SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143510. November 23, 2005.]

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES, petitioner, vs.

HEIRS OF MANUEL ABELLA, represented by MERCEDES N.
ABELLA, respondents.

Sabino Padilla, Jr., for petitioner.

Amado L. Simondo for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; POINTS OF LAW,

THEORIES, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL. — The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is
that he is entitled to possession of the disputed property as the owner thereof
because the property was transferred to him by virtue of an onerous donation
made by respondents. Thus, petitioner's alleged right of possession is premised
on his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case is on
review, by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations
during the proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying
first that respondents had agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the
property, only to say later that what respondents granted to him was the right
to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by the statements he made while
the case was being heard in the lower courts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc.
vs. NLRC, to wit: . . . The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues
and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
2. ID.; ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EJECTMENT; IN CASE FOR
EJECTMENT, ANY FINDING OF THE COURT REGARDING THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP IS MERELY PROVISIONAL AND NOT CONCLUSIVE; CASE AT BAR. —
In a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of
ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive. . . . Thus, the finding in the
forcible entry case that petitioner had become the owner and rightful possessor
of the disputed property because respondents had donated the property to
petitioner is only provisional. It is the ruling in the case for quieting of title,
adjudging herein respondents to be the absolute owners of the subject
property, which is conclusive. The finding in the case for quieting of title that
respondents never consented to petitioner's occupation of the subject property
has now become final and immutable. . . . Necessarily, the finding in the case
for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate the property or to
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 allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the
forcible entry case. . . . Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the
finality of the decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a supervening
event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry
case.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS; PRINCIPLE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL
JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, the Court explained thus: ". . . The jurisdiction of the court to
amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes
final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to
only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand,
the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even after the
judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment. . . .
One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new
circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time." In the case at bar, the new
circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the forcible
entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also
attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the
subject land, and the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant
execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work injustice on
respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful
possessors of the disputed land.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 4, 2000 denying the
petition for review on certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 47747 and the Resolution
dated May 29, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision.

The property in dispute is a parcel of land with an area of one hectare

located beside the Peñafrancia Basilica in Naga City. It is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 004.1152 in the name of herein respondents, the heirs of Don
Manuel I. Abella (respondents). According to herein petitioner Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Caceres (petitioner) said parcel of land had been donated to him
by respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to be offered once a
month in perpetuity for the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I. Abella.
Respondents, on the other hand, vehemently deny such allegation and counter
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 that petitioner encroached and fenced off the subject parcel of land without
their consent. The proceedings that transpired in this case had been accurately
narrated in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch
23, in Civil Case No. 94-3345 in this wise:
In the action for forcible entry instituted by the Heirs of Manuel
Abella (ABELLA, for short) against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Nueva Caceres (ARCHBISHOP, for short) before the Municipal Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 8479, a
judgment was rendered in favor of the ARCHBISHOP, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:
1. The complaint is ordered dismissed for lack of merit
and the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction is hereby
denied for being already moot and academic.

2. The plaintiffs are hereby condemned jointly and

severally to respect the ownership and possession of the one-
hectare lot they had donated, transferred, and conveyed to the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres by way of onerous
donation, and to desist from further interfering with the
possession and enjoyment of the same by the defendant Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Caceres and its representatives, and TADIHE

3. To pay the defendants, jointly and severally, the

amount of P5,000.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of
P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the respondent court's Decision was affirmed in toto

by this Court (RTC 88-1615, Branch 22) in its Decision dated August
19, 1988. The Decision was appealed by ABELLA to the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 17471. The Court of Appeals in its
decision (ANNEX B, Petition) dated July 3, 1990 affirmed the decision of
this Court (Branch 22) by denying Abella's petition for review.
While CA-G.R. SP No. 17471 was pending before the Court of
Appeals, ABELLA filed another case before this Court (Branch 24)
against the ARCHBISHOP, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-1802 for
"Quieting of Title" involving the same property subject matter of MTC
Civil Case No. 8479 (Forcible Entry).
This Court (Branch 24) rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 89-
1802 in favor of ABELLA, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the herein plaintiffs as the rightful owners,
as co-owners pro-indiviso, of the one (1) hectare lot in question
and that the herein defendant has no rightful claim of ownership
over the same. And, accordingly, the defendant is adjudged to
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 recognize and respect the plaintiffs' absolute ownership thereof.
2. Declaring the defendant as the absolute owner of the
total area of 1,000 square meters comprising of that 541 square
meters previously donated by Manuel Abella in August, 1979
(Exhibit 2) and the additional 459 square meters donated
verbally by Mrs. Abella sometime in 1982 which finds acceptance
and recognized by the other owners thereof, Marianito Abella and
Ma. Teresa Abella Ballesteros, co-plaintiffs in the instant case.
3. Plaintiffs' other claims are hereby denied for lack of
merit and/or insufficiency of evidence to sustain them.
4. Defendant's counterclaim is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

The Decision in Civil Case No. 89-1802 was appealed by the

ARCHBISHOP to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
27370. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated November 28,
1991 affirming this Court's Decision (ANNEX D, Petition).
The ARCHBISHOP appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27370 to the Supreme Court which was docketed as
G.R. No. 103123. The appeal was dismissed in a minute resolution
dated June 1, 1992 (ANNEX E, Petition) holding that there was "no
reversible error committed by the appellate court."

Both Decisions in the Forcible Entry case and in the Quieting of

Title case are now final and executory.
The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the Decision in the Forcible
Entry case, but the respondent court [Municipal Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 1 (MTC)] in its Order dated May 10, 1993 (ANNEX A,
Petition) denied the motion for execution. . . . 2

Upon denial by the Municipal Trial Court of petitioner's motion for execution,
he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court but pursuant
to a Resolution dated February 13, 1995, the case was referred to the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Naga City for raffle and was eventually raffled
to Branch 23 thereof. The RTC then promulgated the aforequoted Decision
dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, sustaining the
validity of the respondent court's Order dated May 10, 1993.
Consequently, the petition is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to
costs. aHSTID

SO ORDERED. 3

Herein petitioner again elevated the case straight to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. Per Resolution dated May 13, 1998, the Court
referred the petition to the CA, and on February 4, 2000, the latter promulgated
its Decision 4 denying the petition. The CA held that:

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 . . . Admittedly, the decision in Civil Case No. 8479 for Forcible
Entry has become final and executory earlier than in Civil Case No. 89-
1802 for Quieting of Title. The finality of the decision in the quieting of
title, declaring the respondents as the true owner of the subject
property is a supervening event that renders the judgment in the
forcible entry, awarding possession to petitioner, notwithstanding its
finality, unenforceable by execution. A suspension or refusal of
execution of judgment or order on equitable grounds can only be
justified upon facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order
had become executory, materially affecting judgment obligation. . . 5

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision but on May 29, 2000, a
Resolution was issued denying the same.
Hence, the herein petition where the only issue for resolution is whether
or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein
respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a
supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final
judgment in the previous case for forcible entry.
Petitioner insists that the judgment in the quieting of title case should not
be considered as a supervening event that bars the enforcement of the
decision in the forcible entry case because even if respondents had indeed
been finally adjudged to be the absolute owners of the disputed land, an owner
of a property is not necessarily entitled to possession thereof, such as when the
owner leased out the property to another. Petitioner advances the theory that
what respondents had actually given him is perpetual usufruct over the subject
property.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is that he is
entitled to possession of the disputed property as the owner thereof because
the property was transferred to him by virtue of an onerous donation made by
respondents. Thus, petitioner's alleged right of possession is premised on his
claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case is on review,
by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during the
proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying first that
respondents had agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the property,
only to say later that what respondents granted to him was the right to possess
the property. Petitioner is bound by the statements he made while the case
was being heard in the lower courts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC,
6 to wit:

. . . The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and

arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court
as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would
be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. . . .
7

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in a case for ejectment, any

finding of the court regarding the issue of ownership is merely provisional and
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 not conclusive. This was stressed in Umpoc vs. Mercado, 8 where the Court
stated:
. . . we emphasize that our disquisition on the issue of ownership
in ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is only provisional to
determine who between the parties has the better right of possession.
It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the
subject matter of a separate case of annulment of title filed by
respondent. . . . As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the
question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. 9

Thus, the finding in the forcible entry case that petitioner had become the
owner and rightful possessor of the disputed property because respondents had
donated the property to petitioner is only provisional. It is the ruling in the case
for quieting of title, adjudging herein respondents to be the absolute owners of
the subject property, which is conclusive. The finding in the case for quieting of
title that respondents never consented to petitioner's occupation of the subject
property has now become final and immutable. The CA, adopting the analysis of
the trial court, held thus:
4. The cause of the defendant [herein petitioner] is not
served any better by the fact that Monsgr. Balce had caused the
fencing of the alleged one (1) hectare donated by the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] to the church, because as the record shows Mrs. Abellas
was not aware of said fencing which was done while she was abroad.
And, when she returned from abroad and that fact was reported to her
by her encargado, Erwin Lara, she went to the premises. However, she
no longer did anything about it because the fence was already
destroyed and/or turned down. And, when Monsgr. Balce tried to
reconstruct said fence in 1988 she went to the place with a policeman
and stopped the laborers from continuing with their work in fencing the
property. However, on the following morning, Monsgr. Balce ordered
the same laborers to continue their work. That prompted the plaintiffs
to file a case against Monsgr. Balce before the MTC in Naga City. . . . All
these circumstances undertaken by the plaintiffs negate the idea that
they have already parted with the property in favor of the defendant by
way of donation. 10

Necessarily, the finding in the case for quieting of title that

respondents never agreed to donate the property or to allow petitioner to
occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the forcible entry
case. HESAIT

The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioner's belated claim that

even if title over the property remained with respondents, he is nevertheless
entitled to possession thereof. Since respondents never made the alleged
donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual basis for petitioner to claim
the right of possession over it. cdtai 2006

Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the
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 decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a supervening event that
justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry case. In
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court explained thus:
. . . The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its
judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the
principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few
exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand,
the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even
after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final
judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events
refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which developed after the
judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties
were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time. 12

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the
finality of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the
case for quieting of title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the
issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of
possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible
entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively
declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated February 4, 2000 and its Resolution dated May 29, 2000
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, with Associate Justices

Corona Ibay-Somera and Bernardo Ll. Salas concurring.

2. Rollo , pp. 117-119.

3. Id., p. 124.
4. Id., pp. 43-57.
5. Id., p. 55.
6. G.R. Nos. 114280 & 115224, July 26, 1996, 328 Phil. 814.

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 7. Id., p. 823.
8. G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 220.

9. Id., pp. 238-239.

10. CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 27370 [case for quieting of title], Rollo , pp. 109-
110.
11. G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 370.
12. Id., pp. 386-387.

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