Seven Steps for Wire Strike

Prevention

Aircraft Struck Guy Wires Continuing VMC in IMC

1. SOPs, TSPs, and directives. Standard as Europe, where the prominence of wires would
operating procedures (SOP), training support unduly clutter the map, major wire hazards and wires
packages (TSP), and directives related to terrain that are located in unlikely areas should be plotted.
flight should reflect the safest possible procedures Aircrew members should also be made aware of
for the types of missions being flown. Detailed other unplotted wire locations. All wires should be
responsibilities for the pilot at the controls, pilot not plotted if they do not compromise the usefulness of
at the controls and other crewmembers should be the map and the SA systems. Crewmembers should
specified. Then the responsibilities and procedures be thoroughly briefed on wire strikes before every
should be reinforced regularly at aviation safety and terrain flight mission.
training meetings. 4. Wire marking. Whenever possible, all wires
2. Supervision. Commanders and supervisors around potential takeoff and landing sites on and
must ensure that pilots adhere to established off military reservations should be marked. Certainly,
procedures. All missions should be planned and all all wires around frequently used sites should be
aircrew members should know the plan. Immediate marked. While pilots should know when to expect
corrective action should be taken regarding any wires, markers make them easier to see. Wires noted
violation of flight discipline. as unmarked and near frequently used training areas
3. Hazard maps. Wires and other obstacles that for helicopter operations should be annotated on
pose a threat to terrain flight should be accurately the hazard map and brought up as an issue to the
depicted on hazard maps and aircraft situational unit safety and standardization council.
awareness (SA) systems symbology. In areas, such 5. Plan for terrain flight. Most wire strikes occur
 not allow the pilot to land or climb (e.g., actions
on contact, combat maneuvering flight, and flight
during target designation or handoff ).
7. Go slow when you go low. The slower the
airspeed, the more time pilots will have to identify
and react to an unforeseen obstacle in their flight
path. Assuming good visibility, if two aircraft are
approaching wires and one is at 80 knots (KT) while
the other is at 40 KT, the pilot of the faster aircraft
will need to spot the wires at a distance of more
than 1,650 feet to react and avoid them. The pilot of
the slower aircraft will have ample time to react if
the wires are noted from a distance of 600 feet. One
mistake, such as flying down a river or valley at
speeds which don’t allow hazard detection and
evasion time, getting lost, or failure to update your
Aircraft Struck Wires during Terrain Flight hazard map, is all it takes for you to be a wire strike
during terrain flight in the contour mode or on fatality. Unit commanders, operations officers and
takeoff or landing. Unless planned and required platoon leaders share some of the responsibility for
by the mission, terrain flight should be avoided if wire strike mishaps but the final responsibility lies
unnecessary and unplanned. Aircrew members with crewmembers in the cockpit. Slower airspeed
should also be extremely careful and ensure a during terrain flight doesn’t necessarily mean
low recon is conducted when landing in or taking slowing down to a certain airspeed, it entails
off from confined areas. Be wary of becoming crewmembers flying the helicopter at an airspeed
complacent when in known areas, and always that allows seeing and avoiding hazardous wires or
conduct the low recon. New wires and towers are towers. Other factors are based on tactical flight and
being erected each day so beware. tactics necessary to avoid or evade threat infrared
and radar systems. Solid preflight route planning
6. Maximum crew coordination. The more and staying alert for the unexpected wire is
crewmembers actively engaged in spotting wire consistent with a safely completed mission. Go
hazards on any given flight, the less the risk of wire slower when you go lower.
strikes. When flying in an environment with wires,
maximum coordination among all crewmembers is Aviation Division
needed. During terrain flight, the pilot should give Directorate of Assessments and Prevention
full attention to flying the aircraft. Navigation, setting U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center
radio frequencies, and monitoring instruments
should be a function of
another crewmember.
If pilots must direct
attention away from
flying, they should
land or climb to a
higher altitude. During
combat operations
in high-threat air
defense system areas
of operation, wire strike
prevention must be
part of the mission
planning process.
Certain situations may Crew Failed to Mark Wires on Map
2
Surviving in the Wire Environment
Terrain flight proficiency has become a basic accidents, it seems to be a lack of awareness
combat skill. It increases the effectiveness, of how little room for error there is in the
as well as the survivability, of our actions in terrain flight mode. Any corner-cutting or
a hostile environment. In other words, to compromise in the preparation and conduct of
protect ourselves in a combat environment we these flights can produce disastrous results. The
accept the more manageable risks of the wire validity of this observation can be judged in a
environment. How well have we adjusted to the review of two recent wire strike accidents.
demands of this challenging form of flying?
Wire Strike One
The wire strike mishaps we have each year show Black Hawk crewmembers were on a night
we pay a needlessly high price for the learning vision goggles (NVG) tactical training flight.
process. Seventy-six wire strike accidents involving It was a dark, clear night without a moon.
damage were reported over the past five years. The three crewmembers were wearing
Ten people were killed and 22 injured in these goggles. Three passengers were on board.
accidents. Twelve aircraft were destroyed. The total
cost of these accidents was nearly $21 million. The pilot in command (PC) was navigating
from the left seat. The co-pilot was flying from
If there is a common denominator in these

Common Types of Power Transmission Lines

https://www.signs.org/codes-regulations/federal-regulations/power-line-safety

3
the right seat. The route was being flown at 80 the PC thought these were the wires marked
KT about 150 feet above ground level. The PC on his map. There were no other wires marked
was using the infrared searchlight whenever on his map in the immediate area. He had
he anticipated wires plotted on his hazard not yet reached the wires marked on his map,
map. One-half mile from where the Black which were one-half mile away. When the UH-
Hawk flew over one set of wires marked on the 60 reached the set of wires marked on the map,
map, a 150-foot power-line tower appeared crewmembers were not prepared for them.
unexpectedly. The PC pushed the collective down The PC was a standardization instructor pilot
and told the co-pilot to go under the wires. (SIP) with almost 5,000 hours of flight time and
As the helicopter descended, the co-pilot three years’ experience in the theater of operations.
started a right turn and raised the nose. While He had flown over the same area in the daytime
the helicopter was in the turn, the main rotor but did not recall seeing the wires the helicopter
severed four bottom wires that were more hit.
than three-fourths-inch thick. The UH-60 hit Rank, age and experience do not make
the ground on its right side and came to rest anyone immune to errors. Experience
upright. After the crew and passengers exited, is no substitute for compliance with
a post-crash fire destroyed the helicopter. standard operating procedures (SOP) in the
The error-inviting compromise that set the stage preparation and performance of missions.
for this mishap is easily identified. The PC had not
transcribed all the power lines displayed on the Wire Strike Two
wire hazards map in the operations office to his Another wire strike mishap killed three
own map, despite having the time and opportunity. crewmembers. It involved the No. 4 aircraft in a
seven-ship formation of aircraft returning to home
When the UH-60 flew over the first set of wires, station after a five-day training exercise.

Common Electrical Distribution Lines

https://www.signs.org/codes-regulations/federal-regulations/power-line-safety
4
The flight proceeded in loose trail formation • Ensure all wires are posted on the
with three to five rotor disk separation. Visibility hazard maps (update daily).
conditions were poor, with ceilings estimated at 400 • Go slow when you go low.
to 600 feet. Airspeed varied between 50 and 70 KT
as the flight paralleled a main highway on the left. • Commanders must enforce SOPs. Procedures
for all missions must be clearly spelled out
The flight crossed several sets of power lines. in the SOP, and these procedures should
Before crossing each set, the flight would climb be reinforced regularly at aviation safety
from a cruising altitude of just above the trees to an and training meetings. Breaches of flight
altitude that would allow the wires to be crossed discipline should be corrected immediately.
at the towers. Once the towers were crossed, each
aircraft would descend individually to cruising • Operations officers must schedule compatible
altitude. Visibility was reduced significantly when aircrew members who have attained the
climbing to cross the towers. The aircraft crossed desired state of training as weighed against
over the towers at varying heights, with several the complexity of the mission. Operations
aircraft in the flight crossing at less than the officers must maintain a daily updated hazard
50-foot clearance required by the unit’s SOP. map and brief aviators on wire hazards.
As the flight of aircraft approached the wires at • Aviation safety officers must closely
the mishap site, the flight lead, the No. 2 and No. monitor flight crew scheduling, briefings,
3 aircraft slowed to about 50 KT and crossed the debriefings, posting, availability and use of
tower with less than the 50-foot clearance required. wire hazard maps while promoting wire strike
The No. 4 aircraft descended onto the tower prevention awareness in safety meetings.
while returning to cruising altitude and crashed • IPs must practice, teach, and reinforce
inverted. The height of the tower was 163 feet. wire strike prevention criteria and
The co-pilot was flying the aircraft. Since common-sense rules for detecting and
leaving flight school, he had accumulated only avoiding wires. You set the example.
15.8 hours. His formation flying ability had been • Co-pilots and crew chiefs must be assigned
criticized by the other pilots in the unit, especially specific cockpit tasks and duties. Open lines
his lack of smoothness in crossing wires. of communication must exist between the
His attention may have been so focused on the pilot at the controls and those navigating
aircraft in front of him that he failed to ensure he and/or clearing the aircraft in all quadrants.
had cleared the tower. It is also possible that fear • Every Army helicopter pilot must remain
of going inadvertent instrument meteorological conscious of basic wire strike prevention
conditions (IIMC) in the reduced visibility above measures and continuously consider wires
the tower prompted a premature descent. while flying in the terrain-flight mode. Everyone
The 50-foot crossing height was not enforced on the team shares the responsibility for wire
by several leaders in the flight: the air mission strike mishaps, but the final responsibility
commander, who was the flight lead; the flight still belongs to the people in the cockpit.
platoon leader in the No. 2 aircraft; the unit IP in Because of the wire strike protection system, we
the No. 3 aircraft; and several other PCs. In fact, are not losing as many aircraft to wire strikes as we
it had become an accepted practice in this unit once did. However, wire strikes are still occurring,
to cross wires at less than the required 50-foot just with less catastrophic consequences. A team
clearance. These two accidents underline the critical effort is required to prevent wire strikes.
importance of 10 key wire strike prevention actions:
Aviation Division
• Make sure that thorough hazard and Directorate of Assessments and Prevention
obstacle briefings are conducted U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center
before every terrain-flight mission.
• Mark all wires in the areas you will operate.

5
Centralized Aviation Flight Records (CAFRS):
Record Status Report (RSR) – Medical Status
CAFRS v4.0.3.6, which was released in February 2018, allows users to create a Department of Defense Form
2992, Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty, to replace the Department of the Army
Form 4186. With this release, a DA Form 4186 can no longer be created in CAFRS. Prior to the release of CAFRS
v4.0.3.6, users had to create a DA Form 4186 based on information issued by the flight surgeon or aviation
physician’s assistant (APA) on a DD Form 2992 (between January 2015 and February 2018). The data input into
CAFRS from the DD Form 2992 contains the same information recorded on the DA Form 4186 even though the
forms were different.
The DD Form 2992 is fully functional in CAFRS. The form can be filled out in accordance with DA Pamphlet
40-502, and other Aeromedical Policy Letters and Aeromedical Technical Bulletins. The DD Form 2992 can also
be signed in CAFRS. A few units have made CAFRS available to their flight surgeon and APAs so that the DD Form
2992 process can be completed in CAFRS.
Having said all this, let’s examine the medical status report in the CAFRS RSR, which displays information
from the DD Form 2992. The goal of this article is to share everything that the CAFRS team put into this report.
U.S. Army Aeromedical Activity (USAAMA) at Fort Rucker gave us feedback throughout the development of this
report and the CAFRS DD Form 2992.

First, how do you get to this report? After you log This will open the Record Status Report window.
into CAFRS, click the RSR button. You will need to click on the Medical Status tab first,
then click Generate Report.

The medical status report generates seven categories of medical information. They are, in order from top to
bottom: No Current Medical Exam, DNIF (Down), Expiring in the Next 30 Days, Under Extension, Current
Medical Exam, FFD (Up), and Future. The intent is to put possible issues at the top of the report for the
commander to see. Each category will only appear on the report if you have an aviation crewmember (ACM) with
that medical status. For example, if every ACM has a DD Form 2992 that represents a current flying duty medical
examination (FDME)/flying duty health screen (FDHS), the No Current Medical Exam category will not display
on the medical status report.
Let’s look at the first two categories: No Current Medical Exam and DNIF (Down).

No Current Medical Exam

The No Current Medical Exam category displays a list of ACMs who either have no DD Form 2992 marked as
“Cleared After Flight Duty Medical Examination” or whose last medical exam has expired. If the ACM’s most recent
6
medical exam has expired, the Effective Date and Expiration Date of the medical exam are listed. The asterisk
means that the last medical recommendation form entered into CAFRS was a DA Form 4186. The top two ACMs
in the above image do not have a current DD Form 2992 that represents a FDME/FDHS. The third ACM, 1LT Nova,
has never had a FDME/FDHS entered into CAFRS.
DNIF (Down)
The DNIF (Down) category displays a list of ACMs who are currently restricted from flying duties due to a
medical/dental reason, as indicated on their current DD Form 2992. The reason for the medical/dental restriction
is given in the Status column, and the Effective Date and Expiration Date of the restriction are also displayed,
if applicable. The top two records in the DNIF (Down) category in the above image are the same two from the
No Current Medical Exam category; their status reads Expired Medical Exam, which is why they are DNIF (Duties
Not Including Flying). 1LT Eovaldi is DNIF for a month due to an aircraft mishap. 1LT Nova from the No Current
Medical Exam category has a status of No Medical Exam, which is why he is DNIF.
Now we will move on to Expiring in the Next 30 Days and Under Extensions.

Expiring in the Next 30 Days

The Expiring in the Next 30 Days category displays a list of ACMs whose current FDME/FDHS or extension
will expire within the next 30 days. The date of expiration of the medical exam or extension is displayed in RED
type in the Expiration Date column. The number of days until expiration is displayed in the Status column. The
icon indicates whether the expiring DD Form 2992 represents a FDME/FDHS (person in lab coat) or a FDME/FDHS
extension (red flag).
Under Extension:
The Under Extension category displays a list of ACMs whose medical exam expiration date has been
extended and the ACM is currently within the extension period. The Effective Date and Expiration Date of the
extension are displayed. The Status column displays the date of the DD Form 2992 for FDME/FDHS extension
that was issued by the flight surgeon or APA. In the image shown above, CPT Clemente was issued an extension
on July 26. His FDME/FDHS expired June 30, and since he has a June birth month, he should probably have
received this on June 26 instead of July 26, as shown in the Status column. It is a good idea to verify the date and
to make sure this was not a typographical error.
Current Medical Exam

The Current Medical Exam category displays a list of ACMs with a current FDME/FDHS. This list includes those
whose exams expire within the next 30 days, but it does not include those on FDME/FDHS extension once they
are past the expiration date of the original annual FDME/FDHS. The Effective Date and Expiration Date of each
ACM’s exam are displayed, along with a statement indicating whether the ACM is required to wear corrective
lenses or carry extra spectacles, if applicable, in the Status column. If the ACM’s month of expiration is not the
same as their birth month, the expiration date will be highlighted in yellow as an alert to the user, flight surgeon,
APA, and commander. Notice CW2 July’s expiration date is past the end of his birth month. 1LT Barnes is required
to wear corrective lenses. This is also a good way to stay on top of who needs inserts for their mask. 7
FFD (Up)

The FFD (Up) category displays a list of ACMs who are qualified to perform flying duties. The Effective and
Expiration Date of their medical exam displayed, along with the justification displayed in the Status column.
The top two ACMs were previously DNIF, but are currently FFD (Full Flying Duties), as indicated by the remark in
their Status columns. 1LT Barnes has not been DNIF for his ATP period. CPT Clemente is on an extension; notice
that he is not on the list for a Current Medical Exam.
Future

The Future category displays a list of ACMs who have a FDME/FDHS, extension, upslip, or downslip with an
effective date in the future. The date in BLUE type is an indicator that the effective date is in the future. 1LT Goody
is still on his current FDME/FDHS, but will be on an extension once August begins. He may have scheduled Part II
of his flight physical late. The remaining entries need to be verified for accuracy.
Features
Right clicking on the name of an ACM in any category will allow you to open that ACM’s associated DD Form
2992. Clicking on the column headers will allow you to change the sort order of those columns, giving you the
ability to customize the report. The default order of the medical status report is alphabetical by last name.
Clicking Birth Month changes the order of the report to January – December; clicking Birth Month again
reverses the order of the report to December – January. Working sets can be used to customize reports.
Contact
CAFRS website - https://www.jtdi.mil/group/ACMC_CAFRS
The CAFRS help desk can be reached via email at: usarmy.redstone.ccdc-avmc.mbx.cafrs-help@mail.mil.
Article by:
Traversia Viola
CAFRS Application Engineer
Paul Williams
CAFRS Subject Matter Expert
Alice Gero
CAFRS/SAAS Technical Writer
Brian Pendleton
CAFRS Developer
Jinxiu Knoll
CAFRS Developer

8
Mishap Review - AH-64D
Longbow Wire Strike
While conducting a deliberate attack in an AH-64D
Apache helicopter, the pilot in command (PC) on
the controls had a breakdown in visual scan. The PC
was focused on locating his wingman (Gun 2), over
his left shoulder. As a result, the aircraft struck wires
and impacted the terrain, causing minor injuries to
crewmembers. The aircraft was a total loss.
History
Mishap crewmembers were conducting training
operations in support of an armored division. The
mishap crew was part of a four-aircraft mission to maintain airspace surveillance as directed in
supporting the ground commander while providing the aircrew training module (ATM). Additionally,
attack by fire (ABF) support for a breach force. crewmembers hadn’t properly managed their crew
Crewmembers conducted mission planning and a endurance and did not have hazard data information
risk assessment and the mission was approved. While in the aircraft. A culmination of deviations from
conducting the mission, aircrew members were standard operating procedures and the ATM led to
utilizing their pilot night vision systems, night vision the transmission line mishap.
goggles, and the target acquisition and designation Even with the state-of-the-art information systems
system. The PC was seated in the back seat utilizing available on Army aircraft and the systems available
flight symbology during the mishap phase. A system for operational planning, errors can still lead to
failure in the laser system required the mishap mishaps. It is important for commanders and leaders
aircraft, Gun 1, to move forward of the ABF ridgeline to maintain situational awareness of what is
and manually pass target information to Gun 2. As occurring in their units in relation to how accurately
the battle developed, Gun 1 maneuvered to seek aircrew members are managing their crew
cover and concealment from enemy forces. While endurance, application of base ATM standards
doing so, the Gun 1 PC maneuvered the aircraft while (airspace surveillance), and the basics of pre-mission
instructing the pilot (PI) to stay inside and maintain flight planning. In our high operational tempo
situational awareness on the enemy targets. The PC decisive action training environments, the
was concerned with Gun 2’s location, so he remained culmination of deviations from standard is an easy
outside, looking over his shoulder even though Gun indicator of the lead-up to a mishap. While leaders
2 had called clear of Gun 1. After Gun 1 rolled out of have oversight, the crews are at the sharp end and
consecutive turns, the PI of the aircraft announced responsible for keeping leaders informed so they can
wires just prior to impacting extra-high-voltage make risk decisions based on the most accurate
transmission lines. The aircraft made a forced landing, information. Studies demonstrate that personnel
impacting the ground. There were no injuries to exhibiting fatigue tend to fixate on cognitive tasks
crewmembers. and their ability to address multiple tasks is reduced.
Crew Additionally, crewmember monitoring may help
The PC had 2,733 hours in mission, type, design, personnel effectively spot the first signs of fatigue.
and series (MTDS), and 2,813 hours total time. The PI Crews are eager to execute the mission and it is
had 411 hours in MTDS and 495 hours total time. paramount they don’t let this desire to execute
dampen their actual endurance and flight time
Commentary tracking which results in leaders not having the
The aircraft struck wires due to the PC being correct information to use in risk assessing the crew
fixated on “gaining visual contact” with Gun 2 while for the mission.
Gun 2 had called clear and no factor. The PC failed
9
Class A - C Mishap Tables

10
Blast From The Past: Articles from the archives of past Flightfax issues

VOL. 34, NO.1. 2 Jan 2006

Situational Awareness and Spatial

Disorientation in the Fight
While conducting a low-level night mission, the color, as are the support poles, and are camouflaged
pilot in command (PC) flew the aircraft into wires against the desert. At night, the wires are very
suspended across a river that were known and difficult to detect through night vision devices
depicted on the wire hazards map. The aircraft was (NVDs) because of their small circular reflecting
destroyed and both crewmembers fatally injured. surfaces.
Some would say the cause of this accident was The U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory
overconfidence, bad planning, or maybe just bad (USAARL) is currently conducting a study of
luck. The root of these two deaths, however, was a situational awareness and spatial disorientation
loss of situational awareness. Many factors led to this in operations during the War on Terror. There is no
crew being unaware of the wires that killed them, way to prevent every accident, but here are some
but at least some could have been foreseen and reminders on how to keep your situational awareness
dealt with. One small change could have broken that and your life intact:
accident chain of events and saved the aircrew. • Don’t bust your minimum altitude; it’s usually
In another accident, the aircrew failed to maintain there for a good reason.
the briefed and authorized minimum altitude • Use hazard maps whenever you brief and keep
of 300 feet above ground level (AGL) and went them up to date.
through a four-cable mineshaft ore transport system
suspended 156 feet above the ground. The aircraft • Risk assess (do I need to be flying this low or this
was destroyed and the two crewmembers suffered fast?) and keep reassessing throughout the flight.
fatal injuries. • Don’t become the next cautionary tale.
Two men died because they did not follow their The second area of concern from the survey
own briefing and the local flying orders. In this case, is spatial disorientation. A very experienced
the hazard was marked on the map but had not been standardization pilot described half of his dust
specifically briefed because it was too low to be an landings in theater as “Hail Marys.” Even the sky gods
issue—or so it was thought. The crew’s situational don’t have the ability to see through a brownout, and
awareness was degraded by a combination of poor you cannot fly by the seat of your pants.
planning and poor execution. Brownout accidents, by definition, occur close to
The list of accidents involving an aircrew that lost the ground and are slow. That has limited most of
situational awareness and flew their aircraft into the damage to the machinery rather than the crew.
wires is depressingly long. Every pilot who has flown However, there have been deaths, and nearly all
in Iraq knows the wires in that country seem to have of those were preventable. There are three sets of
been designed for the express purpose of snagging circumstances that have come up time and again:
unwary aviators. The wires are often a rusted brown
11
• Not enough power to climb out of the dust cloud: the last three years, almost always ending with
— Poor power available calculations during the the aircraft on its side. Crewmembers have
planning phase. died as a result.
— Bad placement of forward arming and There is no golden bullet for dust landings, but
refueling points (FARPs) with respect to wind every crew runs the risk of spatial disorientation if
direction and physical obstacles such as sand they get enveloped in the cloud. Crew coordination
berms. is a critical item used to minimize error and alert
crewmembers to flight - critical information. Utilize
— Choosing to take off out of wind and never crew coordination with crew experience to manage
getting above or ahead of the dust cloud. the hazards of dust landings — stay ahead of the
• Hitting an unseen obstacle on the ground: cloud, communicate, use symbology if you have it,
— Poor power available calculations during the and use instruments if you can. However, don’t be
planning phase. afraid to throw away a bad approach; bad approaches
don’t get better at the bottom.
— More than $30 million in damage has been
caused to aircraft over the last three years Based on this survey, we conclude that conducting
by impacting obstacles on the rollout, most better flight planning, thinking ahead of the aircraft,
occurring on reconned and known landing following standing operating procedures, and
zones. Again, this planning and briefing is conducting composite risk management saves lives.
critical to being forewarned — forearmed on Fly safe!
an objective.
LTC IAN P. CURRY
• Lateral drift in the final stages of landing: United States Army Aeromedical
— This has happened more than a dozen times in Research Laboratory

Forum Op-ed, Opinions, Ideas, and Information

(Views expressed are to generate professional discussion and are not U.S. Army or USACRC policy)

On the topic of Army aviation maintenance …

I would just like to say I agree that the utilization asked a simple question, they cannot answer or
of working days required to complete maintenance make a decision. Afterward, you find the platoon
is a terrible way to track maintenance; I completely sergeant and ask why the Soldier was briefing
agree that man-hours are the way to go. In all of and you’re told it was “training.” Training is letting
my travel to combat aviation brigades (CAB), I have the Soldier brief but being available to step in
noticed many commonalities: and help conduct a productive discussion.
• Lack of phase team continuity and • Lack of direction – We tend to have PC
supervision – Many CABs are not protecting meetings because that is what we always do
their phase teams. They are using the phase and there is not a lot of production to them. I
teams as a ready pool of Soldiers, available have also seen a large majority of the meetings
for detail work simply because they are in the end and, after the meeting, still have no idea
hangar and accessible at short notice. what the priority for the day is or what needs to
• Lack of experienced supervision or leadership be accomplished (the primary reason for a PC
in charge of phase teams – Training often meeting).
consists of throwing the phase team leader • Deferred maintenance follow up – Logbook
“into the fire” and walking away. This is notable reconnaissance goes a long way in maximizing
in production control (PC) meetings. How many efficiency. We find that most units have adequate
times have you gone to a PC meeting and there recon sheets but have never actually completed
is a specialist briefing from a clipboard. When the recon. It is a paperwork drill that tends

12
 to get pencil whipped with the assumption maintenance, do not complete the basics well and
that someone else will do the work and do it we are not consistent with our routines. We can
correctly. debate this point all day long; however, I’ve been in
• Parts ordering – ULLS-A does not “talk” to aviation maintenance 29 years and I have seen it. The
GCSS-A. ACN may do so, but when you go to decline in basic skills, whether it is an institutional
tech supply and check a document number, it deficiency (Advanced Individual Training) or a lack of
may show the part is on order. However, it may Soldier personal progression, has caused us to redo
have never made it through Z-PARK. Rollover the same work over and over again to get it right.
document numbers have to be correlated back First published in July 2018, Training Circular 3-04.71
to the unit document number and checked to will help if implemented at units and taken seriously.
ensure they are on order (we have seen this over Lastly, commands are not integrating
and over again). This is a very simple task that maintenance into their operational planning. We
can save so much downtime and remove a lot of have to get back to synchronizing maintenance with
reliance on aircraft on the ground requisitions. the operations and training plan! Our mission is to
Every unit I visit states “We are so busy.” After support Soldiers on the ground, but we must take
further investigation, yes, the units are busy. care of our aircraft and ourselves first in order to
However, units are busy redoing a maintenance support this mission.
task to get it right or they are stopping work on CW5 Rob Devlin
an aircraft to correct Soldier military occupational Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization
specialty training deficiencies. We, aviation Directorate Maintenance Examiner

Mishap Briefs #79

ROTARY WING C-ER Model – Unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
sustained damage from unforecasted weather/hail
Attack while in flight. (Class C)
H-64
E Model – Aircraft descended to ground RQ-7BV2
impact following takeoff from forward arming – During recovery, the air vehicle (AV) experienced
and refueling point. Damage to main and tail a hard landing and bounced over the arresting
rotor system, target acquisition designation pendants and barrier net. The AV continued to roll,
sight pilot night vision sensor, and fuselage impacting a hand rail and sustaining significant
was reported. (Class A) damage. No personnel were injured. (Class B)

UNMANNED - Aircraft experienced ram air turbine (RAT) temps

beyond limitations and immediately returned to
base (RTB). Tactical automatic landing system (TALS)
MQ-1 would not accept aircraft for the recovery due to
C Model – Crewmembers executed a go-around low airspeed. Aircraft crashed in open field and
after nose of aircraft was observed to make contact terminated on a road. (Class B)
with the ground on initial touchdown. Aircrew
members subsequently performed an emergency
landing. Nose landing gear was reported as sheared – Aircrew members reportedly lost link with the
halfway up the strut, and payload turret was aircraft during flight and it impacted off post. Post-
reported as damaged. (Class B) crash fire ensued. (Class B)

13
– The AV was yawing right after the decision point. – Aircraft crashed after touchdown approximately
Upon touchdown, the AV veered off the left side of 100 feet off the runway during TALS landing with
the runway. Aircraft contacted the arresting gear no reported success at programmed “wave off”
during landing and subsequently crashed off the attempts by operators. (Class C)
runway. The AV suffered significant damage and
no personnel were injured. Aircraft was recovered.
(Class C) – Following a handoff, the AV experienced a
propulsion failure. The flight termination system
(FTS) was successfully initiated and the AV has been
– Aircraft was landed to a flight landing strip (FLS) recovered. (Class C)
with the recovery chute following reported TALS
and alternative portable ground control station
connectivity failures. Aircraft was recovered with – During climb-out, the AV experienced a propulsion
approximately $100,000 in damage. (Class C) failure. The FTS was initiated and the AV was
recovered. (Class C)

– Crew reportedly experienced multiple system

failure readings during climb-out. Recovery chute – During the mission, the AV experienced a
was deployed and aircraft was recovered by local propulsion failure. The parachute was deployed and
national authorities. (Class C) no personnel were injured. (Class C)

– Crewmembers reportedly lost link with the aircraft – Aircraft reportedly touched down hard and
while in TALS mode and aircraft crashed off the bounced, missing the arresting gear and barrier net
airfield. It was recovered with significant damage. during recovery phase and struck an obstacle before
(Class C) coming to rest. (Class C)

Online newsletter of Army aircraft mishap prevention

information published by the U. S. Army Combat
Readiness Center, Fort Rucker, AL 36322-5363. DSN 558-
2660. Information is for mishap prevention purposes only.
Specifically prohibited for use for punitive purposes or
matters of liability, litigation, or competition. Flightfax is
approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

14
 AR 385-10/DA PAM 385-90

PRE-ACCIDENT PLANNING
AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program, dated 24 February 2017 and DA PAM 385-90, Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program, Rapid Action
Revision (RAR) Issue date 24 February 2010 are two of the primary publications that address the pre-accident planning requirement for aviation
units.
AR 385-10, Chapter 15, Aviation Safety Management, states that:
a. A unit emergency plan will be prepared and maintained according to DA Pam 385–90 and DA Pam 385–10.
b. The unit pre-accident or pre-emergency plan will be rehearsed, reviewed, and its adequacy documented. The degree of response by
elements in the emergency plan for a rehearsal can vary; however, an exercise requiring all elements to respond physically must be
conducted at least annually.
c. The unit pre-accident or pre-emergency plan should include procedures for response to, and investigation of, accidents where contractor
maintenance supporting unit operations is involved in the accident and the Government has assumed all or some of the risk of loss in the
contract.
DA PAM 385-90, Chapter 1, General, 1-4, provides the following responsibilities to the following personnel: Commanders - Commanders
provide the following functions: Pre-accident plans, including immediate actions, investigation procedures (see DA Pamphlet (Pam) 385-40),
reporting and records (see AR 385-10), and corrective responsibilities; Operations officers – prepare and maintain the unit pre-accident plan for
the commander. The expertise of the ASO and other applicable elements is used in accomplishing this task. Rehearse, review, and document the
adequacy of the unit pre-accident plan. This must be a systemic review and is conducted at least quarterly. The degree of response by elements
in the pre-accident plan can vary; however, an exercise requiring all elements to physically respond must be conducted at least annually (this is
also a function of the Aviation safety officer). Flight surgeon – should ensure that the medical portion of the pre-accident plan is adequate.
Additionally, Chapter 2, Aviation Safety Program, 2-9, Pre-accident planning states that commanders will ensure - the development of
detailed, written, pre-accident plans specifying duties, responsibilities, and immediate actions for personnel involved in accident notification
procedures, search and rescue, accident investigation, and equipment recovery. The unit operations officer develops and administers the pre-
accident plan with the technical assistance of the unit ASO (additional guidance on pre-accident planning may be found in DA Pam 385–10).
Pre-accident plans will — (1) Interface with airfield/installation and higher headquarters plans. Units/facilities on non-Army and non-DOD
airfields will ensure plans are coordinated with appropriate local authorities and comply with applicable Army and DOD requirements. (2) Focus
on organized rescue of personnel, protection of property, preservation of the accident scene, and notification of appropriate personnel. (3)
Address both garrison and field/deployment operations. (4) Address actions for both aviation and ground accidents. The systematic rehearsal
and review of pre-accident plans is as follows:
(1) P
 re-accident plans will be systematically rehearsed and reviewed for adequacy quarterly at a minimum.
(2) Frequent non-tenant user flight crews will be fully knowledgeable of the host installation pre-accident plan.
(3) An example of a unit aviation pre-accident plan is located in appendix C, DA Pam 385-90.
Appendix C, Sample Documents, Pre-accident plan, says that the operations officer should be responsible for establishing, implementing
and accomplishing the pre-accident plan, including:
(1) Coordinating with all personnel.
(2) Familiarizing all unit personnel with the crash alarm system and the provisions of AR 420–1, AR 385–10, and DA Pam 385–40.
(3) Conducting regular (minimum quarterly) documented tests of the plan.
(4) Ensuring air crash search and rescue (ACSR) or local crash grid maps and/or crash grid overlays are distributed and maintained by each
activity listed on the primary and secondary crash alarm systems and in all medical ambulances.
(5) Ensuring DA Pam 385–40 and AR 420–1 are used as guidance.
(6) Ensuring that plans are developed and coordinated to fulfill all Army requirements when operating as a tenant activity on a non-Army or
joint use airfield.
This appendix serves as a functional example for existing units. It is not intended to be construed as the standard for all units. Use of the
example pre-accident plan in appendix C of DA Pam 385-90 is not mandatory unless supported by regulation. The requirement to have a pre-
accident plan and to rehearse the plan, is stated, as shown above, in AR 385-10. This appendix is a good starting point for your plan.

5 Questions
1. A pre-accident plan exercise, requiring all elements to respond physically, must be conducted annually? True or False
2. According to DA PAM 385-90, who prepares and maintains the unit pre-accident plan for the commander?
3. How often, according to DA PAM 385-90, should the operations officer and the ASO conduct a systemic review of the pre-accident
plan? Monthly, quarterly, semi-annually?
4. When operating and conducting operations on a non-Army and/or a non-DOD airfield, should a pre-accident plan be coordinated
with appropriate local authorities and should it comply with applicable Army and DOD requirements?
5. Which appendix in DA PAM 385-90 has a sample pre-accident plan with duties and responsibilities?

15
WIRES
TOWERS

Follow the Seven Steps for Prevention

Follow your TSPs and SOPs for Terrain Flight Operations
Leader supervision - Enforce the standards in the TSP
and SOP
Daily updated operations master hazard map and
updated software for aircraft map applications
Mark wires and understand the pitfalls of wires
through low barrier areas and flying in unfamiliar
terrain
Use terrain flight altitudes when necessary and avoid
excessive speeds at low altitudes
Maximize crew coordination and use every set of eyes
lowe give yourself and crew time to
Slower as you go lower,
identify the wires coming up