10 1108 - 978 1 78743 385 420181001
10 1108 - 978 1 78743 385 420181001
10 1108 - 978 1 78743 385 420181001
MANIPULATION
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MODERN ENERGY MARKET
MANIPULATION
BY
ANDREW N. KLEIT
Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics
The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA
Acknowledgments xi
Preface xiii
Chapter 7 Deutsche Bank: What Should the Legal Rule for Trading
Financial Transmission Rights be? 105
I am very grateful to Stuart Kleit and George Young, who had the misfortune
of reading every word of this book’s draft. Their thoughtful comments greatly
improved the text. I also thank David Applebaum, John Lopatka, and Robert
Zwirb for helpful conversations about legal issues. I also wish to thank Gary
Taylor for his gracious discussions with me about the California electricity crisis.
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Preface
The idea for this book came to me in April 2016 when I was a visiting scholar
at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC has an enviable
record in the area of restructuring electricity and natural gas markets. It also has
a large number of intelligent and motivated staff dedicated to serving the public
interest. Unfortunately, I gained the strong impression that FERC’s mission had
become so broad and complicated that it was hard for the agency to do anything
other than follow previous precedent. In some ways, it appeared that the agency
was largely on autopilot, despite the best intentions of all concerned. I also had
the opportunity to review some manipulation cases from the inside, an experience
I found fascinating.
The motivation for the book came from a large number of sources. The books
by Bork (1976) and Posner (1976), using individual cases for motivation, had a
large impact on antitrust policy. My own work (e.g., Butz & Kleit, 2001) comes
from an interest in exploring important cases and showing what “everyone knows
to be true” is not, in fact, true. This applies in particular to the analysis of the
Hunt Brothers silver episode in Chapter 3.
I shaped this work based on two other important books. The very successful
book edited by Kwoka and White, The Antitrust Revolution, now in its sixth edi-
tion, is has been published for over a quarter of a century. These volumes show
how to present antitrust case studies from scholars and consultants in a book
format. I wish to add to this genre by writing case studies that are in one voice,
where the author is in a position to critique both sides of a legal matter.
A recent work by Taylor, Ledgerwood, Broehm, and Fox-Penner (2015) was
crucial for this book. Taylor and his colleagues lay out many important theoreti-
cal concepts in market manipulation, which I am able to build upon in the intro-
ductory chapters here.
This book starts by describing the relevant financial issues and offering a defi-
nition of “manipulation.” Chapter 2 introduces the basic economics of manipula-
tion, while Chapter 3 describes historical cases in this area. Chapter 4 presents the
relatively simple DiPlacido matter, which was badly argued and decided. Chapter
5 examines the basic structure of restructured electricity markets, whose under-
standing is critical for understanding the electricity market cases examined in the
book. Chapters 6 through 12 examine particular energy manipulation cases in
depth, while Chapter 13 contains some conclusions.
xiv Preface
I note that in several places the book is critical of FERC. That does not mean,
however, that I hold FERC in disrespect. Indeed, my hope is that FERC responds
positively to at least some of my critiques. Every government agency needs to
have its actions examined closely. This is my attempt to do so with respect to
energy market manipulation.
Andrew Kleit
University Park, Pennsylvania
April 2018
References
Bork, R. (1976). The antitrust paradox: A policy at war with itself. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Butz, D. A., & Kleit, A. N. (2001, April). Are vertical restraints anti- or pro-competitive?
Lessons from interstate circuit. Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), 131–160.
Kwoka, J. E., & White, L. J. (2014). The antitrust revolution: Economics, competition, and
policy (6th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford Press.
Posner, R. A. (1976). Antitrust law: An economic perspective. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Taylor, G., Ledgerwood, S., Broehm, R., & Fox-Penner, P. (2015). Market power and market
manipulation in energy market: From the California crisis to the present. Reston, VA:
Public Utility Reports.