Iron and Steel Authority vs.

CA

FACTS: Iron and Steel Authority (ISA)  was created by P.D. No. 272  in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. The list of powers and
functions of the ISA included the following: xx
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. – The authority shall have the following powers and functions: xx
(j) to initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for subsequent
resale and/or lease to the companies involved if it is shown that such use of the State’s power is
necessary to implement the construction of capacity which is needed for the attainment of the
objectives of the Authority; xx
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No.
2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement a large
tract of public located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate
occupancy of NSC.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied
by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277,  was issued directing the
NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also
directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a
period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power
of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of
occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the
plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly ISA commenced
eminent domain proceedings against MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City, praying that it be placed in
possession of the property involved upon depositing in court representing ten percent (10%) of
the declared market values of that property.

A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in
possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC’s fertilizer plant installation.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of
petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment
could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its
opposition to this motion.
The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was
anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that “only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case.”
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the
same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have
ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had
not yet rested their respective cases.

Hence this Petition for Review.

ISSUE: WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.
HELD: The Decision of the CA to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the
expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to
the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the RPfor petitioner ISA
YES

Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action:

Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. – Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under category (b)
above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted, contains express authorization to ISA to commence
expropriation proceedings like those here involved. It should also be noted that the enabling
statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into certain kinds of contracts “for and in behalf
of the Government” in the following terms: xx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the
government, for the bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for any sectors in the
industry, and to maintain inventories of such materials in order to insure a continuous and
adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce operating costs of such sector;   xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic
itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.” The relevant definitions
are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. – Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a
whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the RPrefers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
xxx xxx xxx

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed
by, the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof
such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation,
in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into GRP
and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even though the latter
may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually
successful.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the RP is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having
expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or
justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the Republic to commence all over again
another proceeding, as the trial court and CA had required, was to generate unwarranted delay
and create needless repetition of proceedings:
NOTES:
1. Since, as we have held above, the powers and functions of ISA have reverted to the RP upon
the termination of the statutory term of ISA, the question should be addressed whether fresh
legislative authority is necessary before the RP may continue the expropriation proceedings
initiated by its own delegate or agent.

While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative
department of the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is
necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to
prosecute the expropriation proceedings. For the legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted
a continuing or standing delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise,
or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. The 1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the
time of the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings before the Iligan RTC ,
provided that:
Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. – In addition to his
general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines shall have such other specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law, and also, in particular,
the powers and duties set forth in this Chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be: xx

(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain
in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to direct the Secretary of Justice, where
such act is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court
having proper jurisdiction. xx
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially reproduced the
foregoing provision in the following terms:

Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. – The President shall determine when it is necessary or

advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government,
and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute
expopriation proceedings in the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the President, exercising the power duly delegated under both the 1917
and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary
and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the
Republic and accordingly directed the SG to proceed with the suit. 17
2. It is argued by private respondent MCFC that, because Congress after becoming once more
the depository of primary legislative power, had not enacted a statute extending the term of
ISA, such non-enactment must be deemed a manifestation of a legislative design to discontinue
or abort the present expropriation suit. We find this argument much too speculative; it rests
too much upon simple silence on the part of Congress and casually disregards the existence of
Section 12 of the 1987 Administrative Code already quoted above.
3. Other contentions are made by private respondent MCFC, such as, that the constitutional
requirement of “public use” or “public purpose” is not present in the instant case, and that the
indispensable element of just compensation is also absent. We agree with the Court of Appeals
in this connection that these contentions, which were adopted and set out by the RTC  in its
order of dismissal, are premature and are appropriately addressed in the proceedings before
the trial court. Those proceedings have yet to produce a decision on the merits, since trial was
still on going at the time the RTC precipitously dismissed the expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the Republic is, by such substitution as party-plaintiff,
accorded an opportunity to determine whether or not, or to what extent, the proceedings
should be continued in view of all the subsequent developments in the iron and steel sector of
the country including, though not limited to, the partial privatization of the NSC
In Re Rodolfo Manzano

FACTS
On June 21, 1988, Ilocos Norte Gov. Rodolfo Farinas issued Executive Order RF6-04 designating
Judge Rodolfo Manzano as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which was created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.

Before accepting his appointment, however, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the Supreme
Court seeking the following:

1. authorization to accept the appointment;

2. declaration from the Court that his appointment is not unconstitutional; and
3. declaration that his membership in the said Committee was part of the primary
functions of an Executive Judge.

RULING
The Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for Judge Manzano to become part of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice for two reasons.

First, the said Committee performs administrative functions. Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.

Among the Committee's administrative functions are to receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses
in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; and
recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

Second, under the Constitution, members of the Supreme Court and other courts established
by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative
functions.

Considering that the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee
on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution,
the Court decided to deny his request.
Ople vs. Torres

Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for
the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification reference

system requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic
of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the
congress of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:
WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the
Philippines?

Ruling:
Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the
Philippines.

The Court held that the Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of
legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.  The President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power
over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

In this case, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.

Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Planas vs Gil

Facts:
Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts of certain
government officials in connection with the general election for Assemblymen held on
November 8, 1938 in one of the local dailies. The statement as published in the issue of La
Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the following statements:

“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8 elections, but lost instead
because of a disastrous division due to people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisely so that the President may 
devote all his time to the administration of public affairs for the welfare of the people, but th
e President was the first to play politics. Publicly expressing his preference for candidates of
his liking; and with the President all other officials of the government also moved, taking part in
electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten the opposition and prevent 
candidates supported by the people from going to the National Assembly, and with frauds
and violations of all rules of the civil service to push to victory the candidates of the
Nacionalista Party and the administration, all constructive opposition in the country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe
that the President is from this moment paving the way for his reelection. It is to be feared that
the new National Assembly will change this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the
reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."

The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the petitioner received a letter,
where she is informed that she needs to appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to
prove her statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from office.

At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, appeared at the office of
the respondent and delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the
authority of the respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent Commissioner did
not desist from proceeding with the investigation, but announced before adjourning the
hearing of November 22nd that he would decide the question raised as to his jurisdiction on
November 26, 1938.
It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in this court her original petition
for prohibition of November 25, 1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commisioner from continuing with the
investigation.

Issues:
1. WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the president has the power to order the investigation
3. WON the investigation is in accordance with the law

Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

1. Yes.

In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. The Commissioner of Civil
Service is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Government that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, this
court has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen
Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government 
is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither 
decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunit
y of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport 
for all the subordinate officials and employees of the Executive Department to the extent that 
at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire 
into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.

Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justic
e, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or 
a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This court, therefore,
has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will accordingly proceed to determine the
merits of the present controversy.

2. Yes.

It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the order, but it is contended
"that the said investigation with a view to petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article
VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by any statutory
provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It, therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the
constitutional and legal authority of the President to order the investigation which has given
rise to the present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show
that extensive authority over the public service is granted the President of the Philippines. Ar
ticle VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The Executive po
wer shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." All executive authority is thus vested in 
him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are "faithfully exe
cuted." (Art. VIII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot 
evade, he is granted specific and express powers and functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition t
o these specific and express powers and functions, he may also exercise those necessarily imp
lied and included in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National Assembly may not
enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the
President of the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921]) The Constitution provides that the President "shall have control of all the executive d
epartments, bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general 
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This 
power of control and supervision is an important constitutional grant. The President in the ex
ercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the execu
tive departments.

Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation

of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the
executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all loca
l governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to aut
horize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct, of the petitioner herein. Supervisio
n is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it 
at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power rea
l and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal,
it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful
study and investigation.

Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief Executive by our Constitution,
we should be reluctant to yield to the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is
endowed with broad and extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to
govern with a firm and steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and
much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to order the investigation of
the petitioner in this case. We should avoid that result.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the supervisory
authority to Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the
conflict of views in that body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of
local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which
sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments (Booten vs.
Pinson,
[1915]). The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and 
the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in, imperio to the detriment of a stron
g national government.

Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the Administrative Code of
1917 provides as follows:

"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General (President) shall have
such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and
also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation
of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection
therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the Constitution, still
subsists. It is not inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed
by the National Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)

3. Yes.

The interest of the public service requires that these charges be investigated, so that, if found
to be true, appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of
illegal acts, and if found untrue and made without justifiable motives, the party making them
may be proceeded against in accordance with section 2440, in connection, with section, 2078,
of the Revised Administrative Code." Assuming that this is not one of the grounds provided by
law for which the petitioner may be investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code),
there is weight in the argument that the investigation would still be in order
if for no other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all the facts so that, if fou
nd proper and justified, appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged to have b
een guilty of the illegal acts charged. The enforcement of the law and the maintenance of
peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "take care that the laws be faithfully exe
cuted" is more an imposition of an obligation than a conferment of power. His oath requires 
him to "faithfully and conscientiously fulfill" his duties as President, "preserve and defend" th
e Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to see that the laws be faithf
ully executed is not limited to the enforcement of legislative acts or the express terms of the 
Constitution but also includes the due enforcement of rights, duties, obligations, prerogatives 
and immunities growing out of the Constitution itself and of the protection implied by the nat
ure of the government under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle)

We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecting the constitutional guara
nty of freedom of speech and of the press, no less than the right of assembly and petition whi
ch, according to Stimson (The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights, 152), is its o
rigin rather than its derivation. In the present case, however, the petitioner is not denied the ri
ght, nor is she being investigated because she had exercised that right. She has a perfect right t
o criticize the Government, its administration, its policies and officials, but she may not, on the 
plea of freedom of speech and of the press, impute violations of law and the commission of fra
uds and thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an investigation conducted to elicit the trut
h or falsity of the charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the guarantee which, in the language o
f Wendell Phillips, is "at once the instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright consummate fl
ower of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridled license, and render the Government po
werless to act.

Biraogo vs. Truth Commission

FACTS:  Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.    PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.    Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions; 

DECISION:  No 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of

existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.  
Ocampo vs. Enriquez

FACTS:Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a

Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the
Verbal Order of President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under
Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members
of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as
member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims
and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former
President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human
rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others,
as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and
on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of
Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of

the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the
ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided
a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an

act complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in
their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they
have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal
disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,

petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking
in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts,
but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining
order and injunction when proven necessary.

Constitutionality
 The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has
the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter”
and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a
clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke
Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of
Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as
a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.”
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the
nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

PLANAS VS. GIL
(Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President)
Non-interference Rule: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in
such cases.

But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded from making
an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of
Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white" but also because "even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."
(Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as the judiciary is
concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement
the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is
entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate
cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent,
the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and this result is one of the
necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balance" of the government established.

GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. SPRINGER

(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is interested
essentially an executive act)
ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of Act No.
2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.

HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions,
by the Government of the United States to the executive branch of the government which it
has set up in the Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No.
2822 is unconstitutional and void

RATIO:  The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic
Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of that Act,
and in decisions interpretative of it. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general
distributing clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly
incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by
this court. No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any
of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true that the
Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the
 Government into three departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is
expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that each of the branches of
the Government is in the main independent of the others.

The Organic Act vests the:

a.)    EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.
Ø  execute the law
Ø  power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive
function
Ø  he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the
government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
Ø  made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the
United States operative within Philippine Islands.
Ø  By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged
with the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through
the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to law."

b.)    LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.

Ø  make the law.

c.)     JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First Instance, and inferior
courts. 
Ø  construe the law

Doctrine of separation of powers

Ø  the Supreme Court emphasized that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains,
with minor exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee
in question is an office or executive function; that the NCC and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and
government property belongs to the executive department; that the placing of members of the
Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative
Department of the privileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of
delegated powers, under which delegation legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature
and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General and a
specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly
or indirectly perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding
officers as majority members of a body which has executive functions. That is the meaning we
gather from the tri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions
of the Organic Law.

Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the
voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
However, the Supreme Court notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this
exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

ARTICLE VIII
1987 Constitution, Art. 7 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987

BOOK 2 Chapter 4 JUDICIAL POWER Sec. 16. Judicial Power. - The judicial power shall be
vested in one (1) Supreme Court, and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Such
lower courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari's District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts and they shall continue to exercise their
respective jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and, in cases prescribed by law, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

BOOK 3 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Chapter 5 POWER OF APPOINTMENT Sec. 16. Power of Appointment. - The President shall
exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

Chapter 6 GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Sec. 18. General Supervision

Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

 Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the Philippines are specifically outlined
in Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. The
following powers are:

1. Power of control over the executive branch

The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their
respective officials. The Administrative Code also provides for the President to be responsible
for the abovementioned offices’ strict implementation of laws.

2. Power ordinance power

The President of the Philippines has the power to give executive issuances, which are means to
streamline the policy and programs of an administration. There are six issuances that the
President may issue. They are the following as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987:
·         Executive orders — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
·         Administrative orders — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as the administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
·         Proclamations — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.
·         Memorandum orders — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail, or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or government office
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
·         Memorandum circulars — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for information or compliance, shall be
embodied in memorandum circulars.
·         General or special orders — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.

It is important to note that during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used executive
issuances known as presidential decrees as a form of legislation. These decrees have the full
force and effect of laws because at the time the legislature did not exist and, when the 1973
Constitution was put into full force and effect, it gave the power to the President to do as such.
This continued until the first year of President Corazon C. Aquino’s term. However, President
Aquino opted to used executive orders instead of presidential decrees. President Aquino’s
executive orders, however, still had the full force and effect of laws until the ratification of the
1987 Constitution.
 3. Power over aliens
The President of the Philippines has the power over non-Filipinos in the Philippines. The powers
he may exercise over foreigners in the country are as follows:
 The chief executive may have an alien in the Philippines deported from the country after
due process.
 The President may change the status of a foreigner, as prescribed by law, from a non-
immigrant status to a  permanent resident status without necessity of visa.
 The President may choose to overrule the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration before their decision becomes final and executory (after 30 days of the issuance of
the decision). The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration has jurisdiction over all
deportation cases.
 The president is also mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987 to exercise powers
as recognized by the generally accepted principles of international law.

4. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-gotten wealth
The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.
The power of eminent domains means the state has the power to seize or authorize the seizure
of private property for public use with just compensation. There are two constitutional
provisions, however, that limit the exercise of such power: Article III, Section 9 (1) of the
Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 (2), provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the power of eminent
domain which are as follows:
·         Power of eminent domain — The President shall determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the national government,
and direct the solicitor general, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute
expropriation proceedings in the proper court.
·         Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings — The President shall direct the solicitor
general to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred or assigned to
persons disqualified under the constitution to acquire land.
·         Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government —
1)       The president shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific
public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.
2)      He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public
uses or purposes, any land belonging to the private domain of the government, or any of the
friar lands, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall be
used for the purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise provided by law.
·         Power over ill-gotten wealth — The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute
proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees.

Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the constitution, the
President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime, and protect the interest of the people through orders of
sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.

5. Power of appointment
The President may appoint officials of the Philippine government as provided by the
constitution and laws of the Philippines. Some of these appointments, however,  may need the
approval of the Committee on Appointments (a committee composed of members from the
House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines).

6. Power of general supervision over local governments

The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the mandate to supervise local
governments in the Philippines, despite their autonomous status as provided by Republic Act
No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and Local Government, headed by a
cabinet secretary—an alter ego of the President.

7. Other powers
Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the Philippines, he can also exercise
powers enumerated in the constitution, and powers given to him by law.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

(Delegating to administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulations.)
ISSUES:
(1)      WON The 1973 Constitution and Javellana Ruling is Valid.
(2)      WON The Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose such amendments.

HELD:
 It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."Such a statement served a useful
purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and
effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must
also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
 The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too
strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative
aspect.

Petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by
unconstitutionality.

The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable

provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."

One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to
be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond
doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being
assailed.

Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT
(Power of the president to reorganize the government)
ISSUE:                WON the administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary valid.
HELD:
YES. The President – through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC
Secretary in the present case – may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the
Cordillera Administrative Region with the concomitant transfer and performance of public
functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

Public Office may be created through any of the ff. modes:

1)       by the Constitution,
2)      by law, or
3)      by authority of law.

The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third
mode which could be decreed for instance, through and Executive Order issued by the
President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission under
the Administrative Code. In the case at bar, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed
Memorandum and Department Order pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President
establishing the regional officer in the CAR.

The said Administrative Order did not merely authorize but directed the various departments
and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their
regional offices in the CAR.

What law then gives the President the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government. In fine, the
“designation” and subsequent “establishment” of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in
the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of
functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the
continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of
Transportation and Communications.

Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.

EUGENIO VS. CSC

(Power of congress to abolish)
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. In 1993,
Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was given a CES eligibility
and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
But her appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection,
classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not
have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other
hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which
granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service
Board.

HELD: 
NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be disputed,
therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This
follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is
primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB.

On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has
set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section
17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its
power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General,
Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the
offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
enumerated in Section 16..

From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the
CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program
coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit: Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation
or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.

LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(Power of the president to dismiss)
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to dismiss.
               
HELD:
NONE. Under the law, Career Executive Service Officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified
by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President.
 Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President.
This is in line with the well settled principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint” conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must
be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-
distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing
or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer,
petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of
P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is
emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be
removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the
petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to
remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service
officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial  protection, thus, may only be removed for
a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

Powers of Administrative Agencies

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, ET AL

(Rule-making power of administrative body)
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took
over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest
organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by
the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based
workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the afore mentioned order and to prohibit
implementation.

ISSUES:
1)       WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars;
2)      WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and
3)      WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary
of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is here by authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is

constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is
the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as
required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise
provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of
Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their
adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing.  (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafterbe the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in therule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall takeappropriate measures to
make emergency rules known to persons who may be affectedby them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted