CP - Advantage CPs - Michigan 7 2023 BFHGR

Advantage CPs
Thanks to Anish, Leah, Roan, Lucy, Amy and Maddie for their work on this file
Agriculture
1nc – digital ag
The United States Agency for International Development should launch a Digital
Agriculture for Food Security Challenge that allocates $150 million over five years to
the Digital Agriculture Innovations Fund and convenes the Digital Agriculture Summit.
The CP solves---inspires global investment and innovation in digital agriculture---cheap
and scalable
Jonathan Lehe et al 22 (Chief of Strategy, Partnerships, and Innovation at Precision Development, MA
in Public Administration in International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School, 14 years of
experience in the global agriculture, health, and education sectors, designing, implementing, and
evaluating programs to scale up access to critical services in 35+ countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America,
the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe, previously worked at the Clinton Health Access Initiative and
consulted for the World Bank, FCDO, Bridge International Academies, and MIT’s Jameel Poverty Action
Lab), “Investing In Digital Agriculture Innovation To Secure Food, Yields, And Livelihoods,” 11/10/2022,
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), https://fas.org/publication/investing-in-digital-agriculture-
innovation-to-secure-food-yields-and-livelihoods/
Two-thirds of the world’s ultra-poor depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Low
productivity growth in this sector is the
biggest obstacle to poverty reduction and sustainable food security . The Food and Agriculture Organization’s 2022
report on The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World estimates that around 2.3 billion people—nearly 30% of the global population—
were moderately or food insecure in 2021 and as many as 828 million were affected by hunger. Improving
smallholder farmer
incomes and local food security is critical to achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals by 2030, particularly ending poverty (SDG 1) and eliminating hunger (SDG 2). Yet smallholder farmers typically harvest
only 30%–50% of what they could produce. Smallholder farmers are particularly at risk from climate-driven shocks, and
fundamental changes to growing conditions make climate adaptation a key challenge to improving and securing their yields.
More than $540 billion is spent in the agricultural sector each year through public budgets, mostly subsidies on farm inputs and outputs. Of
USAID’s over $1 billion annual budget for agricultural aid, much attention is given to direct nutrition and economic assistance as well as
institution and market-shaping programs. By contrast, efforts
in climate adaptation and food security innovation like the
Feed the Future Innovation Labs and Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM for Climate) rely
on traditional, centralized
models of R&D funding that limit the entry and growth of new stakeholders and innovators. Not enough
investment or attention is paid to productivity-enhancing, climate-adaptation-focused innovations and
to translating R&D investment into sustainable interventions and scaled products to better serve
smallholder farmers.
USAID recognizes both the challenge for global food security and the opportunity to advance economic security through evidence-driven, food-
system level investments that are climate-driven and COVID-conscious. As directed by the Global Food Security Act of 2016, the U.S.
Government Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS) 2022–2026 and its counterpart Global Food Security Research Strategy (GFSRS) highlight the
potential for digital technologies to play a pivotal role in the U.S. government’s food system investments around the world. The GFSS describes
“an ecosystem approach” that prioritizes the “financial viability of digital products and services, rather than one that is driven predominantly by
individualized project needs without longer-term planning.” A core part of achieving this strategy is Feed the Future (FTF), the U.S.
government’s multi-agency initiative focused on global hunger and food security. Administrator Samantha Powers has committed $5 billion
over five years to expand FTF, creating an opportunity to catalyze and crowd in capital to build a thriving, sustainable global agriculture
economy—including innovation in digital agriculture—that creates more resilient and efficient food systems.
However, USAID stakeholders are siloed and do not coordinate to deliver results and invest in proven
solutions that can have scaled sustainable impact. The lack of coordination means potential digital-
powered, impactful, and sustainable solutions are not fostered or grown to better serve USAID’s
beneficiaries globally. USAID’s Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (RFS) works with partners to advance inclusive agriculture-led
growth, resilience, nutrition, water security, sanitation, and hygiene in priority countries to help them accelerate and protect development
progress. USAID’s FY 2023 budget request also highlights RFS’s continued focus on supporting “partner countries to scale up their adaptation
capacity and enhance the overall climate resilience of development programming.” The
FTF Innovation Labs focus on advanced
do not engage directly in scaling promising innovations or investing in non-
agricultural R&D at U.S. universities but
academic innovators and entrepreneurs to test and refine user-centered solutions that fall within FTF’s
mandate. USAID’s emerging Digital Strategy and Digital Development Team includes specific implementation initiatives, such as a Digital
Ecosystem Fund and an upcoming Digital Vision for each sector, including agriculture. USAID is also planning to hire Digital Development
Advisors, whose scope aligns closely with this initiative but will require intentional integration with existing efforts. Furthermore ,
USAID
country missions, where many of these programs are funded, often do not have enough input in designing
agriculture RFPs to incorporate the latest proven solutions and digital technologies, making it harder to
implement and innovate within contract obligations.
This renewed strategic focus on food security through improved local agricultural yields and climate-resilient smallholder farmer livelihoods,
along with an integration of digital best practices, presents an opportunity for USAID and Feed the Future. By using innovative approaches to
digital agriculture, FTF can expand its impact and meet efficiency and resilience standards, currently proposed in the 2022 reauthorization of
the Global Food Security Act. While
many known agricultural practices, inputs, and technologies could improve
smallholder farmers’ yields and incomes, adoption remains low due to structural barriers, farmers’ lack
of information, and limitations from existing agriculture development aid practices that prioritize
programs over sustainable agricultural productivity growth . Today, with the rapid pace of mobile phone
penetration (ranging between 50% and 95% throughout the developing world), we are in a unique moment to deploy
novel, emerging digital technologies, and innovations to improve food security, yields, and livelihoods
for 100 million smallholder farmers by 2030.
There are many digital agriculture innovations – for example digital agricultural advisory services (DAAS, detailed below) – in
various stages of development that require additional investment in R&D. These innovations could be
implemented either together with DAAS or as stand-alone interventions . For example, smallholder farmers
need access to accurate, reliable weather forecasts . Weather forecasts are available in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), but additional work is needed to customize and localize them to farmers’ needs and to
communicate probabilistic forecasts so farmers can easily understand, interpret, and incorporate them
in their decision-making.
Similarly, digital
innovations are in development to improve farmers’ linkages to input markets, output
markets, and financial services—for example, by facilitating e-subsidies and mobile ordering and
payment for agricultural inputs, helping farmers aggregate into farmer producer organizations and
negotiate prices from crop offtakers, and linking farmers with providers of loans and other financial
services to increase their investment in productive assets.
Digital technologies can also be leveraged to mobilize smallholder farmers to contribute to climate
mitigation by using remote sensing technology to monitor climate-related outcomes such as soil organic
carbon sequestration and digitally enrolling farmers in carbon credit payment schemes to help them
earn compensation for the climate impact of their sustainable farming practices.
Digital agricultural advisory services (DAAS) leverage the rapid proliferation of mobile phones, behavioral science, and human-
centered design to build public extension system capacity to empower smallholder farmers with cutting-
edge, productivity-enhancing agricultural knowledge that improves their food security and climate
resilience through behavior change. It is a proven, cost-effective, and shovel-ready innovation that can
improve the resilience of food systems and increase farmer yields and incomes by modernizing the
agricultural extension system, at a fraction of the cost and an order of magnitude higher reach than
traditional extension approaches.
DAAS gives smallholder farmers access to on-demand, customized, and evidence-based agricultural
information via mobile phones, cheaply at $1–$2 per farmer per year. It can be rapidly scaled up to
reach more than a hundred million users by 2030, leading to an estimated $1 billion increase in
additional farmer income per year.
USAID currently spends over $1 billion on agricultural aid annually, and only a small fraction of this is directed to
agricultural extension and training. Funding is often program-specific without a consistent strategy that can be replicated or scaled
beyond the original geography and timeframe. Reallocating a share of this funding to DAAS would help the agency
achieve strategic climate and equity global food security goals.
Scaling up DAAS could improve productivity and transform the role of LMIC government agricultural extension agents by freeing up resources
and providing rapid feedback and data collection. Agents could refocus on enrolling farmers, providing specialized advice, and improving the
relevance of advice farmers receive. DAAS could also be integrated into broader agricultural development programs, such as FAO’s input e-
subsidy programs in Zambia and Kenya.
DAAS: A highly scalable tool to achieve global food security and climate resilience
Plan Of Action
To spearhead USAID’s leadership in digital agriculture and create a global pipeline from tested innovation to scaled impact, USAID, Feed the
Future, and its U.S. government partners should
launch a Digital Agriculture for Food Security Challenge . With an
international call to action, USAID can galvanize R&D and investment for the next generation of digitally
enabled technologies and solutions to secure yields and livelihoods for one hundred million smallholder
farmers by 2030. This digital agriculture moonshot would consist of the following short- and long-term actions:
Recommendation 1: Allocate $150 million over five years to kickstart the Digital Agriculture Innovations
Fund (DAI Fund) to fund, support, and scale novel solutions that use technology to equitably secure
yields, food security, and livelihoods for smallholder farmers.
The fund’s activities should target the following:
Digital Agriculture Pilot and Research Fund (DAPR Fund) ($35 million): Provide funding for research, user
design, and pilot testing to industry, NGO, and university innovators to create and verify digital
innovations like customized weather forecasts, digital extension, microinsurance, microcredit, and local
input dealer directories. This could employ the Small Business Innovation Research model and use technical assistance from within the
agency and in partner organizations to support the development of promising new ventures or products/services from existing players.
Digital Agriculture Scaling and Commercialization Fund ($100 million): Invest in grants or, with collaboration from
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, in equity funding for proven digital agriculture solutions as bridge
capital to enhance their scaling to new markets or products. Funding should be directed not only to FTF Innovation Labs
solutions but also to those outside the FTF network with a focus on LMIC-founded ventures, digital and technology-enabled startups, and
existing footprints in FTF target countries to ensure broader impact. Selected solutions should have demonstrated
outcomes in proof of concept and moved into the “demonstrated uptake” phase of the product life
cycle. Annual investments should be up to $10 million across a small portfolio of ventures to crowd-in unlocked private capital and foster
competitive, sustainable enterprises. Contract authority should be flexible and mission-oriented.
Market-Shaping and Public-Private Partnerships ($15 million): Create an Advanced Research Projects
Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) style Tech-to-Market Team, a separate group of staffers working full-time to
find marketing opportunities for novel technologies in the innovation pipeline . This group could coordinate
new public-private partnerships, like the Nutritious Foods Financing Facility (N3F), which can support the
digital agriculture ecosystem for smallholder farmers. This funding would also allow for the hiring of a cadre of dedicated
digital development advisors at USAID to spearhead this work in the digital agriculture sector and collaborate with agency country missions in
planning and executing RFPs and other agricultural aid programs.
The fund’s investment priorities should align with stated GFSS and GFSRS objectives, including solutions
focused on climate-smart agricultural innovation, enhanced nutrition, and food systems, genetic
innovation, and poverty reduction. Program activities and funding should coordinate with FTF implementation in strategic priority
countries with large agricultural sectors and mature, low-cost mobile networks such as Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. It should
also collaborate with the FTF Innovation Lab and the AIM for Climate Initiative networks.
Recommendation 2: Convene the Digital Agriculture Summit to create an all-hands-on-deck approach to

facilitate and accelerate integrated digital agriculture products and services that increase yields and
resilience.
USAID will announce the dedicated DAI Fund , convening its interagency partners—like the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA), Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), US Africa Development Foundation (USADF) as well
as philanthropy, private sector capital, and partner country officials and leaders to
chart these pathways and create
opportunities for collaboration between sectors. The Summit can foster a community of expertise and
solidify commitments for funding, in-kind resources, and FTF country partnerships that will enable DAI
Fund solutions to demonstrate impact and scale. The Summit could occur on the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly to allow for greater participation and collaboration with FTF country representatives
and innovators. Follow-up activities should include:
Partner Country Commitments: Secure commitments from FTF partner countries to direct annual
funding toward digital infrastructure and the development of a local digital agriculture economy , whether
in the form of R&D, implementation, or infrastructure funding.
Philanthropic and Private Sector Commitments: Following the Grand Challenges model, the Digital Agriculture for Food
Security Challenge should seek commitments from philanthropy and private sector funders to expand the
funding pool and finance pipelines for startups. Invitation to the Summit would be contingent on
commitments of financial support and in-kind resources for digital agriculture innovation.
SXSAg for Digital Agriculture: Annual gatherings of innovators, investors, and stakeholders to share
knowledge and results as well as attract more private capital.
Innovator Community of Practice: Create a Community of Practice of innovators and experts inside and
outside the agency to advise DAI Fund staff and USAID on current challenges in the digital agriculture
space for non-established entrants and opportunities for future fund investments.
Webinar Series: As a follow-up to the Summit, a webinar series could disseminate knowledge and build
institutional buy-in and support for DAAS with key stakeholders within the agency . Subject matter experts from
PxD and other service providers can share evidence, use cases, and lessons learned in developing and delivering these services and provide
recommendations on how USAID can better incorporate digital agriculture into its operations.
2nc – solvency – digital ag
Digital agriculture can combat coming agricultural concerns---innovation and
communication with farmers is key
Shankarappa Sridhara et al 23 (Professor of Agronomy and working at the Coordinator Center for
Climate Resilient Agriculture at University of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences, Shimoga, Karnataka,
India), “The Role of Digital Agriculture in Mitigating Climate Change and Ensuring Food Security: An
Overview,” 03/17/2023, Sustainability 15(6), 5325
Digital innovation in agriculture represents a great opportunity to eradicate poverty and hunger and
mitigate the effects of climate change [86]. Through digitalization, all parts of the agri-food production chain will be
modified since connectivity and the processing of large amounts of information instantly allow for more
efficient work, greater economic return, greater environmental benefits, and better working conditions
in the field. However, implementing these changes will require governments to increasingly strengthen rural
infrastructure and promote the development of rural communities and small rural businesses so that they can
adopt and implement innovative solutions [86]. The perspectives of digital agriculture adoption were assessed in research
conducted in the United States, which revealed that the perceptions of the derived benefits are heterogeneous and differentiated according to
the agricultural culture [87]. In order to better understand farmers’ adoption decisions or lack thereof, it is important to understand their
perception of the benefits that technology can provide for them.
Previous studies on digital agriculture [88] emphasize that digital agriculture supports better decision-making based on consistent analyses of
agricultural systems, supporting the farmer in the form of digital solutions associated with robotics and artificial intelligence. However, they
stress that it is necessary to coordinate more solid user training, especially for young farmers eager to learn and apply modern agricultural
technologies and to grant a generational renewal yet to come. They consider the right time for society to advance in modern and sustainable
agriculture, becoming capable of presenting all the power of agricultural management based on data to face the challenges posed to food
production in the 21st century.
A study conducted in Sao Paulo [89] investigated the adoption of digital agriculture technologies in sugarcane
production through a questionnaire sent to all companies that operate in the sugar and alcohol sector in the region. The authors concluded
that companies that adopted and used these technologies have proven to reap benefits, such as
management improvement, higher productivity, lower costs, minimization of environmental impacts,
and improved sugarcane quality. Furthermore, another study [90] investigated the use and adoption by producers and service
providers of digital agriculture technologies in different Brazilian agricultural regions and found that the growth of technology
adoption was linked to economic gains in agriculture. Financial aspects combined with the difficulty in
using software and equipment provided by the lack of technical training by field teams were highlighted
as the main factors limiting the expansion in using these technologies in the field [91]. This research indicates
that Brazilian farmers use at least one digital technology in their production system, such as mobile apps, digital platforms, software, global
satellite positioning systems, remote sensing, and field sensors. Consequently, the percentage decreases as the application’s technological
complexity level increases [91].
The use of digital agriculture has the potential to increase the sustainable management of natural
resources, making agricultural areas more productive and reducing the negative environmental impact
[90]. However, there are challenges to amplify its use, including the lack of access to technology and digital
infrastructure in certain regions, limited knowledge and understanding of digital agriculture among farmers and land managers,
and high costs associated with implementing and maintaining digital agriculture systems. Other challenges include limited data quality and
availability for developing accurate models and algorithms, difficulty in integrating digital agriculture technologies with existing farm
management systems and practices, concerns about data privacy and security, and uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of digital agriculture
in mitigating climate change and improving sustainability [88,90,91].
Land managers will face several challenges in the future regarding the future climate scenario with technological solutions .
Different
technologies can be adopted to implement digital agriculture to mitigate climate change, due to which
the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, and heatwaves, which
can lead to crop failure and soil erosion have increased [86]. Temperature and precipitation patterns will change, impacting
crop yields and shifting vegetation zones, affecting ecosystem functions. Additionally, land managers must face the spread of invasive species,
pests, and diseases, which can negatively impact crop and livestock production, and the overall health of ecosystems. Limited
knowledge
and understanding of digital agriculture among farmers and land managers can create a gap between
the technology and land managers. Furthermore, other challenges include limited data quality and availability for developing
accurate models and algorithms and difficulty integrating digital agriculture technologies with existing farm management systems and practices
[92].
In order to
address these challenges, land managers are exploring a range of technological solutions. Precision agriculture
technologies, such as soil sensors, drones, and satellite imagery, must be used to monitor soil and crop
conditions and optimize fertilizer and water usage, create a different energy source, such as biogas and
biofuels, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and provide alternative energy sources, and finally, utilize
climate-smart agriculture practices, such as agroforestry, which integrate trees and crops to enhance
ecosystem services and reduce greenhouse gas emissions [90].
Digital agriculture is the only sustainable solution to food insecurity---incentives for

innovation solve
Bruno Basso & John Antle 20 (John A. Hannah Distinguished Professor in the Department of Plant,
Soil and Microbial Sciences at Michigan State University & professor in the Department of Applied
Economics at Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, and a University Fellow at Resources for the
Future, Washington, D.C. who received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago), “Digital
agriculture to design sustainable agricultural systems,” 04/06/2020, Nature Sustainability 3, pg. 254–256
The global food system must become more sustainable. Digital agriculture — digital and geospatial
technologies to monitor, assess and manage soil, climatic and genetic resources — illustrates how to
meet this challenge so as to balance the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable
food production.
Fifty years ago, many people doubted the ability of the world to feed itself. While food security remains a challenge for the poorest people, the
global food system has been so successful in producing cheap food calories that today three-times more people in the world are obese than
underweight due to malnutrition1. The current food system is able to do this largely because of crop and livestock production technologies that
produce and deliver more food calories to more people than was previously thought possible. But agriculture’s contributions to greenhouse gas
emissions, water pollution and biodiversity loss show that major
agricultural systems are on largely unsustainable
trajectories2. As Schramski et al.3 point out, changing the way we produce and use energy in agriculture as well
as the rest of the economy must be an important part of meeting the sustainability challenge . However, it
seems unlikely that a development pathway for a human population approaching 10 billion could be
achieved with less total energy use. And since some environmental costs will be associated with increased energy use and a
substantially larger human population, achieving a more sustainable development pathway will involve managing trade-offs in complex natural
and human systems among economic, environmental and social dimensions of human well-being4. It now appears likely that
moving agriculture towards a more sustainable development pathway will depend largely on crop
agriculture, particularly if the sustainable human diet is to be largely based on plant-based foods. This will involve trade-offs associated with
the demands such a pathway will place on land, water and genetic resources in many parts of the world5.
The best hope for meeting the challenge of sustainable agricultural development lies in the ongoing
process of innovation now taking place using modern genetic and information technologies to increase
agricultural productivity while balancing economic, environmental and social outcomes associated with agriculture and the food
system. Genetic improvement is a necessary but not sufficient part of this strategy, as we learned in the Green Revolution of the twentieth
century, because environmental outcomes depend on how crop production is managed at the field scale as well as its interactions with
ecosystems across the landscape. Much attention has been paid to the key role that data acquisition plays in improving crop management —
but improvements in system performance will come about only when agricultural science can make
effective use of these ‘big data’. Improved data and analytics will need to be incorporated with
agronomic science, that is, what we call digital agriculture (DA) — a set of digital and geospatial
information technologies that integrates sensors, analytics and automation to monitor, assess and
manage soil, climatic and genetic resources at field and landscape scales.
So-called precision agriculture (PA)6 began to be implemented in the early 1990s ostensibly to increase profitability and reduce the
environmental impact of crop-based systems by applying variable inputs according to spatial variability of crop growth7. However, there is little
evidence as yet demonstrating widespread economic and environmental benefits of precision management technology8. Like many mechanical
technologies, the economic benefits appear to be greatest for larger farms that can spread their fixed costs over many acres, and that can
reduce labour costs through automation. Thus, profitability and adoption in the United States is highest among larger farms, with profitability
only slightly higher on average among adopters, and input use only marginally lower on average, consistent with the finding of minimal
environmental benefits from PA as currently implemented8. One explanation for the failure to achieve more substantial and widespread
improvements in environmental performance is the lack of effective policies to incentivize the implementation of technologies such as PA in
ways that achieve their promise of environmental improvement. For example, in the US Midwest, both surface and groundwater quality
continue to be severely impacted by high levels of agricultural chemical use and pollution caused by surface runoff and leaching to
groundwater, despite a variety of policies implemented since the 1980s to reduce soil erosion and runoff9.
A related explanation for the failure of DA to deliver on its promises is that, thus
far, algorithm developers for precision
management have lacked the data and computational tools needed to convert complex geospatial
information on soil and plant status into appropriate crop management actions . Misinterpretation and misuse of
data appears to be a consequence. For example , many farmers utilize precision technology to apply more nitrogen
(N) fertilizer to low-yielding portions of rain-fed fields in the hope of increasing yields, rather than less N
to avoid fertilizer losses through leaching and runoff of N that crops cannot use . This tendency is compounded by
apparent conflicts between farmers’ goal to maximize economic returns, and the objective of input suppliers to maximize sales of inputs. Thus,
ironically, precision management tools may result in lower economic and environmental sustainability if
not used appropriately.
Recent research suggests that improvements in DA technology could transform these trade-offs into the win–
win synergies that were envisioned for PA, and also help re-design agricultural landscapes for
sustainability10. Given the inherent variability in climate, soil and topography, appropriate assessments of yield variability to make more
informed decisions require at least several years of data10. New methods of analysing spatial-temporal data from
satellites or yield-monitor data from farmer machinery can produce yield stability maps that can be
integrated into farm- and landscape-scale data systems (Fig. 1)10. Yield stability maps depict areas within a field
characterized by consistently high productivity over time, other areas with consistently low productivity, and other areas where yields are
unstable — high one year, low the next. With
use of stability maps, DA can help re-design fields or subareas within
fields that are unprofitable or environmentally unsustainable, and sustainably intensify high-yield areas
of the field knowing that these can respond to more inputs (Fig. 1). Analysis shows that if N fertilizer applications were
based on plant N demand from different yield stability classes, N use in the US Midwest could be reduced by as much as 36% (or 65 kg ha–1)
compared to current, uniform applications. Co-benefits include net energy savings of 3,200 MJ ha–1 and a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions from the unused fertilizer of 890 kg CO2e ha–1. DA
could also enhance sustainability by helping farmers
efficiently diversify their farms. Subfield areas with low input response could be allocated to
biodiversity-conservation strips11, agrivoltaics12 or to perennial bioenergy crops 13. Furthermore, the
accumulation and recycling of plant available nutrients by these native prairie strips encourage improvement of the low stability zones. In the
presence of supportive policies and markets, perennial bioenergy crops planted on low yielding stable zones could generate 3,000 l ha–1 of
ethanol, on average, equivalent to 23 MJ l–1, for a total potential energy production, if implemented on 40 million ha of corn in the United
States, of ~0.7 EJ (exajoule). Thus, DA shows the potential for improvements in the sustainability of agricultural
systems both through more efficient intensification where responsive (referred to by some as
‘sustainable intensification’)5, and also through diversification and increased presence of biodiversity
(crops, pollinators, animals and so on) in areas where current systems have shown to be unprofitable or
harm the environment.
The complexity of agricultural systems and the multi-faceted nature of sustainability mean that two
steps will be needed to move agricultural systems towards more sustainable pathways 14. First is a design
step that involves participatory processes to select indicators and set goals, and uses geospatial data analytics and modelling
tools to quantify outcomes, balance competing interests and create political support for solutions. Second is an implementation
step that involves public and private investments in more sustainable technologies such as DA , as well as
demand-side and supply-side policies such as taxes or subsidies that incentivize or otherwise appropriately encourage
changes in the behaviour of consumers and producers14 . DA is capable of tracing sustainable practices
and linking them to consumer products to develop sustainable certification labelling. Sustainable
technologies need to be developed that are economically viable for the large-scale industrial systems as
well as ones that are appropriate for smaller-scale systems in the developing world15. Smallholder farmers are applying
digital technologies to learn new skills, connect themselves across wide areas, receive and deliver services. Throughout the world, new
businesses are emerging to provide farm management support, yield analytic capabilities and access to financial capital from investors15. An
outstanding challenge is to find ways to make the technologies more scale-neutral so that they can be
utilized by both small- and large-scale operations. This is another area where public policy could play a
positive role to support development and adoption of more sustainable technologies.
As the struggle for implementation of effective climate policy over past decades has shown, the complexity of modern economies and societies
creates great political and governance challenges to sustainable development. There is now widespread recognition that the global food system
must change to support the goals of sustainable development, and much progress has been made towards understanding the kinds of changes
in production and consumption of food that may be necessary16. Yet, thus far there have been many pronouncements of what ‘must’ change,
by scientists as well as by advocates with particular economic or political interests, but little discussion of how those changes can or should be
implemented in ways that balance the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable food production. In our view, until society
makes the needed investments in science-based, participatory processes to map out realistic and equitable options for achieving sustainable
development goals, progress will remain limited. The political and governance challenges of implementation remain daunting everywhere, with
distinct challenges facing the developing and industrialized countries. The good news is that the tools such as digital agriculture needed to
design and implement more sustainable agricultural development pathways for both developing and industrialized countries are advancing
rapidly. Although the challenge remains daunting, progress is possible as citizens, businesses and governments throughout the world recognize
the imperative of sustainable development.
The CP gives farmers an edge---key to worldwide food security and sustainability

Ernesto DR Santibanez Gonzalez et al 23 (Professor Department of Industrial Engineering at
Universidad de Talca, Chile), “Analysis of the drivers of Agriculture 4.0 implementation in the emerging
economies: Implications towards sustainability and food security,” May 2023, Green Technologies and
Sustainability 1(2)
Recognizing and addressing the drivers of Agriculture 4.0 may give farmers a strategic edge in future planning and reduce
their worries about sustainability and food and nutrition security during the ongoing economic crisis . This
study can aid in developing a portfolio of successful solutions by decision-makers to improve the agriculture industry . In future
disruption scenarios, identification and evaluation of Agriculture 4.0 drivers may help calm food security disturbances
worldwide. To identify, evaluate, and prioritize the drivers influencing the adoption and implementation of Agriculture 4.0, this study
proposed an innovative and comprehensive decision aid that combined issues like adaptability, durability, sustainability, and digitalization.
Through strategic prioritizing, our study would
motivate and assist farmers and commercial entities in adopting the
required steps to ensure the appropriate level of food supply.
Focusing on the key drivers such as “Automation & Robotics to lessen the usage of manual labor (D6)”
and “Usage of advanced equipment for large-scale planting and harvesting (D7)” will lead to the usage
of modern equipment and automated tools for planting, harvesting, and other agricultural activities.
This will reduce the number of tasks that people will perform, freeing up time that can be utilized in
other agricultural activities to boost productivity and revenue . The use of “The Internet of Things (IoT) for
advanced real-time monitoring of crops and livestock (D8)” will make it easier to keep track of the crops in
an efficient manner, which will also assist in cutting down on waste and raising profits and the welfare
of animals. The “Global Positioning System (GPS) for operating self-propelled sprayers, tractors, and checking
drainage system (D10)” will assist in the construction of a productive drainage system that will prevent
water clogging at specific locations, as well as resist various types of pests and, ultimately, improving
crop health. “Big Data Analytics (BDAs) to boost agricultural output (D1)” approaches include analytical tools
and techniques for evaluating historical data and delivering precise information on forecasting future
production levels, rainfall, fertilizer requirements, water cycle, plant health, and soil information. With this
knowledge, farmers will be better able to decide which crops to plant when and in what quantities,
increasing productivity and profitability.
2nc – solvency – AI
Increased AI adoption will be key to farming---improves management of soil, crops,
diseases, and weeds
Ngozi Clara Eli-Chukwu 19 (Senior Lecturer in the Department of Electrical & Electronics Engineering
at Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo in Ebonyi, Nigeria), “Applications of Artificial
Intelligence in Agriculture: A Review,” 2019, Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research 9(4),
pp. 4377-4383
Soil management is an integral part of agricultural activities. A sound knowledge of various soil types
and conditions will enhance crop yield and conserve soil resources . It is the use of operations, practices and
treatments to improve soil performance. Urban soils may contain pollutants which can be investigated with a traditional soil survey approach
[11]. The application of compost and manure improve soil porosity and aggregation. A
better aggregation indicates the addition
of organic materials that play an important role in preventing soil crust formation. It is possible to adopt
alternative tillage systems to prevent soil physical degradation . The application of organic materials is essential to
improve soil quality [12]. Production of vegetables and other edible crops is often significantly affected by several soil-borne pathogens that
require control through soil management [13]. Sensitivity to soil degradation is implicit in the assessment of the sustainability of land
management practices, with recognition of the fact that soils vary in their ability to resist change and recover [14].
A summary in AI
soil management techniques is shown in Table I. Management-oriented modeling (MOM)
minimizes nitrate leaching as it consists of a set of generated plausible management alternatives, a
simulator that evaluates each alternative, and an evaluator that determines which alternative meets the
user-weighted multiple criteria. MOM uses “hillclimbing” as a strategic search method that uses “best-first| as a tactical search
method to find the shortest path from start nodes to goals [15]. Knowledge of engineering for constructing the Soil Risk Characterization
Decision Support System (SRCDSS) involves three stages: knowledge acquisition, conceptual design and system implementation [16]. An
artificial neural network (ANN) model predicts soil texture (sand, clay and silt contents) based on
attributes obtained from existing coarse resolution soil maps combined with hydrographic parameters
derived from a digital elevation model (DEM) [21]. The dynamics of soil moisture are characterized and estimated by a remote
sensing device embedded in a higher-order neural network (HONN) [22].
IV. CROP MANAGEMENT
The crop management techniques are summarized in Table II. Crop management starts with sowing, and continues with monitoring growth,
harvesting, and crop storage and distribution. It is summarized as the activities that improve the growth and yield of agricultural products. In-
depth understanding of class of crops according to their timing and thriving soil type will certainly increase crop yield. Precision
crop
management (PCM) is an agricultural management system designed to target crop and soil inputs
according to field requirements to optimize profitability and protect the environment. PCM has been
hampered by lack of timely, distributed information on crop and soil conditions [26]. Farmers must
combine various crop management strategies to cope with water deficit resulting from soil, weather or limited irrigation.
Flexible crop management systems based on decision rules should be preferred. Timing, intensity, and predictability of drought are important
features for choosing among cropping alternatives [27].
Proper understanding of weather patterns helps in the decision-making process that will result in high
and quality crop yield [28]. PROLOG utilizes weather data, machinery capacities, labor availability, and
information on permissible and prioritized operators, tractors, and implements for evaluating the
operational behavior of a farm system. It also estimates crop production, gross revenue, and net profit
for individual fields and for the whole farm [30]. Crop prediction methodology is used to predict the suitable crop by sensing
various soil parameters and parameter related to the atmosphere. Parameters like soil type, PH, nitrogen, phosphate, potassium, organic
carbon, calcium, magnesium, sulfur, manganese, copper, iron, depth, temperature, rainfall, humidity [31]. Demeter is a computer-controlled
speed-rowing machine, equipped with a pair of video cameras and a global positioning sensor for navigation. It is capable of planning
harvesting operations for an entire field, and then executing its plan by cutting crop rows, turning to cut successive rows, repositioning itself in
the field, and detecting unexpected obstacles [32]. The
use of AI in harvesting cucumber comprises of the individual
hardware and software components of the robot including the autonomous vehicle, the manipulator,
the end-effector, the two computer vision systems for detection and 3D imaging of the fruit and the
environment and, finally, a control scheme that generates collision-free motions for the manipulator
during harvesting [33]. Field-specific rainfall data and weather variables can be used for each location. Adjusting ANN parameters affects
the accuracy of rice yield predictions. Smaller data sets required fewer hidden nodes and lower learning rates in model optimization [38].
V. DISEASE MANAGEMENT
To have an optimal yield in agricultural harvest, disease control is necessary. Plant and animal diseases
are a major limiting factor regarding the increase of yield. Several factors play role in the incubation of these diseases
which attack plants and animals, which include genetic, soil type, rain, dry weather, wind, temperature, etc. Due to these factors and the
unsteady nature of some diseases causative influence, managing the effects is a big challenge, especially in large scale farming. Table III lists the
AI applications in disease management available in the literature. To effectively control diseases and
minimize losses, a farmer should adopt an integrated disease control and management model that
includes physical, chemical and biological measure [39]. To achieve these is time consuming and not at all that cost effective
[40], hence the need for application of AI approach for disease control and management. Explanation block (EB) gives a clear view of the logic
followed by the kernel of the expert system [42]. A novel approach of rule promotion based on fuzzy logic is used in the system for drawing
intelligent inferences for crop disease management. A
text-to-speech (TTS) converter is used for providing capability of
text-to-talking user interface. It provides highly-effective interactive user interface on web for live
interactions [45]. A rule based and forward chaining inference engine has been used for the
development of the system that helps in detecting the diseases and provide treatment suggestion in [46].
VI. WEED MANAGEMENT
Weed consistently reduces the farmers’ expected profit and yield [51]. A report confirms a 50% reduction
in yield for dried beans and corn crops if weed infestations are not controlled [51]. There is about 48%
loss in wheat yield due to weed competition [52, 53]. These losses may at times rise up to 60% [54]. A
study on the impact of weed on Soybean showed about 8%-55% reduction in yield [55]. A study on yield
losses in sesame crops accounts them to about 50%-75% [56]. The fluctuation in yield losses may be attributed to the
length of exposure of the crops to the weeds [57, 58] and spatial heterogeneity of weeds [59]. Beyond these, weed has both positive and
negative effects to the ecosystem. According to the relative Weed Science Society of America (WSSA) report, weed effects include flooding
during hurricane, some species of weeds can pave their way during rampant fire, some cause irreparable liver damage if consumed, and they
muscle out plants or crops by competing for water, nutrients and sunlight. Some weeds are poisonous and cause allergic reactions or even may
threat public health. Table IV lists a summary of the AI in weed managements uses.
An intensive management with herbicides has been deployed over the past decades to reduce its effect on crops. However, even with this
management pattern, it was predicted that crop losses due to weed in western Canada field crops are estimated to exceed $500 million
annually [60], hence the need for a more expert weed management technique to compensate for this loss emerges [51 ].
A system can
utilize an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) -imagery to divide image, compute and convert to binary the
vegetation indexes, detect crop rows, optimize parameters and learn a classification model. Since crops
are usually organized in rows, the use of a crop row detection algorithm helps to separate properly
weed and crop pixels, which is a common handicap given the spectral similitude of both [64]. Weed
control in sugar-beet, maize, winter wheat, and winter barley, can be done by applying online weed
detection using digital image analysis taken by an UAV (drone), computer‐based decision making and
global positioning system (GPS)‐controlled patch spraying [67]. The drone in [68] travelled at a speed of 1.2km/h, with
58.10ms and 37.44ms execution time to find the tomato and weed locations to the spray controller respectively
2nc – solvency – IoT
IoT increases farms’ productivity and efficiency---ensures food supply
Tharek Abdul Rahman et al 18 (Professor of wireless communication with the Faculty of Electrical
Engineering and Director of Wireless Communication Centre at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia), “An
Overview of Internet of Things (IoT) and Data Analytics in Agriculture: Benefits and Challenges,” October
2018, IEEE Internet of Things Journal 5(5)
There are several benefits that can be derived from the use of IoT in agriculture . Some of the benefits have been
mentioned in the discussion of application of IoT in Sections III and IV. However, we reiterate and summarize some of the benefits as follows.
Community Farming: The use of IoT can help promote community farming especially in the rural areas .
The IoT can be leveraged to promote services that allows the community to have a common data storage,
share data and information, increase interaction between the farmers and agriculture experts [101]. Also,
through the use of mobile apps and IoT facilities equipment can be shared within the community via free or paid services.
Safety Control and Fraud Prevention : The challenge in the agriculture sector is not just limited to
sufficient production but also the ability to ensure safe and nutritious food supply. There have been several
reports in food fraud which includes adulteration, counterfeit, artificial enhancement [102 ]. This fraud poses health challenge
and can have negative economic impact [103], [104]. Some of the components of food fraud discussed in [104] are product
integrity, process integrity, people integrity, and data integrity can be addressed using IoT technology. IoT can be used to provide
logistics traceability and qualitative traceability of food [105].
Competitive Advantages: The increase in demand for food and the use of innovative technology is
expected to make the agriculture sector very competitive. Also, the enabling of data driven agriculture using IoT will open
new direction in trading, monitoring, and marketing. The ability to lower costs, reduce wastage in application of farm
inputs, such as fertilizer and pesticides increase productivity. The use of real-time data for decision
making will provide the competitive advantage needed for farmers who adopt the IoT ecosystem.
Wealth Creation and Distributions: The deployment of IoT will provide new business models, where the
single farmers can avoid the exploitation of “middle men” and can be in direct relationship with the
consumers [10] leading to higher profit.
Cost Reduction and Wastage: One of the perceived advantages of IoT is the ability to monitor remotely devices and equipment
[106]. The application of IoT in agriculture will help to save time and money in inspecting large fields compared
to personnel physically inspecting the field either via use of vehicles or walking. The ability to know
when and where to apply pesticides or insecticides using IoT will reduce cost and wastage.
Operational Efficiency: The operational efficiency not only relates to farmers but to decision makers related to agriculture sector, such
as government and nongovernmental agencies. Data gathered from agriculture surveillance schemes via IoT can
serve as a guide in agriculture interventions . Such interventions can be prevention of spread of diseases,
veld fire outbreaks, compensation schemes and resource allocations . In addition, farmers can take
advantage of IoT and DA to take accurate and timely decisions in terms of farm management and farm
processes. The ability to automatically document health status of livestock or crop will provide efficient
and effective diagnosis and prescription of medicine by veterinary or agriculture officer to farmers . This
will help reduce loss. Also, with the use of IoT, supply chain of agri-food can be optimized. The use of the IoT in the supply
chain will help to provide real time balancing between the demand and supply.
Awareness: IoT is expected to drive low cost applications and access to wireless network services in the
agriculture sector. To this end, information on markets, prices, services can be accessed via mobile apps. Also, government services
and regulatory standard regarding different farm produce can be made readily available. In addition,
consumers who are interested in organic products and fresh products can easily locate farmers or be alerted when fresh products are available.
Asset Management: IoT will enable real time monitoring of farm assets and machinery against theft,
replacement of parts, and for timely routine maintenance.
Warming
Carbon Pricing
1nc Carbon Pricing Solvency
drives innovation
UOCS, Jan 8, 2017, "Carbon pricing 101" The Union of Concerned Scientists is a national nonprofit
organization founded more than 50 years ago by scientists and students at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. with over 250 working scientests. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/carbon-pricing-
101#:~:text=The%20aim%20is%20to%20put,our%20production%20and%20consumption%20choices ///
SMS MA 😊
Putting a price on carbon helps to incorporate climate risks into the cost of doing business . Emitting
carbon becomes more expensive, and consumers and producers seek ways to use technologies and
products that generate less of it. The market then operates as an efficient means to cut emissions,
fostering a shift to a clean energy economy and driving innovation in low-carbon tech nologies.
Complementary renewable energy and energy efficiency policies are also critical to cost-effectively drive
down emissions.
generates more money than the carbon tax

Grace Smoot, ND, "Carbon Taxes vs Carbon Pricing: What's the Difference?", grace holds a Bachelor’s
degree in Environmental Biology and works as a Natural Resource Specialist
,https://impactful.ninja/carbon-taxes-vs-carbon-pricing-differences/#:~:text=Carbon%20taxes%20are
%20a%20price,price%20on%20carbon%20dioxide%20emissions /// SMS MA 😊
Carbon pricing provides an economic signal to emitters, through which they either change their
emission behavior or continue to emit at the same level at an increased cost. The money generated
from carbon pricing can then be used to fund advancements in green technology and to fuel the low-
carbon movement.
States Plank
States can do carbon pricing - solves
SMS MA 😊
“Carbon pricing” is a market-based strategy for lowering global warming emissions. The aim is to put a
price on carbon emissions—an actual monetary value—so that the costs of climate impacts and the
opportunities for low-carbon energy options are better reflected in our production and consumption
choices. Carbon pricing programs can be implemented through legislative or regulatory action at the
local, state, or national level.
Modeling
CP is popular and modeled – other countries #support
SMS MA 😊
Carbon pricing is widely considered a powerful, efficient, and flexible tool for helping to address
climate change, and is supported by an array of experts, businesses, investors, policymakers, civil
society groups, states, and countries. Carbon pricing programs are already in use in many states and
countries, including in California, the nine Northeast states that belong to the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, and Europe.
AT perm do the CP
Severance – carbon pricing is distinct from a carbon tax
Carbon taxes and carbon pricing are two of the highly debated methods by which we can put a price on
carbon emissions in order to mitigate climate change and create a more sustainable planet for future
generations. So, we had to ask: What’s the difference between carbon taxes and carbon pricing?
Carbon taxes are a price tag put on fossil fuel emissions to disincentivize their use and promote a
switch to green energy. Carbon pricing captures the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions and
ties them to their sources, typically by placing a price on carbon dioxide emissions.
Cap and Trade
1nc
CP solves better than the aff – it does all emissions not just carbon
SMS MA 😊
Under a cap-and-trade program, laws or regulations would limit or ‘cap’ carbon emissions from
particular sectors of the economy (or the whole economy) and issue allowances (or permits to emit
carbon) to match the cap. For example, if the cap was 10,000 tons of carbon, there would be 10,000
one-ton allowances. A declining emissions cap would help reduce emissions over time.
Every source of emissions subject to the cap (for example, power plants or refineries) would be
required to hold allowances equal to the emissions they produce. Power plant operators could acquire
allowances through an auction (where they bid for the allowances they need) or allocation (where they
are given a set number of allowances for free).
Once these entities have allowances, they would be able to trade or sell allowances freely among
themselves or other eligible market participants. Because the allowances are limited and therefore
valuable, those subject to the cap will try to cut their emissions as a way to reduce the number of
allowances they have to purchase. The resulting interaction between the demand and supply of
allowances in the market determines the price of an allowance (also known as the carbon price).
2nc
empirics prove success
of Technology. with over 250 working scientists. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/carbon-pricing-
SMS MA 😊
The U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program, established as part of the Acid Rain program, is a pioneering
example of using the market to drive down pollution. Carbon cap-and-trade programs are already
working successfully in California and the nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states that participate in
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). These states also have complementary renewable energy
and energy efficiency policies that work together with the carbon price to cut emissions. Many more
states are considering carbon trading programs as part of their compliance plans for the Clean Power
Plan.
The world’s first carbon cap-and trade program, launched in 2005, is the European Union’s Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The Canadian province of British Columbia implemented a carbon tax in 2008.
China has also launched a number of pilot cap-and-trade programs at the provincial level and intends to
launch a national trading program within the next few years.
Many big companies are already using an internal price on carbon to inform their business decisions. A
growing list of companies have also voiced support for a policy to put a price on carbon, including Apple,
Google, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, and Nestlé. Companies and investors need to reorient their
business models toward a low-carbon economy, while supporting the implementation of a robust
carbon price.
With growing recognition of the urgent need to address climate change, momentum for adopting
carbon pricing programs is likely to increase in the years ahead both in the U.S. and globally.
RBCF
The USFG should implement RBCF and SCF initiatives in climate policy
Matt King, March 24, 2021, "Results-Based Climate Finance is a powerful tool to build back bettter, but
only if it is within easy reach" Matt King is an Environmental Specialist at the World Bank, where he is
the Fund Manager of the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) in the Climate Funds Management
Unit (SCCFM). Ci-Dev is a $100 million fund that mobilizes private finance for clean energy access in low-
income countries. https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/results-based-climate-finance-powerful-
tool-build-back-better-only-if-it-within-easy /// SMS MA 😊
Focusing on results creates incentives to take action -- from planting trees on degraded land or
expanding access to clean energy, to enabling energy efficiency in industries. The promise of future
payouts drives transformative change in many settings and among many stakeholder
groups. The Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) is making it easier for countries to access this
versatile tool.
Rebuilding economies after the COVID-19 pandemic will put enormous strain on countries’ fiscal
budgets and finance flows from development partners. Results-Based Climate Finance (RBCF)
— payments made for achieving agreed-upon climate-related results, particularly reducing carbon
emissions — can offer an important source of liquidity at this critical moment and support a resilient,
equitable, low-carbon recovery.
<blockquote>
<h3>"Results-Based Climate Finance — payments made for achieving agreed-upon climate-related
results, particularly reducing carbon emissions — can offer an important source of liquidity at this
critical moment and support a resilient, equitable, low-carbon recovery."</h3>
</blockquote>
When Ci-Dev, backed by the World Bank, commits to results-based payments, the agreement often acts
as collateral to catalyze vital private sector investment in climate projects . This approach appeals to
project donors as they only pay for results achieved. It offers recipient countries another funding stream
outside of already-pinched national budgets and traditional development assistance that prioritizes and
scales up climate action. And it provides incentives to strengthen domestic institutions and
infrastructure and spur local communities, private sector players, and other stakeholders to
participate in and benefit from climate-smart activities .
But for all its utility, until recently RBCF has been a complicated tool to employ, putting off many would-
be users. For some results-based climate mitigation projects, participants are working to achieve verified
emissions reductions, which are converted into carbon credits for purchase. Payment only comes when
emissions reduction targets are met, which can take years in some cases. Even with patience and
projects structured with interim results, countries may not have the capacity to follow through with the
complex carbon crediting processes. Demanding requirements for data monitoring, reporting, and
verification (MRV) have burdened many low-income countries with high administrative and financial
costs and slowed their entry into the carbon marketplace.

Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF)
To ease access to carbon credits and other Results-Based Climate Finance, Ci-Dev developed
a Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF). The SCF builds on the World Bank’s successes and lessons
learned implementing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the main international
systems for enabling conversion of emissions reductions into carbon credits under the Kyoto Protocol. It
is a country-driven approach in which client countries and Ci-Dev work together to develop a crediting
framework tailored to their circumstances. The SCF helps reduce time and expense incurred by
countries by streamlining processes, aligning the crediting start date with the implementation date,
eliminating the validation step, simplifying the project cycle, and standardizing the MRV system.
In a nutshell, the SCF allows program teams to focus more on delivering emission reductions and less
on paperwork.
Empirics prove success; Senegal, Rwansa

Matt King, March 24, 2021, "Results-Based Climate Finance is a powerful tool to build back bettter, but
only if it is within easy reach" Matt King is an Environmental Specialist at the World Bank, where he is
the Fund Manager of the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) in the Climate Funds Management
Unit (SCCFM). Ci-Dev is a $100 million fund that mobilizes private finance for clean energy access in low-
income countries. https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/results-based-climate-finance-powerful-
tool-build-back-better-only-if-it-within-easy /// SMS MA 😊
Lower costs, more capacity, quicker results
To put the SCF to the test, we first piloted it in Senegal within a rural electrification project. For over two
years, it ran in parallel with the project’s CDM validation and registration, making it possible to compare
the two processes, timelines, governance structure, stakeholder engagement, and transaction costs. The
SCF achieved substantial cost savings and moved the project from development to its first emission
reduction certification years faster than the CDM process.
We also took the SCF to Rwanda, where we used it to assess carbon credits generated by an efficient
and clean cooking project over two years. The SCF cut implementation costs in half compared to the
CDM, indicating significant efficiencies and return on investment. The pilot also demonstrated how
the SCF puts the national government and institutions squarely in the driver’s seat.
The pilot allowed Rwanda to establish clear governance arrangements and technical materials for
portions of the improved and clean cooking sector. This new level of transparency and predictability in
decision making will make it easier for industry players to tap into carbon markets and RBCF , more
generally.
By easing the technicalities and clarifying the governance around climate mitigation, the SCF has the
potential to unlock the full power of RBCF. The framework is designed to be instrument neutral, so it can
be used across a variety of activities under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. In preparation for the new
carbon marketplace that Article 6 will usher in, we are working on a broader rollout of the SCF. It also
features prominently in a new World Bank Scaling Climate Action by Lowering Emissions (SCALE)* multi-
donor fund taking shape as part of ongoing trust fund reforms. The facility aims to mainstream RBCF
across World Bank operations so all our client countries can access this useful tool to achieve their
development goals. Ensuring RBCF is within easy reach will help economies build back better post-
pandemic and achieve a cleaner, greener future for all of us.
* previously the Climate Emissions Reductions Facility – CERF
instrument neutral, so it can be used across a variety of activities under Article 6 of the Paris
Agreement. In preparation for the new carbon marketplace that Article 6 will usher in, we are working
on a broader rollout of the SCF. It also features prominently in a new World Bank climate emissions
reduction facilitytaking shape as part of ongoing trust fund reforms. The facility aims to mainstream
RBCF across World Bank operations so all our client countries can access this useful tool to achieve their
development goals. Ensuring RBCF is within easy reach will help economies build back better post-
pandemic and achieve a cleaner, greener future for all of us.
Standardized Crediting Framework: definition

Ci-Dev, ND, "Standardized Crediting Framework" https://www.ci-dev.org/standardized-crediting-
framework#:~:text=The%20Standardized%20Crediting%20Framework%20(SCF,to%20generate%20those
%20emissions%20reductions. /// SMS MA 😊
The Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF) is a streamlined, country-owned emissions reduction

crediting framework that improves transparency of national crediting decision making, reduces
transaction costs, and shortens the time it takes to generate those emissions reduction s. Developed
and supported by the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev), the SCF builds on the lessons learned
from experiences with the Clean Development Mechanism ( CDM) model, which was developed and
used under the Kyoto treaty. This means that the SCF can help countries to access climate finance, lower
transaction costs for emissions reduction crediting operations, and encourage private sector
engagement in energy access.
SCF benefits; aligns standards
Ci-Dev, ND, "Standardized Crediting Framework" https://www.ci-dev.org/standardized-crediting-
framework#:~:text=The%20Standardized%20Crediting%20Framework%20(SCF,to%20generate%20those
%20emissions%20reductions. /// SMS MA 😊
The SCF can support a country’s climate action plans and Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
under the Paris Agreement by helping to build capacity of host country institutions, improve
coordination among domestic entities, and align climate change policy goals with sectoral ones . Taken
together, these support mechanisms can help countries to participate in emissions reduction crediting
and to access results-based climate finance. Examples of the SCF in action in Rwanda and Senegal can
be found here.
Due to these successes, Ci-Dev donors have agreed to offer the SCF to the other countries and regions
where the Ci-Dev portfolio is active: Ethiopia, Kenya, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, Senegal,
Rwanda and Burkina Faso.
Results-based Finance: defenition

Spors et al, May 2017, Felicity Spors MSc. Is the Director of Sustainable Finance at the Gold Standard
Foundation. The objective of her work is to support investors and investees measure, manage and
maximize sustainable development impact and value to drive progress in meeting internationally agreed
climate and sustainable development goals. Her financial experience is drawn from 12 years as a Senior
Carbon Finance Specialist at the World Bank, and three years at EIT Climate KIC and two years working
as an expert for the Technical Expert Group and the Sustainable Finance Platform working to develop
the EC sustainable finance taxonomy
, Klaus Oppermann, Caroline Ott, Charis Lypiridis, Pablo Benitez, Tambi Matambo (all World Bank Team),
Christine Gruening, Ulf Moslener and Menglu Zhuang (all Frankfurt School- UNEP Collaborating Centre
for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance) https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Session
%202_Launch%20Report_WBG.pdf /// SMS MA😊
• Results-based Finance (RBF) provided specifically for climate mitigation or adaptation results
• RBCF criteria:
– payments are made for climate mitigation or adaptation results
– payments are made ex post
– payments are made once predefined results have been achieved; and – reported results have been
independently verified.
Incentives actors
Spors et al, May 2017, Felicity Spors MSc. Is the Director of Sustainable Finance at the Gold Standard
Foundation. The objective of her work is to support investors and investees measure, manage and
maximize sustainable development impact and value to drive progress in meeting internationally agreed
climate and sustainable development goals. Her financial experience is drawn from 12 years as a Senior
Carbon Finance Specialist at the World Bank, and three years at EIT Climate KIC and two years working
as an expert for the Technical Expert Group and the Sustainable Finance Platform working to develop
the EC sustainable finance taxonomy
, Klaus Oppermann, Caroline Ott, Charis Lypiridis, Pablo Benitez, Tambi Matambo (all World Bank Team),
Christine Gruening, Ulf Moslener and Menglu Zhuang (all Frankfurt School- UNEP Collaborating Centre
for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance) https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Session
%202_Launch%20Report_WBG.pdf /// SMS MA😊
US-China Coop Adv CPs
Multilat
US-China engagement lowers the cost of energy transition, sustained mutual financing
and coordination key to meet climate targets
Lewis and Springer, 23 (04/2023; Joanna Lewis is Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor of
Energy and Environment and Director of the Science, Technology and International Affairs Program
(STIA) at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She runs the Clean
Energy and Climate Research Group and leads several dialogues facilitating US-China climate change
engagement. Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from the University of California, Berkeley; Cecilia Springer
is the Assistant Director, Global China Initiative at the Boston University Global Development Policy
Center, Ph.D. from the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley;
“Opportunities for US-China Engagement on Development Finance for Overseas Renewable Energy”;
Boston University Global Development Policy Center;
https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2023/04/GCI_WP_029_Lewis_Springer_FIN.pdf)
INTRODUCTION
This working paper begins from the premise that US engagement with China could increase resources
available for RE development in developing countries. We argue that there is a scientific, policy and
economic imperative for an engagement-oriented approach. The aforementioned RE investment gap is
derived from scientific assessments of additional installed capacity and generation necessary to meet
climate targets (International Energy Agency 2021; IRENA 2022). In addition to global science-based
targets, an increasing number of countries, including developing countries, are adopting domestic policies to support their net-zero
commitments. For example, South Africa, Nepal, Brazil, Ecuador and Vietnam have committed to net-zero emissions by 2050; Sri Lanka, Nigeria
and Kazakhstan by 2060; and India and Ghana by 2070. These policy commitments further enforce the need for financial flows to support new
RE infrastructure. Finally,
an engagement-oriented approach to global RE financing will reduce the overall costs
of energy transition. Globalized solar photovoltaic (PV) module supply chains have already saved both
the US and China tens of billions of dollars each since 2008, while future supply chain decoupling could
raise the price of solar modules by 20-25 percent through 2030 (Helveston, He and Davidson 2022). At the same time,
there are minimal and manageable economic and security risks to RE supply chains being partially sourced from China (Davidson et al. 2022)
The premise of engagement is understudied from an empirical perspective. Scholars and politicians alike have proposed that the United States
should compete with China by offering affordable finance for global RE development (Urpelainen 2021; Brian Murray 2013; Tsafos 2022;
Yet given the RE financing gap mentioned, the US alone cannot finance the low carbon
Springer 2022).
development needs of developing countries. The US can, however, work strategically with partners and
leverage public and private finance for recipient countries by providing lower risk, lower carbon
technology that accounts for local needs. If the US were leveraging, rather than attempting to block,
China’s overseas finance, opportunities to support regional development needs would be expanded
while China would simultaneously be pressured to support greener technologies overseas (Hart and
Magsamen 2019).
We acknowledge that US-China relations are, at present, low. However,

both countries continue a multi-decade history of
climate cooperation, even during today’s tense bilateral relationship (Lewis 2023). The US-China Joint
Glasgow Declaration adopted in November 2021 lays out several topics for climate cooperation. The
declaration recalls the commitment made by both countries “regarding the elimination of support for unabated international thermal coal
power generation,” yet fell short for calling for any direct bilateral engagement on the topic of overseas RE finance (US Department of State
Given the crucial roles that both countries play in the development finance arena, we argue that
2021).
coordinated efforts could increase development finance for RE overseas. Other studies agree (e.g. Hart et al.
2016), but do not articulate a clear range of options for the US and China to work together.
In this working paper, we systematically assess the potential set of opportunities that exist for the United States and China to engage on
overseas RE development finance.
China and the United States are the world’s two largest carbon dioxide
emitters. They also have the world’s two largest electricity systems by installed capacity, as well as the
first and second largest amount of installed RE capacity. Both countries have historically taken an active
role in global development via outward financing, and in recent years, have consolidated their overseas
development strategies with larger economic and strategic goals via the BRI from China and the US-led
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), formerly known as Build Back Better World
(B3W). While other countries certainly play important roles in global RE development finance, given the
significant domestic RE industries and consolidated overseas development strategies from the US and
China, this working paper explores potential complementarity in the role that these two particular
countries could play in closing the overseas financing gap in RE.
complementarity between the roles that the United States and China are currently
We begin by assessing the
playing in RE development and finance in third countries. We then examine the range of opportunities that exist for the
US and China to work together in this space, ranging from those that require the least coordination to those that require more in-depth
coordination and even direct cooperation. Finally, we present recommendations for how the US and China should further engage to facilitate
an increase in financing in RE development overseas.
Multilateral development banks and initiatives key to funding RE development

Multilateral platforms including MDBs, intergovernmental forums and international treaties, provide a
potential avenue for the US and China to engage in promoting RE finance abroad, as detailed below.
Benefits of multilateral engagement include the ability to leverage existing platforms and mechanisms,
and the ability to coordinate in a public and more neutral space, relative to bilateral engagement.
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS Multilateral development banks (MDBs) in which the US and China are
both shareholders, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), provide an existing channel for coordination on RE finance. All of
these MDBs have policies or programs in place to support increasing RE investment, particularly in
developing countries (Ray, Bhandary, et al. 2021).
Prior scholarship has argued that MDBs are an important venue for increasing coordinated support for global public goods and sustainable
infrastructure (Bhattacharya et al. 2019) (N. Lee 2017), of which RE projects that contribute to climate mitigation are a
key part. In 2015, MDBs and the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) agreed on a set of Common Principles for finance to
mitigate climate change and to support adaptation to climate change (AfDB et al. 2021). Studies, along with the MDBs
themselves, have pointed to the need for better coordination across institutions to better harmonize
their approaches and methodologies in promoting climate finance (Citi Global Perspectives and Solutions 2021).
There are also significant challenges to coordination with MDBs, and to the US and China increasing
coordination for RE projects both within and across MDBs. For example, the US and China have different
stances within MDBs about what types of projects should receive support, with China favoring
infrastructure and the US favoring social sectors (Yu 2017). Furthermore, the US and China have somewhat differing
strategies towards engagement in the MDBs, with the US favoring more direct intervention on guiding policies and projects, and China favoring
capital participation without exercising shareholder interventions.
Despite these challenges, MDBs represent an existing channel with precedent for cooperative activity on
overseas financing. For example, to the extent that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
represents China and the World Bank represents the US, there are numerous examples of collaborations
between these two institutions (Gallagher 2021).
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUMS Another existing channel for potential coordination is intergovernmental

forums, such as the Group of Twenty (G20). China and the US are both members of the G20. The G20 issued
a sustainable finance roadmap in 2021, which focused on aligning and harmonizing green finance standards. Also in 2021, the G20 issued a joint
communique on ending financing for coal-fired power plants overseas. G20 working groups and engagement groups include relevant topics and
actors for the US, China and other G20 countries to engage on overseas RE financing. In addition, the G20 finance track convenes finance
ministers, central bank leaders and other relevant actors on economic, financial and monetary issues. The finance track, which includes a
sustainable finance agenda, could also be an important venue for engagement.
China and the United States are both participants in the Clean Energy Ministerial process, as well as the
World Economic Forum and the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, all of which have
clean energy finance tracks. China and the US both also participate in the Major Economics Forum on
Energy and Climate.
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS There

are also opportunities for coordination via multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) and treaties that target RE finance overseas, including the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Paris Agreement.
Climate finance has long been a central and contentious issue in the international climate negotiations. China historically has been a recipient of
international financial assistance through global environmental treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol, and research has shown that its access
to the Protocol’s Multilateral Fund played a key role in China meeting its targets to phase out the use of ozone depleting substances (Zhao
China has taken on increasingly more ambitious targets under the Protocol, and worked
2002). As a result,
bilaterally with the US to call for an international hydro-flurocarbon (HFC) phase-down in advance of the
Kigali Amendment (Lin and Schmidt 2013; White House Press Secretary 2013). China was also the leading beneficiary of climate finance
through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (Reuters 2009). Yet, as China has emerged as a more active
player in MEAs, it has yet to play a significant role in contributing to climate financing instruments, even
as it becomes less and less of a beneficiary of these instruments. For example, China has primarily excluded
itself from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), instead preferring to establish its own financing mechanisms
targeting South-South climate cooperation, such as the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund,
established in 2015 with a capitalization of $3.1 billion.
Should China move to become more engaged in the climate financing instruments within key MEAs, there are several opportunities. In addition
to the GCF, in the leadup to 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in 2021, the Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance was
announced in response to calls for coherent and effective support for developing countries’ efforts to decarbonize their economies, adapt to
climate change and establish green growth pathways (UK Government 2021b). The Taskforce is initially chaired by the United Kingdom and Fiji
and includes steering committee members Bhutan, Belize, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Germany, Sweden, the US the GCF and the World Bank,
lacking direct involvement from China (UK Government 2021a).
While China has preferred to establish its own multilateral platforms for engagement, rather than
joining international ones, these may also provide important channels for US engagement in the future.
China recently released a concept note on a Global Clean Energy Partnership, which announced the
intent to co-host a forum with IRENA and invite partners from other countries (S&P Global Commodity Insights
2022).
Bilat
Bilateral engagement between the US and China increases investment and aid
programs creating incentive for the sustainable energy transition
Bilateral Engagement
There are a range of opportunities for the US and China to engage bilaterally with a focus on mobilizing
RE finance overseas. The US and China have a long and rich history of bilateral engagement, which has
produced some of the most successful bilateral climate and energy initiatives over the last few decades
(Lewis 2023). Yet, given the current political tensions that plague the US-China bilateral relationship, it is necessary to examine a range of
engagement options in the RE finance space that entail both higher and lower levels of political coordination, such parallel standards (lower
coordination) to joint financing (higher coordination).
INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS There are opportunities for the US and China to coordinate in order to
clarify the guidelines that govern each country’s individual bilateral development aid and overseas
investments. Such clarified policy statements are not only useful to guide investments and potentially
harmonize standards, but could serve as a way for the two nations to once again demonstrate joint
climate leadership (Hart, Ogden and Gallagher 2016).
There are several specific policy areas that provide opportunities for potential harmonization and alignment. First ,
99 percent of
internationally available development finance is covered by commitments, policies or programs or direct
assistance for ending coal and supporting RE (Ray, Bhandary, et al. 2021). Given these shared goals, established
without direct coordination, US and Chinese DFIs could work to move from commitments towards
implementing specific programs and providing assistance, with alignment on language about
supported/unsupported technology types (e.g., no new coal, or unabated coal) and what instruments
this may apply to.
In addition to DFI-level policies, the US and China can also align on standards for investment (public or
private). The key overseas investment initiatives from each country—the PGII in the US and the BRI in
China—could articulate parallel clean energy investment principles. There has already been some progress made in
this area, as summarized in Table 2. Current investment principles do not specify support for specific RE technologies, or set targets for
investment amounts, making this a possible area for future engagement.
[[table omitted]]
Institutions from the BRI and PGII could also better coordinate with one another on which deals they will
support. Based on the capital, risk appetite, capability and willingness of the institutions, one set of
institutions from the BRI may support a series of projects in one regional or sectoral area while another
set of actors from the PGII may support a series of projects elsewhere. This will take an incredible
amount of coordination potentially agreed upon through a bilateral forum where transparency occurs
amongst the different actors from each initiative. Coordination is more ideal than coexistence due to its
ability to increase the breadth and spread of development finance from all institutions. However, it may not be
the most realistic path due to the high amount of coordination needed amongst institutions and the geopolitical undertones that exist between
governments.
COORDINATED TRADE POLICY Trade and investment policy can have a direct impact on financial flows
overseas. As a result, there are opportunities for the US and China to coordinate their trade polies with
respect to RE technologies in a way that could facilitate, or at least not impede, flows of development
finance to developing countries. Examples of this could include an agreement to remove existing tariffs
and to not place new tariffs on specific RE technology. Both the US and China are part of the
negotiations on an Environmental Goods and Services agreement the being negotiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO) since
2014 (USTR 2022). This could be a renewed topic of US-China bilateral cooperation with a focus specifically on RE technologies.
The US and China could also pursue bilateral agreements on technologies to receive priority for
technology transfers. This can be done through an agreement on the scope and use of intellectual property rights at the international
level through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) or at the regional level through the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (formerly NAFTA), the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
others, primarily governing national level implementation (UNCTAD 2001). Alternatively, instruments have been used to facilitate technology
transfer to developing countries through provisions for financing built in to international treaties, such as the Multilateral Fund in the Montreal
US and
Protocol (UNCTAD 2001), or the technology mechanism in the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2022). There could be an opportunity for the
China to agree on specific technologies that they would prioritize for transfer to the Global South, for
example through the implementation of domestic incentives in parallel, or by jointly participating in
multilateral mechanisms such as those mentioned above.
CAPACITY BUILDING One of the biggest obstacles to the flow of RE financing is a poor enabling environment
in potential recipient developing countries. RE projects often deliver long-term, slower returns and as such face barriers in
developing countries with underdeveloped capital markets (Muñoz Cabré et al. 2020). As a result, capacity building to promote a stronger
Both
enabling environment can help reduce risk associated with RE project financing and make countries more attractive to investors.
China and the US have been involved in capacity building activities in the Global South, including the US
government’s work via USAID and other agencies, and China’s work on South-South cooperation
including through numerous multilateral organizations such as the UN International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (FAO 2022; United Nations 2022;
IFAD 2022). There are numerous opportunities for the US and China to coordinate on capacity building
activities to better facilitate RE financing flows, for example, by developing a joint plan for supporting
key countries in their RE transition.
BILATERAL FINANCING INSTRUMENTS Given the sizable flows of overseas development assistance and FDI coming from the US and China and
targeting fossil fuel development, there is a clear opportunity to consider how to better leverage
primarily
this investment towards cleaner sources of energy. There are several ways that bilateral financing could
be coordinated to achieve this goal. One option would be to establish a joint US-China RE investment instrument,
focused on “de-risking” RE investments. Investment risk exists in part due to policy gaps that can be
addressed through further capacity building (previously discussed), however, specific financial instruments can
play an important supplemental role. This is particularly important in countries where such instruments can lower the cost of
capital, or where sovereign and foreign exchange risks are high, or in markets with minimal local financing available (Citi Global Perspectives
Governments can play a unique role in assembling a portfolio of assistance for
and Solutions 2021).
developing countries in a way that banks alone may not be able to. This includes offering financing that
is accompanied by tailored expertise, capacity building and de-risking instruments, all as part of a joint
assistance package. This can be a large project for a single government to take on, and not all governments might have access to all of
these components. This, therefore, is an example of a place where US-China cooperation could have
potential. As discussed, China has provided development financing at a far larger scale than the US in
recent years, though the US has decades of expertise in supporting capacity building. These are all key
components that could be coordinated bilaterally with a goal of de-risking RE investments in specific
developing countries, which would be tailored towards the specific local needs and context of the target
country.
Another, albeit highly ambitious option, would be for the US and China to jointly establish a US-China
Clean Energy Investment Bank. Such a bank would pool financial as well as capacity building resources from the governments of
both countries in order to scale the sort of de-risking activities discussed. Given the competitive tensions that currently exist in the RE space in
the US and China, a bilateral bank is likely not on the current political horizon, though it has been discussed conceptually during times when
Another option would be for the US and China to work together to establish a
political tensions were lower.
global Climate Action Development Bank, which might supplement or replace the current Green Climate
Fund (Citi Global Perspectives and Solutions 2021). The goal of establishing a new multilateral bank would be to pool
resources globally and bring global scale to RE investment through a facility uniquely designed to
challenges associated with RE investments in developing countries. A multilateral bank may be less
subject to political headwinds compared with a bilateral bank if a diverse range of actors were involved
alongside the US and China in the bank’s formation.
Medical Research and Development
General
R and D solves
Parkinson and Marjanovic, 22 (8/25/2022; Sarah Parkinson is a senior analyst at RAND Europe in
the health and wellbeing group; M.S. in social policy from University of Pennsylvania; Sonja Marjanovic
is director of health care innovation, industry, and policy at RAND Europe; PhD from Judge Business
School at the University of Cambridge; “Improving How Medicines R&D Is Financed Could Support
Innovation and Benefits for Patients”; RAND Corporation;
https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/08/improving-how-medicines-rd-is-financed-could-support.html)
Tackling chronic and infectious diseases depends to a large extent on the ability to develop innovative
and affordable medicines that are available to patients in need. The ability to achieve this hinges partly on how
the financial ecosystem governing medicines research and development (R&D) functions.
The factors influencing medicines R&D financing are complex.

Money matters, of course, but so do issues of supply—
those influencing the attractiveness of investing in a particular area of R&D—and demand—those
influencing the markets for pharmaceuticals.
A new study, conducted by RAND Europe, SiRM, and LEK Consulting for the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport, examined the diverse
types of interventions that can help optimise the financing of medicines R&D on both the supply and demand side. Here, we reflect on some of
the findings.
Supply-side policy interventions that influence risk, costs, durations, and expected returns on R&D can impact on areas of investment.
Approximately US$300 billion a year is invested in medicines R&D globally, with the LEK analysis showing that nearly two-thirds of investment
comes from big biopharma, around a quarter from the public sector and not-for-profit, and approximately a tenth from venture capital.
Although public and not-for-profit investment is essential in feeding scientific advances for R&D further
down the line, decisions made by the private sector play a major role in determining which medicines
are developed.
Private-sector decisionmaking is often related to the ability to generate returns and value for shareholders. However, RAND Europe analysis
highlights other factors that play a role in decisionmaking. For example, whether an R&D area is attractive for private investors will in part be
determined by the pace and nature of scientific discovery, which often builds on publicly-funded research and support for clinical trials
infrastructure.
Medicines R&D is a highly collaborative process, and the ability to partner across countries and between
public and private sectors can also influence how R&D is conducted. Supply-side incentives can make it
easier to pursue collaboration and help manage increasing global competition for investment and
research talent. Examples include investments in building bioscience clusters and tax incentives to
attract companies to a region where collaboration prospects can be maximised.
Medicines R&D is also an expensive process. LEK analysis suggests average out-of-pocket R&D costs to develop a drug are US$280–380 million
for the company executing R&D and US$1.2–1.7 billion for the global financial ecosystem. Taking into account the cost of failure and cost of
capital, this figure increases to a cost of US$2.4–3.2 billion to the system .
Policy interventions that can influence R&D costs
and failure rates can therefore also impact the attractiveness of investment opportunities.
For example, the ability to use diverse types of data and digital technology can impact the nature, pace, and costs of R&D .
Using data and
digital advances create opportunities for designing smarter and potentially less-costly clinical trials and
more efficiently identifying drug targets and novel candidate drug compounds. Policy interventions that
support safe and secure data use and reuse, as well as appropriate safeguards and public trust, are key
in ensuring that data and digital technology can be used to their full potential.
Regulatory developments can also affect the costs and timescales of R&D and investor appetite.
Regulatory innovation can support smarter clinical trial designs at scale. Rapid or expedited reviews or
reduced regulatory fees can also act as “nudge” incentives for innovators. Efforts to tackle fragmented
regulation in some regions of the world, for example around approvals for medicines and drug-
repurposing, data use, and intellectual property, can also influence the attractiveness of a region to
investors.
While supply-side factors loom large over discussions around the financial ecosystem for medicines
R&D, demand-side factors such as pricing and reimbursement models are also essential to ensuring
medicines reach patients.
If investors are not confident that payers will be willing to pay sufficiently high prices for medicines, and at sufficient sales volumes for them to
policymakers and payers can
realise a return, they may decide to not invest in particular R&D areas. RAND Europe analysis flags that
influence R&D pipelines by clearly signalling areas of demand and prioritising areas where they are
willing to pay for innovation. Prioritisation efforts need to focus on health improvements over time,
chronic and orphan therapeutic areas, diverse patient populations, prevention-oriented care, and
benefits that can be realised through drug repurposing .
Significant global effort is looking at innovative pricing and reimbursement models to help tackle
affordability challenges. Examples include outcome-based payments, price-volume agreements,
conditional reimbursement, deferred payments, advanced market commitments, and subscription-
based models in which companies receive monthly fees to do R&D. These monthly fees are in return for a guaranteed
supply of a product if successfully developed at a specific volume and price.
However, there is a lack of robust evidence on the effectiveness of these models and a need to learn from the evaluation of existing efforts to
arrive at solutions that are sustainable and scalable. There may also be scope to use more-diverse types of health care data in value
assessments, which can inform pre- and post-market health technology assessments and pricing discussions. Considerations related to pull
incentives, such as market exclusivity and IP protection, also play a role in overall reimbursement.
For patient benefit, a balance needs to be struck between policy interventions that support affordability
and reward innovation on the demand side with supply-side interventions that encourage investment
and efficient R&D.
Policymakers will need to tackle challenges within medicines R&D from multiple angles (supply and demand, financial and nonfinancial) to avoid
reducing barriers in one area at the expense of exacerbating challenges in another.
More joined-up policy approaches between research and innovation, industry, and health could help
support efforts to implement incentives in a way that better aligns industrial competitiveness with aims
for improving population health and access to affordable new medicines. Tensions between the priorities of these
policy domains undoubtedly exist, but there are opportunities for more-coordinated decisionmaking.
Multilat
UN
Focus on UN and other encompassing treaty-based bodies
Core virtue – Legitimacy
Assumes – The United Nations and other formal, universal bodies grounded in treaty law offer the
firmest foundation for international cooperation and world order.
adv – Enhances cooperation through global membership, standing capabilities, legal foundations, and
binding commitments
da – The UN and other large-membership bodies are vulnerable to sclerosis, principal-agent problems,
regional bloc dynamics, lowest-common-denominator outcomes, and other pathologies.
Neg
The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its commitments
to the UN charter over (x issue).
UN Charter approach solves
Patrick 23 (Stewart Patrick is senior fellow and director of the Global Order and Institutions Program at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His primary areas of research focus are the shifting
foundations of world order, the future of American internationalism, and the requirements for effective
multilateral cooperation on transnational challenges, 1/23/23, “Four Contending U.S. Approaches to
Multilateralism”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/23/four-contending-u.s.-approaches-to-
multilateralism-pub-88852)
The charter conception of world order treats the United Nations, on account of its binding charter and
universal membership, as the ultimate foundation for international peace and security and the first port of
call for cooperation on global challenges. The UN Charter’s most important function is establishing rules governing
the use of force, which is prohibited in all but two cases: when it is conducted in self-defense or when it is authorized by the UN Security
Council. The UN is not a pure system of collective security, in which an attack on any state is automatically considered an attack on all. Rather,
the framework balances egalitarianism and hierarch y. All member states participate in the UN General
Assembly (UNGA), which makes decisions on a one-state, one-vote basis, but ultimate authority over peace and security,
particularly enforcement action, is vested in a Security Council dominated by five veto-wielding
permanent members, which can pass resolutions creating legal obligations for all member states. This bargain recognizes
that the world’s major powers must inevitably play a custodial role in safeguarding world order —and
that the price of their acquiescence to the UN is a guarantee that the council can never act against their perceived vital national interests.7 The
charter conception of world order treats the United Nations as first port of call for cooperation on global challenges. Beyond its fundamental
purpose of “sav[ing] future generations from the scourge of war,”8 the UN
has an additional mandate to advance economic
development and human rights as well other social purposes , including the activities of UNGA, the UN Secretariat, the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and any subsidiary bodies it may create. In the nearly eight decades since they established the world
body in 1945, member states have made full use of these authorities. New
UN departments, programs, specialized
agencies, and treaty bodies have been created to manage and govern an expanding array of global
challenges, from humanitarian emergencies and peace operations to nuclear proliferation, terrorism,
outer space activities, cyber conflict, pandemic disease, climate change, and more . Along the way, the
definition of what constitutes “security” has continued to expand, even as the Security Council continues to debate how much to broaden its
own remit.9
Increased US commitments to the UN solves, leadership is key

Thomas-Jensen and Long 21 (Amanda Long, MIA Candidate at Columbia SIPA | Foreign Policy for
America NextGen | Former U.S. Institute of Peace, Colin Thomas-Jensen, National Security Director at
USAID, 2/18/21, “How the Biden Administration Can Revive U.N. Peacekeeping”,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/how-biden-administration-can-revive-un-peacekeeping)
In many cases, the

international community turns to multilateral peacekeepers . Despite U.N. peacekeeping’s
track record of relative success and its role in shouldering a burden that might otherwise be borne by the United
States and other powerful member states, U.N. peacekeeping faces constant financial pressure and
logistical challenges. As the Biden administration begins to put its imprint on U.S. foreign policy, it should
demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism by reinvigorating American support for effective
peacekeeping and leading other member states in doing the same . As a permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council (UNSC) and the largest funder of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO)—which oversees U.N. peacekeeping— the
United
States plays an important leadership role in authorizing and shaping U.N. missions . With increasingly
assertive rivals like Russia and China seeking to erode U.S. leadership, the Biden administration should
work to resolve the thorny issues being debated in New York , including whether and how the U.N. should support
regionally led peace operations, the role of the U.N. in counterterrorism, and how to mainstream and adequately resource peacebuilding as a
core function of U.N. peacekeeping. Peacekeeping Works, But the Context is Changing Since the first blue-helmeted U.N. troops were deployed
in the Middle East in 1948, the Security Council has authorized 70 peacekeeping missions and deployed more than one-million peacekeepers
from 110 nations to help countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Today, about 95,000 peacekeepers serve in 13 operations
worldwide and remain largely committed to the cardinal rules defined at peacekeeping’s inception: impartiality, consent of the host country,
and the use of force as a last resort. Over 72 years, U.N. peacekeeping missions have supported political transitions, disarmed hundreds of
thousands of combatants, facilitated free and fair elections, and helped new countries—such as Timor Leste—come into being. While many of
the post-World War II international institutions are under increasing strain, U.N.
peacekeeping has proven resilient and
remains a centerpiece of the U.N. system and a critical conflict management tool —despite inconsistent member
state support, logistical and bureaucratic restraints, and multiple cases of sexual abuse and other high-profile scandals. Two of the international
community’s most devastating atrocity prevention failures—the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the Serbian army’s 1995 massacre of Muslim
civilians in Srebrenica—exposed structural deficiencies within U.N. peacekeeping and their human cost. The United Nations and member states
have spent more than two decades working to prevent a repeat of these shameful episodes, with positive results. Numerous peer-reviewed
studies have shown that more peacekeepers in conflict areas correlates with fewer civilian deaths, less violence,
and a better chance at lasting peace. The Effective Peace Operations Network’s (EPON) comprehensive reports on the U.N.
missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali—two of its most criticized—present evidence that U.N.
peacekeeping had a positive effect on reducing levels of violence and providing some measure of
protection to civilians. Another EPON report on an African Union- (AU) led peacekeeping operation in Somalia reached a similar
conclusion. Yet, despite peacekeepers’ best efforts, violence continues or worsens (e.g., in Mali), civilians are still dying, and the prospects for
peace look bleak. However, these harsh realities suggest more about the fundamental limitations of U.N. peacekeeping than its overall efficacy.
Peacekeeping is a conflict management and mitigation tool, not a solution to the complex underlying drivers of conflict. The
United
States and other U.N. member states therefore have a responsibility to reinforce peacekeeping missions
with robust diplomacy and accountability measures to encourage conflict actors to adhere to their
commitments (e.g., cease-fires) and obligations under international humanitarian law.
CP solves, US leadership key

Thomas-Jensen and Long 21 (Amanda Long, MIA Candidate at Columbia SIPA | Foreign Policy for
America NextGen | Former U.S. Institute of Peace, Colin Thomas-Jensen, National Security Director at
USAID, 2/18/21, “How the Biden Administration Can Revive U.N. Peacekeeping”,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/how-biden-administration-can-revive-un-peacekeeping)
The Biden Administration’s Opportunity Amid increasing global power competition that has stunted the UNSC’s basic ability to manage
international peace and security, Secretary-General Guterres launched the “Action for Peacekeeping” initiative to
renew the international commitment to peacekeeping . Guterres’ efforts culminated in 2018 with a multilateral pledge to
build collective action to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United States endorsed the declaration in 2018;
the Biden administration should take several steps to demonstrate American support for Guterres’
effort and advance policies to support more flexible and responsive peacekeeping deployments. Pay up: It
seems relatively straightforward, but simply paying its dues will go far to repairing frayed U.S. credibility on multilateral issues. Doing so
would help to restore U.S. leverage on the Security Council and rebuff criticisms from China and other
permanent members about U.S. freeloading, an argument used in favor of reducing the perceived
outsized weight of the United States on the Security Council . At the same time, the United States should
continue to make the case that, relative to the world’s other major economies, Washington shoulders
too much of the burden of multilateral peacekeeping operations. The upcoming review of the U.N.’s assessed
contributions is an opportunity to right-size expectations of the United States and move forward with Congress, the U.N., and international
partners on the same page. Build support for regional organizations like the AU to access U.N. funding for peace
operations: Regional organizations, particularly the AU, have shown leadership and willingness to combat extremist and terrorist groups
(e.g., in Somalia and the Sahel) and deploy troops to halt ongoing atrocities (e.g., Central African Republic in 2014)—situations for which U.N.
peacekeeping is ill-equipped. Yet regional organizations lack the necessary funding and logistical capacity to sustain these deployments and
must constantly solicit money and other resources from individual member states, despite the positive progress made by AU reforms and the
establishment of the AU’s Peace Fund. The United States has been generous in cobbling together ad hoc financial
and logistical support for regionally led operations , but without consistent funding, regional bodies will struggle to keep
forces on the ground paid and adequately equipped (and therefore motivated) to take on well-armed belligerents. The United States
could signal support by appointing a senior diplomat to secure buy-in from other UNSC members and
the AU for a related Security Council resolution, one that commits to providing sustained financing to support regionally led
operations, assuming they meet a set of agreed conditions. Equip U.N. peacekeepers to fulfill their mandates in a
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency context: While regional organizations and ad hoc regional coalitions like the G5 Sahel
have stepped up to take on violent extremists and terrorist organizations, the Security Council has also mandated blue-helmeted troops to
conduct offensive military operations against insurgents in the DRC and to work alongside French and regional forces fighting terrorist groups in
Mali. Indeed, most new peacekeeping deployments are in active conflict zones, where peacekeepers are themselves frequently targeted by
armed groups. Yet the debate between member states around whether and how the U.N. should operate in these contexts is unresolved,
leading to ad hoc experiments (e.g., the Force Intervention Brigade within the DRC mission) or reducing blue helmets to cannon fodder (e.g., in
Mali and the Central African Republic). The bottom line is that U.N. forces are consistently unable to protect themselves,
much less protect civilians or support peacebuilding efforts in active conflict zones. The United States could work with DPO to
anticipate when a surge is needed to manage a potentially destabilizing moment (e.g., in the run-up to a
contentious election) and plan accordingly. Better align and resource political and peacekeeping
functions: Despite the deficit between what U.N. peacekeepers have and what they need, DPO is relatively privileged within the U.N. system
—assuming member states pay their dues, funding is guaranteed. That is not the case for U.N. Special Political Missions, designed to support
peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery, which rely on voluntary contributions. Restoring political stability to societies ravaged by violence is a
long and arduous process, and Special Political Missions have played a pivotal role in helping countries like Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Timor-
Leste successfully manage these transitions.
The United States could use its Security Council Presidency in March
2021 or July 2022 to lead a discussion over how to ensure these missions are adequately and sustainably
funded, including through the possible use of assessed contributions . U.S. leadership was critical to the
success of peacekeeping summits in 2014 and 2015, but that support has waned. South Korea will hold a ministerial-level
peacekeeping summit in December 2021, and the United States could signal a recommitment to strengthen current and future missions by
sending a Cabinet-level official to lead its delegation.
Aff
UN Charter approach fails, too many structural issues and disagreements
Notwithstanding these advantages, the UN has obvious handicaps. First, it often seems built for frustration , not least
for its most powerful member. Although U.S. negotiators in the World War II–era administration of president Franklin D. Roosevelt
spearheaded the drafting of the UN Charter, the blueprint they created virtually guarantees occasional outcomes that are less than ideal from a
U.S. perspective.22 The veto provision lets other permanent Security Council members, notably China and Russia, thwart U.S. preferences. In
the case of Ukraine, Moscow has blocked universal sanctions and other Chapter 7 enforcement actions against itself. From an ethical
perspective, this is outrageous. “Where is this security that the Security Council needs to guarantee?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
demanded in April 2022. “It’s not there.”23 Likewise, the General Assembly’s one-state, one-vote format allows ideological coalitions and
regional blocs to engage in theater rather than exercise real responsibility. Finally,the UN’s budgetary processes and
labyrinthine reporting structures, which empower the UNGA and ECOSOC rather than major donor states, is a constant
aggravation to Washington. These are facts of life that U.S. administrations and diplomats can
ameliorate but never eliminate. Second, the UN and its agencies do not spring magically to life, even in crises,
nor are they immune from geopolitics.There is a natural temptation to blame UN organs like the WHO for failures in
international cooperation like the haphazard and uncoordinated response to COVID-19. In reality, the performance of multilateral
institutions tends to mirror the preferences of their main members . It is unrealistic to expect UN
multilateralism to deliver when—as during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic—the world’s major powers treat it
as a geopolitical football or abandon the field altogether . It was the decisions by China and the United States
to prioritize strategic rivalry over practical problem-solving, above all else, that guaranteed the UN’s pandemic
failures.24 If a fully-fledged Sino-U.S. cold war erupts in the future, one should anticipate an enduring collapse of Security Council
cooperation, akin to the period from 1947 to 1989 when it was marginal to many major security issues. Already, geopolitics has paralyzed much
of the council’s work. We risk moving toward a world, as Guterres warned in September 2022, of “no cooperation, no dialogue, no collective
problem solving.”25 Third, holding the UN accountable to member states and (ultimately) taxpayers remains
difficult. All formal multilateral organizations create what academics call “principal-agent dilemmas,” because they require governments (in
this case, the principals) to delegate authority to international secretariats (the agents) that may pursue their own agendas rather than respond
to the principals’ desires. Compounding this oversight dilemma, member states typically pool their authority within the governing boards of UN
agencies. Even when voting is weighted to account for relative financial contributions (as in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund),
national influence is diluted. The dynamics of delegation and pooling mean that global bodies can easily go off track—and that the White House
and U.S. Congress must remain vigilant to this possibility.26 Finally, Security Council reform is both imperative and unlikely .
In a perfect world, its composition would adjust automatically to power shifts, such as India’s emergence as a major strategic player and
imminently the world’s most-populous nation—much like football (soccer) clubs rise to and fall from the English Premier League. A Security
Council whose permanent membership continues to overweight Europe while ignoring the developing
world is courting a legitimacy crisis. In a nod to this reality, Biden, in his September 2022 UNGA address, not only reconfirmed U.S.
support for expanding the council to include new permanent and elected members but also for the first time endorsed new permanent seats
for Africa and Latin America.27 While his audience was receptive, the odds of realizing such a reform are long. Absent a global catastrophe, it is
unclear what can break the long-standing, three-way diplomatic logjam that pits the chief aspirants to permanent membership, their main
regional competitors, and a united African bloc with ambitious demands of its own.28
UN cooperation fails, Ukraine war has made it too fragmented
Puri 22 (Amb. Lakshmi Puri was Former Assistant Secretary General, United Nations, Deputy Executive
Director UN WOMEN, Director and Acting Deputy Secretary General , UNCTAD Indian Foreign Service
officer and Ambassador of India, 5/21/22, “The Russia-Ukraine War: The Last Crisis to Break the UN
Camel’s Back?”, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-last-crisis-to-break-the-un-camels-back/)
A global organisation like the United Nations (UN) reflects the seminal challenges and achievements of its times. In 2020, on the organisation’s
75th anniversary, UN Secretary-General António Guterres identified some of the challenges and
achievements that currently confront the organisation . Averring that the world had a surplus of multilateral challenges and
a deficit of multilateral solutions, he regretted that the UN lacked scale, ambition, and teeth . He noted that institutions
with authority, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), do not have the appetite to bite, indicating a lack of political will and
unity of purpose among the member states. Additionally, he urged the member states to strive to
preserve the great achievement of having gone so many years without a nuclear conflict or a military
confrontation between the major powers.[1] As it attempted to recover from the systemic hammer blows caused by the COVID-
19 pandemic, the lightning takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, and the end of the much-vaunted ‘War on Terror’ in August 2021 left the UN
picking up the pieces of human rights and humanitarian crisis. Now,
the ongoing Ukraine war—the first real European conflict since
the Second World War that has put the major Western powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and Russia on the path of direct confrontation—is proving to be a new litmus test for the UN . As an
organisation created after the Second World War by the victors and charged with the task “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war,”[2] will this
be the crisis that breaks the proverbial camel’s back ? The UN is a little more than the sum of
its member-states’ volition and power dynamics , especially of the ones that matter most—the largest budget contributors
and the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC; the US, the UK, and France are the Western group and are counterbalanced by Russia and
China. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has deepened the divide even further . Indeed, Russia sees the US and
Europe drawing the fight out “to the last Ukrainian,” with a view “to suppress Russia” and “create an
antipode” of it.[3] It is no secret that the West and NATO want to make Russia bleed, deplete, and pay for its
misadventure. Some see this as the West’s quest for a ‘End of History 2.0’ (as first conceptualised by American political scientist Francis
Fukuyama) with Russia and a possible ‘Cold War 1.5’—if not 2.0—with China. These new geopolitical and geoeconomic chasms
make it ever more difficult for the UN to hold together and drive a viable and effective global
governance and crisis response system in its four projects of peace and security, sustainable
development, human rights, and humanitarian response .
League of Democracies
Rally established democracies as basis for cooperation
Core virtue – Solidarity
Assumes – The future of an open, rules-based international system depends above all on collective
action among like-minded liberal states.
Adv – Allows democracies to define and defend principles and rules of an open world against their
adversaries
Da – Democracies don’t always agree on rules; developing country democracies may be skeptical of the
club approach; global problems do not sort themselves according to regime type.
More cards - https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/strengthening-democracy-abroad
Maybe league of democracies

Neg
The United States Federal Government should create a new League of Democracies
and cooperate over (x issue)
League of democracies solves
The club approach to multilateralism posits that the most promising foundation for global order and
cooperation is not UN universalism but a league of advanced market democracies committed to an open, liberal,
and rules-based international system. It assumes that established democracies constitute a distinctive
“security community” dedicated to shared political and economic principles —namely, support for
representative and accountable governance, open markets, and the rule of law at home and abroad—
and among whom armed conflict has become inconceiva ble.34 Such collective identity commitments encourage these
countries to define their national interests and policy preferences similarly, narrowing the range of potential disputes and increasing the
prospect that any disagreements that do arise are resolved through diplomatic consultation and mutual adjustment. Grounded
in liberal
internationalism, the club approach promises to advance both the material ends and aspirational
purposes of its democratic members. The heyday of the club approach was during the Cold War, when the United States sought
to consolidate an alliance of like-minded democracies as the core of its grand strategy to contain the Soviet Union. This was not the orientation
the Roosevelt administration had anticipated during World War II. Indeed, U.S. postwar planners laid the groundwork for a new structure of
international peace and security based on the UN, complemented by new multilateral bodies to manage the world economy, including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and an envisioned international trade organization.35 To be sure, Roosevelt did not
envision a pure system of collective security; he understood that the victor powers must jointly guarantee the postwar order. Still, he expressed
confidence that the creation of the UN would “spell an end to the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence,
the balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed.”36 Unfortunately, the Soviet
Union found this universalist vision—and the priority it accorded self-determination over spheres of influence—deeply threatening. As Moscow
tightened its grip over Eastern Europe, the United States deferred its “one world” dreams to build a narrower “free world” community capable
of deterring Soviet aggression and subversion. Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, signaled this dramatic reorientation in U.S. grand
strategy seventy-six years ago, in response to perceived Soviet designs in the eastern Mediterranean, Moscow’s hardening of control in Eastern
Europe, and communist efforts to seize power in war-ravaged European democracies. Enunciating the doctrine that would bear his name,
Truman committed the United States to a sweeping new global mission: “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures.”37 The
United States bolstered Western Europe economically, politically,
and, with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, militarily. Of course, actual
U.S. Cold War policy often fell far short of these high-minded ideals, particularly in the (post)colonial and developing worlds, where the United
States repeatedly aligned with right-wing despots who proved their anticommunist bona fides.38 As the Manichean logic of containment took
hold, the so-called free world came to include many countries where actual freedom was in short supply. Despite this hypocrisy, successive U.S.
administrations continued to treat solidarity among market democracies as the core of U.S. grand strategy. When the bipolar confrontation
suddenly ended, many
in the U.S. foreign policy establishment dreamed that this community would expand
gradually to encompass the entire world.39 In 2000, then U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright and Polish foreign minister
Bronisaw Geremek cosponsored a ministerial conference in Warsaw where delegations from 106 nations signed the Warsaw Declaration, titled
“Towards a Community of Democracies,” pledging cooperation in advancing democratic governance within their own countries and helping
consolidate fragile transitions from authoritarian or totalitarian rule.40 These visions of a democratic renaissance have since been dashed by a
combination of resurgent geopolitical rivalry pitting China and Russia against the West, the retreat of democracy in many other parts of the
world, and the erosion of democratic norms within the United States itself. For proponents of the club approach to international order,
however, these trends merely warrant a doubling down on the ties that bind established democracies. In the July/August 2022 issue of Foreign
Affairs, foreign policy experts Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay assert that unifying the world’s community of advanced democracies is the only
way to rebuild an international system based on “the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle.”41 This is not a new argument—Daalder and
Lindsay have been making it since at least 2004.42 In 2008, the U.S. State Department policy planning staff proposed establishing a strategic
dialogue among ten leading democracies.43 The vision of a league of democracies goes even further back, however. It draws on the late
eighteenth-century writings of Immanuel Kant, who saw a confederation of liberal republics as one precondition for “perpetual peace,” as well
as on the thinking of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, who was convinced that enduring international stability after World War I would require
a majority of nations (especially great powers) to be democracies.44 According to its current champions, a league of democracies
offers open societies the best chance to defend themselves against authoritarian and totalitarian
antagonists and to reinforce rules of international conduct conducive to an open wor ld. In A World Safe for
Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, Princeton political theorist G. John Ikenberry posits that the fate of the
liberal international order depends on whether democracies stand together or apart in confronting their
common security, political, and economic dilemmas .45 Among U.S. think tanks, the Atlantic Council houses the most vocal
supporters of the club approach, expressed through the creation in 2018 of the Democratic Order Task Force. The next year, that body
published the “Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace.” Its seven pillars included the right of all peoples
to freedom and justice; democracy and self-determination; peace and security from aggression,
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction; free markets and equal opportunity; an open and healthy
planet; external assistance against oppression; and collective action to safeguard these rights.46
Subsequently, two Atlantic Council scholars, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, proposed creating “a formal Democracies Ten ” (or
D-10) by enlarging the current G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to include
Australia, South Korea, and the European Union (EU, which already participates in the G7 process). The resulting body would serve
as a steering committee “aimed at fostering strategic alignment and coordinated action among a group
of like-minded, influential democracies to advance a rules-based democratic order .” The authors held out the
possibility that this club could open its doors to other major democracies that are both “strategically
likeminded” and demonstrate a “capacity for global influenc e.”47 Potential candidates could even include developing
countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa, provided that “concerns over like-mindedness”—not least in their attitudes toward China and
Russia—“can be overcome.”48 Well before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden had signaled his own affinity with the club approach. After just
two months in office, he proclaimed the “battle between the utility of democracies . . . and autocracies” to be the defining struggle of the
twenty-first century.49 A key factor behind this stance was growing alarm in Washington over the perceived failure of the United States’
decades-long, bipartisan effort to persuade Beijing to behave as a “responsible stakeholder.”50 Biden pledged to revive Western solidarity as a
bulwark against Chinese and Russian efforts to subvert free societies and upend the rules-based international order. Indeed, this became a
leitmotif of the G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU summits in June 2021.51 The U.S. president and UK prime minister Boris Johnson underscored this
message by releasing a so-called New Atlantic Charter, modeled after the original that Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had issued in August
1941 shortly before the U.S. entry into World War II.52 Biden warmed to this theme in his first UNGA speech in September 2021. “We stand . . .
at an inflection point in history,” he declared. “The future will belong to those who give their people the ability to breathe free, not those who
seek to suffocate their people with an iron hand.”53 This same conviction informed the administration’s Summit for Democracy in December
2021, intended to rally and enhance the resilience of free societies confronting a slew of internal and external threats.54 Adversaries reinforced
Biden’s gravitation to the club model. In early February 2022, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a
bilateral partnership with “no limits”—a club of their own, in effect, intended to make the world safe for autocracy. Their global vision was
deeply at odds with the U.S. notion of an open, liberal, rule-bound international system.55 Not three weeks later, Russia invaded Ukraine. The
conflict, pitting an authoritarian aggressor against an (admittedly imperfect) democracy, confirmed Biden’s conviction that the globe was
splitting into two blocs, much as Soviet aggression and U.S. responses to it had done three quarters of a century before.56 Speaking in Warsaw
soon after, the president framed Ukraine as part of a larger “battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression,
between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.”57 The Russian invasion indeed galvanized the community of advanced market
democracies, reinvigorating a transatlantic alliance that French President Emmanuel Macron had pronounced “brain dead” only three years
earlier.58 Putin’s brazen effort to subjugate Ukraine reminded the citizens of free societies of the foundational values underpinning their
security community—and how much they could lose if they allowed Russian aggression to go unchecked and unpunished. Over the ensuing
year, the Biden administration has led a unified Western response to Russian aggression, coordinating the stances of other democracies,
keeping NATO’s thirty members united in resisting Russian demands and intimidation, orchestrating punishing economic sanctions, supporting
the forward deployment of allied troops, and engineering the alliance’s imminent enlargement to add Sweden and Finland. To Daalder and
Lindsay, the Ukraine war reaffirms the imperative of consolidating the free world’s democratic core. Like Jain
and Kroenig, they propose expanding the G7 , but with a couple of tweaks: tiny New Zealand (population 5 million) would also join
and, of greater significance, NATO would gain “a seat at the table for all security-related discussions.” This notional “G-12”— encompassing
nearly one billion people and accounting for more than 60 percent of global gross domestic product and military spending— would
promote ongoing policy coordination across a range of foreign, security, economic, and global spheres,
from resisting Russian and Chinese aggression to combating climate change, preparing for pandemics,
halting nuclear proliferation, and harmonizing approaches to trade and investment. “Establishing a G-
12,” the authors declare, “is the last best hope to reinvigorate the rules-based order. ”59
New league of democracies solves multilateral issues

Davenport 22 (John Davenport, Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies, Fordham
University, 2/25/22, “Beyond NATO, new alliances could defend democracy and counter Putin”,
https://theconversation.com/beyond-nato-new-alliances-could-defend-democracy-and-counter-putin-
177683)
Russian aggression toward Ukraine continues. The nations of the world, and their current alliances, have
so far proved ineffective at curbing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions . Right now at the United Nations,
dictators and theocratic rulers get an equal voice with democratically elected governments. For almost anything urgent or
relating to international security to get accomplished, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France and the
U.S. must all agree. Imagine the U.N. without them, and the NATO military alliance expanded across the globe, not dependent on one or
two powerful nations to effectively prevent war and build democracy. How the global community responds to its new
challenges may well decide the future of democracy and the cause of human rights in the 21st century .
After years analyzing Putin’s rise and the existential threat he poses, former Russian chess grandmaster and human rights advocate Garry
Kasparov summed up the situation this way in late 2021: “We can either be the generation that renews democracy, or loses it forever.” My
research finds that new alliances may be needed to replace, or at least expand and support, the familiar ones
built to keep global peace in the wake of World War II, when global politics were very different. That is why in my 2018 book, I
suggested that the leading democratic nations all across the world join their economic, military,
technological and moral power into “A League of Democracies.” This concept built on ideas from U.S. Sen. John McCain
and others such as foreign policy experts Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. Developed democracies could work together to
effectively counter not only the influence of Russia and China, but also creeping despotism and mass
atrocities. This group could discourage military coups, support protest movements demanding democratic
rights, prevent new arms races and help developing democracies strengthen their civil services.
AFF
Club approach fails, Trump and decline in confidence in US ensures other countries say
no
For all its surface advantages, the club

model of world order has drawbacks.60 First, cooperation among
democracies, even on matters of security, is hardly guaranteed .61 The most obvious example is the transatlantic rift
over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a decision that U.S. president George W. Bush’s administration took over the objection of close U.S. allies.
It is hardly the only occasion when European and American leaders have not seen eye to eye. Over
the past two decades,
transatlantic solidarity has been repeatedly tested by disagreements over trade, digital privacy, climate
policy, defense burden-sharing, and Iran’s nuclear program, among other matters. Even under the Atlanticist
Biden administration, U.S. industrial policy and protectionism have raised European hackles and charges of American hypocrisy regarding the
“rules-based” international order.62 Biden
has pledged to restore America’s free world leadership , but U.S.
partners are still reeling from his predecessor , who shook the foundations of Western solidarity by questioning the G7’s
relevance, casting doubt on the United States’ commitment to collective defense within NATO, treating
alliances generally as protection rackets, and expressing fawning admiration for despots .63 Given the distinct
possibility that Trump or another so-called America First Republican could secure the presidency in November 2024, U.S. allies would be wise to
hedge their bets against a mercurial superpower whose very commitment to democratic principles (much less to the concept of a so-called free
world) is so tenuous.64 Second, in
the eyes of countless foreign observers, the United States has frittered away
its historical standing to speak as the leader of the democratic world , given both the selectivity of its
support for freedom abroad and the fragility of its own democracy at home . Biden’s “us-versus-them” rhetoric may
be bracing for some Americans; it is less persuasive to potential U.S. partners in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East who are aware of democracy’s
subtle gradations and of the cold-blooded realism of actual U.S. policy, which often includes embracing (or at least fist-bumping) strongmen like
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.65 Most damningly, the Trump
era exposed glaring weaknesses in the
constitutional guardrails against tyranny in the United States itself . For four years, Trump sought to hollow out the
institutions of U.S. democracy, including checks and balances on executive power, an independent judiciary and media, and free and fair
elections.66 These efforts culminated in his refusal to accept defeat and his encouragement of the January 6, 2021, insurrection to block the
peaceful transfer of power to his legitimate successor. America’s radiance as a global beacon of freedom has dimmed.67
CP fails, increases backlash from non democratic countries

Third, too great
an emphasis on democratic solidarity as a foundation for world order risks being
geopolitically divisive, splitting the world into democratic and nondemocratic camps while undermining
prospects for pragmatic cooperation with authoritarian powers including on crucial issues of peace and
security, climate change, and the global economy . In practice, global problems do not coincide with
ideological boundaries, and managing them requires cooperation with adversaries as well as like-minded
fellow travelers. The United States and its allies are deeply entwined economically with China, and they need to coordinate with Beijing
and (over the medium and longer term) with Moscow to address a slew of transnational threats that pay little heed to regime type, such as the
dangers posed by climate change, pandemic disease, and nuclear proliferation.68 In response to this critique, proponents of a democratic
alliance retort that an East-West geopolitical competition is already well under way, and the culprits are authoritarian China and Russia, who
are pursuing revisionist, aggressive, and subversive policies. Neither Beijing nor Moscow, they are quick to add, has allowed the objective need
to collaborate with democracies on global challenges temper their own national efforts to overturn the existing rules-based order or interfere in
the internal political systems of free societies.69 In other words, if international cooperation is deteriorating, autocracies are the ones to blame.
Even if this is true, there is a fourth and more serious problem with the club
approach: it oversimplifies the global landscape
and does not resonate with pressing developing country concerns . To begin with, a strict distinction between
democracies and nondemocracies ignores the world’s messier realities, including the large and growing
number of quasi- or flawed democracies, like India, whose independence and weight in world affairs is increasing. These
dilemmas came to the fore in the guest list for Biden’s 2021 Summit for Democracy, which included the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Pakistan, for example, but not Singapore or Turkey.70 The effort to assign countries into one of two categories risks alienating important if
problematic partners and, in the process, undermining other U.S. diplomatic goals. Compounding matters, when U.S. officials invoke the
concept of democratic solidarity, many in the developing world understand this to imply a focus on wealthy, rather than poor, democracies.71
The West’s perceived inattention to development challenges in the Global South reinforces this sentiment. The war in Ukraine has accentuated
this conundrum. While Western nations have thus far maintained a united front in opposition to Moscow’s aggression, many emerging
economies and developing countries are leery of choosing sides in a new cold war or rallying to
democracy’s banner. This is true even for democracies like Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa—all of which
have chosen, for an amalgam of historical, ideological, nationalist, and pragmatic reasons, to pursue various degrees of nonalignment. (In
India’s case, the practical motivations include preserving Russia as a source of military materiel and low-cost energy and as a strategic
counterweight to China.)72 At the G20 foreign ministers meeting in July 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken failed to enlist these nations
(as well as China, of course) in isolating and punishing Moscow.73
Council
Seek comity and joint action among world’s major powers
Core virtue – Capability
Assumes – A stable world order requires major-power agreement on basic rules of state conduct and a
commitment to collective crisis management.
Adv – Provides a pragmatic platform for managing strategic rivalry and for taking decisive joint action
Da – Great power interaction does not guarantee great power cooperation, lacks global legitimacy,
entrenches power asymmetries, and generates a normatively shallow order.
Neg
The United States federal government should establish a council with China, the
European Union, Russia, Japan, and India to cooperate over (x issues)
CP solves and establishes council approach with global powers, key to solve
Given the imperative of great power cooperation, the shortcomings of universal collective security, and
the pitfalls of an alliance of democracies , some self-identified realists in the U.S. foreign policy community argue that the
United States should promote a global concert of major powers, modeled after the nineteenth-century
Concert of Europe, as the foundation for world order . Two of the most prominent proponents are Richard Haass and
Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations.76 Their argument is straightforward and, initially, beguiling.77 The era of Western
material dominance and ideological supremacy is over, they suggest, making it futile to defend the
liberal international order. At the same time, a daunting array of transnational threats and challenges, from
climate change to nuclear proliferation to cyber insecurity, demands great power cooperation,
regardless of regime type. The shrewd and prudent response is to resurrect a modern, global version of the
historical Concert of Europe, in which five nominal rivals —the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—
consulted and coordinated on a regular basis . Haass and Kupchan nominate six powers as their twenty-first-century heirs: the
United States, China, the European Union, Russia, Japan, and India. The Concert of Europe helped return
stability to the continent after a turbulent quarter century that began with the outbreak of the French
Revolution in 1789, encompassed the Napoleonic Wars, and ended at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. As Henry Kissinger explains in A
World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822, the peacemakers in Vienna succeeded in creating a new form
of international order based on comity among, and collective crisis management by, the European great powers.78 This was not simply a return
to the classical eighteenth-century balance of power. It also entailed a balance of rights and satisfactions among the five
major players, with all agreeing to avoid steps that endangered the continent’s “equipoise”—Europe’s state of equilibrium.79 Members
were expected to manage major disputes jointly, which they did in a series of congresses and conferences. The Concert of Europe also rested
on the tacit agreement between its liberal and conservative wings (comprising Britain and France on the one hand, and Austria, Russia, and
Prussia on the other) not to interfere with each other’s political systems or, more generally, to devolve into armed ideological camps. The result
was what Kissinger defines as a “legitimate” international order—that is, one whose members accept the identity and roles of the great powers
and embrace basic conventions governing state conduct.80 The concert succeeded in limiting the incidence of—though not entirely eliminating
—great power war in Europe during the nineteenth century. Haass and
Kupchan seek to revive such a permanent
structure for the twenty-first century . Its purpose would be to reach consensus on basic norms of
peaceful coexistence, negotiate new rules of state conduct on shared problems, and address regional
security crises on an emergency basis. They concede that the resulting normative order would be shallower than what adherents
of UN universalism or liberal internationalism might desire, but they insist this is inevitable. In a world of political pluralism, they say, liberal and
authoritarian powers must simply agree to disagree on matters like democracy and human rights. A standing secretariat, with accredited
representatives, would support this new global concert’s work.
Cooperation is possible, US and China prove
McCarthy 23 (Simone McCarthy is the China Writer for CNN Digital Worldwide. Based in Hong Kong,
she writes breaking news, analysis and feature stories on China’s politics, society, and foreign affairs. She
is also a contributor to CNN’s three-times-per-week Meanwhile in China newsletter, 7/23/23, “China and
the US are finally talking again – but can they really work together?”,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/23/china/us-officials-visit-china-takeaways-intl-hnk/index.html)
“The two countries are now on a fast track of cooperation, even though neither side has announced it,
internally, they are committed (to this),” Shen said, noting that it was likely both sides in the recent visits had listed out concerns
for the other to consider while working toward the next round of exchange. And despite tough talk from Chinese leaders like Wang Yi, Shen
said Beijing was open to cooperate on issues where it was possible, like climate, even amid broader
tensions. As Kerry closed out his trip earlier this week, the climate envoy, too, seemed hopeful. Though they “realized that it’s going to take
a little bit more work to break the new ground,” the two sides would be meeting on a regular basis in the coming weeks, said Kerry. Speaking
from a security conference in the US on Sunday, Blinken told CNN the US
is attempting to strengthen “lines of
communication” with China to avoid conflict between the two superpowers . “We weren’t doing a lot of
talking before. Now we are. We have different groups that are engaged, or about to engage, on discrete
issues … that are problems … in the relationship where I believe we can, I think, get to a resolution ,” Blinken said,
adding “the proof will be in the results.” Observers will also be watching whether China reciprocates with its own high-level visits to
Washington in the coming weeks – especially as leader Xi may visit the US when it hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
November. The world is big enough for US and China, Yellen says as she concludes Beijing trip The most
obvious first step for a first follow-up – a visit to Washington from Foreign Minister Qin Gang, whom Blinken invited during his
Beijing visit last month – has been complicated, however, by Qin’s mysterious disappearance from public view in recent weeks. Meanwhile,
both sides will need to carefully weigh the optics of their diplomacy for their domestic audiences, where
neither government wants to look soft on the other, especially as the US moves toward its presidential election season. “The expectation
is to continue and strengthen the channels of communications and strive for practical, specific steps to
address issues in bilateral relations,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington. “Military-
to-military (communication) and fentanyl (drug control) are high on the US agenda and I think the Chinese are likely to work
something out later this year … (But) the Chinese will demand reciprocity, which will induce more domestic criticism on US policy,”
she added. And while the prospect of further communications is a positive development, observers warn the situation remains fragile. “The
relationship is on firmer ground, but its still brittle,” said Chong in Singapore. Any number of incidents related to flashpoints in the
relations “could still derail things,” he said.
Aff
Council fails, cooperation impossible and lacks political legitimacy
The logic behind this old-school vision is hard-nosed and clear. Transnational challenges do not sort themselves by regime
type. They require concerted actions among all major powers—democracies and autocracies alike . A case
in point is the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Any effort to negotiate and enforce a
successor to that agreement would need to involve not only the United States and its Western alli es
France, Germany, and the UK, but also Russia and China.81 As a result of Western opposition to its invasion of Ukraine,
Moscow has withheld any such cooperation. Without some accommodation for its interests, the Kremlin has essentially said
there will be no successor deal. Climate change provides an even sharper dilemma, since China emits a third of
the world’s greenhouse gases.82 In November 2021, Washington and Beijing negotiated the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on
Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s. Unfortunately, as Sino-U.S. relations deteriorated in 2022, this initiative largely ground to a halt, with
Chinese officials suggesting they would link climate cooperation to other sensitive items on the bilateral agenda, not least Taiwan.83 The
notion of a concert of powers is an alluring prospect for anyone craving a return to simpler times , when a
handful of foreign ministers could meet in gilded palaces to determine the fate of the world consistent with the pitiless calculus of realpolitik.
Such an anachronistic vision, however, is out of step with the current moment and unrealistic in its
assumptions. It would not cure what ails global governance and could well create more problems than it
resolves.84 The biggest problem with resurrecting a formal concert is that it would lack political legitimacy
in the current global context. Over the past two centuries, the international system has swollen to include nearly
200 independent sovereign nations and, under the auspices of the UN, has developed a dense array of
multilateral bodies and treaties that regulate everything from the use of force to the allocation of orbital slots in outer space. This
vast institutional architecture is imperfect, but its utility should not be ignored. As was already noted, the UN retains unmatched global
authority by virtue of its universal membership and legally binding charter. It is hard to imagine that any new global concert
would enjoy the same respect. A case in point is the body’s envisioned crisis response function. Even if Russia were brought back
into the fold after the Ukraine war, such a role would compete directly with the purpose of the UN Security Council—and without the latter’s
grounding in international law. Most UN member states already consider the G20 (let alone the G7) as
unrepresentative and illegitimate. Creating a new, self-appointed global directorate of the United States, China,
the EU, Russia, Japan, and India—effectively a G6—would elicit much louder howls from those left outside , not least from
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.85 Haass and Kupchan propose to mollify them by granting regional bodies like the African Union,
Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Organization of American States periodic audiences before the new concert. But this
would simply reinforce a global caste system pitting the dominance and privilege of great powers
against the submission and supplication of weak ones —and, unlike the UN Security Council, it would do so outside
of the UN Charter’s legal basis. The concert would also likely encourage the world’s fragmentation into at least
tacit spheres of influence, as each great power asserts a right, and is even granted leeway, to police its respective
neighborhood, a scenario likely to encourage even more unilateral intervention and the emergence of closed regional blocs. Haass and
Kupchan suggest that the new concert “would promote regional integration and look to existing regional bodies to encourage restraint.”86 But
history provides few precedents for such self-control. The scheme’s second shortcoming is its unwarranted optimism that a standing concert
will somehow overcome the fundamental differences of interests and values that currently stymie great power cooperation in existing formal
bodies like the UN, the World Trade Organization, or even informal ones like the G20. The expectation seems to be, essentially, build it and they
will agree. That a mere change of venue will smooth things over sounds like wishful thinking. Haass and Kupchan
posit a socialization process of sorts, whereby “genuine and sustained dialogue” will induce diplomatic flexibility. But it is unclear why this
specific framework would be any more successful at bridging entrenched disagreements over, say, desirable norms of contingent sovereignty,
new rules for cyberspace, or priorities for WHO reform. Haass and Kupchan note that the concert would be more likely than the UN Security
Council to reach compromise, since participants in the new arrangement “would not wield vetoes.”87 The absence of a formal veto, however,
would do little to stop an aggrieved power from blocking consensus in practice.88 The concert
scheme also raises questions of
follow-through. Assuming that major powers can actually agree to something of global significance, they would still need to
bring other countries onboard with their decisions , as well as ride herd on them to ensure implementation. It is unclear,
in this regard, how a concert would leverage the expansive infrastructure of multilateral cooperation
that already exists—or surmount the accountability dilemmas that already plague the G20 . The problem here is
not the idea of a nominal G6, per se, but rather the aspiration to make this single arrangement, or some variation on it, the apex institution for
international cooperation and coordination. Obviously, there is value in having powerful nations meet informally to explore new rules of global
governance, which can then be negotiated and ratified in more encompassing bodies. It also makes sense to have contact groups for specific
regional challenges, such as the P5+1 talks on Iran’s nuclear program, which include the five permanent members of the Security Council plus
Germany. Instead of creating a new great power concert, a more pragmatic approach (discussed in more depth in the next section of this
paper) would recognize that the precise identity and number of players who need to be around the multilateral table will often vary with the
issue at stake. The United States and other great powers need flexibility to adjust such minilateral mechanisms to specific circumstances.
CP fails, illiberal forces ensure backlash and that the council fails
Finally, there is a third limitation to the global concert proposal that advocates of the club approach to
international order would be quick to point out: it represents the premature surrender of liberal
internationalism.89 Today, illiberal forces are on the march; democracies are on the defensive . This is arguably
the very moment, however, to reinforce Western solidarity in defense of an open, rules-based order—a vision grounded in shared interests and
values that has traditionally animated U.S. foreign policy since the days of the Atlantic Charter.90 Haass and Kupchan imply that the United
States, Europe, Japan, and other Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) partners should subordinate their principles
for the sake of great power comity and practical cooperation in managing common challenges. There is little
indication, however,
that China and Russia share such qualms or are prepared to abandon their aggressive regional ambitions
and interference in Western political systems so that a new concert can address the shared
vulnerabilities of interdependence. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, and the grinding war that has
since unfolded, expose the shortcomings of a concept of world order that depends on great power self-
restraint and collective crisis management. Any new concert system would likely permit major powers
great leeway in managing political order in buffer zones on their immediate borders, at potentially unacceptable
moral costs. If taken to its logical extreme, the concert approach would also delegitimize U.S. and Western
condemnation of authoritarian powers for violating human rights in contravention of the UN Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and multiple international conventions.
Ad hoc
Tailor ad hoc arrangements to each global contingency
Core virtue – Flexibility
Assumes – Managing a complex global agenda requires an à la carte approach, with the constellation of
players shifting with the specific challenge.
Adv – Facilitates flexible, modular, and nimble, cooperation via an ad hoc, informal approach
Da – Multilateralism à la carte can raise transaction costs, undermine formal bodies, encourage forum
shopping, and lack enforcement, legitimacy, and accountability.
Neg
The United States Federal Government should create an informal, nonbinding
agreement with (x countries) over (x issue)
Tailored use of ad hoc agreements empirically solve multilateral issues
A fourth approach to multilateralism places its faith not in universal treaty-based bodies, an alliance of democracies, or an apex
global concert but in flexible coalitions whose focus, size, and membership can be tailored to specific
contingencies. Indeed, this is already occurring. As Alan Alexandroff of the University of Toronto observes, we inhabit a “G-x”
world, in which the number of parties (“x”) involved in collective action increasingly varies with the
precise issue or dilemma at hand and the interests and competencies of relevant countries .91 The future
of global governance, in this view, lies with informal, nonbinding, minilateral arrangements .92 From a U.S.
perspective, the coalitional impulse has obvious attraction s. Still the world’s most powerful country according to most
measures, the United States has fewer short-term incentives than weaker nations to invest in formal
multilateral organizations—as well as greater opportunities to pick and choose among frameworks that
promise to expand its freedom of action and policy autonomy in pursuing its preferences. Rather than accept
the constraints of the UN or even formal alliances, the United States can sometimes enjoy greater maneuvering room
and control over outcomes by working through issue-specific coalitions —adopting (as the old British idiom
recommends) a “horses for courses” approach. The George W. Bush administration took this strategic logic to the extreme after the September
11, 2001, attacks. As then secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld told radio host Larry King on December 5, 2001, the United States was
cooperating with “dozens and dozens of countries” on different aspects of the “war against terrorism,” from cracking down on terrorist
financing to mobilizing troop contributions in Afghanistan. Instead of a single coalition, Rumsfeld explained, “There are multiple coalitions. . . .
And that’s the way it ought to work. I’ll tell you why. The worst thing that you can do is allow a coalition to determine what your mission is. . . .
It’s the mission that determines the coalition.”93 Rather than a true multilateral undertaking, the U.S. antiterrorism campaign by design was a
hub-and-spoke arrangement based on bilateral deals with a heterogeneous group of countries, in which an American sheriff largely determined
the actions of its posse. The Bush administration repeated this pattern after the UN Security Council refused to authorize enforcement action
against Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 with the diplomatic backing of forty-nine countries.
Journalists noted the distinctiveness of this tactic. “You seem to be equating an ad hoc coalition that the United States has been able to form
around one issue and one task with permanent bodies, like the UN and NATO, which have charters formed by treaties,” one reporter
challenged White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. “Does the president believe that international affairs can be conducted entirely through ad
hoc bodies like the one he’s putting [together]?” In response, Fleischer said, “The point I’m making here is that there are many ways to form
international coalitions. The United Nations Security Council is but one of them.”94 The Bush
administration’s preference for ad
hoc arrangements was embodied most fully in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The brainchild of then
undersecretary of state John Bolton, this innovative partnership was designed to intercept illicit air and maritime shipments of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles and related technologies. By Bush’s second term, administration officials were
touting PSI as a general model that might be extended to promote collective action in confronting other global threats. Unlike the UN or other
formal bodies that placed an American Gulliver at the mercy of Lilliputians, the United
States could determine the agenda for
collective action from the outset. Washington would issue invitations to a small, like-minded group; draft
principles that narrowly circumscribed the coalition’s mandate and scope of activities ; and—once the core
group had signed on—lead a global campaign to get others to join on its terms.95 Although president Barack
Obama dispensed with Bush’s unilateralist rhetoric and committed the United States to updating existing multilateral organizations, his
administration also employed ad hoc arrangements. The most prominent was the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which involved dozens of partner
nations spanning all regions of the globe and levels of development.96 It was hardly the sole example. To prevent nuclear weapons from falling
into the hands of nonstate actors, for instance, Obama sponsored the Nuclear Security Summit, a biennial gathering of the fifty-odd countries
possessing nuclear weapons and/or fissile material. To combat Somali piracy,
it encouraged a multinational armada including
vessels not only from traditional U.S. treaty allies but also from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and other nations. To address climate change, it sponsored the Major Economies Forum (MEF), comprising the
seventeen largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Even the nationalist Trump administration, despite its avowed determination to pursue U.S.
“dominance” in outer space, embraced a similar minilateral logic in May 2020 when it announced the Artemis Accords. These agreements
commit each signatory to reaffirm established legal principles of outer space governance, including to
pursue only peaceful purposes, provide emergency assistance, share scientific data, avoid activities that
might interfere with each other’s lunar operations, and respect UN guidelines on space debris . In effect, the
Trump administration used a minilateral mechanism to try to consolidate an international legal foundation for the next phase of space
exploration.97 The Biden administration, upon taking office, endorsed this approach. More recently, the Biden administration has
pursued a similar course on the governance of cyberspace . In April 2022, it persuaded more than sixty nations to
associate themselves with a Declaration for the Future of the Internet. The signatories adopted several common principles, including to defend
human rights and fundamental freedoms, preserve an open and global internet, promote inclusive and affordable access, protect trust and
privacy, and embrace a multistakeholder model of cyber governance.98 In sum, “ G-x” arrangements are now well established
on the global scene. A few are multipurpose groupings like the G20 , which has served since 2008 as the premier forum
for global economic coordination. Others are more specialized, such as the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People, which was
created jointly by France and Costa Rica in late 2020 to advance global biodiversity conservation, including by permanently protecting 30
percent of Earth’s land and ocean by 2030. By October 2022, more than a hundred governments had publicly endorsed this target.99 In part,
the rise of à la carte multilateralism reflects the frustrations of operating through outdated, formal intergovernmental bodies that have proven
all-too-resistant to reform. In retrospect, the U.S. officials who helped lay the institutional foundations for the post-1945 multilateral order
were fortunate, at least with respect to their self-appointed task. They operated in a time of extraordinary crisis that facilitated institutional
change, faced a relatively blank institutional slate, negotiated with fewer foreign players, and operated at the height of U.S. primacy. None of
these factors apply today. There has been no major catastrophe on the order of the Great Depression nor World War II. Rather than a tabula
rasa, policymakers face a world that is dense and encrusted with often-outdated international
institutions, each with vested interests. Since the UN was established, the number of sovereign states has nearly quadrupled, in
part as former colonized countries became independent. More people around the world achieved their self-determination, but multilateral
diplomacy has also become more complicated. U.S. and Western dominance are not what they once were, and there is
increasing global divergence on fundamental norms of world order , such as the appropriate boundaries of sovereignty,
the criteria that justify intervention, the proper role of the state in the market, and where to strike the balance between political stability and
human rights.100 Compounding matters, many of today’s cross-border problems are even harder to manage than in the past, since they
address behind-the-border matters (such as data privacy laws) or require (as in the case of arms control agreements) intrusive methods for
monitoring and verification. The implausibility of sweeping institutional reform makes coalitions attractive . Their
main advantages include speed, flexibility, modularity, informality, opportunities for discrimination, and
possibilities for experimentation.101 Whereas negotiations in large- or universal-membership bodies tend to be protracted and
inconclusive, ad hoc approaches can allow a limited number of parties —including at times nonstate actors—to move with
dispatch. Unlike conventional intergovernmental organizations, which often seek to address issues comprehensively, coalitions permit
governments to bite off digestible chunks of the global agenda (a disaggregated form of multilateralism that can be
described as “global governance in pieces”).102 Such modularity is a driving force behind the emergence of so-called regime complexes, which
arise when different institutions (such as, in global health, the WHO, the Global Fund, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance) share space in the same general policy sphere but focus on
discrete problems.103 Informality is another appeal. Instead of spending years negotiating binding international
conventions, coalition participants can rely on voluntary codes of conduct and pledge-and-review sessions , in
which they commit to certain nationally determined actions. Given the hurdles to renegotiating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, for instance,
some established spacefaring nations have advocated for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, specifying basic norms to
address new challenges.104 Purpose-built frameworks can also help participants—including, in principle, great powers—compartmentalize
different aspects of their bilateral relationships, so they can cooperate in some realms while competing in others. Finally, ad
hoc
coalitions can offer opportunities for experimentation, including for networked, transnational
cooperation among technical ministries of different sovereign governments. Given these advantages,
coalitions seem destined to become even more prominent in international politics.
Ad hoc agreements solve, empirically proven

Botting 23 (Alexander Botting has extensive experience in international policy, having executed
advocacy campaigns on technology policy issues in more than 50 countries, spanning five continents. He
most recently served as director for global regulatory cooperation at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
where he led initiatives in the areas of cybersecurity, emerging technologies, and regulatory
cooperation, 6/2/23, “Embracing Ad Hoc International Coalitions May Be The Best Approach for The
Biden Administration, but It’s Not Without Challenges”,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/embracing-ad-hoc-international-coalitions-may-be-best-
approach-biden-administration-its-not)
By any measure, the US has done a remarkably effective job of winning over like-minded governments to its
view of limiting the presence of “untrustworthy” (read: Chinese or Russian-developed) companies in critical technology networks. In 2020, the
UK announced it would not ban Chinese vendors from all parts of its 5G network in a move that frustrated US counterparts and risked
undermining the US strategy at its outset. Following steady lobbying from the US government and the implementation of sanctions against
Chinese entities, however, they reversed course. Today, the UK government is among the most ardent advocates for the Prague Proposals – a
set of recommendations on technical and non-technical risks to 5G infrastructure that aligns with the US view. Canada, France, and Germany all
deliberated for a long time, eager not to upset relations with China, before ultimately acquiescing to the view that our digital infrastructure
cannot be owned and operated by companies that function at the whim of authoritarian governments. Alignment on restricting autocratically
controlled technology is now moving more rapidly, with cooperation among likeminded states on everything from ransomware to AI to
quantum computing. While the Trump Administration embraced bilateral pressure , the Biden Administration has
embraced international coalition-building. But its approach is not merely a reversion to the status quo. More so than any
administration before, Biden’s is largely looking to ad hoc coalitions rather than traditional forums for
international engagement to drive its agenda. This is due in part to the realities facing the administration:
most existing forums were designed with the mindset that economic integration would drive all
countries toward the US’s democratic, capitalist model . Now that the “end of history” has been debunked and decoupling
critical supply chains from China has superseded integration as the preferred approach, many pre-existing multilateral forums are
no longer viewed as feasible settings for implementing multilateral technology policy initiatives. Take
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as an example . Its raison d’etre is “championing free trade and
open investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, [and] encouraging economic and technical cooperation.” While
the US may share these objectives with many APEC member economies, APEC’s sweeping membership
includes governments such as Russia and China, with whom such integration is no longer desired . At the
same time, APEC undermines its utility by excluding major regional partners such as India. APEC is not unique in this regard. The G20,
United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all face similar challenges. In response, we
saw the US first pivot away from APEC to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), then to the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) as its preferred mechanisms for driving regional economic
discussion and integration. Similarly, the recently established Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) has become the preferred
mechanism for addressing legal and policy issues around cybercrime, rather than the UN. And the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ( Quad)
has risen from dormancy to become a highly active environment for Australia, India, Japan, and the US
to cooperate on issues ranging from technology policy to vaccines. The center of gravity has shifted. The deadlock
resulting from traditional methods of international cooperation has forced a call for new bargains, new
coalitions, and new forms of international cooperation.
Aff
Ad hoc agreements fail
Nevertheless, there are real

drawbacks and risks in creating a new arrangement for every challenge. First, it is
unclear whether ad hoc mechanisms are more effective than formal intergovernmentalism at delivering
results, particularly when it is difficult to enforce compliance with voluntary commitments. Consider, for
example, the multiple, flexible frameworks that constitute the regime complex for climate change. To date, the actual achievements of the MEF
have been negligible, just as follow-through has been underwhelming on the nationally determined contributions pledged at the Paris climate
conference in 2015. A similar problem has afflicted the G20’s mutual assessment process , which commits governments
to submit to one another and the IMF a summary of their national economic plans, including potential negative impacts of those choices on
other countries. Instead of a peer review mechanism that holds G20 governments’ feet to the fire, this framework has been impotent,
particularly as G20 members have limited the IMF’s independent surveillance and monitoring role. More generally, there is little
evidence
that flexible minilateralism can overcome tough cooperation problems, particularly in the context of
intense geopolitical competition. In 2020, deepening Sino-U.S. frictions paralyzed a more robust G20 response to the outbreak of
the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and global debates over
whether Russia should be ejected from the forum—have again hamstrung much of the G20’s work .105 In
his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2022, Secretary-General Guterres poured cold water on the notion that à la carte
multilateralism can replace the hard work of formal multilateral diplomacy or the standing capabilities of UN agencies. “No major global
challenge can be solved by a coalition of the willing. We need a coalition of the world.”106 Second, the ad hoc approach to
international cooperation risks undermining international organizations . At times, informal bodies can revitalize
formal ones, including by encouraging them to adopt new standards. The creation of the G20, for instance, revived the IMF and World Bank and
spurred the replacement of the Financial Stability Forum with a more robust Financial Stability Board. Likewise, the money-laundering
standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) coalition were subsequently adopted by the IMF, as well as formalized in UN Security
Council resolutions. At other times, however, the emergence of alternative institutions has come at the expense of
existing bodies, diluting the coherence of the multilateral system. This is particularly true when dissatisfied
or revisionist powers seek to challenge the mandates, rules, and practices of established international
institutions. Such “contested multilateralism” can take one of two forms.107 The more moderate is when states unhappy with the status
quo try to shift the setting for multilateral deliberation and policymaking to an alternative, existing institution whose mandate and decision
rules they find more congenial. The more radical is when dissatisfied
powers try to create an entirely new and
competitive arrangement. This brings us to the third potential downside of the coalition approach. It can contribute to
rampant forum shopping—and not just by the United States—as governments flit among alternative institutional
frameworks based on situational circumstances and exigencie s. For decades, the United States seemed best positioned
to play the game of contested multilateralism, picking and choosing among flexible frameworks as the situation demands. Although
Washington retains a significant ability to pivot among institutions, the diffusion of global power and influence means that other countries can
increasingly avail themselves of similar opportunities.108 Indeed, they are already doing so. China has sponsored or cosponsored a slew of new
institutions, ranging from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New
Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and (more recently) the Global Development Initiative and Global Security
Initiative.109 In short, other
major players are “perfectly capable of playing the same game of ad hoc
‘minilateralism’ to their own advantage and America’s detrimen t.”110 Over time, such dynamics could undermine the
coherence of international cooperation and accelerate the world’s fragmentation into competing geopolitical blocs.
Overreliance on ad hoc bad, undermines institutions and empowers revisionist
countries
Fourth, overreliance
on purely ad hoc approaches can be ethically and normatively problematic, raising
concerns and dilemmas about legitimacy, equity, and accountability . To begin with, informal multilateralism
risks undercutting public international institutions that have traditionally sought (or aspired) to provide
global public goods, replacing them with new governing frameworks that may restrict access to those same benefits. Since it was
created in 2008, the G20 has been criticized by other UN member states—the G175, if you will—for making decisions that affect the rest of
humanity. Successive G20 chairs have tried to ameliorate these concerns through elaborate outreach efforts. But the inherent tensions
between effectiveness, which implies modest size, and legitimacy, which implies broad representation, persist. Ultimately, this raises an ethical
quandary that the UN’s founders had sought to address in 1945 by creating the UN General Assembly: namely, how to prevent poorer countries
from being excluded from global decisionmaking processes that affect them directly. A purely
coalitional approach to world
order risks accentuating the global inequity and injustice that already pervades world politics. Although
power shapes the design and dynamics of all institutions, large-membership, treaty-based organizations typically possess some internal checks
and balances. They also provide opportunities for weaker actors to have a voice, dampening the naked exercise of power and fostering
bargaining and consensus building. Standing bodies also possess independent secretariats staffed by international civil servants and
technocrats, creating an institutional identity distinct from member states. For all these reasons, formal multilateral organizations are better
placed than narrower groupings to advance the agendas and interests of the otherwise powerless.111 Accountability is also a
problem for coalitions. As hard as it can be to hold formal multilateral bodies to account, the task is even greater when it comes to
minilateral ones. A comparison between the G20 and the World Bank is instructive. The lack of a robust G20 mutual
accountability mechanism makes it hard to determine whether its members are fulfilling pledges made
at successive summits. Meanwhile, the World Bank, which is under increased pressure from civil society groups to embrace
transparency, has taken positive steps in the direction of accountability. Finally, coalitions present financial and logistical
challenges. The proliferation of ad hoc groupings, with their attendant summits, work streams, and
reporting requirements, tests the bandwidth of all national governments with demands on scarce
personnel, resources, and time. This is true even for an institution the size of the U.S. State Department. For smaller, poorer
countries, the burden is even heavier.
Ad hoc fails – multiple warrants

Botting 23 (Alexander Botting has extensive experience in international policy, having executed
advocacy campaigns on technology policy issues in more than 50 countries, spanning five continents. He
most recently served as director for global regulatory cooperation at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
where he led initiatives in the areas of cybersecurity, emerging technologies, and regulatory
cooperation, 6/2/23, “Embracing Ad Hoc International Coalitions May Be The Best Approach for The
Biden Administration, but It’s Not Without Challenges”,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/embracing-ad-hoc-international-coalitions-may-be-best-
approach-biden-administration-its-not)
Effectively Selecting Partners for Ad Hoc Initiatives As new

forums are created to champion a particular policy agenda,
it must be determined which partners will participate in each . The CRI cast a wide net, given the need for broad
cooperation in bringing cybercriminals to account in far-flung parts of the world. Conversely, for Open RAN activities, the Quad has arguably
been the multilateral center of gravity, as the ambition of allies in APEC has not yet been matched by those in the EU. Such a flexible
approach has clear benefits, but risks leaving some partners feeling shunned by the choices made .
Conversely, it reduces the ability of the US government to encourage partners to make difficult but
necessary choices when they know that an a la carte option is available . Navigating a Lack of Bureaucratic Resources
and Buy-In Multilateral bureaucracies are often maligned , but fulfill a critical function in catalyzing the work toward the
objectives of the institution. Ad hoc coalitions, and even nascent multilateral organizations such as the Quad,
have no secretariat responsible for the day-to-day execution of the mission. As a result, activity can be
sporadic and oriented around periodic high-level meetings (and the need for national-level bureaucrats to show progress
at those meetings) rather than a targeted action plan . Many of the more challenging tasks the US and its partners want to achieve
cannot be executed in a 30-day scramble, risking trading tangible progress for statements of intent. Giving Strategic Objectives Primacy over
Tactical Initiatives The plethora
of workstreams will ensure a steady stream of activity to keep bureaucrats
busy under pre-existing forums such as APEC, G7, G20, ITU, UN, WTO, as well as new or revamped forums such as the CRI,
Declaration on the Future of the Internet, IPEF, Quad, UN Cybercrime Treaty and Open-Ended Working Group. In the drive to find tactical wins
in each forum, however, the administration
must ensure that its strategic objective – limiting the presence of
“untrustworthy” companies in critical technology networks – remains paramount. After all, "strategy without
tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
Inequality
CP---Education---1NC
The United States federal government should <write cp text>
Education is the root cause and best solution to solve inequality
Ireland ’16 [Corydon; 02/15/2016; Harvard Correspondent; "The costs of inequality: Education’s the
one key that rules them all," Harvard Gazette, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-
costs-of-inequality-educations-the-one-key-that-rules-them-all/ The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish
Guddati–Class of 2024]
The odds of his escaping a poverty-ridden lifestyle, despite innate intelligence and drive, were long. So
how did he help mold his own narrative and triumph over baked-in societal inequality? Through
education.
“Education has been the path to better opportunity for generations of American strivers, no less for
me,” Patrick said in an email when asked how getting a solid education, in his case at Milton Academy
and at Harvard, changed his life.
“What great teachers gave me was not just the skills to take advantage of new opportunities, but the
ability to imagine what those opportunities could be. For a kid from the South Side of Chicago, that’s
huge.”
If inequality starts anywhere, many scholars agree, it’s with faulty education. Conversely, a strong
education can act as the bejeweled key that opens gates through every other aspect of inequality,
whether political, economic, racial, judicial, gender- or health-based.
Simply put, a top-flight education usually changes lives for the better. And yet, in the world’s most
prosperous major nation, it remains an elusive goal for millions of children and teenagers.
CP---Education---2NC
Investing in education has a substantial effect on income inequality – 20 years of data
prove
Dodge ’21 [Jeff; February of 2021; MA in Journalism at University of Colorado Boulder, Director of
Internal Communications at Colorado State University; "CSU economists: Investment in education would
reduce financial inequality in Colorado," College of Liberal Arts, https://libarts.source.colostate.edu/csu-
economists-investment-in-education-would-reduce-financial-inequality-in-colorado/ The St. Mark’s
School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]
If Colorado wants to proactively decrease poverty levels and the income gap between white
communities and communities of color, it should invest in education, the judiciary, health care and
human services — instead of the corrections system.
That’s the conclusion of a recent study conducted by a Colorado State University economics professor
and one of her master’s students. The ensuing report, “Economic Mobility for Low-Income Families in
Colorado: The Need for Increased Targeted Public Investment,” was released Jan. 22 by The Bell Policy
Center and finds that education tops the list of priorities for state funding if Colorado wants to boost the
financial well-being of its low-income populations and communities of color.
Anita Alves Pena of CSU’s Department of Economics and John Singleton, who will earn his master’s
degree in economics this spring, found that while Colorado’s economy has grown over the past two
decades, low-income families and communities of color have not seen an increase in economic mobility
as a result. They looked at the state’s “Big Six” public expenditure categories (health care, K-12
education, human services, higher education, corrections, and the judiciary) and asked themselves: If
the state of Colorado were to spend $10 more on each of its residents, how should those dollars be best
allocated among those six buckets?
These graphs show changes in the probability of poverty in white communities (red lines) versus
communities of color (blue lines) with a $10 per-capita increase in state general fund spending, broken
down by budget category.
‘An education story’
They found that investments in K-12 education and higher education would have the most impact on
reducing financial inequalities and improving the economic status of low- and middle-income families.
“This is an education story, both in terms of K-12 and higher ed,” Pena said. “We found that adding
public funding to those educational categories would be particularly meaningful to improve the quality
of life for families in the state and reduce inequalities.”
Pena and Singleton analyzed almost 20 years of data from the American Community Survey, which is
conducted as part of the U.S. Census, through 2018. They found that, when adjusted for inflation and
population, the state’s public expenditures have remained stagnant during that time, and incomes have
not kept pace with growing costs. In fact, in the case of higher education, state funding has decreased
significantly, forcing Colorado colleges and universities to increase tuition to cover expenses. As a result,
they found, fewer lower- and middle-income families can afford to send their kids to college.
“The changing costs are especially important for the generations of individuals who grew up being told
to ‘go to college to get ahead in life,’” Singleton said. “That mindset was prevalent for multiple
generations, but now our state investment undermines that value proposition, given the shift in costs
onto individuals and families.”
Home ownership
Pena points out that having a college degree is a major factor in a person’s income, especially when it
comes to home ownership, which is one of the primary ways to gain wealth. She said that boosting K-12
funding, on the other hand, tends to decrease poverty levels because of the positive effects it has on
parents and families.
Investments in education solve the root cause of inequality – addressing long-term

solutions
OECD ’21 [09/16/2021; "Boost education investment to tackle inequality of opportunity, says OECD,",
https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/boost-education-investment-to-tackle-inequality-of-opportunity-
says-oecd.htm //The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]
16/09/2021 - Governments should boost their investment in education in order to tackle the sources of
inequality of opportunity. This would help create a more level playing field for people of all ages to
acquire the skills that power better jobs and better lives, according to a new OECD report.
Education at a Glance 2021 says that one in five adults across the OECD has not attained upper
secondary education and in some countries, a significant share of children leave school early. In 2019, at
least one in ten school-aged youth were not in school in about a quarter of OECD countries. But some
countries have made progress: between 2005 and 2019, the out-of-school rate at upper secondary level
dropped by more than 15 percentage points in Mexico, Portugal and the Russian Federation.
Socio-economic status has a greater impact on the literacy skills of 15-year-olds than gender or country
of origin, but some education systems are far more resilient to social disadvantage than others, says the
report. Socio-economic status also tends to influence the programme orientation students pursue, with
those without tertiary-educated parents more likely to pursue vocational tracks at upper secondary
level. Those without upper secondary education face disadvantages in the labour market. In 2020, the
unemployment rate of young adults that had not completed upper secondary education was almost
twice as high as those with higher qualifications.
“The COVID-19 pandemic has hit our health, economic, and social sectors hard and exposed some
systemic weaknesses hampering genuine social mobility,” said OECD Secretary-General Mathias
Cormann, launching the report in Paris. “Equality of opportunity is a key ingredient for a strong and
cohesive democratic society. Unlike policies that address the consequences, education can tackle the
sources of inequality of opportunity. Boosting investment in better and more relevant education will be
key to helping countries deliver long-term economic and social prosperity.”
Immigrant background tends to influence learning trajectories while employment prospects of foreign-
born adults vary greatly across countries, finds the report. In almost all countries with available data, the
upper secondary completion rate of first or second generation immigrants was lower than that for
students without an immigrant background. Labour market outcomes vary greatly for foreign-born
adults with different levels of education, reflecting the supply and demand for different skills, the
difficulties tertiary-educated foreign-born adults face in gaining recognition for their education and
experience earned abroad, and lower wage expectations of foreign workers in some countries.
Gender disparities also persist. Boys are more likely than girls to repeat a grade and underperform in
reading, and less likely to complete upper secondary education. Boys are usually overrepresented in
vocational paths and less likely to enter and graduate from tertiary education. Women also outnumber
men in participation rates to formal adult learning. Yet they remain less likely to be employed and earn
less than men across all levels of educational attainment and OECD countries, even among those having
graduated from the same field of study.
Investment in education is key, but rising educational spending has not generally led to improved
outcomes, suggesting that countries need to look harder at how to invest resources most effectively,
and to match resources with needs. On average across countries, expenditure on educational
institutions amounted to approximately USD 9 300 per student at pre-primary level in 2018; USD 10 500
at primary, secondary and post-secondary non tertiary level; and USD 17 100 at tertiary level. The public
sector funds 90% of total expenditure on primary and secondary institutions on average, often
compulsory in most OECD countries, and 66% at tertiary level.
Two-thirds of countries reported increasing public expenditure to education in 2020 to support the
educational response to COVID-19 and about three quarters reported increasing it in 2021. Sustaining
these investments will be critical to reverse learning losses, develop teachers’ capacity to tailor learning
strategies to individual students’ needs, and leverage investments made to integrate technology in
education.
Lifelong learning has become more critical for adults to upskill and reskill in a changing world. Yet, more
than half of adults did not participate in adult learning in 2016, and the pandemic further reduced
opportunities to do so. Educators need to work more closely with other government sectors and
business to help promote flexible pathways in and out of education that evolve alongside labour market
demands, according to the report.
Education at a Glance 2021 includes a special spotlight report: The State of Global Education – 18
months into the pandemic. The reportreveals that the extent of lost learning opportunities in the
classroom has been significant in many countries. The higher the education level, the longer schools
were fully closed on average. The number of days of full school closure represents roughly 28% of total
instruction days over a typical academic year at pre-primary and more than 56% at upper secondary
level on average across OECD countries. This has consequences on equitable learning: while the
majority of education systems around the world shifted to remote learning, students from
disadvantaged backgrounds may find it more difficult to study effectively from home.
Education at a Glance provides comparable national statistics measuring the state of education
worldwide. The report analyses the education systems of the OECD’s 38 member countries, as well as of
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
CP---Education---AT: Squo Solves
Educational inequality exists now – statistical analysis proves
Ireland ’16 [Corydon; 02/15/2016; Harvard Correspondent; "The costs of inequality: Education’s the
one key that rules them all," Harvard Gazette, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-
costs-of-inequality-educations-the-one-key-that-rules-them-all/ The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish
PLATEAU ON EDUCATIONAL GAINS
The revolutionary concept of free, nonsectarian public schools spread across America in the 19th
century. By 1970, America had the world’s leading educational system, and until 1990 the gap between
minority and white students, while clear, was narrowing.
But educational gains in this country have plateaued since then, and the gap between white and
minority students has proven stubbornly difficult to close, says Ronald Ferguson, adjunct lecturer in
public policy at Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and faculty director of Harvard’s Achievement Gap
Initiative. That gap extends along class lines as well.
In recent years, scholars such as Ferguson, who is an economist, have puzzled over the ongoing
achievement gap and what to do about it, even as other nations’ school systems at first matched and
then surpassed their U.S. peers. Among the 34 market-based, democracy-leaning countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States ranks around 20th
annually, earning average or below-average grades in reading, science, and mathematics.
By eighth grade, Harvard economist Roland G. Fryer Jr. noted last year, only 44 percent of American
students are proficient in reading and math. The proficiency of African-American students, many of
them in underperforming schools, is even lower.
“The position of U.S. black students is truly alarming,” wrote Fryer, the Henry Lee Professor of
Economics, who used the OECD rankings as a metaphor for minority standing educationally. “If they
were to be considered a country, they would rank just below Mexico in last place.”
Harvard Graduate School of Education (HGSE) Dean James E. Ryan, a former public interest lawyer, says
geography has immense power in determining educational opportunity in America. As a scholar, he has
studied how policies and the law affect learning, and how conditions are often vastly unequal.
His book “Five Miles Away, A World Apart” (2010) is a case study of the disparity of opportunity in two
Richmond, Va., schools, one grimly urban and the other richly suburban. Geography, he says, mirrors
achievement levels.
CP---EITC---1NC
The EITC (Earned Income Tax Credit) solves inequality – giving cash yet incentivizing
work
Roche ’19 [Julia La; 05/03/2019; Finance reporter at Yahoo Finance; “Warren Buffett identifies the
'best way' to address income inequality,” https://www.yahoo.com/now/warren-buffett-eitc-
150619498.html?
guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAGmBaJ
euQmZ2vrEwhuuZcXlP0PgTz5qbTrShGBIlL33Lh4G-ymCd-
q4CXT_xn3oKsC0Ij3wlGqLlqSmhQ2zP54EITjT7OScMk8aBT5vNl83-
B_jRDjOohAdn64wulLQuwXkrdFFZmcMwlfJLxjsgD1LZsgpBImhLyryfyBVxrqYx //The St. Mark’s School of
Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]
Legendary investor Warren Buffett, the third richest person in the world, argues in a new interview that
the best way to address income inequality is through the Earned Income Tax Credit.
"[I] think the Earned Income Tax Credit is the best way to put money in the pockets of people that don't
fit well under the market system, but that are perfectly decent citizens," Buffett, the CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway (BRK-A, BRK-B), said in a wide-ranging interview with Yahoo Finance's editor-in-chief, Andy
Serwer.
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a refundable tax credit that goes to millions of low- to moderate-
income workers, particularly parents, to supplement their earnings. One of the reasons Buffett favors
the EITC is that it rewards work.
"I also think you want them to have a feeling of accomplishment," he said.
The EITC, he argues, is also more effective than raising the minimum wage.
"They just need more cash. They don't need a higher wage; they need more cash in their pocket. And
the government, at relatively low cost, can provide a decent living for anybody that's ... that's working
40 hours a week, and has a couple of children. And we've gone in that direction, and it's sort of
bipartisan," Buffett said.
Buffett also thinks that the EITC would be better as a monthly payment than an annual one.
The bottom line is that raising the EITC can help more people feel part of the economic system, Buffett
suggested.
"I think there are various things you could do, but you want them to feel part of the system, and as more
and more of these golden eggs are laid,” he said, “you want them to get a little more of their share."
CP---Marijuana---1NC
Legalizing marijuana generates at least 130 billion and millions of new jobs
Zezima ’18 [Katie; 01/10/2018; climate science and impact editor, education from Boston University;
“Study: Legal marijuana could generate more than $132 billion in federal tax revenue and 1 million
jobs,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2018/01/10/study-legal-marijuana-could-generate-
more-than-132-billion-in-federal-tax-revenue-and-1-million-jobs/ The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish
Legalizing marijuana nationwide would create at least $132 billion in tax revenue and more than a
million new jobs across the United States in the next decade, according to a new study.
New Frontier Data, a data analytics firm focused on the cannabis industry, forecasts that if legalized on
the federal level, the marijuana industry could create an entirely new tax revenue stream for the
government, generating millions of dollars in sales tax and payroll deductions.
“When there are budget deficits and the like, everybody wants to know where is there an additional
revenue stream, and one of the most logical places is to go after cannabis and cannabis taxes,” said Beau
Whitney, a senior economist at New Frontier Data.
The analysis shows that if marijuana were fully legal in all 50 states, it would create at least a combined
$131.8 billion in in federal tax revenue between 2017 and 2025. That is based on an estimated 15
percent retail sales tax, payroll tax deductions and business tax revenue.
The federal government would reap $51.7 billion in sales tax from a legal marijuana market between
2017 and 2025, entirely new revenue for a business that remains illegal -- and unable to be taxed --
federally.
The business tax rate for the study was calculated at 35 percent. The corporate tax rate was lowered to
21 percent in a sweeping tax bill President Trump signed last month.
“If cannabis businesses were legalized tomorrow and taxed as normal businesses with a standard 35
percent tax rate, cannabis businesses would infuse the U.S. economy with an additional $12.6 billion
this year,” said Giadha Aguirre De Carcer, the CEO of New Frontier.
The study also calculates that there would be 782,000 additional jobs nationwide if cannabis were
legalized today, a number that would increase to 1.1 million by 2025. That includes workers at all ends
of the marijuana supply chain, from farmers to transporters to sellers.
The study estimates that about 25 percent of the marijuana market will continue to be illicit, and will
shrink if the legal marketplace is not overly taxed or expensive.
“Consumers want to do things legally in general, but they don’t want to do it at too much of a price,”
Whitney said. “If they go to 7-11 to pick up cannabis, they’re willing to pay 10 to 15 percent on top of
what they get on the street. Once they get above that, it slows the transition and makes the consumer
think twice about making that legal purchase.”
Marijuana is legal for adult recreational use in eight states. California, the world’s largest market, started
its recreational sales on Jan. 1. Twenty-nine states allow the use of medical marijuana. In the three
states where adult use has been legal for the longest period of time – Colorado, Washington and Oregon
– there had been a combined total of $1.3 billion in tax receipts, according to the study.
The nationwide legalization of marijuana, however, is looking unlikely under the Trump administration.
While there has been a bipartisan push in Congress to both legalize marijuana nationally and protect the
individual states where it is legal, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has gone after the industry.
Last week Sessions made it easier for U.S. Attorneys in places where marijuana is legal to enforce federal
law, rescinding Obama-era guidance that discouraged enforcement of federal marijuana law in states
that legalized the drug.
The decision has been pilloried by the cannabis industry, which argued that Sessions is trying to stop the
momentum of a growing business and restart the war on drugs. The decision has been harshly criticized
even by some Republicans. Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) threatened to hold up the confirmation of
Justice Department posts in response to the announcement.
Sessions said he’s enforcing federal law, simply directing all U.S. Attorneys to use previously established
prosecutorial principles that provide them all the necessary tools to disrupt criminal organizations,
tackle the growing drug crisis, and thwart violent crime across our country,” Sessions said in a
statement.
Some in the industry believe Sessions’s actions could force Congress to step in and regulate the market,
or move to legalize marijuana altogether.
Aff Answers
Carbon Pricing
Perm do the CP
perm do the cp – taxes are pricing
Carbon taxes are one aspect of carbon pricing, where a price is placed on emitted CO2 in order to
internalize the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions. These external costs include damages caused
by climate change: sea level rise, temperature rise, and increased occurrences of extreme weather
events.
“Carbon Pricing: an instrument that captures the external costs of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—
the costs of emissions that the public pays for, such as damage to crops, health care costs from heat
waves and droughts, and loss of property from flooding and sea level rise—and ties them to their
sources through a price, usually in the form of a price on the carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted.”
Digital Agriculture
2ac – digital ag fails
Their authors ignore key difficulties like algorithm inaccuracies, inflexibility, and farm
inequalities---more like “imprecision farming”
Oane Visser et al 21 (Associate Professor in Agrarian Studies at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the
Netherlands), “Imprecision farming? Examining the (in)accuracy and risks of digital agriculture,” August
2021, Journal of Rural Studies, Volume 86, pg. 623-632
This article critically examined the promise of superb precision and accuracy that widely features in
accounts of digital agriculture. It showed that weak GPS reception, sensor errors, as well as spatially or
temporally incomplete and self-learning algorithms that are still early in their learning process can all
cause inaccuracies that are easily hidden by a high volume of data and sophisticated maps (with high
granularity). As a result, digital agriculture is often ‘precisely inaccurate’ (McFarland and McFarland, 2015), giving a false sense
of accuracy.
In the AgTech sector, the inadequate or inaccurate functioning of technologies , if acknowledged, is portrayed as a
transitory problem as technologies will constantly become more powerful and precise. This view can also be encountered in the social
science literature, where inaccuracies are labelled, for instance, as ‘teething problems’ (Jakku et al., 2019: 6). We do not contest that
technologies will advance further. However, assuming that they are on a steady and steep curve
towards evermore hyper-accuracy is problematic in several ways.
First, there is the danger that research will attribute blame for inaccuracy predominantly to the farmers who have to learn how to adopt, use,
or ‘digi-grasp’ (Dufva and Dufva, 2018; Rijswijk et al., 2019: 11) digital technologies. AgTech representatives, but also academic studies, tend to
highlight the farmers’ role in mis-adoption and ‘operator errors’. This reflects a de-contextualised view of technologies as abstract solutions,
with implementation and use problems detached from them, and relegated to the ‘human factor’. This article, on the contrary, appreciates that
an algorithm, or digital farming technology at large, cannot be grasped without examining ‘its wide socio-technical assemblage and its use’
(Kitchin, 2017: 23). Our examination of this assemblage and use in digital agriculture highlights farmers’ important role in preventing errors and
shaping digital technologies’ accuracy, when calibrating technologies or corroborating algorithmic advice.
Second, to assume that inaccuracies of digital technologies are just a temporal blip hampers scrutinizing
the more fundamental tensions and limits connected to digital agricultural technologies. If big data and
algorithms indeed turn our world into a ‘black box society’ with hidden algorithms controlling ever more
aspects of our lives, as critical scholars of algorithms like Pasquale (2015) assert, then we cannot afford to
leave these technologies unexamined.
Third, even when the code of algorithms improves and future field trials with digital technologies show
enhanced accuracy, this might not always translate into increased accuracy in diverse everyday farming
operations. Following Burrell (2016) and Kitchin (2017) we contend that algorithms and their effects can only be grasped
‘in the wild’. Subsequently, the highly diverse and dynamic natural context in which they have to operate
becomes just as important in determining accuracy as the code itself (and the other socio-technical aspects). It appears that the
enormous variety of plant growth stages and ‘normal’ weather variation currently pose considerable
challenges to technologies, varying from sensors to artificial intelligence . Climate change will highly increase this
unpredictability, with more extreme weather, new plant diseases, and pests. This is likely to widen implementation gaps
(Sumberg, 2012) of new technologies. Rising unpredictability and the subsequent lack of a stable, relevant
baseline will make fine grained analysis of data a major challenge. This might mean that rapid technological
advances only result in sluggish progress in terms of accurately measuring and influencing conditions in
the field.
This article identified two major risks of inaccuracies in digital agriculture, which we termed the ‘precision trap’ and the ‘precision divide’. The
‘precision trap’, refers to a stark belief in the overall precision of digital technologies inspired by some seemingly precise
output generated by big data, that hinders identifying (in time) the inaccuracies that may arise. Such a trap is
likely under at least three conditions which are all likely to become more prevalent: increased opacity of
digital technologies (particularly due to algorithmic opacity); increased remoteness of the farmers from the field; and a
move from real-time measurement and advice to forecasting. These conditions impede corroboration by farmers
of the data and advice generated by digital technologies . Also, there is the danger of an ‘accuracy trap’
(Rankin, 2020), namely a denouncing of all factors that cannot (yet) be measured with high accuracy. Farmers’ preoccupation with
the nitty gritty of precisely measurable individual parameters and variable rate application might for
instance distract them from deepening a holistic understanding of key determinants of cultivation, such
as the soil, and the more difficult to measure environmental effects. A group of Dutch farmers for instance wondered ‘Does precision farming’s
attention for the square meter not distract from what is much more important, namely improvement of the soil?’ (Tholhuijsen, 2020: A14).
The ‘precision divide’ refers to the unequally distributed precision benefits resulting from the growing
‘algorithmic divide’ (Yu, 2020) between farmers focusing on staple crops (mostly commercial and more industrial farms)
and farmers cultivating other crops. Digital innovation focuses primarily on the first type of farmers, who
consequently benefit from more advanced algorithms and relatively precise or ‘good enough’ data. At the same time, other farmers
have to make do with less advanced or less applicable algorithm s for their crops, which can be ‘a disaster’ as
one farmer stated. Furthermore, the precision divide is likely to deepen and become multi-layered also within the
group of farmers producing the staple crops targeted by the digital tools, as it is likely that higher-paying ’prime’
options will provide some users with more accurate and fine-grained advice, while others might need to content themselves
with ’basic’ algorithmic advice. Earlier research on digital agriculture has identified a digital divide, namely unequal obstacles to
access and use of digital technologies. The ‘precision divide’ goes beyond that by pointing out that even farmers who have managed to access
and use new technologies may still experience major disadvantages depending on their crops and ability to pay for services. These farmers
find an unequal share of digital farming’s inaccuracies on their ‘plate’.
Overall, turning digital farming into genuine precision farming requires substantial work from the farmer to tweak sensors, check yield maps,
and corroborate algorithmic advice. For farmers with the right (staple) crops that may well result in ‘good enough’ data and quite precise
operations. However, especially for
farmers with crops that fall outside the gaze of the providers of digital
technologies, digital farming might feel more like ‘imprecision farming’.
Digital agriculture fails---lack of regulations, cybersecurity, and farmers’ trust

Adesola Anidu & Rozita Dara 21 (Cybersecurity recipient of the University of Guelph MCTI Program &
Principal Investigator of Data Management and Privacy Governance research program in the School of
Computer Science at the University of Guelph), “A review of data governance challenges in smart
farming and potential solutions,” 2021, IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society
(ISTAS), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9629169
A. Data ownership, access, and use
issue of trust amongst parties needs to be resolved. Wiseman et al. [7]

For digital technology to transform the food chain, then the
highlighted some of the farmers’ concerns such as data ownership/sharing, lack of a suitable business model to
share farm data, lack of transparency in the terms of usage of data license/agreements, privacy
concerns and inequality in negotiating power . Schuster [8] also argues that the ownership of data is a cause for
concern as farmers/producers believe they are the owner of the data generated in their farms . The author
further discusses the rules on controlling farm data and points out that they are inadequate and may result in misuse of data.
The economicvalue of data increases as they are aggregated This causes policy and regulatory problems
connected to aggregate versus individual data ownership and users rights for both farmers and
developers of digital applications. As the number of users increases, it becomes complicated to define data ownership and data
usage rights [9]. With the vast data being produced, farmers have become more cognizant of the value the data can bring hence the issue of
who owns or have access to the agricultural data emerges. This issue may even prevent effective data interoperability.
Agricultural data is being governed by private contracts and technology use agreements. These contracts have
different data access and use policies most are non-negotiable having a “leave it or take it” option [10]. A
recent survey by [10] reveals that most farmers are unaware of the conditions of data contracts they have agreed to. This is one of the
reasons for mistrust in the management of agricultural data . Also, the absence of government legislation
and lack of consistency in agricultural data contracts makes stakeholders concerned about how the data
is accessed and used. This has limited the potential gains that can be derived from utilizing these
agricultural data. Moreover legal, and regulatory frameworks around the world do not accept agricultural
data as intellectual property further aggravating the issue of data ownership . To address this, various agricultural
codes of practice have been implemented but these are voluntary industry standards not a mandatory policy. According to [10], these
agricultural codes of practice can be used to fill regulatory gaps and support government regulations thereby facilitating the use of data and
thus protecting the security and privacy of farmers and producers.
Based on the review conducted by [10] on agricultural codes of practice particularly the New Zealand’s Farm Data Code of Practice and the
American Farm Bureau’s Privacy and Security Principles for Farm Data, it was noted that these codes
of practice do not have an
agile agricultural data normative framework and implementation and evaluation methods.
B. Data privacy
The fear of data falling into the wrong hands particularly producer’s competitors is paramount in the
heart of producers’ concerns. Presently, no federal law is protecting agricultural data similar to health (HIPAA) and
financial data. Moreover, the privacy policies available deal with personal information and not agricultural data. This is a threat to the
growth of digital agriculture. Data privacy and sharing problems need to be resolved because data systems depend on
farmers/producers trusting data aggregators on the use and sharing of their data which is often difficult for producers [11]. Farmers are
concerned about how information relating to their farming activities is used by competitor farms [12].
C. Lack of regulatory laws
The lack of legal and regulatory laws focusing on how agricultural data is collected, shared, and used
contributes to the problems being encountered by farmers in adopting digital technologies . Laws relating to
agricultural data are not consistent. Wiseman et al. [7] stated that lack of clarity and transparency on issues centered
around data ownership, trust, privacy, liability, and portability in the business relationship governing
smart agriculture is a contributing factor to the reluctance among farmers in sharing their data . A legal
framework needs to be put in place.
D. Security
Security concerns data, IoT, cloud and network. Most of the cyber threats being faced in the agricultural
industry are similar to the threat vectors in other connected sectors. The same tactics used in other industries are being utilized here such as
improper use of USB thumb drives, spear-phishing, and other cyber-attacks which can lead to reputation loss, data theft, destruction of
equipment and other issues. Also, the generally accepted mitigation techniques can be used in preventing such attacks. In information security,
the three main threats are to confidentiality, integrity, and availability [13].
Confidentiality is the security principle designed to ensure that data and information are not accessed by unauthorized users. Threats to
confidentiality could be a deliberate theft of data generated or accidental leakage of data to third
parties which could be a result of not implementing patching and appropriate security controls. This could
also occur if user agreements, privacy controls are not well structured . It can also be through remote access to unmanned
aerial system (UAS) data and unethical sale of confidential data which could be possible through insider
threat.
Integrity is the security principle that assures the accuracy and completeness of data throughout its lifecycle. It guards against data modification
in an unauthorized manner. As digital agriculture is being embraced using robotics, IoT, machine learning, there
are threats to data
integrity which includes intentional falsification of data that can come from adversarial attacks
corrupting the machine learning model or the data itself leading to incorrect categorization /prediction .
Also, introducing rogue data into a sensor network corrupts the data leading to falsification of results and
insufficiently vetted machine learning model.
Availability in security ensures that information is readily available and accessible to authorized users. Threats
to availability include
disruption to positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)systems either space-based or ground-based and
disruption to communication networks through DDoS.
E. Security and Privacy of Connected Devices
The use of IoT is the driving force for smart farming. The Internet of Thing devices are prone to cyber-
attacks as most of these devices are not made with security in mind . These devices can be attacked
remotely creating an unproductive and unsafe farming environment. Attacks on IoT devices can be against integrity,
privacy, confidentiality, authentication, and availability [14]. Attacks against privacy could be a result of an attacker trying
to access the private data and subsequently compromise the privacy of the system . Attacks against
authentication is a type of attack that creates identities to imitate authorized nodes such as IoT devices. These attacks can be in the form of
replay attack, impersonation attack, spoofing attack, and masquerade attack. Attacks against confidentiality are attacks that attempt to spy on
the network traffic between IoT devices compromising confidentiality subsequently leading to wrong decisions. Examples of such attacks
include brute force attacks, known key attacks and tracing attacks. Attacks against availability can be in form of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) thereby making the required service unavailable. Attacks against integrity can be in the form of a biometric template attack, forgery
attack, trojan horse attack, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Cyber-attacks
on farms can lead to devasting effects
capable of disrupting the economy of a nation that is solely dependent on agriculture.
US-China Coop
Fails
US-China relations too strained
Nouriel Roubini, 23 (5/4/2023; professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of
Business and is the co-founder of RGE Monitor, an innovative economic and geo-strategic information
service, PhD in Economics from Harvard University; “The US-China relationship is still moving slowly
towards a collision”; The Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/may/04/the-us-china-
relationship-is-still-moving-slowly-towards-a-collision)
I recently attendedthe China Development Forum (CDF) in Beijing, an annual gathering of senior foreign business
leaders, academics, former policymakers, and top Chinese officials. This year’s conference was the first to be held
in person since 2019, and it offered western observers the opportunity to meet China’s new senior leadership,
including new premier Li Qiang.
The event also offered Li his first opportunity to engage with foreign representatives since taking office. While much has been said about the
Chinese president, Xi Jinping, appointing close loyalists to crucial positions within the Communist party of China (CPC) and the government, our
discussions with Li and other high-ranking Chinese officials offered a more nuanced view of their policies and leadership style.
Prior to becoming premier in March, Li served as the CPC secretary in Shanghai. As an economic reformer and proponent of private
entrepreneurship, he played a crucial role in convincing Tesla to build a mega-factory in the city. During the Covid-19 pandemic, he enforced
Xi’s strict zero-Covid policy and oversaw a two-month lockdown of Shanghai.
Fortunately for Li, he was rewarded for his loyalty and not made into a scapegoat for the policy’s failure. His close relationship with Xi also
enabled him to convince the Chinese president to reverse the zero-Covid restrictions overnight when the policy proved to be unsustainable.
During our meeting, Li reiterated China’s commitment to “reform and opening up”, a message that other Chinese leaders also conveyed.
Li’s remarkable wit contrasted sharply with the more reserved demeanour of former premier Li Keqiang, whom we met in earlier years when he
was premier. During our meeting, he made Apple CEO Tim Cook laugh out loud by attributing his joyful mood to the viral video of Cook being
applauded by crowds during his visit to an Apple store in Beijing. He even joked about a video of US lawmakers grilling TikTok CEO Shou Zi
Chew, which had also gone viral that week. Unlike Cook, he noted, the beleaguered TikTok boss was not smiling during his congressional
hearing. Li’s joke included an implicit warning that although US firms are still welcome in China, the Chinese government can play hardball if its
firms and interests are treated harshly in the US.
Li’s veiled threat captures the current Chinese attitude towards the US. Although
senior economic policymakers in China
often talk about opening up, China’s policies still prioritise security and control over reform. Qin Gang,
China’s new foreign minister, adopted a hawkish stance during his development forum address. Taking
an implicit swipe at the US, Qin warned western attenders that while China aims to maintain an open
global trading regime, the country would respond forcefully to any attempt to drag it into a new cold
war.
In a recent speech, US treasury secretary Janet Yellen sought to alleviate China’s concerns that America is trying to “contain” its rise and
decouple from its economy. Recent American actions limiting trade with China, she clarified, were based on national security concerns rather
than an effort to hinder the country’s economic growth.
But assuaging China will be difficult when the US is reportedly planning to introduce far-reaching
restrictions on Chinese investments in the US and on American investments in China. To date, Chinese
officials have not been receptive to Yellen and secretary of state Antony Blinken’s efforts to establish a
dialogue on how to maximise cooperation, minimise areas of confrontation, and manage the two
powers’ escalating strategic competition and rivalry.
Renewable Investment
AT: carbon taxes fail
Carbon taxes work and are key to raising revenue for green energy
Aimée Dushime, 21 (6/16/2021; currently works in the social infrastructure advisory group of the
Deals Advisory Team at KPMG, London focus; “Addressing climate change through carbon taxes”; World
Economic Forum; https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/addressing-climate-change-through-
carbon-taxes/)
The case for carbon taxes
Many economists have argued that carbon taxes are the most efficient and cost-effective way to curb
climate change and address the problem of global warming. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), a carbon tax is “an instrument of environmental cost internalisation. It is an
excise tax on the producers of raw fossil fuels based on the relative carbon content of those fuels.”
Research shows that putting a price on carbon-based fuels, in the form of a fee or tax, can be an
effective way of reducing GHG emissions and pollution levels across the globe . By placing higher taxes on carbon-
based fuels, households and industries can reduce the level of pollution and look to alternatives like solar power
and hydrogen engines, which have lower impacts on the environment. The implementation of a carbon
tax system, therefore, provides an incentive for businesses and industries to develop more
environmentally friendly production processes. The taxing of GHG emissions encourages investment in
renewable energy and leads to further technological developments. In recent years, evidence has shown
that technology and innovation have made solar energy more efficient and effective for the purpose of
reducing the costs of pollution.
implementation of a carbon tax policy can raise significant revenue for countries, which can then
Also, the
be used to address the economic harm caused by the burning of fossil fuels. Governments could, for instance,
use revenue derived from carbon taxes to reduce personal income taxes, future deficits, or to invest in
clean energy and climate adaptation.
Education
CP---Education---2AC
Education doesn’t solve the real problem – households need more income
Hanauer ’19 [Nick; July of 2019; entrepreneur and venture capitalist, the founder of the public-policy
incubator Civic Ventures, and the host of the podcast Pitchfork Economics; "Better Schools Won’t Fix
America," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/07/education-isnt-enough/
590611/ The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]
What I’ve realized, decades late, is that educationism is tragically misguided. American workers are
struggling in large part because they are underpaid—and they are underpaid because 40 years of trickle-
down policies have rigged the economy in favor of wealthy people like me. Americans are more highly
educated than ever before, but despite that, and despite nearly record-low unemployment, most
American workers—at all levels of educational attainment—have seen little if any wage growth since
2000.
To be clear: We should do everything we can to improve our public schools. But our education system
can’t compensate for the ways our economic system is failing Americans. Even the most thoughtful and
well-intentioned school-reform program can’t improve educational outcomes if it ignores the single
greatest driver of student achievement: household income.
For all the genuine flaws of the American education system, the nation still has many high-achieving
public-school districts. Nearly all of them are united by a thriving community of economically secure
middle-class families with sufficient political power to demand great schools, the time and resources to
participate in those schools, and the tax money to amply fund them. In short, great public schools are
the product of a thriving middle class, not the other way around. Pay people enough to afford dignified
middle-class lives, and high-quality public schools will follow. But allow economic inequality to grow, and
educational inequality will inevitably grow with it.
By distracting us from these truths, educationism is part of the problem.
Whenever i talk with my wealthy friends about the dangers of rising economic inequality, those who
don’t stare down at their shoes invariably push back with something about the woeful state of our
public schools. This belief is so entrenched among the philanthropic elite that of America’s 50 largest
family foundations—a clique that manages $144 billion in tax-exempt charitable assets—40 declare
education as a key issue. Only one mentions anything about the plight of working people, economic
inequality, or wages. And because the richest Americans are so politically powerful, the consequences of
their beliefs go far beyond philanthropy.
A major theme in the educationist narrative involves the “skills gap”—the notion that decades of wage
stagnation are largely a consequence of workers not having the education and skills to fill new high-
wage jobs. If we improve our public schools, the thinking goes, and we increase the percentage of
students attaining higher levels of education, particularly in the STEM subjects—science, technology,
engineering, and math—the skills gap will shrink, wages will rise, and income inequality will fall.
The real story is more complicated, and more troubling. Yes, there is a mismatch between the skills of
the present and the jobs of the future. In a fast-changing, technologically advanced economy, how could
there not be? But this mismatch doesn’t begin to explain the widening inequality of the past 40 years.
In 1970, when the golden age of the American middle class was nearing its peak and inequality was at its
nadir, only about half of Americans ages 25 and older had a high-school diploma or the equivalent.
Today, 90 percent do. Meanwhile, the proportion of Americans attaining a college degree has more than
tripled since 1970. But while the American people have never been more highly educated, only the
wealthiest have seen large gains in real wages. From 1979 to 2017, as the average real annual wages of
the top 1 percent of Americans rose 156 percent (and the top .01 percent’s wages rose by a stunning
343 percent), the purchasing power of the average American’s paycheck did not increase.
Some educationists might argue that the recent gains in educational attainment simply haven’t been
enough to keep up with the changing economy—but here, yet again, the truth appears more
complicated. While 34 percent of Americans ages 25 and older have a bachelor’s degree or higher, only
26 percent of jobs currently require one. The job categories that are growing fastest, moreover, don’t
generally require a college diploma, let alone a STEM degree. According to federal estimates, four of the
five occupational categories projected to add the most jobs to the economy over the next five years are
among the lowest-paying jobs: “food preparation and serving” ($19,130 in average annual earnings),
“personal care and service” ($21,260), “sales and related” ($25,360), and “health-care support”
($26,440). And while the number of jobs that require a postsecondary education is expected to increase
slightly faster than the number that don’t, the latter group is expected to dominate the job market for
decades to come. In October 2018 there were 1 million more job openings than job seekers in the U.S.
Even if all of these unfilled jobs were in STEM professions at the top of the pay scale, they would be little
help to most of the 141 million American workers in the bottom nine income deciles.
It’s worth noting that workers with a college degree enjoy a significant wage premium over those
without. (Among people over age 25, those with a bachelor’s degree had median annual earnings of
$53,882 in 2017, compared with $32,320 for those with only a high-school education.) But even with
that advantage, adjusted for inflation, average hourly wages for recent college graduates have barely
budged since 2000, while the bottom 60 percent of college graduates earn less than that group did in
2000. A college diploma is no longer a guaranteed passport into the middle class.
Meanwhile, nearly all the benefits of economic growth have been captured by large corporations and
their shareholders. After-tax corporate profits have doubled from about 5 percent of GDP in 1970 to
about 10 percent, even as wages as a share of GDP have fallen by roughly 8 percent. And the wealthiest
1 percent’s share of pre-tax income has more than doubled, from 9 percent in 1973 to 21 percent today.
Taken together, these two trends amount to a shift of more than $2 trillion a year from the middle class
to corporations and the super-rich.
The state of the labor market provides further evidence that low-wage workers’ declining fortunes
aren’t explained by supply and demand. With the unemployment rate near a 50-year floor, low-wage
industries such as accommodations, food service, and retail are struggling to cope with a shortage of job
applicants—leading The Wall Street Journal to lament that “low-skilled jobs are becoming increasingly
difficult for employers to fill.” If wages were actually set the way our Econ 101 textbooks suggested,
workers would be profiting from this dynamic. Yet outside the cities and states that have recently
imposed a substantially higher local minimum wage, low-wage workers have seen their real incomes
barely budge.
All of which suggests that income inequality has exploded not because of our country’s educational
failings but despite its educational progress. Make no mistake: Education is an unalloyed good. We
should advocate for more of it, so long as it’s of high quality. But the longer we pretend that education is
the answer to economic inequality, the harder it will be to escape our new Gilded Age.
However justifiable their focus on curricula and innovation and institutional reform, people who see
education as a cure-all have largely ignored the metric most predictive of a child’s educational success:
household income.
The scientific literature on this subject is robust, and the consensus overwhelming. The lower your
parents’ income, the lower your likely level of educational attainment. Period. But instead of focusing on
ways to increase household income, educationists in both political parties talk about extending ladders
of opportunity to poor children, most recently in the form of charter schools. For many children, though
—especially those raised in the racially segregated poverty endemic to much of the United States—the
opportunity to attend a good public school isn’t nearly enough to overcome the effects of limited family
income.
As Lawrence Mishel, an economist at the liberal-leaning Economic Policy Institute, notes, poverty
creates obstacles that would trip up even the most naturally gifted student. He points to the plight of
“children who frequently change schools due to poor housing; have little help with homework; have few
role models of success; have more exposure to lead and asbestos; have untreated vision, ear, dental, or
other health problems; … and live in a chaotic and frequently unsafe environment.”
Indeed, multiple studies have found that only about 20 percent of student outcomes can be attributed
to schooling, whereas about 60 percent are explained by family circumstances—most significantly,
income. Now consider that, nationwide, just over half of today’s public-school students qualify for free
or reduced-price school lunches, up from 38 percent in 2000. Surely if American students are lagging in
the literacy, numeracy, and problem-solving skills our modern economy demands, household income
deserves most of the blame—not teachers or their unions.
If we really want to give every American child an honest and equal opportunity to succeed, we must do
much more than extend a ladder of opportunity—we must also narrow the distance between the
ladder’s rungs. We must invest not only in our children, but in their families and their communities. We
must provide high-quality public education, sure, but also high-quality housing, health care, child care,
and all the other prerequisites of a secure middle-class life. And most important, if we want to build the
sort of prosperous middle-class communities in which great public schools have always thrived, we must
pay all our workers, not just software engineers and financiers, a dignified middle-class wage.
Today, after wealthy elites gobble up our outsize share of national income, the median American family
is left with $76,000 a year. Had hourly compensation grown with productivity since 1973—as it did over
the preceding quarter century, according to the Economic Policy Institute—that family would now be
earning more than $105,000 a year. Just imagine, education reforms aside, how much larger and
stronger and better educated our middle class would be if the median American family enjoyed a
$29,000-a-year raise.
In fact, the most direct way to address rising economic inequality is to simply pay ordinary workers
more, by increasing the minimum wage and the salary threshold for overtime exemption; by restoring
bargaining power for labor; and by instating higher taxes—much higher taxes—on rich people like me
and on our estates.
Educationism appeals to the wealthy and powerful because it tells us what we want to hear: that we
can help restore shared prosperity without sharing our wealth or power. As Anand Giridharadas explains
in his book Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World, narratives like this one let the
wealthy feel good about ourselves. By distracting from the true causes of economic inequality, they also
defend America’s grossly unequal status quo.
We have confused a symptom—educational inequality—with the underlying disease: economic

inequality. Schooling may boost the prospects of individual workers, but it doesn’t change the core
problem, which is that the bottom 90 percent is divvying up a shrinking share of the national wealth.
Fixing that problem will require wealthy people to not merely give more, but take less.
CP---Education---1AR
Investing in education can’t solve inequality – takes way too long and Canada proves
Osberg ’14 [Lars; 09/12/2014; Professor in the Department of Economics at Dalhousie University; "Is
Education the Answer to Income Inequality?," Inequality.org, https://inequality.org/research/education-
answer-income-inequality/ The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]
It has long been fashionable to assert that improved education is the answer to our growing inequality
problem. But even if increasing educational attainment reduced inequality of opportunity between the
disadvantaged and the middle class – and reduced wage differentials within the middle class – this does
not imply an acceleration of the rate of average income growth of the bottom 99 percent.
Educational initiatives are notorious for long time lags. Even an all-powerful leader with a magic wand
that could instantaneously revolutionize primary and secondary education in 2015 would have to wait
12 years to see, in 2027, the full impact of this policy on high school graduates. [pullquote] Educational
initiatives are notorious for long time lags. [/pullquote] To improve education over current levels, some
post-secondary education would then be needed, pushing graduation back to 2031 or later – by which
time the income gaps projected in Figure 1 would already have fully emerged.
Even then, aggregate impacts would initially be small, because the flow of new graduates entering the
workforce each year is only about 1/40th of the workforce, and the impact on average labor force skills
is the differential between the skills of entering and retiring cohorts. It would be roughly another twenty
years before new entrants were the majority of workers (i.e. around 2051, or about 36 years after the
change).
Furthermore, since most people have completed their education by their mid-twenties, a focus on
“solving” the inequality problem through improved education essentially means writing off older
generations – i.e. anyone now over 30, which is most of the population.
Canada’s experience offers a guide to whether an expansion of education can really be expected to
solve the inequality problem. For the age group 25-64, Canada’s tertiary education attainment level (51
percent in 2010) substantially exceeds that of the United States (42 percent).[1] [pullquote] In Canada,
improved education has not produced greater income inequality. [/pullquote]
Canada’s investment in education has been a “good thing” for many reasons, but it has not prevented
the stagnation of median household incomes in Canada and has not produced greater income equality.
Education is a good thing – just don’t expect it to solve the problem of rising income inequality anytime
soon.
Education isn’t nearly enough to eliminate economic disparities

Irwin ’15 [Neil; 03/31/2015; M.B.A. from Columbia University, Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics
and Business Journalism, Senior economics correspondent for The New York Times; “Why More
Education Won’t Fix Economic Inequality,” https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/upshot/why-more-
education-wont-fix-economic-inequality.html //The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of
2024]
There remains a plausible solution to rising inequality that avoids those polarizing ideas: strengthening
education so that more Americans can benefit from the advances of the 21st-century economy. This is a
solution that conservatives, centrists and liberals alike can comfortably get behind. After all, who doesn’t
favor a stronger educational system? But a new paper shows why the math just doesn’t add up, at least
if the goal is addressing the gap between the very rich and everyone else.
Brad Hershbein, Melissa Kearney and Lawrence Summers offer a simple little simulation that shows the
limits of education as an inequality-fighter. In short, more education would be great news for middle
and lower-income Americans, increasing their pay and economic security. It just isn’t up to the task of
meaningfully reducing inequality, which is being driven by the sharp upward movement of the very top
of the income distribution.
It is all the more interesting that the research comes from Mr. Summers, a former Treasury secretary
who is hardly known as a soak-the-rich class warrior. It is published by the Hamilton Project, a centrist
research group operating with Wall Street funding and seeking to find third-way-style solutions to
America’s problems that can unite left and right.
In their simulation, they assume that 10 percent of non-college-educated men of prime working age
suddenly obtained a college degree or higher, which would be an unprecedented rise in the proportion
of the work force with advanced education.
They assume that these more educated men go from their current pay levels to pay that is in line with
current college graduates, minus an adjustment for the fact that more college grads in the work force
could depress their wages a bit.
There is no doubt that in this simulated world with a more educated labor force, middle-income workers
earn more — $37,060 in simulated 2013 earnings for a person at the 50th percentile, compared with
$34,000 in the real world, a 9 percent improvement.
But that improvement brings that 50th-percentile worker only back closer to the inflation-adjusted level
of income he enjoyed in 1979, which was $37,838. Meanwhile, the 90th-percentile worker in this
simulation holds onto (and indeed improves upon) the sharp income gains of the past 34 years. Annual
earnings at the 90th percentile climbed from $75,700 in 1979 to more than $100,000 in both the actual
2013 data and the simulation with higher education levels.
Add it all up, and the Gini ratio, a frequently used measure of income inequality, would decrease only to
0.55 from 0.57 in this scenario of drastic educational improvement. It would still be far higher than the
0.43 recorded in 1979.

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Advantage CPs

The fund’s activities should target the following:

Recommendation 2: Convene the Digital Agriculture Summit to create an all-hands-on-deck approach to

Digital agriculture is the only sustainable solution to food insecurity---incentives for

The CP gives farmers an edge---key to worldwide food security and sustainability

IV. CROP MANAGEMENT

generates more money than the carbon tax

Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF)

Empirics prove success; Senegal, Rwansa

Lower costs, more capacity, quicker results

* previously the Climate Emissions Reductions Facility – CERF

Standardized Crediting Framework: definition

The Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF) is a streamlined, country-owned emissions reduction

Results-based Finance: defenition

We acknowledge that US-China relations are, at present, low. However,

Multilateral development banks and initiatives key to funding RE development

INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUMS Another existing channel for potential coordination is intergovernmental

MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS There

The factors influencing medicines R&D financing are complex.

Core virtue – Legitimacy

Increased US commitments to the UN solves, leadership is key

In many cases, the

CP solves, US leadership key

Core virtue – Solidarity

More cards - https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/strengthening-democracy-abroad

Maybe league of democracies

New league of democracies solves multilateral issues

For all its surface advantages, the club

CP fails, increases backlash from non democratic countries

Core virtue – Capability

Core virtue – Flexibility

Ad hoc agreements solve, empirically proven

Nevertheless, there are real

Ad hoc fails – multiple warrants

Effectively Selecting Partners for Ad Hoc Initiatives As new

‘An education story’

Investments in education solve the root cause of inequality – addressing long-term

PLATEAU ON EDUCATIONAL GAINS

Digital agriculture fails---lack of regulations, cybersecurity, and farmers’ trust

A. Data ownership, access, and use

issue of trust amongst parties needs to be resolved. Wiseman et al. [7]

C. Lack of regulatory laws

E. Security and Privacy of Connected Devices

By distracting us from these truths, educationism is part of the problem.

We have confused a symptom—educational inequality—with the underlying disease: economic

Education isn’t nearly enough to eliminate economic disparities

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