CAAT GM OPS FDAP Guidance Material For Flight Data Analysis Programme Rev.0

Intentionally Left Blank
Flight Data Analysis Programme
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................................3
Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................................4
0. Introduction....................................................................................................................................................5
0.1 Background .............................................................................................................................................5
0.2 Purpose ...................................................................................................................................................5
0.3 Applicability ............................................................................................................................................5
0.4 Reference................................................................................................................................................5
1. Use of Flight Data Analysis Programme .........................................................................................................6
1.1 General ...................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 FDAP Description ....................................................................................................................................6
1.3 FDAP Reporting.......................................................................................................................................7
1.4 FDAP Policy .............................................................................................................................................7
1.5 Summary .................................................................................................................................................7
2. Flight Data Analysis Programme Description .................................................................................................8
2.1 FDAP Overview .......................................................................................................................................8
2.2 FDAP Equipment .....................................................................................................................................8
2.3 Processing of FDA Data ...........................................................................................................................9
2.4 Analysis and Follow-up ........................................................................................................................ 11
3. Prerequisites for and as Effective FDAP ...................................................................................................... 12
3.1 Protection/ De-identification of FDA Data and Follow-up .................................................................. 12
3.2 Policy in Access/ Retention/ Recovery of Data.................................................................................... 12
3.3 Education and Communication ........................................................................................................... 12
3.4 Requisite Safety Culture ...................................................................................................................... 13
4. Establishing and Implementing an FDAP..................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Implementation Plan ........................................................................................................................... 14
4.2 Aims and Objectives of an FDAP.......................................................................................................... 14
4.3 FDAP Team........................................................................................................................................... 15
5. Continuous Improvement ........................................................................................................................... 17
6. FDAP Procedure Documentation ................................................................................................................ 18
6.1 Disclosure Prevention .......................................................................................................................... 18
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................................................... 19
Example of FDAP Events .............................................................................................................................. 19
Appendix B........................................................................................................................................................ 29
General FDAP Management Flowchart ....................................................................................................... 29
Revision 00, 09-Nov-2021 3

Abbreviations
Abbreviations Meaning
AAL Above Aerodrome Level
AGL Above Ground Level - measured by aircraft’s radio altimeter
AOC Air Operator Certificate
AOCR Air Operator Cer�ﬁcate Requirements
ATC Air Traffic Control
CAAT The Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand
FDA Flight Data Analysis
FDAP Flight Data Analysis Program
FDM Flight Data Monitoring UK CAA’s term for ﬂight data analysis program
and its systema�c use as a quality and safety monitor (may be used in
lieu of the term FDAP).
FDR Flight Data Recorder - normally the crash recorder
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance - FAA’s term for flight data analysis
program and its systematic use as a quality and safety monitor (may be
used in lieu of the term FDAP).
GRAF Ground Replay and Analysis Facility – Teledyne Controls - Flight Data
Company - FDR data replay and analysis software
HOR Helicopter Opera�ons Requirements
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audit
QAR Quick Access Recorder - secondary recorder with a removable recording
medium - traditionally tape, now moving towards Optical Disk or solid
state
SMS Safety Management System
SOP Standard Operating Procedure

0. Introduction
0.1 Background
Flight Data Analysis Program (FDAP) Guidance Material (GM) is issued by the Civil Aviation Authority of
Thailand (CAAT) from time to time to provide practical guidance or certainty in respect of the statutory
requirements for aviation safety. GM contain information regarding standards, practices and procedures
acceptable to CAAT. GM may be used, in accordance with AOCR Chapter 1, 11.3, 11.4 and HOR 9.7, to
demonstrate compliance with a statutory requirement.
0.1.1 As required by AOCR, the AOC holder of an aeroplane of a certificated take-off mass in
excess of 27,000 kg shall establish and maintain a FDAP as part of its safety management system
(SMS). The FDAP shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of
the data.
Note: An operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme to another
party while retaining overall responsibility for the maintenance of such a programme.
0.1.2 As required by HOR, the AOC holder of helicopter operated offshore operations. When
conducting CAT operations with a helicopter equipped with a flight data recorder, the operator shall
establish and maintain FDM system, as part of its integrated management system, by 1 January 2019.
The FDM system shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of
the data.
0.1.3 Flight Data Analysis (FDA) will enable the AOC holder to identify potential hazards to flight
operations. The AOC holder may, based on analysis of flight data, amend Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and policy to manage its risks.
0.1.4 This GM guides the AOC holder on the set up of a FDAP that is integrated within the safety
assurance component, with emphasis on data protection, de-identification and cultivation of a
positive safety culture.
0.1.5 The flight data analysis programme shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards
to protect the source(s) of the data in accordance with Appendix 3 to Annex 19.
0.2 Purpose
This GM provides to demonstrate compliance with, and information related to, requirements regarding the
implementation of a Flight Data Analysis Programme (FDAP).
0.3 Applicability
This GM is applicable for the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holder conducting operations under Thai AOCR
and HOR.
0.4 Reference
0.4.1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual
0.4.2 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 10000 Manual on Flight Data Analysis
Programmes (FDAP)
0.4.3 EASA AMC/GM to Annex III (Part-ORO)
0.4.4 UK Civil Aviation Authority CAP 739 (Flight Data Monitoring), second edition dated June 2013.

1. Use of Flight Data Analysis Programme

1.1 General
FDAPs should be used to identify systemic causes for deviation from standard operations. They can detect
adverse trends in any part of the flight regime and when integrated within a SMS, it will allow an AOC holder
to:
1.1.1 identify operational safety trends and areas of operational risk and, quantify safety margins;
1.1.2 identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting occurrences of non-standard, unusual
or unsafe circumstances;
1.1.3 use the FDAP information on the frequency of such occurrences, combined with an
estimation of the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which may become
unacceptable if the discovered trend continues;
1.1.4 put in place risk mitigating measures to address unacceptable risk that has been identified;
and
1.1.5 monitor effectiveness of a particular risk mitigating measure.
1.2 FDAP Description

1.2.1 An FDAP may be described as a non-punitive programme for routine collection and analysis
of flight data to develop objective and predictive information for advancing safety, e.g. through
improvements in flight crew performance, training effectiveness, operational procedures, maintenance
and engineering, and air traffic control (ATC) procedures.
1.2.2 FDA involves:
a) capturing and analysing flight data to determine if the flight deviated from a safe
operating envelope;
b) identifying trends;
c) promoting action to correct potential problems.
1.2.3 Deviations of more than certain predetermined values, called “exceedances”, are flagged and
evaluated. The FDA team will propose and evaluate corrective actions, as well as produce exceedances
aggregation over time to determine and monitor trends. FDA also allows for early identification of
aircraft system degradation for maintenance action.
1.2.4 Engine monitoring programmes may utilize FDAP data for reliable trend analysis, as manually
coded engine data are limited in terms of accuracy, timeliness and reliability. It is also possible to
monitor other aspects of the airframe and systems.

1.3 FDAP Reporting

1.3.1 AOCR Chapter2 Item 17 states that Operators and pilots-in-command of Thai registered
aircraft are required to report accidents, incidents or occurrences which endangers, or unless corrected
would have endangered the flight crew and passenger and aircraft
1.3.2 The reportable safety matters (or commonly known as Mandatory Occurrence Report,
“MOR”). MOR incidents detected by FDAP should therefore normally be reported by the crew in
accordance with the established procedures. If the MOR incident is not already reported, the AOC
holder should ensure that the MOR report is made immediately. Protocols signed between the AOC
holder and crew member representatives regarding FDAP should clearly explain this requirement.
1.4 FDAP Policy

1.4.1 The protocol referred to in paragraph 1.3.2 should include an agreed policy on FDA data de-
identification before it is needed in extreme circumstances. The AOC holder should provide clear and
binding assurance on the nondisclosure of individuals who may be identified through the data
collected. There may be exceptions such as when the AOC holder, or a flight crew member, believes
that there is a continuing unacceptable safety risk if specific action regarding a flight crew member is
not taken. In such a case an identification and follow-up action procedure, previously agreed to before
the particular event, can be applied. There should be an initial stage during which the data can be
identified to allow confidential follow up by the crew representative or trusted individual agreed to by
the AOC holder and the flight crew. Strict rules of access should be enforced during this period. In the
case where a MOR is required, any data retained by the programme may not be de-identified or
removed from the system prior to the investigation or confirmation.
1.4.2 It is important that FDAPs are non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the
source(s) of the data according to CAAT requirement no. 32 Protection of Safety Data and Safety
Information.
1.5 Summary
FDAPs offer a wide spectrum of applications for safety management. Furthermore, it also offers the benefit
of improving operational efficiency and economy that compensate the needed investment. The objective is
to:
1.5.1 determine operating norms;
1.5.2 identify potential and actual hazards in operating procedures, fleets, aerodromes, ATC
procedures, etc.;
1.5.3 identify trends;
1.5.4 monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions taken;
1.5.5 provide data to conduct cost-benefit analyses;
1.5.6 optimize training procedures; and
1.5.7 provide actual rather than presumed performance measurement for risk management
purposes.

2. Flight Data Analysis Programme Description

2.1 FDAP Overview
2.1.1 The quality and capability of an operator’s FDAP will be dependent on the selection,
availability of flight parameters, and the quick access recorder’s (QAR’s) availability. The selected flight
parameters should be relevant and appropriate to reflect the safety, quality or risk level of the process
thereby providing a performance track. The FDAP is not a one-size-fit-all programme. Depending on
availability of resources, technology, complexity and size of operation, the FDAP may need to be
tailored to suit the needs of the organisation. Briefly, the FDAP would consist of an on-board device to
record data and a means to transfer the recorded data to a processing system. Thereafter, software is
needed to process the data for analysis, and if desired, to develop flight animation for stakeholders’
analyses and crew debriefing.
2.1.2 As part of an operator's SMS safety assurance processes, an FDAP will have identified
indicators or parameters chosen for measuring and monitoring the operator's safety performance,
including “operational events”. These events may be low consequence (deviation, non-compliance
events) or high consequence safety performance indicators (accident and serious incident rates). Such
data are routinely fed into or part of the safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS).
2.2 FDAP Equipment

2.2.1 FDAP generally involve systems that capture flight data, transform the data into an
appropriate format for analysis, and generate reports and visualisation to assist in assessing the data.
Typically, the following equipment capabilities are needed for effective FDAP programmes:
a) an on-board device to capture and record data on a wide range of in-flight parameters;
b) a means to transfer the data recorded on board the aircraft to a ground-based
processing station;
c) a ground-based computer system to analyse the data, identify deviations from expected
performance, generate reports to assist in interpreting the read-outs, etc.; and
d) optional software for a flight animation capability to integrate all data, presenting them
as a simulation of in-flight conditions, thereby facilitating visualisation of actual events.
2.2.2 Airborne Equipment
a) The flight parameters and recording capacity required for flight data recorders (FDR) to
support accident investigations may be insufficient to support an effective FDAP. Other
technical solutions are available, including the following:
i. Quick access recorders (QARs). QARs are installed in the aircraft and record flight
data onto a low-cost removable medium.
ii. some systems automatically download the recorded information via secure
wireless systems when the aircraft is in the vicinity of the gate. There are also
systems that enable the recorded data to be analysed on board while the aircraft
is airborne.
b) Fleet composition, route structure and cost considerations will determine the most
cost-effective method of removing the data from the aircraft.

2.2.3 Ground Replay and Analysis Equipment

a) Data are downloaded from the aircraft recording device into a ground-based processing
station, where the data are held securely to protect this sensitive information.
b) FDAP generate large amounts of data requiring specialised analysis software.
c) The analysis software checks the downloaded flight data for abnormalities.
d) The analysis software may include: annotated data trace displays, engineering unit
listings, visualisation for the most significant incidents, access to interpretative material,
links to other safety information and statistical presentations.
2.3 Processing of FDA Data

2.3.1 The operator's SMS assurance processes would also have procedures for corrective or follow-
up action to be taken when targets are not achieved and/or alert levels are breached that are set for
each of the performance indicators/parameters.
2.3.2 Exceedance detection, such as deviations from flight manual limits or SOPs, is one way of
extracting information from flight data. A set of core events/parameters establishes the main areas of
interest to an operator.
2.3.3 Exceedance detection, An AOC holder can select exceedance parameters for its FDA data
detection system to suit their operation. Examples of exceedances are:
a) excessive pitch on take-off;
b) climb out speed low or high during take-off;
c) stall warning;
d) ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning;
e) flap limit speed exceedance;
f) excessive rate of descent below 1000 feet. The value of tracking exceedance data is it
provides factual information which complement crew and engineering reports.
g) fast approach;
h) high/low on glide slope; and
i) heavy landing
2.3.4 Exceedance data provides factual information which complement crew and engineering
reports. Examples of exceedances are:
a) Reduced flap landing;
b) hard landings;
c) emergency descent;
d) engine failure;
e) rejected take-off;
f) go-around;
g) airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS); or
h) GPWS warning and system malfunctions.
2.3.5 Routine Measurements

A selection of routine parameters can also be extracted to analyse trends or tendencies and areas safety
interest, where a system defining what is normal practice. This may be accomplished by retaining
various snapshots of information from each flight. The examples may be categorized as
a) Flight parameters monitored such as Take-off weight; flap setting; temperature;
rotation and lift-off speeds versus scheduled speeds; maximum pitch rate and attitude
during rotation; and gear retraction speeds, heights and times.
b) Comparative analyses such as pitch rates from high versus low take-off weights;
unstable approaches; and touchdowns points on short versus long runways.
Note: In the examples above, the measurements could result in correcting handling
techniques
2.3.6 Statistics
Series of data collected to support the analysis process: this technique should include the number of
flights flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.
2.3.7 Incident Investigation
FDAPs provide valuable information for incident investigations and for follow-up of other technical
reports. Quantifiable recorded data extracted may be useful to enhance recall by the flight crew. FDAP
data also provide accurate indication of system status and performance, which may assist to determine
the causal factors of the incident and effect relationships.
Examples of incidents where recorded flight data could be useful: High cockpit workload conditions as
corroborated by such indicators as:
a) late descent;
b) late localizer and/or glide slope interception;
c) large heading change below a specific height;
d) late landing configuration;
e) unstabilized and rushed approaches, glide path excursions, etc.;
f) exceedances of prescribed operating limitations (such as flap limit speeds, engine over-
temperatures); and
g) wake vortex encounters, low-level wind shear, turbulence encounters or other vertical
accelerations.
2.3.8 Continuing Airworthiness
Both routine measurements and exceedances can be utilized to assist the continuing airworthiness
function. FDAP data also could be used for technical monitoring programmes for impending failure
prediction and maintenance scheduling. Examples are:
a) engine deterioration programmes look at measures of engine performance to
determine operating efficiency, predict impending failures and assist in maintenance
scheduling.; and
b) brake and landing gear usage.

2.3.9 Integrated Safety Analysis

All the data gathered in an FDAP should be integrated in a central safety database. By linking an FDAP
database to other safety databases (such as incident reporting systems and technical fault reporting
systems), a more complete understanding of events becomes possible through cross-referencing the
various sources of information. Care should be taken, however, to safeguard the confidentiality of FDA
data when linking the data to identified data.
Example: A heavy landing results in a flight crew report, an FDA exceedance and an engineering report.
The flight crew report provides the context, the FDA exceedance provides the quantitative description
and the engineering report provides the result
2.4 Analysis and Follow-up

2.4.1 Overviews and summaries of FDA data should be compiled on a regular basis, to identify
specific exceedances and emerging undesirable trends and to disseminate the information to flight
crews. Revision to operating and flight manuals and changes to ATC and aerodrome operating
procedures could also be outcomes of FDA data analysis.
2.4.2 De-identified FDA data should be archived as these over times can provide a picture of
emerging trends and hazards in their analyses.
2.4.3 Lessons learned from an FDAP may warrant inclusion in the company’s safety promotion
activities. Care is required, however, to ensure that any information acquired through FDA is de-
identified before using it in any training or promotional initiative unless permission is given by all the
crew members involved. Care should also be taken that, in order to avoid an exceedance, flight crews
do not attempt to “fly the FDA profile” rather than follow SOPs. Such a behavior would have a negative
impact on safety.
2.4.4 A proper value should be programmed for trigger and exceedance and designed to include
an acceptable buffer that will disregard minor deviation, spurious events, as well as introduce an
adequate operational margin to fly the aeroplane through SOPs, instead of leading the flight crew to
focus on FDA parameters in order to avoid deviations.
2.4.5 As in any closed-loop process, follow-up monitoring is required to assess the effectiveness of
any corrective actions taken. Flight crew feedback is essential for the identification and resolution of
safety problems and could include answering the following example questions:
a) Is the implementation of corrective actions adequate and effective?
b) Are the risks mitigated, or unintentionally transferred to another part of the operations?
c) Have new problems been introduced into the operation as a result of implementing
corrective actions?
2.4.6 All events are usually archived in a database. The database is used to sort, validate and display
the data in easy-to-understand management reports. Over time, this archived data can provide a
picture of emerging trends and hazards that would otherwise go unnoticed.
2.4.7 All successes and failures should be recorded, comparing planned programme objectives with
expected results. This provides a basis for review of an FDAP and the foundation for future programme
development.

3. Prerequisites for and as Effective FDAP

3.1 Protection/ De-identification of FDA Data and Follow-up
3.1.1 The protection of safety data, tenet under SMS, applies also to FDA captured under the FDAP.
This is very significant in the context of an FDAP. Data protection can be optimised by:
a) adhering to the protocols between management and the flight crews, where available;
b) strictly limiting data access to selected individuals in the FDAP team;
c) maintaining tight control to ensure that data identifying a specific flight are kept secure;
d) ensuring that operation problems are promptly addressed by management; and
e) to the extent possible, non-reversible de-identification of the flight data files after a
time appropriate for their analysis.
3.1.2 For similar reasons, there should be a well-structured de-identification system to protect the
confidentiality of the data under the FDAP. FDA data should be de-identified by those allocated for the
role before it is used in training programmes, fleet meetings or incident reviews unless permission is
given by all the crew members involved. Those responsible should clearly understand that any closure
of identities for purposes other than safety management can compromise the required cooperation of
the affected flight crew in clarifying and/or documenting and event.
3.1.3 As in any closed-loop process, follow-up monitoring is required to assess the effectiveness of
any corrective actions taken. For example, if the FDAP picks up a proliferation of high rates-of-descent
events at low levels on the approach, proposals from those responsible for corrective action should be
closely monitored to establish that there is tangible evidence or reduction in the frequency of these
events.
3.2 Policy in Access/ Retention/ Recovery of Data

3.2.1 Due to the large volumes of data involved, it is important that a strategy for data access and
security, both online and offline is carefully developed to meet the needs of FDAP user. In many cases
engineering is involved in data retrieval from the aircraft. Policy on access and security must be written
down clearly to cover instances like these.
3.2.2 There should be data recovery strategy to ensure a sufficiently representative capture of
flight information to maintain a current over view of operations. Data recovery should take place in a
timely manner to acquire knowledge of immediate safety issues, the identification of operational issues
and to facilitate and necessary operational investigation before crew memories of event can fade.
3.3 Education and Communication

The objectives and the safety recommendations evolving from the FDAP should be visible to all stakeholders
if the system is to receive the desire buy-in. Newsletters, flight safety magazines, highlighting examples in
training and simulator exercises, periodic reports to industry and regulatory authority are some to achieve
efficient communication and dissemination of such information.

3.4 Requisite Safety Culture

Indicators of an effective safety culture typically include:
3.4.1 top management’s demonstrated commitment to promoting a proactive safety culture;
3.4.2 a non-punitive operator policy that covers the FDAP;
3.4.3 FDAP management by dedicated staff under the authority of the safety manager, with a high
degree of specialisation and logistical support;
3.4.4 involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when identifying and assessing the risks
(for example, pilots experienced on the aircraft type being analysed);
3.4.5 monitoring fleet trends aggregated from numerous operations, not focusing only on specific
events;
3.4.6 a well-structured system to protect the confidentiality of the data; and
3.4.7 an efficient communication system for disseminating hazard information (and subsequent
risk assessments) internally and to other organisations to permit timely safety action.

4. Establishing and Implementing an FDAP

4.1 Implementation Plan
4.1.1 Typically, the following steps are required to be taken by the AOC holder to implement an
FDAP:
a) management approval of programme;
b) implementation of formal agreement between management and flight crews;
c) identification of FDAP team, selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff
to operate the programme.
4.2 Aims and Objectives of an FDAP

4.2.1 As with any project there is a need to define the direction and objectives of the work. A
phased approach is recommended so that the foundations are in place for possible subsequent
expansion into other areas. Using a building block approach will allow expansion, diversification and
evolution through experience.
Example: with a modular system, begin by looking at basic safety-related issues only. Add engine health
monitoring, etc. in the second phase. Ensure compatibility with other systems.
4.2.2 A staged set of objectives starting from the first week’s replay and moving through early
production reports into regular routine analysis will contribute to a sense of achievement as milestones
are met.
Examples of short-term, medium-term and long-term goals:
a) Short-term goals:
i. establish data download procedures, test replay software and identify aircraft
defects;
ii. validate and investigate exceedance data; and
iii. establish a user-acceptable routine report format to highlight individual
exceedances and facilitate the acquisition of relevant statistics.
b) Medium-term goals:
i. produce an annual report — include key performance indicators;
ii. add other modules to the analysis (e.g. continuing airworthiness); and
iii. plan for the next fleet to be added to programme.
c) Long-term goals:
i. network FDAP information across all of the operator’s safety information systems;
ii. ensure FDAP provision for any proposed alternative training and qualification
programme (ATQP); and
iii. use utilisation and condition monitoring to reduce spares holdings.
4.2.3 Initially, focusing on a few known areas of interest will help prove the system’s effectiveness.
In contrast to an undisciplined ‘scatter-gun’ approach, a focused approach is more likely to gain early
success.

4.3 FDAP Team

4.3.1 Preferably, the responsibility of the Safety Manager should include the implementation of
the FDAP and must ensure that trends analysed and mitigation measures must be transmitted to the
relevant parties. The team should comprise the following entities
a) Team leader
It is essential that the team leader earns the trust and full support of both management
and flight crews. He/she acts independently of others in line management to make
recommendations that will be seen by all to have a high level of integrity and
impartiality. The individual requires good analytical, presentation and management
skills. He/she should be the safety manager or placed under the authority of the safety
manager.
b) Flight operations representative/s
This is person/s is usually an experienced pilot on the aircraft type and operation. This
team member’s in-depth knowledge of SOPs, aircraft handling characteristics, training
concepts, airports and routes will be used to place the FDA data in a credible context.
c) Technical representative/s
The person/s interprets FDA data with respect to the technical aspects of the aircraft
operation and is familiar with the power plan, structures and systems departments’
requirements for information and any other engineering monitoring programmes in
use by the AOC holder.
d) Flight crew contact person
The person could be a pilot association officer. He is person usually assigned by the AOC
holder for this responsibility. The position requires good people skills and a positive
attitude towards safety education. The flight crew contact person should be the only
person permitted to connect the identifying data with the event. The flight crew
contact person requires the trust of both flight crew members and managers for his/her
integrity and good judgement. He should be trained in using FDA data animation for
debriefing purposes.
e) Engineering technical support
This person/s is usually an avionics specialist, involved in the supervision of FDR
serviceability. Indeed, an FDAP can be used to monitor the quality of flight parameters
sent both to FDR and to the FDA recorder, and thus ensure the continued serviceability
of the FDR. This team member should be knowledgeable about FDA and the associated
systems needed to run the programme.
f) Air safety coordinator
This person cross-references FDA information with other safety data sources (such as
the company’s mandatory or confidential incident reporting programme, crew
resource management and LOSA) and with the AOC holder’s SMS, creating a credible
integrated context and information. This function can reduce duplication to follow-up
investigations.

g) Replay operative and administrator

This person is responsible to the day-to-day running of the system, producing reports
and analyses, Methodical, with some knowledge of general operating environment,
this person keeps the programme moving. AOC holders may utilise the services of a
specialist contractor to operate an FDAP.
4.3.2 This team should be involved in all the ensuring steps:
a) development of a FDAP business plan, including processes, software and hardware and
assignment of adequate resources;
b) establishment and verification of operational and security procedures;
c) development of an FDAP procedures manual;
d) assessment of possible interfaces between an FDAP and other safety data sources of
integration of an FDAP into the SMS;
e) selection of equipment (airborne, ground-based computer system, interface with other
data sources and the SMS);
f) selection and training of the FDAP team members, according to their respective roles;
g) testing of data transfer, testing of the ground-based computer system (including data
acquisition, definition of trigger logic expression, alerts, data analysis and visualization,
data de-identification, final storage of data);
h) testing if data security, including security procedures;
i) identification of areas of interest that should be first looked at in the data;
j) checking of the proper decoding and of the quality of flight parameters used by an FDAP;
and
k) start of data analysis and validation, focused on key areas in operation.

5. Continuous Improvement
New safety issues identified and published by other organisations, such as safety investigation reports, safety
bulletins by the aircraft manufacturer of safety issues identified by aviation authorities should be assessed for
inclusion in a corresponding monitoring activity of an FDAP.
The FDA processes and procedures should be amended when an FDAP matures and each time there are
changed in the operations, the internal organization of the AOC holder, or the interface with other data
sources and processes

6. FDAP Procedure Documentation

6.1 Disclosure Prevention
The FDAP procedure document, or memorandum of understanding (MOU), to prevent disclosure of crew
identity should be written in a document is to be signed by all parties (airline management including the Flight
Safety Manager and the Accountable Manager, flight crew member representatives nominated by the pilot
union and the pilot association) will, as a minimum define:
6.1.1 The aim of the FDAP;
6.1.2 A data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to specifically
authorised persons identified by their position;
6.1.3 The method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require specific
flight follow-up for contextual information; where such crew contact is required the authorised persons
need not necessarily be the program manager, or safety manager, but could be a third party (broker)
mutually acceptable to flight crew members representative and management;
6.1.4 The data retention policy and accountability including the measures taken to ensure the
security of the data;
6.1.5 The conditions under which, on the rare occasions, advisory briefing or remedial training
should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner;
6.1.6 The conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn (e.g. for reasons of gross
negligence or significant continuing safety concern);
6.1.7 The participation of flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the data, the
action and review process and the consideration of recommendations; and
6.1.8 The policy for the publishing the findings resulting from the FDAP.

Appendix A
Example of FDAP Events
A.1 Table 1 provides examples of FDAP events that may be further developed using operator and
aeroplane specific limits. More important than the number of FDAP event definitions that are
programmed in the FDA software is that those definitions cover, as much as practicable, the operational
risks that have been identified by the operator.
Event Group Description

Rejected take-off High speed rejected take-off
Take-off pitch Pitch rate low or high on take-off
Pitch attitude high during take-off
Unstick speeds Unstick speed high
Unstick speed low
Height loss in climb-out Initial climb height loss 20 ft above ground level
(AGL) to 400 ft above aerodrome level (AAL)
Initial climb height loss 400 ft to 1 500 ft AAL
Slow climb-out Excessive time to 1 000 ft AAL after take-off
Climb-out speeds Climb-out speed high below 400 ft AAL
Climb-out speed high 400 ft AAL to 1 000 ft AAL
Climb-out speed low 35 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL
Climb-out speed low 400 ft AAL to 1 500 ft AAL
High rate of descent High rate of descent below 2 000 ft AGL
Missed approach Missed approach below 1 000 ft AAL
Missed approach above 1 000 ft AAL
Low approach Low on approach
Glideslope Deviation under glideslope
Deviation above glideslope (below 600 ft AGL)
Approach power Low power on approach
Approach speeds Approach speed high within 90 seconds of
touchdown
Approach speed high below 500 ft AAL
Approach speed high below 50 ft AGL
Approach speed low within 2 minutes of
touchdown
Landing flap Late land flap (not in position below 500 ft AAL)
Reduced flap landing
Flap load relief system operation
Landing pitch Pitch attitude high on landing
Pitch attitude low on landing
Bank angles Excessive bank below 100 ft AGL
Excessive bank 100 ft AGL to 500 ft AAL
Excessive bank above 500 ft AGL
Excessive bank near ground (below 20 ft AGL)
Normal acceleration High normal acceleration on ground

Event Group Description

High normal acceleration in flight flaps up (+/-
increment)
High normal acceleration in flight flaps down
(+/- increment)
High normal acceleration at landing
Abnormal configuration Take-off configuration warning
Early configuration change after take-off (flap)
Speed brake with flap
Speed brake on approach below 800 ft AAL
Speed brake not armed below 800 ft AAL
Ground proximity warning Ground proximity warning system (GPWS)
operation - hard warning
GPWS operation — soft warning
GPWS operation — windshear warning
GPWS operation — false warning
Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II) ACAS operation — Resolution Advisory
warning
Margin to stall/buffet Stick shake
False stick shake
Reduced lift margin except near ground
Reduced lift margin at take-off
Low buffet margin (above 20 000 ft)
Aircraft flight manual limitations Maximum operating speed limit (VMO)
exceedance
Maximum operating speed limit (MMO)
exceedance
Flap placard speed exceedance
Gear down speed exceedance
Gear selection up/down speed exceedance
Flap/slat altitude exceedance
Maximum operating altitude exceedance

A.2 Table 2 provides examples of FDAP event definitions that may be further developed using
operator- and helicopter-specific limits. This table is considered illustrative and non-exhaustive. More
important than the number of FDAP event definitions that are programmed in the FDA software is that
those definitions cover, as much as practicable, the operational risks that have been identified by the
operator.
Event title/description Parameters required Comments

Ground
Outside air temperature (OAT) OAT To identify when the
high — Operating limits helicopter is operated at the
limits of OAT.
Sloping-ground high-pitch Pitch attitude, ground switch To identify when the
attitude (similar) helicopter is operated at the
slope limits.
Sloping-ground high-roll Roll attitude, ground switch To identify when the
attitude (similar) helicopter is operated at the
slope limits.
Rotor brake on at an excessive Rotor brake discreet, NR To identify when the rotor
number of rotations (main brake is applied at too high
rotor speed) (NR) NR.
Ground taxiing speed — max Ground speed (GS), ground To identify when the
switch (similar) helicopter is ground taxied at
high speed (wheeled
helicopters only).
Air taxiing speed — max GS, ground switch (similar), To identify when the
radio altitude (Rad Alt) helicopter is air taxied at high
speed.
Excessive power during ground Total torque (Tq), ground To identify when excessive
taxiing switch (similar), GS power is used during ground
taxiing.
Pedal — max left-hand (LH) Pedal position, ground switch To identify when the
and right-hand (RH) taxiing (similar), GS or NR helicopter flight controls
(pedals) are used to excess on
the ground. GS or NR to
exclude control test prior to
rotor start.
Excessive yaw rate on ground Yaw rate, ground switch To identify when the
during taxiing (similar), or Rad Alt helicopter yaws at a high rate
when on the ground.
Yaw rate in hover or on ground Yaw rate, GS, ground switch To identify when the
(similar) helicopter yaws at a high rate
when in a hover.
High lateral acceleration (rapid Lateral acceleration, ground To identify high levels of
cornering) switch (similar) lateral acceleration, when
ground taxiing, that indicate
high cornering speed.


High longitudinal acceleration Longitudinal acceleration, To identify high levels of
(rapid braking) ground switch (similar) longitudinal acceleration,
when ground taxiing, that
indicate excessive braking.
Cyclic-movement limits during Cyclic stick position, ground To identify excessive
taxiing (pitch or roll) switch (similar), Rad Alt, NR or movement of the rotor disc
GS when running on ground. GS
or NR to exclude control test
prior to rotor start.
Excessive longitudinal and Longitudinal cyclic pitch rate, To detect an excessive rate of
lateral cyclic rate of movement lateral cyclic pitch rate, NR movement of cyclic control
on ground when on the ground with
rotors running.
Lateral cyclic movement — Lateral cyclic position, pedal To detect the risk of a
closest to LH and RH rollover position, roll attitude, elapsed helicopter rollover due to an
time, ground switch (similar) incorrect combination of tail
rotor pedal position and lateral
cyclic control position when on
ground.
Excessive cyclic control with Collective pitch, longitudinal To detect an incorrect taxiing
insufficient collective pitch on cyclic pitch, lateral cyclic pitch technique likely to cause rotor
ground head damage.
Inadvertent lift-off Ground switch (similar), To detect inadvertent lifting
autopilot discreet into hover.
Flight — Take-off and landing
Day or night landing or take- Latitude and Longitude (Lat & To provide day/night relevance
off Long), local time or UTC to detected events.
Specific location of landing or Lat & Long, ground switch To give contextual information
take-off (similar), Rad Alt, total Tq concerning departures and
destinations.
Gear extension and retraction Indicated airspeed (IAS), gear To identify when
— airspeed limit position undercarriage airspeed
limitations are breached.
Gear extension & retraction — Gear position, Rad Alt To identify when
height limit undercarriage altitude
limitations are breached.
Heavy landing Normal/vertical acceleration, To identify when hard/heavy
ground switch (similar) landings take place.
Cabin heater on (take-off and Cabin heater discreet, ground To identify use of engine bleed
landing) switch (similar) air during periods of high-
power demand.
High GS prior to touchdown GS, Rad Alt, ground switch To assist in the identification
(TD) (similar), elapsed time, of ‘quick stop’ approaches.
latitude, longitude


Flight — Speed
High airspeed — with power IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2, pressure To identify excessive airspeed
altitude (Palt), OAT in flight.
High airspeed — low altitude IAS, Rad Alt To identify excessive airspeed
in low-level flight.
Low airspeed at altitude IAS, Rad Alt To identify a ‘hover out of
ground’ effect.
Airspeed on departure (< 300 IAS, ground switch (similar), To identify shallow departure.
ft) Rad Alt
High airspeed — power off IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2 or one engine To identify limitation
inoperative exceedance of power-off
airspeed.
Downwind flight within 60 sec IAS, GS, elapsed time To detect early downwind turn
of take-off after take-off.
Downwind flight within 60 sec IAS, GS, elapsed time To detect late turn to final
of landing shortly before landing.
Flight — Height
Altitude — max Palt To detect flight outside of the
published flight envelope.
Climb rate — max Vertical speed (V/S), or Palt, or Identification of excessive
Rad Alt, Elapsed time rates of climb (RoC) can be
determined from an
indication/rate of change of
Palt or Rad Alt.
High rate of descent V/S To identify excessive rates of
descent (RoD).
High rate of descent (speed or V/S, IAS or Rad Alt or elevation To identify RoD at low level or
height limit) low speed.
Settling with power (vortex V/S, IAS, GS, Tq To detect high-power settling
ring) with low speed and with
excessive rate of descent.
Minimum altitude in NR, total Tq, Rad Alt To detect late recovery from
autorotation autorotation.
Low cruising (inertial systems) GS, V/S, elevation, Lat & Long To detect an extended low-
level flight. Ground speed is
less accurate with more false
alarms. Lat & Long used for
geographical boundaries.
Low cruising (integrated Rad Alt, elapsed time, Lat & To detect an extended low-
systems) Long, ground switch (similar) level flight.


Flight — Attitude and controls
Excessive pitch (height related Pitch attitude, Rad Alt To identify inappropriate use
— turnover (T/O), cruising or elevation, Lat & Long of excessive pitch attitude
landing) during flight. Height limits may
be used (i.e. on take-off and
landing or < 500 ft) — Lat &
Long required for specific-
location-related limits.
Elevation less accurate than
Rad Alt. Elevation can be used
to identify the landing phase in
a specific location.
Excessive pitch (speed related Pitch attitude, IAS, GS, Lat & To identify inappropriate use
— T/O, cruising or landing) Long of excessive pitch attitude
during flight. Speed limits may
be used (i.e. on take-off and
landing or in cruising) — Lat &
Long required for specific-
location-related limits. GS less
accurate than IAS.
Excessive pitch rate Pitch rate, Rad Alt, IAS, ground To identify inappropriate use
switch (similar), Lat & Long of excessive rate of pitch
change during flight. Height
limits may be used (i.e. on
take-off and landing). IAS only
for IAS limit, ground switch
(similar) and Lat & Long
required for specific-location-
related limits.
Excessive roll/bank attitude Roll attitude, Rad Alt, IAS/GS To identify excessive use of roll
(speed or height related) attitude. Rad Alt may be used
for height limits, IAS/GS may
be used for speed limits.
Excessive roll rate Roll rate, Rad Alt, Lat & Long, Rad Alt may be used for height
Ground switch (similar) limits, Lat & Long and ground
switch (similar) required for
specific-location-related and
air/ground limits.
Excessive yaw rate Yaw rate To detect excessive yaw rates
in flight.
Excessive lateral cyclic control Lateral cyclic position, ground To detect movement of the
switch (similar lateral cyclic control to
extreme left or right positions.
Ground switch (similar)
required for pre or post T/O.


Excessive longitudinal cyclic Longitudinal cyclic position, To detect movement of the
control ground switch (similar) longitudinal cyclic control to
extreme forward or aft
positions. Ground switch
(similar) required for pre or
post T/O.
Excessive collective pitch Collective position, ground To detect exceedances of the
control switch (similar) aircraft flight manual (AFM)
collective pitch limit. Ground
pre or post T/O.
Excessive tail rotor control Pedal position, ground switch To detect movement of the tail
(similar) rotor pedals to extreme left
and right positions. Ground
pre or post T/O.
Maneuver G loading or Lat & Long, normal To identify excessive G loading
turbulence accelerations, ground switch of the rotor disc, both positive
(similar) or Rad Alt and negative. Ground switch
(similar) required to determine
air/ground. Rad Alt required if
height limit required.
Pilot workload/turbulence Collective and/or cyclic and/or To detect high workload
tail rotor pedal position and and/or turbulence
change rate (Lat & Long) encountered during take-off
and landing phases. Lat & Long
required for specific landing
sites. A specific and
complicated algorithm for this
event is required. See United
Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority (UK CAA) Paper
2002/02.
Cross controlling Roll rate, yaw rate, pitch rate, To detect an ‘out of balance’
GS, accelerations flight. Airspeed could be used
instead of GS.
Quick stop GS (min and max), V/S, pitch To identify inappropriate flight
characteristics. Airspeed could
be used instead of GS.
Flight — General
OEI — Air OEI discreet, ground switch To detect OEI conditions in
(similar) flight.
Single engine flight No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine To detect single-engine flight.
Tq
Pilot event No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine To identify engine-related
Tq issues.


Traffic collision avoidance TCAS TA discreet To identify TCAS alerts.
system (TCAS) traffic advisory
(TA)
Training computer active Training computer mode To identify when helicopter
active or discreet have been on training flights.
High/low rotor speed — power NR, Tq (ground switch To identify mishandling of NR.
on (similar), IAS, GS) Ground switch (similar), IAS or
ground speed required to
determine whether helicopter
is airborne.
High/low rotor speed — power NR, Tq (ground switch To identify mishandling of NR.
off (similar), IAS, GS) Ground switch (similar), IAS or
ground speed to determine
whether helicopter is airborne.
Fuel content low Fuel contents To identify low-fuel alerts.
Helicopter terrain awareness HTAWS alerts discreet To identify when HTAWS alerts
and warning system (HTAWS) have been activated.
alert
Automatic voice alert device AVAD discreet To identify when AVAD alerts
(AVAD) alert have been activated.
Bleed air system use during Bleed air system discreet, To identify use of engine bleed
take-off (e.g. heating) ground switch (similar), IAS air during periods of high-
power demand.
Rotors’ running duration NR, elapsed time To identify rotors’ running
time for billing purposes.
Flight — Approach
Stable approach heading Magnetic heading, Rad Alt, To identify unstable
change ground switch (similar), gear approaches.
position, elapsed time
Stable approach pitch attitude Pitch attitude, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable
switch (similar), gear position approaches.
Stable approach rod GS Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable
Stable approach track change Track, Rad Alt, ground switch To identify unstable
(similar), gear position approaches.
Stable approach angle of bank Roll attitude, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable
Stable approach — rod at Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground To identify unstable
specified height switch (similar), gear position approaches.
Stable approach — IAS at IAS, Rad Alt, ground switch To identify unstable
specified height (similar), gear position approaches.
Glideslope deviation above or Glideslope deviation To identify inaccurately flown
below instrument landing system
(ILS) approaches.
Localiser deviation left and Localiser deviation To identify inaccurately flown
right ILS approaches.

Low turn to final Elevation, GS, V/S, heading Airspeed could be used instead
change of GS.
Premature turn to final Elevation, GS, V/S, heading Airspeed could be used instead
change of GS.
Stable approach — climb IAS (min & max), V/S (min & To identify unstable
max), elevation approaches.
Stable approach — descent IAS (min & max), V/S, elevation To identify unstable
approaches.
Stable approach — bank IAS (min & max), V/S, To identify unstable
elevation, roll approaches.
Stable approach — late turn Heading change, elevation, GS To identify unstable
approaches.
Go-around Gear select (Rad Alt) To identify missed approaches.
Rad Alt for height limit.
Rate of descent on approach Altitude rate, Rad Alt, Lat & To identify high rates of
Long, ground switch (similar) descent when at low level on
approach. Rad Alt if below
specified height, Lat & Long for
specified location required.
Flight — Autopilot
Condition of autopilot in flight Autopilot discreet To detect flight without
autopilot engaged; per
channel for multichannel
autopilots.
Autopilot engaged within 10 Autopilot engaged discreet, To identify inappropriate use
sec after take-off elapsed time, ground switch of autopilot when on ground.
(similar), total Tq, Rad Alt Elapsed time required to allow
for permissible short periods.
Excessive pitch attitude with Pitch attitude, autopilot To identify potential for low
autopilot engaged on ground discreet, ground switch NR when helicopter pitches on
(offshore) (similar), Lat & Long floating helideck.
Airspeed hold engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of
airspeed (departure or non- (ground switch (similar), total autopilot higher modes.
departure) Tq, Rad Alt) Ground switch (similar), total
Tq and Rad Alt to determine if
the flight profile is ‘departure’.
Airspeed hold engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, Rad To detect early engagement of
altitude (departure or non- Alt, (IAS, ground switch autopilot higher modes. IAS,
departure) (similar), total Tq) ground switch (similar), total
Tq to determine if the flight
profile is ‘departure’.
Alt mode engaged — altitude Autopilot modes discreet, Rad To detect early engagement of
(departure or non-departure) Alt, (ground switch (similar), autopilot higher modes.
total Tq, IAS) Ground switch (similar), total


Alt mode engaged — airspeed Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of
(departure or non-departure) (ground switch (similar), total autopilot higher modes. IAS,
Tq, Rad Alt) ground switch (similar), total
Tq to determine if the flight
profile is ‘departure’.
Heading mode engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, IAS To detect engagement of
speed autopilot higher modes below
minimum speed limitations.
Ground switch (similar), total
V/S mode active — below Autopilot modes discreet, IAS To detect engagement of
specified speed autopilot higher modes below
VS mode engaged — altitude Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect early engagement of
(departure or non-departure) (WOW, total Tq, Rad Alt) autopilot higher modes.
Ground switch (similar), total
Flight director (FD) engaged — FD discreet, IAS To detect engagement of
speed autopilot higher modes below
FD-coupled approach or take FD discreet, IAS, ground switch To detect engagement of
off — airspeed (similar) autopilot higher modes below
Go-around mode engaged — Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, To detect engagement of
airspeed ground switch (similar), total autopilot higher modes below
Tq, Rad Alt minimum speed limitations.
Flight without autopilot Autopilot channels To detect flight without
channels engaged autopilot engaged; per
channel for multichannel
autopilots.

Appendix B
General FDAP Management Flowchart

CAAT GM OPS FDAP Guidance Material For Flight Data Analysis Programme Rev.0

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Flight Data Analysis Programme

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1. Use of Flight Data Analysis Programme

1.2 FDAP Description

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1.3 FDAP Reporting

1.4 FDAP Policy

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2. Flight Data Analysis Programme Description

2.2 FDAP Equipment

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2.2.3 Ground Replay and Analysis Equipment

2.3 Processing of FDA Data

2.3.5 Routine Measurements

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2.3.9 Integrated Safety Analysis

2.4 Analysis and Follow-up

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3. Prerequisites for and as Effective FDAP

3.2 Policy in Access/ Retention/ Recovery of Data

3.3 Education and Communication

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3.4 Requisite Safety Culture

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4. Establishing and Implementing an FDAP

4.2 Aims and Objectives of an FDAP

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4.3 FDAP Team

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g) Replay operative and administrator

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6. FDAP Procedure Documentation

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Event Group Description

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Event Group Description

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Event title/description Parameters required Comments

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Event title/description Parameters required Comments

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Event title/description Parameters required Comments

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Event title/description Parameters required Comments

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Event title/description Parameters required Comments

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