Feb 23 

(iv) Last clear chance aka supervening negligence or discovered peril 

Phil. Bank of Commerce vs. CA, supra - BALASBAS

NOTE: Digest of Ms Quiambao to. Kindly ready your case notes (asa negligence (3)) para di niyo na
ulitin. 

PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL

INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL, et al.
RESPONDENTS: THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO
LIPANA, its President & General Manager

FACTS:
 RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its
business of selling appliances.
 From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in
the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC.
o these deposits were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Yabut's
husband, Bienvenido Cotas who maintains an account with the same bank.
 Even though PBC have been regularly furnishing Romeo with monthly statements showing its current
accounts balances, he never checked such statements reposing complete trust and confidence on
PBC.
 Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated.
o She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate.
 The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number.
 The duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the
account holder was left blank.
o PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both deposit slips
retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.
o The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes.
o After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the
duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number.
 This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private respondent's knowledge.
 Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money, but its
demand went unheeded
 PMC then filed a collection suit before the RTC. 

RTC: found PBC negligent

→ Ordered PBC, now absorbed by defendant Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, and defendant
Azucena Mabayad to pay the RMC, jointly and severally, and without prejudice to any criminal action which
may be instituted if found warranted:
1. The sum of P304,979.72, representing plaintiffs lost deposit, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from
the filing of the complaint;
2. A sum equivalent to 14% thereof, as exemplary damages;
3. A sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due, as and for attorney's fees; and
4. Costs.

CA: Affirmed with modification:

→ the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified therein are eliminated.

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by RMC — PBC's or RMC’s negligence. (PBC)

PBC: The proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of RMC and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee in the person of Ms. Irene Yabut.
 
RMC: The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of PBC, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in
validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate, presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished.

RULING:
Our law on quasi-delicts states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 
There are three elements of a quasi-delict:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
→ there is damage suffered by RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which
caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit.
 
Negligence - the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
 
Picart v. Smith: provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
→ Applying this test:
 PBC’s teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was
not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
 Negligence lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
o While Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of PBC and now its Vice-
President, ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit
slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures
 
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent. 
→ It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of PBC in the selection and
supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by RMC, and not the latter's
act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee.

Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina (reiterated in the case of BPI v. CA): Proximate cause - "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. . . ."
→ Absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip,
Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
 
Doctrine of "last clear chance" ("supervening negligence" or "discovered peril") - states that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. 
 Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence.

PBC was indeed the culpable party.

→ Assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with
the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that PBC, thru
its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
 
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is
expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
 
HOWEVER, the degree of diligence required to be exercised by banks in dealing with their clients is more than
that of a good father of a family.
→ Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. 
 
Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals: in every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat
his account with the utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions.
The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as
possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor
can dispose as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. A blunder on
the part of the bank, such as the failure to duly credit him his deposits as soon as they are made, can cause
the depositor not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.

As a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship.
→ In the case before us, it is apparent that PBC was remiss in that duty and violated that relationship.

However, it cannot be denied that, indeed, PMC was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements
of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed
against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs.
 
This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be
awarded to the RMC under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.

IN APPLYING THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE , PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not
exercising the proper validation procedure  
    Doctrine of “last clear chance” (also referred to, at times as “supervening negligence” or as “dis-covered
peril”), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof.
     Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought
by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence.
       Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner,
yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Tiu vs. Arriesgado (GR No. 138060, 1 September 2004) - DIMARUCUT

DOCTRINE: The principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit
between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles.
 
FACTS:
 A cargo truck passed over a bridge, then one of its rear tires exploded.
 The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the  highway and removed the damaged
tire to have it vulcanized.
 Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter
to place a spare tire behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The truck’s
tail lights were also left on. (12AM)
 D’ Rough Riders passenger bus was approaching the said bridge, Virgilio Te Laspiñas, the driver, saw
the stalled truck. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck but it was
too late.
 The impact left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado suffered a fracture and his wife Felisa
died.
 Respondent Pedro Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and
attorney’s fees before the RTC Cebu City against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus operator William
Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas.
 The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along
the national road, and that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the
accident.
 Petitioners Laspiñas and Tiu (employer) alleged that Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along
the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was
further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the
brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid
damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the
cargo truck’s left rear.
  They contend that the principle of last clear chance is applicable in the case.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent Arriesgado.
 CA affirmed RTC reducing the amount of damages
 
ISSUE
Whether the principle of last clear chance is applicable in the case. - NO.
 
RULING:
 
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
 The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Is Inapplicable in the Case at Bar
 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant
case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles.
 It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that
the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code.
 Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent Arriesgado’s wife due to the
negligence of petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this score.
 
NEGLIGENCE
 
BUS DRIVER
 Indeed, petitioner Laspiñas’ negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. By his own
admission, he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of Compostela, Cebu at a
speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision occurred. The maximum speed allowed by
law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
 Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
 
EMPLOYER
 Petitioner Tiu failed to Overcome the presumption Of negligence against him as One engaged in the
business Of common carriage.
 It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed
upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the
matters that need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners
assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and
to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances.
 Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the
negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence
in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of
diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.
 While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that
the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the
accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to
conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger
bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common
carrier.
 
TRUCK DRIVER AND HELPER
 Respondents Pedrano and Condor were likewise Negligent.
 The manner in which the truck was parked clearly endangered oncoming traffic on both sides,
considering that the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place occurred in the wee hours of
the morning.
 The Court can only now surmise that the unfortunate incident could have been averted had respondent
Condor, the owner of the truck, equipped the said vehicle with lights, flares, or, at the very least, an
early warning device.
 Hence, we cannot subscribe to respondents Condor and Pedrano’s claim that they should be absolved
from liability because, as found by the trial and appellate courts, the proximate cause of the collision
 was the fast speed at which petitioner Laspiñas drove the bus. To accept this proposition would be to
come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Indeed, our law on quasi-delicts seeks
to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among its members. To accept
this proposition would be to weaken the very bonds of society.
 

Philippine National Railways Corporation vs. Vizcara (GR No. 190022, 15 February 2012) -
MADLAMBAYAN
PETITIONERS: Philippine National Railways Corporation, Japhet Estranas and Ben Saga
RESPONDENTS: Purificacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara, Cresencia A. Natividad, Hector Vizcara, Joel Vizcara
and Dominador Antonio
 
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of
last clear chance cannot be applied.

FACTS:
1. On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo was driving a passenger jeepney
headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions, namely, Cresencio, Crispin, Samuel,
Dominador and Joel.
2. While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train,
then being operated by respondent Estranas, suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger
jeepney.
 The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel.
On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.
3. At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage
was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another signboard.
4. On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of
the deceased victims filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate
driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City.
 
RTC: ruled in favor of the respondents. Judgment is y rendered ordering defendants PNR, Estranas and
Saga to, jointly and severally pay.
 
CA: affirmed the RTC decision with modification with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the
respondents.
 
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence
and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney.
 They argue that as a professional driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and
regulations, including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary
measures to observe in traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by
PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and
thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to maintain a safe distance
between the jeepney he was driving and the truck ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the
PNR signage displayed along the crossing.
 
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: reiterate that the petitioners' negligence in maintaining adequate and
necessary public safety devices in the area of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap.
 They asseverate that if there was only a level crossing bar, warning light or sound, or flagman in the
intersection, the accident would not have happened. Thus, there is no other party to blame but the
petitioners for their failure to ensure that adequate warning devices are installed along the railroad
crossing.
 
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable (NO)
i. Whether petitioner PNR is negligent (YES)
ii. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents (NO)
 
RULING:
The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
 
Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the
nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety
railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside
from the absence of a crossing bar, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly
maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good
condition, not just a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order.
Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established the fact of negligence on the part of
the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages.
 

 
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
 
The Court cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not even
aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents
was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded
to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the
impression that it was safe to proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the
collision did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the truck they were
trailing was able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding
or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of
sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. He proceeded to cross the
track and, all of a sudden, his jeepney was rammed by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then,
the circumstances before the collision negate the imputation of contributory negligence on the part of the
respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have happened had the petitioners installed
reliable and adequate safety devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the
same.
 

 
The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the instant case.
 
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
 

To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the
jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.
Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent
preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be
applied.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED. 

(v) Fortuitous event (Art. 1174) 

National Power Corporation vs. CA (GR No. 103442-45, 21 May 1993) - MANGALINDAN

Petitioner: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Benjamin Chavez

Respondent: Gaudencio C. Rayo, Et Al
DOCTRINE: The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from
creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.

FACTS:

This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints for damages filed against the
NPC and Benjamin Chavez before the trial court.
  Gaudencio C. Rayo et.al, (plaintiff/private respondents) sought to recover actual and other
damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the
town of Norzagaray, Bulacan
 The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by NPC (defendant/petitioners) of
water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).

Private Respondent’ contentions:

 NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River
 Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident
 despite private respondents’' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of
typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam
 when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's
spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River
 as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned,
and their properties were washed away.

NPC& Chavez (PR) contentions:

 It exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the
hydroelectric plant
 It exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees
 written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents about
the impending release of a large volume of water and advise them to take the necessary
precautions
 the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid
greater damage to people and property
 in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control
the flood that resulted
 the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria.
  that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.

TC: dismissed the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence

CA :reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private respondents (Petitioners
solidarily liable)

ISSUE: WON petitioners were negligent

RULING: YES, petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the
spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of petitioner 'headlessness,
slovenliness, and carelessness."

Proximate Cause: proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by private respondents herein —
was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly
sent to the affected municipalities, was insufficient.

CA FINDINGS:

NOTE: *wala masyado details sa ruling ng SC pero it agreed kasi findings ng CA and eto yung sa CA:

 AS TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONERS:

The resulting flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat
River bank would have been avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the Angat Dam by
maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allow room for the expected torrential
rains. 

Apart from the newspapers, defendants-appellees learned of typhoon "Kading' through radio
announcements.Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat Dam can safely hold a normal
maximum headwater elevation of 217 meters. Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees
maintained a reservoir water elevation even beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no
sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that will inevitably be brought by the
coming typhoon.

 AS TO THE NOTICE: 
 Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway
gates at midnight of October 26, 1978 and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so
served, for the volume of water to be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents
near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away, should have been advised to
evacuate. 

Said notice, addressed "TO ALL CONCERN (sic)," was delivered to a policeman (Civil Case No. SM-
950, pp. 10-12 and Exhibit "2-A") for the municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice was not thus addressed
and delivered to the proper and responsible officials who could have disseminated the warning to the
residents directly affected. As for the municipality of Sta. Maria, where plaintiffs reside, said notice
does not appear to have been served.

Eto naman SC:

SC CONCLUSION AS TO FORTUITOUS EVENT:

 Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners,
were guilty of negligence. 
 The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man.
Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws
applicable to acts of God.

Legal Basis:

In  Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals we held:

To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur:

 (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;

 (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; 

(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
moral manner; and

(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 

Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation
as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability.

Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing
a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage
was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been
occasioned. 

(vi) Prescription (Arts. 1144, 1146, 1150) 

Kramer vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. L-83524, 13 October 1989) - MARTINEZ

PETITIONERS: ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER

RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC

DOCTRINE: Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The four year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.
 

SUMMARY: In 1976, the fishing boat of Kramers collided with the boat of Trans-Asia, causing the Kramers'
boat to sink along with their caught fish. Both captains of the ship filed a case with the Board of Marine
Inquiry. In 1982, the Board of Marine Inquiry made a final decision against Trans-Asia. In 1985, after 3 years
 of the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry, Kramers filed a case with the RTC. Trans-Asia contended the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prescription because Kramers filed their complaint beyond
the four-year prescriptive period. Kramers contended that since it’s a marine collision, the period should be
counted from 1982 or the date when the decision of the Board became final. 

SC ruled the action was prescribed. An action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The four year prescriptive period
must be counted from the day of the collision. (1976-1980). Kramers can directly file a case to the court.

FACTS:                                                        
 
 April 8, 1976 - The  fishing boat (F/B Marjolea) owned by Kramers was making its way from
Marinduque to Manila. The boat was involved in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V Asia
Philippines) owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a result of the collision, the boat of
Kramers  sank, taking with it its fish catch.
 The captains of both ships submitted their individual marine protests with the Board of Marine
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
 April 29, 1982 - Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard ruled against Trans-Asia.
The second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine
officer.
-    the loss of Kramers’ boat and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the employees of Trans-Asia.
who were on board during the collision.
 May 30, 1985 – Kramers filed a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia before the RTC.
 
RTC: It denied the motion filed by Trans-Asia.
-    The four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only
from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been
finally ascertained by the Board of Marine Inquiry
 
CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Contention of Trans-Asia:  Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a
complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. Therefore, the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prescription because Kramers filed their complaint beyond the
four-year prescriptive period (May 30, 1985). Kramers should have filed their complaint within four years from
the date when their cause of action accrued from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision happened,
 
Contention of Kramers: Since it’s a marine collision, the period should be counted from 1982 or the date
when the decision of the Board became final.

 
ISSUE: Whether the action has been prescribed (YES)
 
HELD:
 
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The four year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
 
The court discussed the right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements: (Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration)
 
1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
3. an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff

It is only when the last element takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has been
established.
 
Therefore, it is clear that in this action for damages arises from the collision of the 2 boats and the 4-
year prescriptive period must be counted from the date of the collision (1976).
 
Kramers need not to wait for  the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry (admin body)  before they can
file an action for damages. Kramers can Immediately seek relief from the courts after the collision.

(vii) Double recovery (Art. 2177) 

(viii) Involuntariness 

Insanity 
Arts. 12 and 101, RPC 
People v. Austria (GR No. 111517-19, 31 July 1996) - QUIAMBAO
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: ROGER AUSTRIA Y NAVARRO alias "BERNIE" 

DOCTRINE: To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.  
 The testimonial and documentary evidence marshalled in this case by acknowledged medical experts
have sufficiently established the fact that Austria was legally insane at the time he committed the
crimes.

 However, he is still civilly liable under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:
 On or about the 25th day of September 1989, 1:00 o'clock in the morning, in Pangasinan: 
Roger Austria, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong), with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and stab Mylene Samson, Myrna C. Samson, and Tyrone Samson in their dwelling,
inflicting injuries 
o Myrna and Tyrone died. 
Narration:
 Myrna and six of her seven children were fast asleep in their house located at Barangay Domalandan,
Lingayen, Pangasinan.  
 Austria, who was the Samsons' next door neighbor, suddenly entered their house, without their
knowledge and consent, and proceeded to the room where Myrna and her two sons were sleeping.  
 He stabbed Myrna and Tyrone with a "balisong" several times.  
 They managed to run away but Austria chased them, continuing with the stabbing until Myrna fell dead
by the stairs and Tyrone in front of the altar, in the vacant third bedroom. 
 When Austria noticed Mylene peeping through an opening of their bedroom's door, he went after her
and likewise stabbed her several times inside the room.  
 Thereafter, he left the house through the kitchen door. 
 Guadalupe dela Cruz, mother of Myrna, was awakened from sleep by the commotion and moaning in
her daughter's house, which was only about five (5) meters away from her own house.  
 Thereupon, she rushed to the kitchen and saw Austria running away with a "balisong."  
 Austria was charged with the crimes of Frustrated Murder and Murder in three separate informations
filed with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
 Austria pleaded not guilty establishing the defense of insanity.
 Dr. Constantine D. Della, a psychiatrist at Baguio General Hospital, examined and treated Austria on
April 23, 1991 and issued a "Psychiatric Evaluation" dated November 14, 1991: 
o Austria is found to be suffering from a long-standing illness classified as Schizophrenic
Psychosis, Paranoid type manifested as follows: 
(1) deterioration in areas of work, social relations, and personal hygiene; (2) auditory
hallucinations; (3) incoherence and irrelevance; (4) talking by himself; (5) delusions of grandeur;
(6) delusion of persecution; (7) poor impulse control, judgment, and insight; (8) walking
aimlessly; (9) failure to sleep well; and (10) violent and destructive behavior. 

RTC: Found Austria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the three (3) crimes of Murder on two (2) counts,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal, and of Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code 
 Sentenced to suffer imprisonment of: 
o Double reclusion perpetua; and 
o Four (4) Years and Six (6) Months of prision correccional to Sixteen (16) Years and Six (6) Months of
prision mayor 
 And to indemnify the heirs of Myrna, Tyrone, and Mylene. 

ISSUE: WON Austria was legally insane at the time he committed the crime. (YES)

RULING:
Meaning of "insanity" 
 Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code: For a person to be adjudged insane, he must deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. 
 "insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the
 accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence
of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability." 
 Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code: "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease
or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or
of the intellectual faculties, or by impaired or disorder volition." 

Schizophrenia is defined as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between

fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusion. 

A "Paranoid Type Schizophrenia" is described as follows: 

Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by poor
interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are
truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippant, facetious
responses cover an underlying hostility. 

When insanity of the defendant is alleged as a ground of defense or reason for his exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding to act under prosecution or at the
very moment of its execution. 
 
To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.  
 To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after.  
 Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a
defense.  
 A person's mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external acts.  
 
Many states and the federal government have placed the burden on the defendant to prove legal insanity by a
preponderance of evidence. This is now the majority rule. 
 Dr. Della testified during cross-examination that Austria's long-standing illness cannot be cured by
medication. 
 He also testified that when the crimes occurred, Austria was suffering auditory hallucinations and
having a relapse. 
1. Austria was first admitted to a Mental Hospital in 1972, diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid type and was confined therein for about a month;  
2. the second time in 1977 for three weeks,  
3. the third time in 1988 for about a month, and the last time on April 8, 1991. 

The testimonial and documentary evidence marshalled in this case by acknowledged medical experts have
sufficiently established the fact that Austria was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes.
 His previous confinements, as early as 1972, his erratic behavior before the assaults and Dr. Della's
testimony that he was having a relapse all points to a man deprived of complete freedom of will or a
lack of reason and discernment that should thus exempt him from criminal liability.  
 
However, he is still civilly liable under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code: 
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforce subject to the following rules: 

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. 

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or
control or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. 

Second. In case falling with subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. 

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
 liable. 

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. 

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 or article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable,
saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. 
→ The accused must make indemnification to the heirs of his victims, Myrna C. Samson and Tyrone Samson
and to the victim who survived, Mylene Samson.

Intoxication 

(ix) Waiver 
Gatchalian v. Delim (GR No. L-56487, 21 October 1991) - VELEZ
PETITIONER: REYNALDA GATCHALIAN
RESPONDENTS: ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE: A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and
clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini-bus at a
point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province.
 On the way, while the bus was running along the highway, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the
road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. 
 Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to the
hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
 While injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited
them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00
with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs.
Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint
Affidavit which stated, among other things:

"That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames
met an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No.
3;
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to mechanical defect and went off
the road and turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us;
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the
said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.”

 Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gatchalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La
Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the
complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white
scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex
on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She also
alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment.
She prayed for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for
the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.prLL
 In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner
had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private
respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit.

RTC: the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the
Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against
respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
CA: the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed
the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid waiver made by the petitioner Gatchalian - NO

RULING:
The Court held that “A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms
thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.”

Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the
hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her
for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who
had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully
the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether
she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers
in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be
contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to
dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers
and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to
public policy.

(x) Immunity from personal liability by public officials 

(xi) Contributory negligence (Art. 2179) 

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. IAC (GR No. L-65295, 10 March 1987) - BALASBAS

FACTS:

 at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-
dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails
phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. 
 Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General
Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car.
 Petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix") owned the dump truck. It was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked
askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic. 
 There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U.
Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving
his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
 Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
 Contention of Phoenix and Carbonel - that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
 Trial court - favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel
 Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court - affirmed the decision of the trial
court

ISSUE: WON the proximate cause of injuries was his own negligence?
RULE: NO. PRIVATE RESPONDENT DIONISIO'S NEGLIGENCE WAS "ONLY CONTRIBUTORY,"

 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the
courts
 At the time of the incident Dionisio has no curfew pass. People who had gathered at the scene of the
accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on.
 Private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and
brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7. Private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should
have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out
onto the road lane.
 Truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would
in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any
warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable
risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.
 In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain
of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability
 Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of damages.—Turning to the award of
damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one
hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio;
only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily
liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be
borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We
see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.

RULE: DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE

 To apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that
while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance"
of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear
chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.
 Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent
appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this
presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the
dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when
coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the
dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in
vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

Genobiagon vs. CA (GR No. 40452, 12 October 1989) - DIMARUCUT

DOCTRINE: The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.
 
FACTS:
  At about 7:30pm, a rig driven by Gregorio Genobiagon bumped Rita Cabrera, an 81 year old woman
who was crossing.
 Gregorio's rig was following another at a distance of two meters.
 Rita started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as Gregorio's vehicle was going so fast
not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the
rig ahead of him, the Gregorio's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, died.
o Gregorio continued to drive on, but a by-stander, Vicente Mangyao, who saw the incident right
before him, shouted at Gregorio to stop. He ran after Gregorio when the latter refused to stop.
Overtaking the Gregorio, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer
was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.'
o Gregorio went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman
was unconscious. The victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she
died three hours later.
 Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the CFI Cebu. CFI found petitioner
guilty of the felony charged.
 CA affirmed CFI increased the accused's civil liability to P12,000. Motion for reconsideration was
denied.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged contributory negligence of the victim would exonerate the accused - NO.
 
RULING:
 The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.
 "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence (People vs. Orbeta)." (People vs. Quinones).
 
 The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is
devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA
198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.
 CA is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to
P30,000. Costs against petitioner.