Shana (Six Days – Thirty Years), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999,
pp. 56–75.
39 Rabin at General Staff meetings, 18 March 1965 and 15 March 1965.
40 Nevertheless, several foreign guests did attend the parade including the Deputy
President of Malagash, the Chiefs of Staff of Chile and Liberia, General Pierre
Koenig and others. Davar, 16 May 1967. On international objections to

holding the parade in Jerusalem and the discussion at the Israel–Jordan
Armistic Commission, see Odd Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East,
London: Leo Cooper, 1973, pp. 105–106, and J. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder,
London: Frank Cass, 1980, pp. 12–13. On deliberations of the US administra-
tion on whether the US Ambassador Walworth Barbour should attend the
parade since Britain and France had decided not to send their ambassadors, see
FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 5.
41 Yediot Aharonot, 9 May 1967, and see in particular letter of Ben-Gurion to
Davar, 17 May 1967. The editors commented that even Ben-Gurion’s colleague
in Rafi, Moshe Dayan, did not concur with the criticism.
42 On the parade affair and the Alterman poem see U. Narkis, Akhat Yerusha-
layim (Jerusalem is One), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1976, pp. 14–20; see also Haber,
ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim,
1988, pp. 145–148.
43 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 5.
44 Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), A, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, p. 134.
Vague information was conveyed to the Chief of Staff prior to this, on the night
of 14/15 May. Ibid.

1 Meir Amit, head of the Mossad (1963–1968), lists among the negative results
of the Sinai Campaign ‘a fathomless crisis with Egypt’. Amit, Rosh be-Rosh
(Head On), Tel Aviv: Hed Artzi, 1999, p. 79.
2 Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, C, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1975, pp. 1526–1529.
3 Amit, Head On, pp. 204–228. For an opposing view see Y. Karoz, ha-Ish Baal
Shnei ha-Kovaim (The Man with Two Hats), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence,
2002, pp. 184–186. For the Minutes of a meeting with the head of the Mossad
on this issue see Z. Shalom, ‘A missed opportunity’, ha-Tziyonut (Zionism), 22
(2001), pp. 321–353.
4 On the Rotem affair see Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), A, pp.
106–108 and Z. Tzahor, ‘It all depends on the Air Force: the Rotem affair, Feb-
ruary 1960’, in Z. Lakhish and M. Amitai (eds) Asor lo Shaket (An Unquiet
Decade), Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1995, pp. 225–248. See also steno-
graphic minutes of a discussion at the Dayan Centre (16 December 1987) on
the Rotem affair of 1960 as a stage on the way to the May 1967 crisis, Dayan
Centre library, Tel Aviv University, and U. Bar-Joseph, ‘Rotem: the forgotten
crisis on the road to the 1967 war’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1996,
Vol. 31 (3), pp. 547–566.
5 Amer’s scheme was known to the General Staff at the beginning of December
1966. Rabin at a study day on ‘The waiting period’ held at Yad Tabenkin, Efal,
292 Notes
on 4 September 1989. See also S. Yitzhaki, be-Einei ha-Aravim (In Arab Eyes),
Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 196, p. 95.
6 Rabin, Service Notebook, A, pp. 134–135.
7 This was in accordance with the security doctrine. See Y. Tal, Bitakhon Leumi
(National Security), Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996, pp. 85–88.
8 IDF History Department (classified internal research) Supreme Command Post,
p. 183. Testimony of Rabin’s bureau chief Col. Rafi Efrat on the events of 16
May 1967.
9 Eshkol at government meeting, 16 May 1967. Compare ‘The main Intelligence
evaluations’ for this period, IDF History Department (classified internal
research), ha-Oyev, ha-Um veha-Maatzamot (The Enemy, the UN and the
Powers), B, pp. 12–13.

10 Eban at government meeting, 16 May 1967.
11 Aran and Eshkol, ibid. Between 8 and 12 May, Fatah’s terror acts included
mining of roads in the Galilee, firing on a bus on the main road to Jerusalem,
and a mine laid near Kibbutz Amatzia.
12 On the evacuation of the UNEF force, see I.J. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, New
Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1978, pp. 14–22. For a serious attempt to clarify the
background and the Egyptian intentions behind the demand for evacuation, see
R. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 63–71. See also U Thant’s report to the
Security Council, 27 May. Cited in Laqueur, pp. 253–281.
13 Rabin’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1168.
14 Dayan at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 17 May 1967. See
summary of Eshkol–Bunche meeting (6 July 1966) and a document on ‘Israel’s
position on UNEF’, IDF Archive, 9/96/57.
15 Eshkol at Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 17 May 1967.
16 Knesset members at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 17 May 1967.
17 Eshkol at Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, 17 May 1967.
18 Foreign Minister’s briefing of political correspondents, 17 May 1967, IDF
Archive, 117/70/114.
19 Regular television broadcasts were introduced in Israel only in 1968.
20 Testimony of Efrat on events of 17 May 1967. See also Khel ha-Avir be-
Milkhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim (The Air Force in the Six Day War), Air Force
Command (classified internal research), pp. 117–119.
21 Efrat’s testimony on events of 17 May 1967.
22 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, p. 193.
23 Ibid., p. 195.
24 Ibid.
25 Efrat’s testimony on events of 18 May 1967. Rabin’s report at the government
meeting, 21 May 1967. I.J. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, New Delhi: Oxford and
IBH, 1978, pp. 30–35.
26 Efrat’s testimony on events of 18 May 1967.

1 From the outset, the goal of Israeli diplomacy was to avert war and not to
prepare the diplomatic conditions for a military operation. See Y. Ben-Meir,
Civil–Military Relations in Israel, New York: Columbia, 1995, p. 93.
2 The expression ‘noble steeds’ applied to senior officers eager for battle was
coined by Moshe Dayan. Yoman Maarekhet Sinai (Sinai Campaign Diary), Tel
Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1965, p. 85.
3 A detailed and well-documented description of the crisis and of Israel’s decision-
Notes 293
making from Eban’s viewpoint, with emphasis on the political and diplomatic
echelon, appears in the ms. of his book, Abba Eban, The Six Day War, 1969.
The ms. which I received thanks to Dr Benjamin Geist, comprises more than 500
pages, including numerous documents. The book was never published and part
of it was integrated into Eban’s autobiography, Pirkei Hayim (Chapters in a
Life), B, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978. Important studies in this sphere include M.
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, Berkeley: University of California, 1980; B. Geist,
‘The Six Day War – a study in the setting and the process of foreign policy
decision making under crisis conditions’ (Dissertation), Jerusalem: The Hebrew
University, 1974. J. Gross Stein and R. Tanter, Rational Decision-making:
Israel’s Security Choices 1967, Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1980. Y. Bar-
Simantov, Israel, the Superpowers and the War in the Middle East, New York:
Praeger, 1987, pp. 85–145. See also Bar-Zohar, ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter
(The Longest Month), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1968.
4 On this see in particular D. Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, New York: Linden
Press, 1984; R. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993 and W.B. Quandt, Peace Process,
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1993. See also FRUS, 1964–1968, Vols
18 and 19.
5 On the worsening of relations between Nasser and Johnson, see Parker, Miscal-
culation, pp. 225–249 and Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 99–122. On the
Soviet definition of Lyndon Johnson as a dangerous man capable of becoming
involved in adventures, see Heikal, ha-Sphinx veha-Commissar (The Sphinx
and the Commissar), p. 29 and see pp. 167, 154 and 172. On US–Egypt con-
tacts see FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 18, Doc. 20, 96–98, 110–111, 115, 125–132,
193–198, 217, 378, 390, 412, 417.
6 The evidence from various sources on aggressive Egyptian intentions is
resounding. There were apparently orders for a surprise Egyptian attack on 27
May which were cancelled at the last moment, probably because of the US
warning. One of the sources of evidence is the Egyptian Chief of Staff General
Fawzi. See Quandt, Peace Process, p. 512, n. 38, and M. Oren, Six Days of
War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 92–97, 119–121.
7 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 8.
8 For a description of the evolvement of Johnson’s stand from ‘red light’ to
‘yellow light’ during the crisis see W. Quandt, ‘Lyndon Johnson and the June
1967 war: what colour was the light?’, Middle East Journal, 46(2) (spring
1992), pp. 198–228.
9 Eshkol letter to Johnson, 18 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
10 The ‘editors’ committee’ was a closed, select forum, which consisted of editors
of newspapers and radio networks (TV broadcasts began only in 1968). In July
1966 an agreement was signed between the Chief of Staff and the committee,
which replaced a previous agreement from 1951. See M. Zak, ‘The censor and
the press in five wars’, Kesher, 13 May 1993, pp. 5–20. On the Six Day War,
ibid., pp. 12–13.
11 Eshkol to editors’ committee, 18 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
12 Report of Foreign Ministry to legations, 19 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
13 P. Seale, Assad, Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1994, p. 137. See also Quandt, Peace
Process, pp. 28–30, and Mutawi, p. 94.
14 Eban at General Staff meeting, 21 May 1967. Perusal of the press at the time
reveals that the editors did in fact cooperate. Only on 22 May was a brief item
published, quoting Radio Cairo, on Israel’s communications to the Western
Powers, informing them that it would resort to military force if Egypt blocked
the Straits of Tiran. Yediot Aharonot, 22 May 1967.
294 Notes
15 Eban at Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967. On the quiet diplo-

matic campaign warning against the possibility of blocking of the Straits, see
Eban, Six Day War, pp. 63–69.
16 Cable from Eban to Harman and Raphael, 20 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
17 Cable from Eban to Raphael, 21 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
18 In a conversation with US Ambassador Barbour and emissary McPherson when
war broke out, the head of the Mossad, Meir Amit, mentioned this message
conveyed to Nasser before the blocking of the Straits. Cable from Bitan to
Harman, Evron and Raphael, 5 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
19 On the US commitments on freedom of shipping given to Israel in return for
consent to full withdrawal from all territory conquered during the Sinai Cam-
paign, and Foreign Minister Golda Meir’s pronouncements on this issue at the
UN on 1 March 1957, see Bar On, Gates of Gaza, pp. 352–368; see also G.
Meir, Khayai (My Life), Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1975, pp. 218–225.
20 Eban at Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967.
21 Quandt believes that the administration in Washington could have warned
Nasser more firmly against closing the Straits, but adopted an over-cautious
approach both on freedom of shipping and on commitment to Israel’s security.
Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 28–30.
22 The Foreign Minister cabled the Ambassador in Washington in response to his
report: ‘We must protest vehemently against the comment of [Assistant Secret-
ary of State Lucius] Battle that the time is not right for expedition of the supply
of the agreed security needs’, and emphasized that this could be ‘psychologi-
cally and politically destructive’. Eban to Harman and Raphael, 20 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive.
23 Ambassador Barbour pleaded with Israel not to rule out the principle of the
presence of a ‘symbolic part’ of the UN force on Israeli soil. Bitan to Harman,
22 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
24 Eshkol and Eban at the Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967. At
the time the US administration approved a ‘package’ of economic and security
aid requested by Israel, which included one hundred armoured cars, considerate
credit for the purchase of Patton tanks and Hawk missiles, spare parts for tanks
and supply of surplus foodstuffs. Cables from Evron to the Foreign Ministry,
21 May 1967 and 23 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
25 Bitan to Harman, 21 May 1967, Eshkol Archive. The sensitivity of the adminis-
tration on this issue is attested to by an appeal by Rostow on behalf of the
President to Jewish associates to do everything in order to moderate public
opinion in the US. Evron to the Ministry, 22 May 1967, Eshkol Archive. On
the Jewish impact on Johnson see H. Saunders, ‘The White House, US Jewry
and the Six Day War’ in A. Sheshar (ed.) Shisha Yamim – Shloshim Shana (Six
Days – Thirty Years), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999, pp. 137–142.
26 Eban at Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
27 After the Sinai Campaign Israel revoked unilaterally the armistice agreement
with Egypt. See M. Bar-On, Shaarei Aza (The Gates of Gaza), Tel Aviv: Am
Oved, 1992, p. 318. Ben-Gurion, Yihud ve-Yeud (Singularity and Mission), Tel
Aviv: Maarakhot, 1971, pp. 269–270.
28 Minutes of the meeting reveal that Eshkol did not read out this prepared
summary, Eshkol Archive.
29 In addition to the Egyptian reconnaissance sortie over Dimona on 17 May,
mentioned above, a more daring photography flight was carried out on 26 May
(see below).
30 Interview with Azaryahu Arnan, Galili’s aide, 12 August 1998.
31 See also statement by Rabin (Chapter 2 above): ‘There is an object in the south
Notes 295
of the country, the ideal object for limited reaction [on the part of Egypt] for
which it would receive the total support of the whole world.’
32 The Minister of Transport Moshe Carmel, who was also not a champion of
Dimona, was more anxious at the prospect of the bombing of airfields. See his
remarks at the Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967.
33 There is no indication that Israel took any clandestine action to warn Egypt
against attacking the reactor. See also A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New
York: Columbia Press, 1998, pp. 259–276.
34 Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967.
35 Eban at General Staff meeting, 21 May 1967.
36 Haaretz, 22 May 1967.
37 Ministerial Committee on Security, 21 May 1967.

38 Ibid.
39 On the discussion in the Knesset and Ben-Gurion’s attempt, which failed, to
transfer the discussion to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, see S.
Nakdimon, li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor,
1968, pp. 31–40.
14 The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift to

Intelligence planning
1 Testimony of Efrat, on 19 May 1967.
2 This was the last General Staff discussion in the customary form in the confer-
ence room of the General Staff. Immediately afterwards the bureaux of the
Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations and Chief of Intelligence moved to the
supreme command post (‘the Pit’).
4 For details see IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, pp.
201–206.
6 The comparison which naturally comes to mind is the conduct of Intelligence
Chief Brigadier General Eli Zeira in October 1973. Zeira refused to modify his
evaluation that Egypt and Syria would not start a war despite overwhelming
information to the contrary.
7 Rabin at General Staff meeting, 19 May 1967.
8 Efrat’s testimony on 19 May 1967.
9 For details see IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, pp. 215,
209.
10 Ben-Gurion Diaries, 22 May 1967.
11 Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), A, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, pp.
144–145.
12 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 217 (according to tes-
timony of Deputy Chief of Staff Southern Command, Aryeh Shahar).
13 Hofi lectured to the Staff College on 28 July 1971 on ‘The operational plans
which preceded the Six Day War’, IDF Archive, 192/74/981.
14 For Kilshon, including maps and assignment of forces and tasks, see IDF
History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 12–128.
15 For a description of the logistic problems of Pitchfork see remarks of
representative of the Quartermaster Branch in a discussion with the Chief of the
Operations Department on 20 May 1967, IDF History Department, Supreme
Command Post, A, pp. 219–239.
16 For the main points of the plan presented by Hofi to Weizman see IDF History
Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 219.
296 Notes
17 Allon’s notes on submission of the plans, IDF History Department Archive, 20

May 1967.
18 Testimony of Tal, IDF Archive, 192/74/405.
19 Testimonies of Gavish, IDF Archive, 192/74/998 and of Sharon, IDF Archive,
192/74/1038 and 192/74/205.
20 Dayan, Avnei Derekh (Milestones), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1977, p. 402.
15 Casus belli
1 For the full text of Nasser’s speech see W. Laqueur, The Road to War 1967,
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968, pp. 288–293.
2 For Nasser’s version of the Sinai Campaign in 1956 see his article in the Egypt-
ian Gazette, 6 December 1956, translated and edited by M. Shemesh, Iyunim
bi-Tkumat Yisrael (Israel Independence Studies), 4 (1994), pp. 98–116.
3 For Lior’s version of events see Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War
Will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, pp. 163–165.
4 Press headlines reflect the atmosphere. See e.g. Maariv, 23 May 1967. The
immediate mobilization of reserves intensified the atmosphere of emergency.
5 Testimony of Efrat for 23 May 1967. See also IDF History Department,
Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 240–241 and note on page 241.
6 That same day Johnson issued a statement denouncing the blocking of the
Straits and supporting freedom of shipping, and Eugene Rostov met with
Harman and Evron and informed them that the US had approved an ‘aid
package’ requested by Israel including, among other things, one hundred
armoured cars, spare parts for tanks, and considerable credit (US$214 million)
for purchase of Patton tanks and Hawk missiles, surplus foodstuffs and so on.
Cables of Ambassador and Minister in Washington, 23 May 1967, IDF
Archive.
7 The summary of Rabin’s remarks according to the diary of Efrat, his bureau
chief, for 23 May 1967.
8 Ibid. According to Lior, Rabin predicted ‘tremendous damage’ to the northern
settlements since Israel had no immediate response to offer to Syrian artillery.
Lior’s summary, Eshkol Archive.
9 An oil-tanker from Iran, bearing the Liberian flag, was due at Eilat on 29 May.
It changed its destination.
10 Lior’s summary ‘Consultations in Supreme Command Post’, 23 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive. Efrat wrote in his diary that he had gained the impression that
the Prime Minister had not yet decided whether to take action. Efrat’s testi-
mony for 23 May 1967. See also Haber, pp. 163–165.
11 This is evident in the Minutes of the meeting of the Ministerial Committee on
Security, 23 May 1967. For a detailed description of the meeting by Lior, see
Haber, Today, pp. 165–170 and cf. M. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamim
(Six Years Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1968, pp. 128–129.
12 Several of the participants in the meetings proposed sending a non-official
figure to the US, for example, Golda Meir, former Foreign Minister. Eban
threatened to resign and the proposal was rejected. Rabin, Service Notebook,
A, p. 155.
13 Minutes of meeting with representatives of the opposition, 23 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive.
14 Testimony of Efrat for 23 May 1967.
15 Ibid. Efrat commented: ‘The Chief of Operations exerted more pressure than
the Chief of Staff’.
16 Ibid. Rabin was voicing his doubts as to the ability of the IAF to achieve superi-
Notes 297
ority in the air rapidly. The government’s fears at the prospect of bombarding
of settlements in the north are also reflected in his remarks.
17 Haber, Today, p. 173.
18 Efrat’s testimony for 23 May 1967.
19 S. Nakdimon, li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor,
1968, pp. 56–57.

1 The IDF pressure was expressed, inter alia, in a briefing for military correspon-
dents. See e.g. Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 24 May 1967: ‘It’s not the British who will
break the blockade for us nor the Sixth Fleet. The blockade is like a rotten
tooth to be extracted, otherwise the whole body will be affected.’
3 Weizman’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1157. Testimony of Gavish, IDF
Archive, 192/74/998.
4 ‘Summary of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Chief of
Operations’, 24 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
5 Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv:
Idanim, 1988, pp. 174–175.
6 Barlev, who had spent the day – the first since his return from Paris the previ-
ous evening – studying the IDF plans, expressed his support for Kardom 2 as
presented by Weizman. After the presentation to Eshkol, Barlev visited Rabin,
briefed him and reassured him. Barlev’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1232.
8 This transpires from Weizman’s order to move forces that night. See also
Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, A, p. 160.
9 Haber, Today War will Break Out, pp. 175–176.
10 On details of movements see testimonies of Gavish and Tal, IDF Archive,
192/74/998 and 192/74/974.
11 Sharon’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1038. Testimony of Gavish, IDF
Archive, 192/74/998.
12 Testimony of Barlev, IDF Archive, 192/74/1232. See also Weizman, Heaven
and Earth are Yours, pp. 262–263.
13 Rabin, Service Notebook, A, p. 152.
14 Rabin, Service Notebook, A, p. 159. Weizman, Heaven and Earth, pp.
258–259. Haber, Today, pp. 174–175.
15 Argov to Bitan, 24 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
16 Argov to the Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1967, Eshkol Archive. Barbour’s
response suggests that he understood from Argov that the army was liable to
act on its own initiative.
17 The Commander of the IAF, Motti Hod, claims that it was clear to him and to
most of the General Staff that the pressure exerted by the IDF commanders
‘doesn’t reach the political echelon the way we phrase it but through Yitzhak
Rabin and it sounds different when coming from him’, IDF Archive,
192/74/1156.
19 On the content of the discussion see Rabin, Service Notebook, A, p. 161.
20 Testimony of Efrat for 25 May 1967. Summary of the meeting by Lior, Eshkol
Archive.
21 Summary of the meeting by Lior, Eshkol Archive.
22 The Egyptian Minister of War, Shams Badran, left for Moscow on 24 May for
298 Notes
two days with the aim of military coordination and supply. Heikal, ha-Sphinx
veha-Commissar (The Sphinx and the Commissar), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1981,
pp. 27, 178–180.
23 The text of the cables sent on 25 May to the Foreign Minister is cited in Yariv’s
testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1323.
24 On the Eban–de Gaulle meeting on 24 May in the Elysee Palace see, for details,
Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamin (Six Years Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am Oved,
1968, pp. 136–141 and Eban, Pirkei Khayim (Chapters in a Life), B, Tel Aviv:
Maariv, 1978, pp. 337–340. Bar-Zohar, ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The
Longest Month), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1968, pp. 101–107.
25 On the views for and against Eban’s trip see Gilboa, Six Years, pp. 130–132
and Nakdimon, li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv:
Ramdor, 1968, pp. 57–58, 61–62.
26 Eban, Chapters in a Life, B, pp. 344–349, makes critical mention of the cables.
See also Rabin, Service Notebook, A, pp. 161–165.
27 Weizman noted that on his return on 25 May, Rabin ‘was different to what he
had been in the past’. Weizman, Heaven and Earth, p. 262.
28 Efrat’s testimony for 25 May 1967.
29 M. Oren, Six Days of War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.
119–121. See also W. Quandt, Peace Process, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institute, 1993, p. 512, fn. 38.
30 A summary of the meeting of the Chief of Staff, Chiefs of Operations and Intel-
ligence and Brigadier-General Barlev with the PM, 25 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive.
31 On receiving the cable after arrival in Washington, Eban immediately requested
that his meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk be brought forward. At the
meeting on 25 May in the afternoon, Eban read out the text of the cable. Rusk,
taken by surprise, immediately cut short the meeting in order to report to the
President and the Secretary of Defence. Eban, Six Day War (ms. 1969), pp.
114–115. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 64.
32 Report by the General Director of the Foreign Ministry Arie Levavi at the
meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security, 26 May 1967. The words
‘suicide’ and ‘US commitment to Israel’s security’ do not appear in the State
Department telegram to Cairo, but were probably expressed by Rostow during
his meeting with Kamel. See FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 65.
33 Heikal claims, for example, that Johnson terrified the Soviets, and the Secretary
General of the Communist Party Leonid Brekhnev told the UN Secretary-
General: ‘This man is ready to undertake any adventure. The world should
beware him!’ Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 29; see also ibid., pp.
154, 167, 172.
34 Eban’s report on his meetings in Washington, government meeting, 27 May
1967. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 69, 72, 76, 79.
35 Minutes of government meetings, 27–28 May 1967. See also Eban, Chapters,
B, pp. 344–349.
36 Eban did not evaluate correctly the significance of the US warning to Egypt. He
believed that because of the cables he lost the first round of the battle. Ibid.,
p. 349.
37 See chapter on the Six Day War headed ‘The trap’ in Heikal’s book, The
Sphinx, pp. 172–198.
38 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 84, 88, 90.
39 Heikal, The Sphinx, pp. 181–182.
Notes 299
17 The politicians’ quandry

1 Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, p. 163.
2 Minutes of meeting of the Alignment Party Political Committee, 25 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive.
3 At a meeting with Eshkol on 25 May, Shapira demanded that the government
be expanded and the appointment of Ben-Gurion, or at least Dayan, as Minis-
ter of Defence. Eshkol remained adamant. He was surprised at Shapira’s
contradictory stand: ‘You want Dayan and you don’t want war?’ Minutes of
Alignment Party Political Committee, 26 May, 1967, Eshkol Archive.
4 Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv:
Idanim, 1988.
5 Testimony of Tal, IDF Archive, 192/74/974. Rabin, Service Notebook, A,

p. 162.
6 The forum consisted of the Prime Minister, Ministers Allon, Galili, Aranne and
Sasson, the Mapai Secretary Golda Meir and Shaul Avigur. Minutes of the
political committee meeting, 25 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
7 Ibid.
8 Minutes of consultations, 25 May 1967, Eshkol Archive. The meeting was
attended by Eshkol, Levavi, Tekoah, Dinstein, Yaffe, and later also by Amit
and Yariv.
9 Ibid.
10 According to Amit, the CIA man said: ‘Help us to help you!’ Ibid.
11 Summary of PM s consultation with his advisers, 25 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive.
12 Many years later Moshe Carmel recalled the ‘stunned shock’ of the ministers
when they learned, during that government meeting, that ‘a squadron of Egypt-
ian fighter planes was over the Dimona reactor’. Carmel at a study day on ‘The
waiting period’, Yad Tabenkin, 4 September 1989.
13 Participating in the consultations were Eshkol, Rabin, Weizman, Herzog and
Lior. Lior’s summary of the meeting, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
14 Ibid and testimony of Efrat for 26 May 1967 on the government resolutions as
conveyed to him by the PM’s military secretary.
15 Efrat’s testimony for 26 May 1967. Minutes of government meeting, 27/28
May 1967.
16 The term ‘fateful conversation’ is taken from Efrat’s diary. Efrat’s testimony for
26 May 1967.
17 Ibid. President Johnson was angered by the atmosphere of pressure created by
Eban, and wanted to postpone the meeting. See Quandt, Peace Process, Wash-
ington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1993, p. 37, and a cable from Minister Evron
to the Prime Minister, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
18 The height of the diplomatic campaign and the outcome

1 Eban’s report at the government meeting, 27 May 1967. W.B. Quandt, Peace
Process, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1993, pp. 35–41.
2 According to Evron’s cable to the Prime Minister, 26 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive. Cf. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 64.
3 Evron to the PM, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
4 Remez to Foreign Ministry, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
5 Geva to Rabin, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive. Geva to Intelligence Branch, 26
May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
6 The information on the Johnson–Eban meeting in this chapter is based on an
300 Notes
almost verbatim report of the talks in the file for 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
Compare FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 77.
7 Ibid.
8 The text of Bulganin’s letter to Ben-Gurion may be found in Bar-On, Shaarei
Aza (The Gates of Gaza), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992 pp. 316–317.
9 Kosygin to Eshkol, 26 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
10 Cable from Ambassador in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive.
11 See remarks of Egyptian and Russian participants on the Soviet role in the Six
Day War at a symposium marking its twenty-fifth anniversary. R. Parker (ed.)
The Six Day War – a Retrospective, Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1996 (throughout the book); see also Heikal, ha-Sphinx veh A-commissar (The
Sphinx and the Commissar), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1981, pp. 178–182.
12 The text of Nasser’ speech appears in Document 1 in T. Draper, Israel and World
Politics – Roots of the Third Arab–Israeli War, New York: Viking Press, 1968.
13 Harman to Foreign Ministry, Eshkol Archive, 27 May 1967. Ibid.
14 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, New Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1978, pp. 63–86.
15 Details of deliberations – government meeting, 27–28 May 1967.
16 On US efforts in Cairo during the crisis see mainly R. Parker, The Politics of
Miscalculation in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp.
225–226, 233–238.
17 Sapir did not specify Peres by name, but his meaning was clear. Peres did in fact
meet with Sapir that day (27 May). Nakdimon, li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes
(Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1968, p. 113.
18 The following details are cited from the Minutes of the meeting, 28 May 1967.
19 The US commitment of 1957 to Egyptian freedom of shipping through the
Straits of Tiran, in light of the Israel government resolution to withdraw from
Sinai, was qualified to the effect that it would not conflict with a possible ruling
of the International Court at The Hague. See Memorandum from Secretary of
State Dulles to Ambassador Eban on 11 February 1957. B. Reich and A. Got-
tfeld, Artzot ha-Brit veha-Sikhsukh ha-Yisraeli–Aravi (The US and the
Israel–Arab Dispute), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1977, pp. 127–128. Israel feared
that the issue might be submitted to The Hague while the Straits were blocked.
Nasser told U Thant that he was willing to accept international arbitration on
the Straits question, including The Hague Court, but displayed no readiness to
revoke the blockade. Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, pp. 70–79.
19 Waiting
1 IDF History Department, Mutzav Pikud Elyon (Supreme Command Post), A, p.
278. Gavish testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/998.
2 The Armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed on 24 February
1949. Eilat was captured on 10 March.
3 Muhammad Hasanin Heikal described the creation of a buffer between ‘the
Arab East and the Arab West’ as the gravest consequence of the 1948 war. I.
Asia, Tismonet Dayan (The Dayan Syndrome), Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot
1995, pp. 7, 137–140. Egyptian documents captured during the war included
operational orders to cut off the southern part of the Negev. IDF Archive,
192/74/33.
4 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 273, 300.
5 Efrat’s testimony for 27 May 1967. This was apparently the first statement of
the political echelon in the course of the crisis in favour of capturing the Golan
Heights.
Notes 301
6 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 279. IDF Archive,

192/74/1232.
7 Sharon’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1038.
8 After the government meeting, Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir proposed that
Eshkol should not wait until the following day in order to address the public
which ‘felt a little neglected’, but should broadcast that evening to the nation.
Government meeting, 28 May 1967.
9 On the broadcast, its circumstances and outcome see Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz
Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988 pp. 193–194,
Nakdimon, li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor,
1968, pp. 128–131, Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamim (Six Years Six Days),
Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968, pp. 168–170. The shorthand typist Mitka Yaffe
blamed herself for typing the speech in small letters. T. Lipkin-Shahak, ‘The
muse of history’, Maariv, 30 January 1998.
10 The full text of the speech may be found in Gilboa, Six Years, pp. 169–170.
11 Shlomo Shamgar, Yediot Aharonot, 30 May 1967. Uri Avneri, Haolam Hazeh,
31 May 1967.
12 Eilon’s notes on the discussions, IDF History Department Archive, Haber, pp.
194–198.
13 Haber, ibid. See also Asia, The Dayan Syndrome, pp. 149–150.
14 Haber, p. 198 and Lior’s note, 28 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
15 Efrat’s testimony for 28 May 1967. Eilon’s notes, IDF History Department
Archive.
17 Testimony of Tal, IDF Archive, 192/74/974. Testimony of Gavish, IDF
Archive, 192/74/404. Testimony of Sharon, IDF Archive, 192/74/1038.
18 Eilon’s notes on the discussion with the Chief of Staff, 29 May 1967, IDF
History Department Archive.
19 Testimony of Yariv, IDF Archive, 192/74/1155.
20 The document is in the IDF Archive, 192/74/1176.
21 Ibid. This is the only explicit reference I have found to the possibility that Egypt
might employ radioactive weapons. It will be recalled that the view was
expressed in Israel that Nasser possessed ‘a secret weapon’. Bar-Zohar, ha-
Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The Longest Month), p. 140. This was also the
conclusion of the US Embassy in Cairo. R. Parker, The Politics of Miscalcula-
tion in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 90.
20 Establishment of a national unity government: the military

aspect
1 ‘I decided in my heart: history! – whatever you want to do – do it fast!’, Eshkol
told party members. Minutes of Mapai Secretariate meeting, 1 June 1967,
Eshkol Archive.
2 For a detailed survey of the evolvement of events in the political establishment
from 22 May to the formation of the extended government, see S. Nakdimon,
li-Kraat Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1968.
3 A document summarizing the stages up to Dayan’s appointment, Eshkol Archive.
4 Ibid., M. Dayan, Avnei Derekh (Milestones), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1977, p. 420.
Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 102.
5 Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 165. Wahrhaftig claims that the preference
for Ben-Gurion and Dayan was due to Ben-Gurion’s stand, similar to that of
the National Religious Party, against an initiated attack. Author’s interview
with Wahrhaftig, 24 August 1998.
302 Notes
6 Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 138.

7 Ibid., pp. 183–184.
8 Record of a telephone converaation between Eshkol and Shapira, 31 May
1967, Eshkol Archive. Government meeting 31 May 1967.
9 On 24 May Begin met on his initiative with Eshkol and proposed the establish-
ment of an emergency government headed by Ben-Gurion or, alternatively, the
appointment of Ben-Gurion as Minister of Defence. Eshkol rejected the pro-
posal outright, saying: ‘These two horses will never again be able to pull a
single wagon.’ Nakdimon, pp. 68–70. Gilboa, pp. 160–161.
10 Herut originated in the Revisionist Movement whose map of Eretz Israel on
both banks of the Jordan, included no Egyptian territory, apart from the Gaza
Strip which was then under Egyptian domination.

11 Nakdimon points out in his book that circles in Mapai were convinced that
Minister of the Interior Shapira thought that Dayan and Begin would constitute
a moderate factor security-wise. Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 184.
12 Y. Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983, pp. 249–251.
13 General Rehavam Ze’evi says that if it had depended on his colleagues at the
General Staff, Allon would have been preferred to Dayan. Interview of author
with Ze’evi, 3 September 1989. See also Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 180.
14 See Tevet, Moshe Dayan, p. 428.
15 Testimony of Narkis, IDF Archive 192/74/1336 Nakdimon, Towards Zero
Hour, p. 256.
16 This is Peri’s view. See Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, pp. 249–251.
17 Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, p. 141, 253.
18 Ibid., p. 256.
19 Ibid., p. 140. The words ‘military coup’ do not appear in the fragmented quote
cited by Nakdimon, but they are clearly implied from the context. In his book,
Abba Eban refers critically to Eshkol’s meeting with the generals, and notes
that ‘there was even talk of a military coup’. Eban, The Six Day War (manu-
script 1969), pp. 165–168.
20 Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, pp. 145–146. Nakdimon notes that Ben-
Gurion’s moderate statement contained an echo of much more extreme remarks
which he had voiced previously at a meeting of the Rafi faction. See also central
item in Haaretz, 30 May 1967.
21 Nakdimon, ibid., p. 184.
22 Ibid., pp. 245, 254.
23 Ibid., pp. 251–257.
24 Ibid., pp. 179–180. In the summary it was noted that the Prime Minister ‘left
after a commotion’. Summary of Alignment faction meeting, 30 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive.
25 Minutes of the morning meeting of the Alignment leadership, 31 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamim (Six Years Six Days), Tel
Aviv: Am Oved, 1968, pp. 175–176 and Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour, pp.
181–183.
26 Minutes of afternoon meeting of the Alignment leadership, 31 May 1967,
Eshkol Archive. Dayan, Milestones, p. 416, Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour,
pp. 187–188, 209–211.
27 Dayan, ibid., Nakdimon, ibid., pp. 188–189.
28 This was also the opinion of General Rehavam Ze’evi. Author’s interview with
Ze’evi, 3 September 1998.
29 Government meeting, 31 May 1967. Dayan, ibid. Rabin, Service Notebook, A,
pp. 175–176. Conversation with Gavish, IDF Archive, 192/74/1379.
Notes 303
30 Rabin’s condition was an open secret in the General Staff. Rehavam Ze’evi did
not go into detail on the subject but his remarks imply that he and other
members of the General Staff guarded and protected Rabin during the crisis.
Interview of author with Ze’evi, 3 September 1998.
31 Government meeting, 31 May 1967.
32 On the stormy meeting on 1 June 1967, see full stenographic report in Nakdi-
mon, Towards the Zero Hour, pp. 205–220, 223–242. Note Eshkol’s remarks,
ibid., pp. 205–217.
33 Ibid., pp. 220–223.
34 Ibid., pp. 244–245.
35 Ibid., pp. 242–243. When women supporters of Rafi demonstrated outside the
Mapai Central Office in support of Dayan, Eshkol nicknamed them ‘the merry
wives of Windsor’. Dayan, ibid., p. 420.
36 Nakdimon, ibid., p. 259. Eshkol reported to the Alignment ministers that the
Chief of Staff was being ‘roasted on the spit’ by the generals because of his pro-
posal to appoint Dayan as CO Southern Command. Minutes of the meeting, 1
June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
37 Hazan and his party claimed that the defence portfolio should be retained by
Eshkol, but Hazan understood that his party alone could not counter the
demand for the replacement of the Minister of Defence. Gilboa, Six Years, pp.
186–187. Nakdimon, ibid., p. 245.
39 Haber, ha Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv:
Idanim, 1988, p. 203. Weizman himself provides a milder and slightly different
version of the event in, Heaven and Earth, p. 264.
40 The coopting of Dayan as representative of Rafi was the logical outcome of the
political reality, but Eshkol cited an additional reason – fear that Rafi might
decide to appoint Shimon Peres as its representative in the new government.
Minutes of Alignment ministers’ meeting, 1 June 1967, Eshkol Archive. The
resentment against Peres, the moving spirit in Rafi, who had conducted the
savage propaganda campaign against the government, was often reflected in
statements by Eshkol and other ministers.
41 Ibid. See also Dayan, Milestones, p. 418. Nakdimon, Towards Zero Hour,
p. 245.
42 Dayan promised BG: ‘I will come to you morning and night.’ He declared that
one of his aims in joining the government was for ‘Ben-Gurion to be ready to
be at my side in all weighty calculations . . . I will regard this guidance as no
less significant than the weighty things I will do as minister of defence’. Nakdi-
mon, ibid., pp. 254–255, 263. It was a meaningless promise. From the moment
Dayan was appointed he found no time for Ben-Gurion. The latter’s attempts
up to the end of the war to meet with Dayan and influence his decision-making
bordered on the pathetic. Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 5–11 June 1967.
43 The candidature of Begin, leader of the Herut movement and Chairman of
Gahal, was self-evident. The Liberal Party, the second component of Gahal, did
not choose Yosef Sapir as its representative until the following day. Hence only
Begin attended the first session of the new government on 1 June 1967.
44 Two of the senior party members, Golda Meir and Shaul Avigur, did not
attend, probably in protest at not having been consulted. Nakdimon, Towards
Zero Hour, p. 246. Eshkol asked Golda Meir to join the government but she
refused. Minutes of Mapai Secretariate meeting, 1 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
Nakdimon, ibid., p. 259.
45 Nakdimon, ibid., pp. 246–248.
304 Notes
46 The government subsequently took the decision to accept Eshkol’s request to

release him from his position as Minister of Defence, to bring in Dayan and
Begin as ministers and to empower the Prime Minister to bring in an additional
minister from Gahal. Government meeting, 1 June 1967.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 The entry of foreign forces into Jordan, and in particular into the West Bank,
was regarded as one of the pretexts for war which would require Israel’s mili-
tary intervention. M. Behr, Kavim Adumim b’Astrategiat ha Hartaah ha-
Yisraelit (Red Lines in Israel’s Deterrent Strategy), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1990.
50 Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security, 1 June 1967.
21 The strategic turning point: the Egypt–Jordan defence pact

1 A detailed description by King Hussein of his trip to Cairo, its background and
outcome appears in his book Milhamti Be- yisrael (My War with Israel) (trans-
lated into Hebrew and edited by A. Kam), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1974, pp.
47–55. The text of the Jordanian–Egyptian pact appears in S. Segev, Sadin
Adom (Red Sheet), Tel Aviv: Tversky, 1967, pp. 269–271. On Jordan’s
predicament, and the constraints and internal pressures which left it no altern-
ative but to link up with Egypt, see S.A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 85–122; see also Chapter 8
(above).
2 Y. Allon, Masakh shel Hol (Curtain of Sand), Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad,
1959, pp. 373–378.
3 It is noteworthy that Lyndon Johnson too in his memoirs attributes Israel’s
decision to go to war to the Jordanian–Egyptian pact: fear of entry of Iraqi
troops into Jordan, assignment of an Egyptian commander in Jordan and the
threat of commando action against Israeli airfields. See L.B. Johnson, The
Vantage Point, New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1971, p. 296. Similar
comments are made by Rusk, justifying Israel’s preventive action. D. Rusk, As I
Saw It, New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. 387.
4 Hussein himself explained to the US Ambassador in Amman that he was flying
to Egypt to obtain ‘life insurance’. Harman’s report for 1 June 1967 on his talk
with Eugene Rostow, 31 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
5 There are echoes of this hope in a talk between the British Ambassador Michael
Hadow and Eban. The Ambassador reported that he had heard from his coun-
terpart in Jordan that Hussein’s situation was very bad and he felt the end was
near, and the British Foreign Office was surprised that Israel had not taken
immediate action when Nasser announced the blocking of the Straits. Report of
Eban–Hadow meeting, 29 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.
6 The day before the war began, Eban said that he had checked all the reports
and found that ‘since the Egyptian–Jordanian pact, no US statement has
repeated the question of restraining etc’. Minutes of Ministerial Committee for
Security 4 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
7 IDF History Department, Mutzav Pikud Elyon (Supreme Command Post), A, p.
298. Rabin even said that he was ready to risk losing settlements in the Galilee
Panhandle and the Jordan Valley as the result of a sudden Syrian attack if it
averted danger from the West Bank. In any event, he emphasized, the main thing
would be the blow to the Egyptian army. Eilon’s reports on General Staff discus-
sions, 31 May 1967, IDF History Department Archives. Peri, Between Battles
and Ballots, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 249–250.
8 Peri, ibid., pp. 249–250.
Notes 305
9 Rabin said: ‘The main enemy is Egypt and therefore no other arena should
divert us from the main issue.’ Notes by Eilon on General Staff discussions, 31
May 1967, IDF History Department Archive, and see Dayan’s remarks to Uzi
Narkis, CO Central Command, on 1 June 1967, U. Narkis, Akhat Yerusha-
layim (Jerusalem is One), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1976, pp. 79–80.
10 Eban, Pirkei Khayim (Chapters in a Life), B, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978, p. 401.
The messages to Hussein were transmitted through three channels: military
liaison through Lt. Col. S. Gat and Colonel Daud; through the head of the UN
Observers General Odd Bull; and through the US Embassy in Israel. Rabin,
Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), A, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, p. 188.
11 IDF actions on the Jordanian front on the first day of the war were conducted
for tactical purposes and were aimed in the main at removing Jordanian
artillery in the Jenin sector from the range which threatened the IAF base at
Ramat David; in south Jerusalem on taking over the the UN Headquarters at
Commissioner’s Palace which the Jordanian army had taken over, and to
capture the ‘sausage’ positions and the village of Zur Baher in order to cut off
Jerusalem from Bethlehem and the Hebron mountains; in northern Jerusalem
the objective was to link up – through the Police Academy position, Ammuni-
tion Hill stronghold and the quarter of Sheikh Jarah – with the Mount Scopus
enclave whose safety was feared for, and to break through the Radar positions,
Sheikh Abdel Azizi and Bidu towards tel el-Ful in order to cut off Jerusalem
from Ramallah and Samaria. In addition, the small Jordanian air force was
destroyed (some thirty planes) after it had bombed targets inside Israel. On the
war on the Jordanian front see IDF History Department, ha-Maarakha ba-
Zirah ha-Yardenit (The Battle in the Jordanian Arena), pp. 133–413.
12 Eilon’s notes on the discussions, 30 May 1967, IDF History Department Archive.
13 See details, IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 299–300.
14 Ibid. In the afternoon of the same day the Head of the Operations Department
held an additional discussion for a more detailed formulation of the plan to
conquer the West Bank. Eilon’s notes on the discussions, 30 May 1967, IDF
History Department Archive.
15 Narkis’ testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1336. On Ben-Gurion’s decision to
limit IDF intervention, in the event that Hussein was deposed and foreign forces
entered the West Bank, to a link-up to Mount Scopus see also Narkis,
Jerusalem is One, p. 52.
16 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 300–304.
17 Ibid., p. 318. Eilon’s notes on presentation of plans to the Chief of Operations,
31 May 1967, IDF History Department Archive.
18 Eilon’s notes on the discussion, 31 May 1967, IDF History Department Archive.
19 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 323–324. The
following day the Sadan deployment for the Jordanian sector was presented to
the Chief of Staff in the war room. Rabin then conferred with the CO Central
Command to discuss Jerusalem. Efrat testimony for 1 June 1967. At this
meeting, Narkis requested the further postponement of the fortnightly convoy
to Mount Scopus which had already been delayed, lest it serve as ‘a match to a
barrel of fuel’. Rabin agreed. Narkis, Jerusalem is One, p. 77.
20 Pargol – planning order, IDF Archive, 192/74/1176.
21 Testimony of Efrat for 1 June 1967. Efrat adds: ‘[CO IAF] Motti [Hod] tells us
that by the evening no bomb will fall on Israel from the air.’ The CO of the IAF
was implying that by the first evening of the war the IAF would have completed
the task on neutralizing the Arab air forces and they would no longer be able to
attack Israel. Hod wanted to bolster Rabin’s confidence and disperse his doubts
in the IAF abilities. Hod’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1156.
306 Notes
22 Efrat’s testimony for 1 June 1967. Eban, Chapters of a Life, B, pp. 380–381.
23 Bar-Zohar, ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The Longest Month), Tel Aviv:
Lewin-Epstein, 1968, pp. 102–107. M. Zur, Moka Limon, Tel Aviv: Maariv,
1989, pp. 115–116.
24 Eshkol himself thought it would be better to send Golda, under guise of a fund-
raising mission so that the trip would appear unofficial. See Nakdimon, li-Kraat
Shaat ha-Efes (Towards Zero Hour), Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1968. p. 56.
25 In the government, as noted above, Allon was Eban’s sharpest critic and also
reflected the views of the General Staff. The Gahal and Rafi representatives,
convened by Eshkol on 23 May for consultations without telling them about
Eban’s mission, felt they had been deceived. Nakdimon, ibid., pp. 57–58.
Knesset members from Eban’s party rallied against him. MKs Aryeh Eliav,
Aharon Yadlin and Gabi Cohen defined themselves as ‘the counter-balance to
Eban’s five-stage missile [i.e. the US plan for lifting the blockade as presented
by Eban] which would never be launched’. See ibid., pp. 179, 185–187.
26 It was Minister of Justice Yaakov Shimshon Shapira, Eban’s fellow party
member, who proposed this at a meeting of the Alignment Party Political Com-
mittee on 31 May. According to this proposal, Eban was to receive the impres-
sive and empty title of ‘deputy prime minister’. Eban announced that he would
resign, and the proposal collapsed. Moshe Haim Shapira and Moshe Kol has-
tened to his defence. See ibid., pp. 179, 183–184, and Gilboa, Shesh Shanim
Shisha Yamin (Six Years Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968, p. 175.
27 Gilboa, ibid., p. 154. Bar-Zohar, Longest Month, p. 143.
28 Minutes of government meeting, 27 May 1967. See also Gilboa, ibid., p. 173.
29 In his talk with Eban in the White House on 26 May, Johnson said: ‘I’m not a
feeble mouse or a coward, and we’re going to try. What we need is a group, five
or four or less, or if we can’t do that, then on our own.’ See Chapter 18
(above), and Gilboa, ibid., p. 154.
30 In his communication to Johnson on 29 May, formulated by Eban, Eshkol wel-
comed the US promise to adopt ‘any and all measures’ to open the Straits of
Tiran. Walk Rostow expressed reservations and commented to Evron that this
formula could be interpreted as exceeding the President’s authority. Eban claims
that he was basing himself on Johnson’s positive answer to the question of
whether he had decided to make ‘every possible effort’ to guarantee freedom of
shipping. He saw no fundamental difference between the two phrases. Eban,
The Six Day War (ms.), 1969, pp. 196–199. The American reservation made a
poor impression and Eban was blamed. E. Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama
(Today War will Break Out), p. 201. Rabin, Service Notebook, A, pp. 177–178.
22 The decisive meeting in the Pit: the Ministerial

Committee versus the General Staff
1 Eshkol at government meeting, 1 June 1967.
2 The impact of their meeting with the senior command on Friday was evident in
the remarks of the ministers at Sunday’s government session. Minutes of
government meeting, 4 June 1967.
3 The content of the 2 June meeting of the Ministerial Committee with the
General Staff forum as quoted below is based on the Minutes of the meeting,
IDF Archive, 192/74/1201; and cf. Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today
War will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, pp. 204–212.
4 Reference was to Jewish influence on the administration. See H. McPherson,
‘The White House, US Jewry and the Six Day War’, Shisha Yamim, Shloshim
Shana (Six Years, Six Days), Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999, pp. 137–142.
Notes 307
5 In practice this was an indirect admission that Israel should not wait, even for
economic reasons, more than a few days.
6 There were, however, differences of opinion between Dayan and Allon. The
latter favoured reaching the Canal, conquering the Gaza Strip and transferring
its refugees to Sinai. Dayan objected. See Dayan, Avnei Derekh (Milestones),
Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1977, p. 422.
7 Efrat’s testimony about 2 June 1967.
8 For characterization of a political culture as ‘mature’ where the level of military
intervention in politics is the lowest, see A.S. Feiner, ha-Ish al Gav ha-Soos
(The Man on the Horse), Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1982, pp. 24–182.
9 See A. Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, New Haven:
Yale University Press, p. 14.

10 Z. Schiff, ‘1967 – the General Staff in the government’s Eyes’, Haaretz, 6 June
1997.
11 Wahrhaftig related that during a tour of the Gaza Strip border he conferred
with representatives of settlements and the Deputy CO of the Eighty-fourth
Division, Herzl Shafir. Offensive epithets were directed at the government ‘as if
to say: you are fools!’ Author’s interview with Wahrhaftig, 24 August 1998.
12 The economic recession and the deterioration in security during the second half
of 1966 and the first half of 1967 affected the public mood and created an
atmosphere of depression across the country. Many Israelis emigrated to
Europe and America, and a popular joke at the time was that ‘the last to leave
is requested to switch off the light at Lod [later Ben-Gurion] airport’.
13 In order to prevent slackening of tension, it was decided, as noted above, to
defer release of reserve units, a decision which was misinterpreted by the Prime
Minister’s office. Haber, Today War will Break Out, p. 193.
14 S. Nakdimon, ‘The generals revolt 67’, Yediot Aharonot, 15 September 1985.
15 Remarks of Tal, Narkis and Elazar at the stormy meeting with the Prime Minis-
ter on 28 May. IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp.
288–289. Haber, Today War Will Break Out, pp. 196–197.
16 Eshkol’s widow, Miriam Eshkol, in press interviews, used the word ‘putsch’.
The members of the 1967 senior command reject her version of events and
admit only that there was a ‘sharp conflict’ between them and the politicians,
and no more. S. Nakdimon, ‘The generals revolt 67’, Yediot Aharonot, 15 Sep-
tember 1985.
17 Weizman is quoted as follows: ‘I don’t believe that a military coup could have
taken place, but we were never closer’; see J. Larteguy, The Walls of Israel,
New York: Evans & Co, 1968, p. 75.
18 B.S. Hersh, Bereirat Shimshon (Samson’s Choice), Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot,
1992, p. 125.
19 Sharon’s testimony, IDF Archive, 192/74/1038. A senior military correspon-
dent heard from a certain general (apparently Sharon) that he thought it was
possible to lock the ministers in another room and carry out a clean coup. Z.
Schiff, ‘1967 – the General Staff in government eyes’, Haaretz, 6 June 1967.
20 S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1957, pp. 74–79.
21 Dayan, Milestones, pp. 422–423.
22 Another of Eshkol’s fears, which Dayan tried to calm, was of ‘beheadings’ in
the Ministry of Defence. Minutes of meeting of Alignment ministers, 1 June
1967, Eshkol Archive. Lior describes the situation differently. Haber, Today
War Will Break Out, pp. 145–185.
23 Minutes of government meeting, 8 June 1967. Dayan, Milestones, pp. 474–475.
24 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 353.
308 Notes
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. See also Dayan, Milestones, p. 423.
27 The war did not proceed according to Dayan’s instructions, and he himself
approved the seizing of strongholds beside the Suez Canal in order to block the
Egyptian escape routes from Sinai. Moreover, after the war Dayan regretted not
having ordered the IDF to hold on to the West Bank of the Canal (and the East
bank of the Jordan). Dayan at a gathering to sum up the lessons of the war, 28
February 1968, IDF Archive, 192/74/987.
28 Eilon notes on 2 June 1967, Archives of IDF History Department.
23 The decisive stage: war

1 Cables of Washington Embassy, 30 May 1967, Eshkol Archive.

2 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 2, 5.
3 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 13.
4 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 18, 19.
5 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 36.
6 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 30.
7 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 34.
8 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 31. Goldberg recommended to U Thant that
he also visit Tel Aviv and Damascus. U Thant ignored the recommendation.
9 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 40, 41.
10 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 49.
11 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 51.
12 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 57, 58, 62, 133. De Gaulle unquestionably
wanted to exploit the crisis in order to gain France a central role in solution of
international problems as the intermediary between West and East, and to
promote French interests in the Middle East.
13 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 53, 54.
14 Rusk himself explained to the President, before meeting with Eban, that Eban
needed something ‘solid’ to appease the ‘hawks’. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19,
Doc. 71.
15 On 31 May Johnson ordered the establishment in the State Department of a
‘task force’ to consider urgently other solutions. FRUS, 1964–1968, Doc. 106.
16 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 58, 68, 91, 130.
17 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 61, 76, 142.
18 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 79.
19 Note from Johnson to Kosygin, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 88.
Eban–Rusk meeting, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 64.
20 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 54, 61, 79, 130. The US Ambassador to
Moscow, Thomas Thomson, deduced, on the other hand, that the Russians had
known about the Egyptian moves which had generated the crisis, but not about
the intention to block the Straits. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 59.
21 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 50, 69, 98.
22 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 71.
23 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 64, 71.
24 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 69, 98.
25 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 131.
26 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 99.
27 FRUS, Vol 19, Doc. 108, Doc. 122.
28 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 56, 67, 107.
29 Nolte even proposed a package deal whereby Israel would grant the Palestinian
refugees the choice between return and full compensation, and agree to inter-
Notes 309
nationalization of Jerusalem and discussion of its borders on the basis of the

1947 UN partition plan. In return, the Arabs would recognize its existence ‘in
effect’, permit passage through the Bay of Aqaba and end the boycott. FRUS,
1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 67.
30 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 117.
31 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 91, 114, 115, 137, 143.
32 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 125, 141.
33 FRUS, Vol. 19, Doc. 144.
34 M. Bar-On, Gates of Gaza, pp. 130–138.
35 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 100, 119, 128.
36 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 123, 129, 134, 145.
37 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 144. The Americans and British also dis-
cussed the possibility of appointing a mediator, and even mentioned the name
of Gus Lindt, Swiss Ambassador to Moscow. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc.
130.
38 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 77.
39 Preparations in Washington for the visit of Mohi al-Din and his meeting with
President Johnson began on 4 June. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 148.
40 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 114.
41 FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 141.
42 Amit confirmed this at a study day at Yad Tabenkin on 4 September 1989
devoted to the waiting period.
43 Zeev Schiff defined Amit’s mission as a ‘question mark’ concerning everything
that Eban had brought back. Schiff at a study day on the Six Day War, Tel
Aviv University, 20 March 1996. See also Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama
(Today War will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, p. 216, and Bar-Zohar,
ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The Longest Month), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein,
1968, p. 143.
44 This is also Amit’s view. See Maarakhot, No. 325 (June–July 1992), p. 12.
Eban claims that the decision to send Amit was taken jointly by himself and
Eshkol. Eban (ms. 1989), p. 199.
45 Amit related at the study day at Yad Tabenkin on 4 September 1989 that the
plane in which he travelled to the United States was full of passengers fleeing
Israel.
46 Amit’s description of the meeting, ibid., and expanded remarks in Amit, Rosh
be-Rosh (Head On), Tel Aviv: Hed Artzi, 1999, pp. 237–243. FRUS,
1964–1968, Vol. 19, Doc. 124.
47 At the beginning of the crisis the Israeli Embassy in Washington already esti-
mated that ‘the problem is Zvulun’. Evron to Bitan, 20 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive. ‘Zvulun’ was the code-name for Rusk in confidential Foreign Ministry
correspondence.
48 Harman to the Foreign Minister, 2 June 1967, Eshkol Archive. Rusk, it seems,
did not accept Israel’s stand that the concentration of forces and blocking of the
Straits were an act of aggression to which Israel had the right to respond with
gunfire.
49 Evron to Deputy Minister of Defence, 3 June 1967, Eshkol Archive. Bitan
to Evron, 3 June 1967, Eshkol Archive. The fact that the Dolphin was
anchored at Massawa ready to sail for Eilat was mentioned by Ambassador
Harman in a talk with Rusk and Rostow on 2 June. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol.
19, Doc. 132.
50 Clark Clifford, Head of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
described this as a ‘personal view’ in a talk with Evron. Evron to Foreign
Minister, 1 June 1967, Eshkol Archive. Johnson’s friend, the Jewish Justice Abe
310 Notes
Fortas, told Ambassador Harman that it was vital for Israel to avoid firing the
first shot. Harman to Foreign Minister, 2 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
51 Johnson’s note to Eshkol, 3 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
52 The meeting was also attended by Deputy Defence Minister Zvi Dinstein,
Foreign Minister Eban and his Director-General Levavi, Yigal Allon, the PM’s
Adviser Ygael Yadin and PM Office Director-General Yaakov Herzog.
Summary of meeting, 3 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
53 Ibid.
54 Summary of meeting at PM’s home with Amit and Harman, night of 3–4 June
1967, Eshkol Archive.
55 Rabin Report, p. 172. Efrat’s testimony for 3 June 1967. See also Haber,
Today War will Break Out, pp. 215–218.

56 See below and testimony of Lior, ibid., p. 219.
57 Meeting of Ministerial Committee on Security, 4 June 1967. See also Haber,
ibid., 1988, p. 215.
58 Eban said: ‘I checked all the material from three to four days ago, and in effect
since the pact between Egypt and Jordan no American talk has repeated the
talk of self-control, restraint.’ Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Secur-
ity, 4 June 1967.
59 Eshkol’s military secretary, Yisrael Lior, was the first to greet the Prime Minis-
ter when he arrived in his office on the morning of 4 June before the meeting of
the Ministerial Committee. He sensed that Eshkol was again suffering last-
minute indecision. Lior’s summary, 4 June 1967, Eshkol Archive.
60 Dayan ridiculed the very thought that the Sixth Fleet might guarantee Israel’s
safety: ‘Two thousand Marines from the Sixth Fleet won’t do more than two
hundred [Egyptian] tanks in Eilat.’ Allon too dismissed the idea, claiming that it
would turn Israel into a dependant state and a victim of appeasement. Minister-
ial Committee on Security, 4 June 1967.
61 Ibid.
62 On the agenda of the government, whose session was ‘camouflaged’ as a
regular meeting, were additional clauses for discussion apart from the ‘security
situation’. For example, Israel’s participation in the diplomatic conference in
Stockholm, the ratification of an Israel–Belgium cultural agreement, the coopt-
ing of Knesset member Yosef Sapir into the government, and of Begin, Dayan
and Sapir on to the Ministerial Committee on Security. Government meeting, 4
June 1967.
63 The French embargo had been proclaimed two days previously, on 2 June. A
US declaration on the stoppage of arms consignments to the region was
expected once fighting began.
64 Government decision, 4 June 1967.
65 In hindsight, Rabin said that as a result of the waiting, the reserve forces
entered the fight as a regular army with regard to training, organization and
integration in the fighting force. Rabin at study day on the waiting period, Yad
Tabenkin, 4 September 1989.
66 See Irit Keinan, ‘The Six Day War as the mirror of a bygone media era’ in
Sessar (ed.) Shisha Yamim – Shloshim Shana (Six Days – Thirty Years), Tel
Aviv: Am Oved, 1999, pp. 209–221.
67 H. Herzog, ha-Yamim ha-Gdolim (The Great Times), Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1969.
Herzog’s broadcasts won him tremendous popularity and natioal standing,
which later promoted his election as Israel’s sixth President (1983–1993).
68 See A. Yariv, ‘War of alternatives – war of no alternatives’, in Milkhemet Brera
(War with Alternatives), Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1985, pp. 9–29.
69 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, pp. 380–385.
Notes 311
70 For details of the reasons for choosing 07:45 as the zero hour, see IDF History
Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 378.
71 IDF History Department, Supreme Command Post, A, p. 396. This is according
to the operational ledgers. General Ze’evi claimed in an interview that he gave
the order ‘Red Sheet’ – the code-name for Operation Nakhshonim. Interview of
the author with Ze’evi, 3 September 1998.
Afterword
1 Government decision, 4 June 1967.
2 Government meeting, 5 June 1967.
3 Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 6 June 1967.

4 Lior’s summary of a meeting in the PM’s office, night of 5/6 June 1967.
5 Meeting of Ministerial Committee on Security, 8 June 1967. H. Bartov, Dado,
A, Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978, p. 136.
6 Reuven Pedatzur, Nitzahon ha-mevukha (The Triumph of Confusion), Tel
Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1966, pp. 39–40.
7 Ze’evi document, ‘Political settlement for the West Bank’, 15 June 1967. Ami
Gluska, Gandhi’s Heritage, B, Maariv, 24 October 2001.
8 Pedatzur, Triumph of Confusion, 1996, pp. 47–57. The September 1967 Arab
summit in Khartoum decided on the famous three ‘No’s’: no negotiation, no
recognition and no peace with Israel.
9 Maariv, 13 June 1967.
10 Pedatzur, Triumph and Confusion, pp. 117–121.
11 The Six Day War cut short a historical process of ‘Jordanization’ of the Pales-
tine problem, whose fruition could have finally integrated the two banks of the
Jordan. The Jordanian option was open to Israel for twenty years, between
1967 and 1987, until the first Intifade broke out, following which King Hussein
renounced responsibility for the West Bank. Failure to take advantage of the
Jordanian solution left Israel in direct and cruel confrontation with the insol-
uble Palestinian problem.
Appendix
1 Yisrael Tal, CO of the Armoured Corps under Rabin, described him as the
supreme authority, ‘guide and mentor’ of the entire IDF command, ‘an unparal-
leled expert’, ‘erudite’, and the man who built up the army. Author’s interview
with Tal, 19 October 1998. See also Maarakhot, 344–345 (December 1995),
pp. 4–5. Rehavam Ze’evi, Deputy Chief of Operations, lavishly praised Rabin
as the best and profoundest of his commanders in the IDF, who taught him
more than anyone else – author’s interview with Ze’evi, 3 September 1998.
Elsewhere he described him as ‘head and shoulders above others’. See M.
Sheshar, Sikhot im Rehavam Zeevi (Conversations with Rehavam Zeevi), Tel
Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1992, pp. 116 and 165. See also testimony of Eshkol’s
military secretary, Yisrael Lior, Haber, ha-Yom Tifrotz Milkhama (Today War
will Break Out), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988, pp. 41–42, 97.
2 Moshe Dayan’s biographer, Shabtai Tevet, wrote that it was Rabin who used the
English phrase ‘He is a user of force, not a builder of one’ about Dayan – Tevet,
Moshe Dayan, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1973, p. 405. Rabin, on the
other hand, was more a builder of force than a user of force. Unlike Dayan, he
did not believe in improvisation but only in precise planning. D. Horovitz,
Mesima Bilti Gemura – Khayav u-Moto shel Yitzhak Rabin (Unfinished Mission
– the Life and Death of Yitzhak Rabin), Or Yehuda: Maariv, 1996, pp. 42–43.
312 Notes
3 See also Peri, Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983, pp. 162–163.
4 Testimony of Narkis, IDF Archive, 192/74/1149. Testimony of Hod, IDF
Archive, 192/74/1156.
5 Rabin interview by Ronel Fisher, Hadashot, 22 May 1992.
6 Rabin, Pinkes Sherut (Service Notebook), Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, pp.
149–150.
7 Assistant to the Minister of Defence Haim Yisraeli says that Rabin did not
request Eshkol’s approval for his meeting with Ben-Gurion. Author’s interview
with Yisraeli, 12 November 1998.
8 Rabin, Service Book, 1979, p. 150. Hadashot, 22 May 1992.
9 Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 22 May 1967.

10 M. Dayan, Avnei Derekh (Milestones), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1977, pp. 399–400.
11 Ibid., p. 399.
12 Rabin, Service Book, pp. 156–158.
15 Leah Rabin, Kol ha-Zman Ishto (Always his Wife), Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988,
p. 112.
16 Weizman memo of 6 November 1967 – published in Haaretz, 22 April 1974.
Aviv: Maariv, 1975, pp. 258–259. Weizman’s mention of a second meeting
with Rabin contradicts Leah Rabin’s report that her husband received sedation
and slept until the following afternoon. It is possible that Rabin got up in the
morning, met Weizman and then went back to sleep.
18 Rabin, Service Notebook, p. 159.
19 In an interview twenty-five years later, Rabin said that he had indeed offered
Weizman command over the IDF, but did not remember if he had meant until
he recovered or more than that: Hadashot, 22 May 1992.
20 Rabin, Service Notebook, p. 159. See also Haaretz, 22 April 1974.
21 Weizman, Heaven and Earth, p. 262.
22 This is the impression gained from the documents, but it was denied by Ze’evi.
He claimed that ‘Barlev did not push Rabin aside. Rabin chose to remain aside.’
Author’s interview with Ze’evi, 3 September 1998.
23 Weizman, Heaven and Earth, p. 258. Author’s interview with Ze’evi, 3 Septem-
ber 1998. Weizman memo in Haaretz, 22 April 1974. Rabin denied it: ‘There
was no problem with my functioning from 24 May onward.’ Hadashot, 22
May 1992. Barlev said cautiously that Rabin ‘until the end of the war . . . was
not in full form’. C. Guy, Barlev, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998, p. 125.
24 Minutes of meeting of Alignment Party ministers, 31 May 1967, Eshkol
Archive. See also Bar-Zohar, ha-Khodesh ha-Arokh be-Yoter (The Longest
Month), Tel Aviv: Lewin-Epstein, 1968, p. 84. Author’s interview with
Wahrhaftig, 24 August 1998.
25 Mati Peled commented: ‘It was obvious that Rabin was relieved when Dayan
was appointed Minister of Defence. He was freed of the burden of a Chief of
Staff who was in effect also fulfilling the role of minister of defence.’ Nakdi-
mon, ‘The Generals’ Revolt 67’, Yediot Aharonot, 15 September 1985.
26 See Ben-Meir, Civil–Military Relations in Israel, New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1995, pp. 107–108, 128.
27 See e.g. Amos Keinan’s article, ‘Yitzhak Rabin, hero of Israel’, Yediot
Aharonot, 10 June 1967, and a profile by Raphael Bashan, Yediot Aharonot,
13 June 1967.
Select English bibliography
Books
Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim (ed.). The Arab–Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An
Arab Perspective, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1970.
Ajammi, Fouad. The Arab Predicament, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1981.
Aronson, Shlomo. Israel’s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and its Ramifica-
tions, Kings College, London, 1998.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. Israel, The Superpowers and The War In the Middle East,
Praeger, New York, 1987.
Ben Meir, Yehuda. Civil–Military Relations in Israel, Columbia University Press,
New York, 1995.
Bialer, Uri. Between East and West; Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation
1948–1956, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
Brecher, Michael Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press,
London, 1974.
Brecher, Michael (with Benjamin Geist). Decisions in Crisis – Israel 1976 and
1973, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980.
Bull, Odd. War and Peace in the Middle East, Leo Cooper, London, 1973.
Cockburn, Andrew and Leslie. Dangerous Liaison, HarperCollins, New York, 1991.
Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York,
1998.
Draper, Theodore. Israel and World Politics – Roots of the Third Arab–Israeli
War, Viking Press, New York, 1968.
Evron, Yair. Israel’s Nuclear Dilema, Routledge, London, 1994.
Gazit, Mordechai. President Kennedy’s Policy toward the Arab States and Israel,
Tel Aviv University Press, Tel Aviv, 1983.
Glassman, Jon D. Arms for the Middle East – The Soviet Union and War in the
Middle East, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1975.
Golan, Galia. Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gor-
bachev, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
Gross-Stein, Janice and Tanter, Robert. Rational Decision-making: Israel Security
Choices 1967, Ohio University Press, Columbus, 1980.
Hahn, Peter L. The United States, Great Britain and Egypt 1945–1956, North
Carolina University Press, Chapel Hill, 1991.
314 Select English bibliography
Heikal, Mohamed H. The Sphinx and the Commissar, Harper & Row, New York,
1978. The Cairo Documents, Doubleday, New York, 1973.
Hirst, David. The Gun and the Olive Branch, Faber & Faber, London, 1977.
Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, 1957.
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York, 1971.
Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point, Holt, Reinhart & Winston, New York,
1971.
Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War 1958–1967, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1967.
Lacouture, Jean. Nasser, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1973.
Lall, Arthur. The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis 1967, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1968.
Laquuer, Walter. The Road to War 1967, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1968.
Larteguy, Jean. The Walls of Israel, Evans & Co, New York, 1968.
Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan. The Israeli Army, Allen Lane, London, 1975.
Medzini, Michael. Israel’s Foreign Relations – Selected Documents, The Ministry
of Foregn Affairs, Jerusalem, 1976.
Mutawi, Samir, A. Jordan in the 1967 War, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1987.
Nassif, R. U Thant in New York, Hurstand Co, London, 1986.
Neff, Donald. Warriors for Jerusalem, Linden Press, New York, 1984.
Nutting, Anthony. Nasser, Constable, London, 1972.
Oren, Michael. Six Days of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.
Palumbo, Michael. Imperial Israel, Bloomsbury, London, 1992.
Parker, Richard. The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Indiana Univer-
sity Press, Bloomington, 1993.
–––– (ed.). The Six Day War – A Retrospective, University Press of Florida,
Gainesville, 1996.
Peri, Yoram. Between Battles and Ballots, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1983.
Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel, Frank Cass, London, 1969.
–––– The Military and Politics in Modern Times, Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT, 1977.
Perlmutter, Amos and Bennet, V. (eds). The Political Influence of the Military, Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1980.
Quantdt, William. Decade of Decisions, University of California Press, Berkeley,
1977.
Quandt, William B. Peace Process, The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC,
1993.
Rabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs, Steimatzky, Bnei-Brak, 1994.
Rabinovich, Itamar. Syria Under the Baath, Israel University Press, Jerusalem,
1972.
Rahmy, A.A. The Egyptian Policy in The Arab World, University Press of America,
Washington. DC, 1983.
Reich, Bernard. Quest for Peace: U.S.–Israel Relations and the Arab–Israeli Con-
flict, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1977.
Riad, Mahmoud. The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, Quartet Books,
London and New York, 1981.
Select English bibliography 315
Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Sinai Blunder, Oxford University Press and IBH, New Delhi,
1978.
Rostow, Eugine. Peace in the Balance, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1972.
Rusk, Dean. As I Saw It, W.W. Norton, New York, 1991.
Sacher, Howard M. A History of Israel, Alfred A. Knope, New York, 1969.
–––– Egypt and Israel, Marek, New York, 1981.
Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity, Harper & Row, New York, 1977.
Safran, Nadav. Israel – The Embattled Ally, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1978.
Segev, Shmuel. The Iranian Triangle, Free Press, New York, 1988.
Shemesh, Moshe. The Palestinian Entity 1959–1974, Frank Cass, London, 1988.
Shlaim, Avi. Collusion Across the Jordan, Columbia University Press, New York,
1988.
Wilson, Harold. The Chariot of Israel, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1981.
Yaniv, Avner. Deterrence Without the Bomb – The Politics of Israeli Strategy, Lex-
ington Books, New York, 1984.
Young, Peter. The Israeli Campaign 1967, William Kimber, London, 1967.
Articles
Benjamini, Haim. ‘The Six Day War, Israel 1967: decisions, coalitions, con-
sequences – a sociological view’ in M. Lissak (ed.) Israeli Society and Its Defence
Establishment, Frank Cass, London, 1984.
Bentwich, Norman. ‘The Israel–Syrian Armistice Agreement’, International Rela-
tions, 3 (October 1967), pp. 253–258.
Brown, C.L. ‘Nasser and the June war: plan or improvisation?’ in Samir Seikaly et
al. (eds) Quest for Understanding, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1991.
Cohen, Avner. ‘Nuclear weapons, opacity and Israeli democracy’ in A. Yariv (ed.)
National Security and Democracy in Israel, Boulder, CO: Lynne Riennner, 1993,
pp. 197–225.
–––– ‘Cairo, Dimona and the June 1967 war’, Middle East Journal, 50(2) (spring
1996).
Gera, Gideon. ‘Israel and the June 1967 war: 25 years later’, Middle East Journal,
46(2), pp. 229–243.
Hahn, Peter L. ‘Containment and Egyptian nationalism: the unsuccessful effort to
establish the Middle East command’, Diplomatic History (winter 1987), pp.
23–40.
Handel, Michael. ‘The development of the Israeli political-military doctrine’ in F.B.
Horton et al. (eds) Comparative Defence Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, MD, 1974, pp. 279–289.
Horowitz, Dan. ‘The control of limited military operations, the Israeli experience’
in Y. Evron (ed.) International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control, The
Leonard Davis Institute, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 258–276.
–––– ‘The Israel defence forces: a civilianized military in a partially militarized
society’ in R. Kolkowicz and A. Korbonski (eds) Soldiers, Peasants and Bureau-
crats, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980.
Hourani, Albert. ‘The June war’ in A.R. Taylor and R.N. Tetlie (eds) Palestine: A
Search for Truth, Public Affairs Press, Washington, DC, 1970, pp. 159–165.
316 Select English bibliography
Lapidoth, Ruth. ‘The Security Council in the May 1967 crisis: a study in frustra-
tion’, Israel Law Review, 4(4) (October 1969).
Lissak, Moshe. ‘Paradoxes of Israeli civil–military relations’ in Moshe Lissak (ed.)
Israeli Society and Its Defence Establishment, Frank Cass, London, 1984.
Luttwak, Edward. ‘Defense planning in Israel: a brief retrospective’ in G. Newman
(ed.) Defense Planning in Less-indusrialized States, Lexington Books, Lexington
MA, 1984, pp. 131–144.
Parker, Richard. B. ‘The June 1967 war: some mysteries explored’, Middle East
Journal, 46(2) (Spring 1992), pp. 177–197.
Perlmutter, Amos. ‘The Israeli army in politics: the persistence of the civilian over
the military’, World Politics, 20(4) (July 1968), pp. 606–643.

–––– ‘The military and politics in Israel’ in F.B. Horton et al. (eds) Comparative
Defense Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1974, pp.
88–97.
Quandt, William B. ‘Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 war: what color was the
light?’, Middle East Journal, 46(2), pp. 198–228.
Yost, Charles W. ‘The June 1967 war: how it began’ in M.D. Khadduri (ed.) The
Arab–Israeli Impasse, Robert B. Luce, Washington, DC, 1968.
Index
The arrangement is letter-by-letter. anti-aircraft Hawk missiles 25

References to notes are prefixed by n. anti-Jewish riots 2
References to bibliographic notes are Aqaba, bay of 152–3; see also Straits of
suffixed with b. Tiran
Italic page numbers indicate Arab attack: fear of 23
illustrations, tables and plates not Arab declarations 23
included in the text page range. Arab diversion plan 50
Arab reaction: to 7 April 1967 action
7 April 1967 action 99–107 103
Arab revolt: (1936–1939) 2
Abdullah, Colonel 96 Arab states xiv–xv
Abdullah, King 84, 85 Arab Trade Union Confederation:
abortive initiatives: of USA 32–3 Nasser’s speech 185–6
aerial incursions 128–9, 177 Arafat, Yasser 68
Ahdut Haavoda 8, 10–11 Aranne, Zalman 46, 125, 138, 140,
Ahdut Haavoda ministers 5 155, 178, 187, 205, 254
aim of war 257 Argov, Shlomo 164–5
air attacks: Syrian 77–80; threat of armistice agreements 3, 23, 40, 95–6,
176–7 105
aircraft 29, 30–1, 36, 37 arms purchase 36–7
al-Hama incident 44 arms race 92
the Alignment (Maarach) 8 arms supply 22, 25–6
Alignment Party 47 Aronson, S. 27
Allon, Yigal Plate 11; 4 June meeting Artillery Corps 37
254; biographical notes 269; defence Aryana, Baharam 109
portfolio 204, 208–10; ‘hawkish’ Athens: coup 113
view 178–9, 188, 267; military atomic reactor 14, 15, 22, 25,
experience 10, 42; Operation ‘Wind’ 27–9
debate 63; pre-emptive attack 24; Atzmon plan 149–51, 157, 162
and Rabin’s assessments 5; return of Australia 247
160, 173–4, 174–5, 267; support for Avigur, Shaul 175
Eshkol 192; Syrian border fire 93 Axe plan (Kardom) 147–9
‘all-out event’ 23
Alterman, Natan 120 Baath Party 49, 59, 61, 79, 113
Amer, Abdel Hakim 118, 121, 123, balance of forces report 24
152 Bamahaneh interview: Rabin 80–1
Amit, Meir Plate 2; 121, 176, 248, Barbour, Walworth 88, 132, 165, 190,
250–1 191
Amit’s mission 248–9 Bar Kochba, Simon 1
Anderson, Robert 245, 246 Bar-Lavi, Zeev 219
318 Index
Barlev, Haim Plates 12, 13; 270b; civil emergency measures 141
activist view 173–4; Chief of Staff civil–military relations 4–5
appointments 19, 163; diversion Cohen, Eli 74
scheme 52; and Eshkol 195; Gaza Comer, Robert 29–30
Strip 236; and Rabin 267; return compromise formula 246–7
from Paris 158, 160 conspiracy theories 108–9, 112, 113
Barzilai, Yisrael 93, 104, 155, 187 coups: Athens 113; Damascus 61; fear
Bay of Aqaba 152–3; see also Straits of of 231–2; Syria 59
Tiran ‘Czech arm deal’ 6
Begin, Menahem Plate 14; 156, 174,
204, 206, 252, 254, 270b Damascus military coup 61
Ben-Eliezer, Aryeh 156 Dan tributary 44–6
Ben-Gurion, David Plate 1; advice on Dayan, Moshe Plate 14; 269b; 4 June
appointments 19; and Eshkol 8, meeting 252–3; on 7 April 1967 action
9–10, 15, 47; fear of military coup 104; appointed Chief of Staff 24;
207–8; and IAF deterrent 44; and appointment as Minister of Defence
Jordan 85; ‘mini-parade’ 119; on 12; argument for war 251; Atzmon
mobilization 144; National Religious plan 150; and Ben-Gurion 8; on the
Party proposal 177; nuclear blockade 156; commander of the
programme 27; Operation ‘Rotem’ southern front 210–11; consultations
122; and Rabin 265; resignation on conquered territories 258–9;
14–15; security doctrine 24; struggle defence portfolio 204–7; demilitarized
for statehood 3 zones 43; diversion scheme 51; draft
Bentov, Mordechai 140, 187, 255 proposal 255; on Egyptian
Ben Yair, Elazar 1 entrenchment 226; on Egyptian move
bilateral agreements 32 to Sinai 126; Gaza Strip 236;
blockade: Straits of Tiran 137, 152–3, instructions for General Staff 235–7;
160, 181–2, 190, 239–40, 244 on the Israeli Army vi; Jerusalem 257;
blockade testing 243 on military situation 214–15; ‘noble
border adjustments 16–19 steeds’ 292n2; on offensive action 105;
border incidents 38 operational planning 147; resignation
border infiltration defence 88–9 15, 46; security doctrine 24; Sinai
border threats: Sinai Peninsula 122–5, Campaign 4; Suez Canal 236–7
164–6 ‘declaration of maritime nations’ see
Bourguiba, Habib 60 naval escort plan
Britain: naval escort plan 191, 240–1; defence pact: Egypt and Jordan 84
and Palestine 2–4 defensive action 10, 94
British Foreign Office 304n5 defensive doctrine 23
broadcasts 195–6, 256 ‘defensive-offensive’ doctrine 23
Brown, George 240 defensive operational planning: ‘Sadan’
buffer fire 54, 75, 93 (Anvil) 144, 145–7
Bull, Odd Plate 2; 42, 63, 77, 94, 95, de Gaulle, Charles 182, 187, 221, 222,
96, 105, 116 252, 308n12
Bunche, Ralph 63 demilitarized zones 40–3, 93, 95
democratic rule 13
cables, to Eban 166–8, 171, 187 deployment 51–3
Carmel, Moshe 5, 10, 140, 178–9, 190, deterrent strategy xiii, 17–18
192, 233 Dimona reactor 14, 15, 22, 25, 27–9,
Carmon, David 105 33–6, 128–9, 138–9
ceasefire proposal: Syrian 62–3, 75 Dinstein, Zvi 15, 94, 121, 141
Chief of Staff xvii, 47; role of 9; see also diplomacy 81–2, 131–41
Dayan, Moshe; Laskov, Haim; Rabin, disinformation: Soviet 109, 114–16,
Yitzhak; Weizman, Ezer; Zur, Zvi 118, 143
Christian, George 181 diversion scheme: Jordan River 29, 43,
Chubakhin, Dimitri 82, 133, 184 44–5, 48–58
Index 319
documentation xvi European weapons supply 26–7;

Dolphin (‘test’ vessel) 250 expertise 42–3; and the General Staff
‘doves’ 205 16–18; government of Plate 5, xiii, 5;
IAF employment 45–6; Independence
eastern front 218–22 Day declarations 117; Lebanese
Eban, Abba 269–70b; 4 June meeting settlement 53; meeting 2 June 227–8;
252; cables from Eshkol 166–7, 171; meeting 4 June 253; Ministerial
and de Gaulle 166; and diplomacy Committee remarks 137–8; as
221–2; diplomatic campaign 134; Minister of Defence 9; note from
‘dove’ 205; on Israeli legations 139; Johnson 250, 252; nuclear
meeting 4 June 254; Operation programme 28–9, 30; offensive
‘Wind’ 64; postponement of military action 190; Operation ‘Wind’ 64;
action 191, 192–3; proposal for US press briefing 133; priorities 257–8;
mission 155; security policy 127; and punitive attack on Syria 99–100; and
Soviet ambassador 133; Syrian Rabin 8–9; Rabin’s Bamahaneh
campaign 125; UNEF 63 interview 80–1; security problems
Eban’s mission to US 155, 158, 160, discussion 94; on Syria 127;
166–72, 180–4, 242 terrorism problems 89–91
Efrat, Rafi 109 Eshkol government Plate 5
Egypt: 7 April 1967 action 103; arms European weapons supply 25–6
supply 22; ‘Czech arm deal’ 6; evacuation: UNEF Plate 8; xvi, 125,
invasion by (May 1948) 3; Iran and 127, 128, 129–30, 137–8, 239
110; missiles 33; movement of forces Evron, Ephraim 154, 181, 242–3
122–5, 164–6; nuclear infrastructure existential dread 6–8
22; and the PLO 66; Rabin on 20; existential threat 197
radicalization xiv–xv; Sinai xiii;
sortie over Dimona reactor 128–9; Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia xv
and Syria xiv; talks with 121; Fatah (Palestine Liberation Movement)
tripartite Union 14, 15 10, 68–9, 71–3, 82, 86, 116
Egyptian air force 214 Fawzi, Mahmoud 118, 168, 185
Egyptian–Czech arms deal 59–60 Fein, Motti 19
Egyptian missiles affair 14, 31 Feldman, Meyer 32
Egyptian–Syrian defence pact 83, 104, France: aircraft 31; embargo 310n63;
110 proposal for talks 240; relations with
Egyptian–Syrian–Iraqi Union 14, 15, 85 26, 27; weapons supplies from 36
Egypt–Jordan defence pact 216–22, ‘frontal clash’ 74–6, 79–80
233, 238 fronts: priorities 217–18
Egypt–US relations xv
Eilat 121, 194 Gahal 174
Elazar, David Plate 7; 45, 74, 76, 200 Galilee, Lake 42, 48, 77–80
Elrom, Gideon 19 Galili, Yisrael 5, 134, 138, 155–6, 190
embargoes 255 gas 144
Eretz Israel 1 Gavish, Yeshayahu Plate 12; 99, 157,
escalation 40–7, 48–58, 66–73, 106–7 162, 163, 211, 212, 224, 236
Eshet, Shalom 24; mobilization 141 Gaza Strip 3, 20, 145, 147, 149, 236
Eshkol, Levi Plates 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, Gazit, Sholmo 258
269b; appeals to Shapira 206; General Staff xvii; on the blockade
appointment as Prime Minister 153–4; composition of (1967) 12;
15–16; and Ben-Gurion 8, 9–10, 15, confrontation with Eshkol 197–8;
47; on the blockade 154, 158; Dayan’s appointment 206–7; debate
broadcast 195–6; cables to Eban on terrorism 70–1; diversion scheme
164–6; confrontation with General 51–2; Egyptian missiles 31; and
Staff 197–8; and defence portfolio Eshkol 16–18; and the government
209; on deterrence 7; Dimona issue 10–12; implications of waiting
139; on Egyptian move to Sinai 124; 198–203; influence of 228–34;
320 Index
General Staff continued 44–6; and Eshkol 8; Hawk missiles

security problems discussion 94; and 32; Operation ‘Wind’ 63–5
Syria 74; weapons supply 27 IDF (Israel Defence Force): action
‘German scientists’ affair’ 14, 31 against Syria 92–3; arms purchase
Germany 26, 29 36–7; border adjustment 17; buffer
Geva, Yosef 89, 180 fire 54; demilitarized zones 43;
Gilon, Eliyahu 162 deployment at Ain Sufira (Operation
Golan Heights 18, 54 Wind) 63–5; diversion scheme
the government: Ben-Gurion’s 14–15; incidents 53–4; establishment of 3;
composition of (1967) 11; and Hawk missiles 32; image 196;
General Staff 10–12 influence of 8, 228–34; intervention
government of national emergency see 14; and Israeli society 6; ‘offensive-
national unity government defensive’ doctrine 23; operational

Great Britain see Britain planning 145–7; Samu 85–91
Great Powers: rivalry between xvi Ilan, Uri 74
Gromyko, Andrei 114, 240 immigration 2, 3
guerrilla war: against the Germans 2; Independence Day: declarations 114,
Palestine organizations 10, 66–73; 116–18; ‘mini-parade’ 118–20
Syrian support for 92 Independent Liberals 5
Gvati, Haim 188–9 Intelligence appraisal: implications of
waiting 201–3
Hacohen, David 127, 156 intelligence evaluation 142–3; 31 May
Hadow, Michael 304n5 223–4
Hafez, Amin al- 49, 61 international armada 191, 240, 247,
Haganah defence organization 2 250–1
Hamilton, Charles 121 Iranian–Israeli connection 109–12
Hamud, Isa 68 Iranian–Soviet connection 113–15,
Harel, Isser 14, 121 114–15
Harman, Avraham 154, 181, 239, 251 Iraq: Iran and 110; tripartite Union 14,
Harriman, Averell 29–30 15
Harriman–Cromer talks 29–31 Iraqi Mig 78
Hawk missiles 25, 32 Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military
Hazan, Yaakov 105–6, 211 Organization) 2, 3
Heikal, Muhammad Hasanin 185 Israel Air Force (IAF) see IAF (Israel Air
Helms, Richard 248 Force)
Helou, Charles 53 Israel Armament Development
Herut Party 19 Authority (Rafael) 35
Herzl, Theodore 1 Israel Defence Force (IDF) see IDF
Herzog, Haim 256 (Israel Defence Force)
Herzog, Yaakov 85, 176 Israeli–Egypt relations 121
Hinawi, Sami al- 59 Israeli–German relations 14
Hirbet Kara 53, 56–7 Israeli–Jordan relations 84–91
Hod, Motti Plate 6; 76, 82, 101, Israeli–Syrian relations 48–9, 92–7
102–3, 200 Israel map xi
Hofi, Yitzhak 124, 145–6 Israel–Syria border 40–3
Holland 247 Israel–Syria talks 95–6, 105
Horev, Amos 201 Israel–US relations 27–9
Hoveyda, Abbas 109 Israel Workers Party (Mapai) see Mapai
Hussein, King 29, 84, 85, 88, 91, (Israel Workers Party)
199–200, 216, 217, 244
Hussein–Nasser pact 216–22, 233, 238 Jadid, Salah 61
Jerusalem 4, 84, 86, 90–1, 118–20,
IAF (Israel Air Force): 1 April 1967 257, 259
attack 99–107; command of 19; Jewish Brigade 2
employment in border incidents Johnson, Lyndon Plate 4; commitment
Index 321
222; and Eban 181–2; international militancy 3

‘armada’ 238, 240; and Israeli military action 51–3
nuclear programme 28; message from military coups: Athens 113; Damascus
Kosygin 190–1; messages to Eshkol 61; fear of 231–2; Syria 59
131, 135–6, 154, 250, 252; military experience 10–11
US–Egypt agreements 32–3 military leaders: and political leadership
Johnston, Eric 48 xiv
Joint Armistice Commission 95, 105 ‘mini-parade’ 118–20
Jordan 3, 14, 15, 66, 67, 99 Minister of Defence: authority of 234
Jordan–Egypt defence pact 194, missiles 25, 31–2, 33
216–22, 233, 238 mobilization 124, 141, 144–5, 158
Jordanian border 66 Mohi al-Din, Zakaria 246
Jordanian front 218–22 ‘Moked’ Operation 162, 164, 176, 194,

Jordanian option 260 256
Jordan–Israeli relations 84–91 morale 198–9, 231
Jordan water crisis see diversion scheme moratorium 186
Judean revolts 1 Mossad 14, 78
Kardom 2 plan 157, 162, 194 Nadel, Haim 218–19

‘Kardom’ (the Axe) plan 147–9 Nahal Soreq reactor 22
Kennedy, John F. 14, 15, 28 ‘Nakhshonim’ plan 150, 235–7, 256
Khalil, Mahmoud 121 Narkis, Uzi 206–7
Khirbet Kara 104 Nasser, Gamal Abdel: avoidance of war
‘Kilshon’ (Pitchfork) plan 147, 295n14, 57–8; and Baathist regime 49; and
295n15 Ben-Gurion 14; defence pact 84; and
Kol, Moshe 138 diversion scheme 55–6; meeting with
Korazim sector 53, 56–7 Anderson 246; missiles 31; and
Kosygin, Alexai 171, 184, 190 nuclear issue 34–5; speech at Bir
Gafgafa 152–3; speech to Arab Trade
Lahav, Pinhas 45 Union Confederation 185–6; troubles
Lake Galilee 42, 48, 77–80 xiv–xv; and USA 32–3, 131–2;
Landau, Haim 105 warning from US 169–70
Lapid, Yosef 13 Nasserism xiv, 110
Laskov, Haim 205 ‘national government’ 200
Lebanon 53, 56, 71, 99 National Military Organization (Irgun
Lehi (Lohamei Herut Yisrael – Israel Zvai Leumi) 2, 3
Freedom fighters) 3 National Religious Party 5, 93, 177,
Levavi, Aryeh 176 206
Lior, Yisrael 42, 81, 158 national resource allocation 7
Litani River waters 16, 18 national unity government:
appointment of Minister of Defence
McCloy, John 32 204–12; demand for 204;
McNamara, Robert 248–9 establishment 213–15
Maariv 13 National Water Carrier 44, 48–9; see
Makhous, Ibrahim 116 also diversion scheme
map, pre-1967 borders xi naval escort plan 191, 240, 247, 250–1
Mapai (Israel Workers Party) 5, 8, 10, navy 37
15, 47, 206 Neeman, Yuval 24, 258
Mapam Party 5, 93 Negev Plate 9; 194
Mardor, Monia 35–7, 76 news items 43
mass immigration 3 Nimrodi, Yaakov 109
McNamara, Robert 180, 181 ‘noble steeds’ 131
meetings: Friday 2 June 223–9; Sunday Nolte, Richard 240, 244
4 June 252–5 nuclear programme 27–9, 30, 33–6
Meir, Golda 85, 134, 156, 209 nuclear reactor 22, 25, 33
322 Index
nuclear weapons 22 ‘popular struggle’ 92

pre-emptive strikes 4–5, 16–18, 20, 22,
objectives 257 160, 165–6, 238
occupation 18, 20 pre-emptive strike theory 24–5
occupied territories 259 press briefing 133
offensive action 10 press reports 43
‘offensive-defensive’ doctrine 23–5 preventative war 24–5
offensive doctrine 18–19 public pressure 204
offensive operational planning: ‘Sadan’ punitive action: against Syria 98–107
(Anvil) 144, 145–7
offensives 258 Rabin, Yitzhak Plates 2, 3, 11, 13,
oil 109, 121 269b; on 7 April 1967 action 103–4;
Operation ‘Alpha’ 72 approach 42; argument for war 251;

Operation ‘Bluebird’ 177 Atzmon plan 149–51, 157;
Operation ‘Cliff’ 69–70 Bamahaneh interview 80–1; on the
Operation ‘Crusher’ 87 blockade 154, 155; border
Operation ‘Jewel’ 71 adjustment 16–17, 18–19; ceasefire
Operation ‘Joseph’ 72 proposal 63; as Chief of Staff 262–8;
Operation ‘Moked’ 256 collapse 153, 158, 160, 262–8;
Operation ‘Nakhshonim’ 256 condition of 211; courses of action
Operation ‘Rotem’ 122 145; credo 19–21; and Dayan
Operation ‘Scales’ 71 210–11; deputation to USA 28;
Operation ‘Stratum’ 88 diversion scheme 51–3, 57; and
Operation ‘Wind’ 63–5 Egypt 111–12; on Egyptian move to
operative planning 7–8 Sinai 126; Eshkol and 8–9, 16; Gaza
Strip 236; guerrilla warfare 70–1;
Pahlevi, Muhammed Reza 114–15 Independence Day declarations 117;
Palestine 1–4 and Iran 109–12; Kardom plan 149;
Palestine Conciliation Commission 23 Lake Galilee incident 78–9; morale of
Palestine Liberation Army 67, 68 army 198–9; Operation ‘Wind’ 64–5;
Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah) and Peres 26; policy of pacification
10, 68–9, 71–3, 82, 86, 116 55; readying for war 143–4; recovery
Palestine Liberation Organization 165, 168; relationship with
(PLO) 49, 66–8, 91 government xiii; report on military
Palestine terror units 10 situation 214; response to Johnson
Palestinian refugees 14, 23, 258 192; responsibility for failure 260–1;
Palmach 2, 11, 19 Samu operation 87, 88; security
Pargol (the Scourge) 218–22 policy 5; and Syria 74; Syrian
partition 3, 23 armistice talks 96; Syrian border
peace treaties 259 discussions 93; and terrorist activity
Peled, Elad 76 80; USA 89; and USA 29, 99;
Peled, Matti 226–7 weapons supply 27
Peres, Shimon Plates 1, 4; deterrent Rabinowitz, Alexander 89
capacity 17–18; and Eshkol 10, Radfa, Munir 78
303n40; resignation 15; and Sapir radicalization xiv–xv
188; view on war 35; weapons Rafael (Israel Armament Development
supply 25–6, 27 Authority) 35
Pitchfork plan (‘Kilshon’) 295n14, Rafi (Israel’s Workers List) Party 10,
295n15 15, 213
Plan A: diversion scheme incidents 53–4 Raphael, Gideon 134
planning: authority for 7–8 refugee problem 14, 23, 236, 246, 258,
PLO (Palestine Liberation 308n29
Organization) 49, 66–8, 91 Remez, Aharon 180
poem (Alterman) 120 reprisal raids 38, 63–5, 69–72, 105
poison gas 6 Revisionist Party 2
Index 323
revolts 1 Shazar, Zalman Plate 5

Riad, Mahmoud 240 Sherf, Zeev 141
Rikhye, Jit 129 shipping issue 133–5; see also
Rimalt, Elimelech 105, 156 blockade
riots: anti-Jewish 2; Syria 113, 116 Shishakli, Adib al- 59
Romans 1 Shukeiri, Ahmad 67, 216
Romema district terrorist activity 86, Sidki, General 105
90 Sinai 147, 257
Rostow, Eugene 154, 169, 181, 186, Sinai Campaign xiv, 4, 20, 25, 60
239 Sinai Peninsula: movement of Egyptian
Rostow, Walt 180, 181, 245 forces 122–5
Rusk, Dean 6, 28, 180, 191, 240, Sisko, Joseph 181
244–5, 248, 249–50 skirmishes 40–3

Smythe, Hugh 244
sabotage 99, 141; see also guerrilla war source material xvi
‘sabres’ 3 Southern Command’s plans 235–7
Safran, Nadav 9, 10 sovereignty 40–2, 95
Samu operation 85–91 Soviet Union: arms supply 22;
Sapir, Pinhas 138, 140, 155, 177, 188, blockade crisis 240; ‘Czech arm
205 deal’ 6; and Egypt xv;
Sapir, Yosef Plate 14; 204 Egyptian–Syria defence pact 99;
Sasson, Moshe 95 infiltration 36; and Iran 113–15;
Saudi Arabia 111, 244 and Israel xii–xiii; message to
Saunders, Harold 247–8 Eshkol 184–5; message to Johnson
Saunders report 247–8 190–1; report to Egypt 109,
Schocken, Gershom 133 114–16, 118, 143; and Syria 62, 79;
Second World War 2 and USA xvi; Yariv on 142–3
secret weapons: fear of 6 speeches: broadcast by Eshkol 195–6;
security doctrine 22–5 Nasser’s at Arab Trade Union
security funding 7 Confederation 185–6; Nasser’s at Bir
security policy 5, 7 Gafgafa 152–3
security problems xiii State of Israel: establishment of 3
security theory 5 status quo 106
Semyonov, Vladimir 82 Straits of Tiran 121, 131, 132, 135,
Serlin, Yosef 156 147; see also blockade
Shalev, Arye 59 strategic planning 7
Shapira, Anita 12 Suez Canal 236–7
Shapira, Moshe Haim 270b; on Allon Suidani, Ahmed al- 61, 62–3, 92
206; and Dayan 205–7; on Dayan Suleiman, Sidki 103, 105
212; deferment 255; Eban’s mission summit conferences: Arab (1964) 29;
155; employment of IAF 93; fear of Cairo (1964) 44, 49; Casablanca
‘hawks’ 174; Friday 2 June meeting (1965) 23, 60–1
224; Jerusalem 257; Operation Superpower intervention 171
‘Wind’ 63; proposal for USA and Syria: 7 April 1967 attack 99–107;
Britain 140; and Rabin 265–6 armistice agreement 59; arms supply
Shapira, Yaakov Shimson 190 22; ceasefire proposal 63; Damascus
Sharett, Moshe 24 coup 61; and Egypt xiv, 60; and
Sharm al-Sheikh 130, 137, 147, 257 Fatah 74–5; guerrilla warfare xii;
Sharon, Ariel Plate 12; 270–1b; Gaza hostility towards 74; Iran and 110;
Strip 236; interview 4; Kardom 2 military coups 59; settlement talks
plan 162, 163; Kardom plan 147; 95–6; and Soviet Union 62; terrorist
military coup 232; offensive stance activities 92; tripartite Union
197; on senior command 6–7; and 14, 15
Superpowers 225–6; and war Syrian–Israeli relations: deterioration
proposal 76 59–65
324 Index
Tal, Yisrael 5, 9, 147, 150, 162, 199, US–Egypt agreements 32

236 US–Egypt relations 36
Talbot, Philip 32 US–Israeli agreements 32, 37–8
tanks 29, 37
technological defence 88–9 Wahrhaftig, Zerah Plate 14; 11, 46,
Telem, Bini 77 187, 205, 254, 307n11
territorial goals 16–19, 20 waiting: implications of 198–203, 233
terrorism 89–91 War of Independence (1948) 4, 23
terrorist activity 239 water issues see diversion scheme
terrorist attacks 38, 66–73, 82, 133 water projects 18, 29, 48–9, 276n15
terror units 10 Wazir, Halil al- 68
‘test’ vessel (Dolphin) 250 weapons 22
Thant, U 125, 128, 134, 137, 239 weapons supply 25–6, 29–31
Thompson, Thomas 240 Weizman, Ezer Plates 6, 13, 270b;
Thomson, George 180, 240 aerial attack on Syria 45–6; border
Tiran Straits blockage xv, xvi expansion 17; command of IAF 19;
Tripartite Agreement 14, 15, 49, 85 confidence in IAF 189–90; defensive
deployment 89; fighter planes 30–1;
UAR (United Arab Republic) 49 independent actions 161–4; Lake
UN (United Nations) xvi, 3, 23, 79, 82 Galilee incident 79; missile purchase
UNEF (UN Emergency Force) Plate 8; 32; mobilization 158; outburst to
Bunche on 63; evacuation xvi, 125, Eshkol 212–13; and Rabin 266–7;
127, 128, 129–30, 137–8, 239; role talk with Eshkol 195
of 121 Weizmann, Chaim 1, 3
unilateral action 191 West Bank 3, 18, 20, 84–5, 218–22
United Arab Command 29, 88 White Papers: (1939) 2, 3
United Arab Republic (UAR) 49 Wilson, Harold 182
United Nations (UN) xvi, 3, 23, 79, 82 Wingate, Charles Orde 2
United States of America (USA) see World War II 2
USA (United States of America)
UN partition plan 3, 23 Yaffe, Avraham 147, 162, 163, 225
Un Security Council 116 Yamani, Zaki 244
UN Truce Supervision Observers’ force Yariv, Aharon 270b; dialogue with
xvi, 40, 42 USA 28; Dimona reactor 128; on
uprisings 1 Egyptian deployment 142–3, 186–7,
‘urban line’ 84 199–200, 201, 252, 254; on Hussein
USA (United States of America): 88; Independence Day declarations
abortive initiatives 32–3; approach 117–18; intelligence evaluation (31
238–40; collaboration agreement 99; May) 223–4; pre-emptive strike
compromise formula 246–7; 165–6; reactions to 7 April 103;
diplomacy 131–3, 135–6; Eban’s Soviet influence 62, 82; and Syria 75,
mission 158, 160, 166–72, 180–4; 79; US stance 223–4; visit to Europe
and Egypt 57–8, 245–6; Intelligence 96–7; water struggle 55
evaluation 241–2; Israel’s fears 6; Yemen War xv, 55, 58, 112–13
Jordan–Egypt defence pact 217; Yishuv 2
Jordanian arms deal 29, 30; messages Yisraeli, Haim 257
from Arab capitals 243–5; naval Yost, Charles 245
escort plan 191, 247; nuclear
programme 27–9; policy 136; Zaim, Husni al- 59
relations with 14, 15; Saunders Ze’evi, Rehavam 11, 94, 201, 236, 258
report 247–8; and Soviet Union xvi; Zeira, Eli 295n6
technological defence 88–9; warning Zionist Movement 1, 3
to Egypt 169–70, 183; weapons Zur, Zvi Plates 2, 3, 10, 16, 26
supply 25–31
Plate 1 Ben-Gurion takes his leave of the Ministry of Defence – flanked by his successor
Levi Eshkol and the Deputy Minister of Defence, Shimon Peres (28 June 1963).
Plate 2 Chief of Staff Zvi Zur welcoming the new CO of the UN Truce Supervision
Organization, Norwegian General Odd Bull. Between them: Deputy Chief of
Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Intelligence Chief Meir Amit (6 June 1963).
Plate 3 Prime Minister Eshkol announces the handover of command of the IDF from Zvi
Zur to Yitzhak Rabin (31 December 1963).
Plate 4 Prime Minister Eshkol presents Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres to
President Lyndon Johnson at a reception at the White House (1 June 1964).
Plate 5 The Eshkol government with President Zalman Shazar after taking the oath of
office in the Knesset (12 January 1966).
Plate 6 Ezer Weizman handing over command of the IAF to Motti Hod (26 April 1966).
Plate 7 Eshkol and CO Northern Command David Elazar examining the damage inflicted
by the heavy Syrian shelling of Kibbutz Gadot (8 April 1967).
Plate 8 Observers from the UNEF dismantling the Erez border point before their evacu-
ation from Egypt (19 May 1967).
Plate 9 Israeli tank crews mounting tanks somewhere in the Negev during pre-war
training (20 May 1967).
Plate 10 Eshkol addressing the Knesset several hours before Nasser’s announcement of
the blocking of the Tiran Straits. ‘We have no plans to attack’, he said (22 May
1967).
Plate 11 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Labour Minister Yigal Allon and Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin touring IDF divisions in the Negev (25 May 1967).
Plate 12 Deputy Chief of Staff Haim Barlev, CO Thirty-eighth Division Ariel Sharon and
CO Southern Command Yeshayahu Gavish during the ‘waiting period’ (1 June
1967).
Plate 13 Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, Deputy Chief of Staff Haim Barlev and Operations
Chief Ezer Weizman (3 June 1967).
Plate 14 The new ministers in the National Unity government: (l to r) Defence Minister
Moshe Dayan and Ministers without Portfolio Yosef Sapir and Menahem Begin.
Beside Dayan, half hidden: Zerah Wahrhaftig (4 June 1967).

The Israeli Military and The Origins of The 1967 War - Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-67

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Israeli Military and The Origins of The 1967 War - Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-67

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Israeli Military and The Origins of The 1967 War - Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-67

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Downloaded by [INFLIBNET Centre] at 05:22 29 August 2012

The Israeli Military and the

Government, armed forces and

First published 2007

ISBN 0-203-96596-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–39245–4 (hbk)

‘The Israeli army is called a “defense force” but it is not a defensive

1 Personnel changes in the defence establishment 14

2 Basic security issues 22

3 Escalation – Stage 1: from skirmishes in the

4 Escalation – Stage 2: diversion 48

5 The dispute with Syria worsens 59

6 Escalation – Stage 3: ‘harassment’ 66

7 The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’ 74

8 Israel–Jordan: the Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian

9 The clash with Syria approaches 92

11 The trigger 108

12 The start of the crisis 121

13 The era of diplomacy 131

14 The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift

15 Casus belli 152

16 The army pressures the government 160

17 The politicians’ quandary 173

18 The height of the diplomatic campaign – and the

20 Establishment of a national unity government:

21 The strategic turning point: the Egypt–Jordan

22 The decisive meeting in the Pit: the Ministerial

23 The decisive stage: war 238

Appendix: what happened to Yitzhak Rabin? 262

3 Border incidents by sector – 1 January 1964 to 5 June

Tel Aviv Bank Amman

Map 1 Israel and its neighbours – pre-1967 borders.

The Arab–Israeli war of 1967 transformed the Middle Eastern political

that Israel was planning to launch an attack on Syria. Egypt hastened to

downhill slide into war.

The Arab states

halting the large-scale dispatch of surplus foodstuffs to Egypt, the latter’s

The Powers and the UN

the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine,

erupted against the background of a wave of Jewish immigration from

new generation of ‘sabras’ (native-born Jews), with a militant activist

In the post-Holocaust Jewish community the prevailing mood was militant

A number of researchers have studied the Israeli military, its operations

In a democracy there is a division of functions: the politicians examine

Security theory and security policy

Existential dread – and public faith in the army

‘When I served in the army’, he declared, ‘I don’t recall a single

The government’s approach to security policy during this period was

Ben-Gurion vs. Eshkol; Eshkol vs. Rabin

Eshkol was also weakened by his gradually evolving rancorous dispute

The General Staff vs. the government

Table 1 Composition of the Israeli government – 1967

Name Party Portfolio Year of Country

Levi Eshkol* Mapai PM and Minister of 1895 Ukraine

Table 2 Composition of the IDF General Staff – 1967

Yitzhak Rabin⫹ Chief of Staff 1922 Native born

Yisrael Tal CO Armoured Corps 1924 Native born