SpringerBriefs in Ethics

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Barbro Fröding

Virtue Ethics and Human

Enhancement

13
Barbro Fröding
Division of Philosophy
Royal Institute of Technology
Stockholm
Sweden

ISSN 2211-8101 ISSN 2211-811X (electronic)

ISBN 978-94-007-5671-7 ISBN 978-94-007-5672-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4
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‘For Simon’
‘I am greatly indebted to a number of
­people for helping me to develop and refine
the ideas presented in this book. Without
their i­nsights, suggestions, comments, and
­constant encouragement I would not have
been able to write this. A very special thanks
goes to Professor Roger Crisp and Professor
Julian Savulescu (both Oxford University)
as well as to all the colleagues and friends
at The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical
­Ethics and at Lincoln College in Oxford. I
would also like to thank Professor Sven Ove
Hansson (Division of Philosophy, Royal
Institute of Technology (KTH) and ­Associate
Professor Martin Peterson (Eindhoven
­University of Technology) for their
­unfaltering support and constructive c­ riticism.
All errors that remain are of course my own.’
Contents

1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Costs of Poor Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Involving All Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Virtue Ethics as a Possible Solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.1 The Virtue Ethics Approach Promotes Engagement . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Virtues as Useful Skills in a Changing Society. . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.3 Virtue as Good Overall Judgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Is Virtue Really an Alternative for the Many?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 The Good Life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.1 The Good Life According to Aristotle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Eudaimonia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Ergon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 The Function Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 Two Takes on Human Fulfillment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 The Good Life is an All-Inclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7 Unhappiness in the Modern Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8 The Praise Cult. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.9 Is Feeling Sad a Disease?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.10 A Good Life in a Modern Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.11 The Possibility of Many Good Lives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.12 The Mixed Life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.13 It is Good Enough to be ‘Good Enough’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.14 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 The Biological Obstacles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.1 The Best of Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 The State of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Taking a Closer Look at the Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Moral Psychology Perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

ix
x Contents

4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4.1 A Hard Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 Virtue as Excellence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 Feelings and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Reason and Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 Moral Experts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.6 The Doctrine of the Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.7 A Middling Disposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.8 The Power of Good Habits and Rolemodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.9 Choosing Between the Virtues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.10 A Few General Comments on the Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.10.1 Justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.10.2 Unity of the virtues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.10.3 Virtue and Pleasure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.11 The Character Virtues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.12 The Intellectual Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.13 What is Phronesis?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.14 How does Phronesis Relate to the Character Virtues?. . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.15 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

5 Examples of Useful Capacities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

5.1 Global Risks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.2 A Sense of Equity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3 Learning Situation Sensitivity Rather than Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.4 4 Useful Old (Aristotelian) Virtues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.5 Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.6 Examples of Useful Modern Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.7 Creativity and Problem Solving. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.8 How to Stimulate Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.9 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

6 Critique of Virtue Ethics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

6.1 Why Virtue Might be Impossible for the Many . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2 Two Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3 A Reply–How Practice Leads to Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.4 Role Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.5 Good Enough to be a Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.6 The Advantage of Multiple Role Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

7 Three Enhancement Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

7.1 Enhancement Through Life-Style Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.1.1 Physical Activities and Brain Plasticity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.1.2 Diet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Contents xi

7.1.3 Supplements: The Example of Fatty Acids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

7.1.4 Combining Diet Changes, Increased Physical Activity
and Memory Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.2 Enhancement Through Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.2.1 Three Categories of Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2.2 Some Problems with Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2.3 Some Potential Advantages of Drugs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.3 Why Drugs and Technology Will Not Do the Whole Job . . . . . . . . . 74
7.4 Enhancement Through Committing to the Virtuous Life . . . . . . . . . 75
7.4.1 Virtue is Good Now and Good for Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.5 Living the Happy Life Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.6 Why We Need the Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.7 Combining Life-Style Changes, Drugs and Virtue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

8 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.1 A Combination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Introduction

This essay shows how a number of key ethical aspects of human cognitive enhance-
ment can be successfully addressed within a virtue ethics framework.1 The discussion
includes examples of character virtues such as courage, generosity and temperance as
well as epistemic (i.e. intellectual) virtues such as creativity, intellectual honesty and
practical wisdom. Because the virtues are interrelated—to be virtuous involves hav-
ing a sense of decency and good overall judgement—it makes sense to use examples
from both the intellectual and the moral domains. The examples feature both ancient
virtues and new, or more modern, ones. A mix is likely to better assess how such
capacities can enable us to increase our well-being and, consequently, be of special
interest for an agent seeking to live a good life in the information society.

The Current Situation

For a brief background consider the following. This is the age of information,
but while the availability and access to information has never been better, soci-
ety at large can hardly be labeled as wise and well-informed. The current situation
both strengthens the old, and adds new epistemic demands on people, demands
that most of us appear unable to meet in the present. From a practical perspective
this has serious socio-economic consequences in the present as well as the near
future. Two key examples, affecting us both on an individual and a community-
wide level, are the absence of consensus on how best to control global warming
and the ongoing financial crisis. Hence, to study how we can improve the ways in
which individuals make important decisions and how that is linked to our overall
well-being is one of the more pressing issues in current bioethics.
In the past two decades, researchers in the natural and behavioral sciences have
begun to explore biological (as well as cultural) explanations for the frequent failure to
respond rationally to the information available to us. It has been shown that most
people are greatly challenged in their decision making by ungrounded fear, bias,

1
Thus far the bulk of the debate on bioethics and neuroethics, including human cognitive enhance-
ment, has been conducted in consequentialist and/or deontological terms.

xiii
xiv Introduction

short-sightedness and misplaced epistemic deference2 and it appears quite plausible

that such, and other similar, constraints could have a negative effect on their overall
level of well-being.3 Additional studies have shown that more information is not
always a good thing in the sense of making people’s lives go better.4 This holds true
both from the subjective perspective (more information tends to trigger unpleasant
feelings of stress and confusion rather than empowerment) and from an objective
perspective (it is not the case that the more information we have the better decisions we
make). It would appear that most of us would have something to gain from managing
this situation better. One way to do so would be by enhancing our cognitive capacities.

Why an Inclusive Dialogue is Vital

Human cognitive enhancement is still a novel topic.5 The freshness of the

­subject, in combination with the speed of the scientific developments and a
growing general interest all speak in favour of an inclusive dialogue.6 So far the

2
See e.g.: Greene and Haidt (2002) ‘How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?’, Trends in
Cog. Sci. 6: 517–23: Haidt (2001) ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuition-
ist Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psych. Rev. 108: 814–834: Wheatley & Haidt (2005) ‘Hyp-
notic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe’, Psych. Sci. 16: 780–4: Kosfeld et al. (2005)
‘Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans’, Nature 435: 2: Knoch et al. ‘Diminishing Reciprocal Fair-
ness by Disrupting the Right Prefrontal Cortex’, Science 314/5800: 829–32: Kiesel et al. ‘Uncon-
scious Priming According to Multiple S-R Rules’, Cognition 104/1: 89–105: Brasil-Neto et al.
(1992) ‘Focal Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Response Bias in a Forced-Choice Task’, J.
of Neurol., Neurosurg., and Psychiatry 55: 964–6: Baumeister (2002) ‘Yielding to Temptation’,
J. of Consumer Research 28: 670–6: Beckham (2004) ‘Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent
Brain’, Science 305/5684: 596–9: Tancredi (2005) Hardwired Behavior (New York: CUP): Libet
et al. (eds.) (1999) The Volitional Brain (Charlottesville: IA): Harman (1999) ‘Moral Philoso-
phy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’, Proc. of the
Aristotelian Soc. 99: 315–331: Doris (2002) Lack of Character (Cambridge: CUP).
3
For a discussion see e.g. Kahane and Shackel (2010), ‘Methodological Problems in the Neu-
roscience of Moral Judgment’, Mind and Language, 25, 5:561–58.: Levy (2007), Neuroethics:
challenges for the 21st century, CUP, UK.: Singer (2005), ‘Ethics and Intuition’, The Journal of
Ethics (2005) 9: 331–352, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, (2001) ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intu-
itions.’ Philosophical Topics, 29, p. 429–60.
4
Bishop, M. (2000). In praise of epistemic irresponsibility: How lazy and ignorant can you be?
Synthese, 122, 179–208; Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological ration-
ality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75–90; Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos
V. (2010) The less-is-more effect: Predictions and tests. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5,
No. 4, pp. 244–257.
5
In this essay I follow the broad definition of cognitive enhancement as offered by N. Bos-
trom and A. Sandberg in their 2009 article ‘Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regula-
tory Challenges’, Science and Engineering Ethics, 15:311–341. “Cognitive enhancement may be
defined as the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or
augmentation of internal or external information processing systems”, p. 311.
6
For an interesting discussion on the importance of transparent commnication and inclusiveness
within the EU see J. Habermas (2011) Zur Verfassung Europas - Ein Essay, Ersatz.
Introduction xv

discussion has been limited to a small group of people with a special interest and
there has also been a tendency to favour science fiction like examples. I believe
this to be unfortunate for two reasons. First, because such scenarios tend to
strike the broader audience as too unrealistic and far-fetched and, second,
because it threatens to give rise to the type of irrational fear which trigger knee-
jerk responses.
Notably, the information provided must not only be correct but it is of impor-
tance that the communication is tailored to the intended recipient. To ground the
theory in cases that the recipient can relate to is essential if the philosophical
aspects are to be taken seriously and contribute to the wider debate. Indeed espe-
cially so in a science-society context where people come to the table from differ-
ent backgrounds and sometimes radically different ‘pre-understanding’ of the
issues.7 Consider for example that the concerns of the general public are not only
strongly felt but also that they include both physical risks (for example addiction,
side effects, coercion and inequality) as well as more ethical or broadly philosoph-
ical aspects which has to do with values and notions of dignity aspects which, in
turn, are often very emotionally charged.
Miss-communication is likely to create an intellectual gridlock, something
which is not only unfortunate but plausibly constitutes a very real threat to our
well-being and quality of life. For a prime example of the type of unproductive
and polarised debate a lack of openness and inclusiveness can lead to, consider the
conflicted debate that has been raging on GMO in the past two decades.

Engaging Examples

There is, however, a delicate balance between, on the one hand ensuring scientific
soundness while avoiding speculation, and, on the other, grabbing the imagination of
the reader. This essay focuses on scenarios that we are facing today or in the near
future.8 In fact, there are plenty of such examples. On a very basic level all of us
employ cognitive boosting strategies such as sleeping and exposing ourselves to
stimulating and complex environments (e.g. school). In addition, most people also
have personal experiences of cognitive enhancement substances such as nicotine,
caffeine and glucose (can help to increase concentration) as well as alcohol (can

7
See e.g. NanoBio-RAISE and Nano2Life (FP6) and ETHENTECH (FP7)
8
Consequently, I will not discuss methods such as: deep brain stimulation (DBS), non-invasive
brain stimulation TDCS and TMS, tissue enginering or various other ways to stimulate precise
neurons. For an interesting discussion on TDCS see R. C. Kadosh, N. Levy, J. O‘Shea, N. Shea,
N., J. Savulescu (2012), The neuroethics of non-invasive brain stimulation, Current Biology Vol
22 No 4. R1-R4: M. H. Rogers, P. B. Anderson (eds.) (2009) Deep Brain Stimulation: Applica-
tions, Complications, Side-Effects, Nova Biomedical Books, New York.
xvi Introduction

make the person more outgoing and sociable).9 A bit more extreme—but still not
unusual—is the relatively high number of people who admit to using prescription
drugs in order to enhance their performance under pressure.10 Perhaps surprisingly,
professional academics and students are well represented in the group of healthy
people choosing to consume such drugs.11 When asked why, the users voiced con-
cerns of being unable to keep up with their peers and/or meet the expectations placed
on them by teachers or employers unless they boosted themselves in this way.12
Most of the examples to be explored here will be of drugs that are used with the
intention to heighten cognitive capacities rather than physical capacity or moods.
A fuller account will be given in Chaps. 5 and 7 but already here it should be
pointed out that studies show that (i) have moderate effect in the healthy and (ii)
that the measurably positive effects are primarily found in individuals at the bot-
tom end of the normality curve.13 Consequently, placebo effect aside, it would
appear that people who are already high performers would have little incentive to
use the drugs that are on offer currently. It would be an irrational risk as most of
the drugs tend to have negative side-effects, be costly and, last but not least, that
procuring them might even be a criminal offence.
What is to follow is intended to contribute to the current debate in two ways:
first, by adding some interesting and novel perspectives on human enhancement
and, second, by providing a practical introduction to virtue ethics. Regardless of
position, it seems that developing additional philosophical approaches that are
likely to facilitate the discussions and help to tease out the issues at stake would be
in everyone’s interest. As Claude Bernard pointed out—“Art is I: Science is We”.

9
D. M. Warburton (1992), Nicotine as a cognitive enhancer, Progress in Neuro-Psychopharma-
cology and Biological Psychyiatry, 16(2), pp. 181–191: Newhouse et al (2004), Effects of nicotine
stimulation on cognitive performance, Current Oppinion in Pharmacology, 4(1) pp.36–46: Rusted
et al (2005) Nicotine Improves memory for delayed intentions, Psychopharmacology (Berl),
182(3), pp. 355–365: Tieges et al (2004), Caffeine strengthens action monitoring: Evidence from
the error related negativity, Brain Research, Cognitive Brain Research, 21(1), pp. 87–93.
10
By drugs I mean so called nootropics i.e. pharmacological substances that have physiological
effects on the brain.
11
Note that even small changes could make adifference, see e.g. N. Bostrom and A. Sandberg, Cog-
nitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, Sci Eng Ethics (2009) 15:311–341.
12
For a discussion and more examples see, for example, J. Savulescu and N. Bostrom (eds.),
Human Enhancement, OUP, 2009: Greely et al (2008), Towards responsible use of cogni-
tive-enhancing drugs by the healthy, Nature 456: 702–705; DAK. Gesundheitsreport 2009.
Analyse der Arbeitsunfa¨higkeitsdaten. Schwerpunktthema Doping am Arbeitsplatz. 2009.
http://www.dak.de/content/ filesopen/Gesundheitsreport_2009.pdf
13
For a broader discussion of the effects of ‘cognition enhancers’ in a healthy brain see e.g.
Academy of Medical Sciences Report, Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs (2008), Chap. 8.
For a summary of Cochrain reviews regarding the effects see R. Jones et al (2007). Cognition
enhancers. In D. Nutt, T. Robbins, G. Stimson, M. Ince and A. Jackson (2007). Drugs and the
future: brain science, addiction and society. Elsevier, London, UK; A. Sandberg (2011) Cogni-
tion Enhacement – upgrading the brain, in: Savulescu, J., Meulen, R., T., Kahane, G., Enhancing
Human Capacities, Wiley-Blackwell p. 79.
Chapter 1
The Problem

Looking around the world today two things are obvious: (1) humans are severely
challenged in the area of rational decision-making, and (2) as a result of e.g.
­technological developments society around us is getting increasingly complex.
Numerous scientific studies in the fields of, for example, neurology and
­neuropsychology have shown that information overload and stress have a very
negative impact on capacities such as memory (both process and long-term), risk
assessment and epistemic deference.1 We can envision various ways of honing our
decision-making skills ranging from a commitment to behaving better or perhaps
carrying out radical changes to the political structure, to using drugs and nanotech
brain implants designed to make people less selfish and short-sighted. Indeed,
some such technologies might be less futuristic than one might think. In the last
decade alone there have been significant breakthroughs in so called BMI (brain
machine interface) technologies.2 Very generally speaking, these are techniques
which enable researchers to connect machines to the human nervous system.3 The
machines are then used to stimulate the brain and already today BMIs are used to
treat deafness, Parkinson’s disease and depression.4

1 See for example Torkel Klingberg, Den översvämmade hjärnan, Natur och Kultur, 2007: E
Hallowell, Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People Underperform, Harvard Business Review,
2005.
2 Lebedev MA, Nicolelis MA. Brain–machine interfaces: past, present and future. Trends

Neurosci 29: 536–546.

3 Vidal J. (1973) Toward Direct Brain–Computer Communication Annual Review of Biophysics

and Bioengineering, Mullins LJ, editor. Annual Reviews, Inc., Palo Alto, Vol. 2, 1973, pp.
157–180.
4 Berger F. et al. (2008) Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Brain-Implants Using Nano-Scale

Materials and Techniques, NanoEthics, Volume 2, Number 3 (2008), 241–249, DOI: 10.1007/
s11569-008-0044-9

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 1

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_1, © The Author(s) 2013
2 1 The Problem

1.1 The Costs of Poor Decision-Making

Most people are less than optimally placed for good decision-making and the chal-
lenges are both moral (bias, lacking objectivity) and intellectual (poor at processing
large amounts of information and at identifying experts). The widespread lack of
ability poses a very real threat to our quality of life. Not only is a great number of
people not leading as good a life as they could but, arguably more seriously, our
survival as a species might be under threat if we continue to make ill-informed
decisions. Consider, for example, the lack of collaboration on how best to curb
global warming, the number of armed conflicts raging around the world and the
on-going Financial Crisis.
Yet another example of the far-ranging consequences of bad decision-making
is the refusal of some parents to give their children the MMR vaccine on the
grounds that there is an increased risk for the child to develop autism. Numerous
scientific studies have shown that there is no such connection and that the origi-
nal scare was based a report which had used false material. Unfortunately the
impact has been limited and this misconception has resulted in measles becoming
more common in the population. As shown in a recent WHO Report Europe is in
fact close to a measles epidemic which is especially depressing since the disease
had been successfully combated for many years.5 Such decisions reveal both a
lack of understanding of the practical facts and a deeply rooted irrationality as it
is the well-being and life-quality of these very individuals (as opposed to that of
some other group in society, or a future generations or an alien species) that is at
stake.
The 2012 Report on Global Risks (World Economic Forum) lists the biggest
threats to our future prosperity and security.6 While the top three in the category of
‘most likely to occur’ is: severe income disparity, chronic fiscal imbalances and
rising green house emissions, the biggest threats from the perspective of ‘negative
impact’ are: major systemic financial failure, water supply crisis and food supply
crisis. The report also brings up the threat of the ‘x-factor’, i.e. events that cannot
be foreseen.
Most of the risks cannot be eradicated, nor is it plausible that negative out-
comes can be avoided altogether. Successful management and mitigation of such
crisis requires skilful leadership, wisdom, flexibility, creativity, courage, hon-
esty and collaboration to mention but a few capacities. On a brighter note how-
ever, we can improve on the current state of affairs and limit the impact both
on people’s quality of life and on the planet. But such endeavours requires col-
laboration, commitment, research and the allocation of financial resources. It
would appear that we, both as a collective and as individuals, can ill afford poor
decision-making.

5 See the Weekly Mortality and Morbidity Report Increased Transmission and Outbreaks of
Measels European Region, 2011 December 2, 2011/60(47):1605–1610
6 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2012.pdf
1.2 Involving All Groups 3

1.2 Involving All Groups

Because of the potentially life altering nature of these issues the discussions and
the dialogue ought to be as inclusive as possible.7 Research breakthroughs in medi-
cine, bioscience and nanotechnology offer opportunities for great benefit to people
and significant economic development but they also raise strong public concerns
with regards to, for example, ethics, privacy and autonomy. Judging by the pace at
which, for example, biotechnology and nanotechnology develop it seems likely
that the ethical questions will become increasingly pressing and complex. In light
of what we know about the problems that plague the dialogue between laypeople
and experts on these issues (e.g. their focus on different aspects as well as framing
issues) it is of the highest importance to bring about conditions which allow and
enable experts from various academic backgrounds to meet and discuss both with
each other and with representatives from lay group communities.8
The agenda of the society-wide dialogue on human enhancement should
include both which decisions we ought to make right now and how best to improve
our capacity for making good decisions both today and in the future. Further, it
would be of the essence to explore how this situation could be addressed in a way
that is as un-restricting and un-invasive (both in the moral and physical sphere)
as possible. In order to promote this type of engagement it is important to choose
suitable examples. On that note, I have purposely sought to stay clear of cases that
might be perceived by the reader as unrealistic. In fact one needs to look no fur-
ther than to people’s everyday lives to find examples of performance enhancement:
both nicotine and alcohol are (in moderate quantities) known to have a positive
impact on concentration and sociability.
Public engagement activities have shown that people in general view sub-
stances like coffee, tea and coca-cola as radically different from drugs, even in
cases where the effects would be similar.9 Interestingly, however, studies have also
shown that an increasing number of healthy people regularly use prescription
drugs in order to enhance their cognitive performance.10 For the purposes of this
text I take ‘healthy people’ to be individuals who fall within the range of what is
considered normal.11 Evidently, the capacity of those who find themselves at the
lower-end might differ radically from those at the top-end, but the point is that
they all meet the criteria of what society has decided to view as normal variation.

7 On the importance of public involvement in the EU see e.g. J. Habermas (2011) Zur
Verfassung Europas—Ein Essay, Ersatz
8 See e.g. NanoBio-RAISE and Nano2Life (FP6) and ETHENTECH (FP7) and the AHRC

Framing Effects in Ethical Dilemmas project 2010–1012.

9 See e.g. Academy of Medical Sciences Report, Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs (2008),

p 149.
10 See for example Sahakian and Morein-Zamir. 2007. Professor’s little helper. Nature 450:

1157–1159.
11 In this I broadly follow the 1946 WHO definition of health as “A state of complete physical,

mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.
4 1 The Problem

This essay will describe three different ways to improve decision-making skills:
promotion of virtue ethics, drugs and technology, lifestyle changes. Chapter 7
­contains a discussion on the respective advantages and disadvantages of these
methods as well as some possible combinations of the three. Already here, how-
ever, I will offer a brief sketch of the three main reasons for why it is a good idea
to approach human enhancement from a virtue ethics perspective.

1.3 Virtue Ethics as a Possible Solution

The ancient Greeks held that one way of radically improving decision-making
capacity and overall good judgement comes through instilling a set of moral and
intellectual virtues. These virtues, understood as stable character traits, would then
issue in actions that are (more) in line with what is actually good for us. ‘Old’ virtues
such as generosity, courage and temperance, as well as ‘new’ virtues such as creativity,
intellectual honesty, improved memory (both working memory and long-term mem-
ory) and open-mindedness are likely to be highly useful.12 Such capacities come into
play both on the micro-level and the macro-level as being more virtuous will enable
us to make better decisions both in everyday practical situations and on a societal
level, e.g. policy decisions. Notably, all these virtues are taken to be valuable in their
own right, as opposed to pure instrumental value.

1.3.1 The Virtue Ethics Approach Promotes Engagement

The intellectual and character virtues tend to be (roughly) in line with many people’s
well considered, stable moral intuitions and this seems to be the case both for indi-
viduals of secular and non-secular convictions.13 In general, agents are less likely
to reject new ideas if those ideas are compatible, at least to some extent, with the
value system they already subscribe to.14 While this is of course not a right-mak-
ing feature in and of itself it is, it is a distinct advantage as we are talking about
applied ethics rather than the purely theoretical version. As the initial acceptance
threshold is fairly low this assists in creating a platform for the type of society-
wide, inclusive, dialogue that I argue in favour of.

12 For an explanation of why memory is included here please see Chap. 5.

13 For an interesting discussion on such aspects as broadly conceived of see, for example, the
work of Professor Celia Deane-Drummond, Notre Dame University, http://theology.nd.edu/
people/faculty/celia-deane-drummond/
14 Here it should be added that the religious person would draw on the interpretation of the

scriptures and the ‘revelations of God’ for their moral virtues. The point I seek to make here,
however, is more a general one namely that many non-religious person would subscribe to simi-
lar values even though they have other methods for identifying them.
1.3 Virtue Ethics as a Possible Solution 5

Such a dialogue is the modern version of what Aristotle referred to as the dia-
lectic method—his main method for intellectual enquiry into morality. For
Aristotle this meant that he thought that the whole moral enterprise ought to
begin with ‘what is known to us’.15 To him, such a common starting point was
absolutely essential. What then ought to be done is to test the theory against those
beliefs and if they do not correspond it is bad news for the theory rather than for
the common sense view held by good people. However, this method is controver-
sial as it makes the theory very vulnerable to attacks. Aristotle claimed that his
conclusions about ethics are objectively true but as the Skeptics (and others)
pointed out it is far from obvious that any universal conclusions can be drawn
from these initial common beliefs. Simply put the main problem of (pure) dialec-
tics is that people have different opinions and an ethical theory that rests solely on
common sense beliefs is easily attacked. To get out of this situation and refute the
critics Aristotle had to show the following three things. Firstly, that people have
other reasons (than what their views happen to be) for accepting what he claims
in the Nicomachean Ethics. Secondly, that there is a connection between the vir-
tues and self-interest, i.e. why it is in my interest to do the fine and noble. Thirdly,
that this proof is based on objective facts about why a rational agent should
choose to act in accordance with the virtues. Fortified like this the method morphs
into a ‘strong dialectic’.16 Here the theory is shown to rest on common sense
beliefs and objective truths, e.g. facts of human nature, thus becoming more solid.
The open dialogue also links in well with other aspects of Aristotle’s theory. By
and large his approach leans towards the pragmatic: this is supposed to be ethics
for people such as us and it really comes down to what type of life we want overall.
This can then be contrasted with competing theories such as consequentialism and
deontology where the main focus is on how agents ought to act in specific situations.

1.3.2 Virtues as Useful Skills in a Changing Society

Instilling the virtues would, plausibly, generate a positive, twofold effect. It would
groom us for the future and it would also make us better decision-makers, i.e.
increase our well-being, in the present. Becoming more virtuous is likely to help
us deal better with novel situations as they present themselves. Presumably this is
likely to be advantageous as society around us changes at an ever increasing pace.
Consider, for example, how the information-flow through the Internet (blogs, tweets
etc.) is multiplying and how traditional authorities are drowned out by the self-
acclaimed experts who present themselves at a baffling rate. Evidently some, perhaps
even many, have sound knowledge but the problem is that it is very hard to tell who
is genuine and what their agenda is. This exploding access to information is in fact

15 /NE1095b4/
16 See T.H. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
6 1 The Problem

often hailed as one of the great advantages of the Internet. It is thought that a less
restricted flow levels the playing field and empowers the citizens. While that might
be true to an extent, it constitutes a very real problem as people simply do not know
whom to listen to when they are flooded with contradictory information. Increasing
openness and access is, in principle, positive and even if it could be restricted (which
seems highly implausible) it is far from clear that such a move would improve mat-
ters. In light of this it would seem a superior strategy to adapt and seek to become
better at epistemic deference and rational decision-making for example.

1.3.3 Virtue as Good Overall Judgement

When the virtues have been instilled people become better decision-makers overall.
While we cannot predict the future it appears reasonable to assume that the world will
continue to change at a rather high rate. Presumably it will also become increasingly
complex. This means that humans will face new situations in which we need to
make responsible and well-considered decisions. Now, given that we cannot know
the exact nature of the issues it would make sense to seek to increase capacities such
as equity and overall good judgement. As suggested above that is both a responsible
way to tackle the current situation and to prepare to face the yet unknown.
Instilling the virtues creates positive spin-off effects where we will become
more apt at deciding both which technological and medical enhancement tech-
niques we might need, and how they should be put to optimal use. For a current
example, consider the, at times rather heated, discussion on which type of knowl-
edge students ought to acquire in schools.17 Very briefly the argument is that the
current educational system forces the students to make choices at a very early
stage and that such streamlining is negative both for the individual and for society.
The critics call for ‘fundamental knowledge’ which in practice is a return to a
more classical education involving subjects such as history, literature and philoso-
phy. The argument is that such knowledge enables people both to make sense of
the world around them and contribute to making them more creative problem solv-
ers and thus better decision-makers.

1.4 Is Virtue Really an Alternative for the Many?

While this might sound all good and well the following question immediately pre-
sents itself: given the scientific evidence that we have a tendency to make poor
decisions then how plausible is it really that the majority of people would both be

17 The example is from Sweden but similar discussions are taking place in many other countries

as well.
1.4 Is Virtue Really an Alternative for the Many? 7

willing, let alone actually able, to lead the virtuous life? I quite agree. Aristotle him-
self pointed out that the virtuous life is an acquired taste, that it requires a lot of train-
ing and that it can seem hard at times. Consequently, I am certainly not ruling out the
introduction of technological and/or medical enhancements but only in combination
with the life-style changes that comes with virtue (this is explored in Chap. 7).
In the debate it is frequently suggested that human enhancement is incompat-
ible with a virtue ethical perspective. I believe such broad claims to be misplaced.
Admittedly there is no guarantee that enough people would want to take on a more
virtuous life-style, neither is there an automatic connection between increased
intellectual capacity and high moral maturity. In other words: were we to rely
solely on enhancement through drugs and technology we would run the risk of
creating a society populated with highly intelligent but immoral agents. My claim
is instead that while it is likely that we will need both methods, a good reason to
start with the virtue part right now is that it will make us better at deciding what
kind of technological and medical assistance we might require.
That said, it is not correct to say that virtue ethics is a ‘bootstrap’ theory. In
many ways humans can be inspired by and model themselves on the positive exam-
ple set by others. The fact that there are very few, perhaps no, perfect human beings
around does not undermine this idea. There are plenty of ‘situation-based’ role
models, e.g. the young doctor can look to a senior colleague for how best to deliver
difficult information to a patient. The Junior can recognise that the Senior might
not be excellent in all respects, in fact she could be very average when it comes
to generosity, but that is not to say that she cannot serve as a good role model on
occasions such as these. Another example might be Ghandi, while it might have
been the case that he neglected his own family and himself that does not make
him an unsuitable role-model for us when we seek to learn what courage and self-
lessness might be. It could also be objected that not everyone, for all their good
intentions, will have the same capacity for self-improvement. Again, even if that is
recognised it would seem the case that the vast majority of people can improve on
themselves to some extent (this will be expanded on in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7).
The idea that a life lived in accordance with the virtues is the good life for
being such as us is central to this essay. This is the life where we flourish, can
exercise our rational capacities and grow as human beings. In other words, it gives
us the best shot at making the most of our lives. Admittedly the virtuous life will,
at times, be hard, demanding and not at all as pleasurable as Aristotle et al. would
have people believe. But that fact is not incompatible with the claim defended
here, namely that those who chose this life will, in general, fare better than those
who do not. It should also be mentioned that the merits of the life of virtue needs
to be assessed from an ‘overall quality of life perspective’. Notably, this is not
intended as a complete or exegetic account of virtue ethics. Rather, the aim here
is to discuss how some key ideas in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, when inter-
preted in a contemporary context, can be a productive approach.
Chapter 2
The Good Life

This chapter introduces Aristotle’s version of the good life. The Greek term is
eudaimonia but I will use the words ‘fulfilled’, ‘happy’ and ‘good’ interchangeably
when I refer to this type of life. As part of this discussion a number of key con-
cepts e.g. the dialectic method, the function argument and ergon will also be
explained. I will try to keep the theory (as well as the Greek terms) to a minimum
and mix it up with practical examples. A theoretical background is, however, nec-
essary for the later discussion of the applicability and usefulness of virtue ethics.1
This chapter also contains an account of some aspects of modern life that are
likely to have a negative impact on many peoples’ quality of life. For example, the
borderline obsession with happiness in combination with a narrow take on what
type of experiences might qualify. The chapter finishes on a more upbeat note as
the final sections are spent defending the idea that, if only viewed a bit more plu-
ralistically, the good life is indeed a life many of us could lead.
Notably, this is not intended as an authoritative, or exegetic, reading of
Aristotle. Rather, the contribution this essay seeks to make is to show that, if read
somewhat creatively, many of the ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotles cen-
tral work on ethics) make for a highly useful approach to modern moral problems.2
In fact it seems that Aristotle would approve of such attempts. In the
Nicomachean Ethics he writes
This, then, is a sketch of the good: for, presumably, we must draw the outline first, and fill
it in later. If the sketch is good, anyone, it seems, can advance and articulate it, and in such
cases time discovers more, or is a good partner in discovery. This is also how the crafts
have improved, since anyone can add what is lacking [in the outline].3

1 Parts of this chapter has been previously published on the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics
blog and as an the article B. Froding, Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life,
Neuroethics (2011) 4:223–234.
2 Unless stated otherwise I have used Irwin’s translation of the NE. Aristotle (1999). The

Nicomachean Ethics (translation and introduction by T. Irwin), Hackett, 2nd edition.

3 /NE1098a22-26/.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 9

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_2, © The Author(s) 2013
10 2 The Good Life

Moreover, it is clear that anyone who wants Aristotle’s argument to make sense
needs to stretch it a bit: the original text is both patchy and filled with repetitions
and the Greek frequently indeterminate.
In some respects my reading of the Nicomachean Ethics diverges from the
standard one. One such instance has bearing on the issues discussed in this chap-
ter. It regards the contested issue of whether or not the happy life is a possibility
for many or just a few (or indeed no one). Very briefly, my take on this is that the
combination of (1) statements such as ‘a lot of people can be happy’,4 (2)
Aristotle’s dialectical method, and (3) Aristotle’s usage of paradigm cases which
are deliberately extreme in order to be as clear as possible, speaks in favour of the
idea that the happy life might not be conditional on complete virtue. In practice
this means that we do not have to be perfect in order to count as morally good but,
rather, that one can be ‘good enough’.5 This is not merely a theoretical point. As
will be shown later on this reading has quite concrete implications both for what a
good life is and its availability for the many.

2.1 The Good Life According to Aristotle

Aristotle famously argued that a life lived in line with the virtues is the best life
for any human being. This is the happy and fulfilled life, the life that allows us to
flourish and realise all our capacities. Notably, however, this life is not just a set of
actions–it is a set of actions performed by someone who does them because she
correctly sees the point in doing them.
On the Aristotelian account the virtues have both cognitive and emotional
dimensions and these will be further explained and detailed in Chap. 4. While
modern psychologist might find some aspects of his analysis less convincing than
others, Aristotle did indeed touch on something that is still a central question in
ethics. Namely: is moral virtue something that can be mastered through rigor-
ous training, or, is it a part of human nature? If the former is correct it seems that
the virtues could be acquired through education and practice, thus implying that
morality to an extent is about ‘effort’. The latter answer, on the other hand, sug-
gests that morality is an inbuilt quality that some agents possess and other do not
or, at the very least, that we possess to different extents.
To Aristotle it was quite clear that a combination of education, habituation and
lifelong practice is the way to instil the virtues. Similarly to other forms of knowl-
edge they will come in stages and the process is likely to be long and require con-
siderable commitment and effort. One way of learning is to look to the example of a
good man (for more on this see Chaps. 4 and 7). The idea is that we can recognise
virtue in others without mastering the virtues ourselves (just like we can see when
someone is in fine health without having a 1st in medicine) and seek to model our-
selves on that. As a consequence, Aristotle denied that there might be a ‘talent for

4 See Book 1.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

5 See also, Chaps. 4 and 7.
2.1 The Good Life According to Aristotle 11

morality’. He rejected the idea that some individuals could be more morally gifted
and that the virtue would come easier to some because they have a certain set of
other personal qualities.6 Aristotle had to insist that we all have a capacity for virtue
and vice as he wanted to make a strong case for personal moral responsibility.
For Aristotle the moral value of an action is based on whether or not the agent
can see what she is doing as making sense from the point of view of the fulfilled life.
This is not to say, however, that the consequences are irrelevant and should be wholly
disregarded. Consequences do matter to the virtuous agent but they are simply not
the right-making feature against which ones actions are to be evaluated. In the case
of the good life one has to think specifically about the quality of what one is doing
and only secondarily of the causal effectiveness. For example: my bioethics mentor
Professor A has had an accident and will hospitalized for a week. Visiting people in
the hospital might be a kind thing to do for an array of reasons one of which would
be that it is often boring to be a patient–time passes slowly and there is little distrac-
tion from the pain. As a virtuous person I will do what is kind but not as an instru-
ment to cheer Professor A up. While that is a positive consequence my reason for
acting is for the sake of the fine and noble. Now, in most cases the virtuous action
will indeed generate the best outcome but the fact that this is not always the case
hardly poses a threat to the validity of the theory as such.

2.2 Eudaimonia

Aristotle argued that the supreme human good is eudaimonia. This is the happy
and fulfilled life for any human being. Regardless whatever else one might want
out of life, whatever one’s preferences: this is the best available life. Further to
that point Aristotle held that this is something that all rational humans would
­understand. This life is far more than just an option among other equally good
alternative lives, and in the Nicomachean Ethics he sought to show the reader what
kind of a person she needs to be in order to lead this happy life.
Eudaimonia is the ultimate justification for living in a certain way. It is rational
to want eudaimonia as Aristotle conceived of it because it is only then we flour-
ish, i.e. realize all our capacities and are fully human. The eudaimon life consists
of all intrinsically worthwhile actions and as such it is always the best life avail-
able to us. Adding something to such a life will not mean an improvement because
it necessarily includes all the activities that are valuable for humans. Arguably
this might strike the reader as a bit odd, let us imagine the following scenario:
Professor C is leading a fulfilled life when she learns that she has been awarded
the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Now, is it plausible that this really would add noth-
ing in form of fulfilment to her life? One way of interpreting Aristotle would
be that it is the theory of happiness that has to be complete and self-sufficient.
However, even if we accept eudaimonia as the best possible life that alone neither
explains what sort of life it is, nor which activities we should engage into fulfil this
end. The answer has to do with our nature and mans’ so called ergon.

6 In the sense of ‘natural virtue’.

12 2 The Good Life

2.3 Ergon

To know what is good for us we need to know what kind of beings we are. For
Aristotle humans, animals and plants all have souls. Not in the sense that they all
have a conscious aim but more in the sense that they have an internal organization
which explains how they typically behave, that “its organizational purposiveness
governs all its activities”.7 But even though we might have different types of souls
(as a result of being organized differently) we all share one thing: the well-being
of any organism depends on how well it can exercise its capabilities.
Ergon is the distinctly human. It is either something that only humans can do or
something that we can do better than all other animals and plants. To reach fulfilment
we need to perform those skills/capacities which are special to humans and we need
to perform them well. In the Nicomachean Ethics happiness for a human being is said
to be the “…activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and
most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one.”8 Recognizing that there
might be a dispute as to what such a good is Aristotle said that any candidate for the
good must be completely self-sufficient: therefore it cannot be e.g. wealth, pleasure or
honour—as they are all means to an end. This is of course a normative account of the
final good and those who do not agree have mistaken desires according to Aristotle.
It is by looking at the ergon that we judge the excellence of a person, an ani-
mal, a plant or a thing.9 Although mankind has ergon as a group for Aristotle, we
all have the same ‘amount’, it seems reasonable to assume that he would have
agreed that the more virtuous a person is the better she would be at fulfilling her
ergon. Contrary to ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ ergon does not deal with identity aspects
of change (physical or otherwise) but with activity—ergon always issue in action.
It is by understanding our ergon that we can gain knowledge both about the con-
nection between the soul and the virtues and about how the virtues contribute to
the overall good and enables man to be happy.

2.4 The Function Argument

Aristotle’s whole system is firmly grounded in the study of human nature and
human motivation. Very broadly speaking the way to know what to do, accord-
ing to Aristotle, is to seek the judgment of a good man. Such a good man would
know what the right thing to do would be for any agent in a given situation. This is
highly relevant as his ethics are about being sensitive to situations, to what the cir-
cumstances require and then to be motivated to act in the right way. In other words
it is our nature that determines what fulfilment must look like for us, an assertion
which brings us to the Function Argument.
7 Hughes G. (2001), Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics, NY: Routledge,
p. 34.
8 /NE1098a17-20/.
9 Note, however, that only humans can be happy.
2.4 The Function Argument 13

The Function Argument is Aristotle’s favoured method for discovering what

human fulfilment consists in. This is a normative account stipulating that facts
about human nature should determine what is good for a human being. The coun-
ter argument would be a straight forward conative account claiming that a person’s
desires should determine what is good for her. To reject the idea of any common
human nature is a fairly radical position to take. That is not to say, of course, that a
specific interpretation of what it is cannot be rejected but perhaps not the very exist-
ence of a set of features common to all humans. To discard the latter notion seems
to be a bit more than to simply assert the freedom to choose ones moral ideals.
The description of the Function Argument is somewhat short but this was not a
problem as the reader was assumed to have the necessary background e.g. from
having read Plato’s Republic. In fact, Aristotle made a lot of assumptions about his
students and he had a quite narrowly defined person in mind.10 Already at the
beginning of the teaching the student would subscribe to a certain set of values
influencing the way they viewed the world. These values are called the first princi-
ples, or archai, examples would be laws of nature and basic intuitions of the kind
that eudaimonia equals human good. That is not to say, of course, that this was the
ethics of the Athenians only. Aristotle’s claim was far stronger than that—he
argued that it is valid for all of mankind and anyone who is rational would see
that. It deserves pointing out, however, that he never sought to convince those who
had radically different views of life that this was the only path to happiness.
Aristotle was not taking on the role of the moral missionary in that sense.
In Chaps. 4 and 7, I will discuss weather or not Aristotle’s sterotypical view of
who his student is and what he knows threatens to undermine the applicability of
the theory as a whole.

2.5 Two Takes on Human Fulfillment

The fact that the Nicomachean Ethics is, in places, somewhat ambiguous has caused
disagreement on a number of issues amongst scholars. One especially heated debate
pertains to what type of activities the happy life should involve. One interpretation,
the Inclusivist, is that it should include a range of activities, both the practical and the
theoretical. The other view, the Exclusivist, is that true fulfillment can only be real-
ised in one single activity namely that of theoretical contemplation (Theoria).
The problem is that these two views yield very different visions of who the
truly virtuous being is. Is it someone who contributes to society (helps to run
things) in a way that perhaps even enables others to lead morally admirable lives?
Or is it a person in an ivory tower who contemplates Theoria in splendid isola-
tion? A more pragmatic interpretation would be the following: it is the theory of
eudaimonia that must be self-sufficient and lacking in nothing—that it must list

10 For a critique see Chap. 6.

14 2 The Good Life

all the goods there are. In practice, however, it is the exercise of all the virtues that
makes this life worth living. The conclusion of the Function Argument, i.e. that
we should exercise all the virtues–both the character virtues and the intellectual
virtues, supports this. In practice, the happy life for the vast majority of people
will be a mix of the practical and the theoretical, leaving ample space for exercis-
ing both the intellectual and the character virtues. What the exact balance between
them ought to be would presumably depend on the individual’s capacity.

2.6 The Good Life is an All-Inclusive

Aristotle does not seem to want to leave anything good or nice for the vicious. For
example, when he builds up the Function Argument Aristotle seeks to contrast his
vision with competing views of the happy life. He wants to show that his version
includes all the good things and, further, that to exercise the virtues is pleasurable.
Commenting on Aristotle’s wish to pack all that is good into the happy life Roger
Crisp writes
By incorporating into his position the generally accepted view that wealth, power and so
on are honourable in themselves, he advances his eudaimonistic aim of showing that the
happiness constituted by virtue is ‘lacking in nothing’. Finally, it is clear that wealth,
power, and indeed honour, have value only as elements within the virtuous life itself. It is
the noble which really matters, though the noble will be partly manifested in the actively
virtuous possession of great wealth and other external goods.11

2.7 Unhappiness in the Modern Society

Thus far we have looked at happiness and the good life from an ancient perspec-
tive. Below this will be compared and contrasted with the perspective of the mod-
ern society.12 Somewhat gloomily, however, I propose to begin by discussing why
so many claim to be so unhappy.13
Over the last two decades an increasing number of people—young and old,
women and men, even children—appear to have grown increasingly unsatisfied.14

11 Crisp R., Aristotle on Greatness of Soul, in Kraut R. Blackwell Companion to the

Nicomachean Ethics, Blackwell, 2006. p. 14.
12 Note that the studies quoted below draw on subjective self-assessment of well-being and

satisfaction.
13 For a broader discussion on reasons see, for example, C. Lasch (1979), The Culture of

Narcissicm, New York: Norton: Z. Bauman (1991), Modernity and Ambivalence. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press: Z. Bauman (1993) Postmodern Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Basil
Blackwell: Z. Bauerman (2000) Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.
14 See for example The UN Human Development Report 2011 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/;

International Living’s Annual Quality of Life Index 2011; Eurobarometer 75 http://ec.europa.eu/

public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_publ_en.pdf.
2.7 Unhappiness in the Modern Society 15

The fact that a great many rate their own levels of contentment and happiness as
low has, however, triggered a rather fierce debate as to the cause and effect as well
as to how accurate a tool self-assessment polling really is. The subject of this
essay is of course the philosophical aspects of what a happy human life plausibly
could be taken to be. None the less I think that a few concrete examples from this
rather polarised debate can shed some light on this.
Consider the following case: in spite of objectively being among the best off in
the world a relatively large number of Swedish teens and young adults rank their
level of well-being comparatively low. When polled they report that they suffer
from anxiety, stress and unhappiness.
One example is the WHO report ‘Health Behaviour in School-aged Children
(HBSC)’ which is based on national studies of young people’s health and well-
being. Some 40 countries participated in this study the aim of which is to “gain
new insight into, and increase our understanding of young people’s health and
well-being, health behaviours and their social context”.15 When asked to rank their
life satisfaction Swedish children and teens scored significantly lower than the
other Nordic countries. According to the national 2005/2006 report 43 % of
15–16 year olds said that they felt down at least once a week (to be compared with
25 % in 1985 for example). The 2007 Status Report summary states that
Self-reported mental ill health—such as anxiety, worry, or anguish and continuous tired-
ness—has decreased to some degree in several population groups since the beginning of
the 21st century, having previously shown an increasing trend for some years. In certain
groups, however, mental ill health has continued to increase since the years of 2000–2001,
in particular among young women. 16

A follow-up study (released in 2011) again confirmed that mental health and
overall well-being continue to decrease among Swedish teens. The survey, carried
out by the Swedish National Institute of Public Health, has very high statistic qual-
ity. The response rate was 83 % which means that over 172,000 pupils in grade
6–9 completed the questionnaire. While the majority of all students have good
mental health it is clear that the level of mental ill increases the older the students
get and, further, that girls report more mental ill health compared with boys.17
These results are echoed in others studies e.g. ‘MTV Well-being Study’ which
polled 5,200 16–34 year olds in 14 countries on their own perceived sense of well-
being. Although Swedes ended up high in the ranking overall it is interesting to
note that only 27 % said that they were happy (compare e.g. with Argentina 75,
Mexico 71 and Indonesia 62 %).18

15 http://www.hbsc.org/.
16 FHI, Swedish National Institute of Public Health, summary of Status Report 2007: Public
Health and Social Conditions.
17 For the full report see http://www.fhi.se/Publikationer/Alla-publikationer/Kartlaggning-av-

psykisk-halsa-bland-barn-och-unga/.
18 MTV International Wellbeing Study.
16 2 The Good Life

Such findings have received a lot of attention from Swedish politicians, journal-
ist and the general public alike.19 The discussion regards both the possible causes
and the reliability of such findings and it appears safe to assume that there are
many complex factors at play here and no one explanation covers it all. A contrib-
uting factor, however, might be an implicit or explicit expectation that a good and
successful life must not involve experiences like failure and disappointment.20

2.8 The Praise Cult

An increasing number of child psychologists, for example Dr Carol Craig (Chief

Executive of the Centre for Confidence and Glasgow), worry that there is a ten-
dency among teachers and parents to tell young people that the most important
thing in life is whether or not they feel happy. Dr Craig has argued that the exag-
gerated focus on building self-esteem leaves adults overly afraid of criticising the
children. “Parents no longer want to hear if their children have done anything
wrong. This is the downside of the self-esteem agenda. The problem is that if you
tell parents that it’s incredibly important that children feel good all the time, we
will get people going out of their way to boost children’s self-esteem all the time”.
The concern is that absence of criticism will cause the children to become narcis-
sistic and leave them ill-prepared to form lasting relationships.21
The well-known Danish child psychologist and family therapist Jesper Juhl has
voiced similar views
A healthy self esteem is a deep existential quality that enriches people and makes it pos-
sible for them to enrich the lives of other people. Self confidence is a very good thing
when it comes to our development of skills—practical, personal, academic, sport and so
on. But a strong self confidence does not give you more self esteem. The current trend
among European parents is to constantly praise children—no matter what and how they
do. This does not strengthen their self esteem it only pumps up their egos. Personal feed-
back is much better—both for parents and children—and it strengthens self esteem on
both sides. 22

19 For a broader discussion on some of these aspects see e.g. M. Alvesson (2006), Tomhetens

Triumf, Atlas och Liber, Sweden: L. Teurell and B. Sigrell (2011), Jag, mig och mit—om nar-
cissism i vår tid, Lind & Co, Sweden: J. M Twenge and K. Cambell (2009) The Narcissism
Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement—America in the Age of Entitlement, Free Press,
USA: J. M. Twenge (2007), Generation Me: Why Today's Young Americans Are More Confident,
Assertive, Entitled--And More Miserable Than Ever Before—Why Today's Young Americans Are
More Confident, Assertive, Entitled—and More Miserable Than Ever Before, Free Press, USA.
20 For a complete report and literary review covering the period 1945–2009, see the Health

Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences report “Time trends in mental health of
children and adolescents”. Barns och ungdomars psykiska hälsa i Sverige (April 2010).
21 From an interview in The Observer, 15.03.09.
22 http://www.familylab.de/files/Artikel_PDFs/Presse_PDFs/children_are_competent.pdf.
2.8 The Praise Cult 17

Assuming that most parents seek to do what they believe best for their children
this trend seems to imply that many parents and other adults believe that being
criticised (even in a constructive, sensitive and appropriate manner) would some-
how be incompatible with them being happy. But what do we really mean when
we say ‘happiness’ and when we talk about a happy, or a good, life? Is it the case
that we in society today tacitly, or otherwise, subscribe to the idea that a happy life
equals an uncomplicated life largely void of challenges?

2.9 Is Feeling Sad a Disease?

In the last two decades a substantial revision of criteria for clinical depression and
various other mental disorders have taken place. If the new criteria are correct they
would indicate that people are not only less happy than previously thought but in
fact that a large number of them meet the criteria of clinical depression. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, this has proven highly controversial and is the cause of heated
debate. At one end of the scale it is argued to be a society wide social construction
of disease and a medicalisation of the human condition. At the other end, it is con-
sidered evidence of the advancement of medicine and science: finally we are
beginning to understand mental disease and unhappiness in a way that can actually
help people, remove stigma and alleviate suffering.23
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) is published
by The American Psychiatric Association (APA) but is used all over the world as a
reference work on the classification of mental health disorders for both children
and adults. The current version is the fourth, revised, edition (DSM-IV-TR) and
DSM V is expected to be published in May 2013.24 While often referred to as the
‘shrink bible’ the DSM is far from uncontroversial. For example, the definition of
depression as an illness of the brain best explained in biological terms has received
a lot of attention. The critics have, amongst other things, argued that the symptoms
are so broadly defined that people mistakenly think they have them, that the symp-
toms are not reliable indicators of mental illness and that the focus should be on
the causes rather than the symptoms.25
American psychotherapist Gary Greenberg (to use but one example) questions
the usefulness of the revised criteria suggesting that it conflates ‘ordinary sadness
and general blues’ with mental illness. In his 2010 book “Manufacturing
Depression” Greenberg explains that according to the DSM definition what begins
as a normal condition of life, i.e. feeling sad, becomes diagnosable as the illness

23 For a discussion see e.g. I. Hacking (1999) The Social Construction of What? Harvard

University Press: I. Hacking, Making up People, London Review of Books, Vol 28. No. 16, pp.
23–26.
24 For the online draft version of DSM V please see http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx.
25 Other hotly debated DSM definitions include ADD (Attention-Deficit Disorder) and ADHD

(Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder).
18 2 The Good Life

depression after two weeks. He also points out that it follows from the description of
symptoms in the DSM that 30 % of the adult US population is depressed. In other
words, that they match enough of the criteria on the list to have a diagnosable men-
tal disorder. Using similar definitions, the WHO writes that 50 % of all women and
25 % of all men will at some stage of their lives suffer depression.26 Depression
related illness is considered a leading cause of disability and WHO forecast that “By
the year 2020, depression is projected to reach 2nd place of the ranking of DALYs
calculated for all ages, both sexes. Today, depression is already the 2nd cause of
DALYs in the age category 15–44 years for both sexes combined”.27 (DALY or
Disability Adjusted Life Years i.e. the sum of years of potential life lost due to pre-
mature mortality and the years of productive life lost due to disability).
In addition to the problems relating to the criteria for diagnosis the long-term
risks of, for example, anti-depressants are not sufficiently researched. A 2012
report on the long-term effects of treatments for depression published by The
Swedish Council on Health Technology Assessment (SBU) high-lights several
problematic aspects.28 For example, that there is no or low evidence for the lasting
positive effects of anti-depressants and that the long-term impact is under-
researched.29 Clearly the DSM alone cannot be blamed for the lack of research but
the current situation makes an open, and inclusive, debate on diagnosis criteria as
well as suitable treatments, all the more important.
Evidently the task of this essay is not to discuss the medical aspects. It is
none the less hoped that the last paragraphs have gone some way to indicate how
entrenched the debate this field really is. Leaving the broader question of whether
or not society is engaging in ‘the social construction of disease’ we shall now return
to the philosophical question of what a happy life plausibly could be taken to be.

2.10 A Good Life in a Modern Society

As explained above it appears that a lot of people are unhappy and that the jury is
out on both the causes and the best treatments. From a philosophical perspective,
however, I would like to suggest that the problem is two-fold. Many people seem
obsessed with happiness and the pursuit thereof and, at the same time, deeply mis-
taken about what a happy life for a human being can be taken to be. Perhaps one
should instead begin by pondering the following: is it really the case that feeling bad
sometimes is always a bad thing and, further, if such moods automatically ought to
be considered evidence of illness. Understandably, this can sound provocative but
this is neither an attempt to glorify suffering, nor to construct a bootstrap argument.

26 WHO is currently working on an updated version of symptoms.

27 http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/definition/en/.
28 Summaries and penultimate draft published on their web 2012-01-11.
29 For more information see http://www.sbu.se/sv/.
2.10 A Good Life in a Modern Society 19

Arguably, sadness and suffering—even lengthy spells of it—is a normal reaction

to things like bereavement and loss. If a beloved spouse passes away, one ought to
feel extremely sad maybe even depressed. This is not being ill, it is being human.
The fact that we might (the effects are not really clear) get drugs that can alleviate
the symptoms—rather than addressing the actual problem—is not in itself a good
reason to take them. Perhaps we just have to live through it, adjust to the new reality,
learn to cope and eventually find new joys. An alternative is to device of strategies
of how people can be helped to cope better with their circumstances (regardless of
the causes). It appears plausible that a combination of drugs (if required) and ther-
apy and ‘coaching’ which will help us reflect and gain self-knowledge, and in turn,
increase acceptance might have a positive effect. Perhaps we can then escape the
melancholia that poison our minds and make us give up hope.
It is of course perfectly possible to conclude that mankind is a gloomy bunch
curtesy of our genetic make-up and that this, no fault of our own, is in fact our
natural state. Evidently it does not follow from the fact that something is natural
that it should be preserved or even that it is positive. Consider for example the case
of modern healthcare and how that enables both humans and animals to overcome
all kinds of ailments and disease which in a state of nature would have been det-
rimental to both life and well-being. This would then speak in favour of enhance-
ment through drugs and technology. Before jumping to that conclusion, however,
it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at what kind of experiences and pur-
suits a happy life for beings such as us might involve.

2.11 The Possibility of Many Good Lives

There is a tendency to talk about the happy life in the singular. Such an approach
does not, however, seem particularly compatible with the modern, democratic
ideal of pluralist values. A more palatable idea to most people is that there are sev-
eral versions of the happy and good life which, while they have a lot in common,
also involve different activities and pursuits.
Ancient Greece was, in spite of being the cradle of democracy, hardly a bastion of
pluralism and inclusiveness in the sense relevant to this discussion. It has been greatly
contested whether or not Aristotle recognised that there could be more than one ver-
sion of the good life. As previously mentioned the account given here diverges from
the standard one in some respects. One aspect concerns the type of activities that
should be involved, another aspect is the level to which the virtues have to be mas-
tered for a life to count as happy. Very briefly my position is the following: in prac-
tice the good life is about more than philosophical contemplation in an isolated ivory
tower. It is also about acting in accordance with the other, more practical, virtues and
about participating in society. For the good life to be a real possibility for the many,
and not only people like Plato and other great philosophers, seems to presuppose that
it consists of a mix of politics (i.e. practice) and philosophy (i.e. theory) and that the
exact balance of the two blocks depends to a large extent on the individual. Further,
20 2 The Good Life

and this is more controversial: an agent who possesses a large number of virtues and
is continent with regard to the rest can well be leading a happy life. The person would
of course exercise the virtues and seek to improve herself at all times but the point
is that she would not have to be perfect in every regard. In short, one both needs to
conduct one’s life well and interact in society and be able to stand back and reflect
on oneself, life and the world and see how it fits in with the bigger picture. For this
to be possible, however, the individual has to be out there in society something which
would expose her to an array of potentially negative experiences.

2.12 The Mixed Life

Very broadly speaking then there are two, incompatible, descriptions of the happy life
which curry favour in today’s society. One is to view a good life as a string of uninter-
rupted, pleasurable experiences, something which requires an extremely sheltered
existence. The other view is that a good life is filled with experiences, encounters and
interaction. But as we expose ourselves and introduce others into our lives we also
become susceptible to disappointment, loss and so on. Evidently I neither wish to
imply that pain and suffering are good states in themselves, nor that we ought to accept
social injustice, poverty, violence and disease as a natural part of a human life. Quite to
the contrary I would argue that we should work both on improving ourselves as well as
society and promoting happiness and well-being on a large scale. My point is rather
that even if we are successful in this project it seems that in light of what we know
about human nature and human co-existence a good life will be a bit of a mixed bag.
In all likelihood it will involve anger, loss, failure, rejection, pain and disappointment
but it will also offer pleasure, warmth, joy and success. It would be perplexing if the
conclusion is that the fact that we are human does not mean that we cannot have good
and happy lives. Arguably, the problem is not so much an exaggerated focus on happi-
ness—if anything, to strive to be happy seems a fine and noble goal30—but rather a too
narrow understanding of what type of experiences a happy human life could involve.

2.13 It is Good Enough to be ‘Good Enough’

The good life for most of us would be a mixed life in two regards (1) it contains
both political and contemplative activities and (2) it does not presuppose perfec-
tion. In practice the good life is more than contemplation, it is also about acting in
accordance with the other virtues and participating in society. So in actuality there
can be many different versions of the happy life. We master the virtues to different
extents but once we are above a certain threshold level we are in the race so to
speak. That said all the virtues need to be mastered to some extent. Having a few

30 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html.
2.13 It is Good Enough to be ‘Good Enough’ 21

of the virtues to the full extent does not make up for have none of certain others.
So generous thieves or brave gluttons or witty cholerics are, despite their qualities,
not virtuous agents. On a similar note virtue has a best before date. To keep their
moral fitness and to continue leading the good life the person has to work hard—
the virtues need to be exercised and she must try to improve herself. To engage in
and exercise the virtues willingly and with pleasure, for the sake of virtue, that is
the best life for any human being.31
This position is, however, far from uncontroversial. On the one hand Aristotle
never says outright that a person who does not master the complete set of virtues
could be called virtuous, but on the other he writes that a lot of people could be
happy and if the criterion for happiness truly is complete virtue then it is very hard
to see how that could be true. Like many other issues in the Nicomachean Ethics it
is not entirely clear what Aristotle really intended. None the less, especially given
his general outlook and philosophical method, it seems reasonable to assume that
he would have agreed that happiness can be widely shared. Given that most people
are not fully virtuous that would appear to imply that people can be happy without
having internalized all the virtues completely.

2.14 Conclusion

In addition to Aristotle’s account of how to lead the happy life there are other rea-
sons for adopting a more pragmatic outlook: an ethical theory which sets the bar
so high that it become impossible for a mere mortal does not have much practical
relevance. Indeed, it is often thought to undermine the whole concept–what is the
point of ethics if it cannot be applied one might ask. While it might be unrealistic
to expect people both to know and to do the right thing at every turn, we can all
strive to become better versions of ourselves. As shown in this chapter a more prag-
matic take on virtue ethics seems to imply that many can lead good and happy lives
though they might not be excellent in every respect. Life is sometimes hard and we
are frequently tempted to do things which might have negative consequences both
for ourselves and for others. Sometimes we give in, fail to anticipate, turn a blind
eye, feel too tired, find an excuse and so on and so forth but a lot of the time we can
also get it right. As we go through life we can learn and we can change—the good
life is an ongoing project and a life-long commitment. But the positive news is that
it is available for most people: it is alright to be good enough.
So was the poet W. H. Auden right then when he wrote that to philosophize was
a luxury which only those fortunate enough not to have to worry about worldly
stuff could afford? 32 On one level it is undeniably true that man cannot live unless

31 Because the exercise of the virtues is both means and ends in themselves. The virtues them-
selves, on the other hand, are arguably to be understood as pure means to the noble act.
32 Original quote: “it is nonsense to speak of higher and lower pleasures. To a hungry man it is,

rightly, more important to eat than that he philosophize”, W. H. Auden.

22 2 The Good Life

a set of basic needs are satisfied and that it is only then that he has the energy and
time to reflect on other aspects of life. As has been shown in this chapter, however,
once above a certain persistence threshold we tend to care a lot about the quality
of life. Perhaps we spend too much time thinking about it rather than actually liv-
ing. However, that might be living is clearly about much more than mere survival.
Living well is about both the practical and the theoretical and it is clear that many
are willing to forfeit certain bodily pleasures if they believe that increases the
chances overall happiness. So in that sense we are not slaves to our biology.
Popular wisdom has it that if we only work hard enough we appear to be able to
‘overcome’, or at least transform, ourselves into a better version. On a more down-
beat note, however, recent work in the natural sciences has shown that one major
obstacle that stands firm between us and the good life is our biology. Let us now
turn to take a closer look at some of these findings.
Chapter 3
The Biological Obstacles

This chapter focuses on the biological obstacles that stand between us and the type of
good decision-making which enables us to live the happy life. Recent scientific studies
indicate that our failure to lead the happy life can be explained in terms of lacking cog-
nitive capacities. Humans in general are bad at responding to information, an inability
which extends both ‘the gathering of information phase’ and to ‘the drawing conclu-
sions and acting on them phase’. This has some very negative consequences.
As a collective, mankind harbours strong tendencies towards greed, egoism,
short-sightedness and unwarranted aggression and, in addition, many if not most of
us also display surprisingly poor overall judgement. The decisions we make, and fail
to make, all come at a cost and from a practical perspective this has serious socio-
economic implications. Consider for example the lack of efficient collaboration on
addressing global warming, the galloping financial crisis and vaccine refusals. Not
to mention the number of on-going armed conflicts and the large scale suffering
they cause millions of people. These are but a few situations where irrational deci-
sion-making causes unnecessary suffering and major havoc.1 In light of this one
could be forgiven for feeling somewhat downbeat about human nature.

3.1 The Best of Intentions

While most people agree that the current state of affairs greatly undermines human
well-being there is wide disagreement on how best to improve things. Of special
interest here, however, is the call for a revival of the moral virtues, a strategy which
has been championed both by the church and secular society. The general assumption
is roughly that were we only more virtuous then surely the world would be a better
place in pretty much every respect and we would all be happier. On such accounts,

1 For the purposes of this text I will take the word ‘irrational’ to mean that the outcomes are bad
both for us as individuals and as group members.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 23

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_3, © The Author(s) 2013
24 3 The Biological Obstacles

to take moral responsibility would presumably require attitude changes as well as,
potentially cumbersome, life-style changes. Examples of the former might involve
becoming more charitable and less selfish, to extend one’s care and concern to the
less unfortunate people outside our immediate circle. Examples of the latter would
include both fairley far-reaching attitude adjustments and a willingness to sacrifice
some modern comforts. For example, to travel less by car and plane, consume less
(farmed) meat and pay extra environmental taxes. While this might seem laudable,
radically amending one’s ways in practice has, for most people, proved easier said
than done. Perhaps it is indeed the case that the road to hell is paved with good inten-
tions? Adding to the burden, it appears that a combination of environmental and
biological factors conspire to make the self-improvement project even harder.
Clearly it is one thing to know what one ought to do and quite another to actu-
ally perform that act. Even in situations where we want to behave well and do the
right thing it might not be a straightforward matter. From an environmental point of
view it is not evident that modern society with its focus on the individual is particu-
larly conducive to a sense of care and concern for the other. If anything, it fre-
quently encourages selfish behaviour, free-riding and greed instead of rewarding a
sense of responsibility and an ability to think about the bigger picture. Consider the
example of cheating. Tests have shown that most people are willing to cheat if the
circumstances are right.2 We rationalise our behaviour by persuading ourselves that
other people would do the same in similar circumstances and/or by coming up with
an additional, special, reason which makes it alright to violate the general rules.
Slightly more surprising, perhaps, the researchers also found that the main reason
for actually respecting the rules was not the risk of being caught, named, shamed
and publicly embarrassed. Rather, what tended to stop people from cheating was to
be reminded of their own moral values. When subjects received some subtle
­priming on social and moral considerations, for example were asked to recite the
10 commandments right before the experiment, their behaviour tended to improve.3
If this is correct, it could be taken to indicate that an on-going debate on moral val-
ues and what type of behaviour they might translate to in practice, could help peo-
ple to better themselves. The merits of such an inclusive, society-wide, dialogue,
and the ways in which it can promote virtuous behaviour is thus emphasised
throughout this essay. Recognising that current social structures might not be opti-
mally conducive to moral improvement, however, is not enough. For one thing it
does not explain why even those individuals who are deeply committed to behaving
morally frequently fall short. Here I am thinking about people who are equipped
with intelligence, good impulse control and an ability to turn a blind eye to the
siren calls of a less than virtuous society but who still fail to do the right thing.

2 Dan Ariely, Professor of Behavioural Economics at MIT, has performed a series of tests to find
out how far ‘normal’ people are willing to go to cheat and how they rationalise their actions to
themselves.
3 For an interesting discussion on the effects of social priming on moral aspects and how

that might influence calculative rationality see e.g. Long Wang, ChenBo Zhong and J. Keith
Murnighan (2011) The Ethical and Social Consequences of a Calculative Mindset.
3.2 The State of Play 25

3.2 The State of Play

The situation is really rather perplexing. While access to information and the gen-
eral level of education has never been higher, humans, as a collective, continue to
display a very poor capacity for rational decision-making.
Recent studies have suggested that the best explanation for this widespread
inaptitude might come from the natural sciences. If correct, the underlying cause
for our poor decision-making might not only be moral (e.g. lack of self-discipline)
but in fact biological. A number of experiments have shown that most of us are
notoriously bad at processing information, judging risk and calculating conse-
quences. We suffer from bias, information overload and an inability to identify the
right experts to whom we can defer the decision to. We are, in short, severely epis-
temically challenged.4 To top things off, our situation is likely to get ever more
precarious as the information society continues to develop.
Adding insult to injury a recent British study has shown that some of the com-
paratively meagre cognitive capacities we possess begin to decline already around
the age of 45. A group of researchers (University College London) studied the
cognitive abilities of 7,390 individuals, between the ages 45–70, at three different
times over a 10 year period (the study began in 1997). The tests involved assess-
ment of, for example, mathematical reasoning, memory and vocabulary.
Previously it was thought that the cognitive decline set in around the age of 60 but
here the conclusion was “All cognitive scores, except vocabulary, declined in all
five age categories (age 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, 60–64, and 65–70 at baseline), with
evidence of faster decline in older people” and “Cognitive decline is already evi-
dent in middle age (age 45–49)”.5 The link between this cognitive deterioration,
dementia and Alzheimer’s disease requires much further research. That said, it is
hoped that these findings could contribute to the identification of a window when
treatments (in the way of brain exercise as well as drugs) could be embarked on.

4 See e.g. Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman (eds.) (2002) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology
of Intuitive Judgment (New York: CUP): Greene & Haidt (2002) ‘How (and Where) does Moral
Judgment Work?’, Trends in Cog. Sci. 6: 517–23: Haidt (2001) ‘The Emotional Dog and its
Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psych. Rev. 108: 814–834:
Wheatley & Haidt (2005) ‘Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe’, Psych. Sci.
16: 780–4: Kosfeld et al. (2005) ‘Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans’, Nature 435: 2: Knoch
et al. ‘Diminishing Reciprocal Fairness by Disrupting the Right Prefrontal Cortex’, Science
314/5800: 829–32: Kiesel et al. ‘Unconscious Priming According to Multiple S-R Rules’,
Cognition 104/1: 89–105: Brasil-Neto et al. (1992) ‘Focal Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and
Response Bias in a Forced-Choice Task’, J. of Neurol., Neurosurg., and Psychiatry 55: 964–6:
Baumeister (2002) ‘Yielding to Temptation’, J. of Consumer Research 28: 670–6: Hsee & Hastle
“Decision and experience: why don’t we choose what makes us happy?, TRENDS in Cognitive
Science, vol. 10, no 1 January 2006.
5 Timing of onset of cognitive decline: results from Whitehall II prospective cohort study,

BMJ2012:344 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d7622(Published 5 January 2012). Cite this as:BMJ2012:344:d7622.

26 3 The Biological Obstacles

Early treatment could plausibly have positive effects, for example slowing down
the pace, even though it might not stop the decline all together.
If the best explanation for our behaviour is our biology this ought to have far-
reaching implications for the role of enhancement through, for example, drugs
and technology but also for our judicial system. As previously noted, the threat
of severe punishment and public humiliation is unreliable as a deterrent and
unlikely to promote positive behavioural changes in the long run. It would appear
that most of us are in the habit of a certain amount of service of the lips. What
will be discussed here, however, is the idea that if negative and self-destructive
behaviour can best be explained by our biology then science might help us to
develop new and more efficient ways of improving ourselves. Consider, for
example, that a drug which promoted our capacity for epistemic deference was
developed and that taking it would improve our decision-making. In addition to
being a significant scientific breakthrough, would it not be rational for most of us
to want to enhance our cognitive capacities in such a way? Indeed, some would
argue, we would even be morally obliged to do so. Below follows a very brief
overview of the biological explanations for poor decision-making and lack of
good judgement.

3.3 Taking a Closer Look at the Science

Most people are greatly challenged in their decision-making by ungrounded fear,

bias, short-sightedness and misplaced epistemic deference to mention but a few
factors6 and it appears quite plausible that such, and other similar, constraints
could have a negative effect on their overall level of well-being.7 Previously it has

6 See e.g.: Greene & Haidt (2002) ‘How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?’, Trends in
Cog. Sci. 6: 517–23: Haidt (2001) ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psych. Rev. 108: 814–834: Wheatley & Haidt (2005) ‘Hypnotic
Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe’, Psych. Sci. 16: 780–4: Kosfeld et al. (2005)
‘Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans’, Nature 435: 2: Knoch et al. ‘Diminishing Reciprocal
Fairness by Disrupting the Right Prefrontal Cortex’, Science 314/5800: 829–32: Kiesel et al.
‘Unconscious Priming According to Multiple S-R Rules’, Cognition 104/1: 89–105: Brasil-Neto
et al. (1992) ‘Focal Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Response Bias in a Forced-Choice
Task’, J. of Neurol., Neurosurg., and Psychiatry 55: 964–6: Baumeister (2002) ‘Yielding to
Temptation’, J. of Consumer Research 28: 670–6: Beckham (2004) ‘Crime, Culpability, and the
Adolescent Brain’, Science 305/5684: 596–9: Tancredi (2005) Hardwired Behavior (New York:
CUP): Libet et al. (eds.) (1999) The Volitional Brain (Charlottesville: IA): Harman (1999) ‘Moral
Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’,
Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc. 99: 315–331: Doris (2002) Lack of Character (Cambridge: CUP).
7 For a discussion see e.g. Kahane and Shackle, ‘Methodological Problems in the Neuroscience

of Moral Judgment’, forthcoming in Mind and Language: Levy (2007), Neuroethics: challenges
for the 21st century, CUP, UK.: Singer (2005), ‘Ethics and Intuition’, The Journal of Ethics
(2005) 9: 331–352, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, (2001) ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.’
Philosophical Topics, 29, pp. 429–60.
3.3 Taking a Closer Look at the Science 27

often been argued that failing to do the right thing could be reduced to lacking
commitment and character. Interestingly, however, recent research in the natural
and behavioural sciences has challenged common wisdom and put forward a new
model which, if accepted, ought to have significant implications for how we think
about morality. On this account our frequent failure to respond well to the infor-
mation available to us is explained in terms of biology.8
To put it bluntly: Humans in general are bad at responding to information.
The problem is twofold—we are bad both at identifying the problems and in
addressing them. As such, the problem extends to both ‘the gathering of infor-
mation phase’ and to ‘the drawing conclusions and acting on them phase’. This
inability has far-reaching, negative, consequences. Consider, for example, the
lack of consensus on issues relating to the environment and the global econ-
omy. Even though everyone around the table know full well that failing to col-
laborate will have disastrous consequences all too many refuse to put their ore
in. These are but two areas where a mix of (for example) greed, cowardice, self-
ishness and lack of creativity has stifled collaboration and keeps causing large
scale suffering.
To make matters worse most of us tend to tackle information-related problems
by searching for even more information. The, not so sublime, irony is of course
that if we fail to ensure that we can process and respond to the information that is
sourced we risk being left even worse off. We find ourselves both unable to take in
the new and to evaluate the old.
Some key examples of problems in the cognitive sphere are: a low ability to
process information, low capacity for concentration and creative thinking as
well the fact that we all subscribe to various bias which undermines the ration-
ale behind many of our explanatory models. Notably this also includes ‘status
quo bias’, i.e. the fact that other things being equal people tend to favour their
current situation over a new one. Interesting, this preference is so strong that it
has been shown to lead many to maintain status quo even when a change would
be positive.9
Not only do we fall short both in respect to cognitive capacities but also with
respect to our moods.10 Examples of moods that restrict us are aspects like shy-
ness, low self-confidence and/or self-esteem. A tendency towards negative think-
ing and unwarranted worrying might hold us back from performing as well as we
perhaps could. It can, for example, lead us to turn down opportunities for public
speaking and to spend time and energy worrying about our various short-comings.
Such inflated and misplaced concerns are highly likely to have negative effects on
our overall performance and our social interaction.

8 As well as cultural factors.

9 N. Bostrom and T. Ord (2006), The reversal test: eliminating status quo bias in applied ethics.
Ethics, 2006 Jul:116(4):656–79.
10 I have deliberately excluded physical enhancement of the kind of muscle strength and higher

pain threshold.
28 3 The Biological Obstacles

3.4 Moral Psychology Perspective

The advances in the natural sciences yield ever increasing knowledge about the
biological functioning of both animals and humans.11 The news is not always posi-
tive from the point of view of moral philosophy. Numerous studies have called the
stability of our judgments into question by showing that they might be manipu-
lated through hypnosis,12 hormones,13 and transcranial magnetic stimulation.14
Further, our choices are affected by priming15 and transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion16 and self-control can be impaired by brain dysfunction.17 , 18
Other studies have identified yet more cognitive constraints. Researchers sug-
gest that humans in general do not respond well to information, and as a result
tend to acquire false beliefs. Having a tendency to leap to judgement means,
among other things, that we also tend to trust unreliable information sources and
distrust reliable ones. An example of, potentially, misplaced trust is that we are
much less adept at telling when a spouse or a close friend are lying to us than
when a stranger does. Our bias towards believing people close to us can partially
be explained by the fact that close relationships depends on trust, so being overly
suspicious might well conflict with the ability to create and maintain such bonds.
Some of the farther reaching conclusions aside, it seems reasonable to assume
that these cognitive short-comings hamper our general understanding of the world.
They make us less able to make sense of things, to explain, to reason and to draw
conclusions which, in turn, will have consequences for our capacity for moral rea-
son. At the very least they would have a negative impact on our ability to act in
accordance with our intuitions. While many of these scientific findings can make
important contributions to explaining, and in some cases predicting, human behav-
iour, it is still early days in the field of brain studies. Furthermore, in addition to
expanding our scientific knowledge, much more research is needed in order to
determine the balance and interaction between biological and environmental factors

11 Parts of this section has been previously published in B. Froding, Cognitive Enhancement,
Virtue Ethics and the Good Life, Neuroethics, (2011) 4:223–234.
12 Wheatley & Haidt (2005) ‘Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe’, Psych.

Sci. 16: 780–4.

13 Kosfeld et al. (2005) ‘Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans’, Nature 435: 2.
14 Knoch et al. ‘Diminishing Reciprocal Fairness by Disrupting the Right Prefrontal Cortex’,

Science 314/5800: 829–32.

15 Kiesel et al. ‘Unconscious Priming According to Multiple S-R Rules’, Cognition 104/1:

89–105.
16 Brasil-Neto et al. (1992) ‘Focal Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation and Response Bias in a

Forced-Choice Task’, J. of Neurol., Neurosurg., and Psychiatry 55: 964–6.

17 Beckham (2004) ‘Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain’, Science 305/5684: 596–9.
18 See also M. Spitzer et al. (2007), The Neural signature of social norm compliance, Neuron,

56(1), pp. 185–196.

3.4 Moral Psychology Perspective 29

in shaping our behaviour. While it seems uncontroversial that there is a connection

between our biology and our capacity to make moral judgements, exactly what it
looks like and the possible implications for ethics require further study. Despite the
many unanswered questions, however, this type of scientific research has been
taken to show that we are less rational—and arguably then less morally responsi-
ble—than we like to think.19 The next chapters will continue to explore the impli-
cations for virtue theory if many of these claims turn out to be correct.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter has painted a rather grim picture both of the current situation and the
chances of imminent improvement. If the natural scientists are right about our low
cognitive capacities stemming from our biological make-up it would seem that try-
ing to instil stable values and character traits in the young by way of education and
training is rather futile. Such practices might, best case scenario, produce ‘moral
experts’ which is not to be confused with ‘true excellence’.
As will be explained further in the next chapter, human excellence is an uncon-
ditional disposition to act, to feel and generally respond in ways typical of the
good person. Expertise, on the other hand, is simply the ability to act and respond
(and perhaps in some cases feel) in the ways typical of the sort of expert in ques-
tion. The problem with the moral expert is that she is unreliable as she can be
thoroughly possessed by an ability and yet prefer to exercise it badly or indeed
not at all. Now, if we can enhance our capacities in a lasting and stable manner
by way of medicine and technology without significant, negative, side-effects it
appears that we have good reason to do so. Presumably this would be rational both
for individuals and societies. This is of course assuming that we agree that moral
improvement and certain behavioural changes are desirable and, further, that if
used responsibly some such enhancements are likely to increase the level of well-
being and cut down on unnecessary suffering in the world today.
Chapter 5 will provide practical examples of how we can improve our cognitive
capacities by way of drugs and contrast that with life-style options such as a com-
mitment to virtue and regular meditation. Before turning to the practical we will
take a closer look at some key elements in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.

19 Tancredi (2005) Hardwired Behavior (New York: CUP): Libet et al. (eds.) (1999) The

Volitional Brain (Charlottesville: IA).

Chapter 4
Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire
Them

Now the turn has come to say more both about which virtues, and capacities,
Aristotle had in mind and how agents are expected to acquire them. While the
focus in this chapter is on the character virtues as well as the intellectual virtues
the discussion also extends to how agents are supposed to instill them and how
we become (more) virtuous agents. Consequently, a number of key concepts con-
nected to the virtues, e.g., the Doctrine of the Mean, moral expertise and the pro-
cess of deliberation, are explained and problematized. In addition to providing a
theory background the following is also intended to work as a ‘reference chapter’
that the reader could re-visit while reading other parts of the book.

4.1 A Hard Life

As previously mentioned the virtuous life can occasionally appear both hard and
demanding and it might take time to grasp that this is the best life available to us
and thus the only rational choice. As a result, the quality of our upbringing and the
society around us (and the laws) are of the essence, this is what will help us to see
the light. As Aristotle points out
It is difficult, however, for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his youth if he has
not been brought up under the correct laws: for the many, especially the young, do not find it
pleasant to live in a temperate and resistant way. That is why laws must prescribe their upbring-
ing and practices: for they will not find these things painful when they get used to them.1

Through this process of habituation we become better and more reliable moral
agents. Notably, however, we need to continue our moral workout even as virtu-
ous agents. In order to stay ethically fit and keep our moral dispositions trim and
reliable the virtues must be exercised. To embark on the path of the fulfilled and
happy life is a big commitment but it is also the happiest and most enjoyable life
for any human being.

1 /NE1179b32-37/.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 31

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_4, © The Author(s) 2013
32 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

4.2 Virtue as Excellence

The Greek word arete means virtue in the sense of excellence, to be virtuous is
to be excellent at doing something. In that sense the virtues are outward, pro-
duction oriented, and about actions. This might seem odd as many of us are
more used to the Judeo-Christian notion of virtue i.e., a quality of inner spirit
that has few manifestations. On that view the traditional idea is that regardless
of what the world looks like the virtuous are sure to reap their rewards in the
afterlife. Many of the Greek philosophers, however, held that humans should be
virtuous for the sake of this life: now is the time when one will be rewarded (of
course as the virtuous action is also the most pleasurable the ‘reward’ is not
simply external).2
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes that we must choose the virtues for
their own sake but then in other parts of the text he talks of actions (that the virtues
issue in) as means. This has caused some people to worry that the virtues would
become instrumental and that the agent would choose them as a quick way, a tech-
nique, to secure the happy life. This would be problematic because acting virtu-
ously is not something we do in the sense that we might agree to take medicine
to get well—exercising the virtues is part of eudaimonia. Clearly Aristotle argues
that doing the fine and noble is leading the fulfilled life and thus that the virtuous
action is an end in itself.

4.3 Feelings and Actions

Aristotle thought that there are two types of (moral) virtues. Firstly, there are intel-
lectual virtues—they belong to that part of the soul that has reason. Secondly, there
are virtues of character—they concern the part of the soul that has feelings and
desires but which can listen to reason.3 When we function well desire listens to rea-
son although it has none in itself. Notably Aristotle talks of two types of reason:
intellectual and practical and it is only the former that is free from desire.4 Naturally,
the virtuous agent would experience a feeling of pleasure as she does the right thing,
since the fine and noble is always the most appealing act to her. But the point to
bring home is that it is not the feeling of pleasure that explains why the virtuous do
what they do.5

2 Lear J. (1988). Aristotle—the desire to understand. Cambridge University Press. p. 153.

3 For a discussion see/NE1102b30-34/. Sometimes a distinction is made between moral virtues
and eudemonic virtues. With regards to Aristotle I believe this to be confusing, for him all moral
virtues were eudemonic virtues.
4 For the argument see Book 1.13 of the NE, e.g./NE1102a25-b3/.
5 For a discussion see Skorupski, J. (1999). Ethical explorations OUP.
4.3 Feelings and Actions 33

On the Aristotelian account the moral virtues do not come through nature. We are
neither born with them nor can we learn them purely from teaching.6 Rather, they
have to be acquired through habit. Consequently, ethical education is about re-organ-
izing people’s desires—about getting things straight in the soul—so that one gets
pleasure from noble acts and pain from bad ones.7 In order to do the right thing in a
given situation the agent needs both the motivation (i.e., the desire) to act in that way
and the sensitivity to see what the right action is in that particular circumstance.

4.4 Reason and Desire

Dispositions give rise to relatively fixed patterns of behaviour and some, but not
all, of them are best described as habits.8 As a result of human nature we also have
physical dispositions, for example to grow, to digest and to think.
With regards to the virtues it is the habitual disposition (hexis in Greek) that is
of interest. Aristotle defined a hexis as a state and explains:
By states I mean what we have when we are well or badly off in relation to feelings. If, for
instance, our feeling is too intense or slack, we are badly off in relation to anger, but if it is
intermediate, we are well off: the same is true in the other cases.9

The habitual dispositions are either aretai (i.e., moral skills), or technai, (i.e.,
other skills).10
As previously mentioned all of us have a soul (see Chap. 2). Further, this soul
contains both reason and desire—this is simply a part of the human condition. The
difference between the virtuous and the vicious, however, is that only the former has
a unified soul. Because reason is on top of their desire they come to desire only the
fine and the noble and they only take pleasure in the good. As their desire is in har-
mony with their reason they suffer no struggles or wrongful temptations. Indeed, this
is why self-discipline is a sign of weakness and not a virtue for Aristotle. Consider
the following example. When presented with the third cinnamon bun of the day
my virtuous friend Doctor M refrains effortlessly. He does so because he is sensi-
tive enough to realize that even if he might get pleasure from eating buns in general
this is not an instance when he will get any pleasure as he has already had his share
for today. On Aristotle’s view this is the type of person we should praise and admire
because he is happy and flourishing (which the struggler definitely is not).

6 Aristotle recognises that some people have natural virtues to a higher extent than others and

thus it might be easier for them to acquire the relevant moral virtues but those agents are not
morally praiseworthy on account of being morally gifted as it were.
7 Lear J. (1988). Aristotle—the desire to understand. Cambridge University Press, p. 168.
8 For example brittleness which is a dispositional property of glass and this influences the behav-

iour of glass when dropped i.e., it shatters.

9 /NE1105b27-30/.
10 Interestingly the root of the word aretai is aner which means ‘man’. Hence, the virtues were

what made people manly.

34 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

4.5 Moral Experts

Aristotle put forward three conditions for an act to count as virtuous. The agent
has to (a) have practical knowledge, i.e., know what she is doing, (b) chose the act
and chose it for its own sake and (c) the act must flow from a firm character. To
assess if an action is virtuous we need to know how the agent saw what she was
doing, because
…at a pinch a person can on occasion exercise self-control and do what needs to be done
even when they cannot do it in the way that the good person does it. It is therefore not the
case that on each occasion a correct moral assessment of what should be done requires
moral virtue, though it is true that moral virtue is needed to get things right consistently,
day in and day out”.11

When Aristotle emphasizes that virtue involves rational choice he appears to

want to say more than simply that agents are responsible for their own morality
(obviously we have a choice not to behave virtuously). Most probably, he wants to
distinguish between the virtuous person and the person who simply does what vir-
tue demands. The latter person, who is sometimes referred to as ‘the moral expert’
or ‘the continent person’, would only be at the trainee stage of virtue.
So what is the difference between ‘human excellence’ and ‘expertise’ then?
Human excellence is an unconditional disposition to act, to feel and generally
respond in ways typical of the good person. Expertise, on the other hand, is simply
the ability to act and respond (and perhaps in some cases feel) in the ways typical
of the sort of expert in question. Hence, an agent who is not virtuous, say Doctor
A, can be thoroughly possessed by an ability and yet prefer not to exercise it at all,
or he could prefer to exercise it badly. In other words—he can commit moral fail-
ure as described by Aristotle. Such acts are impossible for the excellent person as
her disposition would be firm and unchanging.

4.6 The Doctrine of the Mean

The Doctrine of the Mean is a central concept in virtue ethics. This model explains
that a virtue is the intermediate within an ethical triad framework. The virtue lies
between two vices and issue in actions which neither go too far nor fall short. One
vice symbolizes how to go wrong through excessive behaviour and the other through
deficient behaviour. It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of the mean does
not say that one and the same person cannot display both corresponding vices (at dif-
ferent occasions). In fact, that seems a quite plausible scenario as a person who fails
to grasp the essence of the specific virtue is likely to go wrong in all kinds of ways.
Indeed, such an agent lacks understanding of both proportion and context.

11 Hughes G. (2001), Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics, NY: Routledge, p.

220.
4.6 The Doctrine of the Mean 35

Aristotle uses the metaphor of the skilled archer hitting the mark. This, how-
ever, might be easier said than done. Just like the archer we must take many things
into consideration when we aim to shoot, the moral equivalents of hurdles like
tremble of hands, crosswinds, effects of gravity etc. We need to compensate for
those things—for our moral constitutions. Fortunately the right action does not
have to be bulls-eye every time, on most occasions there is a bigger range in which
the hit still qualifies as excellent.
To understand what Aristotle wanted to say with this metaphorical picture of
the right balance in life it is not particularly conducive to think of it as one, exact
spot. Rather, the balance is relative to a number of aspects. For example: was it
done at the right time, to the right extent, by the right person, for the right reasons,
in the right way and so on and so forth.12 Aristotle calls this ‘distinguishable incre-
ments’ and in the modern literature it has been referred to as “the particulars of
that action or emotional response”. 13 This appears to pre-suppose that we are talk-
ing about other things than simply degrees of emotion. To illustrate this it might
well be more pragmatic to break it down to a number of sub-scales. In order to hit
the mean on the ‘grand scale’ one must hit the mean on all the individual sub-
scales. This is presumably what Aristotle had in mind when he somewhat depress-
ingly informs us that we can err in countless way but only get it right in one.

4.7 A Middling Disposition

So what then is this elusive ‘right amount’?14 Aristotle’s idea was that the reason
for which a feeling is said to be in the mean (with regards to e.g. the amount, the
time, the intensity, the reason and so on) is because that is how a virtuous person
would feel in that situation. Notably then, it is not the case that there is a “right
feeling” which is decided independently of the virtuous agent.
Consequently, the right-making feature as such is not simply that it is felt. The
underlying reason for why this feeling is correct is of course a story about human
nature which is universally true.15 At first this may sound strange because it seems
that the right amount of feeling could sometimes be the maximum amount.
Presumably it would be the appropriate reaction to be completely outraged if one
for example was the victim of an unprovoked and brutal attack in the street.
Notably the doctrine of the mean does not stipulate that agents should always be
moderate (they should, however, always be temperate) in their response and it is
important to recall that Aristotle would have had little regard for Christian virtues
such as e.g., the turning of the cheek and perhaps universal compassion.

12 See e.g.,/NE1106b21-22/,/NE1109a28/,/NE1111a3-5/,/NE1135a25, NE1135b33/).

13 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 111.
14 Note, however, that not all virtues have their ‘signature’ feeling.
15 See Chap. 2 for an account of the Function Argument.
36 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

4.8 The Power of Good Habits and Rolemodels

The way to acquire the character related virtues is though habitually behaving in cer-
tain ways. At the early stages it is very similar to a skill which the student seeks to
perfect but as she develops and matures as a moral agent all the mechanical connota-
tions fall away and it becomes like a second nature. Or, perhaps more appropriately,
it becomes our first and only nature. The agent internalises the virtues and becomes
the type of person who only takes pleasure in doing the fine and noble, which is the
ultimate proof that desire is ruled by reason in their souls. The overarching purpose
of a good upbringing and the habituation process is to get the agent to understand the
world objectively. In other words, to make sure that their ‘desire’ (i.e., the subjective
response) is in line with their ‘reason’ and that it stays that way.16 This is where the
moral expert, described above, goes wrong. Such a person is guided by reason but
lacks the proper desire. She knows what the virtuous act is and in fact she frequently
chooses it. But whereas the desire in the virtuous person listens to reason and then
willingly and with pleasure does its bidding that is not the experience of the conti-
nent person. This agent desires things that are not virtuous and thus has to force her-
self to do what she rationally knows to be the right thing.
To learn the virtues we ought to model ourselves on the virtuous people around
us.17 Initially we might just imitate them but little by little, given that we do it seri-
ously, deliberately, consciously etc., we start acquiring the virtues. Aristotle
emphasized that it is the way in which we do it that matters. It is about acquiring
the right internal dispositions because the virtues always issue in action. You can-
not be secretly good yet strategically mean!
… the phrase ‘acting virtuously’ has two senses: it can mean either (1) performing the sort
of action that someone who is virtuous would perform, or (2) performing that sort of
action, but as a virtuous person would do it. And Aristotle’s claim is that, by performing
actions of the former sort, we become such that we perform actions of the latter sort.”18

When an agent learns the virtues she progresses step by step. The first level is that
she realizes what the right thing to do in a certain situation is. The second level is to
choose the act which the virtuous person would. The third, and final, level is when she
performs the deliberation, the choosing and the action as a virtuous agent would have.
At last there is no conflict between desire and reason in the soul of the agent and she
achieves inner harmony and happiness. It follows that for an agent to be virtuous it is
not enough to do the right thing, she must also meet certain other criteria. She must do
it knowingly she must decide to do it she must recognize that the action is an end in
itself19 and finally she must act from “a firm and unchanging disposition”.20

16 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. p. 103.

17 For more on rolemodels see Chaps. 6 and 7.
18 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. p. 104.
19 Note that this is not incompatible with it also being a means to the most teleios end.
20 /NE1105a32-34/.
4.9 Choosing Between the Virtues 37

4.9 Choosing Between the Virtues

We know that an agent has acquired a virtue when she habitually acts like a per-
son of virtue would. When she carries out the action willingly and without seeking
any reward as the pleasure she derives come from the act itself and not from some
external treat or praise.
The general idea is that the agent would not have preferred any alternative
action—nothing else would have been more satisfying or more to their liking. But
could not several actions be right on some occasions, could this agent not be neu-
tral between two virtues?21 Let us imagine a situation where generosity and
friendship would prompt me to act in the same way. Can I then ‘choose’ my driv-
ing force, is it up to me to decide whether I should be kind or generous? Aristotle
would presumably accept this—if it is the case that two or several virtues would
yield the same action the virtuous agent is free to choose as she sees fit. He would
no doubt add, however, that the virtuous agent would never be in this situation. To
individuate the virtues and test them one by one against the situation, like a car-
penter might dig through his tool-box, would be the decision-making process of
the trainee. To deliberate what every virtue would require of me and then decide,
even if I eventually made the right decision and it was willingly and with pleasure
and so forth, would be a stage in the learning process. For the morally mature
agent, on the other hand, deliberation and decision-making is a holistic process
where all the relevant virtues are involved automatically because that is the extent
to which I have internalized the virtues.

4.10 A Few General Comments on the Virtues

4.10.1 Justice

Aristotle recognizes two types of justice, both of which are character related, and
he calls them particular justice and general justice. This division is in line with
his usual method in the sense that it reflects both the general view held at the time
(among his peers at least) as well as what had been said on the topic by Socrates
and Plato before him.
Particular justice is justice in the narrow sense, i.e., virtues expressed in partic-
ular ways which are connected to various parts of the basic structure of society
and its institutions. General justice, on the other hand, is justice in the broadest
sense. It is a constituent of all the virtues helping the agent to act in an overall

21 Note that I am not concerned with the idea of conflicting virtues (where different virtues would

prompt us to act in very different ways) nor with moral dilemmas (where no action is right).
38 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

lawful way. That seems to presuppose that we cannot have the complete virtue of
general justice unless we have all the other virtues, nor can we possess the virtues
(to the full extent) without having the necessary component that is general justice.
Clearly such a conclusion is not particularly palatable for those of us who read
Aristotle as saying that the happy life is a possibility for many rather than a few.
Rather, re-connecting to my ideas of virtue as a possibility for many, I would
favour a reading where an agent can be said to have “enough” virtue to be gener-
ally just and thus able to lead a happy life.22

4.10.2 Unity of the virtues

In principle Aristotle held that each virtue has its restricted domain within which it
regulates the good, or appropriate, behaviour. Courage is primarily for the battle-
field, generosity is primarily for dealing with money and so forth. That said, most
of the virtues of course come into our lives on many levels: I can be generous with
my time, my emotions and my knowledge. I need courage in my civic life in the
city state (for example I must show my true colours and take a stand for my view
even though I might be humiliated) and so on. Aristotle also explains that all vir-
tues contribute to the good functioning of a person in their own particular way and
in doing so they complement each other.
While most scholars would agree that some virtues are entwined beyond sepa-
ration there is substantial disagreement on ‘to what extent’. Very briefly the ‘unity
of the virtues debate’ can be described as involving two quite different understand-
ings of what it means to be a virtuous person. The first group holds that to be vir-
tuous means having all the virtues, this would naturally be very difficult and it
might well be the case that there are no virtuous people at all.23 This camp empha-
sizes the fact that if this was not what Aristotle thought then it is remarkable that
he did not spell it out in a clear-cut and unambiguous way. The opposition argues
that to qualify as happy it is good enough to have several virtues and to be well on
the way to acquiring the others.24 In doing this they appeal to Aristotle’s method
of creating paradigm cases, common sense morality.25

22 As explained in Chaps. 1 and 2.

23 As will be explained in Chap. 6 it is sometimes said that there are socio-economic reasons for
which virtue simply is not a possibility for some people. That only the wealthy and the privileged
can acquire the virtues of magnificence and greatness of soul as these would be aristocratic vir-
tues. If that is true that seems to have implications for the unity of the virtues idea.
24 For a discussion on this see Chap. 1.
25 See Book 1.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
4.10 A Few General Comments on the Virtues 39

4.10.3 Virtue and Pleasure

Aristotle says that our likes and dislikes indicate whether or not we have
acquired the virtues to the full extent. Our true preferences will reveal us
because the good person takes pleasure only in doing the fine. On occasion
this position might seem counter-intuitive. It would appear, for example, that
Aristotle commits himself to views such as ‘it is pleasurable to be hacked to
pieces on the battle-field’. But what he reasonably can be read as saying is rather
that although virtues such as courage might bring great physical pain, doing the
right thing means achieving one’s goals and is thus still pleasurable. Moreover,
staying with the war metaphor, nothing can make up for running from the bat-
tle-field abandoning one’s friends and fellow citizens. Failing to do the virtuous
thing on this occasion will ruin your life—it will simply not be a life worth liv-
ing any longer.
Let us imagine the following situation: Professor D, an accomplished bio-
chemist and explosives expert, has been called into defuse a bomb filled with
lethal gas. The criminal gang that has rigged the bomb have taken over the local
supermarket where they now hold a large number of terrified shoppers hostage,
all of whom they are threatening to kill. Professor D knows that the odds are very
high that she will be severely wounded, most probably killed, if she tries to defuse
the explosive but she still goes ahead. Although setting off the bomb might prove
to be a quite physically painful experience she knowingly and willingly chooses
that action. It is not that she is tired of life, that she underestimates the gravity of
the situation or feels forced to do it etc. Risking her life like that, in these particu-
lar circumstances, is eudaimonia for her.

4.11 The Character Virtues

Aristotle’s term ‘the excellencies of the soul’ is intended to cover both the virtues
of character and the virtues of intellect. This is a list of the 10 character virtues
some of which will be further discussed in Chap. 5.26
• Courage (andreia),
• Temperance (sophrosune),
• Generosity (eleutheriotes),
• Magnificence (megaloprepeia),
• Greatness of soul (megalopsuchia),
• A nameless excellence which has to do with small honors,

26 Not all virtues and vices have a name and are simply referred to as ‘a nameless excellence’

having to do with so-and-so.

40 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

• Even temper (praotes),

• The three social or conversational, excellences:
– the first is nameless but has to do with friendliness,
– the second is also nameless has to do with truthfulness,
– the third is wit (eutrapelia).
As explained above all these virtues are arranged in sets of three where the vir-
tue is the mean between two vices. Examples of such ethical triads would be cow-
ardice, courage and rashness or wastefulness, generosity and avariciousness.
It is an open question how well the virtues fit the triads—in some cases there
seem to be more than two vices (e.g., temper) and in other cases less (e.g., justice).
While there is not space to discuss this issue here, it is worthwhile to remember
that Aristotle did not intend this list to be a complete and final document. These
are practical examples intended to clarify his ideas. Further to that point, they are
paradigm cases made deliberately unambiguous and as such they are extreme. It is
unlikely that Aristotle would have insisted that those who did not display virtue to
this complete extent in fact had none of it.

4.12 The Intellectual Virtues

So far we have discussed the character virtues, i.e., being good or excellent at
doing X, Y or Z, and it is now time to turn to the intellectual virtues, i.e., being
good or excellent at thinking about how one should act.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains that there are five separate intellectual
virtues and spends a fair amount of effort on showing how his account is fact a detailed
break-down of what Socrates regarded as the single virtue of wisdom.27 Aristotle
points out, for example, that they should be considered in a special order, that they all
have their own tasks and that they are not all equally important.28 We learn that there is
scientific knowledge (episteme), craft knowledge (techne), practical wisdom (phrone-
sis), intellect (nous) and last but certainly not least there is wisdom (sophia). Sophia is
the highest of all the thinking virtues—this is the virtue of Theoria which as explained
earlier is the best and most meaningful activity for any human being.

4.13 What is Phronesis?

Phronesis, or practical wisdom, helps us ‘see’ the right action in a given situation.
This capacity enables us to direct and harmonize the different virtues in order for
them to form a coherent whole. To have phronesis means to be good at thinking

27 For epsiteme, techne and sophia I have used Irwin’s translation but for phronesis and nous I

have chosen Roger Crisp’s.

28 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 208.
4.13 What is Phronesis? 41

about how one should act in order to live a worthwhile life. Such an individual is
good at thinking morally, i.e., she knows the moral principles and moreover, she
knows how to apply them in practical situations.
Sometimes phronesis is translated as ‘the right principle’ or ‘the correct rule’.
This is misleading as it might tempt the reader to understand it as a single maxim,
rather than a virtue just as dynamic as the character related ones (in the broad
sense it involves for example good deliberation and cleverness/intuition).

4.14 How does Phronesis Relate to the Character Virtues?

Knowing what to choose, however, requires one not only to have virtue but also to
be able to read the situation and understand how that virtue ought to be applied in
this particular circumstance. To do that I must deliberate what it would mean to be
kind, generous, courageous and so on in this such-and-such situation. What should
I, for example, do about the fact that Doctor E fails to realize that her colleagues
really do take offence at the crude jokes she insists on telling at the hospital staff
meetings? What would the virtuous act be? Is it kind not to tell her as it might
cause her to return to her old shy and self-critical ways and undo years of therapy
in one swift blow, or does kindness here mean telling her the truth? Does truthful-
ness and courage demand that I stop pulling the wool over her eyes? To know
what the virtue requires of me I need to be a mature moral agent and there is no
denying that moral decision-making is difficult business.29 The choice we make is
‘an all things considered’ judgment of how to act in a situation. As the relationship
between the intellectual and the emotional in moral decision-making is among the
most disputed issues in the Nicomachean Ethics this merits some further
comments.30
It is said that complete practical excellence combines the qualities of the intel-
lect and the character—together they help us select the means and assess what are
the worthwhile goals. What seems to me a quite plausible way of connecting them
was suggested by Sarah Broadie.31 Aristotle says that the character virtues and
phronesis each make a necessary contribution to good conduct. However, for phro-
nesis to be able to ‘look in the right direction’ and to be sensitive to the relevant
characteristics of the situation (i.e., identifying the stuff that is to go into the delib-
eration) it needs the support of nous (cleverness, penetration, intelligence, intuition
call it what you want). Nous ‘helps’ phronesis to spot the mean and then the excel-
lence of the person comes out in the deliberation when the fine and noble act is
chosen. Hence, without phronesis we cannot have complete character virtues and

29 As Hursthouse points out.

30 This is in no small part due to Aristotle’s apparently contradictory accounts, compare e.g.
Book 3.2–3 with Book 6.12–13 of the NE.
31 Aristotle (2002). The Nicomachean Ethics, (translation, introduction and commentary by S.

Broadie and C. Rowe), Oxford University Press.

42 4 Aristotle’s Virtues and How to Acquire Them

vice versa. Perhaps it could be said that it provides the necessary infrastructure for
deliberation and decision-making.
A second way in which Aristotle connects the mastering of the moral virtues to
the intellect is that the virtues require the ability to deliberate and that deliberation
is a part of phronesis. When we use phronesis we deliberate on both the good life
and happiness in a general sense and we think of the specific action. Phronesis
helps us to ‘see’ the virtuous act, it answers all the ‘how’, ‘when’, ‘to whom’ and
‘how much’ questions that arise in our lives.

4.15 Conclusions

This chapter has covered a number of aspects of classical virtue ethics theory. For
example: the virtues of character and intellect and how they combine to make us
more virtuous and thus happier.
The next chapter focuses on the ‘applied side’ of virtue ethics. It addresses
questions such as how the theory translates into the practical, some implications
for everyday life, and which virtues and capacities that are the most likely to be
useful in the modern world. I will mix examples of both traditional and more mod-
ern virtues and suggest some ways in which they could help improve on the cur-
rent state of affairs. The necessity of developing a sense of equity and overall good
judgement will also be further elaborated on. Further, Chap. 5 includes a short
section on Virtue Epistemology and some examples of potentially useful cogni-
tive virtues as identified by scholars in that area. Although young, this is an impor-
tant field where a lot of work is being done trying to identify the cognitive virtues
which might prove essential for a happy life in a modern society. For example, I
will canvass some ‘new’ virtues such as creativity, intellectual honesty and open-
mindedness and proceed to show how they can help solve some widespread infor-
mation-related problems of today and tomorrow.
Chapter 5
Examples of Useful Capacities

This chapter will provide concrete examples of a number of moral and epistemic
virtues and show how they can help people in general to live better lives in the
modern society. By ‘better’ it should be noted that I mean both in the sense they
increase their own well-being and contribute to a broader improvement of soci-
ety. The account provided here draws on scientific research into the ways in which
people assimilate information and form their beliefs (as explained and exem-
plified in Chap. 3), as well as virtue theory. Further to this, the field of ‘Virtue
Epistemology’ is introduced. While it is a relatively young field much interesting
and, for the purposes here, highly applicable research has already been carried out.
I will now turn to examine eight virtues/capacities which are likely to improve
our understanding of what is morally expected of us when we engage in, for exam-
ple, modern bio- and nanotechnology. Four of the examples involve traditional vir-
tues (courage, temperance, generosity, practical wisdom) while the other four are
capabilities that have been brought to the floor more recently (creativity, intellec-
tual honesty, improved memory both with regards to process memory and long-
term memory, open-mindedness). It will be shown how these, and presumably
other, virtues can help solve some widespread information-related problems in the
modern world.1

5.1 Global Risks

As explained in previous chapters most people are challenged in the department

of rational decision-making. This state of affairs has a very negative impact on
our quality of life. Time and again, we are led to make bad decisions by greed,

1 For good accounts of other useful capacities such as fidelity and fairness see for example
J. Savulescu and I. Hansson (2010), Moral Transhumanism, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,
0: 1–14, 2010. J. Savuelscu and A. Sandberg. (2008). Neuroenhancement of love and marriage:
the chemicals between us. Neuroethics 1: 31–44.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 43

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_5, © The Author(s) 2013
44 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

selfishness, lack of responsibility, low capacity to take on the bigger picture, irra-
tional fear, bias and so on. Prime examples of bad decision-making are the lack of
collaboration on how best to curb global warming, the number of armed conflicts
raging around the world and the on-going Financial Crisis.
In their 2012 Report on Global Risks (7th edition) the World Economic Forum
lists the biggest threats to our future prosperity and security.2 Split over 5 catego-
ries (economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological) the 50
most pressing threats facing us in the next decade are identified and discussed. In
terms of likelihood the top 3 are: severe income disparity, chronic fiscal imbal-
ances and rising green house emissions. In terms of negative impact the major
threats are: major systemic financial failure, water supply crisis and food supply
crisis. Further to this there is the ‘x-factor’, i.e. events that cannot be foreseen.
Examples of the latter include volcanic winters and cyber neotribalism. Successful
management and mitigation of such crisis requires skilful leadership, wisdom,
flexibility, creativity, courage, honesty and collaboration to mention but a few
capacities.
Most of the risks cannot be eradicated, nor is it plausible that negative out-
comes can be avoided altogether, but the good news is that we are not power-
less. Through collaboration, commitment, research and the allocation of financial
resources we can improve the current situation and limit the impact both on peo-
ple’s life quality and on the planet. It would appear that we, both as a collective
and as individuals, can ill afford poor decision-making.

5.2 A Sense of Equity

Ceteris paribus what we need is a solid sense of equity. This sense of decency
or overall good judgement will enable us to make better decisions and fare bet-
ter in life in general. But what is the best strategy for acquiring it? As seen
in previous chapters Aristotle advocated instilling the moral and intellectual
virtues though rigorous training. In Chap. 7 some alternative ways of gain-
ing those capacities will be outlined. But before we can continue discussing
the best and most efficient methods, however, we need to take a closer look at
which capacities it is that would be the most conducive to the leading of the
good life.
Below follows eight (8) virtues that plausibly would contribute positively
to our well-being both in the now and in the future. The first four featured on
Aristotle’s shortlist in Chap. 4—courage, temperance, generosity and practical
wisdom (phronesis). The latter four—creativity, intellectual honesty, improved
memory both with regards to process memory and long-term memory and open-
mindedness—are more recent suggestions which primarily have been discussed

2 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2012.pdf
5.2 A Sense of Equity 45

in the neighbouring field of Virtue Epistemology. But first a few comments on

equity.
As explained in Chap. 4 a person who has a (sufficiently) good grip of the
moral and the intellectual virtues is a just person. This is someone who knows how
to interpret the spirit of the laws and avoids both making mistakes and becom-
ing overly rigid by following it to the letter. She can adapt to the circumstances
without losing sight of what is truly just in a situation. This mature incorporation
of justice means that she has equity—the capacity or the decency—to fill in gaps
in the law for example. Hence, she would be able to determine the just action and
thus deal with situations for which no law has (yet) been written. As with the other
virtues she has the ability to reason as well as a deep understanding for what it
really means to be just and taken together those qualities enables her to read even
very complicated situations right. This has implications on Aristotle’s view on the
need for a formalised ethical code.

5.3 Learning Situation Sensitivity Rather than Rules

Aristotle believed that since ethics is not a science to treat it as such would be
to miss the whole philosophical point. The question ‘how should we live?’ can-
not be given a codifiable answer beyond the recommendation to acquire the vir-
tues and only take pleasure in doing the fine and noble. To him that was the
wrong approach: as rules could not possibly capture all potential scenarios they
will end up becoming a hindrance and an over-simplification rather than help.
Rather, he argued, moral decision-making is about learning how to become sen-
sitive to circumstance, to see what is right to do in a certain situation. That is
the only reliable skill we can hope for simply because it is the only one versatile
enough.
The mature moral decision-maker achieves this sensitivity through a combination
of phronesis, the virtues and a sense of equity.3 Consequently, the moral agent must
simply learn to be situation sensitive and thus judge things rightly, that is the only
way to lead the fulfilled life. At first this might seem like a profound challenge to the
whole theory. If it is true that any principle that we could come up with sooner or
later would meet an exception then how can morality ever be said to rest on a solid
foundation?
Some philosophers, for example Roger Crisp, argue that Aristotle’s aversion to
rules has been exaggerated to create a false contrast with, for example, utilitarian-
ism. He holds that virtue ethics indeed has a very central rule, namely that all
agents should be virtuous. Further to that point Crisp also rejects the claim that
rules for moral decision-making has to interfere with situation sensitivity.4 Hence,

3 See Chaps. 1 and 4.

4 See Book 9.2 of the NE, especially the last sentence.
46 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

although Aristotle clearly would not be in favour of rigidity, or the usage of rules
to free the agent from having to deliberate deeply complex situations, rules per se
were not problematic for Aristotle. It was rather the rules of thumb that he was
reluctant to spell out as they are context dependent.5
As the discussion of the role of rules in Aristotle goes right to the heart of his
theory some further comments are in place: Aristotle explained that actions pos-
sess moral qualities independently what we happened to believe or feel about
them and an agent who have phronesis knows this. Hence, phronesis can be said
to involve both true judgment (I am capable of reading situations aright), and
correct desire (because if I have the character virtues I will only desire the fine
and noble). Against this it is frequently protested that since there are no inde-
pendent criteria for the correctness of moral judgment it is not clear how the vir-
tuous agent is to be identified? Without speculating too much, Aristotle
presumably would have replied that any satisfactory moral theory must have its
roots in a theory of how human beings are by nature constructed and then point
to the Function Argument.6 He might also argue that just as we can see when
people are in good health without being trained as doctors we can recognize
when someone lives a fulfilled life—we do not need a complete and detailed
theoretical account to do this. Thirdly, it might be argued that the fact that the
virtuous person is capable of explaining their actions, albeit in hindsight, and
that they will do this by invoking one or several of the virtues is reliable
evidence.

5.4 4 Useful Old (Aristotelian) Virtues

Let us now turn to discuss four, key, Aristotelian virtues that appear likley to con-
tribute favourably to good decision-making and overall judgement. They are: cour-
age, temperance, generosity and practical wisdom (phronesis).
Courage
The Ethical Triad Cowardice Courage Nameless (Rashness)
Courage is generally considered to be a rather clear-cut case of a character related
virtue as Aristotle described them and one might suspect that this is contributing to
his choice to cover it first.7 Just like all the other virtues courage plays an impor-
tant social role. The courageous person values his life highly and is neither a cow-
ard nor prone to taking foolish risks. Courage should be understood as feeling the

5 See for example Book 9.2 of the NE.

6 See Chap. 4.
7 Irwin’s translation of andreia is bravery but in this introduction I have chosen to use the word

courage instead (as does e.g. Roger Crisp as well as Broadie & Rowe) to avoid getting stuck in
the battle metaphors.
5.4 4 Useful Old (Aristotelian) Virtues 47

right amount of fear, at the right time, for the right reasons and so forth.8 It is said
to lie in the mean between cowardice and rashness and the paradigm case is on the
battlefield.9
It has been said that Aristotle in fact might have held that that the bravest thing
is never to feel fear at all and that the sensation of fear is a reliable indication of
vice in these situations. By and large such a reading seems implausible. Indeed, it
could be argued that it can be highly appropriate to feel fear as it shows that one
realizes the gravity of the situation and understands ones own mortality. Crucially,
however, the fear I feel will not escalate into panic and I can stay calm and level
headed in the midst of danger. My feelings will not take control of me and sud-
denly prompt me to run from the battle. In fact the contrary is true—because I am
courageous I am happy to have this opportunity to defend my country and I want
to do just that even though it is likely to be my end. My reasonable fear will work
to my advantage as the adrenalin will make me more focused without taking over
my capacity for rational decision-making.
For all the emphasis on the warrior examples I do not think that Aristotle
should be read as saying that true courage can only be displayed on the battle field
when engaged in mortal combat. Some philosophers have pointed out that because
the battle metaphor is powerful it tends to be used for any situation that calls for
bravery (but which might have little to do with battle). Further to this, the life in
the city state of ancient Athens was arranged such that the most immediate threats
to one’s life had been removed. Consequently the big remaining worry was con-
flicts with other states, so again it was natural to use the battle metaphor.10 In light
of this there is nothing odd about Aristotle favouring the war scenario when he
speaks of courage and should not lead the reader to the conclusion that it is the
only situation where true courage can be displayed.
Indeed, we can very well imagine everyday scenarios where doing the right
thing would require a quite high amount of courage. Let us consider the follow-
ing example: I am meeting Philosopher E after work. As she arrives rather late
I demand an explanation for her tardiness. It turns out that as she was waiting
for the bus she had heard raised voices and a woman’s muffled scream. Peeking
around the corner she saw a very large, very angry man violently shaking a crying
woman. The man was very aggressive, the street dark and empty and Philosopher
E is of rather slight built. Yet she leaped forward scolding and shouting and man-
aged to rescue the woman. Other examples of everyday situations where a sense
of courage in central to good decision-making are the all too familiar ‘oh some-
one really ought to do something about X’ scenarios. Perhaps one or several of
the following cases sound familiar: ‘oh someone really ought to tell that teenage

8 See e.g. Pears for a very interesting discussion on this. Pears D. (1980). Courage as a Mean.
In, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty, 1980, University of California Press, 171–188.
9 I have previously stated that the virtues are dispositions for actions, not for feelings, conse-

quently what I mean here is “a feeling that will issue in the right action”.
10 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. p. 163.
48 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

girl to give up her seat to the old man or that parent not to manhandle the child in
the supermarket or that well-dressed man to stop shouting down his mobile phone
disturbing everyone on the bus or that boy to pick up his litter and put it in the
next bin or that woman to stop kicking her dog etc. While these examples may
appear petty, to take reponsibility for the communal and to stop leaving it to that
unidentified ‘someone’ does require some courage. To refrain is not only about
not taking the time or minding one’s own business even though many of us might
prefer to explain it that way. Instead, what we ought to do is to step up and take
a responsibility for those individuals who cannot speak for themselves and the
environment (both the built and the natural environment) even when this comes a
certain personal cost.
Going back to Aristotle he decribes five different types of false, or spurious,
courage in addition to the real thing. Here I shall only discuss bravery of citizens,
or spurious courage, which Aristotle believed to be the trickiest form as it “…
looks the most like bravery.”11 He talks of people who do brave things out of fear
of dishonour and shame—their primary concern is what others might think rather
than doing the fine. In this group we also find those who pretend to be courageous
while knowing fully well they are perfectly safe.
It is sometimes suggested that it is not possible to show true courage in the
Aristotelian sense in a situation which one did not bring about oneself and where
there is no hope of escape. That in order to be courageous there has to be both
exist a possibility to escape and a way of warding off evil by standing one’s
ground.12 I do not find it convincing to interpret Aristotle as arguing that courage
is not for facing a hopeless situation where there is no hope of victory (be that
external or internal). It seems odd in light of the rest of his argument let alone the
fact that it is on collision course with common sense. It is more plausible that he
would recognize that the dying patient facing her death in a dignified and com-
posed way is displaying courage, just in the same way as a prisoner on death-row
can.13
Aristotle frequently says that the virtuous agent does what he does willingly
and with pleasure. Feelings of like and dislike reveal important facts about the
moral status agent, “we must take someone’s pleasure or pain following on his
action to be a sign of his state.”14 While many virtuous actions would indeed be
enjoyable yet it is also quite clear that there can be situations such that the agent
most definitely would not experience any pleasure. Returning to the warrior in the
example above a rather pleasureless scenario might be getting hacked to pieces by

11 /NE1116a18/.
12 See e.g. Broadie, p 24–25 where she refers to Book 3.8, 1116a30-b2 and 3.6, 1115b4 of the
NE in: Aristotle (2002). The Nicomachean Ethics, (translation, introduction and commentary by
S. Broadie and C. Rowe), Oxford University Press.
13 See Pears for the example about the prisoner on death row. Pears D. (1980). Courage as a

Mean. In, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A O. Rorty, 1980, University of California Press,
171–188.
14 /NE1104b5-6/.
5.4 4 Useful Old (Aristotelian) Virtues 49

a berserk enemy. So how are we to understand Aristotle here? One reading is that
Aristotle in fact recognizes that courage might well involve pain but that
insofar as someone does what is courageous in spite of the pain, he achieves his goal, and
this is something he likes and enjoys. That he enjoys his action in this respect can be
missed precisely because of the pain that surrounds it.15

Hence, as Aristotle argued that there are two types of pleasures, those of the
body and those of the soul, it is possible for him to say that doing the fine and
noble in fact is pleasurable even though it might involve great pain and suffering.16
Even if one’s death is painful and even if one would ideally have wanted a few
more good years the fact that one will now have a glorious death to crown one’s
life is pleasurable. It could perhaps also be added that for the virtuous there are no
alternatives at that stage, nothing could ever make up for fleeing.
Temperance
The Ethical Triad Self-Indulgence – Temperance: Nameless
This is the opposite of courage in the sense that the former is about pain and this is
about pleasure.17 Or, perhaps more accurately, about the desire for pleasure and
why it should be controlled. Both Plato and Aristotle understood temperance as
the proper balance between desire and reason in the soul and one needs the virtue
of temperance not to become insatiable and destructive both on a personal level
and a societal one. It helps us to reject our sheer animality and re-affirm our status
as humans. Note that temperance is about becoming the master of your weak-
nesses. Hence, in light of my strong preference for cheese staging a raclette and
kirsch bonanza would be quite bad whereas the same amount of melted cheese
consumed by someone else might not qualify as self-indulgent.18
The temperate person is fully capable of enjoying the pleasures of consumption
but is not completely driven by desire. Desire does not take over and silences the
voice of reason in the good agent. She is aware and in control of the lure of bod-
ily pleasure and thus she knows to enjoy it at the right time, to the right extent, at
the right time, with the right people, for the right reasons and so on. Temperance
is not about denying oneself the good stuff but about not letting the desire for it
rule one’s life. The concern is about enjoying pleasure in the wrong way just as
much as it is about enjoying the wrong kind of pleasure. Hence, a very late, wine-
drenched evening with friends need not be problematic at all per se, at any rate
there would not be anything objectively wrong about it. According to Aristotle
there are many problems with self-indulgence and not all of them have to do with
over-consumption. A related problem is when the only thing the agent cares about
is the smell and the taste of the food—like an animal obsessed with its prey. Doing
this we over-look the finer nuances and become insensitive to them. Instead we

15 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 166.

16 See Book 3 of the NE.
17 Note that temperance is not the same as ‘prudence’.
18 Naturally, the agents I have in mind do not have the same taste as I do.
50 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

should be like wine-connoisseurs and appreciate the colour, texture, bouquet etc.
equally much. Evidently modern society is rife with examples where we would do
a lot better, both as individuals and as a group, if we could control our appetite for
‘bodily pleasures’. With regards to diet and physical exercise, for example, a great
many would benefit from an enhanced capacity for striking a balance between
complete ascetism and an ‘extra everything’ approach. An improved capacity for
epistemic deferrance might make it easier for knowing whom to listen to in the sea
of self-proclaimed experts.
The vicious, lacking in temperance, are always yearning for pleasures and feel
deprived when they cannot have them. Aristotle holds that self-control is just a
confirmation that the agent is vicious. For him both a sense of shame and self-
control entails having inappropriate desires and consequently he found the moral
saint far more praise-worthy than the moral hero. In adults a sense of shame is an
affection (a worry about getting a bad reputation) and not a proper disposition and
thus a true sign of worthlessness. For youths who are still trainees, on the other
hand, it might well be useful and they can benefit greatly as it stops them from
realizing their worst ideas and helps to form their characters.19 Thus, the
reformed alcoholic who still might feel the urge to drink every now and then but
who never gives in is not admirable for Aristotle. This might seem counter intui-
tive to us because we often connect ‘how hard is it to do X’ to ‘how admirable it
is to be good at X’.
As mentioned in the discussion on courage Aristotle talks of two types of pain,
here the equivalent is two types of pleasure. Those that have to do with the body
and those that have to do with the soul, examples of the latter would be love of
honour or of learning.20 With regard to temperance Aristotle focuses on ‘the pleas-
ures we share with the animals’, e.g. eating, drinking and sex, as he argues that
such things are the domains of excess and deficiency. Then he goes on to make a
further distinction:
Temperance, then, will be about bodily pleasures, but not even about all of these. For
those who enjoyment in objects of sight, such as colors, shapes, a painting, are called nei-
ther temperate nor intemperate, even though it would also seem possible to enjoy these
either rightly or excessively or deficiently.21

It has been pointed out that it is somewhat odd that Aristotle restricts temper-
ance to brutish or animalistic pleasures. It would, for example, be perfectly pos-
sible to have an unhealthy obsession—to be fanatical—about art or music and if
that is the case it is not clear exactly how that would differ from being an alco-
holic or a sex addict. In theory at least, it might lead one to compromise ones’
well-being by giving prority to habits and pursuits that would negatively impact
quiality of life.

19 See e.g. Book 2.7 of the NE, especially 1108a31-23, 4.9, 1128b10-12 and 15–21.
20 See e.g. Book 3.10 of the NE, especially 1117b24-33/.
21 /NE1118a2-7/.
5.4 4 Useful Old (Aristotelian) Virtues 51

Generosity
The Ethical Triad Wastefulness – Generosity: Stinginess
This virtue has to do with the giving, taking and usage of financial assets (includ-
ing money, services and property). As Aristotle writes it deals with “anything whose
worth is measured by money.”22 To qualify as generous it is acceptable to give a bit
too much but it is never ok to take too much—it is far worse to be greedy than to be
wasteful as the avaricious tend to go to greater lengths at getting what they want.
The excellence lies not in the quantity that is given but in the disposition of the giver.
One must only give in accordance with one’s assets, otherwise one is left without
resources and thus unable to give to the deserving which of course would be bad.
Generosity deals both with how we receive our money or assets—from what
source, in what manner and so forth—and how we choose to spend it. Notably,
however, Aristotle emphasizes that it is more important to give in the right way
than it is to take in the right way, this is because he argues that for most people it
is harder to part with property without regret than to take.
Using wealth seems to consist in spending and giving, whereas taking and keeping seems
to be possessing rather than using. That is why it is more proper to the generous person to
give to the right people than to take from the right sources and not the wrong sources.23

Thus, giving is superior to receiving.

Furthermore, this view is linked to the idea that the receiver finds himself
indebted to the giver which is not a good position to be in.
For it is more proper to virtue to do good than to receive good, and more proper to do fine
actions than not to do shameful ones, and clearly [the right sort of] giving implies doing
good and doing fine actions, while [the right sort of] taking implies receiving well or not
doing something shameful.24

That said, it is important not to read Aristotle as saying that we have any obli-
gation to give more than common decency calls for. Being generous has nothing
to do with the supererogatory for him (supererogation means roughly to go above
and beyond the call of duty). Indeed how could there be room for such act with in
his theory as that would imply that there would be finer acts than the virtuous?
The two extremes are the wasteful and the stingy. As the former spends both
too much, and indiscriminately, and takes too little she is likely to end up bank-
rupt. The good news is that such a person might be cured. The latter, on the other
hand, is worse off as their condition is incurable and the avaricious tend to go to
greater lengths to satisfy their desire. Stinginess involves two factors: deficiency in
giving and excess in taking both regarding the amount taken and the source where
it comes from.25 It is explained that there are two types of avaricious people: the

22 /NE1119b26-27/.
23 /NE1120a9-12/.
24 /NE1120a13-16/.
25 Examples of wrong ways to earn money would be pimping, shylocking, dicing or being a

petty-thief.
52 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

miser who takes the right way but obviously is far too tight-fisted and the scaven-
ger for profit who might well be generous in one sense but yet guilty of taking
money from any source he can lay his hand on.26
A related aspect is the type of relationship the person has with her money.
Presumably their attitude towards their assets and the way they take pleasure in
them might be rather revealing. Consider Donald Duck’s Uncle Scrooge. Not only
is he a miser of inter-galactic proportions but it is the way in which he takes pleas-
ure in his money that seems deeply troubling. He obviously fails to hit the mean.27

5.5 Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)

As explained in Chap. 4 practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues and as

such it does not fit into the ‘ethical triad model’. Further to this it is a ‘meta-virtue’
in the sense that it impacts on both all the other virtues as well as on overall good
decision-making.
To have phronesis means to be good at thinking about how one should act in
order to live a worthwhile life. Such an individual is good at thinking morally, i.e.
she knows the moral principles and moreover, she knows how to apply them in prac-
tical situations. When we use phronesis we deliberate both the good life and happi-
ness in a general sense and we think of the specific action. Phronesis helps us too
‘see’ the virtuous act, it answers all the ‘how’, ‘when’, ‘to whom’ and ‘how much’
questions that arise in our lives. This makes it a key element of equity, i.e. the ability
to make sound ‘all things considered’ decisions which then guide one’s actions.
So far so good. Unfortunately, however, Aristotle is not very forthcoming when
it comes to explaining how we acquire the intellectual virtues. Instead, he settles
for something rather vague about it being more through instruction than practice
and training. Because learning the intellectual virtues are so central to becoming a
virtuous agent I think it appropriate to discuss this further. Below follows a brief
account of how the good man develops his morality over time:
For Aristotle moral virtue comes in stages, through education and habituation,
and it has both cognitive and emotional dimensions.28 Admittedly his analysis might
not have been very refined in the eyes of a modern psychologist but he touched on
something that is still a question in ethics, i.e. can virtue be taught or can it only be
acquired by practicing or is it perhaps part of human nature?29 Aristotle talks of the
that (knowledge in a qualified sense) and the because (knowledge in the unqualified
sense). Humans can have either just the that, i.e. the capacity to listen to the advice
of good people and to observe what the just men do, or both. When we have both we

26 Note that there can be people such that they suffer both the opposing vices at the same time./

NE1121b21-31/.
27 Note that the virtue of open-handedness also deals with the way the agent spend on herself.
28 Burnyeat M. F. (1980). Aristotle on Learning to be Good. In, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics, ed.

A O. Rorty, 1980, University of California Press, p. 71.

29 /NE1179b20-1180a/.
5.5 Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) 53

have phronesis and thus we can work out for ourselves how to act in any given situa-
tion. We have a deep understanding and have internalized the virtues fully. We desire
to do the noble and we take pleasure in doing it. In Aristotle’s world his students
would learn the that by listening to his lectures and then, with lots of practice and
over time, they would also be able to acquire the because. Knowing the that means
knowing what it is to do the fine and noble, to have a good grasp both of the charac-
ter virtues and the intellectual virtues (so that one can read the situation right). The
student knows these things because she has observed the behaviour of good men and
listened to their advice. She has leaned them by heart like she would any other sub-
ject and is slowly beginning to realize how to do this on her own.
For concreteness consider the process of learning a new language such as
French for example. First I learn the words for particular situations e.g. what to
say at the customs or when I go grocery shopping. I produce grammatically cor-
rect, although very simple, sentences—not because I know French grammar well
but because I have learnt (and accepted) that this is the good way of talking to a
customs officer or a clerk. Notably, however, I do not yet know the because and
thus my knowledge is unreliable. Gradually, I learn more (become familiar with a
great number of situations and practice my grammar and vocabulary) and start to
internalize the language. I become able to know what to say in new situations. I
reach the level where I can construct my own grammatically correct sentences for
new situations. Now I am beginning to know the because. I get more and more
advanced and suddenly one day I am fluent in French. I no longer think of rules
or specific words—it just flows out of me, effortlessly and with pleasure in all sit-
uations. In doing this I meet one of Aristotle’s key criteria as a student: I under-
stand what would be the virtuous choice and I take pleasure in doing just that.30
The example of language is especially suitable because just like morality a
language cannot be fully mastered through a set of rules. To really speak well,
as opposed to merely correct, one must have a feeling for the language, be sensi-
tive to the different words and situations, the nuances, the undercurrents. No set
of meticulous rules can ever hope to capture this. Further, it appears to work well
with another idea in the Nicomachean Ethics namely that there is something less
trustworthy about the ‘moral expert’ than the virtuous agent. Although the for-
mer might be able to model herself on the virtuous agent and act like he would
every time their act would not be the same form a moral point of view. Even
if she is doing the right thing that does not make her virtuous. Chances are of
course that this moral impostor would slip up sooner or later but even if she did
not we would trust her less. Presumably such an agent would also have problems
explaining her actions. Similarly with the language: we would be reluctant to
agree that a person was mastering a language if they had no knowledge of gram-
mar and never could explain why they constructed their sentences the way they
did. Even though such a person might speak fluently it is not them we would go
to for advice on syntax.

30 See Dworkin ‘Laws & Empire’ for a similar analogy. Dworkin R. (1986), Law’s Empire,

Belknap Press.
54 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

A brief summary of the key points: the first step in the moral development is to
learn the that and begin to take pleasure in doing the noble, this is done through
the right upbringing. This will teach the agent what the good life is and she will
then decide to do what it takes to secure this happy life—she accepts the goal of
eudaimonia. It should be noted that natural virtue, although perhaps pleasant for
the person in question, does not equal virtue proper. Such an agent would still
have to practice and learn phronesis in order to fully understand the goal of
eudaimonia and thus have ‘real virtue’.31 The second step is to install the habitual
part of the virtues in the person through practice which involves both habituation
and teaching. In other words, it is not possible to simply reason one’s way to
becoming virtuous. At this point, although the agent starts to take increasing
pleasure in doing the noble, she might still occasionally slip up. The third step,
which develops parallel to the second step, is about phronesis. This is the icing on
the virtue-cake and without it one cannot have any of the individual virtues and
consequently nor the whole of virtue. This intellectual virtue makes the agent see
which action is the right one, i.e. the virtuous one. This action is both means and
ends, it is an end in itself and will bring about the desired overall end which of
course is the fulfilled life. Now you only take pleasure in the noble and you have
learned the because. As you know that this is the most advantageous choice for
you are no longer tempted to act otherwise, that would simply be irrational.

5.6 Examples of Useful Modern Virtues

Seeking to understand and improve the ways in which humans form beliefs is far
from a novel philosophical undertaking. A fairly recent strategy, however, is the
one presented here i.e. to combine ideas from the areas of virtue ethics and virtue
epistemology with some revealing insights from the natural sciences. I believe that
this can be a fruitful approach which can improve the ways in which individuals
and societies make important decisions. To enable the reader to better assess the
merits of this approach a short introduction to Virtue Epistemology is called for.
The field of Virtue Epistemology is young but interest is growing rapidly both
from a theoretical and a more applied perspective. In the last two decades a lot of
work is being done trying to identify some cognitive virtues which might prove
essential for a happy life in a modern society. Very broadly speaking there are two
camps: the virtue reliabilists32 and the virtue responsibilists33. Both groups

31 For a discussion see Book 6.13 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

32 See, for example, Axtell (ed.) (2000), Knowledge, Belief and Character, (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield): Sosa (1991) Knowledge in Perspective, (New York: CUP): Greco (2000),
Putting sceptics in their place (New York: CUP).
33 For example, Zagzebski (1996), Virtues of the Mind: an inquiry into the nature of virtue and

the ethical foundations of knowledge (New York: CUP): Montmarquet (1993), Epistemic Virtue
and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield)
5.6 Examples of Useful Modern Virtues 55

research the type of capacities that enables us to respond well to information and
increases our epistemic ability broadly conceived of. As for exactly which virtues
one might require in order to respond well to information well (that is: which vir-
tues that might be ‘key epistemic virtues’) there is, however, widespread disagree-
ment. The reliabilists focus on natural, as well as, acquired reliable virtues (or
competencies) such as sensory capacities, induction, deduction and memory. The
responsibilists, on the other hand, focus on acquired stable character traits such as
open-mindedness and intellectual courage and do not view natural faculties like
vision and memory as epistemic virtues proper.
In the previous section I suggested that traditional virtues relevant to promoting
good information handling will include courage, temperance, generosity and phro-
nesis.34 New, or non-traditional, virtues might include open-mindedness (the will-
ingness to revise beliefs in the face of evidence and to entertain alternatives35),
creativity, intellectual honesty and improved memory (both with regards to process
memory and long-term memory).
A few further comments on why memory enhancement is mentioned in this
essay. While it is not at all clear that the various forms of memory fit the tradi-
tional definition of an intellectual virtue it appears plausible that an improved
memory could be highly conducive to leading a the virtuous and happy life. It
seems likely, for example, that a good memory would enable the individual to
manage larger quantaties of information and make more informed decisions than
she would otherwise. Better decision-making, could in turn, promote the develop-
ment of the virtues and the sense of overall good judgement. Consequently, the
primary reason for including memory in this essay is that it could be conducive to
the instilling of the virtues and the leading of the good life. This is different to vir-
tue epistemology where the broad focus is on the improvement of epistemic ability
as such.
To seek to improve one’s memory through various methods might be rather
similar to seeking to enhance various other cognitive capacities. Evidently it
would, just like all the other virtues come as part of a package and be used in
a virtuous way. Sometimes it is rather good to forget. Consider, for example, a
depressed person with very good memory. Plausibly she might be prone to vari-
ous cognitive bias that might affect her overall outlook on life. Notably that should
not be taken to mean that I have a strong position on this but, rather, that given
the intimate links between the various intellectual capacities it must be further
explored.

34 Although not covered here I also think that nous (intellect), and sophia (theoretical wisdom)

are key.
35 Roberts & Wood (2007) Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford:

OUP): Zagzebski & De Paul (eds.) (2003) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and
Epistemology (Oxford: OUP).
56 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

Naturally there are numerous other examples: epistemic conscientiousness36/

responsibility37 (commitment to discovering the truth), and impartiality. That
these traits are good candidates for new epistemic virtues is suggested by the
widespread habit of holding many beliefs not because they are true, but for other
reasons, such as to signal group allegiance or to support more fundamental
beliefs.38 All that said, it is still early days in this field and much more research is
required.
As the format of this essay does not permit me to cover all of them I have
opted to focus on creativity. Below follows a short account intended to sketch
how heightened creativity might contribute to making us better problem solvers,
for example by becoming less likley to be controlled by irrational fear, misplaced
bias and old habits that no longer serve us well. Combined with the moral virtues,
increased creativity could, reasonably, be taken to have a positive impact on our
overall decision-making capacity.

5.7 Creativity and Problem Solving

Very generally speaking creativity could be said to involve ‘…the production of

novel, useful products39'. From a purely ethymological perspective, however, crea-
tivity comes from the Latin word meaning ‘to create’ or ‘to make’.40
Many researchers agree that they often get their best ideas when they ‘least
expect it’. They see solutions to problems when they are away from their offices/
labs, or are engaged in another, unrelated, activity such as reading a novel, listning
to a piece of music or walking in the park. Suddenly it is like the penny drops. In
reality, however, there is, of course, nothing sudden about this at all. The insight
has, in most cases, been preceeded by both concious and sub-conscious thought
processess that have primed the brain for this insight. Arguably, such accounts
could be taken to indicate that by being creative with, for example, one’s work
environment or one’s standard explanatory models could have a positive impact
on problem solving. Seen in that light, perhaps creativity could be described as an
ability to see unusual and unexpected connections or as a ‘capacity for problem
solving’.

36 Montmarquet (1987) ‘Epistemic Virtue’, Mind 96: 482–497.

37 Code (1984) ‘Toward a “Responsibilist” Epistemology’, Philosophical and
Phenomenological Research XVL: 29–50.
38 See, for example, Heil (1983) ‘Believing What One Ought’, Journal of Philosophy 80/11:

752–765.
39 Nigel Mumford, 2003, p. 110
40 For a discussion on creativity see Heilman, K. M., Nadeau, S. E. and Beversdorf, D. O.

(2003) 'Creative Innovation: Possible Brain Mechanisms', Neurocase, 9: 5, 369–379 DOI:

10.1076/neur.9.5.369.16553
5.7 Creativity and Problem Solving 57

Such experiences are corroborated by scientific research. Numerous studies

have indicated that creativity can be stimulated or trigged in certain environments,
through practicing, exposure and so on. In other words: that many people can
become more creative by, for example, changing habits or undertaking other life-
style adjustments.41 If this is the case it certainly adds some extra clout to Edison’s
comment that “Genius is 1 % inspiration and 99 % perspiration”.
According to research in the field many creative people have certain personality
traits in common. More often than not they tend to be extrovert and open, tolerant,
compassionate, conscientious, structured and intellectual.42 The fact that such
capacities or traits have been observed together is promising. While it might not be
a necessary pre-condition for creativity to also be, for example, intellectually hon-
est, courageous and open-minded, it appears plausible that such traits tend to have
certain beneficial effects on each other. While such a positive co-variation is of
great interest, three things must immediately be added. Firstly, such traits are also
found in individuals that are not extra-ordinarily creative. Secondly, it is not clear
to what extent such traits are best explained by the genetic make-up of that individ-
ual or by environmental factors as broadly concieved of. Without going into detail
it appears that most scientists in the field believe in a mix and that the real question
is the exact balance. Thirdly, it is not clear what preceeds what. Is it that having
these other capacities triggers creativity or is it the other way around, i.e. that being
able to see solutions where others do not makes it easier for those individuals to let
go of, for example, bias. Further, while these individuals are likely to be less risk
averse and willing to test things out than their peers, such propensity is, however,
certainly no guarantee for them being better at assessing the actual risk.
Studies indicate that when people are in a creative state, the extreme version
of which is often called Flow, they also experience intense well-being. Flow
could be loosely described as a mental state involving concentration, focus and
elation which occur when a person is fully emersed in an activity (e.g. writing,
playing music or doing sports). Brain scans have shown that high levels of dopa-
mine are released in the brain and such a connection with the body’s own reward

41 See e.g. T. Klingberg (2011), Den Larande Hjarnan (especially Chaps. 7, 9 and 10), Natur

och Kultur: M. A. Owen et al. (2010), Putting brain training to the test, Nature, 465, pp. 775–
778: F. McNab et al. (2009), Changes in cortical dopamine D1 receptor binding associated with
cognitive training, Science, 323, pp. 800–802: T. Klingberg (2010), Training and placticity of
working memeory, Trends in Cognitive Science, 14, pp. 317–324: L. B. Thorell et al. (2009),
training and transfer effects of executive functions in preschool children, Developmental Science,
12, pp. 106–113: C. H. Hillman et al. (2008), Be smart, exercise your heart: exercise effects
on brain and cognition, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 30, pp. 5368–5375: S. J. Colcombe et
al. (2006), Aeorobic exercise trainign increases brain volume in ageing humans, The Journal
of Gerontology. Series A, Biological Sciences and Medical Sciences, 61, pp. 1166–1170: A. C.
Pereira et al. (2007), an in vivo correlate of exercise-induced neurogenesis in the adult dentate
gyrus, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104,
pp. 5638–5643.
42 See e.g. the work of Dr Maria Sandgren who is active at Sodertorns Hogskola, Stockholm,

Sweden.
58 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

system has received great interest.43 Consider for example the research carried
out by Fredrik Ullen, Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, at the Karolinska
Institute in Stockholm.44 Along with his team he explores the connections
between learning, creativity and Flow in an attempt to reveal the neural mecha-
nisms of expertise in general and musical expertise in particular. While Flow is
very pleasurable and the experience is highly motivating in the sense that it
makes the individual want to perform that task again, it should be noted that both
dicipline and hard work are pre-requisites for Flow. Clearly much more research
is needed but despite the current epistemic situation it seems reasonable to make
the following assumption: to have a capacity for creativity tends to have a posi-
tive correlation with the overall quality of life of a person. More speculative, but
in line with some key virtue ethics ideas, would be the following: a society where
individuals are encouraged, and stimulated, to be creative is more likely to
become an open and inclusive society than one where creativity is shunned or
severely regulated.

5.8 How to Stimulate Creativity

Now, given that we know a fair bit about which type of environments that are more
likely to trigger creativity and inspiration it would make sense that we both organise
society such that it would be conducive but also that we train ourselves to expose
ourselves. From a very practical perspective individuals could be challenged to
change routines, reflect critically on their standard explanatory models, pencil in
more ‘do nothing time’ in their diaires, dare to fail more often and not feel so upset
about it and so on and so forth.45 It is often said that good habits should start early
and if that is true it would appear that school is a good place to begin. Unfortunately,
however, some studies have shown that not all teachers like creative students.
It appears that teachers have a tendency to rate the character traits that are asso-
ciated with creativity as negative. In fact, there is (some) evidence that many
teachers tend to think of these children as difficult, obnoxious, impolite, critical
and disruptive.46 The creative children were also associated with other characteris-
tics which are perceived as potentially problematic, for example, impulsivity and
risk-taking. Their less creative peers, however, were frequently described as

43 See e.g. F. Ullen et al. (2010), Thinking Outside a Less Intact Box: Thalamic Dopamine D2

Receptor Densities are Negatively Related to Psychometric Creativity in Healthy Individuals.

PloS ONE 5(5): e10670. Doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010670.
44 http://ki.se/ki/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=36958&l=en.
45 See e.g. the studies on the connection between breaks and creativity by J.

School and B. Baird, St Barabara University http://www.scientificamerican.com/

article.cfm?id=allowing-the-mind-to-wander-aids-creativity#commentForm.
46 See e.g. Torrance, E. P. (1963). The creative personality and the ideal pupil. Teachers College

Record, 65, pp. 220–226.

5.8 How to Stimulate Creativity 59

manifesting character-traits which the teachers rated much more favourably, for
example acceptance of authority and a proneness to conform.47 Such attitudes lead
to teachers rejecting, or sometimes even punishing, the creative kids and favouring
other students instead. Such tendencies are especially problematic as studies have
shown that a supportive environment can play a big role when it comes to nurtur-
ing creativity in students.48 If these students are not only not encouraged by their
teachers to develop but in fact even punished for not conforming that might have a
very negative effect on capacities such as creativity.49
As already explained scientific research in this field has shown that to be (more)
creative—literately to create—we need to call old truths and habits into question
and seek to break free from some of them. The somewhat gloomy news, however,
is that it appears that society today is not organised to offer a lot of incentive to
individuals to go through this process. If, for example, if children are not encour-
aged and stimulated to build their creativity at school that could, plausibly, decrease
the likleyhood of them blossoming into the type of creative adults who can (and
dare) think of new sollutions to old, as well as new, problems and situations.
Evidently, to challenge the standard ways can prove unpleasant, tiresome,
frightening and generally emotionally taxing. Moreover, it appears that to be
creative requires hard work, discipline and a certain degree of stubbornness. As
pointed out above—sudden insights are very rarely sudden. Consider, for example,
the cases of Thomas Edison and Ludwig van Beethoven. In addition there is also
an element of ‘good imagination’ which might well be key to very high creativity
and it is not clear that a capacity for ‘imagination’ can be created in an individ-
ual that has none. Then again most agents would have some and that ability could
plausibly be honed. The million dollar question is of course how best to become
more creative. Could it be through drugs and technology or through embarking
on a life in accordance with the virtues or through undertaking other life-style
changes? This will be further discussed in Chap. 7.

5.9 Conclusion

Barring psychic abilities it is of course impossible to know exactly what the future
may hold but it would be reasonable to assume that it will be no less challenging
and complex that our current reality. Consequently it seems plausible that agents
47 See e.g. Bachtold, L. (1974), The creative personality and the ideal pupil revisited. Journal of
Creative Behaviour, 8, pp. 47–54; Cropley, A. J. (1992), More ways than one: Fostering creat-
vitiy. Norwood, NJ: Ablex; Dettmer, P. (1981). Improving teacher attitiudes toward carachteris-
tics of the creatively gifted. Gifted Child Quarterly, 25, pp. 11–19.
48 See e.g. Harrington et al. (1987), Testing aspects of Carl Roger’s theory of creative envi-

ronments: Child-rearing antecedents of creative potential in young adolescents. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 52, pp. 851–856.
49 Erik L. Westby, V. L. Dawson, Creativity: asset or burden in the classroom? Creativity

Research Journal, 1995, vol 8, no. 1, pp. 1–10

60 5 Examples of Useful Capacities

would benefit from being adaptable and creative both in their reading of situations
and when they look for solutions. Further, it is not unlikley that agents equipped
with capacities such as courage, generosity, practical widom, creativity, intel-
lectual honesty, improved memory and temperance—to mention but a few quali-
ties—are likley to fare better and make better choices than those without. When
combined they will translate into a sense of equity and the type of good overall
judgement which is essential to responsible, mature, moral decision-making.
Indeed, if the virtuous life is the best life it would be strategic to opt for a life-
style and habits that would facilitate the instilling and, the improvement, of such
abilities. Further to this, as most people would fare better most of the time
embarking on such a project would be positive both for the individual and for soci-
ety at large. Consequently, to create an environment which involves both intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations to be creative could be defended on other grounds than
paternalism. This reconnects to the need for a society-wide, inclusive, ongoing
dialogue as explained in Chap. 2.50 Another link between Aristotle and the on-
going dialogue is his conviction that the moral and intellectual virtues need to be
exercised at all times. That, just like physical fitness, the virtues have a best before
date. Moreover, in an ever changing society we need to continue to develop the
virtues in order to make the best calls and to continue to lead the good life. This
was also recognised by Aristotle who did not intend his list of virtues as final but
rather as a starting point that could well be amended. It might be a tad over opti-
mistic to assume that this would solve all the problems listed here but, we would
none the less be better placed with regards to responsible decision-making.
We will now turn to discuss how these, and other positive, capacities could
become more prevalent. In Chap. 7 it will be argued that virtues such as cour-
age, temperance, generosity and practical wisdom, creativity, intellectual hon-
esty, improved memory and open-mindedness could be successfully instilled, or
improved on, through a combination of education, training, life-style changes,
drugs and medical technology. As has been previously pointed out virtue ethics
could very well be combined with a set of technological and or medical enhance-
ments techniques. While there is no inbuilt incompatibility between technology
and virtue, on my account, the suitability of the technique or drug in question
would of course have to be assessed from a virtue perspective. At the very least
this ought to ensure that we make better calls with regards to which medical and
technological enhancement techniques we find desirable and morally permissible.
Before we can explore the methods further, however, some of the criticism of
virtue ethics must be addressed.

50 For an interesting discussion on the importance of transparent commnication and inclusive-

ness within the EU see J. Habermas (2011) Zur Verfassung Europas—Ein Essay, Ersatz.
Chapter 6
Critique of Virtue Ethics

In the last few chapters it has been argued that the life of virtue is the best, happi-
est and most desirable life. Even accepting that, one might wonder whether or not
it is possible to have this life. This chapter will address some of those concerns
and elaborate on the habituation process and the importance of role models, i.e.
methods through which the virtues are instilled.1
Virtue ethics has frequently been criticised for being unachievable for socio–
economic reasons. It has been said to require a certain social background involv-
ing everything from money to responsible parents and as a consequence it would
only be the children of the elite who got the chance to even try to become virtu-
ous. In addition it is far from clear that even those fortunate few who got the right
training would manage to instil the intellectual and moral virtue to the extent that
they actually become the type of stable character traits that always issue in action.
Previously such claims had, largely, to rest on assumptions and observations about
human behaviour and our general nature. Recent advancements in the medical sci-
ences in general, and brain research in particular have, however, provided addi-
tional ammunition for the critics of virtue theory. Scientific findings indicate that
most people are subject to substantial cognitive constraints. In general, humans
are, for example, biased, poor at handling information and bad at deferring judge-
ment. Arguably, these and other similar constraints could stand between us and
the good life. The findings have been taken to show that the primary reasons most
of us fail to develop the moral and epistemic virtues to the full are of a biological
nature as opposed to insufficient moral motivation and training. Chap. 3 took a
closer look at some these studies and then discussed whether or not these find-
ings really pose a serious threat to some of the central assumptions in virtue ethics
(as well as in other normative theories drawing on intuitions). This chapter, on the
other hand, will focus on the idea that that the main obstacles standing between
us and the good life stem from inside the theory itself. There is a long tradition
of accusing virtue ethics of, for example, being elitist: failing to provide adequate

1 This was briefly addressed in Chap. 4.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 61

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_6, © The Author(s) 2013
62 6 Critique of Virtue Ethics

action-guiding and to be based on an overly optimistic view of human nature.

Consequently, it is now time to focus on the process of habituation and the impor-
tance of good role models.

6.1 Why Virtue Might be Impossible for the Many

To be virtuous in one’s actions means to do the virtuous thing consistently, with

pleasure and for the sake of virtue (i.e. not use the virtues as instruments). As
moral novices, and intermediates, we work towards becoming agents with settled
characters who do the virtuous, willingly and for its own sake. This is a tall order.
The virtuous life can appear very hard and it may take time to grasp that this is the
best life available and, as such, the most rational choice. As a result, the quality of
our upbringing and the society around us, as well as the laws, are key to the suc-
cessful development of virtue. As Aristotle points out
It is difficult, however, for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his youth if he has
not been brought up under the correct laws: for the many, especially the young, do not find it
pleasant to live in a temperate and resistant way. That is why laws must prescribe their upbring-
ing and practices: for they will not find these things painful when they get used to them.”2

6.2 Two Problems

The idea that a process of habituation (education and training) can be the making
of good and reliable agents, and that virtue can be instilled through a combination
of rationality, will, self-discipline and the threat of punishment has been subject to
frequent critique. Such misgivings have led some scholars to reject the whole
­virtue project described by Aristotle as largely unattainable, for example on the
grounds that it is unrealistic and elitist. In addition to faltering action guiding for
specific situations, it has also been claimed that it is unrealistic that humans could
develop the kind of stable (moral) character traits required.3

2 NE1179b32–37.
3 Harman (1999) ‘Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the
Fundamental Attribution Error’, Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc. 99: 315–331: Doris (2002) Lack
of Character (Cambridge: CUP): Darley and Batson (1973) ‘"From Jerusalem to Jericho": A
study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior’. JPSP, 27, 100–108. For
a discussion and possible responses, see e.g. the discussion on hexis in Hutchinson (1986) The
Virtues of Aristotle, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul: Nussbaum (1986), The fra-
gility of goodness, CUP, UK: Hursthouse (1991) ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 223–246, MacIntyre (1981), After Virtue: a
study in moral theory, University of Notre Dame Press, USA: Haidt (2004), ‘Intuitive ethics: how
innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues’, Daedalus, vol:133 iss:4 pg:55:
Crisp R. and Slote M. (1997), eds. Virtue Ethics, OUP, UK: Harman (1999) ‘Moral Philosophy
Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error’, Proc. of the
Aristotelian Soc. 99: 315–331: Doris (2002) Lack of Character (Cambridge: CUP).
6.2 Two Problems 63

If stable character traits of this kind turned out to be an illusion, matters would,
arguably, look especially bleak for moral theories such as virtue ethics that are
structured around the very idea that humans can, and indeed should, develop sta-
ble character traits that can guide their actions. In virtue ethics there is a strong
emphasis on the capacity for deliberation, the ability to pick up on morally relevant
features in a particular situation. Virtue theory holds that the good life depends on
a successful internalisation of the virtues and assumes that agents can both recog-
nise virtue in others and, subsequently, seek to model themselves on these good
examples. But how plausible is the idea that we can acquire virtues through habitu-
ation and, if humans are incapable of forming stable character traits, and our moral
decisions are the results of things like mood and practical circumstance, then how
could context awareness and situation sensitivity matter in an interesting way?

6.3 A Reply–How Practice Leads to Knowledge

Although a complex issue it is widely considered that for any moral theory to be
taken seriously it must be helpful with regards to choosing the right action in a dif-
ficult situation. If true, many philosophers would take that as evidence of a very
serious flaw which would jeopardize virtue ethics claim to be a capable normative
theory in its own right. Most likely that would lead them to conclude that the main
contribution of virtue ethics would be as a supplement to another, more robust,
theory. Such attacks often point to a particular section in the Nicomachean Ethics
where Aristotle admits that the Doctrine of the Mean, with its sweeping statements
like ‘virtuous actions are intermediate, in the way that sound reason indicates’, is
not very helpful for those who seek moral guidance. That it is about as action
guiding as being told by the doctor that one will get well if one takes medicine–
and then getting kicked out before being told which medicine. Indeed, he never
answers the question that he himself raised, in spite of claiming that he is intend-
ing to give his readers a good reply.4
However, not all scholars agree with this reading. One example would be the
Michael Pakaluk who proposes that Aristotle could be understood in the following
way (in which case there would be nothing odd about it): Aristotle was not overly
concerned with this alleged problem of guidance. In fact he would have thought
most people capable of figuring out what bravery in battle, or justice when dealing
with others, would require. Pakaluk goes on to say that it would in fact be rather
odd for Aristotle to be offering rules or specific guidelines because
…he has emphasized up to this point that rules are open-ended. The way in which maxims
must be left unspecified, because they require sensitivity to particular circumstances, is
not something that could be remedied by giving further rules and prescriptions.”5

4 See e.g. Urmson J. O. (1973). Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics,

ed. A O. Rorty, 1980, University of California Press, pp. 157–170.

5 Pakaluk M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 212.
64 6 Critique of Virtue Ethics

Then he adds that this is in fact where ‘sound reason’ comes into the picture–
this is the situation sensitivity. So in fact Aristotle is not calling for rules–he is
calling for increased sensitivity. This sensitivity is the sense of equity and over-
all good judgement that an agent that has instilled the virtues masters and that is
exactly the capacity that will enable her to deal with the type of morally challeng-
ing and difficult situations that form a part of any human life. This is the capacity
we can fall back on when we need to make all things considered judgements. This
will guide her actions and, moreover, do so in a flexible way which rules carved in
stone are less likely to do.

6.4 Role Models

As previously mentioned Aristotle adviced that one way of instilling the virtues
and to know what to do is to look to the example of a good man and to be inspired
by him or her. But how might we recognise the appropriate role model–and per-
haps more pressingly—what might the qualification criteria be?
At first on-look the idea of setting a good example might indeed sound both
attractive and intuitive. Of course one can be inspired by role models: surely
observing the deeds and practices of others can trigger a genuine desire to reform
one’s behaviour! But do we have good reasons to be so optimistic? In Chap. 3
some of the challenges, environmental and biological, that we appear to be up
against when seeking to improve ourselves morally were discussed. In way of a
very brief summary the message was: humans are, from an epistemic perspec-
tive at least, rather ill equipped for life in the ‘information society’. Such findings
have caused some researchers to question how probable it is that we can develop,
and maintain, the type of stable character traits which could guide and inform our
moral deliberations. I, on the other hand, would argue both that we can do so in
many cases (through the process of habituation) and that we, in light of some of
these findings, have all the more reason to try to do this.
Even assuming that an agent would be willing and able to commit to ‘virtue
training’, however, many questions with regards to the role model remain. Consider
for example how one is to recognise the good character traits in others and, further,
just how ‘good’ an agent has to be in order to be considered suitable as a model.
Aristotle thought that actions possess moral qualities independently of what we
happen to believe or feel about them. The good agent would know this as she
would have what Aristotle called ‘practical wisdom’ (phronesis).6 This virtue
involves both true judgment, i.e. a capacity to read situations correctly and correct
desire, i.e. only for the fine and noble. Against this it can be protested that there
are no independent criteria for the correctness of moral judgment and thus it is not
clear how the virtuous agent is to be identified. To this Aristotle presumably would

6 See chap. 4 for an account.

6.4 Role Models 65

have replied that any satisfactory moral theory must have its roots in a theory of
how human beings are by nature constructed (see Chap. 3 for The Function
Argument). He might also argue that just as we can see when people are in good
health without being trained as doctors we can recognize when someone lives a
fulfilled and happy life–we do not need a complete and detailed theoretical
account to do this. Thirdly, it might be argued that the fact that the virtuous person
is capable of explaining their actions, albeit in hindsight, and that they will do this
by invoking one or several of the virtues is evidence. While this sketch might point
to some possible answers to the ‘how’ question we still need to address the,
­perhaps slightly more debatable, ‘who’ question.

6.5 Good Enough to be a Model

When looking for moral role models it might be helpful not to insist on perfection
in every regard. I propose to think of the virtues as threshold concepts and by this I
mean that people do not have to be fully virtuous to qualify for the happy life.
Because the good life is a mix between the practical and the theoretical there are,
in actuality, many different versions of the happy life (we can have the virtues to
different amounts) but once we are above a certain threshold level we are leading a
happy life which is filled with worthwhile activities. To stay above the thresholds,
however, one needs to work hard trying to improve and become more virtuous.7
In order to remain ethically fit and keep our moral dispositions trim and reliable
the virtues must be exercised. Without opening the door to the plain vicious it
seems reasonable to me that an agent who possess a large number of virtues, lack
none altogether and is working hard with regard to the rest can well be leading a
happy life. From a philosophical perspective this is a heavily contested issue. On
the one hand, Aristotle never said outright that a person who does not master the
complete set of virtues could be called virtuous. On the other hand, however, he
wrote that a lot of people could be happy. Without getting into the details of the
debate I believe that given Aristotle’s general outlook and philosophical method, it
seems reasonable to assume that he would have agreed that happiness can be
widely shared.

6.6 The Advantage of Multiple Role Models

It could of course be protested that even if we accept the threshold idea that
does not imply that all agents who are above it also would be great role models.
I quite agree, when someone is looking for an example–trying to find out what the

7 Not because the threshold moves but because the constant commitment to improvement is part
of the virtuous life.
66 6 Critique of Virtue Ethics

virtuous characteristically would do in that situation–she should look to Pericles

over someone like me for example. The fact that I might have managed to squeeze
myself over the threshold hardly makes me excellent. But the point I am seeking
to make here is rather that a person can qualify as a role model with respect to
­certain characteristics or even in a certain type of context.
Admittedly it would be hard to say that someone who was sub-standard with
regards to some virtues, even though she is utterly virtuous in other respects,
would be a proper example. Such a lack of internal coherence would imply that
the person in fact is doing what she knows is right but for all the wrong reasons,
e.g. to deceive and manipulate others and to create advantages for herself. But that
is not to say that we must look for the role model. Perhaps a better strategy would
be to look for a role model—someone who masters the situation relevant virtues.
Such people, of which there could be many, would be excellent or near excellent
in some respects and above the threashold in all the others.

6.7 Conclusion

While the idea of the virtuous life might sound all good and well the following
question immediately presents itself: given the scientific evidence that we have a
tendency to make poor decisions then how plausible is it really that the major-
ity of people would be both willing and actually able to lead the virtuous life.
Indeed, Aristotle himself pointed out that the virtuous life is an acquired taste, that
it requires a lot of training and that it can seem hard at times.
In the debate it is frequently suggested that virtue ethics is incompatible with
human enhancement strategies. I believe such claims to be false and unhelpful.
While there is no guarantee that enough people would want to take on a more vir-
tuous life-style, there is neither an automatic connection between increased intel-
lectual capacity and high moral maturity. In the next chapter I will argue that while
we are likely to need a the help we can get, a good reason to start with the virtue
part right now is that it will make us better at deciding what kind of technologi-
cal and medical assistance we might require. While I am certainly not ruling out
the introduction of technological and or medical enhancements, I believe that they
ought to be combined with substantial life-style changes.
Chapter 7
Three Enhancement Methods

Looking around the globe the same dismal scenario repeats itself: in the face of
glaring evidence humans are led to make bad decisions by greed, selfishness, lack
of responsibility, low capacity for taking in the bigger picture, irrational fear, bias
and so forth. Our poor decision-making has large scale, potentially disastrous,
consequences for millions of people. Consider, for example, the human suffering
in the wake of global warming, armed conflicts and the financial crisis.1
In the previous chapters a set of intellectual and moral virtues considered con-
ducive to good decision-making have been introduced. I have sought to explain
how they are likely to improve the way we deal with information and, conse-
quently, help us fare better in the modern information society. How agents, by
cultivating virtues such as generosity, courage, practical wisdom, creativity, intel-
lectual honesty and open-mindedness (among others) might increase their ability
to form true beliefs and better address some widespread information-related prob-
lems. In addition, the life in accordance with such, and other, virtues would be very
likely to have a positive impact on his/her overall well-being and quality of life.
In this chapter the focus is on how such capacities might best be instilled and/
or improved on. I will explore the main advantages and disadvantages of the three
methods for cognitive improvement, namely (1) lifestyle changes (such as physical
exercise, diet/supplements and mental training) (2) drugs, (3) commitment to the
virtuous life. As the advantages of virtue ethics have been elaborated on throughout
this book the emphasis will be on exploring whether or not some of the biological
constraints (as described in Chap. 3) could be overcome through medical or techni-
cal enhancement and what the ethical implications of such practices are likely to be.
The latter half of the chapter consists of a longer section arguing in favour of a
combination of the three methods as the most promising route to take when seek-
ing to acquire a sense of equity, decency and overall good judgement. In this I
reject the often made (explicitly and implicitly) assumption that virtue ethics as

1 Parts of this chapter has previously been published in B. Froding, Cognitive Enhancement,
Virtue Ethics and the Good Life, Neuroethics (2011) 4:223–234.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 67

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_7, © The Author(s) 2013
68 7 Three Enhancement Methods

a theory is incompatible with human enhancement. Regardless of method and

techniques it should be quite clear that our relative success at instilling these, and
other, virtues could have substantial implications for issues pertaining to quality of
life and social organisation.

7.1 Enhancement Through Life-Style Changes

This section will offer two different ways to improve our cognitive capacities
through lifestyle changes: (1) physical activities such as exercise or playing music
(2) diet and food supplements such as fatty omega acids. Evidently this is a vast field
and the summaries given here have to be both brief and oversimplified. The take
home message, however, is that it appears that humans can have a positive impact on
their biology through their behaviour. That we can change and improve our capaci-
ties both in ways and to an extent that previously have been thought impossible.

7.1.1 Physical Activities and Brain Plasticity

Numerous studies investigating the plasticity of the brain have shown that we can
boost our cognitive capacities, in a lasting manner, through various forms of physical
activity. The realisation that the adult brain is in fact much more malleable than previ-
ously thought has inspired many researchers to look into how the cognitive capacities
can be improved on. For example, the connection between boosted process-memory
as well as our longterm memory and physical exercise have attracted much interest.2
Cardiovascular training has been seen to lead to increased brain-activity in both
the frontal lobe and the parietal lobe and has had a positive impact on memory
(both process memory and long-term memory) as well as capacity for problem
solving. These improvements have been observed both in the young and the old.3
Other studies have verified that playing music, meditating and undergoing mem-
ory training programs (to learn, for example, to create systems and to repeat facts
at certain intervals) has had positive effects. Yet other studies show that test per-
sons who have to juggle a set of balls on a daily basis quickly show evidence of
growth of grey matter. In an article published in Nature Draganski et al. write
…these individuals show a transient and selective structural change in brain areas that are
associated with the processing and storage of complex visual motion. This discovery of a

2 T. Klingberg (2011), Den Larande Hjarnan, p. 122: L. Bäckman, L. Nyberg, A. Soven et al.

Effects of working-memory training on striatal dopamine release, Science, August 5th 2011.
3 S. J. Colcombe et al. (2004): S. J. Colcombe et al. (2006): A. C. Pereira et al. (2007):

C. H. Hillman et al. (2008): K. I. Erickson et al. (2010): J. Ratey (2008): L. T. Ferris et al.
(2007): B. A. Sibley and J. L. Etiner (2003): A. J. Richardson and P. Montgomery (2005): R. G.
Voight et al. (2001): S. Hirayama et al. (2004): C. Eppig et al. (2010): T. Klingberg, Den Larande
Hjarnan av Torkel Klingberg, Natur och Kultur (2011)
7.1 Enhancement Through Life-Style Changes 69

stimulus-dependent alteration in the brain’s macroscopic structure contradicts the traditionally

held view that cortical plasticity is associated with functional rather than anatomical changes.4

Other interesting examples of the power of the habituation process are, for
example, found in the numerous scientific studies which connect meditation and
other forms of mind training to longterm change (especially with regards to neuro-
plasticity).5 Such findings add an interesting dimension to some of Aristoteles key
ideas. As has been explained here Aristotle held that the good life is not just a set
of actions—it is a set of actions performed by someone who does them because
she correctly sees the point in doing them. As a consequence, moral virtue comes
in stages, through education and habituation, and has both cognitive and emotional
dimensions. In this he touched on something that is still a question in ethics, i.e.
can virtue be taught or can it only be acquired by practicing or is it perhaps part of
human nature. While these are but a few examples it appears that modern science
has vindicated, at least some parts of, Aristotle’s theory.

7.1.2 Diet

Positive effects which are more shortterm are identified in studies focusing on the
relationship between diet, brain capacity and performance. In summary, it has been
shown that food stuffs that keep the blood sugar levels stable, e.g. wholegrain prod-
ucts, makes us perform better.6 For example, a recent Swedish study conducted at
the University of Lund compared the memory (attention- and process-memory) of

4 Draganski et al. (2004) Neuroplasticity: Changes in grey matter induced by training, Nature
427, 311–312: see also T. Klingberg et al. (2010) Training and plasticity of working memory,
Trends in Cognitive Science, 14, pp. 317–324
5 See for example S. van Leeuwen, W. Singer and L. Melloni (2012) Meditation increases the

depth of information processing and improves the allocation of attention in space, Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience, April 2012: Luders et al. The underlying anatomical correlates of
long-term meditation: Larger hippocampal and frontal volumes of gray matter. Neuroimage
45: 672–678. Britta K. Hölzel, Ulrich Ott, Tim Gard, Hannes Hempel, Martin Weygandt,
Katrin Morgen, and Dieter Vaitl, “Investigation of mindfulness meditation practitioners with
voxel-based morphometry” in Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2008 March: 3(1): 55–61. Lazer
et al. Meditation experience is associated with increased cortical thickness. Neuroreport.
16: 1893–1897. Brefczynski-Lewis et al. Neural correlates of attentional expertise in long-term
meditation practitioners. Proc Natl Acad Sci 104: 11483–11488.
6 For links between cognitive capacity and glucose, creatine and amino acids (for example) see

Fox, P.T., Raichle, M.E. et al. (1988). Nonoxidative glucose consumption during focal physi-
ologic neural activity. Science, 241(4864), 462–464; Rae, C., Digney, A.L. et al. (2003). Oral
creatine monohydrate supplementation improves brain performance: a double-blind, placebo-
controlled, cross-over trial. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological
Sciences, 270(1529), 2147–50; McMorris, T., Harris, R.C. et al. (2006). Effect of creatine supple-
mentation and sleep deprivation, with mild exercise, on cognitive and psychomotor performance,
mood state, and plasma concentrations of catecholamines and cortisol. Psychopharmacology,
185(1), 93–103; Lieberman, H.R. (2003). Nutrition, brain function and cognitive performance.
Appetite, 40(3), 245–54.
70 7 Three Enhancement Methods

40 women and men in the ages 49–70 during a four hour period after breakfast. It
turned out that the people who had eaten whole grain bread, as opposed to white,
consistently performed much better.7

7.1.3 Supplements: The Example of Fatty Acids

Given the aging population dementia related disease will become an increasing
problem in the Western world. Recent EU statistics forecast that by 2025 more than
25 % of all Europeans will be 65 or over. These diseases cause great suffering and
have a radically negative impact on the life-quality both of the individual and their
families. Further to this, the cost of the care is quickly becoming a big financial
challenge for many countries. Interestingly then, studies on humans and animals
alike have shown that a high intake of the fatty acid DHA can help against develop-
ing alzheimers disease. While more research is of course needed, especially with
regards to long-term results, this is very promising. One study concludes that
“Supplementation with n-3 FA may be a strategy to add to lifestyle prevention for
postponing early cognitive symptoms in AD but more research is needed”.8
Other similar studies have also been linking the intake of Omega3 and height-
ened cognitive abilities as well as having a positive impact on depression.9
Research projects at Karolinska Institutet in Sweden have shown that supplemen-
tation with fatty acids to patients with mild to moderate altzeimers disease may
both have a positive effect on cognition and, further, that it “…may reduce depres-
sion and agitation depending on APOE ε4 status and increase body weight loss in
patients with mild to moderate AD”.10

7.1.4 Combining Diet Changes, Increased Physical Activity

and Memory Training Programs

In a large scale, ongoing, study Professor Miia Kivipelto at the KI Alzheimer

Disease Research Center (KI-ADRC) at Karolinska Institutet tests if and how life-
style changes might impact the onset of altzheimers and other dementia realted dis-
ases.11 The study involves some 1200 test persons from Sweden and Finland and
two years into the study researchers are reporting clear improvement with regards to
overall health which in turn has a positive impact on memory. The risk factors the
group studies are colostral, blood sugar and weight. The life-style changes are rather
invasive and involve specific diet recommendations, increased physical activity,

7 http://www.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=1383&visa=pm&pm_id=1815
8 http://ki.se/ki/jsp/polopoly.jsp?a=48112&d=34670&l=sv
9 http://www.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=1383&visa=pm&pm_id=1815
10 http://ki.se/content/1/c6/04/87/81/Freund_Levi_Abstract_Sw_Eng.pdf
11 To be completed 2013.
7.1 Enhancement Through Life-Style Changes 71

memory training programs and medical check-ups. Added bonus is that the test per-
sons also have decreased their risk for cardio vascular disease, depression and stroke.
Previous research has shown that there is a link between higher education and
complex tasks at work, for example, and a delayed onset of dementia related dis-
eases. It is, however, thought that while this enables the individual to compensate for
the decreasing capacity rather than changing the actual pathology of the disease. It is
therefore highly likely that it will be a combination of better diagnostic tools, lifestyle
changes and a vaccine will be the most promising route. An open question which
requires much further research is how early these changes need to begin and for how
long they have to go on in order for there to be any positive, lasting effects. Of pri-
mary interest here, however, is the fact that life-style changes can have a positive
effect on memory capacity. It shows that there is an intimate connection between fac-
tors that we ourselves can impact in our everyday lives and our cognitive capacities.12

7.2 Enhancement Through Drugs

One of the main the pit-falls of much of the current debate on human enhancement
is that the examples used strike many as either too unrealistic to take seriously or too
frightening to take in. The consequence is that the debate becomes excluding and nar-
row which, given the pressing nature, of these issues is very unfortunate indeed. One
needs look no further than to the GMO debate to realise why it is in everyone’s interest
to establish an inclusive, society wide, dialogue at an early stage. Further, such discus-
sions ought to encompass both which decisions we ought to make right now and how
best to improve our capacity for making good decisions both today and in the future.
On that note, I have sought to use examples which are both relevant and scientif-
ically sound yet, hopefully, not too mundane. A good place to start when we look
for examples of performance enhancements is actually many people’s everyday
lives. Nicotine, caffeine and alcohol are (in moderate quantities) known to have a
positive impact on concentration and sociability. Stepping it up one level, studies
have also shown that an increasing number of healthy people regularly use pre-
scription drugs in order to enhance their performance.13

12 See for example P1 http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=412&artikel=5030142

13 See for example Sahakian, and Morein-Zamir. 2007. Professor’s little helper. Nature 450:
1157–1159: Repantis, D., Schlattman, P., Laisney O., Heuser, I. (2010) Modafinil and methyl-
phenidate for neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: A systematic review, Pharmacological
Research 62 187–206: Schermer, M., Bolt, I., (2011) What‘s in a Name? ADHD and the
Gray Area between Treatment and Enhancement, in: Savulescu, J., Meulen, R., T., Kahane,
G., Enhancing Human Capacities, Wiley-Blackwell pp. 243–260: Franke, A., Bonertz, C.,
Christmann, M., Huss, M., Fellgiebel, A., Hildt, E., & Lieb, K. (2011). Non-Medical Use of
Prescription Stimulants and Illicit Use of Stimulants for Cognitive Enhancement in Pupils
and Students in Germany. Pharmacopsychiatry, 44(02), 60–66: R. C. Kadosh, N. Levy, J.
O‘Shea, N. Shea, N., J. Savulescu (2012), The neuroethics of non-invasive brain stimulation,
Current Biology Vol 22 No 4. R1-R4: M. H. Rogers, P. B. Anderson (eds.) (2009) Deep Brain
Stimulation: Applications, Complications, Side-Effects, Nova Biomedical Books, New York.
72 7 Three Enhancement Methods

7.2.1 Three Categories of Drugs

Very broadly speaking performance enhancing drugs can be split into three groups
depending on the intended effect. The examples explored in this volume primarily
involve drugs that are used with the intention to heighten cognitive capacities but
there are also one or two cases of so called mood enhancers (see below).14
Naturally the effects tend to overlap but in the interest of clarity it can still be
useful to categorise them even in this general sense.
Firstly there are the substances that are consumed with the intention to enhance
cognitive capacity. Examples are Ritalin (developed to treat ADHD): Ampakines
or cholinesterase inhibitors (drugs developed to counter cognitive degeneration in
Alzheimer patients) and modafinil (developed to treat narcolepsy). Still quite new but
receiving increasing interest are, for example, Apamine, NMDA agonists, GABAB
blockers and CREB modulators. Looking ahead it is quite clear that genetherapy is the
holy grail of enhancement and it is not impossible that we will see more of it in the
medium to long run. Currently, however, it is a slow and high-risk project and the con-
nection between certain genes and capacities such as memory or IQ is unclear at best.
Secondly, there are those drugs consumed to enhance moods. Examples are
SSRIs, beta-blockers, and dopamine enhancers which are used to overcome negative
feelings such as lacking optimism, performance anxiety and shyness.15 Thirdly, there
are drugs used to enhance physical capacity, e.g. steroids allowing athletes to build
more muscles or boost their oxygen capacity but these will not be explored here.

7.2.2 Some Problems with Drugs

Interestingly, studies show that (1) most of these drugs have moderate effects in
the healthy and (2) that the measurably positive effects are mainly found in indi-
viduals located at the bottom end of the normality curve. For the purposes of this
text I take ‘healthy people’ to be individuals who fall within the range of what
is considered normal. Evidently, the capacity of those who find themselves at the
lower-end might differ radically from those at the top-end, but the point is that
they all meet the criteria of what society has decided to view as normal variation.
If such studies are correct it would appear that, placebo effect aside, people who
are already high performers would have little incentive to use the drugs that are
currently on offer. It would be an irrational risk as most of the drugs tend to have
unclear long-term risks as well as negative side-effects in the present. For example,

14 Plausibly, some key concerns that attach to mood enhancers, e.g. that they will ‘flatten our souls’,

are less applicable to the case of cognitive enhancements. N. Bostrom and A. Sandberg (2009)
‘Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges’, Science and Engineering
Ethics, 15: p. 326.
15 Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Then there is also deep brain stimula-

tion (DBS), non-invasive brain stimulation (e.g. Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation and
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation).
7.2 Enhancement Through Drugs 73

it could be the case that one cognitive capacity is negatively affected as the studied
one is improved on. In light of this it might be somewhat surprising to learn that pro-
fessional academics and students are well represented in the group of healthy peo-
ple choosing to consume these and other similar drugs. When asked why, the users
voiced concerns of being unable to keep up with their peers and/or meet the expec-
tations placed on them by teachers or employers unless they boosted themselves in
this way but also that it might enable them to achieve a great scientific breakthrough.
At this point it is worth clarifying that modafinil (increases alertness and reduces
the need for sleep) could be an exception. There might even be evidence for positive
effects regarding learning and working memory (very little or no evidence of effects
on longterm memory however). In addition, it does not appear to create abuse liability,
i.e. to create dependency or require a steady increase in dosage to maintain effects.16
Although potentially very interesting, much further research is required.
Further, even assuming that modafinil have no such negative side-effects it should
be noted that while it increases alertness it does not have any evidence based posi-
tive impact on capacities such as self-discipline or the ability to concentrate on one
specific undertaking. In other words, one can be feeling very awake yet display
poor ability to focus on the most relevant task at hand i.e. writing the next aca-
demic paper as opposed to creating a new catalogue system on one’s computer.
Further, there is no guarantee that the individual will devote the new-found energy
to focus on tasks or thoughts that are conducive to her overall well-being.
As explained, most scientific studies have not found any (major) negative side-
effects in way of a habituation which requires a dose increase, or other addictive quali-
ties with regards to modafinil. There is, however, a growing suspicion that modafinil
also has a mood enhancing effect, something which might or might not be considered
problematic. Further, a very recent German study claims that modafinil is in fact
highly addictive and that this is not reflected in the current debate on the ethical aspects
of such drugs.17 In addition, broader concerns that as the modafinil tends to make the
individual sleep less that could lead to chronic sleep-deprivation which, in turn, has a
negative impact on metabolism, immune system and mood have been raised.

7.2.3 Some Potential Advantages of Drugs

If many people are bad at acquiring true beliefs and prone to various cognitive
biases as a result of their very nature, it does not seem entirely plausible that
they would be able to instil the virtues.18 Yet, failing to do so would mean that

16 See e.g. Kumar R. (2008), Approved and investigational uses of modafinil: an evidence-based

review, Drugs, 68(13):1803–39

17 A. Heinz, R Kipke, H. Heimann, U. Wiesing (2012), Cognitive neuroenhancement: false

assumptions in the ethical debate, J Med Ethics medethics-2011-100041 Published Online First:
6 January 2012
18 For more on the habituation process as envisioned by Aristotle see Chaps. 4, 6 and 7.
74 7 Three Enhancement Methods

they—no fault of their own—would be disqualified from leading a fulfilled and

good life. Faced with this gloomy prospect, one could be forgiven for thinking
that it would be a positive thing if, courtesy of e.g. medicines or perhaps certain
types of hormones, we became more inclined to behave in ways that would make
our lives go better.19 The advantages and disadvantages of biological manipula-
tions and various other forms of enhancements have been discussed at length by
­philosophers.20 While most of these authors do not tend to couch the potential
benefits of biological manipulation in virtue terms, it is not unlikely that even
­traditional virtue ethicists might take comfort in the prospect of human cognitive
enhancement as a means to overcome the biological challenges that stand
between us and the good life.
It could also be contended that if the socio-economic hurdles of virtue eth-
ics could be side-stepped if drugs, with evidence based positive effects and few
or no negative side-effects, then promoting them would be justifiable from a fair-
ness perspective. It could be argued that those individuals, who through no fault
of their own plausibly would be very hard-pressed to instill the virtues, could then
be lifted to a level where it would be meaningful for them to embark on the virtue
project. It would mean that they then would have the same chance as everyone
else. Even more radically, it might even be suggested that such drugs ought to be
subsidised as better overall decision-making would increase responsible behav-
iour, for example with regards to the environment, but also improve the overall
life-quality and well-being of the individual.

7.3 Why Drugs and Technology Will Not Do the Whole Job

Even if the scientific claims described in Chap. 3 are accepted, it is, however, far
from clear that the good life for humans could best be secured through cognitive
enhancement alone. For one thing, there is little reason to believe that improving
an agent’s cognitive capacity also would be conducive to her moral goodness.

19 Current examples of healthy people using prescription drugs in order to enhance their per-
formance are Ritalin (developed to treat ADHD): Ampakines or cholinesterase inhibitors (drugs
developed to counter cognitive degeneration in Altzheimer patients: and modafinil-based sub-
stances (developed to treat excessive need for sleep). For a comment see e.g. Sahakian and
Morein-Zamir (2007), ‘Professor’s Little Helper’, Nature 450, 1157–1159.
20 See e.g. Bostrom & Sandberg (2009) ‘Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory

Challenges’, Science and Engineering Ethics: Roche & Liao (2009) ‘After Prozac’, in J.
Savulescu, R. ter Muelen, and G. Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capabilities (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell): Savulescu J, Bostrom N. (2009.) eds. Human Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford
University Press: Liao, S. M., Savulescu, J., and Wasserman, D. (eds), 2008, ‘Special Issue:
The Ethics of Enhancement’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 25: 3 pp. 159–261: Sahakian &
Morein-Zamir (2007) ‘Professor’s Little Helper’, Nature 450, 1157–1159: Catterjee (2007)
‘Cosmetic Neurology and Cosmetic Surgery: Parallels, Predictions and Challenges’, Quarterly of
Healthcare Ethics, 16: 129–137.
7.3 Why Drugs and Technology Will Not Do the Whole Job 75

Indeed, one could easily imagine clever but very wicked individuals who use
their capacities to secure advantages at the expense of others. As pointed out in,
for example, ‘From Chance to Choice’, the moral virtues are required to guide
our choices and actions, perhaps especially so if we employ cognitive enhance-
ments.21 A related problem is that substances can have both positive and nega-
tive effects. Consider for example the case of the hormone oxytocin. The
positive news is that it appears to increase people’s capacity for interpreting the
emotional state of others which, in turn, is conducive to empathy.22 A downside,
however, is that when given oxytocin people tend to be less likley to modify
their trust behaviour in the face of evidence, i.e. one risks becoming gullible.23
Moreover, a lack of moral and epistemic virtues would greatly impede our abil-
ity to judge which type of enhancements that are the most likely improve the
quality of life.
In the next section it will be shown why deciding to live life in accord-
ance with the virtues represents a more attractive life strategy for agents inter-
ested in happiness. The argument for this claim is twofold. Firstly, it will be
explained that the virtues are more likely to provide the kind of flexible capac-
ity that agents require to excel at deliberation and decision-making, and further,
that the process of habituation is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable.
Secondly, the virtues add extra dimensions to the good life which are unlikely
to be available through increased hormone levels or technical enhancements.
Currently, there is little evidence that through various enhancement methods
we would be able to mimic the rich and complex experiences that an agent
gains while learning to understand the demands of the virtues and how to act
accordingly.

7.4 Enhancement Through Committing to the Virtuous Life

The point that the virtuous life is the best and happiest life is the underlying
assumption of this whole essay and defending that further is not the point of this
section. The focus here is on delivering a convincing argument for why instilling

21 Here I am thinking especially about the example of ‘vicious Cynthia. Buchanan, Brock,
Daniels and Wikler (2000), ‘From Chance to Choice’, CUP. Other examples from the popular
culture would be the character Data in the Star Wars. He is highly intelligent and physically
strong but has no emotions (he has an ‘emotion chip’ installed but that does not really work all
that well). Another, somewhat bleaker, example is HAL 9000 in the book by Arthur C Clarke
which later was turned into the movie ‘2001—a space odyssey’ by Stanley Kubrick.
22 G. Domes et al. (2007), Oxytocin improves “mind-reading” in humans, Biological Psychiatry,

61(6), pp. 731–733.

23 T. Baumgartner et al. (2008), Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry of trust and trust adapta-

tional humans, Neuron 58(4), pp. 639–650: M. Kosfeld et al. (2005), Oxytocin increases trust in
humans, Nature, 425 (7042), pp. 673–676.
76 7 Three Enhancement Methods

the virtues is the way to achieve lasting happiness and responsible decision-
making. It has previously been pointed out that once the virtues have been instilled
people become better decision-makers overall and tend to be able to make ‘all
things considered judgements’. Consequently, learning the virtues has a two-fold
positive effect as it both makes us better decision-makers today and it grooms us
for future decisions.

7.4.1 Virtue is Good Now and Good for Later

Consider the following: the information flow through the Internet (blogs, twitter
and so on) is multiplying. At the same time there are fewer ‘central check/valida-
tion’ authorities and the number of self-acclaimed experts that present themselves
at an astonishing rate. Evidently some, perhaps even many, have sound knowledge
but the problem is that it is very hard to tell who is genuine and what their agenda
is. People simply do not know who to listen to when they are flooded with contra-
dictory information. Undeniably increasing openness and access is in principle
positive and I am certainly not saying that this in itself is a problem or that it
should be stopped. Rather, the point is that given our new reality we need to adapt
and become better at making decisions. We see today that when people are left to
their own devices they tend to make bad decisions as humans are challenged both
morally (bias, lacking objectivity etc.) and cognitively (unable to process large
amounts of information, decide who is an authority on a subject etc.). For a very
concrete example one only needs to consider the refusal of some parents to give
their children the MMR vaccine. As shown in a recent WHO Report Europe is in
fact close to a measles epidemic which is especially worrying since the disease
was nearly eradicated for a great number of years. 24 Arguably, such and other
similar decisions display a lack of understanding and a deeply rooted irrationality
as it is their own well-being and life quality that is on the table, not only that of
everyone else.

7.5 Living the Happy Life Now

As explained in the previous chapters the virtuous life is the best and happiest life
for any agent. Importantly, however, it is not something we do in order to become
happy at some later stage. Quite to the contrary, doing the virtuous thing means
living the good life here and now. In addition to enabling the individual to lead a
happy life, it is also likely to generate a number of positive spin-off effects. The
virtues listed in Chap. 5 would heighten our sense of equity and overall good

24 See the Weekly Mortality and Morbidity Report Increased Transmission and Outbreaks of

Measels—European Region, 2011 December 2, 2011/60(47): 1605–1610.

7.5 Living the Happy Life Now 77

judgement. Such capacities will, in turn, mean that we would be more apt at decid-
ing which technological and medical enhancement techniques we might benefit
from as well as how they should be put to optimal use. Moreover, it is plausible
that there is a positive co-variation between the capacities. For example, that people
who are creative and who are open-minded also tend to be better at judging risks.

7.6 Why We Need the Virtues

It seems plausible that cognitive enhancement could make an important contribu-

tion by helping to lift agents to a starting point where they would have a reasona-
ble chance at instilling the virtues. To grant it the status of an alternative strategy
for the good life, however, would be a mistake.25 Two arguments support this
claim. The first argument focuses on the epistemic and moral capacities that the
agent develops, while the second argument is concerned with the intrinsic value of
the process itself.26
Firstly, it is likely that the capacities the agent ends up with through piece-
meal enhancements are not on par with the overall situation sensitivity and
capacity for skilful deliberation which is achieved by instilling the virtues.
Being virtuous means being sensitive to contexts and situations in a very fine-
tuned way. It involves a substantial element of sound judgment as well as prop-
erly directed sentiments, and it allows the agent to be highly discriminating when
she exercises the virtues and responds to situations. The virtues transform the
agent into a stable and reliable decision-maker who knows what to do in the ‘all
things considered’ sense. This, in turn, enables her to be flexible and thus well
equipped to face the changing reality and ever-increasing flow of information in
society. Capacities like sound judgement and situation sensitivity are also likely
to continuously re-enforce the agent’s own commitment to virtue, thus minimis-
ing the development of enhanced but immoral agents. Moreover, such abilities
will be helpful when evaluating the potential goodness of emerging enhancement
technologies.
By committing to the virtuous life, the agent would not only be better off from
an all-things-considered aspect, but also with regards to the development of the

25 This has been previously published in B. Froding, Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and
the Good Life, Neuroethics, (2011) 4:223–234.
26 I am acknowledging that forms of very advanced conative (emotional) enhancement poten-

tially might achieve both the same results and mimic the experience of habituation. This essay
however, deals with the type of medical and technological possibilities that we have access to
today or are likely to have in the near future. For space reasons, this book cannot deal with cona-
tive enhancement as a separate issue but for an interesting argument, see e.g. Douglas (2008)
‘Moral enhancement’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3: Persson and Savulescu
(2008) ‘The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral
Character of Humanity’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3.
78 7 Three Enhancement Methods

individual virtues. In other words, she would be good both at getting the informa-
tion right and at making the decisions. Of special interest here are intellectual vir-
tues such as open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and creativity.27 Indeed, in
being virtuous the agent will be better both at concrete decision-making and
knowing when, what kind and to whom epistemic deference would be appropri-
ate.28 In light of the medical and technological knowledge we have today, it
appears improbable that cognitive enhancements would be able to rival both this
general sense of equity and the individual virtues. Another aspect, although not to
be explored here, is that agents who habitually act virtuously could (as a beneficial
side-effect) be likely to bring about a society where the institutions subscribe to a
set of institutional virtues, e.g. transparency.29 Further to this, most cognitive func-
tions (as opposed to physical ones such as length and physical features considered
beautiful for example) are not primarily ‘positional goods’. In other words, the
value for me to more of a certain cognitive does not primarily depend on others
not having it.30
Secondly, cognitive enhancements through drugs or technology are unlikely
to mimic all the worthwhile aspects of the virtuous life. Consider, for example,
the intrinsically valuable process of habituation that agents are expected to
undertake (as described in Chap. 4). What matters here are not only the capaci-
ties the agent hopefully manages to develop—while the virtues are a ‘lot of ends’
and a ‘little means’ in themselves, it is central to the theory that doing the virtu-
ous thing is leading the good life. In other words, the actual experience of the
process is valuable in itself: it is a key part of eudaimonia also as the agent goes
through it.31
The virtuous life is said to ‘lack nothing’ but the reasons for it being the best
choice encompass more than pleasure and feelings of well-being. Although it is
said to be the most pleasurable life, the motivation and commitment is not based
on a wish to maximise pleasure. Virtue theory recognises that a good life is a
mixed bag of experience: a human life in all likelihood will involve anger, loss,

27 See work by virtue-responsibilists like Linda Zagzebski and James Montmarquet for example.
See also Chap. 5.
28 Here I am following the Aristotelian account in assuming some version of cognitivism—i.e.

that the virtuous person is the one who knows what is right and wrong.
29 For some interesting ideas on Social Moral Epistemology, see e.g. Allen Buchanan (2007)

‘Institutions, Beliefs and Ethics: Eugenics as a Case Study’, Journal of Political Philosophy
15/1: 22–45: A. Buchanan (2009), ‘Philosophy and Public Policy: A Role for Social Moral
Epistemology’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 JUL 2009, DOI: 10.1111/j.146x930.2009.00
452.x
30 N. Bostrom (2203), Human genetic enhancements: A transhumanist perspective, Journal of

Value Enquiry, 37(4), pp. 202–214.

31 For an account of the temporal aspects of different virtues and personal goods, i.e. the idea

that certain virtues are good for us at certain points in our lives (for example, that innocence and
trustingness is good for children but less so for adults), see Slote (1983) Goods and Virtues, New
York: Clarendon Press. Note, however, that Slote does not claim that all virtues are ‘relative’ in
this sense.
7.6 Why We Need the Virtues 79

failure, rejection, pain and disappointment but also offer pleasure, warmth, joy
and success. Very generally speaking it could be said that there is an emphasis on
process, not simply on outcomes, and that the good life in this definition accom-
modates many different types of experiences. Many enhancement strategies for
the good life, on the other hand, seem to assume a rather narrow idea of what
well-being and a good life is. The problem is not so much a potentially exagger-
ated focus on happiness (if anything, to strive to be happy seems a fine and noble
goal) but rather the one-dimensional understanding of what type of experiences
make up a happy life. To regard happiness as short-hand for ‘a long string of
pleasant experiences’ would be very limiting, not in the least as it would exclude
a large part of the interaction that goes on between humans. The understanding
of well-being that virtue ethics subscribes to, however, is a richer and more com-
plex concept and, thus, better at capturing what we mean when we think of a
good life.32
As has been shown here there are aspects of the good life, including capacities
that agents can achieve only, or in fuller and more complete way, through com-
mitting to virtue ethics. Further to that, such a commitment is both an on-going
and a life-long process, which makes it hard to see how it could be replaced even
by a series of one-off enhancements. Consequently, agents who choose cogni-
tive enhancement on its own would be highly likely to miss out on key aspects
of the good life and as a result come to jeopardise their own flourishing. Such a
life strategy would then be, arguably, not only inferior but actually irrational. But
even if the virtuous life is superior, all things considered, the scientific research
presented in Chap. 3 raises question marks with regards to the actual living of
such a good life. While virtue may be excellent in theory, it could, as a conse-
quence of our various cognitive constraints, be (almost) unattainable in practice
for most people.

7.7 Combining Life-Style Changes, Drugs and Virtue

So far it has been argued that none of these three ‘methods’ for cognitive
enhancement is convincing enough on its own as a recipe for the good life for
most people. The effects of life-style changes, although important tool, appear to
be somewhat less radical than what might be necessary given the state of affairs.
They might certainly have an important role to play but more in the sense of a
supporting strategy. Drugs and technology, while potentially very potent indeed,
still require much more research (especially with regards to risks) and develop-
ment. Also it is very important to note that increased cognitive capacity with
regards to, for example, memory and intelligence is no guarantee for an increased
sense of morality. As for virtue ethics the main challenge is that it appears nearly

32 See Chap. 2.
80 7 Three Enhancement Methods

impossible to lead a fully virtuous and good life. So while the virtues are condu-
cive to good moral behaviour, it is far from obvious that most people would be
able to develop these unconditional dispositions to act, feel and generally respond
in ways typical of the good person. It is, of course, perfectly possible to accept
the claim that the fully virtuous life is the best and most fulfilled life and at the
same time accept that it might be unachievable for most people, or indeed for
everyone. Even in light of such misgivings, however, it does not follow that the
idea of the virtuous life being the best conceivable life needs to be abandoned. A
genuine commitment to virtue as the superior choice does not, on its own, provide
reasons to think that the virtuous life would have to exclude cognitive enhance-
ments. To the contrary, it is likely that some cognitive enhancements will prove
conducive to the good life and could enable a larger number of people to embark
on the virtuous path.
It is often assumed that a virtue ethics approach to the good life would be
incompatible with human cognitive enhancements and that virtue ethics and
human enhancement champion two deeply conflicting ideas.33 This appears to be
a mistake. Quite to the contrary, it seems that some cognitive enhancements might
not only be seen as neutral from a virtue perspective but indeed as facilitating, for
example, the habituation process. Notably this is not an attempt to construct an
argument for cognitive enhancements per se, but rather to explore the best strategy
for a happy life, all things considered.
As explained previously, critics of virtue ethics who claim, for example, that
the theory is unachievable and unrealistic, have received support from findings in
the natural sciences (see Chaps. 3 and 6). The results indicate that most people
suffer an array of cognitive constraints that could stand in the way of them devel-
oping the virtues and leading the good life. In general, humans respond to infor-
mation ineffectively, which, in turn, is likely to lead them to acquire false beliefs.
For example, being bad at deferring judgement means that we do not distinguish
well between unreliable information sources and reliable ones. Furthermore, we
are afflicted by numerous cognitive biases and have low impulse control. Such
findings threaten to cast serious doubts on a number of central themes in virtue
ethics. Perhaps not unexpectedly, however, our expanding technological and medi-
cal knowledge might also provide solutions to these problems in the form of useful
cognitive enhancements for humans.
Very briefly, the idea is that cognitive enhancements might help us to over-
come a number of biological constraints that threaten to block the development
of the virtues.34 As previously mentioned cognitive enhancements could lift
agents to a starting point from which embarking on the habituation process is a
real possibility. In other words: neuroenhancers could enable more people to
become virtuous. This would level the playing field and it ties in well with wide-
spread intuitions about fairness and equality. In addition to making virtue more

33 See, for example, bio-conservatives like Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass and George Sandel.
34 Any such enhancements must of course be voluntary and safe.
7.7 Combining Life-Style Changes, Drugs and Virtue 81

attractive as a moral theory, such a combination might also strengthen it by mak-

ing the good life more achievable and less dependent on luck, which, in turn, fits
very well with the central virtue ethics idea that agents are responsible for their
morality, or lack thereof.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined and compared three different methods for cognitive
enhancement: life-style changes, drugs and a commitment to the virtuous life. It
has been argued that all three methods are unlikely to do the whole job on their
own and that the most promising route forward might well be a combination of all
the above.
Some virtue ethicists might fear that using cognitive enhancements in the way
described here would distort people’s moral development but I believe this to be
unfounded. The position defended here is certainly not that cognitive enhance-
ments of the kind we have access to today or might have in the foreseeable
future could or should take the place of, for example, the habituation process.
While enhancement will not be a substitute, it may well work as a facilitator,
contributing to making virtue ethics a more convincing theory to many mod-
ern scholars. If we accept that those individuals who manage to develop moral
and epistemic virtues will, in general, fare better in life than those who do not,
it seems reasonable to follow Aristotle both in recommending the virtuous life
to others and to seek to lead it ourselves. Indeed, it could even be argued that
anyone who takes the virtue project seriously should be prepared to explore this
combination further.
Another aspect which merits consideration is that the epistemic and moral
virtues will be increasingly important as we further explore enhancement. That
will increase the likelihood for such pursuits being undertaken responsibly as
agents will improve their sound judgement and their capacity to discrimi-
nate effectively. Hopefully this could create a platform for responsible—vir-
tuous—enhancement where various techniques are evaluated on the basis of
how well they contribute to the leading of the good life. Key aspects would of
course be safety, voluntariness, autonomy and informed consent, fairness and
transparency.
In an article Savulescu and Sandberg argue that, since studies show that long
term stable love relationships increase our overall well-being (both on an individ-
ual and a social level), it would be desirable to improve human capacity for form-
ing such bonds with the help of neuroenhancement. “Love is one of the
fundamental aspects of human existence. It is to a large part biologically deter-
mined. We should use our growing knowledge of the neuroscience of love to
82 7 Three Enhancement Methods

enhance the quality of love by biological manipulation”.35 In their concluding

remarks they observe that “Trends in divorce, as well as findings in evolutionary
psychology, suggest that love might need a helping hand”. While this might well
be true, that helping hand is most likely to come in the shape of a combination of
life-style changes, drugs and the epistemic and moral virtues traditionally
understood.

35 J Savuelscu and A Sandberg. (2008). Neuroenhancement of love and marriage: the chemicals

between us. Neuroethics 1: 31–44.

Chapter 8
Conclusion

Looking around the world today it is quite clear that a great many are not leading
as good a life as they potentially could. Here it has been suggested that this situa-
tion could, to some extent, be improved on were people in general to become more
virtuous as this would have a positive impact on the cognitive abilities and capac-
ity for decision-making. Against this it has been argued that it is na to talk about
virtues. That there is little evidence is there that we can achieve stable character
traits and, further, that the best explanation for why we keep behaving the way we
do is that it is human nature.1 Recent studies in the natural and behavioural
­sciences have generated additional support for the latter position which previously
was defended mainly on philosophical grounds.
In this essay I have sought to argue both that such a gloomy view of mankind is
unwarranted and further, that even if it were correct that we might be able to break
away from some of these biological chains courtesy of modern medicine and tech-
nology. While it is true that humans often behave in ways that undermine our well-
being both in the short and the long term it is also the case that we can improve

1 As discussed by G. Harman in, for example, Harman (1977), The Nature of Morality, New

York: Oxford University Press: S. Milgram (1974), Obedience to Authority: An Experimental

View, London: Tavistock Publications. For a comment on ‘bystander theory’ see e.g. Haney,
C., Banks, W. C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison.
International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1, 69–97.: Zimbardo, P. (2007). The
Lucifer Effect: How good people turn evil. Reading, UK: Rider.: Bandura, A., Underwood, B.,
& Fromson, M. E. (1975). Disinhibition of aggression through diffusion of responsibility and
dehumanization of victims. Journal of research in personality, 9, 253–269: Bar-On, D. (2001)
The Bystander in relation to the victim and the perpetrator: Today and during the Holocaust.
Social Justice Research, 14, 125–148: 1975). For studies showing how raising self-awareness of
the bystander promotes good behaviour see e.g. Ellsworth, P. C., & Langer, E. J. (1976) Staring
and approach: An interpretation of the stare as a nonspecific activator. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology. 33, pp. 117–122: Wegner, D. M. & Schaefer, D. (1978). The concentration of
responsibility: An objective self-awareness analysis of group size effects in helping situations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 36, 147–155. F X. Gibbons (1990). Self-attention
and behavior: A review and theoretical update. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology, (Vol. 23, pp. 249–303). San Diego: Academic Press.

B. Fröding, Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement, SpringerBriefs in Ethics, 83

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4_8, © The Author(s) 2013
84 8 Conclusion

ourselves through various methods and become, for example, more healthy or
less biased. In other words, even though the best explanation might be biologi-
cal that in itself does not imply that one ought to be defeatist about the good life.
Recognising that certain traits and capacities (or lack thereof) have a biological
cause is not to say that such features cannot be improved on, or even, altered all
together.
We still know very little about the underlying causes of our behaviour and the
way we interact and make decisions. The debate on what can be best explained in
terms of biology, what is more likely to be the result of environmental factors and
what the balance between the two might be has only just begun. As much more
research into the ethical, social and regulatory issues of human cognitive enhance-
ment is required this contribution has not been intended not as a presentation of
‘ready answers’ but rather as an invitation to further debate and dialogue.

8.1 A Combination

So how can we get better at handling modern life and perhaps overcome ourselves
as it were? The central claim is that (some) cognitive enhancements are compat-
ible with a virtue ethical conception of the good life. That cognitive enhancement
and virtue can co-exist comfortably and, further, that enhancement, in some cases,
could be a necessary pre-requisite for the habituation process as described in the
Nicomachean Ethics. On this account, cognitive enhancement would not replace
but facilitate virtue, something which is likely to make virtue ethics a more con-
vincing account of the good life. Equally, the instilling of the intellectual and char-
acter virtues would make agents better at making decisions with regards to what
type of enhancements ought to be explored.
Evidently, I do not wish to argue that people can become virtuous in the
Aristotelian sense through enhancement alone (at least not with the type of medi-
cines and technology that are available today or in the foreseeable future). Rather,
the suggestion is that some cognitive enhancements might enable a larger num-
ber of people to embark on the virtuous life. Quite plausibly, science can help us
improve and enable more people to embrace the idea that the virtuous life is the best
conceivable life. If many of the cognitive constraints could be overcome, or com-
pensated for, the good life understood as the virtuous life could become a real possi-
bility for many of us. With cognitive enhancements, agents could be levelled up to a
starting point from which they might find it very possible to being to instil many of
the virtues. If cognitive enhancements work as facilitators of virtue they could, plau-
sibly, boost rather than undermine the agent’s situation sensitivity and the intrinsi-
cally valuable process of habituation. Agents would still have to engage actively,
to exercise the virtues willingly and with pleasure for the sake of virtue. Indeed, it
could be a very good example of how to use enhancement technology virtuously.
By and large then, a combination of a life in line with virtue, some cognitive
enhancements through medicine and perhaps technology and life-style changes is
8.1 A Combination 85

the most constructive way forward. It will create a stronger connection between
what we say we value and want and our actual behavioural patterns and help many
of us could then move from a merely theoretical commitment to the virtuous life
to a practical one.
In light of the social and biological limitations explained in this essay it
is, arguably, not less but all the more important to continue the virtue project.
Instilling stable character traits can help us regulate our behaviour, counterbal-
ance our natural challenges and make us happier. It might well be that we need
a new, or greatly extended, set of epistemic and/or character virtues to do well in
the modern world but the idea that the virtuous life is the good life is far from
doomed. The fact that the habituation, or learning, process might be lengthy and at
times quite hard is not to say that it is impossible or not worthwhile. As Aristotle
pointed out—the virtuous life is an acquired taste.