Al-'Ilm Al-Hudûrî - Conhecimento Por Presença (Inglês) - Volume I

Al-Ìlm al-Hudûrî
Knowledge by Presence
Al-Ìlm al-Hudûrî
An Epistemological Bridge between
Philosophy and Mysticism
Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Reza

Hejazi, H.I.M.
Printed in the United States of America
© Copyright: All rights reserved

First Edition 2010
Islamic Studies and Research Academy (ISRA), USA
israoffice@gmail.com ; isra.academy@yahoo.com
Book Title: al-Ìlm al-Huduri: Knowledge by Presence
Authored by: Sayyed Mohammad Reza Hejazi, Ph.D., H.I.M.
Pages: 190 / Language: English / First Published: 2010
The Book: This book explores the issue of knowledge by presence as an epistemological problem in
philosophy. Al-Ìlm al-Huduri (knowledge by presence) deserves as an epistemological bridge
between philosophy and mysticism. This book is a comparative study of the epistemology of
Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî, two Muslim thinkers of the 6th/12th and 11th/17th century. It
focuses on two main issues: Illuminative theory of knowledge and, in the framework of this theory,
Mullâ Sadrâ's doctrine of knowledge by presence (al-'ilm al-hudûrî) studied in the context of his
philosophical system (al-hikmah al-muta'âlîyah). Mullâ Sadrâ's doctrine of knowledge by presence is
the corner stone of his epistemological system. In the light of this doctrine, he gives a new definition
of knowledge, an innovative interpretation of its division into al-'ilm al-hudûrî and al-'ilm al-husûlî,
and, finally, a systematic chain of various kinds of knowledge by presence (e.g., self-knowledge,
God's knowledge of His Essence and God's knowledge of things). These three aspects of his doctrine
have been surveyed and, in comparing them with Suhrawardî's theory, evaluated in this book.
The Author: Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Reza Hejazi is Professor of Islamic Philosophy, Mysticism,
Religious Studies and Islamic Theology at I.M. Seminary, Director of the Islamic Studies and Research
Academy (ISRA), California, USA, Chairman of A.B.A. Assembly of North America, and a founder
member and a Trustee of the Ibn Sina Health Foundation of North America (ISHFNA). He has also
served as Director at the I.E.C., Washington D.C. and was a Chairman at the I.I.N.Y., New York, USA.
He holds a Master of Arts degree in Islamic Jurisprudence from Elmiyeh Seminary of Qom, a
doctorate in Islamic Philosophy from B.U.C. Institute of Qom, a second Master of Arts degree in
Epistemology and Islamic Mysticism from McGill University, Montreal, Canada; and a second
doctorate in Philosophy of Ethics from Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., USA. Dr.
Hejazi has published 22 books in Arabic, Persian and English. He has also published more than 18
articles in different languages and participated in about 28 international and inter-disciplinary
Seminars, Conferences and Academic Workshops. In addition to his teaching and writing, Dr. Hejazi
serves as a consultant in the fields of education, morality, religion and philosophy.
ISBN-13: 978-1453779040 (CreateSpace-Assigned)

ISBN-10: 1453779043
BISAC: Philosophy / Epistemology

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH
THE MOST BENEFICENT
THE MOST MERCIFUL
Table of Contents
Transliteration table …………………………………………………………. 11

Notes on technicalities ………………………………..….………………… 13
INTODUCTION …………………………………………………………………… 15
I. General ………………………………………………………………. 17
II. The philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ …………….…………….. 19
III. This study and its methodology ………………………… 23
PART I
Knowledge, Definition and Division
CHAPTER 1 The Definition of Knowledge ……………..…….…. 33
I. General ………………………………………………..….………. 33
II. The concept and the nature of knowledge ………. 34
III. The definition of knowledge ………………………..….. 37
CHAPTER 2 The Division of Knowledge ………………………..…. 53

I. Al-‘ilm al-husûlî …………………………………….….……….. 55
II. Al-‘ilm al-hudûrî ……………………………..……….………… 59
III. A characterization of the two kinds
of knowledge ………………………….……………………………… 64
CHAPTER 3 Immateriality and

" Knowledge by Presence" ………………………….…………. 75
I. Tajarrud (Immateriality) …………………………..………… 75
II. Tajarrud al-‘ilm (Immateriality of knowledge) …… 79
10 Table of Contents
III. Ibsâr (vision) …………………………………………………… 85
PART II
Knowledge by Presence ( al-‘ilm al-hudûrî )
Introduction …………………………………………………….………………… 99
CHAPTER 4 The “human soul” and

knowledge by presence ……………………………....……... 105
I. Self (al-dhât) ……………………………..………………………. 105
II. Self-knowledge (al-‘ilm bi al-dhât) …………………….. 109
III. The human soul knows its attributes,
dispositions and faculties by presence …….. 116
CHAPTER 5 God and knowledge by

Presence ……………………………………………………..……….. 131
I. God’s knowledge of His Essence
(al-‘ilm bi-dhâtihî) ………………………..…………… 131
II. Causal relationship (al-‘illîya) ……………….…………… 135
III. God’s knowledge of the things ……………….……….. 138
CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………….…………. 157
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… 167

Transliteration Table
CONSONANTS
Arabic Persian Arabic Persian
‫ء‬ ‘ ‘ ‫ص‬ S S
‫ب‬ B B ‫ض‬ D Z
‫پ‬ - P ‫ط‬ T T
‫ت‬ T T ‫ظ‬ Z Z
‫ث‬ TH TH ‫ع‬ ‘ ‘
‫ج‬ J J ‫غ‬ GH GH
‫چ‬ - CH ‫ف‬ F F
‫ح‬ H H ‫ق‬ Q Q
‫خ‬ KH KH ‫ک‬ K K
‫د‬ D D ‫گ‬ - G
‫ذ‬ DH DH ‫ل‬ L L
‫ر‬ R R ‫م‬ M M
‫ز‬ Z Z ‫ن‬ N N
‫ژ‬ - ZH ‫و‬ W V/U
‫س‬ S S ‫ه‬ H H
‫ش‬ SH SH ‫ى‬ Y Y
VOWELS
long ‫ا‬ ā
‫آ‬ Ā
‫و‬ ū
‫ي‬ ī
Doubled ‫ى‬ īy or iyy (final form ī)
Persian) ‫و‬ uww (final form ū), uvv (for
Diphthongs ‫و‬ au or aw
‫ى‬ ai or ay
Short –َ- a
–ُ- u
–ِ- i
Notes on technicalities
1. The system of transliteration that has been used

throughout this work for both Arabic and Persian is the one
employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill
University with the following exceptions: The
transliteration of the feminine ending “tâ marbûta” (É, ÜÉ)
is rendered as [a] when it is not pronounced, in words such
as Nihâya, and [at] when it appears in a construct (idâfa)
formation, like in the case of Hikmat al-Ishrâq. I have used
[â], [î] and [û] instead of [a], [i] and [u].
2. The article ‘al’ is almost always dropped from Arabic family
names in the text.
3. All translation from Arabic and Persian into English are
mine unless otherwise stated in the footnotes.
4. Since this book has focused on an analysis based on
primary sources, the convention of citing the original text
in brackets (parentheses) has been used, immediately
following the translation or exposition of the author’s
writings. This has the advantage of enabling the reader to
turn to the original immediately if he so wishes.
5. Dates have generally been cited according to the lunar
Islamic date (Hijrî) followed by its equivalent Christian date.
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
I. General
The problem of knowledge (al-‘ilm)1 in the history of

Islamic thought has been considered a main problem in the
fields of philosophy, theology and logic. Muslim philosophers
and theologians, holding different doctrines and backgrounds,
have approached the problem, regarding various aspects of
knowledge and its close relation to other philosophical and
logical issues. They have propounded the problem of
knowledge in several places of their works under titles such as
al-wujûd al-dhihnî (mental existence), al-nafs (soul or spirit),
al-ilâhîyât (theology or divine knowledge).2
In fact, when we approach the works of such Muslim
thinkers as Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna), Ghazzâlî, Tûsî, Ibn
‘Arabî and Suhrawardî (from third/ninth to sixth/twelfth
centuries)3, as well as Mullâ Sadrâ, Sabzavârî and Tabâtabâ'î
(from tenth/sixteenth century onward), we can find
considerable parts of their works in which they have argued
about the problem of epistemology (the theory of
knowledge).4 However, Muslim thinkers, having contemplated
the ontological problem at issue, were more interested in
some specific topics with regard to the subject and the object
of knowledge whereas the question of the adjustment of one’s
18 Introduction
perception, as a subject, with the external objects has been

hardly taken into account.5 In other words, apart from some
questions raised by Ghazzâlî, they did not explicitly examine
the skeptical problems which have been, more or less, taken
into consideration by the epistemological systems in Western
philosophy, specially in modern philosophy–i.e., philosophy
since the Renaissance.6
Nevertheless, the existence, the nature and the
divisions of knowledge, the close relation between knowledge
and existence, as well as its attributes and characters are major
subjects discussed by Muslim thinkers in their works.7
One who scans through the history of Islamic thought
will come across the fact that the discussion of several aspects
of the theory of knowledge was primarily raised by Muslim
theologians (mutakallimûn) from the second century onward.
Thereafter, a direct line of development can easily be traced
from Fârâbî (d. 339/950) to Ibn Sînâ (d. 428/1037), and then to
Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198). This line of philosophical thought is
called the Peripatetics in the history of Islamic philosophy (al-
Mashshâ`ûn). On the other hand, an “Illuminative” school of
thought was systematized and developed by Suhrawardî (d.
587/1191) and his successors (al-Ishrâqîyûn). Moreover, the
line of mystical thought which was developed by Ibn al-‘Arabî
(d. 638/1240) and his followers occupied a notable portion of
Islamic thought.8
In other words, pertaining to the Islamic intellectual
framework, Muslim thinkers can be classified into four
dominant categories: Theologians (Mutakallimûn), Peripatetics
Al-‘Ilm al-Hudûrî (Knowledge by Presence) 91
(Mashshâ`ûn), Illuminationists (Ishrâqîyûn), and Mystics (Sûfîs).

All of these four groups of Islamic thought dealt with the
question of “knowledge,” utilizing several languages and
different methodological constructions. These four major
schools of intellectual development, as well as the traditional
context, became united in a vast synthesis as a new school of
hikma (theosophy) called by its well-known author Mullâ Sadrâ
Shîrâzî9 the “transcendent theosophy” (al-hikmat al-
muta‘âlîya).
II. The philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ
Mullâ Sadrâ,10 the Persian philosopher of the 11th/17th

century was the founder of the school of transcendent
theosophy (al-hikmat al-muta‘âlîya). He maintained the
necessity of unifying various current schools of thought in
order to demonstrate the universal truth that lies at the heart
of all religions. He tried to establish a system of philosophy
with a view to reconcile separate doctrines in Muslim thought,
namely the peripatetic tradition (al-mashshâ`îyya) represented
by Fârâbî (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sînâ (d.428/1037), the
illuminationist tradition (al-ishrâqîyya) of Suhrawardî
(d.587/1191), the mystical thought (al-‘irfân) represented by
Ibn al-‘Arabî (d.638/9240), and the classical tradition of kalâm
which had already entered its philosophical phase in Nasîr al-
Dîn Tûsî (d.672/1273). He also adequately considered the
works of Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî (d.606/1209) to the extent that,
20 Introduction
according to F. Rahman, Râzî was Mullâ Sadrâ’s most

persistent target.11
Moreover, Mullâ Sadrâ used his deep knowledge of the
Holy Qurân and hadîth of the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) and the Imâms
(p.b.u.t.).12 The variety and universality of his method, style,
and intellectual characters are obvious from his large works.13
In this regard S. H. Nasr states:
It is in the numerous writings of this veritable sage
(Mullâ Sadrâ) that the vigorous logical discussions of al-
Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ, the critiques of al-Ghazzâlî and
Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, the illuminative doctrines of Shihâb
al-Dîn Suhrawardî, and the supreme experiential
knowledge of the Sûfîs as formulated by such masters
of gnosis as Ibn ‘Arabî and Sadr al-Dîn al-Qûnawî
became united in a vast synthesis whose unifying
thread was the inner teachings of the Qurân as well as
Hadith and the saying of the Shî‘îte Imams.14
Mullâ Sadrâ’s cognizance of Greek philosophy and his

familiarity with the school of Alexandria enabled him to study
the ancient wisdom of those civilizations which had developed
elaborate metaphysical theories. It was precisely this
familiarity that enabled him to finally create a synthesis of all
these traditions within the matrix of Islamic spirituality.
It is historically obvious that for several centuries the
followers of two major opposing schools, namely the
Peripatetics and Sufis, were challenging each other’s
intellectual aspects, having recourse to different methods. The
possibility of bringing about a harmonization between these
two schools was the question on the intellectual horizon of the
time. Before Mullâ Sadrâ, Suhrawardî (d. 587/1191)

demonstrated that such a synthesis was not only possible but
necessary. He maintained that a thorough familiarity with
Peripatetic philosophy was the prerequisite for the
understanding of the philosophy of illumination.15 This attempt
created a bridge between the rationalistic tradition and
Sûfîsm.16Like Suhrawardî, Mullâ Sadrâ was wholly convinced of
the interdependent relationship between mystical experience
and intellectual thinking. Any philosophizing, on the one hand,
which does not lead to the highest spiritual realization is but a
vain and useless pastime; any mystical experience, on the
other hand, which is not backed by a rigorous conceptual
training in philosophy is but a way to illusions and
aberrations.17
What makes Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophy unique and
distinct from other philosophical paradigms is a particular
methodology and mode of discussion. Mullâ Sadrâ not only
narrates, evaluates, and, in some cases, criticizes different
doctrines and traditional systems of thought, but he also
clarifies and demonstrates some new philosophical problems
which have been hardly considered by former Muslim
thinkers.18 These two crucial aspects of his philosophical
system let him, on the one hand, function as a historian of
Islamic thought, and on the other hand remain the dominating
figure in the continuing tradition of Islamic philosophy to this
day.19
Mullâ Sadrâ had a profound influence on Islamic
philosophy, especially in Shî‘îte circles. He not only laid the
22 Introduction
corner stone for the development of future philosophical

systems, but his school of transcendent theosophy (al-hikmat
al-muta‘âlîya) became a foundation upon which an esoteric
interpretation of Shî‘îte Islam was made. In one sense, it has
been claimed that Mullâ Sadrâ not only revived the study of
metaphysics in the Safavid period, but he also established a
new intellectual perspective and founded the last original
traditional school of wisdom in Islam.20 Unlike Ibn Sînâ and Ibn
Rushd, his works were not translated into Latin and, therefore,
Mullâ Sadrâ has remained largely unknown to the West.21
With regard to the theory of knowledge and its relation
to his ontological doctrine, Mullâ Sadrâ asserts that from an
abstract concept of existence, there can be no way to the
affirmation of a real individual existence. The real existence
cannot be known except by direct intuition (mushâhada
hudûrî), and any attempt to capture it in the mind by any idea
must by definition fail. On the other hand, the nature of
knowledge, he asserts, is only obtainable by presence of the
real existence. In other words, all kinds of knowledge refer to
the knowledge by presence in which the subject directly
captures the real existence without any concept or form.22
These two propositions, indicating a very fundamental basis of
Mullâ Sadrâ's epistemological system, illustrate the close
relationship between existence (al-wujûd) and knowledge (al-
‘ilm) in his philosophy.
In the view of Mullâ Sadrâ, a direct cognition of an
object implies the cognition of its being, whether that
cognition is empirical (husûlî) or intuitive (hudûrî) on the one
hand, or is sensible (hissî), imaginative (khayâlî) or intellective

(‘aqlî) on the other.23
Based on these very primary ontological and
epistemological principles of the Sadrian philosophical system,
the kernel and primary focal point of this study will be to
explore and analyze the broad doctrine of this philosopher in
its epistemological aspects.
III. This study and its methodology
The central task of this work is to attempt an analytical

study of Sadrâ’s theory of knowledge, particularly knowledge
by presence, and his claim that it is only through intuitive
knowledge that one is able to understand and grasp the reality
directly and without mediation. Since his philosophical thought
in general, and his theory of knowledge in particular, are
notably influenced by Suhrawardî,24 the illuminative positions
will be comparatively and critically examined in this study.
Mullâ Sadrâ, we can say, approaches the problem of
knowledge from the principles of his philosophical system “al-
hikmat al-muta‘âlîyah.” These philosophical principles might
be summarized as follows:
1. The principiality of existence (asâlat al-wujûd),
2. Analogical gradation of unique existence (al-tashkîk
fi al-wujûd),
3. Immateriality of perception (tajarrud al-idrâk),
24 Introduction
4. The division of knowledge into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and

al-‘ilm al-husûlî,
5. The unity of "perceiver," "perceived" and
"perception" (ittihâd al-mudrik wa al-mudrak wa al-idrâk),
6. The function of the soul (fi‘l al-nafs).25
His “philosophical epistemology,” in point of fact, has
been developed from these philosophical elements. In
particular, his ontological views serve as the foundation upon
which his ideas or theories on metaphysics, logic, and, finally,
epistemology are established.26
Leaving out the problem of ontology,27 which governs
almost the whole field of metaphysics and lies far beyond the
frame work of our subject, we may rightfully concentrate our
attention on the problem of knowledge, particularly
knowledge by presence. It is generally accepted that
knowledge by presence distinguishes illuminationist
epistemology in general, and Sadrian doctrine in particular,
from the Peripatetic theory. This distinction is explicitly
obvious in several fields of their epistemological system- e.g.,
the problem of definition and division of knowledge, the
nature of man’s knowledge, and the question of the
knowledge of Necessary Existent. The core of the book,
therefore, revolves around Mullâ Sadrâ’s theory of
theosophical epistemology called “knowledge by presence”
(al-‘ilm al-hudûrî).
To demonstrate Mullâ Sadrâ’s notion of “knowledge by
presence” one has to examine the following:
1. The definition of knowledge.

2. The division of knowledge into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and
al-‘ilm al-husûlî.
3. The nature of “knowledge by presence”.
These problems will be discussed in the part I.
4. The sorts of “knowledge by presence”.

This problem will be examined in the part II.
This book will not only illustrate the Sadrian doctrine

and analyze its specific arguments but also compare it with the
Suhrawardian theory of “knowledge”. In addition to “self-
knowledge,” other kinds of “knowledge by presence” will be
elucidated in this study as well. To do so, examining Mullâ
Sadrâ’s several works,28 this study will focus more on his major
and main work, al-Asfâr al-Arbaàh.29 The works of
Suhrawardî, in the comparing examinations, will be dealt with
as well. In a philosophical system such as Mullâ Sadrâ’s, one
often faces the problem of verification which implies the
verification of method.30 Therefore, in the analysis of the
topics and issues, a variety of methodologies will be used, each
of which is suited to some aspect of Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophy.
1
The two Arabic words al-‘ilm and al-ma‘rifa mean knowledge. The usage
of these two terms, as well as other words such as al-‘irfân, al-shu‘ûr
and al-'idrâk, in various Islamic fields (e.g., philosophy, theology,
26 Introduction
mysticism, logic) have been considered and examined by Muslim

thinkers in several perspectives and technical senses. It seems that
“there was no real difference between al-ma‘rifa and al-‘ilm at the
earliest stages of Muslim metaphysical thought, and the same would
seem to be valid for mysticism. Later, however, despite the continued
usage of al-‘ilm and the fact that some mystical authors placed this kind
of knowledge above al-ma‘rifa, the latter became “a term expressive of
the distinctive essence of mysticism.” Later too, Gnostic knowledge (al-
ma‘rifa) became the preserve of the saints alone.” Jan Richard Netton,
Al-Farabi and His School (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 33.
See also Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of
Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1970), pp. 164-8,202-3.
2
M. Mutahharî, Sharh-i Mabsût-i Manzûmah, vol. 1 (Tehran: Intishârât-i
Hikmat, 1984), pp. 255-8.
3
From here on I will give the dates both in the Islamic and Christian
calendar that are roughly six hundred years apart.
4
I mean here by epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, the branch of
philosophy which is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge,
its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to
knowledge. For more details see: D. W. Hamlyn, "History of
Epistemology," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan,
1967), vol.3, p.8.
5
There is a treatise of Nasîr al-Dîn Tûsî, written in Arabic, entitled Sharhi
Mas'alah al-‘Ilm (the description of the problem of knowledge) in which
the author explains and analyses several aspects of knowledge.
However, he doesn't approach the skeptical objections which threaten
the very foundations of knowledge. See: Tûsî, Sharhi Mas'alah al-‘Ilm
(Mashhad: Matba‘ah Jâmi‘ah, 9166), pp. 98-46.
6
M. T. Mesbah Yazdi, Ta‘lîqah (Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ, 1984), p. 84.
7
M. Mutahharî, Sharh-i Mabsût-i Manzûmah (Tehran: Intishârât-i Hikmat,
1984), vol. 1, pp. 255-8.
8
For further information about the development of Islamic philosophy see:
F. Rahman, “Islamic philosophy,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P.
Edwards, vol. 4 (New York, London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 219-224; S.H.
Nasr, “Mullâ Sadrâ,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, p. 412; Sadr
al-Dîn Shîrâzî and His Transcendent Theosophy, pp. 85-94; Majid Fakhrî,
A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press,

1970), pp. 341-46.
9
In this regard, Nasr states: “Sadr al-Dîn Mohammad al-Shîrâzî (979-
1050/1571-1640), commonly known as Mullâ Sadrâ, is the greatest
philosopher-theosopher of the Safavid period in Iran.” For more
information of his time, as well as his intellectual personality see: S.H.
Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (London: Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1981),
pp. 158-989; “The Metaphysics of Sadr al-Dîn Shîrâzî and Islamic
Philosophy in Qajar Iran,” in Qajar Iran, ed. by E. Bosworth (California,
1992), pp. 177-18; “Theology, philosophy and spirituality,” in Islamic
Spirituality, ed. S.H.Nasr (N.Y., 1991); F. Rahman, The Philosophy of
Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany, SUNY Press, 1976); M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic
Philosophy (N.Y., 1970), pp. 339-46. In the present work, Sadr al-Dîn al-
Shîrâzî is often referred to as Mullâ Sadrâ or Sadr al-Mutaàllihîn (the
head of theosophers).
10
For further information about Mullâ Sadrâ’s life see: M. Khânsârî, Rawdât
al-Jannât, vol. II (Tehran, 1306 A.H. Lunar), pp. 331-32; M. Al-Hurr al-
‘Amilî, Amal al-Amil, p. 58 (noted by Muhammad Qumî); with regard to
modern studies concerning Mullâ Sadrâ’s life see A. Zanjânî, al-Faylasûf
al-Fârsî al-Kabîr sadr al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî (Damascus, 9136); A.M. Ma‘sûmî,
“Sadr al-Dîn Shîrâzî,” Indo-Iranîca, vol. XIV, no. 4 (December, 1961), pp.
27-42 (of Persian Arabic section); S.J.Ashtiyânî, Sharh Hâl wa Arâ`-i
Falsafîy-i Mullâ Sadrâ (Mashad, 1961), pp. 112-145; S.H.Nasr (ed.),
Mullâ Sadrâ commemoration (Tehran, 1961); Sadr al-Dîn Shîrâzî and his
Transcendent Theosophy (Tehran, 1978). pp. 31-31; “Sadr dl-Dîn Shîrâzî
(Mullâ Sadrâ), His life, Doctrines and Significance,” Indo-Iranica, vol. XIV,
no. 4 (December, 1961), pp. 6-16; E.G. Browne, A Literary History of
Persia, vol. IV (New York: Scribner’s Sons,9102), pp. 421-30.
11
F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), p.
8.
12
For more detail see: S.H.Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, pp. 158-68;
Qarâ`î, “Post-Ibn Rushd Islamic Philosophy in Iran,” Al-Tawhid, vol. III,
no. 3 (April-June, 1986), pp. 37-45.
13
Mullâ Sadrâ was a prolific writer. In addition to his great work, the Asfâr,
he wrote over forty books and treatises. For further information see:
introduction by editor of the Asfâr, M. R. Muzaffar; S. H. Nasr, Sadr al-
Dîn Shîrâzî and his Transcendent Theosophy (Tehran: 1978), pp. 39-50;
28 Introduction
S. J. Ashtîyânî, Sharhi hâl wa ârâì Falsafîye Mullâ Sadrâ , (Tehran:

Nihzat-i Zanân-i Musalmân, 1981), pp. 45-71; F. Rahman, The Philosophy
of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 16-20.
14
S. H. Nasr, "Existence (wujûd) and Quiddity (mahîyyah) in Islamic
Philosophy," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXIX, no. 4, Issue
no. 119 (1989), pp. 419-20.
15
For an introductory survey of the Suhrawardian position see: S.H. Nasr,
Three Muslim Sages (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976), pp. 52-82;
“Shihâb al-Dîn Suhrawardî Maqtûl,” A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed.
M.M. Sharif, vol. I (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), pp. 372-98.
16
M. Aminrazavi, Suhrawardî’s Theory of Knowledge, Ph.D. Diss.,
(Philadelphia, Temple University, 1989), pp. 16-17.
17
We can find this basic principle in both Suhrawardian philosophical
system and Mullâ Sadrian system of thought. See above, n. 15; and
below, n. 19.
18
Corbin calls Mullâ Sadrâ’s transformation of earlier Islamic philosophy a
“revolution.” He writes “Mullâ Sadrâ opère une révolution qui détrône
la véritable métaphysique de l’essence, dont le règne durait depuis des
siècles, depuis Fârâbî, Avicenne et Sohrawardî.” Le livre des pénétrations
métapysiques (Lagrasse, France: Verdier, 1988), p. 62.
19
In this regard see: S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, pp. 158-181. Nasr
has considered and elucidated the importance of Mullâ Sadrâ as “a
source for knowledge of the earlier schools of Islamic philosophy and
the history of Islamic philosophy in general.”
20
S.H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (London, Boston: Allen & Unwin,
1981), p. 164.
21
For more detail of his influence on Islamic philosophy see: S. H. Nasr,
“The Metaphysics of Sadr al-Dîn Shîrâzî,” in Qajar Iran, ed. by E.
Bosworth (California, 1992), pp. 177-198; F. Rahman, The philosophy of
Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 13-16.
22
Asfâr (Bairut: Dâr Ihyâ` al-Turâth al-‘Arabî, 9110), book I, part 3, pp. 214.
23
Ibid., I/1, pp. 116-9.
24
The greatest influence on Mullâ Sadrâ’s doctrines is that of Suhrawardî,
the founder of the Illuminationist school of thought. Mullâ Sadrâ wrote
a commentary on Suhrawardî’s Hikmat al-Ishrâq, partly criticizing,

rejecting or modifying him, and partly accepting and supporting him in
several places. On Suhrawardî and his influence on Mullâ Sadrâ see: S.
H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, Suhrawardî’s part; M. Fakhri, A History of
Islamic Philosophy, pp. 326-344; F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ
Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), Introduction.
25
For more details see: F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 210-246; S. M. R. Hejazi, “Being and Knowledge
in Mullâ Sadrâ’s Philosophy,” read paper (N.Y., 9112).
26
On the significance of his ontological views see: M. Abdul Haq, “Mullâ
Sadrâ’s concept of being,” Islamic Studies, vol. VI, no. 3 (September,
1967), pp. 267-276; S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, pp. 174-181;
"Existence (wujûd) and Quiddity (mahîyyah) in Islamic Philosophy,"
International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXIX, no. 4, Issue no. 119
(1989), pp. 419-20; F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 27-44.
27
The problem of ontology and the meaning and reality of existence has
been treated so thoroughly and so systematically in this philosophy that
the whole area of this philosophy is characterized by the sense of
existence. Mullâ Sadrâ devoted the whole of the first book of his Asfâr
to the discussion of wujûd (existence) to which he returned in several of
his other works. See also F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 27-44.
28
According to the list of Mullâ Sadrâ’s works given by M. R. Muzaffar, the
editor of Asfâr (Tehran, 1958), in his Introduction (p. 16) to the work,
Mullâ Sadrâ wrote 32 or 33 treatises altogether. In one sense, his works
may be divided into the purely philosophical and the religious; and, in
another way, they may divided into original works and commentaries on
earlier philosophical writings, the most important being his
commentaries on the metaphysics of Ibn Sînâ’s al-Shifâ` and
Suhrawardî’s Hikmat al-Ishrâq.
29
The full title of Mullâ Sadrâ’s multivolume work written in Arabic is al-
hikmat al-muta‘âlîya Fî al-Asfâr al-‘Aqlîyat al-Arba‘a (The Transcendent
Wisdom of the Four Intellectual Journeys of the Soul) first lithographed
in 1865 (1282 A. H. lunar) almost 225 years after his death. For detailed
information about parts of four journeys of Asfâr see: S. H. Nasr, Sadr
30 Introduction
al-Dîn Shîrâzî and his Transcendent Theosophy (Tehran, 1978), pp. 55-
60.
30
For instance, in Asfâr, Mullâ Sadrâ usually employs an especial method in
which he has first discussed the views of various schools and then
synthesized the different doctrines into a unity which seeks to
encompass them.
PART ONE
Knowledge
Definition and Division
CHAPTER 1
The Definition of Knowledge
I. General
Is knowledge definable? If it is so, how can we define

knowledge, concerning the concept and the nature of
knowledge? These were earlier identified as two of the most
basic epistemological questions which could be asked.
Numerous answers have been given down the ages and
diverse aspects of the same problem have been surveyed at
various times. These two questions have been central
problems in the history of epistemological philosophy. An
understanding of the concept of knowledge, as well as its
nature, is a prerequisite for embarking upon any attempt to
answer other epistemological questions.
Most philosophers have had something to say about
the nature of knowledge, although many have taken its nature
for granted.1Some philosophers, regarding the former
question, maintain that knowledge is not definable and,
therefore, they believe that the original definition of
knowledge is rendered circular or tautological. Some of them,
by contrast, under the impression that its definition is possible,
34 Chapter One: The Definition of Knowledge
have asserted several definitions of knowledge, by a very

different route. In this regard, we can also find the same story
in the history of Islamic philosophy, theology and mysticism.2
Since knowledge of any sort is the foundation of every
philosophical argument, it is natural to discuss at first the
concept, essence (nature), and kinds of knowledge. In Western
philosophy, the theory of knowledge has been a central
problem in philosophy from the earliest times.3 In Islamic
philosophy, the problem of knowledge, its definition, divisions,
and sources have been highly considered by Muslim
philosophers. Muslim theologians (mutakallimîn) also discuss
at first the essence and kinds of knowledge.4
Muslim philosophers and theologians, however, taking
it for granted that knowledge of nature is possible, differ with
regard to whether or not the definition of knowledge is
logically possible.5
II. The concept and the nature of knowledge
It is generally accepted that, in the case of definition or

description of “knowledge,” there are two sides that might be
separately considered: the concept and the nature of
knowledge. Logically, any kind of definition dealt with the
nature of “knowledge” should be preceded by an examination
of the concept of knowledge. Yet, it is taken for granted that
the concept of knowledge is self-evident (al-badîhî).6 However,
one might ask whether a proposition expressing the concept of
knowledge defended as being self-evident, entails the
proposition expressing the essence (nature) of knowledge

defended as being self-evident as well.
On the other hand, with respect to the definition of
knowledge, Muslim thinkers have had recourse to two kinds of
technical terms: evaluative and (or) descriptive terms.7
However, it is evident that their investigation of the nature of
knowledge occurs within the framework of a general
metaphysical theory. Unfortunately, none of them adequately
clarifies the nature of the specific coherence between external
and internal world or, in other words, between object and
subject in any kind of knowledge. So, the distinction between
subjective and objective conceptions of reality remains in need
of much clarification.8
It should be considered that, assuming that the
thinkers' analysis is correct and complete as an analysis of the
concept of knowledge, knowing the correct analysis of the
concept of knowledge is not sufficient for knowing the
complete essence of knowledge. Some may hold that, though
we can know the content of the concept of knowledge, we do
not (or we cannot) know the complete essence of knowledge.
Hence, conceptual analysis is insufficient for determining the
complete essential nature of knowledge.
On the concept of knowledge (al-‘ilm or al-ma‘rifa),9 if
it is logically accepted that the subject matter of a science
could be known either by an acquired concept or by a self-
evident one,10 it is obvious and generally admitted that the
concept of knowledge is self-evident. In one sense,
understanding the concept of knowledge self-evidently means
that we know what knowing is or what the word “know”

means; for we know how to use the word correctly.
Traditionally, one who scans through the pages of the history
of Islamic philosophy will surely come across the fact that
most, if not all, of Muslim philosophers11 strenuously
maintained that the concept of knowledge is primitive and
indefinable; thus it is self-evident.12
On the nature of knowledge, there are two major
doctrines among Muslim thinkers; whether knowledge is a kind
of quiddity (mâhîyyah) or a kind of existence (nahwun min al-
wujûd). For whom knowledge is quiddity, its genus is either
quality (al-kaifîya) or relation (al-idhâfa or al-nisbat), or
affection (al-infî‘âl). Concerning these different doctrines,
Muslim thinkers have asserted diverse definitions of
knowledge.13
Suhrawardî (d. 587/1191), founding his philosophical
system on light, holds that our knowledge is not in the first
place mediated by concepts but occurs presently by a direct
relation with its object. Our conceptual knowledge is once or
twice removed from the thing.14 Considering the distinction
between concept and reality, Suhrawardî and his follower,
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî (d. 710/1310), have made a sharp and
consistent distinction between the structure of the conceptual
world and the structure of the real world.15
According to Mullâ Sadrâ (d. 1050/1640), knowledge is
not logically definable, for logical definition is in terms of genus
and species which are two kinds of quiddity (mâhîyah), while
the nature of knowledge is a kind of existence (nahwun min al-

wujûd).16
For both either Suhrawardî, who defines knowledge as
a kind of being manifest (al-zuhûr), or Mullâ Sadrâ, who
identifies knowledge as a kind of existence (al-wujûd),
grasping the real existence of the realities is the main goal of
their proposed epistemological system.17 In this regard,
Suhrawardî rejects the Peripatetic theory of definition and
establishes his own theory. Suhrawardî, in the critique of the
Peripatetics, argues that the Peripatetic approach to definition
makes it impossible to know the reality of anything, and in his
own logic he substitutes a theory of definition based on direct
knowledge (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) of things.18 He also uses a theory
of vision based on simple presence in place of Peripatetic
theories requiring an intermediate entity. His theory of vision,
as we shall see, has explicitly been rejected by Mullâ Sadrâ.
III. The definition of knowledge
On definition of knowledge, many different

propositions are cited.19 When we examine and peruse these
definitions, we will find that in most of them, if not all, some
technical terms, such as al-ma‘rifat (knowledge), al-idrâk
(perception), al-i‘tiqâd (belief), al-tayaqqun (certainty), and al-
sûrat (form) are employed. These terms, in turn, should be
described and logically defined by the term of al-‘ilm
(knowledge). For this reason, someone may hold that the
original definition of knowledge is rendered circular. For

instance, al-Râzî (d.606/1209)20 asserts that the definition of
knowledge by both real definition (al-hadd) and descriptive
definition (al-rasm) is impossible, and there is nothing more
evident than al-‘ilm (knowledge).21
Mullâ Sadrâ also, at the very beginning of his discussion
about knowledge, states that al-‘ilm (knowledge) is not
definable, for everything is appearing and manifested before
al-‘aql (intellect) by al-‘ilm (knowledge), hence, it is not
possible that knowledge itself be appearing or manifested by
something else.22
This allegation which indicates logical circularity might
be, however, denied with the argument that there is an
obvious difference between the concept of knowledge which is
examined by thinkers defining and describing it, and the
existence of knowledge which entails the appearance and
manifestation of everything before the intellect (al-‘aql).
Accordingly, the concept of knowledge could be appearing and
manifested before the intellect by other concepts without any
logical circularity or intellectual contradiction.23
That is why philosophers, as well as theologians, who
deny the possibility of the definition of knowledge, have
offered diverse definitions. Besides, Mullâ Sadrâ himself,
asserting the former statement, declares some propositions as
definitions or descriptions of knowledge.24 Mullâ Sadrâ, in this
regard, enumerates several views some of which he accepts
after necessary modifications, while criticizing and rejecting
others. He then formulates and demonstrates his own view.25
One view, which is attributed to the Peripatetics by

Suhrawardî, defines knowledge, particularly intellectual
knowledge, in terms of abstraction or separation from matter.
Abstraction here is taken as something negative. Mullâ Sadrâ,
following Suhrawardî, rejects this kind of definition. He
remarks that whenever we know something, we are aware
that knowledge is something positive and we are not aware of
any negatives. Moreover, "to be abstract" can never be a
translation of "to be knowledge"; that is why it requires a
proof to show that all knowledge includes abstraction.26
Another definition is to say that knowledge consists in
the imprinting of the form of the object in the subject. This is a
common definition of knowledge, in which knowledge is
considered as an acquired form, being a mediator between
subject (knower) and object (known). In analyzing this
definition, Mullâ Sadrâ mentions several objections against this
view. It is obvious that this is not true of self-knowledge (al-
‘ilm bi-dhât), for it is admitted that self-knowledge does not
come about by the imprinting of one's form into oneself. The
second objection to this view is that the imprinting of forms in
matter does not become knowledge for material bodies.27
Suhrawardî, however, accepts this kind of definition at
least in some part of knowledge, e.g., knowledge in which the
subject knows (or perceives) the object through a form
(mithâl).28 Mullâ Sadrâ also, in some cases, confirms this kind
of description of knowledge where he asserts that;
Knowledge is the presence of the forms before the
intellect (al-‘aql).29
What we understand from these two statements cited

by either Suhrawardî, who defines knowledge as a kind of
being manifest (al-zuhûr), or Mullâ Sadrâ, who identifies
knowledge as a kind of existence (al-wujûd), is that, on the one
hand, the reality of known object (ma‘lûm), in some kind of
knowledge, could be, according to them, absent of the subject
and, on the other hand, knowledge is not restricted to
knowledge by presence. Accordingly, some propositions in
which Mullâ Sadrâ affirms that every kind of knowledge refers
to knowledge by presence should be elucidated.30
Suhrawardî, denying all peripatetic definitions,
propounds his own definition of knowledge. He seeks to
translate the phenomenon of cognition into the terminology of
light. In his definition, he uses two technical terms: al-nûr
(light) and al-zuhûr (appearance or being manifest).31 He
asserts that al-nûr (light) is manifest to itself and makes other
things manifest (al-nûr zâhirun li-dhâtih wa muzhirun li-
ghairih).32 He depicts the categories of light as that which is
light for itself, and that which is light for something else. The
light which is light for itself appears for itself, and it knows
itself directly. In sum, the immaterial light knows itself directly,
because of the nature of light, and knows the other things
through an illuminative relation (al-idâfah al-ishrâqîyah).33
Vision, according to him, happens simply by the presence of a
lighted object before a healthy eye and, therefore, it happens
by an intuitive illumination for the soul (ishrâq-un hudûrî-un li-
nnafs).34
Mullâ Sadrâ critically treats Suhrawardî's definition of

knowledge, confirming some part of his theory and denying
the other part. He asserts that his idea about the light being
manifest for itself, which is a self-existing and a self-knowing
substance, is correct insofar as it identifies true being with
knowledge. He, thereafter, having interpreted the light as
existence, holds that Suhrawardî's idea, in this part, refers to
Mullâ Sadrâ’s own selected view, which implies the fact that
knowledge is existence (al-‘ilm huwa al-wujûd).35
Regarding the other part of Suhrawardî’s theory, Mullâ
Sadrâ rejects Suhrawardî's idea through both destructive
answer (al-jawâb al-naqdî) and constructive answer (al-jawâb
al-hallî). He declares that the connection (which Suhrawardî
posited between the act of vision and an externally subsisting
material form) cannot be, since the relation between what has
no position (that is, the soul’s act of vision) and something
having material dimensions (that is, the “object of vision, in
their theory) is impossible except by means of something
having position. So that even if one should suppose the validity
(of their theory of vision) through an intermediary (between
the soul and the material object of vision), the relation would
not be one of illuminative knowledge, but rather a material
and spatial one, since all the activities of material powers and
everything which they undergo must be in a spatial location.36
Besides, it is not true that those material things which
are, according to Suhrawardî, pure darkness (al-ghawâsiq), can
be known by direct illuminational awareness, like pure body
and pure quantity; whereas we believe that, Mullâ Sadrâ adds,
the pure body cannot be the object of one's perception or

intellection. Since what is material, like pure body, is able to be
divided in different directions and each direction is absent
from the others, hence it is absent from itself, let alone from
the other things.37 With respect to this objection he affirms;
For it has been proven that this mode of shadowy and
material being is veiled from itself by itself. So with
regard to this (material) mode (of being), the presence
(of a material thing) is precisely the same as its absence
from itself; its coherence is the same as its separability;
its unity is the same as its potential multiplicity; and its
38
conjunction is the same as divisibility.
Elsewhere, he holds that, “what is in the external

materials is not the sort of thing that can be connected in
essence with perception, nor can it be present immediately in
perception and have being in consciousness.”39
Mullâ Sadrâ, examining and criticizing the other
definitions, both Peripatetics and illuminatives, propounds his
own definition of knowledge:
Knowledge is neither a privation like abstraction from
matter, nor a relation but being (wujûd). (it is) not every
being but that which is an actual being (bil-fi‘l), not
potential (bil-quwwah). (It is) not even every actual
being, but a pure being (wujûdan khâlisan), unmixed
with non-being (al-‘adam). To the extent that it
becomes free from an admixture of non-being, its
intensity as knowledge increases.40
This statement frankly elucidates that his investigation

of the nature of knowledge occurs within the framework of a
general metaphysical theory. Knowledge, according to him, is

pure existence and free from matter. Mullâ Sadrâ, therefore,
has based his theory of knowledge on two prime bases: one of
them is a very fundamental principle of his philosophical
system, the principiality of existence (asâlat al-wujûd). On this
point, there is a deep gap between Suhrawardî's illuminative
system and Mullâ Sadrian philosophy. Suhrawardî is the most
relentless critic of the doctrine of the reality of existence and
the pioneer of the doctrine that essence is the sole reality and
existence a mental abstraction.41
For Suhrawardî, according to Mullâ Sadrâ’s
interpretation, essence or quiddity (al-mâhîyah) is principial
(asîl) and, therefore, existence (al-wujûd) cannot be regarded
as a real attribute of essence; because if existence were
realized in a determined (realm), then it would be existent and
would also have existence. Its existence would have existence
and so on ad infinitum (in a vicious regress).42 Mullâ Sadrâ,
answering the objections raised by Suhrawardî, demonstrates
the principiality of existence. For Mullâ Sadrâ, existence is the
corner stone of both his philosophical system (al-hikmah al-
muta‘âlîyah) and epistemological theory.43 According to him
the nature of knowledge does not pertain to quiddity (al-
mâhîyah), which has “never inhaled the perfume of real
existence at all.”44 He insists on the fact that the nature of
knowledge is a form of “existence” (nahwun min al-wujûd).45
The second prime basis in Mullâ Sadrian theory of
knowledge is immateriality of knowledge (tajarrud al-‘ilm). This
is a view acceptable to both Suhrawardî, who defines
knowledge through his terminology of light, and Mullâ Sadrâ,

who has defined knowledge on the basis of the prime principle
of his philosophy (asâlat al-wujûd). In the following chapter,
the problem of immateriality of knowledge will be pursued,
concentrating upon Suhrawardîan and Mullâ Sadrian
arguments.
Mullâ Sadrâ, using these two principles, has offered a
unique definition of knowledge which shows a very close
relationship between existence and knowledge in his
epistemological system. It must be stated at this juncture that
Mullâ Sadrâ has based his theory of knowledge on the reality
of existence, rather than on a concept of something which is
itself absent from the mind. Hence, according to him, direct,
intuitive experience is the only way to know the reality of
knowledge. 46
It might be said, however, that this kind of definition is,
at least at first glance, both too vague and too broad, because,
on the one hand, any sort of definition or description should
include all kinds of its sub-divisions. On the other hand, the
definition, even though it is not real definition, should explicitly
clarify and identify the subject. Assuming the correctness and
completeness of Mullâ Sadrâ's analysis of the definition of
knowledge, the next step would be to confirm the fact as to
which kind of quiddity (al-mâhîyah) we can abstract from the
existence of knowledge, at least some kind of knowledge. For
this kind of existence is contingent (mumkin), and every
contingent, as it is demonstrated by philosophers, is a
combined pair (kullu mumkinin zawjun tarkîbî) from quiddity
and existence.47 To answer this question there are diverse

ideas whether its quiddity is quality (al-kaifîya), or relation (al-
idâfa), or relational quality (al-kaifîya zât al-idâfa), or
something else.48
In comparing the definition of our two sages, specially
on knowledge by presence, it might be remarked that Mullâ
Sadrâ reached much the same rationalist and intuitive
conclusion as Suhrawardî, although by a very different route.
The technical term, manifest (zâhir), is the corner stone of
Suhrawardî's definition while for Mullâ Sadrâ, the reality of
existence is the sole reality of knowledge. In sum, regarding
these two ontological-intuitive definitions, one might conclude
the following formula demonstrating a synthesis of Sadrîan-
Suhrawardîan theory:
Existence (wujûd) = Presence (hudûr) = Manifestation
(zuhûr)
However, it is intelligible that both Suhrawardî and
Mullâ Sadrâ have developed their idea of knowledge on the
basis of intuitive experience.
In our discussion so far, examining different views
about the definition of knowledge, it has become clear that, in
approaching the definition of knowledge, several aspects
should be considered. Knowledge is a kind of existence
(nahwun min al-wujûd), as Mullâ Sadrâ remarks; and
manifestation or appearance (zuhûr) is a prime character of
this kind of existence, as Suhrawardî asserts. In addition, since
knowledge has several kinds and levels, its existence has its
own identity in each case, which has each time its specific
characters, e.g., it is pure existence in "self-knowledge" (‘ilm

al-dhât bi-al-dhât) but, in some cases, such quiddities as
quality, relation, or relational quality have been abstracted
from its existence. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that, in
their definitions of knowledge, Muslim thinkers, each in his
turn, indicate some aspects of knowledge, ignoring or
considering the other aspects. But in a complete definition we
should, as mentioned before, bear in mind all aspects.
1
D. W. Hamlyn, "History of Epistemology," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 3, p. 10.
2
For instance, in the Muslim world, at least for Fârâbî (d. 339/950) and his
successors, knowledge and a theory of knowledge was both possible
and necessary. For more information see: I. R. Netton, Al-Fârâbî and His
School, (London, New York: Rouledge, 1992), p. 88.
3
"This problem occupies an important place in most major philosophical
systems whether philosophy is conceived as an ontological undertaking
or a critical inquiry. In modern philosophy in the widest sense of the
phrase–i.e., philosophy since the Renaissance– theory of knowledge has
usually been the primary field of philosophy." Anthony Quinton,
"Knowledge and Belief," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), vol. 4, p. 345.
4
The fact that most, if not all, Muslim theologians have notably discussed
diverse aspects of knowledge in their works is obvious from the
following passage: "These discussions occupy a position in Islamic
theological manuals, which open by setting out the definition and

meaning of knowledge in its various kinds, e.g., al-Bâqillanî, Tamhîd; al-
Baghdâdî, Usûl; al-Ìjî, al-Mawâqif. B. Abrahamou, "Necessary
Knowledge in Islamic Theology," British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, vol. 21, no.1 (1993), Exeter, p.20.
5
Unlike Western philosophers, Muslim thinkers, insofar as I have
discovered, have not seriously approached the problem of possibility or
impossibility of the nature of knowledge. They took it for granted that
knowledge of nature was possible. In other words, the existence of
knowledge was not considered as a serious problem in their
epistemological system, but it was evident for them that the existence
of knowledge was necessary and did not need any logical
demonstration. See: Shams al-Dîn Bukhârî, Sharhi Hikmah al-‘Ain, p.
305; M. H. Tabâtabâ'î, Nihâyat al-Hikmah, (Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ,
1984), p.193; M. T. Mesbâh Yazdî, in his Ta‘lîqah on Nihâyat al-Hikma
(Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ, 1984), p. 193.
6
See below, nn. 11,12.
7
Ibn Sînâ (d. 428/1037) for instance, in his survey of the knowledge of The
First (al-Awwal), asserts that this kind of knowledge is better (afdal);
and Tûsî (d. 672/1273), the commentator, elucidates and evaluates
several kinds of knowledge, using some evaluative terms. See: al-Ishârât
wa al-Tanbîhât (Tehran: Matba‘a Haidarî, 9128), vol. 3, pp. 290-11.
8
This is a very basic problem in epistemology and I hope, by and by, I shall
approach this problematic issue, concerning two different metaphysical
methods: intellectual and intuitive.
9
Both terms al-‘ilm and al-ma‘rifa are used by the Peripatetics to designate
knowledge in the general sense, for which Suhrawardî uses the term
idrâk; and this has the sense of perception or cognition as a process of
knowledge. Ghazzâlî distinguishes between ma‘rifa as pertinent to
tasdîq, and ‘ilm as pertinent to tasawwur. Ghazzâlî, Mihak al-Nazar fî
al-Mantiq, ed. al-Na‘sânî (Beirut, 9166), pp. 8-10.
10
J. Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1992), p. 44.
11
It has been said that “the majority of theologians subscribe to the view
that “knowledge” is definable and consequently they postulate a variety
of definitions.” A. Al-Oraibi, Shî‘î Renaissance, Ph.D. thesis (McGill

University, 1992), p. 74.
12
Mullâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî, Asfâr, I/3, p. 278; M. H. Tabâtabâ'î, Nihâyat al-Hikma,
(Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ, 1984), p. 193; M. T. Mesbah Yazdi, Ta‘lîqa
‘alâ Nihâyat al-Hikma, (Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ, 1984), p. 193.
Mesbâh holds that the existence of knowledge is necessary (darûrî), for
the existence of everything would be demonstrated by it, and the
concept of knowledge is self-evident (badîhî), hence its definition is
impossible.
13
Sabzavârî (d.1289/1878) quotes different opinions about "knowledge," as
to whether its "genus" is "quality," as is commonly held, or "relation," as
has been held by Fakhr Râzî, or "affection," as some have held. He,
asserting several degrees for knowledge, holds that some kinds of
knowledge are qualities relating to the soul, and some of it are not
qualities. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (trans. and eds.), The
Metaphysics of Sabzavârî (New York: Caravan Books, 1977), pp. 210-11.
14
Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq (Tehran: Chap-i Sangî, 1913), pp. 38-9, 295-6.
15
J. Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992),pp. 83-84. The author adds: "This conceptual system,
however, was not arbitrary but had a systematic relation to experience
and reality. The program of Qutb al-Dîn's first philosophy is the
exploration of this conceptual structure, its relation to reality, and the
structure of reality insofar as it relates to the secondary intelligibles that
are correlates of all our thoughts."
16
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 278-99, 382-3; Mafâtîh al-Ghaib (Tehran: Muàssisa
Mutâli‘ât wa Tahqîqât-i Farhangî, 1986), pp. 108-110. For more
information on Mullâ Sadrâ’s concept of wujûd and mâhîyah see: S.J.
Ashtîyânî, Hastî az Nazar-i Falsafa wa ‘Irfân, pp. 63-95; F. Rahman, The
Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 27-58; S. H. Nasr, "Existence (wujud) and
Quiddity (mahiyyah) in Islamic Philosophy," International Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. XXIX, no.4, Issue no. 119 (1989), pp. 409-28.
17
On the contrary, for the Peripatetics like Fârâbî the reality of thing is not
obtainable because man, according to him, cannot grasp the reality of
an object; and he is able to know its properties (khawâss) and accidents
(a‘râd). Fârâbî, al-Rasâìl, al-Ta‘lîqât (Haidar Abâd, 1914), pp. 130,141.
Ibn Sînâ also, in some of his works, gives us the same statement. See
Ibn Sinâ, Al-Ta‘lîqât (p. 82).
18
Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 38-9. For a full discussion of Suhrawardî’s
examination of the problem “definition” see: H. Ziai, Knowledge and
Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), pp. 77-135.
19
al-Jurjânî (d. 808/1405) quotes several definition under the title of al-‘ilm
(knowledge) and states his own selected definition as following: "
knowledge is a certain belief which corresponds to the reality." Al-
Ta‘rîfât (Beirut: Maktaba Lubnân, 1990), p. 160. Among theologians, al-
Ìjî (d. 756/1355), on definition of knowledge, mentions several
impressions some of which are: 1. al-Râzî's opinion: knowledge is
necessary, darûrî (therefore, it doesn't need any definition). 2. al-
Juvainî's and al-Ghazzâlî's point of view: knowledge is not necessary, but
its definition is very difficult. 3. For the rest of Muslim thinkers it is
speculative, nazarî or acquired, muktasab. Then he quotes different
definitions and, finally, selects his accepted one. Al-Mawâqif, pp. 9-11.
20
Muhammad ibn ‘Omar Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî is one of the most important
Ash‘arite theologians who was among the first to systematize Islamic
theology on a philosophical basis. Fazlur Rahman asserts that al-Râzî,
being Mullâ Sadrâ's most persistent target, wielded great influence on
the subsequent philosophical tradition in Islam. F. Rahman, The
Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, p. 8.
21
F. Razî, al-Mabâhith al-Mashriqîyah (Beirut: Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabî, 9110),
pp. 450-3.
22
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, p. 278.
23
Sabzavârî has paid attention to this point in his commentary on Mullâ
Sadrâ's Asfâr, I/3, p.278.
24
Asfâr, I/1, p.116; part 3, pp. 286,297,354; Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, p. 108. It
could be mentioned here that the propositions which are offered as the
definitions of knowledge are not logically the definitions of knowledge,
for it has been cited that, on the one hand, the logical definition consists
of genus and species and, on the other hand, there is no genus and
species for the nature of “knowledge.” Hence, these propositions seem
to be merely as sharh-ul-ism; or, as Mullâ Sadrâ mentions, these are
propounded as the admonitions and explanations implying clarity and
plainness. Asfâr, I/3, p. 278.
25
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 278-99; Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, (Tehran: Mu`ssasa Mutâli‘ât wa
Tahqîqât-i Farhangî, 1986), pp. 108-110. See also F. Rahman, The
Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 210-220.
26
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 286,289. For Suhrawardî's objection to this definition see:
Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p.151. All references here, for Suhrawardî's works
such as Hikmat al-Ishrâq, al-Talvîhât, al-Mashâri‘ wa al-Mutârihât, and
al-Muqâwimât are to the collection under the title of Opera
metaphysica et mystica, vol. I & II, ed. Henricus Corbin (Istanbul: Maarif
Matbaasi, 1945, 1954).
27
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 288-9.
28
Suhrawardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 111. Elsewhere, he remarks that:
"perception (idrâk) occurs when the idea or form (mithâl) of the reality
(haqîqa) of the thing is obtained by the person, i.e., in the knowing
subject." Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 15 [trans. H. Ziai, Knowledge and
Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), p. 140].
29
Mullâ Sadrâ, Risâla al-Tasawwur wa al-Tasdîq [ed. in al-Jawhar al-Nadîd
(Qum: Intishârât-i Bîdâr, 1984) p. 307.
30
I shall attempt to examine his propositions in the following chapter.
31
The term manifest as a translation for the technical term zâhir has been
used by some contemporary writers like J. Walbridge in The Science of
Mystic Light (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
32
Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p.113.
33
Ibid., pp. 106-8,117.
34
Ibid., pp. 97-100; al-Mutârihât, p. 486. In this regard, Ziai concludes as
following: "For Suhrawardî, one does not proceed to know a thing by
analyzing it, but by having an intuitive grasp of its total reality and then
analyzing the intuition." Knowledge and Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.:
Scholars Press, 1990), p. 130.
35
Asfâr, I/3, p.291.
36
Mullâ Sadrâ, Ta‘lîqât on Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq (Tehran: Chap-i Sangî,
1913), pp. 270-274; al-‘Arshîya, p. 237 [trans. by J. W. Morris, The
Wisdom of The Throne (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1981) pp. 136].
37
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 291-2; Ta‘lîqât on Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 268-274; al-
‘Arshîyah, p. 225.
38
al-‘Arshîyah, p. 225 (trans. by J. W. Morris, The Wisdom of The Throne
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981) pp. 107-8).
39
Ibid., p. 237. Morris here declares that, “Sadra’s primary concern here is
to clarify the ontological implication of Suhrawardî’s theory with regard
to the true nature of soul; he does not claim to outline an adequate
alternative account of vision (or any other sense) on the level of physical
or psychological theory.” (P. 936, n. 83). However, it might be said that,
although Mullâ Sadrâ here does not offer the alternative theory of
vision, he demonstrates his own account in several places of his works.
We shall examine Mullâ Sadrâ’s theory, as well as his criticizing
Suhrawardî’s doctrine, in the following chapter.
40
Asfâr, I/3, p. 297 [trans. by F. Rahman in The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1975), p. 213].
41
32.
42
For Mullâ Sadrâ’s interpretation of Suhrawardî’s concept see: Asfâr, I/1,
pp. 38-45; Ta‘lîqât on Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 182-192; al-Mashâ‘ir,
trans. and ed. P. Morewedge (New York: SSIPS, 1992), pp. 22-33. For
Suhrawardî’s own idea see: Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 64-6; Opera I,
al-Talwîhât, pp. 22-3.
43
Mullâ Sadrâ, in his major work, has devoted four chapters to the
discussion of the principiality of existence. He mentions some views,
their objections, and answers one by one. Finally, he demonstrates his
own doctrine by several arguments. Asfâr, I/1, pp. 38-74.
44
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mashâ‘ir, trans. and ed. P. Morewedge (New York: SSIPS,
1992), p.43.
45
See above, n. 16.
46
al-Mashâ‘ir, pp. 30,43,63. Although the same theory had a background in
the illuminative doctrine of Suhrawardî.
47
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 12.
48
Ibn Sînâ (d. 428/1037) somewhere describes knowledge as relational
quality, and elsewhere, as spiritual quality or simple relation. al-Ishârât,
vol. 2, pp. 319-24, 334-62; vol. 4, pp. 710-16.
CHAPTER 2
The Division of Knowledge
Al-‘ilm al-husûlî & Al-‘ilm al-hudûrî
In the analysis of the theory of knowledge, the terms

“subject” and “object” have the primary role, regarding the
process of knowledge. The term “subject” indicates the mind
(or any other substituting term) that fulfills the act of
knowledge through knowing something, while the term
“object” refers to the thing known by that subject. The object
therefore has a share, together with the subject, in the
construction of the act of knowing.
The distinction between “knowing subject” and “object
known,” however, is the accepted one so far. From this
distinction (or, in other words, dualism of “subject” and
“object”), some epistemological problems such as justification
and correspondence will arise. Moreover, some divisions of
knowledge like its division into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and al-‘ilm al-
husûlî pertain to this dualism as well.
Muslim thinkers have divided knowledge (al-‘ilm) into
several divisions, considering ontological perspectives and
epistemological aspects.1 In this regard, Mullâ Sadrâ, in his
master work Asfâr, has allocated several chapters to the
54 Chapter Two: The Division of Knowledge
discussion of knowledge’s divisions.2 Nevertheless, he declares

that al-‘ilm (knowledge) could not be the object of divisions,
for, he argues, knowledge is a kind of wujûd (existence), and
wujûd is not genus (al-jins) nor species (al-fasl) by means of
which a thing is to be logically divided.
Therefore, all kinds of divisions which have been cited
by philosophers refer in reality to the “known” (al-ma‘lûm),
not to “knowledge” itself. He adds that the “known” is united
with the “knowledge” in the same way as “quiddity” is united
with “existence.”3
Sometimes Mullâ Sadrâ divides knowledge into al-‘ilm
al-husûlî (formal, empirical, or conceptual knowledge)4 and al-
‘ilm al-hudûrî (knowledge by presence or intuitive
knowledge).5 This classification was elaborated before Mullâ
Sadrâ by Suhrawardî and Mîr Dâmâd among others. This
terminology was also used by the Sûfîs along with the terms
kashf and wijdân (intuition and inspiration).6
At other times, Mullâ Sadrâ, following the Peripatetic
system, classifies knowledge as al-hissî (sensory), al-khayâlî
(imaginary), al-wahmî (apprehension), and al-‘aqlî
(intellectual). The term used in this classification is idrâk
(perception),7 which is more or less taken synonymously with
‘ilm or ma‘rifa (knowledge), in Mullâ Sadrâ’s epistemological
system.8
This classification could be found in the works of the former
philosophers. For instance, Ibn Sînâ, closely followed in this by
Tûsî, has divided al-idrâk (perception) into above-mentioned
four kinds, i.e., al-hissî, al-khayâlî, al-wahmî and al-‘aqlî.9 Ibn
Sînâ also considers two kinds of perception: direct and indirect

perception,10 which we will, in our language, consider as al-‘ilm
al-hudûrî and al-‘ilm al-husûlî in the following pages. The
division of knowledge into “al-‘ilm al-husûlî” (conceptual or
empirical knowledge) and “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî” (knowledge by
presence or intuitive knowledge) will be examined here, taking
into account both the Suhrawardian and Sadrian consideration
of the issue.
I. Al-‘ilm al-husûlî
Al-‘ilm al-husûlî11 has been defined as "the knowledge

which comes through the form of an object about the very
essence of that object in the mind of the subject or the
knower."12 According to this definition, the knower, in this kind
of knowledge, becomes acquainted with two things:
(1) the geometrical form or shape of the known object,
and
(2) the essence or intrinsic nature of it.
The knowledge of the form and outer shape is the
actual required knowledge in al-‘ilm al-husûlî, while the
knowledge of the external reality is accidental or bil-‘arad.13
It is not historically evident who, for the first time in the
Muslim world, employed the word “al-‘ilm al-husûlî” as a
technical term for such a kind of knowledge that would be
obtained through a form or concept. However, some related
words such as al-husûl (occurrence) and al-iktisâb (acquisition)
could be found in the logical and philosophical texts of earlier

Muslim thinkers, where they are defining “knowledge” (al-‘ilm)
or “perception” (al-idrâk).14 By using these words, they
attempted to define a kind of knowledge which was described
as “al-‘ilm al-husûlî” in the language of the later thinkers like
Mullâ Sadrâ, Sabzavârî, and Tabâtabâ`î. Mullâ Sadrâ, in several
places of his works, has employed the term “al-‘ilm al-husûlî”
for a kind of knowledge which is obtainable through a formal
or conceptual mediator.15
Therefore, it seems plausibly acceptable that the
occurrence or acquisition (husûl or iktisâb) of a form or a
concept is a key principle of the definition of this kind of
knowledge (viz., al-‘ilm al-husûlî). Consequently, thanks to this
kind of knowledge, the subject (al-‘âlim) knows the object (al-
ma‘lûm) through a form (sûra, mithâl) or a concept
(mafhûm).16
Al-‘ilm al-husûlî is limited to the perpetually changing
form of the object. Besides, the knowledge which is obtained
through the form, because of the ontological separation
between form and its reality, can be either true or untrue
knowledge. Also this knowledge is encompassed by the mind
of the knower which is colored with the color of possibilities or
is liable to doubt and error. So certainly it is a narration of a
state of the known object in which it actually is not. Its
characters will be examined in the last part of this chapter.
In the case of sense perception, the duality of subject
and object causes double objects in front of the subject. On
the one hand, there is an external object existing
independently outside of the mind (subject). On the other

hand, there is also an object that is present in the existence of
the subject. The correspondence of the inner object (or
subjective object) with the external object is required in any
actual knowledge. Consequently, the relation of knowing with
the two objects is entirely different.17
Suhrawardî states, following Ibn Sînâ, that ‘perception’
(idrâk), as the most general act of knowing an ‘absent thing’
(al-shay’ al-ghâìb), occurs when the idea (mithâl) of the reality
(haqîqa) of the thing is obtained by the person, i.e., in the
knowing subject.18According to him, to know an absent object
means that the subject obtains the idea ‘mithâl’ of the reality
or haqîqa of the object. This proposition could be considered
as a definition of al-‘ilm al-husûlî, which occurs only, in
Suhrawardî’s view, for absent objects. This kind of definition of
knowing an external entity which is absent from the subject,
however, could be found in the peripatetic works.19 In this
regard, Ibn Sînâ defines the act of perception as following:
Perceiving a thing means that its quiddity (haqîqa) is
represented (mutamaththila) to the perceiver [and]
monitored by the [organ] through which he perceives.20
Considering this kind of knowledge, Suhrawardî states

that there must be a complete correspondence between the
‘idea’ obtained in the subject , and the object, which is absent
from the subject; only such a correspondence shows that
knowledge of the thing as-it-is has been obtained.21 This
means that to obtain this kind of knowledge (al-‘ilm al-husûlî),
a kind of correspondence has to be established between the
perception in the subject (i.e. the ‘idea’) and the object, which
is not the case of knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî).
Suhrawardî’s view of intuitive knowledge indicates that the
subject’s immediate experience of the “presence” of the object
determines the validity of knowledge itself; therefore, in
knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî), there is no absence
between subject and object.22
Mullâ Sadrâ, following the traditional doctrines, namely
Peripatetic and illuminational views, primarily divides
knowledge, as it was mentioned above, into al-‘ilm al-husûlî
and al-‘ilm al-hudûrî. He indicates that, in al-‘ilm al-husûlî, the
reality of the external object of knowledge is absent from the
subject and, in its place, a mental existent is at the presence of
the subject, known by it directly23. Then he states that the
mental existence (al-wujûd al-dhihnî) of the direct object is
thoroughly corresponding with the external existence (al-
wujûd al-khârijî) of the “absent” object. There isn’t any
essential difference between these two kinds of something’s
existence. The only difference is that one existence is mental,
and the other is external.24
As we have seen, both Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ
declare that, in this kind of knowledge (al-‘ilm al-husûlî), the
form or concept which is known by the mind should be
conformable to the real object, i.e., the external reality. They,
however, don’t elucidate, so far as I could find, the problem
that, in the light of their epistemological system, how they can
prove the conformity of a mental form with its external
existence. The thesis I am putting forward is that although they
strenuously corroborate the necessity of this conformity in

true knowledge, the process of adjustment between our mind,
as the subject of knowledge, and the external world, as the
object of knowledge, has not plausibly been demonstrated by
them.
Mullâ Sadrâ’s view is that al-‘ilm al-husûlî also refers
ultimately to al-‘ilm al-hudûrî.25 This view might be examined
in the light of his ontological theory since, in my opinion, it is
the key in developing a Sadrian theory of knowledge. His
explanation and argumentation of the issue shall be seen in
the following pages.
II. Al-‘ilm al-hudûrî
The concept of al-‘ilm al-hudûrî may be found in Plato's

idealistic theory of knowledge but is not clearly stated by him.
In Aristotle's epagoge or induction, the intuitive power of
mind is mixed with his idea of the universal residing in the
particulars and, therefore, is not clear. It was Plotinus who, for
the first time, introduced the two distinct functions of the
nous, namely intuitive and discursive.26 Among the Muslim
philosophers Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ took over this Neoplatonic
idea of intuition virtually intact. But Suhrawardî gave it a new
interpretation in the light of his famous doctrine of light.27 In
his system, this hudûr (presence or intuition) became zuhûr or
ishrâq (manifestation or illumination).28
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî (d.710-1311),29 commenting on
Suhrawardî’s remarks on the division of knowledge into
conception and assent (al-tasawwur wa al-tasdîq), asserts that

this division applies to formal knowledge, not to intuitive
knowledge, which occurs by the simple presence of the known
to the knower. This is the kind of knowledge we have of the
Creator, of the celestial intellects, and of our own selves; for it
would be absurd to suppose that our self-knowledge is by the
mediation of a form.30 Although Shîrâzî, in this statement,
doesn’t give us any argument for the knowledge by presence,
he corroborates the reality of this kind of knowledge, as well as
its several sorts, in the view of illuminationist philosophy.
One can say that the theory of “knowledge by
presence” distinguishes illuminationist epistemology in
general, and Sadrian doctrine in particular, from the
Peripatetic theory of knowledge. This distinction is obvious in
several fields of their epistemological system- e.g., in the
definition and division of knowledge, and in the theory of
Necessary Existent’s knowledge.
Suhrawardî, criticizing the Peripatetic theory,
demonstrates a special mode of perception which, being called
‘seeing’ or ‘vision’ (mushâhada), emphasizes intuitive
knowledge. In this kind of perception, the subject has an
immediate grasp of the object without the mediation of a
predicate.31
Suhrawardî, holding the view that the knowledge of
any absent thing occurs when the idea (mithâl) of the reality
(haqîqa) of the thing is obtained by the person, i.e., in the
knowing subject,32maintains that there is another kind of
knowledge by means of which the essences of things (things as
they are) are obtained. This kind of knowledge is validated by

the experience of the ‘presence’ (al-hudûr) of the object. This
proposition, as Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî argues, signifies ‘knowledge
based on illumination and presence’ (al-‘ilm al-ishrâqî al-
hudûrî), by means of which an ‘illuminationist relation’ (al-
idâfa al-ishrâqîya) is established between the subject and the
object, resulting in knowledge of essence.33 It does not require
a conception of the object; it is non-predicative, and it is based
on the relation between the ‘present’ object and the knowing
subject. Suhrawardî holds that this method is the most valid
way to knowledge.34
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî, thereafter, remarks the examples of
this kind of knowledge as the following: knowledge of God
(‘ilm al-Bârî), knowledge of incorporeal separate entities (‘ilm
al-mujarradât al-mufâraqa), and knowledge of oneself (al-‘ilm
bi-anfusinâ).35 Suhrawardî, moreover, maintains that the
process of ‘seeing’ or ‘vision’ (al-ibsâr) also occurs through an
‘illuminationist relation’ (al-idâfa al-ishrâqîya) in which the
subject has an immediate grasp of the object without the
mediation of a predicate. Therefore, the external objects are at
the presence of the knowing subject.36
Mullâ Sadrâ also demonstrates, in addition to “al-‘ilm
al-husûlî,” another kind of knowledge, al-‘ilm al-hudûrî, in
which the existence of a thing becomes united with the
existence of the subject. According to this interpretation, one
of the Sadrian famous theories- the existential unity between
the knower, the known, and the act of knowing- makes
sense.37
Mullâ Sadrâ, like Suhrawardî, begins his argumentation

on knowledge by presence from “self-knowledge” (al-‘ilm bi-
dhât). He holds that the self knows itself in the manner of
knowledge by presence, which is existentially identical with the
very being of the self itself. Then he demonstrates another
kind of knowledge by presence the arguments of which will be
discussed in the following part. Ultimately, he propounds his
own developed view that any case of knowledge refers to
knowledge by presence.38 To understand this Sadrian notion
better, it will be useful to have a glance at the elements of his
description of knowledge by presence.
In his discussion of mental existence (al-wujûd al-
dhihnî), Mullâ Sadrâ demonstrates the idea that the object
known, in any case, will be an immaterial existence presented
before the soul, whether the perceived object is a sensitive
entity or an intellectual one. Although the external object is
the object known in al-‘ilm al-husûlî, it is an internal existence
which is ultimately perceived by the soul. Consequently, all
kinds of knowledge (or perception) refer to knowledge by
presence.39 He argues as follows:
In reality, all that man conceives or perceives–whether
through intellection or sensation, and whether in this
world or in the other world–are not things separate
from his essence and different from his ipseity (that is,
his individual being and substance). That which he
essentially perceives is only existing in his essence, not
in something else.40
The same doctrine has been accepted by his followers

such as Tabâtabâ`î.41 Having stated the division of knowledge
into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and al-‘ilm al-husûlî, Tabâtabâ`î remarks

that this division is true at the first simple view, but, in a
profound understanding, the “knowledge by correspondence”
also refers to the “knowledge by presence”.42 Explaining the
reference of “knowledge by correspondence” to the
“knowledge by presence”, M.T. Mesbah, in his Gloss on
Tabâtabâ`î’s Nihâyah, propounds three interpretations for
that; and finally selects the third as the best. He states:
Whatever we assume as knowledge by correspondence
(al-‘ilm al-husûlî), which is revealing the objects known
by accident (al-ma‘lûmât bi al-‘arad), it is in fact
knowledge by presence which discovers the objects
known by essence (al-ma‘lûmât bi al-dhât). Knowledge
reveals the external objects by a consideration of the
intellect (i‘tibâr-on min al-‘aql). Therefore, knowledge
by correspondence (al-‘ilm al-husûlî) is a consideration
that the intellect has to have recourse to.43
The language of this passage gives an interpretation

which frankly elucidates Mullâ Sadrâ’s view of the issue.
In the light of the above discussion, Mullâ Sadrâ’s idea
of “al-‘ilm al-husûlî,” which refers to “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî” might
be summarized as follows: the mental form, which represents
the external reality, can be regarded in two ways: first, it is
considered as what is presently known to the soul without any
mediation. The existence of the form, in this consideration, is
at the present of the soul and, therefore, the soul knows it by
presence. In this case, it is called, according to Mullâ Sadrâ, “al-
‘ilm al-hudûrî.” Second, it is considered as what is revealing the
external object. It is, in this consideration, like a mirror which

shows the other things and is called “al-‘ilm al-husûlî.”44
III. A characterization of the two kinds of knowledge
Although knowledge has been epistemologicaly divided

into al-‘ilm al-husûlî and al-‘ilm al-hudûrî, there is, as we have
seen, an ontological relation between these two sorts of
knowledge to the extent that any kind of al-‘ilm al-husûlî can
be reduced to al-‘ilm al-hudûrî. Nevertheless, concerning their
distinctive aspect, the following characters might be pointed
out:
1. The double object is the essential character of al-‘ilm

al-husûlî whereas, in al-‘ilm al-hudûrî, there is only one object
presents to the subject. In other words, there is no mediation
in al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and, therefore, the subject attains the
reality of the object without any intermediary such as form or
concept. In al-‘ilm al-husûlî, on the contrary, the object is
obtainable through a form or a concept.
Consequently, in this kind of knowledge, there are two
objects known: the object known by essence (al-ma‘lûm bi-al-
dhât) and the object known by accident (al-ma‘lûm bi-al-
‘arad).45 The external reality is the object known by accident
since its external reality as it is external cannot be attained by
the subject directly. The external object as an independent
existence lies outside of the subject and is exterior to it. The
form or concept which is supposed to be conform to the
external reality is the object known in reality and, thus, the

reality of the form or concept is at the presence of the
subject.46
2. The nature of al-‘ilm al-husûlî is conceptual, i.e. the

knowledge which is presented for the subject is through a
concept or form; it can bee divided into conception (tasawwur)
and assent (tasdîq). Al-‘ilm al-hudûrî, by contrast, does not
involve any distinction of conception and assent, because it
belongs to the order of being and reality itself.47 It is based on
the relation–obtained without a temporal extension–between
the “present” object and the knowing subject.
So, it is a kind of knowledge by means of which the
essence of things (i.e., things as they are) may be “obtained.”
This kind of illuminationist knowledge, to repeat, is validated
by the experience of the “presence” (hudûr) of the object, i.e.,
it does not require a conception and then (later in time) an
assent.
Unlike the Peripatetic school, who divided knowledge
into tasawwur (conception) and tasdîq (assent)48, for
Suhrawardî, as well as Mullâ Sadrâ, this kind of division is true
only for one sort of knowledge, i.e., al-‘ilm al-husûlî.49
3. It has been claimed that knowledge by mediation

(al-‘ilm al-husûlî) requires separation of subject and object,
whereas knowledge by presence necessitates the union of the
subject and the object.50
The first part of this claim is true since, in any kind of al-
‘ilm al-husûlî, there must be a mediation through which the
subject would be able to realize the object. The second part of

this statement, however, is questionable. In self-knowledge,
the union of the subject and object is plausible. But the
knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) is not restricted to
the self-knowledge.51
4. The process of thinking (al-fikr) occurs in al-‘ilm al-

husûlî not in knowledge by presence, because the process of
thinking (al-fikr) happens within the forms and mental
concepts. Ibn Sînâ (d. 428/1037) gives us a definition of
“thought” (al-fikr) as follows:
I mean by “thought” here that by which a human being
has, at the point of resolving, to move from things
present in his mind-conceptions or assents- to things
not present in it.52
This statement explicitly indicates that “thought” occurs, more

or less, within the concepts and forms. On the other hand, the
science of logic is there to preserve one from error in his
thought.53 But there is no room for logic in the process of
“knowledge by presence.”54
5. Al-‘ilm al-husûlî happens when the process of

knowing occurs between the soul and an absent thing which
are not united with each other. M.Haìri gives us an
explanation of the term of “absence” here:
The word “absence,” quite often used in the linguistic
technique of illuminative philosophy, means that there
is no logical, ontological, or even epistemological
connection between the two existences (namely
subject and object) that are supposed to be in two

completely different circumstances of being.55
Knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî), by contrast,

occurs when the object is at the presence of the subject. Since
the material world is, as Mullâ Sadrâ argues, absent from itself,
let alone from other things such as human soul,56 the only
knowledge of external world (i.e., material world), which is
logically possible for the human soul to be obtained, is al-‘ilm
al-husûlî. Therefore, knowledge by presence is restricted to
immaterial existents.57
6. The dualism of truth and falsehood is a character of

al-‘ilm al-husûlî whereas knowledge by presence is free from
this dualism. M. Haìrî argues that:
This is because the essence of this pattern of knowledge
(i.e. knowledge by presence) is not concerned with the
notion of correspondence. When there is no external
object, correspondence between an internal and
external state, as well as between “external fact” and
“statement,” is not withstanding.58
To complete this argumentation, it might be said that the

unification of the subject and object in “knowledge by
presence” obviates the ground of the dualism of truth and
falsehood. Here, in knowledge by presence, there is no sense
of falsehood because the reality of the object is at the
presence of the subject. Therefore, in the epistemological
system of our sages, namely Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ,
there is another sense of truth which is applicable to
knowledge by presence.59
7. There are two kinds of object known in al-‘ilm al-

husûlî: that which is known-by-itself (al-ma‘lûm bi al-dhât; lit.
known-by-essence) and that which is known-by-another (al-
ma‘lûm bi al-‘arad; lit. Known-by-accident). The known-by-
itself is the form apprehended by the knower itself. The
known-by-accident is the external reality represented by the
cognitive form; it is called the “accidentally known” (al-ma‘lûm
bi al-‘arad) due to its association with the known-by-itself.60
This kind of division, however, does not happen to al-‘ilm al-
hudûrî, because, in this kind of knowledge, there is no
separation and, therefore, dualism between the knower and
the object known. The reality of the object exists at the
presence of the subject.
Closing the chapter, it could be concluded that Mullâ

Sadrâ traditionally accepts the division of knowledge into al-
‘ilm al-husûlî and al-‘ilm al-hudûrî. But he finally, in the light of
his ontological system and his own definition of knowledge,
holds that every kind of knowledge is ultimately reduced to
knowledge by presence.61 This is, according to Mullâ Sadrâ, the
only way through which one can obtain the reality as it is. Thus
he states that:
The knowledge of the reality of existence cannot be
except through the illuminative presence and an
intuition of the (immediate) determined (reality); then
there will be no doubt about its inner-nature.62
1
For instance, Sabzavârî mentions several divisions of knowledge such as:
"Knowledge is either husûlî (empirical) or hudûrî (intuitive); and it is
either mufrad (separative) or murakkab (collective); and it is either fi‘lî
(active) or infi‘âlî (passive). The Metaphysics of Sabzavari, trans. and
eds. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (New York: Caravan Books, 1977), pp.
212-13.
2
Asfâr, I, 3, pp. 382-4, 500-507.
3
Ibid., p. 382.
4
In the following pages, I shall attempt to clarify the technical term al-‘ilm
al-husûlî.
5
Asfâr, I/1, pp. 272-86, 309; Risâla al-tasawwur wa al-tasdîq, p. 307.
6
H.A.Ghaffar Khan, “Shâh Walî Allâh: on the nature, origin, definition, and
classification of knowledge,” Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 3, no. 2
(1992), Oxford, pp. 210-11.
7
This term is also used in Suhrawardian epistemological language. Ziai
alleges that the term idrâk as used by Suhrawardî is like a genus that
covers a number of species, such as ‘ilm, ma‘rifa, hiss, etc. Knowledge
and Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), p. 141 (note no. 1).
8
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 293,382-3. Idrâk has been divided into several divisions in
recent Persian philosophy for which see: A. M. Mishkât al-Dînî, Tahqîq
dar Haqîqat-i ‘ilm (Tehran: Châpkhân-i Dânishgâh-i Tehran, 1965), pp.
2ff.
9
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât (Tehran: Matba‘a Heidarî, 9128), vol. 2,
al-namat 3, pp. 343-7.
10
Ibid., pp. 334-342.
11
Al-‘ilm al-husûlî can be translated as sensory, empirical, conceptual,
formative, and a posteriori knowledge. It is called empirical or
observational because observation and practical experience are its
prerequisites. It is called formative because the form of the known
object is the central point where the activity of the perception becomes
knowledge. And it is called a posteriori because knowledge in this case
comes after the experience and observation. S. J. Sajjadi, Farhang-i
‘Ulûm-i ‘Aqlî (Tehran: Kitâbkhâni Ibn Sînâ, 1962), p.173. It is also

translated as knowledge by correspondence. M. Haìri, preferring this
translation, remarks: “In almost all versions of Islamic philosophy, from
Avicenna down to Sadr al-Dîn Shîrazî, the notion of “correspondence” is
taken as the prime condition of this kind of knowledge.” The Principles
of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), p.
918. However, it seems to me that “correspondence” is merely one
aspect of al-‘ilm al-husûlî which does not accurately indicate the nature
of that. Thus I think that, for some reasons I shall explain in the
following pages, the English term “conceptual knowledge” is more
precisely tantamount to the term “al-‘ilm al-husûlî.”
12
More or less, we can find this definition in the following texts: Ibn Sînâ,
al-Ishârât., vol. 2, p. 334; al-Ta‘lîqât (Qum: Markaz-i al-Nashr, 1984), pp.
79,82; Bahmanyâr, al-Tahsîl (Tehran: Dânishgâh-i Tehran, 1961), pp.
493-8, 745; F. Râzî, al-Mabâhith al-Mashriqîya, vol. 1, pp. 439, 450;
Suhrawardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 15; Tûsî, Sharh-i Masàlat al-‘Ilm, pp.
26,28; Mullâ Sadrâ, Risâla al-Tasawwur wa al-Tasdîq, pp. 307-8;
Sabzavârî, Asrâr al-Hikam (Tehran: Kitâbfurûshî-i Islâmîya, 1959), p. 61;
S. J. Sajjadi, Farhang-i ‘Ulûm-i ‘Aqlî (Tehran: Kitâbkhâni Ibn Sînâ, 1962),
p. 173.
13
For more detail see: M. Haìri Yazdi, The principles of Epistemology in
Islamic Philosophy (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 47-56.
14
See above, n. 12.
15
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, p. 382; Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, p. 109; Risâla al-
Tasawwur wa al-Tasdîq, pp. 307-8
16
Due to the above remarks it seems to me that the English term
“conceptual or mediated knowledge” would preferably be an
appropriate equivalent for the technical term “al-‘ilm al-husûlî.”
17
In this regard M. Haìrî states: “The relation of knowing or perceiving,
however, with regard to the objective object (i.e., external object) is
accidental (bi-al-‘arad) and with regard to the subjective object (i.e.,
mental object), essential (bi-al-dhât). M.Haìri, The principles of
Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 32.
The parentheses and italics are mine.
18
Suhrawardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 15.
19
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât., vol. 2, al-namat 3, pp. 334-342.
20
Ibid., p. 334 (trans. by A. Al-Oraibi in Shî‘î Renaissance, Ph.D. thesis,
McGill University, 1992).
21
22
Ibid., pp. 111-116.
23
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, pp. 280-84, 298.
24
The division of existence into mental existence (al-wujûd al-dhihnî) and
external existence (al-wujûd al-khârijî) has been discussed in several
philosophical and theological works so far. Mullâ Sadrâ earmarks one
part of the first book of his Asfâr (about 64 pages) to the discussion of
mental existence (al-wujûd al-dhihnî) and its ontological and
epistemological characters. Asfâr, I/1, pp. 263-326.
25
Ibid., pp. 297-99, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib (Tehran: Muassasa Mutâli‘ât wa
Tahqîqât-i Farhangî, 1984), p. 109; al-‘Arshîya, p. 32.
26
F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms (New York: New York University
Press, 1967), p. 127.
27
According to some of Sufis' idea, namely Shâh Walî Allâh’s, the notion of
al-‘ilm al-hudûrî is slightly different from that of Suhrawardî. This
understanding is that “it is a direct fayd (emanation) from al-Rahmân,
not from the person who is receiving intuition or illumination. According
to him, the Gnostic is in a passive state. It is al-Rahmân who induces
intuitive knowledge in the heart of the mystic in an indescribable way.”
H. A. Ghaffar Khan, “Shâh Walî Allâh.,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 3:2
(1992), p. 211.
28
S. J. Sajjadi, op. cit. 170.
29
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî was one of the pupils of Nasîr al-Dîn Tûsî, and one of
the famous astronomers and philosophers. In the field of Peripatetic
philosophy, he left a remarkable work, written in Persian, entitled
Durrat al-Tâj. He was one of the popular expositors of Suhrawardî’s
illuminationist philosophy. In his commentary on Suhrawardî’s Hikmat
al-Ishrâq, Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî explains and elucidates the whole idea of
the illuminative system.
30
Q. Shîrâzî, Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq ‘Commentary on The Philosophy of
Illumination’ (Tehrân: Châp-i Sangî, 1913) pp. 38-39.
31
H. Ziai, Knowledge And Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), p.
135.
32
33
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî, Sharh., p. 39.
34
In this regard, Ziai, the author of knowledge and Illumination, asserts and
explains the idea of Suhrawardî, as well as Shîrâzî- the commentator of
Hikmat al-Ishrâq. Unfortunately, he doesn’t clarify the main difference
between the knowledge which is obtained through an ‘idea’ (mithal)
and the knowledge which is obtained by presence. It is clear that,
according to Suhrawardî, the technical terms such as ‘presence’ (al-
hudûr), ‘illuminationist relation’ (al-idâfa al-ishrâqîya), and ‘knowledge
based on illumination and presence’ (al-‘ilm al-ishrâqî al-hudûrî) refer
only to the latter. The commentator, Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî -in his Sharh, p.
39- explicitly elucidates the distinction between these two kinds of
knowledge, with regard to the view point of Suhrawardî. On this point
see: H. Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press,
1990), pp. 140-3.
35
Q. Shîrâzî, Sharh., p. 38.
36
In Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 97-103, Suhrawardî mentions several viewpoints
and rejects all one by one. thereafter, he explains his own idea.
37
Mullâ Sadrâ notably has a discussion about the issue, “ittihâd al-‘aql wa
al-‘âqil wa al-ma‘qûl”. Having remarked and evaluated several notions,
he finally demonstrates his theory of unification (al-ittihâd). In this
regard see: Asfâr, I/3, pp. 312-44; F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ
Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976), p. 239.
38
Mullâ Sadrâ, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib (Tehran: Muassasa Mutâli‘ât wa Tahqîqât-i
Farhangî, 1984), pp. 108-110.
39
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/1, pp. 282-296, 308-309.
40
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 32 (trans. by J. W. Morris in The Wisdom of
the Throne, p. 159).
41
The great contemporary Muslim philosopher, ‘Allâma Sayyed
Muhammad Husayn Tabâtabâ`î (1321-1402/1902-1983) is the author of
some philosophical works such as Nihâyat al-Hikmah, and Usûl Falsafa
wa Ravish realism (The principles of philosophy and the Method of
Realism) in which he defended realism in its traditional and medieval

sense against all dialectic philosophies. For Tabâtabâ`î’s view of the
present issue see: Nihâyah al-Hikmah (Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ,
1989), pp. 196-205.
42
Tabâtabâ`î, Nihâyah al-Hikmah, p. 196.
43
M.T.Mesbah Yazdî, Ta‘lîqa ‘alâ Nihâyat al-Hikma (Tehran: Intishârât-i al-
Zahrâ, 1989), p. 196.
44
For more details on this issue see: Mullâ Sadrâ, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, p. 109,
al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd (Tehran: Anjuman-i Shâhanshâhî Falsafi Iran,
1976), pp. 82-3.
45
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/1, pp. 282-92 (with the notes of Sabzavârî and M.H.
Tabâtabâ`î), Asfâr, I/3, p. 313.
46
Having paraphrased two kinds of object, M. Hâìrî attributes the
character of double objectivity to the phenomenal knowledge (al-‘ilm
al-husûlî). The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy (New
York: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 27-32.
47
M. Haìrî Yazdî, The Principles., pp. 46-7, Agâhî wa Gavâhî (Tehran:
Anjuman-i Islâmî Hikmat wa Falsafi Iran, 1981), p. 6 (n. 1).
48
Ibn Sînâ, al-Najât, al-mantiq (Beirut: Dâr al-Jîl, 1992), ch. 2; Bahmanyâr,
al-Tahsîl (Tehran: Dânishgâh-i Tehran, 1961), p. 4.
49
Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî, Sharh-i Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 38-39.
50
M. Haìri, The Principles., pp. 43-4; M. Aminrazavi, Suhrawardî’s Theory of
knowledge, p. 188.
51
Several kinds of knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) will be
examined in the following part.
52
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, vol. 1, p. 10. (Trans. by S.C.Inati).
53
Logic, spoken of as a tool or as a science, is a set of rules that helps one
distinguish the valid from the invalid explanatory phrase and proof.
Ibid., pp. 9,117,127.
54
H. Malikshâhî, Tarjuma va Tafsîr Tahdhîb al-Mantiq Taftâzânî, p. 23.
55
M. Haìrî, The Principles., p. 47. The parentheses are mine.
56
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 225. Mullâ Sadrâ here argues that any
material thing is absent from itself by itself.
57
The discussion and the arguments of the nature of knowledge by
presence, as well as of its restriction to the immaterial things will be
pointed out in the following chapter.
58
M. Haìrî Yazdî, The Principles., p. 45. The parentheses are mine.
59
In the very beginning of his Hikmat al-Ishrâq (p. 10), Suhrawardî asserts
that there is no doubt in this kind of illuminative understanding. Mullâ
Sadrâ also confirms the same statement in his work Al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 30.
60
Mullâ Sadrâ, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, p. 109; Tabâtabâ`î, Bidâyat al-Hikmah
(Beirut: Dâr al-Mustafâ, 1982), p. 164.
61
Mullâ Sadrâ, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, pp. 108-110.
62
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 30 (trans. by P.Morewedge in the same
page).
CHAPTER 3
Immateriality and “knowledge by presence”
I. Tajarrud (Immateriality) 1
The technical term “immaterial” (mujarrad) is

traditionally used in contrast with the term “material”
(mâddî).2 In physics, “material being” (al-mawjûd al-mâddî) is
an entity being susceptible of division into quantities and
location in space. Being in space and time, having susceptibility
of motion and change are general characters of physical
matter.3 The existence of this kind of being is, in the language
of Mullâ Sadrâ, associated with matter (al-mâdda) and position
(al-wad‘) and is spatio temporal.
One (form) is the material form the existence of which
is associated with matter and position and is spatio
temporal.4
Mullâ Sadrâ, dividing the being of the world into

“material” (mâddî) and “immaterial” (mujarrad) existents,
elaborates several levels for the immaterial world. Some
immaterial beings are completely separated from the matter
and its attributes such as time and space, whereas some other
76 Chapter Three: Immateriality and Knowledge
immaterial beings are separated from some material aspects.

A good example for the former, according to Mullâ Sadrâ, is an
“actual intelligible” and for the latter is an “actual imaginable”.
He states:
... and the other is a form which is free and separate
from matter, from position, and from space and
location. The separation is either complete, in which
case it is an actual intelligible form, or incomplete in
which case it is an actual imaginable or an actual
sensible form.5
This kind of classification has a background in the

philosophy of Ibn Sînâ (d. 428/1032).6 Ibn Sînâ classified the
substances into three major categories:
1. The substance whose being is one, which possesses
contingency (mumkin) and is completely separate (mujarrad) from
all matter and potentiality is called Intellect (‘aql).
2. The substance whose being is one but accepts the form of
other beings is divided into two categories:
a. That which does not accept divisibility and,
although separate from matter, has need of a body in its
action is called Soul (nafs).
b. That which accepts divisibility, and has the three
divisions of length, width and depth is called Body (jism).7
The same classification has been, more or less,

considered by the Muslim thinkers after Ibn Sînâ, but in a
diverse route and, in some cases, by a different language.
Under their classification, the doctrine of “world of Images”
(‘Alam al-Mithâl) has been propounded as an independent
realm. It was developed after al-Ghazâlî (505/1111) by

Suhrawardî (282/9919), Ibn ‘Arabî (638/9240), and others.
According to this doctrine, the ontological structure of reality
comprises three worlds–that of pure ideas or intellectual
entities on top, of pure images or figures in the middle, and of
material bodies at the lowest rung.8
Suhrawardî9 propounds his own classification but in a
different language. Employing his illuminative terminology,
Suhrawardî has divided the world into several categories. First,
he divided it into what is “light in the very reality of itself” and
what is not “light in the very reality of itself,” which falls into
the category of darkness. Then, he divided the “light” into a
mode of light that is genuine, unadulterated, and noninherent
in anything else, and another mode of light that is accidental
and subsists in something else. Darkness is also divided into a
mode of darkness that does not occur in another thing and
therefore is pure and independent, and a mode which does
occur in something else and is not independent. The former is
called in his illuminative language the “obscure substance” (al-
jawhar al-ghâsiq). Examples of the latter are all material
objects. These material objects are essentially counted among
the modes of darkness, and they are called “intermediate
objects” (al-barzakh).10 Consequently, what is called “light”
(nûr) in his system is free from matter, and, on the contrary,
what is called “dark” (zulma) or “intermediate object” (al-
barzakh) is material (mâddî or jism).
Following the traditional classification, Mullâ Sadrâ has
also ontologically demonstrated three different realms: the
spiritual, the imaginative, and the material. The imaginative

world11 of images or symbols connects the spiritual to the
material world. These three realms represent the continuity of
existence constantly sustained by the Source of everything,
God.12
Thus, existence is divisible, from the aspect of freedom
from matter and its absence, into three realms. One of them is
the world of matter and potentiality. The second is that in
which matter is absent, though not some of its properties such
as shape, quantity, position, etc. It is called the “world of
Images’ (‘âlam al-mithâl) and the “intermediate world” (‘âlam
al-barzakh), which lies between the world of the intellect
(‘âlam al-‘aql) and the material realm. Therefore, Mullâ Sadrâ
uses the word al-barzakh in a different sense than Suhrawardî.
The third is the world of non-materiality (‘âlam al-tajarrud),
totally free from the effects of matter. It is called the world of
intellect (‘âlam al-‘aql).13
In sum, it is plausible to conclude here that, according
to Mullâ Sadrâ, the technical term, “mâddî,” is used for an
entity which has actually the three divisions of length, width
and depth. This entity, which is also associated with position,
space, time and location, is called, in his terminology, “jism” or
“jismânî” (body).14 The technical term “mujarrad,” by contrast,
is applied for an entity which is free from, at least, one aspect
of “mâdda”. This application comprises a variety of entities
and levels–beginning from the lowest rung of “tajarrud,” such
as an actual sensible form perceived by sensory organs, to the
highest level of “tajarrud,” such an entity being totally free

from matter, position, space, time and location.15
II. Tajarrud al-‘ilm (Immateriality of knowledge)
In the theory of knowledge, there are three basic items

which have to be considered as the elements of the process of
knowing–the subject knowing (al-‘âlim), the object known (al-
ma‘lûm), and knowledge (al-‘ilm). In the tradition of Islamic
philosophy, the issue has received considerable attention. One
who scans through the pages of the history of Islamic
philosophy will surely come across the fact that Muslim
thinkers have ontologically examined the three-fold process of
knowledge, regarding the problem of materiality and
immateriality.16 Our sages, namely Suhrawardî and Mullâ
Sadrâ, have also given much consideration to the problem of
materiality and immateriality of knowledge (al-‘ilm), knower
(al-‘âlim) and known (al-ma‘lûm) in different places of their
works. Their argument and discussion will be analyzed, in
greater detail, in the coming pages (under the title of ibsâr
“vision”). But first, we shall examine briefly the problem of
“immateriality” of “knowledge” and “knower.”
a: Immateriality of “knowledge”
Both Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ maintain that
“knowledge” (al-‘ilm) is “free from matter” (mujarrad). Their
notion is understood from their definition of knowledge (as we

have seen in chapter one).
In Suhrawardî’s epistemological system, the terms
“presence” (hudûr) and “manifest” (zuhûr) are more or less
synonymously employed in the definition of knowledge.17
Elsewhere, he asserts that “hudûr” or “zuhûr” is applied only
to “light” (nûr) which is free from matter. He adds that
although the “material substances” are, in his words, darkness
[which is called “intermediate objects” (al-barzakh)], they are
rather in such a state that should rays of light be cast upon
them by which they can come to light, they thereby become
apparent; but should these rays not reach them, they fall back
to absolute darkness and disappear.18
It might be concluded here that according to
Suhrawardî, the nature of knowledge, which is described as
“light” by him, is absolutely free from matter.
Mullâ Sadrâ, confirming the Suhrawardian concept of
hudûr and zuhûr, prefers to define knowledge by his own
terminology, which is derived from his ontological attention on
the concept of “existence” (wujûd). He defines knowledge as
“a pure existence, free from matter (al-wujûd al-mujarrad min
al-mâdda)”19 Thereafter, he argues that “knowledge” is not
body and body also cannot become knowledge.
Body itself cannot become knowledge, since it is not
pure being: parts of a body, being mutually exclusive,
are never present to each other and hence body can
never attain a real unity which is requisite for true being
and knowledge.20
As we can see here, Mullâ Sadrâ, demonstrating the

immateriality of “knowledge,” has employed the Ishrâqî term,
namely the term of “presence” (hudûr) and its antonym
“absence” (ghaiba).
Therefore, one of the main arguments for the
immateriality of “knowledge” and “knower” is based on the
principle of “presence” (hudûr), which has been employed in
Ishrâqî definition of knowledge and also accepted by Mullâ
Sadrâ. According to this argument, knowledge is “presence”
(hudûr) and the presence of anything requires it to be
something which is in act (bi-l-fi‘l), free from any association
with matter and potentiality (al-quwwa).
Further, the presence of knowledge requires that the
knower acquiring its knowledge be also in act (bi-l-fi‘l), in total
actuality, non-deficient in any respect arising from association
with matter.
Hence, the knower is also non-material and free from
potentiality. From this, it becomes clear that knowledge, as we
have seen in chapter one, is “presence” of a non-material
existent for a non-material existent.21
Mullâ Sadrâ, however, argues that some kind of
knowledge is absolutely separated from matter, such as
intellection, and some kind of knowledge is separated from
some aspect of matter, such as sensation and imagination.
Nevertheless, the nature of perception, he adds, is absolutely
based on at least a kind of immateriality.22
b: Immateriality of “knower”
On the immateriality of the human soul (as a knower),
there is an accepted theory among the Muslim philosophers,
namely Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, Tûsî, Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ. By
different methods and distinct backgrounds, they have
demonstrated the immateriality of the human soul, confirming
the fact that “nafs” (the human soul) is ultimately capable of
existing independently of the body.23 In order to prove that
“self” (al-nafs) is an immaterial spiritual substance, Ibn Sînâ
has recourse to his famous argument that a person, under
certain suppositions, can affirm his own “self” (dhâtihî) without
affirming the existence of his body.24
In a number of his works,25 Suhrawardî holds that the
human soul “self” (nafs) is separated from the body since, he
argues, the body is in a continuous state of change. But, it is
not possible for humans to undergo so much change and yet
remain the same. There must be an immaterial substance,
mind or self (nafs), separate from body. The nature of this
substance or entity cannot be material since all material things
undergo change and therefore cannot remain the same.
Consequently, this “self” (nafs) has to be immaterial. In this
regard Suhrawardî states:
All the parts of the body change and if your “self”
consisted of these parts of the body, they would also be
in a continuous state of change. (Thus) your self
yesterday would not be the same “self” as today, but
each day your self would be other than itself and this
obviously is not the case. And since your knowledge is
continuous and permanent it is not at all body nor part

of the body, but it is beyond all this.26
As this statement shows, Suhrawardî holds that

knowledge, like “self”, is immaterial and he elsewhere argues
for that by the same argumentation. Suhrawardî also in several
places of his works asserts different argumentations for the
immateriality of the “human soul.”27 In this connection, he
relies on a famous argument that the human soul is
incorporeal since it becomes conscious of itself. He says:
It was proven that every being who becomes conscious

of his essence is an incorporeal light, and its opposite,
meaning everything that is light is also conscious of its
own nature, is also true.28
In Mullâ Sadrâ’s system of philosophical psychology,

there are several levels for the human soul, from the beginning
of its generation to the end of its goal. The soul is, in some
level, pure material (jismânî) and in some level pure immaterial
(‘aqlânî), and, between these two levels, there are different
levels for the soul, regarding the weakness and strength of the
materiality and immateriality.29
In his major work, Asfâr, Mullâ Sadrâ has devoted a
whole section to the discussion of the immateriality of “human
soul.”30 Analyzing and criticizing several points of view, Mullâ
Sadrâ has given more than twelve rational, mystical, and
traditional demonstrations for the immateriality of “human
soul.” After every argument, he evaluates it and replies to the
objections which had been raised by others. Finally, he holds
that the soul is bodily in its origin but spiritual in its survival
(jismânîyat al-hudûth, rûhânîyat al-baqâ`).31
Yet Mullâ Sadrâ maintains that the human soul is free
from matter and hence capable of existence independently of
the body. The reason for this doctrine, in part, is to prove that
simple human souls which possess hardly any intellective
activity, but simply work with imagination also survive. For,
Mullâ Sadrâ absolutely holds that a being endowed with
imagination is independent of natural matter even though it is
not independent of a certain kind of extension and quantity
(miqdâr) which, however, is not material. This view, in turn,
rests on his doctrine of the ‘Alam al-Mithâl (World of Images),
according to which, an image, although not spiritual, is not
material either, is not directly subject to substantive change as
the world of physical forms and, therefore, exists by itself
independent of matter.32
Further, to prove that the human soul is separate from
the body, Mullâ Sadrâ applies the philosophers’ argument33
from self-knowledge. The human’s self-knowledge is direct,
continuous, and independent of its knowledge of the external
object. Hence the human soul is independent of the material
body. Again, he argues that the immateriality of “knowledge”
also postulates the immateriality of the soul. Apprehension of
knowledge means the reception of the known by the knower,
and the apprehension of a thing and its presence is nothing
except its existence, that existence itself. The immediacy of the
known requires that the knower acquiring its knowledge be in
act, non-deficient in any respect arising from association with
matter. Hence, the knower (al-nafs al-insânî) is non-material

and free from potentiality (al-quwwa).34
According to our sages’ argumentation so far it
becomes clear, firstly, that the knowledge must necessarily be
something non-material.
Secondly, the knower, through whom knowledge
subsists, must also necessarily be non-material. But the known,
to which knowledge pertains, in Mullâ Sadrâ’s point of view,
must be non-material whereas Suhrawardî doesn’t necessitate
the immateriality for the known. Their notion and
philosophical argumentations will be discussed in the following
pages.
III. Ibsâr (vision)
The problem of vision (ibsâr) has been considered in

different ways by Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ. Suhrawardî
formulates a theory of vision on the basis of direct “relation”
(al-idâfah) between the soul and the external world whereas
Mullâ Sadrâ thoroughly rejects this illuminative notion.
However, both have refuted the traditional views of vision,
namely “intibâ‘” (the imprinting of a form from the object in
the eye) or “khurûj al-shu‘â‘” (the exit of a ray from the eye).
Against these two theories, we can find the same objections in
our sages’ works. They maintain that vision (ibsâr) does not
consist of the imprint of the form of the object in the eye, nor
of something that goes out from the eye. Therefore, the act of
seeing, according to them, is a kind of knowledge by presence

but in a different manner.35
Refuting the other existing theories of how vision
occurs, Suhrawardî offers his own view which can be explained
within the principles of illumination. He states:
once you know that vision is not caused by the
impression of phantasms from the visible object on the
eye, nor does it occur through the emission of visual
rays from the eye. Then except for the encounter of the
lit object with the healthy eye, it is not in anything
else... and the result of this encounter in regards to
sight is due to the absence of the veil between that
which sees and the seen.36
The act of vision, according to Suhrawardî, is

applicable whenever the subject (the sound eye) and the
object (the luminous thing) are both present. In this case, an
“illuminationist relation” (al-idâfa al-ishrâqîya) is established
between the subject and the object. There are a number of
conditions necessary for the act of vision.
These conditions, as Ziaì summarizes, are:
“ 9. The presence of light is due to the propagation of
light from the source of light, i.e., the Light of Lights.37
2. The absence of any obstacle or veil (hijâb) between
the subject and the object.38
3. The illumination of the object as well as the
subject.”39 Consequently, Suhrawardî, on the basis of the
knowledge by presence, formulates his theory of vision (ibsâr)

which is in accordance with his illuminationist doctrine.40
Mullâ Sadrâ, rejecting the two traditional theories of
vision, criticizes Suhrawardî’s theory as well. He holds that any
kind of material body (al-jism al-mâddî) cannot be a direct
object for perception.41 The argument that Mullâ Sadrâ gives
us, in his objection against Suhrawardî, is based on his
ontological notion of a material existent, i.e., a material being
is veiled from itself by itself. He adds:
It has been proven that this mode of shadowy and
material being is veiled from itself by itself. So with
regard to this (material) mode (of being), the presence
(of a material thing) is precisely the same as its absence
from itself; its coherence is the same as its separability;
its unity is the same as its potential multiplicity; and its
conjunction is the same as its divisibility.42
On the basis of this ontological principle, Mullâ Sadrâ

demonstrates his argument of the process of vision. Mullâ
Sadrâ states another objection against Suhrawardî, considering
the term of “illuminative relation” (idâfa ishrâqîya).
Suhrawardî maintains that this kind of relation occurs through
the soul’s direct witnessing of a form external to the eye and
subsisting in matter. Mullâ Sadrâ claims that this kind of
relation between the soul and the material world could not be
as an “illuminative relation.”
This connection (which they posited between the act of
vision and an externally subsisting material form)
cannot be, since the relation between what has no
position (that is, the soul’s act of vision) and something
having material dimensions (that is, the “object” of

vision, in their theory) is impossible except by means of
something having position.
So that even if one should suppose the validity (of their
theory of vision) through an intermediary (between the
soul and the material object of vision), the relation
would not be one of illuminative knowledge, but rather
a material and spatial one, since all the activities of
material powers and everything which they undergo
must be in a spatial location.43
Mullâ Sadrâ then proceeds to state his own view of

vision:
The truth about vision–as God has shown us by
inspiration–is that after the fulfillment of certain
specific conditions, with God’s permission, there arise
from the soul forms suspended (from their notice
archetypes), subsisting through the soul, present in the
soul, and appearing in the world of the soul–not in this
(material) world.44
Mullâ Sadrâ’s argument can be summarized as follows:

The material being cannot be a direct object for perception
since it is absent from itself, let alone from the other thing. The
external world and the absence of a veil between that and the
knower (i.e., the soul) are some necessary conditions for the
act of seeing. Since there has to be a causal relationship
between the observer and what is seen, the soul is, by the help
of God, the creator of the immaterial form.
The visible form, which is directly perceived by the soul, is an
immaterial being, representing the external world. Therefore,
in seeing something, it is not the case that the subject sees the
external object but that it is the presence of the inner object to
be seen that allows for the very act of seeing to take place.45
According to Mullâ Sadrâ, the act of seeing (or any kind
of sensitive perception) takes place when an interaction
happens between the soul (as a knower) and the external
world (as a known). The external world, on the one hand,
prepares some necessary conditions of the act of seeing, and
the soul, on the other hand, makes an immaterial form
corresponding to the external object.
Consequently, the existence of the form (in any sort of
perception), being at the presence of the soul, is directly
perceived by the soul.46 Mullâ Sadrâ contends that this
relation between the soul and the immaterial form is due to be
called “illuminative relation” (al-idâfah al-ishrâqîyah).47
What seems plausible, on the ground of our discussion,
to be concluded here is that Mullâ Sadrâ reached much the
same epistemological conclusion as Suhrawardî, although by a
very different route. Having recourse to their illuminative
principles, both Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ have been
ultimately led to the inference that, in the act of vision, the
only way through which the external thing could be known is
knowledge by presence.
The process of “knowledge by presence,” according to
Suhrawardî, happens directly between the soul (nafs) and the
external object. But, according to Mullâ Sadrâ, since the
process of “knowledge by presence” cannot be applicable
directly between knower and any material object, as we have
seen above, the soul, in this case, knows by presence the

immaterial form which is representative of the external object.
The being of those (material) things is not in sensation,
and they are grasped by sense or by the intellect only in
an accidental manner and in consequence of a form in
sensation corresponding to them.48
As we have seen so far, the difference between

Suhrawardî’s notion of vision and Sadrâ’s is obvious, although
there are many similarities between their epistemological
systems. Therefore, it is plausible to claim that the most
important distinction between Suhrawardian epistemology
and Sadrian theory of knowledge concerns the problem of
vision “ibsâr.”
Mullâ Sadrâ’s theory of vision, however, has been
criticized by his well-known follower, Mullâ Hâdî Sabzavârî.
Confirming Suhrawardî’s theory of vision, Sabzavârî, in his
Glosses on Asfâr, replies to the objections Mullâ Sadrâ has
propounded against Suhrawardî. He remarks that there are
several ranks for the soul in some of which the soul can directly
observe the existence of the external world. In this case, the
relation between the soul and the external object is by unity
(bi-l-ittihâd).49
Some contemporary thinkers such as Mesbâh Yazdî also
criticize the Sadrian notion of vision. Mesbâh Yazdî asserts that
one may accept the fact that a material thing is absent from
itself to the extent that every part of its being is separated
from the others, but it doesn’t necessitate its absence from its
efficient cause.
It could be considered that as the cause gives the existence to

everything, and therefore there is an ontological relation
between them, in the same vein, everything is at the presence
of its cause. Thus there is logically an epistemological relation
between the efficient cause and things.50
Concerning Suhrawardî’s account of vision and
Sabzavârî’s support, one might say that this kind of relation,
namely “illuminative relation,” is acceptable if there were a
causal-relation between two things. If Suhrawardî accepts this
kind of relation between “human soul” and the external
world51, it would be plausible for him to confirm an intuitive
relation between them, as Sabzavârî does. But here an obvious
objection arises against Mullâ Sadrâ who thoroughly denies
the material world to be the direct object for any kind of
knower.
If Mullâ Sadrâ contends the causal relation between the
external world and its creator (i.e., the Necessary Existent),
why does he discard any epistemological relation between
them! The Sadrian argumentation and the objections will be
discussed in chapter five.
What we may conclude so far, considering the results
of our sages’ arguments, is that, in the process of vision, the
function “knowledge by presence” is the unique way through
which the soul can be aware of the external world. In this
connection, the difference between their epistemological
system is that, for Suhrawardî, a material being can be a direct
object for “knowledge by presence,” whereas, for Mullâ Sadrâ,
by contrast, the direct object for knowledge (any sort of

knowledge) should be an immaterial thing.
Consequently, the material world is “known by essence” (al-
ma‘lûm bi-dhât) in Suhrawardî’s system, and “known by
accident” (al-ma‘lûm bi-l-‘arad) in the Sadrian system.
1
“separation from matter,” “noncorporeality” or “immateriality” are the
usual translations of “tajarrud.”
2
mâdda, translated here as “matter,” often refers simply to the elements
of corporeal being, and in those cases is close in meaning to jism,
“body.” According to the definition of “jism” that Mullâ Sadrâ gives us
here the term “jism or jismânî” is preferably, in contrast with
“mujarrad,” applied in place of “mâdda or mâddî.” Asfâr, I/2, p. 94.
3
J. Sajjâdî, Farhang-i ‘Ulûm-i ‘Aqlî (Tehran: Kitâbkhâni Ibn Sînâ, 1962), p.
192.
4
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, p. 313 (trans. by M.Hâìrî as stated in The Principle
of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, p. 35).
5
Ibid., p. 313.
6
Ibn Sînâ, known to the West as Avicenna, lived from 980-1037 A.D. For
further information on his life see: William E. Gohlman, The life of Ibn
Sînâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974).
7
Ibn Sînâ, Dânishnâmah ‘Alâ`î, Ilâhîyât, p. 36 (trans. by S. H. Nasr in An
Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, p. 200). See also F.
Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology, (London: Oxford University Press,

1952), pp. 38-40.
8
For a full discussion of the history of the doctrine of the “world of Images”
(‘Alam al-Mithâl) prior to and including Mullâ Sadrâ see: F. Rahman, “
Dream, Imagination, and ‘Alam al-Mithâl,” Islamic Studies, no. 3 (1964),
pp. 167-80.
9
Fazlur Rahman believes that after Ibn Sînâ, concerning the theory of
“World of Images” (‘âlam al-mithâl), a new development explicitly starts
with Suhrawardî. For more information see: F. Rahman, The Philosophy
of Mullâ Sadrâ, p. 201.
10
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 107-8.
11
The intermediate imaginative world must not be confused with the
faculty of imagination.
12
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mashâ‘ir (New York: SSIPS, 1992), p. 63.
13
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, pp. 501-507; F. Rahman, The philosophy of Mullâ
Sadrâ, pp. 200-201; M.H.Tabâtabâ`î, Bidâyat al-Hikma (Beirut: Dâr al-
Mustafâ, 1982), p. 151.
14
In several places of his works, Mullâ Sadrâ employs the term “jism” for a
material entity versus the immaterial thing. Asfâr, I/3, pp. 297-9, al-
Mashâ‘ir, p. 81, al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 18-21, ‘Arshîya, p. 225.
15
For more details on the problem of materiality and immateriality, see M.
T. Mesbah Yazdi, Amûzish Falsafa, vol. 2, p. 924; S. M. R. Hejazi, “
Material and Immaterial Existent,” Ma‘rifat, no. 1 (winter 1992), pp. 18-
26.
16
Ibn Sînâ in several places of his works has examined the issue in a vast
dimension. al-Najât, pp. 99-105, al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 77-81, Dânishnâmah
‘Alâ`î, Ilâhîyât, p. 36. For Fârâbî’s idea, see Risâlat fî Ithbât al-mufâriqât,
p. 7.
17
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p.113; see also chapter 1, pp. 21-
23.
18
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 108-110.
19
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 292, 294, 297; Asfâr, I/1, p. 290.
20
Ibid., pp. 297-8 (trans. by F. Rahman in The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, p.
213).
21
M. H. Tabâtabâ`î, Bidâyat al-Hikma (Beirut: Dâr al-Mustafâ, 1982), pp.
148-9.
22
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, p. 79.
23
For Fârâbî’s point of view see: al-Rasâìl, Risâlat fî Ithbât al-Mufâriqât, pp.
3,5,7; al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 10,12-13; al-Madîna al-Fâdila, p. 23; for Ibn Sînâ’s
theory see: al-Shifâ`, al-Nafs, chapter 6, al-Ishârât, vol. 2, pp. 319-24,
334-42; for Tûsî’s doctrine see: his notes on Ibn Sînâ’s al-Ishârât., vol. 2,
pp. 319-24, 334-42. In this connection, for more details see: F. Rahman,
Avicenna’s Psychology, pp. 50-53; Prophecy in Islam (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1958), Chapter I, Section 1,2.
24
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât., vol. 2, al-namat 3, pp. 319-323; al-Najât, pp. 174-8.
See also Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 106.
25
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Talvîhât, pp. 68-74,79-81, al-Mashâri‘, pp. 496-7;
Partaw Nâmah, chapter 4, pp. 23-24.
26
Suhrawardî, Partaw Nâmah, chapter 4, pp. 23-24 (trans. by M.
Aminrazavi, in Suhrawardî’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 127). For another
argumentation of Suhrawardî, see p. 76 in the following chapter.
27
Opera I, al-Talvîhât, pp. 68-74,79-81, al-Mashâri‘, pp. 496-7.
28
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 116.
29
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 325-27, ‘Arshîya, p. 19.
30
Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 260-322.
31
Ibid., p. 347.
32
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 42-44, 278, 294-6.
33
For Fârâbî’s demonstrations that the human soul is immaterial see:
Risâlat fî Ithbât al-Mufâriqât, p. 2; and for Ibn Sînâ’s argumentation see:
al-Shifâ`, al-Nafs, pp. 187-96; al-Najât, pp. 210-20; see also F. Rahman,
Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 41-
54.
34
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 43, 294-6.
35
For Suhrawardî’s view see: Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 134; for Sadrian
theory see: Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 178-183.
36
Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 134.
37
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 150, 152-153.
38
Ibid., pp. 134-5, 213-216.
39
H. Ziaì, Knowledge and Illumination (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990),
p. 161.
40
For a more complete discussion on this problem see: M. Aminrazavi,
Suhrawardî’s Theory of Knowledge (Ph. D. Thesis, Temple University,
1989), pp. 234-237.
41
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, p. 182.
42
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîyah, p. 225 (Trans. J.W. Morris in The Wisdom of
the Throne, pp. 107-108).
43
Ibid., p. 237 (Trans. J.W. Morris in The Wisdom of the Throne, p. 136).
44
Ibid., p. 237 (Trans. J.W. Morris in The Wisdom of the Throne, pp. 136-
137).
45
M. H. Tabâtabâ`î, n. 1, Asfâr, I/1, p. 286.
46
Mullâ Sadrâ, Ta‘lîqa ‘alâ Sharh-i Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 454.
47
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, p. 182, al-‘Arshîyah, p. 21.
48
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 227 (Trans. J. W. Morris in The Wisdom of the
Throne, p. 114).
49
Sabzavârî, n. 1, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 179-81 (n. 1). See also his notes on Mullâ
Sadrâ’s Asfâr, III/1, pp.164-166 (n. 3).
50
M. Mesbâh Yazdî, Ta‘lîqa., pp. 205, 256-7. This issue and the Sadrian
theory of vision (concerning the problem of God’s knowledge) will be
discussed in chapter 5.
51
It seems that Suhrawardî, in his Hikmat al-Ishrâq, maintains this kind of
relationship between a special kind of human being and the external
world. For more details see: Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 213-215.
PART TWO
(al-‘ilm al-hudûrî )
Introduction
So far we have seen the definition and clarification, as

well as the characters of “knowledge by presence” (al-‘ilm al-
hudûrî) in the sense found in the epistemological system of our
sages Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ. In this part, the primary
aim is to clarify certain kinds of “knowledge by presence”
which have been, or might be, examined in their system.
It seems generally accepted by Muslim philosophers
that non-material substances are in-themselves present-for-
themselves by virtue of their completeness and actuality.1 But
is immediate knowledge confined to a thing’s knowledge of
itself, or, when both subject and object are non-material, does
it include a cause’s knowledge of its effect, and vice versa?
It seems that the Peripatetics hold the former position
and the Illuminationists subscribe to the latter view. The
epistemological consideration of this question, in its turn,
raised serious debates among them, especially with regard to
the problem of God’s knowledge of His effects.
It should be noted that most philosophers who have in
any way addressed the problem of “knowledge by presence”
(al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) consider “self-knowledge” (al-‘ilm bi al-dhât)
100 PART TWO: Introduction
as a case of that, holding that, in this case, the object of

knowledge should exist at the presence of the subject.2 But,
with respect to other kinds of knowledge by presence, there is,
as we shall see, no general agreement among them.
To be sure, it is generally held that the Peripatetics
have restricted “knowledge by presence” to “self-knowledge”
(al-‘ilm bi al-dhât). Sabzavârî, for example, asserting that
"intuitive knowledge" is not confined to "self-knowledge",
rejects the view attributed to the Peripatetics, namely,
confinement of al-‘ilm al-hudûrî (intuitive knowledge or
knowledge by presence) to "self-knowledge," and al-‘ilm al-
husûlî (empirical knowledge) to "knowledge of anything other
than "self".3
Nevertheless, this attribution could be questioned
because Ibn Sînâ himself, in some places of his works, states
that the only way for the human soul, which is essentially
immaterial, to know the immaterial entities (such as universals
“kullîyât” and intelligible concepts “‘aqlîyât”) is a direct
perception, i.e., without any formal or conceptual mediator, or
employing a bodily organ.4 Therefore, according to Ibn Sînâ,
there is a kind of knowledge by presence other than self-
knowledge.
Both Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ, as well as their
followers such as Sabzavârî and Tabâtabâ`î, however, maintain
other kinds of knowledge by presence. Generally speaking,
they hold that when, on the one hand, two existents are
immaterial and there is, on the other hand, an ontological
relationship between them–such as causal relationship–thus
they know each other by presence, for there is no barrier

between them. In the case of an immaterial cause and its
effect, for instance, the effect is present with all its being for
the cause, without there being any barrier between them. It is
known with immediacy to the cause through its existence
itself. Similarly, when the cause and the effect are non-
material, the cause is present with its existence for its effect,
which is sustained by it, and there is no barrier separating
them. Hence the cause is known to its effect with an
immediate knowledge.5
Suhrawardî, at one time, went even further. He held
that, in the case of vision (ibsâr) as we examined in the
preceding chapter, the act of vision is applicable whenever the
subject (the sound eye) and the object (the luminous thing) are
both present without there being an obstacle. In this case, an
“illuminationist relation” (al-idâfa al-ishrâqîya) is established
between the subject and the object.6
Therefore, according to Suhrawardî and contrary to
Mullâ Sadrâ, the scope of the process of “knowledge by
presence” is wider, including the epistemological relationship
between the material world which is illuminated, and the
subject (knower).
Mullâ Sadrâ, in several places of his works, insists on
the fact that “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî” is not restricted to self-
knowledge; thus he demonstrates certain kinds of knowledge
by presence. Sometimes he states generally that, on the one
hand, either the relation of unification (al-ittihâd) or that of
causality (al-‘illîya) is a pre-condition for any kind of
knowledge, and, on the other hand, these two situations

happen only within knowledge by presence.7 At other times,
he declares that there are different kinds of knowledge by
presence, examining the division of knowledge into al-‘ilm al-
husûlî and al-‘ilm al-hudûrî.8
Sabzavârî9 and Tabâtabâ`î, in their notes on Asfâr,10
expound three kinds of knowledge by presence. The former
writes that “the immaterial thing’s knowledge of its essence
(‘ilm al-mujarrad bi-dhâtih), the cause’s knowledge of its effect
(‘ilm-u al-shai` bi-ma‘lûlih), and the mortal thing’s knowledge
of the reality in which it is annihilated (‘ilm al-fânî bi-l-mufnâ
fîh) are three kinds of “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî.”11
In sum, he elsewhere asserts that there are two cases
for knowledge by presence: unification (al-ittihâd) and
causality (al-‘illîya).12 Tabâtabâ`î, in his note, indicates too the
same statement, confirming the three cases of knowledge by
presence.13 Among the contemporary writers, Haìrî also
examines three kinds of knowledge by presence:
9. Immaterial being’s knowledge of “itself,”
2. Immaterial being’s knowledge of its attributes and
actions,
3. Effect’s knowledge of its immaterial cause.
He declares that the first is acceptable for all
philosophers, namely the Peripatetics and Illuminationists, and
the second is originated and demonstrated by Tûsî, and the
third is allocated to mysticism.14 To sum up the discussion, it
could be said that our philosophers, Suhrawardî and Mullâ
Sadrâ, as well as their followers like Sabzavârî and Tabâtabâ`î,

seem clearly to have accounted several kinds of al-‘ilm al-
hudûrî in their epistemological system.
In the following chapters, we will examine certain
disputed kinds of knowledge by presence: knowledge by
presence of the human soul and knowledge by presence of
God.
1
In chapter 4, I shall attempt to give a detailed account of this kind of
knowledge by presence, namely self-knowledge.
2
For instance see: Fârâbî, al-Rasâìl, Risâlat fî Ithbât al-Mufâraqât, pp.
3,5,7; al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 10,12-13; Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ`, al-Nafs, pp. 212-213;
al-Ishârât, vol. 2, pp. 319-24, 334-42, vol. 3, p. 481, vol. 4, p. 709; al-
Najât, p. 99; al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 77-81, 160-62; Fakhr al-Râzî, al-Mabâhith
al-Mashriqîya, pp. 459-463; Tûsî, Sharh Mas‘alat al-‘ilm, pp. 28,34.
Although, in the case of the former philosophers such as Fârâbî or Ibn
Sînâ, we don’t find the exact term “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî” in their works, the
definition of self-knowledge (al-‘ilm bi-dhât) they give us is more or less

corresponding to what we meant by “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî”.
3
The Metaphysics of Sabzavari, trans. and eds. M. Mohaghegh, T. Izutsu,
(New York: Caravan Books, 1977), p. 212.
4
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ta‘lîqât, p. 80.
5
We will examine their argumentations in the following chapters.
6
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 97-103, 134-5, 150.
7
Mullâ Sadrâ, Mafâtîh al-Ghaib, pp. 108-9; Asfâr, III/1, pp. 162-4.
8
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/3, pp. 319-20; III/1, pp. 161-4; al-Mabda` wa al-
Ma‘âd, pp. 34-7; Risâla al-Tasawwur wa al-Tasdîq, p. 308.
9
Sabzavârî also, in his Asrâr al-Hikam, demonstrates three kinds of
knowledge by presence. Asrâr al-Hikam (Tehran: Kitâbfurûshî-i Islâmîya,
1959),p. 61.
10
The most important commentators on Mullâ Sadrâ’s major work, the
Asfâr, are Mullâ Hâdî Sabzavârî (d. 9281/9822) and ‘Allâma Sayyed
Muhammad Hosayn Tabâtabâ`î (d. 1402/1983).
11
Sabzavârî, in his notes on Asfâr, I/3, p. 3
12
Sabzavârî, in his notes on Asfâr, I/1, p. 288.
13
Tabâtabâ`î, in his notes on Asfâr, I/3, p. 319.
14
M. Hâìrî, Agâhî wa Gavâhî (Tehran: Anjuman-i Islâmî-i Hikmat wa Falsafi
Iran, 1981), pp. 5-6.
CHAPTER 4
The “human soul” and knowledge by presence
I. “Self” (al-dhât)
One of the central problems of philosophy has been to

prove the existence of a non-material entity which is generally
referred to as “self,” “mind”, or “soul”.1
In the history of Islamic philosophy, the issue has also
received a notable attention and Muslim thinkers have often
discussed the issue “self” (nafs or dhât). Both the peripatetic
philosophers such as Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ2 and the illuminative
thinkers such as Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ,3 in numerous
places, have argued for the existence and immateriality of
“self” (nafs) which is distinct from the body. For both Fârâbî
and Ibn Sînâ, the human soul (al-nafs) is ultimately an
immaterial spiritual substance capable of existing
independently of the body.4 To prove that “self” (al-nafs) is an
immaterial spiritual substance, Ibn Sînâ has had recourse to his
famous argument of ‘the floating man.’ He states that a person
can, under certain suppositions, affirm his own “self” (dhât or
anâ`îya) without affirming the existence of his body.5
106 Chapter Four: The Human Soul and Knowledge
Suhrawardî holds that “self” (nafs) exists separated

from the body. He argues that: “we often refer to ourselves
and say “I” (ana) did this or that. If I would separate a part of
myself (e.g., my hand) and put it on the table, I would neither
refer to it as Ì` nor would I be any different as far as my
personality is concerned.”6 On this argumentation, he
concludes that “self” or “I” is different from my body and thus
it has to be immaterial. Then he argues that “self” (nafs) is
above and beyond the body and there is a correlation between
them. His argument goes as follows:
Know that “nafs” (soul) was not present before the
body. If it were present prior to it, it would have been
neither one nor many; and this is impossible. The
reason why a variety of souls (self) could not have
existed before the body is because all things when they
share in the same thing, i.e., soul, are one, and when
they become numerous they become different...
Therefore it becomes apparent that the soul cannot
exist before the body and that they come into existence
simultaneously.7
What we comprehend from this argumentation is that

Suhrawardî elaborates the idea that “soul” as an incorporeal
entity exists with the human body. In contrast to the body
which is dark in itself, the "self" (soul) is light in itself; and it
not the subject of changes. In addition, it could be concluded
here that, according to Suhrawardî, a self-aware or self-
luminous is given only in a direct experience of the self,
through which I realize that my “self” (dhâtî) is not in a subject
(lâ fî mawdû‘), and it is nothing but existence and perception.8
Mullâ Sadrâ approaches the problem of “self” (nafs)

from his principle of the “principiality of existence” (asâlat al-
wujûd) in which he differs from Suhrawardî. According to this
principle, the only reality is “existence” (al-wujûd) and
quiddities are constructed by the mind.9 Mullâ Sadrâ holds that
whenever the soul is conceived as a concept and is defined, it
will be found to be an essence. However, in a direct self-
experience, the soul is only given as a pure existent, and since
existence has no genus, it is not given in experience either as a
substance or non-substance.10 For Mullâ Sadrâ, direct, intuitive
experience is the only way to know reality.11 Thus the reality of
the soul may be achieved through a direct experience.12 In
comparing with Suhrawardî’s theory, as mentioned in al-
Talwîhât,13 Mullâ Sadrâ expresses the same explanation of the
process of a direct self-experience.
Having analyzed and criticized the traditional doctrines,
Mullâ Sadrâ elaborates his theory of “self” (nafs), as well as its
relation with the body.14 According to him, the soul is not
eternal but originated and, thus, at its birth, it is in matter,
developing towards immateriality. He ultimately maintains
that the soul (self) is bodily in its origin and with regard to its
governing function (al-tasarruf), but spiritual in its survival (al-
nafs jismânîyat al-hudûth wa al-tasarruf wa rûhânîyat al-
baqâ`).15
The soul first emerges as vegetative, then as perceptive
and mover at the animal level, then as potential intellect, and
finally as pure intellect. The soul has its being at all these levels
and at each of these levels it is the same in a sense, and yet
different in a sense because the same being can pass through

different levels of development. The soul does not emerge as a
genuine and complete unity until it reaches the status of the
acquired intellect.16
We can obviously see here that Mullâ Sadrâ applies his
three fundamental principles: the “principiality of existence”
(asâlat al-wujûd), the “systematic ambiguity” (al-tashkîk), and
the “substantive movement” (al-harakat al-jawharîya). By
having recourse to these principles, he demonstrates that, on
the one hand, the nature of human soul (nafs) is a kind of
existence, and, on the other hand, there is an evolutionary
change in the essence of the human soul.
Furthermore, to prove the human soul (self) and its
separation from the body, Mullâ Sadrâ also applies the
philosophers’ argument from self-knowledge, i.e., a direct
experience.17 As we have seen above, the same argumentation
is applied by Suhrawardî as well. It therefore seems that the
main argument our sages rely on to prove the human soul is a
kind of illuminative or intuitive experience, viz., self-
knowledge. On the other side, in order to categorize the
human soul “self” (nafs) in their philosophical system,
Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ have apparently used their own
terminology. In accordance with their philosophical languages,
Suhrawardî categorizes “self” (ana or nafs) as “light” (nûr)
because it is nonmaterial and, therefore, is present to itself,18
whereas Mullâ Sadrâ categorizes it as “existence” (wujûd)
because the reality of nafs is observed directly.19
It should be noted that we mean here by the technical

term “self” and the related Arabic words such as “al-nafs,” “al-
dhât” and “ana” a more general meaning than “human soul.”
It involves, in the terminology of our discussion, the essence
“dhât” of God as well.20 In this respect Suhrawardî remarks
that “the concept “ana” which involves the Necessary
(Existent) and any other, is an entity which perceives itself`.”21
Therefore, in the following pages, we use the above words
interchangeably, alluding to what constitutes the identity of a
person, in the case of human “self,” and to the essence of God,
in the case of God’s “self.” Thus, in what follows, taking into
consideration the immateriality of our disputed subject, i.e., al-
dhât (self), we will examine two kinds of this entity: first one’s
knowledge of his own “self” (in this chapter) and, thereafter (in
the following chapter), God’s knowledge of His own “Self” (al-
Dhât).
II. Self-knowledge (al-‘ilm bi al-dhât)
The problem of self-knowledge, concerning an

incorporeal entity, has received much consideration among
Muslim philosophers. The peripatetic thinkers such as Fârâbî
and Ibn Sînâ have explicitly paid attention to the issue and, in
several places of their works, argued about the immateriality
and self-awareness of the human soul (nafs). Fârâbî,
identifying the human soul as an immaterial substance (al-
mufâraq), argues that, on the problem of self-knowledge, the
human soul directly perceives it’s essence (dhâtihâ) without
any mediator or employing a bodily organ (al-âlat).22 For Ibn

Sînâ, who holds that the human soul is an immaterial spiritual
substance capable of existing independently of the body, every
immaterial entity, e.g., the human soul, is aware of “itself.”23 It
is evident from their argument that “the human soul” knows
“itself” by presence (i.e., without any mediator of form or
concept) since it is nonmaterial, and every immaterial being is
present for its essence.24
However, it is traditionally assumed that the
Peripatetics confine “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî” to “self-knowledge,”
while confining “al-‘ilm al-husûlî” to “knowledge of anything
other than “self.”25 Apart from the reservations made in the
introduction of part two,26 we may accept that, according to
the Peripatetics, “self-knowledge” is essentially a kind of
knowledge by presence “al-‘ilm al-hudûrî.”
Suhrawardî has examined the issue in several places of
his works.27 He argues that a being which has an essence (al-
dhât) is either aware of its essence or not. If it is aware, then it
cannot be dark, since “his essence is revealed for him.”28 He
states:
Anyone who has a reality of which he is never oblivious
is not obscure [ghâsiq lit. crepuscular]. This is so
because of the clarity and apparentness of his reality to
himself. He is not a mode of darkness inherent in
another thing, for even a mode of light cannot be light
in itself let alone that of darkness. Therefore, he is an
immaculate purity of light that cannot be located by
physical indication.29
This statement that is based on his philosophy of Ishrâq

indicates that human soul knows itself; and this is a reason,
according to Suhrawardî, for its immateriality. The next step
here is that Suhrawardî will be obliged to provide an answer to
the question: How does one really know himself? In other
words, what is the nature of “self-knowing,” “self-awareness,”
or “self-consciousness”? Regarding our preceding discussion of
the division of knowledge into “al-‘ilm al-husûlî” and “al-‘ilm
al-hudûrî,” under which of them is this kind of knowledge
categorized?
Dealing thoughtfully with the question of self-
consciousness, Suhrawardî gives us the answer in the light of
his theory of knowledge. He argues that human soul knows
“itself” by presence, without any mediator of form or idea
(mithâl). In this regard he states:
Since you are not absent from your own reality (dhâtuk)
and from your awareness of that reality, and it is not
possible that this awareness be by a representation or
any superaddition, it thus follows that in this awareness
of your reality you need not have anything besides the
very reality of yourself, which is manifest to itself or, if
you wish, not absent from itself.30
He gives us more details on the issue (self-knowledge)

in his discussion with Aristotle. His famous dream-vision of
Aristotle is recounted in full by him in the “al-Talwîhât,”31 but
mentioned in other places as well.32In this dream-vision
Suhrawardî points to the significance of self-knowledge (al-‘ilm
bi al-dhât) in the illuminative view of knowledge and
perception.
The dream-vision is an allegory through which

Suhrawardî expostulates his view of knowledge. He asked
Aristotle the question of knowledge (masàlat al-‘ilm).
Aristotle’s solution is: “return to your soul (or self), then you
solve [the problem].33It seems evident that “the answer given
by “Aristotle” to the fundamental question about “knowledge”
provides the very basis of Suhrawardî’s famous “knowledge by
presence” (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî or shuhûdî).”34 Since the dream-
vision throws much light on Suhrawardî’s theory of self-
knowledge, some parts of it will be quoted at some length.
Aristotle: “Think introvertively of yourself. (If you do so,
you will certainly discover that your very selfhood) will
then resolve (the problem) for you.”
Suhrawardî: “But how?”
Aristotle: If you are really aware of yourself, then your
awareness of yourself will (not) be (anything but)
awareness by yourself. For, if it were in any other way,
it would mean that there was another acting power
(besides your own), or another knowing subject
(besides yourself), that operated in yourself in knowing
you. (It would not therefore be you who knew yourself.
But it must be the case that you know yourself.). Thus
we return to the same question (i.e. of whether or not
you are aware of yourself by yourself), and this shows
itself to be an obvious absurdity (i.e. it would go on ad
infinitum).”
Suhrawardî: “Assuming that you know yourself by
yourself, (and not by anything else, the question then
becomes:) is (your knowledge of yourself) through the

production of an effect from yourself in yourself?”
Aristotle: “All right (,let us assume the existence of such
an effect).”
Suhrawardî: “But if a (certain) effect (which is actuated
by yourself) does not correspond with the reality of
yourself, then it is not true to say that you really know
yourself.”
Aristotle: “Then (let us assume), “I said,” (that such an
effect is a (true) representation of my own reality.”
Suhrawardî: “does this representation belong to a
universal self, or is it appropriated (to your individual
selfhood) by (taking on) specific qualities?” (Of these
alternatives) I chose the second.
Aristotle: “(Now) every representation (occurring) in
the self (as the intellect) is a universal, even if it be
qualified by many universal qualities (and restrictions,
for) this (sort of multi-qualification) does not prevent
(such a representation) being shared by (, and
applicable to, many) individual selves. If it should
happen that (a certain representation of this kind) is
prevented (from applying to many), it must be for some
accidental reason. But (undoubtedly) you know yourself
(in such a way that your selfhood,) by (its) essential
reality, refuses to be shared (by other selves). Therefore
this (particular and unshared) apprehension (of
yourself) cannot be by representation.”35
In this discussion, self-knowledge is the primary

question considered by Aristotle, and, thereafter, self-
consciousness and the concept of “I” (ana) have been regarded

the grounds of knowledge. Through the initial consciousness of
one’s essence, a way to knowledge-called the “science based
on presence and vision (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî al-shuhûdî)- is
conclusively gained.36 What we may conclude from the
argument, which is indicated in the discussion between
Suhrawardî and Aristotle, is the fact that, according to
Suhrawardî, the only way through which one is able to identify
the reality of his essence (al-dhât), is “knowledge by presence”
Mullâ Sadrâ also approaches the problem of “self-
knowledge” in the light of his philosophical system (al-hikmat
al-muta‘âlîya). As we have seen above, to prove the human
soul “nafs,” Mullâ Sadrâ, on the one hand, has recourse to a
basic, ontological principle “the principiality of existence”
(asâlat al-wujûd) according to which the only reality is
existence and quiddities are constructed by the mind.37 Thanks
to this principle, he holds that the human soul “nafs” is a form
of existence (nahw min al-wujûd).
On the other hand, he maintains that direct, intuitive
experience is the only way to know reality,38 thus the reality of
the soul could be achieved through a direct experience. In this
kind of relationship, there is no formal or conceptual mediator
between a person (as a knower) and his essence “dhât” (as an
object known).
Consequently, when I refer to myself, Mullâ Sadrâ adds,
and consider my essence directly, the only thing that I realize is
my existence that perceives itself.39 In this direct experience,
one doesn’t rely on a form or concept to achieve his own

“self,” since any kind of form or concept (even the concept of
“ana”), being universal, is outside of the reality of his essence
(dhâtihî).40
To demonstrate that “knowledge by presence” is the
only way through which one can achieve the reality of his own
“self,” Mullâ Sadrâ uses the same argumentation as
Suhrawardî does. To sum up, it could be said that, according to
them, it is certain that one’s knowledge of his own “self,” to
which he refers as his “I,” is a kind of knowledge by presence.
A generally cited argument, which is found also in Ibn Sînâ’s
writings,41 is summarized as following:
One cannot fail to be conscious of his own self in any
circumstance, in solitude or in others’ company, in sleep or
wakefulness, or in any other state.
This consciousness is not by virtue of the presence of the
quiddity of the “self” before us; it is not present as a concept,
or known through mediated knowledge. That is because a
mental concept, of whatever kind, is always capable of
corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, and (when
pertaining to a particular object) its individuality is only due to
the external existent (to which it corresponds).
Now, that which we recognize in relation to ourselves–that we
refer to as “I”–is something essentially individuated, incapable
of corresponding to multiple things. Individuality (al-
tashakhkhus) is a property of existence; hence our knowledge
of our selves is by virtue of their presence for us with their very
external existence, which is the ground of individuation and
external effects. This is a kind of knowledge called “immediate

knowledge” (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî; literally, “knowledge by
presence”).42
Generally speaking, it might be said that they (i.e.,
Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ) have actually thought over the
problem of self-knowledge (al-‘ilm bi al-dhât) within their
philosophical system. Hence their theory, in this regard, seems
to have been considered in the light of their whole system
which is known as illuminative philosophy.
Consequently, apart from the usage of their own
languages (i.e., “light” or “existence”), it seems that, as we
have seen above, there is no obvious difference between our
sages in both the way of argumentation and the result on
which they demonstrate the theory of “self-knowledge.”
III. The human soul knows its “attributes,” “dispositions” and

“faculties” by presence
The human soul–whether it is defined as a faculty or

power inherent in the body, or as a spiritual substance capable
of existing independently of the body–develops into an
actualized intellect and can think immaterial forms.
Psychologically, there are certain attributes, dispositions, and
faculties or “inner senses” that are imputed to the human soul,
with which the soul has been, in its turn, defined or
characterized by philosophers since antiquity.43 In this part of
discussion, we are expected to examine the epistemological
relationship between the human soul and its related entities,

with regard to our philosophers’ doctrine.
Suhrawardî, who believes that “self” (nafs) exists
distinctly from the body, maintains that the human soul
employs the body and operates within it, using several powers
and faculties. The soul, according to him, directly apprehends
the body, its powers and faculties, without employing any form
or bodily organ.44 In certain places of his works, Suhrawardî
elaborates this doctrine, pursuing his idea of self-knowledge
that occurs directly for the soul.45 In his al-Mashâri‘,
Suhrawardî goes into somewhat more detail arguing as
follows:
The self does in fact apprehend its body as well as its
imagination and its phantasm. The supposition that
these things are apprehended through a representation
inherent in the reality of the self, while the
representation as such is universal, would imply that
the self is the mover of a universal body, using universal
mental powers, and has no apprehension of its
particular body nor acquaintance with the powers that
belong to itself.
This [consideration] is obviously not right. For the
imagination is ignorant of [cannot apprehend] itself,
just as it is ignorant of all the mental powers, even if it
cannot challenge the effects of these powers in actual
operation. Now, if the imagination is not competent to
realize either itself or these mental powers, no material
power can ever understand the truth of itself. And if the
self [as an intellect] were also not supposed to know
anything other than universals, then it would
necessarily follow that a man would never know his

own particular body, his own particular imagination,
and his own particular phantasm, all of which pertain to
himself. But this is not actually the case, because in the
world of reality there are no human beings who do not
know in presence their own particular bodies and their
own particular mental powers while using their own
particular powers. The conclusion is that man knows
himself and all his mental powers with no mediation of
any mental image, and knows the entirety of his body in
the same manner.46
In this argument, Suhrawardî approaches a traditional

question whether the human soul is able to apprehend
particulars or its capacity is restricted to the apprehension of
universals. He replies by arguing that, on the one hand, if a self
(nafs) as an intellect knows only universals, then he would
never know particulars such as his own particular body, his
own particular imagination, and his own particular phantasm.
On the other hand, the human soul (self) knows directly
his own particular body and other particulars. Consequently,
the soul is, according to Suhrawardî, able to conceive
particulars. Nevertheless, it seems that Suhrawardî takes for
granted that the human soul (self or nafs) apprehends directly
its own body, its own powers and phantasm, without using any
form or bodily organ. To support his idea, Suhrawardî
continues his argument:
One of the things that support our opinion that we do
have some kind of apprehensions (idrâkât) which need
not take a form of representation (sûra) other than the
presence of the reality (dhât)47 of the thing

apprehended (mudrak), is when a man is in pain from a
cut or from damage to one of his organs. He then
has a feeling of this damage. But this feeling or
apprehension is never in such a way that that damage
leaves in the same organ of the body or in another a
form of representation of itself besides the reality of
itself. Rather, the thing apprehended is but that
damage itself. This is what is truly sensible and it counts
in itself for pain, not a representation of it, caused by
itself. This proves that, there are among things
apprehended by us some things such that in being
apprehended, it is sufficient that their reality be
received in the mind or in any agent which is present in
48
the mind.
The thesis Suhrawardî is putting forward, in his

discussion so far, is the fact that the human soul, besides its
direct apprehension of itself, has its direct experience of
certain entities, e.g., its powers, faculties and internal states.
The principles of his argument are evident, for, according to
the definition he gives us, the direct experience occurs in a
case in which there would not be any veil or obstacle between
a perceiver and something perceived. In the case of the human
soul and its particular relatives, these particulars, according to
Suhrawardî, exist at the presence of the soul and, therefore,
the soul directly perceives them as it knows itself by presence.
The question of the epistemological relationship of the
soul to its particular relatives has received a special
consideration among Muslim philosophers. In this respect,
Tûsî’s view of the problem will be briefly mentioned. Tûsî,49
evidently following the same line of thought, maintains that

“just as an apprehender (al-‘âqil) in perceiving his own essence
through his essence does not require a form other than the
form of his own essence through which he is what he is, so also
in perceiving that which emanates from his essence he does
not need any form other than the form of the emanation
through which the emanation is what it is.”50 Let us examine
Tûsî’s argument. He begins with an example:
Consider your own case when you apprehend
something by means of a form which you have
imagined or brought to mind. This form does not
emanate absolutely from you alone, but rather with a
certain participation of something else. Nevertheless,
you do not apprehend this form through another form,
but rather, just as you apprehend that thing through
the form, so also do you apprehend the form itself
through that same form without there being any
doubling of forms within you. Indeed, the only things
that double are your (mental) consideration (i‘tibârât)
connected with your essence and that form only by way
of superimposition (al-tarakkub).51
Tûsî has elaborated this argument about the problem

of God’s knowledge. In this part of his argumentation, he
attempts to prove his theory thanks to a direct self-experience.
Tûsî considers certain that this kind of experience is
undoubted, for everyone may procure the self-experience in
his own self. What we understand from Tûsî’s argument is that
there is no mediator between the soul and what happens in it
like a form or a concept. In this argument, his attempt is to
show us the fact that the imagination or perception of the
form which exists in oneself does not happen through another

form, rather one apprehends the form without there being any
doubling of forms within him. Elsewhere, he explicitly declares
that the human soul directly apprehends itself, its organs
(âlâtihâ), and its intellections (ta‘aqqulâtihâ), without
employing any intermediary organ.52
The same doctrine is also taken into account by Mullâ
Sadrâ. He accepts Aristotle’s definition of the soul as entelechy
of the body insofar as it operates through faculties. According
to him, the soul cannot as such be separate and independent
of matter. The soul, he holds, is at its birth, in matter and
gradually develops through a spiritual path insofar as it
becomes free from some aspects of matter and the material
body53 This Sadrian account of the development of the human
soul is related to his doctrine of “substantive movement” (al-
haraka al-jawharîya) which lies at the root of his system.54
Mullâ Sadrâ, as seen earlier, has established his theory of the
existence and development of the soul on some of his
fundamental principles such as the principiality of existence
(asâlat al-wujûd), the systematic ambiguity (al-tashkîk fi al-
wujûd), and the substantive motion (al-haraka al-jawharîya).
The relationship of the soul to the body is in such a way
that the soul works through organs which means not only
“physical organs” like hands, liver or stomach, but also
“faculties or powers” like nutrition and digestion.55 Mullâ
Sadrâ’s interpretation raises the soul from the status of a
purely physical form to a form that, although in matter, is
capable of transcending it.
The non-material human soul, which, being the

ultimate form for its species, despite its simplicity, is the
source of all its excellencies (al-kamâlât) and effects (al-âthâr)
that it possesses in its essence. In addition, for Mullâ Sadrâ,
“the soul is all of the faculties” (al-nafs kull al-quwâ).56 This
theory is understood on the basis of his general principle that
“a simple nature is everything” (basît al-haqîqa kull al-ashyâ`).
Faculties are the “modes” (shu`ûn) or “manifestations”
(mazâhir) of the soul.57
Based on this ontological relation between the soul and
its faculties and powers, there is also, according to Mullâ
Sadrâ, a direct epistemological relation between them. The
human soul’s direct knowledge (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) of itself is a
detailed knowledge of its faculties, powers, and excellencies,
although these are not distinguished from one another.
Keeping its unity and connecting extension, the soul, in its
developing movement, reaches a level in which it is able to
create something like a form or an idea in its world.
For Mullâ Sadrâ, as we saw in our discussion of “ibsâr,”
the soul operates as an agent in the process of sensitive and
imaginative perception. That is to say, the external world, on
the one hand, prepares some necessary conditions of the act
of perceiving, and the soul, on the other hand, makes an
immaterial form corresponding to the external object.
Consequently, the existent of the form (in any sort of
perception), being at the presence of the soul, is directly
perceived by the soul.58 To support this doctrine, Mullâ Sadrâ
states:
everything that man perceives and sees directly by

means of his imaginal faculty and his interior sense
does not at all inhere in the body of the brain or in
some power inhering in that area; nor is it located in
the bodies of the heavenly spheres or in a world
separated from the soul, as some followers of the
illuminationist (philosophers) have mentioned. Instead,
it subsists in the soul–not like something inhering in
something else, but rather like an act subsisting through
its agent.59
Rejecting the other doctrines, Mullâ Sadrâ goes on

arguing for his own theses. He demonstrates his doctrine on
the basis of his understanding of the human soul. For Mullâ
Sadrâ, the ontological relationship between the soul, on the
one side, and its forms, concepts, faculties, powers, and
internal states, on the other side, is an especial relation which
is based on the agency of the soul. According to his point of
view, the internal forms, concepts, faculties, powers,
attributes, and dispositions are the “modes” (shu`ûn) or
“manifestations” (mazâhir) of the soul.60 This multiplicity, in
the case of the soul and its states, refers to unity (al-kathra
yarji‘u ilâ al-wahda), for “the soul is all of the faculties” and,
therefore, it keeps its unity and simplicity in all levels.61
The development of the soul is marked by successive
stages of increasing unity and simplicity. The soul, at the
highest stage of its development, resembles God, for God, in
His absolute simplicity, comprehends everything.62 Such a soul
begins to function like God and creates forms from within
itself.
It is not impossible, though, that a single essence (that

is, the soul) might become so perfected and increase so
much in the strength of its essence and the intensity of
its stage (of being) that it could become in its essence
the basis of something for which it was not previously a
basis, and the source of things that had not developed
in it before. This is (not impossible) because of the great
extent of (the soul’s) field of being.63
By proving a particular ontological relation of the soul

to its faculties and powers, Mullâ Sadrâ goes on arguing that
the epistemological relation between them occurs within the
framework of “knowledge by presence.” As the soul directly
knows itself without any conceptual mediator, it knows and
conceives directly its faculties and powers, as well as its
attributes and dispositions.64
To prove his theory, Mullâ Sadrâ has recourse to the
argument that, on the one hand, the faculties and other
attributes and powers inhere in the soul. On the other hand,
when something inheres in something else, such that the being
of that first thing in itself is the same as its being in that in
which it inheres (wujûduhû fî nafsih huwa wujûduhû fî
mahallih), it follows that:
When something inheres in something else, such that
the being of that first thing in itself is the same as its
being in that in which it inheres, then it is impossible for
its own being to be in one world and for the being of
that in which it inheres to be in another world.
Therefore, the inhering thing and that in which it
inheres are in one world, so that which perceives and

that which is perceived are of one mode (of being).65
Furthermore, Mullâ Sadrâ examines the arguments on

which both Suhrawardî and Tûsî rely, as seen earlier. Mullâ
Sadrâ argues that whenever one uses his powers or faculties,
he is using particular powers and faculties, not universal ones.
Hence, he apprehends them particularly and intuitively
without any formal or conceptual mediator. In addition, any
kind of form or concept which is perceived through the mind,
Mullâ Sadrâ adds, is universal, whereas we apprehend
ourselves and in particular forms. Consequently, we do not
apprehend ourselves and our faculties and powers through the
universal forms or concepts.66
Finally, Mullâ Sadrâ concludes that the first knowledge
which appears for every body, in the very beginning of his life,
is his knowledge of his own “self” and then his knowledge of
his own powers and faculties. These kinds of knowledge are
essentially “knowledge by presence.”67
Mullâ Sadrâ–in his discussion of the issue, that is, the
human soul and its intuitive knowledge of its powers and
faculties–has pursued a rational-intuitive path according to
which he formulates his own doctrine. As we have seen above,
he has recourse to certain Aristotelian principles, as well as
several illuminative bases. To establish his ultimate conclusion,
he also relies on some mystical principles which had been
developed in Ibn ‘Arabî’s system.
Based on these principles, Mullâ Sadrâ organizes his theory of
the ontological and epistemological relation of the human soul
to its faculties, powers, attitudes and dispositions. He

ultimately holds that the human soul, at the highest stage of its
development, begins to function like God and creates
something from within itself.
At this stage, the Perfect Man, as we find in Ibn ‘Arabî’s
teachings, must function directly through the simplicity and
unity of his mind.68 Thanks to this conception, Mullâ Sadrâ
develops his doctrine of the essential “creativity” of the soul
(khallâqîyat al-nafs). Based on this doctrine, the faculties and
powers are essentially at the presence of the human soul; and
the human soul apprehends them directly, without any formal
or conceptual mediator.
1
In this regard, there are some technical Arabic terms such as nafs, rûh,
dhât which are interchangeably used by Muslim thinkers. In the case of
the identity of a person, these terms are represented to the term ana ( I
).
2
For Fârâbî’s point of view see: al-Rasâìl, Risâla fî Ithbât al-Mufâraqât, pp.
3,5,7; al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 10,12-13; al-Madîna al-Fâdila, p. 23; for Ibn Sînâ’s
theory see: al-Shifâ`, al-Nafs, chapter 6, al-Ishârât, vol. 2, pp. 319-24,
334-42. In this connection, for more details see: F. Rahman, Avicenna’s
Psychology, pp. 24-68; Prophecy in Islam (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958),
Chapter I, Section 1,2.
3
Suhrawardî’s view on the existence of a self in his Persian works can be
found in the following works: Hayâkil al-Nûr, pp. 4-92; al-Alwâh al-
‘Imâdîyah, pp. 116-165; Bustân al-Qulûb, pp. 342-387; and Yazdân
Shinâkht, pp. 412-444. In his Arabic works, he discusses the issue in the
al-Talwîhât, pp. 68,81,82. Suhrawardî in Partaw-Nâmah (Opera III, pp.
23-24) offers several arguments for the existence of a “self” (nafs) and
its independence of the body. Mullâ Sadrâ also allocated one part of his
major work Asfâr to the issue. Asfâr, IV/1.
4
Fârâbî, al-Rasâìl, Risâlat fî Ithbât al-Mufâraqât, pp. 3,5,7; al-Ta‘lîqât, pp.
10,12-13; al-Madîna al-Fâdila, p. 53; Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ`, al-Nafs, chapter
6, al-Ishârât, vol. 2, pp. 319-24, 334-42.
5
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât., vol. 2, al-namat 3, pp. 319-323. See also F. Rahman,
Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 50-
62.
6
Opera III, Partaw-nâma, pp. 23-4 (trans. by M. Aminrazavi in Suhrawardî’s
Theory of Knowledge, p. 124). For another argumentation of
Suhrawardî, see p. 58 in the preceding chapter.
7
Ibid., pp. 25-6 (trans. by M. Aminrazavi in Suhrawardî’s Theory of
Knowledge, p. 125).
8
Suhrawardî, Opera I,al-Talwîhât,p.115.
9
Mullâ Sadrâ, in his major work Asfâr has devoted four chapters to the
discussion of the principiality of existence (asâlat al-wujûd). He
mentions some views, as well as their objections, and answers one by
one. Finally, he demonstrates his own doctrine by several arguments.
Asfâr, I/1, pp. 38-74.
10
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 11-14.
11
Mullâ Sadrâ,al-Mashâ‘ir,p.30. al-Mashâ‘ir is one of the famous works of
Mullâ Sadrâ in Metaphysics. It has been edited and translated into
French by Henry Corbin entitled as Le Livre des pénétrations
métaphysiques (Paris and Tehran, 1965), and into English by Parviz
Morewedge entitled as The Metaphysics of Mullâ Sadrâ (New York:
SSIPS, 1992).
12
Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 47-8.
13
See above, n. 8.
14
Ibid., pp. 11-23.
15
Ibid., pp. 326-7, 347.
16
Ibid., pp. 51, 121-3, 134-6.
17
Ibid., pp. 47-8.
18
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 110-111. It should be noted
that sometimes Suhrawardî uses the term “wujûd” (existence) in his
examination of self-experience. See above, n. 8.
19
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, p. 47. However, we have seen before, in chapter
1 (p. 23), that Mullâ Sadrâ has interpreted the illuminative term “nûr” in
his own terminology as “wujûd.”
20
The problem of God’s knowledge of His Essence (al-‘ilm bi-dhâtihî) will be
examined in the following chapter.
21
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Talwîhât, p. 116.
22
Fârâbî, Risâlat fî Ithbât al-Mufâriqât, pp. 3, 7.
23
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât., vol. 2, al-namat 3, pp. 319-323.
24
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 79,80,82.
25
Sabzavârî, Sharh Manzûma, p. 185.
26
See above, pp. 70-74.
27
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Talwîhât, pp. 69-75; al-Mashâri’, pp. 484-489;
Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 110-116
28
Opera, II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 110.
29
Ibid., pp. 110-111 (trans. by M. Haìrî, as stated in The principle of
Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, p. 72).
30
Ibid., p. 112.
31
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Talwîhât, pp. 70-74. For more explanation, see M.
Haìrî, Knowledge by Presence, pp. 121-165.
32
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Mashâri‘, p. 484.
33
Suhrawardî, Opera I, al-Talwîhât, p.70.
34
H. Landolt, “Suhrawardî’s “Tales of initiation,” Journal of The American
Oriental Society, vol. 107, no. 3 (July-September, 1987), p. 480.
35
Opera I, al-Talwîhât, p. 70 (trans. by M. Haìrî as stated in Knowledge by
Presence, pp. 329-330).
36
Ibid., pp. 70-4.
37
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/1, pp. 38-74.
38
al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 30.
39
Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 47-8.
40
Ibid., III/1, pp. 156-7.
41
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 79,160,161,162.
42
For Suhrawardî see: Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 111-113; for Mullâ
Sadrâ see: al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 80-83.
43
See F. Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology (London: Oxford University Press,
1952), pp. 25-40.
44
Opera I, al-Talwîhât, pp. 71-3.
45
Ibid., pp. 71-3; al-Mashâri‘, pp. 484-5.
46
Opera I, al-Mashâri‘, p.484-5. (trans. by M. Hâìrî as stated in The principle
of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, p. 94-95).
47
The translator, M. Hâìrî, here prefers the word “reality” as the more
suitable translation of dhât.
48
Opera I, al-Mashâri‘, p.485. (trans. by M. Hâìrî as stated in The principle
of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, p. 94-95).
49
The important thirteenth century philosopher, scientist, and Shî‘îte
theologian Nasîr al-Dîn al-Tûsî was a great follower of Ibn Sînâ, and one
of the most important commentator on his al-Ishârât. He was, however,
influenced by certain views of the Illuminationist philosophers, although
the exact extent and nature of this influence still needs to be closely
determined.
50
Tûsî, in his notes on Ibn Sînâ’s al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, vol. 3, al-namat
7, pp. 714-92 (trans. by N. Heer in his translation of Jâmî’s al-Durra al-
Fâkhira, p. 46).
51
Ibid., pp. 714-715.
52
Tûsî, Sharh-i Masàlat al-‘ilm (Mashhad: Matba‘a Jâmi‘a, 9162), p. 32.
53
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 12-14. See above, p. 78.
54
The doctrine of “substantial movement” has been considered as a novel
theory demonstrated by Mullâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî. He has discussed the issue
and its related problems in detail in Asfâr, I/3, pp. 80-113. For more
explanation, see F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1975), pp. 94-124.
55
Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 16-17.
56
Ibid., p. 51, 120-123, 133-5, 221-230.
57
Ibid., pp. 133-6.
58
Mullâ Sadrâ, Ta‘lîqa ‘alâ Sharh-i Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 454.
59
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, pp. 237-8 (trans. by J.W. Morris as stated in The
Wisdom of the Throne, p. 138).
60
A very similar idea has been already held by Suhrawardî. In his Hikmat al-
Ishrâq (p.213).
61
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 51-2, 73-77, 133-6.
62
Ibid., p. 121.
63
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 228 (trans. by J.W. Morris as stated in The
64
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, pp. 157-164.
65
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 236 (trans. by J.W. Morris as stated in The
66
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, pp. 157-9; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 80-1.
67
Ibid., p. 161; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, p. 81.
68
Asfâr, IV/1, p. 140-142.
CHAPTER 5
God and “Knowledge by presence”
The problem of God’s knowledge has a long story in the

history of Islamic thought. Without exaggeration the discussion
of God’s knowledge has received a remarkably profound
consideration by Muslim thinkers, namely theologians,
philosophers and Sûfîs.1 Mullâ Sadrâ enumerates no less than
ten different views on this issue.2 I don’t aim to give a detailed
account of the history of this problem here, but we may safely
examine the view points of our sages, Suhrawardî and Mullâ
Sadrâ, bearing in mind the scope of our disputed subject, viz.,
knowledge by presence. Concerning the organization of our
study, we shall make a distinction between two parts of God’s
knowledge: that of His Essence, and that of His effects. The
former is discussed in the following pages, and, thereafter, we
will examine the latter in the present chapter.
I. God’s knowledge of His Essence (al-‘ilm bi-dhâtihî)
Thanks to our philosopher’s system of thought, the

issue of God’s knowledge of His Essence has received an
132 Chapter Five: God and Knowledge by Presence
illuminative outlook and is interpreted in the framework of

their epistemological theory, i.e., knowledge by presence.
Nevertheless, the doctrine itself had a long history before
them, especially in the Peripatetic (al-mashshâ`) philosophy
and Islamic theology (kalâm).
It is historically evident that most philosophers who
have in any way addressed the problem of God’s knowledge of
His Essence have accounted it in a framework excluding any
external agent or mediator, i.e., in a way preparing what came
to be known as knowledge by presence.3 The peripatetic
philosophers, like Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ, have maintained that
God knows His essence by presence, without any form or
concept.4In this regard, Ibn Sînâ argues:
Al-Bârî (The Necessary Existent) apprehends His
Essence (dhâtahû) since the existence of His essence
belongs to Himself. And every entity apprehending an
essence, that essence occurs to the same entity in-itself
(fî dhâtihâ).5
Ibn Sînâ then goes on arguing that His knowledge of His

Essence does not require a form superadded to Him.
Therefore, the First (al-awwal) apprehends His Essence
without there being any difference (taghâyur), with respect to
existence (fi al-wujûd), between His Essence and His
apprehension of His Essence , except in the consideration (fi al-
i‘tibâr).6
Relating to the theory of God’s knowledge, Suhrawardî
considers two separate issues: God’s knowledge of His Essence
and God’s knowledge of the things. Concerning the former,
Suhrawardî states that God (the Light of Lights) is a pure Light

that exists in itself (al-qâìm bi al-dhât). This kind of being
knows itself by presence, without any form or idea. He argues:
A thing that exists in itself (al-qâìm bi al-dhât) and is
conscious of itself does not know itself through a
representation (al-mithâl) of itself appearing in itself.7
In this argument, Suhrawardî simply elaborates the fact

that self-consciousness which happens for an immaterial entity
should be a direct experience, free from idea or formal
mediator, and also free from material organs. The Pure Light is
completely free from darkness (that is, in his language, matter
or material entity), and as such apprehends itself without any
intermediary or representation. Apart from his illuminative
terminology, the structure of this argument, as we have seen
above, is found in Ibn Sînâ.
Regarding the same question, Mullâ Sadrâ
demonstrates his theory of God’s knowledge of His Essence in
the light of his philosophical system (al-hikma al-muta‘âlîa). On
the one hand, he holds that “every comprehension is realized
due to some mode of abstraction from matter and its
obstacles.”8 On the other hand, he believes that the reality of
knowledge essentially refers to the reality of existence. In this
regard, he states that “His knowledge is reducible to His
Being.”9 He adds: “knowledge is nothing but presence of
existence without any obstacles.”10 Thanks to these
fundamental principles, Mullâ Sadrâ elaborates his
argumentation of God’s knowledge of His Essence. He states:
It [The Necessary Existent] is (purely) simplicity in its

inner-reality (and thus is) independent of
contamination from imperfection, contingency and
privation. Any entity that is in this manner, its inner-
reality is present to itself without impediment (lit. Veil).
Knowledge is nothing but presence of existence without
any obstacle... The highest degree of intelligibles is the
most forceful in existence–and That is The Necessary
Existent. His inner-being intellects His (very) inner-
being.11
Mullâ Sadrâ, having recourse to his terminology of

“existence” (al-wujûd), contrary to Suhrawardî who used the
term “light” (al-nûr), refines the same argument the result of
which could be summarized as follows: The Necessary Existent
(viz., Light of Lights in Suhrawardî’s language) is a Pure Existent
(or Pure Light) and free from material. The incorporeal existent
is present to itself because there is no ontological veil between
that and its essence. In addition, according to Sadrian
definition of knowledge, knowledge is nothing but presence of
existence without any obstacles. Therefore, being present to
itself, the Necessary Existence is directly aware of itself. On this
stage, the unity of the intellect, intelligible and intellection, as
Mullâ Sadrâ demonstrates, occurs in a very high level.12
Apart from their different languages, notably the terms
“light” (al-nûr) and “existence” (al-wujûd)–our sages have
relied on the same key principles in their arguments. For both,
the First (The Light of Lights or The Necessary Existent) is pure,
single (basît), incorporeal (mujarrad), being ontologically at the
presence of itself. Thus, the result of this presence, for both, is
an epistemological relation between God and His Essence

(dhâtihî). Consequently, one can plausibly claim that these two
thinkers, on this very issue, have pursued the same argument
that led them to the same conclusion.
As we have observed so far–on the problem of self-
knowledge, particularly God’s knowledge of His Essence
(dhâtihî)–there is no serious difference, concerning the result
of their arguments, between the Peripatetic philosopher Ibn
Sînâ and the illuminationists such as Suhrawardî and Mullâ
Sadrâ, although they rely on particular routes and examine
various arguments. It is generally acceptable for both sides
that, on the one hand, the essence of God is entirely pure and
immaterial. On the other hand, the process of self-knowledge,
in the case of immaterial entity, happens directly, for there is
no veil or obstacle between an “immaterial entity” and its
essence.
II. Causal relationship (al-‘illîya)
It seems that the problem of causation (al-‘illîya) has

been implied, as we shall see, as the key principle in a rational
discussion of God’s knowledge of things. We begin by
explaining this key element, after which we shall turn to the
problem of God’s knowledge.
It is historically evident that the question of causation
has a long story in the history of human thought. The
discussion of causal relationship, as well as a number of serious
debates, goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Generally speaking,

the two-fold principles of causation could be defined in such a
way that “a cause has traditionally been thought of as that
which produces something and in terms of which that which is
produced, its effect, can be explained. That which is caused
might be either some new substance or simply a change in
something that already exists.”13 The close relation between
cause and its effect is one of the crucial items that have been
considered in this regard. Examining the above definition of
the causation, R. Taylor states that “it was also generally
supposed by philosophers that there is a certain necessary or
inherent connection between any cause and its effect. By this
is meant that the joint occurrence of both is not “accidental”–
that a cause is something which is such that, once given its
effect cannot fail to occur–and that a cause compels the
occurrence of its effect–that the effect must happen in case
the cause exists.” 14
Regarding the question of causation and the necessary
relation between cause and effect, philosophers have
demonstrated several kinds of causes. Aristotle, drawing upon
the traditions of his predecessors, distinguished four quite
different kinds of causes or explanatory principles. These he
called the “efficient” cause (causa quod), or that by which
some change is wrought; the “final” cause (causa ut), or end or
purpose for which a change is produced; the “material” cause,
or that in which a change is wrought; and the “formal” cause,
or that into which something is changed.15
Muslim philosophers, who paid attention to the

question of causation, have considered Aristotelian theory
and, reasonably, accepted his classification of cause and effect.
Similarly, they classified causes into “internal” and “external.”
The “internal causes” (al-‘ilal al-dâkhilîyah, also called ‘ilal al-
qiwâm, the causes of subsistence) are “matter” (mâdda) and
“form” (sûra), which make the effect subsist. The “external
causes” (al-‘ilal al-khârijîyyah, also called ‘ilal al-wujûd, the
causes of existence) are the “agent” (al-fâ‘il, i.e., efficient
cause) and the “end” (al-ghâyah, final goal, i.e., the final
cause). The “agent” is sometimes called “mâ bihi al-wujûd”
(that on which the effect’s existence depends) and the “end”
“mâ li ajlihi al-wujûd” (the raison d’etre).16
For our own purposes here, what is more disputed,
from the above kinds of causes, is the third cause, the
“efficient cause” (al-‘illa al-fâ‘ilîya), i.e., one which gives
existence to the effect. Muslim philosophers have defined the
“causal relationship” between the “efficient cause” and its
effect in such a way that the existence of the effect derives
from the existence of the cause; that is the efficient cause. In
other words, the existence of the effect depends on the
existence of the cause and, by contrast, the existence of the
cause is independent from the existence of the effect.17
Ontologically, this definition seems to show a close relation
between the “efficient cause” and its effect to the extent that
the need of the effect for the cause is nothing except the need
of its existence for the cause and that need is not separate
from its existence, in the sense that there is existence and
need.18
The causal connection between God (as an efficient

cause “al-‘illa al-fâ‘ilîya”) and the things is regarded as an
epistemological one. The epistemological relation between this
kind of cause, i.e., the efficient cause, and its effect the
existence of which is inseparable from that of its cause, seems
to be interpreted and demonstrated as “knowledge by
presence” in the philosophy of both Suhrawardî and Mullâ
Sadrâ. In what follows, I will attempt to concisely approach the
epistemological relation between God and His effects, rather
than their ontological relationship.
III. God’s knowledge of the things
The question of God’s knowledge of things (e.g., His

effects, universals and particulars) has been a major issue
among Muslim thinkers, theologians (mutakallimûn),
philosophers and Sufîs.19 Our philosophers, Mullâ Sadrâ and
Suhrawardî, have given special consideration to the question
of God’s knowledge of the things, a question around which has
centered a great deal of controversy between philosophers
and theologians (mutakallimûn) for centuries.20 Mullâ Sadrâ
cites and discusses more than ten different views on this
issue.21 All of these groups have given diversified rational,
traditional and intuitive proofs for the positions they have
taken and attempted refutations of the positions of their
opponents. The complete verification of these opinions would
require a detailed discussion that cannot be contained in this
book, being beyond the purpose of this study.
Thus, the main aim here is to examine our two sages’

consideration of the epistemological relation between God and
His effects, bearing in mind their rational background and
illuminative method.
The peripatetic philosophers, such as Ibn Sînâ and his
followers, maintain that His attributes are identical with His
essence; and, in the case of His knowledge of things, He knows
His effects through their forms established in His essence (viz.,
He knows the universals directly and the particulars through
their universal forms).22 On God’s knowledge of the particulars,
it was held that, according to the Peripatetics, God cannot
know particulars since such knowledge would involve change
in God. To overcome this difficulty, Ibn Sînâ has devised the
theory that “God knows all particulars but in a universal way.”
The substance of this theory is that God, being the ultimate
cause of all things, knows the whole range of causes and
effects and their relations and hence knows all particulars, not
as particulars but as universals.23 This eternal knowledge in
God, therefore, is changeless, since it does not depend upon
sense perception that is liable to change.24 Suhrawardî has
summarized The Peripatetic theory as follows:
The Peripatetics and their followers say that the
knowledge of the Necessary Existent is not something
additional to it; rather it is its lack of absence from its
own immaterial essence. They argue that the existence
of things results from the Necessary Existent’s
knowledge of them.25
It is true that Ibn Sînâ’s aim is to establish (a) the

changeless character of God’s knowledge, (b) the fact that
God’s knowledge precedes the existence of things and does

not follow them, and (c) the fact that God’s knowledge is
creative (fi‘lî) and not receptive (infi‘âlî) as human knowledge
is.26 Ibn Sînâ’s theory that was attributed to the teachings of
Aristotle, was, however, rejected by Muslim theologians,27 as
well as such philosophers as Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ.
The view which is held by Suhrawardî, and, more or
less, accepted by Tûsî,28 is that God’s knowledge of things
actually depends upon things themselves, which, as separate,
distinct, and successive existents, are the objects of God’s
knowledge, but insofar as they are present to Him collectively
and emanate from Him, constitute His knowledge. Suhrawardî
highly criticizes the Peripatetic view, namely Ibn Sînâ, which
holds that the originals exist in the divine Essence, and that the
source of all knowledge is God’s consciousness of His own
Essence. Suhrawardî states that this view implies pluralism in
the divine Essence because “that which becomes present is
different from the person for whom the presence occurs.”29
Then he approaches the issue (i.e., God’s knowledge of
His effects) by having recourse to his epistemological theory,
knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî). According to him,
God’s knowledge occurs by a special illuminational relationship
between God and things. To solve the problem, Suhrawardî
refers to his illuminative account of vision (ibsâr). As we have
seen in chapter 3, he holds that vision is the unobstructed
presence of the lighted object before a sound eye. The very act
of “seeing,” which is, according to Suhrawardî, equal to
“knowing,” can occur only when there is no veil between the
external object and him who sees. In other words, the act of
vision happens when the object is at the presence of the
subject. The knowledge of God (Nûr al-Anwâr, literally, the
Light of Lights), is of this kind, that is, a kind of presence, which
infers a direct, illuminational relationship between God and
things. Since all things are in the presence of the Light of
Lights, all things are manifest (zâhir) to it; hence the Light of
Light knows all things by presence. Therefore, God’s vision and
knowledge are the same.30 Consequently, God knows things
directly because of this relationship of ishrâq (illumination) and
does not need any intermediate cognitive forms.31
In this regard, Tûsî’s consideration of God’s knowledge
may be accounted as that of a follower or supporter of
Suhrawardî’s idea. To examine this, let us have a glance at
Tûsî’s argumentation. Rejecting Ibn Sînâ’s doctrine of forms in
God’s mind, Tûsî, in this sense, departs from the traditional
peripatetic view. His profound examination of the issue will
throw light on our survey of the fact that the epistemological
relation between God and His effects happens by virtue of
knowledge by presence. He argues that just as the soul knows
such imaginative and intellective forms as it itself creates
directly, not through any preceding forms, but because it is
their creator, so does God know things directly because they
flow from Him as His creations, not through any preceding
cognitive forms.32 The affinity of this view with that of
Suhrawardî in certain essential respects is obvious: both deny
Ibn Sînâ’s cognitive forms and identify God’s knowledge of
things with the fact that things flow from God, viz., a direct
knowledge based upon God’s creative activity.
Therefore, Suhrawardî and Tûsî hold that God’s

knowledge of things is the things themselves and thus is direct
and not mediated by forms. They agree that this direct
knowledge of God is not only of universals but also of
particulars and, indeed, material objects. Thanks to this notion,
they envisage two fundamental questions: first, how does God
know (of course by presence) the details that would happen in
time and in several places? In other words, how does God
know something not existent now? The problem is that there
can be no being, in the case of non-existent, at the presence of
God, becoming the object of His knowledge. Furthermore, the
changes that occur within the separate, distinct, and
successive existents, would affect God’s knowledge. Since
there is a succession in temporal things, His knowledge would
change from moment to moment.
They have profoundly considered these questions and,
in the light of their doctrine, tried to answer them. Concerning
the former, having denied His being in time and space,
Suhrawardî and Tûsî maintain that the relation of all times
(past, future, and present) and places to Him is a single
identical relation (al-nisba al-wâhida al-mutasâwîya).
Therefore, all things which are in time and space are present to
Him and equally related to Him, although He knows their
relationship to each other as well as the priority of some of
them to others.33
With regard to the latter question, they hold that
changes affect not God’s knowledge but the objects of His
knowledge; and they don’t necessitate His Essence to be a

substratum (mahall) for changing and multiple entities.34
As we have seen before (in chapter 3), Mullâ Sadrâ
strongly rejects Suhrawardî’s doctrine of vision (that is, al-
ibsâr). In the case of God’s knowledge of particulars, i.e.,
material beings, he is also critical of both, Suhrawardî and Tûsî,
and asks: how can perception take place on the part of a being
that is beyond space and time? In addition, how can
perception take place without sense-organ? For Mullâ Sadrâ,
the most foolish theory of all is that of those who maintain
that the material forms–despite their being submerged in
matter–are forms of knowledge present in Him as His
Knowledge.35 The reason Mullâ Sadrâ relies on, as we have
examined in chapter 3, is that this mode of material being is
veiled from itself by itself. So, with regard to this mode, the
material being cannot present in itself, let alone in a perceiver
like God.36
Mullâ Sadrâ is also highly critical of Ibn Sînâ who
describes divine knowledge of the particulars in purely
conceptual terms. Mullâ Sadrâ argues that if His knowledge
were treated in conceptual terms, as Ibn Sînâ apparently treats
it,37 it would have to be, as some kind of essence, additional to
His Existence.38
Besides the above mentioned theories, Mullâ Sadrâ
enumerates several views on God’s knowledge, analyzing and
evaluating them one by one.39 He ultimately formulates his
own view on the basis of the doctrine that existence alone is
real and God is pure existence. On the one hand, he strongly
upholds the theory of “simplicity” (al-bisâtat) and formulates

the principle that “a simple being is all things” (basît al-haqîqa
kull al-ashyâ`).40 To explain this principle, he says:
Since the Necessary (Existent) –The Exalted– is the
ultimate in the series or chain of needs and
dependencies, it is the telos of everything, and the
totality of all Truth-Reality (alethiea). Thus its Existence
is neither bound up with anything nor dependent on
anything. Then it is The Simple Reality from every point
of view.41
On the other hand, he maintains that knowledge and

existence are co-extensive, and just as existence admits of an
infinite gradation and is applied with systematic ambiguity, so
is knowledge.42 By demonstrating these two very fundamental
key principles, Mullâ Sadrâ gives his final solution to the
problem of God’s knowledge. He argues:
His knowledge of all things is One reality. Yet while
being One, it is knowledge of each (single) thing... His
knowledge is reducible to His being. So just as His
being–May He be exalted–is not mixed with privation of
anything at all, likewise his knowledge of His Essence
(or Self), which is the Presence (to Himself) of His
Essence, is not mixed with the absence of anything at
all. This is because His Essence is That Which makes all
things to be those things and Which gives all realities
their reality.43
Elsewhere, he adds: “Just as His Existence is not

contaminated with privation or deficiency, so is His knowledge
which is the presence of His Essence; nothing touches it... The
presence of His Essence-The Exalted-is the presence of

everything.”44 What we conclude from the above arguments is
that “simple existence” (al-wujûd al-basît), according to Mullâ
Sadrâ, is a kind of being which contains all states of existence
in itself without being alike with them, since existence is
systematically ambiguous (al-mushakkak). God, therefore,
knows all things, particulars and universals, because He
envelops all of them as His modes and manifestations in
different orders or gradations of existence. God’s knowledge is
consequently nothing but His simple existence (al-wujûd al-
basît), an order of being unique to Him.45
Mullâ Sadrâ has some considerations against
Suhrawardî and Tûsî with respect to their idea of God’s
knowledge of material things. According to Mullâ Sadrâ,
material objects as such cannot even become objects of sense
perception for humans, let alone for God. This is because these
objects–their parts being mutually exclusive–are not even
present to themselves, let alone present to a percipient. 46 This
objection, however, is itself rejected by his well-known
commentator, Sabzavârî. Confirming the theory of Suhrawardî
and Tûsî, some contemporary thinkers such as Mesbâh Yazdî
also reject the Sadrian objection. Mesbâh Yazdî asserts that
one may accept the fact that a material thing is absent from
itself to the extent that every part of its being is separated
from the others, but it doesn’t necessitate its absence from its
efficient cause. It could be considered that as the cause gives
the existence to everything, and therefore there is an
ontological relation between them, in the same vein,
everything is at the presence of its cause. Thus there is logically
an epistemological relation between the efficient cause and

things.47
In certain places of his works, Mullâ Sadrâ himself,
however, elaborates the argument that supports the idea that
every being (particular or universal) is at the presence of God.
These Sadrian statements give evidence for the opposite trend
of his mind. Let us examine his argumentation.
The consequence of Mullâ Sadrâ’s argument is that
God’s knowledge of things is the things themselves; knowledge
and existence are, as seen before, coextensive, but existence is
what is truly real, and knowledge, when separated from
existence, becomes just so many concepts, essences or ideas.
Mullâ Sadrâ has shown us that God’s simple knowledge “al-‘ilm
al-basît” (which is identical with his being itself) involves all
sorts of existence, including universal and particular forms of
things and even material objects, which he tells us lie in the
last “arrangement” (stage) of God’s knowledge.
Because all existence is present at the level of God’s
simple being “al-wujûd al-basît,” when He reflects upon
Himself, He knows everything in both a simple and a detailed
manner (al-ijmâl wa al-tafsîl). Mullâ Sadrâ then explains how
God’s knowledge and the forms or degrees of existence it
consists of are related to Him. He declares that God, in
knowing himself, knows other things by virtue of the fact that
“knowledge of the complete cause necessitates complete
knowledge of the effect.”48 If it is held, he states, that
knowledge of the complete cause is not a conception, or idea
(naqsh) extraneous to the very reality of the cause, but is
rather identical with the existence of the cause itself, “then it

follows (logically) that the knowledge which comes from it (i.e.,
the cause itself) is nothing but the very existence of the effect
itself.” Furthermore, this knowledge of the effect is nothing
more than the actual effect itself.49 Accordingly, their (i.e., the
effects’) existence in the external world is exactly the same as
the knowledge of God.50
What we may conclude here is that Mullâ Sadrâ, in this
part of his argumentation, comes very close to Suhrawardî and
Tûsî, regarding God’s knowledge of the external world, insofar
as he (Mullâ Sadrâ) has employed the same terminology. This
is more obvious in the following demonstration. Mullâ Sadrâ
uses the illuminative terms (such as hudûr and its relative
words) with regard to the question: if all effects of God are
regarded as His knowledge, including the succession of events
that occurs in the temporal world, would this not constitute an
affront to His unity, tainting it with multiplicity? Mullâ Sadrâ’s
answer to this problem here is precisely what we have already
seen from Suhrawardî and Tûsî. He states:
All temporal things and material events in relation to
God, who is free from time and space, are equidistant
(mutasâwiyah al-aqdâm) from the presence of God and
also they are equidistant in actualization (husûl) in the
presence of his majesty...it is not conceivable in God to
suppose any past, present, or future, because these are
relations by which motions and things subject to change
are characterized as are “above,” “below” and
“proximity,” etc., relations by which bodies and special
things are characterized. Thus, it is necessary to hold
that all existents are pure actuality (fi‘liyyah sirfah) and

pure presence (hudûr mahd) in relation to God, without
temporal and special relation, without absence or lack;
but time, with its renewal and space with its divisions
with regard to God, are like a moment and a point.51
From this passage, a general outline of Mullâ Sadrâ’s

ultimate notion of the problem, namely God’s knowledge of
the external world, might be drawn. Much more would have to
be said about Mullâ Sadrâ’s arguments of the problem, but I
hope I have shown the fact that, with respect to the subject of
our study, the Sadrian theory is conceivable in the light of his
notion of knowledge by presence. The point I am trying to
make here is that Mullâ Sadrâ, having recourse to his
ontological and epistemological bases, has reached the same
illuminative conclusion as Suhrawardî, although by a different
route.
It seems to me that, with respect to the problem of
God’s knowledge of His effects, Mullâ Sadrâ assumes two kinds
of relationship between God (as an emanating cause) and
things: an ontological relationship which is described as
causation (of course in Sadrian sense, i.e., al-idâfa al-
qayyûmîya) and epistemological relationship which is known in
Sadrâ’s system as intuitive relationship (i.e., al-idâfa al-
shuhûdîya). Mullâ Sadrâ ultimately solves the problem of God’s
knowledge of things by confirming that these two
relationships, viz., al-idâfa al-qayyûmîya and al-idâfa al-
shuhûdîya, are united and, consequently, what kind of
interpretation is offered for the former is true for the latter as
well.52
Considering the background of Mullâ Sadrâ on this

subject, one may envisage the fact that there are three
important sources of inspiration for Mullâ Sadrâ: rational
method of Ibn Sînâ, illuminative path of Suhrawardî and
mystical experience of Ibn ‘Arabî. Confirming this threefold
ground of Mullâ Sadrâ’s theory, Fazlur Rahman states that
“this is, of course, not to say that our philosopher lacks
originality–on the contrary, his doctrine of existence and
constant movement of existential forms is uniquely his own,
even though his source of inspiration remains Ibn ‘Arabî, and
to a lesser extent al-Suhrawardî among post-Ibn Sînâ
thinkers.”53
It should be noted that the problem deserves a more
thorough discussion than can be given here. However,
concerning the scope of the subject of our study, the essential
point to be drawn from this survey is that, according to both
Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ, it is plausible to assume God’s
knowledge of His effects (i.e., particulars and universals) as a
kind of knowledge by presence; although they have had
recourse to different circuits. Furthermore, one may claim
that, with respect to the topic, the same conclusion could be
drawn from the Peripatetic theory as well, viz., the ultimate
interpretation of God’s knowledge is knowledge by presence.
Even if one believes that, according to the Peripatetics,
the forms of things exist in the Essence of God, it still requires,
however, that those forms are at the presence of God. In
other words, God knows the universals (al-kullîyât) and the
forms of the particulars (suwar al-juz`îyât) directly, without any
other form or idea. Accordingly, it is permissible to say that–for

both sides, namely the Peripatetics and the illuminationists–
the process of God’s knowledge ultimately occurs by presence
1
Fârâbî, al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 8, 12; Kitâb al-Fusûs, p. 18, 20-21; Ibn Sînâ, al-
Ishârât., vol. 4, al-namat 7, pp. 708-9; al-Najât, pp. 99-100, 102-3; al-
Ta‘lîqât, pp. 78-9, 81, 97; Ghazzâlî, al-Iqtisâd fi al-I‘tiqâd, pp. 99-100;
Tahâfut al-Falâsifa, pp. 188-201; al-Râzî, al-Mabâhith al-Mashriqîya, vol.
1, pp. 491-5; Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 150-153; Tûsî,
Sharh Masàlat al-‘Ilm, pp. 38-44; Ibn Rushd, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, pp.
447-468; Jâmî, al-Durrat al-Fâkhira, pp. 14-24; F. Rahman, The

Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 146-963; H. Landolt, “Ghazâlî and
Religionswissenschaft,” p. 21, n. 928.
2
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, pp. 180-2; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 90-91;
Sabzavârî, Asrâr al-Hikam, pp. 67-68; Tabâtabâ`î, Nihâyat al-Hikma, pp.
326-9. F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, p. 146.
3
It should be noted here that I don’t mean by “knowledge by presence” the
literal term which has been used in the recent philosophical texts. What
I mean is that the “definition” that they (i.e., the Peripatetics) give
about God’s knowledge of Himself is exactly what we call “knowledge
by presence” (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî).
4
For Fârâbî’s idea see: al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 8, 92; for Ibn Sînâ’s arguments see:
al-Ishârât., vol. 4, al-namat 7, pp. 708-9; al-Najât, pp. 99-100, 102-3; al-
Ta‘lîqât, pp. 78-9, 81, 97.
5
6
Ibid., pp. 78-9, 81, 97. On this argumentation, Ibn Sînâ is followed by his
pupil Bahmanyâr; See al-Tahsîl, pp. 573-4.
7
8
9
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, p. 150, 174-6; al-‘Arshîya, p. 224.
10
al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 63.
11
al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 63 (trans. by P. Morewedge in the same page).
12
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, pp. 174-6. We can find the same argument and
the same result in the former philosophers such as Bahmanyâr, the
pupil of Ibn Sînâ. In his al-Tahsîl (p. 573).
13
Richard Taylor, “Causation,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), v. 2, p. 58.
14
Ibid., p. 58.
15
Richard Taylor, “Causation,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), v. 2, p. 56, with ref. to Metaphysics I, 3.
16
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, vol.3, pp. 441-6; Bahmanyâr, al-
Tahsîl, p. 519; al-Râzî, al-Mabâhith al-Mashriqîya, vol. 1, p. 586;
Suhrawardî, al-Mutârahât, pp. 377-9; Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/2, pp. 127-
130; F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 74-81.
17
Ibn Sînâ, al-Rasâìl, Risâla al-Hudûd, p. 117; Bahmanyâr, al-Tahsîl, p. 519;
Mîr Dâmâd, al-Qabasât, p. 53; Suhrawardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 62; al-
Mutârihât, pp. 376-7; Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/2, p. 127. In Hikmat al-Ishrâq
(p. 62).
18
19
Fârâbî, al-Ta‘lîqât, pp. 8, 12; Kitâb al-Fusûs, p. 18, 20-21; Ibn Sînâ, al-
Ishârât., vol. 4, al-namat 7, pp. 708-9; al-Najât, pp. 99-100, 102-3; al-
Ta‘lîqât, pp. 78-9, 81, 97; Ghazzâlî, al-Iqtisâd fi al-I‘tiqâd, pp. 99-100;
Tahâfut al-Falâsifa, pp. 188-201; al-Râzî, al-Mabâhith al-Mashriqîya, vol.
1, pp. 491-5; Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 150-153; Tûsî,
Sharh Masàlat al-‘Ilm, pp. 38-44; Ibn Rushd, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, pp.
447-468; Jâmî, al-Durrat al-Fâkhira, pp. 14-24.
The problem of God's knowledge, particularly His knowledge of things,
has been assumed as a main part of Christian theology as well. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274) has asserted:
"The forms of all things occur in the essence of God, so He, at
first, apprehends these forms by presence, not through other
forms but rather through those identical forms."
P.K. Meagher, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion (Washington, D. C.:
Corpus, 1979), p. 1826.
20
It has been said that this issue is one of the most difficult of all
philosophical questions in which some great sages, in spite of their
sagacity and sharp-sightedness, have committed some blunders. Mullâ
Sadrâ, al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, p. 90.
21
Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, III/1, pp. 180-2; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 90-91;
Sabzavârî, Asrâr al-Hikam, pp. 67-68; Tabâtabâ`î, Nihâya al-Hikma
(Tehran: Intishârât-i al-Zahrâ, 1984), pp. 326-9.
22
Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, vol. 3, al-Namat 7, pp. 712-14; al-
Ta‘lîqât, p. 82.
23
Ibn Sînâ, al-Najât, pp. 102-5; Ibn Rushd, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, 447-468.
24
This doctrine of Ibn Sînâ’s was severely criticized by al-Ghazzâlî (d.
505/1111) and al-Râzî (d. 606/1209). In this respect, al-Ghazzâlî has
excommunicated the philosophers in his book Tahâfut al-Falâsifa

(Incoherence of the philosophers), p. 308. For al-Râzî’s criticism see: his
notes on Ibn Sînâ’s al-Ishârât (Qum, 1982), pp. 71-3.
25
Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 150-1 (trans. by J. Walbridge).
26
For a careful account on this issue see: Marmura, “Some Aspects of
Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 82 (1962), pp. 299-312, esp. pp. 304-9.
27
For instance, “Abul-Barakât al-Baghdâdî (d. 547/1152) rejected Ibn Sînâ’s
formulation of the doctrine that God knows every particular but “in a
universal way” rather than through perception. According to Baghdâdî,
both sense perception and intellective perception belong to the soul
and do not intrinsically involve the body. Then he concludes that God
knows the particulars just as he knows the universals.” Fazlur Rahman,
“Islamic Philosophy,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 223.
28
The important thirteenth century philosopher, scientist, and Shî‘îte
theologian Nasîr al-Dîn al-Tûsî was a great follower of Ibn Sînâ, and one
of the most important commentators on his al-Ishârât. He was,
however, influenced by certain views of the Illuminationist
philosophers, although the exact extent and nature of this influence still
needs to be closely determined.
29
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 151.
30
Suhrawardî, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, pp. 150-53.
31
Mullâ Sadrâ precisely quotes Suhrawardî’s idea and evaluates it,
comparing it with Tûsî’s view point. Asfâr, III/1, pp. 249-253.
32
Tûsî, notes on Ibn Sînâ’s al-Ishârât., vol. 4, al-namat 7, pp. 714-717;
Sharh-i Masàlat al-‘Ilm, pp. 28-29.
33
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 151; Tûsî, Sharh-i masàlat al-
‘ilm, pp. 39-40.
34
Tûsî, Sharh-i masàlat al-‘ilm, pp. 39-40.
35
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-‘Arshîya, p. 225.
36
Ibid., p. 225.
37
38
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 403-407,417.
39
Asfâr, III/1, pp. 180-182; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 91-123. F. Rahman,
The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 146-163; See H. Landolt, “Ghazâlî
and Religionswissenschaft,” p. 21, n. 928.
40
The theory of basît al-haqîqa kull al-ashyâ` has been profoundly
considered and also demonstrated by Mullâ Sadrâ in his works. Asfâr,
I/2, pp. 368-72; III/1, pp. 100-104; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 43-6; al-
Mashâ‘ir, pp. 62-3.
41
Al-Mashâ‘ir, p. 59 (trans. by P. Morewedge in the same page ).
42
Asfâr, I/1, pp. 117-8, 276. For the discussion of systematic ambiguity
(tashkîk) of existence, see Mullâ Sadrâ, Asfâr, I/1, pp. ; F. Rahman, The
Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ, pp. 34-7.
43
Al-‘Arshîya, p. 224 (trans. by J.W. Morris as stated in The Wisdom of the
Throne, pp. 104-105).
44
Al-Mashâ‘ir, pp. 69-70 (Trans. by P. Morewedge in the same page).
45
Asfâr, I/3, pp. 407, 417.
46
Asfâr, III/1, pp. 164-7, 259-260; al-‘Arshîya, p. 225.
47
For Sabzavârî’s view see his notes on Mullâ Sadrâ’s Asfâr, IV/1, pp. 179-
81 (n. 1); III/1, pp.164-966 (n. 3); for Mesbâh’s opinion see: Ta‘lîqa., pp.
205, 256-7.
48
Asfâr, III/1, p. 176; al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, pp. 89-90; al-‘Arshîya, p. 224.
49
Mullâ Sadrâ, Risâla fî al-Qadâ` wa al-Qadar, p. 152 [trans. by D. Ede as
stated in Mullâ Sadrâ and the Problem of Freedom and Determinism
(Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1978), p. 52].
50
Ibid., p. 152.
51
Mullâ Sadrâ, Risâla fî al-Qadâ` wa al-Qadar, p. 152 [trans. by D. Ede as
stated in Mullâ Sadrâ and the Problem of Freedom and Determinism
(Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1978), p. 54].
52
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mabda` wa al-Ma‘âd, p. 121-3.
53
F. Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany: SUNY Press, 1976),
pp. 162-3.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion
There is a question that may be asked: Ìs the Sadrian

epistemological system's task merely to describe the structure
of human knowledge (especially knowledge by presence), and
perhaps to fix its limits, or is it also to produce a rational
reconstruction of the whole reality, which would exhibit the
true relations between its parts, as well as subject and object?
It can be so far understood that the epistemological
system of Mullâ Sadrâ, following in its illuminative elements of
Suhrawardî’s, gives not only clear answers to such questions
as: what knowledge is, how its process occurs, and how its
subjective and objective aspects are distinguished. Particularly
in the light of theory of “knowledge by presence”, it also
elucidates a doctrine of a very close relation between
knowledge and existence. In other words, considering
“knowledge by presence” as an ultimate key for his
epistemology, Mullâ Sadrâ attempts to prove a link between
his ontological and epistemological systems.
In addition, one may conclude that the theory of
“knowledge by presence” (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî) is considered by
Mullâ Sadrâ to be necessary in order to connect the other
elements of his philosophical epistemology. The existence of
“knowledge by presence,” on the one hand, elucidates a
158 Conclusion
reasonable interpretation of a point of relation between his

ontological and epistemological system. On the other hand, it
provides the necessary link among different kinds of cognition
that enables him to offer a coherent and consistent theory of
knowledge. The nature of this knowledge, according to Mullâ
Sadrâ, has to be axiomatic and a priori. It is reasonable to
assume that ‘knowledge by presence’ is a key to the validity of
Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophical epistemology. Therefore, it is in
this sense that ‘knowledge by presence’ becomes a common
thread that connects his ontological and epistemological
philosophy.
What Mullâ Sadrâ has clearly been trying to
demonstrate is a rational link between existence, as an
ontological element, and knowledge, as an epistemological
principle. Existence, therefore, becomes the substance of
knowledge and knowledge the substance of existence. In this
respect, on the one hand, he states:
The realization (inner-reality) of existence in its
presence and inner revelation is the most evident of all
entities.1
On the other hand, he declares:

The knowledge of the reality of existence cannot be
except through the illuminative presence and an
intuition of the (immediate) determined (reality); then
there will be no doubt about its inner-nature.2
Finally he maintains that:

Knowledge is nothing but presence of existence without
any obstacles.3
Thanks to these statements, Mullâ Sadrâ formulates his

metaphysical theory of the two-fold link (that is, ontological
and epistemological) between “existence” and “knowledge.”
On this point, I think that Mullâ Sadrâ establishes a very
fundamental basis for the whole of his philosophical system.
Having recourse to the theory of knowledge by presence, he
demonstrates that one can achieve and apprehend the reality
as it is (i.e., existence “wujûd”). Knowledge by presence is the
only way, according to Mullâ Sadrâ, through which one has a
direct experience of the reality. At the same time, this
interpretation would give us a clue for an understanding of the
links between Mullâ Sadrâ’s ontology and his epistemology.
Before Mullâ Sadrâ, the philosophical epistemology of
Suhrawardî had comprised the similar conclusion, although by
a different terminology. Suhrawardî, in the light of his theory
of light, maintained that one can ultimately attain certainty
only through the knowledge which is attained by illumination.
This illuminative knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ishrâqî) is obtainable
without any mediation. In the very beginning of his Hikmat al-
Ishrâq, Suhrawardî concisely states his theory of ‘intuitive
knowledge.' He says:
As we observe the sensible world through which we
gain certainty of its states of affairs, we then base a
thorough and precise science on this basis (math,
astronomy). By analogy, we observe certain things in
the spiritual domain and then use them as a foundation
upon which other things can be based. He whose path
and method are other than this will not benefit from
this and soon will be plunged into doubt.4
160 Conclusion
Suhrawardî tries, as I understand him, to demonstrate

that there is an important link between his ontological and
epistemological system, which has been represented by ishrâq
(intuition). He developed this idea thanks to his philosophy of
light. Light therefore becomes the substance of knowledge and
knowledge the substance of light. In this regard, he states:
If there be anything that needs no definition or
explanation, it has to be obvious by nature, and there is
nothing more obvious and clear than light. Thus, there
5
is nothing that needs no definition except light.
In other words, the theory of “knowledge by presence,”

and thus the whole discussion of knowledge of whatever kind
and however achieved, has an ontological as well as
epistemological function and dimension. It seems to me that it
was one of the fruits of Sadrian epistemology that the process
of “knowledge by presence” gained a prominent ontological
rank. It might be held that Mullâ Sadrâ, in the light of this
theory, turns the traditional epistemology, namely Aristotelian
and Neoplatonian, into metaphysics.
The epistemological conclusion to be drawn from the
Sadrian examination of “knowledge by presence” is clear: like
the whole epistemological system, this theory is underpinned
by a substratum of both Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. As
in some of his other parts of philosophy that are not to be
classified directly under the heading of epistemology, these
two philosophies stand shoulder by shoulder and frequently
interact. Philosophically, this must be counted as a major facet
of Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophy and metaphysics;
epistemologically the combination is intriguing because of the

concepts of hierarchy and emanation which are infiltrated into
the basic Aristotelian data and terminology, and also because
of the attempt to view epistemology in terms of ontology.
Therefore, the prime importance of “knowledge by presence”
in Mullâ Sadrâ’s epistemology, and the link between progress
in several levels of knowledge, cannot be overstated.
In the Sadrian system, the three technical terms
“existence” (wujûd), “presence” (hudûr), and “intuition”
(shuhûd) have received a similar meaning and in certain cases
are used interchangeably. Concerning Mullâ Sadrâ’s doctrine,
to show the inter-relation among these three terms, S. H. Nasr
gives us an interpretation. He states that “the ordinary man is
usually aware of the container, whereas the sage sees content
which is at one being (wujûd), presence (hudûr), and witness
(shuhûd)... In fact, the degree of awareness of being is itself
dependent upon the degree of awareness of the knower, the
degree and mode according to which he is. The more man is,
the more he is able to perceive being.”6 This version that
partially indicates Mullâ Sadrâ’s doctrine, also elucidates that
“knowledge by presence” is precisely a connecting link
between ontological chain and epistemological sequence in
Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophical system.
I should like to draw a general and corollary conclusion
from Mullâ Sadrâ’s main epistemic thesis as it has been
presented. Mullâ Sadrâ’s subjectivist thesis may at first seem
inconsistent with his ontological and epistemological system.
However, to be a subjectivist in this sense, i.e., in the theory of
162 Conclusion
knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-hudûrî), is not necessarily to

be anti-empiricist or anti-inductivist. On the contrary, to be a
subjectivist in this sense is to appreciate fully the limits of the
empirical or inductive methods, not as a prelude to disposing
of these methods, but as a basis of understanding the
limitations imposed on Man’s epistemic ability.
This brings us to the final point that Mullâ Sadrâ seems
to have sustained that human/material knowledge is by
definition quite limited and of lesser value. In order to arrive at
true knowledge, one has to emancipate oneself from all ties
with the material world. Real knowledge therefore is quite
distinct from this-worldly knowledge.
As a result of this study, it seems that Mullâ Sadrâ’s
theory of knowledge by presence, which has had a long
background in the history of Islamic thought (namely the
Peripatetic and Illuminatinist), has played a significant role in
his philosophical system, al-hikma al-muta‘âlîya. Although
Suhrawardî was his forerunner in pointing to the significance
of knowledge by presence, Mullâ Sadrâ gave a systematic
shape to the issue within the whole philosophical structure.
Having recourse to certain rational and mystical elements,
Mullâ Sadrâ tried to prove that “mystic experience is a
cognitive experience and mystic truth is essentially intellectual
truth.”7 Since he refers all kinds of knowledge to knowledge by
presence, it seems correct to assume that “knowledge by
presence” is the key principle of his epistemological system.
Concerning the problem of knowledge by presence, in
comparing Mullâ Sadrâ and Suhrawardî, it could be found that,
in one sentence, Mullâ Sadrâ reached much the same

illuminative conclusion as Suhrawardî, although by a different
route. According to this study, it could be understood that, in
the context of Suhrawardî’s Illuminative philosophy, Mullâ
Sadrâ has established his epistemological system.
Nevertheless, regarding the issue, there are some differences
between our sages, Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ. These
differences, as seen in this study, might be listed as follows:
 The definition of knowledge,
 The division of knowledge,
 Theory of vision (al-ibsâr), and
 The problem of God’s Knowledge.
As we have already examined, Mullâ Sadrâ, considering these
problems, seems to elaborate his own view, departing and, in
some cases, refuting Suhrawardî’s elaboration.
Consequently, it has been apparently realized that
Mullâ Sadrâ’s doctrine of knowledge by presence is the corner
stone of his epistemological system. In the light of this
doctrine, he gives a new definition of knowledge, a novel
interpretation of its division into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and al-‘ilm al-
husûlî, and, finally, a systematic chain of various kinds of
knowledge by presence (e.g., self-knowledge, God’s knowledge
of His Essence and God’s knowledge of things).
164 Conclusion
1
Mullâ Sadrâ, al-Mashâ‘ir (New York: SSIPS, 1992), p.6 (trans. by
P.Morewedge in the same page).
2
Ibid., p. 30.
3
Ibid., p. 63.
4
Suhrawardî, Opera II, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, p. 13 [trans. by M. Aminrazavi in
Suhrawardî’s Theory of Knowledge (Ph. D. Thesis, Temple University,
1989), p. 174].
5
Ibid., p. 106 [trans. by M. Aminrazavi in Suhrawardî’s Theory of
Knowledge (Ph. D. Thesis, Temple University, 1989), p. 175].
6
S.H. Nasr, “Post-Avicenna Islamic Philosophy and the study of Being,” in
Parviz Morewedge (ed.), Philosophy of Existence (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1982), p. 341.
7
4.
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In The Name of Allah
The Most Compassionate
The Most Merciful
First Edition 2010
Islamic Studies and Research Academy (ISRA), USA
israoffice@gmail.com ; isra.academy@yahoo.com
Book Title: al-Ìlm al-Huduri: Knowledge by Presence
Authored by: Sayyed Mohammad Reza Hejazi, Ph.D., H.I.M.
Pages: 190 / Language: English / First Published: 2010
The Book: This book explores the issue of knowledge by presence as an epistemological problem in
philosophy. Al-Ìlm al-Huduri (knowledge by presence) deserves as an epistemological bridge
between philosophy and mysticism. This book is a comparative study of the epistemology of
Suhrawardî and Mullâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî, two Muslim thinkers of the 6th/12th and 11th/17th century. It
focuses on two main issues: Illuminative theory of knowledge and, in the framework of this theory,
Mullâ Sadrâ's doctrine of knowledge by presence (al-'ilm al-hudûrî) studied in the context of his
philosophical system (al-hikmah al-muta'âlîyah). Mullâ Sadrâ's doctrine of knowledge by presence is
the corner stone of his epistemological system. In the light of this doctrine, he gives a new definition
of knowledge, an innovative interpretation of its division into al-'ilm al-hudûrî and al-'ilm al-husûlî,
and, finally, a systematic chain of various kinds of knowledge by presence (e.g., self-knowledge,
God's knowledge of His Essence and God's knowledge of things). These three aspects of his doctrine
have been surveyed and, in comparing them with Suhrawardî's theory, evaluated in this book.
The Author: Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Reza Hejazi is Professor of Islamic Philosophy, Mysticism,
Religious Studies and Islamic Theology at I.M. Seminary, Director of the Islamic Studies and Research
Academy (ISRA), California, USA, Chairman of A.B.A. Assembly of North America, and a founder
member and a Trustee of the Ibn Sina Health Foundation of North America (ISHFNA). He has also
served as Director at the I.E.C., Washington D.C. and was a Chairman at the I.I.N.Y., New York, USA.
He holds a Master of Arts degree in Islamic Jurisprudence from Elmiyeh Seminary of Qom, a
doctorate in Islamic Philosophy from B.U.C. Institute of Qom, a second Master of Arts degree in
Epistemology and Islamic Mysticism from McGill University, Montreal, Canada; and a second
doctorate in Philosophy of Ethics from Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., USA. Dr.
Hejazi has published 22 books in Arabic, Persian and English. He has also published more than 18
articles in different languages and participated in about 28 international and inter-disciplinary
Seminars, Conferences and Academic Workshops. In addition to his teaching and writing, Dr. Hejazi
serves as a consultant in the fields of education, morality, religion and philosophy.
ISBN-13: 978-1453779040 (CreateSpace-Assigned)

ISBN-10: 1453779043
BISAC: Philosophy / Epistemology

‫العلم الحضوري‬
‫پژوهشي مقايسه اي بين ديدگاه هاي شناخت شناسانه‬
‫صدر المتألهين و شيخ اشراق‬
‫دکتر سيد محمد رضا حجازي‬
‫‪Printed in the United States of America‬‬
‫‪© Copyright: All rights reserved‬‬

‫العلم الحضوري‬
Al-Ìlm al-Hudûrî

Al-'Ilm Al-Hudûrî - Conhecimento Por Presença (Inglês) - Volume I

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Al-`Ilm al-Hudûrî

An Epistemological Bridge between

Philosophy and Mysticism

Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Reza

Printed in the United States of America

© Copyright: All rights reserved

ISBN-13: 978-1453779040 (CreateSpace-Assigned)

Printed in the United States of America

Transliteration table …………………………………………………………. 11

CHAPTER 2 The Division of Knowledge ………………………..…. 53

CHAPTER 3 Immateriality and

III. Ibsâr (vision) …………………………………………………… 85

CHAPTER 4 The “human soul” and

CHAPTER 5 God and knowledge by

CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………….…………. 157

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… 167

Arabic Persian Arabic Persian

‫ژ‬ - ZH ‫و‬ W V/U

Doubled ‫ى‬ īy or iyy (final form ī)

Persian) ‫و‬ uww (final form ū), uvv (for

1. The system of transliteration that has been used

The problem of knowledge (al-‘ilm)1 in the history of

perception, as a subject, with the external objects has been

(Mashshâ`ûn), Illuminationists (Ishrâqîyûn), and Mystics (Sûfîs).

II. The philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ

Mullâ Sadrâ,10 the Persian philosopher of the 11th/17th

according to F. Rahman, Râzî was Mullâ Sadrâ’s most

Mullâ Sadrâ’s cognizance of Greek philosophy and his

time. Before Mullâ Sadrâ, Suhrawardî (d. 587/1191)

corner stone for the development of future philosophical

hand, or is sensible (hissî), imaginative (khayâlî) or intellective

III. This study and its methodology

The central task of this work is to attempt an analytical

4. The division of knowledge into al-‘ilm al-hudûrî and

1. The definition of knowledge.

4. The sorts of “knowledge by presence”.

This book will not only illustrate the Sadrian doctrine

mysticism, logic) have been considered and examined by Muslim

A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press,

S. J. Ashtîyânî, Sharhi hâl wa ârâ`i Falsafîye Mullâ Sadrâ , (Tehran:

a commentary on Suhrawardî’s Hikmat al-Ishrâq, partly criticizing,

Is knowledge definable? If it is so, how can we define

have asserted several definitions of knowledge, by a very

II. The concept and the nature of knowledge

It is generally accepted that, in the case of definition or

proposition expressing the essence (nature) of knowledge

that we know what knowing is or what the word “know”

the nature of knowledge is a kind of existence (nahwun min al-

III. The definition of knowledge

On definition of knowledge, many different

original definition of knowledge is rendered circular. For

One view, which is attributed to the Peripatetics by

What we understand from these two statements cited

Mullâ Sadrâ critically treats Suhrawardî's definition of

the pure body cannot be the object of one's perception or

Elsewhere, he holds that, “what is in the external

This statement frankly elucidates that his investigation

general metaphysical theory. Knowledge, according to him, is

knowledge through his terminology of light, and Mullâ Sadrâ,