Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

A comparative analysis of process safety management (PSM) systems in the

process industry
Chizaram D. Nwankwo *, Stephen C. Theophilus, Andrew O. Arewa
Faculty of Engineering, Environment and Computing, Coventry University, CV1 5FB, United Kingdom

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The root cause of most accidents in the process industry has been attributed to process safety issues ranging from
Process safety management (PSM) poor safety culture, lack of communication, asset integrity issues, lack of management leadership and human
Accidents factors. These accidents could have been prevented with adequate implementation of a robust process safety
Process industry
management (PSM) system. Therefore, the aim of this research is to develop a comparative framework which
Comparative analysis
could aid in selecting an appropriate and suitable PSM system for specific industry sectors within the process
industry. A total of 21 PSM systems are selected for this study and their theoretical frameworks, industry of
application and deficiencies are explored. Next, a comparative framework is developed using eleven key factors
that are applicable to the process industry such as framework and room for continuous improvement, design
specification, industry adaptability and applicability, human factors, scope of application, usability in complex
systems, safety culture, primary or secondary mode of application, regulatory enforcement, competency level, as
well as inductive or deductive approach. After conducting the comparative analysis using these factors, the
Integrated Process Safety Management System (IPSMS) model seems to be the most robust PSM system as it
addressed almost every key area regarding process safety. However, inferences drawn from study findings
suggest that there is still no one-size-fits-all PSM system for all sectors of the process industry.

1. Introduction the process industry (AIChE, 2011). There is a huge debate regarding the
distinguishing factor between process safety and occupational safety.
The continuous increase in worldwide energy demand has seen However, it should be noted that occupational safety, unlike process
proliferating rates in the complexity of process facilities and operations safety, focuses solely on workplace hazards such as slips, trips and falls
in the process industry. These industry advancements have led to more (Cheng et al., 2013).
exposure to higher risk levels which require urgent attention. Research There are dire consequences associated with process safety failings,
findings by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers most of which could lead to multiple fatalities, environmental damage,
(IOGP) as illustrated in Fig. 1 show that the fatal accident rate (FAR) in property loss, criminal charges, damage to company reputation and
the oil and gas industry has been on the steady increase over the last huge financial implications (Ismail et al., 2014). A typical example is the
three years (IOGP, 2017). Despite the average reduction in fatal acci­ Deepwater Horizon blowout in 2010 which claimed 11 lives, spilled
dents over the last decade, there has been an upsurge of FAR from 1.1 in over 4 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico, led to death of
2014, to 1.4 in 2015 and 1.7 in 2016. While there was reduction in fa­ diverse aquatic species, displaced businesses, tourists and indigenous
talities from 54 in 2015 to 50 in 2016, more fatalities were witnessed in inhabitants, and incurred criminal charges and financial implications to
fewer incidents in 2016. British Petroleum (BP) of up to $60 billion till date (Norazahar et al.,
There seems to be an unpredictability in the nature of accident 2014). Other case studies include the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 which
occurrence, which reiterates the urgent need to address them using a caused 167 fatalities, the Alexander Kielland collapse in 1980 which
preventive approach rather than reactive technique (Theophilus et al., caused 123 fatalities and the BP Texas refinery explosion in 2005 which
2018). Process safety is a field which is based on the prevention of ex­ led to 15 fatalities and 180 injuries (Ismail et al., 2014). The root causes
plosions, accidental chemical releases, fires, and structural collapses in of these accidents have been attributed to process safety failings ranging

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: nwankwo4@uni.coventry.ac.uk (C.D. Nwankwo), ab2038@coventry.ac.uk (S.C. Theophilus), ab6887@coventry.ac.uk (A.O. Arewa).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2020.104171
Received 11 June 2019; Received in revised form 1 November 2019; Accepted 13 May 2020
Available online 18 May 2020
0950-4230/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

1.2. Process safety functional pillars

Process safety is fundamentally built on functional pillars (CAPP,

2014; ISC, 2018). The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
(CAPP) proposed four functional pillars and had previously compared
the elements of only four processes safety management systems (PS-MS)
using these four functional pillars listed below (CAPP, 2014, p. 18).

Pillar 1: Commit to Process Safety

Pillar 2: Understand Hazards and Risk
Pillar 3: Manage Risk
Pillar 4: Learn from Experience

Similarly, the Energy Institute proposed four functional pillars which

closely match those proposed by CAPP and are depicted in Fig. 2 (Energy
Fig. 1. Number of fatalities, fatal accidents and fatal accident rates in the oil Institute, 2016). Both the CAPP and the Energy Institute identified
and gas industry from 2007 to 2016 adapted from IOGP (2017). leadership commitment to be top and the need to learn from experience
(review and improvement) as key to processes that must follow all risk
from poor safety culture, lack of communication, asset integrity issues, control management processes.
lack of management leadership and human factors (Hsu et al., 2015). However, IChemE Safety Centre (ISC) proposed six functional pillars
These could have been prevented with the adequate implementation of a depicted in Fig. 3 (ISC, 2018). These pillars identify that effective
process safety management (PSM) system across these process facilities management of process safety requires leadership commitment as cen­
(Bridges and Tew, 2010). This paper was not geared towards selecting tral to process safety management in an organisation. It also reflects on
the best PSM system for various industries, but it was rather aimed at the four pillars proposed by CAPP and Energy Institute. However, these
developing a comparative framework which could aid in selecting the six pillars created some overlap and was also acknowledged by the ISC
appropriate and suitable PSM system for specific industry sectors within For instance, safety culture could be considered the under the human
the process industry. The key objectives of this research were to: factors pillar or the culture pillar.
While the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) had
a) Select the various PSM systems that have been developed across previously compared the elements of only four processes safety man­
various fields and industries since the inception of process safety in agement systems (PS-MS) (CAPP, 2014, p. 18) using the four pillars
the 1970’s. listed above, this paper will compare the elements of all the known
b) Develop a framework based on different features that could be used PS-MS (seventeen in total) using the same four functional pillars.
in analysing the functionalities of the various PSM systems.
c) Compare the various PSM systems based on the developed frame­ 1.3. Key elements of a process safety management system
work and map them according to their levels of flexibility and
robustness. Regulators and process industry managers alike are recognising that
d) Recommend areas for future improvement in each of the PSM there are key process safety elements that must be part of any process
systems safety management system (PS-MS) and must address process safety
functional pillars. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the ISC prosed seven process
This section provided a general overview of process safety and cre­ safety functional pillars as: 1) Process Safety Leadership (PSL); 2)
ates a rationale for this study using process accident statistics. The next Knowledge and Competence (KC); 3) Engineering and Design (ED) 4)
section outlines the characteristics of various PSM systems and regula­ Systems and Procedures (SP); 5) Learn from Experience (LE); 6) Human
tions, as well as their strengths and drawbacks. Furthermore, the Factors (HF) and 7) Safety Culture (SC). Therefore, any process safety
development of the framework used for comparing the various PSM management system (PS-MS) elements should address these key func­
systems is discussed, after which the systems are compared using the tional pillars. For example, there is an increased acknowledgement that
developed framework. Suitable inferences are drawn from the study and “strong Process Safety Leadership is vital, because it drives the “safety
appropriate recommendations are made accordingly for the PSM sys­ culture” of an organisation, and safety culture in turn influences em­
tems and the process industry going forward. ployees’ behaviour and participation in safety. Similar to occupational
safety, tasks may also be delegated in process safety. However, the re­
1.1. Overview of process safety management systems sponsibility and accountability to ensure that safety will always remain
with the leadership of the organisation (IChemE, 2015). Therefore,
PSM was first introduced in 1971 by experts in the European Process Safety Leadership is a vital element in any PSM system to
Federation of Chemical Engineering, which later evolved into the cre­ encourage an atmosphere which inspires safe behaviour.
ation of systems and frameworks in the 1980’s (EPSC, 2018). Various
PSM systems have been developed over the years, with each having its 1.3.1. Essential elements of corporate governance for process safety
strengths and drawbacks (Theophilus et al., 2018). The PSM systems According to OECD (2017), there are five categories which represent
that were selected to be examined in this paper were chosen based on the essential elements of corporate governance for process safety. These
their applicability in various sectors of the process industry. A summary are illustrated in Fig. 5 using a process of risk awareness, information,
of these PSM systems that have been selected for this study is presented competence and action; while leadership and culture form the central
in Table 1. This analysis shows the trend in development of PSM systems focus. Leadership and culture create an open environment for process
over the years, the theories behind their design, their framework for safety (Frank, 2007). CEO and leaders ought to provide policy on
implementation, their industries of application and their drawbacks. corporate governance for process safety which describes the manage­
ment expectations, required commitment, and corporate activities in
relation to process safety (Webb, 2008). With regards to risk awareness,
there should be a clear understanding of vulnerabilities and risks
(Hendershot et al., 2011). It is also essential that management has

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C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Table 1
Process safety management systems in the process industry adapted from Theophilus et al. (2018).
Model Framework Year of Theory Behind Model Design Industry for the Deficiency of Model References
design Model

Responsible Care It is built on a simple Plan-Do- 1984 It was designed to prevent the Petrochemical �It does not consider Howard et al.
® Process Check-Act framework that unintended release of several human factors (2000)
Safety Code elevates the standard for hazardous substances by using �There is no road-map for Lenox and Nash
(RCPSC) performance in industries, as well technical improvements implementation of the (2003)
as being flexible in meeting needs elements within its
of various companies framework
CIMAH It applies a goal-setting 1984 It was designed to curb the All industrial sectors �No safety reports Cassidy (2013)
regulations framework to identify, evaluate consequences of major except nuclear and �Changes to safety HSE (2015)
and mitigate any dangerous accidents on people and the armed-forces management systems not Process
consequences that may arise from environment installations addressed Engineering
industrial activities. �Emergency planning (2000)
issues HSE (2017a)
API RP 750 It is organized similarly to the 1990 It was designed as the first Oil and Gas �It did not set out Patel (2005)
OSHA and CCPS framework such framework for managing Petrochemical indicators for measuring API (2017)
that it embodies 11 elements and process hazards in the oil and Refining process safety WorkSafe (2011)
implements them using the PDCA gas industry performance
framework �Human factors are not
well addressed
US OSHA PSM It is a performance-based 1992 It was designed to mitigate the Manufacturing �It has remained Belke (2000)
Program framework hinged on accidental release of hazardous Chemical unchanged and has few Kaszniak (2010)
management commitment which chemicals Transport human factor elements in Summers (2000)
increases the workforce influence its framework
in managing process safety
Safety Case Its regulatory framework was 1992 It requires companies in Offshore �It focuses only on paper Cassidy (2013)
made to meet the offshore installations to safety and not real safety HSE (2017a)
recommendations in the Lord produce a safety document to in practice. HSE (2017b)
Cullen’s report after the Piper show that there is an efficient �They are compliance- Israni et al. (2015)
Alpha disaster. safety management system in driven Hopkins (2015)
place �They reduce the level to NOPSEMA (2017)
which risks are being CAPP (2014)
considered within
organisations as they feel
they already have a safety
case
ExxonMobil It is built on the ISO 14001 1992 It was designed to improve Petroleum �It is quite complex to be ExxonMobil
OIMS standard, as well as the personnel, health, security and understood by people that (2017a)
Responsible Care initiative to process safety performance are not part of the ExxonMobil
manage health, security, safety company (2017b)
and environmental risks �It does not certify Theriot (2002)
employee compliance to
standards.
ILO PSM It is built on a similar framework 1993 It was designed to prevent All major hazard �It does not incorporate CAPP (2014)
Framework with the OSHA PSM program major industrial accidents in installations except key human factors like ILO (2017)
the hazardous industries nuclear, military and safety culture into its
transport other than framework
pipeline �It does not focus on
performance
measurement and
management review
API RP 75 It is also organized similarly to 1993 It was developed as a safety Oil and gas �It does not incorporate API (2004)
the OSHA and CCPS framework and environmental program human factors fully into BSEE (2017)
such that it embodies 11 elements for offshore operations and its framework WorkSafe (2011)
and implements them using the facilities
PDCA framework
EPA RMP Its framework is centered around 1994 It was designed to monitor Chemical �Human factors are not US EPA (2013)
hazard assessment, a prevention companies involved in the use Petroleum adequately addressed Ufner and Igleheart
program and an emergency of regulated toxic or flammable �No certified method of (2017)
response program which must be substances for prevention of implementation US EPA (2017a)
included in the RMP to be accident release US EPA (2017b)
submitted to the EPA
COMAH Its framework is extended from 1999 It allows competent authorities All hazardous �Cost of compliance HSE (2015)
regulations the CIMAH regulations and is to assess the safety of industries �Public information may Process
designed to meet the designated sites using safety affect commercial Engineering
requirements of the Seveso II reports. confidentiality and site (2000)
Directive security HSE (2017a)
�Consent for hazardous HSE (2017b)
substances CAPP (2014)
�Different attitudes to Beale (2001)
implementing the Seveso
II Directive across Europe
AIChE/CCPS Risk Risk-Based Process Safety (RBPS) 2007 It was designed after the Chemical Process �It does not address all Pitblado (2011)
Based Process Framework builds the ideas of the Bhopal tragedy in 1984 to offer Industries human factors. Rigas and
earlier CCPS model to organize improved results with less �There is no road-map for
(continued on next page)

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C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Table 1 (continued )
Model Framework Year of Theory Behind Model Design Industry for the Deficiency of Model References
design Model

Safety (RBPS) the management system funds and as a benchmark for implementation of the Sklavounos (2004)
Model principles of the Plan-Do-Check- the industry elements within its Frank (2007)
Act in order to be used across framework
various organisations
BP OMS Its framework integrates BP’s 2007 It was designed after the Oil and gas �It does not incorporate BP (2014)
requirements on operational Deepwater Horizon blowout to all safety management Dumon (2014)
reliability, social responsibility, ensure compliance of BP’s system elements in it Whitford et al.
environment, security, safety and industry standards with framework (2011)
health into a common legislative requirements
management system
SEMS Regulation Its framework is a performance- 2010 It was enacted to make Offshore oil and gas �It does not fully API (2004)
focused tool for managing and mandatory the API RP 75 rule incorporate all human BSEE (2017)
integrating offshore activities in order to enhance factors into its framework WorkSafe (2011)
based on the API RP 75 third environmental protection and
edition in 2004. safety of offshore oil and gas
activities
Energy Institute Its framework is built with the 2010 It was designed to provide a Energy industry �Human factors are not Hooi et al. (2014)
High-Level Reason’s Swiss Cheese model as a basic and organized approach fully integrated into the Murray (2015)
PSM template, however, using the for small and large framework Yew et al. (2014)
Framework Health and Safety Management organisations across all energy �There is no adequate
System developed by ILO and sectors route map for
OSHA as a benchmark for its implementation
implementation
DuPont Its framework is built on high 2010 It was initially designed to Conglomerate �Its basic wheel-like Kalthoff (2005)
Operational levels safety culture, with ensure safety of their facilities, comprising of various structure shows no line of Fern�andez-Mu~niz
Risk management commitment and but later was used as industrial sectors action or implementation et al. (2007)
Management operational discipline by benchmark for other of elements within its Hart and Milstein
(ORM) Model workforce being the central point companies within and across framework (2003)
of focus in successful various industries
implementation of its plan
CSChE PSM It was built on a similar 2012 It was created as a more Chemical �It does not consider CAPP (2014)
Guide 4th framework with the 1989 AICHE/ efficient framework for the involvement of the Amyotte (2011)
edition CCPS Technical Management of prevention of accidents in the workforce and
Chemical Process Safety. Canadian chemical industries stakeholders
�It does not also take into
account the manner in
which operations are
conducted.
IOGP/IPIECA The framework uses a Plan-Do- 2014 It was designed to improve the Oil and Gas �It does not fully address IOGP (2014)
OMS Check-Act approach to address development and application human factors within its CAPP (2014)
Framework security, process safety, quality, of health, safety and framework
environment and social environmental management �It totally relies on human
responsibility risks. systems. compliance and does not
provide enforcement
actions
Process Safety The PSM system is developed 2014 It was designed as an OSHA Chemical �The PSM system focuses Aziz et al. (2014)
Information based on Process Safety PSM compliance system for solely on process safety
Management Information (PSI) element of PSM managing process chemicals, information which is one
System 29 CFR 1910.119 (d) technology and equipment of many elements in a PSM
(PSI4MS) information in pilot plant. system
Contractor This PSM system was developed 2015 It was designed to provide a All hazardous �The PSM system focuses Abdul Majid et al.
Management based on OSHA PSM 29 CFR structured and easy technique industries solely on contractor (2015)
System (CoMS) 1910.119 (h) to plan and implement a management which is one
practical and comprehensive of many elements in a PSM
contractors’ management system
system
Emergency The framework was created based 2016 It was designed to provide a All hazardous �This PSM model is solely Abdul Majid et al.
Planning and on OSHA CFR 1910.119 (n) and a structured and easy technique industries based on emergency (2016)
Response (EPR) model was developed to reflect for organisations to plan and planning and response,
model this framework implement emergency which is one of many
planning and response based elements in a PSM system
on PSM requirements
IPSMS model The Integrated Process Safety 2017 It was designed as a robust and Oil and Gas �This model was only Theophilus et al.
Management System (IPSMS) holistic alternative to the validated using literature, (2018)
model was designed using the previous PSM models by without any input from
PDCA framework, while its integrating their elements into industry professionals
implementation strategy adopted one PSM system and including �It failed to consider
the DuPont tripartite operational the human factors missing factors such as impact of
discipline model of three main from them climate change on oil and
aspects: personnel, technology gas operations in its
and facilities design

4
 C.D. Nwankwo et al.
Table 2
Essential features of a process safety management system.
Process Safety Energy DuPont OSHA AIChE/ Responsible CSChE API API COMAH CIMAH Safety BP ExxonMobil IOGP/ PSI4MS CoMS EPR ILO PSM EPA IPSMS
Management (PSM) Institute ORM/ PSM CCPS Care Process PSM RP RP Regulations Regulations Case OMS OIMS IPIECA model Framework RMP Model
System Elements High-Level PSM Program RBPS Safety Code Guide 75/ 750 OMS 17
PSM Model Standard 4th SEMS
Framework edition

1. Management ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
commitment,
responsibility and
accountability to
process safety
2. Compliance with ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
legal and industry
standards
3. Worker ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
consultation
4. Objectives, ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
targets and safety
programs
5. Employee, ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
contractor and
supplier selection
and management
6. Stakeholder ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
involvement
7. Process hazard ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
analysis
8. Health evaluation
5

✓ ✓ ✓
and fitness for
duty
9. Document and ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
record control,
and process
knowledge
management
10. Operating ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

manuals and
procedures
11. Process safety ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
information
12. Standards and ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
safe work
practices
13. Management of ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
change
14. Operational ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
readiness and pre-
startup reviews
15. Emergency ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
planning and
response
16. Inspection and ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
maintenance
17. Performance and ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
quality assurance
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
(continued on next page)
 C.D. Nwankwo et al.
Table 2 (continued )
Process Safety Energy DuPont OSHA AIChE/ Responsible CSChE API API COMAH CIMAH Safety BP ExxonMobil IOGP/ PSI4MS CoMS EPR ILO PSM EPA IPSMS
Management (PSM) Institute ORM/ PSM CCPS Care Process PSM RP RP Regulations Regulations Case OMS OIMS IPIECA model Framework RMP Model
System Elements High-Level PSM Program RBPS Safety Code Guide 75/ 750 OMS 17
PSM Model Standard 4th SEMS
Framework edition

18. Asset integrity

and management
of safety critical
devices
19. Operational ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
control, permit to
work and risk
management
20. Communication ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
amongst workers
21. Training, ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6

competency and
performance
22. Incident ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
reporting
23. Benchmarking ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
24. Audits ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
25. Incident ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
investigation

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

26. Management ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
review and
intervention for
continuous
improvement
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Fig. 2. Four functional pillars proposed by the Energy Institute (Energy Insti­
tute, 2016).

Fig. 4. Six functional pillars of process safety (IChemE, 2015).

Fig. 3. Six functional pillars proposed by the IChemE Safety Centre (ISC, 2018).

knowledge of the importance of process safety throughout life cycle,

identifies various layers of protection within process systems, ensures
consistent management systems, assesses risks of budget reductions on
process safety, and takes responsibility for emergency planning (OECD,
2017). Similarly, CEO and leaders ought to ensure that process safety
programmes are driven by essential data that proactively seek out in­
formation relating to process safety (audits, performance indicators,
inherent hazards and risks, dangerous trends, effective control of risks,
contractor management, etc). Also, management should ensure that
process safety programmes are robust enough to guarantee organisa­
tional competence to manage the hazards of its operations (Elangovan
et al., 2005). Process safety programmes ensure that organisational
leaders engage in articulating and driving active monitoring and plans.

1.3.2. Essential features of a process safety management system

Every PSM system has various features that aid the implementation
Fig. 5. Essential elements of corporate governance for process safety
of process safety in an organisation. The robustness of a PSM system is (OECD, 2017).
hugely dependent on the elements contained within its framework and
the existence of a clear implementation strategy for each of these ele­
all essential elements of a PSM system. However, this is because it in­
ments. Theophilus et al. (2018) developed an integrated process safety
tegrated elements from all existing PSM systems; thereby improving on
management system (IPSMS) model which was geared towards
the weaknesses of individual PSM systems.
addressing human factors that were missing from existing PSM systems.
This IPSMS model was developed by pooling elements across various
PSM systems to develop its theoretical framework. As illustrated in 1.4. Research methodology
Table 2, every essential feature of a PSM system that was present in any
PSM system was highlighted using a tick mark, while those that were This research paper adopted a qualitative methodology, with pri­
absent were left blank. The table shows that the IPSMS model contains mary and secondary data collected for qualitative data analysis.

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C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Merriam and Tisdell (2015) highlight qualitative research as an induc­ had continuous improvement strategies in their framework were
tive process where data is analysed for the purpose of formulating hy­ marked as “Yes”, while those without one were marked as “No”.
pothesis. Similarly, Creswell (2013) suggests that qualitative research �Design specification: IChemE Safety Centre (ISC) prosed seven
helps in investigating and providing solutions to gaps in knowledge in process safety functional pillars as: 1) Process safety leadership
several disciplines. Although, Flick (2009) opines that this method is (PSL); 2) Knowledge and competence (KC); 3) Engineering and
time-consuming and less accurate with cognitive interpretations to design (ED) 4) Systems and procedures (SP); 5) Learn from experi­
study findings. However, the argument of Creswell et al. (2007) that ence (LE); 6) Human factors (HF) and 7) Safety culture (SC) (ISC,
qualitative research deals with richer information and provides deeper 2018). The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP)
insight into the phenomenon being studied makes it a preferred method proposed four functional pillars and had previously compared the
of choice for this study. Hence, this research adopted the qualitative elements of only four processes safety management systems (PS-MS)
approach as the preferred method of choice to develop a comparative using these four functional pillars including: Commit to process
framework for process safety management systems in the process safety, understand hazards and risk, manage risk and learn from
industry. experience (CAPP, 2014, p. 18). Similarly, the Energy Institute pro­
posed four functional pillars which closely match those proposed by
1.5. Population sample and data collection method CAPP comprising of: Process safety leadership, Risk identification
and assessment, Risk management, as well as review and improve­
1.5.1. Collection of documentary data ment (Energy Institute, 2016). Also, OECD (2017) highlights five
The study utilised documentary data which contained relevant in­ categories which represent the essential elements of corporate
formation about process safety management systems. These documen­ governance for process safety including: risk awareness, information,
tary data were sourced from peer-reviewed literature in academic competence and action, as well as leadership and culture. The design
databases such as Science Direct, Scopus, Research Gate, Wiley Online specification of the IPSMS model by Theophilus et al. (2018) was
Library and Google Scholar. found peer-reviewed journals to be very developed by incorporating all 26 essential features of existing pro­
reliable sources of information for academic research. Process safety cess safety management systems as seen in Table 2. Therefore, this
data were also sourced from websites of reputable organisations such as study included design specification into its comparative framework
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), UK HSE, OECD, DuPont, to account for essential features of PSM systems. Since the PSM
Energy Institute American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and systems have a total of 26 elements in their framework collectively,
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). The Zotero each PSM system was given a score out of 26 to account for the
research assistant was used to collate all documentary data used for essential elements of a PSM system contained in their framework.
analysis in this study and also served as the primary reference tool for �Industry adaptability and applicability: Industry adaptability
this research. After searching each of these databases, a total of 21 PSM and applicability were selected as one of the comparative criteria as
systems were selected for comparison in this study. the process industry comprises of various sectors. It is imperative
that any PSM system which is developed for the process industry
1.5.2. Collection of interview data should at least be applicable across a number of sectors within the
Qualitative interviews were conducted to understand the perception process industry (McGuinness and Utne, 2014). The various PSM
of process safety experts regarding the comparative framework for PSM systems were assessed from a scale of 1–5, with 1 denoting low in­
systems in the process industry. The interviews helped in buttressing and dustry adaptability and 5 representing a very high industry adapt­
validating the documentary data collected from academic literature. A ability. This means that PSM systems that are used within just one
total of 9 process safety experts were contacted to participate in the sector are given a score of 1 while those applicable to multiple sec­
interview; however, only 4 of them responded and agreed to be part of tors have scores increasing up to 5, depending on the number of
the study. The interviewees were selected using simple random sam­ sectors they could be used in.
pling based on their job affiliation and level of experience in the process �Human factors: Human factors were also selected as key factors
industry. The interview participants included two Process Engineers and that could be paramount in ascertaining the robustness of PSM sys­
two Process Safety Management Lecturers. The interviewees were tems, since the safety and integrity of activities that take place in the
engaged through telephone calls and face-to-face meetings. Upon process industry are functions of the interaction among man,
seeking permission of each interview participant, the location and time equipment and process (Rodríguez and Díaz, 2016). In this regard,
of the interview were scheduled. Each interview lasted for about 15–20 the PSM elements were evaluated using the Human Factors Analysis
min and some probing questions were asked after specific questions to and Classification System (HFACS) by (Shappell and Wiegmann,
gain more detailed information about the comparative framework being 2013). The HFACS system comprises of 19 human factors which were
developed. Interviews were recorded and later transcribed to ensure that all juxtaposed with the various PSM systems to see which of the
every conversation was appropriately documented. systems addressed key human factor categories. Any PSM element
that addressed all 19 human factor components sufficiently was
1.6. Qualitative data analysis allotted a score of 19, and corresponding scores were given to any
PSM system depending on the number of human factors they
1.6.1. Documentary analysis adequately addressed.
After analysing documentary data from journal papers and company �Scope of application: The scope of application was another factor
websites, the factors that were selected for the comparative framework that was taken into consideration, with Theophilus et al. (2016)
of PSM systems include: suggesting that PSM systems could be affected based on the hierar­
chical level within the organisation which it applies to. These various
�Framework and room for continuous improvement: Every PSM levels ranged from 1 for employees and staff, 2 for line managers and
system is required to have continuous improvement strategies which supervisors, 3 for senior management of company and organisation,
could help organisations cope better with management of change 4 for safety regulators and 5 for national and international agencies
(AIChE, 2014). Ideally, after conducting risk assessments or incident and institutions. Depending on the level of hierarchy that a PSM
investigations, some flaws may be identified within an organisation’s system was applicable to, they were designated a range of scores. For
PSM system that need to be addressed (AlKazimi, 2015). Therefore, example, a PSM system that was applicable from personnel to na­
framework and room for continuous improvement was selected as a tional and international agencies was given a range of 1–5, implying
key factor for the comparative framework. All PSM systems which that its scope of application was extensive.

8
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

�Usability in complex systems: The usability of the PSM systems in system found to be inductive was marked as “I” while those that were
very complex systems was also taken into context. The process in­ deductive were marked as “D”. The systems that applied both
dustry is made up of several complex systems and the levels of inductive and deductive approaches were marked as “ID”.
complexity within these systems have tremendously increased over
the years, which goes to suggest that PSM systems ought to also 1.6.2. Content analysis of interview responses
evolve to cater for these complexities that could pose new hazards The interview data for this study was analysed using content analysis
(Qureshi, 2008). Ideally, PSM systems should accommodate tier 1 due to its ability to identify paragraphs, themes and keywords in an
(greater consequence) and tier 2 (lesser consequence) process in­ interview. Content analysis involves the process of identifying percep­
cidents (AIChE, 2011). The scores allotted to each PSM system under tions, collecting samples of these perceptions and analysing them in
this category were either “Yes” for those that can be used in complex order to find any correlations (Elo et al., 2014). The analysis of interview
systems and “No” for those that cannot. data highlighted some notable factors which are to be considered when
�Safety culture: It is satisfactory for every organisation in the pro­ comparing PSM systems. The interview questions were structured to
cess industry to have a PSM system in place. However, it is also vital first seek expert opinion about the factors which should be included in
to note that safety culture is pivotal in ensuring the success of any of the comparative framework, before suggesting some other factors ob­
these systems (Shirali et al., 2016). Without a good safety culture in tained from literature. In this section, key findings from the transcribed
any organisation, all safety policies, procedures and measures could interview responses are extracted, trimmed and presented as quotes.
be in serious jeopardy (Morrow et al., 2014). Consequently, safety Process safety experts were first quizzed about the factors that they
culture was added as one of the criteria for examining the PSM sys­ believed were important when comparing process safety management
tems and it was also designated using the “Yes” or “No” (PSM) systems. Their responses are presented below: ‘ … I believe that
classification. an ideal process safety management system should be compared based
�Primary or secondary mode of application: Some PSM systems on their ability to prevent loss of containment. They should have ele­
are designed to be applied as stand-alone components of a PSM ments that specifically tackle risks associated with fires, explosion,
system, while others require the incorporation of one or more PSM collapses, and structural damage.’ – Process Engineer, oil and gas
systems to function successfully (Moore et al., 2015). Consequently, company in Aberdeen
the PSM systems were grouped in this category under P for primary
‘ … Well, I think any system for process safety should be able to
and S for secondary systems, with primary systems being those that
manage process hazards and risks. Things like facility or equipment
can function alone while secondary systems require integration with
damage, operational procedures, and regulatory compliance are
other PSM systems to be successfully implemented. Some systems
important factors to be considered.’ – Process Engineer, chemical
which could function solely, and could also be integrated with other
manufacturing plant in Nigeria
systems were assigned as PS.
� Regulatory framework and enforcement: Similar to the analogy of ‘ … It is one thing to have a process safety management system, but it
safety culture being pivotal in ensuring the success of PSM imple­ is another thing for that system to be easily understood and imple­
mentation, it is noteworthy to include regulatory enforcements as mented in industry. I would say factors such as complexity of the
prerequisites in PSM systems as national and international agencies, system, the various features contained within the management sys­
as well as regulatory bodies could better execute PSM elements to the tem, and adequate knowledge and training for the implementation
latter (Kwon et al., 2016). A typical example is the Safety Case are all vital.’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United
Regulations which places an onus on all operators of offshore oil and Kingdom
gas facilities to produce a safety case document to ensure that they
have mitigated all possible hazards as far as reasonably practicable ‘ … The factors in question will depend on the particular industry
(UKHSE, 2006). This is key in not just ensuring that there is a safety within the process sector because each industry comes with its own
policy but goes as far as confirming that every requirement in the unique risks’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United
policy is met. Hence, PSM systems that did not place emphasis on Kingdom
regulatory enforcement were designated as “No, while those which Afterwards, interviewees were probed further using the comparative
did were marked “Yes”.
factors obtained from literature. After listing all 11 factors used for the
�Competence level: The various ways and methods through which comparative framework, participants were asked if there were any other
PSM systems can be applied are most times detailed in their imple­
factors that were missing from the framework. Their responses were
mentation strategy. This provides the end-users which could be staff, thus: ‘ … The factors you just mentioned are good enough to compare
regulators, government or even the general public on how they could
process safety systems’ – Process Engineer, oil and gas company in
implement this system. However, a major factor to be considered is Aberdeen
the level of competence (knowledge, ability, training and experi­
ence) required to implement a PSM system in any organisation ‘ … Not exactly. I believe these are well detailed’ – Process Engineer,
(Dekra, 2017). Most PSM systems may require advanced competence chemical manufacturing plant in Nigeria
in order to be applied, while some require basic competence.
‘ … Like I said earlier, training is important. So, it is good that
Depending on the level of competence required to use any of these
competence has been added because it covers training, knowledge,
systems, “A” was assigned to those systems that needed advanced
experience and ability’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer,
competence level to gain knowledge of their application, while “B”
United Kingdom
was allotted to those which needed basic competence to use.
�Inductive or deductive approach: Finally, the principle of oper­ ‘ … PSM system should be compared depending on the industry
ation for each PSM system was considered. PSM systems were ana­ which is using them. So yes, I believe industry adaptability and
lysed for how they execute the various elements provided within applicability are important factors to consider’ – Process Safety
their framework. PSM systems adopt either an inductive or a Management Lecturer, United Kingdom
deductive approach in their method of application. Inductive PSM
systems stipulate various key areas, elements, factors and measures Participants were also asked whether they believed that PSM systems
that should be present within an organisation to ensure safety, while should be flexible in their scope of application and the criteria which
the deductive systems verify the levels of functionality, compliance flexibility of PSM systems should be based on. They responded by
and adequacy of the measures being suggested (Sklet, 2004). Any saying: ‘ … To say a process system is flexible, they should be applied

9
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

across any industry and in any situation that arises’ – Process Engineer, in understanding the accident investigation tools that were either
oil and gas company in Aberdeen loosely coupled and tractable, tightly coupled and tractable, loosely
coupled and intractable, as well as tightly coupled and intractable.
‘ … For flexibility, I will say anyone with limited knowledge or
Similarly, in this study, the quadrant matrix was used to show PSM
experience should be able to use it’ – Process Engineer, chemical
systems that were flexible and robust, inflexible and robust, flexible and
manufacturing plant in Nigeria
not robust, as well as inflexible and not robust.
‘ … Such a PSM system should be able to cater for any kind of process
safety risks before you can deem it to be flexible’ – Process Safety 1.7. Comparison of PSM systems using developed framework
Management Lecturer, United Kingdom
As seen in Table 3, all PSM systems have framework and room for
continuous improvement, with the exception of the US OSHA PSM
Program, ILO PSM framework, EPA RMP, DuPont ORM model. The PSM
‘ … This means that the PSM system can be applied in any situation systems with the highest level of industry adaptability “5” within the
and in various ways’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United process industry include: CIMAH regulations, US OSHA PSM program,
Kingdom ILO PSM framework, COMAH regulations, Energy Institute High-Level
PSM framework, DuPont ORM model, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS
Lastly, participants were also asked whether they believed that PSM model. Most of these PSM systems can be widely applied in the chemical,
systems should be compared based on their levels of robustness and the oil and gas, petrochemical and other major hazardous installations
criteria which robustness of PSM systems should be based on. Their across the process industry. Based on the HFACS framework, the PSM
responses were: ‘ … That has to do more with the amount of process risks systems that addressed at least 10 out of 19 human factors in the
that are addressed by the management system’ – Process Engineer, oil framework include the RCPSC, ILO PSM framework, API RP 75, COMAH
and gas company in Aberdeen regulations, AICHE/CCPS RBPS model, SEMS regulation, Energy Insti­
‘ … A process system is robust if it can manage if it addresses all the tute High-level PSM framework, IOGP/IPIECA OMS framework, CoMS
comparative factors listed here’ – Process Engineer, chemical and the IPSMS model. For the scope of application, the number of PSM
manufacturing plant in Nigeria systems that are applicable from national and international agencies
down to the personnel include: CIMAH regulations, US OSHA PSM
‘ … A robust process safety management system must not be lacking program, Safety Case, ILO PSM framework, EPA RMP, COMAH regula­
any essential features of a standard process safety management tions, SEMS regulation and IPSMS model. Considering the complex na­
system – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United Kingdom ture of operations in various sectors of the process industry, it is evident
that all current PSM systems can be applied in complex sociotechnical
‘ … Again, I think this might depend on the industry of application
systems. However, some of these PSM systems as highlighted by other
because what might be robust for one industry might not be the same
comparative factors may not be robust enough to adequately address
for another’ – Process Safety Management Lecturer, United Kingdom
key concerns in the process industry. The PSM systems that considered
The last two questions on flexibility and robustness of PSM systems safety culture in their framework include RCPSC, US OSHA PSM pro­
were used to compare PSM systems in the study using a quadrant matrix gram, ExxonMobil OIMS, ILO PSM framework, AIChE/CCPS RBPS
similar to the study of Hollnagel and Speziali (2008). In their study, model, BP OMS, Energy Institute High-Level PSM framework, DuPont
accident investigation tools were compared according to their levels of ORM model, CSChE PSM Guide 4th edition, IOGP/IPIECA OMS frame­
coupling and tractability. As seen in Fig. 6, this quadrant matrix helped work, PSI4MS, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS model. Some PSM systems
could also be easily incorporated with other PSM systems during process
safety implementation such as US OSHA PSM program, AIChE/CCPS
RBPS model, DuPont ORM model, PSI4MS, CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS
model. There are certain PSM systems that also ensure regulatory
enforcement if not adhered to such as CIMAH regulations, US OSHA
PSM program, Safety case, ILO PSM framework, EPA RMP, COMAH
regulations, AIChE/CCPS RBPS model, SEMS regulation, Energy Insti­
tute High-Level PSM framework, DuPont ORM model and IOGP/IPIECA
OMS framework. With regards to training needs for the various PSM
systems, there are few that require basic competence for employees in
implementing them such as RCPSC, API RP 750, API RP 75, PSI4MS,
CoMS, EPR model and IPSMS. The other PSM systems are quite complex
in implementation and could be cumbersome to implement without
adequate and intensive training. The RCPSC, API RP 750 and API RP 75
adopt an inductive approach in their implementation strategy while
CIMAH regulations, Safety case, COMAH regulation and SEMS regula­
tion adopt a deductive approach. Other PSM systems adopt a mixed
approach of inductive and deductive methods in implementing their
PSM strategy.

1.8. Flexibility and robustness of PSM systems

According to findings from the comparative framework, it is perti­

nent to group these PSM systems according to their levels of flexibility
and robustness. This could ease the decision of companies who wish to
adopt a PSM system by providing them a summary of all PSM systems in
Fig. 6. Quadrant matrix used to classify accident investigation tools (Hollnagel the process industry at first glance (Lee et al., 2016). As illustrated in
and Speziali, 2008). Fig. 7, this categorisation of PSM systems was done in a matrix structure

10
 C.D. Nwankwo et al.
Table 3
Comparative Framework of PSM systems and regulations in the process industry.
Criteria for Framework and room Design Industry Human factors Scope of Usability in Safety Primary or Regulatory Competency Inductive/
comparison for continuous specification adaptability and (man, machine, application Complex culture Secondary mode framework and level Deductive
PSM systems improvement applicability process) systems of application enforcement approach

Responsible Care ® Yes 12/26 1 15 1–3 Yes Yes S No B I

Process Safety Code
(RCPSC)
CIMAH regulations Yes 19/26 5 9 1–5 Yes No S Yes A D
API RP 750 Yes 22/26 3 9 1–3 Yes No S No B I
US OSHA PSM No 14/26 5 9 1–5 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID
Program
Safety Case Yes 21/26 1 9 1–5 Yes No S Yes A D
ExxonMobil OIMS Yes 19/26 1 9 1–3 Yes Yes P No A ID
ILO PSM Framework No 17/26 5 13 1–5 Yes Yes P Yes A ID
API RP 75 Yes 22/26 1 10 1–3 Yes No S No B I
EPA RMP No 17/26 1 9 1–5 Yes No S Yes A ID
COMAH regulations Yes 21/26 5 13 1–5 Yes No S Yes A D
11

AIChE/CCPS Risk Yes 26/26 5 13 1–4 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID

Based Process Safety
(RBPS) Model
BP OMS Yes 22/26 1 9 1–3 Yes Yes P No A ID
SEMS Regulation Yes 22/26 1 10 1–5 Yes No S Yes A D
Energy Institute High- Yes 20/26 5 14 1–4 Yes Yes P Yes A ID
Level PSM
Framework
DuPont Operational No 13/26 5 9 1–3 Yes Yes PS Yes A ID

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Risk Management
(ORM) Model
CSChE PSM Guide 4th Yes 19/26 1 9 1–4 Yes Yes P No A ID
edition
IOGP/IPIECA OMS Yes 23/26 1 13 1–3 Yes Yes P Yes A ID
Framework
PSI4MS Yes 13/26 1 9 1–4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID
CoMS Yes 18/26 5 13 1–4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID
EPR model Yes 11/26 5 9 1–4 Yes Yes PS Yes B ID
IPSMS Model Yes 26/26 5 19 1–5 Yes Yes PS No B ID
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

Fig. 7. Quadrant matrix showing the flexibility and robustness of PSM systems in the process industry.

similar to the study of (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). Flexibility of PSM needs to be carried out to validate and test the IPSMS model in various
systems was decided based on 3 factors including industry adaptability, sectors of the process industry. Other PSM systems that also showed high
competence level and inductive/deductive approach; while robustness levels of flexibility and robustness include the AICHE/CCPS RBPS
was decided based on all 11 comparative factors shown in Table 3. model, ILO PSM framework, US OSHA PSM program, DuPont ORM
Therefore, the matrix was calibrated using a scale of 3 for flexibility and model and Energy Institute PSM framework. However, PSM systems
9 for robustness. Firstly, any PSM with a high score in industry adapt­ such as the IOGP/IPIECA framework, COMAH regulations, SEMS regu­
ability was deemed to be flexible and robust in its application, while lation, CIMAH regulations, and EPA RMP are less flexible in terms of
those with low scores had less flexibility and robustness ratings. PSM competency but more flexible in terms of industry adaptability. The API
systems with high scores under human factors were also classified as RP 750, API RP 75, BP OMS, Safety case and ExxonMobil OIMS are all
robust systems as they could address multiple flaws emanating from highly specialised PSM systems restricted to use within the oil and gas
various accident causal factors. Also, PSM systems whose scope of industry; hence the reason for their low level of flexibility in industry
application spanned from national agencies “5” to personnel “1” were adaptability. The PSI4MS, CoMS and EPR model have moderate levels of
also grouped as robust PSM systems. Since all PSM systems in the pro­ flexibility and robustness, possibly because they are highly specialised
cess industry are applicable to complex systems, they were all deemed to PSM systems solely for process safety information, contractor manage­
be robust in this regard. Similarly, PSM systems that included safety ment, and emergency planning and response respectively. Evidence
culture in their framework were considered to be robust. Some PSM from these findings suggest that there is still more research to be done in
systems can be used as primary standalone systems and also secondarily terms of enhancing the flexibility and robustness of PSM systems in the
in conjunction with other PSM systems. Such PSM systems which had process industry.
both primary and secondary applications were also believed to be robust
since they can be used in almost every scenario (Energy Institute, 2016). 2. Conclusion
It is one thing to have a PSM system and another thing to ensure that it is
enforced (Moore et al., 2015). Without enforcement of these PSM sys­ This research was aimed at conducting a comparative analysis of
tems, they could just be bureaucratic formalities which will not be PSM systems in the process industry. The study involved the develop­
adhered to by employees (Pitblado, 2011). Therefore, for a PSM system ment of a comparative framework to aid in the selection of appropriate
to be robust, it must also have regulatory enforcement at the heart of its PSM systems for specific industry sectors within the process industry. A
implementation. The more robust a PSM system is, the more advanced total of 21 PSM systems were selected for this study and their theoretical
the training needs for it will be (Ferna �ndez-Mun~ iz et al., 2007). Hence, frameworks, industry of application and deficiencies were all explored.
PSM systems with advanced training needs were classified as robust. This comparative framework was designed using 11 key factors which
However, this could hamper their level of flexibility as they might not be were applicable to the process industry including: industry adaptability,
flexible to be applied by novices in the process industry. Likewise, PSM human factors, scope of application, use in complex systems, safety
systems which applied inductive and deductive approaches in their culture, primary or secondary mode of application, regulatory enforce­
implementation strategy were thought to be flexible and robust. ment, training requirement, as well as inductive or deductive approach.
As illustrated in Fig. 7, the IPSMS model seems to be the most flexible After conducting the comparative analysis using these factors, the In­
and robust of all the PSM systems in this study. This is possibly because tegrated Process Safety Management System (IPSMS) model was
the IPSMS model was developed by incorporating the elements from all deemed to be the most robust PSM system as it addressed almost every
other PSM systems to form its theoretical framework; hence, making it a key area regarding process safety. However, the IPSMS model has not
robust coalition of PSM systems for the process industry (Theophilus yet been tested or validated by any organisation within the process in­
et al., 2018). One factor it was lacking, however, was the lack of regu­ dustry and this poses to be a major flaw of system. A major inference
latory enforcement offered by its implementation strategy. A possible drawn from this research is that there is no one-size-fits-all PSM system
reason for this could be because this model has not been adequately for all sectors of the process industry. Instead, process industry sectors
validated and tested in the process industry. Therefore, more research should be extensive and thorough when selecting the right PSM system

12
C.D. Nwankwo et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66 (2020) 104171

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