Perpetual Peace
Perpetual Peace
Perpetual Peace
PERPETUAL PEACE
By I M M A N U E L KANT
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ESSAY F O L L O W S T H A T O F T H E F I R S T E N G L I S H
E D I T I O N , P U B L I S H E D IN L O N D O N IN 1796, A N D
ORIGINAL TRANSLATION
INTRODUCTION
NICHOLAS M U R R A Y BUTLER
Columbia University
in the C i t y of N e w York
May i, 1932
PERPETUAL PEACE
SECTION I
S E C T I O N II
C O N T A I N I N G T H E D E F I N I T I V E A R T I -
CLES FOR A P E R P E T U A L P E A C E
A M O N G S T A T E S
it is of such frequent use in the civil law, though with this differ-
ence: the prohibition is there express and absolute, and the permis-
sion is not inserted as a respective condition, which it ought to be,
but is found among the exceptions. W e forbid this or that, it is
there said, excepting No. i , 2, 3, and so forth, without end. T h e
exceptions are not joined to the l a w from a fixed principle, but by
chance, and blindly applied to the various cases that occur; for,
otherwise the restrictions would be always inserted in the formula
of prohibition, which would thereby become permissive law. It is
likewise very much to be regretted, that the question proposed by
Count de Windischgraetz has been so soon relinquished. This pro-
found sage had precisely insisted upon the point now under discus-
sion, in his ingenious problem, which still remains to be solved.
Indeed we shall have no reason to promise ourselves an immutable
and permanent legislation, till the possibility of a mathematical
formula shall be demonstrated, which may serve as a foundation to
laws. Without this we shall have general laws, which may be ap-
plied to a great number of cases, but no universal laws, applicable
to all cases, as the idea of a law seem to require.
[ XI ]
not take place except in a state of legislation; without
which one may treat another as an enemy, after having
in vain demanded this protection.*
* The common opinion is, that one dares act hostily only
against an aggressor; and this is true, when both live in a state of
civil legislation. For, on entering into it, they reciprocally guaran-
tee to themselves the requisite security, by the common obedience
which they pay to the sovereign. But the man, or the nation, that
live in a state of nature, deprives me of that security, and attacks
me without being an aggressor, by the mere circumstance of living
contiguous to me, in a state of anarchy and without laws; men-
aced perpetually by him with hostilities, against which I have no
protection, I have a right to compel him, either, to associate with
me under the dominion of common laws, or to quit my neighbour-
hood.
Here is a principle then, upon which all the subsequent articles
are established:
All men, who have a mutual influence over one another, ought
to have a civil constitution. Now every legitimate constitution,
considered in respect of the persons who are the object of it, is
I. Either conformable to the civil right, and is limited to a
people (jus cwitatis).
II. Or to the rights of nations, and regulates the relations of
nations among each other ( j u s gentium).
III. Or to the cosmofolitical right, as far as men, or states,
are considered as influencing one another, in quality of constituent
parts of the great state of the human race (jus cosmofoliticum).
This division is not arbitrary; but necessary in respect of the
idea of a perpetual peace. For, if two nations, under one of these
three relations, were in a state of nature, and having reciprocal
physical influence upon each other, the state of war would be im-
mediately revived, to be freed from which is the present end in
view.
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A P E R P E T U A L PEACE
T H E civil constitution of every state ought to be
republican.
The only constitution resulting from the idea of the
social compact, upon which every good legislation of a
nation ought to be founded, is a republican constitu-
tion.* It is the only one established upon principles
A PERPETUAL PEACE
A PERPETUAL PEACE
S U P P L E M E N T
PEACE
SUPPLEMENT THE SE C ON D .— SE CR E T
PART I
OF A PERPETUAL PEACE
PART II
MORALITY
than ought to be to those who are but too well disposed to abuse
such a facility?
[ 67 ]
For, if they cannot produce their effect only as far
as they are notorious, they must accord with the general
end of the public,—with happiness; consequently they
are reconcileable with politics, which is occupied in con-
ceiving a state of things, with which each may be satis-
fied. And if this end can be attained only by the pub-
licity of maxims which are proposed, i. e. in removing
from them all subject of distrust, they must be more-
over conformable to the rights of the public: the only
point of union at which the particular ends of all can
be made to meet. I shall defer till another occasion the
developement of this principle. I only add, that it is
transcendent, since its formula includes nothing mate-
rial, nothing which relates to the doctrine of happiness,
and that it must be drawn from experience; it aims
only at the form of universality which gives the force
of laws to maxims.
I f it is a duty, if the hope can even be conceived, of
realizing, though by an endless progress, the reign of
public right—perpetual peace, which will succeed to
the suspensions of hostilities, hitherto named treaties
of peace, is not then a chimera, but a problem, of which
time, probably abridged by the uniformity of the prog-
ress of the human mind, promises us the solution.
FINIS