Farhat Document 2018
Farhat Document 2018
Farhat Document 2018
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Exploring the Perspectives of the Saudi State’s Destruction of Holy Sites:
Shazia Farhat
Harvard University
November 2018
© 2018 Shazia Farhat
Abstract
This thesis explores Saudi Arabia’s perspective on the destruction of heritage sites
before and after Saudi Arabia became a state, seeking answers to these questions: why
does Saudi Arabia commit these acts in the name of Islam? How much influence does
Wahhabism have on Saudi actions? How does the country justify these actions even
occurred during the formation of the first Saudi state. But as time passed, the Wahhabi
ulama (religious scholars) lost considerable power over religious affairs in Saudi Arabia,
and it is apparent that religion is no longer at the helm of the Saudi society. Saudi Arabia
claims that the destruction of heritage sites protects religious pilgrims from weak
structures in danger of falling, and protects adherents whose faith is weak from the
danger of committing shirk (associating others with God—a form of unbelief). I contend
that in reality such destruction has no religious basis but rather reflects what suits the
Saudi state, which in this case is financial gain. The Saudi state’s aim is to make way for
modernization so it can increase the government’s financial resources which will enable
investments in hotels and shopping malls. At the same time, the state maintains its
religious hegemony by pacifying the Wahhabi ulama, giving them vague authority in
If the motivation for such destruction were solely religious, many heritage sites in
Saudi Arabia would not exist today. These sites existed for centuries, maintained by
previous Muslim rulers, and the government is enjoined to preserve them by both the
Quran and the Sunnah, according to non-Wahhabi ulama. As such, although there is a
need to accommodate an increasing number of pilgrims, there are several ways the state
could safeguard not only the pilgrims but the historically relevant heritage sites, while
I. Introduction..............................................................................................................1
The Third Saudi Emirate and the State of Wahhabi Power ...................................13
v
Non-Wahhabi Scholars’ Perspectives....................................................................32
Diversity in Islam.......................................................................................33
Tourism ..................................................................................................................54
References..........................................................................................................................61
vi
List of Tables
vii
Glossary of Arabic Terms
amir Ruler
haram Sacred
ikhwan Brothers
Kufr unbelief
masjid mosque
viii
mujtahidin Those who formulate independent judgments
salah Prayer
ix
Chapter I
Introduction
During the early Islamic conquests of the seventh century, Caliph Umar’s (634-
This is the assurance of safety which the servant of God, Umar, the
Commander of the Faithful, has granted to the people of Jerusalem. He has
given them an assurance of safety for themselves, for their property, their
churches, their crosses, the sick and the health of the city, and for all the
rituals that belong to their religion. Their churches will not be inhabited
[by Muslims] and will not be destroyed. Neither they, nor the land on
which they stand, nor their crosses, nor their property will be damaged.
They will not be forcibly converted. (Hamblin, 2001)
In Muslim culture, the prohibition against destroying religious sites, even those of
enemies, has ancient roots. The terms of the seventh century peace treaty referenced
above suggest that Umar ibn Al-Khattab, the second Sunni caliph and a senior companion
of Prophet Muhammad, not only “oversaw major expansion of the Islamic empire, and
transmitted numerous hadith” (sayings or actions of the Prophet Muhammad) but was
also “considered a particularly authoritative source” on Islamic law (Umar ibn, n.d.).
Umar believed that religious sites should be preserved, and that people of other religions
should not be forced to convert to Islam. If Prophet Muhammad’s own trusted companion
and the second caliph in Islam refused to destroy non-Muslim places of worship, then a
crucial contradiction arises as the world watches the destruction of Islamic cultural
even condoned within the context of Islam? According to those who carry out such
destruction, the answer lies within the ultra-conservative branch of Islamic thought
Islamic religious and legal scholar Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab. He declared that
preserving such Islamic heritage sites leads to shirk (associating other beings with God),
which occurs when a person venerates such sites in addition to venerating God. It is
viewed as a type of idolatry, and defies a core Islamic tenet of tawhid (there is one God,
and He has no partners associated with Him) (Shirk, n.d.). Shirk is considered the
To explore this question, this thesis focuses on the destruction of heritage sites
such as mosques, grave sites, and residences of principal figures associated with early
Islamic history. The destruction of these sites is studied, with a specific focus on the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before and after it became a state. My decision to focus on
Saudi Arabia arises from the fact that it is the country where both Islam and Wahhabism
initially emerged and still coexist today. Additionally, follow up questions such as, has
Wahhabi doctrine influenced the Saudi state during its many iterations to allow such
destruction, how does the Saudi government justify its actions, and whether there are
other Muslim scholars who oppose these acts of destruction will assist in answering the
main question.
There are some limitations to the scope of this study. First, my focus is on Islamic
heritage sites, in particular sites in and around the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina,
which are connected to key figures in Islam such as Prophet Muhammad and his family.
2
Second, the acts of destruction considered are limited to those undertaken by Saudi
Arabia before and after it became a state. Third, since most of the statements made by the
Saudi government are in Arabic, some information may not be accessible, such as tweets
conclusion. Chapters II and III provide the historical and ideological backgrounds of
Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism. Chapter II covers the period leading up to the formation of
the current Saudi state and the involvement of the Wahhabi movement in that formation.
Chapter III addresses the current Saudi administration and the current status of Wahhabi
power. These two chapters highlight the justifications offered by Saudi Arabia for the
destruction of heritage sites in the context of religion, both before and after Saudi Arabia
became a state. Chapter IV presents the counter-argument by Muslim scholars who, like
Caliph Umar, do not believe such destruction should occur. Chapter V analyzes the
justifications presented by Saudi Arabia and the motivations behind the destruction.
3
Chapter II
background that set the stage for the creation of the Saudi-Wahhabi ideology, which in
Saudi-Wahhabi Ideology
Muhammad ibn Saud, a member of the Al Saud family, ruled interior portions of
Arabia during the eighteenth century. The Al Saud family belonged to a landholding
merchant class in Najd, a sedentary group that founded the small town of al Diriyah,
whose population was made up of farmers, merchants, artisans, and lesser known ulama
Ottoman Empire tried to expand its authority into Najd and al Diriyah, but it did not
succeed. Consequently, the absence of Ottoman rule meant that towns like al Diriyah
were ruled by tribal confederations. Muhammad ibn Saud’s authority as ruler was
acknowledged by the residents due to a combination of factors: his mediation skills, his
residence in the oasis, his ability to defend the colony against raids by other tribes, and
his ownership of cultivated land and wells in and around the settlement (Al Rasheed,
2002, p. 15). However, the Al Sauds’ power was limited to the settlement, as was
4
common in Arabia at that time, because their authority lacked two things: an “identifiable
The Al Saud family fortunes changed once they embraced the Wahhabi
movement associated with the reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (Al Rasheed,
2002, p. 16). Abd al Wahhab belonged to a Najdi family that produced several
jurisprudence, which was also known for its austere interpretation of Islam. Continuing in
the path of his ancestors, Abd al Wahhab pursued his religious education by travelling to
Mecca, Medina, Basra, and beyond before coming back to Najd where his father was a
religious judge (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 16; Menoret, 2005, p. 44; Commins, 2006, pp. 1-2;
Although Abd al Wahhab pursued religious education like his father, it appears
that his father strongly disagreed with him on the issue of innovations in rituals that could
amount to idolatry. Consequently, Abd al Wahhab remained quiet about his mission until
after his father’s death in 1740. Thereafter, however, he aggressively began to prohibit
people from relying on anyone but God because he believed he was living in the time of
jahiliyya (periods of ignorance) that had been prophesied by Prophet Muhammad back in
the seventh century. During jahiliyya Prophet Muhammad taught the significance of
worshiping one God. This concept was alien to local Arabs, but over time Prophet
Muhammad gained many followers, but he warned that a time would come when Islam
would again be as foreign to humankind as it had been during the seventh century
(Commins, 2006, pp. 2-3). Abd al Wahhab believed Islam had become foreign to the
Arabian community and had fallen back into jahiliyya during his life. To pull the
5
community out of jahiliyya, Abd al Wahhab preached the importance of tawhid (the
oneness of God), and he censured all forms of innovation, such as having intercessors
between God and believers, venerating saints or kings, and visiting holy men’s tombs--all
of which were endemic among the oasis dwellers and nomads of Arabia. Abd al Wahhab
regarded visits to graves, and/or turning burial sites into shrines or mosques, to be
emulations of Jewish and Christian rituals and he warned that such acts led to kufr
(unbelief) and shirk. He required payment of zakat (an Islamic tax) and insisted on the
duty of every believer to answer his call for jihad (holy war) against those who did not
innovation, arguing for a strict interpretation of sharia (Islamic legal codes and rules).
However, since Arabian politics at the time were in disarray, the purification of Islam and
the application of sharia law needed the support of a new political authority (Al Rasheed,
Abd al Wahhab attracted a few supporters, but he also experienced opposition and
subsequently moved to al Uyaynah in Hasa. Initially, Abd al Wahhab had the benefit of
political support from the amir (ruler) of al Uyaynah, Uthman ibn Muammar, who
endorsed Abd al Wahhab’s reforms. With the amir’s support, Abd al Wahhab carried on
with his mission of purifying Islam by combating innovations and applying sharia.
Despite the amir’s support, he soon faced considerable resistance to his mission. First, the
local religious scholars convinced the ruler of Hasa, Sheikh Sulayman ibn Urayar, that
the reformer’s mission constituted a threat to the Sheikh’s right to collect taxes. Second,
the reformer’s harsh retribution against those who resisted his religious opinions and his
6
the inhabitants of al Uyaynah and their ruler. Consequently, Muhammad ibn Abd al
Wahhab was eventually expelled by the amir of al Uyaynah (Commins, 2006, p. 17-18;
Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 17; Menoret, 2005, p. 48; Aarts & Roelants, 2015, pp. 6-7).
In 1744, the reformer arrived in al Diriyah, a settlement forty miles away from al
Uyaynah, and ruled by Muhammad ibn Saud. Ibn Saud afforded protection to Abd al
Wahhab and indicated a willingness to endorse the reformer’s mission on two conditions:
“First, that he pledge to continue supporting Ibn Saud if their campaign to establish
God’s unity triumphed. Second, that Abd al Wahhab approve of Ibn Saud’s taxation of al
Diriyyah’s harvests” (Commins, 2006, p. 19). Abd al Wahhab agreed to the first
condition, but countered the second condition with a proposal of how “God might
compensate the amir with booty from raids and legitimate taxes [zakat] greater than the
taxes on harvests” (Commins, 2006, p. 19). A pact was established between the two men
in 1744, in which Abd al Wahhab was guaranteed control over religious interpretation,
and ibn Saud would be acknowledged as a political leader of the Muslim community (Al
Following through with his objection to taxation, Abd al Wahhab’s first act was to
put an end to the taxation of agricultural produce in the new emirate and to let revenue
from jihad replace it. This economic measure was another pact made between Abd al
Wahhab and Al Saud (Menoret, 2005, p. 48; Commins, 2006, p. 19). By “abolishing
fiscal pressure on the agricultural produce of the al Diriyah emirate and making the state
finances dependent upon conquests,” Abd al Wahhab’s religious reform quickly spread
throughout Arabia because it allowed wealth accumulation for those who supported the
7
The First Saudi Emirate and the Wahhabi Movement
Between 1744 and Sheikh Sulayman ibn Urayar’s death in 1792, the Saudi-
Wahhabi coalition systematically expanded its dominion via jihad until it encompassed
all of central Arabia. The coalition pursued expansion in order to obtain compliance with
the tenets of Wahhabi Islam among the sedentary and nomadic populations. Expansion
by jihad was the only way the Sheikh could reach beyond the confines of the settlement;
because of the significance of jihad in Wahhabism, the conquest of new territories was
accepted as permissible. This was the first time since the time of Prophet Muhammad that
a great part of the peninsula was merged under a single political rule that implemented
only one interpretation of Islam (Commins, 2006, p. 19; Al Rasheed, 2002, p.18). This
reform movement gave legitimacy to the Al Saud family which it had been unable to
achieve through traditional means of tribal origin and wealth. Abd al Wahhab promised
wealth to Al Saud in the form of zakat and expansion through jihad and he delivered (Al
Through jihad, and commanded by Abd al Aziz, son of Muhammad ibn Saud, the
Saudi leadership spread into Riyadh, Kharj, and Qasim by 1792, and Wahhabism became
the dominant religious doctrine. Thereafter, Saudi forces moved eastward into Hasa.
When Abd al Aziz installed Saudi rule over Taif in 1802, over Mecca in 1803, and over
Medina in 1804, the Wahhabi ulama commanded the destruction of the domed tombs in
8
The expansion of the Saudi emirate continued southward into Asir and also to the
northeast, reaching the regions of Mesopotamia. In 1801, the cities of Karbala and Basra
were attacked and pillaged (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 22). Although Saudi forces attacked
cities in Iraq and Syria with great success, these conquests did not result in the formation
of a Saudi-Wahhabi presence there due to the distance from their power base in Arabia.
Thus, the first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate created a “political realm with fluctuating
In 1803, followers of Wahhabism, with support from the Al Saud family, carried
out a campaign of destruction, leveling all existing domes in the holy city of Mecca
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 71; Al Alawi, 2015; “Mecca’s Changing Face”, 2014). In 1806, they
occupied Medina and left no “religious building, including mosques, without demolishing
it, whether inside or outside the Baqi” (graveyard with graves of Prophet Muhammad’s
family) (Ahmed, 2006, p. 71). The destructive crusade continued, targeting the graves of
the martyrs of Uhud, the Mosque of al Manaratain, the mosque of the Prophet’s daughter
Fatima, the tombs of the Prophet’s wives and companions; structures in the Baqi were
flattened to the ground leaving not a single dome in place (Ahmed, 2006, p. 71: Rizvi,
2015, p. 85).
Wahhabism believed they were acting in alignment with what Abd al Wahhab presented
in one of his major works, the Kitab al Tawhid (The Book of God’s Unity). This book
contained 67 short chapters: the first six define idolatry and monotheism, the rest use
Quranic verses and hadiths to indicate what was permitted and what was forbidden. Each
chapter started with text, either Quranic verses and/or hadiths on a particular topic, such
9
as shirk, followed by a list of important issues in the chapter that a follower should reflect
upon. For example, in Chapters 20, 21, 22, and 61, Abd al Wahhab called attention to
visiting and venerating graves and tombs, and the relationship of these acts to shirk. In
Chapter 21, titled “Exaggeration in the Graves of the Righteous Persons Tends Them to
Become Idols Worshipped Besides Allah,” Abd al Wahhab shares a hadith that states:
“Imam Malik recorded in his book ‘Muwatt’ that the Prophet said: O Allah! Never turn
my grave into an idol to be worshipped. Allah’s wrath intensified on a people who turn
their Prophet’s graves into Masjid (mosque)” (Abd al Wahhab, n.d., p. 59). Similarly, in
Chapter 61, titled “What is the Punishment for the Picture-Makers?,” the hadith declares:
any such construction, for leaving structures like these standing would lead a Muslim to
commit shirk. From this perspective, the followers of Wahhabism were cleverly
complying with the book in nineteenth-century Arabia; however, in their quest to purify
Islam, it also seems the followers of Wahhabism purged rather than purified Islam.
When the Saudi emirate expanded to the borders of Hasa and Hijaz, areas still
under the control of the Ottoman Empire, the arrival of the Saudis did not sit well with
the Ottoman ulama. They urged Istanbul to take steps to quell the Najdi movement in
those regions, given that the Wahhabi mission threatened their position (Commins, 2006,
p.30). After the Saudi conquests of Mecca and Medina in 1803 and 1804, respectively,
they were no longer just an annoyance to the Ottoman Empire; they had become a threat
10
as they asserted their Arab authority as superior to the Turkish Empire. It was imperative
that the Ottoman Empire first recover control of the Holy Cities and then completely
destroy the ideological challenge posed by the Wahhabi mission (Commins, 2006, p. 32).
by sending a naval expedition into Arabia, with the assistance of the governor of Egypt,
Muhammad Ali. The Saudis conducted a surprise attack and forced the Ottoman-
Egyptian troops to retreat, but the troops recovered and marched into Medina, forcing the
Saudis to evacuate in 1812 after a brief siege. In 1813, the Saudis withdrew from Mecca
During this time, Saud ibn Abd al Aziz, who had taken over from his father Abd
al Aziz, died leaving his son Abdullah ibn Saud to face the Ottoman-Egyptian troops. In
1815, the Ottomans pushed into Najd, where fighting led to a ceasefire when the Saudis
the Ottoman-Egyptian army and many of the Wahhabi ulama were massacred. The
sacking of al Diriyah marked the end of the first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate (Commins,
The Ottoman war against the Saudis had both a tactical and a religious purpose:
the offensive was aimed not only at crushing Saudi political power in the region but also
destroying the Wahhabi mission. For the Saudis, the encounter with the Ottoman Empire
was not just a political scuffle of Arabs versus Turks but also a religious fight between
monotheism and idolatry. The Saudi-Wahhabi amirs were of the opinion that under
Ottoman rule shirk had spread, and it was imperative that Islam needed to be purified of
such shirk. At the end of 1818, with al Diriyah completely demolished, the first Saudi
11
state came to its end, and its leader Abdullah ibn Saud was returned to Istanbul for public
By 1824, the Ottoman-Egyptian army had pulled out of Najd due to frequent
Saudi raids, logistical strains, and pressure from local inhabitants. This opened the way
for Turki ibn Abdullah, son of Abdullah ibn Saud, to return to Riyadh, a larger town
located south of al Diriyah. With a small force, Turki captured Riyadh and made it his
capital, and by 1825 his jurisdiction covered central and southern Najd all the way to
Qasim. In 1834, Turki was assassinated and his son Faysal ibn Turki became amir of the
second Saudi-Wahhabi emirate (Commins, 2006, pp. 44-45; Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 23).
When Faysal died at the end of 1865, internal disagreements over his successor created
rifts in the Saudi family. This crisis of succession set off a long military contest that
effectively eroded Saudi power, resulting in the fall of the second Saudi emirate in 1891
to the Rashidi emirate based at Hail (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 24; Commins, 2006, p. 61).
Although the collapse of the first Saudi emirate was due in part to military
intervention by the Egyptians on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, the second Saudi emirate
fell apart for two reasons: (1) dissension within the Saudi family weakened the already
frail Saudi leadership, and (2) while the Saudi family continued to fight among
themselves, a rival central Arabian emirate, the Rashidis of Hail, threatened Saudi
dominance and then stepped in to replace them (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 25).
12
Third Saudi Emirate and the State of Wahhabi Power
As previously noted, the Rashidis, with support from the Ottomans, took over the
Saudi capital of Riyadh. However, in 1902, Ibn Saud (also called Abd al Aziz) returned
from exile in Kuwait to claim his rightful place as amir. With assistance from the Al
Sabah family who were Kuwait’s rulers, Ibn Saud began a series of campaigns against
the Rashidis. By 1906, he controlled southern and eastern Najd, had extended his control
over Qasi and Unayzah, and laid siege on the Rashidi capital of Hail, which eventually
surrendered. The Ottomans confirmed Ibn Saud as the de facto ruler of Qasim and
During this time, Britain—which had treaties with several other Gulf rulers—did
not involve itself with the Saud family since it still considered Ibn Saud to be an
“Ottoman vassal”; it was not until the start of World War I that this impression changed
when Britain realized it needed Ibn Saud’s support to end Ottoman dominance in Najd.
This led to the Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 1915, which acknowledged that Najd and Hasa
were Ibn Saud’s territories, and that the British government would provide Ibn Saud with
aid if there were hostilities toward these territories. The treaty also accorded Ibn Saud a
monthly subsidy of £5,000. This was the beginning of Britain’s direct participation in the
In 1918, the end of World War I also brought the end of the Ottoman Empire’s
authority in Arabia. In 1924 and 1925, there were several more changes within the Saudi
emirate. For example, the monthly subsidy that Ibn Saud received from Britain stopped,
which caused him to seek other avenues to support his financial affairs. One possibility
was income generated from pilgrimage taxes; another was customs duties assessed in the
13
region of central Hijaz (Al Rasheed, 2002, pp. 43, 45-46). To secure this income, Ibn
Saud attacked Taif and then marched on to Mecca. Although the invasion was motivated
by the need for money, Ibn Saud proclaimed to all that the reason for capturing the holy
city was to ensure the safety and security of the holy land and the pilgrims that arrived
there each year. Interestingly, this same reasoning was again used a few centuries later
when Saudi rulers demolished several historically relevant sites in and around Mecca and
Medina. After securing Mecca in 1924, Ibn Saud’s troops captured other cities, such as
Medina and Jeddah, and with these and the other main cities of Hijaz under his
jurisdiction, Ibn Saud declared himself King of Hijaz in December 1925 (Al Rasheed,
2002, p. 46; Commins, 2006, pp. 72, 77). In 1932, the third and final revival of Saudi rule
began when Ibn Saud designated his realm the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 22
Following the captures of Medina and Mecca, the Najdi ulama celebrated the
seizures because they viewed Hijaz under the rule of the Ottoman Empire as the center of
operations for disseminating numerous innovations within Islam. Capturing this area was
an opportunity to take back and purify Islam from the influences of the Ottoman Empire
(Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 64). For example, the Baqi, the oldest cemetery in Medina, and the
monuments at Uhud that were destroyed during the first Saudi emirate, were rebuilt
between 1848 and 1860 during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. In 1925, with Hijaz
under Saudi control, the Wahhabi ulama again removed this Ottoman idolatry by
destroying or painting over many historical heritage sites (Ahmed, 2006, p. 72; Al Alawi,
14
How was all this achieved? Ibn Saud and the ulama’s conquests occurred because
a religio-tribal military force, the ikhwan (brothers), helped them fight the Ottomans. But
after conquering Hasa, Hail, and Hijaz, the ikhwan leadership rebelled against Ibn Saud
because the ikhwan believed themselves to be full partners in the newly created Kingdom
and wanted their share. Assuming that this new Kingdom was theirs, they began to
destroy shrines built on the tombs of the Prophet’s relatives and companions in the belief
that they were purifying the land from religious innovations (Al Rasheed, 2002, pp. 65-
In 1928, as the ikhwan were getting out of hand, Ibn Saud sent letters to the Najdi
tribal chiefs and the ulama reminding them how he conquered the holy cities from the
Ottoman Empire. He also referred to the pledge Abd al Wahhab had made to continue
supporting Ibn Saud if their campaign to establish God’s unity triumphed. Further, he
reminded them of the Wahhabi precept that obedience to the ruler is compulsory for all
subjects, including the ulama and the ikhwan. Ibn Saud informed them that if no steps
were taken to stop the ikhwan, he would abdicate. In response the ulama announced that
the ikhwan leaders were in the wrong, and the ulama restated their commitment and oath
of allegiance to Ibn Saud (Al Rasheed, 2002, pp. 50, 67; Commins, 2006, pp. 90-91). By
March 1929, with the assistance of the British, Ibn Saud had built a fighting force to end
the ikhwan rebellion, which led to the rebels’ surrender to the British in January 1930 (Al
In time, the role of the ulama became one of state apologists who were called on
by the King when needed, such as when decreeing fatwas (a jurist’s legal or religious
opinion), which gave legitimacy to the King’s actions. In due course, it became clear to
15
the ulama that for them to have a role in the new Kingdom, they had to accept the
subordination of religion to politics (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 68; Commins, 2006, pp. 98-
99).
16
Chapter III
The military and diplomatic campaigns undertaken by Abd al Aziz ibn Saud from
1902 to 1932 resulted in the formation of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He also
was responsible for installing Wahhabism as the “official religion of the twentieth
century Arab nation” by reinstating the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab to
their traditional role (Commins, 2006, p. 71), making sure, however, that their Wahhabi
impulses were restrained. Eventually the Wahhabi ulama acknowledged their limited role
as “guardians of ritual correctness and public morality” while surrendering to Ibn Saud
and the Saud family the “right to pursue what he deemed necessary for the Kingdom’s
Taking back Riyadh from Rashidi control in 1902 and suppressing the ikhwan in
1930 gave ibn Saud the leverage he needed with the ulama. He could make changes
within the emirate, with or without consulting them, and override any objection the
Wahhabi ulama raised against his policies (Commins, 2006, pp. 98-99). Consequently,
when the Wahhabi ulama defended policy measures taken by the Saud government to
stamp out religious disagreement and political unrest, the ulama lost their credibility and
influence within the Saudi state, influence they had enjoyed since the first Saudi emirate
(Commins, 2006, p. 156). It became obvious that the government ultimately made all the
rules.
17
Wahhabism or Salafism
context of the destruction of early Islamic sites, I will clarify the terms Wahhabism and
● Salafism subscribes to the ways and teachings of early Muslim ancestors. All
Wahhabis are Salafis, but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. Salafism “ideologically is
a wider concept, as Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has
spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Whereas, Wahhabism only
To avoid confusion, in this thesis I use the terms Wahhabi or Wahhabism, since these are
the most prevalent terms used when scholarly works discuss Saudi Arabia in the context
of religion.
Since Saudi Arabia’s constitution is based on the Quran (the holy text), and
sharia is the legal foundation from which the country is governed, it is reasonable to look
at what power the ulama hold in the country and which Wahhabi doctrines are utilized to
justify actions taken by the Saudi government (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 9). As stated
previously, the alliance between the Wahhabi clerics and the House of Saud can be
18
characterized as a “power-sharing arrangement” in which the ulama guarantee the
political legitimacy of the Al Saud in exchange for the clerics’ religious legitimacy and
recognition, limited though it may be (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 15). Wahhabism
When or if this occurs, it puts the clerics in one of two situations: either defending the
rulers or criticizing them (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 20; Commins, 2006, p. 5). The
religious and “social sphere in Saudi Arabia is controlled by the official scholars who are
appointed by the state . . . and occupy the highest religious positions in the Kingdom”
(Bin Ali, 2016, p. 149). The state needs these scholars to manage the social sphere in
order to establish conformity among the people. The ulama are, in turn, aware that in
order to execute their religious policies, they need to remain compliant with the Saudi
rulers because their ideas can only go into effect with the protection of a ruler. It is
therefore debatable how independent the clerics truly are in their religious proclamations
The impact of most ulama has gradually lessened over time, but especially in
recent years. Under contemporary Saudi leadership, ulama power is limited to acting as
guardians of ritual correctness and public morality, but nothing more. However, the
Senior Council of Ulama—the highest religious body in Saudi Arabia, the members of
which are all appointed by the King—have the task of declaring fatwas (Boucek &
Boucek, 2010). The next few paragraphs review the fatwas of contemporary Wahhabi
ulama in Saudi Arabia, specifically fatwas by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz. Ibn Baz
19
was not only the mufti (a jurist appointed by the state and serving on advisory councils)
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until his death in 1999, and President of the
Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Fatwa, but he was also Head of the
Council of Senior Scholars of Saudi Arabia (Bin Ali, 2016, p. 277). He issued several
fatwas in his lifetime, which had considerable leverage in the Wahhabi community.
Below are some of his rulings on taswir (picture, image, painting, drawing, sculpture,
statue) (see Table 1) and other rulings for masjids and graves (see Table 2), specifically
about visiting them and building mosques on them based on hadith. Since some of the
fatwas convey similar ideas, only a few are provided below; the list is not exhaustive.
“Taswir of beings with a soul is not an act of major kufr; it is however one of the major
sins because it can lead to major shirk” (Permanent Committee Fatwa no. 6541, n.d.).
“There is no difference between surahs of humans and other beings with souls and the
surahs of kings, scholars, etc. In fact, the degree of prohibition regarding the surahs of
kings, scholars, and other influential people is severe, because the fitnah (dissent; chaos)
that might be caused by them is greater” (Fatwa of ibn Baz on Taswir, n.d.).
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Table 2. Fatwas on Masjids and Graves
“It is not permissible to perform salah in a masjid where one person or more are buried.
This grave or graves should be dug up and moved to the public graveyard” (Permanent
Committee Fatwa no. 6425, n.d.).
”It is prohibited to include the grave or any part of the cemetery in the masjid”
(Permanent Committee Fatwa no. 7095, n.d.).
“If they (masjids) are built on them (graves), the Muslim rulers should demolish them,
provided that this will not cause any fitnah which cannot be overcome” (Permanent
Committee Fatwa no. 3201).
In view of the fact that there is a strong prohibition on building mosques over
graves, there are those who point to Al Masjid Al Nabawi, the Prophet Muhammad's
Mosque, in Medina where one not only finds the grave of the Prophet but additionally
two of his companions buried within the confines of the Mosque. Therefore there are
several fatwas regarding the graves of the Prophet Muhammad and two of his
Muhammad was not buried at the mosque after his death; rather, he was buried inside the
house of Aisha, his wife. When Abu Bakr, first Caliph and father-in-law to the Prophet
(Afsaruddin, 2014a) died, he was buried with the Prophet in the same room. When Umar,
21
second Caliph after Abu Bakr, died, he was also buried there (Afsaruddin, 2014b). This
room was not inside any masjid. Through several expansions of the masjid, the room
stayed outside the boundaries of the masjid. However, when the masjid was expanded
during the era of Al Walid ibn Abdul Malik, an Umayyad Caliph, he included the room in
the masjid. This is not considered burial in the masjid; rather the room in which these
three graves were buried was included in the masjid for the purposes of expansion. So the
understanding is that what was done by Al Walid is no excuse for contradicting the
no. 1644, Fatwa no. 4521, & Fatwa no. 11086, n.d.; Fatwa on wisdom, n.d.; Fatwa on
burying, n.d.).
To summarize, these fatwas mainly target two issues: first, the prohibition on
creating, having, or venerating a taswir, whether of human or animal; and second, the
these lead to shirk because a fundamental Islamic tenet states that a Muslim should not
form of fatwas, the Saudi government produced its own notifications, but on the subject
of preservation. For example, in 2000 the Saudi government initiated the Saudi
Commission for Tourism and National Heritage (SCTH, 2017), formerly known as the
Saudi Commission of Tourism and Antiquities (SCTA), “to stimulate and develop not
only tourism but also the national heritage sectors in the Kingdom” (“SCTH Initiatives,”
22
2017). In 2013, the Islamic History Sites Care Program was inaugurated by the SCTH to
care for Islamic historical sites that are “associated with the Prophet’s Sira (Prophet’s life
and events) and the era of early Muslim Caliphs” (“SCTA President,” 2017). The
maintenance projects, and develops the necessary action plans to conserve these sites”
(SCTA,” 2015.). According to the official SCTH website and the President of SCTH,
Prince Sultan bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the preservation works “are totally carried out
in compliance with the sharia laws and rules and respecting Islamic faith and principles,”
because the country, since its establishment by King Abdul Aziz, is based on “the sharia
laws and the Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah (the Prophetic tradition), and pure faith of
Islam” (SCTA President”, 2017). The program supervisor, Saad Al Rashi, provided a
resources and wells associated with the Prophet Muhammad’s Sira, in addition to
rehabilitating Prophet’s migration route” (“SCTA President”, 2017). The Saudi state’s
claim of efforts to preserve the sites included “sites in Makkah and Madina and
protecting them from misuse and encroachment.” The President of SCTH Prince Sultan
stated:
I would like here also to refer to the great efforts made by government in
preservation of antiquities during current expansion in the Holy Mosque.
During the expansion process surrounding the Holy Mosque, which aims
to facilitate pilgrims’ performance of hajj rites in particular in Makkah as
well as facilitating the visitation to the Holy Mosques in general. The
government is also keen to document the historic landmarks and ensure
they are not being removed or destroyed. (“SCTA President,” 2017)
Similar assertions have been documented by the local news. For example, Arab
News published what the President of SCTH, Prince Sultan bin Salman, had stated
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“regarding the expansion works in the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah and their
impact on archaeological and historical sites, and how the government is keen to protect
such sites as they are part of Islamic history” (“Thousands of Artifacts,” 2014).
according to sharia law, which means they would be aligned with proclamations made by
the ulama in the form of the fatwas. However, actions taken by the Saudi government
contradict the proclamations made by both the government and the Wahhabi ulama. For
example, in Madain Saleh, there are 131 tombs dating from the first century A.D., and
instead of leveling these tombs per Wahhabi principles, the SCTH website boasts of the
government’s efforts to register it as one of four heritage sites on the UNESCO World
Heritage List (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 5; SCTH, “Saudi Sites,” 2018). This location
also has twenty shrines in good condition with statues of winged lions with human heads
(SCTH, “About Madain Saleh”, 2014). At a location in Hail, there is rock art that is also
on the World Heritage List. The rock art, spread across two locations, which together
form the Jubbah site, is one of the largest and oldest rock art sites in the Saudi kingdom.
Additionally, there is another site, the Rata and Al Manjor, which “include
figures” (SCTH, “Rock Art”, 2015; SCTH, “Jubbah Site”, 2015; SCTH, “Rata and Al
Manjor Site”, 2015). These sites raise the question: why have they not been destroyed
according to the Wahhabi creed? If the government follows sharia guidelines as far as
ancient sites are concerned, then these sites should have been destroyed.
24
Another instance of Saudi rulers not following sharia and going against the
Wahhabi principles relates to pictures. The fatwa prohibiting taswir is not limited solely
to statues and pictures of animals. The prohibition regarding the taswirs of kings,
scholars, and other influential people is in fact more severe because revering them leads
to shirk. So it’s intriguing to note for instance, the centennial celebration, designed to
mark 100 years of Al Saud rule. This celebration created opportunities for the Saudi
government to develop “an ancestor cult around Ibn Saud” in which Ibn Saud, the
deceased ruler, was venerated for his accomplishments; he became a symbolic figure, and
things related to him became icons portraying his many attributes (Al Rasheed, 2002, p.
209). The Ministry of Information “captured all these in pictures and portraits of the
worship so the staging of the centennial spectacle illustrates how the Saudi royal family
overrules the ulama and their Wahhabi doctrine by celebrating the deceased king with
god-like devotion (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 215; Hameed, 2015). The array of portraits of
the king and of senior princes, which were created and distributed in a country where
statues, images, and even paintings of human figures are banned due to Wahhabi
ideology, showed the power that the Saudi government wields over its ulama and the
reality of how negligible the ulama’s power has become since the first Saudi emirate (Al
25
It seems that Saudi rulers follow Wahhabi ideology when it suits them and
disregard the principles of Wahhabism when it is not in their interest. For instance, in
1998, “the grave of Amina bint Wahb, the Prophet’s mother, was bulldozed in Abwa and
gasoline was poured on it” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 74). Sites in Mecca and Medina have seen
similar destruction:
The house of Khadija (first wife of Prophet Muhammad) was excavated during the
sacred mosque’s extensions. This was the house where the Prophet received some of
his first revelations and where his children were born. Dar al Arqam, the first school
where the Prophet taught, was demolished. There are plans to demolish the house of
Mawlid where the Prophet was born, a house that some 60 years ago was turned into
a cattle market then later converted into a library. Now there are plans to build a
palace on the site for King Abdullah (Ahmed, 2006, p. 74; Al Alawi, 2015; Peer,
Foundation, “17th century Ottoman era porticos and Mamluk columns dating back
660 years were also demolished [in Mecca]. The Ottomans had marked certain
historical locations, such as the house of Umm Hani where the Prophet commenced
In Medina, only two of seven original mosques at the site of the famous Battle of the
Trench still remain; the demolished mosques were replaced by ATM machines
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 74; Power, 2014). One of the two remaining mosques, Masjid Fath,
is scheduled for demolition. It was built where the Prophet stood during the Battle of
the Trench praying for victory, and where he received God’s assurances of victory
26
and the eventual capture of Mecca (Ahmed, 2006, p. 74; Al Alawi, 2015; Power,
2014).
All this destruction comprises just ten percent of the proposed changes the Saudi
government wants to bring to Mecca and Medina (Al Alawi, 2015). What is not readily
understood is why some sites are placed on the UNESCO World Heritage list while
others are destroyed—when all of these sites, according to Wahhabi doctrine, should be
destroyed.
reasons. First, the destroyed sites pose “security risks for visiting pilgrims” due to their
structural instability (“Mecca’s Changing Face,” 2014; Peer, 2012). According to Abu
Bakr Bagader, an official with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation which represents
officials because it will alleviate mobility issues facing Muslim pilgrims by expanding
the space for them to perform their rituals (“Mecca’s Changing Face”, 2014; Peer, 2012).
Second, the demolition of historically relevant heritage sites was done to ensure that
worshipers would not commit shirk by revering structures with ties to the Prophet and his
This type of “development” also occurs abroad. For instance, this same viewpoint
was taken in Kosovo after the Kosovo war ended in 1999. Harvard University Fine Arts
librarian Andras Riedlmayer, who surveyed the area, found that historical buildings such
as mosques built during the Ottoman rule, which were damaged during the war, were
demolished by the Saudis rather than repaired so as to make way for a proper Islamic
structure (Naegele, 2000). The destruction was not limited solely to mosques; cemeteries
27
were targeted and Ottoman-era gravestones were bulldozed. Riedlmayer believes these
Likewise, Riedlmayer noted that immediately after the war in Bosnia, a Saudi aid
agency applied for permission to restore the Gazi Husrev Beg mosque. But when it came
time to restore it, the Saudis ordered the Ottoman-style decorations to be “stripped off
and discarded” and replaced with the whitewashed Saudi style (Naegele, 2000). Robert
Bevan (2006) reports similar incidents in his book The Destruction of Memory. He states
that when the sponsors of mosque restoration are Saudi, strings are attached to the
architecture, give way to the austere whitewash” (p. 180). He offers a similar example to
Riedlmayer with the restoration of the Gazi Husrev Beg mosque. In his opinion, “the
damage caused by its rebuilding, by its whitewashing, and the removal of applied
decoration was more thorough than the damage that was caused by Serbian shelling” (p.
180).
Yet if these are the steps taken—under the guidance of Wahhabism, by the Saudi
government within and outside of the Saudi Kingdom—then why did the Saudi
government allow the preservation of structures in Jubbah, Rata, and other similar sites?
Why has the Saudi government paid to erect the Faysal Mosque in Pakistan, which shows
elements of classical Ottoman style such as a dome surrounded by tall minarets (Rizvi,
2015, pp. 28, 90)? Unlike the whitewashed interiors of “restored” mosques in Bosnia, the
inside walls of the Faysal Mosque are covered in rich blue and gold calligraphic tiles. The
minbar, from which the imam gives his sermon, is decorated with large circular
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medallions of cut lapis lazuli mosaic. The platform for the muezzin (the person who calls
out prayers) is embellished with an immense abstract mural. Breaking from traditional
Saudi ideology, the mosque also has on its grounds the tomb of a military leader credited
that the mosque has so many embellishments and that it commemorates both a military
leader (via construction of the tomb) and a King (by naming the mosque in his honor)
given that Wahhabism strongly renounces erecting memorials of any sort in the belief
that they might lead Muslims to shirk. The differences between the simple whitewashed
mosques in Kosovo and the elaborate and intricately decorated mosque in Pakistan, or the
preservation of historic sites registered on the World Heritage List compared to the
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Chapter IV
It is apparent that although the Wahhabi ulama would like the Saudi state to
follow the principles of Wahhabism and destroy such historically relevant heritage sites,
Saudi rulers in fact apply those principles where they deem necessary, leading to
Muslim scholars are of the opinion that such destruction is not allowed by Islam.
Opposition to Ibn Abd al Wahhab’s ideology existed long before the twenty-first
century. In the early 1740s, many Muslim ulama in Mecca wrote treatises attacking Abd
opposition from Sulayman Ibn Suhaym, a religious leader in Riyadh in the eighteenth
century, when ibn Suhaym criticized Abd al Wahhab for destroying the tomb of the
Prophet’s companion, Zayd ibn al Khattab, “even though there were practical, not
idolatrous reasons for erecting a tomb. The story was that the area was too rocky to dig a
grave, so the Prophet’s companions had to set up a stone tomb to protect Zayd’s corpse
from beasts of prey” (Commins, 2006, p. 20). Abd al Wahhab’s brother, who was a judge
like their father, also opposed Wahhab’s teachings. Citing the same scholars on whom
Abd al Wahhab relied to support his position, the brother contradicted Abd al Wahhab’s
30
23). Even in the face of such opposition, however, Abd al Wahhab’s ideology survived
not because he made stronger arguments, but through the sheer force of the Saudi
military establishment with which he had formed an alliance (Commins, 2006, p. 24).
Henri Lauziere (2016) calls the ideology followed by the Wahhabis purist
Salafism, using the adjective purist to “convey the persistent preoccupation of today’s
Salafis with religious purity, which they seek to embody” (p. 6). Quintan Wiktorowicz
(2006) also talks about the purists as those Salafis who “emphasize a focus on nonviolent
methods of propagation, purification, and education” (p. 208). Most points of view taken
by scholars against the destruction of heritage sites in the name of Islam focus on those
who follow jihadist Salafism. Both Lauziere and Wiktorowicz state that the jihadi Salafi
terrorist groups, like the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamic State (also referred to as IS,
ISI, ISIS, and Daesh) in Iraq and Syria, take a more violent or militant approach to their
adversaries (p. 9, 208, respectively). Of course, most Salafis reject such labeling since,
from their point of view, there is only one authentic Salafism, to which “the pious
ancestors of the first three generations of Muslims conformed, revealed, unsullied by any
There are reasons for disagreement among scholars regarding the destruction of
heritage sites. For example, Islam is not a “centralized religion” like Catholicism rather
Islam has cultivated a system of jurisprudence called fiqh, with guidelines that are
designed to solve practical problems (Mallon, 2015). The Quran is the highest authority
31
within fiqh, followed by the Sunnah, and then followed by examples from Islamic history
that function as types of precedents (Mallon, 2015; UNESCO, 2001, p. 57). Therefore,
specialists in Muslim law and religion use these guidelines to validate their opposition to
perpetrated by jihadist Salafi groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State, I focus on the
Arabia specifically. While this might be construed as overly generalized, the Quranic
verses and Hadiths cited in the next few pages hold the same authority whether they are
applied to jihadist or purist Salafi groups. If the act of destruction is condemned by the
Quran or the Sunnah, the outcomes remain the same, whether such destruction is
undertaken by terrorist groups or by legitimate states such as Saudi Arabia; the guidance
remains unchanged.
sites occurred in 2001 at the Doha Conference of Ulama on Islam and Cultural Heritage,
shortly after the Taliban demolished the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan. The next
major statement was issued in 2014, when scholars collaborated on a letter critiquing and
condemning Islamic State’s destruction of Muslim and non-Muslim sites in Iraq and
Syria. In both instances, specialists in Muslim law and religion employed Islamic
jurisprudence, both Quranic verses and Islamic history, to condemn these acts of
destruction. The scholars called attention to three things: (1) the evolution of Islam and
32
how it has historically accommodated diversity; (2) the use of history to acquire
knowledge and learn lessons from ancient sites and people; and (3) the fact that many
historical sites have been deliberately preserved by Islamic rulers for centuries. Each of
Diversity in Islam
The 2001 Doha Conference emphasized that civilizations are not formed in a
vacuum but rather as a result of contributions made by diverse peoples, religions, and
amalgamating various pre-existing civilizations, cultures, and features that were in tune
with the basic principles of Islam (p. 24). According to the Quran, “And of His signs is
the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and
colours. Lo! herein indeed are portents for men of knowledge” (Pickthall, Quran 30:22).
In the opinion of Abdul Hamid Al Ansari, Dean of the Faculty of Sharia, Law and
Islamic Studies at University of Qatar, who gave the keynote paper at the Doha
Conference:
The Quran says: “Had Allah willed, He could have made you one community. But that
He may try you by that which He hath given you (He hath made you as ye are). So vie
33
one with another in good works” (Pickthall, Quran 5:48). Similar sentiments of diversity
appear in other places in the Quran: “And if thy Lord had willed, He verily would have
made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing” (Pickthall, Quran 11:118). What
these Quranic verses and Ansari himself suggest is an argument for the value of diversity
in Islam. Such an argument enables Muslims to embrace the fact that while Islam was
the conquering Muslims amplified and embraced some of the characteristics from these
Scholars believe that the value Islam places on diversity should teach Muslims to
be less severe about practices such as visiting graves or preserving historical sites. God
says in the Quran, “Keep to forgiveness (O Muhammad), and enjoin kindness, and turn
away from the ignorant” (Pickthall, Quran 7:199). Non-Wahhabi ulama state that “the
more severe opinion should not be considered more pious, religious or sincere to God.
Even the Prophet Muhammad said, ‘Be gentle, and beware of violence and foul
language”’ (“Letter to Baghdadi,” 2014). However, this perspective runs counter to what
Wahhabi scholars preach. The point is that although many countries and provinces were
conquered by Muslim forces, the conquered people were never forced to convert. Dawah
(an invitation to join Islam) was offered with fairness and gentleness, not with violence
(“Letter to Baghdadi”, 2014). The Quran says: “And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the
earth would have believed together. Wouldst thou (Muhammad) compel men until they
Quran 2:256). “Say: (It is) the truth from the Lord of you (all). Then whosoever will, let
him believe, and whosoever will, let him disbelieve” (Pickthall, Quran 18:29). In all these
34
verses, the Quran states that people must not be forced to accept a certain creed—unlike
what the Wahhabi ulama assert. Since none of the companions of the Prophet
Muhammad forced their beliefs on those they conquered, it is apparent that any assault or
destruction due to fear of shirk leads to what is wrong, not right, and “If God wanted this,
He would have obliged them over the minutest details of His religion” (“Letter to
Baghdadi,” 2014).
These writings suggest that God gave humanity choices and freedom. He could
have written out every detail for pious Muslims to follow yet he did not, thereby
excessive harshness, raising questions of whether the Wahhabi ulama in Saudi Arabia are
forcing their uncompromising views on Muslims in apparent opposition to the faith itself.
In a letter sent to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, non-Wahhabi scholars
declared that although they disagree among themselves on the subject of graves, they do
agree that where there is disagreement the best option is to be more merciful and to avoid
In summary, then, do not destroy grave sites in fear that it might lead to shirk; rather, go
to these graves so that Muslims are reminded that death comes to all at some time.
Where fatwas and sharia laws are concerned, scholars talk about “practical
jurisprudence”:
35
What is meant by “practical jurisprudence” is the process of applying
sharia rulings, and dealing with them according to the realities and
circumstances that people are living under. This is achieved by having an
insight into the realities under which people are living and identifying their
problems, struggles, capabilities and what they are subjected to. Practical
jurisprudence considers the texts that are applicable to people’s realities at
a particular time, and the obligations that can be postponed until they are
able to be met or delayed based on their capabilities. Religious edicts
(fatwas) change with the change of time, place, customs and
circumstances, and all of this is from the religion of God. (“Letter to
Baghdadi,” 2014)
Hence, decisions are best made in the context of circumstances at the time, and flexibility
is needed to ensure one does not endorse an overly severe position simply to be perceived
as more pious, religious, or sincere to God. Similarly, since fatwas may change with time,
place, and circumstances, it is best not to consider these religious opinions as written in
stone.
Diversity enables mutual connection and cooperation and is a source of joy and
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), “For Muslims, faith is associated with
knowledge, and the Quran and hadith contain so many passages which emphasize the
diversity strengthens knowledge, enhances life, and encourages human progress through
36
Utilizing History to Acquire Knowledge and Learn Lessons
Numerous verses of the Quran focus on the idea of heritage and past civilizations
as one way to acquire knowledge, given that all human history is connected (UNESCO,
2001, p. 28). In many verses, the Quran states that “antiquities should be contemplated
and lessons drawn from the indications which they provide as a way of remembering the
feats of earlier nations” (UNESCO, 2001, p. 31). Thus, preserving the past in order to
Both the Sunnah and the Quran endorse the pursuit of knowledge and suggest that
lessons can be learned from history and heritage. The Prophet said: “He who desires life
in this world must seek knowledge and he who desires the afterlife must seek knowledge.
And he who desires life in this world and the afterlife must seek knowledge” (UNESCO,
2001, p. 57). The Quran relates the story of Pharaoh to serve as a warning: “But this day
We save thee in thy body that thou mayst be a portent for those after thee” (Pickthall,
Quran 10:92). With this story, the Quran teaches that history offers lessons, and for this
reason we should preserve and study history, since the Prophet has said; “The pursuit of
Baghdadi,” 2014).
The Quran and the Sunnah both advocate obtaining knowledge, so much so that in
the quest for knowledge, if a Muslim has to travel, he/she should do so. The Quran says:
“Have they not travelled in the land to see the nature of the consequence for those who
disbelieved before them? They were mightier than these in power and (in the) traces
(which they left behind them) in the earth” (Pickthall, Quran 40:21). It also says: “Have
they not travelled in the land and seen the nature of the consequence for those who were
37
before them? They were stronger than these in power, and they dug the earth and built
upon it more than these have built” (Pickthall, Quran 30:9). In this way, Muslims are
enjoined to learn from history and avoid repeating the mistakes of their ancestors, even if
The Quran discusses “education and learning through exploration of the universe
and recommends travel on land and even on the seas with the clear objective of seeking
lessons from history. It encourages believers to travel in order to understand the reasons
for the rise and fall of earlier civilizations” (UNESCO, 2001, p. 50). Muslims are to learn
from the histories of earlier nations by scrutinizing their experiences, cultures, and
heritage in order to improve their own understanding. The Quran says: “Travel in the
land, and see the nature of the consequence for those who were before you” (Pickthall,
Quran 30:42). It describes a believer as one who travels through the land for the purpose
of gaining knowledge from past civilizations that have been left behind by previous
generations (UNESCO, 2001, p. 66). When learning from past nations, the Quran says:
“Do but travel in the land and see the nature of the consequence for those who did deny”
(Pickthall, Quran 3:137); also: “Say (unto the disbelievers): Travel in the land, and see
the nature of the consequence for the rejecters” (Pickthall, Quran 6:11). These verses
suggest that it is important to preserve the cultural heritage of the past so we can see what
lessons might be obtained from the mistakes of our ancestors. In the absence of such
histories, we may repeat their mistakes and fall prey to the same fates as our predecessors
(UNESCO, 2001, p. 66). Even the former Mufti of Egypt, Nasr Farid Wasil, states that
for the ancient forefathers, “antiquities were preserved on account of the examples and
38
Neither the Quran nor the Sunnah advocate limits on the study, preservation, or
examination of heritage. Rather, the excerpts quoted here focus on the idea that to seek
knowledge, it is necessary to study and analyze past civilizations and their heritage
(UNESCO, 2001, p. 62). Islam recognizes the value of cultural heritage, including
historical monuments. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, an Islamic scholar and peace activist,
In his view, the preservation of heritage is lawful and worthy for it not only connects the
present to the past but allows knowledge to be extrapolated from the past for the benefit
of the future.
These sites were viewed as an inheritance that belonged to the entire human race, serving
(UNESCO, 2001, p. 27). Sheikh Muhammad Abdu, a modern master of the mujtahidin
39
Look at the figure of the Sphinx, next to the Great Pyramid, and you either
see the lion as a man or the man as a lion. Preserving these monuments is,
in fact, to preserve knowledge and pay recognition to the creativity of the
workmanship. What does the sharia have to say about such figures if they
are meant to depict the psychological reactions or physical states of the
human being? On the whole, the Islamic sharia is most unlikely to prohibit
one of the best media of knowledge, having ascertained that it poses no
threat to the religion in terms of either belief or action. (UNESCO, 2001,
p. 30)
Why didn’t the companions who were the first conquerors, destroy the
idols found in Egypt, Persia and Afghanistan? It was because they realized
that they were no longer graven images, having instead become nothing
more than a token of the past. They did not overlook the historic value of
these monuments because they tell the story of the development of the
human mind. (UNESCO, 2001, p. 31)
The Muslims conquered the lands of Persia and Egypt and arrived in India,
a country which harbors some of most ancient temples and statues in the
entire world. . . . Nevertheless, no one has ever been known to regard these
statues as idols, nor has it ever been known for the Muslims to declare war
on them. It should be borne in mind some of these conquests took place in
the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and that those who led the Muslim
armies were mostly companions or followers of the Prophet, whose
commitment to and understanding of Islam no one can doubt. (UNESCO,
2001, p. 32)
embedded tenet within Islam, for these sites have existed for many years suggesting that
the companions of the Prophet and the pious ancestors that followed all intentionally
preserved these historical sites for the future generations so they might gain knowledge
and learn from previous civilizations and cultures about heritage and diversity.
On the subject of the Prophet’s companions, the ulama at the Doha conference
spoke about how the early followers of Islam, such as the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, acted in
40
accordance with the Prophet Muhammad by following his example. For instance, Abu
Bakr instructed his commanders to have regard for the freedom and culture of the peoples
and lands they captured (UNESCO, 2001, p. 58). Another example is the fact that Abu
Bakr prayed in the Church of the Nativity, in Bethlehem, which contained many images
and statues—a testament to the Islamic tradition of tolerance toward non-Muslim cultural
and religious heritage (UNESCO, 2001, pp. 52, 58). If Abu Bakr, who is considered by
the Wahhabis as an example to be followed by all Muslims, can pray in a church with
images and statues, then domes above mosques or embellishments within and outside of a
The non-Wahhabi scholars present at the Doha conference also drew attention to
the tolerant nature of Islam. They highlighted the fact that Islamic tradition “requires
respect for the human heritage in general, whatever its sources, forms or manifestations”
(p. 7). Muslims have preserved a diverse range of historical monuments and cultural
heritage so that future generations can learn from the past. The fact that the Islamic world
has preserved such a huge part of world heritage lends support to the idea that Muslims
already have been lost or destroyed. “The position of Islam regarding the preservation of
the cultural heritage is a firm position of principle which expresses the very essence of
Other Voices
The scholars at the Doha conference are not the only experts on Muslim law and
41
gravesites. Other independent scholars have given their thoughts on this issue, further
corroborating what the scholars at the Doha conference and the signatories of the Letter
to Baghdadi expressed.
(ICOMOS), Secretary General Mehr Azar Soheil highlighted the idea that when Islam
underwent a period of expansion, it absorbed the ancient cultures of conquered lands and
adapted itself to them (p. 63). Soheil (2007) cites Quranic verses that state, “Is it not a
guidance for them (to observe) how many generations We destroyed before them, amid
whose dwelling places they do walk” (Pickthall, Quran 32:26). The Quran calls attention
to the fact that these ancient sites, as well as previous civilizations and cultures, are a
testament to lost glories left behind to guide future generations (Soheil, 2007, p. 67).
previously, how the Quran invites the reader to travel the earth, see the ancient sites and
learn from them, because the past is connected to the present and future. For example, the
Quran says “Systems have passed away before you. Do but travel in the land and see the
nature of the consequence for those who did deny (the messengers)” (Pickthall, Quran
3:137). Soheil continues by stating that the Quran grants awareness to ancient nations and
their heritage, and underscores the need to study their histories. This implies that past
cultures are a great source of guidance and knowledge, and that preservation of cultural
Muslim Societies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar, makes similar points to those
42
already presented in regard to how Islam expanded to far regions of the world: it inserted
itself within communities and civilizations, integrating with existing history and heritage
(p. 44). Gharib echoes many of the same Quranic verses presented earlier while also
made by Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi stating that preserving built heritage not only secures
the future of the city but the future of the next generation, for it provides diversity for the
city and knowledge for the coming generation (p. 45). Gharib points out that in 1903,
Sheikh Mohamed Abdu of Egypt, issued a fatwa entitled ”Figures and statues, their
advantage and the ruling in their regard,” (quoted earlier) which emphasizes how little
threat the Sphinx poses to the practice of Islam (p. 45). Gharib (2017b) states that
harm and cause no harm and this is captured from a famous speech of the Prophet which
states that: There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm” (p. 372).
philosopher, insisted that earlier Muslim leadership accepted the value of historical
monuments and heritage, and therefore curbed their destruction (2017b, p. 373) Al
Baghdadi wrote: “And still the Kings take into account the survival of this built heritage
and prevent damaging it” (Gharib, 2017a, p. 44; Gharib, 2017b, p. 374). This
demonstrates that Islamic principles before and during the thirteenth century protected
sculptures (Gharib, 2017a, p. 44; Gharib, 2017b, p. 374). According to Islamic scholar
Yusuf al Qaradawi, “the intent of the Islamic law is strongly related to preservation and
conservation. Islam is driven by the strategic objectives extracted from the Quran and the
43
Sunnah and the intent and objectives of the Islamic law is to sustain God’s creation”
destruction by jihadist Salafis such as the Taliban and Islamic State, some scholars have
directed their commentary directly toward Saudi Arabia. For example, Abdul Wahhab
Abu Sulaiman, a historian, researcher, and Islamic educator, presented a sharia ruling on
development in and around Mecca, asserting that historical sites such as the birthplace of
Prophet Muhammad should be protected under Islamic law (Al Alawi, 2015). Other
scholars indicated concerns about such destruction after reading a 61-page document
Riyadh. That cleric proposed that the Prophet Muhammad’s remains be moved to the
nearby Baqi cemetery. In 2014, in response to this proposal, the Indonesian Religious
Affairs Minister asked the Saudi ambassador for clarification on this issue. In reply, the
ambassador assured the Minister that the report was false. Indonesia’s largest Muslim
organization, Nhadlatul Ulama (NU), issued a strong criticism when it heard the news
that the Prophet’s remains might be moved from their current location. The chairman of
NU’s executive council, Slamet Effendi Yusuf, equated the plan with “stupidity and
ignorance” and stated that “NU would be in vanguard of opposition to it” (Woodward,
Islam, both of which oppose tomb veneration, condemned that news. The Correct Islamic
organizations, issued similar strong condemnation upon hearing the news and called upon
all Muslims of the world to unite and stand against such an act (Woodward, 2014).
44
Beyond the criticism by Muslim scholars of destruction in Mecca and rumors of
the removal of the Prophet’s tomb from Medina, there have been other Muslim
condemnations regarding the possible destruction of historic Muslim sites, such as the
destruction of graves and mosques in Kosovo after the war. Saudi Arabia brought its
Wahhabi influence into Kosovo by offering monetary funds as aid. Historic buildings,
such as 400-year-old mosques that were damaged during the war, were torn down rather
than repaired, to make way for “proper” Islamic structures. The Ottoman-style mosques
and cemeteries where Ottoman-era gravestones stood were also bulldozed (Naegele,
2000). Such purposeful damage did not go unnoticed by the local imams and religious
figures. Idriz Bilalli, imam of the central mosque in Podujevo, initially welcomed help
from any source. But when he saw the Wahhabi influence permeating his community, he
grew concerned. He had trained at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia in the late
1980s and he “understood there was a campaign of proselytizing, pushed by the Saudis”
(Gall, 2016). He campaigned against the spread of Wahhabism, but eventually the
influence of Arab sponsors won and Bilalli was removed from his post (Gall, 2016).
Although there are a few Muslim scholars who have voiced their criticism against
Saudi destruction of historical sites within and outside of Saudi Arabia, it seems many
more remain silent. Two reasons could be behind such absence of criticism: (1) pilgrim
quotas, and (2) financial support. The issue of quotas on pilgrim arises from a fear in
many Muslim countries that if they challenge the Saudi government on the issue of
destruction of historical sites that the Saudi authorities might limit how many hajj
pilgrims can come from that country (Chehata, 2014; Taylor, 2011; Power, 2014). On the
issue of financial support, most imams and countries that receive monetary aid choose to
45
remain silent about the destruction of historical sites. For example, Saudi Arabia has
donated as much as 18 million Saudi riyals to restore Al Zaytuna Mosque, and 2 million
Saudi riyals to maintain the King Abdulaziz Mosque, both in Tunis. Similarly, the Saudi
(“Prince Sultan”, 2017; “Saudi Arabia Donates,” 2018). To criticize a state for destroying
its own historical structures when that state is providing millions to restore the historical
46
Chapter V
Previously in this thesis, I showed that during the formation of the first emirate
and before the Saudi state existed, Saud ibn Abd al Aziz installed Saudi rule over Taif in
1802, over Mecca in 1803, and over Medina in 1804 via jihad. At the same time,
Wahhabi ulama ordered the destruction of the domed tombs in Medina in line with
domes on graves so as to keep them unmarked and discourage veneration (Al Rasheed,
2002, p. 21). Followers of Wahhabism, with support from the Al Saud family, carried out
a campaign of destruction, leveling all existing domes in the holy city of Mecca as well
(Ahmed, 2006, p. 71; Al Alawi, 2015; “Mecca’s Changing Face,” 2014). Wahhabi
followers occupied Medina and razed to the ground every religious building and grave,
whether inside or outside the Baqi (Ahmed, 2006, p. 71). This destructive crusade
continued through the nineteenth century, targeting the graves of the martyrs of Uhud,
mosques outside the Baqi, the Mosque of al Manaratain, and many more historically
relevant heritage sites, leaving not a single dome in the locale (Ahmed, 2006, p. 71).Thus,
in the nineteenth century, during the pre-Saudi state era, the argument for destroying
Islamic heritage sites was based solely on Wahhabi doctrine that led followers toward
The military and diplomatic campaigns undertaken by Abd al Aziz ibn Saud
during the formation of the third Saudi state resulted in the modern Kingdom of Saudi
47
Arabia. Additionally, ibn Saud laid the base for installation of Wahhabism by reinstating
the Al al Sheikh, descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, as the religious leaders
in Saudi Arabia (Commins, 2006, p. 71). In due course, however, the impact of the ulama
slowly lessened. Under the contemporary Saudi leadership, their power was limited to
acting as guardians of ritual correctness and public morality. The Wahhabi ulama
acknowledged their constrained role while surrendering to the Saud family the “right to
pursue what the ruler deemed necessary for the Kingdom’s and dynasty’s welfare”
(Commins, 2006, p. 71). This approach of politics over religious policies continues today;
the ulama are aware that in order to implement their religious policies, they need to stay
compliant with the Saudi rulers. (Bin Ali, 2016, p. 150; Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p. 16).
According to the official Saudi government website, all preservation works are
executed under sharia laws respecting Islamic faith and principles because the country,
since its establishment by King Abdul Aziz, has been based on sharia laws, the Prophet
Muhammad’s Sunnah, and the pure faith of Islam (SCTA, 2017). The current
destruction, only development, and that this development is necessary for two reasons.
First, the sites pose security risks for visiting pilgrims due to their structural instability
(“Mecca’s Changing Face,” 2014; Peer, 2012). The construction projects will alleviate
mobility and crowd issues that Muslim pilgrims face, by expanding the space allotted for
performing their rituals (“Mecca’s Changing Face,” 2014; Peer, 2012). Second, these
construction projects are all undertaken to ensure that worshippers will not commit shirk
by revering structures with ties to the Prophet and his family (“Mecca’s Changing Face”,
2014; Peer, 2012). Thus, in the twenty-first century, the argument for destroying sites
48
such as graves and mosques is two-fold: first, that it will protect and accommodate
worshipers, and second, that it will keep Muslims from committing shirk.
Are these the real motivations of the Saudi government for destroying such sites:
protecting Muslims not only from weak faith but also from weak structures? I have
clarified the apprehension that non-Wahhabi scholars and intellectuals have expressed
about connecting such destructive actions to Islam. Although many scholars have
commented on the destruction wrought by jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic
State, the sources they cited to criticize the terrorists’ action—the Quran and the
Sunnah—can also be employed to criticize Saudi Arabia as well. Both the Quran and the
Sunnah advocate a path that requires a pious Muslim to first, appreciate diversity and
freedom instead of coercion; second, preserve such heritage sites so as to learn lessons
from their history; and third, appreciate the fact that previous rulers—some of which
were the Prophet Muhammad’s companions and early Muslim ancestors, the Salaf—did
not destroy such historically relevant heritage sites. The few religious scholars that have
voiced criticism of Saudi Arabia have mainly targeted the idea of destroying the dome at
the Prophet Muhammad’s tomb in Medina and the subsequent removal of his body to
Baqi.
Although I accept that religion, specifically Wahhabism, may have been the main
(if not the only) argument used during the first Saudi emirate, the pre-Saudi state, the
current regime’s motivation for such destruction is not motivated solely by religion or
security. I believe that the justifications behind the current wave of destruction,
specifically around the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, are in response to economic
49
Before I explore these justifications, I will suggest reasons why this destruction
could not be solely based on religion, in this case Wahhabism. One reason was provided
earlier, in Chapter Two: the fact that the Saudi government allowed not only the
preservation of 131 tombs dating from the first century A.D. but going one step further
and registering the site on the UNESCO World Heritage List (Aarts & Roelants, 2015, p.
5; “Saudi Sites,” 2015). Furthermore, the government also tolerated the Rock Art of Hail,
with its anthropomorphs, bovine figures, and numerous representations of human figures,
rather than leveling the tombs or erasing the art in deference to Wahhabi principles
(SCTH, “Rock Art”, 2015; SCTH, “Jubbah Site,”2015; SCTH, “Rata and Al Manjor
Site,”2015). If the government were in fact following Wahhabi doctrine as its main
motivation, then the tombs and art should have been destroyed.
dedicated to promoting visual art such as paintings and sculptures. The organization,
named Painting & Patronage, was established in Riyadh in 1999 by Prince Khalid Al
Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, who is not only the Governor of Mecca Region but also
the Adviser to King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, custodian of the two holy
mosques,. The fact that there are several fatwas against visual arts such as paintings and
sculptures, and yet the Saudi rulers have dedicated a non-profit for the sole promotion of
such art, is another example of how the current rulers of Saudi Arabia are demonstrably
Another example is the fatwas issued by the ulama to prohibit taswir. Whether of
rocks or in the form of a picture, the prohibition against taswir is severe because revering
such objects in any way leads one to shirk. Yet, the centennial celebration designed to
50
mark one hundred years of Al Saud rule created opportunities for the Saudi government
to develop “an ancestor cult around Ibn Saud,” in which he was venerated by capturing
(Al Rasheed, 2002, pp. 209, 211, 214). As an ideology, Wahhabism disparages the
commemoration of history because such festivities represent a form of bida, and as such
the tradition denounces saint worship (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 215; Hameed, 2015). Even
Shaykh Abd al Aziz ibn Baz issued a fatwa in which he declared that the centennial
celebration was an imitation of non-believers. Therefore, had the Saudi rulers strictly
followed Wahhabism, these events would not have occurred (Al Rasheed, 2002, p. 205).
Wahhabist concept called al wala wal bara (hereafter referred to as WB) which translates
as “loyalty and disavowal”: wala means loyalty to the Muslim community, bara means
rejection of the non-Muslim and their culture. Wahhabis believe that WB safeguards
them from bida and strengthens unity among true believers of Islam. WB requires that
Muslims not imitate non-Muslims in their dress, language, morality, or culture. Similarly,
The only celebrations a Muslim can participate in are the two Eids: one that marks the
end of Ramadan, and one that marks the pilgrimage season; any other festival or
celebration is bida (Bin Ali, 2016, pp. 136-141), and celebrating the Al Saud centennial is
In the nineteenth century, followers of ibn Abd al Wahhab accused the Ottomans
of corrupting Islam and were labeled as heretics as only Arabs were deemed worthy
Muslims because they believed in tawhid and stayed away from bida. However, if one
51
looks at what now occupies the current sites that were destroyed to protect Muslims from
bida and shirk, it is apparent that religion was not the basis for such destruction. For
example, a Hilton hotel and a Burger King, both symbols of Western capitalism, stand on
the site where the house of the Prophet’s closest companion and Islam’s first Caliph, Abu
Bakr, once existed (Power, 2014; Hameed, 2015). Surrounding the holy site in Mecca are
shopping plazas filled with designer fashions, food courts, luxury hotels, parking lots,
helipads, and much more, all promoting Western capitalism and conveying the feel of
New York or Las Vegas rather than a place to venerate the one true God (Peer, 2012; Al
Alawi, 2015). Thus, the pious Muslim is being pulled away from God by flagrant
capitalism. The construction of hotels and shopping malls goes against the concept of al
wala wal bara because it allows an otherwise pious Muslim to easily access the culture of
Is it reasonable to argue then that such destruction is not for religious reasons
(Commins, 2006, p. 100)? During the eighteenth century, both Muhammad ibn Abd al
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud agreed to finance their conquests with zakat and jihad.
Later, when there was less money, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud attacked Mecca for the purpose
protect the pilgrims. Thereafter, the Treasury continued to depend on pilgrims and zakat.
However, after Ibn Saud founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, his finance
minister signed an agreement in 1933 with Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) to begin
exploration for oil (Al Rasheed 2002, p. 91). From that point, through the 1970s,
considerable income was realized from the sale of petroleum. However, in the 1980s
weak demand for oil and lower prices drove down revenues, causing a budget deficit
52
until 2000 (Menoret, 2005, pp. 140-41). Since 1938, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed
considerable revenue from oil, but today the oil-rich country is entering a post-oil era in
which it wants financial resources that are less dependent on oil (Mufson, 2017; Ellyatt &
Gamble, 2018). The slowdown in oil revenues during the 1980s was a reminder to the
country of the need to diversify its economy. Thus, Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, as part of the country’s move to diversify its oil-based economy, has developed a
plan to reinvent the Saudi economy by 2030, calling his plan Vision 2030 (Mufson, 2017;
Ellyatt & Gamble, 2018). As part of this quest, the evidence I have cited points to two
main motivations for the destruction of historical religious sites: real estate and tourism.
Real Estate
During the 1970s, real estate became a “profitable and prestigious investment” in
Saudi Arabia, and land surrounding the holy cities became the object of attention
(Menoret, 2005, p. 160). Mecca is one of, if not the most, expensive area of real estate in
the world; the price of one square meter ranges from $130,000 to more than $500,000
(Atassi, 2015; Peer, 2012). It is no wonder that the house of Mawlid, where the Prophet
was born, is under threat: not because it might lead Muslims to venerate the house where
the Prophet was born, but because a large real estate development project, the new Jabal
Umar, would transform the site into car parks and hotels (Ahmed, 2006). Around the
Grand Mosque in Mecca, recent sites were destroyed and replaced with luxury hotels
where rooms range from $500 to $5,880 per night. Such economic returns become a
53
Another example is Bani Saad village. The SCTH recently stated that “Bani Saad
village in Taif had nothing to do with Halima Al Saadiya, the wet nurse of the Prophet
Muhammad” (“Site in Taif”, 2016). The site is popular among Muslim travelers and
pilgrims because of its connection to the Prophet’s life, yet the SCTH believes there is no
evidence to prove this is the case: “After studying historical texts and geographical sites,
the team later reached the conclusion that Bani Saad, where the Prophet had spent his
childhood” is located elsewhere (“Site In Taif”, 2016). Was it just coincidence then that
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman approved approximately $3 billion for projects in Taif that
will include a new airport, the tourist city of Souq Okaz, a residential suburb, and an
industrial and university city, all of which will contribute to Taif’s economy and tourism
Tourism
cities of Mecca and Medina (“Saudi Arabia to Open,” 2017; “Saudi Crown Prince,”
2017). However, the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 economic reform program views
religious tourism as one way to expand and diversify the economy away from oil, hoping
that pilgrims will visit not only the holy cities but eventually spend their money at luxury
resorts, food courts, and designer fashion stores that surround these holy cities (“Islamic
Tourism,” 2017).
Even before the discovery of oil in the Kingdom, state revenues had been drawn
from zakat and pilgrimage taxes. Therefore it makes sense that the country would again
look to religious tourism and pilgrimage taxes as sources of revenue. Some estimates say
54
that over four million Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca each year, and the rulers
have always regarded pilgrims as a major source of revenue, typically exceeding $30
billion. In 2025 close to 17 million pilgrims are expected to visit Mecca (Peer, 2012).
The SCTH has said that it plans to restore the historical mountains of Mecca as
yet another way to attract pilgrims. For example, the Jabal Al Noor, a mountain in the
city of Mecca where Hira Cave is located, has great significance in the history of Islam.
Hira Cave was where the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the Prophet, thus
people seek out this historic cave. Another site that attracts many religious tourists is the
Cave of Thawr where the Prophet Muhammad and his companion Abu Bakr took shelter
from pagans who pursued them during their migration to Medina (“Saudi Tourism
Authorities,” 2017; “Saudi Arabia to Promote,” 2018). Many pilgrims and visitors to
Medina also visit Mount Uhud, known for the famous battle of Uhud in 625, where
Muslim forces battled against a pagan tribe from Mecca. Mount Uhud is associated with
several historical sites, one of which is the burial site for 70 of the Prophet’s companions
killed during the battle (“In Picture,” 2017; Mohammed, 2017). Had the Saudi
would have destroyed or closed Mount Uhud, the Cave of Thawr, and Hira Cave, since
visiting these sites would lead many of the pilgrims to venerate them due to their
connection to the Prophet Muhammad, eventually leading the pilgrims to bida and shirk.
However, these sites are not only open to visitors and pilgrims, but the Kingdom
highlights these sites and plans to rehabilitate the historic mountains to appeal to pilgrims
and encourage them to visit the sites. An example of this is when in 2016, the SCTH
investigated the erasure “of historic writing[s] on Uhud Mountain near the graveyards of
55
the martyrs,” submitting a report to the President of SCTH, Prince Sultan bin Salman,
and Saleh Abbas, the Director of the SCTH’s branch in Medina, recommending
Although the influence of Wahhabism was strong in the earlier Saudi states,
which led to much of the destruction of historically relevant heritages sites, even then
financial motivation was part of the plan. Conquests in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries not only expanded the domains of the Saudi state, but also expanded its
finances due to the raids and pillaging of lands such as Hasa, Basra, and beyond. Pilgrims
have long been the main source of revenue, even before the formation of the first Saudi
state. The discovery of oil only shifted the focus temporarily. The reality is that with two
of the holiest cities of Islam—Mecca and Medina—it is not likely that Saudi rulers will
ignore Muslim pilgrims and the consistent revenue they bring to the state.
The destruction of historically relevant sites has not come about solely because of
Wahhabism; rather, given the evidence cited in this thesis, the Saudi state appears to have
two agendas behind its actions. One is to make way for modernization in the state that
will increase its financial resources, as exemplified by the luxury hotels that surround
Mecca. The other is to maintain its religious hegemony by placating the Wahhabi ulama,
allowing them some authority in matters of religion, similar to what was done in Kosovo.
Had the motivations for destruction been solely religious, many of the locations
56
Chapter VI
Conclusion
At the beginning of this thesis, I proposed one main question for which I sought
even condoned within the context of Islam, as such structures could lead a
Muslim to shirk?
● Question #2 asked: has Wahhabi doctrine influenced the Saudi state during its
● Question #3 asked: how does the Saudi government justify its actions?
The first Saudi emirate was characterized by conquests and motivated by the
desire to spread pure Islam. Before the discovery of oil, the Saudi state acquired its
authority and validity via Islam in the form of Wahhabism. Saudi rule was legitimized by
the support of the ulama; in turn, the ulama, backed by the Saudi emirate, demolished
what they considered bida or shirk. However, after the formation of the third Saudi
emirate and the discovery of oil, the situation changed: whereas Islam was originally the
driving force of conquest, it now took a back seat to modernization. The Wahhabi ulama
of the first Saudi emirate lacked the power they once held. Limited to acting as guardians
of ritual correctness and public morality, the role of the ulama became that of state
57
apologists, to be called upon by the King when needed. In due course, it became clear to
the ulama that if they wished to have a role in the new Kingdom, they had to accept the
With the ulama’s role constrained, the Saudi government pursued the following
actions, which it deemed necessary for the Kingdom’s and the Saud family’s welfare,
● the preservation and listing of the Rock Art of Hail on the UNESCO World
Heritage List,
● the centennial celebration of Al Saud rule by venerating ibn Saud’s legacy, and
● allowing Western capitalism to surround the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Each of these actions points to a country that has changed over time, focusing more on its
economy and future modern state rather than its religious ideology.
Although the Saudi government might claim that removing heritage sites
affiliated with the Prophet Muhammad and his family, and expanding the area
surrounding the holy city of Mecca, were done not only to accommodate pilgrims but
also to stop pilgrims from committing shirk, the fact is that the destruction of relevant
historic sites did not come about solely because of Wahhabism. Rather, the Saudi state
demonstrates by its actions, often in contradiction with its statements, two objectives
1. to make way for modernization in the state that will move it forward financially,
58
companion and Islam’s first Caliph, and replacing it with luxury hotels and
shopping malls.
embellishment.
Most non-Wahhabi Muslim scholars are of the opinion that Islam does not
condone such acts, which is why it is not possible to assign culpability to Islam.
According to many non-Wahhabi scholars, the Quran, the Sunnah, and many examples
throughout history highlight the importance of preserving ancient heritage sites. Scholars
advocate a path that requires a pious Muslim to first appreciate diversity and freedom
instead of coercion; second, preserve such heritage sites so as to learn lessons from their
history; and third, appreciate the fact that previous rulers such as Prophet Muhammad’s
companions and the early Muslim ancestors, the Salaf, did not destroy such historically
Several possible courses of action could be considered by the Saudi state to stop
further destruction of these sites. For example, hotels and other commercial structures
could be built several miles from holy sites and roads constructed to accommodate the
hospitals and fire departments, if pilgrims are truly the main concern of the Saudi state
(Hameed, 2015). The state could limit the number of pilgrims that arrive each year,
which would profoundly lower the number of negative incidents involving pilgrims. The
Saudi government has sufficient resources that it could manage a smaller crowd without
59
having to create more room by expanding the mosques in Mecca or Medina or destroying
ancient heritage sites to build luxury hotels. To avoid veneration by the visiting pilgrims,
the state could simply block off sites that have a connection to the Prophet and his family
instead of leveling them off. Such sites could be transformed into museums or libraries
for Muslims to visit and expand their knowledge—something emphasized by both the
Wahhabist philosophies occurred during the formation of the first Saudi state. But as time
passed and the Wahhabi ulama lost their power over religious affairs in Saudi Arabia, it
became obvious that religion was no longer influencing Saudi society. These religious
sites have been around for centuries, maintained by previous caliphs and sultans, each of
whom was enjoined by both the Quran and the Sunnah to preserve them. While there is a
preserve these historically relevant heritage sites even as the country moves toward a
60
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