SARMIENTO V AGANA

FACTS: Issues:
Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo wed, Rebecca’s
mother offered a lot in Paranaque that they could build their house ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith
on. In 1967, they finally built their home which cost about
PhP8,000-10,000, thinking that someday, the lot would be Ruling:
transferred to them in their name. It turns out, though, that the lot
was owned by the Spouses Santos who , in turn, sold the same to We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in
Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year later, Sarmiento ordered the view of the peculiar circumstances under which they had
Valentinos to vacate their lot, then eventually filed and Ejection constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE.
Suit against them.
As far as they knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's
mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the
The lower court ruled in Sarmiento’s favor and ordered her to pay property,... could reasonably be expected to later on give them the
20,000 as the value of the house. But the case was then elevated to LAND.
the CFI of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and pursuant to Art.448 of
the CC (March 1979), the Court ordered Sarmiento to exercise the In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code
option in 60 days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the house provides:
or to let them purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able
to exercise this option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit the "ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
25,000 purchase price with the Court. build, sown or planted in good faith,... shall have the right... to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
ISSUE: payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or...
Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
option: to buy the building or to sell the land? and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

HELD: However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.
believed that Rebecca’s mother has the capacity to eventually
transfer the title of the land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
(LO) was required to exercise only 2 options: To purchase the does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper...
house or to sell the land to them, in this case, based on the value indemnity.
decided by the courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option
within the allotted period, and based on Art. 448, the LO is The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
compelled by law to exercise either option. Not choosing either is a disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
violation of the law.
. The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00... could not
have been very much more than that amount during the following
2. January when ERNESTO and wife were asked to vacate.
Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila
SARMIENTO against private respondends, the spouses ERNESTO The challenged decision of respondent Court, based on valuations
Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo. of P25,000.00 for the LAND and P40,000.00 for the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, cannot be viewed as not supported by
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the the evidence.
latter's mother had told him the couple could build a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot The provision for the exercise by petitioner SARMIENTO of either
the option to indemnify... private respondents in the amount of
ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE... on the P40,000.00, or the option to allow private respondents to purchase
LAND the LAND at P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a correct decision.

It was probably assumed that the wife's mother was the owner of "The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned
the LAND and that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred to by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is
the spouses. paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546).
The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under...
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to
name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santos, Jr. who... sold the same to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as
petitioner SARMIENTO. respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell
the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it... from
SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate and... filed... the land where it is erected.
an Ejectment suit against them.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to
SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built the "We hold, therefore, that the order... compelling defendants-
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in good faith petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to
plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay
It then ordered ERNESTO and wife to vacate the LAND after for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void,...
SARMIENTO has paid them the mentioned sum... of P20,000.00. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby ordered
dismissed,
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance...
after the submission of memoranda, said Court rendered a
modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

SARMIENTO was required, within 60 days, to exercise the option

to reimburse ERNESTO... and wife the sum of P40,000.00 as the
value of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or the option to allow them
to purchase the LAND for P25,000.00.

SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options within the
indicated period, and ERNESTO was then allowed to deposit the
sum of P25,000.00... with the Court as the purchase price for the
LAND.
MACASAET V MACASAET prove.[29] Petitioners contend that the lower courts erred in...
using another ground (tolerance of possession) to eject them.
Facts:
In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally
The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the
The children were invited by the parents to occupy the latter's two defendant's right to possess, arising from an express or implied
lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family solidarity. contract.[30] In other words, the plaintiff's cause of action... comes
Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict... terminated this situation. from the expiration or termination of the defendant's right to
Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, continue possession.[31] The case resulting therefrom must be
the children lost their right to remain on the property. They have filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements
that they constructed thereon in... good faith and with the consent In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands,
of the parents. petitioners "refused to pay the accrued rentals and [to] vacate the
leased premises."[34] It prayed that judgment be rendered
In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies. "[o]rdering [petitioners] and all those claiming rights under them...
to vacate the properties x x x and remove the structures x x x
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita[5] Macasaet and Respondents constructed thereon."[35] Effectively then, respondents averred
Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is that petitioners' original lawful occupation of the subject lots had
the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.[6] become unlawful.

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Petitioners dispute the lower courts' finding that they occupied the
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the subject lots on the basis of mere tolerance. They argue that their
children.[7 occupation was not under such condition, since respondents had
invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties.[39]
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels
of land... situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of
verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that
construction business; and that despite repeated demands,... the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.[40] A...
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.[ summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this
implied obligation.[41] The unlawful deprivation or withholding of
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to [42]
construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order
that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or
of Ismael), and... help in resolving the problems of the family.[9] enduring something not wholly approved of."
They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land
they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of
children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T- possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners were able to establish
103141 had... been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in
the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly order that they could all live near one other and help in resolving
given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in family... problems.[46] By occupying those lots, petitioners
the renovation of respondents' house.[10] demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation. Hence, there was
a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding possession of the
The MTCC[11] ruled in favor of respondents and ordered lots impliedly arose between the parties.
petitioners to vacate the premises.
The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely
On appeal, the regional trial court[15] (RTC) upheld the findings of "something not wholly approved of" by respondents. Neither did it
the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed respondents to appropriate arise from what Tolentino refers to as "neighborliness or
the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, familiarity." In point of fact, their possession was upon the
after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article invitation of and with... the complete approval of respondents, who
desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose
448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.[16] It from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are
added that respondents could oblige petitioners to purchase the basic Filipino traits.
land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In
the latter situation, petitioners should pay rent if... respondents Right to Use the Lots Terminated
would not choose to appropriate the building.[17]
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore
Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the clear. The issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a
parties filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review, which were stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows the
later consolidated.[18] courts to fix the duration or the period.

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael "Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.[19] Thus, possession of the intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of...
respondents' letter to vacate it "The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor.
Issues:
"In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under
"3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties.
the case on the matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them."
Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof that
should apply, if ever to apply the Civil Code; Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties
intended a period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the
Ruling: facts of the present case.

The Court's Ruling To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use
the lots, they did so out of parental love and a desire for solidarity
The Petition is partly meritorious. expected from Filipino parents. No period was intended by the
parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement...
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so.[47]
premises? At the outset, we stress that this is the main issue in
ejectment proceedings.[27] In the present case, petitioners failed to Based on respondents' reasons for gratuitously allowing
justify their right to retain possession of the... subject lots, which petitioners to use the lots, it can be safely concluded that the
respondents own. Since possession is one of the attributes of agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children
ownership,[28] respondents clearly are entitled to physical or mutually benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a...
material possession. resolutory condition in such an agreement.[48] Thus, when a
change in the condition existing between the parties occurs --like a
Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved
respondents based their Complaint regarding the nonpayment of conflict or animosity -- the agreement may be deemed...
rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter failed to terminated. Having been based on parental love, the agreement
would end upon the dissipation of the affection.
No Right to Retain Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the
present factual milieu. The established facts of this case show that
Possession respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by
petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon...
Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the
the lower courts' dismissal of their contention that Lots T-78521 construction of the improvements introduced thereon.[73] Thus,
and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they
of their inheritance and given in consideration for past... debts. built the structures on those lots.

The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely DEPED V CASIBANG
inchoate and is vested only upon the latters' demise. Indisputably,
rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death FACTS:
of the decedent
Respondents are the heirs of late Juan Cepeda, the registered owner
Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the of theproperty in controversy. It is alleged that sometime in 1965,
future is not inconsistent with the owners' taking back possession upon the request of the thenMayor Justo Cesar Caronan, Cepeda
in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.[ allowed the construction and operation of a schoolon the western
portion of his property. The school is now known as Solana North
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of CentralSchool, operating under the control and supervision of the
possession. petitioner Department ofEducation (DepEd).Sometime between
October 31, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the respondentsentered
Third Issue: and occupied a portion of the property. Upon discovery of the said
occupation,the teachers of the school brought the matter to the
Rights of a Builder in Good Faith attention of the barangay captain.The school officials demanded
the respondents to vacate the property. However, therespondents
As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the refused to vacate the property, and asserted Cepeda's ownership of
owner to everything that is incorporated or attached to the property. the lot.DepEd filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages
[60] Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an against respondents andthe court ruled in favor of the petitioner
immovable -- is governed by Articles 445... to 456 of the Civil and directed the respondents to vacate thepremises. Respondents
Code. filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of
Moneyagainst the DepEd. Respondents averred that since their late
Articles 447 and 1678 of the father did not have anyimmediate need of the land in 1965, he
consented to the building of the temporarystructure and allowed
Civil Code Inapplicable the conduct of classes in the premises. They claimed that they
havebeen deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the portion of
To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements the land occupied by theschool, thus, they are entitled to just
introduced on the property, petitioners cite Article 447.[61] They compensation and reasonable rent for the use ofproperty.In its
allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they had no Answer, the DepEd alleged that it owned the subject property
lease agreement with respondents. because it waspurchased by civic-minded residents of Solana,
Cagayan from Cepeda. It further allegedthat contrary to
We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the respondents' claim that the occupation is by mere tolerance, the
rules that apply when the owner of the property uses the materials propertyhas always been occupied and used adversely, peacefully,
of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor continuously and in theconcept of owner for almost forty (40)
builds on the property of another, which is the factual milieu... years. It insisted that the respondents had lostwhatever right they
here. had over the property through laches.During the trial, respondents
presented, inter alia, the OCT No. O-627 registeredin the name of
In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the Juan Cepeda; Tax Declarations also in his name and the tax
contention of petitioners regarding the inapplicability of Article receiptsshowing that they had been paying real property taxes on
1678 deserves attention. The CA applied the provisions on lease, the property since 1965. Theyalso presented the Technical
because it found their possession by mere tolerance comparable Description of the lot by the Department of Environment
with that of a... lessee, per the pronouncement in Calubayan v. andNatural Resources Land Management Services showing that
Pascual the subject property wassurveyed in the name of Cepeda and a
certification from the Municipal Trial Court ofSolana, Cagayan
As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresita's possession of the two declaring that Lot 115 was the subject of Cad Case No. N-13 in
lots was not by mere tolerance, a circumstance that negates the LRCCad. Record No. N-200 which was adjudicated to Cepeda.
applicability of Calubayan.
On the other hand, despite notice and reset of hearing, the DepEd
Article 448 Applicable failed to presentits evidence or witness to substantiate its defense.
Consequently, the RTC consideredthe case submitted for decision
On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land and rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2008, findingthat the
of another, the applicable provision is Article 448, which reads: respondents are the owners of the subject property. The Court of
[64] Appeals thenaffirmed the decision of the RTC.

"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been ISSUES:
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to 1. Whether or not the respondents are barred to recover possession
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after because ofPrescription and/or laches.
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or 2. Whether or not DepEd is a builder in good faith?
to oblige... the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or RULINGS:
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is 1. No, respondent is not barred by prescription and or/laches.The
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, court ruled that Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect
he shall pay... reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not for anunreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. which, by exercising duediligence, could or should have been done
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of earlier; it is negligence or omission toassert a right within a
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof." reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the partyentitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.There is no
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of demand;each case is to be determined according to its particular
the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.[ circumstances. Thequestion of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and sincelaches is an equitable doctrine, its
From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief application is controlled by equitableconsiderations. It cannot work
that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.In order to
to build, plant, or sow thereon.[67] constitute laches, the following elements must be present:
1)
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del claims, givingrise to the situation of which complaint is made for
Campo v. Abesia,[68] this provision was applied to one whose which the complaint seeks aremedy;
house -- despite having been built at the... time he was still co- (2)
owner -- overlapped with the land of another.[69] This article was delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed havinghad knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and
improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that having been afforded anopportunity to institute a suit;
the law deemed the builder to be in good... faith. (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of thedefendant that the of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;and if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
(4) or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
to thecomplainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.In the present the terms thereof.
case, as registered owners of the lots in question, the
respondentshave a right to eject any person illegally occupying 2.
their property. This right isimprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioner'soccupation of the property, When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is
and regardless of the length of that possession, thelawful owners terminated, Article 448 governs in case real property (like a house)
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at exists.
all.
This rightis never barred by laches. FACTS:
Further, case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a
at the latter'stolerance or permission, without any contract between corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff owns
them, are necessarilybound by an implied promise that the 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of
occupants will vacate the property upondemand. the lot is 45 square meters (which is about the size of a typical
2. YES, Starbux café)
DepEd is a builder in good faith.
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property
into two lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties
asserts title tothe land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a
discovered that the house of the defendants occupied a portion of
possessor in the concept of owner,and that he be unaware that there
the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flawwhich invalidates
requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession
it.However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code
of the encroached 5 sqm.
was applied beyondthe recognized and limited definition of good
faith, e.g., cases wherein the builderhas constructed improvements
The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the
on the land of another with the consent of theowner. The Court
land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
ruled therein that the structures were built in good faith in
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
thosecases that the owners knew and approved of the construction
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
of improvements onthe property.In the present case, despite being a
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd isconsidered a builder in
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
good faith, since Cepeda permitted the construction ofbuilding and
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if
improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article
its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
448may be applied in the case at bar.
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
SPOUSES DEL OCAMPO V ABESIA
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and
in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since
This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the corner of F.
art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the
Flores and Cavan Streets, Cebu City. An action for partition was
portion of defendant’s house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND
filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are
Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm their
co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share
house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-
each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in
ownership should govern, and not that of accession.
accordance with the agreement of the parties. ,the Id commissioner
conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and submitted a report
RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered
to the trial court on May 29, 1976, recommending that the property
Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching
be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square
the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having
meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15 square
to axe the family home, hence they appealed.
meters for the defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants
were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of
CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.
defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of
Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested their conformity to
ISSUE:
the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate
w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on
who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square
property that used to be co-owned, but was subdivided.
meters of the land in question.
HELD:
Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to
The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was
a builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in
terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448 therefore
common.
governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but
this was built on good faith. Hence, the plaintiffs have the right to
Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it
choose one of two options
appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion
of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of
> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and
indemnifying the Defendants; or
Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which
may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
their home rested. ( or they can rent it)
been established.

Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs

have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their
house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more
than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built
thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The
defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon
such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house,
at their own expense, if they so decide.

Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown, or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, of a lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, owned by... another, deliberately exposing himself and his family
to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all
Facts: improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that
Edith Robillo purchased a land from Pleasantville Development would follow.
Corporation, designated as Lot 9. In 1975, respondent Eldred
Jardinico brought the rights of the lot from Robillo. During the "Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a
purchase, the lot was empty. On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property.
brought Lot No. 8 of the same subdivision from CT Torres
Enterprises (CTTEI). One of CTTEI’s employees, Zenaida Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision
Octaviano, accompanied Kee and his wife to the site and site accompanied by CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who
mistakenly pointed to Lot 9 instead of Lot 8. Afterwards, Kee authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was
made improvements on Lot 9, constructing a residence, a store, etc. indeed Lot 8. Having full... faith and confidence in the reputation
In the contract of sale on installment signed by Kee, it is provided of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification of
that the vendee shall bear the expenses of whatever consequential the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
change made in the property misdelivery.

Issue: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
Did Kee waive his rights against recovering damages resulting building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
from the company’s negligence by signing the contract? title.[9] And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee.[10]
Ruling:
No. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and could not At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said
be allowed. Kee was a builder in good faith, honestly thinking that lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the
he was making improvements on his own property. Article 6 of the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.
Civil Code provides that “rights may be waived unless the waiver Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
is contrary to law, public, order, public policy, morals, or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by On issue no. 2
law.”
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent,
Facts: done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage
caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent who
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated exceeds his authority is personally liable for the... damage.
as Lot 9, Phase II and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville
Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate
bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In
vacant. acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It
is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register principal... of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil
of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Code.
Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for
respondent Wilson Kee, who had... taken possession thereof. damages. Now, the extent and/or amount of damages to be
awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 evidence is adduced.
of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
(CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually
presented in the trial court; hence no damages could now be
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico awarded.
confronted him. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement,
but failed. On issue no. 3

On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the
that the latter remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. When amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00, respectively, as prayed for in
Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the Municipal his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint ruling that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of
for ejectment with... damages against Kee. Appeals, however,... reinstated the award of attorney's fees after
ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and
CTTEI. The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court
and depends upon the circumstances of each case.[19] We shall not
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals. Jardinico was
attributable to CTTEI. compelled to litigate for the protection of his... interests and for the
recovery of damages sustained as a result of the negligence of
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City petitioner's agent.
(RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were
not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that Principles:
they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent,
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage
he was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent who
improvements on Lot 8. exceeds his authority is personally liable for the... damage.

Issues: ROSALES V CASTELLFORT

(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith? Facts:

(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Spouses
Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
Rosales (petitioners)... are the registered owners of a parcel of
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper? land... petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on
their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent
Ruling:
(Castelltort).
On issue no. 1
It turned out that respondents... had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and same Subdivision Plan,... but that after a survey thereof by
conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good geodetic engineer... he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the
faith. Castelltorts purchased.

The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors Petitioners... filed... for recovery of possession and damages... the
committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong property to Castelltorts claimed in their Answer... that they were builders in
Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser good faith.
 for specific performance and damages with the trial court, alleging
in constructing the house on petitioners' lot as they in fact that the Spouses Firme reneged on their agreement to sell the
consulted her before commencing any construction thereon, they Property. The complaint asked the trial court to order the Spouses
having relied on the technical... description of the lot sold to them, Firme to execute the deed of sale and to deliver the title to the
Lot 16, which was verified by her officially designated geodetic Property to Bukal Enterprises upon payment of the agreed
engineer. purchase price. On 7 August 1998, the trial court rendered
judgment against Bukal Enterprises, dismissing the case and
Issues: ordering Bukal Enterprises to pay the Spouses Constante and
Azucena Firme (1) the sum of P335,964.90 as and by way of actual
whether Castelltort is a builder in good faith. and compensatory damages; (2) the sum of P500,000.00 as and by
way of moral damages; (3) the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way
Ruling: of attorney’s fees; and (4) the costs of the suit.

In the case at bar, Lot 16 was sold by Lina... to Castelltort The trial court held there was no perfected contract of sale as
Bukal Enterprises failed to establish that the Spouses Firme gave
While prior to the sale, what Villegas showed Castelltort as their consent to the sale of the Property; and that Aviles had no
evidence of his mother valid authority to bind Bukal Enterprises in the sale transaction.
Bukal Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
Lina's ownership of the property was only a photocopy of her title reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
TCT No. (T-42171) T-18550... he explaining that the owner's
duplicate of the title was lost and that judicial reconstitution ISSUES:
thereof was ongoing, Castelltort acted in the manner of a... prudent
man and went to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a Whether there was a perfected contract between the Spouses Firme
certified true copy of the TCT. and Bukal Enterprises, the latter allegedly being represented by
Aviles.
The certified true copy bore no annotation indicating any prior Whether or not Statute of Frauds may apply?
adverse claim on Lot 16.
RULING:
The records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing
his house on petitioners' lot, he believed that it was the Lot 16 he There is no perfected contract.
bought and delivered to him by Villegas. Even the existence of a signed document purporting to be a
contract of sale does not preclude a finding that the contract is
The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was eventually traced invalid when the evidence shows that there was no meeting of the
to the error committed by geodetic engineer... in placing stone minds between the seller and buyer. In this case, what were offered
monuments on petitioners' property, instead of on Lot 16, the lot in evidence were mere unsigned deeds of sale which have no
sold to Castelltort probative value. Bukal Enterprises failed to show the existence of a
perfected contract of sale by competent proof.
As correctly found by the CA, both parties having acted in good
faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this 2. There is no basis for the application of Statute of Frauds.
case is Article 448 of the Civil Code
The Court of Appeals held that partial performance of the contract
Under the... provision, the landowner can choose between of sale takes the oral contract out of the scope of the Statute of
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or Frauds. This conclusion arose from the appellate court’s erroneous
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The records
considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the show that there was no perfected contract of sale. There is
builder in good... faith shall pay reasonable rent. therefore no basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The
application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords perfected contract.
with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies FIRME V BUKAL
with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is... preclusive.
Facts:
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel Spouses Firme are the registered owner of a parcel of land. Renato
instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. de Castro(Vice President of Bukal) authorized Aviles to
negotiate with the Spouses Firme for the purchase of the property.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character Bukal filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show against Spouses Firme because Spouses Firme refused to
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing execute a Deed of Sale.
improperly or wrongfully. During negotiations three drafts of deed of sale were presented to
Spouses Firme by Aviles. None of the three drafts was signed
The good faith ceases or is legally... interrupted from the moment by Spouses Firme. Moreover, Bukal facilitated the relocation of
defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous squatters (relocation fee of 60k-100k per squatter was paid) and
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. fenced the property despite absence of deed of sale.
RTC: There was no perfected contract of sale.
In the case at bar, Castelltort's good faith ceased... on August 21, CA: There was a perfected contract of sale.
1995... when petitioners personally apprised him of their title over The Issues
the questioned lot. 1. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that there was a
perfected contract of sale between petitioners and
As held by the CA, should petitioners then opt to appropriate the respondent despite the adduced evidence patently to the contrary;
house, they should only be made to pay for that part of the... 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in not finding that the alleged
improvement built by Castelltort on the questioned property at the contract of sale is enforceable despite the fact
time good faith still existed on his part or until August 21, 1995. that the same is covered by the statute of frauds
3. Whether or not Spouses Firme are builder in good faith
the commencement of Castelltort's payment of reasonable rent 4. Whether or not Spouses Firme are entitled to compensatory or
should start on August 21, 1995 as well, to be paid until such time moral damages
that the possession of the property is delivered to petitioners, The Ruling of the Court
subject to the reimbursement of expenses, that is,... if such option 1. Whether there was a perfected contract of sale
is for petitioners to appropriate the house. There was no perfected contract of sale.
a. There was no consent on the part of the Spouses Firme.
If the option chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale, however, the  Spouses Firme flatly rejected the offer of Aviles to buy the
payment of rent should continue up to the actual transfer of Property on behalf of Bukal Enterprises ( no
ownership. concurrence of the offer and the acceptance on the subject matter,
consideration and terms of payment as would
FIRME V BUKAL result in a perfected contract of sale.)
 they did not consent to the contract of sale is the fact they never
FACTS: signed any deed of sale.(The offered evidence
is unsigned deed of sale which according to SC have no probative
Spouses Constante and Azucena Firme are the registered owners of value)
a parcel of land located on Dahlia Avenue, Fairview Park, Quezon  There was no Board Resolution authorizing Aviles to negotiate
City. Renato de Castro, the vice president of Bukal Enterprises and and purchase the property on behalf of Bukal (a
Development Corporation authorized his friend, Teodoro Aviles, a corporation)
broker, to negotiate with the Spouses Firme for the purchase of the >>Contracts or acts of a corporation must be made either by the
Property. On 28 March 1995, Bukal Enterprises filed a complaint board of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by
the board. Absent such valid delegation/authorization, the rule is
that the declarations of an individual director relating to the Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud... respondent
affairs of the corporation, but not in the course of, or connected Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents
with, the performance of authorized duties of such director, are collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally
held not binding on the corporation. registered the said... accretions
 Aviles signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of the Complaint filed by Bukal which was Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their
not accompanied by a proof that Aviles was authorized (it is inheritance... claims over the Motherland and the two (2)
required that the person signing the document must accretions because they respected respondents' rights,...
be duly authorized either by corporate by-laws or by specific act of respondents contended that: (a) the Amended Complaint stated no
the BOD) cause of action against them, having failed to clearly and precisely
2. Whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions
There is therefore no basis for the application of the Statute of they... have allegedly committed;
Frauds. The application of the Statute of Frauds
presupposes the existence of a perfected contract. During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties
3. Whether Bukal Enterprises is a builder in good faith that the Motherland was eventually sold by the Heirs of Ciriaco to
Bukal Enterprises is not a builder in good faith because. No deed a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera),... the RTC rendered a
of sale has been executed in this case. Despite the Decision[26]in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed
refusal of the Spouses Firme to sell the Property, Bukal Enterprises respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective
still proceeded to introduce improvements on the portions in the Motherland and in the accretions
Property. Bukal Enterprises introduced improvements on the
Property without the knowledge and consent of the Spouses The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the
Firme. When the Spouses Firme learned about the unauthorized present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco
constructions made by Bukal Enterprises on the Property, they and the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland.[27] It gave
advised the latter to desist from further acts of trespass on their probative weight to Francisco, et al.'s allegation... that the
Property.[60] Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their
Bukal Enterprises is not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses mother, Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for
incurred in relocating the squatters. Bukal Enterprises his then-pending homestead patent application.
spent for the relocation of the squatters even after learning that the
Spouses Firme were no longer interested in selling the In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the
Property. De Castro testified that even though the Spouses Firme Motherland in trust for them... once his homestead patent
did not require them to remove the squatters, they chose to application had been approved.As Ciriaco was only able to acquire
spend for the relocation of the squatters since they were interested the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the
in purchasing the Property.[62] proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the
4. Whether the Spouses Firme are entitled to compensatory and Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al... the CA
moral damages rendered a Decision[29] reversing and setting aside the RTC
Spouses Firme are not entitled. It was established that Spouses Decision... the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a
Firme that they normally travel more than once a year to homestead patent, which later became the basis for the issuance of
visit their children in the Philippines (they are already US a Torrens certificate of title in his name;... it was awarded by the
residents) the actual travelling expenses cannot be attributed solely government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the stringent
for requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,... and
the attendance of the hearings in the case. The court deemed it his title thereto had already become indefeasible.[32]
proper that nominal damages must be awarded because Bukal Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in Ciriaco's
violated the property rights of the Spouses Firme. name, his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners
thereof.
HEIRS OF NARVASA V IMBORNAL
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an
Facts: implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland.
(Basilia) had four (4) children,... namely, Alejandra, Balbina, This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds
Catalina, and Pablo. Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr from... the sale of the Sabangan property an inheritance of their
predecessors, the Imbornal sisters were used for the then-pending
(Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children[10] of homestead application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As
Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, co-owners of
the Motherland... together with Ciriaco's heirs.
(Petra) was the daughter of Balbina.[11] Petitioners are the heirs
and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra Issues:
(Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondents Emiliana,
Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Ruling:

Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo. An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the
parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of
Basilia owned a parcel of land... which she conveyed to her three justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or
(3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and downright fraud.[44] To reiterate, Article 1456 of the

Catalina (Imbornal sisters) Civil Code states that"[i]f property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
Catalina's husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
granted a homestead patent... riparian land (Motherland)... adjacent the property comes."
to the Cayanga River
The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party
He was eventually awarded Homestead asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.[45]
Patent While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the
evidence... must be trustworthy and received by the courts with
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose,
Motherland,... the First Accretion,... adjoined the southern portion equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is
of the Motherland. required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.

was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral
Esperanza Narvarte,... the Second Accretion,... abutted the First evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been
Accretion on its southern portion... was issued in the names of all either mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco.
the respondents covering... the Second Accretion. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of
an... implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.
children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed
As the CA had aptly pointed out,[47]a homestead patent award
] for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions[48]
respondents,... anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which
with the help of his wife Catalina,urged Balbina and Alejandra to includes actual possession, cultivation, and... improvement of the
sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent
therefrom to fund histhen-pending homestead patent application the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary
over the Motherland. for the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it is
highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired... and belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied of the current of the waters." Therefore, being the owner of the
trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially land adjoining the foreshore area, the heirs of Pablo Imbornal are
considering the dearth of evidence showing that the Imbornal the riparian owners, and they have preferential rights over the
sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion... accretions. ***End***
thereof, or asserted any right over the same at any point during
their lifetime. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the RONQUILLO V CA
Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent
No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco's title to the Motherland G.R. No. L-55138 September 28, 1984ERNESTO V.
had become indefeasible. RONQUILLO,
petitioner,vs.
, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO P. SO,
oral testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal respondents.FACTS:Antonio P. So filed an action for the collection
agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and of money against Ronquillo, OffshoreCatertrade Inc., Johnny Tan
Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the... and Pilar Tan. The amount of P117,498.98 sought to be
presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to collectedrepresents the value of the checks issued by the latters in
Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was payment for foodstuffs delivered toand received by them. The said
acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.A compromise
evidence of Francisco, et al. would not effectively establish their agreement has been entered where So agrees to reduce its total
claims of ownership. It... has been held that oral testimony as to a claim to onlyP110,000 .00 and Ronquillo, et. al. agree to bind
certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is themselves to initially pay out of the totalindebtedness of
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence,[50] especially P110,000.00 the amount of P55,000.00 on or
since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the before December 24, 1979
1920s. andthe balance of P55,000.00 to be paid
individually and jointly
2, FACTS: Basilia Imbornal had four children, Alejandra, Balbina, .So filed a Motion for Execution on the failure of Ronquillo, et al.
Catalina, and Pablo, and from those arose the following heirs:  to make the initial paymentof P55,000.00 on or before December
24, 1979 as provided in the Decision. ObligorsRonquillo and Pilar
Heirs of the Francisco Narvasa— descendants of the Alejandra and Tan tendered P13,750.00 each but was refused by So. Hence, the
Balbina Imbornal twoinstead deposited the said amount with the Clerk of Court. The
other two obligors did not paytheir shares.So again filed a motion
Heirs of Pablo Imbornal—descendants of Pablo Imbornal which resulted to the issuance of a writ of execution for
thesatisfaction of the sum of P82,500.00 as against the properties
[Sabangan Property] During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of of Ronquillo, et.al, "singly or jointly liable."However, Ronquillo
land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, raised the question of the validity of the order of execution when
Pangasinan with an area of 4,144 sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan thelower court's decision based on the compromise agreement did
property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, not specifically state theliability of the four obligors to be solidary.
Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.
[Motherland] On the other hand, the husband of Catalina Imbornal, ISSUE:Whether or not Ronquillo and other obligors are solidarily
namely Ciriaco Abrio, was granted a homestead patent over a 31, liable.
367 sq. meter riparian land adjacent to the Cayanga River,
Pangasinan. Consequently, the heirs occupied the northern HELD:Yes.Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more debtors in
Motherland, one and the same obligation does notimply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound
of Ciriaco Abrio portion of the to render, entire compliance with the prestation. Then is a solidary
liability only whenthe obligation expressly so states, or when the
On the other hand, the heirs of Pablo Imbornal occupied the law or the nature of the obligation requiressolidarity.Art. 1208. If
southern portion of the land. There were two accretions that from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligation to
occurred through the course of time: 1st Accretion—occurred which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the
during 1949 and adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many equal
A TCT was issued Victoriano, who is one of the heirs of Pablo shares as there are creditors and debtors, the credits or debts being
Imbornal; 2nd Accretion—occurred during 1971 and abutted the considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court
First accretion on the southern portion of the Motherland. The TCT governing themultiplicity of quits.Clearly then, by the express term
was issued in the name of all the heirs of Pablo Imbornal. The heirs of the compromise agreement and the decision based uponit, the
of Francisco Narvasa filed an Amended Complaint for defendants obligated themselves to pay their obligation
reconveyance, partition and/or damages against the heirs of Pablo "individually and jointly".The term "individually" has the same
Imbornal. The heirs of Francisco Narvasa anchored their claim on meaning as "collectively", "separately", "distinctively",respectively
the following allegations: or "severally". An agreement to be "
individually liable
Also, the heirs of Francisco Narvasa further alleged that through " undoubtedly creates aseveral obligation, and a "several obligation
deceit, fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, the heirs of Pablo is one by which one individual binds himself to perform the whole
Imbornal had illegally registered the said accretions in their names obligation.The obligation being described as "individually and
—notwithstanding that they were not riparian owners. jointly", the same is thereforeenforceable against one of the
numerous obligors.
ISSUE: W/N THE HEIRS OF FRANCISCO NARVASA OWN
THE MOTHERLAND (RIPARIAN LAND) ALONG WITH THE Facts:
SUBSEQUENT ACCRETIONS? NO
Petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo was one of four (4) defendants in
HELD: The Court first ruled over the existence of a valid implied Civil Case... filed by private respondent Antonio P. So, on July 23,
trust between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters. Implied Trust: 1979, for the collection of the sum of
There is no implied Trust
P117,498.98 plus attorney's fees and costs. The other defendants
Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is acquired were Offshore Catertrade, Inc., Johnny Tan and Pilar Tan. The
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of amount of P117,498.98 sought to be collected represents the value
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the of the checks issued by said defendants in payment for foodstuffs
person from whom the property comes." In this case, it cannot be delivered to and... received by them. The said checks were
said that, through oral evidence that Ciricao was merely a trustee dishonored by the drawee bank.
of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the
Imbornal sisters or their heirs. Weighed against the presumed Plaintiff agrees to reduce its total claim of P117,498.95 to only
regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the P110,000.00 and defendants agree to acknowledge the validity of
lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and such claim and further bind themselves to initially pay out of the
registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of the total indebtedness of P110,000.00 the amount of P55,000.00 on or
heirs of Francisco Narvasa would not effectively establish their before
claims of ownership.
December 24, 1979, the balance of P55,000.00, defendants
Not Riparian owners; thus not owners of the accretion individually and jointly agree to pay within a period of six months
Subsequently, the Court further held that as the heirs of Francisco from January 1980, or before June 30, 1980; (Italics supplied)...
Narvasa failed to prove their ownership rights over the private respondent (then plaintiff) filed a Motion for Execution on
Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First the ground that defendants failed to make the initial payment of
Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979 as provided in the
fail. The heirs of Francisco are not the owners of the two accretions Decision.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as
follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
Said motion for execution was opposed by... herein petitioner (as obligation,[14] and a "several obligation"... is one by which one
one of the defendants) contending that his inability to make the individual binds himself to perform the whole obligation.
payment was due to private respondent's own act of making
himself scarce and inaccessible on December 24, 1979. Petitioner The obligation in the case at bar being described as "individually
then prayed that private respondent be ordered to accept his... and jointly", the same is therefore enforceable against one of the
payment in the amount of P13,750.00. numerous obligors.

During the hearing of the Motion for Execution and the Opposition petition is hereby DISMISSED
thereto on January 16, 1980, petitioner, as one of the four
defendants, tendered the amount of P13,750.00, as his pro-rata Principles:
share in the P55,000.00 initial payment. Another defendant, Pilar P.
Tan, offered to... pay the same amount. Because private respondent Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more debtors in one and the
refused to accept their payments, demanding from them the full same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
initial installment P55,000.00, petitioner and Pilar Tan instead right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
deposited the said amount with the Clerk of Court. The amount entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability
deposited was subsequently withdrawn by... private respondent. only... when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or
the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
private respondent moved for the reconsideration and/or
modification of the aforesaid Order of execution and prayed Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the
instead for the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all obligation to which the preceding article refers the contrary does
defendants, jointly and severally". not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into
as many equal shares as there are creditors and debtors, the credits
Petitioner opposed the said motion arguing that under the decision or debts... being considered distinct from one another, subject to
of the lower court being executed which has already became final, the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits.
the liability of the four (4) defendants was not expressly declared
to be solidary, consequently each defendant is obliged to pay only
his own... pro-rata or 1/4 share of the amount due and payable.

the lower court issued an Order

There appears to be a non-payment in accordance with the

compromise agreement of the amount of

P27,500.00 on or before December 24, 1979. The parties are

reminded that the payment is condition sine qua non to the lifting
of the preliminary attachment and the execution of an affidavit of
desistance.

a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the sum of

P82,500.00 as against the properties of the defendants (including
petitioner), "singly or jointly liable."... issued a notice of sheriff's
sale, for the sale of certain furnitures and appliances found in
petitioner's residence to satisfy the sum of P 82,500.00.

Realizing the actual threat to his property rights... petitioner filed

on March 26, 1980 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
then Court of Appeals... praying at the same time for the issuance
of a restraining order to stop the public sale.

He raised the question of the validity of the order of execution, the

writ of execution and the notice of public sale of his properties to
satisfy fully the entire unpaid obligation payable by all of the four
(4) defendants, when the lower court's decision based on the...
compromise agreement did not specifically state the liability of the
four (4) defendants to be solidary.

the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration but

the scheduled public sale in that same day did not proceed in view
of the pendency of a certiorari proceeding before the then Court of
Appeals.

This Court, however, finds the present petition to have been filed
prematurely. The rule is that before a petition for certiorari can be
brought against an order of a lower court, all remedies available in
that court must first be exhausted.

In the case at bar, herein... petitioner filed a petition without

waiting for a resolution of the Court on the motion for
reconsideration, which could have been favorable to the petitioner.

Issues:

Was the filing of a petition for certiorari before the then Court of
Appeals against the Order of Execution issued by the lower court,
dated March 17, 1980, proper, despite the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration of the same questioned Order?

What is the nature of the liability of the defendants (including

petitioner), was it merely joint, or was it several or solidary?...
whether or not he is liable jointly or solidarily.

Ruling:

based on the parties' compromise agreement... defendants

individually and jointly agree to pay within a period of six months

Clearly then, by the express term of the compromise agreement

and the decision based upon it, the defendants obligated
themselves to pay their obligation "individually and jointly".

The term "individually" has the same meaning as "collectively",

"separately", "distinctively", respectively or "severally". An
agreement to be "individually liable" undoubtedly creates a several