TAB 5 - Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera V Prime Utilities BHD
TAB 5 - Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera V Prime Utilities BHD
TAB 5 - Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera V Prime Utilities BHD
(1) Aduan-aduan plaintif bukan tidak berasas atau tanpa kebenaran. Sebagai
pemegang-pemegang saham minoriti, plaintif mempunyai hak untuk
mengambil tindakan derivatif untuk melindungi kepentingan syarikat
(lihat perenggan 28). G
(2) Plaintif telah memenuhi kesemua keperluan prosedur di bawah ss 181A
dan 181B Akta dan ia adalah kes yang layak untuk mahkamah
membenarkan izin yang dipohon (lihat perenggan 29).]
Notes H
For a case on suit against directors, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2011
Reissue) para 145.
Cases referred to
Celcom (M) Bhd v Mohd Shuaib Ishak [2011] 3 MLJ 363; [2010] 7 CLJ 808, I
CA (refd)
Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd [1997] BCTC LEXIS 5338, CA
(refd)
Mohd Shuib Ishak v Celcom (Malaysia) Berhad [2008] 1 LNS 314, HC (refd)
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera v Prime Utilities Bhd
[2013] 7 MLJ (Hasnah Mohammed Hashim J) 833
INTRODUCTION
A (c) the company which owes the investment sum is a company known as
Boston Asset Management Pte Ltd;
(d) the defendant admitted that the sum is due and owing by Boston as
indicated in its report financial statement ended 30 November 2003;
B (e) no steps were taken by the defendant to recover the balance of the
investment sum;
(f ) the plaintiff vide its solicitors through a series of letters inquired into the
progress of the recovery of the investment sum. The defendant through
C its solicitors notified that a letter of demand had been issued and a writ of
summons may be filed against Boston;
(g) since there was no update as to the progress of the recovery action the
plaintiff then issued a letter pursuant to s 181B(2) of the CA indicating
its intention to commence a derivative action against the defendant; and
D
(h) on 3 June 2009 the plaintiff filed an OS for leave to commence action
against Boston. Through the affidavits it was discovered that:
(i) the defendant had commenced an action against Boston on 28
January 2010;
E
(ii) the said suit was struck out by the High Court as no action was taken
by the defendant after the filing of the writ. However the defendant
then proceeded to file another suit. The second suit also suffered
from the fate as the defendant did not take any further action to file
F an extension to serve the writ out jurisdiction; and
(iii) Boston was subsequently wound up on 3 December 2010 by the
High Court of the Republic of Singapore. The plaintiff then decided
to withdraw the second suit. The defendant however did not file any
proof of debt despite request from the plaintiff.
G
The IMA was opened with a foreign asset management company (‘FAMC’) with A
authorization for the FAMC to make discretionary investments in Malaysia. The
FAMC acquired 70% equity interest in a property based group (‘PBG’). The PBG
owns nineteen (19) parcels of development land valued on 28 September, 2001 by
a firm of professional valuers to be approximately RM400 million. The FAMC has
guaranteed, upon notice of withdrawal or termination, to repay the principal
amount placed together with the guaranteed return of 5% per annum either via the B
transfer of assets or the proceeds from disposal of the property based investment,
under the IMA.
Subsequent to the financial year end, the FAMC settled the interest accrued as at 30
April, 2003 amounting to RM4,450,000 including interest up to 31 August, 2003
and also partially repaid the placement amounting to RM4,000,000. The balance of
the placement amounting to RM108,000,000 with interest thereof will either be C
repaid to the Company on or before 30 November, 2003 or as requested by the
Company via the set off of the amounts payable amounting to RM79,000,000 for
the proposed acquisition of the remaining 48% equity interest in SASB. The balance
of the placement after the proposed set off amounting to RM29,000,000 with
interest thereof will be repaid to the Company on or before 30 November, 2003.
D
[5] The notes to the financial statements from 2002–2008 also had
explanations clarifications with regards to the said investment. The defendant
had demanded the refund of the capital sum together with interest since
December 2005. Until 2008 there is no mention of status of the recovery of the E
RM108,000,000. In the annual reports the defendant did not mention of any
litigation for the recovery of the said sum.
[6] The plaintiff then through its lawyers issued a letter inquiring from the
defendant whether legal action had been field to recover the debt from Boston.
The defendant informed the plaintiff that they were studying the matter and F
will revert after 21 days. The defendant’s solicitors subsequently informed the
plaintiff that the defendant had through another solicitors issued a letter of
demand against Boston and that there is an intention to file a writ and
statement of claim against Boston.
G
[7] By letters dated 24 June 2008 and 4 September 2008 the plaintiff ’s
solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors to inquire and follow up on the
status of the recovery action. They were informed to write directly to the
defendant. Therefore by a letter dated 11 September 2008 the plaintiff through
its solicitors wrote to defendant to inquire the status of the recovery action. The H
defendant replied that the defendant’s board would reply to the plaintiff ’s
query. However, the defendant’s board failed to so and as a result this plaintiff
commenced this action under s 181A against the directors of the defendant.
THE LAW
I
A (2) Proceedings brought under this section shall be brought in the company’s
name.
(3) The right of any person to bring, intervene in, defend or discontinue any
proceedings on behalf of a company at common law is not abrogated.
(4) For the purposes of this section and sections 181B and 181E,
B
‘complainant’ means:
(a) a member of a company, or a person who is entitled to be registered
as a member of a company;
(b) a former member of a company if the application relates to
C circumstances in which the member ceased to be a member;
(c) any director of a company; or
(d) the Registrar, in case of a declared company under Part IX.
[11] Abdull Hamid Embong JCA (as he then was) through his judgment in
Celcom (M) Bhd v Mohd Shuaib Ishak [2011] 3 MLJ 363; [2010] 7 CLJ 808
said explained that:
838 Malayan Law Journal [2013] 7 MLJ
[12] Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Tang Kwor Ham &
Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 60; [2006] 1
CLJ 927 said that for leave application the High Court should not go into the E
merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for
leave is frivolous. All that is required for the applicant to show is that there is
some substance in the grounds supporting the application. In the Supreme
Court case of Tuan Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco (Malaysia) Berhad [1995] 2
MLJ 442; [1995] 3 CLJ 627 the court referred to the case of R v Secretary of F
State for the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum [1990] COD 107 where
the Court of Appeal in England laid down the guidelines to be followed by the
court when considering an application for leave, in the following terms:
(i) The judge should grant leave if it is clear that there is a point for further G
investigation on a full inter partes basis with all such evidence as is
necessary on the facts and all such argument as is necessary on the law.
(ii) If the judge is satisfied that there is no arguable case he should dismiss the
application for leave to move for judicial review.
H
(iii) If on considering the papers, the judge comes to the conclusion that he
really does not know whether there is or is not an arguable case, the right
course is for the judge to invite the putative respondent to attend and
make representations as to whether or not leave should be granted. That
inter partes leave hearing should not be anywhere near so extensive as a full
substantive judicial review hearing. The test to be applied by the judge at I
that inter partes leave hearing should be analogous to the approach
adopted in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal against an arbitrator’s
award, … namely: if, taking account of a brief argument on either side, the
judge is satisfied that there is a case fit for further.
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera v Prime Utilities Bhd
[2013] 7 MLJ (Hasnah Mohammed Hashim J) 839
[15] In Mohd Shuib Ishak v Celcom (Malaysia) Berhad [2008] 1 LNS 314
Ramly Ali J (as he then was) adopted the following principle:
E
The test for good faith was dealt with by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in
Primex Investments Ltd v Northwest Sports Enterprise [1995] CanLII 717(BC SC),
where the court considered the requirement under s 225 of the BC Company Act in
an action where the petitioner applies for leave to bring a derivative action in the
name of Northwest Sports Enterprise Ltd against several of its current directors,
F together with companies in which some of them have an interest. Mr Justice Tysoe
in finding the applicant acted in good faith appears to tie the requirement of ‘good
faith’ to the test of the ‘interest of the company’. He stated that were there is an
arguable case, the applicant cannot be said to be acting in bad faith because he wants
the company to pursue what he genuinely considers to be a valid claim. In that case,
G there was no evidence the applicant was using the prospect of a derivative action as
a threat in order to extract some advantage from the company. Tysoe J also indicates
that an applicant advancing self-interest is not necessarily acting in bad faith.
[16] Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the plaintiff ’s
H application is not premised on acting in good faith. The reasons are as set out
below:
(a) there was no full and frank disclosure of the facts by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff ’s representative was a member of the defendant’s board of
I directors;
(b) the plaintiff had never raised any allegations that the directors of the
defendant had failed and/or neglected and/or refused to take any action
to recover the investment sums. The plaintiff is therefore estopped from
raising the objections (Re Thien Kon Thai [2008] 6 MLJ 278);
840 Malayan Law Journal [2013] 7 MLJ
(c) the plaintiff had not filed any complaints against the defendant’s directors A
to the Companies Commission of Malaysia or Securities Commission
alleging neglect, conspiracy or negligence;
(d) the investment agreement was entered into with the knowledge and
agreement of the board of directors. The plaintiff ’s representative was a B
member of the board. Therefore the plaintiff was aware of the said
investment as reflected in the defendant’s financial reports. Further the
plaintiff did not raised any objection neither did it take any steps nor
made any complaints despite knowing that the sums may not be fully
recovered; and C
(e) no steps were taken to remove the directors or to vote against the
reappointment of any of the directors.
[17] Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff is not D
objecting to the investment made. The application is filed because of the
defendant’s the failure and/or refusal of the directors of the defendant to take
steps to recover the investment sum due and owing to the defendant by Boston.
[18] It was discovered through the affidavits filed by the defendant that there E
was a suit filed by the defendant in the Shah Alam High Court (22–537 of
2007). However no further action was taken and the suit was subsequently
struck out by the Shah Alam Court. Another suit was filed (22–157 of 2010)
on 4 February 2010. In this suit no action was taken to serve the writ out of
F
jurisdiction during the validity of the writ of summons.
[20] It is further submitted that the breach of the directors’ duties were made
evident when the directors of the defendant refused to file proof of debt H
(‘POD’) against Boston when it was wound up on 3 December 2010 by the
High Court of the Republic of Singapore. The refusal to file the POD was on
the basis there is no judgment. The plaintiff subsequently demanded further
clarification and/or explanation from the directors of the defendant concerning
the failure to pursue the debt. The defendant however did not respond to the I
plaintiff ’s request.
[21] It is the submission of learned counsel of the plaintiff that the case of Re
Thien Kon Thai referred to by the defendant is not applicable as it relates to a
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera v Prime Utilities Bhd
[2013] 7 MLJ (Hasnah Mohammed Hashim J) 841
A fraudulent act of the defendant who had transferred and registered the land in
the name of Madam Thien who was not a party to the suit.
[22] The main reason the plaintiff commenced this action is because the
defendant had not proceeded diligently to recover the investment sums nor
B given any reasonable explanation why it had not pursue the recovery of the
investment sum. The plaintiff had written to the defendant requesting for an
explanation for the failure to pursue the recovery of the investment but the
directors of the defendant have failed to respond or reply to that letter. No
explanation has been given by the defendant for the reluctance to file the proof
C of debt against Boston.
(ii) The directors had conspired with Boston by delaying their recovery A
action until winding up to Boston;
(iii) The directors had delayed the recovery action with a view to defeat
the defendant’s recovery action.
B
[25] The directors of the defendant must exercise skill, care and diligence in
performance and discharge. As the custodian of the defendant the directors are
duty bound to explain their actions to the plaintiff. The plaintiff have shown
through its affidavits that it is acting in good faith and in the best interest of the
company in bringing this action against the defendant. There is no evidence
that this application is made in bad faith or for collateral purposes. C
[26] Another point that the court must consider deciding whether to grant
D
leave into when is whether ‘if it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of
the company that the application for leave be granted’.
[27] The test of whether an action is prima facie in the interests of the
company can be found in the case of Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries E
Ltd [1997] BCTC LEXIS 5338:
The real question here is whether in the circumstances of this case, ‘it is prima facie
in the interests of the company that the action be brought’ (s 222(3)(c)). It will be
noted that the legislature has said that it is sufficient to show that the action sought
is prima facie in the interest of the company and does not appear to require that the F
applicants prove a prima facie case. Presumably the authors of that legislation had in
mind that a minority shareholder being in a real sense on the outside is often not in
a position to obtain evidence such as that the Crown could be expected to put
forward to found a prima facie case in a criminal matter.
G
[28] In the present case, the complaints by the plaintiff as shown in all the
affidavits are not without basis or substance. Even as minority shareholder the
plaintiff has the right to take a derivative action to protect the interest of a
company.
H
DECISION OF THE COURT
[29] Upon reading the originating summons and the relevant affidavits and
upon a consideration of the written submissions by counsel for both parties, I
held that this was a fit and proper case for the court to grant leave to the plaintiff I
to commence a derivative action in the name of the defendant against the
directors of the defendant. The plaintiff has, at this stage, complied with all the
procedural requirements as required under ss 181A–181B of the CA to obtain
leave.
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera v Prime Utilities Bhd
[2013] 7 MLJ (Hasnah Mohammed Hashim J) 843
A [30] Based on the above considerations the court grants leave in favour of the
plaintiff as in prayer (1) of the application with costs.
B
Reported by Ashok Kumar