Myanmar 2021

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VOL. 4 NO. 6 Myanmar Special Issue 2021
Senior Leader Perspectives

1 Myanmar Probably Needs a Military . . . Just Not the One It Has
Ambassador Scot Marciel
11 Women on the Front Lines in Myanmar’s Fight for Democracy

LTC Miemie Winn Byrd, EdD, US Army (ret.)
Feature
20 Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
Pawan Amin & Dr. Monish Tourangbam
Views
37 The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN Inflection Point
Charles Dunst
46 Myanmar’s Military Coup

Security Trouble in Southeast Asia
Dr. Indu Saxena
56 Between Political Violence and COVID-19

Many Citizens in Myanmar Pushed to Armed Resistance
Tom Connolly
Editorial Advisors
Gen Kenneth S. Wilsbach, USAF, Commander, Pacific Air Forces
Gen Herbert J. Carlisle, USAF, Retired; President & CEO, National Defense Industrial Association
Amb. Daniel Shields, Retired, Department of State
Dr. Mehmed Ali, Acting Director, Air University Press
Reviewers
Air Cdre Nasim Abbas, PAF Lt Col Alexander B. Fafinski, Dr. Adam Lowther Mr. Richard M. Rossow
Instructor USAF Director, Department of Multi- Senior Adviser and Wadhwani
Air War College (Pakistan) Military Professor domain Operations Chair in US–India Policy Studies
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Bachmann Dr. Ian C. Forsyth Lt Col Scott D. McDonald, US tional Studies
Professor Analyst Marine Corps, retired
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University of Canberra (Australia) Department of Defense Dr. Montgomery McFate Speechwriter/Special Assistant to
Dr. Lewis Bernstein Dr. Jai Galliott Professor the CJCS
Historian, retired Defense Analyst, Cyber Security US Naval War College
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US Army Dr. Sandeep "Frag" Mulgund
Canberra @ ADFA Professor
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Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific
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Strategy Officer (AF/A3)
US Air Force Academy
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China Aerospace Studies Institute
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Studies Dr. Satoru Nagao
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Assistant Professor US Air War College
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US Air War College Dr. Akhlaque Haque
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US Naval War College
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Security College mingham
Postdoctoral Fellow Professor
Australian National University Dr. Jessica Jordan
US Naval War College Shawnee State University
Dr. Stephen F. Burgess Assistant Professor
Professor Air Force Culture and Language Dr. Jagannath P. Panda Dr. Michael E. Weaver
US Air War College Center Research Fellow & Centre Associate Professor
Dr. Isaac Kardon Coordinator, East Asia Air Command and Staff College
Dr. Chester B. Cabalza
Assistant Professor, China Mari- Manohar Parrikar Institute for Mr. Keith Webster
Vice President, Center of Re-
time Studies Institute Defense Studies & Analyses
search and Strategic Studies Senior Vice President for Defense
Development Academy of the US Naval War College Dr. Saadia M. Pekkanen and Aerospace
Philippines Maj Gen Brian Killough, Job and Getrud Tamaki Endowed US–India Strategic Partnership
USAF, ret. Professor Forum
Mr. Eric Chan Founding Co-Director, Space
Former Deputy Commander,
Policy Analyst Brig Gen Craig D. Wills,
Headquarters Pacific Air Forces Policy and Research Center
US Air Force (SPARC) USAF
Mr. Chris Kolakowski Director of Strategy, Plans, and
Dr. Adam Claasen University of Washington
Director
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Wisconsin Veterans Museum Dr. James E. Platte
Massey University Pacific Air Forces
Dr. Carlo Kopp Assistant Professor
CDR Mark R. Condeno Center for Unconventional Dr. Roland B. Wilson
Lecturer
Philippine Coast Guard Monash University Weapons Studies Program Coordinator & Professor
Dr. Zack Cooper Dr. Terence Roehrig of Conflict Analysis & Resolution
Dr. Amit Kumar
Senior Fellow President Professor George Mason University, Korea
American Enterprise Institute AAA International Security US Naval War College Campus
Dr. Scott Edmondson Consultants Dr. Jim Rolfe Dr. Austin Wyatt
Assistant Professor Dr. Suzanne Levi-Sanchez Senior Fellow, Centre for Strate- Research Associate
Air Force Culture and Language Assistant Professor gic Studies University of New South Wales–
Center US Naval War College Victoria University of Wellington Canberra @ ADFA
SENIOR LEADER PERSPECTIVE
Myanmar Probably Needs a Military

. . . Just Not the One It Has
M
uch of the world has expressed regret (if not outrage) at Myanmar’s
military coup on 1 February 2021 and the brutal crackdown on the
population in its aftermath. Nevertheless, some international analysts
continue to contend that the Tatmadaw (the official name of the armed forces)
remains an essential force in a country that is riven by ethnic conflict and that
otherwise lacks strong institutions.1 As a result—or so the argument goes—any
solution to the current crisis in Myanmar (formerly Burma) requires a deal that
allows the Tatmadaw to continue largely intact and maintain significant power.
The current realities on the ground—the Tatmadaw’s overwhelming force and
willingness to use it, its dogged determination to remain in power, and the scat-
tered and poorly resourced nature of its opponents—could lead those advocating
a negotiated settlement to accept that the military would have to remain in place
in something close to its precoup shape and form. Accepting the possibility of
such an outcome, however, does not mean that it would be healthy or sustainable.
Taking the position that the Tatmadaw is an essential institution ignores two
fundamental realities: its own record of fostering conflict and division, mismanag-
ing and subordinating the country’s interests to its own obsession with power; and
the near unanimity with which the Myanmar population despises the armed
forces and will no longer live peacefully under its control. The February 2021 coup
sparked a national uprising of a magnitude that should have everyone questioning
long-held assumptions about the centers of power in the years ahead.
Fifty Years of Damage

For at least a half-century, the military has been an unrelentingly negative force
in Myanmar in nearly every respect. In fact, it is hard to think of another institu-
tion anywhere that has done more damage to a country and society over such a
long period. The Tatmadaw has been and remains, in the words of David Mathie-
son, an “Army of Darkness.”2
To understand the military’s role, one must start with the fact that Myanmar is
what the historian Thant Myint-U has called an “unfinished nation,”3 meaning
that its hundreds of ethnic groups have never been united by a collective sense of
national identity. For much of its modern history, the country has seen a struggle
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 1

Marciel
between the forces of Burman (or Bamar) nationalism, representing the country’s
majority, and the many ethnic minority communities who demand autonomy or
some form of federalism to safeguard their rights and cultures.
During the colonial period, the British reinforced ethnic divisions and identi-
ties, brought in large numbers of immigrants from India, and favored certain
ethnic groups over the majority Bamar. During World War II, Bamar nationalists
led by Aung San sided with the Japanese, while some ethnic minority groups
fought alongside the British, resulting in multiple clashes and several horrific
massacres. In the leadup to independence in 1948, Aung San sought to unify the
country based on the promise of autonomy for ethnic minority communities (the
so-called Panglong Agreement), but his 1947 assassination prevented that prom-
ise from being implemented.
Army commander General Ne Win led a coup in 1962 that ended the coun-
try’s messy postindependence democratic experiment and reasserted the domi-
nance of the Bamar majority. The coup, and the policies that Ne Win subsequently
enacted, placed the country on a downhill trajectory that lasted for decades. Ne
Win’s Bamar-Buddhist nationalism and fear of outside intervention led him to
isolate the country, expel much of the large Indian population—which included
many able administrators and entrepreneurs—and nationalize the economy under
military control, calling it the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” He banished foreign
education institutions, including missionary schools along with the Ford Founda-
tion and Asia Foundation, and pursued a disastrous socialist-autarkic economic
strategy that sent the country in the wrong direction. By 1987, Ne Win’s economic
policies had so impoverished Burma that it won admission to the United Nations’
group of “Least Developed Countries,” officially marking it as one of the globe’s
poorest states.4
Across five decades of rule, Ne Win and successor military leaders would reject
any ideas of autonomy or federalism, insisting on a strong Bamar-dominated uni-
tary state and engaging in regular battles with a variety of ethnic minority insur-
gent groups, largely in border areas, that were seeking autonomy. The autocrats
also institutionalized deeply problematic concepts of ethnicity and identity that
deprived those not considered indigenous (or “national races”), such as the Ro-
hingya, of basic rights. They paid lip service to the concept of diversity while
practicing “Burmanization” of the country’s history, language, education, and cul-
ture, pressuring all other ethnic groups to assimilate and suppressing attempts to
develop or keep alive ethnic minority heritage. Rather than using institutions
such as the military to integrate the country, they ensured such institutions be-
came the near-exclusive domain of the Bamar, who in their view were the only
group that maintained unquestioned loyalty to the country. By refusing to recog-
2 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Myanmar Probably Needs a Military . . . Just Not the One It Has
nize the legitimate grievances of ethnic minority populations and in fact brutally
suppressing them, Ne Win’s regime deepened the country’s communal divisions
and stoked even greater conflict.
Politically, Ne Win arrested thousands of opponents, suppressed civil and po-
litical liberties, and imprisoned ethnic minority leaders, including the country’s
first president, the Shan prince Sao Shwe Thaik, who died in prison. In border
areas, the Tatmadaw pursued its brutal counterinsurgency doctrine, known as the
“four cuts” strategy5—cutting off food, funds, intelligence, and recruits—to try to
defeat ethnic insurgent forces such as the Kachin Independence Organization,
Shan State Army, and Karen National Union, as well as the Chinese-backed
Communist Party of Burma. The Communist Party of Burma eventually im-
ploded in 1989, but many ethnic insurgent groups continued to fight.
In 1988, sharply deteriorating economic conditions and widespread frustration
spawned a mass protest movement led by students. The protests led to Ne Win’s
resignation, but a new cadre of generals took charge and bloodily suppressed the
demonstrations, resulting in thousands of deaths and many more imprisoned.
These generals, who gave their regime the Orwellian name SLORC (State Law
and Order Restoration Council), ended the pretense of socialism but maintained
military control over the economy, with an element of deeply corrupt capitalism
that ruthlessly exploited the nation’s natural resources and concentrated wealth in
the hands of the military elite and their cronies, leaving most of the rest of the
population impoverished.
For the next two decades, the generals continued the repressive practices and
economic mismanagement that had characterized Ne Win’s rule, propelling the
country further backward in almost every respect. The SLORC held elections in
1990, but it ignored the results when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy (NLD) party won an overwhelming majority, imprisoning many
NLD and other prodemocracy leaders and continuing military rule for another 20
years. The generals suppressed most political activity, strictly censored and con-
trolled the media, imprisoned dissidents, and blatantly manipulated the country’s
judiciary.
Although the economy probably enjoyed modest growth from 1990 to 2010
(the official figures are questionable, to say the least), much of that growth ap-
peared to come from resource exploitation—amid much corruption—and was
neither sustainable nor equitable. According to the World Bank, as late as 2014
the poverty rate was still above 37 percent (the highest within ASEAN), and per
capita income was just above $1,000. The military also failed to invest in infra-
structure; the country’s electricity grid reached only one-third of the population,
and the density of the road network was well below most neighbors.6 Few had

Marciel
access to the internet, and a SIM card cost $2,500 in 2010. More broadly, military
officers regularly interfered in the running of the economy, telling farmers what to
grow and when, operating as many as 11 exchange rates (which created huge
profit opportunities for them and those connected to them), and overseeing a
banking sector better known for money laundering than lending. At the same
time, the regime was collecting huge proceeds from its control of the country’s
state-owned enterprises, which operated most of the extractive industries.
The generals collected few taxes and funneled much of the nation’s severely
inadequate budget to the military itself, starving the educational and health care
systems. According to the World Bank, the military received about 40 percent of
the national budget in 2000, compared to only 1.5 percent going to health care.7
The World Health Organization’s 2000 report ranked Myanmar’s health care per-
formance at 190th out of 191 countries, ahead of only Sierra Leone.8 That same
year, the military regime was spending only 0.5 percent of GDP on education,
and more than half the population could not afford even basic education.9
The combination of high poverty rates and low investments in education and
health had predictable results. According to the World Bank, as the country en-
tered its reform period after 2010, it had the lowest life expectancy in ASEAN
and the second highest level of child and infant mortality. Roughly 30 percent of
students finished high school, with a quarter going no farther than primary
school.10
The military regime also failed miserably—indeed, it did not even try—to ease
the longstanding tensions and mistrust between ethnic minority communities
and the Bamar majority that had plagued the country for decades. And though
the military did not begin the process of dividing the country by ethnicity, it cer-
tainly reinforced it. It sought to “unify” the nation by forcing assimilation, ban-
ning the teaching of ethnic minority languages and history, force-feeding the
population a Bamar-centric educational curriculum, backed by constant propa-
ganda, and harshly suppressing ethnic insurgencies that sought autonomy. In do-
ing so, it reinforced prejudices, amplified mistrust, and exacerbated the very divi-
sions that were the root causes of decades of conflict and despair.
The military combined brutal counterinsurgency campaigns, with constant ef-
forts to exploit and expand the divisions among the different ethnic groups. Its
four-cuts tactics involved massive human rights violations—forced labor, systemic
use of rape as a weapon of war, indiscriminate shelling, wholesale destruction of
villages, and widespread torture and murder—that among other things produced
hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people.11
Starting in the early 1990s, the military entered several cease-fire agreements,
mostly so it could concentrate its forces against other insurgent groups. It also

struck deals with certain groups that, in effect, turned them into proxy militias in
return for virtual licenses to engage in smuggling, illegal timber trade, and narcot-
ics production and distribution. The military, in that sense, is largely responsible
for the massive expansion of illicit activity, including one of the world’s biggest
narcotics industries, which is wreaking havoc inside the country and causing
widespread suffering outside.
By 2011, when a newly elected government led by general Thein Sein unex-
pectedly began to reform and open the country, the military had directly or indi-
rectly run the country for nearly 50 years. During that time, Burma—it has been
known as Myanmar since 1989—had regressed from a country that was near the
forefront or at least in the middle ranks of the various Southeast Asian nations on
a number of indexes (economy, education system, rice exports, and quality of civil
service) to a deeply impoverished, conflict-ridden, and isolated state known more
for its horrific human rights record and for producing drugs, refugees, and fear
than anything else. It is hard to think of any positive contribution the military
made to the country during that time. It reflected one of the worst records of rule
and governance of any institution in the world.
The Military During the Reform Period

The Thein Sein government introduced significant reforms and established a
nascent national peace process. Between 2011 and 2015, it freed political prison-
ers; allowed the establishment of political parties, independent media, and civil
society; ended censorship; boosted spending on health and education; and liberal-
ized the economy—all while opening the country to the world. The military
largely accepted these reforms while maintaining its monopoly of power over se-
curity issues and 25 percent of seats in parliament—both guaranteed by the 2008
constitution that the generals had written. The military also—however reluc-
tantly—accepted the 2015 elections results, which brought longtime opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party to power. In addition, it began
working with the International Labor Organization and others on issues such as
recruitment of child soldiers.
During this period, some Western countries, included the United States, held
out hope that the military could be persuaded to accept further reform in return
for the prospect of greater international recognition and—over time—an en-
hanced ability to engage and work with Western militaries. As US ambassador to
Myanmar beginning in early 2016, I had multiple conversations with General
Min Aung Hlaing and other military leaders in which I made clear that further
reform and increased respect for human rights could lead to greater engagement
from the US military.

Marciel
The generals insisted they supported the democratization process and looked
forward to increased military-to-military engagement, but over time it became
clear they were not willing to change the military’s behavior. The Tatmadaw con-
tinued its habitualized “four cuts” approach, particularly in operations against the
Kachin Independence Army in the northeast, with no improvement in its human
rights performance. It also greatly hindered progress in the national peace process,
insisting that ethnic armed groups surrender their arms and also failing to honor
agreements embedded in the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. While the
generals for the first time allowed discussion of the concept of federalism, they
made it clear through words and actions that they still did not accept anything
less than a Bamar-dominated political system in which the military continued to
play a leading role.
Then, in late 2016 and again in mid-2017, the Tatmadaw responded to attacks
by a small group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), by launching a
horrific, bloody operation against the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine
State. Amid widespread reports of rape, torture, and murder, the security forces
razed hundreds of Rohingya villages, causing more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee
to Bangladesh. The United States determined that the operation constituted eth-
nic cleansing; others characterized it genocide.
It is true that the mistreatment of the Rohingya, which goes back decades, was
not just an issue of the Tatmadaw. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government—along
with much of the media and, it seemed, the population—failed to support Ro-
hingya rights and even defended the military’s operation, denying the widespread
allegations of severe human rights violations. Nevertheless, it was the Tatmadaw
that actually carried out the ethnic cleansing, proving once again that its behavior
had not changed and that it continued to operate with impunity. Conversations
with military officials during this time bordered on the bizarre, with top generals
insisting there had been no human rights abuses and wondering aloud why the
world did not believe them. In one meeting, military commander General Min
Aung Hlaing brought out a photo album filled with gruesome pictures of dead
soldiers and police as evidence of ARSA atrocities, as if that somehow justified
the military’s ethnic cleansing operation against the entire Rohingya community.
Ahead of 2020 national elections, the military again showed its hostility to re-
form by blocking proposed constitutional changes that, among other things,
would have gradually reduced the Tatmadaw’s role in parliament. Then, when the
military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party suffered a humiliating
defeat at the hands of the NLD in the election, the Tatmadaw cried foul, de-
manded an investigation into alleged electoral fraud, and then—when the NLD
rejected its demands—staged a coup on 1 February 2021.

When a Country Despises Its Military

The coup and the military’s subsequent brutal suppression of protests, along
with its aggressive attacks against several ethnic armed groups and newly formed
“people’s defense forces” that also opposed the coup, have revealed a Tatmadaw
that operates—and is seen by the public—more like a foreign occupying force
than a legitimate national institution. First, the coup itself had no legitimate jus-
tification; the military simply wanted to seize power. Second, the widespread, in-
discriminate violence, torture, and looting the military has inflicted on the civilian
population clearly have been designed to terrorize or cow the public into submis-
sion, an outrage that has stripped the Tatmadaw of what little support and respect
it previously enjoyed in the country. Third, the military’s actions have revealed that
it continues to operate and to think inside its own cocoon, almost hermetically
sealed from the society at large. It engages in constant self-aggrandizing propa-
ganda, is largely oblivious to the thinking and attitudes of the public, and indoc-
trinates its members to see anyone who disagrees as an enemy.
The Tatmadaw enjoys almost no support among the public, save for a few who
are either related to military officers or financially connected to the organization.
In fact, the overwhelming sentiment of Myanmar’s population appears to be that
there is neither hope nor opportunity for the country as long as the military re-
mains in power. The dominant view among protestors and others resisting the
coup is not to return to the status quo ante but rather to eliminate the military as
an independent political actor and to fundamentally reform the institution. Some
of the ethnic armed groups—more accustomed to dealing with the military and
perhaps more aware of its force superiority—might be amenable to cutting a deal
in return for greater autonomy, but that is not where the majority of the country’s
population is now.
In sum, nearly 60 years after it seized power, the Tatmadaw has shown itself to
be a driver of conflict and division, not a force for unity. It has failed miserably at
economic management, not to mention developing health and education systems.
It has fostered corruption and a massive illicit economy, including one of the larg-
est narcotics production operations in the world. It has promoted the dominance
of the majority Bamar–Buddhist community in a country that has no chance of
peace and success absent the establishment of some form of federalism that ad-
dresses the grievances and aspirations of its significant minority populations. And
in the past several months, its obsession with power, its brutality, and its failure to
understand today’s Myanmar society has sparked a national revolt and created
massive turmoil and instability that it has almost no chance of ending.

Marciel
Hypothetically, one can make a good argument that Myanmar needs a military
to serve as a national institution and as a force for unity in a country full of conflict
and centrifugal forces. There is, however, no evidence that the current military—
the Tatmadaw—is serving or can serve in these roles. The Tatmadaw is a cancer.
Until and unless it changes dramatically, there is little hope for Myanmar to
achieve peace, unity, economic development, or any true sense of nation.
If Myanmar is to enjoy a truly national military, the current institution needs to
be torn down, at least in part, and rebuilt with new leadership, a different culture,
and a new vision. The Myanmar people will need to create their own vision for
what a better military might look like. Presumably, it would be an integrated in-
stitution, answerable to elected civilians, without economic interests, and with a
different culture that respects human rights and prizes accountability. It likely will
require years if not decades of transition, but it is critical now for the Myanmar
people to develop a vision for such a military, and then they can begin to discuss
steps needed to achieve it. Maybe a new national military college that is fully in-
tegrated can be a first step, in addition to eliminating ethnic identity from any
military documents and developing a completely new training regimen.
Implications
The obvious question remains what good this analysis even offers given that the
Tatmadaw right now seems entrenched in power, uninterested in reforming itself,
and far from a position in which it would be compelled to accept restructuring or
major reform.
The answer comes in three parts. First, it should lead analysts and foreign gov-
ernments to recognize that Myanmar is likely to continue to suffer from conflict
and instability (and be a headache for ASEAN) for as long as the Tatmadaw (a)
remains in power and (b) continues to operate in its current form and in an over-
bearing political and economic role. The Myanmar people already know this. It
would be helpful if foreign analysts and foreign ministries also understood it and
thus stopped arguing that the Tatmadaw is an essential institution that needs to
be maintained.
Second, given this analysis, foreign governments and other actors ideally will
resist the temptation to think that the current crisis will either ease on its own or
be satisfactorily resolved via limited compromises that free a few political prison-
ers, offer promises of future elections, or propose yet another long-term road map
to better politics. While a deal that ends or reduces the violence and/or allows
humanitarian assistance to reach vulnerable populations would be welcome, it
would not resolve the underlying problem or restore stability.

The third aspect should be a greater effort on the part of foreign governments
to support the efforts of the Myanmar people to compel the Myanmar military to
change as a precondition to any political resolution. This is not a call to arm the
resistance but rather to do everything possible to ratchet up the pressure on the
military. Many people believe the Tatmadaw cannot be defeated militarily. They
might be right, but today everything in Myanmar is up in the air, and nothing
should be taken for granted. As the analyst Zaw Tuseng recently wrote: “There is
nothing pre-determined about what will happen in Myanmar, certainly not the
Tatmadaw’s survival.”12 Even if the Tatmadaw is not defeated militarily on the
battlefield, it is possible that the intense pressure it is under—if sustained and
even increased—will force it to make concessions that right now seem unimagi-
nable. This is not a prediction but a potential scenario.
In the near term, the only positive way ahead is for enough officers in the Tat-
madaw to recognize that the current situation is not viable and to look for a way
out that would involve negotiations that lead to at least the beginning of reform
of the military itself, as well as restoration of the many earlier reforms that the
postcoup regime has reversed. That will require intense pressure on the Tatmadaw
in all forms, including financial, combined with a clear message that the goal is
not to eliminate the military or to punish all members but rather to initiate sig-
nificant restructuring and reform while pursuing justice—including in interna-
tional legal forums—against top generals and some individuals clearly involved in
massive violations. The key is to encourage more defections from the rank and file
as well as new calculations from more senior officers.
For the international community to play a constructive role in resolving the
chaos in Myanmar, it must adopt strategies that recognize there is no sustainable
solution to Myanmar’s woes without substantial reform of the Tatmadaw and that
reasoning with the current leadership in the hope it will change its behavior is
fruitless. Compelling change within the military might seem unthinkable right
now—and efforts might well fail—but the alternative is to accept that Myanmar
will remain a source of instability, conflict, refugees, narcotics, and distress for the
foreseeable future. µ

Ambassador Marciel (MA, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; BA, international relations,, University of
California at Davis) is a Visiting Scholar, Visiting Practitioner Fellow on Southeast Asia, at Stanford University’s
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He served as US Ambassador to Myanmar from March 2016
through May 2020, leading a mission of 500 employees during the difficult Rohingya crisis and a challenging time
for Myanmar’s democratic transition and the United States–Myanmar relationship. Prior to serving in Myanmar,
Ambassador Marciel served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific at the Department
of State (DOS), where he oversaw US relations with Southeast Asia. From 2010 to 2013, he served as US Ambas-

Marciel
sador to Indonesia. Prior to that, he served concurrently as the first US Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia from 2007 to 2010.
Ambassador Marciel is a career diplomat with 35 years of experience in Asia and around the world. In addition to
the assignments noted above, he has served at US missions in Turkey, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Brazil, and the Philip-
pines. At the DOS in Washington, he served as Director of the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia, Director of the
Office of Mainland Southeast Asia, and Director of the Office of Southern European Affairs. He also was Deputy
Director of the Office of Monetary Affairs in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.
Notes
1. See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan, “Five Hard Truths About Myanmar,” Global Brief, 2
April 2021, https://globalbrief.ca, and Dewey Sim, “Keep Myanmar’s ‘Hated’ Military or Face
Another Iraq or Libya: Singapore’s George Yeo,” South China Morning Post, 11 March 2021,
https://www.scmp.com.
2. David Scott Mathieson, “Myanmar’s Army of Darkness,” The Nation, 12 February 2021,
https://www.thenation.com.
3. Thant Myint-U, “Myanmar, An Unfinished Nation,” Nikkei Asia, 17 June 2017, https://asia.
nikkei.com.
4. Committee for Development Planning, “Report of the 23rd Session: Supplement No. 10,”
UN Economic and Social Committee, 21–24 November1987, at https://undocs.org. See also Da-
vid Steinberg, “Crisis in Burma,” Current History 88, no. 537 (1 April 1989), https://www-
proquest-com.stanford.idm.oclc.org.
5. @Kim_Joliffee described the “four cuts” approach in an excellent thread on Twitter on 15
June 2021. See also Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, (London: Zed
Books, 1999), and Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003).
6. World Bank Group, “Myanmar, Ending Poverty and Promoting Shared Prosperity in a
Time of Transition: A Systemic Diagnostic,” November 2014, 7, https://www.worldbank.org.
7. Global Health Access Program and the Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, “Diagnosis Critical: Health and Human Rights in
Eastern Burma,” https://www.jhsph.edu.
8. World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2000, https://www.who.int.
9. Council on Foreign Relations, “Burma: Time for a Change,” Report of an Independent Task
Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, 13, https://cdn.cfr.org.
10. Council on Foreign Relations, “Burma: Time for a Change,” 13,.
11. See, for example, The Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action
Network, “License to Rape: The Burmese Military Regime’s Use of Sexual Violence in the Ongo-
ing War in Shan State,” May 2002, https://www.peacewomen.org.
12. Kyaw Tuseng, “The Revolt Against Myanmar’s Junta Can Succeed,” The Irrawaddy, 20 June
2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com.

SENIOR LEADER PERSPECTIVE
Women on the Front Lines in

Myanmar’s Fight for Democracy
S
ince Myanmar’s newly established State Administration Council, led by the
commander in chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup on 1
February 2021, the country has descended into violent chaos. When mil-
lions of protesters peacefully took to the street demanding to restore the demo-
cratically elected government, they were met with the military’s signature brutal
crackdown. The very first fatality of the military’s ruthless suppression was a
19-year-old woman named Mya Thwet Khine. A sniper fatally shot her in the
head while she participated in a rally near Nay Pyi Taw, the country’s capital city.1
Since her death, many more female protesters have been killed, arrested, and as-
saulted by the military as they demonstrated against the coup. The military raided
homes in the middle of the night, dragged the women off to jail, and locked them
up without due process. Once in captivity, many of them were subjected to tor-
tured interrogations and sexual assaults.2 “Despite the risks, women have stood at
the forefront of Myanmar’s protest movement, sending a powerful rebuke to the
generals who ousted a female civilian leader and reimposed a patriarchal order
that has suppressed women for a half a century.”3 According to one of the protest-
ers, “as a mum, in the deep down of my heart, I realized that the future of my
daughter, and the future of all young people in the country will be drawn back to
dark.” Women know that they have more to lose. Therefore, about 60 percent of
protesters are women, according to the Women’s League of Burma.4 The mass
number of women in the front line of this political uprising defies their stereo-
typical role.
Traditional Role of Women in Myanmar Society

While Myanmar women traditionally enjoyed considerable agency and rights,
their roles were constricted over time. Following the 1962 coup, successive mili-
tary regimes used isolationist policies to control and subjugate the population by
cutting off the country from the rest of the world. The regimes aimed to keep out
the “undesirable foreign influences.”5 The military regimes were largely successful
in keeping the people ignorant by deliberately dismantling the public education
and health systems. They controlled the population by clamping down on civil
society and using state-sanctioned violence against those who oppose the regime.

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All these tactics had particularly detrimental effects on women’s rights and roles
over the years. For example, the military regime promoted nationalism by amend-
ing the interfaith marriage law to the detriment of the women. The new law
stripped women who marry non-Buddhist or non-Burmese men of their property
rights. Also, the military regime prohibited women’s networking alliances. The
regime allowed only organizations that will purportedly preserve Myanmar cul-
ture, which means strengthening the traditional gender roles and bolstering males’
privileged position within the society.6
Although the women actively participated in the anticolonial struggle for inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom in the 1930s, they were still subordinated
under the men. Due to engrained beliefs about appropriate gender roles, it was
difficult for women to achieve the same levels of authority and influence as men.7
After the independence from the British, now under Myanmar military rule,
women were further relegated to the sidelines since the Myanmar military is an
extremely chauvinistic organization. The military’s top-down structure and cul-
ture reinforced the concept of male superiority and discouraged women from
participating in political activities. As such, women were perpetually underrepre-
sented in the leadership positions of the government bureaucracy. Authorities
disproportionately targeted and punished women who dared to oppose or chal-
lenge the status quo.8 It was not surprising that the military sniper chose to shoot
a young woman as the first victim in this current uprising. According to the state-
run MRTV, the military snipers were ordered to purposefully shoot the protesters
in the head to create a sense of horror for the onlookers.9 Instead of being fright-
ened, more women came out to protest against the military regime after 1 Febru-
ary.
Changing Role of Women in Myanmar Society

Beginning around 2011, the country’s opening and the process of transition to
democracy opened the eyes of Myanmar women. They were exposed to new ideas
about gender equality, feminism, and human rights as the world reengaged the
country. Most of the international aid packages had women’s empowerment and
capacity-building components. Women had opportunities to question and chal-
lenge the prevailing cultural beliefs, practices, and power structures that kept
women in subordinate positions.10 United Nations Security Council Resolution
1325, Women’s Peace and Security, offered additional capacities and capabilities
for the Myanmar women to take part in the nontraditional peace and security
sectors. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi led the National League for Democracy to
power, the women’s traditional understanding of leadership—such as deeply held
beliefs that leadership belongs to men—was dispelled. In addition to her charisma

Women on the Front Lines in Myanmar’s Fight for Democracy
and popularity, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s gender has been one of the key factors
that endangered the existing misogynistic power structure. The process of democ-
ratization of the country’s political system allowed women’s voices and perspec-
tives to enter the political arena. They are now refusing to go back. Daw Zin Mar
Aung,11 minister of foreign affairs of Myanmar’s National Unity Government,
said “this battle is the last battle for us and for the country” during her interview
with ABC Australia on 29 July 2021.12
Women Formed the Backbone of the Revolution

Women are taking this current political crisis as an opportunity to reshape the
narrative of women’s role in society in addition to opposing the military takeover.
They have become the backbone of the revolution. Women’s labor unions, gar-
ment workers, health care providers, and teachers were the first to protest. “Women
activists and politicians have also helped mobilize crowds to join the protests.
Daw Ei Thinzar Maung, one of the country’s youngest candidates for MP in the
last election, nominated by the Democratic Party for a New Society, has been
using her social media accounts where she has more than 360,000 followers to
rally support for the demonstrations.”13 The most influential critic of the regime,
Daw Ei Pencilo, with 1.6 million followers, is on the regime’s most-wanted list for
her ability to lead public opinion against the military.14 The women have been able
to improve their capacity for social mobilization and networking.15 There is also
unprecedented cooperation between different ethnic women’s groups in response
to the coup. They have been able to leverage social media platforms such as Face-
book to socialize their ideas and mobilize the people for action. Myanmar women
are feeling empowered to lead the rebellion this time around. They now have the
capacity and capabilities to lead the effort. One of the women passionately said
with conviction that “we as the future mothers of the country, we have the respon-
sibility to lead the restoration of democracy.”16 They are now associating mother-
hood with leadership. Again, this is a departure from the traditional mindset of
leadership being a masculine domain. The local NGO Gender Equality Network
estimated that 70–80 percent of movement’s leaders are women.17 According to
Daw Khin Ohmar, an 88-Generation18 political activist: “In 1988, the leaders
were men. This time, they’re women. It’s exciting.”19
Innovative Methods of Protests

The women are utilizing feminine qualities and newly acquired capabilities
gained since the opening to counter the military junta. The capabilities are bring-
ing innovative tactics to the fight. Women protesters hoisted traditional women’s

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sarongs and undergarments over the streets to stop the advancing troops. They are
creatively utilizing the deep-rooted belief that men’s masculine superiority, hpone,
will vanish if the women’s sarongs and undergarments soar directly above the
men’s heads. This tactic stopped the advancing armed troops in their tracks. They
did not dare to cross the clotheslines, and the women were able to save lives that
day. Since then, the regime has made such tactics illegal and brutally raided homes
of the women who had engineered them. Still, women continue with their resis-
tance. They also led the nightly campaign of banging pots and pans, the traditional
way to ward off evil, to clearly send a message to the regime of their dissent.20
Now, it is illegal to do so and again, the security forces raided homes for such
activities and arrested the residents, of which many were women. The youngest
victim so far has been a seven-year-old girl, Khin Myo Chit, who was shot during
a home raid in Mandalay.21
The women also played a leading role in organizing and sustaining the Civil
Disobedience Movement (CDM), which has been nominated for the Nobel
Peace Prize. The CDM was primarily responsible for preventing the military re-
gime to consolidate its control of the population and country so far. The CDM
delivered a crippling blow to the military regime as majority of civil servants
joined the strike. Nearly 20,000 university faculty and administrators joined the
CDM, and at least three-quarters of the university faculty is female. More than a
quarter of teachers in basic education joined the CDM. Again, nearly 90 percent
of the teachers are women. Despite constant fear of arrest and financial loss, the
participants of CDM remained committed to the strike. They refuse to return to
work until democracy is restored in Myanmar.
Myanmar Democracy in the Context of Strategic Competition and

China
According to the 2021 Freedom House report, 75 percent of the population
around the world experienced 15 years of consecutive decline of freedom and
continuous recession of democracy.22 Myanmar, situated on the doorstep of China
in mainland Southeast Asia, now joins the ranks of those who are in the front line
in the fight for democracy. This puts Myanmar square in the middle of the major
powers competition and the contest between democratic systems and authoritar-
ian regimes. China does not wish to see Myanmar be a democratic country. Safe-
guarding and controlling the Myanmar corridor was of vital importance to Bei-
jing’s foreign policy. Myanmar provides a strategic alternative to China’s “Malacca
Dilemma.” China’s dependency on the narrow Strait of Malacca, where a majority
of its shipping and energy supplies must traverse through, created a significant

vulnerability in its strategic competition with the United States. Beijing sees un-
fettered access to the Myanmar corridor as a key to remedy this strategic vulner-
ability. Furthermore, having access to over 2,000 kilometers of Myanmar coastline
(strategically located at the western entrance to the Malacca Strait) with direct
access to the Indian Ocean would give China an enormous commercial advantage
over its major competitors. If this comes to fruition, China will be able to control
both the eastern part of Malacca Strait via the artificial islands in the South China
Sea and the western part via Myanmar.
Additionally, China has viewed Myanmar as a land bridge to the Indian Ocean.
This recognition and ambition date back to the early Chinese explorers who
searched for a route from the landlocked provinces of China (such as the modern-
day Yunan area) via Myanmar to the sea. Therefore, it has always been a great
concern for China to limit Western influence in Myanmar. Flourishing democ-
racy in Myanmar is not in the best interest of China. Since the coup, China has
refused to condemn the military junta and vetoed many of the resolutions against
the junta at the United Nations.23 There has been allegation of China’s assistance
with establishing Cyber Firewall to restrict and track the protesters’ online activi-
ties.24
Russia’s Assistance to the Military Junta

Amid the coup, Russia strengthened its ties with the military regime. Russia’s
deputy defense minister attended the Armed Forces Day celebration on 27 March
2021, the same day the junta’s security forces killed nearly 100 unarmed protest-
ers, including children, in 40 towns and cities throughout Myanmar.25 In June,
Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu hosted General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit
to Moscow with pomp and circumstance. The defense minister affirmed Russia’s
continuing support to Myanmar military with training and arms sales. Myanmar
has been one of the traditional export markets for Russian weapons. Russia sees
the rising instability within Myanmar as a lucrative opportunity to increase its
sales of weapons.26 Myanmar military has purchased $807 million in Russian
weapons since 2011. Recently, Russia is set to deliver six Su-30 fighter jets and has
agreed to supply the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, Orlan-10E surveil-
lance drones, and radar equipment.27 Myanmar’s military has been increasingly
relying on airstrikes in the border areas to crack down on ethnic armed groups,
which are also assisting and training protesters and Peoples Defense Forces28. The
indiscriminate nature of the airstrikes has killed many unarmed villagers, includ-
ing children, and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians.29 Such conditions
are likely to intensify as the military obtains new and advanced airpower with the
help from Russia.

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COVID-19 Surge Exacerbates Political Crisis

To make things worse, COVID-19 infection is spreading rapidly in Myanmar.
The UN special rapporteur for Myanmar has warned that the country is at risk of
becoming a “super spreader” COVID state for the region.30 On 30 July 2021, “the
United Kingdom has warned the United Nations Security Council that half of
coup-wracked Myanmar’s population of 54 million could become infected with
COVID-19 within the next two weeks.”31 In the midst of COVID spread, the
security forces have been targeting the health care workers and physicians who
participated in the CDM. According to the United Nations, the security forces
had conducted 260 attacks against health care workers, killed 18, and detained
157 so far.32 Many of them were shot in the head. Myanmar is now considered
one of the most dangerous places on earth for health care workers.33 Again, most
Myanmar health care workers are women. The head of the country’s vaccination
program, Dr. Htar Htar Lin, was arrested and charged with high treason in June
2021.34 Many women health care workers and physicians are working in under-
ground clinics to provide health care to the desperate population. These under-
ground health care clinics are constantly in threat of raids.
Women at the Front Line of the Fight for Democracy

As the country continues to descend into deeper turmoil with assistance from
China, Russia, and COVID-19, women are holding the front line with nothing
but their courage, commitment, and creativity. Intervention or substantive sup-
port from the United Nations, ASEAN, the United States, or the European
Union is unlikely.
It is now up to women leaders such as Daw Zin Mar Aung, Daw Ei Thinzar
Mung, Daw Thinzar Shunlei Yi and Daw Ester Ze Naw; women lawyers Daw
Zar Li, Daw May Zin Oo, Daw Myint Myat, Daw Khin Hlaing, Daw Khin
Myo;35 women journalists Daw Naw Betty Han and Daw Nyein Lay; women
organizers Daw Tin Wei and Daw Moe Sandar Myint—working day and night
risking arrests and their lives—to ensure that the fight continues against the bru-
tal military regime. The National Unity Government, made up of ousted lawmak-
ers in hiding, has also appointed several women ministers.36
As the battle for democracy in Myanmar rages on at the doorstep of China,
Myanmar’s women will continue to stand on the front lines to prevent the tri-
umph of authoritarianism. It is a tall order for them to reach a tipping point
against the heavily armed military—which enjoys the support from authoritarian
regimes such as China and Russia—without some substantive international as-
sistance beyond encouragements and statements. The battle for democracy in

Myanmar has become a symbolic contest between democracy and authoritarian-

ism at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. It will be in the best interest of the
most prominent exemplars of democracy to assist Myanmar’s women achieve the
tipping point to defeat the military regime. The failure to restore democracy in
Myanmar will have reverberations throughout the Indo-Pacific. “The interna-
tional community must recognize the courage of the women of Myanmar and
stand with them in their fight for democracy.”37 µ

Dr. Byrd received a BA in economics and accounting from Claremont McKenna College and holds an MBA with
emphasis in Asia-Pacific economics and business from the University of Hawaii. She earned her doctorate in educa-
tion leadership from the University of Southern California. She retired from the US Army after 28 years of distin-
guished service. Highlights of her military career include serving as the deputy economic advisor, civil-military op-
erations plans officer, and interagency operations officer at US Pacific Command in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. She also served as a linguist and cultural advisor to the US delegations attending the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, POW/MIA recovery negotiations in Myanmar (Burma), and Operation
Caring Response to Cyclone Nargis, and US-Myanmar (Burma) Human Rights Dialogues. Dr. Byrd joined the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies in 2007. She researches, teaches, and publishes in the areas of US–Myanmar
(Burma) relations; security dynamics in Southeast Asia; economics and security linkages; rising inequality and its
implication on security; the roles of private-sector, women, and education in socioeconomic development; civil-
military operations; leadership; organizational development & innovation; women peace & security; and transfor-
mational learning and adult education.
Notes
1. Associated Press, “Woman dies after being shot during Myanmar protest,” New York Times,
19 February 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/.
2. “UN Official Condemns Myanmar Military over Sexual Violence.” VOA News, 26 June
2021, https://www.voanews.com/.
3. Hannah Beech, “She is a hero: In Myanmar’s protests, women are on the front lines.” New
York Times, 4 March 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/.
4. Umayma Khan, “Women of Myanmar stand resilient against the military coup,” Aljazeera,
25 April 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/.
5. Jessica Harriden, The Authority of Influence: Women and Power in Burmese History (Copenha-
gen: NIAS Press, 2012), 47.
6. La Ring Aye Lei Tun and Su Su Hlaing, Feminism in Myanmar: A Research Study (Yangon:
EMReF Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation, 2019), 9.
7. Harriden, The Authority of Influencep, 154.
8. Harriden, The Authority of Influencep, 179.
9. Reuters, “Myanmar Military Says Protesters Will Be ‘Shot in the Head’: Report,” NDTV,
26 March 2021, https://www.ndtv.com/; “Russia says to boost miliary ties with Myanmar as junta
leader visits,” Reuters, 23 June 2021, https://www.reuters.com/; and “Myanmar military frees hun-
dreds of detained protesters, child victim buried,” Reuters, 23 March 2021 https://www.reuters.
com/.
10. Harriden, The Authority of Influencep, 48

Byrd
11. Daw Zin Mar Aung is a former political prisoner who served 11 years in detention and a
Member of the Parliament representing National League for Democracy (NLD) 2015–-2020.
She was re-elected in the 2020 election. She was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
the National Unity Government, which was established to counter the military regime after the
coup.
12. Matt Davis, ABC News (Australia) “Whats Happening in Myanmar?,” YouTube, 29 July
2021, https://www.youtube.com/.
13. Tanyalak Thongyoojaroen, “Myanmar women risk it all to challenge the junta,” Aljazeera, 8
March 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/.
14. Matthew Tostevin, “‘Catch me if you can’—writers on wanted list taunt junta as Myanmar
law suspended,” Independent.ie, 14 February 2021, https://www.independent.ie/.
15. Aye Lei Tun and Su Hlaing, Feminism in Myanmar, 13.
16. Nu Nu, not real name for safety reasons, interview with author, 8 March 2021.
17. Laura Villadiego, “The women’s revolution: what the coup means for gender equality in
Myanmar.” Equal Times, 7 May 2021, https://www.equaltimes.org/.
18. “88 Generation” refers to prodemocracy movement participants who participated in a se-
ries of protests that launched on the date, 8-8-88. The military regime violently crushed the move-
ment and jailed many of the leaders for decades.
19. Villadiego, “The women’s revolution.”
20. Phyu Phyu Oo, “The Importance of Myanmar’s Pots and Pans Protests,” The Interpreter, 11
February 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.
21. Reuters, “Myanmar Military Says Protesters Will Be ‘Shot in the Head’”; “Russia says to
boost miliary ties with Myanmar,” Reuters; and “Myanmar military frees hundreds of detained
protesters.”
22. Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege
(Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2021), 1.
23. Cameron Peters, “The UN condemned Myanmar’s coup. Will that matter?” Vox, 20 June
2021, https://www.vox.com/.
24. “Burmese Expert—China helping military establish cyber firewall,” VOA Burmese Service,
12 February 2021, https://www.voanews.com/.
25. “Top Russian Defense Official Seeks Closer Burma Ties as Junta Kills Scores of Protesters
in ‘Shocking Violence’,” Radio Free Europe, 27 Marcj 2021, https://www.rferl.org/.
26. “Myanmar military says protesters will be “shot in the head”,” NDTV; “Russia says to boost
miliary ties with Myanmar,” Reuters; and “Myanmar military frees hundreds of detained protest-
ers,” Reuters.
27. “Russia on Track to Deliver Fighter Jets to Myanmar – Reports,” Moscow Times, 23 July
2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/.
28. The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is the armed wing of the National Unity Government,
which was formed by the democratically elected members of the parliament that the military coup
ousted. The PDF was established to counter and protect the populace and protesters from the
brutal oppression of the military junta. Currently, the PDF is being trained by the long established
ethnic armed groups in the border areas of Myanmar–China, Myanmar–Thailand, and Myanmar–
India.
29. Tom Fawthrop, “Can Myanmar’s Protesters Win?,” The Diplomat, 1 April 2021, https://
thediplomat.com/.

30. Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Myanmar could become COVID ‘super-spreader’ state, says UN ex-
pert,” The Guardian, 28 July 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/.
31. “UN warned fo ‘dire’ COVID situation in Myanmar,” Aljazeera, 30 July 2021, https://www.
aljazeera.com/.
32. David Rising, “Residents: Myanmar leaders use pandemic as politcal weapon.” AP News,
30 July 2021, https://apnews.com/; and Kristen Gelineau and Victoria Milko, “In Myanmar, the
military and police declare war on medics,” AP News, 6 July 2021, https://apnews.com/.
33. Gelineau and Milko, “In Myanmar, the military and police declare war on medics.”
34. Gelineau and Milko, “In Myanmar, the military and police declare war on medics.”
35. Robert Bociaga, “Life in hiding: Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement.” The Diplomat,
22 June 2021, https://thediplomat.com/; and Robert Bociaga, “The danger of defending the de-
fenseless in Myanmar,” The Diplomat, 18 May 2021, https://thediplomat.com/.
36. Mimi Aye, “Myanmar’s women are fighting for a new future after a long history of military
oppression,” Time, 31 May 2021, https://time.com/.
37. Thongyoojaroen, “Myanmar women risk it all.”

FEATURE
Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific

Strategy
Why Is China Winning and What to Do about It?
Pawan Amin
Dr. Monish Tourangbam
T
he Tatmadaw—Myanmar’s military—under the leadership of Com-
mander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing, began a coup on the morning of 1
February 2021, deposing the democratically elected members of Aung
San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and declaring a year-long
state of emergency. This decision by the Tatmadaw came after its repeated asser-
tions regarding irregularities in the November 2020 elections—a claim Myan-
mar’s Union Election Commission dismissed, citing lack of evidence. As things
stand currently, Beijing is best positioned to play the role of a mediator to impress
upon the new military regime to honor its commitment to re-establishing demo-
cratic governance. However, the question is, would Beijing want to do so? Since
the coup, China has insisted that the international community should not inter-
fere in Myanmar’s internal affairs and has encouraged engagement with the Tat-
madaw. On the other hand, Washington has voiced support for member countries
facing China’s aggression and urged the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) to act to end violence and restore democracy in Myanmar. What do
these divergent approaches toward Myanmar indicate about the extent of Wash-
ington’s leverage vis-à-vis Beijing’s clout? Does Washington’s reliance on ASEAN
to bring about a change of course in Myanmar, amid China’s multifaceted influ-
ence there, reflect a viable strategy? Moreover, where does Myanmar, situated at
the confluence of South and Southeast Asia, feature in the US Indo-Pacific
strategy, and can Washington’s rhetorical flourish of ASEAN Centrality in its
Indo-Pacific strategy realistically help the United States navigate Myanmar’s
quagmire?
Keeping these fundamental questions in context, the article will probe Wash-
ington’s relative lack of attention to Myanmar in its Asia rebalancing and Indo-
Pacific strategies and its failure to reap the benefits of Myanmar’s reform and
opening. The article will also assess the extent of the leverage of China’s power in
Myanmar and its implications for Myanmar’s own ability to hedge its bets, and
that of other major players to promote their interests in Myanmar. Lastly, the ar-

Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
ticle will analyze the emerging trajectory of China’s role in Myanmar post the
military coup and argue that Washington needs to soberly assess the value of
Myanmar in its strategic calculus for the Indo-Pacific. Based on such an assess-
ment, Washington needs to clarify the objectives of its approach to Myanmar and
then arrive at its strategy to achieve those objectives, which might include recali-
brating its reliance on ASEAN, its dynamics with China vis-à-vis Myanmar, and
engagement with like-minded partners of the Indo-Pacific region.
Washington’s Myopic Vision for Myanmar and China’s Gain

The trajectory of the US approach to Myanmar can best be described as mis-
guided oscillation. Not only does Washington keep reverting to an approach that
has met with repeated failure but also the distance between the US objectives and
means have been so wide that their implementation has only resulted in shifting
the goal posts further away every time. So far, the United States has employed the
entire range of its diplomatic temper to get the military dispensation in Myanmar
to acquiesce to US demands, ranging from avoidance to ostracization and punish-
ment (sanctions and introducing UN Security Council resolutions to censure the
regime on its human rights records), while also periodically shifting from limited
to pragmatic engagement.
Ever since the 1988 uprising that brought the military junta to power, US for-
eign policy in Myanmar has been aimed to restore the democratically elected
NLD government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and ending the military regime—
this despite the fact that General Saw Maung–led State Law and Order Restora-
tion Council had merely replaced an equally brutal military government, to which
Washington had been providing assistance periodically.1 The zeal with which
Washington has attempted to end military rule and establish electoral democracy
in Myanmar has been exceptional when compared to other authoritarian and
military regimes in the neighborhood that are arguably of greater strategic and
economic import to the United States.2 Perhaps that is the reason why Washing-
ton is more willing to test the limits of the Tatmadaw’s political flexibility and
commitment to peaceful transition to democracy.
According to Prof. David Steinberg of Georgetown University, Myanmar is a
“boutique issue” in US foreign policy—.3 He asserts that Myanmar was not a
major crisis relative to the other issues, which US needed to address in its foreign
policy. However, owing to the lobbying capacity of expatriates from the country,
it had gained some currency with administrations and in the US Congress. Prior
to Obama administration, America’s Myanmar policy was steered by the legisla-
ture. Democracy promotion in Myanmar was a bipartisan issue and congressmen
from both sides of the aisle have introduced legislations sanctioning the members

Amin & Tourangbam
of Junta since the early 90’s.4 Such a bipartisan attitude against an antidemocratic
military ruled Myanmar translates to legislative pressures on the executive.5
For instance, following is the statement from the executive order sanctioning
Myanmar by Pres. Joe Biden in February 2021, “. . . rejecting the will of the people
of Burma as expressed in elections held in November 2020 and undermining the
country’s democratic transition and rule of law, constitutes an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States.”6 This next statement is from the executive order signed by Pres. Barack
Obama in 2009, also imposing sanctions on Myanmar, “. . . the actions and poli-
cies of the Government of Burma continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”7 In both
statements, given more than a decade apart, the situation in Myanmar is catego-
rized as an unusual and extraordinary threat to US national security and foreign
policy. The only likely challenge that could emanate is the precedent that is set
from the executive having to deploy sanctions in pursuance of democracy promo-
tion abroad. Moreover, considering the relative lack of Myanmar’s importance in
the plethora of US foreign policy issues and its low cost-benefit ratio, American
presidents are less likely to challenge the legislature on its decisions pertaining to
Myanmar.
One major regional ramifications of this approach has been an increase in
China’s influence in the region and in ASEAN. Following the group’s decision to
induct Myanmar in 1997 over objections from the United States, Washington did
not sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for more than a decade. The
United States also reduced its participation in the ASEAN summit and refused
to host ASEAN meetings to avoid meeting officials of Myanmar’s State Peace
and Development Council regime.8 During the tenure of Pres. George W. Bush,
the United States also became preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iraq to the
detriment of its ties with ASEAN.9 This affected the United States’ broader stra-
tegic objective, as the void created by America’s absence provided space for China
to emerge as one of the biggest trading partners and investment destinations for
Myanmar and the region.10 This would had a direct bearing on the structure of
US–China competition thereon, as ASEAN emerged as the platform for address-
ing regional security issues, and China leveraged its deep economic linkages with
a few Southeast Asian neighbors to prevent the grouping from arriving at a con-
sensus against China’s territorial intransigencies in the South China Sea. This
made the grouping ineffective in coordinating a regional response.
Change in US approach to the region and to Myanmar did not happen until
the Obama administration called for a review of Myanmar policy in September
2009.11 This change in approach was premised on how sanctions and constructive

engagement had failed to meet US objectives in Myanmar.12 Rather, a multilat-

eral initiative led by the United States, including ASEAN, India, Japan, and
China—which was envisioned as encouraging reform and reconciliation in
Myanmar—was deemed the way forward.13 Then-US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton laid down Washington’s new approach to the region during her visit to
the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta in 2009. The same year, Clinton attended the
ASEAN Regional Forum and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Sec-
retary Clinton decoupled Myanmar from the US–ASEAN relationship and an-
nounced that Washington’s Myanmar policy was under review and that the new
administration did not believe sanctions to be an effective strategy in Myanmar.
Thereon, the Obama administration’s strategy was to deepen ties with ASEAN,
while at the same time continuously engaging Myanmar for reforms and main-
taining a flexible policy approach to address any number of possible outcomes
during Myanmar’s transition process.
Despite some resistance to this approach in the US Congress, Senator Jim
Webb (D-VA), Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Southeast
Asia, argued the need for the United States to balance between its concerns for
democracy and human rights on one hand and its strategic interests in the region
on the other.14 He also went on to assert that China was able to expand its influ-
ence in Myanmar because of US sanctions.15 While this opportunity could have
proven to be an ideal reset strategy—and in many ways, it was—the American
beltway’s overt support for Suu Kyi and the NLD, coupled with reluctance to
engage important domestic political actors in Myanmar, hindered a more realist
strategy. The United States was following what one analyst calls a “tit-for-tat”
diplomacy in Myanmar, where every step the ruling junta took toward democratic
reforms was reciprocated with greater political and diplomatic outreach by the
Obama administration.16 To that end, Pres. Thein Sein of the Tatmadaw-backed
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) undertook some genuine re-
form measures, including conducting free and fair by-elections in April 2012,
which the NLD won comfortably. Thereafter, the United States lifted investment
sanctions later that year and suspended a ban on importing goods from Myan-
mar.17 However, Derek Mitchell’s (who was confirmed as the US ambassador to
Myanmar) direct involvement in Suu Kyi’s campaign made it appear as if the
United States was interfering in the 2015 elections.18
America’s support for Suu Kyi led the junta to accuse her of being an “axe-
handle of the West.”19 Apart from wasting away America’s goodwill through such
explicit support, Washington’s approach was extremely shortsighted. Neither the
NLD nor Suu Kyi were in any way representative of the many ethnic organiza-
tions in the country.20 Moreover, without the support of the Tatmadaw, neither

Amin & Tourangbam
Suu Kyi nor any other civilian administration can govern Myanmar. Apart from
being the most important political actor in the country, the Tatmadaw’s role in
ensuring political stability is vital. Myanmar is and will continue to be a conflict
zone for some time to come. Much of the peripheral regions are under de-facto
control of the ethnic armed organizations, which sustain themselves through a
thriving parallel economy financed by drug, arms, and human trafficking. By sup-
porting the NLD and Suu Kyi, the United States, for all its intents and purposes,
backed the strongest civilian candidate who would guarantee a victory in general
elections. However, Washington lost the plot in having a sustainable political
transition by antagonizing all other important players.
During the Trump administration, both houses of the Congress had Republi-
can majorities, and if there was indeed a vision to resurrect America’s deficient
role in Myanmar’s treacherous politico-economic transition, a more effective
model for engaging multiple actors in Myanmar could have been built. The Trump
presidency however, with its “America first” rhetoric and focus on cutting down
America’s international commitments, did not seem to have any purposeful vision
for Myanmar in its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Thus, during the recent increase
in political tensions, America’s withering points of engagement with political
players in Myanmar stood exposed. The United States has been deficient, perhaps
intentionally, in its outreach to the Tatmadaw.21 While this approach can be ex-
plained by placing it in context of Washington’s priority in ensuring the NLD’s
electoral success, it was incredibly myopic. By sidelining the most powerful do-
mestic political actor, which had retained the constitutional authority to snap-
back the democratic reforms at any given time, the United States, in effect, limited
its own ability to help sustain the NLD government.
In the previous three decades, US foreign policy toward Myanmar was consis-
tent in that any action of the Tatmadaw deemed detrimental to the goal of de-
mocracy promotion or preserving human rights has been swiftly met with US
sanctions. However, by now, it is evident that such measures do not get Washing-
ton anywhere closer to its goal. What is worse is the lack of international reciproc-
ity to Myanmar’s reform process has made it less likely that the Tatmadaw will see
any benefits from investing in political reforms moving forward.
According to Bertil Lintner, the Tatmadaw was keen to reduce its dependence
on China.22 However, the US legislative and executive branches would not settle
for anything less than allowing Suu Kyi and the NLD free and unconditional
participation in the elections. In this phase, Washington had little to lose from the
Tatmadaw’s refusal and hence was more willing to use coercive diplomacy. The
Tatmadaw had a lot to lose if the United States and the international community
did not accept the reform measures, which made it more willing to acquiesce to

international demand for deeper reforms. After the 2012 by-elections and 2015
general elections, the Tatmadaw had seemingly come through on its commitment.
Now, the ball was in the US court, whereby Washington had to reciprocate by
providing alternate sources of investments—thereby reducing Naypyidaw’s eco-
nomic dependence on Beijing. However, as discussed earlier, Myanmar has always
been a boutique issue in US foreign policy. Therefore, the consequences of failure
of agreement were not too severe in Washington’s strategic calculus. Thus, the
United States was less willing to put its weight behind American businesses to
ensure reciprocity.
Currently, the situation is much different. The Tatmadaw has seen that it can no
longer count on the West to substitute or at least reduce its economic dependence
on China. Moreover, unlike during the reform phase, the junta does not have to
consider domestic public opinion any longer, as its actions are not bound by elec-
toral outcomes for the time being. In the 2008 constitution, the junta reserved for
itself the right to declare a state of emergency if it perceived a threat to Myanmar’s
sovereignty. In such a circumstance, the legislative, executive, and judicial author-
ity is transferred to the Commander in Chief of Myanmar’s Defence services.
Moving forward, the Tatmadaw will be less willing now to make concessions as
it had before. On the other hand, while the Trump administration had little to no
interest in pursuing democratic reforms in Myanmar, the Biden administration is
yet to formulate its priorities in the region. If Biden’s response to the coup earlier
this year is anything to go by, then it was a clear indication that promoting de-
mocracy and human rights abroad are once again going to become an important
pillar of US foreign policy.23 Does this necessarily mean that the United States
would be more willing to offer rewards in exchange for the junta restoring democ-
racy? While an articulation of US foreign policy priorities in the region is still
awaited, moving forward it seems unlikely that the Biden administration would
be more successful or willing than the Obama administration in getting US busi-
nesses to invest in Myanmar.
To meet US objectives in Myanmar, Washington has exhausted both the carrot
(promise of investment, trade, political assistance in reconciliation process) and
the stick (sanctions, UNSC resolutions) toward this end. Both approaches have
antagonized powerful domestic actors in Myanmar. One possible alternative
could be to expend more energy in reducing China’s influence in Myanmar by
making Myanmar an integral component of US Indo-Pacific strategy.
Situating Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

From Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia to Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,
certain commonalities in America’s approach continue to persist. At the core,

Amin & Tourangbam
both strategies signal a realignment of US resources to counter China’s growing

capability and a willingness to change the status quo in the region. This has taken
the form of economic leverages that make the aid and investment recipients in the
littoral regions less inclined to use multilateral forums like ASEAN to counter
China’s belligerence. The Obama administration sought to dilute China’s coercive
capability by integrating the ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum into the se-
curity architecture of the region. However, in return, China has been successful in
using its economic leverage in nonlittoral states like Cambodia to dilute the col-
lective bargaining capacity of the ASEAN by blocking any attempt at censuring
Beijing for China’s intransigence.24
In this broader strategic framework, Myanmar’s relevance to the US Indo-
Pacific strategy has been limited to ending Naypyidaw’s weapons purchases from
North Korea. Back in 2011, while seeking to improve ties with the United States,
Naypyidaw had to give assurances and end its weapons purchases as part of its
reform process.25 However, since 2018, reports of Myanmar purchasing weapons
from North Korea, including ballistic missiles, have begun to surface in the me-
dia.26 It is likely that once again the United States will link Myanmar’s reform
process with its military ties with North Korea. The declassified U.S. Strategic
Framework for the Indo-Pacific identifies two regional countries as strategic threats
to US national interest—North Korea and China. Myanmar has traditionally
maintained deep ties with both regimes. While Washington insisted on Naypy-
idaw severing military ties with the former, during the beginning of the Pragmatic
Engagement back in 2009, Secretary Clinton saw China as a partner when it
came to assisting in Myanmar’s reform process.
Despite the junta’s overtures, the fact that Naypyidaw was actually trying to
move closer to Washington and pivot away from Beijing did not matter as much
to successive US administrations. As long as the democratic reforms went forward
in a steady pace, the Obama administration was willing to incrementally concede
political recognition to the USDP. However, judging by the administration’s sup-
port to Suu Kyi and the NLD in winning the election, it is apparent that Wash-
ington cared more about the political transition rather than checking Chinese
influence. On the other hand, the Tatmadaw itself had adopted a very cautious
approach to the reform process, including installing constitutional safeguards to
protect its interests in a democratic Myanmar. Through its support to the NLD,
the United States might have inadvertently democratized Myanmar at a faster
pace than the Tatmadaw was ready to accept, thereby creating further distrust
among the Tatmadaw’s leadership regarding America’s long-term intentions.
Washington’s limited goal in Myanmar cost it a partner who was willing to
make difficult political concessions to reduce China’s influence in the region, a

primary objective of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. While Myanmar falls geograph-

ically in the region that the United States defines as the Indo-Pacific, it is not of
strategic import to Washington given its limited role in addressing the flashpoints
that have been the focus of US Indo-Pacific strategy so far: the South China and
the East China Seas. While Washington has sought to bring together all regional
countries that may perceive shared interest with the United States given their own
contentions with Beijing, America’s objective has been limited to amplifying op-
position to China’s belligerence in the high seas and seeking commitments to
deter any eventuality that may arise from China’s misadventures in these zones.
The United States has never promised to reciprocate such commitments with a
promise to come to aid of nonlittoral countries in their own conflict with China.
This understanding of expectations also limits the extent of cooperation in the
region. However, there are certain low-intensity issue areas where a shared Indo-
Pacific objective can be met with limited costs, and Myanmar is the lowest hang-
ing fruit.
Low levels of economic development due to economic mismanagement and
decades of sanctions have pushed Myanmar deep into China’s embrace. Reducing
this dependence was one of the reasons Myanmar sought development partners
in the West. While China has invested in infrastructure development, most of it
is built to connect resources to Chinese businesses in Yunnan or Chinese busi-
nesses to markets and ports. Infrastructure connectivity within different parts of
Myanmar itself is still wanting. The 2019 US document, Free and open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision, acknowledged the infrastructure deficit in the region,
which China has been leveraging for influence using the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). The document reflected on infrastructure programs that could provide an
alternative to the BRI to countries in the region.
Transitioning to democracy is difficult in the absence of peace. For peace to
sustain in a fractured political environment like Myanmar, there needs to be cer-
tain peace dividends. Even if establishing a democratic system with Suu Kyi at its
helm continues to be the guiding objective of Biden’s Myanmar strategy, it will
not sustain merely by helping the NLD win elections. For democracy to survive,
all political parties must feel assured that their political and economic interests are
protected. This means that moving forward, the Tatmadaw and regional ethnic
political groups and armed organizations need to be included in the crafting of
Myanmar’s political future. This will not be easy given China’s insecurities and
proxy actors like the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—
aka Kokang Army and Arakan Army (AA)—which could incite violence to
scuttle any process of reconciliation.

Amin & Tourangbam
Unless a long-term picture of Myanmar’s role in US regional strategy is articu-

late and established, the US–Myanmar relationship will continue to oscillate with
every change in presidency or more often, if the frequency of coups increases.
While countering China’s influence is the broader strategic objective, the task
might be easier said than done. Given the favorable position it enjoys, trying to
rout Chinese influence can lead to backlash from the Myanmar military, which is
presently counting on China to insulate it from international censures. However,
there is a limit to how much Beijing can leverage China’s current position. It can
only build so many miles of highways and railways. Similarly, it cannot perpetuate
the conflict for eternity just to keep itself politically relevant.
By partnering with like-minded countries like India and Thailand, which have
stakes in a peaceful Myanmar, the United States can leverage political capital of
regional countries that have been engaging with Myanmar and its domestic actors
since independence. More importantly, if Washington were to maintain consis-
tency in the US approach to Myanmar, the United States will need to accept that
its broader strategic objective will always take precedence over its limited regional
goals. By prioritizing democracy promotion and relying solely on Suu Kyi to de-
liver it, Washington risks losing its political capital and pushing Myanmar further
into China’s embrace, thereby scuttling even the broader objective. Navigating
such complexities will require a more sophisticated foreign policy, which does not
rely solely on one person or party. To that end, assessing China’s foreign policy
approach to Myanmar might have some lessons for the United States.
China’s Multilayered Engagement with Myanmar

China’s engagement with Myanmar is one of the most sophisticated bilateral
relationships that Beijing operates. As a neighboring country, China, like India,
has inherited a restive borderland along the China–Myanmar border. The political
reach of the central government in Myanmar, and to some extent the Bamar-
dominated Tatmadaw, is restricted to the center of the country, while along the
country’s borders, non-Bamar ethnic communities maintain their semi-sovereign
enclaves with their own ethnic armed organizations (EAO). Most of these EAOs
finance their operations through illegal farming and trafficking of opium, illegal
manufacturing and trading of firearms and weapons, and illicit logging, mining,
and trafficking in precious minerals.
Given this neighborhood, Beijing has been exceptionally successful in navigat-
ing a complex political landscape and extracting maximum benefits for China. In
the initial decades after coming to power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
focused on supporting the Burmese Communist Party—comprised of non-Bamar
ethnic groups—to defeat the Kuomintang forces that had taken shelter in the

southern neighbor following their defeat in China’s civil war. Following a period
of economic reforms, China’s policy became increasingly federated and operated
from Kunming for a brief while. It was focused on finding markets for local busi-
nesses that could not compete with big businesses along China’s eastern coast.
Thus, Myanmar became a conduit for developing China’s landlocked Yunnan
province. Myanmar provided the easiest means for shipping and exports to Yun-
nan. Consequently, Myanmar is home to a large Chinese business community. As
per one account, 700–800 Chinese enterprises are operating in Myanmar.27
China’s top foreign policy objectives in Myanmar are threefold. First is ensur-
ing stability along its border. EAOs operating along the China–Myanmar border
are nonsignatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). This means
frequent clashes between these EAOs and the Tatmadaw are commonplace. Chief
among these EAOs are the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa
State Army (UWSA), and the aforementioned MNDAA.
China’s proactive involvement in Myanmar’s National Reconciliation Process
started due to frequent eruption of clashes on the Chinese side of the border. In
2009, fighting between the MNDAA and Tatmadaw drove nearly 30,000 refu-
gees into Yunnan.28 In 2015, while targeting MNDAA strongholds, Tatmadaw
aircraft dropped bombs on the Chinese side of the border, killing five Chinese
citizens.29 In 2017, two Chinese died inside Myanmar during similar clashes.30
These clashes threaten Chinese business interests, as the bulk of trade between
Myanmar and Yunnan passes through border towns like Muse. Major economic
projects like the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, Ruili–Mandalay Railways,
and Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone are in conflict areas. Protecting these
economic interests forms a second objective of China’s diplomacy.
Third, and one of the most strategic aspects of China’s interests in Myanmar is
gaining access to the Indian Ocean. Shipping costs for transporting goods to in-
land Chinese provinces reduces greatly when imported through Myanmar’s Ky-
aukphyu port. The China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, which reduces China’s
dependence on the narrow Straits of Malacca, makes Naypyidaw an important
partner in China’s energy security. This necessitates China to maintain a healthy
relationship with any central government.
The economic and strategic stakes for China to protect these investments in
Myanmar are high, thereby necessitating a multilayered approach to diplomacy.
This requires Beijing to build multiple leverages with different political actors in
a manner that China’s role in Myanmar’s domestic affairs becomes indispensable.
Beijing does not see this as interference, claiming it is the domestic actors in
Myanmar who request Chinese assistance and that China does not do anything
of its own volition. However, it would be naïve to believe that Beijing is merely a

Amin & Tourangbam
passive participant, when the whole purpose of China’s engagement is to protect

its interests in Myanmar at all costs. Moreover, the fact that China has tradition-
ally held close ties to EAOs that are not signatories to the NCA has also led to
speculations that China is providing economic and military assistance to these
groups to perpetuate the conflict and maintain its political leverage with the Tat-
madaw. Despite the distrust, the Tatmadaw has little room for maneuvering given
its economic and military dependence on Beijing.
The leverages that China seeks to create are threefold: political, economic, and
military. China has cultivated tremendous political capital for itself by becoming
an active mediator of conflicts in Myanmar, often hosting meetings between fac-
tions to resume peace. China has displayed its ability to bring EAOs to the nego-
tiating table—for example the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference,
organized by Special Envoy Sun Guoxiang—making it an important partner for
all political actors in Myanmar. Weeks prior to this conference the , KIA,
MNDAA, AA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State
Army-North (SSA-N) formed the Federal Political Negotiation and Coordina-
tion Committee (FPNCC) to renegotiate the terms of the NCA. This threatened
to derail the negotiations, as these groups were among the most powerful EAOs
and had the most frequent clashes with the Tatmadaw. Sun Guoxiang used his
influence to convince the FPNCC to attend the second session of the 21st Cen-
tury Panglong Peace Conference.31 In 2018 Sun Guoxiang also arranged for in-
dividual EAOs of the FPNCC to meet with the Tatmadaw in Yunnan to negoti-
ate terms for signing the NCA, once with the KIA in Dali and later that year with
the Northern Alliance (TNLA, MNDA, AA, UWSA, and KIA) in Kunming.32
In August 2019, when clashes broke out between the Northern Alliance and the
Tatmadaw at the Mandalay–Muse highway at Northern Shan State, the special
envoy met the representatives of the Northern Alliance in Kunming and arranged
a meeting between the alliance and Tatmadaw to end the fighting.33
China maintains ties with political actors in Myanmar at all levels. Some schol-
ars have said that it was the cancellation of the multibillion-dollar Myitsone dam
and Letpadaung Copper mine due to local unrest that caused China to develop a
horizontal foreign policy approach, seeking to establish political ties with all ma-
jor political actors. However, Beijing has always maintained political ties with all
major political players, including the opposition groups and EAOs. Chen Ruishen,
China’s ambassador to Myanmar between 1987 and 1991, met Suu Kyi several
times during his tenure, even after the junta placed her under house arrest. Talk-
ing about China’s approach to powerful political actors abroad, he said, “Our
stance at the time was to not interfere in the disputes in Myanmar’s politics and
to take a neutral stance. After recognizing the military government, we still kept

contact with the opposition because it was an important political force in the
country. . . . As long as the party is a legitimate one, there is no reason for us to
avoid a meeting.”34 Adding to this, another scholar from the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations notes, “aside from keeping diplomatic re-
lations with foreign governments, China often holds exchanges with foreign par-
ties both in and out of power. . . . With the principle of not intervening in the
internal affairs of others, China develops interparty relations only for further
improving bilateral ties. It is just a method to expand the channels for
communication.”35
Following international ostracization on the heels of the Rohingya crisis of
2017, China’s importance to shelter the civilian regime and the Tatmadaw against
any UNSC resolutions became even more pronounced. Moreover, this assistance
increased Myanmar’s economic reliance and the Tatmadaw’s military dependence
on China. While the Myanmar economy was witnessing a steady growth rate
with moderately increased foreign investment following the 2015 elections, the
COVID-19 pandemic, sanctions following the Rohingya crisis of 2017, and the
domestic political turmoil following the coup served to bring the economy to a
grinding halt. The World Bank has contracted Myanmar’s growth forecast for
2021 by 10 percent.36 On the other hand, according to the UN Development
Program, the series of crises that have impacted Myanmar’s economy could result
in half the population of Myanmar living below the national poverty line by
2022.37
As per one estimate, out of the approximately 26 billion USD worth of Myan-
mar’s total global trade, nearly 9 billion USD, or one-third, was conducted with
China in 2019.38 In 2020, 96 percent of China’s demand for tin concentrate and
nearly half its heavy rare earth concentrates came from Myanmar.39 Beijing in-
vested USD 20 billion in Myanmar in 2020, making China the highest source of
foreign investment in country.40 At present, the debt owed by Myanmar to China
is 28 percent of Myanmar’s GDP and 40 percent of its total debt.41 Myanmar’s
Auditor General cautioned that at a 4.5-percent interest rate, the interest on Chi-
nese loans is higher than that from any other country or lending agency, including
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.42 Naypyidaw pays USD 500
million to China annually toward loan repayment.43 It is opined that the reason
for the high interest rate is so that China can take controlling stakes of strategic
projects like the deep-water port in Kyaukphyu.44 Despite the optimism sur-
rounding the bonhomie between the West and Myanmar in the beginning of the
previous decade, the outcome that Myanmar was hoping for did not come to
fruition. Other than China remaining Myanmar’s most important trade and in-
vestment partner, Beijing’s economic compulsion of Myanmar, coupled with the

Amin & Tourangbam
scope and value of upcoming Chinese projects, render China so indispensable to

Myanmar’s economy, despite the concerns surrounding the debt burden that
Myanmar would be taking on itself.
For a military embroiled in continuous conflict, access to arms and ammuni-
tions becomes vital for regime survival. As per the SIPRI database, Myanmar
spent USD 1.3 billion on arms imports from China. Fifty percent of Myanmar’s
major arms imports between 2014–2019, including radars, warships, combat and
trainer aircrafts and 90 percent of its military transport came from China.45 To be
able to sell weapons to the Tatmadaw and yet to maintain the trust of the EAOs
that are fighting the Tatmadaw requires some measure of skilled balancing. Bei-
jing’s diplomacy in Myanmar benefits from the fact that it is not impinged on the
success of a particular individual/party or a particular outcome. This allows a cer-
tain amount of maneuverability to China’s diplomacy to work with multiple play-
ers who are at odds with each other to achieve Beijing’s long-term strategic goals.
Conclusion—Is It Worth Winning Myanmar Back?

Before assessing the differences in the two approaches, it would be fair to ac-
knowledge the structural factors that influence bilateral relationships with Myan-
mar. By virtue of being a proximate power, China has had many more reasons to
develop a deeper relationship with Myanmar. The CCP has had a long history
with the Burmese Communist Party, which eventually dissolved into ethnic orga-
nizations along Myanmar’s periphery. In the 1990s, China’s Western Develop-
ment Strategy—which intended to develop the western provinces of China—
identified Myanmar as an ideal market to help grow the businesses of Yunnan
province and as a footbridge to connect Yunnan to the Indian Ocean, thereby
facilitating exports to global markets. More recently, with higher stakes in pre-
serving China’s expanded economic and strategic portfolio in Myanmar, Beijing
has started playing an active role in conflict mediation. Some have opined that
China’s participation in the Myanmar’s reconciliation process is merely a means
to bring Naypyidaw closer into Beijing’s sphere of influence. While that might be
true, that does not diminish the fact that there was a strategic compulsion behind
this approach. Needless to say, the potential fallout of a misstep is also equally
great and will endanger China’s investments, most of which are in conflict-prone
regions.
While China has reaped rewards from its political investment—not only in the
reconciliation process but also by protecting the central government against col-
lective action in international forums—the risk exposure to Chinese economic
and political investments are also equally high. Given China’s increasing global
portfolio of investments in other conflict regions, China has also had to walk a

tightrope between protecting its investment without conceding too much, lest it
sets an expensive precedent that other investment recipients from China can use
to their advantage.
There are two foreign policy strategies of China that are at interplay in Myan-
mar: Western Development strategy and the Malacca Dilemma. The latter is
China’s attempt to reduce the risk to its energy supply—the majority of which
traverses the narrow Straits of Malacca. Given the friction in Beijing’s ties with
India and the United States, both of which have significant naval presence in the
Indian Ocean, China has concerns that if a conflict were to break out, its crucial
energy supplies could be disrupted. To prevent that, China has been setting up
alternative routes for energy supply. This makes the the Kyaukphyu–Kunming oil
and gas pipeline vital to China’s energy security. These broader strategic objectives
guide China’s diplomacy in Myanmar.
On the other hand, while Washington has a well-articulated strategy for ensur-
ing US primacy in the region, and Myanmar is in the geographical area covered
by the Indo-Pacific, US strategy toward Myanmar has been a continuation of its
priorities articulated in the 1990s. It continues to lobby for Suu Kyi and the NLD
to be restored to power. This is purely an emotive and value-laden issue for the
Congress and is devoid of any realpolitik considerations, since no military regime
in recent history has challenged or threatened US interests in the region.
The USDP government implemented real political change and took Naypy-
idaw on the path to democracy in hopes of reducing economic and political de-
pendence on China. This was an opportunity presented on a platter by a country
enmeshed in China’s sphere of influence, which was risking its most crucial rela-
tionship and implementing political reforms, in hopes of providing more political
space to its rival to reduce China’s influence. This was obstensibly a key objective
of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, for its part, Washington was only inter-
ested in the reforms undertaken by USDP so long as such measures ensured a
transition of power to the NLD through an electoral victory. This has damaged
America’s political capital in Myanmar, as the Tatmadaw will be wary of imple-
menting any change that dilutes its power without any reciprocal material benefits
to Myanmar in return. While the Tatmadaw today is reliant on China for reviving
Myanmar’s economy, protecting the regime in multilateral forums, bringing a
peaceful settlement to the decades-long civil war, the junta still has enough rea-
sons to not trust China entirely. This provides a space for Washington to maneuver
and not just bring the process of democratic transition back on track but also in-
tegrate Myanmar into the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Before Washington does that, however, the Biden administration must make
an honest assessment of whether it wants to expend political capital in the Con-

Amin & Tourangbam
gress to pursue a strategy that promotes democracy in Myanmar. The administra-

tion must also be prepared to expend economic resources to provide a viable alter-
native to Naypyidaw. There is a high chance that the pace of democratic transition
will be slower than before or might not succeed. Considering the myriad of other
foreign policy issues that require the Biden administration’s attention, including
its recent blunders in Afghanistan, the government must decide if Myanmar de-
serves the requisite attention. The primary objective of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
is to reduce China’s influence in the region. If the Tatmadaw, as seen during
Myanmar’s phase of reform and opening, intends to reduce the nations overde-
pendence on neighboring China, US policy toward Myanmar in itself and as a
component of its broader Indo-Pacific Strategy requires a more realist turn. Such a
strategy must be premised on effectively engaging multiple players of Myanmar’s
quagmire and doing so in concert with other like-minded partners of the Indo-
Pacific region. µ
Pawan Amin
Mr. Amin is a PhD Candidate at the Chinese Studies Programme, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of Interna-
tional Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Dr. Monish Tourangbam

Dr. Tourangbam is a Senior Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Ma-
nipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal and the Honorary Director of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Stud-
ies.
Notes
1. David Steinberg, “Myanmar and U.S. Policy: Platitudes, Progress and Potential Problems,”
Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs (Fall/Winter 2014), 115–16.
2. Steinberg, “Myanmar and U.S. Policy,” 116.
3. David Steinberg, “The United States and Myanmar: A ‘boutique Issue’?,” International Af-
fairs 86, no. 1 ( January 2010), 175.
4. Steinberg, “Myanmar and U.S. Policy,” 115.
5. Steinberg, “The United States and Myanmar,” 175.
6. Barack Obama, “Message from the President and Notice regarding Burma,” 15 May 2009,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/.
7. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Executive Order on Blocking Property with Respect to the Situation
in Burma,” 11 February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
8. Priscilla Clap, “Prospects for Rapprochement Between the United States and Myanmar,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no.3 (December 2010), 413.
9. Jurgen Hacke, “Myanmar Now a Site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?,” LSE IDEAS
(November 2012), 54, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/.

10. Hacke, “Myanmar Now a Site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?.”

11. Craig Clafter, “American Foreign Policy Towards Myanmar part1: ‘Blinded by the light’ of
Wilsonian Idealism,” NewMandala, 3 February 2021, https://www.newmandala.org/.
12. Clap, “Prospects for Rapprochement Between the United States and Myanmar,” 411.
13. Clafter, “American Foreign Policy Towards Myanmar.”
16. Nehginpao Kipgen, “A Review of US-Myanmar Relations: THE APPLICATION OF
TIT-FOR-TAT DIPLOMACY,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 17, no.4 (De-
cember 2013): 104–13.
17. Kipgen, “A Review of US-Myanmar Relations,” 110.
19. David Steinberg, “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy Towards Burma/Myanmar,” Journal
of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 3 (2010), 40.
20. Jonah Blank, “Myanmar Coup: First Foreign policy Test for President Biden,” TheRand-
Blog, 9 February 2021, https://www.rand.org/.
22. John Zaw, “China’s diplomatic shield has a price for Myanmar,” UCANEWS, 21 January
2019, https://www.ucanews.com/.
23. Hal Brands, “The Emerging Biden Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2021, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/.
24. “ASEAN nations fail to reach agreement on South China Sea,” BBC, 13 July 2012, https://
www.bbc.com/; and Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina, and Ben Blanchard, “ASEAN deadlocked
on South Chian Sea, Cambodia Blocks Statement,” Reuters, 25 July 2016, https://www.reuters.
com/.
25. Choe Sang Hun, “Myanmar Vows to Cease Buying Weapons from North Korea,” New
York Times, 15 May 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/.
26. Lindsay Murdoch, “Fears Myanmar buying missiles from North Korea raise Canberra’s
alarm,” Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/.
27. “To leave or not, Chinese companies are torn in the face of West-incited attacks amid
Myanmar Political upheaval,” Global Times, 18 March 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.
28. Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Myanmar headache,” The Diplomat, 19 February 2015, https://
thediplomat.com/.
29. Ankit Panda, “Myanmar Bombings in Yunnan Killed 4 Chinese,” The Diplomat, 14 March
2015, https://thediplomat.com/.
30. USIP Senior Study Group Report, “China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflict,” United
States Institute of Peace, no. 1 (September 2018), 16, https://www.usip.org/.
31. Chan Thar, “China Urges Northern Alliance to Attend Panglong Conference,” Myanmar
Times, 21 May 2018, https://www.mmtimes.com/.
32. Sai Wansai, “China’s mediation of Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw,” ShanNews, 16
August 2018, https://english.shannews.org/; and Chan Thar, “Government meets with Northern
Alliance Group for the first time,” Myanmar Times, 6 September 2018, https://www.mmtimes.
com/.
33. “FPNCC Leaders Meet Chinese Envoy,” Burma News International, 29 August 2019,
https://www.bnionline.net/.

Amin & Tourangbam
34. Zhu Shanshan, “Chinese ambassador met with Aung San Suu Kyi,” Global Times, 16 De-
cember 2011, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.
35. Zhu, “Chinese ambassador met with Aung San Suu Kyi.”
36. World Bank, “Myanmar Economy Expected to Contract by 18 percent in 2021: Report,”
26 July 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/.
37. UNDP, “Pandemic and political crisis could result in half of Myanmar’s population living
in poverty by 2022, UNDP says,” 30 April 2021, https://www.undp.org/.
38. “Annual International Trade Statistics by Country (HS02)- Myanmar,” Trend Economy,
https://trendeconomy.com/.
39. “Explainer: Possible impact of Myanmar coup on China’s metal and rare earth supply,”
Reuters, 10 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/.
40. Sumanth Samsani, “Understanding the relations between Myanmar and China,” Observer
Research Foundation, 26 April 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/.
41. Chaubey Santosh, “India Must Take Note of Chinese Designs in Myanmar as Another
Hostile Front May Open in Coup Shadow,” News 18, 12 February 2021, https://www.news18.
com/.
42. Santosh, “India Must Take Note of Chinese Designs.”
45. Samsani, “Understanding the relations between Myanmar and China.”

VIEW
The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN

Inflection Point
Charles Dunst
E
arly on the morning of 2 February 2021, soldiers and police officers
marched through the streets of Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s capital, accompa-
nied by an insentient but no less imposing cadre of tanks and helicopters.
Within hours, the military—the Tatmadaw—had seized control of the govern-
ment, cut off Internet networks, shut down the stock market, and placed under
arrest numerous activists and politicians, including, most notably, Aung San Suu
Kyi, the civilian government’s de facto leader. The Tatmadaw then declared a “state
of emergency” in which Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military’s com-
mander in chief, would govern for a year. His security forces have since responded
viciously to nationwide anti-coup protests, killing upwards of 800 people, includ-
ing young children in their own homes.1
But this coup nonetheless remains incomplete: Many Burmese officials—dip-
lomats, police, and even soldiers—have pushed back against or defected from the
military.2 The most prominent example is U Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambas-
sador to the United Nations, who continues to side with his country’s pro-
democracy demonstrators and has raised the famous three-finger salute—a pan-
Asian demand for freedom borrowed from The Hunger Games film franchise—at
the United Nations (UN) in New York. The junta demanded the ambassador’s
resignation and charged him with high treason, but he refuses to stand down.3
(The UN General Assembly’s credentials committee will not meet until Septem-
ber; it remains unclear if the UN would accept a junta-appointed ambassador.)
ASEAN’s Response
ASEAN’s response, however, has been anything but brave. Its member states
are far from united: Thailand has promised not to interfere, saying that the coup
is none of its business; Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have essentially
said the same; Brunei has called for a return to Myanmar’s previous semidemo-
cratic system; while Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed “disgust at the con-
tinuing deadly violence against unarmed civilians,” per the former’s prime minis-
ter, and called for the restoration of democracy.4 But, on the whole, none are
willing to truly stand up to the Tatmadaw or stand up for the Suu Kyi government.
Instead, ASEAN member states are allowing Myanmar’s incomplete coup to drag

Dunst
on, all while offering the Tatmadaw undeserved legitimacy by allowed junta leader
Min Aung Hlaing and other representatives of his government to join and speak
at official virtual meetings. Malaysian diplomats have also met with junta officials
(although Malaysia’s foreign ministry later denied any recognition of the Tat-
madaw regime),5 while the bloc watered down a UN resolution calling for an
arms embargo on Myanmar.6 Min Aung Hlaing even attended the ASEAN sum-
mit in Indonesia—his first foreign trip since seizing power.7
By accepting the Tatmadaw regime on the grounds of non-interference in other
members’ domestic affairs—a firm ASEAN commitment—the bloc is undermin-
ing both Southeast Asia’s stability (what happens as more refugees continue to
flood out of Myanmar and when the country becomes a hotbed for illicit activity?8)
and the region’s geopolitical ambitions more broadly. Indeed, with ASEAN al-
lowing the junta to take Myanmar’s seat, the body will struggle to bring the hu-
man rights-wary United States to the table. This will leave Southeast Asian coun-
tries to engage the Americans on a bilateral basis—one that disadvantages the
smaller and less powerful countries of Southeast Asia who intend to shape their
collective future without relying on China or the United States. To avoid becom-
ing a vassal for the former, Southeast Asians know that they need the Americans
to be both present and engaged. But if ASEAN further legitimizes the Tatmadaw,
the bloc risks driving away the United States; the agony, then, will not just be
Myanmar’s but also ASEAN’s. And perhaps the only beneficiary, at least strategi-
cally, will be China.9
Intra-ASEAN relations are based on the principle of noninterference: member
states should neither meddle in one another’s domestic affairs nor support politi-
cal movements in neighboring states. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s
foundational document, states plainly that member states must prevent external
interference to ensure domestic and regional stability.10
But ASEAN has hardly always followed this principle. In December 2005, for
example, its ministers castigated Myanmar, urging the previous Tatmadaw junta
(which ruled from 1962 to 2011) to democratize and release political prisoners,
including Suu Kyi, who spent some 15 years under house arrest after returning to
the country in 1988.11
Yet ASEAN members are nonetheless still clinging to the principle of nonin-
terference today, in no small part because the region has experienced deep demo-
cratic backsliding since 2005 and because none of these illiberal leaders want the
limelight of criticism shined on them. In recent years, the military seized control
of Thailand in its own coup; Cambodia’s Hun Sen further consolidated his deeply
autocratic personalist regime; and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, a vocal sup-

The Myanmar Coup as an ASEAN Inflection Point
porter of the extrajudicial killing of drug users and other criminals, won elections
and has since governed semiautocratically.
ASEAN has also for years ignored Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya
Muslims, natives of Myanmar’s Rakhine State who are nonetheless stateless be-
cause the state denies them citizenship under a 1982 law based on the presump-
tion that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, even though many have
lived in Myanmar for generations. The bloc continued looking away in 2017, when
the Tatmadaw ramped up its long-running campaign against the Rohingya,
torching their villages, raping their women, and massacring their infants.12 Dur-
ing this campaign, the Tatmadaw killed somewhere around 24,000 Rohingya and
drove more than 730,000 to seek refuge in Bangladesh.13
ASEAN’s promised noninterference protects these and other bloc members
from the human rights criticisms more likely to stem from the West. ASEAN
members simply avoid these headaches by agreeing to collectively look the other
way.
But the bloc’s commitment to noninterference has undermined its geopolitical
influence before. Former US president George W. Bush, during his administra-
tion, held ASEAN at arm’s length because it included Myanmar’s previous junta
in its hosted events. At an ASEAN event, President Bush once even refused to sit
at the same table as Tatmadaw leaders.14 Throughout the 2000s, meanwhile, his
administration routinely sent lower-level officials to ASEAN meetings—such as
the deputy to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who herself skipped at least
one meeting in protest—at least partially because junta members were taking part
in ASEAN pageantry.15 In 2006, the United States and European Union skipped
ASEAN meetings to protest Myanmar’s potential chairmanship of the bloc.16
That year, the West demanded that Myanmar release Suu Kyi from house arrest
or move toward democratization before chairing the organization; Myanmar did
neither and instead gave up the chairmanship.17
The situation is arguably much trickier today, though, with at least two groups
claiming to represent Myanmar—one of which, the junta government, both the
Joseph Biden administration and leading European powers deem illegitimate. The
other is a National Unity Government (NUG) comprising elected members of
parliament, protest leaders, and ethnic minorities; the Committee Representing
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a shadow cabinet behind the NUG, has already
confirmed Suu Kyi as its de facto leader.18 The NUG now hopes to win interna-
tional recognition and aid before ousting the military and bringing back some
form of democracy to Myanmar.19

Dunst
The View from Washington

But Washington will likely not recognize the NUG, despite the fact that top
officials from the US State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
have spoken with members of the CRPH.20 Recognizing an unelected but demo-
cratically minded shadow government would be extremely out of character for the
United States.
It is also worth considering that Suu Kyi’s inclusion in the NUG may not actu-
ally help as much as the group’s leaders intend. No longer the icon revered by the
world for standing up to a brutal junta, she is despised in many Western circles
because she was so impassive in the face of the military’s anti-Rohingya violence
(and later even defended it).
Too many Western elites never truly understood Myanmar and Suu Kyi’s po-
litical calculations—that she would not, for all her supposed liberal ideals, stand
up for a community as domestically despised as the Muslim Rohingya are in
Myanmar.21 Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party’s rank-and-file
supporters, like a significant share of the Buddhist majority, believe that the Ro-
hingya—called “Bengalis” by many Burmese—are not truly from Myanmar and
simply do not deserve to live in the country.22 In 2016, Suu Kyi reflected this
position by asking the US ambassador in Myanmar not to refer to the group as
“Rohingya.”23 Indeed, she herself has long refused to use the term, instead sug-
gesting that they are not actually from Myanmar.24 A decade ago, an NLD
spokesman made the party’s views (and seemingly those of Suu Kyi) plain: “The
Rohingya are not our citizens.”25
Western elites nevertheless for years projected their hopes for Myanmar onto
Suu Kyi, making her a global human rights icon despite her outright hostility to
criticism of human rights issues within her own country.26 They expected her to
stand up for minorities, even though her and her party’s anti-Rohingya attitudes
were obvious. Her foreign backers responded with little less than disgust when
she backed the Tatmadaw after the 2017 violence in what was a plainly pragmatic
effort to “be good with Min Aung Hlaing,” as one veteran Myanmar politician
put it.27 When the Tatmadaw faced charges of genocide at The Hague, she horri-
fied her international admirers by showing up to defend it; she once again failed
to even call the Rohingya by their name.28
But Myanmar’s former quasidemocratic political system gave the military 25
percent of the seats in parliament by default; positive terms with the Tatmadaw
were therefore necessary for Suu Kyi. Yet even defending the Tatmadaw at The
Hague could not win her the generals’ trust. Standing up for them, and losing her
international reputation in the process, could not keep the Tatmadaw at bay.

The situation, then, is as follows: Not only are there at least two groups claim-
ing to represent Myanmar but also a deeply tarnished Suu Kyi remains attached
to the “good” one—some of whose members have little democratic legitimacy
(despite all their good intentions). So, while Washington refuses to negotiate with
the junta even if doing so might be strategically wise,29 and remains committed,
on paper at least, to reinstalling the Suu Kyi government,30 it is hard to see the
United States spending the necessary geopolitical capital to do so. Myanmar is
too far way, too much of a headache, and nowhere near the top of the Biden ad-
ministration’s list of priorities, particularly given recent events in Afghanistan.
Most likely we’ll see limited symbolic opposition, aggressive statements, and some
sanctions (as we’ve seen so far), but little meaningful action. The Biden White
House will not risk too much on behalf of a former peace icon turned pariah.
Yet Biden entered office with hopes of forming some kind of anti-China or at
least China-skeptical bloc in Asia—a daunting task to begin with, for various
economic, cultural, and political reasons. But Myanmar’s incomplete coup, ASE-
AN’s toleration of it, and Washington’s halfhearted commitment to Suu Kyi are
throwing a wrench in these plans. Biden may want to repivot from the Middle
East to Asia, but if Myanmar junta leaders are invited to events such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum or East Asia Summit, he will find it difficult to attend.
Biden’s secretaries of state and defense, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, re-
spectively, have taken part in virtual ASEAN events at which Tatmadaw officials
represented Myanmar, but they did so begrudgingly, and they used their platforms
to denounce the junta and demand ASEAN action on the coup.31 President
Biden, however, has not allowed himself to be in the Tatmadaw’s presence; it’s
hard to imagine that he will change this position moving forward. Indeed, one
expects that he will continue avoiding any in-person (or even Zoom) photo-ops
with Min Aung Hlaing or other junta leaders. If Min Aung Hlaing or any Tat-
madaw representatives are at the ASEAN Regional Forum or East Asia Sum-
mit—which they probably will be—one should wager that Biden will not be there
and that he will send a lower-level official to signal his displeasure with ASEAN.
Biden will certainly not want to appear softer on human rights compared to
George W. Bush. Blinken, for his part, has in his nascent tenure moved human
rights increasingly into the State Department’s forefront; it is unlikely that Biden
would undo this by agreeing to pal around with the junta. One instead expects
that Biden will stick to his principles by refusing to recognize the Tatmadaw or
engage with Myanmar’s generals in person or even through Zoom, all while push-
ing in a somewhat limited manner—likely sanctions, but certainly no support for
military intervention—to bring back Suu Kyi’s government.

Dunst
Biden and Blinken have made and will continue to make clear their opposition
to the junta and ASEAN’s toleration of it, but the administration will nonetheless
try to cooperate with Southeast Asia on development, trade, and pushing back
against Chinese aggressiveness. Biden’s goal of forming some China-skeptical
bloc in the Indo-Pacific is too important to be sidelined by Myanmar’s domestic
difficulties.
But Washington’s unwillingness to either negotiate with the junta or truly go
out on a limb for Suu Kyi risks extending the incompleteness of Myanmar’s
coup—which would be disastrous for ASEAN. The grouping has so far shown an
unwillingness to act. Its leaders will not invite members of the NUG to meetings
and push the junta out of its official workings, as anticoup activists hope.32 But
ASEAN’s inaction will make relations with Biden difficult: he has made human
rights enough of a priority that he cannot turn a blind eye to the bloc’s toleration
of the Tatmadaw in the name of grander strategic goals. By failing to act, then,
ASEAN will rob itself of an audience with the president of the United States,
which remains the only meaningful counterweight to China and on which most
member states do not want to be reliant.
ASEAN’s Choices
Nearly every country in region (with the exceptions of Cambodia, Laos, and
now post-coup Myanmar) understands the necessity of and yearns for positive
ties with both great powers. However, it does not appear that Southeast Asian
leaders understand how seriously Biden is committed to his antijunta position
and how limited his support for Suu Kyi remains. Southeast Asian leaders seem
not to understand that their underwhelming response to the Myanmar crisis
could prevent ASEAN from bringing America back on board following the cha-
otic years under President Donald Trump. ASEAN’s lenience toward the Tat-
madaw will come at the bloc’s own peril.
Myanmar’s incomplete coup therefore poses a serious threat not only to re-
gional security but also to Southeast Asia’s geopolitical influence at large. If
ASEAN, because of its promised noninterference, cannot handle the Tatmadaw
and bring the president of the United States to the proverbial (and literal) table,
how can it effectively be central to regional affairs, as it has long claimed to be?
How can ASEAN hope to craft any alternative to Beijing’s Sinocentric plans for
the region if the bloc cannot get the president of United States, the man in charge
of the only other great power, to even show up?
The answer is that it cannot. If ASEAN continues to legitimize the Tatmadaw,
Biden will refuse to attend events at which junta officials are present, thereby
forcing members states to relate with the United States on bilateral terms—a

haphazard situation for the United States, which would prefer to work through
the bloc, and a similarly unideal one for the smaller Southeast Asian countries,
which will feel America’s weight more when negotiating alone.
ASEAN’s toleration of the Tatmadaw thus risks squandering America’s re-
newed focus on Southeast Asia at a moment—marked by the pandemic, from
which the whole region is reeling, and China’s increasing military and diplomatic
aggressiveness—when the region’s leaders cannot afford to do just that.
For ASEAN to remain relevant, its leaders must recognize that leaving Myan-
mar’s coup incomplete is fundamentally untenable. If the bloc hopes to engage the
United States on areas of mutual concern—such as securing more American-
made COVID-19 vaccines or countering China in the South China Sea—it will
have to address the Myanmar crisis.
ASEAN leaders would be wise to work creatively around the principle of non-
interference to prevent figures such as Min Aung Hlaing from further installing
themselves in the organization’s halls of power. They need to do so not on behalf
of the often absent forces of good that claim to bend the arc of history toward
progress, or even for liberal values, but for their own self-interest. It does not mat-
ter why they do the right thing, only that they actually do it. If selfishness forces
ASEAN to act, the region and the United States will be better for it.
Ultimately, though, if ASEAN wants to shape Southeast Asia’s future in
Southeast Asians’ interests by working with both the United States and China,
rather than simply relying on the latter, the bloc’s leaders need to wake up to
Biden’s reality and promptly display political bravery—a characteristic that its
leaders have lacked thus far. µ
Charles Dunst
Mr. Dunst is an associate with Eurasia Group’s Global Macro practice, where he focuses on Chinese foreign policy
and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific. He is also a visiting scholar at the East-West Center in
Washington and a contributing editor of American Purpose, Francis Fukuyama’s new magazine. A former foreign
correspondent in Southeast Asia, he has reported from the region for outlets including the New York Times, The At-
lantic, the Los Angeles Times, and Foreign Policy. Twitter: @CharlesDunst
Notes
1. “Myanmar Coup: The People Shot Dead since the Protests Began,” BBC News, 13 April
2021, https://www.bbc.com; Charles Dunst, “How to Keep Myanmar from Becoming Another
US Failure,” Boston Globe, 2 April 2021, https://www.bostonglobe.com.
2. “Rejecting Military Regime, Dozens of Myanmar Diplomats Abroad Support Myanmar
Citizen Rallies,” VOI English, 6 March 2021, https://voi.id; Stephen Castle, “Myanmar Envoy
Who Critiqued Coup Is Locked Out of London,” New York Times, 7 April 2021, https://www.
nytimes.com; “More Than 600 Police Join Myanmar’s Anti-Regime Protest Movement,” The Ir-

Dunst
rawaddy, 5 March 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com; “Myanmar Army Defects to KNU to Side

with Anti-coup Protestors,” Myanmar Now, 2 March 2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org.
3. Marc Perelman, “Myanmar’s UN Envoy Kyaw Moe Tun: ‘I’m proud to have been charged
with high treason’ by Junta,” France24, 18 March 2021, https://www.france24.com.
4. Rodion Ebbighausen, “Myanmar Coup: ASEAN Split Over the Way Forward,” DW, 29
March 2021, https://www.dw.com.
5. “Head of Myanmar’s Military Junta Min Aung Hlaing Appears in Online Asean Confer-
ence,” South China Morning Post, 18 March 2021, https://www.scmp.com; P. Rem Kumar, “Malay-
sia Envoy’s Meeting with Myanmar Junta Sparks Uproar,” Nikkei Asian Review, 8 April 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com; “Malaysia Defends Myanmar Envoy’s Meeting with Junta after Back-
lash,” Reuters, 8 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com.
6. Olivia Enos and Patrick Coe, “ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar’s Coup Is Failing,” Heritage
Foundation, 23 July 2021, https://www.heritage.org.
7. Richard C. Paddock, “General Who Led Myanmar’s Coup Joins Regional Talk on the Cri-
sis,” New York Times, 24 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com; “Myanmar Junta Chief to Attend
ASEAN Summit in First Foreign Visit Since Coup,” Reuters, 17 April 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/.
8. Charles Dunst, “Myanmar Is a Danger to Its Neighbors—Will Anyone Step In?,” GZERO
Media, 15 July 2021, https://www.gzeromedia.com.
9. “ASEAN Will Lose Relevance If It Ignores the Coup in Myanmar,” The Economist, 31
March 2021, https://www.economist.com.
10. Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions, and the Challenge to
‘Global’ Governance,” Pacific Review 21, no. 4 (2008): 451–68.
11. “Update Report No. 4: Myanmar,” Security Council Report, 15 December 2005, https://
www.securitycouncilreport.org.
12. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Rohingya Recount Atrocities: ‘They Threw My Baby Into a Fire,’” New
York Times, 11 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com.
13. “Former UN Chief Says Bangladesh Cannot Continue Hosting Rohingya,” AlJazeera, 19
April 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com.
14. Aaron Connelly, “The Coup in Myanmar and the Threat to ASEAN Centrality,” Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 March 2021, https://www.iiss.org.
15. “Obama Calls for Suu Kyi’s Release at ASEAN Summit,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,
15 November 2009, https://www.rferl.org.
16. “Myanmar Gives Up 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship,” New York Times, 26 July, 2005, https://
www.nytimes.com.
17. “Myanmar Gives Up 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship.”
18. John Reed, “Aung San Suu Kyi Supporters Unveil Myanmar ‘National Unity Govern-
ment,’” Financial Times, 16 April 2021, https://www.ft.com.
19. “Myanmar Coup Opposition Forms Unity Government,” Reuters, 16 April 2021, https://
www.yahoo.com.
20. “Some Countries Will Officially Recognise Myanmar’s Shadow Government in Coming
Days, Says New Minister,” Myanmar Now, 16 April 2021, https://myanmar-now.org.
21. Hannah Beech, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human Rights Icon?,” New Yorker, 2
October 2017, https://www.newyorker.com.

22. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Why Aung San Suu Kyi Isn’t Protecting the Rohingya in Burma,”
Washington Post, 15 September 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com.
23. Richard C. Paddock, “Aung San Suu Kyi Asks U.S. Not to Refer to ‘Rohingya,’” New York
Times, 6 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.com.
24. Anealla Safdar and Usaid Siddiqui, “ICJ Speech: Suu Kyi Fails to Use ‘Rohingya’ to De-
scribe Minority,” Al Jazeera, 13 December 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com.
25. William McGowan, “Burma’s Buddhist Chauvinism,” Wall Street Journal, 3 September
2012, https://www.wsj.com.
26. McGowan.
27. McGowan.
28. Safdar and Siddiqui, “ICJ Speech: Suu Kyi Fails to Use ‘Rohingya’ to Describe Minority.”
29. Charles Dunst, “How to Keep Myanmar from Becoming Another US Failure.”
30. David Brennan, “Antony Blinken, Congress Respond to Myanmar Coup, Aung San Suu
Kyi Arrest,” Newsweek, 1 February 2021, https://www.newsweek.com.
31. “Blinken Urges ASEAN to Take ‘Immediate Action’ on Myanmar,” Al Jazeera, 14 July
2021, https://www.aljazeera.com.
32. “ASEAN Denounced for Inviting Junta Chief to Summit on Myanmar,” Radio Free Asia,
19 April 2021, https://www.rfa.org.

VIEW
Myanmar’s Military Coup

Security Trouble in Southeast Asia
Dr. Indu Saxena
Abstract
Myanmar’s military junta overturned the 2020 general election result and seized
power by a military coup on 1 February 2021. An estimated 800 people have
already died in the lethal response by security forces. The Myanmar coup has had
great repercussions in the effort to establish democracy in Myanmar and to
maintain security in the Indo-Pacific region.
This article highlights the tyranny of the military junta and the backsliding of
democracy in Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), contending that Russia and
China’s unwavering support of Myanmar’s military makes it difficult to restore
the democratic process and reestablish peace and stability. It also proposes that
the triangular nexus of China–Myanmar–Russia propels apprehensions for the
rise of autocracy and its impact on South Asia and Southeast Asian security ar-
chitecture and regional stability.
Introduction
It has been many months since the military coup in Myanmar, and people are
still protesting in the streets. The military junta has imposed many restrictions to
prevent the flow of communications, including disrupting internet access and
phone lines. There is no arguing about Myanmar’s long history of repressing
peaceful protest, infringing fundamental rights, and arbitrary arrest. In a recent
move, the state election commission has shown its intention to dissolve demo-
cratic leader Aung San Suu Ki’s political party, the National League for Democ-
racy (NLD), for its alleged involvement in the 2020 general election, citing elec-
tion fraud, and could charge its leaders with treason. On 24 May 2021, Aung San
Suu Kyi appeared before the court for the first time after her detention in the
coup. She seemed determined to stand by the democracy supporters and avowed
that her party exists as long as the people exist.
Myanmar has witnessed ruthless military rule since its independence from
Britain in 1948.1 On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military detained many
political leaders, activists, and senior leaders of NLD in Naypyidaw and other
parts of the country. The popular leader Aung San Suu Kyi was detained in her

house. It is assumed that the coup took place due to the defeat of the military-
supported candidates and the NLD’s landslide victory in the general election,
which was held in November 2020.2 The NLD won 346 seats in parliament, more
than the 322 seats required to form a new government.3 The election results favor-
ing Aung San Suu Kyi, a democratic icon, startled the military regime.
The army is trying to reverse the election, alleging unfair and biased processes.
Aung San Suu Kyi remains detained by the military, which has filed several
charges against her. On this constitutional crisis of Myanmar, UN Secretary-
General António Guterres said that the election turnover is “unacceptable” and
urged the international community “to make sure” the military takeover and coup
fail.4 Ironically, Myanmar had a short-lived experience of a quasidemocratic sys-
tem after 2011 when the powerful military, named “Tatmadaw,” started parlia-
mentary elections. Despite the military reserving 25 percent of all the seats in
parliament for itself and putting other safeguards in the constitution for its own
benefit in the 2015 general election, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD won big in both
houses.5 It was highly expected that the NLD’s victory would begin a new chapter
in Myanmar’s democracy transition process and would limit the power of the
military. On the contrary, Tatmadaw remained all-powerful, with control over
legislating and the power to choose the president; Aung San Suu Kyi was barred
from holding any executive power under the constitution.6 She held a “state coun-
cilor” position and was a de facto leader. She had personally witnessed the military
atrocities against ethnic minorities, yet she also rejected the international criticism
of “ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingya and even defended the military-influenced
government against alleged human right violations in the International Court of
Justice on 10 December 2019.7 Aung San Suu Kyi’s support of the Myanmar
government, which was held responsible for the “genocidal intent” against ethnic
minority Rohingya by the United Nations International Fact-Finding Mission
Report, maligned her image as a democratic icon, resulting in a loss of interna-
tional credibility.
The worst phase came after the February 2021 military coup in which the
military took control over the country and the military leaders (working as the
State Administrative Council) launched brutal crackdowns against pro-democracy
demonstrators. This article holds that the military coup has killed the hope of
democracy in Myanmar and fostered growing concerns over a civil war in Myan-
mar. It contends that this represents alarm bells over the rise of autocracy in the
region and the potentially catastrophic impact on the region’s security and stabil-
ity.

Saxena
Ruthless Military Rule since the Dawn of Burma’s Independence

The tyranny of the military has a long-standing history in Myanmar, dating to
when it was known as Burma. The assassination of General Aung San in 1947, a
national hero of Burma’s independence and the founder of the Burma National
Army, started Burma down the path of becoming a military-dominated state.
However, it remained a type of parliamentary democracy with heavy military in-
fluence, until a military coup led by General Ne Win in 1962. Ne Win imposed a
harsh authoritarian regime, including suspension of the 1947 constitution, sup-
pression of demonstrations, arrest of political opponents, and heavy crackdowns
on “ethnic armed groups.”
The resentment against Ne Win’s regime exploded into a mass protest in 1988,
predominantly led by students demanding a multiparty system, resulting in the
replacement of the old military regime with a new one and the formation of the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The new military regime
was established at the expense of democracy, leading to the deaths of hundreds of
thousands of protesters.8
At the same time, pro-democracy voices grew stronger, and the SLORC re-
lented and allowed the registration of political parties. It was during this major
development that Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Major General Aung San,
founded the NLD and raised her voice against abuses of power by the military
and led pressure on the military regime to hold elections. This show of power
threatened the military junta, which placed her under house arrest.9
Under domestic and international pressure, the military regime held an elec-
tion in 1990. The NLD won the elections, but the junta refused to accept the
election results, maintaining tight control over the government, arresting elected
leaders and activists, and keeping Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, a condi-
tion of isolation in which she remained intermittently for two decades.10
In 2008, the military regime adopted a new constitution in a controversial ref-
erendum, ensuring its control over the government by reserving 25 percent of
parliamentary seats for military officials. The new constitution also disqualified
the spouses and parents of foreign nationals from serving as the president of
Myanmar, which excluded Aung San Suu Kyi. The generals called these constitu-
tional changes “disciplined democracy.”11 Nonetheless, Aung San Suu Kyi sought
popularity at the national and international levels, and her party kept winning
elections in 2015 and 2020.

Military Regime and Genocide

The brutal side of the military regime showed itself in 2017, when it started
“clearance operations” to wipe out ethnic minorities, mainly Muslim Rohingya.
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, “Since then, an estimated 745,000 Rohingya—including more than
400,000 children—have fled into the Cox’s Bazar.”12 The former High UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights described the military’s “clearance operations”
as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and stated that its actions seemed to
be “a cynical ploy to forcibly transfer large numbers of people without possibility
of return.”13
In 2019, an independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, es-
tablished by the United Nations Human Rights Council, submitted its report of
the military regime’s “genocidal intent” against ethnic minorities in Myanmar.
Marzuki Darusman, chair of the fact-finding mission, said: “The international
community must hold the Myanmar military to account for the tremendous pain
and suffering it has inflicted on persons of all genders across the country.”14 De-
spite such severe opprobrium at the international level, the Myanmar security
forces’ unrelenting clearance operations continue to demonize the ethnic Ro-
hingya, furthering the humanitarian crisis.
Unworthy Role of Russia and China

Myanmar relies heavily on China and Russia for diplomatic support, arms and
weapons, and trade and commerce. There are several reasons behind Russia’s and
China’s support for the military regime. The first is ideological: to discredit and
disregard any democratic process in the neighborhood and thereby promote au-
thoritarianism. Second is geopolitical: to maintain an ally in Southeast Asia to rally
with and oppose Western countries. And the third is economics and arms trade:
Myanmar is largely dependent on Russian and Chinese arms and is an attractive
market for Chinese investment and infrastructure projects.
China used its veto power in the UN Security Council to stave off any action
against Myanmar’s military regime, and Chinese media called the coup a “cabinet
reshuffle.”15 China has been diplomatically supporting Myanmar and shielded
the military regime in the United Nations for crime against humanity as well.
China has cemented its bilateral relations with Myanmar by investing heavily in
infrastructure, pipelines, special economic zones, and a deep-sea port under its
massive development project known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The statistic
shows that China’s export to Myanmar has risen exponentially, from 285,000
USD in 2005 to 6.445 million USD in 2019.16

Saxena
(Source: Statista)
Figure 1 Value of goods exported from China to Myanmar from 2005 to 2019.
Notably, Myanmar’s geographical location in the Indian Ocean is of strategic
significance; it provides easy access to sea lanes for Chinese oil imports from the
Middle East. The overland route of the Kunming–Kyaukpyu gas pipeline between
Myanmar and China has already started. In addition, China is the main supplier
of arms, constituting 48 percent of total arms imports to Myanmar.17
Russia has also supported Myanmar’s military regime by blocking, with China,
a joint UNSC statement condemning the February 2021 coup.18 After that, in
March, Russian deputy minister of defense Colonel General Alexander Fomin
attended Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day event at Naypyidaw and expressed its
desire to bolster Russia–Myanmar relations and enhance military-technical coop-
eration.19 In response to his visit, Myanmar’s General Min Aung Hlaing thanked
Russia for its support in the UNSC.
Russia’s desire to intensify relations with Myanmar’s military regime is driven
by arms exports to Myanmar. Russia is the second largest arms supplier to Myan-
mar, constituting 15 percent of arms imports.20
Myanmar has been a long time buyer of Russian arms and has received 30
MiG-29 jet fighters, 12 Yak-130 jet trainers, 10 Mi-24 and Mi-35P helicopters,
and eight Pechora-2M antiaircraft missile systems from Russia since the 2000s.21
In addition, Russia will supply Myanmar with Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile
systems, Orlan-10E surveillance drones, and radar equipment, and it intends to
be a major partner in Myanmar’s military modernization, a long-term plan of
General Min Aung Hlaing. The bilateral ties between Russia and Myanmar have

(Source: SIPRI Fact Sheet, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020”)
Figure 2 Myanmar’s major arms suppliers in 2011–2020.
grown in recent years, with Russia providing army training and university schol-
arships in addition to selling arms to the military. Due to such bilateral activi-
ties, Russia has been held responsible by the United Nations and several Western
countries for alleged atrocities against ethnic minorities. Russia’s official visit to
Myanmar is an attempt to legitimize the military junta and the coup. Russia is
complicit in the military’s campaign of crushing people’s voices and the decay
of democracy in Myanmar; likewise, President Vladimir Putin allegedly tried to
assassinate, and then imprisoned, a domestic political opponent, Alexei Nalvany.
Russia sees long-term profit potential by ramping up its ties to the military
junta, a customer of Russia’s arms and a strategic partner in Southeast Asia that
can possibly provide a foothold to Russia to benefit its Indo-Pacific interests.
Russia’s pragmatic foreign policy serves its own best interests by providing sup-
port to Myanmar’s military regime.
It seems certain that Russia and China, the two autocratic global powers, have
no sympathy with pro-democracy movements in Myanmar. Both those countries
have strategic, geopolitical, and economic interests in Myanmar, and both want to
retain and expand links given that Myanmar is so significant, strategically speak-
ing, in East Asia. Therefore, Russia and China have no intention of condemning
the coup at any point, and Moscow’s and Beijing’s support for a military dictator-
ship in Myanmar has hampered the pro-democracy movement.
Notably, Myanmar’s internal politics and decision-making process is imbued
by the China–Russia convergence. However, both China and Russia, being “revi-

Saxena
sionist powers” with their own authoritarian systems, are best aligned with Myan-
mar’s military junta to impede Myanmar’s democratic process. Therefore, the
burgeoning relationship with China and Russia affects domestic politics—and
raises a growing concern for regional security.
However, the White House under President Joseph Biden strongly condemned
the military coup and the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, calling it an “assault on
democracy and rule of law.”22 The international community has been largely con-
demning the coup d’état, with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and
the European Union imposing sanctions and Japan suspending Myanmar’s finan-
cial aid.23 The West as a promoter and guarantor of democracy and human rights,
has minimal influence on the military junta.
Alarms for the Rise of Autocracy in the Region

The current unrest in Myanmar seems to represent an artifact of the past in
Southeast Asian nations, when people’s resistance took place against Suharto in
Indonesia and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. If the turbulence in Myan-
mar were to continue for a longer period or deteriorate, the effect could spill into
neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, where many countries maintain illiberal
democracies and strongmen in power. These populist strongman leaders do not
have any desire to uphold democratic values. Pluralism, electoral politics, and civil
liberties have eroded, in fact, from one-party states such as Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam to democratic states with strongmen rulers such as Thailand, the Philip-
pines, and Malaysia.
Additionally, it is highly likely that the outflow of new refugees (after Ro-
hingya) from Myanmar to neighboring countries may destabilize the region. And
concern over civil war erupting in Myanmar has only grown. The UN special en-
voy for Myanmar, Schraner Burgener, warned in a 24 May 2021 virtual confer-
ence of the possibility of civil war given the perpetual violent attacks on civilians
by the military force, compelling them to use offensive actions. She called the
situation in Myanmar “very bad,” and since then more than 800 people have been
killed, more than 5,300 arrested, and more than 1,800 arrest warrants issued by
the military. These are the figures reported in the media, but there may be many
more going unreported.24
The 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
agreed on a five-point action plan at a summit on Myanmar in April 2021, which
was attended by the mastermind of the coup himself, General Min Aung Hlaing.
The five points include: the immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue
between the military and its opponents, facilitation of mediation, allowing hu-
manitarian assistance, and permitting a visit by a special ASEAN envoy. 25How-

ever, in an interview with Chinese television, General Hlang said that he “doesn’t
see those five points can be implemented” and refused the visit from the Southeast
Asian envoy until security and stability are established.26
(Source: Freedom House; The Heritage Foundation; Oxford Analytica)
Figure 3 Southeast Asia’s political system.
Options
There are several options. The regime has no intention to work with civil society
or any international human rights group. The military wants to maintain tight
control over the country. First, the UNSC should take stringent steps immedi-
ately, either constituting a special commission or sending a special envoy to
Myanmar to assess the situation and consolidate support with the Burmese. The
role of regional actors, notably ASEAN and others with a regional outreach, is
significant in condemning the military coup, alerting regional leaders to its reper-
cussions, and warning the military of a state failure in Burma.
Second, the UNSC unanimously voted against the use of coercive power by the
military on protesters and minorities. The UNSC members should vote for a
complete arms embargo for Myanmar. Third, like-minded countries should pro-
tect the protesters’ rights and maintain safeguards for a safe solution that brings
back normal domestic relations. Finally, civil society should come together and
evaluate options to solidify human rights protection in the region.

Saxena
Conclusion
The vision for democracy in Myanmar became complicated when conflict was
reignited between military forces and ethnic minority insurgent groups. The civil-
ians who have been protesting and marching on the streets for so long started
using more aggressive means to protest, as they are unwilling to accept military
rule. Until now, it was well understood that Tatmadaw is very powerful, and it is
likely impossible for the military to accept election results and cede power to
people’s representatives. It is widely believed that major Western countries and
the UNSC could not do much to resolve the Rohingya crisis, as China and Russia
continue to support the Myanmar military and its oppressive actions in the
UNSC.
It is worth pondering that mere condemnation and limited sanctions by the
United States and other members of the international community would not sub-
due military rulers to bring normalcy back and transfer power to elected leaders
as long as the military enjoys the support of China and Russia. µ
Dr. Indu Saxena

Dr. Saxena is a senior writer with the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers. She has published articles and com-
mentary in journals and newspapers. She has also presented her papers at international conferences and seminars.
She is a graduate in global affairs from Rutgers University, New Jersey. Her research interests include international
relations theory, international security, terrorism and counterterrorism, and South Asia’s geopolitics.
Notes
1. Andrew Selth, “Democracy in Myanmar: Who Can Claim Victory?,” in Interpreting Myan-
mar: A Decade of Analysis (Acton ACT, Australia: ANU Press, 2020), 389–94.
2. Hanna Beech and Saw Nang, “Myanmar Elections Delivers Another Decisive Win for
Aung San Suu Kyi,” New York Times, 4 December 2020, https://www.nytimes.com.
3. Beech and Nang, “Myanmar Elections.”
4. “A Conversation with U.N. Secretary General António Guterres,” Washington Post, 3 Febru-
ary 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
5. Jonah Fisher, “Myanmar’s 2015 Landmark Elections Explained,” BBC News, 3 December
2015, https://www.bbc.com/.
6. International Crisis Group, Briefing No. 147/Asia, “The Myanmar Elections: Results and
Implications,” 9 December 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/.
7. “Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar from Accusations of Genocide, at Top UN Court,”
UN News, 11 December 2019, https://news.un.org/.
8. D. C. Williams, “A Second Panglong Agreement: Burmese Federalism for the Twenty–First
Century” in Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar, ed. A. Harding and K. K. Oo, (Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 61, cited in UN Fact-Finding Mission Report 2018 (A/HRC/39/
CRP.2 2018, p. 22).
9. Williams, “A Second Panglong Agreement.”

10. J. Badgley and I. Holliday, “Democracy,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar,

ed. A. Simpson, N. Farrelly, and I. Holliday (London: Routledge, 2018), 38, cited in UN Fact-
Finding Mission Report 2018 (A/HRC/39/CRP.2 2018, p. 22).
11. UN Fact-Finding Mission Report 2018 (A/HRC/8/12, para. 24).
12. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rohingya Refugee
Crisis,” https://www.unocha.org/.
13. Stephnie Nebehay, “Brutal Myanmar Army Operation Aimed at Preventing Rohingya
Return: U.N,” Reuters, 11 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/.
14. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, News Events, “UN
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar Calls for Justice for Victims of Sexual and Gender-Based
Violence,” 22 August 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/.
15. Bill Bostock, “China and Russia Blocked the UN from Condemning Myanmar’s Military
Coup,” Business Insider, 3 February 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/.
16. “Value of goods exported from China to Myanmar from 2005 to 2019,” Statista, https://
www.statista.com/.
17. Siemon T. Wezeman, Arms Flows to South East Asia (Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2019), https://www.sipri.org/.
18. Bostock, “China and Russia Blocked the UN.”
19. “Myanmar Military Rolls Out Red Carpet for Russian Defense Minister,” Irrawaddy, 25
January 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/.
20. Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexander Kuimova, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in Interna-
tional Arms Transfer, 2020,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2021, https://sipri.org/.
21. “Myanmar Military Rolls Out Red Carpet,” Irrawaddy.
22. “Biden Threatens U.S. Sanctions after Myanmar Coup, Launches Policy Review,” Reuters,
1 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com.
23. “EU and U.S. Sanctions Step Up Pressure on Myanmar Military over Coup,” Reuters, 21
March 2021, https://www.reuters.com/.
24. Edith M. Lederer, “UN Envoy Warns of Possible Civil War in Myanmar, Seeks Talks,”
ABC News, 25 May 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/.
25. ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders Meeting,” 24 April 2021,
https://asean.org/.
26. “Myanmar Junta Says No ASEAN Envoy Visit until Stability Restored,” Reuters, 7 May
2021, https://www.reuters.com/; and Lederer, “UN Envoy Warns.”

VIEW
Between Political Violence and

COVID-19
Many Citizens in Myanmar Pushed to Armed Resistance
Tom Connolly
T
he Myanmar military coup led by Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing occurred on
1 February 2021, and since then the junta has consistently demonstrated
its propensity for violence and repression toward Myanmar’s citizens pro-
testing the new regime.1 In self-defense, many citizens established civilian-led
militias or joined the ranks of established ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
From Naypyitaw, the battlefield view is convoluted: the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s
armed forces) must deal with civilian protests in its major cities while battling
multiple ethnic insurgent groups on different fronts. That being said, counterin-
surgency is an area in which the Tatmadaw has excelled since its inception decades
ago, and Myanmar’s civilians are paying the overwhelming price of dissent. Fur-
ther, the State Administrative Council (SAC) has used the COVID-19 pandemic
to its advantage, amassing critical oxygen and vaccine supplies for use in its secu-
rity forces while denying lifesaving care to those outside its ranks.
Since initiating the bloody coup on 1 February, the SAC has officially nullified
the results of Myanmar’s 2020 general elections and arrested senior national lead-
ers, including Aung San Suu Kyi.2 It is responsible for the deaths of more than
900 protesters and bystanders, the enforced disappearances of more than 100
persons, and the torture and rape of an unknown number in custody.3 Protesters
took to the streets in the hundreds of thousands during the early days of the coup,
but many have moved to flash mob-style protests lasting less than ten minutes to
avoid violent repercussions from the Tatmadaw.4 In April, a group of ousted
politicians, activists, and representatives from several ethnic minority groups
formed the National Unity Government (NUG), with the stated goal of ending
military rule and restoring democracy.5 The NUG first endorsed self-defense on
14 March and then announced the creation of People’s Defense Forces on 5 May
to oppose the SAC.6
In addition to killing civilians, the SAC has also imposed restrictions on the
transportation of food, fuel, and other critical commodities into Kayah State since
28 May, starving residents of basic necessities.7 Tom Andrews, the UN special
rapporteur for Myanmar, recently warned of “mass deaths from starvation, dis-
ease, and exposure in Myanmar” resulting from the Tatmadaw’s restriction of

Between Political Violence and COVID-19
critical resources.8 The military has also been implicated in prosecuting and kill-
ing workers delivering humanitarian aid to affected areas. On 26 May, security
forces gunned down two youths in Demoso Township, Kayah State, who were
delivering food to displaced people and arrested three volunteers on their way
back from assisting civilians.9 Reportedly, the Tatmadaw has undertaken an ex-
tensive online disinformation campaign, prolifically uploading Facebook posts
designed to sow distrust among insurgent groups.10
As the regime continues to employ deadly tactics to subdue protesters, many
citizens turned to violent resistance, which has extended to forming civilian mili-
tias and joining established EAOs.11 In Myanmar’s cities, residents took measures
for self-protection in response to increasingly violent crackdowns from the Tat-
madaw, including barricading roads, appointing night watches to monitor security
forces, and creating defense groups armed with makeshift weapons and shields.12
At one point, Frontier Myanmar magazine reported at least 10 urban rebel cells,
while Radio Free Asia recorded at least 300 explosions since the February coup,
which mainly targeted police and administrative offices, as well as other facilities
connected to the regime.13 The antiregime movement is a diverse mix of Myan-
mar’s citizens; its membership ranges from professional groups—including engi-
neers and teachers—to preexisting civil society networks and labor unions.14
In the countryside, civilian self-defense militias evolved differently. Given the
military’s preoccupation with protests in major cities, rural citizens found them-
selves able to demonstrate free from heavy-handed crackdowns for much longer.15
Locally organized militias have fought the Tatmadaw in many areas, with notable
battles occurring in parts of Chin State, Kayah State, as well as the Sagaing, Mag-
way, and Mandalay regions.16 Tamu Township, in the Sagaing region on the India
border, was the site of one of the earliest clashes. After the killing of a protester by
security forces on 25 March, locals formed the Tamu Security Group (TSG) and
began stockpiling rifles, purchasing grenades, and creating improvised explosive
devices.17 After a number of battles and utilizing their intimate knowledge of the
terrain to carry out guerrilla-style warfare, the TSG claims to have killed 15
members of the armed forces.18 The Tatmadaw reportedly enlisted the help of a
militia composed of Meitei fighters from the Indian state of Manipur to help
combat TSG, and the security situation in the area remains tense.19 Civilian-
created militia groups have tended to be most effective in regions with existing
militias or ethnic armed groups or with strong traditions of hunting.20 Many ci-
vilian militias have also proven adept in regions that have not been subject to
armed conflict for some time where the Tatmadaw’s infrastructure, weaponry, and
intelligence capacity are underdeveloped.

Connolly
Citizens have also turned to established ethnic armed groups (EAO) for pro-
tection and war-fighting skills. Dissidents and activists have received military
training and combat experience from established EAOs, such as the Kachin In-
dependence Army, Karenni Army, and Karen National Liberation Army.21 Mem-
bers of the NUG have also sought refuge from the SAC in border regions con-
trolled by ethnic insurgents.22 Especially in the early days of the coup, while the
Tatmadaw was focused on Myanmar’s major cities, armed ethnic groups were able
to launch coordinated attacks in the countryside, killing numerous Tatmadaw
soldiers and raiding outposts.23 The Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State has also
played a complicated role in postcoup Myanmar. As the military wing of the
United League of Arakan, the AA was removed from the Tatmadaw’s list of “ter-
rorist” groups in March, reportedly so that the military could end the distraction
of fighting on its northern frontier.24 However, this has not prevented AA troops
from engaging the Tatmadaw in combat, and in June the AA released a number
of captured soldiers to the security forces.25 In all likelihood, the AA sees Myan-
mar’s evolving security situation as a means to extract concessions from the mili-
tary while it fights on multiple fronts, as well as an opportunity to more strongly
assert its political interests in Rakhine State.26
At times, civilian-organized militias have combined forces with established
militant groups and created entirely new organizations. The Karenni Nationalities
Defence Force (KNDF) is one such example, which formed on 31 May as a
merger of factions from the People’s Defense Forces and EAOs throughout Kayah
and Shan States.27 The KNDF has claimed it has killed nearly 200 members of
the security forces since 21 May, and it has been known to target alleged Tat-
madaw informants.28 In June, the KNDF was involved in heavy fighting in Kayah
State, bordering Thailand, with the confrontation peaking in Demoso Township,
where the group reportedly killed about 80 members of the security forces.29 In
response to KNDF resistance in Demoso, the Tatmadaw employed overwhelming
force, utilizing artillery barrages, airstrikes, and helicopter gunships, which led to
the displacement of more than 100,000 civilians.30 The huge impact on civilians
brought the KNDF to the negotiating table on 15 June in talks facilitated by local
church leaders. Both sides reached a temporary cease-fire agreement, which ten-
tatively remains in place.31
The emergence of civilian militias and growth of established EAOs following
the February coup carry wide-ranging implications for Myanmar. Some observers
have suggested that opposition to the military junta presents an opportunity for
different ethnic groups to work together against a common enemy.32 In an inter-
view with the New York Times, Col. Mai Aik Kyaw, of the Ta’ang National Lib-
eration Army, seems to echo this sentiment, noting that cooperation among

EAOs will lead to better outcomes for resistance groups.33 However, not every
ethnic armed group has been able to overcome the divide-and-rule strategy of the
Tatmadaw, which has come to define its approach to counterinsurgency.34 In Shan
State, for example, a recent proposal for unity between the Restoration Council of
Shan State and the Shan State Progressive Party under the proposed Shan State
for Federal is yet to occur.35 The sheer number of ethnic groups further obscures
clear communication among EAOs, and many of the major ethnic groups have
more than one armed organization claiming to represent their interests.36
Additionally, the NUG will struggle to achieve its stated goal of bringing es-
tablished or civilian militias under a single command. Many of the ethnic armed
groups remain wary of the NUG, which was initially formed by a Bamar political
party that, prior to the coup, was widely criticized for ignoring the rights and
grievances of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.37 The Chin National Front remains
the only ethnic militia formally allied with the NUG, and its vice chairman and
NUG minister of federal affairs, Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong, has expressed his
concern of a Bamar-dominated coalition.38 Although many of these militias ex-
press support for the parallel government, the majority have had minimal contact
with the NUG and have not stated their express intention to come under its
command.39 Civilian militias have, thus far, declined to enter a formal military
alliance with NUG and seem more likely to form alliances under the authority of
EAOs, as the Kayah militia has done and as the Kachin Independence Organisa-
tion has stipulated that any militia in Kachin State must do.40 That being said,
there remains the possibility that the NUG will be more appealing to EAOs given
that it has openly endorsed federalism rather than a centralized authority; it also
boasts significantly more ethnic minorities than the cabinet formed by the Na-
tional League for Democracy.41 Nevertheless, with the privileged access to lucra-
tive resources and economic rents that armed actors usually enjoy, new militias are
unlikely to dissipate quickly. In fact, as the economic fallout of the February coup
becomes increasingly acute, this could create an incentive for groups to secure
existing sources of revenue.42 The International Crisis Group suggests that the
emergence of new, sustained militia groups is likely, which is consistent with the
patterns of insurgency seen throughout Myanmar’s history.43
The rise of so many new militias and expansion of established EAOs compli-
cate the combat landscape for the Tatmadaw. It must now battle insurgents that
are widely dispersed throughout the country, including many areas where it has
not fought before and has little military infrastructure.44 Confronting these
groups and dealing with escalated fighting with armed groups in Kachin, Shan,
and Kayin States, while simultaneously maintaining a strong troop presence in
the nation’s cities to suppress dissent, will likely stretch the Tatmadaw’s capacity.45

Connolly
However, the security services have been accustomed to fighting insurgencies

since Myanmar’s independence in 1948, and it has been fiercely battling the Ara-
kan Army in Rakhine State. Counterinsurgency is a particular skill of the Tat-
madaw, and the armed forces have shown a proclivity to implement its so-called
four-cuts counterinsurgency strategy.46 Designed to restrict access to food, funds,
intelligence, and recruits, the four-cuts strategy seeks to starve the support base of
armed resistance and turn civilians against insurgent groups.47 The Tatmadaw is
also known to employ sexual violence and the deliberate targeting of civilians to
terrorize and displace populations, as it has already done in Mindat (May) and
Demoso ( June).48
The COVID-19 pandemic, although problematic for the military junta, has
proven to be another tool the Tatmadaw has exploited to privilege its own security
forces to the detriment of those opposing the SAC. According to official num-
bers, more than 14,000 people have died from the disease, which per capita is the
worst rate in Southeast Asia.49 However, few citizens are officially tested and even
fewer are treated in public hospitals, which suggests that the actual numbers are
likely to be higher.50 The Tatmadaw has deliberately obstructed lifesaving care to
COVID-19 patients, targeted medical workers, and banned sales of oxygen to
civilians not supported by the SAC, leading many to accuse the Tatmadaw of
weaponizing the pandemic.51 In parts of the country, insurgent groups are fulfill-
ing the role of public health authorities. In Rakhine State, for example, the Ara-
kan Army has enacted lockdown measures in the state’s 17 townships and has
threatened punitive action against those not abiding by health instructions.52
Some observers have expressed hope that COVID-19 could deal a serious blow
to the stability of the SAC, however, given that the junta has consistently reserved
vaccinations for its soldiers, hoarded oxygen supplies, and controlled access to
lifesaving care, this appears to be unlikely.53
The February military coup and ensuing violence have pushed many citizens
toward armed resistance. Civilian militias have emerged in the cities and country-
side as a means for citizens to protect themselves from the SAC’s harsh crack-
down on protests. Established ethnic insurgent groups have also offered sanctuary
to political dissidents, as well as combat training to activists looking to oppose the
military junta. In a grim turn, the SAC and security forces have also utilized the
COVID-19 pandemic to their advantage as best they can. By restricting critical
oxygen supplies and reserving vaccinations for its rank-and-file members, the
Tatmadaw has found yet another means of rewarding those loyal to the SAC and
controlling those expressing resistance. µ

Tom Connolly
Mr. Connolly is a current MA student at King’s College London based in Melbourne, Australia. He has a long-
standing interest in security and terrorism and the importance of multilateral institutions. He graduated with a BA
from the University of Melbourne in 2017, with a double major in history and politics. Tom later received a bursary
to undertake a summer intensive at Rothberg International School, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, which examined
the evolution and ideological discourse of contemporary Islamist movements. Following this, Tom undertook lan-
guage study in Cairo and served as a risk analyst at the Australian-based Foreign Brief. He is currently a nonresident
Vasey Fellow at the Pacifc Forum and a researcher/editor for the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers.
Notes
1. Brian Adams, “Six Months After Coup, the World Has Failed the People of Myanmar,”
Foreign Policy in Focus, 4 Aug. 2021, https://fpif.org.
2. Lucia Stein and Rebecca Armitage, “What Has Sparked the Arrest of Myanmar’s de Facto
Leader in Dawn Raids?,” ABC News, 2 Feb. 2021, https://www.abc.net.au.
3. Naing Khit, “For Myanmar’s Top Generals, Overturning Election Results Is a Rite of Pas-
sage,” The Irrawaddy, 27 July 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com; “New Arrests in Myanmar, as US
Moves to Sanction Coup Leaders,” Al Jazeera, 11 Feb. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com; “Myan-
mar: Coup Leads to Crimes Against Humanity,” Human Rights Watch, 31 July 2021, https://www.
hrw.org.
4. Niharika Mandhana, “Myanmar Protests: Hundreds of Thousands Take to the Streets Dur-
ing Strike to Oppose Coup,” Wall Street Journal, 22 Feb. 2021, https://www.wsj.com; “Myanmar
Protesters Stage ‘flash Mobs’ to Avoid Bullets,” Nikkei Asia, n.d., https://asia.nikkei.com.
5. “Opponents of Myanmar Coup Form Unity Government, Aim for ‘Federal Democracy,’”
Reuters, 16 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com.
6. “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup,” Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 28 June 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org.
7. “Karenni Resistance Fighters Agree to Ceasefire as Number of IDPs Passes 100,000,”
Myanmar Now, 16 June 2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org.
8. Faruk Zorlu, “UN Expert Calls for Action to Avoid Mass Deaths in Eastern Myanmar,”
Anadolu Agency, 10 June 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr.
9. Emily Fishbein, Nu Nu Lusan, and Zau Myet Awng, “Villages Empty, Civilian Armed
Groups Rise in Eastern Myanmar,” Al Jazeera, 7 June 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com.
10. “With Tales of Torture, Campaign Seeks to Divide Armed Resistance,” Frontier Myanmar,
28 July 2021, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net.
11. Hannah Beech, “‘Now We Are United’: Myanmar’s Ethnic Divisions Soften After Coup,”
New York Times, 30 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com; “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw.”
12. “Myanmar Violence Escalates with Rise of ‘Self-Defense’ Groups, Report Says | Voice of
America—English,” Voice of America, 27 June 2021, sec. East Asia Pacific, https://www.voanews.
com; “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup.”
13. “‘Our Revolution Is Starting’: Urban Guerrillas Prepare to Step up Killings, Bombings,”
Frontier Myanmar, 9 June 2021, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net.
14. “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup.”
15. “‘Our Revolution Is Starting.’”

Connolly
18. “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw”; “Tamu Defense Force Kills at Least 15 Myanmar Junta
Troops,” The Irrawaddy, 12 May 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com.
19. “Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw.”
21. “With Tales of Torture, Campaign Seeks to Divide Armed Resistance”; Hannah Beech,
“After Myanmar Coup, a New Resistance Rises,” New York Times, 24 March 2021, https://www.
nytimes.com.
22. Beech, “‘Now We Are United.’”
23. Beech.
24. “Myanmar Military Removes Rebel Arakan Army from ‘Terrorist’ List,” Al Jazeera, 11
March 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com.
25. Robert Bociaga, “David and Goliath: Myanmar’s Armed Resistance at the Crossroads,” The
Diplomat, 27 July 2021, https://thediplomat.com.
26. Kyaw Lynn, “The Arakan Army, Myanmar Military Coup and Politics of Arakan,” Trans-
national Institute, 10 June 2021, https://www.tni.org; “Myanmar’s Civil War Is Becoming Bloodier
and More Brutal,” The Economist, 24 June 2021, https://www.economist.com.
27. Saw Thonya, “Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) Will Carry out NUG’s De-
fense Policies,” Burma News International, 3 June 2021, https://www.bnionline.net; “Karenni Re-
sistance Force Claims at Least 80 Regime Soldiers Killed in Demoso,” Myanmar NOW, 2 June
2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org.
29. “Karenni Resistance Force Claims at Least 80 Regime Soldiers Killed in Demoso.”
32. , “‘Now We Are United.’”
33. Beech.
34. Bociaga, “David and Goliath.”
35. Bociaga.
37. “Myanmar’s Civil War Is Becoming Bloodier and More Brutal,” The Economist, 24 June
2021, https://www.economist.com; Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Shadow Government Forms Mi-
litia to Oppose Military Junta,” Voice of America, 6 May 2021, sec. East Asia Pacific, https://www.
voanews.com.
38. “Civilian Armies Take Resistance to Myanmar’s Streets,” The Australian, 21 June 2021,
https://www.theaustralian.com.au.
46. Emily Fishbein, Nu Nu Lusan, and Vahpual, “Myanmar Military Adopts ‘Four Cuts’ to
Stamp out Coup Opponents,” Al Jazeera, 5 July 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com.
47. Fishbein, Lusan, and Vahpual.

48. Fishbein, Lusan, and Vahpual; “Myanmar: Coup Leads to Crimes Against Humanity”;
Jonathan Head, “Myanmar: The Small Embattled Town That Stood up to the Army,” BBC News,
22 May 2021, https://www.bbc.com; “Over 1,000 People from Kayah Village in Need of Shelter,
Medicine after Fleeing Fighting,” Myanmar NOW, 23 June 2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org.
49. “Myanmar COVID: 319,250 Cases and 10,988 Deaths—Worldometer,” n.d., https://
www.worldometers.info; David Rising, “Residents: Myanmar Leaders Use Pandemic as Political
Weapon,” 30 July 2021, sec. East Asia, https://apnews.com.
50. Vahpual, “Myanmar’s Military Has Weaponized COVID-19,” Time, 5 Aug. 2021, https://
time.com.
51. Vahpual; Sebastian Strangio, “Yunnan Sees COVID-19 Spike as Myanmar Slides Toward
‘Super-Spreader’ State,” The Diplomat, 21 July 2021, https://thediplomat.com.
52. “Arakan Army Announces Lockdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Amid COVID Surge,”
The Irrawaddy, 21 July 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com.
53. Vahpual, “Myanmar’s Military Has Weaponized COVID-19”; Bociaga, “David and Goli-
ath.”

Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell Anvesh Jain Eleanor Lewis
Director & Editor in Chief Assistant Senior Member Member
Dr. Indu Saxena Leo Mathers Maj Christopher Little, USAF
Deputy Director Assistant Senior Member Member
Patricia Clough Emilio Angeles Leo Lin
Deputy Editor in Chief Member Member
Jon Howard Benafsha Attar Capt Peter Loftus, USAF
Assistant Editor in Chief Member Member
Ashish Saxena Capt Michael Brodka, USA Dr. Adam Lowther
Senior Artificial Intelligence Liaison Member Member
Dr. Chulanee Attanayake David Broughton Jack Moore
Senor Member Member Member
Dr. Achala Gunasekara-Rockwell Soumyadeep Deb Asst. Prof. Rubaiyat Rahman
Senior Member Member Member
Dr. Hyun-ji Rim 2nd Lt Brendan Donnelly, USAF Atandra Ray
Lt Col Terence "TV" Vance, USAF, ret. Andrew Erskine Rushali Saha
Maj Kaoru Elliott, USSF Joseph Hammond Mrittika Guha Sarkar
Maj Matthew House, USA Col Jeffry Hollman, USAF Arushi Singh
Maj J.R. Sessions, USA Prakash Jangid Mahika Sri Krishna
Ben Ho Sumnima Karki CDR Michael Tomsik, USN
Thilini Kahandawaarachchi Sunaina Karki Fabio van Loon
Donna Budjenska Aakriti Kumar Ankush Wagle
Assistant Senior Member Member Member
Tom Connolly Dr. John Lash 2nd Lt Grant Willis
Mrityunjaya Dubey Capt Neil Law, USA Sanskruti Yagnik
https:// https:// https:// https://

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JIPA The Journal of

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

https://www.af.mil/ https://www.spaceforce.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/

Senior Leader Perspectives

11 Women on the Front Lines in Myanmar’s Fight for Democracy

46 Myanmar’s Military Coup

56 Between Political Violence and COVID-19

Myanmar Probably Needs a Military

Fifty Years of Damage

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 1

2 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 3

4 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

The Military During the Reform Period

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 5

6 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

When a Country Despises Its Military

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 7

8 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Ambassador Scot Marciel

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 9

10 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Women on the Front Lines in

Traditional Role of Women in Myanmar Society

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 11

Changing Role of Women in Myanmar Society

12 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Women Formed the Backbone of the Revolution

Innovative Methods of Protests

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 13

Myanmar Democracy in the Context of Strategic Competition and

14 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Russia’s Assistance to the Military Junta

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 15

COVID-19 Surge Exacerbates Political Crisis

Women at the Front Line of the Fight for Democracy

16 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Myanmar has become a symbolic contest between democracy and authoritarian-

LTC Miemie Winn Byrd, EdD, US Army (ret.)

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 17

18 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 19

Myanmar in the US Indo-­­Pacific

20 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Washington’s Myopic Vision for Myanmar and China’s Gain

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 21

22 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

engagement had failed to meet US objectives in Myanmar.12 Rather, a multilat-

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 23

24 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Situating Myanmar in the US Indo-­­Pacific Strategy

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 25

both strategies signal a realignment of US resources to counter China’s growing

26 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

primary objective of the US Indo-­­Pacific Strategy. While Myanmar falls geograph-

JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021) 27

Unless a long-­­term picture of Myanmar’s role in US regional strategy is articu-

China’s Multilayered Engagement with Myanmar

28 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  SPECIAL ISSUE (AUGUST 2021)

Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific

Situating Myanmar in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

primary objective of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. While Myanmar falls geograph-

Unless a long-term picture of Myanmar’s role in US regional strategy is articu-

10. Hacke, “Myanmar Now a Site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?.”