Maritime Security

in the Gulf of Guinea

March 2013

Report of the conference held at Chatham House, London, 6 December 2012

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Contents

Preface v
Introduction 1
Keynote Address 7
Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea 11
Summary of debate 22
Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea 26
Summary of debate 27
Conference Programme 35
Biographies 37
Further Reading 40
About the Africa Programme 43
The African Studies Centre, Coventry University 43
page iv

Audience at the Chatham House conference

 page v
Preface

The following report is based upon the presentations and discussions at a conference
on ‘Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea’, held at Chatham House on 6 December
2012. The event was a follow-up to a conference held on HMS Dauntless in Luanda
in June 2012.
The keynote speech was given by Ambassador Florentina Adenike Ukonga,
Deputy Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. This was followed by
two sessions on ‘Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea’ and on ‘Institutional Cooperation
in the Gulf of Guinea’.
The purpose of the conference was to encourage policy-orientated sharing of
views. Particular attention was paid to piracy and oil theft in and emanating from
Nigeria, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other maritime
issues, in order to explore potential regional solutions to these problems.
In attendance were representatives from the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the
Nigerian Navy, the International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, the UK
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the UN Department of Political Affairs. The
conference was held in collaboration with the African Studies Centre, Coventry
University. This conference report was written by Chris Vandome, Administrative
Assistant, Africa Programme, Chatham House.
For more information, including recordings, transcripts, summaries and further
resources on this and other related topics, please visit www.chathamhouse.org/
research/africa.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page vi

Map 1: The Gulf of Guinea

15º Senegal

The Gambia Mali

Burkina Faso
Guinea Bissau
Guinea

Côte Nigeria
Sierra Leone
d’Ivoire Ghana

Liberia Togo
Benin Cameroon
Equatorial Guinea

São Tomé and Príncipe

Equator
Gabon

Rep. of
Congo
DRC

Angola

15º

Namibia
Prime Meridian

15º 15º

Source: Googlemaps
 page 1
Introduction

Maritime security is an emerging issue in the Gulf of Guinea region.1 Energy security
and trade depend to a large extent on sea-based transport, and the region is currently
the source of around 5.4 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d). This is equivalent
to more than the total amount imported by EU27 countries in 2008 (4.9 mbbl/d)
and over half of US crude oil imports in 2008 (9.8 mbbl/d). Oil supply from the
region in 2011 was equivalent to 40% of total EU27 and 29% of total US petroleum
consumption in the same year. Angola and Nigeria account, respectively, for 34%
and 47% of the region’s total oil supply.
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for nearly 30% of attacks (427 of 1,434)
in African waters between 2003 and 2011, and that proportion is increasing. This is
partly due to successful counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia (operation
EU NAVFOR Atalanta) that have reduced piracy east of Suez, but instances of piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea are also on the increase: 53 cases were recorded in 2011,
compared with 39 in 2010, and a number of cases go unreported. Map 2 shows the
locations of the 62 reported attempted and actual attacks in 2012. This trend has
continued into 2013 with attacks off the coasts of Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and the
Republic of Congo.
Maritime security is essential to maintaining the flow of revenues from oil and
gas, which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the
region. At the same time maritime resources such as fish, aquaculture and intact
ecosystems directly contribute to the livelihoods of many Africans.

1 There is no clear definition of the Gulf of Guinea. In its narrowest definition it is bounded by the intersection
of the Equator and the Prime Meridian (0°0’0”, 0°0’0” – see Map 1). In its widest definition it includes the
region from Guinea to Angola (-15°0’0”, -15°0’0”).
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 2

Map 2: International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery, 2012

15º Senegal

The Gambia Mali

Burkina Faso
Guinea Bissau
Guinea

Côte Nigeria
Sierra Leone
d’Ivoire Ghana

Liberia Togo
Benin Cameroon
Equatorial Guinea

São Tomé and Príncipe

Equator
Gabon

Congo

DRC

Angola

15º

Namibia
Prime Meridian

Actual attack

Attempted attack
15º 15º

Source: www.ics-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map
 Introduction

page 3
Fish stocks are an important source of protein for the region. Angolan annual
per capita food supply from fish and fishery products over the period 2002–07 was
14kg per person – above the sub-Saharan average of 8kg – which is fairly typical
of regional coastal nations. The poorest 40% of the regional population depend
on fish as a crucial component of their diet. Illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing by both foreign and African vessels is now a serious problem. The
continuation of this activity will have an impact on the world fish markets as stocks
are depleted. This global dynamic increases the incentive for a global solution.
Maritime security is important for exploiting maritime resources, securing
livelihoods and development. It should, however, be framed within national and
regional policy that goes beyond immediate needs and reactive engagement. Such
an integrated strategy includes environmental protection, management of fish
stocks, tourism and the transport needs of landlocked countries. Neglect could
result in acute security challenges in the future (food insecurity due to overfishing
or environmental degradation of the seas, for example).
Much of the problem of oil theft may have root causes in Nigeria. The country
has a population of around 150 million, and the average age is only 19. The Niger
Delta is home to 30 million people, 30% of whom are unemployed. This does not just
present an immediate domestic economic problem, but the toxic mix of organized
crime, rising small-arms proliferation and insurgency, and high levels of youth
unemployment has regional implications too. Increased violence in the Delta region
would lead to increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. If
10% of the Niger Delta population were displaced, then three million people would
be dispersed around West Africa, dramatically escalating the problem.
On the other hand, the underlying problems and root causes cannot simply be
pinned on Nigeria, and maritime security is a regional rather than a purely Nigerian
issue as pirates cross international boundaries and attack foreign ships, and as many
are located in different countries. This is evident in the rise of attacks elsewhere in
the region. Some of the comparative scale of the problem in Nigeria may be the result
of the country being by far the largest oil producer in the region. Beyond the issue
of piracy, general maritime insecurity leading to IUU fishing is not only a regional
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 4

Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea

 Introduction

page 5
but a global problem, as stock depletion caused by West African IUU fishing has an
impact on the global market.
Ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of any existing
regional body acting alone. A number of regional organizations share an interest
in maritime security; these include the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and the Gulf of
Guinea Commission (GGC). Geographical and mandate overlap argues for greater
integration and coordination of maritime initiatives.
Of these various bodies, the GGC has the largest mandate for dealing specifically
with maritime issues. It was established in 2001 as a permanent framework for
collective action, with a view to ensuring peace, security and stability conducive to
economic development in the region. Most recently, on 29 November 2012, the GGC
signed the Luanda Declaration on Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Region.2
The declaration states that in response to increasing maritime insecurity, GGC
member states need to establish regional cooperation and inter-state dialogue. There
are a number of transboundary issues that require an inter-state approach, such as
arms proliferation, crude-oil theft, terrorism and migration. As such, the declaration
calls for the consideration of a permanent mechanism to enforce and monitor peace
and security in the region. The potential for establishing such a mechanism was the
subject of this conference.

2 Luanda Declaration on Peace and Security, www.psgg.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/

LuandaDeclaration-ENFINAL.pdf.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 6

Ambassador Florentina Adenike Ukonga, Deputy Executive Secretary,

Gulf of Guinea Commission, speaking at the Chatham House conference
 page 7
Keynote Address

This section is an edited version of Ambassador Ukonga’s keynote address in which

she provides an introduction to the discourses later in the conference.
Ambassador Ukonga stated that the consequences of these unresolved issues
include an increased number of attacks on ships, presenting a serious problem to
maritime transportation; increased costs of maritime transportation in the region
through higher insurance premiums; decreasing revenues for ports of the region
as fewer ships call at them; serious oil theft, with some countries losing up to a
third of production to offshore theft; poaching and overfishing, with disastrous
consequences for artisanal fishermen of the region and depletion of fish stocks; and
political unrest leading to disruption of hydrocarbons production.
The countries of the region have taken some actions to curb the incidence of
criminal activities in their territories both on land and at sea. Ambassador Ukonga
said that at the national level they are trying to resolve the political and economic
causes of criminality, including poverty reduction and establishing good governance
practices. There has also been an increased military focus on the issue with the
establishment of Special Forces to deal with criminal activities. This has been in joint
efforts with domestic law-enforcement agencies and coastguards, with more patrols
and better equipment. In some cases private security firms have also been used to
patrol maritime borders.
Some neighbouring countries are already working together. Benin and Nigeria
established a joint maritime patrol mechanism, Operation Prosperity, from October
2011 for an initial period of six months. This succeeded in reducing the number of
pirate attacks off the coast of both countries. However, pirate attacks increased along
the less well patrolled coast of Togo.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 8

Why is the Gulf of Guinea important?

• Geographical location: It is an important maritime route for commercial shipping from
Europe and America to West, Central and Southern Africa. Its proximity to Europe and
North America for the transportation of the low-sulphur crude oil from the region
further raises its importance in the global supply of energy.
• A major source of hydrocarbon resources: The region produces about 5.4 million barrels
of crude oil per day. The United States sources 15% of its supplies from the Gulf of Guinea,
and China and Japan depend on it for a substantial amount of their oil and gas. It also
continues to supply France and other countries of Europe.
• Investment: Oil companies from the West and the East have made huge investments for
both onshore and offshore drilling, and since the region has the fastest rate of discovery
of new oil reserves in the world, it also attracts new investments for further exploration.
• Rich fishing and other marine resources: Fishing trawlers come to the region from
all over the world. Many are there illegally as a result of inadequate and inappropriate
security checks.
• Rich forestry, agricultural and mineral resources: All these are exported through the
Gulf of Guinea to markets in Europe and America.

In response to the growing menace of piracy and armed robbery at sea, ECCAS
set up a maritime security strategy for its region. According to the strategy, each
participating member state of ECCAS is expected to contribute men and equipment
for the operation of maritime surveillance groups. Ambassador Ukonga argued
that the experience with the different types of initiatives, whether national, bilateral
or international, has shown that all these mechanisms have met with limited
success. The operations have been very expensive and there are doubts as to their
sustainability, partly because the criminals move from the well-patrolled areas to
those that are not so well patrolled.
National, bilateral and international actions in tackling issues of maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea will be more effective if they fit into a region-wide
strategy for maritime security. According to Ambassador Ukonga it is at the level
of international institutions that a comprehensive maritime security strategy can be
decided upon, adopted and implemented. This will require a strong political will and
 Keynote Address

page 9
political commitment from the leaders of the region to give the necessary political
support and the financial and human resources that such a project will require.
Ambassador Ukonga argued that what may be required for a successful battle
against criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea is a common maritime security
strategy that will cover its whole maritime domain. The strategy’s long-term
objective would be the establishment of a Gulf of Guinea Guard Force based on the
forces of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) but reorganized to cover the
whole region. This would require the development of maritime-domain awareness
capabilities in each state of the region.
In order for such a strategy to work a number of measures would need to
be implemented. Sub-regional centres could be designated as well as a regional
coordinating centre, building on the work and facilities of ECCAS. More emphasis is
needed on information and intelligence-sharing and capacity, with a further need for
systematic coordination in counter-piracy operations among countries of the region.

What are the challenges faced?

• Area: The Gulf of Guinea is a vast expanse of water, stretching almost 6,000km from
Senegal to Angola, with weak surveillance and uncoordinated security patrols. An over-
concentration on land security in the region over a long period of time has left the
maritime domain unpatrolled.
• Economic: There has been increased incidence of armed robbery at sea and piracy; theft
of hydrocarbon resources on the high seas/illegal bunkering; pipeline vandalism; illegal
trafficking in arms, drugs and persons; and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing in
the waters of the region.
• Political: The maritime domain becomes a good breeding ground for dissent to grow
and fester, with devastating effects on the home governments of dissidents. One specific
political challenge is poverty among the host communities of the rich natural resources
of the region.
• Environmental: Particularly pollution from exploitation and exploratory activities, and
accidents from oil spills.
• Legal: There are unclear definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as an
inadequate legal framework for prosecuting criminals when intercepted.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 10

Such a level of coordination and cooperation would have to include an agreement

allowing member states to pursue criminals across maritime territorial boundaries.
Ambassador Ukonga argued that in order for these prescriptions to be effective
they would have to be underpinned by large-scale capacity-building of the naval
and coastguard personnel, as well as investment in appropriate equipment to enable
them to confront criminal gangs that are heavily armed with sophisticated and
modern weapons. She said that there was potential for this to be supplemented by
an increase in the use of private armed security companies.
In conclusion, Ambassador Ukonga said that the GGC was in a unique position
to have a maritime security mechanism that can take care of the entire region, if
such a mechanism is decided upon, adopted and established. No country in the
region is capable of devising a solution alone. There is therefore a need for assistance
from partners and the international community at large that will be geared towards
improving the security situation in the region.
 page 11
Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

Oil theft and illegal ‘artisanal’ refining in the Niger Delta are increasing problems,
causing significant environmental and economic devastation. These activities
are not new, but since the end of the militant crisis in 2009 their scale has grown
beyond recognition as thousands of demobilized militants have turned to crime as
a source of income. While they may appear chaotic, these activities are structured
and organized. Some of those involved are working for local markets, inefficiently
refining products for communities desperate for fuel and power. Some – far larger in
scale, organization and significance – are managing an international export business
with tentacles across the globe.

Aerial view of an illegal refinery in the Niger Delta (photo courtesy of Shell Petroleum Development Company).
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 12

By mid-2012, the Nigerian government estimated as many as 400,000 barrels of

oil were being stolen each day, costing the country up to $1 billion per month in lost
revenues. These are criminal organizations posing a clear, hard security threat, and
in some cases they have replaced the government in building roads and providing
schools and hospitals, competing for the loyalty of the local population.
Drawing on his experience of community engagement, Tony Attah of
Shell spoke about the oil industry’s perspective on these issues. He started by
highlighting the extent of the problem, stating that it is a highly organized criminal
phenomenon involving a parallel industry with a developed supply chain and
growing sophistication. It involved trained engineers returning each night to
siphon oil, and boatyard operators who helped construct and supply barges to
the thieves to transport crude oil around the creeks. A small amount of the stolen
oil remained in the local market, although rudimentary refinement techniques
resulted in up to 80% of this oil being dumped into the creeks. The refined element
of the oil that remained in the local market was used to fuel small generators
used by the local population. But the vast majority of the oil was exported. It was
taken to larger tankers waiting offshore, which transported it to refineries outside
the country. These transfers were conducted out at sea, making them difficult
to detect.
Attah identified the underlying problem as being the widespread poverty and
unemployment in the Niger Delta, which made crime an attractive option despite
the high risks. However, he said those involved in the Niger Delta were just the foot
soldiers. The networks were orchestrated by individuals both inside and outside
Nigeria, running an industry worth billions of dollars, the foundations of which were
corruption and violence. The proceeds of this industry entered the global financial
system, as well as funding other criminal structures.
He emphasized that the impact on the legitimate oil industry put an enormous
strain on staff and operations, diverting time and resources to battle the consequences
of criminal activities. Contractors had been killed in reprisal attacks for clampdowns.
Crime also increased operating costs in terms of higher insurance premiums and
lost revenue.
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 13
The perils of illegal refining

While there have been claims that Shell is voicing concerns on the environmental
effect of the illicit oil trade to divert attention away from its own failings, Attah
asserted that this was definitely not the case. He said that Shell had invited the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature to set up an independent
scientific panel to advise on conservation and spill-site restoration, especially
recommending new technologies and methodology, and these efforts were already
delivering results.
For Attah, the solution required coordinated action, both at the national and local
level inside Nigeria, and at a regional and international level outside. It required
detection and the collection of evidence, military or police intervention, arrests and
effective judicial action. It also depended on transparency and the publicizing of
punishment to act as a deterrent.
Attah said that the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria had taken
steps towards making it harder for thieves to attack pipelines. But at the same time
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 14

the thieves were becoming more innovative. Given that the company operated
6,000km of pipeline, it was virtually impossible to secure the entire network. When
efforts were made in one area, the criminals moved to another. Recognizing this
problem, the company had initiated a public campaign to raise awareness among
politicians, the media and other stakeholders. Subsequently, the government had
amended the operational mandate of a joint task force to include the prevention of
oil theft. While this had resulted in the destruction over 1,000 illegal refineries and
the seizure of tankers, as yet there had not been a single conviction for oil theft.
Despite domestic responses, little has been done at the international level. Attah
argued that regional security structures and international governments needed to
start using the available satellite technology to track and intercept illicit cargoes of
stolen oil to and from the Gulf of Guinea. Shell has also started lacing its crude oil
with unique synthetic tracers, enabling identification of stolen oil at the point of
purchase when it re-enters the legitimate market.
There is more to be done in tracing the international financial flows and networks
that profit from these activities. Attah stated that current legislation targeting
organized crime and terrorism appeared to provide ample legal instruments to do
the job.
He also highlighted a number of domestic issues that needed to be addressed in
conjunction with targeting oil theft. Development aid must be used effectively to
create alternative and sustainable livelihoods, especially for young men. Investment
in the power and refinement sectors was also necessary to provide fuel and power
to local populations in the area, reducing their demand for illicit fuel. In turn, that
required legislative reform in Nigeria to create attractive investment conditions and
commercial returns to encourage the private sector to invest the tens of billions of
dollars needed.
Attah noted that there was a long list of priorities, and given the broad nature
of the various problems many partners and organizations had a role to play. He
acknowledged that some of these actors were in the room and that events such as
this conference were effective in bringing them together and producing dialogue, but
also said there was an urgent need for others to be more involved.
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 15
In order to optimize existing options, Attah argued that there needed to be a clear
legal framework that was adhered to by the various countries in the region.
The overriding legal document on maritime security is the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and its definitions and precedents are applied
by most major maritime organizations. The document defines ‘Territorial Sea’ as
extending up to 12 miles from the shore; and ‘High Seas’ as everything beyond this
limit. More importantly, the document sets out what the obligations of states are in
these different maritime areas.
Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy in such a way that it is possible only on the
high seas, outside the 12-mile range, whereas criminal actions within territorial seas
are classified as armed robbery against ships. The difference is one of jurisdiction.
Beyond 12 miles from shore, piracy is a universal crime and any state can establish
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates, and states have an obligation to intervene. Within
the 12-mile limit, responsibility lies with the coastal states. This distinction becomes
very important when one talks of private maritime security companies and armed
personnel aboard ships.
This difference was emphasized by Chris Trelawny, the deputy director of the
Maritime Safety Division of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). He
pointed out that the vast majority of attacks over the past few years had occurred
within the jurisdiction of coastal states and therefore were not piracy per se. In 2012
most attacks were against chemical, oil and gas tankers. In total over the last 10 years
there have been 108 attacks in international waters, 173 in territorial waters and
270 in port areas.3 Since 2002 there have been fluctuations in the number of attacks
reported, and despite much talk about rising piracy in the region, reported attacks
decreased by 10% from 2011 to 2012.
Types of piracy in the region include attacks directed at cargo, attacks carried out
for logistic purposes (e.g. to steal fuel, food and other resources to keep the piracy
operations going) and mugging. This is markedly different from the piracy taking

3 The IMO publishes information and statistics on global piracy trends on its website (www.gisis.imo.org).
Statistics are based on reported incidents and the IMO is aware that there is a level of under-reporting.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 16

place off the coast of Somalia, which is based on a kidnap-and-ransom model. It is

also a lot more violent than Somali piracy.
Trelawny stated that piracy and armed robbery, or in this case wider maritime
crime, was a land-based issue and was a symptom of wider problems ashore, most
significantly governance practices. He argued that more focus on these broader
issues was required, rather than stalking pirates at sea. Given that piracy in the Gulf
of Guinea was largely related to hydrocarbon theft, one should ask who was ‘not
noticing’ the 4,500 tons of stolen crude oil entering the market.
There are a number of initiatives for the region, but Trelawny was sceptical as
to whether multilateral policies and initiatives received adequate support from
individual sovereign states.
There are obligations to implement initiatives such as the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code, aimed at making ports more effective, cutting down
on theft in ports and preventing terrorism threats. There are also environmental
concerns given the appalling statistics on pollution, which is killing off the fish and
minimizing the potential for tourism in West Africa.
According to Trelawny, issues relating to safety of navigation also need to be
addressed. This would help to develop intra-African trade by sea, thereby promoting
economic development as countries trade more within Africa instead of sending raw
materials to the West, and helping to raise profits by processing the resources closer
to their place of origin.
The wider maritime security issues that the IMO is concerned about are illegal,
unregulated and unreported fishing, which is a massive problem and probably
far more important in West Africa than piracy; and illegal trafficking of guns,
oil, humans and stolen goods, which is another major factor affecting Africa’s
sustainable development. The fishing business in this area has an estimated value
of $10–23 billion. In most West African countries this represents much of national
incomes; moreover fish provides over 50% of the edible protein consumed in the
region. The current fishing levels off the coast of West Africa are unsustainable; and
the destruction of the fishing grounds creates a security problem.
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 17
Sovereign countries need to develop their own maritime security strategies.
Once the need is established and the potential for making money exists, then
these countries will be more able to implement such strategies. Similarly, illegal
fishing, dumping, piracy, armed robbery, and search and rescue all require legal
frameworks, situational awareness and the capacity to deal with the issues and
ultimately prosecute offenders. A potential role for the international community
is the development of domestic capacity to do so through technical assistance
and training.
Lt Cdr Stephen Anderson, executive officer and second-in-command on HMS
Dauntless, provided an overview of the warship’s recent AURIGA 12 deployment
to West Africa in 2012. Four out of the seven months of the deployment were
spent operating in and around the west coast of Africa, demonstrating a growing
awareness of the risks to maritime security in this region, and the United Kingdom’s
recognition that a deployed warship can do much to highlight these problems and
tackle them in conjunction with host-nation support. Parts of sub-Saharan Africa
have become the favoured staging area for narcotics smuggling across the Atlantic

HMS Dauntless and RHIB

 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 18

owing to the effectiveness of maritime policing in the Caribbean. The majority

of this trafficking takes place by air and sea in the vicinity of latitude 10 degrees
north, known as ‘Highway 10’. Furthermore, human trafficking along the west coast
of Africa, particularly towards the Canary Islands, has exacerbated the criminal
element in maritime trade in the region. This is closely related to piracy and robbery
as all revolve around the acquisition of weapons and illegal monetary transactions,
and represent a direct threat to the safety of mariners.
Anderson said that functions the Royal Navy can fulfil include preventing
conflict by providing political influence and political choice; providing security
at sea to the United Kingdom’s interests around the globe and playing a key role
in maintaining good order at sea; promoting partnerships by encouraging and
developing stable and cooperative relationships around the world; promoting
humanitarian assistance by providing independent humanitarian aid around
the world without the need to draw on a country’s infrastructure or resources;
protecting the international economy by safeguarding trade routes and the flow
of energy resources; and being ready to fight, thereby providing the British
government with the option to employ military force at a time and place of
its choosing.
A key element of the deployment was working with other nations and
agencies to help develop capacity in the maritime environment and improve
maritime safety and security. This included training in seamanship, leadership,
and tightrope and boarding for maritime and Special Forces personnel in support
of their own efforts.
As well as training functions, HMS Dauntless was able to provide an accurate
White Shipping Plot, and was the sole provider of a Recognized Maritime and
Air Picture in the region during its deployment.4 This demonstrated the need for
local capacity-building in this area. Anti-piracy efforts rely on having an accurate
and timely intelligence assessment based upon organic and external sources, as

4 Under international maritime law all merchant shipping has to transmit its position and identification using
the Automatic Identification System (AIS) that, on detection, make up a white shipping plot. Contacts are
then classified and colour-coded to give the full RMP – Recognized Maritime Picture.
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 19
HMS Dauntless

well as ‘patterns of life’ analysis. This is an area in which regional forces currently
require assistance.
Yaron Gottlieb, senior counsel at INTERPOL, suggested that a more holistic
approach must be taken to combat piracy from a law-enforcement perspective.
He agreed that piracy was a symptom and there needed to be a corresponding land-
based solution as well as securing the maritime domain.
INTERPOL established an anti-piracy task force in 2008 and has established
regional bureaus in Abidjan and Yaoundé. This task force has struggled with the
problem of under-reporting. Of all red notices received relating to piracy, almost all
come from countries in the Horn of Africa, while there have been no such requests
from those in West Africa.5 Similarly, of the hundreds of piracy suspects recorded in
the Global Maritime Database, all are related to Somali piracy.

5 A red notice is the highest-priority level of request for the arrest of a person issued by INTERPOL,
which cannot issue international arrest warrants. An overview of INTERPOL’s notices and policing efforts
can be found in ‘Policing INTERPOL’, Chatham House Roundtable Summary, 2 December 2012,
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/051212summary.pdf.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 20

With regard to maritime security issues there needs to be cooperation between

four main types of actors – navy and coastguard, police, judiciary, and private
industry – that are not used to coordinated action, as was also the initial experience
in Somalia.
In the case of East Africa, naval forces have achieved a lot, but their experiences
there highlighted their inability to collect evidence. They are not law-enforcement
forces, and they lack the necessary institutional knowledge for evidence-gathering
and investigation. There have also been cases where information has been withheld
on the grounds that it is classified.
In November 2012 the UN Security Council, for the first time, discussed piracy
from the global rather than a regional perspective. Gottlieb argued that this should
be the general policy direction because local problems often require global solutions.
This was part of what he referred to as a ‘glocalization’ of anti-piracy efforts.
As criminals take global ideas and implement them at a local level, addressing
the problem requires global solutions that are tailored to local environments or
conditions. For example, local political and economic conditions can be conducive
to global organized crime. The weak institutions and poor governance of some West
African states make them ideal routes for drugs originating in South America.
Gottlieb said that discussions of piracy will inevitably draw comparisons
with what has been happening off the coast of Somalia. There are some similarities.
For example, in both Somalia and Nigeria piracy started as a local initiative in
reaction to domestic issues. Then, once organized criminal networks saw the
potential, they stepped in. However, Somali piracy has been about financial gain
following a kidnap-and-ransom model. Vessels and hostages are taken for ransom;
pirates tend to avoid violent confrontation; and they operate far out to sea. Piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea has been markedly different, following an armed-robbery model
involving heavily armed groups, high levels of violence, operations close to the shore,
political corruption and direct, violent engagement with local police forces that are
also often corrupt.
Gottlieb remarked that post-9/11 there has been a tendency to relate any large-
scale criminal activity to terrorism but this is not necessarily the case. There has been
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 21
Yaron Gottlieb, INTERPOL, speaking at the Chatham House conference

little evidence suggesting that the pirates operating in Nigeria are cooperating with
Boko Haram, for example, but there are links to other forms of criminal activity.
This follows a fairly normal pattern of global organized crime. Once established in a
certain domain, organized criminal groups will identify all available opportunities,
such as trafficking in drugs, people, arms, counterfeit medicine and cigarettes. This
is currently happening in West African ports such as Abidjan and Dakar, which
have become hotspots for the processing of illegal fishing. A UN assessment mission
concluded that counter-piracy operations also lead to success in operations to
counter illegal fishing, which demonstrated that a certain relationship did exist.
Further problems are lack of communication and insufficient use of communication
networks, and law-enforcement challenges such as lack of personnel, training
and resources.
Gottlieb argued that the typical response of the international community to a
new phenomenon such as this was to adopt a new convention and create a new
institution, but in this case it would be more effective to address the issue using
existing legal frameworks such as the UN Convention on Transnational Organized
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 22

Crime. This can be used in the case of counter-piracy on the open seas and it has a
sufficient legal framework to serve as the basis for extradition requests.
Gottlieb acknowledged that until recently piracy in the Gulf of Guinea had not
been considered serious enough for engagement by the international community,
although there had been good recent responses with the two UN Security Council
resolutions and a number of conferences discussing the issue and strengthening
political resolve in the region to combat corruption and organized crime.

Summary of debate

A number of concerns were raised during the discussion regarding private maritime
security companies (PMSCs). They are keen to get involved in the Gulf of Guinea
following their perceived success in the Gulf of Aden, with floating armouries
already preparing to deploy.

Royal Navy Lynx helicopter aboard HMS Dauntless

 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 23
The Nigerian Navy’s concern over the use of PMSCs is based on a fear of different
ships coming into Nigerian territorial waters without being under the control of any
authority in Nigeria. The Navy is responsible for putting armed personnel onto a
vessel, but PMSCs are already providing equipment and boats that are then manned
by members of the Nigerian Navy. Nigeria is not averse to PMSCs per se as they are
already being used in operations, but there are concerns regarding their legitimacy,
especially if their participation increases.
PMSCs are already used for gathering intelligence that is then communicated to
the Nigerian Navy. The Nigerian military focus is on the accumulation of hardware
and personnel, but surveillance and satellite technology are crucial. This needs to be
provided by the government or, if not, by the private sector.
It was asked whether the potential for violent confrontation between the pirates
and the PMSCs had been considered. As already noted, piracy in West Africa tends
to be more violent than that in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. There was a concern
that putting armed personnel on vessels would lead to unmanaged violence in the
Gulf of Guinea.
On the topic of PMSCs it was emphasized that the use of armed personnel on a
vessel is a last resort. Their role must be restricted to organizational knowledge such
as the ensuring of well-planned routes. Effective anti-piracy measures can be taken
without using these companies by using non-lethal defences and anti-boarding
mechanisms such as the placing of barbed wire on vessels. When armed personnel
are deployed, they need to be very highly trained and to be there mainly to advise
the captain. The PMSCs used so far in West Africa have been ill-trained, which has
led to firefights. Furthermore, effective counter-piracy operations are dependent on
the use of expensive hardware, most notably helicopters. The fact that, so far, this has
not been the case in the region was seen as demonstrating why the use of PMSCs,
especially local ones, needs to be regarded as a last resort rather than as an effective
counter-piracy mechanism.
It was argued that increased peer pressure on states was needed to address
underlying governance and legal issues. A law-enforcement void presents a threat to
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 24

other countries as well. Given that fish are migratory, a state that fails to protect its
fishing grounds affects other countries in the region.
Beyond maritime law enforcement and maritime development more generally,
there need to be attractive alternative options to criminal activities for young men,
such as the rebuilding of industry.
It was mentioned that in some countries in the region members of military and
police forces have links to international drug cartels, pirates, illegal fishers and
smugglers. The first stage in tackling such a problem is to recognize its existence.
Countries often try to hide or avoid these problems because they are ashamed of the
fact that they are unable to tackle them.
On the subject of information-gathering, it is important to manage expectations
regarding the information gathered up to now regarding illegal activity, as well as on
the involvement of the wider international community. International actors such as
INTERPOL can provide training, equipment and resources, but however much they
do, this cannot replace the engagement of local institutions.
It was pointed out that a number of countries in the region lack enforcement
structures on land, and this extends into the maritime domain. Arguably, this lack
is a symptom of failing agencies and institutions. Individual agencies are failing.
However, Trelawny challenged this by saying that maritime law enforcement writ
large is a matter of national rather than departmental or institutional concern.
Recognizing this, the IMO is trying to push for joined-up maritime thinking,
establishing national maritime security commissions within these countries. In
Ghana there are 15 different agencies represented on such a commission, all of
which have a stake in the maritime sector. For example, the Navy is used to transport
fishery-protection officers and customs officers. Such operations are beneficial
because the more agencies work together, the more they are able to monitor
one another.
Finally the issue of ‘insider piracy’ was covered. It was asked whether or not there
was any evidence to suggest that sometimes the crews of the vessels attacked were
implicated. It was stated that the IMO data on piracy attacks are based on what is
reported. It is accepted that under-reporting occurs, in terms both of not reporting
 Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

page 25
attacks and of reporting them but withholding some information. Trelawny said that
the IMO had received anecdotal evidence of crew who were not being paid regularly
taking part in oil theft, but because such incidents were not officially reported the
IMO did not know who was involved. It had also received anecdotal evidence of
security teams boarding boats with empty bags and leaving with full ones. This
is a major law-enforcement and governance issue, and highlights yet again the
importance of having well-trained security personnel.
page 26

Institutional Cooperation in the

Gulf of Guinea

There are many relevant stakeholders in the Gulf of Guinea: global institutions
such as the UN and IMO; regional institutions such as the AU, GGC and MOWCA;
sub-regional institutions such as ECOWAS and ECCAS; and numerous states with
interests there, as well as the countries of the region themselves.
Commodore Kenneth B. Ati-John of the Nigerian Navy spoke about the priorities
and efforts of regional institutions in the Gulf of Guinea, areas of cooperation and
challenges for regional institutions, and Nigeria’s perspective on institutional
cooperation in the region.
He noted that until recently there had been relatively low levels of cooperation
between regional institutions, but there now seems to be a shift in regional
cooperation, in recognition of the importance of the maritime security challenge.
This relates to the issue of ‘sea appreciation’. At the political level in the region a
better understanding of the value and the usefulness of the sea is called for.
In March 2012 a conference on maritime security in the region, facilitated by
AFRICOM and the Africa Centre for Strategic Security Studies, resulted in an
agreement between ECCAS and ECOWAS to continue towards a memorandum
of understanding (MoU) and the adoption of multilateral agreements for
regional cooperation.
Ati-John highlighted the challenges facing these institutions as inadequate
surveillance systems leading to a lack of maritime domain awareness and funding.
There are dramatic differences in the ability and willingness to pay. For example,
the joint patrols by the Nigerian and Equatorial Guinean navies are 90%-funded
by Nigeria.
 Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

page 27
According to Ati-John, Nigeria is fully committed to a collective security approach
and believes that the attainment of maritime security in the region will be achieved
through partnerships with its neighbours and the international community.
At the bilateral level, Nigeria has been at the forefront of enhancing cooperation
aimed at improving security in the West African sub-region. This is demonstrated
by ongoing anti-piracy and joint maritime patrols as part of Operation Prosperity.
At the multinational level, Nigeria continues to work with other international
partners and stakeholders. The African Partnership Station is one such initiative.
Olivio F.A. Jacinto, the senior maritime adviser for Angola’s permanent
representation to the IMO, stated that at some level the countries in the region
are already interacting with each other in various ways. However, there are many
improvements to be made. The African Maritime Transport Charter passed in 2010
in South Africa was intended to determine regional cooperation. Unfortunately it
has not been implemented as was expected. Furthermore MOWCA and the IMO
are working in collaboration on a project on the regional integration of coastguard
forces. So far this has resulted in the MoU of the Integrated Coast Guard Function,
but this has not been implemented fully by participating states.
Some countries have made efforts: for example, Ghana has conducted a regional
seminar in partnership with the IMO. Angola has also organized the first national
seminar on the implementation of the IMO/MOWCA project. So there are some
signs of progress.
Jacinto was optimistic about constructing a regional solution, arguing that
everything necessary was already in place, with the GGC as the high political body
and the RECs to deal with the finance. He argued that MOWCA could be brought
in at the technical level as a decision-making body.
He concluded by proposing the establishment of a Gulf of Guinea maritime forum,
in which all these regions could convene to discuss these issues. He stated that, in
general, there was a clear need for better regulation, monitoring and management
of maritime resources throughout West and Central Africa. Regulatory frameworks
needed to be adopted and adequately implemented at the national level, in particular
in connection with the criminalization of illegal activities at sea.
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 28

Francesca Jannotti Pecci, added to the dialogue on existing institutional efforts

and made some observations on their success.
She stated that the emerging inter-regional cooperation efforts in the maritime
domain needed to be sustained and expanded. This included the development of
an integrated strategy that would comprehensively address the maritime domain,
of which piracy and armed robbery at sea was only one dimension. Such a strategy
would build upon existing instruments and frameworks and feed the initial efforts
at continental level – through the African Union – to develop an African Integrated
Maritime Strategy. Expert analysis suggested that ECCAS’ strategy, as well as ongoing
MOWCA initiatives, could serve as a good basis for such expanded cooperation at
the regional level in the maritime security domain.
In terms of inter-institutional cooperation, Pecci argued that efforts should be
made to avoid a multiplication of processes and initiatives, and that genuine political
will and commitment should go beyond the competition of institutional agendas and

Speakers at the Chatham House conference

 Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

page 29
the ‘vanity of the leadership role’ to identify a strategy where each institution can
contribute based on its comparative advantage. This was all the more important in
the perspective of fostering and sustaining African regional integration as a whole.
In this context, the MOWCA/IMO Sub-regional Integrated Coastguard Network
needed to be sustained and fully integrated in the ongoing efforts with a view to avoid
duplication and fragmentation of efforts which had the potential to undermine a
coherent and systematic approach. MOWCA, with the support of the IMO, could be
well placed to serve as the technical and programmatic forum in support of the three
‘political’ organizations (ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC) currently leading efforts.
On the issue of funding, Pecci stated that a sustainable instrument needed to be
developed on the basis of a collective self-taxation scheme capable of catalysing
international assistance. Regular state budgetary appropriations, contributions from
major stakeholders and taxes on commercial activities at sea could all contribute to
developing such a funding scheme.
Pecci said it was crucial that further efforts focus on African ownership; the link
between economic development and maritime security; the need for coordination,
to include exchange of information among both regional states and their maritime
centres; interoperability of naval responses; and the need for a comprehensive
response incorporating land-based issues such as governance and the justice sector.
In drawing up a strategy, Pecci said, regional stakeholders must not lose sight
of the importance of eradicating root causes that lead to the proliferation of illicit
activities at sea. As it was widely acknowledged that ‘efforts to combat piracy start
on land’, serious efforts to combat corruption were crucial: first, to prevent the loss
of public money that could be used to address youth unemployment and poverty,
and overall to strengthen state institutions and the rule of law; and secondly to
tackle criminal networks ‘on land’ that were widely acknowledged to be closely
linked to acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. In this latter regard the UN Office
for West Africa, the Department of Political Affairs and the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) were implementing a joint initiative – the West Africa Coast
Initiative – that aimed at building national capacities through the establishment of
transnational crimes units in a number of West African countries. Such initiatives
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 30

needed to be sustained both politically and financially, while their funding

remained unpredictable.
Given both the nature of the challenge and the geography of the zone, AFRICOM
took that position that a regional approach to maritime security was the only way
to respond to these conditions and keep vital transportation corridors and offshore
extractive industries open to trade.
The AFRICOM Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Ambassador Christopher
Dell, stated that, in order to strengthen the ability of African states and regional
organizations, AFRICOM had developed a Subordinate Campaign Plan (subordinate
to its broader Theatre Campaign Plan for the entire continent) centring on capacity-
building among the regional nations and regional security organizations as the best
means of countering illicit trafficking and piracy.
He explained that the strategy was based on the premise that the solution lay in
building partner capacities to deal with crimes at sea as law-enforcement challenges,
rather than expanding regional naval forces or deploying Western naval forces to
fill a perceived security void. This involved strengthening the laws and the legal
systems of West African states, training their law-enforcement authorities (whether
coastguards, navies or some other units) in the conduct of maritime law-enforcement
operations such as ship boarding and searches, and working with the African Union
and the sub-regional organizations such as ECCAS and ECOWAS to promote both
African leadership and regional cooperation in the area of maritime safety and
security. The role of the international community was to support African capacity
by advising, training and equipping local security forces and by promoting regional
and international coordination.
He said that existing regional cooperation and agreements that were proving
effective included technical steps taken jointly by ECCAS and ECOWAS in recent
months to create a cooperative maritime security approach, as well as supporting the
ongoing work to operationalize the REC initiatives. As noted above, since September
2011, Nigeria and Benin have cooperated on combined anti-piracy operations that
have resulted in immediate positive results. In October 2011 alone, two large tanker
ships suspected of carrying out illegal ship-to-ship operations were captured and
 Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

page 31
handed over to the Benin authorities for prosecution, and three fishing vessels and a
tanker were rescued from attempted pirate attacks.
To stem the rise in piracy the United States and other international partners have
supported and assisted in these efforts. A critical first step has been the drafting of
comprehensive maritime agreements, which effectively establish regional maritime
zones under ECCAS and ECOWAS. This regional approach makes maritime
safety and security a shared responsibility. Together the member states are now
conducting cross-border patrols, sharing law-enforcement intelligence, establishing
and maintaining joint coordination centres and implementing a regional strategy.
The US naval component of AFRICOM has been conducting exercises such as
Obangame and Saharan Express to reinforce these draft operational agreements and
help breathe life into them.
The United States does not have a counter-piracy presence with dedicated assets
or operations in the Gulf of Guinea; however, it does have a maritime programme
in support of regional efforts – the Africa Partnership Station. This builds partner
capacity through tailored training, and combined exercises and operations, which

Non-lethal counter-piracy measures

 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 32

are conducted on an individual state and regional basis. These programmes increase
maritime domain awareness, enhance maritime professionalism and facilitate
regional integration.
Dell said that tackling maritime security enforcement had to be about combined
maritime and law-enforcement actions that complied with international law and
protect African sovereignty. If you seized an illegal fishing vessel or a small boat
laden with cocaine, you must be able to deal judicially with the alleged criminals
and with the confiscated contraband. Just making an arrest was not enough. The
reality was that very few African countries had the capacity to fully integrate the
entire continuum of maritime law enforcement. Therefore, in addition to the
Africa Partnership Station, AFRICOM was sponsoring the African Maritime Law
Enforcement Partnership. AMLEP’s operations typically employ an African host
nation’s own law-enforcement boarding team along with a US Coastguard boarding
team, operating from a US vessel to support the host nation’s enforcement of laws
and treaties.

Non-lethal counter piracy measures such as barbed wire and lookouts

 Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

page 33
He said that AFRICOM was also supporting efforts by regional governments to
develop improved capabilities for providing security to both vessels and offshore
installations. For example, it had provided assistance in evaluating and validating
the effectiveness of Ghana’s Master Plan for the Security of the Oil and Gas Industry.
Dell finished by saying that the heads of state meeting of ECOWAS and ECCAS in
April 2013 to address piracy, as recommended by United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 2018 and 2039, could become a milestone in this fight.

Summary of debate

The debate following the second set of presentations focused on regional and
state capacity issues, the ability to coordinate such a plethora of organizations,
and corruption.
In response to a question on Angola’s motives for involvement on the issue, it
was highlighted that maritime issues in the Gulf extended beyond piracy, which
was centred on Nigeria. One of the main concerns for both the region and the
international community was IUU fishing. Angola shared the Gulf coastline with a
number of other countries and was keen to have a stable relationship with them. Part
of the solution was to track the oil after it was stolen and find out where the money
was ending up.
It was agreed that a large part of the problem related to governance onshore,
which was often characterized by weak institutions and poor governing practices.
However, it was asserted that the way to combat such issues was not by ‘naming and
shaming’, challenging people or making arrests. Rather, it involved the engagement
and support of the international community to help in developing domestic good
practices. It was argued that the international community had a moral responsibility
to help combat corruption because it had the funds and experience required.
The military functions of the RECs were decided and outlined by the AU within
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework, which created the
military components of the RECs. In assessing the security risks that required the
attention of the APSA, land issues have been prioritized over maritime security. This
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 34

reflects a limited understanding of the importance of the sea by the political elite,
whose concern was to intervene in countries in peacekeeping and peace operations.
The idea of adding a maritime component to this is relatively new and as yet not
fully discussed.
Both maritime security efforts and governance development are hampered by
capacity issues. This was one of the main themes in the presentations and was
reiterated in the debate. Even when there is a disaster-management architecture
in place and organization at the government level, which looks good on paper, the
organization will not be in a position to address those challenges if the assets are
not available or are inadequate. The APSA was cited as an example of this. It was
suggested that this was one area that could benefit from private-sector involvement
as some stakeholders, such as multinational corporations, had better structures,
were better organized and had better resources to respond to some of these kinds
of challenges.
There was a sense of bewilderment regarding the plethora of international
organizations engaged in the maritime domain. Many of the presentations had
referred to the efforts of ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, CRESMAC, MOWCA and the
GGC, and there were questions about the possibility of dovetailing aspects of these.
In response it was stated that one of the aims for the UN office for West Africa and
the UN office for Central Africa was to bring ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC
together with the idea of eventually bringing in the more specific ad hoc expertise
of the IMO and MOWCA. Operation Prosperity was mentioned as a successful
example of this. The so-called ‘Big Brother’ states needed to take the lead on
such projects.
Other comments highlighted the disjuncture between political will and readiness
on the one hand, and operational capability on the other. It was recognized that the
number of recent conferences and events on the issue, such as those led by Chatham
House and the Luanda Conference on Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, had
increased the visibility on the subject. However, this now needed to lead to action.
 page 35
Conference Programme

Chatham House, London, 6 December 2012

10:30–10:50 Keynote Address

Ÿ Amb. Florentina Adenike Ukonga, Deputy Executive Secretary

for Political Affairs, Gulf of Guinea Commission, Luanda

Ÿ Chair: Professor Bruce Baker, Director, African Studies Centre,

Coventry University

10:50–13:00 Session 1: Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea

Ÿ Crude oil theft: Tony Attah, General Manager,

Sustainable Development and Community Relations,
Shell Petroleum Development

Ÿ Piracy: Chris Trelawny, Deputy Director Maritime Safety Division,

International Maritime Organization

Ÿ Counter-piracy and maritime security: Lt Cdr Stephen Anderson,

HMS Dauntless, Royal Navy

Ÿ Chair: Janina Cieciora, Head of Maritime Security, Foreign &

Commonwealth Office

13:00–14:00 Lunch

14:00–15:30 Session 2: Institutional Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

Ÿ Commodore Kenneth B. Ati-John, Nigerian Navy

Ÿ Olivio F. A. Jacinto, Senior Maritime Adviser, Angola Permanent

Representation to the International Maritime Organization

Ÿ Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Political Affairs Officer, Policy and

Mediation Division, United Nations Department of Political Affairs
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 36

Ÿ Amb. Christopher W. Dell, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-

Military Activities, United States Africa Command

Ÿ Chair: Captain (ret.) Ioannis Chapsos, Centre for Peace &

Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University

15:30–15:45 Final session: closing remarks

Ÿ Alex Vines OBE, Research Director, Area Studies and International

Law; and Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House
 page 37
Biographies

Ambassador Florentina Adenike Ukonga is the Deputy Executive Secretary

(Political Affairs) at the Gulf of Guinea Commission in Luanda, Angola. She
worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for
over 30 years as Under-Secretary for African Affairs. Ambassador Ukonga has
actively been involved in maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea region since
her appointment as Deputy Executive Secretary at the Gulf of Guinea Commission
in 2007.

Tony Attah is Vice President of Health, Safety, Security and Environment for Shell
Sub-Saharan Africa. He is responsible for company relationships with regional
and municipal governments in the Niger Delta. He has extensive experience of the
Niger Delta operations, the socio-political situation and issues relating to social and
business performance in the oil and gas Industry.

Chris Trelawny is the Deputy Director of the Maritime Safety Division at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in charge of the Sub-Division for
Maritime Security and Facilitation. Prior to that, he was the head of the Maritime
Security Section. He is responsible for advising and liaising with IMO member
governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations
on the facilitation of global maritime transport, maritime security, piracy and
related issues.

Lieutenant Commander Stephen Anderson is the Executive Officer and Second in

Command in HMS Dauntless, one of the Royal Navy’s new Type 45 destroyers. He
served with the staff of Commander United Kingdom Maritime Forces, assisting in
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 38

the establishment of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, and he

has experience working with the US Combined Task Force 151 in the fight against
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin.

Yaron Gottlieb is a Senior Counsel at the Office of Legal Affairs of INTERPOL.

His main fields of published research are protection of cultural property under
international law; international police cooperation; and maritime piracy. He is a
member of the Israeli and the New York State Bars.

Commodore Kenneth B. Ati-John has held the position of Chief of Staff Officer
at the Western Naval Command in Lagos since March 2011. His previous service
postings include Chief Operating Officer at the headquarters of the Western Naval
Command; Principal Staff Officer of the National Defence Academy; and Directing
Staff of the National Defence College.

Olivio F.A. Jacinto has been Senior Maritime Adviser for the Permanent
Representation of Angola to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since
November 2006. He has primary responsibility for advising the representation
in matters relating to the work of the IMO, such as, among others, pollution
from ships, maritime security, technical cooperation, piracy matters and
international conventions as well as interacting with international organizations and
non-governmental organizations on matters related to maritime transport.

Francesca Jannotti Pecci joined the Policy and Mediation Division of the
Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations Headquarters in December
2012. Previously, she worked as a political officer for the United Nations Office in
West Africa and for the United Nation Stabilization Mission in the DRC, on the rule
of law and protection of civilian issues.

Ambassador Christopher W. Dell is Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military

Activities of the United States Africa Command. He is a career member of the Senior
 Biographies

page 39
Foreign Service, with the rank of Career Minister. He has received numerous awards,
including the Presidential Distinguished Service Award and the State Department’s
Robert C. Frasure Award for his role in helping Angola through the aftermath of its
civil war when serving there as an ambassador.
page 40

Further Reading

Chatham House conference resources, including programme and presentations can

be accessed at: www.chathamhouse.org

Publications are listed in date order.

Selected publications on maritime security and the Gulf of Guinea:

AU, 2010a, ‘2050: Africas Integrated Maritime Strategy’ (www.au.int/pages/maritime)
AU, 2010b, ‘Towards Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy’ (www.africa_union.org/
root/ua/conferences/2012/avril/psc/07avril/maritime.htm)
Baker, M. L., 2011, ‘Toward an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the
African Union to Revolutionize the African Maritime Sector’, Naval War
College Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2011 (www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/
b49b0b07-c0a4-41e1-964d-dc37cf03e0b0/Toward-an-African-Maritime-
Economy--Empowering-the)
ECCAS, 2010, ‘ECCAS protocol on African Security’ (French) (www.africa-union.
org/root/ua/conferences/2010/avril/psc/07avril/African_Union_Member_
States_06-07_April_2010_Experts_Meeting_on_Maritime_Security_and_
Safety_Strategy-Documentation/ECCAS_Protocol.pdf)
International Crisis Group, 2012, ‘The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone’
(www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/195-the-gulf-of-guinea-
the-new-danger-zone.aspx)
 Further Reading

page 41
Leijenaar, A., 2012, ‘Africa Should Wake Up to the Importance of an Integrated
Maritime Strategy’, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria (www.issafrica.
org/iss_today.php?ID=1552&utm_source=ISS%2BWeekly%2B40&utm_
medium=Email&utm_campaign=ISS%2BWeekly)
Malaquias, A., 2012, ‘Ask the Expert: The Growing Threat of Oil Pirates in West
Africa’s Gulf of Guinea’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies
Nincic, D., Vreÿ, F., Onuoha, F.C. et al., 2009, African Security Review, Vol. 18,
No.3, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa (http://hawk.ethz.
ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/112047/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/
ca27ccdb-f7a3-4614-bb43-218c3f4f19fd/en/A9RD5.tmp.pdf)
Onuoha, F.C., 2012, ‘Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea’, Al
Jazeera Center for Studies (http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012
612123210113333.htm)
Stead, S., Chitiyo, K., Potgieter, J. and Till G., 2010, Maritime Development in
Africa: An Independent Specialists’ Framework, The Brenthurst Foundation,
Discussion Paper 2010/03 (www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_
Commisioned_Reports/BD1003_Maritime-Development-in-Africa.pdf)
Traub-Merz, R. and Yates, D. (eds), 2004, Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security
& Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
(http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02115-inf.htm)
UN, 2011, ‘United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2018’ October
2011 (http://daccess- ods.un.org/TMP/2670638.26322556.html)
UN, 2012a, ‘Security Council 6723rd Meeting (AM): Gulf of Guinea Piracy
“Clear Threat” to Security, Economic Development of Region; Countries Need
United Front in Response, Top UN Official tells Security Council’ (www.un.un.
org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10558.doc.htm)
UN, 2012b, ‘UNSC Resolution 2039
Vogel, A., 2009, Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the Roles of African Maritime
Security Forces, Africa Security Brief, No. 2, December 2009 (http://africacenter.
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/AfricaBrief_2.pdf)
 Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea
page 42

Organizations:
African Union (AU): www.au.int/
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS): www.ceeac-eccas.org/
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): www.ecowas.int/
International Maritime Organization (IMO): www.imo.org/
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA): www.amssa.net/
framework/MOWCA.aspx
United Nations (UN): www.un.org/en/
US Africa Command (AFRICOM): www.africom.mil/
 page 43
About the Africa Programme

The Africa Programme at Chatham House develops foreign policy-orientated

research on issues affecting individual states of Africa, their international relations
and the African continent as a whole. Since its establishment in 2002, the Africa
Programme has grown to become the world’s largest independent centre for policy
research and debate on Africa’s international politics. The Africa Programme works
to improve the quality of information available to policy- and decision-makers
internationally. Current research areas include:

• Governance and corruption;

• Piracy and armed non-state actors;
• Africa in the international system;
• Peace and security; and
• Resources and society.

More information is available at www.chathamhouse.org/africa.

The African Studies Centre, Coventry University

The African Studies Centre is a trans-disciplinary hub, supporting learning and

research in Africa. The centre acts as a platform for inter-disciplinary partnerships,
and has established a reputation among African scholars as one of the most effective
and productive policy-related research centres in the United Kingdom.

For further enquiries about the Centre and its research visit:
wwwm.coventry.ac.uk/RESEARCHNET/AFRICANSTUDIES.
Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is of international concern.

Piracy, illegal over-fishing and crude oil theft are a growing threat. The
issue is attracting increasing attention from regional and international
governments and bodies.

A number of institutions are currently acting on the issue, most

prominently the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), alongside the
Regional Economic Communities and international organizations such
as the African Union and the UN. The regional nature of the problem
requires a regional response to be an integral part of the solution.
However, many efforts thus far have been undermined by lack of
capacity and weak governance.

The purpose of the conference was to encourage a policy-orientated

exchange of views, identifying potential opportunities for regional
solutions. What emerged from the presentations and discussions
challenges the tendency to portray the GGC as a panacea.

Chatham House, 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE

T: +44 (0)20 7957 5700 E: contact@chathamhouse.org
F: +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org
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