POLICE POWER

1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200

-The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made
clear that Buck’s challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the
process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing
had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit
Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so
requested by the patient. Only after “months of observation” could the operation take
place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation.
Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like
Virginia’s in order to prevent the nation from “being swamped with incompetence . . .
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”

2. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City of Manila, July 31, 1967
-Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right
to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery.

3. Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 597

-The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

4. Republic v. Meralco, G.R. No. 141314, Nov. 15, 2002

- The business and operations of a public utility are imbued with public interest. In a
very real sense, a public utility is engaged in public service—providing basic
commodities and services indispensable to the interest of the general public. For
this reason, a public utility submits to the regulation of government authorities
and surrenders certain business prerogatives, including the amount of rates that
may be charged by it. It is theimperative duty of the State to interpose its
protective power whenever too much profits become the priority of public
utilities.

5. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

- The laws were made for the interest of our state. According to the Court, the
disputed law was ratified to remedy a real actual threat and danger
to the Philippine economy posed by foreign dominance and control of
the retail business. The enactment undoubtedly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, wherein the State protects its own interest and insures
its security and future.
6. Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649
-Police power must be reasonably exercised. Otherwise, it is unconstitutional if a law is
supposed to promote the welfare of the people but has not been crafted to have a
reasonable purpose achieved through reasonable means.Gambling is essentially
antagonistic to the objectives of national productivity and self-reliance; it is a vice and a
social ill whichh the government must minimize (or eradicate) in pursuit of social and
economic development. Said law expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to
operate all forms of gambling facilities (including jai-alai) issued by local governments.

7. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148

-As the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection
and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed full play,
subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means
provided in section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 567 bear no relation to the objective
pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods arealike constitutionally
 valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police
power.

8. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255

-Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that LGUs can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.

9. Miners Association v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100

- The State, in the exercise of its police power, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying
and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
10. Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA, 195 SCRA 112
- In situations such as stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of police power. The ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests through the exercise of
police power.

11. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

- The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.

12. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

- It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that “inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation’.”Taxation has been made the implement of the state’s
police power.At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing
legislature.

13. Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

- The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

14. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323

- The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers
-
15. Bunting v. State of Oregon, 243 U. S. 42.
- The Supreme Court concluded that the Oregon statute on labor was not
unconstitutional. The Oregon statute did not interfered with an employer from
negotiating wages with employees (only limited the number of hours worked, thus
it did not fixed wages). The Supreme court upheld the decision of the Oregon
Supreme Court, stating that Oregon acted within its police powers and had the
authority to regulate the health, the safety, and the welfare of workers.

16. MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Assn., March 27, 2000

 - Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police
power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the
MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.

EMINENT DOMAIN

17. Rule 67 Rules Of Court

- Expropriation is the act of a government in claiming privately owned property to
be used for the benefit of the overall public. It is governed by rule 67 of rules of
court.
18. Assn. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343
-Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landwoner
will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds
and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are “negotiable at any time.” The other modes,
which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

19. Roxas & Co. v. CA, 321 SCRA 106

- Application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law – the implementation of
the CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent
domain – to the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property but where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of their
own lands they own in excess of the maximum area ed, there is taking
under the power of eminent domain.

20. Belen v. CA, 195 SCRA 59

- The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure
by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their
properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to
provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case
under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.

21. Manosca v. CA, Jan. 29, 1996

-The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be
restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear
cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well
be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary
in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

22. De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660

- The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or
claiming to own the property including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest
at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award.

23. Republic v. De Knecht, Feb. 12, 1990

-While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to
take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so
provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be
undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but
also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
24. EPZA v. Dulay, 148 SCRA 305
-The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much
less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed
compensation.

25. Phil. Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272

- At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific
affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement
Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or
imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8.
-
- Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue
here sought to be raised—whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772
constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec’s power under Article IX, Section
4 of the Constitution, ““supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchise or permits for the operation of—media of communication or information
—for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections—” to is not ripe for
judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis
mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

26. Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620

-The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results. In the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and
services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In -either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and
benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of
the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.The Public Service Commission, under the law, has
no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private property under the sovereign
right of eminent domain.

27. Republic v. Salem Investment, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000
The first phase of eminent domain is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
- Complaint”…xxx.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners…xxx
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to
have been completed.Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation
that title over the property passes to the government therefore, until the action
for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownershipover the
 property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the
latter canexercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of
his property, subject to thepower of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation
-
28. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002
- The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation
must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

29. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta

- The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners
of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
homeowners.There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
30. City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349
- The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that
a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b)
also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to
the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must
be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or
that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law.

31. Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220

- The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purpose for the construction
of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means “use by the
public” has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of
eminent domain comes into play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

32. Iron and Steel Authority v. CA, Oct. 25, 1995

- When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as wellas the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic.
-
33. SMI Development Corp. v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862
- The current law on the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not require
prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent
domain.
-
34. Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240
 - In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary
for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary”, in this
connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a
reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs
of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable
ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are
hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their
properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better
served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.The
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss. 46 Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right
immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must
be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due
process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a
party in order to defeat the ends of justice.

35. Land Bank v. CA, July 10, 1996

- The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it had been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Any resulting discrepancy between administrative
regulations and provisions of the law will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law.
-
36. Napocor v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542
- The transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the
payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal
interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties
expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in
the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint
judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
shall apply.
-
37. Napocor v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1
- The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate court show that “x x x While it
is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the
imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no
plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs
that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to
cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.” Normally,
of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of way. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
-
38. TELEBAP v. Comelec, April 21, 1998
- Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it
does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to
 provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
PAs radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

POWER OF TAXATION

39. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US

- States cannot interfere with the federal government when it uses its implied
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause to further its express constitutional
powers.
-
40. Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
- It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute
is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is
where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a
clear abuse of power. It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an
arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly
calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been held that where the
assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public
purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is
subject to attack on due process grounds
-
41. Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292
- The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption
from all kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed
on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A
donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an
excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
-
42. Philex Mining v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Aug. 28, 1998
- Taxes cannot be subject to legal compensation to be offset against tax refunds for
the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and
debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt:
debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to
the Government in its sovereign capacity.
-
43. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, 298 SCRA 83
- The value-added tax is an indirect tax and the amount of tax may be shifted or
passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services.
This rule shall likewise apply to existing sale or lease of goods, properties or
services
-
- The phrase “in the course of trade or business” means the regular conduct or
pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, including transactions incidental
thereto, by any person regardless of whether or not the person engaged therein is
a non-stock, nonprofit organization (irrespective of the disposition of its net
income and whether or not it sells exclusively to members of their guests), or
government entity. The term “in the course of trade or business” requires the
regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, regardless… of
whether or not the entity is profit-oriented.
-
44. Chavez v. PCGG, Dec. 9, 1998
- When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a
citizen and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. A void
agreement will not be rendered operative by the parties’ alleged performance
(partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect.
-
45. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, 309 SCRA 87
 -Double taxation usually takes place when a person is a resident of a contracting state and
derives income from, or owns capital in, the other contracting state and both states
impose tax on that income or capital.
46. Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
- The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public

DUE PROCESS

47. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, GR 139465, Jan. 18, 2000

- Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment. The above description in Ruperto applies to an
administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has
no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine
whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not
the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body’s power
is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed
in court.
-
48. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, Oct. 17, 2000 (Reconsideration)
- The constitutional right of an extraditee as granted by the Bill of Rights cannot be
invoked when the extradition documents are still in the evaluation stage. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding. The process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused.
-
49. Govt. of the United States v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
- When it requires a speedy action on the petition, the trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression – a
prima facie finding – sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused. Govt. of the United States v. Purganan.
-
50. Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001
- A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
51. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200
- The public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to
prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are
enough

52. Dumlao v Comelec, 96 SCRA 392

 - The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.

53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

-The Court found that the due process clause protects liberties that are “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
This includes the zones of privacy found throughout the Bill of Rights.
-
54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45
- Due Process Clause protected freedom of contract, state laws could only interfere
with it if they were valid exercises of the police power.The right to contract ones
labor is at the “liberty of the individual” and the State cannot interfere by passing a
statute limiting a persons ability to contract. However, the State may still have a
legitimate reason to regulate certain industries if the health of the employees is at
risk. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Under that provision no State can deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is
part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances
which exclude the right.
-
55. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502
- Due process requires that an economic regulation is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
The means must have a real and substantial relation to the objective. The Fifth
Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state
action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. The
guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation
valid for one sort of business may be invalid for another sort because the
reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts.

56. Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523

- the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions. There are withal minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2)they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered
enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is
understood… that he is enrolling for the entire semester. It is thus evident that
after the… close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening... teachers. The contract
having been terminated,… there is no more contract to speak of. The school
cannot be compelled to enter into another contract… with said students and
teachers.
-
57. Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635
- There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these Rights is the right to hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
 present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to
deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
-
58. Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319
- The Fourteenth Amendment’s so-called due process clause says that the States
may not restrict the life, liberty and property of individuals without “due process
of law”. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s immunity
against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right.
-
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
- The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state
action the right to privacy, and a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion falls
within that right to privacy. A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without
respect to the stage of pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although
the state has legitimate interests in protecting the health of pregnant women and
the “potentiality of human life,” the relative weight of each of these interests
varies over the course of pregnancy, and the law must account for this variability
-
60. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379
- The United States Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to
the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
-
61. Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
- We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to “review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,” final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
-
62. People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163
- As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle
-
63. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525
 - There is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to a great
variety of restraints. Freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and
restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can
be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances. In Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital (1923), the Supreme Court ruled that a minimum wage law for
women violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it
abridged a citizen's right to freely contract labor.

EQUAL PROTECTION

64. Philippine Judges Assn. v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

- The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. The
Constitution provides a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.The distinction made by the law is superficial.
It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. This is not a question of
wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
-
65. Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it
is directed or by territory within which is to operate.
-
66. De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000
- The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality
amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
-
67. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, Feb. 17, 1968
- The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class.
-
68. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
-It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
And the classification, to be reasonable, (!) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not
predicated upon the assumption that the nonChristians are “impermeable to any civilizing
influence.” On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a
slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
69. People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000
-The provision granting an exemption to Members of Congress as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication, or equitable considerations. The organs of government may not
show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall
be displayed. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
 distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and...
restricted in liberty of movement

70. People v. Mijano, July 23, 1999

- The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the
equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is
dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person
differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. It applies to all
persons and to all classes of personsThe perpetration of rape against a 5-year old
girl does not absolve or exempt accused-appellant from the imposition of the
death penalty by the fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, and lacks of
catechetical instruction.
-
71. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537
- 1890 La. Acts No. 111, p. 152, § 1 provides: All railway companies carrying
passengers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but separate
accommodations for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more
passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches
by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations: Provided, That this
section shall not be construed to apply to street railroads. No person or persons,
shall be admitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to
them on account of the race they belong to.
-
72. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
-The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is
explicit. …The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not
accorded the same protection, then it is not equal… Preferring members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.

73. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3

- No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
-
74. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294.
- In the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, segregation is a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
-
75. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497
- The concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from the
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of the
laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of
law,” and, therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States does not imply that
the two are always interchangeable phrases. But discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to violate due process.
-
76. Loving v. Virginia, 888 U.S. 1
- Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to existence and survival.
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58, 20-59, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is to deprive all the state’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under
the United States Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state. Laws banning
interracial marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

77. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618

-The statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a
classification which denies equal protection of the laws because the interests allegedly
 served by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or
are not compelling governmental interests.In moving from state to state or to the District
of Columbia a person exercises a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
78. *Falcis III v. Civil Registrar-General G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019
- Legal standing or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” To possess legal standing, parties must show “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged.” The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings
suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures “that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”

78. *Garcia v. Drillon G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013

- The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.

Search and Seizure

80. RULE 126 ROC

- No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

81. People v. Castillo G.R. No. 204419 November 07, 2016

- A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a
search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided
that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are presentThe requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

82. https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62499

83. Dabon v. People G.R. No. 208775. January 22, 2018

- 1987 Constitution provides for the protection of the people’s rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, to wit: Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Thus, the State and its agents cannot
conduct searches and seizures without the requisite warrant. Otherwise, the constitutional right is
violated.
84. People v. O'Chalain G.R. No. 229071. December 10, 2018

Search and Seizure

85. Zafe v. People G.R. No. 226993, May 03, 2021

- The fundamental right against unreasonable search and seizure must remain effective despite the
need to protect a confidential informant’s identity. While a judge’s determination of probable
cause in issuing a search warrant will generally be upheld if supported by substantial basis, the
existence of such basis requires proof on record that the issuing judge “personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses."

86. People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457

-The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution.—The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2).
The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.However, such right
is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely:
(1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view

87. People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716

- Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being
committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the
same constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches.

88. People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246

- There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when
the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime
was committed; and when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict.

89. People v. Dichoso, June 4, 1993

- It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his control or
possession.

90. People v. Evaristo, Dec. 11, 1992

- While the place to be searched and the property to be seized under a search warrant must be
particularly described in the warrant, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as
the conditions will ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.

91. People v. Exala, 221 SCRA 494

- When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8 th Ed., Vol. I, p.
361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived
and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.” There are instances where search and
seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the
“stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints.

92. Manibog v. People March 20, 2019 G.R. No. 211214

- For a “stop and frisk” search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally
observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is
committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an
infringement of a person’s basic right to privacy. Accordingly, to sustain the validity, the arresting
officer should have personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of
which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer
to investigate further.

93. People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756

- The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would
have fled the law as his two companions did.

94. People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788

- No less than the Constitution mandates that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. While jurisprudence and statute have
created exceptions allowing warrantless arrests founded on probable cause, if a warrantless arrest
is conducted outside of these exceptions, any evidence resulting therefrom will be deemed
inadmissible in court.

95. People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

- The constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures is imposable only against the
state and not to private persons. However, if the private person is acting upon orders of
government officials, the principle of agency applies, because in fact such private person is acting
in the interest of government, and is therefore subject to the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

96. People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597

- The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence
The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

97. People v. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462

- Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It
must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

98. People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220

- A police officer or a private person may without a warrant arrest a person in flagrante delicto.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.

99. Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69

- For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be PROBABLE CAUSE, which is to be determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

100. Salazar v. Achacoso, Mar. 14, 1990

- Section 38, paragraph ©, of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.
.
101. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
- A police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of
whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything,
he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so.

102. Stonehill v. Diokno, June 19, 1967

- Officers of certain corporations, from which documents, papers and things were seized by means
of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the seizures because said
corporations have personalities distinct and separate from those of said officers. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. The
objection to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

103. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

- There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for
a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.
104. Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311
- The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz.,
in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People
vs. Kagui Malasugui thus: “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for
the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.”
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for
habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further, detained by virtue of valid information filed against them in court.

105. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383

- The Fourth Amendment places the United States courts and federal officials, in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all
entrusted under our federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who
execute the country's criminal laws to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the Constitution, find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.

106. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25

- The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not prohibit the admission of evidence
obtained during an apparently illegal search and seizure in State courts. The question whether
Congress could validly enact legislation permitting the introduction in Federal courts of evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was left open.

107. People v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 244045. June 16, 2020

- As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a
court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the
personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented
before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly
described.Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is
not favored and is strictly construed against the government. According to jurisprudence,
“warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Simply stated, a more
extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates
probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

108. Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112

- The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line.

109. In re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382

-A letter individually addressed to some justices of the Supreme Court is not covered by the
constitutional right to “privacy of communication” when the same pertain to their exercise of
judicial functions.

110. Ramirez v. CA, Sept. 28, 1995

- The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly
makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier “any”.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

111. Zulueta v. CA, Feb. 20, 1996

- The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

112. Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, Aug. 4, 1994

- It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
113. Hing v. Choachuy (G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
- an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The right to privacy
is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities.”It is the right of an individual “to be
free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in
matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.”Simply put, the right to privacy is “the
right to be let alone.”

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States
abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

114. Ople v. Torres, July 23, 1998

- The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden
of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

(1) The need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and
 (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308

115. Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001

- The requisites in order for an In camera inspection to be allowd are: there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction; the account must be clearly identified; the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction; the
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection;and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

116. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479

- A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right
prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal.

117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

- the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “protects against
state action the right to privacy, including a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy,”
and that “though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both
the pregnant woman’s health and the potentiality of human life.” Striking this balance of interests,
Roe v. Wade effectively stopped the enforcement of many state laws that banned abortion before
24 weeks. The Supreme Court later reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that “the
fundamental right of privacy protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate
family matters” and that a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it creates an “undue
burden” on a pregnant person’s right to choose.

118. People v. Castillo G.R. No. 204419 November 07, 2016

- A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a
search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided
that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are presentThe requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
119. https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62499
120. Dabon v. People G.R. No. 208775. January 22, 2018
- Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No
search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The law is mandatory to ensure the regularity in the execution of the search warrant.

This requirement is intended to guarantee that the implementing officers will not act arbitrarily
which may tantamount to desecration of the right enshrined in our Constitution. In this case, it is
undisputed that Dabon and his wife were actually present in their residence when the police
officers conducted the search in the bedroom where the drugs and drug paraphernalia were
found. It was also undisputed that, as the CA recognized, only Brgy. Kagawad Angalot was present
to witness the same.

121. People v. O'Chalain G.R. No. 229071. December 10, 2018

- while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
a routine security check being conducted in air and sea ports has been a recognized exception. This
is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4)
seizure of evidence in “plain view”; (5) consented warrantless search; (6) “stop and frisk” search;
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
122. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616
- The First Amendment does not protect speech that is designed to undermine the United States
in war by fueling sedition and disorder.There are limits on the protections on speech afforded by
the First Amendment, and it does not prevent individuals from facing the consequences of their
actions. Protections on speech are lower during wartime when the speech has a detrimental effect
on national security. The effort of the immigrants to inspire unrest in the U.S. and undermine its
military objectives in Europe ran directly counter to the national interest, so it could not be
permitted.

123. Bayan v. Ermita (CPR), G.R. No. 169838, April 20, 2006
- The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys
dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people.

124. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000

- “The ‘dangerous tendency’ rule, on the other hand, may be epitomized as follows: If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.”

125. SWS v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001

- The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that “the government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”11
The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 12 thus:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words – those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.

126. Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999

- A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable
motive. To this genre belong “private communications” and “fair and true report without any
comments or remarks Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are not within the
exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court,
they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since
fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. 19 As early as 1918, in United
States v. Cañete,20 this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public
policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right
cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the
statute punishing libels.The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press.

127. In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC, Sept. 29, 1998
- Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure
of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

In light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998), any appeal
by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with
the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be
forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED respectively.
Let this Resolution be published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines and
copies thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Ombudsman

128. Resolution Re: Live TV & Radio Coverage of Cory Aquino Libel Case, Oct. 22, 1991
- Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a
court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporter's constitutional rights
are no greater than those of any other member of the public. 15 massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can also alter or destroy the constitutionally
necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements impartiality imposed by due
process of law are denied the defendant 16 and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not
be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the
courtroom. 17

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice and considering further that the freedom of the press and the
right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed.
Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

ACCORDINGLY, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the distraction of
the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the
Court Resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.

129. In Re: Request for TV-Radio Coverage of Estrada Trial, June 29, 2001
- an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is
hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions:
(a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews
shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment
except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the
live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all
the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and
other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; € to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and
control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and
that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.

130. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255

- the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press may protect libelous words
about a public official in order to foster vigorous debate about government and public affairs.
Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or made with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

131. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
- The Court held that the government did not meet its burden of showing justification for the
imposition of a prior restraint of expression. Furthermore, it stated that under the First
Amendment, the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship,
injunctions, or prior restraints, and that the guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
expense of informed representative government was not justified.

132. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697

- The recognition of authority to impose previous restraint upon publication in order to protect the
community against the circulation of charges of misconduct, and especially of official misconduct,
necessarily would carry with it the admission of the authority of the censor against which the
constitutional barrier was erected. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its
existence, does not depend on proof of truth.

133. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444

- The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

134. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377

- The Court reversed the decision, concluding that even if the expression reached by the ordinance
was proscribable under the “fighting words” doctrine, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional
because it prohibited otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addressed. The Court held that the First Amendment did not permit the government to impose
special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. While the statute
served a compelling interest, there were content-neutral alternatives available.

135. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47

- If speech is intended to result in a crime, and there is a clear and present danger that it actually
will result in a crime, the First Amendment does not protect the speaker from government action.
It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to
previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose. The character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It
does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect
of force. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right.

136. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367

- This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the
quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of
descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever
imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to §
12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and
consequently that O’Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it.

137. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397

- The majority of the Court, according to Justice William Brennan, agreed with Johnson and held
that flag burning constitutes a form of “symbolic speech” that is protected by the First
Amendment. The Court rejected offensiveness as a valid reason to prohibit speech or ideas and
held that actions used to express ideas cannot be banned just because the idea they are expressing
is offensive.

138. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503
- The Supreme Court reversed because the wearing of armbands was entirely divorced from
actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those that participated in it. Petitioners’ conduct was
closely akin to pure speech which was entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment, absent facts that might reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities. The school officials banned and sought
to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance on the part of petitioners. There was no evidence whatever of petitioners’
interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case did not concern speech or action
that intruded upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.

139. Adiong v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 712

- The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether
the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and
without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the
right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can
even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this
right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties

140. Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861

- The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture “The Four Day
Revolution” does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent’s “right of privacy.” CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – that words are used
in such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore
the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to
yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would
precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any
right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a
highly critical stage in the history of the country.

141. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109

- U.S. Const. amend. I. in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to
disclose his associational relationships. However, the protections of the U.S. Const. amend. I,
unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under U.S. Const. amend. V, do not
afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where U.S. Const. amend. I rights
are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing
by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances
shown.

142. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665

- In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of press did
not create a constitutional privilege protecting reporters from having to testify in grand jury
proceedings about the identity of news sources or information received in confidence. On a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment accorded a
newsman no privilege against appearing before a grand jury and answering questions as to either
the identity of his news sources or information which he has received in confidence. The Court
perceived no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective
grand jury proceedings was insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on
news gathering that petitioner argued would result from insisting that he answer to the grand jury.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the evidence failed to demonstrate that there would be a
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if the Court reaffirmed the prior common
law and constitutional rule regarding testimonial obligations of newspaper reporters. The Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that petitioner had to appear before the grand
jury to answer questions put to him.

143. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252

-Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding
judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. The
United States Supreme Court found that those freedoms could not have been permissibly abridged
unless the words used were in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they would have caused a substantive evil. The worst of the editorials merely
threatened future adverse criticism if the state court ruled a particular way, which criticism should
have been reasonably expected anyway. The telegram, also, merely threatened a strike in
response to a state court’s ruling in a pending case- a consequence that could reasonably have
been expected. The Court found that neither the editorials nor the telegram could possibly have
caused the substantive evil of unfair disposition of the cases.

144. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

- As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and the “We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print. This
state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

145. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296

- The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut statute deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty
without due process of law. Under the statute, the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council was
authorized to withhold his approval if he finds that a cause was not a religious one. This authority,
according to the Court, was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

While general regulations on solicitation were held to be legitimate, censorships and restrictions
based on religious grounds were not. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public
order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of “free
communication of views.” The plaintffs’ messages and protests, while offensive to many, did not
threaten “bodily harm,” and was considered as protected religious speech.

146. Consolidated Edison Company v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530
-The Supreme Court ruled in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530
(1980), that the First Amendment protects a government-regulated utility’s expression of opinion
on issues of public policy through inserts in customer billing statements.
It is one of several decisions issued by the Court since the late 1970s that have recognized and
expanded the First Amendment free speech rights of corporations.

147. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353

- Conviction upon a charge not made is the sheer denial of due process. Peaceable assembly for
lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action
cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as
criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to
the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom
of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes
elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order,
they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.
148. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494
- A court must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.Upon review, the Court affirmed the
conviction, holding that §§ 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 10 and 11, as applied to
defendants did not violate their First Amendment rights because their conduct presented a clear
and present danger of attempting to accomplish a crime that was within Congress’ power to
punish. The structure and purpose of the statute demand the inclusion of intent as an element of
the crime. Congress was concerned with those who advocate and organize for the overthrow of
the Government. Certainly those who recruit and combine for the purpose of advocating
overthrow intend to bring about that overthrow.

149. Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647

- The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station
may be closed or its operations curtailed. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no
controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which
government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each
appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City
Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).

All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom
of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be
the clear and present danger rule—that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
the lawmaker has a right to prevent. The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend
itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

The closure of the petitioner’s radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of
the grounds and without hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is
manifest that due process was not observed. If there is an idea which should be impressed in the
minds of those who wield power it is that power must be used in a reasonable manner.
Arbitrariness must be eschewed.

150. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229

- The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views. A function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech is
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest. There is no room under our constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or
community groups.
151. Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315
- The First Amendment permits the government to take action against speech when there is a clear
and present danger that it will cause a disturbance of the peace.
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets,
or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to
prevent or punish is obvious.

152. Gitlow v. State of New York, 268 U. S. 652

-the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that individuals cannot be ”deprived
of liberty without due process of law” applies free speech and free press protections to the states.
Freedom of speech and of the press, as secured by the Constitution, is not an absolute right to
speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose or an immunity for every
possible use of language. A State, in the exercise of its police power, may punish those who abuse
this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite
to crime or disturb the public peace, is not open to question
153. Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717
-The Court reiterated in this case that importance of motion pictures as a medium of
communication of ideas and expression of artistic impulse. It is also considered an organ of public
opinion that must be afforded protection unless there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil. Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. The general principle is that
freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.

154. In re: Column of Ramon Tulfo, April 17, 1990

- Freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute, and freedom
of expression has, on appropriate occasions, to be adjusted and accommodated to the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the authority, integrity and orderly functioning of the courts. For, the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
framework of a functioning and orderly system of justice.
Freedom of expression is not license to insult the Court and its members and to impair the
authority, integrity and dignity of the Court. The inherent power of courts to punish any
publication calculated to interfere with the administration of justice is not restricted by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, for freedom of the press is subordinate to the
authority, integrity and independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice.
Freedom of the press must not be confounded with license or abuse of that freedom. Writers and
publishers of newspapers have the right, but no greater than the right of others, to bring to public
notice the conduct and acts of courts, provided the publications are true and fair in spirit; in short,
there is no law to restrain or punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or
by the courts,
Provided that free expression is not used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members. Consequently, Tulfo’s
as well as intervener’s press freedom claim is not well taken in this case.

155. In re: Emiliano P. Jurado, Apr. 6, 1995

- Free press not to be preferred to an independent judiciary. The court underscores the importance
of both the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are equally important
public interests which need on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and
the other. One such public interest is in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. Exercise of freedom of speech not to be abused.
Journalist and lawyer at the same time – Right to private reputation. Judges are commonly and
rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more
stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from
private persons. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of
the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about
a public
Official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

156. JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553

- the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by
the constitutions of democratic countries. The receiving state is tasked for the protection of
foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement
of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as
defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to
free speech and peaceable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent
mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with constitutionally guaranteed
rights. a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. – (1) The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. (3) Application for
permit should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant but at another place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for
the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the licensing authority
must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity.

157. Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476

- From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such
vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests test.”
The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.”

158. Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359

- The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As
a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy
of disorder under the name of dissent,whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and
place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.

159. Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U. S. 141

-Freedom of speech embraces the right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to
receive it. The privilege may not be withdrawn even if it creates the minor nuisance for a
community of cleaning litter from its streets. Yet the peace, good order, and comfort of the
community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place, and manner of distribution.

160. Mutuc v. Comelec, 36 SCRA

-Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to
impose such ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed
to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription. The Constitution prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press. According to
the Supreme Court, this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an
evil against which this constitutional right is directed

161. National Press Club v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 1

-The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
and information. The fundamental purpose of such “supervision or regulation” has been spelled
out in the Constitution as the ensuring of “equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply,” as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in
connection with “public information campaigns and forums among candidates.” The provision of
the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the
press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX © (4) which may be seen to be a special
provision applicable during a specific limited period.

162. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331

- Although the editorials were not balanced, they were not intended to interfere in an ongoing
case. Reed observed that “free discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of
Americanism. . . . Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the
essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.” The decision relied on
Bridges v. California (1941).
163. People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265
- Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt, which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. That is
thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty
of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.

164. Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362

- Pinoy Playboy – Miller test (3 Tests)
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find the work, taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive
Way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.The Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without
any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner’s magazines on the basis simply of their
determination… that they are obscene. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state
has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications.
However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not
exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection.

165. Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71

- Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact
that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify
its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

166. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 896

-The Court reasoned that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places
such as courthouses and therefore, a judge cannot decide to close a court proceeding without
factual findings that override the public’s right to access. The freedoms of speech, press, and
assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted.

167. Sanidad v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529

- What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of
advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.

168. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516

- Amendment freedoms, including freedom of speech and assembly, had a preferred place within
our society because they were indispensable to our democratic system. Any attempt to restrict
preferred freedoms must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by a clear and present danger.

169. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; 84 L. Ed. 1093

- Ala. Code § 3448 (1923) is invalid on its face. The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed
by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in the United States, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.

170. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39

-The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the
Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from
imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff
acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he “objected to what was being
sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest,” there were no First Amendment
violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for
lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.

171. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, October 30, 1995

- Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.

172. US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731

- Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.

173. Villar v. TIP, 135 SCRA 706

- Academic freedom enjoyed by “institutions of higher learning” includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be… followed meticulously. It
cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the
students thus prejudiced, their right to the... equal protection clause[15] being disregarded.

174. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357

- That the freedom of speech which is secured by the United States Constitution does not confer an
absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a state in the exercise of its police power
may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to
incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.

175. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298

- That the freedom of speech which is secured by the United States Constitution does not confer an
absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a state in the exercise of its police power
may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to
incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question.

176. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1

- Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-
interests test”. The principle “requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. The clear and present
danger” doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom
of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the “hierarchy of civil liberties”. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The
prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.

OBSCENITY CASES

177. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2349, June 26, 1997
- The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, lacks the precision that U.S.
Const. amend. I requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors
access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.The breadth of the coverage of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, was wholly unprecedented. The
scope of the CDA was not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-ended
prohibitions embraced all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or
displaying them on their own computers in the presence of minors. The general, undefined terms
“indecent” and “patently offensive” covered large amounts of non-pornographic material with
serious educational or other value. Accordingly, the CDA was unconstitutional due to its
overbreadth.

178. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 5

-The basic guidelines in determining whether material is obscene are: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

179. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476

- The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that obscenity was not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press. The Court determined that the test of whether
materials were obscene was whether, to the average person applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appealed to prurient interest. The
lower courts applied the proper standard. Because the material was obscene, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1461
was a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress to punish use of the mail for
obscene material

180. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966),

- The United States Supreme Court has defined obscenity in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), in the following terms: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be
established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

181. Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2

- In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State through the Secretary of
Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was
merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian,
Muslim, Protestant or Jehovah’s Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed
upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational
institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and
see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties
of citizenship.The constitutional protection of religious freedom … gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma
182. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1
- The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church, or aid any religion or prefer one religion over
another. The First Amendment does not prohibit New Jersey from using tax-raised funds to
transport children to parochial schools because it cannot exclude individuals because of their faith,
or lack of it. A state cannot exclude individuals from receiving generally available public benefits
for the sole reason that they are members of a certain religious faith

183. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624

- The right of a state to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due
process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
“rational basis” for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship
may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.

184. Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, March 1, 1993

-in requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education
is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely
enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike… whether Christian,
Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah’s Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon
it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational
institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate… system of public education, and
see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties
of citizenship

185. Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201

- Any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was only
incidental to a legitimate secular objective, would not violate the prohibition.What is guaranteed
by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence
is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

186. Centeno v. Villalon, 236 SCRA 197

- Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts—that is,
Freedom to believe and Freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject for regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection.
In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to
unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Therefore, PD 1564 does not violate the freedom of
religion.

187. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569

- Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent
with civil liberties. Where a restriction of the use of highways is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil
right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.

188. Fonacier v. CA, 96 Phil. 417

- Where a decision of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is
in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the civil courts.
189. Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
- Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the
Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious
tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom
of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

190. German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514

- The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two
concepts — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.

191. Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420

- Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties . . . observe
honesty and good faith.” Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is
genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be
characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of
demonstrators crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by
the public of J P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted.

192. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. v. CA, July 26, 1996

- The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs
193. Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U. S. 501
194. Pamil v. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413
195. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
196. School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203
197. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421; 8 L. ed. 2d. 601
- The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is... translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.

198. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54

-The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

199. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306

-When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of the traditions of
the United States. For it then respects the religious nature of the people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be
preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not
finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian
education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But there is no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and
to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The
government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any
sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone
to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its
doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for
worship or instruction.
200. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296
- To condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a
license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a
religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution

MIRANDA RIGHTS

201.Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

- In the context of custodial interrogation, once warnings have been given, the
subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation
operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time,
the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have
him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an
attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent.
202.People v. Endino, 353 SCRA 307
- An interview was recorded on video showing the accused unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly, and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession was
admissible in evidence against him since the confession was voluntarily given
without any coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
203.Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
-The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the
investigating officers tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the
questions appeases to be innocent. At this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is
needed in order to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions
or confessions from the lips fo the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission
of an offense. While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of
counsel during a police line up, the moment there is a move to elicit admissions or
confessions, even a plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of the
counsel.

204.People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158

- Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death. 67 This rule also applies to all
other criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking
life and liberty except that of the guilty.
-
205.Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4
- Constitution should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect.
Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and)
to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel,
since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
-
206.People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 385
- Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
 Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.
-
207.People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190
– Under Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, it is required that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings:

A) He must be informed of his right to remain silent;

B) He must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and
C) He must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer
will be appointed to represent him.
D) A lawyer who was a station commander of the police cannot be considered an
“independent counsel” as contemplated by the law.

208.People v. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541

-
It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement
of the accused when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard
requirements of the due process that should be accorded to the accused in custodial
investigation, hence he should be acquitted. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial
confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an
admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on
inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.

209.People v. Bacamante, Sept. 5, 1995

- Lawyer must be present and able to advice and assist his client from time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extra judicial confession.
-
210.People v. Ballesteros, 237 SCRA
- Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal
charge. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is
a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but
wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. Reasonable doubt is
that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. A precise
example would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in the case at bar where
accused-appellants individually interposed the wavering defense of alibi.
-
211.People v. Bandula, May 27, 1994
-The Constitution mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

212.People v. Barasina, Jan. 21, 1994

- Art. 3 sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be
informed on his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. The word preferably does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attys.
-
213.People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
- If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
-
214.People v. Daniega, Dec. 29, 1995
- The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be
 made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the
confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
-
215.People v. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93
- The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an
agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the
execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be
based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct
indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the
commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that the two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated, it may
also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.
-
216.People v. De La Cruz, 224 SCRA 506
- There is seizure of evidence from one’s person without a search warrant, needless
to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful
arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the
arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the
malefactors were invariably caught red-handed. There being no violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated
articles are admissible in evidence.
-
217.People v. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291
- one of this Court’s primordial responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible
construction. This is to effectuate the intention of the legislature so as to avoid an
absurd conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of R.A.
No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal only.
-
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that “penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony,” finds meaning in this case. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the
reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.

218.People v. Dimaano, 209 SCRA 819

-
- The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for
a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of
the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
-
219.People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
- It is essential that the person making the confession must be assisted by a
“competent” counsel. The meaning and standards of a “competent counsel” were
explained in People vs. Deniega as follows:
-
- …[T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should
be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would be
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s
constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused’s right
to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel ‘contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.’
-
220.People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36
 - In an extra-judicial confession, the confessant carries the burden of convincing the
court that his admissions are involuntary and untrue. (People v. Manabo, 18 SCRA
30). This Luvendino had failed to do. He claimed he was given fist blows by many
policemen and his neck was strangled with a chain when he refused to admit guilt
at the Eastern Police District and then later given the “7-up treatment” in another
place. Although he said he sustained injuries, no proof was submitted to that effect
except his bare and uncorroborated testimony. He admitted that his mother and
Atty. [Eustacio] Flores were present when he subscribed before the fiscal the next
day, but he did not say that he had told them about the torture employed on him.
If it were really true that he was abused in the manner he described it, tale-tell
signs of the maltreatment could have been visible the following morning and
would not escape the notice of his mother and his lawyer and appropriate steps
could have been taken so that he may be examined by a competent physician. It is
interesting to note that Atty. Flores made no mention of such injuries when he was
called as a defense witness.
-
221.People v. Maqueda, March 22, 1995
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- PEOPLE v. HECTOR MAQUEDA, GR No. 112983, 1995-03-22
- There is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in
Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:
-
SEC. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.

SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually

applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is… charged.

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of

his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct
or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to… prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is But an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself
is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate
fact of guilt

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior
to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when
a person is

“under investigation for the commission of an offense."

The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government,

declaring the rights that exist without... governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect;[28] or
restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types
of action prohibited, but in the general principle that... keeps alive in the public
mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited."[29] They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power,[30] or state
tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the... principles of the government
and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the
relationships between individuals.
 222.Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
- A constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at trial could surely
vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a
completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less might deny a defendant
effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him.
-
223.People v. Andan, March 3, 1997
- What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false,
not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he… must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(1) To remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence
against him.

224.People v. Teehankee, Oct. 6, 1995

- Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: “Sec. 14.
Amendment.—The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
-
- If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.”
-
225.People v. Gamer, Feb. 29, 2000
- The Court enumerated factors to be considered, following the totality of
circumstances test, in order to resolve the admissibility of an out-of-court
identification of suspects, viz:
-
- . . . (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
226.Gutang v. People, July 11, 2000
-The Court ruled that it was admissible. The right to counsel begins from the time a
person istaken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of
crime. Such right isguaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence ofcounsel.However, what the Constitution prohibits is
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extortcommunication from the
accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may bematerial to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation and not to
unearthundisclosed facts.An accused may validly be compelled to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoesremoved or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done withoutgoing against the
proscription against testimonial compulsion.

RIGHT TO BAIL
227.April 3, 2019 G.R. No. 240596 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner Vs. NOVO TANES y
BELMONTE, Respondent
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/apr2019/gr_240596_2019.html

The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.

To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings
is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense
to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a
summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence
for purposes of bail.

228.Comendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80

- It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these
rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18
of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge. Article 18 of the Articles of War entitle “each side” to one
peremptory challenge, with sole provisio that “the law member of court shall not
be challenged except for cause.”
-
- A Peremptory Challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or
wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by
him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused is entitled to fair
trial. It allows the accused to Reject a member of the court.
229.Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 3
- Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this
constitutional provision under the circumstances.
-
230.Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
- The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the
commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail.
-
231.Paderanga v. CA, Aug. 28, 1995
- As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot
be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities,
either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. It would be incongruous to grant
bail to one who is free. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest
or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.
-
232.People v. Donato, June 5, 1991
- Rebellion is a bailable offense; bail as a matter of right – Right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right, such is required only bail is
discretionary.
-
233.Govt. of the United States v. Purganan, Sept. 24, 2002
- Extradition case is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. Article III, Section
13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.
-
234.Tucay v. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110
- Although the Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail
to the accused, respondent judge should nevertheless have set the petition for bail
for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was
not really contesting the bail application. He should have called a hearing for the
additional reason of taking into account the guidelines in Rule 114, Sec. 6 of 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in fixing the amount of the bail.
-
235.Maguddatu v. CA, Feb. 23, 2000
-It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of
law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Despite an order of arrest from the trial court
and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large.
The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant
bail to one who is free. Petitioners Compliance and Motion, dated Feb. 8, 1999
came short of an unconditional submission to respondent court’s lawful order and
to its jurisdiction.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

236.201. Estrada v. Desierto, March 2, 2001

- Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.Pervasive publicity
is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally
infect their impartiality.
-
237. Abadia v. CA, Sept. 23, 1994
- The constitutional rights of the accused are clearly available to all citizens even
without statutory enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals by
reason of gaps in the law by which they are not responsible. They cannot be taken
away from individuals by reason of their vocation. Military do not waive right
based on their uniforms. Their jobs also do not necessarily mean that they agree to
fall under exclusively on the jurisdiction of their vocation.
238.. Corpuz v. People, 194 SCRA 73
 - It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive
findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences
presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records
shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the
accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not
really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster
- The equipoise rule(balancing test) which is the presumption of innocence is
applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case
the scale of justice should be tilt in favor of the accused. There is no such balance
in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must
yield to the positive finding that he is guilty of malversation
-
239.Cosep v. People, May 21, 1998
240.Petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial
and neutral judge as an indispensable imperative of due process. Judges must not only be
impartial, but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
the decision will be just. However, this is not to say that judges must remain passive or
silent during the proceedings. Since they are in a better position to observe the demeanor
of the witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask
questions to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed
to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the
judge, being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to
expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time

241..Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

-Exclusive is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. (Article IV, Section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
to fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts and disloyalty
and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. (Article 44,
RPC).

242.Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

- The Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial and, as such, applies the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In overturning Betts, Justice Black
stated that “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” He
further wrote that the “noble ideal” of “fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which ever defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him.”
243.Guerrero v. CA, June 28, 1996
- While this Court recognizes the night to speedy disposition quite distinctly from
the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused
protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party
involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work
against and preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice. In the
instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the
accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case
prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent
judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence
 of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity
to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
-
244.Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
-In a 5-4 Supreme Court decision Miranda v. Arizona (1966) ruled that an arrested
individual is entitled to rights against self-incrimination and to an attorney under the 5 th
and 6th Amendments of the United States Constitution. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
culminated in the famed “Miranda rights” requirement during arrests.

245.People v. Esparas, Aug. 21, 1996

- The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from
exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital
punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of the
court But a duty to review all death penalty cases. (People vs. Esparas, G.R. No.
120034, August 20, 1996). By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived
his right to appeal.
-
246.People v. Holgado, 86 Phil. 752
- The SC ruled that one of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our
Constitution is that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law”, and that all accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel.” In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. Thus, the SC decided for a new arraignment and a new trial after the
accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.
-
247.People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37
- It is for the foregoing reasons that the writer of this opinion voted with the six (6)
Justices who ruled on the full right of petitioner to waive his presence at said
proceedings.
-
- Since only six (6) Justices (Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Muñoz Palma
and Aquino) are of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings while five (5) Justices (Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in… agreement that he may so waive such right,
except when he is to be identified, the result is that the respondent Commission’s
Order requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should
be modified, in the sense that petitioner’s presence shall be… required only in the
instance just indicated. The ruling in People vs. Avancena is thus pro tanto
modified.”
-
248.People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79
-The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is that the lower court
has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but until the case is terminated

249.People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805

- If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
-
250.People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202
- In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. They should
balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who
violate its penal laws.
-
251.People v. Teehankee, Oct. 6, 1995
 -In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its damaging
quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the
properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.

252.Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, April 26, 1994

- Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to
any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided
by the PCGG.TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
- 1. Transactional Immunity – is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant
the witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of
the act or transaction.
- 2. Used-and-derivative-use – a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution.
-
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

253.RA 8493 Speedy Trial Act of 1998

-AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Establishes the duration for a trial from start to
finish. Trials whose penalties do not exceed six months or a P1,000 fine or both should
only last 180 days from the first day of trial. The court can extend the trial, given a
compelling reason.

254.Abadia v. CA, 236 SCRA 676

- These rights are clearly available to all citizens even in the absence of statutory
enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals because of gaps in the
law for which they are not responsible. They cannot be taken away from certain
individuals because of the nature of their vocation. Members of the military
establishment do not waive individual rights on taking up military uniform. That
they become subject to uniquely military rules and procedures does not imply that
they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules and
regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern all of the
country’s citizens. As the respondent Court correctly held:

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

255.Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, May 26, 1969

-The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to
remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness by the
prosecution. The reason is that the right against self incrimination, along with the other
rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded to the human personality.

256.People v. Tranca, Aug. 17, 1994

- What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to export communication from the witness,
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated
otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt.
-
257.Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
- The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. Criminal procedure, the rules
of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the
guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to
 embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No
accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to
establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make
the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood.
But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to
acquit a guilty person.
-
ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016

Signed on July 23, 2016
OPERATIONALIZING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION AND THE STATE POLICIES TO FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE
PUBLIC SERVICE AND PROVIDING GUIDELINES THEREFOR

258.Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515

-BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for
exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for
such disapproval. No film or motion picture… intended for exhibition at the moviehouses
or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject
matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety.

259.Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14

- The access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public
has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The New
Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on
matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records,
as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such
limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy.
-
260.Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 44
- For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or
decrees being enacted by their government, sufficient appropriation of time and
publication is necessary. According to Article 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be
given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted. This is
to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respect
their right to be informed. The respondents however brought up the fact that the
Official Gazette may not be the most effective medium for the people to be
educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication dates as well as its
limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such
as newspapers of general circulation because of its wide readership and regular
dates of printing
261.Valmonte v. Belmonte, Feb. 13, 1989
- The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the government.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an
adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms
of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand
with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.The constitutional
right to information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it
must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public
concern” and that the same is not exempted by law from the operation of such
constitutional right.

RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES

262.CENECO v. Secretary of Labor, 201 SCRA 584

 - The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their
withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the
resignation of the member- employees is an expression of their preference for
union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy
of the State to afford fall protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free
collective bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and join unions
for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.
-
263.In re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554
-The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar
associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is
voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a
member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives
and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not
infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power
necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name
of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of
the bar.

264.Occeña v. Comelec, 127 SCRA 404

- the Interim of Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments, vested
by the provisions of the 1976 amendments, having same function with National
Assembly, which one is to propose amendments, and of the 1973 Constitution, in
its transitory provisions, upon special call by the Prime Minister. No argument
against the validity of the amendment of the law because amendment includes
revision or total overhaul of the Constitution. Whether the case, it would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. Moreover,
necessary votes to approve the proposition were met by the majority of its
members.
-
265.People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
- That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the “ultimate
value” of society. It surpasses and transcends every other value, “for if a society
cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, no subordinate value
can be protected”.
-
266.SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
-
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that
the State “shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law” [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding
the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right
of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to
the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike

267.Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54

- RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the
closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It
does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor
unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not
to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
 so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they
can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision
on freedom of association.”

CONTRACT CLAUSE

268.Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, Apr. 21, 1995

-It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to Determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. But due to increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention, delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With this power, administrative bodies
may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which
the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

269.Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398

-States may use their protective power in a reasonable manner to affect rights under any
contract. There are five main factors that must be considered in determining whether the
use Is reasonable: whether an economic emergency exists, whether the legislation serves
a legitimate objective, whether the actions by the legislature are justified by the
emergency and only appropriate to the emergency, whether relief from contractual
obligations is unreasonable, and whether the legislation is temporary

270.Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323

- It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.Unlike a promissory
note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its
presentation to the bank.
-
271.Ortigas v. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533
- Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power,
e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in
exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the
general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which
results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
-
272.Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, 201 SCRA 13
- The contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are
annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary, to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power. Like all contracts, subject to the overriding
demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine
in the legitimate exercise of police power. The jurisdiction of the court guarantees
sanctity of contract and is said to be the ‘law between the contracting parties,’
(Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene ‘law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.’ (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot
be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health,
safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual
rights, whenever necessary.
-
273.West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379
 - The United States Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to
the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

274.Alcuaz v. PSBA, May 2, 1988

- When a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling
for the entire semester. After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak
of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers.
- The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at
bar does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized
the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative
process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of
letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction
against them.
-
- With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of
the teachers, while the investigation is on-going, the respondent school has
created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors.
275.Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong, May 27, 1993
- There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. The
Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to
submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners’
notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. An ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING conducted to investigate students’ participation in a hazing activity
need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.

276.Isabelo v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Nov. 8, 1993

- Academic Freedom. Court cited Garcia v Loyola School of Technology, Reitereated in
Tangonan v Pano, where: admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon
the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of
the student. While the court ordinarily would not delve into the exercise of sound judgment,
we will not, however, hesitate to act when we perceive taints of arbitrariness in the process.
Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged
license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally
telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
that every ”person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”

277.Non v. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523

- The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has
already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions’ discretion on the admission
and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom
guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
-
- The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however,
cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their
 constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation
of their right to equal protection.
-
278.University of San Agustin v. CA, March 7, 1994
- Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon
meeting its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except
in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the
student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is
expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transferWhen a
student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this Court
recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning.
Thus, they are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and
regulations in the admission of students, 25 including setting of academic
standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are competent to determine who
are entitled to admission and re-admission.
-
279.University of San Carlos v. CA, Oct. 18, 1988
- It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these
rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who
are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion
on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts
unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
-
280.UP v. Ayson, Aug. 17, 1989
- Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No.
1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not
secondary education. Section 2 of said Act states that “the purpose of said
University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical training.”cralaw
virtua1aw library
-
- It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the
University of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or
abolish the UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have
not been met, Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary notwithstanding. The findings of
facts by the Board of Regents which led to its decision to phase out the UPCBHS
must be accorded respect, if not finality. Acts of an administrative agency within
their areas of competence must be casually overturned by the courts. It must be
emphasized that UPCBHS was established as a component of the tertiary level, i.e.,
the teacher/training program. As it turned out however, the latter program was
not viable in UPCBHS thereby necessitating the phasing out of UPCBHS, the
rationale being its reasons for existence no longer exists. On this score, UPCBHS
differs from the other UP high schools in Iloilo, Diliman, Cebu and Los Baños. The
latter schools serve as laboratory schools for the College of Education in said areas,
whereas, in Baguio, there is no College of Education.

HABEAS CORPUS

281.Cuenca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851

-
- An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement.
The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose
one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary
power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is
to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection
 of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion
-
282.Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487
-The Constitution does not give the president the authority to suspend, or authorize the
suspension of, the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus may only be
suspended by Congress. The constitutional clause allowing such suspension is found in
Article I, which details legislative powers. If the authority to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus were meant to be given to the executive, it would be found in the second article.
The president may not take it upon himself to exercise a power reserved to Congress,
even in times of emergency, tumult, or danger.
283.Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2
-The Constitution expressly vests judicial power in one supreme court and such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The President is
controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty is to execute, not to make, the
laws; and there is no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of
jurisdiction.

284.In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1

- Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 10 to define and punish offences against the Law of Nations, of which the law of
war is a part, had by the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593, recognized the
“military commission” appointed by military command, as it had previously existed
in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of war. Article 15 declares that the
provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not be
construed as depriving military commissions or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the
law of war may be triable by such military commissions or other military tribunals.
285.In re: Sumulong, Dec. 25, 1995
- Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially
adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres
remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon
which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which
is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first
conviction until November 2, 2000.Congress, in the exercise of the power
conferred upon it by U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 to define and punish offences
against the Law of Nations, of which the law of war is a part, had by the Articles of
War, 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593, recognized the “military commission” appointed by
military command, as it had previously existed in United States Army practice, as
an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of
war. Article 15 declares that the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction
upon courts martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or
offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military
commissions or other military tribunals.
-
286.Magno v. CA, 212 SCRA 229
- A habeas corpus proceeding “x x x shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty x x x.” (Rule 102, Sec. 1,
Revised Rules of Court) Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially
because a decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner’s
permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from this country.
287.Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152
- Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person
is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he
affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived
from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the
Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that
inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a person is
deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and
indivisible.