Risks of RFID

Inside Risks Peter G.
Neumann and Lauren Weinstein
Risks of RFID
L ike most other technologies, RFID (Radio-Fre-

quency IDentification) systems have pluses and
minuses. In their most common applications,
passive RFID tags enable rapid contactless determi-
nation of the tags’ serial numbers, in theory helping
ing specific victims, widespread selective data mining,
and sweeping up entire databases. Possible intents for
such misuses might include robbery, identity theft,
fraud, harassment, and blackmail, for example.
With the range of potential problems associated
to reduce erroneous identifications. However, this with RFID systems, the question of voluntary vs. invol-
technology becomes dangerous whenever the binding untary use becomes paramount; when things go
between the tag and its context of use is in doubt. wrong, somebody is likely to be hurt—financially or in
This situation is similar to Social Security numbers, other ways. It’s possible that involuntary RFID-implant
which are themselves useful as identifiers but not as “chipping” of perceived miscreants will happen soon.
authenticators, with a wide range of proven abuses. It’s then probably just a matter of time before broader
RFID benefits may be negated by numerous forced deployment will permeate society, justified by
opportunities for accidental or intentional misuse of organizations and authorities based on security, finan-
the technology and its supporting systems, along with cial, or other seemingly laudable goals.
a wide range of issues relating to system and data At the basic computer-science level, inadequate
integrity, personal well-being, and privacy. Tags may security in operating systems, database management
be counterfeited, cloned (duplicated), swapped, dam- systems, networking, and other components support-
aged, intentionally disabled (in some cases even ing the use of RFID technology are sorely in need of
remotely), or otherwise misused. RFID technology can improvement. Consistent, correct, and up-to-date dis-
be easily compromised if used with insecure systems. tributed databases are essential for system availability
This is especially problematic in sensitive environments and survivability. Several R&D directions might be
if RFID tags use unencrypted or (as in the case of the helpful, although these are not limited to RFID tech-
impending U.S. passports) weak encryption protocols. nologies in their implications. Particular needs include
Numerous privacy issues exist, some of which can the ability to develop trustworthy systems, with suit-
have serious consequences if they are ignored or rele- able security, accountability, auditing, binding
gated to second-order considerations. Tags are poten- integrity, privacy-preserving cryptography, and so on.
tially subject to remote surveillance whenever they are RFID-related technologies can have some attractive
unshielded. Testing indicates that even passive RFID benefits in certain carefully delineated situations. How-
tags may be interrogated over far greater distances than ever, in all cases, possible technical and privacy risks
originally anticipated. The implications of these prob- must be considered objectively in operational environ-
lems are immense for persons bearing RFID-enabled ments. Even more importantly, it’s crucial that we
credit cards or passports, not to mention individuals engage now in a far-reaching, society-wide dialogue
with embedded subcutaneous RFID implants—who regarding the circumstances and contexts within which
would have no ability to control when and where these RFID systems should or should not be used, and the
implants may be interrogated. rights of individuals and organizations to control
Furthermore, various issues related to pervasive whether or not they will be subject to various uses of
security problems can lead to increased privacy viola- these systems. This is an especially difficult task,
tions committed by insiders and outsiders, such as because many of the would-be applications are emo-
misuses of databases associated with RFID tag infor- tionally charged, and RFID capabilities and ostensible
mation or derived from the context in which the tags benefits are in some cases being hyped far beyond what
are used. System-related examples include intrinsic is realistic. Yet it is such critical deliberations that will
security vulnerabilities of the ancillary computer sys- likely influence whether RFID will be deployed pri-
tems, inadequate user and operator authentication, marily in useful tools, or rather as identity shackles. c
and overly broad system and database authorizations.
PAUL WATSON
Such situations can create rampant opportunities for Peter G. Neumann moderates the ACM Risks Forum.
misuse of the accompanying database information. Lauren Weinstein (lauren@pfir.org) is co-founder of People for
Internet Responsibility (www.pfir.org). He moderates the Privacy Forum
For example, many opportunities will exist for target- (www.vortex.com/privacy).
136 May 2006/Vol. 49, No. 5 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM

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Inside Risks Peter G.

Neumann and Lauren Weinstein

L ike most other technologies, RFID (Radio-Fre-

136 May 2006/Vol. 49, No. 5 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM

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