BUCHANAN, Allen. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Isntitutions
BUCHANAN, Allen. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Isntitutions
BUCHANAN, Allen. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Isntitutions
Governance Institutions
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane*
‘‘L
egitimacy’’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say
that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert
that it has the right to rule—where ruling includes promulgating
rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to non-
compliance and/or benefits to compliance. An institution is legitimate in the so-
1
ciological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule. When people
disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, their disagreements are typically
normative. They are not disagreeing about whether they or others believe that
this institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the
2
right to rule. This essay addresses the normative dimension of recent legitimacy
discussions.
We articulate a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of global
governance institutions. This standard can provide the basis for principled
criticism of global governance institutions and guide reform efforts in circumstan-
ces in which people disagree deeply about the demands of global justice and the
role that global governance institutions should play in meeting them. We stake
* The authors are grateful to Sahar Akhtar, Christian Barry, Thomas Christiano, Michael Doyle, Nicole Has-
soun, Andrew Hurrell, Nan Keohane, Avery Kolers, Joseph S. Nye, John Tasioulas, and two anonymous referees
for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to William Alford, Ryan Goodman, and Gerald
L. Neuman for valuable criticisms and suggestions when such a version was presented at Harvard Law School,
November 3, 2005. We are particularly grateful to comments by Charles Beitz and a number of other colleagues
made at a workshop on the normative and empirical evaluation of global governance, Princeton University,
February 17–18, 2006. Further useful comments were made at the conference on "Legitimacy and International
Law" at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany,
June 13–14, 2006.
1 A thorough review of the sociological literature on organizational legitimacy can be found in Mark C.
stitutions, see Daniel Bodansky, ‘‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for Interna-
tional Environmental Law?’’ American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3 (1999), pp. 596–624. For an impressive
earlier book on the subject, see Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990). Franck’s account focuses on the legitimacy of rules more than institutions and in our judg-
ment does not distinguish clearly enough between the normative and sociological senses of legitimacy.
405
out a middle ground between an increasingly discredited conception of legitimacy
that conflates legitimacy with international legality understood as state consent,
on the one hand, and the unrealistic view that legitimacy for these institutions re-
quires the same democratic standards that are now applied to states, on the other.
Our approach to the problem of legitimacy integrates conceptual analysis and
moral reasoning with an appreciation of the fact that global governance institu-
tions are novel, still evolving, and characterized by reasonable disagreement
about what their proper goals are and what standards of justice they should
meet. Because both standards and institutions are subject to change as a result of
further reflection and action, we do not claim to discover timeless necessary and
sufficient conditions for legitimacy. Instead, we offer a principled proposal for
how the legitimacy of these institutions ought to be assessed—for the time being.
Essential to our account is the idea that to be legitimate a global governance in-
stitution must possess certain epistemic virtues that facilitate the ongoing critical
revision of its goals, through interaction with agents and organizations outside
the institution. A principled global public standard of legitimacy can help citizens
committed to democratic principles to distinguish legitimate institutions from
illegitimate ones and to achieve a reasonable congruence in their legitimacy
assessments. Were such a standard widely accepted, it could bolster public sup-
port for valuable global governance institutions that either satisfy the standard
or at least make credible efforts to do so.
‘‘Global governance institutions’’ covers a diversity of multilateral entities, in-
cluding the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), various environmental institutions, such as the climate change regime built
around the Kyoto Protocol, judges’ and regulators’ networks, the UN Security
3
Council, and the new International Criminal Court (ICC). These institutions are
like governments in that they issue rules and publicly attach significant con-
sequences to compliance or failure to comply with them—and claim the authority
to do so. Nonetheless, they do not attempt to perform anything approaching a full
range of governmental functions. These institutions do not seek, as governments
do, to monopolize the legitimate use of violence within a permanently specified
territory, and their design and major actions require the consent of states.
3 A large and growing literature exists on global governance. See, for example, Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey
A. Hart, eds., Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999); Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue,
eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); and David Held and
Anthony McGrew, eds., Governing Globalization (London: Polity Press, 2002).
4 Erika de Wet, ‘‘The Security Council as Legislator/Executive in Its Fight against Terrorism and against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Question of Legitimacy’’ (presentation at the conference
‘‘Legitimacy and International Law,’’ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, Heidelberg, Germany, June 14, 2006).
5 The emphasis here on the coordinating function should not be misunderstood: global governance institutions
do not merely coordinate state actions in order to satisfy preexisting state preferences. As our analysis will make
clear, they can also help shape state preferences and lead to the development of new norms and institutional
goals.
6 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:
9 Andrew Hurrell, ‘‘Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?’’ Review of International
Studies 31, supp. S1 (2005), p. 16.
10 Legitimacy can also be seen as providing a ‘‘focal point’’ that helps strategic actors select one equilibrium so-
lution among others. For the classic discussion of focal points, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 3. For a critique of theories of cooperation on the basis of
focal point theory, and an application to the European Union, see Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, ‘‘Ideas,
Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market,’’ in Judith Goldstein and
Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 178–85.
11Most contemporary analytic philosophical literature on legitimacy tends to focus exclusively on the legitimacy
of the state and typically assumes a very strong understanding of legitimacy. In particular, it is assumed that
legitimacy entails (1) a content-independent moral obligation to comply with all institutional rules (not just
content-independent moral reasons to comply and/or a content-independent moral obligation to not interfere
with others’ compliance), (2) being justified in using coercion to secure compliance with rules, and (3) being
justified in using coercion to exclude other actors from operating in the institution’s domain. (See, for example,
Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? For and Against
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005]). It is far from obvious, however, that this very strong con-
ception is even the only conception of legitimacy appropriate for the state, given what is sometimes referred to
as the ‘‘unbundling’’ of sovereignty into various types of decentralized states and the existence of the European
Union. Be that as it may, this state-centered conception is too strong for global governance institutions, which
generally do not wield coercive power or claim such strong authority. For a more detailed development of this
point, see Allen Buchanan, ‘‘The Legitimacy of International Law,’’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas,
eds., The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
State Consent
The first view is relatively simple. Global governance institutions are legitimate if
(and only if) they are created through state consent. In this conception, legit-
imacy is simply a matter of legality. Legally constituted institutions, created by
states according to the recognized procedures of public international law and
12 This view was forcefully expressed by Professor Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, in comments on a
dations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. ch. 5.
15How the requirement of ongoing consent should be operationalized is a complex question we need not try
to answer here; one possibility would be that the treaties creating the institution would have to be periodically
reaffirmed.
Global Democracy
Because democracy is now widely thought to be the gold standard for legitimacy
in the case of the state, it may seem obvious that global governance institutions
are legitimate if and only if they are democratic. And since these institutions in-
creasingly affect the welfare of people everywhere, surely this must mean that
they ought to be democratic in the sense of giving everyone an equal say in how
they operate. Call this the Global Democracy View.
The most obvious difficulty with this view is that the social and political con-
ditions for democracy are not met at the global level and there is no reason to
think that they will be in the foreseeable future. At present there is no global po-
litical structure that could provide the basis for democratic control over global
governance institutions, even if one assumes that democracy requires little direct
participation by individuals. Any attempt to create such a structure in the form
of a global democratic federation that relies on existing states as federal units
would lack legitimacy, and hence could not confer legitimacy on global gover-
nance institutions, because, as has already been noted, many states are them-
selves undemocratic or lack other qualities necessary for state legitimacy.
Furthermore, there is at present no global public—no worldwide political com-
munity constituted by a broad consensus recognizing a common domain as the
proper subject of global collective decision-making and habitually communicat-
ing with one another about public issues. Nor is there consensus on a normative
framework within which to deliberate together about a global common interest.
Indeed, there is not even a global consensus that some form of global govern-
ment, much less a global democracy, is needed or appropriate. Finally, once it is
1. It must provide a reasonable public basis for coordinated support for the
institutions in question, on the basis of moral reasons that are widely ac-
cessible in spite of the persistence of significant moral disagreement—in
particular, about the requirements of justice.
2. It must not confuse legitimacy with justice but nonetheless must not allow
that extremely unjust institutions are legitimate.
3. It must take the ongoing consent of democratic states as a presumptive
necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, for legitimacy.
4. Although the standard should not make authorization by a global democ-
racy a necessary condition of legitimacy, it should nonetheless promote the
key values that underlie demands for democracy.
5. It must properly reflect the dynamic character of global governance in-
stitutions: the fact that not only the means they employ, but even their
goals, may and ought to change over time.
17 For a valuable discussion that employs a different conception of normative uncertainty, see Monica Hlavac,
‘‘A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’’ (unpublished paper).
18 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), n. 17.
19 Allen Buchanan and Matthew DeCamp, ‘‘Responsibility for Global Health,’’ Transnational Medicine (forthcoming).
20In March 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the replacement of the Commission on Human
Rights (fifty-three members elected from slates put forward by regional groups) with a smaller Human Rights
Council elected by a two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly (see his report ‘‘In Larger Freedom,’’
A/59/2005, para. 183).
21 For the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program (the
no. 4 (2004), pp. 577–91. See also Randall W. Stone, Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and
the Post-Communist Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
25 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, ‘‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,’’ American
Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005), pp. 29–44. See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘‘Redefining
Accountability for Global Governance,’’ in Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, eds., Governance in a Global Econo-
my: Political Authority in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 386–411.
26 For a discussion, see Ngaire Woods, ‘‘Holding Intergovernmental Institutions to Account,’’ Ethics Interna-
27 Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003).
28 For a discussion of the role of critical revisability in practical reasoning, with parallels to theoretical reasoning,
see Allen Buchanan, ‘‘Revisability and Rational Choice,’’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 3 (1975), pp. 395–408.
29 For an illuminating account of the legitimacy of health care institutions that emphasizes responsibility for justi-
fications, see Norman Daniels and James Sabin, ‘‘Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation,
and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers,’’ Philosophy Public Affairs 26, no. 4 (1997), pp. 303–50.
30 See Richard B. Stewart, ‘‘Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century,’’ New York University Law Review
78, no. 2 (2003), pp. 437–60; and Benedict Kingsbury, Nikon Kirsch, and Richard B. Stewart, ‘‘The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law,’’ Law and Contemporary Problems 68, nos. 3 and 4 (2005). See also Daniel Esty,
‘‘Toward Good Global Governance: The Role of Administrative Law’’ (paper presented at a conference on global
administrative law, New York University, April 21–23, 2005). See also John Wickham, ‘‘Toward a Green Multi-
lateral Investment Framework: NAFTA and the Search for Models,’’Georgetown International Environmental
Law Review 12, no. 3 (2000), pp. 617–46; James Salzman,‘‘Labor Rights, Globalization, and Institutions: The Role
and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,’’ Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 21, no. 4 (2000), pp. 769–848; and OECD, Getting to Grips with Globalization: The OECD in a Chang-
ing World (Paris: OECD Publications, 2004).
31The analogy in the economics of information is to the market for used cars. A potential buyer of a used car
would be justified in inferring poor quality if the seller were unwilling to let him have the car thoroughly exam-
ined by a competent mechanic. See George A. Akerlof, ‘‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970), pp. 488–500.
‘‘Legitimacy in International Law: Some Introductory Considerations’’ (paper prepared for the conference
‘‘Legitimacy in International Law’’ at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, Heidelberg, Germany, June 13–14, 2006).
35 On our view, the legitimacy of global governance institutions, at present at least, does not require participation
in the critical evaluation of institutional goals and policies by all who are affected by them; but if the standard of
legitimacy we recommend were accepted, opportunities for participation would expand.
The central argument of this essay can now be summarized. The Complex
Standard provides a reasonable basis for agreement in legitimacy assessments of
global governance institutions. When the comparative benefit condition is satis-
fied, the institution provides goods that are not readily obtainable without it.
These goods, however, can be reliably provided only if coordination is achieved,
and achieving coordination without excessive costs requires that the relevant
agents regard the institution’s rules as presumptively binding—that is, that they
take the fact that the rule is issued by the institution as a content-independent
reason for compliance. The instrumental value of institutions that satisfy the com-
parative benefit condition also gives individuals generally a content-independent
reason not to interfere with the functioning of the institutions. Satisfaction of the
minimal moral acceptability condition rules out the more serious moral objec-
tions that might otherwise undercut the instrumental reasons for supporting the
institution. Satisfaction of the other conditions of the Complex Standard, taken
together, provides moral reasons to support or at least not interfere with the insti-
tution. Among the most important of these reasons is that the institution has
epistemic virtues that facilitate the development of more demanding standards
and the progressive improvement of the institution itself. Thus, when a global
governance institution meets the demands of the Complex Standard, there is jus-
tification for saying that it has the right to rule, not merely that it is beneficial.
CONCLUSION
In this essay we have offered a proposal for a public standard of legitimacy for
global governance institutions. These institutions supply important benefits that
neither states nor traditional treaty-based relationships among states can provide,
but they are quite new, often fragile, and still evolving. Politically mobilized chal-
lenges to the legitimacy of these institutions jeopardize the support they need to
function effectively, in spite of the fact that these challenges are typically un-
principled and possibly grounded in unrealistic demands that confuse justice