Investments Bodie Kane Marcus 9th Edition Solutions Manual
Investments Bodie Kane Marcus 9th Edition Solutions Manual
Investments Bodie Kane Marcus 9th Edition Solutions Manual
Solutions Manual
PROBLEM SETS
2. Even if many investors exhibit behavioral biases, security prices might still be set
efficiently if the actions of arbitrageurs move prices to their intrinsic values.
Arbitrageurs who observe mispricing in the securities markets would buy
underpriced securities (or possibly sell short overpriced securities) in order to profit
from the anticipated subsequent changes as prices move to their intrinsic values.
Consequently, securities prices would still exhibit the characteristics of an efficient
market.
3. One of the major factors limiting the ability of rational investors to take advantage
of any ‘pricing errors’ that result from the actions of behavioral investors is the fact
that a mispricing can get worse over time. An example of this fundamental risk is
the apparent ongoing overpricing of the NASDAQ index in the late 1990s. A
related factor is the inherent costs and limits related to short selling, which restrict
the extent to which arbitrage can force overpriced securities (or indexes) to move
towards their fair values. Rational investors must also be aware of the risk that an
apparent mispricing is, in fact, a consequence of model risk; that is, the perceived
mispricing may not be real because the investor has used a faulty model to value the
security.
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4. There are two reasons why behavioral biases might not affect equilibrium asset
prices: first, behavioral biases might contribute to the success of technical trading
rules as prices gradually adjust towards their intrinsic values, and second, the
actions of arbitrageurs might move security prices towards their intrinsic values. It
might be important for investors to be aware of these biases because either of these
scenarios might create the potential for excess profits even if behavioral biases do
not affect equilibrium prices.
5. Efficient market advocates believe that publicly available information (and, for
advocates of strong-form efficiency, even insider information) is, at any point in
time, reflected in securities prices, and that price adjustments to new information
occur very quickly. Consequently, prices are at fair levels so that active
management is very unlikely to improve performance above that of a broadly
diversified index portfolio. In contrast, advocates of behavioral finance identify a
number of investor errors in information processing and decision making that could
result in mispricing of securities. However, the behavioral finance literature
generally does not provide guidance as to how these investor errors can be exploited
to generate excess profits. Therefore, in the absence of any profitable alternatives,
even if securities markets are not efficient, the optimal strategy might still be a
passive indexing strategy.
6. a. Davis uses loss aversion as the basis for her decision making. She holds on to
stocks that are down from the purchase price in the hopes that they will recover.
She is reluctant to accept a loss.
7. a. Shrum refuses to follow a stock after she sells it because she does not want to
experience the regret of seeing it rise. The behavioral characteristic used for the
basis for her decision making is the fear of regret.
8. a. Investors attempt to avoid regret by holding on to losers hoping the stocks will
rebound. If the stock rebounds to its original purchase price, the stock can be sold
with no regret. Investors also may try to avoid regret by distancing themselves
from their decisions by hiring a full-service broker.
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AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
9. a. – iv
b. – iii
c. – v
d. – i
e. – ii
10. Underlying risks still exist even during a mispricing event. The market mispricing
could get worse before it gets better. Other adverse effects could occur before the
price corrects itself (e.g. loss of clients with no understanding or appetite for
mispricing opportunities).
11. Data mining is the process by which patterns are pulled from data. Technical
analysts must be careful not to engage in data mining as great is the human capacity
to discern patterns where no patterns exist. Technical analysts must avoid mining
data to support a theory, rather than using data to test a theory.
12. Even if prices follow a random walk, the existence of irrational investors combined
with the limits to arbitrage by arbitrageurs may allow persistent mispricings to be
present. This implies that capital will not be allocated efficiently—capital does not
immediately flow from relatively unproductive firms to relatively productive firms.
14. Breadth:
Net Breadth is positive—bullish
Advances Declines
Advances signal (no one would actually use
1,604 1,434 170 a one-day measure).
16. The confidence index increases from (5%/6%) = 0.833 to (6%/7%) = 0.857.
This indicates slightly higher confidence which would be interpreted by
technicians as a bullish signal. But the real reason for the increase in the
index is the expectation of higher inflation, not higher confidence about the
economy.
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CHAPTER 12: BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
17. At the beginning of the period, the price of Computers, Inc. divided by the industry
index was 0.39; by the end of the period, the ratio had increased to 0.50. As the
ratio increased over the period, it appears that Computers, Inc. outperformed other
firms in its industry. The overall trend, therefore, indicates relative strength,
although some fluctuation existed during the period, with the ratio falling to a low
point of 0.33 on day 19.
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AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
19. This pattern shows a lack of breadth. Even though the index is up, more stocks
declined than advanced, which indicates a “lack of broad-based support” for the rise
in the index.
20.
Net Cumulative
Day Advances Declines
Advances Breadth
1 906 704 202 202
2 653 986 -333 -131
3 721 789 - 68 -199
4 503 968 -465 -664
5 497 1,095 -598 -1,262
6 970 702 268 -994
7 1,002 609 393 -601
8 903 722 181 -420
9 850 748 102 -318
10 766 766 0 -318
The signal is bearish as cumulative breadth is negative; however, the negative
number is declining in magnitude, indicative of improvement. Perhaps the worst
of the bear market has passed.
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CHAPTER 12: BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
23. Note: In order to create the 26-week moving average for the S&P 500, we
converted the weekly returns to weekly index values, with a base of 100 for the
week prior to the first week of the data set. The following graph shows the S&P 500
values and the 26-week moving average, beginning with the 26th week of the data
set.
a. The graph summarizes the data for the 26-week moving average. The graph
also shows the values of the S&P 500 index.
b. The S&P 500 crosses through its moving average from below fourteen times,
as indicated in the table below. The index increases seven times in weeks
following a cross-through and decreases seven times.
Date of Direction of S&P 500
cross-through in subsequent week
05/18/01 Decrease
06/08/01 Decrease
12/07/01 Decrease
12/21/01 Increase
03/01/02 Increase
11/22/02 Increase
01/03/03 Increase
03/21/03 Decrease
04/17/03 Increase
06/10/04 Decrease
09/03/04 Increase
10/01/04 Decrease
10/29/04 Increase
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04/08/05 Decrease
c. The S&P 500 crosses through its moving average from above fourteen times,
as indicated in the table below. The index increases nine times in weeks
following a cross-through and decreases five times.
Direction of S&P Direction of S&P
Date of Date of
500 in subsequent 500 in subsequent
cross-through cross-through
week week
06/01/01 Increase 03/28/03 Increase
06/15/01 Increase 04/30/04 Decrease
12/14/01 Increase 07/02/04 Decrease
02/08/02 Increase 09/24/04 Increase
04/05/02 Decrease 10/15/04 Decrease
12/13/02 Increase 03/24/05 Increase
01/24/03 Decrease 04/15/05 Increase
d. When the index crosses through its moving average from below, as in part
(b), this is regarded as a bullish signal. In our sample, the index is as likely
to increase as it is to decrease following such a signal. When the index
crosses through its moving average from above, as in part (c), this is regarded
as a bearish signal. In our sample, contrary to the bearish signal, the index is
actually more likely to increase than it is to decrease following such a signal.
24. In order to create the relative strength measure, we converted the weekly returns for
the Fidelity Banking Fund and for the S&P 500 to weekly index values, using a
base of 100 for the week prior to the first week of the data set. The first graph
shows the resulting values, along with the Relative Strength measure (× 100). The
second graph shows the % change in the Relative Strength measure over 5-week
intervals.
a. The following graph summarizes the relative strength data Fund.
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AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
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AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
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Performance of Performance of
Date of Date of
Banking Fund in Banking Fund in
Decrease Decrease
subsequent week subsequent week
07/07/00 Underperformed 04/16/04 Underperformed
07/14/00 Outperformed 04/23/04 Outperformed
05/04/01 Underperformed 12/03/04 Outperformed
05/11/01 Outperformed 12/10/04 Underperformed
10/12/01 Outperformed 12/17/04 Outperformed
11/02/01 Outperformed 12/23/04 Underperformed
10/04/02 Outperformed 12/31/04 Underperformed
10/11/02 Outperformed
25. It has been shown that discrepancies of price from net asset value in closed-end funds
tend to be higher in funds that are more difficult to arbitrage such as less-diversified
funds.
CFA PROBLEMS
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CHAPTER 12: BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
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CHAPTER 12: BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
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b. Reference point: Maclin’s reference point for his bond position is the purchase
price, as evidenced by the fact that he will not sell a position for less than he
paid for it. This fixation on a reference point, and the subsequent waiting for
the price of the security to move above that reference point before selling the
security, prevents Maclin from undertaking a risk/return-based analysis of his
portfolio position.
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AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
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Investments Bodie Kane Marcus 9th Edition Solutions Manual
ii. Loss Aversion (Risk Seeking): Pierce is exhibiting risk aversion in deciding to sell
the Core Bond Fund despite its gains and favorable prospects. She prefers a certain
gain over a possibly larger gain coupled with a smaller chance of a loss. Pierce is
exhibiting loss aversion (risk seeking) by holding the High Yield Bond Fund
despite its uncertain prospects. She prefers the modest possibility of recovery
coupled with the chance of a larger loss over a certain loss. People tend to exhibit
risk seeking, rather than risk aversion, behavior when the probability of loss is
large. There is considerable evidence indicating that risk aversion holds for gains
and risk seeking behavior holds for losses, and that attitudes toward risk vary
depending on particular goals and circumstances.
Standard finance investors are consistently risk averse, and systematically prefer a
certain outcome over a gamble with the same expected value. Such investors also
take a symmetrical view of gains and losses of the same magnitude, and their
sensitivity (aversion) to changes in value is not a function of a specified value
reference point.
iii. Reference Dependence: Pierce’s inclination to sell her Small Company Fund
once it returns to her original cost is an example of reference dependence.
This is predicated on the current value as related to original cost, her reference
point. Her decision ignores any analysis of expected terminal value or the
impact of this sale on her total portfolio. This reference point of original cost
has become a critical but inappropriate factor in Pierce’s decision.
In standard finance, alternatives are evaluated in terms of terminal wealth values
or final outcomes, not in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference point
such as original cost. Standard finance investors also consider the risk and return
profile of the entire portfolio rather than anticipated gains or losses on any
particular investment or asset class.
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