National Territory

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011

Doctrine: The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the Philippine government may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.

Citizenship
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
Doctrine: Repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original
nationality. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Thus, he
or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth.

Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

Doctrine: Under customary international law, a child whose parents are both unknown shall
have the nationality of the country of birth, which is presumed to be where it was found. As a
matter of law, foundlings are natural-born citizens.

Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012

Doctrine: Natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office are
required to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before
an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Renunciation of foreign Citizenship
that is not sworn before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
certificates of candidacy will not be sufficient regain the political right to seek elective office.

Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016

Doctrine: The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship
are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for
public office.

Caballero v. Comelec, GR. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

Doctrine: Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 has no retroactive effect with
respect to residence. It merely gives one the option to again establish his domicile in old
domicile, said place becoming his new domicile of choice.

Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Doctrine: If a local candidate is disqualified due to his ineligibility (such as based on citizenship),
his certificate is void from the beginning, and he is not a candidate at all in the elections.

Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016

Doctrine: The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship
are separate requirements.

Constitutional Government
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018
Doctrine: All provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-executing, because to treat them
as requiring legislation would result in giving the legislature the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

State Principles and Policies

 Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012
Doctrine: Only the President can exercise the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, which must
be exercised by him in person. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Doctrine: The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital
privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R.
No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Doctrine: Any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, may bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws.

State Immunity from Suit

Department of Transportation v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016
Doctrine: The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. Even an unincorporated agency such as the DOTC may be sued, even when
performing sovereign functions, for taking of private property without filing an expropriation
case. The Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the respondents’ property
amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.

Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014
Doctrine: An unincorporated agency enjoys immunity from suit and waives its non-suability only
when it enters into proprietary contracts. There is no waiver of immunity when the DPWH enters
into public road construction contracts, which involve exercise of government functions.

Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
Doctrine: If the government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental
functions, it is not immune from suit.

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
Separation of Powers, Check and Balance and Judicial Review
Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Doctrine: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016

Doctrine: A taxpayer's suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct
correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of
law or the Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress.

Provincial Bus Operators Association v. Department of Labor, GR No. 202275, Jul 17, 2018
Doctrine: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. An actual case or controversy is "one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented are "definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Philconsa v. Philippine Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016
Doctrine: A petition to declare as unconstitutional peace agreements that can only be
implemented through the passage of a law and/or amendment of the Constitution is premature
and not ripe for adjudication. Congress has full discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro Basic
Law that Congress, in its wisdom, deems necessary and proper. The Executive branch cannot
compel Congress to adopt the peace agreements.

Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010

Doctrine: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases.

Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
Doctrine: Each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling
resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers, prerogatives and
privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and
privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an action to challenge the same
to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof.

Abad v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015

Doctrine: Who to appoint is "a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide." For the betterment of government service, the appointing
authority may consider other "abstract criteria," aside from the minimum qualifications set by
law in making appointments.

Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
Doctrine: Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.

Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021

Doctrine: The President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our
foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
country's interface with other states and governments.

Baguilat v. Alvarez, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 227757

Doctrine: Under the Constitution, the House has sole control over method and manner of
choosing its officers other than the Speaker. The method of choosing its officers must be
prescribed by the House, not the courts. Moreover, the House has sole authority to determine
the rules of its proceedings. Mere matters of procedure of the House are of no concern to the
courts. The Supreme Court has no authority to interfere and intrude into that exclusive realm.
Thus, the Supreme Court cannot pry into the internal workings of the House.

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011

Doctrine: The one-year bar starts from “initiation” of impeachment complaint. “Initiation” of
impeachment complaint means the filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House.

Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

Doctrine: As a matter of legal principle, issues pertaining to policy and dependent upon the
prudence rather than the legality of a given measure were previously deemed to fall outside the
purview of judicial review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been
limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the
 power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Legislative Branch

Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 01 July 2014
Doctrine: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

Doctrine: The validity of the Pork Barrel System is not a political question because it is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.

Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

Doctrine: A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed
through the power of contempt during legislative inquiry. The Court must strike a balance
between the interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative
inquiries.

Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018

Doctrine: The phrase "speech or debate” refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions
as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question

Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017
Doctrine: President's declaration or suspension. The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the
purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, when the Senate and House of Representatives
already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, and given their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, there is no obligation
on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session.

Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Doctrine: The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

Naval v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

Doctrine: Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation." The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting
power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or
 a province and not the number of registered voters therein. As a result of the reapportionment
made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of
Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District. A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields
no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be
merely renamed as the current Third District. The actual difference in the population of the old
Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the
population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially,
although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the
district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to
office in 2004 and 2007.

Aldaba v. Comelec, G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Doctrine: The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not
one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question. It is well settled
that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the
legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is
properly brought before it.

Abayon v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016

Doctrine: Requisites for nullifying elections: (1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than
fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled,
or in case of the entire municipality, more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the
votes cast therein; and (2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the
lawful and unlawful ballots.

Lagman v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 197422, November 03, 2020
Doctrine: Since the creation of public offices involves an inherently legislative power, the
particular characteristics of the public office, including eligibility requirements and the nature
and length of the term in office, are also for legislative determination.

ABS-CBN Corp. vs. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020
Doctrine: Congress has the sole authority to grant and renew legislative franchises for
broadcasting entities, such as ABS-CBN, to legally broadcast their programs through allocated
frequencies for the purpose. The legislative branch of our government has yet to grant or renew
ABS-CBN's legislative franchise, which decision - whether fortunate or unfortunate - this Court
must impartially respect, else it violates the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

The Executive Branch

Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
Doctrine: The Constitution specifically grants authority to the Supreme Court to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely
within the ambit of judicial review. Moreover, the Constitution also relaxed the rule on standing
by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension.

Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012

Doctrine: The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires.

Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016

Doctrine: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The duty to
protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the
whole territory of the Philippines in accordance with the constitutional provision on national
territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is
the guardian of the Philippine archipelago.

Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016

Doctrine: The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's
power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President
appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.

Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Doctrine: While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress,
and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized
that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of
the treaty.

Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021

Doctrine: The Constitution mandates the president to "ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed." Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty, if a treaty is unconstitutional or
contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute.

Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021

Doctrine: The decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily,
diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government. The Constitution vests
executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect the Philippines, and conduct
foreign affairs, in the President.

Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

Doctrine: President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB
is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. There is no clear constitutional
or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act
entrusted to the judgment of another branch.

Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015
Doctrine: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
Doctrine: A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election." However, the constitutional prohibition on
midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to
appointments made by local chief executives.

Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Doctrine: The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations
of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC. Any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
 pardoning power of the President. Under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." The exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or
the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. This doctrine
of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes.

Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Doctrine: The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from
any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge
of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.

The Judiciary
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018
Doctrine: Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019
Doctrine: LEB rules on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs,
such formulation of Clinical Legal Education Program subject to the approval of the LEB, the
activities that should be included, and the grading system, unduly interfere with the discretion of
a law school regarding its curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these
issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation. The act and practice of the Legal
Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal
internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach.

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

Doctrine: Section 14 of RA 6770 that prohibits lower courts from issuing provisional injunctive
writs to halt investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. This prohibition
constitutes an encroachment upon the Supreme Court's constitutional rule-making authority
and should be considered ineffective until such time as the Supreme Court has decided whether
to adopt it. Matters of procedure fall exclusively within the purview of the Supreme Court, and
that any attempt by Congress to interfere with the provisional remedies created by the court's
duly promulgated rules of procedure constitutes a violation of the separation of powers
principle.

Agcaoili v. Marcos, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018

Doctrine: The Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain
are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional duty
to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact remains
that the Court of Appeals Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over them
primarily belongs to this Court and to no other. The Supreme Court [has] administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine
 of separation of powers. It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as
enshrined under the Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under
the sole discretion of the legislative branch of the government. In point is the power of
legislative investigation which the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative.

Constitutional Commissions
Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262,
November 27, 2013
Doctrine: COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary jurisdiction
to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit.

Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012

Doctrine: The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated
to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. In like manner, a
decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.

Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726, June 25, 2013

Doctrine: Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010
Doctrine: Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, xxx, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.

Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

Doctrine: The COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an
incumbent Member of the House of Representatives from the winning party-list organization
that he represents. His expulsion from the party-list organization is not a mere intra-corporate
matter because it necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must
have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the
requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.

Francisco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018

Doctrine: The COMELEC is fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation
to the election contests before it. The COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power, may
 investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings. weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action. The sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel COC is false material representation compounded by intent to deceive on
the part of the candidate and that the intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain absent an established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to
Poe, the COMELEC can be the proper body to make the pronouncement against which the truth
or falsity of a material representation in a COC can be measured.

Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

Doctrine: To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may
be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity
to be heard." The determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of
one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that
he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him.

Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014

Doctrine: The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. It is settled that the question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.

Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
Doctrine: Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are
not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012
Doctrine: The identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an
administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any department or
agency to conduct an investigation.

Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
Doctrine: Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution

Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Doctrine: The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of
individuals acting as a body. A relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
a member of the body that is the appointing authority (such as the Civil Service Commission)
cannot be appointed by such body.

Accountability of Public Officers

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Doctrine: Ombudsman independence: The independence of the Ombudsman has the following
aspects: 1) It is created by the Constitution and cannot be abolished by Congress; 2) it has fiscal
autonomy; and 3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. The Office of the
 Ombudsman is not under the control of the President, even if it discharges functions that are
executive in nature.

Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017

Doctrine: The Supreme Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective
in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Hence, while
the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized
as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should
be respected.

Bagaoisan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 242005, June 26, 2019
Doctrine: The purpose of the law on nepotism is to take out of the discretion of the appointing
and recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a
relative. Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by
preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Section 59, Book V [Civil Service
Commission], E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers to
"all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature. The prohibition applies without
regard to the actual merits of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the
appointing or recommending authority.

Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014
Doctrine: The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.
They are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are
executive in nature. The framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies
be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would
result in the impairment of their core functions.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012

Doctrine: The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority.

Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015

Doctrine: The Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties
against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on
the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional
deliberations.

The Ombudsman
Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011
Doctrine: The Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or
omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, or improper.

Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018

Doctrine: The Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission. It is only as to the
rank and salary that the Ombudsman and the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and
members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions. In any vacancy for the positions of
Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death,
resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always be
appointed for a full term of seven years. Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the
1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the
deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of
appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven
 years from their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability.

Local Government
City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017
Doctrine: The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to create
an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions independent of the
sovereign state. Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. Local
governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a statute involving the
same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control and regulate the use of ground
water within a City, a power that pertains solely to the NWRB under the Water Code – is ultra
vires and void.

Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018

Doctrine: Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to the
LGUs of a just share in the national taxes, viz.: “Section 6. Local government units shall have a
just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.” Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs shall have a just
share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share
shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Congress has sought to carry out the second
mandate of Section 6 by enacting Section 284, Title III (Shares of Local Government Units in the
Proceeds of National Taxes), of the LGC, which is refers to “Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes.”

Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012
Doctrine: Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.

Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

Doctrine: The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. Thus, the Constitution requires
the approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.” Similarly, conversion will lead
to material change in the political and economic rights of not only of the component city but of
the entire province.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
Doctrine: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. Under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances
declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however,
that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation
and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those
things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan

Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018

Doctrine: The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction."
Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's territorial
boundaries. The intention of the Local Government Code is to consider an LGU's territorial
jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. This is also
clear from other provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 292 and 294, on
the allocation of LGUs' shares from the utilization of national wealth, which speak of the location
 of the natural resources. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or
a geographic region.

Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017

Doctrine: Two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.

Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013

Doctrine: The basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent
against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning
before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012

Doctrine: R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to
all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office. Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office.

Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Doctrine: The votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor
of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected. There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected.

Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

Doctrine: Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code governs the
cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, the COCs. The combined application of
these sections requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-be candidate be true, as
any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COC’s cancellation or the
withholding of due course.

Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012

Doctrine: A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public office.

Additional State Policies:

Natural Economy, Social Justice, Education, The Family, Armed Forces, Media
 Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012
Doctrine: Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required
in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. Both the Voting Control Test and the
Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine
national."

Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016

Doctrine: For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of
the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. If the voting right of a share held
in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is assigned or transferred to an alien, that share is
not to be counted in the determination of the required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the
dividends and other fruits and accessions of the share do not accrue to a Filipino citizen or
national, then that share is also to be excluded or not counted.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R.
No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Doctrine: Service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Agreements involving
Technical or Financial Assistance are service contracts with safeguards. Such service contracts
with foreign corporations may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements;
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because;
(3) Within 30 days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress.

Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018

Doctrine: The intention of the Local Government Code is to consider an LGU's territorial
jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. By
definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or a geographic region.

Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018
Doctrine: The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of
constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the Court's exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must
succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. After a careful review of the
records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been
shown to exist.

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Doctrine: In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation
of powers which imposes upon the court’s proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions
and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

State Powers:
Police Power and Eminent Domain
Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019
Doctrine: The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" and has an
interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the general
welfare of the people. The regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on
the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Thus, the enactment of education laws,
 implementing rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the
State's police power. As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within
the supervisory and regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the Philippine
legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through statutes enacted by
the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police
power over legal education.

Zabal v. Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467

Doctrine: Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the
most pervasive and comprehensive. "It has been defined as the 'state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare." The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of lawful subject and
lawful means. The interests of the public generally require its exercise, and the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, while not being unduly
oppressive.

Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April
25, 2017
Doctrine: The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the
legislature to implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on
the medical services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts
as tax deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is fair and reasonable, and no credible
proof was presented to prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory,
there must be taking of property without just compensation.

Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013
Doctrine: "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people." The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police
power to local government units, as agencies of the State.

Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Doctrine: The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical
features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short
timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply
with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to
constitute abuse of police power.

Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334,
July 1, 2013
Doctrine:
Actions for just compensation are not barred by prescription.
An action for payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by
the Government for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the
owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
Actions for just compensation are not barred by laches.
An action for payment of just compensation is not barred by laches. Laches as a doctrine of
equity does not apply because law and equity dictate payment of just compensation. Thus, even
after the lapse of more than 50 years, a property owner may still file a claim to demand just
compensation for the taking of his property without the benefit of expropriations proceedings.

State Action Doctrine

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Doctrine: The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals. It cannot be
invoked against the actions of private individuals. Thus, if the search is made at the behest or
 initiative of a private entity for its own and private purposes, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked.

Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017

Doctrine: Bantay Bayan or civilian volunteers for the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function and are deemed law enforcers for
purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them
during an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the
Constitution.

Due Process
Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Doctrine: The ordinance requiring a buffer zone around plantations (to be planted with
diversified trees that grow taller than those usually planted in the plantation to protect the
people in nearby areas from pesticide drift) does not permanently and completely deprive the
owners of their landholdings because landowners can still cultivate or make other productive
uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016
Doctrine: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a
particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive
due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to
his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.

Zabal v. Duterte, February 12, 2019, G.R. No. 238467

Doctrine: Concededly, “a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a
living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of
which normally constitutes an actionable wrong." Under this premise, petitioners claim that they
were deprived of due process when their right to work and earn a living was taken away from
them when Boracay was ordered closed as a tourist destination. It must be stressed, though,
that "when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare." Otherwise, police power as an attribute to promote the common
good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, government measures implemented pursuant to the said state power
would be stymied or invalidated.

Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014

Doctrine: The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity
to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is
given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.

Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013
Doctrine: The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to
administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former
a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary,16 and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied.

Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24,
2015
 Doctrine: A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally
protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted
within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the PMA is not immune
from the strictures of due process. It is not required that procedural due process be afforded at
every stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be
held before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military academy.

Equal Protection
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16,
2016
Doctrine: The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by
the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.

Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015

Doctrine: Requiring real property owners but not informal settlers to pay socialized housing tax
to provide funds for the housing of informal settler is not discriminatory. For the purpose of
urban development and housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an
informal settler as two distinct classes are obvious.

1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015
Doctrine: In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.

Privacy
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Doctrine: There are three strands of the right to privacy: locational; informational; and decisional
privacy. The right to informational privacy is usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

Doctrine: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
 has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.

Searches & Seizures

People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
Doctrine: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the right to
privacy. Mere suspicion is not enough for a “stop-and-frisk”; there must be “genuine reason” to
believe that the person has a concealed weapon.

Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Doctrine: For a valid search incident to a lawful arrest, the lawful arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed.
Silence or lack of resistance is not necessarily consent to a warrantless search but mere implied
acquiescence given under intimidating or coercive circumstances

Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018

Doctrine: Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress. The constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.
However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

Doctrine: The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. Cases where
non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017

Doctrine: Bantay Bayan or civilian volunteers for the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function and are deemed law enforcers for
purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them
during an illegal search is inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the
Constitution.

Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Doctrine: The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only
of "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Test to determine the validity of an employer’s
intrusion into an employee’s privacy: 1) whether an employee has a legitimate expectation of
privacy; and 2) whether the employer’s intrusion for non-investigatory, work-related purposes,
as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, is reasonable. A search of an employee’s
office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose.

People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

Doctrine: Warrant must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge, before issuing
the warrant, must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known
to them.

Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019

Doctrine: The first requisite of the plain view doctrine assumes that the law enforcement officer
has "a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area." This means that the officer who made the warrantless seizure must have been in a lawful
position when he discovered the target contraband or evidence in plain view.

Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019

Doctrine: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.

Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015

Doctrine: In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding the
search, the process cannot be reversed.

Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014

Doctrine: A "stop and frisk" search is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The apprehending police
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him.

People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019

Doctrine: There is no valid search incident to a lawful arrest if a motorcycle driver is
stopped/flagged down for a traffic violation that is punishable by a fine and subjected to a
search, as there can be no lawful warrantless arrest for an offense punishable by a fine.

People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014

Doctrine: Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s
consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even
in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for
speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully
apprehended as a guilty party.

Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018

Doctrine: A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless hot pursuit arrest, because the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the
accused had just committed a crime.

Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 01, 2018

Doctrine: When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019

Doctrine: There can be no valid plain view seizure if at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was
not readily apparent to the police that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much
less shabu.

People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020

Doctrine: For the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b)
where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without
opening the car’s doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
€ where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f)
where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Pilapil v. Cu, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020

Doctrine: A municipal mayor has no authority to conduct warrantless search or ocular inspection
on a mining site.

Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

Doctrine: For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as
personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a
 person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this
constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.

Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013

Doctrine: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures.

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016

Doctrine: Searches pursuant to domestic port security measures are not unreasonable per se.
The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine
security procedures in airports. The reason behind it is that there is a reduced reasonable
expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel.

Speech
Nicolas-Lewis v. Comelec, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019
Doctrine: A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the
ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. The allowance of a review
of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling
effect" on protected speech.

Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Doctrine: The tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that primarily advocates a stand on a
social issue; only secondarily—even almost incidentally—will cause the election or non-election
of a candidate. It is not election propaganda as its messages are different from the usual
declarative messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an expression with political consequences,
and the court's construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of
censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker's viewpoint or the
content of one's speech.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October
5, 2010
Doctrine: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

Doctrine: To counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating
free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being
charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.

Manila Bulletin v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017

Doctrine: Criticisms against the “lousy performance” of a public official are qualifiedly privileged
communications and thus would require proof actual malice hold the critic liable for libel.

GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

Doctrine: When it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression and of
the press, the latter must be properly viewed in context as being necessarily made to
accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth and substance to the right to reply
requirement.

1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
Doctrine: Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity. (

Association
Quezon City PTCA Federation v. Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
 Doctrine: Right to form associations and government regulations of associations: The right to
organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to give official status to every single
association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to form themselves as a
collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to be formally recognized by the state
and given all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. The requirement of
registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised
with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition
of legal personality and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate
organizations.

Travel
Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
Doctrine: In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not
necessary, and thus, the DOJ cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement on the
ground that it is necessary to ensure attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. The DOJ cannot keep an individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may
not be able to evade criminal prosecution.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
Doctrine: As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise
of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law.

Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Doctrine: Proclamation No. 475 does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its
issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between the State and
the people. 

Information
Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters, February 1, 2016, G.R. No. 175210
Doctrine: The constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover
national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions
and criminal matters, diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting, executive
sessions of either house of Congress, and internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Close-
door Cabinet meetings are not covered in order to allow the free exchange of ideas among
Government officials.

Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016
Doctrine: While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions,
or decisions" on the bids or proposals.

Religion
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-
SC, March 7, 2017
Doctrine: The State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion,
or prefer one religion over another. It calls for government neutrality in religious matters.

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014 3

Doctrine: Non-establishment clause prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups. (

Custodial Investigation
People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
Doctrine: The invocation of Miranda rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins
"when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
 begun tofocus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."

People v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017

Doctrine: Miranda rights apply only during a custodial investigation, when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person.

People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015

Doctrine: Person is a suspect, under custody and being questioned by the police: Custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on
the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.

Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014
People v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018
Doctrine: Miranda rights are not available in administrative investigations. Thus, an employee’s
written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in
connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment is admissible as evidence against the employee.

Criminal Due Process and Related Rights

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
Doctrine: Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent.

People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019

Doctrine: Before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua; bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense
charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is, bail will be
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.

People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018

Doctrine: The right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases: Protection against vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays

People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018

Doctrine: Dismissal on the ground of violation of the right to speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal.

People v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018

Doctrine: The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018

Doctrine: The right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions, while the right
to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial.

Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015

Doctrine: Jeopardy will not attach in case of dismissal of a complaint during preliminary
investigation. The preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial, and the dismissal of a
case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy.
 Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
Doctrine: If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was
dismissed upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached.

Assistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015

Doctrine: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.

Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
Doctrine: Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence.

People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019

Doctrine: A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. However, if the order of acquittal is
void for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, there will be no
double jeopardy, if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is filed to question a
verdict of acquittal.

Remedies for the Enforcement of Constitutional Rights

Writ of Habeas Corpus ; Writ of Kalikasan ; Writ of Amparo ; Writ of Habeas Data
Mosqueda v. City Government of Davao, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Doctrine: Precautionary principle requires scientific basis. As much as possible, a complete and
objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and
made available to decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action.

Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017

Doctrine: The writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of
such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger
protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective
resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and
balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the
potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017
Doctrine: A detainee must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to
liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases
of violation of R.A. No. 91659) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule
also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such
dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic review.

Agcaoili v. Marcos, G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018

Doctrine: Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court because since then, the restraint
has become legal. The element of illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint
is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus.

Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

Doctrine: The Writ of Amparo is for the protection of the right to life, liberty, and security, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010

 Doctrine: Writ of amparo proceedings do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability,
but only whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof has transpired.

Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017

Doctrine: In the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted.

Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

Doctrine: The application of Writ of Amparo is limited to two situations: (1)“Extralegal killings”
which refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings; and (2)"Enforced disappearances” which are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person
outside the protection of law.

Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011

Doctrine: The failure of the police to conduct a fair and effect investigation may amount to a
violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person. The right to security of
a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the
duty to investigate.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Doctrine: The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened.

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Doctrine: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other for the writ of habeas data to be granted.

Lee v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014

Doctrine: In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner
the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.” Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim.

Salas v. Medina, G.R. No. 251693, September 28, 2020

Doctrine: If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Habeas corpus has been denied on the ground that
the persona seeking relief were detained by virtue of a lawful process. Habeas corpus does not
lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same.

Abellana v. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019

Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance of the
writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint.

Additional Cases
Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020
Doctrine: Oil companies are not public entities nor are they nongovernmental entities receiving
financial aid from the government.
Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Department of Transportation, G.R. No. 238671, June 02, 2020
Doctrine: Grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is: 1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or 2) executed whimsically or arbitrarily in a manner so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.

Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021

Doctrine: Mandamus is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-
existing duty; it does not lie to control discretion. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it
must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012
Doctrine: The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent
to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021

Doctrine: Even if a compelling state interest exists, a governmental action would not pass the
strict scrutiny test if the interest could be achieved in an alternative way that is equally effective
yet without violating the freedom of expression and its allied rights.

Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017

Doctrine: The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is within the
exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend,
or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former
should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.

Madrilejos v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 184389, September 24, 2019

Doctrine: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening event, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.

In the Matter of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus/Data v. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 215585 &
215768, September 8, 2020
Doctrine: The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form
of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly
acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in
the conduct of the proceedings.

Cadajas v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021

Doctrine:  The right to privacy was intended to protect citizens from government intrusions.
Hence, the right to privacy and its consequent effects on the rules on admissibility of evidence
cannot be invoked against private individuals.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Atillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-018, September 29, 2021
Doctrine: The exclusionary rule17 under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution only applies
as a restraint against the State and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals,
save for instances where such individuals are shown to have acted under the color of a state-
related function.

Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Doctrine: Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in
a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Public Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Doctrine:  Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the
President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The
first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique
constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and
covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject
to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
Doctrine: The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with
the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful commitment to the One China
policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-governmental character, the MECO handles
government funds in the form of the "verification fees" it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the
"consular fees" it collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws,
the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such "verification fees" and "consular
fees" should be audited by the COA.