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Derrida, "Difference," 262. Ibid., 263 Ferdinand de Saussure Quoted in Derrida, "Difference," 263. Ibid. Ibid

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4. Why is differance “neither a word nor a concept” ?

A word is sign which is understood as a something which represents the presence of a


certain thing which it is supposed to signify. Furthermore, a word is a sign which functions more
specifically in a determined manner as something which represents presence in language. 1 This
signified thing is the concept. This concept, however, is nothing but a representation of a thing in
the mind which still basically a linguistic representation. This representation is therefore called
an “acoustical image”.2
Now, Saussure tells us that in order that we make language intelligible to us, its words
must be understood in a system of play of differences. After all, there has been no word or sign
that has preceded language. With the establishment of language arose signs which can only be
differentiated through the network of differences among these signs.3 Hence, we know that a sign
is bat (and is supposed to bring us the presence of what a bat is) because it is not ‘cat’, ‘rat’,
‘mat’, or ‘hat’. It is precisely this network which allows us to conceive of the differences present
among signs. Consequentially, these differences also allows us to understand what kind of
presence is supposed to be represented by these signs, that is, the sign ‘bat’ is supposed to have
the power to tell us what a bat is on account of the distinctions which allows bat to be read as
‘bat’ and not ‘cat’ or ‘mat’.
This however is not the case as the signified concept is never actually present in the
representation of the signified. Since words are understood according to a play of differences in
am entangled network, then what we actually know are merely differences in signs and not the
things themselves.4 This is still the case when we think of bats. After all, what is in our minds are
still a manifestation of language. In all actuality, we think of words. And without words, we
cannot think at all. If this difference among signs in a network allows us to understand the signs
themselves, then we are presented with a problem when two signs do not have a difference at all.
A ‘bat’ might be the animal bat, or it might be the baseball bat. We therefore set out to define the
kind of bat that we are purportedly referring to, i.e. the bat used in a baseball game. But all we
have here once again are more signs which are, once again, understood according to the play of
differences of signs in a network. The sign of a ‘bat’, therefore, does not really bring to us a
representation of the presence of a bat, a signified bat if you will. Instead, what we are given in
our understanding of the word ‘bat’ are more words which can only be understood by, yet again,
a play of differences in network.
But what allows for these differences in play? Differance is precisely that. Difference is,
in Derrida’s own words, “no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality, the
conceptual system and process in general.”5 Differance, however, does not have a definition. It
is simply the designated term, devoid of any content whatsoever, for that movement by which
1
Derrida, “Difference,” 262.
2
Ibid., 263
3
Ferdinand de Saussure quoted in Derrida, “Difference,” 263.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
becomes understood according to differences.6 We cannot point it out and define it because
doing so would lead us the regress of the signified and signifiers and the difference at play,
something which is not differance but is made possible by whatever it is makes them possible
(call it differance).

Word count: 587 (excluding direct quotations)

6
Derrida, 264.

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