1.

EMILIO EMNACE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 126334
NOVEMBER 23, 2001

NATURE OF THE CASE:

THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW QUESTIONING THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND RAISING THE ISSUES OF FAILURE OF PAYMENT OF
DOCKET FEES, TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE AND
PRESCRIPTION.

FACTS:
PETITIONER EMILIO EMNACE, VICENTE TABANAO AND JACINTO
DIVINAGRACIA WERE PARTNERS IN A BUSINESS CONCERN KNOWN AS MA. NELMA
FISHING INDUSTRY. SOMETIME IN JANUARY OF 1986, THEY DECIDED TO
DISSOLVE THEIR PARTNERSHIP AND EXECUTED AN AGREEMENT OF PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES AMONG THEM, CONSEQUENT TO
JACINTO DIVINAGRACIA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARTNERSHIP. AMONG THE
ASSETS TO BE DISTRIBUTED WERE 5 FISHING BOATS, 6 VEHICLES, 2 PARCELS OF
LAND LOCATED AT STO. NIÑO AND TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND CASH
DEPOSITS IN THE LOCAL BRANCHES OF THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
AND PRUDENTIAL BANK.

THROUGHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP, AND EVEN AFTER

VICENTE TABANAO'S UNTIMELY DEMISE, PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO
TABANAO'S HEIRS ANY STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE
PARTNERSHIP, AND TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S
FINANCES. CONSEQUENTLY, TABANAO' S HEIRS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, FILED
AGAINST PETITIONER AN ACTION FOR ACCOUNTING, PAYMENT OF SHARES,
DIVISION OF ASSETS AND DAMAGES. PETITIONER FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS
THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF IMPROPER VENUE, LACK OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE NATURE OF THE ACTION OR SUIT, AND LACK OF CAPACITY OF THE
ESTATE OF TABANAO TO SUE.

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS. IT HELD THAT

VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID BECAUSE, WHILE REALTIES WERE INVOLVED, THE
ACTION WAS DIRECTED AGAINST A PARTICULAR PERSON ON THE BASIS OF HIS
PERSONAL LIABILITY. FINALLY, THE TRIAL COURT HELD THAT THE HEIRS OF
TABANAO HAD A RIGHT TO SUE IN THEIR OWN NAMES, IN VIEW OF THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 777 OF THE CIVIL CODE, WHICH STATES THAT THE RIGHTS
TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF THE DEATH OF
THE DECEDENT. PETITIONER FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS WHICH WAS DISMISSED.

ISSUE
1. WHETHER THE VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID SINCE THE ACTION IS A REAL
ACTION INVOLVING A PARCEL OF LAND THAT IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO
2. WHETHER THE SURVIVING SPOUSE OF VICENTE TABANAO HAS LEGAL
CAPACITY TO SUE SINCE SHE WAS NEVER APPOINTED AS ADMINISTRATRIX OR
EXECUTRIX OF HIS ESTATE
RULING
1. NO. THE RECORDS INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ASKING
THAT THE ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP BE ACCOUNTED FOR, SOLD AND
DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTNERS. THE FACT THAT
TWO OF THE ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP ARE PARCELS OF LAND DOES NOT
MATERIALLY CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE ACTION. IT IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM
BECAUSE IT IS AN ACTION AGAINST A PERSON, NAMELY, PETITIONER, ON THE
BASIS OF HIS PERSONAL LIABILITY AND NOT AN ACTION IN REM WHERE THE
ACTION IS AGAINST THE THING ITSELF INSTEAD OF AGAINST THE PERSON. IN
FACT, IT IS ONLY INCIDENTAL THAT PART OF THE ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP
UNDER LIQUIDATION HAPPEN TO BE PARCELS OF LAND.

IT ALSO SEEKS THE ENFORCEMENT OF, AND PETITIONER'S COMPLIANCE WITH, THE
CONTRACT THAT THE PARTNERS EXECUTED TO FORMALIZE THE PARTNERSHIP'S
DISSOLUTION, AS WELL AS TO IMPLEMENT THE LIQUIDATION AND PARTITION OF
THE PARTNERSHIP'S ASSETS. CLEARLY, IT IS A PERSONAL ACTION THAT, IN
EFFECT, CLAIMS A DEBT FROM PETITIONER AND SEEKS THE PERFORMANCE OF A
PERSONAL DUTY ON HIS PART. IN FINE, RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT SEEKING THE
LIQUIDATION AND PARTITION OF THE ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP WITH
DAMAGES IS A PERSONAL ACTION WHICH MAY BE FILED IN THE PROPER COURT
WHERE ANY OF THE PARTIES RESIDE. AS IT IS, VENUE IN THIS CASE WAS
PROPERLY LAID AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED SO.

2. YES. THE SURVIVING SPOUSE DOES NOT NEED TO BE APPOINTED AS

EXECUTRIX OR ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE BEFORE SHE CAN FILE THE
ACTION. SHE AND HER CHILDREN ARE COMPLAINANTS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT AS
SUCCESSORS OF VICENTE TABANAO. FROM THE VERY MOMENT OF VICENTE
TABANAO'S DEATH, HIS RIGHTS INSOFAR AS THE PARTNERSHIP WAS CONCERNED
WERE TRANSMITTED TO HIS HEIRS, FOR RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE
TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF THE DECEDENT. WHATEVER
CLAIMS AND RIGHTS VICENTE TABANAO HAD AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP AND
PETITIONER WERE TRANSMITTED TO RESPONDENTS BY OPERATION OF LAW, MORE
PARTICULARLY BY SUCCESSION, WHICH IS A MODE OF ACQUISITION BY VIRTUE OF
WHICH THE PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO THE EXTENT OF THE VALUE
OF THE INHERITANCE OF A PERSON ARE TRANSMITTED. MOREOVER,
RESPONDENTS BECAME OWNERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE HEREDITARY SHARES
FROM THE MOMENT VICENTE TABANAO DIED.
2.

PEDRO GAYON VS. SILVESTRE GAYON

GR. NO. L-28394
NOVEMBER 26, 1970

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This case is an appeal by Pedro Gayon from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 7334.
3.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ
G.R No. 149926
February 23, 2005

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,
000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations.

On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for
the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again,
Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan.

In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings

commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them
was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to
the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment
with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for
sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence,
before the RTC of Makati City.

Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information
on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.

Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not
bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank
under the joint agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint agreement of partition between the heirs pending the
allowance of probate of decedent’s will was valid and binding.
HELD:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.

The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
4.
ESTATE OF K.H. HEMADY VS. LUZON SURETY
G.R. NO. L-8437
November 28, 1956

Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI dismissing its claim against the Estate
of K. H. Hemady for failure to state a cause of action.

Facts:
Luzon Surety files a claim against the estate of Hemady based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and
by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor in all of them, in
consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the various principals
in favor of different creditors.

Issue:
Whether or not a solidary guarantor’s liability is extinguished by his death.

Held:
The solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent
claim for reimbursement. The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady
in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of
the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by
provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death
to his heirs.
5.

USON V. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. L-4963
JANUARY 29, 1953

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan,
filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named
Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all
of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir
except his widow Maria Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover lands held by Maria
del Rosario who had four illegitimate children with Nebreda, which the latter
contends that her children are given the status and rights of natural children
and are entitled to the successional rights, and because these successional
rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate children may have successional rights
under the new Civil Code by way of its retroactive effect.

RULING:
NO. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but
this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right
of the same origin. The law commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new
right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right
of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
6.)

BORJA VS. BORJA

G.R. No. L-28040
August 18, 1972

FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who
died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and
administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator.
Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate
proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed
special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement,
but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues
that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was
made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated.

HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that
Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the
estate of Francisco and Josefa.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco

de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object
of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee.

And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested

immediatelyfrom the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in
interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is
not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
7.)

BONILLA V. BARCENA
G.R. NO. L-41715
JUNE 18, 1976

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review of the order of the CFI denying the motions
for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned
case.

FACTS:
Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land.
Pending the proceeding, she died. The counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a
written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the
counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the complaint on the ground
that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death
of the plaintiff.

RULING:
YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent,
and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right
to the parcels of land in litigation, was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest
in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There
is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution
as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
8.)
BALUS V. BALUS
G.R. NO. 168970
JANUARY 15, 2010

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision of the CA which set aside decision of the RTC.

FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are the
children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on 6
September 1978. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a
loan obtained from a bank. When Rufo failed to pay the loan, the property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public
auction held for that purpose. The same was not redeemed within the period
allowed by law. Hence, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Rufo
died on 6 July 1984. On 10 October, 1989, petitioner and respondents executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of the a specific one-
third portion of the subject property. Three years thereafter, respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank and a new title was issued in their
name. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. The
respondents thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession. However,
petitioner alleged that respondents’ act of buying back the property without
notifying him inures to his benefit as co-owner and that he is entitledto a one-
third share of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property forms part of the estate of petitioner
and respondents’ father

RULING:
No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of the
estate of Rufo considering that ownership over the same was transferred to the
bank prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance consists of existing property, as
well as accrued property, and transmissible rights and obligations at the time of
death of the decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost ownership over the subject
property during his lifetime, the same no longer forms part of his estate to
which his heirs may lay claim at the time of his death. Consequently, his
children never inherited the property. The Court further ruled that petitioner
and respondents are not co-owners of the subject property and there is no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father.
9.)

SUROZA VS. HONRADO

110 SCRA 338
DECEMBER 19, 1981

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an administrative case against Judge Honrado for having admitted
to probate a will which on its face is void.

FACTS:
Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless,
reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a
daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became
disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another
proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn
Sy to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn
used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito.

When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly
executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the
will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as
executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje.

Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado

appointed Paje as administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to
withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and
instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom
was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order
ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that
Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado
issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit

opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction,
and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of
administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing,
Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado
dismissed it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting
that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax
had been paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge
Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. Judge Honrado in
his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to
the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a
motion, she asked for a 30-day period within which to vacate the house of the
testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree
of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA
dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her failure to
do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying
on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a motion to dismiss the administrative
case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for
having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void.

HELD:
YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was
written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix,
could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of
the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to
the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was
read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of
the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known
to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly
referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been
careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the
language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the
supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her
supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted
by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the
notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition,
respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate
of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.
10.)
MATIAS VS. SALUD
G.R. L-10907
JUNE 29, 1957

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the
will of Gabina Raquel

FACTS:
Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the
probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt,
Gabina Raquel, who died single at the age of 92 years. The will of Gabina
Raquel consists of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there
appears the siganture of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged
in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by
the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause appears
signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each
left margin appears the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written
words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.

The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly

instructed Atty. Agbunag to draft her will and brought to her on January 1950.
With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent affixed her
thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It
was also alleged that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able
to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to the pain in her right shoulder. The
lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed, instructed Lourdes Samonte to write
'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the
witnesses signed at the foot of the attestation clause and the left hand margin
of each page.

The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent. The
CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did
not state that the testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor
did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign after the testatrix.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law
despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation clause.

HELD:
YES. The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another
person wrote the testatrix' name at her request is not a fatal defect, The legal
requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied
by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.

As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be

dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator employs an
unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are
silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the
authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature
itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied that
the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law
11.)

CELSO ICASIANO vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO

G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an appeal from an order of CFI admitting to probate the document
and its duplicate as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte,
deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein
as such.

FACTS:
Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa
Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the
evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in
Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an
original and a carbon copy.

On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought
the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in
Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original
copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he
signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the
testator and other witnesses in his presence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

HELD:
No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves
that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a
duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate
and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct
she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity
of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the
will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate
was regular in all respects.
12.)

CRUZ V. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-32213
November 26, 1973

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First
Instance of Cebu allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late
Valente Z. Cruz.

FACTS:
Agapita Cruz is the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz.
Agapita filed before the CFI an opposition for the allowance of the will of his late
husband alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence. She further alleged that the said
instrument was executed without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last
will and testament. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code).

HELD:
No. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty.
Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will
was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since
he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
“acknowledge before” means to avow, to own as genuine, to assent, to admit;
and “before” means in front or preceding in space or ahead of (Javellana vs.
Ledesma; Castro vs. Castro). Consequently, if the third witness were the notary
public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the
will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary
public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement
(Balinon vs. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were
one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent
position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted.

Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public

may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has
notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve
the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein
because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely
acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as
acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting
witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article
805-06. Probate of will set aside.
13.)

GARCIA V. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-27200
April 30, 1970

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate
the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario. this is also an appeal to remove the
current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla as special administratrix of
the estate on the ground of she possesses interest adverse to the estate and to
order the RD of Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis
Pendens.

FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried with no descendants,
ascendants, brothers, or sisters. At the time of her death, she was said to be 90
years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real
properties. Her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of
the properties. The court approved this because Consuelo has been was already
managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime.

The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the
testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one in
1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew
and spoke; and another in 1960, consisting of 1 page and written in Tagalog.

The respondents alleged that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo
sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of
30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. Also, the deed of
assignment was executed by Gliceria in 1961, when she was already practically
blind.

In addition, the oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo secure

issuance of new TCTs of certain parcels of land, without the court’s knowledge
or authority, and on the pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the
inventory of the estate, when she must have already known by then that the
properties covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband by the
deceased, being the latter’s successor, and having the contract bind the land
through issuance of new titles in her husband’s name cannot but expose her to
the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust, justifying her
removal from the administration of the estate.

At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Consuelo
should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed because
no evidence has been presented to establish that the deceased was not of
sound mind, that even though the allegations state that the deceased prepared
another will in 1956 (12-page), the latter is not prevented from executing
another will in 1960 (1-page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses prove their truthfulness.

ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
HELD:
No, the provision of Article 808 is mandatory. Therefore, for all intents
and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and
the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The
rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind
or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are
not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog
which the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to
the due execution of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain
therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the
12 page will created in 1956 written in Spanish.

As to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the doctor
that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts.
Testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading
print. Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was
not duly executed.

Moreover, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is

not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate
alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.The
notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem,
affecting real property or the title thereto.
14.)

ALVARADO V. GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695
September 14, 1993

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an appeal from the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of
the RTC, admitting to probate the last will and testament with codicil of the late
Brigido Alvarado.

FACTS:
In November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will
entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner
Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at
the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.ccording to Bayani Ma.
Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was
executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from
glaucoma.

Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud
before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the
latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni
Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will
to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation. Said codicil was likewise not
read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the
previously executed will.

When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally
incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under
duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as
testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading
requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with.

HELD:
Yes, the probate should be admitted. The spirit behind the law was served
though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to ensure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its
purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s
will.

Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind
(of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but he
can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808. and that said provision was not
followed strictly is beyond cavil. However, in the case at bar, there was
substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of
making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading
the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do
not accord with his wishes.

Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents
read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgment take place.

There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. With four persons,
mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their
own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured
that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to ensure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
15.)
CANEDA V. CA
G.R. No. 103554
May 28, 1993

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the
attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo
Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article
809, of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the
twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence
before 3 witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad. In
the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and
devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not
appear to be related to the testator.

Subsequently, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of

his last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the
initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.

Before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court, the
testator passed away. One of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate. The petitioners,
claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition
for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will
and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. Benoni Cabrera
died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an
order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard
and resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of

the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in
doubt. On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public
testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while
he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good health
and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as

the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero. CA affirmed the probate
court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally
defective or can be cured under the Article 809.

HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law. Ordinary or
attested wills are governed by Articles 804 to 809. The will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to
the testator or even to the attesting witnesses. It is a separate memorandum or
record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
formalities required by law has been observed. The attestation clause,
therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to
insure the authenticity thereof.

The attestation clause in the will does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The absence of such
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be
probated.

Also, Article 809 does not apply to the present case because the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each
and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of the
attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied
by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the
intestate proceedings shall be revived. Article 809 cannot be used to cure the
defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will.
This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
16.)
ROXAS V. DE JESUS
G.R. No. L-38338
January 28, 1985

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of CFI disallowing the
probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a special proceeding
for partition of the estate of the deceased and delivered the holographic will of
the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased,
which contained a “letter-will” entirely written and signed in deceased’s
handwriting. The will is dated “FEB./61 ” and states: “This is my will which I
want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer.”

Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will
of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed
probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the Civil
Code because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year,
month, and day.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810
of the Civil Code.

HELD:
Yes it is a valid date. This will not be the first time that this Court departs
from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due
execution of wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing
his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the testator. If a will has been executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
thereof is obviated, said will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56
Phil. 282).

If the testator, in executing his will, attempts to comply with all the
requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or
purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the
form followed by the testator. In particular, a complete date is required to provide
against such contingencies as that of two competing wills executed on the same
day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a will was executed
(Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.

As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date “FEB./61”
appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
17.)
AZAOLA V. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003
August 5, 1960

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the CFI, involving the
determination of the quantity of evidence required for the probate of a
holographic will.

FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957.
Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was
made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one
witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the
testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the
death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the
testatrix’s handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the
attorney, and the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an
affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the
testatrix’s signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the
instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on
the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears
on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code,
the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and
the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested;
and because the lone witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body
of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging (1) that he was not bound to produce more than
one witness because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and (2) that
Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its
authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the
authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art.
810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses “who know the handwriting and signature of
the testator” and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not
so express) “that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator”. There may be no available witness of the testator’s hand; or even if
so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an
impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court
to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified
witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the
will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the
Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of
the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as
much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect.
18.)

CODOY VS. CALUGAY

G.R. No. 123486
August 12, 1999

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or directory for
probate of a holographic will.

RULING:

Mandatory if the holographic will is contested. Article 811 is mandatory since

the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that the “shall” in
a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when
used in a statute, is mandatory.

The reason is that we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator. Which is why if the holographic will is
contested, the law requires three (3) witnesses to declare that the will was in
the handwriting of the deceased.
19.)

CAGRO VS. CAGRO

G.R. No. L-5826
April 29, 1953

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI,
admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro.

FACTS:
The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation
was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the
same was signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left-hand
margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to
the attestation clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:
The will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.

Moreover, the signatures affixed on the left-hand margin are not

substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in
conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses
at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
The probate of the will is denied.
20.)
ROSA K. KALAW VS. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA
G.R. No. L-40207
September 28, 1984

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari on the sole legal question of
whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not.

FACTS:
Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of
sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in
1968. The will contained two alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the
sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it and such
was not initialed; and b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and
Gregorio's name was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the
testator.

Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that
she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING:
No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which
could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by
the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will
should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However,
this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it
in accordance with Article 814, or by affixing her full signature.