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Federal Government. 1. A National Government That Exercises Some Degree of Control

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Federal government is the national government that expresses power

Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716.

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]
1 we meet normal means we never said all 2 counter interp Blacks law 3

Substantially should be defined by context Devinsky, 2 (Paul, IP UPDATE, VOLUME 5, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2002, Is Claim "Substantially" Definite?

Ask Person of Skill in the Art, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/c2c73bdb-9b1a-42bf-a2b7075812dc0e2d.cfm)

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the district court, by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to consider what a person of skill in the art would understand in a "technologic context," erroneously concluded the term "substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite. Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417 (Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related
In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity,

to an improved push rod for an internal combustion engine. The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is larger at the middle than at the ends and has "substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and rounded seats at the tips. The district court found that the expression "substantially constant wall thickness" was not supported in the specification and prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition of "substantially" and was, therefore, indefinite. The district court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be definite in some cases but ruled that in this case it was indefinite because it was not further defined. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in requiring that the meaning of the term "substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found solely in intrinsic evidence: "While reference to intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the meaning of words as they would be understood by persons in the field of the invention." Thus, the Federal Circuit instructed that "resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims

may be aided by extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention." The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of mechanics, upon reading the patent
and specification documents."

Not reciprocal- we cant run multiple plans to find the best example of the resolution Time and strat skew: They could read 14 CP texts and wed have to at least cover them all so they dont develop one in the block. Moving Target bad- Hurts fairness as well as education, we dont know what the issues in the debate are until the 2NR. Most real world- Policy makers cant propose competing pieces of legislation and Ive never seen a senator unroll a list of 30 bills he/she might advocate that day

Makes for sloppy debate- Instead of creating effective strategies, negs can just guess and check Voter for fairness and education

Defense: Who says neg flexibility is good, the already have a thousand kritiks and disads, random T violations, and whatever CP they run as long as its dispo. Perm doesnt check abuse: Its just a test of competitiveness, advocated perms justify intrinsicness.

The executive branch cant solve the case-only Congress can provide the needed funds and oversight
Kuenzi 2004
(Jeffrey, Congressional Research Service Policy Papers, Required for linguists in government agencies, October 8, 2k4, www.lexis.com) To a large extent finding language qualified personnel for government agencies is a responsibility of the Executive Branch, but Congress must appropriate funds for agency efforts, and it conducts oversight of programs . In addition, funding for foreign language instruction in civilian institutions originates in legislation. At the present time, a number of issues in regard to foreign language capabilities appear to be receiving congressional attention . This report addresses many of these issues and is intended as background only and will not be updated.

Orders that require funding less powerful, require congressional action William G. Howell (Professor at Harvard University) September 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, Presidential
Studies Quarterly If it has one, the power to appropriate money for unilaterally created programs is Conngress's trump card. When

a unilateral action requires funding, considerable influence shifts back to the legislative branch for in these instances, a president's directive requires positive action by Congress. Whereas before, presidents needed only to block congressional efforts to amend or overturn their orderssomething more easily done, given the well-documented travails of the legislative processnow they must build and sustain the coalitions that often prove so elusive in collective decision-making bodies. And should they not secure it, orders written on paper may not translate into action taken on the ground.

Funding concerns constrain power of executive orders William G. Howell (Professor at Harvard University) September 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, Presidential
Studies Quarterly nThese three caveats aside, the exigencies of funding recommend an important distinction. The

president's powers of unilateral action are greatest when they do not require congressional appropriation. For where funding is required, nonaction on the part of Congress can lead to the demise of a unilaterally created agency or program. And as a consequence, the president's power of unilateral action diminishes, just as
congressional influence over the scope and operations of these agencies and programs expands.

AFF ROLLBACK COURTS


The court overturned clintons executive orders Todd Gaziano (Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director of the Center for Legal Judicial Studies at Heritage Foundation) 2001 Texas Review of Law & Politics, 5 Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. 267

In 1993, President Clinton urged Congress to enact a statute that would prohibit employers from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. The right to hire such permanent replacement workers was firmly established in both the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and in decisions of the Supreme Court. Congress refused to authorize the change in law in 1993-1994. Shortly after Republicans gained control of Congress in 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12,954, an attempt to achieve through executive fiat what he could not achieve through legislation. President Clinton claimed authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (the "Procurement Act") to require all large government contractors, which employed roughly twenty-two percent of the labor force, to agree not to hire permanent replacements for lawfully striking employees. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously issued by the Secretary of Labor. The

overturned the executive order and the implementing regulations that had been court first determined that it had jurisdiction over the case - despite what the court described as President Clinton's "breathtakingly broad claim of non-reviewability of presidential
actions." In short, the court said that it did not have to defer to the President's claim that he was acting pursuant to lawful authority under the Procurement Act.

There is no judicial enforcement of executive orders Kenneth Mayer (Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Wisconsin-Madison) 2001 With the Stroke of a Pen:
Executive Orders and Presidential Power, p. 59-60 In practice, however, it is almost impossible for private claimants to allege violations of an executive order itself or seek damages as a remedy for violations against another private party. Recent court rulings are consistent on this point, holding

that executive orders do not generally permit citizens to insist on judicial enforcement of the orders requirements. More commonly, aggrieved parties must rely exclusively on administrative remedies to resolve disputes that may arise. An executive order issued as part of a statutory delegation of power, or as
part of the process of carrying out a statute, may create enforceable private rights, but only if the statute or the order clearly intended to create such a right. Presidents routinely seek to preempt litigation over their orders, most commonly by inserting within each order a section that denies any intention to create or alter private rights. And if a statute commits a question or determination solely to presidential discretion, the presidents actions are not themselves reviewable. Litigation over

whether government agencies have complied with an executive order raises a different set of issues, but here too the courts have been reluctant to step in. As a rule, federal courts have consistently ruled
that matters relating to internal management procedures and practices in the executive branch are not subject to judicial review.

AFF ROLLBACK CONGRESS


Abuse of executive authority risks draconian crackdown, threatening critical executive constitutional power The National Journal January 1, 2000 Some legal experts counsel Congress to be careful not to usurp legitimate presidential power . One
expert urging caution is Douglas Cox, a lawyer who was deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department during the Bush Administration. "When a President overreaches and uses executive orders

to invade or supersede the legislative powers of Congress, Congress may be sufficiently provoked to consider an across-the-board approach to rein in those abuses," he told the House Rules subcommittee. "Although that reaction is understandable, Congress must be careful to understand the extent to which executive orders are a necessary adjunct of the President's constitutional duties," Cox added. "At all times, Congress has ample legislative and political means to respond to abusive or lawless executive orders, and thus Congress should resist the temptation to pursue more sweeping, more draconian, and more questionable responses." Opposition to executive order risks overturn The National Journal January 1, 2000

Perhaps the most strenuous opposition to a Clinton executive order came in response to his 1996 proclamation, under a 1906 law, setting up the 1.7 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah. Westerners and property-rights activists screamed, "land grab"-even though much of the land was federally owned. On other domestic fronts, Clinton has issued an

order barring federal contractors from hiring replacements for strikers (a federal court of appeals later overturned this order); set up the American Rivers Heritage Initiative; and created the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for gays in the military. Another order outlined procedures to assist federal agencies dealing with states, but the states objected that their authority would be usurped and the order was withdrawn.

AFF XO LINKS TO POLITICS


with agency decisions once the investigations and decision processes are complete. Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative decisions having the force of law with the larger body of law and policy. The use of executive orders to confound or

circumvent normal administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional.

Independent use of executive power saps political capital Simendinger 02 (Alexis, Staff Writer National Journal, The Power of One, National Journal, 1-26, Lexis)
Bush's White House aides insist that the President knows how valuable his political capital is, and that he has to spend that capital wisely. To presidency scholars such as Richard E. Neustadt, who wrote a seminal 1960 book on the subject, real presidential power is the strength and standing to persuade, in order to bring about government action. It is not just the authority to effect change by edict. "From the veto to appointments, from publicity to budgeting, and so down a long list, the White House now controls the most encompassing array of vantage points in the American political system," Neustadt wrote. Bush's first year suggests he understood how to bargain when the

policies at issue were most important to him personally tax cuts and school accountability, for instance. Before September 11, however, the President seemed to get into the most trouble when he exercised power alone. The cumulative uproar over arsenic in water, his early regulatory actions that had an anti-green tinge, and the energy policies that favored the oil and gas industries were sour notes for Bush with the public and with many in Congress . The White House is still feeling the effects of those missteps as Bush heads into his second year.

Debt ceiling costs political capital

US News 6-2 (Republicans Disrespect Obama on Debt Ceiling, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/Jamie-Stiehm/2011/06/02/republicans-disrespectobama-on-debt-ceiling) So yesterday a gaggle of House Republican leaders went to see President Obama in the White House, where he lives as the elected leader of our American democracy, but they did not pay their respects. Nor did they listen to sweet reason on the economy's quiet desperation . Right now, House Republicans are leading a Pickett's Chargethe last act of the three-day Battle of Gettysburg by
General Robert E. Lee's men in Confederate gray uniform. Their rebellious charge against Obama is also against the republic, meaning us, especially the less fortunate and the 9 percent unemployed.

Even the well-off, with their George W. Bush tax cuts extended, are watching their dimes. Doomed though it was, the Confederate brigade soldiers shed a lot of blood on both sides in an ultimately losing battle and Civil War. The 1863 denouement still goes down in some histories and novels as grand and noble, but not in my book.

No Political Capital 2AC


Obama has no political capital multiple reasons

Goodman 6-3 (Peter S., Executive Business Editor Huffington Post, No Jobs, No Leadership: Obama's Big Fail, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/03/obama-jobsleadership-fail_n_870946.html)
You can parse the numbers however you like, but the latest snapshot of the labor market released by the government on Friday tells a dismal story that is already familiar beyond the realm of professional economists and policymakers: The American economy is in grave trouble. We have no engine for growth, no good reason for businesses to believe that actual human beings will soon have more money to spend, which means employers are inclined to hunker down and keep their costs low by limiting their writing of paychecks. In short, a feedback loop of declining fortunes. The worst part is what most Americans know in their bones, not from government reports and the abstract musings of economists, but from the everyday fears that accompany glancing at their checkbooks and their latest credit card bills: There is no relief in sight. No one in a

position to influence this depressing picture is expending real energy to improve it, and least of all

inside the White House, where leadership is imperative. It would be disingenuous to pin the blame for the

chronically lean job market on the Obama administration. The blame goes back over more than a quarter-century: to Ronald Reagan, who turned tax-cut pandering into high art, thus making it politically impossible for his successors to tax the wealthy, thereby accelerating the economic inequality that has left so many Americans unable to spend; to Bill Clinton, who helped turn Wall Street into a wild-west casino, laying the ground for the worst financial disaster since the 1930s; to George W. Bush, who continued both of these projects while wasting our treasure on a pair of ill-conceived wars. But we have every right to demand that the president of the moment lay out a serious and ambitious plan to dig ourselves out of this hole . On that score, Barack Obama -- who came into office with such grand plans and such a capacity to instill hope -- has proved a disappointing failure. His task was no less than finding a way to engineer an economic transformation, one that would restore the traditional promise of middle-class American life: ample reward to finance the necessities of life -- housing, food, health care -for anyone willing to work for them. The disaster he inherited had rendered that promise inoperative. The economy had become dependent on the next fix from the fantasy dealer. First, the technology bubble of the 1990s, which juiced job growth through the willingness of investors to pour money into anything connected to the Internet. Then, the housing bubble, which unleashed a lucrative orgy on Wall Street while handing paper riches to anyone willing to buy a home -- all premised on the crackpot notion that housing prices could only rise. Obama had to help us back to reality, forging a sustainable form of commerce. That was never going to be easy. It would require investments into education and national infrastructure, and into potentially productive emerging industries, such as clean energy and the life sciences. Yet time and again, faced with the need to reach for

something dramatic and game-changing, Obama started out in compromise mode, quickly settling for initiatives that satisfied little more than the ability to declare progress on one front or another. Early
on, he delivered the $800 billion stimulus spending plan, which certainly made things less awful than they would have been absent that government largess, but fell well short of injecting the economy with lasting vigor. And virtually everything he has

engineered since has been weak, ineffectual and -- worst of all -- seemingly calculated for political benefit more than appreciable economic impact. The administrations housing rescue plan, which failed to grapple

with the financial incentives guiding the mortgage industry, handed out modest payment relief to people patient enough and lucky enough to navigate the process, but it was really an attempt to kick the can down the road: Persuade the markets that help was on the way, and hope that, meanwhile, the economy would heal itself, enabling more people to make their monthly payments. The bailouts of the financial system, which staved off a feared slide into the abyss, were calculated to buy time while health returned, spurring bankers to start lending anew to businesses hungry for capital. The bailouts restored order in a fashion: fat banking profits are back, along with bonuses for the people with the corner offices. But none of this has translated into healthy flows of capital to productive parts of the economy. The bankers dont feel like lending, because they have no confidence there are good loans to be made in a weak economy. Worst of all, the would-be customers even the creditworthy ones dont feel like borrowing, because they dont see many productive ways to invest money, not in an economy with permanently elevated unemployment. We do not live in an autocracy, of course. Obama must contend with another branch of government known as the Congress,

where political posturing and stagecraft always seems to trump the actual needs of the regular people. Anyone who thinks Obama could have easily prescribed and administered the proper medicine is in cosmic denial about the extent to which dysfunction grips Washington. That said, this White House has aided and abetted its adversaries through a strategically foolish attempt to carve out a position of seeming responsibility on the federal budget deficit. Back in 2009, just as he stepped into office,
Obama could have told us that all options were bad (not to mention inherited from his predecessor): We could add to our debts, accepting the long-term risks, while investing in a meaningful future that holds the promise of putting Americans back to work; or we could obsess about the deficits, listen to Republicans who delivered it (via wars, reckless tax cuts, and the Great Recession) and start hacking away at spending. Instead, Obama began talking like a deficit hawk, even as he unleashed the

stimulus spending package, thereby handing the Republicans the club they have been using to beat him with (along with the national interest) ever since.

No peak oil- discovery of shale will dominate the market Reuters 8/3- Oil Utica http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/column-oil-utica-

idUSN1E7720GR20110803

One of the big surprises in recent years for the oil market has been the

reversion of the steady decline in U.S. crude output and the emergence of its shale sector as a nontrivial source of global supply growth . New unconventional shale oil plays, such as the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas, have transformed within a few short years from highly speculative exploration projects to potentially major oil producers. Eagle Ford, which as recently as 2009 was still often described as a new frontier in natural gas production, is now seen becoming a major crude oil production center. Already the area is smashing through output forecasts as companies lever strong cash flows due to high oil prices to develop the technical expertise to drill more quickly and productively into the seemingly prolific play. Most significantly for the global oil market, the shale plays have emerged as a source of non-OPEC production capacity growth. While these

crudes will not enter into global trade flows, they will chip away at North America's crude oil import requirements. Moreover, forecasters are only just getting a grip on the significance of shale oil. Projections for 2012 output are being ripped up as productivity in the sector exceeds all but the most aggressive forecast s. The International
Energy Agency forecast in mid-July that the United States would produce approximately 7.9 million barrels per day in 2012, with shale oil driving a modest increase in production from 2011. But between June and July the U.S. Energy Information Administration boosted its own forecast for 2012 liquids production by a startling 170,000 bpd. Further revisions may be in the offing. Consultancy Bentek

said last week Eagle Ford output had more than doubled in the last two months to 160,000 barrels per day and was on track to grow fivefold by 2015.

No Peak Oil- Oil Stabilizing


Oil prices are stabilizing- recent drop in prices proves UPI 8/3- Crude Oil Prices Slide http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2011/08/03/Crude-oil-

prices-slide-Wednesday/UPI-71191312381559/
Crude oil prices dropped under $92 per barrel Wednesday in New York on continued signals the economic recovery is floundering. Prices are still adjusting to a series of weak economic indicators including a disappointing 1.3
percent growth in the gross domestic product in the second quarter and June's 0.2 percent drop in consumer spending. September

delivery West Texas Intermediate crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange dropped $1.86 to $91.93 per barrel. Home heating oil prices shed 7.27 cents to $3.0189 per gallon. Reformulated blendstock gasoline lost 10.6 cents to $2.9313 per gallon. Henry Hub natural gas prices lost 6.5 cents from a recent settlement to $4.09 per million British thermal units. At the pump, the national average price of unleaded gasoline dropped slightly to $3.701 per gallon from Tuesday's $3.703, AAA said.

Shale Oil Solves Peak Oil


New reserves of shale solve peak oil crisis- causes no dependency on middle east oil Bunger and Crawford 4- Peter, consultant in energy policy, Harry, engineer of petroleum Is

Shale Oil Americas Answer to Peak Oil Challenge http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/publications/Pubs-NPR/40010-373.pdf While achieving total US energy independence is an unrealistic objective, it is conceivable that large-scale production of domestic oil shale, combined with continuing growth in tar sand and extra-heavy oil production, could make the US effectively independent of Persian Gulf oil supply sources. Achieving such a goal would have enormous economic, strategic, US oil shale resources possess the same characteristics of accessibility, richness, production assurance, and high product quality as Alberta tar sand resources. Perhaps the surest way for America to add large quantities of proved US reserves is to demonstrate the commercial viability of oil shale. A recent report by the US Department of Energys Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves (NPOSR) details the strategic significance of Americas oil shale for military and domestic needs.3 4 The report suggests that the richness and magnitude of Americas oil shale resources warrants management as a long-term strategic resource, complementing the shorterterm response capability offered by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Development of US oil shale resources could take a decade or more after start-up to mature fully. As with the Canadian tar sand, it may need to weather start-up technology performance issues and occasional, lower petroleum- price cycles.With the advent of a peak in oil production, crude oil prices almost certainly will remain elevated, however, reducing the historic investment risk of low oil prices.

Predictability there are millions of representations that we cant predict the resolution says USFG so we should debate that predictability is key to fairness Education policy discussions foster better informed debate that can be adapted to the real world Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor at Central European University, The enduring dilemmas of realism in International
Relations, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, December 2001, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gus02/gus02.pdf, accessed 8/13/02 Contrary to Waltz, Gunther Hellmann does not leave the debate at this unfinished stage. Starting from the same Friedmanian pragmatist grounding that a

theory is good as long as it works or functions, he wants a return to the common language of academia and practice by pushing academia back to the language of the practitioner, yet by keeping the advantage of
the outside observer. More openly than Waltz, he plays down the need for scientific respectability, but by offering a more philosophically grounded argument. The

grounding is provided by the recourse to the philosophy of science, more particularly to has done the job in undermining the credentials of positivism and all what comes with it. This move takes the ground away for the need of any of the classical justifications in IR theory. Any version of the
modern versions of pragmatism, represented in particular, but not only, by Richard Rorty. For Hellmann, pragmatism correspondence theory of truth, any version of scientific realism, any version of falsification is wrong-headed, if understood in a logical

pragmatism is also not succumbing to the sirens of poststructuralism whose theorising, according to him, is purely de-constructing and has lost any major connection with real problems.
theoretical way. Such devices are just this: scholarly habits devised through the tradition of a scientific community. But

1AC IMPACTS OUTWEIGH Global Warming Henderson 06 alt doesnt solve Global Warming and result in inevitable extinction. Space Colonialization Bolstrom 2003 not about securitizing an Others but fostering a livable future because of limited resources and overpopulation.
Evolutionary biology proves domination is inevitable Thayer, 4 [Bradley, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies and a former Fellow @ the Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict]

Evolutionary theory allows realists to advance offensive realist arguments without seeking an ultimate cause in either the anarchic international state system or in theological or metaphysical ideas. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusions, but the ultimate causal mechanism is
different: human evolution in the anarchic and perilous conditions of the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and most of the Holocene epochs. Specially, evolutionary theory explains why humans are egoistic, strive to dominate

others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions. These adaptations in turn serve as a foundation for offensive realism. The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and

maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary

adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great-so great that it is truly remarkable that a

mammal standing three feet high-without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift-survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to

last in those conditions. The environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination,

and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined
as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their familys or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources). Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances-humans are egoistic and concerned about food-and why some, particularly males, will seek to dominate others by maintaining a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, as the leaders of states

are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they respond to the actions of other states and as they make their own decisions.

And, Perm Do Both


Threats are real and Weezey aint racist not all politicians would make the same mistake and their evidence is based on out-dated Cold War theories Knudsen, 1 [Olav F., Sodertorn University College, Security Dialogue, 32.3, Desecuritizing Securitization] This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military establishment and decisionmakers goes, but its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just arent so anymore. In the postCold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period.
Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states really face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a

misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger referred to real phenomena, and they refer to real phenomena now . The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.

Perm Do Plan without Security Representations. You can only determine the value of policies by their outcomes and not intentions or premises
Waever 1998 [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Securitization and Desecuritization, On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]
From a more Nietzschean perspective, I should also mention that politics always involves an element of exclusion, in which one has to do violence to the inherent openness of situations, to impose a pattern--and one has not only to remember but also to forget selectively. 77 To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things

in one direction instead of another. Whether such an act is "good" or "bad" is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises, but by its effects (which depend on the actions of others, interaction
and, therefore, an element of coincidence). As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian." 78 Acting politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and

"progressiveness" is never guaranteed by one's political or philosophical attitude. Theoretical practices, as well as any political ones, have to risk their own respectability and leave traces, letting posterity tell the story about the meaning of an act. Post-structuralists have usually been arguing that their project is about opening up, implicitly arguing that a situation was too closed, too self-reproducing. Politics is inherently about closing off options, about forcing the stream of history in particular directions.

In the present context, politics and responsibility can involve prevention and limitation and, at times, the tool of securitization may seem necessary. It is thus not impossible that a post-structuralist
79

concerned about risks of power rivalry and wars will end up supporting a (re)securitization of "Europe" through rhetorics such as that of integration/fragmentation. The purpose of this would be to impose limits, but it would have as a side-effect some elements of state-building linked to the EU project. This could therefore imply that national communities might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of identity questions in order to handle the stress from Europeanization. Under such circumstances, there might emerge a complementarity between nations engaging in societal security and the new quasi-state engaging in "European security." Neither of these two moves are reflections of some objective "security" that is threatened; they are, instead, possible speech acts , moving issues into a security frame so as to achieve effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a nonsecurity mode.

Even in the context of cooperation, the history of the space programs across the world is best explained and navigated by realism Sheehan 2007 [Michael The International Politics of Space Series: Space Power and Politics Series editors: Everett C. Dolman and John Sheldon Both School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Air, Maxwell, USA http://bib.tiera.ru/dvd64/Sheehan%20M.%20%20The%20International%20Politics%20of%20Space%282007%29%28248%29.pdf
As with the skies in the early twentieth century, space

evolved from being seen simply as an environment in which the use of force on the ground might be aided, to a dimension in which combat would take place, as each side sought to exploit the military use of space, and deny its use to the enemy. The logic of the inevitability of such developments is in line with the realist approach to international relations, and it is similarly a self-fulfi lling prophecy to the extent that states act as if it was true. Neorealism can also be felt to be validated by the convergence in goals that has occurred over
the same period. By the mid-1980s the various space programmes had obvious similarities, but also important differences. A key feature of the neorealist explanation of international relations is the argument that the security dilemma compels states to behave in

essentially similar ways if they are to survive and prosper. The constraints of the system drive states to become functionally alike in the security realm. There is evidence to support this claim in the evolution of several space programmes in the past three decades. The programmes of Japan and the European Space Agency, for example, originally had no military dimension, while those of China and India lacked a manned presence in space, nor did any of these national and international programmes seem to feel that these absences constituted a signifi cant weakness. In the past two decades, however, the various programmes have become increasingly similar in terms of their content and objectives. Europe and Japan have now added a military dimension, while China has acquired a manned programme and India has announced its intention to do so.
These developments appear to validate the neorealist argument that states in the international system differ in capability, but exhibit a similarity in objectives and process, and indeed are obliged to do so by the nature of the system.25 Neorealists like Waltz argue that states are obliged

to be functionally alike, that they tend to operate with a similar range of instruments and to use them in remarkably similar ways, constrained only by the comparative resources available to them. Against this, realist
assumptions about the likelihood of competition in the international anarchy are not necessarily borne out by the history of space policy. For realists, states are not inclined to cooperate unless there are compelling reasons to do so, because of the mutual insecurity they experience under the security dilemma. Weber, for example, argues that international cooperation is likely to be limited, and where it does occur, will be tenuous, unstable and limited to issues of peripheral importance.26 In space policy, however, states have frequently sought out

opportunities to cooperate and have often self-consciously seen this as a possible way to mitigate the dangers inherent in an adversarial relationship such as that between the superpowers during the Cold War,27 or between China and Russia. Some realist proponents allow for such cooperation. Glaser, for example ,argues that there will be circumstances where a states best security strategy will be cooperation rather than competition.28 For realists, statesmanship is about mitigating and managing, not eliminating confl ict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one.29 There is clearly an appropriate place for international cooperation in such a world view, though it is not seen as overcoming the essentially confl ictual nature of international relations. Thus, space activity brought an alteration in the visible measurement of power, in its image, but not in the underlying fundamentals. Given the dominance of realist thinking in the early years of the space age therefore, it was always likely that competition, rather than cooperation, would be the dominant political theme.30

Realism is the only way to prevent war.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great

Power Politics,
It should be apparent from this discussion that offensive

realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world. One might ask, if the theory describes how great powers act, why is it necessary to stipulate how they
should act? The imposing constraints of the system should leave great powers with little choice but to act as the theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they sometimesalthough not oftenact in contradiction to the theory. These are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see, such foolish

behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.

ALT CANNOT SOLVE Alt only reject security discourse in the 1AC meaning they cant access all their impact claims. Means they cannot access any root cause claim against the aff.

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