FBG Duck Murder Case Proffer

Case: 1:21-cr-00618 Document #: 191 Filed: 08/04/23 Page 1 of 68 PageID #:838
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 21 CR 618
v.
Honorable Martha M. Pacold
CHARLES LIGGINS, et al.
GOVERNMENT’S SANTIAGO PROFFER AND MOTION TO ADMIT

EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E)
Respectfully submitted,
MORRIS PASQUAL
Acting United States Attorney
By: /s/ Jason A. Julien

JASON A. JULIEN
ANN MARIE E. URSINI
CAITLIN WALGAMUTH
Assistant United States Attorneys
219 S. Dearborn Street, Rm. 500
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-5300
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 1
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSPIRACY TO MURDER CARLTON WEEKLY IN AID OF
RACKETEERING, AS CHARGED IN COUNT THREE OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT...... 2
III. OVERVIEW OF O-BLOCK AS AN ENTERPRISE ENGAGED IN RACKETEERING ACTIVITY.
3
A. O-Block is an enterprise as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section
1959(b)(2). ...................................................................................................................... 3
B. O-Block engaged in racketeering activity as defined in Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1959(b)(1) and 1961(1). ......................................................................... 6
C. O-Block has a deadly rivalry with STL/EBT dating back at least a decade. .... 7
D. O-Block is “cliqued up” with neighboring Black Disciple factions. .................... 9
E. “Dead Bitches”...................................................................................................... 9
IV. GOVERNING LAW ................................................................................................. 10
A. Existence of and Membership in the Conspiracy ............................................. 10
B. “In Furtherance of” the Conspiracy .................................................................. 14
C. Alternative Bases for Admissibility of Statements .......................................... 17
i. A Defendant’s Own Statements............................................................................ 17
ii. Non-Hearsay Statements...................................................................................... 18
iii. Statements Against Penal Interest ................................................................... 19
iv. Co-Conspirator statements after Crawford ...................................................... 20
V. THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHARGED CONSPIRACY
AND THE DEFENDANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY ......................................... 21
A. The Conspiracy to Murder Carlton Weekly on August 4, 2020 ....................... 22
i. Ralph Turpin and Witness 2 saw Weekly inside of Milani Boutique. ................ 22
ii. Smart, Roberson, Liggins, Thomas, and Offerd began making their way to E. Oak
Street to murder Weekly. ............................................................................................ 23
iii. Roberson made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to Cooperator 4,
acknowledging that Roberson was on his way to murder Weekly............................. 25
iv. Turpin placed at least one phone call to report Weekly’s Location. ................ 26
v. Smart, Roberson, Thomas, Liggins, and Offerd murdered Weekly and then split
up in different directions. ............................................................................................ 31
vi. Offerd made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to Witness 6. ........ 31
vii. Roberson made additional statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to
Cooperator 4. ................................................................................................................ 33
i
viii. Roberson made additional statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to

Witness 7, this time, for purposes of concealment. .................................................... 35
ix. CPD seized Roberson’s Chrysler 300 the day after the murder, and Roberson
called CPD to get it back. ............................................................................................ 36
x. Charles Liggins made statements in furtherance of concealment of the conspiracy
to murder Weekly. ....................................................................................................... 38
B. O-Block Chains .................................................................................................. 38
C. Social Media ....................................................................................................... 48
D. Tattoos ................................................................................................................ 54
VI. COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS ............................................................................ 56
VII. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 60
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beeson v. United States 90 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1937) .................................................. 16
Bourjaily v. United States 483 U.S. 171 (1987) .......................................................... 11
Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 (2004)................................................... 10, 20, 21
Davis v. Washington 547 U.S. 813 (2006) ................................................................... 10
Garlington v. O(Leary 879 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1989) .................................................. 16
Salinas v. United States 522 U.S. 52 (1997) ............................................................... 13
United States v. Alviar 573 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2009) ....................................... 1, 11, 15
United States v. Ashman 979 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1992) .............................................. 16
United States v. Ayala 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010) .................................................. 14
United States v. Bolivar 532 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 14
United States v. Bustamante 493 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2007)........................................ 15
United States v. Coe 718 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1983) ..................................................... 12
United States v. Cox 923 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) ..................................................... 15
United States v. Cozzo 2004 WL 1151630 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ......................................... 15
United States v. Cruz-Rea 626 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2010) ................................ 10, 14, 15
United States v. Curry 977 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1992) ................................................ 20
United States v. Curtis 37 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................................... 16
United States v. Curtis 324 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2003) ................................................. 13
United States v. Feldman 825 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1987) ............................................. 14
United States v. Gajo 290 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2002) ........................................ 15, 16, 19
United States v. Gaytan 649 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2011) ......................................... 17, 18
United States v. Gil 604 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1979) ...................................................... 12
iii
United States v. Godinez 110 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 1997) .............................................. 17
United States v. Guyton 36 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................................. 12
United States v. Hamilton 19 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1994)........................................ 19, 20
United States v. Handlin 366 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2004) ............................................. 13
United States v. Hargrove 508 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2007) ...................................... 10, 20
United States v. Harris 585 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2009) ...................................... 1, 11, 12
United States v. Haynes 582 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................................... 15
United States v. Herrera-Medina 853 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1988) ........................... 12, 19
United States v. Hoover 246 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2001) .............................................. 10
United States v. Irorere 228 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2000) ................................................ 12
United States v. Johnson 200 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2000) ....................................... 14, 15
United States v. Johnson 592 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010) ............................................. 12
United States v. Johnson No. 08 CR 466, 2011 WL 809194 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2011) 57
United States v. Jones 275 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................................. 13
United States v. Kaden 819 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1987) ................................................. 16
United States v. Lewis 641 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................................. 19
United States v. Lindemann 85 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 16
United States v. Longstreet 567 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2009) .......................................... 13
United States v. Loscalzo 18 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1994) ............................................... 11
United States v. Mahkimetas 991 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1993) ....................................... 14
United States v. Maholias 985 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1993) ............................................ 17
United States v. Maloney 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995) ............................................... 16
United States v. Martinez de Ortiz 907 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1990) .............................. 11
United States v. McClellan 165 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1999) .......................................... 57
iv
United States v. Molinaro 877 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989) .......................................... 15
United States v. Molt 772 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................................... 15
United States v. Montana 199 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 1999) ............................................ 18
United States v. Monus 128 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1997) ................................................ 15
United States v. Nagib 56 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................... 19
United States v. Nicksion 628 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2010) ....................................... 10, 20
United States v. Noble 754 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1985) ................................................ 13
United States v. Petrozziello 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977) ........................................... 10
United States v. Potts 840 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1987) ................................................... 17
United States v. Prieto 549 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2008) .................................................. 16
United States v. Rea 621 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2010) ..................................................... 15
United States v. Rivera 136 F. App’x 925 (7th Cir. 2005) .......................................... 16
United States v. Santiago 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978)................................. 1, 10, 11
United States v. Smalls 605 F.3d 765 (10th Cir. 2010) .............................................. 20
United States v. Sophie 900 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1990) .................................. 13, 15, 16
United States v. Stephenson 53 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1995)........................................... 16
United States v. Thompson 944 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991) ........................................ 10
United States v. Tuchow 768 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................. 12, 18, 19
United States v. Van Daal Wyk 840 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988)........................ 12, 15, 19
United States v. Volpendesto 746 F.3d 273 (7th Cir.) ........................................... 20, 21
United States v. Watson 525 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 20
United States v. Westmoreland 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................... 19
Rules
Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) ..................................................................................................... 18
v
Fed. R. Evid.801(d)(2)(E) ..................................................................................... passim
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) .............................................................................................. 17
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) .................................................................................. 1
vi
The United States of America, by its attorney, Morris Pasqual, Acting United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, submits the following proffer of
evidence as to the admission at trial of certain coconspirator statements against
defendants Charles Liggins, Kenneth Roberson, Tacarlos Offerd, Christopher
Thomas, Marcus Smart, and Ralph Turpin, and moves for the admission of such
statements pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E), and
United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
In this submission, the government describes the law governing coconspirator
statements, outlines some of its evidence establishing the violent crimes in aid of
racketeering (“VCAR”) conspiracy charged in Count Three of the superseding
indictment, and sets forth some of the coconspirator statements for which a pretrial
ruling by the Court is requested, in accordance with Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1130-31,
and established practice in this Circuit. See United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 540
(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Harris, 585 F.3d 394, 398, 400 (7th Cir. 2009).
This submission does not detail all of the government’s evidence that would
establish the existence of the VCAR conspiracy or all of the coconspirator statements
that were made in furtherance of the charged racketeering conspiracy. Rather, this
submission highlights for the Court certain of the government’s evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of the VCAR conspiracy described in Count Three of the
superseding indictment and the participation of the coconspirators. As a result, this
submission does not list all of the government’s evidence and witnesses, nor does it
1
provide all of the evidence that will be presented by identified witnesses. Finally, by
presenting statements attributed to particular witnesses, the government is not
committing to call each of the witnesses for each of the statements attributed.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSPIRACY TO MURDER CARLTON WEEKLY IN AID OF

RACKETEERING, AS CHARGED IN COUNT THREE OF THE SUPERSEDING
INDICTMENT.
On the afternoon of August 4, 2020, Carlton Weekly, who made music under
the stage name “FBG Duck,” was shopping for clothes for his son’s birthday in Milani
Boutique on East Oak Street in the Gold Coast. At approximately 3:59 p.m., Ralph
Turpin and a friend of Turpin’s entered into Milani Boutique and noticed Weekly.
Weekly is a Gangster Disciple from the “STL” faction. Turpin did not like Weekly
prior to August 4, 2020, and knew to call rival Weekly’s rival gang members who
would come downtown to kill Weekly. As a result, as set forth in further detail below,
Turpin made at least one phone call inside of Milani Boutique to Weekly’s rival gang
members to come downtown to kill Weekly.
Approximately three minutes after Turpin entered Milani Boutique, at about
4:02 p.m., O-Block Black Disciples, who have a bitter, deadly rivalry with the STL
Gangster Disciples, began scrambling to make their way downtown. They departed
their neighborhood at approximately 4:06 p.m. in two cars, with Kenneth Roberson,
Charles Liggins, and Christopher Thomas inside of Roberson’s gray Chrysler 300,
and Tacarlos Offerd and Marcus Smart inside of Offerd’s black Ford Fusion. By the
time the two cars arrived on E. Oak Street, at 4:26 p.m., Weekly was standing outside
of a different store, Dolce & Gabbana, waiting to go inside. A total of four shooters—
2
two from each car—exited and fired 38 times in 12 seconds, hitting Weekly 16 times,
the person standing behind Weekly in line three times (“Victim 1”), and Weekly’s
friend who was in her car two times (“Victim 2”). Turpin was standing across the
street on the phone watching as the shooting unfolded.
Roberson, Liggins, Smart, Thomas, and Offerd have each been identified from
surveillance footage inside of the Parkway Gardens Homes (“Parkway Gardens”) on
the south side of Chicago, from which they departed to murder Weekly, and to which
Roberson, Liggins, and Thomas returned after the murder. Offerd, who had just
purchased his Ford Fusion on July 28, 2020, returned it to the dealership
immediately after the murder, but, along with Smart, was picked up from the
dealership by a former girlfriend. The five of them have been identified in the
surveillance video by friends, a security guard at Parkway Gardens, girlfriends,
fellow gang members, a rival gang member, and other witnesses. Similarly, Turpin
was captured on audio and video confessing to what he had done inside of Milani
Boutique, although Turpin did not know he was being recorded.
III. OVERVIEW OF O-BLOCK AS AN ENTERPRISE ENGAGED IN RACKETEERING

ACTIVITY.
A. O-Block is an enterprise as defined in Title 18, United States

Code, Section 1959(b)(2).
O-Block is a street gang and criminal enterprise situated in Parkway Gardens
on the south side of Chicago. O-Block is a faction of the larger Black Disciples street
gang. Parkway Gardens is a fenced-in apartment complex consisting of
approximately 35 buildings and is located between approximately 63rd Street and 66th
3
Street on S. Dr. Martin King Jr. Drive. Because Parkway Gardens is fenced-in and
employs security guards at various checkpoints, O-Block members and Black
Disciples from neighboring, allied factions have described Parkway Gardens as a
“fortress” and “headquarters.” This setup makes it difficult for opposing gang
members to easily ambush O-Block members.
O-Block is comprised of members who engage in violent criminal acts,
including murder and assault. O-Block is also comprised of drug dealers. Some O-
Block members make “drill” music, often bragging about their criminal activities,
publicly claiming responsibility for acts of violence committed by O-Block, taunting
rival gang members, and mocking opposing gang members and their associates who
have been murdered. O-Block members also use social media platforms to promote
O-Block and disparage their rivals.
At times material to the allegations in the superseding indictment, O-Block
had meetings where O-Block business was discussed, including acts of violence
committed against O-Block members and violence to be committed against O-Block
rivals. For example, Cooperator 1, a Black Disciple initiated through the “Newtown”
faction, but who lived in Parkway Gardens from approximately 2006 or 2007 to 2011
and continued to be active as a Black Disciple while living in Parkway Gardens may
testify at trial. If Cooperator 1 is called to testify at trial, the government expects that
Cooperator 1 will testify that while he lived in Parkway Gardens, O-Block members
(O-Block was called “WiiiC City” at that time) would have weekly or bi-weekly
meetings with $20 dues that were paid at each meeting. If a member did not pay
4
dues, that member would be charged interest for unpaid dues. The money was pooled
together for various purposes, including memorials and funerals for deceased
members, bond money for members, and for purchasing firearms. Cooperator 1
continued to live close to Parkway Gardens after moving out of Parkway Gardens in
2011.
Cooperator 2, a current O-Block member, may also testify at trial. If called to
testify at trial, the government expects that Cooperator 2 will testify that he moved
to Parkway Gardens in the late 2000s and became an O-Block member in
approximately 2007. Cooperator 2 will testify that O-Block members continue to have
meetings, and that only shooters and drug dealers are invited to the meetings.
Cooperator 2 has been to meetings where firearms and narcotics were distributed to
O-Block members. Cooperator 2 will testify that, at the times material to the
superseding indictment, O-Block had structure, a hierarchy, and rules that O-Block
members were expected to abide by. Both Cooperator 1 and Cooperator 2 will testify
that O-Block members may have received a “violation” if they did not abide by the
rules, including, but not limited to, an organized beating, and that violations for O-
Block members were discussed in meetings.
Cooperator 2 will testify that, at times material to the superseding indictment,
the leaders of O-Block were “Boss Top” [known to law enforcement as Individual A],
“Duke” [known to law enforcement as Individual B], “BJ” [known to law enforcement
as Individual C], defendant Charles Liggins, and Dayvon Bennett, a/k/a “King Von,”
when he was alive. Bennett was murdered in Atlanta, Georgia, on or about November
5
6, 2020. Cooperator 1 and Cooperator 2 may testify that defendant Marcus Smart
began to emerge as a leader within O-Block after Bennett was murdered. According
to Cooperator 2, Smart kept a fund for commissary and bond for incarcerated O-Block
members, but Smart wouldn’t necessarily collect the money at meetings. Smart would
go around every week or every other week and collect $100 from members. According
to Cooperator 2, this has been going on in O-Block for “forever.”
B. O-Block engaged in racketeering activity as defined in Title 18,

United States Code, Sections 1959(b)(1) and 1961(1).
The government expects that Cooperator 1, if called, will testify that O-Block
members made their money by committing burglaries and robberies, and by selling
drugs when he lived in Parkway Gardens. According to Cooperator 1, O-Block
members controlled the drug trade inside of Parkway Gardens when he lived there
and continue to do so today. According to Cooperator 1, O-Block members would use
vacant apartments to store firearms and narcotics, and no one could sell drugs inside
of Parkway Gardens without the permission of the O-Block members.
The government expects that if called, Cooperator 2 will testify that marijuana,
“pills,” and heroin are distributed in the meetings. Cooperator 2 has personally seen
O-Block members selling heroin and marijuana in Parkway Gardens, and Cooperator
2 himself was a drug dealer. O-Block members are generally the only people who can
sell drugs in Parkway Gardens, and O-Block members enforce that. However,
according to Cooperator 2, other people who are not O-Block members can come into
Parkway Gardens and sell drugs if they pay a percentage.
6
According to Cooperator 2, O-Block members are expected to shoot at opposing
gang members, and that is the only way to rise through the ranks in O-Block outside
of having a lot of money from selling drugs or making music. Killers have more
respect within O-Block than people who just shoot, and killing a high-profile
opposition member—often referred to as an “opp”—will increase status within O-
Block even more.
C. O-Block has a deadly rivalry with STL/EBT dating back at least

a decade.
Cooperator 2 lived in Parkway Gardens and was active as a younger O-Block
member back when O-Block was still called WiiiC City. Odee Perry, an O-Block
member, was murdered by STL member Gakirah Barnes on August 11, 2011.1 STL
member Cooperator 3, who may testify at trial, will testify if called that Gakirah was
his sister and he has first-hand knowledge that she murdered Perry. Thereafter,
Cooperator 2 will testify, WiiiC City became known as O-Block in Odee Perry’s
memory.2 The antagonism between O-Block and STL increased after Perry’s murder.
Cooperator 2 will testify that O-Block members were expected to shoot at and kill
STL members in order to maintain or increase their status within O-Block, and that
killing a high-profile STL member would substantially increase an O-Block member’s
status. If an O-Block member did not shoot at the opps, that person would from then
1 Pronounced Ja-ky-ruh Barnes.
2Cooperator 2 may also testify that WiiiC City was briefly known as “Keta World” after a
beloved Parkway Gardens resident named Keta passed away from natural causes shortly
before Odee Perry was murdered.
7
on be treated like a “goofy.” Which is to say, at a minimum, that person’s status would
decrease.
Cooperator 3 will testify that he has witnessed murders committed by O-Block
members in STL territory. Specifically, the government expects that Cooperator 3
will testify that he witnessed the murder of Dale Fischer, a/k/a “Squirrel,” in STL
territory in December 2011. According to Cooperator 3, Fischer was not a gang
member, but lived in STL territory. Fischer was murdered by O-Block member “T.
Roy” [known to law enforcement as James T. Johnson] and “600” member “D. Rose”
[known to law enforcement as Individual D]. As explained in further detail below,
600 is a Black Disciple faction allied with O-Block.
Cooperator 3 was also present for and witnessed the murder of his sister
Gakirah Barnes by O-Block member Dayvon Bennett in STL territory on April 14,
2014. Cooperator 3 was also shot by Bennett during the incident. Cooperator 3 was
able to escape and saw Johnson waiting for him at the end of the alley he was about
to run through, so instead Cooperator 3 was able to wait until Bennett and Johnson
left. Before leaving, Cooperator 3 observed Bennett stand over Barnes and shoot her
multiple times. Witness 1, who may also testify at trial, also observed this murder.
Witness 1 later saw Bennett come back to the neighborhood after the murder and
state, in a threatening manner, that Bennett was from O-Block.
Cooperator 3 will testify if called that STL members and O-Block members
antagonized each other online, including with respect to deceased O-Block and STL
members. Specifically, Cooperator 3 may testify that O-Block member Individual A
8
antagonized Cooperator 3 after Barnes’s murder during a FaceTime call, with
Individual A claiming to be the one who drove the shooters to STL territory.
D. O-Block is “cliqued up” with neighboring Black Disciple

factions.
Cooperator 2 will testify if called that O-Block is “cliqued up” or allied with
several neighboring Black Disciple factions. O-Block and “600” have been cliqued up
since Cooperator 2 became an O-Block member. Cooperator 2 will testify that O-Block
later became cliqued up with “Lamron” (64th Street and Normal Blvd.) in the early
2010s, and THF (which stands for “Trigger Happy Family”), sometimes referred to as
THF 46 and THF 44, shortly thereafter. If a gang faction is “cliqued up” with another
gang faction, they work together and inherit and adopt each other’s conflicts. So, if
600 or THF is cliqued up with O-Block, 600 and THF would also be in conflict with
STL.
E. “Dead Bitches”
On July 10, 2020, Weekly released a song entitled “Dead Bitches.” According
to a number of witnesses who will testify, including Cooperator 2, rappers from STL
and rappers from O-Block, 600, and Lamron would often disparage the other side in
their music. Dead Bitches, however, was a particularly blistering diss record. In the
song, Weekly raps in a disrespectful manner about a number of dead O-Block
members, including Odee Perry, T. Roy [Johnson], Keta, and Sheroid Liggins,
defendant Liggins’s younger brother. The government expects that Cooperator 2 and
others will identify the names of individuals disrespected in the song at trial.
9
As of August 4, 2023, Dead Bitches has almost 41 million views on YouTube.3
Weekly currently has approximately 430,000 subscribers to his YouTube channel.
IV. GOVERNING LAW
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a “statement” is not
hearsay if it “is offered against a party” and is “a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Admission of such
coconspirator statements against a defendant is proper where the government
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the
defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statements
were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v.
Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2010).4
A. Existence of and Membership in the Conspiracy
In accord with United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978), this
Court must determine whether statements by the defendants’ coconspirator will be
admissible at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). In making this
determination, this Court must decide “if it is more likely than not that the declarant
and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was
made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy ….” Id. at 1143
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKaJT8yWbGs (last viewed August 4, 2023).
4 No Sixth Amendment confrontation issues arise by the use of a non-testifying

coconspirator=s statements, offered for their truth against a defendant because they are not
testimonial. United States v. Nicksion, 628 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24 (2006) and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004));
see also United States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 448-49 (7th Cir. 2007) (coconspirator
statements are neither hearsay nor testimonial).
10
(quoting United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977)); see also United
States v. Hoover, 246 F.3d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 2001). If this Court determines the
statements are admissible, the jury may consider them for any purpose. United States
v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1345 (7th Cir. 1991).
Under Santiago, the government must make a preliminary offer of evidence to
show: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendants and declarant were members of the
conspiracy; and (3) the statements sought to be admitted were made during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Santiago, 582 F.2d at 1134-35; see also, e.g., United
States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). According to Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987), the court can consider the statements in question
(the statements to be admitted) to determine whether the three Santiago criteria
have been met.
Seventh Circuit cases construing Bourjaily have held that properly admitted
hearsay, including statements admitted under the coconspirator exception to the
hearsay rule (Fed. R. Evid.801(d)(2)(E)), may be used to prove what another person
did or said that may demonstrate their membership in the conspiracy. United States
v. Loscalzo, 18 F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hile only the defendant’s acts or
statements could be used to prove that defendant’s membership in a conspiracy,
evidence of that defendant’s acts or statements may be provided by the statements of
co-conspirators.”); United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir.
1990) (en banc).
11
While this Court may consider the proffered statements themselves as
evidence of both the existence of a conspiracy and the defendants’ participation in it,
United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 178, 180 (1987); United States v. Harris, 585
F.3d 394, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2009), the contents of the proffered statements alone are
not sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant’s
participation. There must also be some supporting evidence or facts corroborating the
existence of the conspiracy and a defendant’s participation. Harris, 585 F.3d at 398-
99. The evidence showing the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant’s membership
in it may be either direct or circumstantial. See United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d
749, 754-55 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir.
2000).5
There is no requirement, under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), that the government
establish all elements of a conspiracy, such as a meeting of the minds and an overt
act. United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gil, 604
F.2d 546, 548-50 (7th Cir. 1979). The government need only establish the existence
of a joint venture for an illegal purpose (or for a legal purpose using illegal means)
5 The coconspirator statement rule does not apply when a statement is not being offered for
the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, statements by coconspirators may be admitted
against a defendant, without establishing the Bourjaily factual predicates set forth above,
when such statements are offered to show, for instance, the existence, the illegality, or the
nature or scope of the charged conspiracy. See United States v. Guyton, 36 F.3d 655, 658 (7th
Cir. 1994) (statement that defendant out of cocaine not hearsay because showed membership
in conspiracy); United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 564, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1988)
(addressing “war stories” about the drug trade); United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d
494, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1988) (statements had non-hearsay value to establish knowledge of and
membership in conspiracy); United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 867-69 (7th Cir. 1985)
(pre-conspiracy statements admissible to set scope of anticipated conspiracy).
12
and participation in the joint venture by the defendant and the maker of the
statement at issue (as well as that the statement was in furtherance of the venture).
“[I]t makes no difference whether the declarant or any other ‘partner in crime’ could
actually be tried, convicted and punished for the crime of conspiracy.” Gil, 604 F.2d
at 549-550; see also Coe, 718 F.2d at 835.
While there is thus a distinction between conspiracy law and admissibility
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), certain principles of general conspiracy law are relevant to
the Rule 801(d)(2)(E) inquiries. For instance, “[a] conspiracy may exist even if a
conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the
substantive offense.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997); see also United
States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 919 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 275
F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). The government need not prove that a defendant knew
each and every detail of the conspiracy or played more than a minor role in the
conspiracy. United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, a
defendant joins a criminal conspiracy if he agrees with another person to one or more
of the common objectives of the conspiracy; it is immaterial whether the defendant
knows, has met, or has agreed with every coconspirator. Longstreet, 567 F.3d at 919;
Jones, 275 F.3d at 652.
A defendant (or other declarant) may be found to have participated in a
conspiracy even if he joined or terminated his relationship with other conspirators at
different times than another defendant or coconspirator. United States v. Noble, 754
F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 590
13
(7th Cir. 2004) (“it is irrelevant when the defendant joined the conspiracy so long as
he joined it at some point”). Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a coconspirator’s statement is
admissible against conspirators who join the conspiracy after the statement is made.
United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1074 (7th Cir. 1990). A coconspirator who has
become inactive or less active in the conspiracy nevertheless is liable for his
coconspirators’ further statements unless he openly disavows the conspiracy or
reports it to the police. See United States v. Feldman, 825 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir.
1987).
The government is not required to prove the identity of the declarant; nor must
the declarant’s identity be confirmed in the statement itself. See United States v.
Bolivar, 532 F.3d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2008). Rather, the government need only prove
(from the statement, the context and/or other evidence) that the declarant was in fact
a coconspirator. Id.
B. “In Furtherance of” the Conspiracy
In determining whether a statement was made “in furtherance” of the
conspiracy, courts evaluate the statement in the context in which it was made and
look for a reasonable basis upon which to conclude that the statement furthered the
conspiracy. See Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d at 937; United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529,
533 (7th Cir. 2000). Under the reasonable basis standard, a statement may be
susceptible to alternative interpretations and still be “in furtherance” of the
conspiracy. Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d at 937-38. The “coconspirator’s statement need not
have been made exclusively, or even primarily, to further the conspiracy” in order to
14
be admissible under the coconspirator exception. Id. at 937 (quotations and citations
omitted). That statements were made to a government cooperating witness or
undercover agent does not bar admission of statements otherwise “in furtherance” of
the conspiracy. United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1993); see
also United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 268 (4th Cir. 2010).
“Courts have found a wide range of statements to satisfy the ‘in furtherance’
requirement.” United States v. Cozzo, 2004 WL 1151630 *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(collecting cases). In general, a statement that is “part of the information flow
between conspirators intended to help each perform his role” satisfies the “in
furtherance” requirement. United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 545 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quotations and citations omitted). See also United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 929
(7th Cir. 2002). These include statements made:
 to conduct or help to conduct the business of the scheme, United States v. Cox,
923 F.2d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d
529, 533 (7th Cir. 2000);6
 to recruit potential coconspirators, Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d at 937-38; United States

v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 705 (7th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2012);
 to identify other members of the conspiracy and their roles, Alviar, 573 F.3d at
545;
 to plan or to review a coconspirator’s exploits, United States v. Molt, 772 F.2d

366, 369 (7th Cir. 1985);
6Statements that prompt the listener to act in a manner that facilitates the carrying out of
the conspiracy are also made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy. See United States v. Monus,
128 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir. 1997).
15
 as an assurance that a coconspirator can be trusted to perform his role, United

States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1073-74 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 890-91 (7th Cir. 2007);
 to inform and update others about the current status of the conspiracy or a
conspiracy’s progress (including failures), United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595,
605 (7th Cir. 2010); Alviar, 573 F.3d at 545;
 to control damage to an ongoing conspiracy, United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d

529, 533 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1343-44
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir.
1988);
 to conceal a conspiracy where ongoing concealment is a purpose of the

conspiracy, Gajo, 290 F.3d at 928-29; United States v. Kaden, 819 F.2d 813,
820 (7th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 659-60 (7th
Cir. 1995);
 to reassure or calm the listener regarding the progress or stability of the

scheme, Sophie, 900 F.2d at 1073; Garlington v. O=Leary, 879 F.2d 277, 284
(7th Cir. 1989);
 to report conspirators’ status and in turn receive assurances of assistance from

coconspirators, United States v. Prieto, 549 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2008);
 “describing the purpose, method or criminality of the conspiracy,” United

States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 489 (7th Cir. 1992);
 statements to outsiders “to serve as a salesmanship technique to enhance his

position in the eyes of [the outsider] and give confidence about the ability of
the organization,” United States v. Stephenson, 53 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Curtis, 37 F.3d 301, 308 (7th Cir. 1994).
Finally, it has long been the rule that any statement made by a conspirator
during and in furtherance of a conspiracy is admissible against all coconspirators.
Beeson v. United States, 90 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1937); United States v. Lindemann, 85
F.3d 1232, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Rivera, 136 F. App’x 925,
926 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Whether any other conspirator heard (or, in this instance, saw)
that statement is irrelevant; agency, not knowledge, is the theory of admissibility.”).
16
C. Alternative Bases for Admissibility of Statements
Various statements made during the course of a conspiracy are independently
admissible and do not require a Rule 801(d)(2)(E) analysis. A defendant’s own
statements, for example, are admissible against him pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A),
without reference to the coconspirator statement rule.
i. A Defendant’s Own Statements
A defendant’s own admissions are relevant to establish the factual predicates
for the admission of coconspirator statements against him. See United States v.
Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1997). Many statements described herein and
sought to be admitted against the defendant are independently admissible and do not
require a Rule 801(d)(2)(E) analysis. A defendant’s own admissions, for example, are
admissible against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), without
reliance on the coconspirator-statement rule.7 See United States v. Maholias, 985 F.2d
869, 877 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a
“statement” is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . the
party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity”).
Additionally, a defendant’s own admissions are relevant to establishing the factual
predicates for the admission of coconspirator statements against him. See United
States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Potts, 840 F.2d
368, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1987).
7 Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that a “statement” is not hearsay if “[t]he
statement is offered against a party and is … the party’s own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity.”
17
Moreover, statements during a conversation with a defendant that are offered
by the government to provide context for a defendant’s statements are, as a general
matter, admissible as non-hearsay. For example, in United States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d
573 (7th Cir. 2011), the Seventh Circuit addressed the district court’s introduction of
a confidential informant’s recorded statements to the defendant. The Court held that
the challenged statements were non-hearsay because they were offered not for their
truth but to put the defendant’s “own words in context and to help the jury make
sense out of his reaction to what [the informant] said and did.” Id. at 580 (defendant’s
responses “would have been unintelligible without the context provided by [the
informant’s] statements”). Likewise, a statement that is incapable of verification—
such as a suggestion, question, offer, demand, or order—does not constitute hearsay
because it “do[es] not make any truth claims.” United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d
947, 950 (7th Cir. 1999).
ii. Non-Hearsay Statements
The coconspirator statement rule is not implicated where the relevant verbal
declaration is not a “statement” within the meaning of Rule 801(a), that is, not an
“assertion” subject to verification. An example would be an order or a suggestion. See
United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 868 n.18 (7th Cir. 1985). This is because a
“statement” is defined as “an oral or written assertion” or “nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). Thus, a
statement which is incapable of verification, such as an order or a mere suggestion,
18
is not hearsay and does not invoke a Rule 801(d)(2)(E) analysis. See Tuchow, 768 F.2d
at 868.
Finally, the coconspirator statement rule does not apply when a statement is
not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and thus does not constitute
“hearsay” as defined by Rule 801(c).8 Accordingly, statements by alleged
coconspirators may be admitted against a defendant, without establishing the
Bourjaily factual predicates set forth above, when such statements are offered simply
to show, for instance, the existence, the illegality, or the nature or scope of the charged
conspiracy. Gajo, 290 F.3d at 929-30; see also United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853
F.2d 564, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1988); Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 497-98; Tuchow, 768
F.2d at 867-69.
iii. Statements Against Penal Interest
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), a hearsay statement is admissible
if (1) the declarant is unavailable; (2) the statement was against the declarant’s penal
interest at the time it was made; and (3) corroborating circumstances exist indicating
that the statement is trustworthy. See United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773, 783 (7th
Cir. 2011). When determining whether a statement is against penal interest, each
portion of a proffered out-of-court statement is examined to determine whether it
subjected the declarant to criminal liability. United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d
618, 626 (7th Cir. 2001). A statement may satisfy this requirement if it would be
8Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.”
19
probative at trial against the declarant. United States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d 798, 804 (7th
Cir. 1995). Applying this standard, the Seventh Circuit has held that a declarant’s
inculpatory statements made to friends and acquaintances about crimes committed
by the declarant and his associates are admissible. See, e.g. United States v.
Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 357 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a jailhouse conversation
between two codefendants which incriminated a third codefendant but was also
inculpatory of the first two co-defendants was admissible against the third
codefendant); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1056 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming
the district court’s decision to allow a co-defendant’s inculpatory statement which also
incriminated the defendant in because it was not made in an attempt to curry favor
with law enforcement, but was made to an acquaintance).
Such statements against penal interest are admissible against non-declarant
defendants. See United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 288 (7th Cir.) cert. denied
sub nom. Sarno v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 382 (2014) and cert. denied sub nom.
Polchan v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 383 (2014); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d
583, 587-88 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 356 (7th Cir.
1994). See also United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 773-81 (10th Cir. 2010).9
iv. Co-Conspirator statements after Crawford
Only “testimonial” statements implicate the Confrontation Clause, Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and a statement made in furtherance of a
9 There is no Confrontation Clause problem since “[a] statement unwittingly made to a confidential
informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”
Watson, 525 F.3d at 589.
20
conspiracy is not a testimonial statement. United States v. Nicksion, 628 F.3d 368,
374 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting confrontation clause claim as to introduction of
coconspirator statements because such statements are not testimonial); United States
v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2007) (coconspirator statements are neither
hearsay nor testimonial). Further, even if a hearsay statement does not qualify for
admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), or any other hearsay exception, that fact alone
would not create a Confrontation Clause issue because only testimonial statements
implicate the right to confront a witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design
to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as . . . would an
approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether.”); see also Volpendesto, 746 F.3d at 289 (“[a] statement unwittingly made
to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for
Confrontation Clause purposes.”).
V. THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHARGED

CONSPIRACY AND THE DEFENDANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY
At trial, the government’s evidence will establish that Charles Liggins,
Kenneth Roberson, Tacarlos Offerd, Christopher Thomas, and Marcus Smart,
conspired with each other and others to murder Weekly for the purpose of
maintaining and increasing their position in O-Block, an enterprise engaged in
racketeering activity. At trial, the government’s evidence will also establish that
Ralph Turpin aided and abetted Weekly’s murder and the conspiracy to murder
Weekly.
21
As set forth below, the evidence that establishes the existence of this VCAR
conspiracy meets the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable at this stage
of the proceedings. Below, the government has summarized some of the evidence that
it will present at trial regarding the existence of the charged conspiracy.
A. The Conspiracy to Murder Carlton Weekly on August 4, 2020
i. Ralph Turpin and Witness 2 saw Weekly inside of Milani

Boutique.
According to video surveillance footage from several businesses along E. Oak
Street, CPD POD camera footage, cell phone video recorded by a security guard at a
store working on E. Oak Street (which captured defendant Ralph Turpin speaking on
the telephone), and Witness 2, who may testify at trial, Witness 2 and Turpin traveled
to E. Oak Street on the afternoon of August 4, 2020, to buy clothes for Witness 2’s
children. According to Victim 2 and video surveillance footage, Victim 2 and Weekly
had also traveled to E. Oak Street to purchase some presents for Weekly’s son’s
birthday. Victim 2, who drove Weekly to E. Oak Street that day, waited outside in
her vehicle parked on the street while Weekly shopped inside of their first stop of the
afternoon, Milani Boutique, located at 50 E. Oak Street. According to the owners of
Milani Boutique, who may testify at trial, Milani is a boutique that sells children’s
clothing and Weekly had shopped at the store before.
At approximately 3:59 p.m., while Weekly was inside of Milani, Turpin and
Witness 2 entered into Milani. While Turpin and Weekly were both still inside of
Milani, Turpin placed at least one phone call to alert others, including the named
defendants, that Weekly was inside of Milani. The government will introduce
22
evidence at trial of Turpin recounting this conversation minutes later, unaware that
he was being recorded. Minutes later, at approximately 4:02 p.m. the other five
named defendants began scrambling in Parkway Gardens to make their way
downtown to murder Weekly.
ii. Smart, Roberson, Liggins, Thomas, and Offerd began

making their way to E. Oak Street to murder Weekly.
Specifically, at approximately 4:02 p.m., Smart ran across a parking lot away
from where Offerd’s black Ford Fusion was parked and ran up a flight of stairs. Smart
ran past a group of three people by the stairwell, which included Roberson. Roberson
then turned and ran up the stairwell after Smart. After a few minutes, Smart ran
down the stairwell wearing different clothes, dressed in all black. Thomas ran down
next—dressed in all black (including a black, striped Adidas jacket) and putting a
black baseball cap onto his head—followed by Roberson, who was wearing the same
clothes he was wearing when he went up the stairs. Liggins came down last, also
dressed in dark clothing and a baseball cap turned to the back. Smart entered into
Offerd’s Ford Fusion while Liggins, Thomas, and Roberson entered into Roberson’s
gray Chrysler 300. The cars departed the parking lot in Parkway Gardens at
approximately 4:06 p.m.
A CPD license plate reader and multiple CPD Police Observation Devices
(“POD” and “POD camera”) captured the Chrysler and Fusion traveling from
Parkway Gardens to E. Oak Street at multiple points traveling in tandem. Roberson’s
Chrysler 300 was registered to Roberson on the day of the murder, and Offerd’s Ford
Fusion was registered to Offerd on the day of the murder.
23
(Roberson’s Chrysler 300 on the way to E. Oak Street)
(Offerd’s Ford Fusion on the way to E. Oak Street)
24
Based on the timing, the number of data points (at least one license plate
reader, eleven POD cameras (on the way to commit the murder), and private
surveillance footage), and the path that the vehicles traveled (I-90/94 to Lake Shore
Drive), the path and timing is consistent with the vehicles traveling directly from
Parkway Gardens to E. Oak Street without making any stops. This is corroborated
by data from Roberson’s cell phone. The data from Roberson’s cell phone is consistent
with Roberson traveling from Parkway Gardens directly to E. Oak Street at the time
of the murder, and then back to Parkway Gardens right after the murder.
iii. Roberson made statements in furtherance of the

conspiracy to Cooperator 4, acknowledging that Roberson
was on his way to murder Weekly.
According to Cooperator 4, who may testify at trial, and information retrieved
from Cooperator 4’s cell phone, Roberson and Cooperator 4 were exchanging text
messages while Roberson was traveling to murder Weekly, and shortly after
Roberson and his coconspirators had murdered Weekly. Specifically, Cooperator 4
and Roberson were exchanging text messages because Cooperator 4 was attempting
to return a firearm to Roberson. At 4:19 p.m., while POD camera footage would show
that Roberson was on Lake Shore Drive nearing E. Oak Street (which is corroborated
by Roberson’s cell phone data), Roberson texted Cooperator 4 to take the gun to
Parkway Gardens because they were “on Duck rn [right now],” meaning on the way
to kill Weekly.
25
iv. Turpin placed at least one phone call to report Weekly’s

Location.
Weekly exited Milani and entered into Victim 2’s vehicle at approximately 4:04
p.m. As stated above, Smart, Liggins, Roberson, Thomas, and Offerd appeared to
have received some news at approximately 4:02 p.m. and left Parkway Gardens at
approximately 4:06 p.m. traveling directly towards Weekly’s location on E. Oak
Street. Weekly and Victim 2 pulled away from the curb in front of Milani at
26
approximately 4:05 p.m., returning minutes later and parking in front of Dolce and
Gabbana. Dolce and Gabbana, located at 68 E. Oak Street, is on the same side of the
street as Milani. Turpin exited Milani—without Witness 2—at approximately 4:07
p.m. Turpin entered into a clothing store down and across the street, Moncler, located
at 33 E. Oak Street, at approximately 4:10 p.m. Turpin discussed what had occurred
inside of Milani while speaking on the phone inside of Moncler. Because Turpin was
speaking in a wild and agitated state, a security guard inside of Moncler began to
record him. The security guard, Witness 3, who may testify at trial, began recording
Turpin at 4:13 p.m.
27
Turpin asked someone that he was speaking to on the phone, “[w]hat’s D Thang
number?” and went on to tell the person to whom Turpin was speaking to have “D
Thang” call Turpin. Multiple witnesses are expected to testify that D Thang is Dontay
Banks, Jr., the older brother of Individual E.10 Multiple witnesses will testify that
individual E is a high-ranking Black Disciple and, at times material to the
superseding indictment, was and is a part of a Black Disciple faction allied with O-
Block, Lamron.
10 Dontay Banks, Jr., a/k/a D Thang, was murdered on or about June 6, 2021.
28
Minutes later, Turpin began discussing a woman who Turpin did not name
specifically, but who Turpin referenced as being in a romantic relationship with
Weekly and having Weekly around Turpin’s child. Turpin described the woman as
“bogus,” and went on to state, “It’s over with now though.” Witness 4, who may testify
at trial, identified Turpin in the video as her child’s father. Witness 4 also
acknowledged that she had been in a romantic relationship with Weekly, but was not
at the time of Weekly’s murder. Should Witness 4 testify at trial, the government
expects that Witness 4 will testify that she was heartbroken upon learning of
Weekly’s death because she loved Weekly. Witness 4 will also testify that, on the day
of Weekly’s murder, after Weekly’s murder, she received a text message from Turpin
that contained simply three laughing emojis. Witness 4 will testify that she was not
in regular contact with Turpin, as her child has a cell phone allowing Turpin and her
child to communicate directly.
Witness 5, who has known Turpin for many years and who may testify at trial,
will testify that prior to August 4, 2020, Turpin did not like Weekly over jealously
stemming from Weekly’s relationship with Witness 4.
While Turpin was discussing the unnamed woman, Turpin received an
incoming phone call from a telephone number associated with D Thang. Based upon
Turpin’s cell phone records Turpin’s other phone calls inside of Moncler and Milani
would have likely been video calls as opposed to calls using a telephone number.
However, this call from the telephone number associated with D Thang was an actual
telephone call. Turpin answered the phone call from the number associated with D
29
Thang at 4:18 p.m. Turpin told the caller that he and Witness 2 saw Weekly inside of
Milani. Turpin told the caller that Turpin had people on the phone and on the way
downtown while he, Weekly, and Witness 2 were still inside of Milani Boutique.
Turpin then told the caller that when Weekly left Milani, he followed Weekly outside
and reported as much to “Bad Ass” [known to law enforcement as THF member
Individual F]. According to Turpin, Bad Ass then told Turpin to see what kind of car
Weekly was getting into. Turpin then told the caller that Turpin was standing outside
of Milani when Weekly pulled off, and after walking up the street a little bit, someone
began chasing Turpin down the street with a gun.
Witness 2 may testify at trial that in the above exchange, Turpin was providing
Weekly’s location. Turpin eventually stood across the street from Weekly on the
phone for several minutes until Weekly was murdered at 4:26 p.m., walking over to
Weekly to get a better look after Weekly had been gunned down.
(Turpin in the white tee shirt and jeans while Weekly was lying in the street dying.
This camera view is approximately six minutes behind.)
30
v. Smart, Roberson, Thomas, Liggins, and Offerd murdered

Weekly and then split up in different directions.
According to video surveillance, Offerd’s Fusion and Roberson’s Chrysler 300
arrived at Dolce & Gabbana at approximately 4:26 p.m., with the Chrysler trailing
the Fusion. Two people, including Smart, exited from the passenger’s side of the
Fusion, and started shooting at Weekly while Weekly was standing on the sidewalk.
Weekly and Victim 1, who was in line behind Weekly, ran away from the shooters,
circled around the back of Victim 2’s car and attempted to hide, but the shooters
aggressively pursued Weekly. According to Victim 2, she picked up Weekly’s gun and
shot at the individuals who exited from Offerd’s Fusion. This detail is not public and
is significant for reasons that follow. Liggins and Thomas then exited from the
passenger’s side of Roberson’s Chrysler. The rear passenger, Thomas, stood over and
shot at Weekly while Weekly was on the ground. The shooting lasted about 12 seconds
in total, but the shooters fired 38 times, hitting Weekly 16 times, Victim 2 twice, and
Victim 1 three times. The shooters got back into their respective vehicles and
Roberson’s Chrysler pulled away from the scene first, followed by Offerd’s Fusion.
vi. Offerd made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy

to Witness 6.
Offerd purchased the Ford Fusion from Midway Autohaus in in Bridgeview,
Illinois, on July 28, 2020. On the date of the purchase, Offerd was accompanied by
Witness 6. Witness 6, who may testify at trial, is Offerd’s ex-girlfriend and the mother
of one of Offerd’s children. Offered lied about his employment on the financing
application for the vehicle, and, Witness 6 is expected to testify, Offerd manufactured
31
pay stubs in order to create the impression that he was employed. This was discovered
on or about August 3, 2020, prompting Offerd to begin a text message exchange with
an employee of Midway Autohaus on that day, continuing through August 4, 2020.
Witness 6 will testify that she assisted Offerd in negotiating what to say to Midway
Autohaus in terms of Offerd returning the vehicle, and that Offerd planned to return
the car on August 4, 2020.
According to cell phone records and photographs of the car dealership
employee’s text messages, at 4:35 p.m., approximately nine minutes after the murder,
Offerd texted the car dealership employee that Offerd was on his way to return the
car to the dealership. Witness 6 will testify that Offered spent the night at her house
on the night of August 3rd/morning of August 4th, and that she and Offerd had
discussed that she would give Offerd a ride home from the dealership when he was
ready. Witness 6 will testify that she received a phone call from Offerd the afternoon
of August 4th, awaking her from a nap, telling Witness 6: (1) that Offerd was on his
way to the dealership; (2) to meet him at the dealership; and (3) to text him the
address of the dealership. Shortly thereafter, Witness 6 texted Offerd the address for
the dealership at 4:39 p.m.
Witness 6 arrived at the dealership at approximately 5:15 p.m., beating Offerd
to the dealership. Offerd arrived 10-15 minutes later. Offered arrived at the
dealership with Smart and Offerd’s cousin, Ezell Rawls.11 Offerd then directed
Witness 6 to drop Offerd, Smart, and Rawls off at a different O-Block member’s
11 Rawls died by suicide on or about August 24, 2021.

32
residence, [Individual G], which she did. Witness 6 identified Individual G in photos
as an O-Block member. After Offerd instructed Witness 6 to take him, Smart, and
Rawls to Individual G’s house, the three did not speak for the remainder of the ride.
In approximately late August or early September 2021, Witness 6 became
aware of a video that a blogger made and uploaded to YouTube indicating, in
summary, that Offerd was involved in Weekly’s murder, purporting to include police
scanner audio from August 4, 2020, relating to Offerd, Offerd’s Ford Fusion, and
music that Offerd had made. Someone texted the video to Witness 6. Witness 6 asked
Offerd about the video. Offered responded to Witness 6 that people were “praying on
his downfall,” that “they” hoped he got “locked up” so that “they” could have sex with
his current girlfriend, that Offerd “don’t know nothing” and that he didn’t want to
talk on the phone about it. In a later conversation, after Witness 6 indicated to Offerd
that she had been contacted by law enforcement, Offerd told Witness 6 that she “don’t
know nothing” which Witness 6 understood to mean that Offerd did not want Witness
6 to tell law enforcement where she dropped Offerd off at on August 4, 2020.
vii. Roberson made additional statements in furtherance of

the conspiracy to Cooperator 4.
After murdering Weekly, Roberson continued his text message exchange with
Cooperator 4 about Weekly, at this point, gloating. Specifically, at 4:40 p.m., while
Roberson was still driving back to Parkway Gardens, Roberson texted Cooperator 4
33
to check Spot News.12 At 5:20 p.m., after Roberson had arrived at Parkway Gardens,
Roberson sent Cooperator 4 a link to a news story about Weekly’s murder.
Cooperator 4 will testify that several days later, Roberson met with Cooperator
4 and confessed to Cooperator 4 in-person to having participated in the murder.
However, in the version of events Roberson relayed to Cooperator 4, Roberson
embellished his role, describing himself as a shooter, which is inconsistent with the
surveillance video. According to Cooperator 4, Roberson told Cooperator 4 that
Roberson was in the backseat and fell as he got out to start shooting. Roberson told
Cooperator 4 that Roberson started shooting from the street and a woman started
12Spot News is an individual in Chicago that follows police scanners and reports the news on
social media. The Spot News handle has a high number of followers and is known as a way
people in the Chicagoland area get their news or verify various criminal acts that take place
inside Chicago and its surrounding suburbs.
34
shooting back at him, so “C Murda” [meaning Liggins] shot her. As stated above, this
detail about the offense is not public.
Roberson made the following, additional statements to Cooperator 4 about the
offense:
 The defendants used Roberson’s Chrysler 300 to commit the murder, and there
was more than one car used to commit the murder.
 That three or four people murdered Weekly, but “C Murda” was the only name
that Cooperator 4 remembered.
 That CPD seized Roberson’s Chrysler after the murder.
 That Dipset, a gang faction where Roberson is from originally, is cliqued up

with O-Block, and as a result, in conflict with STL, where Weekly is from.
Roberson indicated that this is a part of the reason why Roberson participated
in the murder.
 That O-Block member Dayvon Bennett had placed a hit out on Weekly prior to
the murder, and this is additionally why Roberson participated in the murder.
 That “C Murda” offered Roberson an O-Block chain after they murdered

Weekly and told Roberson that Roberson might as well become O-Block, but
Roberson turned the O-Block chain down because Roberson was from Dipset.
viii. Roberson made additional statements in furtherance of

the conspiracy to Witness 7, this time, for purposes of
concealment.
At approximately 9:56 a.m. on the day after the murder, Witness 7, who may
testify at trial, sent Roberson a link to a news story about the murder via Instagram.
Witness 7 followed up her message by writing to Roberson, “I know you ain’t take
your car to go do this shit[.]” In response, Roberson twice instructed Witness 7 to
“Unsend that shit[.]”
35
(Witness 7’s Instagram username redacted.)
Witness 7 will testify that she saw a news article about a Chrysler similar to
the one Roberson drove being used to commit Weekly’s murder, and she knew that
Roberson and Weekly did not get along, which is what prompted her to message
Roberson. Witness 7 asked Roberson to call her via Apple FaceTime, which he did.
When they spoke, Roberson asked Witness 7 why she sent him the message, and why
she thought Roberson used his car to commit the murder. Roberson then indicated
that he did not know what Witness 7 was talking about, and the two changed the
subject.
ix. CPD seized Roberson’s Chrysler 300 the day after the
murder, and Roberson called CPD to get it back.
CPD had, in fact, seized Roberson’s Chrysler on August 5, 2020, in the
aftermath of Weekly’s murder. After securing a search warrant for the Chrysler,
36
during the search of the Chrysler, CPD recovered contact information for Liggins
from inside of the Chrysler that appeared to have been written by Liggins (“My #
1773-557-6775,” IG: Oblock_C_Murda,” etc.). CPD also recovered a spent .357 shell
casing from the passenger’s side of the Chrysler resting in between the windshield
and the hood. According to Caryn Tucker, who has been disclosed as an expert in
firearms/toolmarks examination, the spent .357 shell casing recovered from the
Chrysler and the sole .357 shell casing recovered from the scene of the murder were
fired from the same gun.
Thereafter, Roberson, and one of his girlfriends at the time, Witness 8, called
CPD to have the Chrysler 300 returned to Roberson. Witness 8, who may testify at
trial, will identify the Chrysler 300 in pictures that CPD took after CPD seized the
Chrysler as Roberson’s Chrysler 300. Witness 8 will testify if called that she called
CPD at Roberson’s direction on his behalf to have the Chrysler returned to her.
Witness 8 will testify that CPD informed her that only the registered owner,
Roberson, could get the car. Witness 8 then lied to CPD, indicating that she had power
of attorney over Roberson’s affairs in order to get the car returned to her on
Roberson’s behalf.
CPD Sergeant Jorge Rivera, who may testify at trial, will testify if called that
Witness 8 called him at least 12 times inquiring about the Chrysler 300 from August
6, 2020, to August 7, 2020. Sgt. Rivera will also testify that Roberson called Sgt.
Rivera asking that the car be released to Witness 8 on August 7, 2020, and August
11, 2020. On August 7, 2020, when Sgt. Rivera indicated to Roberson that Roberson
37
would need to come to CPD, show identification, and fill out a form in order to get the
Chrysler 300, Roberson told Sgt. Rivera that Roberson was out of town. Roberson
never retrieved the Chrysler 300 from CPD.
x. Charles Liggins made statements in furtherance of

concealment of the conspiracy to murder Weekly.
On or about October 14, 2021, after the defendants had been arrested on the
indictment, Liggins spoke to an acquaintance, believed to be Individual H based on
the telephone number called and the subject of the conversation, via a jail call. During
the call, Liggins instructed the person he called to tell “Duke” that everyone needed
to get new phones. Liggins went on to discuss the murder with the person he called,
describing the case as “weak.” Specifically, Liggins indicated that law enforcement
had shown him a video of the crime scene and the shooters’ faces could not be seen
because they were wearing masks. Liggins went on to state that video of him and his
co-defendants, whom he did not name specifically, going up and down the stairs in
Parkway Gardens, “ain’t nothing.”
B. O-Block Chains
Several members of O-Block wore gold necklaces with diamond-encrusted gold
pendants at times relevant to the conspiracy to murder Weekly. Specifically, several
members wore “O-Block chains” in the months leading up to Weekly’s murder, and
several more members began wearing O-Block chains in the weeks and months that
followed Weekly’s murder.
The O-Block chains were purchased from and manufactured by Icebox
Diamonds & Watches in Atlanta, Georgia, at various points throughout calendar year
38
2020. According to an Icebox representative and co-owner, Witness 9, Dayvon
Bennett purchased the O-Block chains on Bennett’s account throughout 2020.
Specifically, Bennett spent $128,000 on O-Block pendants in 2020.
(Six of the O-Block pendants, including Bennett’s larger pendant)
On or about January 24, 2020, Bennett purchased an O-Block pendant that he
wore for $30,000. Bennett’s pendant was approximately five times larger and more
expensive than the pendants he purchased for other O-Block members later in the
year.
39
On or about July 2, 2020, Bennett ordered five O-Block pendants for $6,000
each, which he picked up on August 7, 2020. Bennett ordered five more O-Block
pendants on July 9, 2020, for $6,000 each, which he picked up on August 14, 2020.
Bennett ordered two more O-Block pendants on August 14, 2020, and additional one
on August 28, 2020, an additional one on September 17, 2020, and an additional one
on September 28, 2020. Bennett also ordered at least one pendant that read “THF”
on September 17, 2020, for $8,000.
The back side of Bennett’s pendant contained additional references to O-Block,
including the names of deceased O-Block members underneath the words “Long
40
Live,” including “Keta,” “Odee,” “Patoon,” “Sheroid,” “Jmoney,” and “T.Roy.” The back
of Bennett’s pendant also contains multiple references to “64,” meaning 64th Street
and S. King Drive where Parkway Garden is located. Bennett’s pendant also states,
“O-Block for Life.”
41
On or about August 10, 2020—six days after the murder—Smart was present
inside of Icebox Diamonds & Watches with Bennett shopping for additional O-Block
pendants.
(Smart on the left and Bennett on the right)
42
Liggins, Offerd, Smart, and Thomas have each publicly posted pictures of
themselves wearing O-Block chains. For example, on or about August 9, 2020, Liggins
posted a picture to his Instagram account of him wearing an O-Block chain:
43
On or about August 28, 2020, Smart posted a picture to his Instagram account
of him wearing an O-Block chain:
44
On or about September 22, 2020, Thomas posted stories on his Instagram
account of Thomas wearing an O-Block chain:
45
On or about June 20, 2021, the user of YouTube account “Losã dosã64”
uploaded a music video for the song “Never Change” performed by Offerd with Offerd
wearing an O-Block chain:
Witness 6 identified the person performing this music video as Offerd.
However, Witness 6 indicated that, according to Offerd, Offerd did not own his own
O-Block chain and had instead borrowed one to shoot this music video.
When Liggins and Smart were arrested for the charges in the indictment and
superseding indictment, both were in possession of O-Block chains. The rear of
Liggins’s O-Block pendant reads “C Murda” at the top (an alias for Liggins), “Long
Live the guys” on the left side, and “Sheroid Squad 1992 – 2012” at the bottom. For
the reasons stated above, “Sheroid Squad 1992 – 2012” is a reference to Sheroid’s
younger brother Sheroid Liggins. According to reports from the Chicago Police
46
Department, Sheroid C. Liggins was born on November 21, 1992, and murdered on
February 16, 2012, near 6421 S. King Dr. in Chicago.
The rear of Smart’s O-Block chain reads “Muwop” at the top (an alias for
Smart) and the names of deceased O-Block members, including Johnson (“T. Roy”
and sometimes referred to as “Troy”).
47
C. Social Media
At all times material to the allegations in the superseding indictment,
members of O-Block have publicly claimed membership in or association with O-
Block on various social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube. Liggins, Roberson, Offerd, Thomas, and Smart have all either claimed
membership in O-Block on social media or posted some association with O-Block on
social media at times material to the superseding indictment.
48
In June, July, and August 2020, Liggins’s Instagram and Facebook display
names were “Oblock_C_Murda” (Instagram) and “Cmurda Oblock” (Facebook). For
example:
(Redacted)
49
(Redacted. Liggins on the far left and Thomas on the far right)
50
In the header of Roberson’s Instagram profile, Roberson referenced O-Block
and other Black Disciples factions cliqued up with O-Block, including 300 (Lamron)
and 600:
Thomas’s Instagram username and Facebook display name also both contained
references to O-Block in the time-period before and immediately after the murder:
51
(As of September 15, 2020)
(Redacted. Posted on August 10, 2020)
In Offerd’s song “Never Change,” referenced above on page 46, Offerd states
multiples times throughout the song’s chorus, “O-Block, Munna Gang. This s**t will
never change.”13 Offerd’s username for his Instagram account is “6los_munna4.” As
stated above, 64 is a common reference among O-Block members to 64th and S. King
Drive where Parkway Gardens is located.
13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rz6kYW2448M (last accessed July 28, 2023).
52
(As of September 22, 2020)
(Redacted. Offerd on the left and Ezell Rawls on the right. As of September 22, 2020).
53
As referenced above on page 44, Smart’s Instagram profile is “muwopfrmdao”
[as in Muwop from O-Block] and depicts Smart wearing an O-Block necklace in
multiple posts:
(A minor’s name and image redacted. As of September 15, 2020)
D. Tattoos
Many O-Block members have “O-Block” tattooed on themselves. Witness 6 will
testify at trial that Offerd has an O-Block tattoo. Dayvon Bennett had both O-Block
and 600 tattooed on himself:
54
(600 on Bennett’s left bicep. “Odee” underneath “O-Block.”)
55
Defendant Smart has both “O-Block” and “Sheroid” tattooed on himself:
VI. COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS
All of the statements identified above as having been made by defendants
Liggins, Roberson, Offerd, Thomas, Smart, and Turpin, whether orally to another
person, such as to Witness 4, Witness 6, Witness 7, or Cooperator 4, via text message,
or on social media, are admissible in evidence as admissions by a party opponent
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
56
However, many of these same statements were also made during the course of
and in furtherance of the VCAR conspiracy to murder Weekly and maintain or
increase position in O-Block. The statements between the coconspirators and to
others outside of the conspiracy in furtherance of the VCAR conspiracy to murder
Weekly fall into a number of categories, all concerning subjects integral to the
conspiracy and its success, and to further the objectives of O-Block as an enterprise.
These statements will be introduced through the testimony of witnesses, including
but not limited to those noted above, other individuals who will be compelled to
testify, consensually recorded in-person appearances and telephone recordings,
including the recordings referenced throughout this submission, as well as recorded
jail telephone calls involving the defendants, their associates, and their unindicted
coconspirators.
Given the extent and number of such statements in this case, the government
does not, and cannot, detail each and every proposed coconspirator statement of each
witness or document. Nor does Santiago or the Seventh Circuit’s precedent require
the government to set forth the specific, verbatim coconspirator statement. Instead,
the Seventh Circuit has specifically stated that categories of statements, such as
those set forth below, suffices. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 554 (7th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that the “government is bound to give notice in
advance of trial of co-conspirator statements it intends to introduce at trial”); United
States v. Johnson, No. 08 CR 466, 2011 WL 809194, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2011)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that the government failed to “specifically identif[y]
57
the statements it intends to introduce” and rejecting defendant’s request “that the
Government be required to specifically identify each statement by a co-conspirator it
intends to introduce”). Nevertheless, the government has provided numerous specific
examples of coconspirator statements here. The coconspirator statements offered at
trial will concern the subjects listed below, and include, but are not limited to, the
coconspirator statements discussed above:
1. Statements made by Roberson to Cooperator 4 regarding Weekly’s

murder, including the following:
a. Statements made by Roberson to Cooperator 4 that Roberson and

his coconspirators were on their way to murder Weekly, in order
to publicly take credit for an act of violence against a rival gang
member and maintain or increase his position in O-Block;
b. Statements made by Roberson to Cooperator 4 in the immediate

aftermath of Roberson and his coconspirators having just
murdered Weekly, including directing Cooperator 4 to check Spot
News and sending Cooperator 4 a link to a news story regarding
Weekly’s murder, in order to publicly take credit for an act of
violence against a rival gang member and maintain or increase
their position in O-Block;
c. Roberson confessing days later to Cooperator 4—including who

was with Roberson—and even embellishing his own role in the
murder, in order to publicly take credit for an act of violence
against a rival gang member and maintain or increase their
position in O-Block;
2. Statements made by Offerd to Witness 6 on the day of Weekly’s murder,

including:
a. That Offerd was on the way to Midway Autohaus and needed a

ride from the dealership;
b. To take Offerd and his coconspirators to Individual G’s residence;
3. Statements made by Offerd to the employee from Midway Autohaus on

the day of Weekly’s murder, including:
58
a. That Offerd was on his way to the dealership in order to return

the Ford Fusion, for the purpose of concealment and to avoid
detection by law enforcement by getting rid of the vehicle he had
just used to murder Weekly;
4. Statements made by Roberson to Witness 7 for the purpose of

concealment, including:
a. Directing Witness 7 to “unsend” a message to Roberson regarding

Roberson having used his own vehicle to commit Weekly’s
murder;
5. Statements made by Roberson to Witness 8 for the purpose of

a. Directing Witness 8 to call CPD to get back the Chrysler that

Roberson and his coconspirators used to commit Weekly’s
murder;
b. Statements Witness 8 made on Roberson’s behalf in order to try

to get the Chrysler back from CPD;
c. Statements Roberson himself then made to CPD to get the

Chrysler back from CPD after Witness 8’s efforts had failed;
6. Statements made by Liggins to Individual H for the purpose of

a. Directing Individual H to tell “Duke” to tell “everyone” to get new

phones in the immediate aftermath of Liggins’s arrest;
As is evident from the categories’ description, all such statements made by
coconspirators furthered the conspiracy. Thus, under the case law summarized above,
all such statements are properly admitted at trial as coconspirator statements under
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
59
VII. CONCLUSION
The above is an outline of the evidence that the government will introduce to
establish that the charged conspiracy existed. Based upon this proffer, the
government respectfully requests that this Court find that categories of coconspirator
statements listed above, as well as coconspirator statements like them, are
admissible pending the introduction of evidence to support this proffer.
MORRIS PASQUAL

JASON A. JULIEN
ANN MARIE E. URSINI
CAITLIN WALGAMUTH
(312) 353-5300
60
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jason A. Julien, an attorney, certify that I served a copy of the foregoing

Government’s Santiago Proffer and Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) by filing the same using the CM/ECF System, and that
a copy will be provided to all parties of record designated to receive notice.
MORRIS PASQUAL

JASON A. JULIEN
ANN MARIE E. URSINI
CAITLIN WALGAMUTH
(312) 353-5300
61

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Case: 1:21-cr-00618 Document #: 191 Filed: 08/04/23 Page 1 of 68 PageID #:838

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GOVERNMENT’S SANTIAGO PROFFER AND MOTION TO ADMIT

By: /s/ Jason A. Julien

viii. Roberson made additional statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to

Beeson v. United States 90 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1937) .................................................. 16

Bourjaily v. United States 483 U.S. 171 (1987) .......................................................... 11

Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 (2004)................................................... 10, 20, 21

Davis v. Washington 547 U.S. 813 (2006) ................................................................... 10

Garlington v. O(Leary 879 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1989) .................................................. 16

Salinas v. United States 522 U.S. 52 (1997) ............................................................... 13

United States v. Bustamante 493 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2007)........................................ 15

United States v. Cozzo 2004 WL 1151630 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ......................................... 15

United States v. Curtis 37 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................................... 16

United States v. Guyton 36 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................................. 12

United States v. Hamilton 19 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1994)........................................ 19, 20

United States v. Lindemann 85 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 16

United States v. Loscalzo 18 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1994) ............................................... 11

United States v. Maloney 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995) ............................................... 16

United States v. Nagib 56 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................... 19

United States v. Petrozziello 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977) ........................................... 10

United States v. Stephenson 53 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1995)........................................... 16

Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) ..................................................................................................... 18

Fed. R. Evid.801(d)(2)(E) ..................................................................................... passim

Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) .............................................................................................. 17

Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) .................................................................................. 1

evidence as to the admission at trial of certain coconspirator statements against

defendants Charles Liggins, Kenneth Roberson, Tacarlos Offerd, Christopher

statements pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E), and

United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).

In this submission, the government describes the law governing coconspirator

racketeering (“VCAR”) conspiracy charged in Count Three of the superseding

superseding indictment and the participation of the coconspirators. As a result, this

presenting statements attributed to particular witnesses, the government is not

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSPIRACY TO MURDER CARLTON WEEKLY IN AID OF

members to come downtown to kill Weekly.

Approximately three minutes after Turpin entered Milani Boutique, at about

street on the phone watching as the shooting unfolded.

surveillance footage inside of the Parkway Gardens Homes (“Parkway Gardens”) on

surveillance video by friends, a security guard at Parkway Gardens, girlfriends,

Boutique, although Turpin did not know he was being recorded.

III. OVERVIEW OF O-BLOCK AS AN ENTERPRISE ENGAGED IN RACKETEERING

A. O-Block is an enterprise as defined in Title 18, United States

O-Block is a street gang and criminal enterprise situated in Parkway Gardens

gang. Parkway Gardens is a fenced-in apartment complex consisting of

employs security guards at various checkpoints, O-Block members and Black

Disciples from neighboring, allied factions have described Parkway Gardens as a

members to easily ambush O-Block members.

O-Block is comprised of members who engage in violent criminal acts,

publicly claiming responsibility for acts of violence committed by O-Block, taunting

O-Block and disparage their rivals.

At times material to the allegations in the superseding indictment, O-Block

committed against O-Block members and violence to be committed against O-Block

Cooperator 2, a current O-Block member, may also testify at trial. If called to

to Parkway Gardens in the late 2000s and became an O-Block member in

Block members were discussed in meetings.

Cooperator 2 will testify that, at times material to the superseding indictment,

to Cooperator 2, this has been going on in O-Block for “forever.”