Military Human Enhancement and International Law
Military Human Enhancement and International Law
Military Human Enhancement and International Law
0: Military Human
Enhancement and International Law
Volume 92 2016
CONTENTS
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I. INTRODUCTION
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ple, whether sleep deprivation would still constitute inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment of personnel who have taken modafinil or a more permanent
variation thereof) and an individual’s ability to refuse to be subjected to the
enhancement, as well as issues regarding the effect on individual accounta-
bility for any actions taken while under the influence of an enhancement.
The need for sleep is not the only “human failing” that armed forces
are looking to manipulate with biochemical enhancement. Other drugs are
being investigated for their utility in reducing the incidence of post-
traumatic stress disorder and the reduction of fear—long implicated in the
commission of war crimes—as well as reducing traumatic memory for-
mation.6
The field of cybernetics has also provided many technological advances
of interest to the military. Brain-machine interfaces, also known as neural
interface systems, attempt to connect the brain directly to a machine with-
out the need for manual input, such as a keyboard, joystick or other device.
The interfaces use electrodes (whether surgically implanted in the brain or
merely resting on the scalp) to record and translate the user’s brain signals
into commands that operate computer-controlled devices. The technology
has been used both to actively control an external device (e.g., the ability to
operate drones with the mind7) and to passively sift information by using
the brain’s power to unconsciously detect anomalies in large amounts of
data.8
Prosthetic technology has made huge strides in the past two years. Sci-
entists have developed prosthetics capable of providing sensory feedback
6. Michael N. Tennison & Jonathan D. Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National Secu-
rity: The State of the Art, PLOS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/ar
ticle?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001289; Alain Brunet et al., Effect of Post-retrieval Propranolol
on Psychophysiologic Responding during Subsequent Script-driven Traumatic Imagery in Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder, 42 JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 503 (2008); Roger K. Pitman et
al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder with Propranolol, 51 BIO-
LOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 189 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Pierre Bienaimé, Mind-Controlled Drones Are Already a Reality, BUSINESS IN-
SIDER (Oct. 24, 2014) http://www.businessinsider.com/drones-you-can-control-with-
your-mind-2014-10. In fact the technology has spread sufficiently enough that 2016 saw
the first mind-controlled drone race organised by the University of Florida.
8. See, e.g., the Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System (CT2WS) developed by
the U.S. Army and DARPA, which detects brainwaves in order to signal when the sub-
conscious evaluates a visual threat. Neal Ungerleider, DARPA’s Cybernetic Binoculars Tap
Soldiers’ Brains to Spot Threats, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.fastcom pa-
ny.com/3001501/darpas-cybernetic-binoculars-tap-soldiers-brains-spot-threats.
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A. Weapons Reviews
9. See David Talbot, An Artificial Hand with Real Feelings, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/522086/an-artificial-hand-with-real
-feelings/.
10. Id.; Katie Drummond, Prosthetics Breakthrough Might Fuse Nerves with Fake Limbs,
WIRED (Feb. 27, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/nerve-prosthetics/.
11. See, e.g., Philip Sherwell, Blind Man Describes Joy at Seeing Wife for First Time in Decade
Thanks to “Bionic Eye,” THE TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11433149/Blind-man-describes-joy-at-
seeing-wife-for-first-time-in-decade-thanks-to-bionic-eye.html.
12. Charles Choi, New Army Exoskeleton Makes Soldiers’ Gunshots More Accurate, POPU-
LAR SCIENCE (June 2, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/army-has-exoskeleton-makes-
soldiers-better-shots; Thomas Black, Iron Man Meets HULC as Lockheed Enters Exoskeleton
Race (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-19/iron-man-
meets-hulc-as-lockheed-enters-exoskeletons-race.
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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obligation.14 The first issue that arises in connection with the use of military
human enhancement technologies is whether and to what extent such
technologies trigger the requirement of a review as provided for in AP I
and/or domestic regulations and practice. An answer to that query hinges
in turn on the question of whether human enhancement technologies—or
more precisely a given specific human enhancement technology—qualify as
a weapon or means or method of warfare.
The term “weapon” is understood to refer to a means of warfare used
in combat operations that is capable of causing either injury to or death of
persons, or damage to or destruction of objects.15 As such, a weapon “con-
notes an offensive capability that can be applied to a military object or en-
emy combatant.”16 The term “means of warfare” is broader than a weapon
inasmuch as it “extends . . . to weapon systems or platforms employed for
the purposes of attack,”17 and includes associated equipment used directly
to deliver force during hostilities.18 Means of warfare, and its sub-category
of weapons, hence apply only in the context of attacks, that is “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”19 Finally,
methods of warfare refers to activities designed to adversely affect the en-
emy’s military operations or military capacity and extends to the various
general categories of operations (bombing, ground, close-air support, etc.),
14. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoDD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition Sys-
tem, encl. 1, ¶ E1.1.15 (2003), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.
pdf. See also OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW
OF WAR MANUAL §§ 6.2, 19.20.1.2 (2015); Maya Yaron, Address before the Group of
Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Statement on Lethal Auton-
omous Weapons (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpass
ets)/A02C15B2E5B49AA1C1257F9B0029C454/$file/2016_LAWS_MX_GeneralDebate
_Statements_Israel.pdf.
15. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE r. 1(ff) (2009)
[hereinafter AMW MANUAL]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT
RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 55 (2010).
16. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397, 404 (2003). See also WIL-
LIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2009).
17. AMW MANUAL, supra note 15, r. 1(t).
18. BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 4 n.7.
19. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 49(1).
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as well as the specific tactics used for attack.20 A common shorthand for
methods of warfare is “the way in which [weapons] are used” in hostili-
ties.21
Despite the occasional assertion to the contrary,22 these working defini-
tions suggest that the enhanced human soldier, per se, is not to be consid-
ered a weapon, because it is not the person that constitutes the offensive
capability that can be applied to military objectives or enemy combatants.
At the current state of development in the realm of human enhancement
technologies, a distinction between the human, on the one hand, and the
enhancement technology, on the other, remains possible since the use of
the technology does not convert the human into an object that could be
considered a weapon. While further developments may lead us down a
path that makes that distinction more complicated, we do not seem to have
arrived at the crossroads where enhancement technologies transmute hu-
mans into mere objects for the purpose of the law of armed conflict.
A given human enhancement technology may very well, however, con-
stitute a weapon. This is the case when the technology is capable of causing
either injury to or death of persons, or damage to or destruction of objects.
Whether human enhancement technology possesses such offensive capa-
bilities depends on the specific technology in question. On the one hand, a
clear-cut instance where that question can be answered in the negative is
biochemical enhancements of members of the State’s own armed forces,
since the enhancement itself does not cause injury to or death of enemy
personnel nor damage to or destruction of objects. On the other hand, a
possible instance where the answer is in the affirmative would be a pros-
thetic enhancement that integrates an offensive capability that is itself a
weapon, such that the prosthetic is able to fire a munition or has the capa-
bility of a stun gun/taser.
Furthermore, human enhancement technologies may fall into the no-
tion of means of warfare. An example would be a neural interface system
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through which weaponized drones are operated since the cybernetic system
would form part of a weapons system employed for the purposes of attack.
Last, but not least, human enhancement technologies can be consid-
ered to be methods of warfare if and when their use constitutes an integral
part of offensive activities at the strategic and tactical levels. In other
words, if human enhancement technologies were to emerge as organiza-
tional features of, and techniques for, weapons and military units to deliver
force against opposing armed forces and military objectives, they will trig-
ger the review obligations under Article 36 of AP I and/or under domestic
regulations.
What, then, are the main substantive principles of the law of armed
conflict that would be utilized in such reviews and what idiosyncratic issues
are raised when these principles are applied to human enhancement tech-
nologies?
23. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 238 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
24. For a description of the evolution of the different wording, see W. Hays Parks,
Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW 55, 86–87 n.123 (2005). The most recent versions include Article 35(2) of Addi-
tional Protocol I which provides: “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.” Identical wording is used in the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter CCW Convention].
25. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL].
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26. Parks, supra note 24. See also BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 55–61.
27. An ill-fated project by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in
1997 attempted to introduce an effects-based methodology which relied solely on medical
evidence and, generally, the worst-case wounding effect of the weapon rather than the
intended or normal effect. Parks, supra note 24. The ICRC project was heavily criticized
for ignoring the balance to be struck with military necessity and was eventually withdrawn
in 2001. Id.
28. As noted in supra note 3, genetic enhancement is not generally addressed in this
study, however, it is worth observing in passing that, by definition, any genetic enhance-
ment would not introduce any component external to the human body.
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the separation in the law of armed conflict between personnel and materiel
means that enhanced soldiers themselves should not be viewed as weap-
ons; however, that is different from saying that the enhancement should
not be viewed as a means of warfare. Where the enhancement technology
is intimately connected with soldiers’ bodies and, in some cases, their
brains, questions about the appropriate countermeasures that may be taken
against those enhancements must be considered.
For example, if a brain-computer interface is viewed as a separate legit-
imate military objective, such that any physiological injury to the soldier
would be viewed as incidental or collateral to the destruction or neutraliza-
tion of the technology,29 a different calculation may result when viewing
the soldier and his or her enhancement as an integrated entity.
Clearly both the enhancement and the soldier may be considered legit-
imate targets. However, if it is permissible to kill the soldier or render him
or her hors de combat, is it then automatically permissible to overload an im-
planted chip such that it may cause brain damage through an electrical
overload of neural circuits? There are two issues at play in this situation.
First, the SIrUS principle generally allows for more serious injuries result-
ing from anti-materiel weapons (for example, the use of depleted uranium
shells in anti-tank weaponry or incendiary weapons against armored vehi-
cles and fortifications) than it would for weapons typically designed for
anti-personnel use.30 This is because the military advantage resulting from
destruction of the tank means the inevitable suffering of the tank’s crew is
not unnecessary. If one views the neural chip implanted in the brain of a
cybernetically enhanced soldier as military materiel separate from the indi-
vidual, the permissible level of injury and harm necessitated by the effects
of a weapon designed to counter that chip may be higher than that of a
weapon directed at unenhanced personnel. One might argue that any coun-
termeasure used against implantable brain chips is designed to destroy the
electronics in the implanted chip and any resulting brain damage to the
soldier would be incidental. But, as Boothby notes in relation to the matter
29. Note that this does not refer to collateral damage in the sense of proportionality
or precautions in attack, which refers only to civilians and civilian objects rather than
military personnel (who, with limited exceptions, may be targeted at all times).
30. See generally Christopher J. Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New
Millennium, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 185, 196
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, U.S. Naval War College In-
ternational Law Studies).
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from its ambit any blinding which takes place as an “incidental or collateral
effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems used against
optical equipment.” A question remains about those with vision that has
been enhanced by other means. For example, Rain Liivoja raises the ques-
tion of whether eyesight which has been augmented through surgical ma-
nipulation would fall within this definition (particularly if it would leave
vision more susceptible to damage by laser).35 Similar questions may be
asked of eyesight which has been improved by other methods; for example,
“biohackers” have been experimenting with increasing their night vision by
using eye drops made from enzymes derived from deep-sea fish.36
35. Rain Liivoja, Senior Lecturer and Branco Weiss Fellow, Melbourne Law School,
Remarks at the Swedish Defence University: Bioenhanced Soldiers and the Prohibition of
Unnecessary Suffering (Sept. 9, 2015).
36. The group dropped a chlorophyll analog (Chlorin e6) found in plants and some
deep-sea fish into the eyeballs to give improved night vision. Alejandro Alba, Group of
Biohackers Test Eye Drops to Give Humans Night Vision, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5,
2015), http://nydn.us/1bZtIQa.
37. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 48; CIHL, supra note 25, rr. 1, 7.
38. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 23, ¶ 78.
39. The principle of proportionality runs as a thread through many of the substantive
provisions of IHL. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii),
57(2)(b); CIHL, supra note 25, r. 14.
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Today’s armed forces deal with vastly more raw data and information than
at any time in history.40 Headsets, video feeds, instant messaging and radio
transmissions all add to the cacophony of data that modern military forces
are facing. This unprecedented amount of raw data helps by permitting
more accurate targeting and in limiting collateral damage; however, these
advantages must be balanced against the dangers of soldiers succumbing to
the resulting “information overload,” which can lead to tragic mistakes.41
Work is ongoing in several research projects into increasing the brain’s
ability to multitask in order to be able to utilize the increased amount of
data without becoming overwhelmed by it. These applied cognition meth-
ods range from attempts to train and “rewire” the functioning of the atten-
tion system to promote “mindfulness,” to heads-up displays that monitor
brain activity in order to identify threats before they are recognized (or
overlooked) by the conscious brain.42
If such methods are successful, the requirement to take all feasible pre-
cautions in attack and to ensure that any targets struck are legitimate mili-
tary objectives will necessarily be revised to take account of what is feasible
when using the new technology. It should be noted that, as with past tech-
nological developments, most States consider that the law does not impose
an obligation to acquire such technologies; however, if the State possesses
the technologies it must field them when feasible.43 In this sense, the use of
human enhancement technologies may improve compliance with the re-
quirements emanating from distinction and proportionality and their mani-
40. One estimate puts the increase in data flow across the U.S. armed forces at 1,600
percent since the events of 9/11. Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data
Overload Can be Deadly, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
41. Id. When U.S. officials looked into an attack by American helicopters that left
twenty-three Afghan civilians dead, they found that informational overload was an under-
lying cause. Id.
42. See, e.g., Kalwinder Kaur, New Sensor System Improves Target Detection, AZO ROBOT-
ICS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.azorobotics.com/News.aspx?newsID=3237 (discussing
DARPA’s Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System program).
43. Customary international law places a general requirement on States to avoid and,
in any event, minimize collateral damage. One of the ways in which this is done is through
the choice of means and methods of attack. See generally CIHL, supra note 25, r. 17 (dis-
cussing the requirement to take “all feasible precautions” to minimize incidental damage).
See also HEATHER A. HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 213–
15 (2012) (discussing new technologies and the choice of weapons as a feasible precau-
tion).
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festation in the realm of precautions, but does not directly affect the con-
tent of the legal rules.
Another project currently under investigation by scientists is to inhibit
or remove fear.44 This is another instance in which the science may have
interesting consequences for compliance with the principles of distinction,
proportionality and precautions by allowing the soldier to make decisions
without being motivated by fear. However, as noted, although such tech-
nologies may increase the likelihood of compliance with the existing laws, it
will not impact the content of the legal principles themselves.
At the far (and perhaps speculative) end of the enhancement spectrum,
exists the possibility of what Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu refer to
as “moral enhancement.”45 Although fraught with ethical issues and of
dubious practical use in the environment of an armed conflict, the theory
of moral bio-enhancement suggests that by amplifying those biological
factors which underlie a sense of justice and altruism, people will be com-
pelled to act in a way that is morally (and, in the present context, legally)
right.46 The obvious difficulty would be ensuring that soldiers are trained to
identify compliance with the law as the morally correct course of action, in
contrast to increasing the sense of empathy (which is the course of action
proposed by Persson and Savulescu in order to protect the environment),
which may result in soldiers unfit for combat. It should be noted that in
most popular science fiction treatments of the topic, the opposite is usually
postulated, i.e., the removal or minimization of empathy to create so-called
“super-soldiers”; it invariably ends badly.47 While a certain level of suppres-
44. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 149–51 (2012).
45. INGMAR PERSSON & JULIAN SAVULESCU, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE: THE NEED
FOR MORAL ENHANCEMENT (2012). While the concept of deliberately manipulating mo-
rality is speculative, it should be noted that the science behind it is not. A recent study
found that common drugs used in the treatment of depression and Parkinson’s disease
sway moral decision making when administered to healthy people. Hannah Devlin, Parkin-
son’s and Depression Drugs Can Alter Moral Judgment, Study Shows, THE GUARDIAN (July 2,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jul/02/parkinsons-and-depression-dr
ugs-can-alter-moral-judgement-study-shows.
46. In their original study, Persson and Savulescu argued for moral enhancement
based on a need for protection of the natural environment. PERSSON & SAVULESCU, supra
note 45, at 107–34.
47. Lack of empathy is also associated with several psychological and personality dis-
orders and is characteristic of psychopathy (or antisocial personality disorder). For exam-
ples in film and television, see, e.g., ROBOCOP (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer et al., 2014) or the
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The principle of protection requires that all persons who are not—or who
are no longer—taking part in hostilities are treated humanely without any
adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.48 When con-
sidering enhancement technologies, one of the areas in which the principle
raises particular issues is with regard to detention. These pertain primarily
to the detainee who has been enhanced, but also in certain circumstances
to the enhanced detainer. With regard to the latter, one can envisage situa-
tions where the use of particular enhancements by the detaining power on
their own armed forces would reduce the possibility of abuses occurring
through moral enhancement as discussed earlier or through methods such
as optical recording (recording of the video stream of an implanted optical
prosthetic could provide a view much like that of a headcam video feed)
designed to increase rule compliance by detention personnel.49 Although
the use of such technology is likely to raise questions regarding the human
rights of the personnel involved (particularly with regard to self-
character of Travis Verta in Continuum (Reunion Pictures & Shaw Media, 2012–2015), part
of a super-soldier program in which the character is implanted with a control chip that
lowers empathy and compassion while ramping up aggression, making him an unstable
psychopath. For a general discussion of the popular culture trope of the “super-soldier,”
see Super Soldier, TVTROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SuperSold
ier (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
48. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 88.
49. It is well established that people comply with rules, and monitor and regulate their
behavior when they believe that they are under surveillance. See, e.g., Sander van der Lin-
den, How the Illusion of Being Observed Can Make You a Better Person, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(May 3, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-illusion-of-being-obs
erved-can-make-you-better-person/. Jeremy Bentham’s thought experiment of the panop-
ticon and the subsequent discussion by Michel Foucault are classic treatments of the psy-
chological phenomena. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
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incrimination),50 it does not implicate the law of armed conflict per se.
Broadly speaking, the law of armed conflict generally does not concern
itself with the protection of a State’s own forces with regard to detention
issues. This is subject to only limited exceptions in the area of the protec-
tion of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in international armed conflicts
(which extends to all those who are in need of care or assistance) and in
non-international armed conflicts (where the protection of persons hors de
combat extends to all members of armed forces).51
In applying the principle of protection to treatment of detainees,
whether military or civilian, the law of armed conflict is directly implicated
in a number of circumstances.
1. Coercion
Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III) prohibits any form of
coercion being inflicted on prisoners of war (POWs) in order to obtain
information.52 Thus, enhancing a prisoner’s trust in his or her captors, by,
for example, increasing their levels of oxytocin, a hormone tied to social
bonding and sometimes referred to as the “cuddle hormone,”53 would fall
afoul of the sweeping and categorical prohibition of coercion. Coercion of
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2. Experimental Treatments
54. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 31, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. It should be
noted that this is not an absolute prohibition and exceptions exist where explicitly provid-
ed for in the Convention, for example in Articles 79–135, which regulate the treatment of
internees.
55. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 92. For specific treaty prohibitions, see Additional Proto-
col I, supra note 13, art. 11; GC III, supra note 52, art. 13; GC IV, supra note 54, art. 32;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 5(2)(e), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
56. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 92.
57. Catherine L. Annas & George J. Annas, Enhancing the Fighting Force: Medical Research
on American Soldiers, 25 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 283
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however, if the treatment has been approved by the treating State’s stand-
ards authority, the procedure or treatment will not be viewed as experi-
mental.58
Another scenario raising interesting legal issues occurs when a detainee has
a medical problem or injury that can best be resolved by a form of en-
hancement. One can imagine a situation in which wounded or sick enemy
personnel require treatment and the standard treatment provided by the
detaining power to its own forces would involve the use of an enhance-
ment technique to block pain, promote rapid healing or enhance the im-
mune system.
The United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) currently has research programs in photobiomodulation to ac-
celerate wound healing, vaccines that block pain within seconds and chem-
ical cascades to stop bleeding within minutes.59 In addition to these en-
hancements designed to address specific issues, DARPA has also been
seeking nanoplatforms that can be introduced into the body for medical
diagnostics, as well as being used to monitor and treat a broad range of
diseases.60 Although these programs are primarily focused on treatment
rather than enhancement, the technologies described can last for a pro-
longed period of time (the effects of the pain vaccine last for thirty days) or
(2009); Efthimios Parasidis, Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military, 44
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 1117 (2012).
58. This function is performed for example by the Food and Drug Administration in
the United States and Läkemedelsverket in Sweden. Rules relating to experimental treat-
ments and trials are coordinated across the European Union and conducted under EU
directives administered by the European Medicines Agency in accordance with standard-
ized internationally recognized “good clinical practice” rules. See, e.g., Commission Di-
rective 2005/28/EC of April 8, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 91) 13 (laying down principles and
detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal products
for human use) and incorporated directives.
59. JOEL GARREAU, RADICAL EVOLUTION: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENHANC-
ING OUR MINDS, OUR BODIES—AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN 27–29 (2005).
60. DARPA News, DARPA Effort Targets Illness Faster, Safer and More Effectively,
ASD(R&E) S&T NEWS BULLETIN 6 (June 15, 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/chieftechn
ologist/publications/docs/ST_NewsBulletin-V2-I24(15JUN2012).pdf; In Vivo Nanoplat-
forms (IVN), DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/program/in-vivo-nanoplatforms (last visited
Mar. 21 2016).
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refuses to provide consent.63 It should be noted that this is not the case
with surgical interventions, where the person concerned may refuse an
operation even if the surgeon considers it essential to the person’s surviv-
al.64
In the case of POWs, nanoplatforms designed for medical diagnosis
may not only be permitted, but may also be preferred. Article 31, GC III
requires that POWs undergo medical inspections at least once a month,
specifically requiring that the most efficient methods available for the de-
tection of contagious diseases, as well as for the supervision of the general
health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners, be employed.65 With technol-
ogy costs inevitably decreasing over time, nanoplatforms may well become
the most efficient way of monitoring the health of detainees.
A third scenario emerges when personnel who have previously been en-
hanced are detained. For example, if a detainee is reliant on periodic inges-
tion of a particular substance to maintain their enhancement, management
of the withdrawal of the individual from that substance may be problemat-
ic. What legal consequences may flow from such a situation?
Under GC III, parties are required to repatriate seriously wounded or
sick POWs to their own country.66 This applies in particular to those whose
mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished; those
who are incurable; those who have recovered, but whose mental or physi-
cal fitness seems to have been gravely or permanently diminished; and
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those who require treatment and are unlikely to recover within a year.67
Prisoners who enter detention while enhanced, and subsequently lose their
enhanced capabilities, may appear to have a permanent diminishment in
their physical or mental capabilities. For detaining forces with no
knowledge of an individual soldier’s baseline levels (i.e., the standard unen-
hanced level of whatever capability or function is being measured for that
particular individual), forming an opinion about the difference between an
enhanced soldier and their unenhanced state will necessarily be based on
generalities. However, the purpose of the provisions is to facilitate the
timely repatriation of gravely sick or wounded soldiers who can no longer
return to active service. If the enhancement technology is such that without
their drugs or other means soldiers will return to a normal baseline state of
an unenhanced but otherwise fit-for-duty soldier, they would not qualify
for repatriation. However should the enhancement be such that lack of
maintenance would result in grave and permanent damage to the baseline
status of the prisoner and the detaining power is unable to provide the ap-
propriate treatment in its detention facilities, the prisoner must be trans-
ferred to a military or civilian medical facility where the appropriate treat-
ment can be provided.68
At the outset of this section, it is pertinent to make a point about the sub-
ject of human rights. Despite the enhanced status of members of the mili-
tary or any other person who is the subject of an enhancement (whether
pharmacological, cybernetic, genetic or otherwise), they remain, at their
core, fundamentally human. The preamble of all the universal human rights
instruments refer to “all members of the human family” and in their open-
ing articles address the rights contained therein to “all human beings.”69
Like the universal instruments, regional human rights instruments also use
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70. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 [hereinafter ACHR]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter ACHPR].
71. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
72. For example, the following European cases all feature complaints in which the
subjects of the rights discussed are still regarded as rights holders. X v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 8416/79, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980) (observing that appli-
cation of certain rights prenatally cannot be excluded); H.L. v. United Kingdom, 2004-IX
Eur. Ct. H.R. 197 (complainant with severe autism and learning difficulties); Zarzycki v.
Poland, App. No. 15351/03 (2013) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
117210 (complainant with forearm prostheses); Tešic v. Serbia, App. Nos. 4678/07,
50591/12 (2014) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-140771 (complainant
with a pacemaker).
73. See, e.g., J.S.C.H. & M.G.S., Case 12.689, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Report No.
80/15, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.156, doc. 33 (2015).
74. Engel and Others v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
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to perform and the risk arising from those activities.75 This approach has
led the ECtHR to provide the State with a considerable degree of latitude
to restrict the human rights of the members of its armed forces during war
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.76 The Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom, on reviewing the approach of the ECtHR
to members of armed forces, observed:
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rights. Qualified rights are rights which may be limited by law in certain
specified circumstances. Both derogable rights and qualified rights may be
significantly curtailed in respect of members of the armed forces. This is
particularly the case in times of armed conflict as many of the limitation
clauses contained in the relevant treaties specifically provide for limitations
and restrictions for reasons of national security and/or public safety. Abso-
lute rights (such as the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment) remain in full force at all times, unaffected by mem-
bership in an armed force or the existence of an ongoing armed conflict or
other situation affecting national security.
With these preliminary observations in mind, we will now address
some of the human rights implications that flow from human enhancement
technologies.
The right to life applies to soldiers both in peacetime and during armed
conflict, although in the latter case the application is substantially curtailed
by both jurisdictional and contextual matters. While members of the armed
forces fall within the jurisdiction of their own State—whether serving at
home or abroad—incidents involving third parties who are subjected to the
actions of enhanced personnel deployed outside their own country will be
governed by the rules on the extraterritorial application of human rights
law, which in turn depend on whether an individual is subject to a State’s
jurisdiction.79
79. Jurisdiction in the context of human rights law carries a special meaning, on which
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is still evolving. At present, for individuals to fall within
the jurisdiction of a State, either the territory in which they are located, or the individuals
themselves, must be under that State’s effective control. Case law establishes that individ-
uals held in detention by a State’s armed forces are within the effective control of that
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State. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99. As a general proposition,
the United States does not consider that human rights law applies extraterritorially: See, e.g.,
United States of America, Fourth Periodic Report of the United States to the U.N. Hu-
man Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4, at 142 (May 22, 2012). That under-
standing has been reviewed by the United States in recent years and it now acknowledges
the Torture Convention “applies to certain areas beyond” its sovereign territory, and more
specifically to “all places that the State party controls as a governmental authority.” U.N.
Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth Periodic
Reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5, at 3 (Dec. 19,
2014).
80. See ICCPR, supra note 69, arts. 4, 6; ECHR, supra note 71, arts. 2, 15; ACHR, supra
note 70, arts. 4, 27. The ECHR specifically exempts lawful acts of war under the deroga-
tions provision of Article 15(2). In contrast, both the ICCPR and ACHR are expressed in
terms of a prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life; death arising from lawful acts of war
are generally not considered arbitrary and therefore would not violate the right in the first
place, rather than requiring a derogation.
81. ROWE, supra note 76, at 137. It should be noted that this is not exclusively the
case.
82. The duty to take positive measures to protect the right to life derives both from
specific statements in the articles of the relevant international treaties that the right should
be protected by law and the general duty of States to ensure the rights recognized in the
various instruments.
83. Smith and Others, supra note 77.
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88. See generally Annas & Annas, supra note 57; Parasidis, supra note 57; George J. An-
nas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using Investigational Drugs
and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 245 (1998).
89. For a summary of the incident, see Annas & Annas, supra note 57, at 293–97. As
this only indirectly impacts the right to life, no further discussion will be included here.
90. See, e.g., id. at 296. Note, however, that others maintain that it should have im-
proved the pilots’ performance. Thom Shanker & Mary Duenwald, Bombing Error in Af-
ghanistan Puts a Spotlight on Pilots’ Pills, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 19, 2003), http://www.ny
times.com/2003/01/19/national/19SPEE.html.
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have an obligation where they know of a risk to the lives of those under
their jurisdiction.91
It should be noted that, as with any other possible breach of the right
to life, the right may also be infringed by a State’s failure to investigate ef-
fectively.92 Investigations must be independent, thorough and prompt, with
a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to
ensure accountability.93 These obligations are unchanged with respect to
deaths that involve human enhancement technologies.
The right of bodily integrity refers to the collection of rights (including the
right to life) concerned with the inviolability of the human body and right
of the person to determine what may be done to it. Referred to in slightly
different terms under different treaty regimes, these rights incorporate se-
curity of the person,94 the right to humane treatment,95 the prohibition
against slavery,96 and the prohibition against torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment,97 as well as the prohibition against medical and scientific
experimentation without freely given consent.98 The prohibitions against
slavery, and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment are absolute
rights; States may not, under any circumstances, have recourse to such
treatment or condone it.99 States must, therefore, also take measures to
91. See, e.g., Osman v United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 115–22; Gonzalez
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009) (Garcia-Sayan, J., concurring, ¶¶ 3–15).
92. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: (Right to Life), U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, at 129, ¶ 4 (2004).
93. See generally Al-Skeini, supra note 79 (holding that deaths must be investigated effec-
tively and impartially); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 172–77 (July 29, 1988) (holding that States have the duty to inves-
tigate the right to life irrespective of the identity of the perpetrator).
94. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 3.
95. ACHR, supra note 70, art. 5.
96. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 8; ECHR, supra note 71,
art. 4; ACHR, supra note 70, art. 6.
97. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 71, art. 3; ACHR, supra note 70,
art. 5(2).
98. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 7.
99. With respect to the obligation not to condone, see, e.g., Articles 4–8 of the Con-
vention against Torture, which require States to make torture a crime under national laws
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and extradite or prosecute anyone present on their territory that is suspected of having
committed an act of torture. States have a duty to investigate allegations of torture
promptly, impartially and effectively (Articles 12 and 13) and where substantial evidence is
found, perpetrators of torture must be punished. Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85.
100. Committee of Ministers, Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces, Recommen-
dation CM/Rec(2010)4 (Feb. 24, 2010), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1590149&
Site=CM.
101. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 71, art. 15.
102. See, e.g., ROWE, supra note 76, at 47.
103. Anthrax Jab Side-Effects Withheld, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2004), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3509037.stm.
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some States refusal has resulted in disciplinary action being taken against
the soldier involved.104
Certainly where the enhancement remains experimental, the soldier will
retain more rights to refuse the enhancement than if it has been approved
for use by the appropriate State authority.105 Regardless of the legal issues
involved, medical ethics require informed consent of the subject for any
experimental treatment. However, serious concerns have been raised by
some authors who argue that true informed consent has been impossible to
achieve in situations involving the military hierarchy,106 citing examples
where pressure (either real or perceived) from senior ranking officers for
soldiers to comply with requests or, in some cases, direct orders to subject
themselves to medical treatment, have removed any genuine ability to re-
fuse.107
The right to bodily integrity is also often expressed as a function of the
right to privacy. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has provided leading
judgments on the scope and contours of the right. The right to privacy
requires that a State respect everyone’s “private and family life, their home
and correspondence.”108 The Court has noted that the term “private life”
includes the physical and psychological integrity of a person, as well as “as-
pects of an individual’s physical and social identity.”109 Courts in other ju-
104. See, e.g., Court-Martial for Refusing Anthrax Shot, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 5, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/05/nyregion/court-martial-for-refusing-anthrax-shot.
html.
105. Such approval is granted in the United States by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency in the United Kingdom
and the Läkemedelsverket (Medical Products Agency) in Sweden.
106. See Jo Bird & Greta Bird, Human Rights and the Military: The “Chemical Soldier,” 30
ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 81, 81–85 (2005); Annas, supra note 88, at 253 n.42 (In the
accompanying text the author points out that, although in principle the soldiers had the
right to refuse a botulinum toxin vaccination, the right was not communicated to them in
the field.).
107. For example, the informed consent form used by the U.S. Air Force specifically
states that although taking Dexedrine is voluntary, refusal to take the amphetamines may
result in a pilot being grounded. Such an outcome would have a major impact on a pilot’s
career. See Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, NAVMED P-6410, Performance Mainte-
nance during Continuous Flight Operations: A Guide for Flight Surgeons 21 (NAVMED
P-6410), Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, 1 Jan 2000).
108. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 8. See also ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 17; ACHR, supra
note 70, art. 11; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7–9, Dec. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364).
109. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 154, ¶ 61.
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risdictions have also viewed the right to refuse medical treatment as a func-
tion of the right to privacy.110 Given that the right to privacy also concerns
the physical integrity of a person, the right may be implicated where the
armed forces require members to undergo enhancements as a requirement
for deployment or to otherwise carry out their duties. Issues have arisen in
the past where the State has required its soldiers deployed in an area in
which it is suspected that the enemy may use chemical or biological weap-
ons to take medically prescribed tablets or inoculations to protect them
against the effects of such weapons.111 The right to privacy has also been
implicated in cases dealing with physical intrusions into the body, for ex-
ample, in the anthrax medication cases discussed above.112
The right is not absolute either for civilians or members of the armed
forces. For example, under the ECHR, States are permitted to restrict the
right of privacy provided that the restriction is in accordance with the law,
pursues a legitimate aim (for example, national security) and is necessary in
a democratic society.113
As to the permissible treatment of individual soldiers once enhanced,
the subject of sleep deprivation provides an interesting example of the type
of issue raised. Sleep deprivation has been denounced on multiple occa-
sions by U.N. human rights bodies,114 including the Committee against
Torture, judicially recognized by the ECtHR as a form of inhuman and
110. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (basing a decision
to terminate treatment, inter alia, on a constitutional right to privacy).
111. ROWE, supra note 76, at 47.
112. Id.
113. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public au-
thority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
Note that the jurisprudence of the court has also established that any interference with
individual rights must also be proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be realized.
For an overview of the principle of proportionality as applied by human rights treaty bod-
ies, see Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Proportionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 446–68 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
114. See, e.g., Theo van Boven (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Sixth Report pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 58/164 and Human Rights Commission Resolution 2004/41, U.N. Doc. A/59/324
(Sept. 1, 2004); U.N. Committee against Torture, Report of the Committee against Tor-
ture, ¶¶ 56, 257, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Supp.) (Sept. 10, 1997).
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115. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 58, ¶ 167 (1978).
116. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel 53(4)
PD 817, ¶¶ 31–32 (1999) (Isr.), reprinted in 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1471
(stating that where sleep deprivation amounts to an end in itself for the purposes of break-
ing the suspect, rather than a side effect, it is prohibited).
117. See, e.g., R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65, [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.).
118. Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 115, ¶ 167.
119. Id. ¶ 162; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32, ¶ 100
(1989).
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120. Although privacy is a qualified, rather than absolute, right and therefore subject
to the normal requirements of limitations on interferences with rights (lawful, necessary in
a democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim), it is diffi-
cult to see what legitimate aim might be served that would make routine outside observa-
tion of intimate family moments necessary or proportionate.
121. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 18; ECHR, supra note
71, art. 9. Other regional human rights instruments refer solely to freedom of conscience
and religion. Although it should be noted that while the ACHR deals solely with con-
science and religion in Article 12, freedom of thought is included with freedom of expres-
sion in the Article 13. ACHR, supra note 70. The ECHR provides that “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and ob-
servance.” ECHR, supra, art. 9.
122. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12, ¶ 31 (1993).
123. As long as the restrictions comply with the requirements of, for example, Article
9(2), ECHR that they are properly prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim (e.g., national
security) and are necessary in a democratic society.
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one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” At first blush this right does not
appear to impact enhancement technologies; however, the advent of brain-
machine interfaces and the suggestion of moral enhancement raise the pos-
sibility of quite literally affecting a person’s ability to think freely. Persson
and Savulescu’s controversial argument for moral enhancement of human
beings goes directly to the very heart of the values protected by this right. 124
“At its most basic, . . . the right seeks to prevent state indoctrination of
individuals by permitting the holding, development, and refinement and
ultimately change of personal thought, conscience and religion.”125 If per-
sonnel are prevented from freely making moral judgments because of a
drug administered to them by State authorities, their fundamental freedoms
may well be violated.
While the current iteration of the problem sounds futuristic, the EC-
tHR has in fact had occasion to address the problem of thought control in
the past. In the Kokkinakis judgment, the Court appeared to suggest that a
breach of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion could
occur in cases of severe spiritual coercion or brainwashing, although the
Court suggested that it would also consider such acts to be in breach of
Article 3 (prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) of the
ECHR.126 The ECtHR has also recognized the particular vulnerability of
124. PERSSON & SAVULESCU, supra note 45. As noted above, Persson and Savulescu
make the claim in relation to environmental damage and climate change (although they
also mention the threat of nuclear war), but there is the potential for application to the
military in the moral enhancement of soldiers, particularly, although not exclusively, with
those involved in detention after the scandals arising in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
While abuse of detainees offers the best and most obvious example of immoral behavior,
there are potentially many others which could affect the way soldiers operate, such as in
targeting. However, enhancement of empathy could, in fact, make targeting decisions,
particularly assessment of proportionality, harder on soldiers since it would be much more
difficult for soldiers to accept and live with any collateral damage.
125. JIM MURDOCH, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CON-
SCIENCE AND RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18
(Counsel of Europe Handbooks, 2012), http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/hr-natimplement/
Source/documentation/hb09_rightfreedom_en.pdf.
126. Kokkinakis, supra note 122.
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127. Larissis and Others v. Greece, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 362. See also FRANCISCO
FORREST MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW:
TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 747 (2006).
128. Emphasis added.
129. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 69, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 19; ACHR, su-
pra note 70, art. 13; ACHPR, supra note 70, art. 9.
130. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opin-
ion OC-5/85, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 30 (Nov. 13, 1985).
131. Rayes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 61–103 (Sept. 19, 2006).
132. ROWE, supra note 76, at 55–58.
133. Interestingly, this limitation does not occur in the ACHPR. ROWE, supra note 76,
at 56. Additional limitations include that such restrictions must be prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society.
134. ROWE, supra note 76, at 57–58.
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135. See Allen Mcouffee, At Last, a Google Glass for the Battlefield, WIRED (Feb. 24,
2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/battlefield-glass/.
136. See, e.g., the DARPA-initiated augmented cognition program. COMMITTEE ON
OPPORTUNITIES IN NEUROSCIENCE FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS, OPPORTUNITIES
IN NEUROSCIENCE FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS 117 (2009), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK207983/.
137. Evgeny Morozov, The Perils of Perfection, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 3, 2013, at SR1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/opinion/sunday/the-perils-of-perfection.html?_r
=0; Edward Champion, Thirty-five Arguments against Google Glass, RELUCTANT HABITS (Mar.
14, 2013), http://www.edrants.com/thirty-five-arguments-against-google-glass/.
138. Parag Khanna & Ayesha Khanna, The Pleasure and Danger of Augmented Reality, BIG
THINK, http://bigthink.com/hybrid-reality/the-pleasure-and-danger-of-augmented-reality
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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139. For example, under the European system these include the right to have access
to a court, the right to remain silent and not incriminate oneself, the right to equality of
arms and the right to an adversarial proceeding. See generally Human Rights Committee,
General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a
Fair Trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007).
140. Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. 117.
141. For a description of different types of military justice systems and the human
rights of the armed forces in the States participating in the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, see OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, HANDBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL
(2008).
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on fair trial rights that are more likely to be initially implemented by the
military.
Articles 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR and 8(2)(g) of the ACHR contain an ex-
press right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt.
Within the European system the right to silence and the privilege against
self-incrimination are not found in the text of the ECHR, but have been
developed through the case law of the ECtHR.142 The Court has noted that
“the . . . right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are general-
ly recognized international standards which lie at the heart of a fair proce-
dure under Article 6.”143 As always, it will depend on the nature of the
technology involved; however, it is foreseeable that certain brain-machine
interfaces and implants (such as ocular implants) may impact on this right
for military personnel. For example, if an ocular implant is recording and
transmitting everything that a soldier sees, a question arises over whether
this will impact the privilege against self-incrimination in any subsequent
proceeding regarding incidents portrayed in the footage. Generally speak-
ing, the privilege against self-incrimination can operate to prevent the use
of compelled information in subsequent criminal proceedings.144 Objective
evidence such as video footage (for example, from a helmet or body cam-
era) does not fall within this right, as it is not communicative evidence and
can be compelled to be provided by the user for a legitimate purpose. Ar-
guably, however, one might draw a distinction between those implants that
require some form of cognitive processing of the data by the individual and
those which are merely a direct video feed and operate in much the same
way as a helmet camera.
More traditional protections of this right, namely against the use of
more directly coercive practices by the government to extract self-
incriminatory evidence, will also adapt to the new technologies involved.
Evidence obtained through the use of biochemical enhancers, such as oxy-
tocin and other chemicals intended to make detainees more cooperative,
will raise the same legal issues from a human rights perspective as the use
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of truth serums has in the past.145 They are also likely to be open to the
same criticisms, i.e., they make a person more susceptible to outside sug-
gestion, thereby increasing the likelihood that the person would recall false
memories and thus falsely incriminate themselves (or others). Use of bio-
chemical enhancers would be specifically prohibited by the fundamental
rights and freedoms contained in the Swedish Instrument of Government,
which specifically provides protection against any “medical influence aimed
at extorting or suppressing statements.”146 While the Swedish approach is
generally considered to be reflective of customary law,147 it is interesting to
note that in March, 2013, a judge in the United States approved the use of
“truth serum” on James Holmes, the defendant in the Aurora, Colorado
mass shooting incident.148
Other enhancements which affect memory recall will also create issues
for fair trial rights. For example, research is ongoing into the use of beta-
blockers and other pharmaceuticals to reduce the impact of traumatic
memory formation.149 Other proof-of-concept research is currently being
carried out involving the manipulation of mouse memories to add emo-
tional content.150 Both projects have potential military application in the
145. See, e.g., John M. MacDonald, Truth Serum, 46 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW,
CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 259 (1955) (on the effectiveness of “truth” serums
generally); The Legal Prohibition against Torture, HRW (last updated June 1, 2004), https://w
ww.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture#serums. See generally Jal-
loh v. Germany, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 281, ¶¶ 103–23 (ruling that the use of a drug to
compel evidence—in this case an emetic—violated the right to a fair trial).
146. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2, 5 (Swed.), reprinted in The Instrument
of Government, SVERIGES RIKSSDAG, https://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-wo
rks/Democracy/The-Constitution/The-Instrument-of-Government/ (then follow “The
Instrument of Government” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
147. See, e.g., the broad wording of Article 55(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, which is
considered reflective of customary international law and provides that a person “shall not
be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (emphasis added).
148. Ed Pilkington, Judge Approves Use of “Truth Serum” on Accused Aurora Shooter James
Holmes, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
mar/12/judge-approves-truth-serum-james-holmes. Truth serum was approved for the
purposes of determining the insanity or otherwise of the accused in the event that he
claimed an insanity defense.
149. Jim Giles, Beta-blockers Tackle Memories of Horror, NATURE, 436, 448–49 (28 July
2005).
150. Nick Bilton, Computer-Brain Interfaces Making Big Leaps, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 4,
2013, at B4, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/disruptions-rather-than-time-co
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Once enhanced soldiers have completed their service and seek to return to
civilian life, attention will have to be given to both the rights of the soldiers
returning and to the wider societal impact of the presence of enhanced
veterans in the population.
A. Removal of Enhancements
One of the major issues to be addressed will be what happens to the en-
hancements of enhanced soldiers once they leave the armed forces. Lin and
his co-authors have raised the question of whether soldiers should be re-
quired to have any enhancements removed before integration back into
civilian society so as not to give enhanced personnel an unfair advantage in
the civilian workplace.151 However, the legal situation regarding removal of
enhancements is far from certain. For example, the ownership of medical
devices (and even of the data received from them) differs across jurisdic-
tions. From an ownership perspective, there may be a difference between
implantable technology and prosthetics (albeit intimately connected ones).
While some technologies may rightly be considered materiel of the armed
forces and be required to be relinquished on exit from the armed forces—
perhaps to be replaced by a more civilian-appropriate version, for example,
in the case of a forearm prosthesis—other technologies may more properly
be viewed as having become the property of the individual soldier.152
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The concern about the impact of reintegrating military veterans into civil-
ian society extends also to their treatment by mainstream society. If en-
hanced veterans were to present a significant threat to unenhanced workers
in terms, for example, of lost job opportunities, the societal tendency to
153. Functional plasticity, that is the brain’s (limited) ability to adapt and form new
neural pathways, is well documented, particularly in instances of traumatic stress. Given
that members of the armed forces are routinely deployed into situations which expose
them to high levels of traumatic stress, this is of increased importance to military patients.
154. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 12. See also European
Social Charter art. 13(1), Feb. 26, 1965, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (ensuring a right to healthcare).
Healthcare is understood to include the preservation of mental and physical health
through medical services. See also DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LE-
GAL AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES 61, CM/Rec, at 4 (2010).
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155. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 7. See also Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. No.
177 (creating a “free-standing” non-discrimination provision).
156. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 14.
157. ACHR, supra note 70, art. 1(1).
158. See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2, of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/20, ¶¶ 15, 20–35 (July 2, 2009) (discussing the need for a flexible approach
to “other status” and further examples of prohibited grounds of discrimination including,
inter alia, disability, nationality, age and health status).
159. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
24–25, ¶ 56 (1976).
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A. State Responsibility
A State considering the use of enhanced soldiers must also consider its
responsibility for the acts of its organs under the doctrine of State respon-
sibility.161 The State remains responsible for acts carried out by State organs
(including individuals) in their official capacity regardless of whether that
State organ was acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions, or if the State
knew of its actions.162 The same rules apply to persons and entities that are
empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority, but who are
not State organs (for example, State contractors, such as prison guards,
who are engaged to provide services).163
160. HUMAN RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, supra note 154.
161. While this article deals primarily with the impact of enhancement of the armed
forces, the issues addressed apply equally to members of the intelligence services and other
State organs. To cite a fictional example, the main characters in the Bourne series of mov-
ies (played by Matt Damon & Jeremy Renner) featuring enhanced individuals have both
worked in different programs run by the intelligence services of the United States.
162. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art.
7, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug.
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4
/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
163. Id., arts. 5, 7.
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B. Individual Responsibility
171. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 141, arts. 16, 17.
172. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 422
(Feb. 26).
173. Id. ¶¶ 423–24. See also Christian Dominicé, Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States
and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 286 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010).
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and related question is how does that impact the individual’s responsibility
for any breaches of the law of armed conflict on the battlefield while so
enhanced?
1. Free Will
At the extreme end of enhancement technology lays the risk that certain
enhancements could interfere with the free will of the individual being en-
hanced. Such a determination would interfere with the individual’s capacity
to form the mens rea necessary to be held responsible for his or her actions
under international criminal law. Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) sets out the customary law standard for
the mental element required when no specific rules regulate the mens rea,174
indicating a person will only be held criminally liable for their acts where
they are committed with intent and knowledge. The intent requirement can
be divided into two parts. First, the person must intend to perform the
specific act, i.e., they “mean to engage in the conduct” described in the
crime.175 Second, if the definition of the crime requires that a particular
consequence results from the act (for example, the death of a person), the
perpetrator must either “mean to cause that consequence” or at least be
“aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”176
The use of human enhancement technologies may affect these re-
quirements in a number of ways. For example, where prosthetics are con-
trolled by cybernetic implants, such as an advanced military exoskeleton,
the implant may be subject to interference either by the soldier’s State or
through a third party hacking the device. This would provide a defense
similar to that of automatism, which occurs when the person involved
proves it was an involuntary action over which he or she had no control.177
It is not just the control of prosthetics which may be compromised.
Research conducted at the University of Washington on human-to-human
interfaces enabled a researcher to control the hand movements of a col-
174. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 30. See also GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 104–6 (2d ed. 2005).
175. Rome Statute, supra note 143.
176. Id.
177. See generally WERLE, supra note 153, at 105 (noting that automatism prevents
criminal responsibility for crimes under international law).
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178. Doree Armstrong & Michelle Ma, Researcher Controls Colleague’s Motions in 1st Hu-
man Brain-to-Brain Interface, UW TODAY (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.washington.edu/
news/2013/08/27/researcher-controls-colleagues-motions-in-1st-human-brain-to-brain-
interface/.
179. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 30. See also WERLE, supra note 153, at 105.
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180. For example, those elements of crime involving value judgements such as “in-
humane” or “severe.” See WERLE, supra note 153, at 105–6; COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 902 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.
2008).
181. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 8(2)(b)(i) (emphasis added).
182. Id., art. 8(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
183. Id., art. 8(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
184. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(b)(vii), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (emphasis added).
185. Id., art. 7(1)(e) (emphasis added). See WERLE, supra note 153, at 106–9.
186. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 31(1)(b) (But excepting situations when “the
person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances that the person
knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to
engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).
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suppose a specific substance (for example, both drink and drugs are cov-
ered); however, it is intended to apply only to external substances intro-
duced into the body.187 The use of pharmaceutical enhancements may fall
within this category, as by analogy may other enhancements such as brain-
machine interfaces where they have the same effect as that necessary for a
mental defect or intoxication to provide a defense to a criminal charge.
However, any enhancement which acts on the body’s own functions, for
example by adjusting body chemistry or genetics to create an ability within
an individual to trigger increased levels of adrenaline or other neurochemi-
cals at a later time, would not give rise to the defense of intoxication as the
intoxicating agent would be a naturally formed (endogenic) substance.188
The defense of intoxication is not available in circumstances where the
individual was voluntarily intoxicated when they either knew or disregarded
the risk that they would likely engage in conduct constituting a crime.189
There is a very real question to be considered on whether the taking of an
enhancement drug which can mean success or failure of the mission—and
in some cases literally the difference between life and death—can ever be
considered truly voluntary in a hierarchical military system. This echoes the
arguments about true informed consent in the military setting.190 There is
certainly evidence of the pressure on U.S. troops to take drugs (both for
performance enhancement in the case of Air Force pilots and prophylacti-
cally in the case of anthrax vaccines for ground troops in Iraq), indicating
that the voluntary nature of such enhancements could be called into ques-
tion.191 Even if the defense is available, then clearly the question of whether
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that they felt pressure to take the pills, citing fear that they would be “scrubbed from the
mission” if they did not do so. Shanker & Duenwald, supra note 90.
192. COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 159, at 547.
193. International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence r. 145(2), ICC-
ASP/1/3 (part II-A) (2002) (“In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Court shall
take into account, as appropriate: (a) Mitigating circumstances such as: (i) The circum-
stances falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility, such
as substantially diminished mental capacity or duress . . . .”). See also Rome Statute, supra
note 175, art. 78(1).
194. Rule 67(a)(ii)(b) of the rules of procedure and evidence for both the ICTY and
ICTR provide, “Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial
Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter: (i) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its
intent to offer: (b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental
responsibility.” See respectively International Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 50 (July 8, 2015) (as amended, originally adopted Feb 11, 1994); International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (May 13, 2015) (as
amended, originally adopted June 29, 1995).
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that capacity does not provide a complete defense to the charge leading to
an acquittal.195
VII. CONCLUSION
195. Prosecutor v Delalić et al., (‘Čelebići Case’), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal
Judgement, ¶ 590 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
482