Nagel Right and Wrong
Nagel Right and Wrong
Nagel Right and Wrong
rality is supposed to apply to everyone: and can luckily no one is doing it to me. Fm doing it to
we assume that everyone has such a concern for someone else, and I don't mind that at all!"
others? Obviously not: some people are very self- This answer misses the point of the question.
ish, and even those who are not selfish may care When you are asked how you would like it if
only about the people they know, and not about someone did that to you, you are supposed to
everyone. So where will we find a reason that ev- think about all the feelings you would have if
eryone has not to hurt other people, even those someone stole your umbrella. And that includes
they don't know? more than just "not liking it"—as you wouldn't
Well, there's one general argument against "like it" if you stubbed your toe on a rock. If
hurting other people which can be given to any- someone stole your umbrella you'd resent it.
body who understands English (or any other lan- You'd have feelings about the umbrella thief,
guage), and which seems to show that he has not just about the loss of the umbrella. You'd
some reason to care about others, even if in the think, "Where does he get off, taking my um-
end his selfish motives are so strong that he per- brella that I bought with my hard-earned money
sists in treating other people badly anyway. It's and that I had the foresight to bring after read-
an argument that I'm sure you've heard, and it ing the weather report? Why didn't he bring his
goes like this: "How would you like it if someone own umbrella?" and so forth.
did that to you?" When our own interests are threatened by the
It's not easy to explain how this argument is inconsiderate behavior of others, most of us find
supposed to work. Suppose you're about to steal it easy to appreciate that those others have a rea-
someone else's umbrella as you leave a restau- son to be more considérate. When you are hurt,
rant in a rainstorm, and a bystander says, "How you probably feel that other people should care
would you like it if someone did that to you?" about it: you don't think it's no concern of
Why is it supposed to make you hesitate, or feel theirs, and that they have no reason to avoid
guilty? hurting you. That is the feeling that the "How
Obviously the direct answer to the question is would you like it?" argument is supposed to
supposed to be, "I wouldn't like it at all!" But arouse.
what's the next step? Suppose you were to say, Because if you admit that you would resent it
"I wouldn't like it if someone did that to me. But if someone else did to you what you are now
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What Does It All Mean? Right and Wrong
doing to him, you are admitting that you think wouldn't resent it at all. I wouldn't like it if
he would have a reason not to do it to you. And someone stole my umbrella in a rainstorm, but I
if you admit that, you have to consider what that wouldn't think there was any reason for him to
reason is. It couldn't be just that it's you that he's consider my feelings about it." But how many
hurting, of all the people in the world. There's people could honestly give that answer? I think
no special reason for him not to steal your um- most people, unless they're crazy, would think
brella, as opposed to anyone else's. There's that their own interests and harms matter, not
nothing so special about you. Whatever the rea- only to themselves, but in a way that gives other
son is, it's a reason he would have against hurt- people a reason to care about them too. We all
ing anyone else in the same way. And it's a rea- think that when we suffer it is not just bad^br us,
son anyone else would have too, in a similar but bad, period.
situation, against hurting you or anyone else. The basis of morality is a belief that good and
But if it's a reason anyone would have not to harm to particular people (or animáis) is good or
hurt anyone else in this way, then it's a reason bad not just from their point of view, but from
you have not to hurt someone else in this way a more general point of view, which every think-
(since anyone means everyone). Therefore it's a ing person can understand. That means that
reason not to steal the other person's umbrella each person has a reason to consider not only
now. his own interests but the interests of others in
This is a matter of simple consistency. Once deciding what to do. And it isn't enough if he is
you admit that another person would have a rea- considérate only of some others—his family and
son not to harm you in similar circumstances, friends, those he specially cares about. Of
and once you admit that the reason he would course he will care more about certain people,
have is very general and doesn't apply only to and also about himself. But he has some reason
you, or to him, then to be consistent you have to to consider the effect of what he does on the
admit that the same reason applies to you now. good or harm of everyone. If he's like most of
You shouldn't steal the umbrella, and you ought us, that is what he thinks others should do with
to feel guilty if you do. regard to him, even if they aren't friends of his.
Someone could escape from this argument if, » «
when he was asked, "How would you like it if Even if this is right, it is only a bare outline of
someone did that to you?" he answered, "I the source of morality. It doesn't tell us in detail
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how we should consider the interests of others, This degree of impartiality seems too much to
or how we should weigh them against the special ask of most people: someone who had it would
interest we all have in ourselves and the partic- be a kind of terrifying saint. But it's an impor-
ular people cióse to us. It doesn't even tell us tant question in moral thought, how much im-
how much we should care about people in other partiality we should try for. You are a particular
countries in comparison with our fellow citizens. person, but you are also able to recognize that
There are many disagreements among those you're just one person among many others, and
who accept morality in general, about what in no more important than they are, when looked
particular is right and what is wrong. at from outside. How much should that point of
For instance: should you care about every view influence you? You do matter somewhat
other person as much as you care about your- from outside—otherwise you wouldn't think
self? Should you in other words love your neigh- other people had any reason to care about what
bor as yourself (even if he isn't your neighbor)? they did to you. But you don't matter as much
Should you ask yourself, every time you go to a from the outside as you matter to yourself, from
movie, whether the cost of the ticket could pro- the inside—since from the outside you don't
vide more happiness if you gave it to someone matter any more than anybody else.
else, or donated the money to famine relief? Not only is it unclear how impartial we should
Very few people are so unselfish. And if some- be; it's unclear what would make an answer to
one were that impartial between himself and this question the right one. Is there a single cor-
others, he would probably also feel that he rect way for everyone to strike the balance be-
should be just as impartial among other people. tween what he cares about personally and what
That would rule out caring more about his matters impartially? Or will the answer vary
friends and relatives than he does about strang- from person to person depending on the
ers. He might have special feelings about certain strength of their different motives?
people who are cióse to him, but complete im- This brings us to another big issue: Are right
partiality would mean that he won't favor and wrong the same for everyone?
them—if for example he has to choose between Morality is often thought to be universal. If
helping a friend or a stranger to avoid suífering, something is wrong, it's supposed to be wrong
or between taking his children to a movie and for everybody; for instance if it's wrong to kill
donating the money to famine relief. someone because you want to steal his wallet,
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Right and Wrong
What Does It All Mean?
but leaves it unclear what these universal rea-
then it's wrong whether you care about him or sons are which do not depend on motives that
not. But if something's being wrong is supposed everyone actually has. What does it mean to say
to be a reason against doing it, and if your rea- that a murderer had a reason not to do it, even
sons for doing things depend on your motives though none of his actual motives or desires
and people's motives can vary greatly, then it gave him such a reason?
looks as though there won't be a single right and Third, we could say that morality is not uni-
wrong for everybody. There won't be a single versal, and that what a person is morally re-
right and wrong, because if people's basic mo- quired to do goes only as far as what he has a
tives differ, there won't be one basic standard of certain kind of reason to do, where the reason
behavior that everyone has a reason to follow. depends on how much he actually cares about
There are three ways of dealing with this other people in general. If he has strong moral
problem, none of them very satisfactory. motives, they will yield strong reasons and
First, we could say that the same things are strong moral requirements. If his moral motives
right and wrong for everybody, but that not ev- are weak or nonexistent, the moral require-
eryone has a reason to do what's right and avoid ments on him will likewise be weak or nonexis-
what's wrong: only people with the right sort of tent. This may seem psychologically realistic, but
"moral" motives—particularly a concern for it goes against the idea that the same moral rules
others—have any reason to do what's right, for apply to all of us, and not only to good people.
its own sake. This makes morality universal, but The question whether moral requirements are
at the cost of draining it of its forcé. It's not universal comes up not only when we compare
clear what it amounts to to say that it would be the motives of different individuáis, but also
wrong for someone to commit murder, but he when we compare the moral standards that are
has no reason not to do it. accepted in different societies and at different
Second, we could say that everyone has a rea- times. Many things that you probably think are
son to do what's right and avoid what's wrong, wrong have been accepted as morally correct by
but that these reasons don't depend on people's large groups of people in the past: slavery, serf-
actual motives. Rather they are reasons to dom, human sacrifice, racial segregation, denial
change our motives if they aren't the right ones. of religious and political freedom, hereditary
This connects morality with reasons for action,
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caste systems. And probably some things you that they are morally mistaken. But if you do
now think are right will be thought wrong by fu- that, you must be appealing to some more ob-
ture societies. Is it reasonable to believe that jective standard, an idea of what is really right
there is some single truth about all this, even and wrong, as opposed to what most people
though we can't be sure what it is? Or is it more think. It is hard to say what this is, but it is an
reasonable to believe that right and wrong are idea most of us understand, unless we are slavish
relative to a particular time and place and social followers of what the community says.
background? There are many philosophical problems about
There is one way in which right and wrong are the content of morality—how a moral concern
obviously relative to circumstances. It is usually or respect for others should express itself;
right to return a knife you have borrowed to its whether we should help them get what they want
owner if he asks for it back. But if he has gone or mainly refrain from harming and hindering
crazy in the meantime, and wants the knife to them; how impartial we should be, and in what
murder someone with, then you shouldn't re- ways. I have left most of these questions aside
turn it. This isn't the kind of relativity I am talk- because my concern here is with the foundation
ing about, because it doesn't mean morality is of morality in general—how universal and ob-
relative at the basic level. It means only that the jective it is.
same basic moral principies will require differ- I should answer one possible objection to the
ent actions in different circumstances. whole idea of morality. You've probably heard it
The deeper kind of relativity, which some peo- said that the only reason anybody ever does any-
ple believe in, would mean that the most basic thing is that it makes him feel good, or that not
standards of right and wrong—like when it is doing it will make him feel bad. If we are really
and is not all right to kill, or what sacrifices motivated only by our own comfort, it is hope-
you're required to make for others—depend en- less for morality to try to appeal to a concern for
tirely on what standards are generally accepted others. On this view, even apparently moral con-
in the society in which you Uve. duct in which one person seems to sacrifice his
This I find very hard to believe, mainly be- own interests for the sake of others is really mo-
cause it always seems possible to criticize the ac- tivated by his concern for himself: he wants to
cepted standards of your own society and say avoid the guilt he'll feel if he doesn't do the
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"right" thing, or to experience the warm glow don't. And I may want to jump into an icy river
of self-congratulation he'll get if he does. But to save a drowning stranger not because it will
those who don't have these feelings have no mo- make me feel good, but because I recognize that
tive to be "moral." his Ufe is important, just as mine is, and I rec-
Now it's true that when people do what they ognize that I have a reason to save his Ufe just as
think they ought to do, they often feel good he would have a reason to save mine if our po-
about it: similarly if they do what they think is sitions were reversed.
wrong, they often feel bad. But that doesn't Moral argument tries to appeal to a capacity
mean that these feelings are their motives for for impartial motivation which is supposed to be
acting. In many cases the feelings result from present in all of us. Unfortunately it may be
motives which also produce the action. You deeply buried, and in some cases it may not
wouldn't feel good about doing the right thing be present at all. In any case it has to compete
unless you thought there was some other reason with powerful selfish motives, and other per-
to do it, besides the fact that it would make you sonal motives that may not be so selfish, in its bid
feel good. And you wouldn't feel guilty about for control of our behavior. The difficulty of jus-
doing the wrong thing unless you thought that tifying morality is not that there is only one
there was some other reason not to do it, besides human motive, but that there are so many.
the fact that it made you feel guilty: something
which made it right to feel guilty. At least that's
how things should be. It's true that some people
feel irrational guilt about things they don't have
any independen! reason to think are wrong—
but that's not the way morality is supposed to
work.
In a sense, people do what they want to do.
But their reasons and motives for wanting to do
things vary enormously. I may "want" to give
someone my wallet only because he has a gun
pointed at my head and threatens to kill me if I
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