Global Policy Volume 11 . Supplement 3 .

October 2020
93

Rising Powers, UN Security Council Reform,

and the Failure of Rhetorical Coercion
Martin Binder

Special Issue Article

University of Reading
Monika Heupel
University of Bamberg

Abstract
Despite repeated calls for reform, the UN Security Council has as yet resisted to satisfy the demands of a group of rising pow-
ers – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (G4) – for a permanent seat. We focus on one strategy of institutional adaptation to
power shifts mentioned in the introductory article to this special issue and examine why the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy
has failed to resonate with the Council’s permanent members and the wider UN membership. Looking at the key debate on
Security Council reform in the General Assembly in 2005, we examine the justifications the G4 have offered to support their
proposal and whether these have been accepted as legitimate by UN member states. We show that the G4’s rhetorical coer-
cion strategy has failed to resonate with the targeted audience because the G4 have justified their demand strongly in terms
of how their material contributions would enhance the UN’s performance. In contrast, the G4’s opponents provided justifica-
tions predominantly based on fair and democratic procedures, generating higher levels of expressed support. The importance
of procedural fairness is consistent with findings in social psychology and challenges the prominent argument that perfor-
mance is the main path to legitimacy for international institutions.

Policy Implications
• States seeking institutional reform cannot just state their demands, they need to justify why their demands are legitimate.
For these justifications to resonate with the targeted audience and, in particular, with veto players who can thwart their
reform attempts, states must appeal to widely accepted norms.
• Improving the performance matters for the legitimacy of international institutions, but member states place as much, if
not more, value on procedural fairness. Hence, states that strive for institutional reform cannot just point to resulting
increases in the institutions’ performance. They must be able to appeal to gains in procedural fairness that result from
their proposed reforms.
• Investing political capital and resources in a campaign for institutional reforms at the UN Security Council that cannot be
justified with a view to enhancing procedural fairness does not pay off for states. Not only does it deflect attention from
other pressing issues that need to be addressed at the UN, but states that do so also risk alienating states whose support
they need for other initiatives at the UN or elsewhere.

India and Japan (the G4) have launched the most promising
Introduction
reform initiative since the General Assembly (GA) had set up
There is near-universal agreement among United Nations an open-ended working group on the matter in 1993. How-
member states that the Security Council needs to adapt to ever, their proposed plan for reform, which would have
the changes in word politics that have occurred since the given them permanent seats in the Council and thus influ-
creation of the UN.1. The permanent membership and veto ence and status (Ward, 2017), failed to receive sufficient
right for a small group of states that derive their privileges backing. On the contrary, the G4’s opponents came forward
from the power constellation at the end of World War II are with competing reform proposals to frustrate the G4’s
perceived to be particularly anachronistic. Scholars even demands.
point to a norm of Security Council reform in that no state The Introduction to this special issue (Kruck and Zangl,
can publicly reject the need for reform (Schaefer, 2017). And this issue) proposes four strategies of institutional adapta-
yet, all efforts to reform the Council have failed to garner tion to power shifts: power bargaining, strategic cooptation,
the necessary support of the Council’s five permanent mem- rhetorical coercion, and principled persuasion. We focus on
bers (P5) and two thirds of the wider UN membership. In one of these strategies – rhetorical coercion (see also Fiore-
2005, in the wake of the UN World Summit, Brazil, Germany, tos, this issue; Goddard, this issue; MacDonald, this issue) –

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12857 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and
distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Martin Binder and Monika Heupel
94

to shed light on the G4’s failure to provide compelling justi- because the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy was mis-
fications for their reform initiative. guided. Nor do we seek to assess the explanatory power of
Our paper makes two important contributions. First, the G4’s ill-fated rhetorical coercion strategy relative to
because the G4 lack outside options (power bargaining) and other potential explanations for the failure of Security Coun-
sufficient material resources they can trade in for reform cil reform, such as the high decision-making threshold for
(strategic cooptation), rhetorical coercion is an important Charter amendments (Hosli and Do €rfler, 2019), the G4’s lack
strategy for the G4 that has not been examined in the con- of outside options (Zangl et al., 2016; Lipscy, 2017), or the
text of Security Council reform so far. Rhetorical coercion G4’s inability to provide convincing normative arguments or
occurs when a ‘claimant’s opponents have been talked into material incentives to their regional competitors (Schirm,
a corner, compelled to endorse a stance, they would other- 2010). We believe that rhetorical coercion in the context of
wise reject’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p. 36). In the context institutional adaption is an important strategy for rising
of institutional adaptation, negotiating parties – challengers powers that warrants an analysis in its own right. Our aim is
and preservers of an institutional status quo – publicly therefore to present and examine an argument as to why
exchange arguments about the legitimacy of the status quo the G4’s rhetorical coercion strategy failed to provide com-
and the proposed reform to mobilize support. If rhetorical pelling justifications for their reform proposal that would
coercion succeeds and the justifications resonate with the have forced their opponents to endorse a stance they were
target audience, the space for contestation is narrowed opposed to.
down to the extent that counter-narratives are no longer In the next section, we develop our argument in more
feasible. One party to the debate is rhetorically outmaneu- detail. In the third section, we introduce our empirical strat-
vered and must consent to the other party’s claims (Krebs egy and present the results of our analysis. The final section
and Jackson, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Second, we lack summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions about
a clear understanding of the conditions under which rhetori- how and why rising powers apply rhetorical coercion in
cal coercion is successful in the context of institutional response to power shifts.
adaption. We therefore build on several strands of literature
in political science and social psychology to examine which
The argument
justifications resonate with the target audience and why.
The argument we propose is that the G4 failed to put for- The argument we propose in this article is that the rhetori-
ward justifications that sufficiently resonated with the target cal coercion strategy the G4 have employed to claim perma-
audience and, as such, failed to devise an effective rhetorical nent membership in the Security Council has failed to talk
coercion strategy. We show that the G4 have put strong the P5 and a large enough segment of the UN membership
legitimatory emphasis on how their economic and political into a corner. The justifications the G4 provided for their
weight and their material contributions would enhance the claims did not sufficiently resonate with the target audience,
Council’s performance in addressing international security and they did not close off routes for rebuttal for their oppo-
threats as well as compliance with Council decisions. How- nents. Negotiating institutional adaptation involves coercive
ever, the G4’s performance-based justifications did not win threats and material incentives, but it also involves struggles
sufficient support and failed to close off routes for their riv- over institutional legitimacy. States cannot just state their
als to reject them rhetorically. By contrast, justifications demands, they need to justify why their proposed institu-
based on fairer procedures that the opponents of the G4 tional reform is normatively appropriate: ‘(B)ehind every
have used to justify their rejection of the G4 proposal – claim to an issue, every demand for a settlement, is a ratio-
accountability, participation, representation of developing nale explaining why an audience should accept a particular
states – generated much higher levels of expressed support bargaining position as legitimate’ (Goddard, 2006, p. 41).
among UN member states. The importance states publicly Rhetorical coercion is a ‘political strategy that seeks to
attach to fair and democratic procedures is consistent with twist arms by twisting tongues’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p.
accounts pointing to an increasing salience of democratic 42). It implies that political actors use language instrumen-
governance norms. It is also in line with research in social tally to justify their policy objectives and obtain acceptance
psychology that highlights the value individuals ascribe to and support (Kruck and Zangl, this issue). By rhetorical fram-
fair decision-making procedures. We explore the plausibility ing, political actors seek to engage in meaning-making. If
of this argument with data collected in the 2005 UNGA successful, they narrow the space for contestation by closing
debate on the G4 proposal for Security Council reform. We off routes for opponents to challenge the dominant justifica-
have chosen the 2005 debate because in the run-up to the tions and, eventually, coerce their opponents into accep-
UN world summit in the same year an important – perhaps tance. Opponents might not be silenced altogether, but as
even unique (Stedman, 2007) – window of opportunity the rhetorical terrain is increasingly constructed in a way
opened for the G4. In addition to that, the debate allows us that is unfavorable to them, they can at best contest the
to examine not just the justificatory claims of the G4 but margins but not the core of the dominant narrative (Hurd,
also whether they resonated with the targeted audience 2005; Krebs and Jackson, 2007; McDonald and Merefield,
(the P5 and the wider UN membership). 2010; Holland and Aaronson, 2014; Daßler et al., 2018).
Our aim is not to explain why the reform proposed by Rhetorical coercion differs in important ways from princi-
the G4 failed. We do not claim that the reform fell through pled persuasion (Kruck and Zangl, this issue; Goddard, this

© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Rising Powers and Security Council Reform
95

issue). Actors who craft rhetorical moves with which they Jackson (2007, p. 48), as well as others, do not spell out
intend to get their opponents ‘rhetorically maneuvered into which specific justifications appeal to publics and why, but
a corner’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p. 42) need not be con- they make the general argument that rhetorical coercion is
vinced of the justifications they publicly express. Rather, more likely to be successful if claimants can refer to ‘existing
they are strategic actors who use justifications instrumen- commonplaces that represent the boundaries of legitimate
tally, choosing those rhetorical devices they expect to yield framing’. Building on extant scholarship, we propose two
most traction – be they in line with their true motivations or main grounds of legitimacy for international institutions that
not (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Furthermore, as highlighted by the G4 may use to justify their proposal: good performance
Kruck and Zangl in the Introduction to this special issue, the and fair procedures (input and output legitimacy, see e.g.,
purpose of rhetorical coercion is not to convince an oppo- Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Scharpf, 1999; Tallberg and
nent of the truth or reasonableness of one’s claims and Verhaegen, this issue).2.
arrive at a consensus. The purpose is to force an opponent While scholars typically argue that both grounds matter
into acceptance by closing off opportunities for rebuttal (Dellmuth et al., 2019), the dominant view has traditionally
even if the opponent is unconvinced of the validity of the been that the legitimacy of international institutions
claims (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). depends primarily on their performance. Accordingly, an
What rhetorical moves can achieve this purpose? The jus- institution’s legitimacy stems from its ability to enhance the
tifications political actors bring forward to bolster their common welfare of a given community by effectively solv-
claims must resonate with the dominant norms and under- ing problems in need of collective solutions (Scharpf, 1999).
standings of the relevant community. Thus, when molding Institutions are created with a specific aim. If they do not
their rhetorical strategy, actors are not entirely free in linking fulfill their purpose, they lose legitimacy. Some proponents
their arguments to whatever value judgments. Rather, to of this view argue that performance is the most important,
render public opposition to their claims costly, they must if not the only, source of legitimacy for international institu-
link these claims to norms and justifications that are tions (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Gutner and Thompson,
accepted by the relevant audience (Goddard, 2009; Daßler 2010).
et al., 2018). This is expected to work particularly well when That the legitimacy of and support for governments and
political actors can rhetorically entrap their opponents, that other domestic institutions depend on their ability to gener-
is, when they are able to publicly expose their opponents’ ate favorable outcomes, has been supported by decades of
failure to live up to self-proclaimed normative convictions political science research (for an overview see Lewis-Beck
(Goddard, 2009; Lyall, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Rhetori- and Stegmaier, 2000). Recent research on international insti-
cal coercion is unlikely to work if ‘the structures of discourse tutions also shows that performance is an important driver
. . . are relatively loose (and permissive)’ (Krebs and Jackson of their legitimacy (e.g., Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015).
2007, p. 57). Hence, when there is little agreement on what Drawing from social psychology, we suggest that fair and
compelling norms a given community shares, rhetorical democratic procedures are a more suitable justification for
coercion is unlikely to have the intended effect of foreclos- legitimate international institutions than often claimed.
ing alternative rhetorical routes and extorting support. Social psychologists have pointed out that fair procedures
In the context of Security Council reform, the G4 apply a matter in various ways. From an instrumental process con-
rhetorical coercion strategy if they provide public justifica- trol perspective, fair procedures provide actors with voice
tions for their demand to become permanent Council mem- and give them the opportunity to introduce inputs into the
bers in the relevant debates in the GA, drawing on widely decision-making process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Social
shared norms that are difficult to rebut publicly. Thus, to win identity theory argues that actors value fair procedures
over UN member states, the G4 need to offer acceptable justi- because they allow them to construct their identity as
fications. This presupposes enough UN member states with respected and equal members of a community and extend
no self-serving interest in Security Council reform (i.e. no aspi- to them self-esteem and prestige (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Fair
rations for permanent membership or wish to resist a regional procedures also serve as heuristic for actors who are uncer-
hegemon). It also presupposes that the preferences of UN tain about decisional outcomes they receive from institu-
members are not fixed so that member states can be won tions. Accordingly, actors use information about the fairness
over (O’Mahoney, 2017) – as is testified, for instance, by the of procedures to evaluate decisional outcomes and the
varying number of supporters of the G4 and their regional riv- trustworthiness of decision-makers (Van den Bos et al., 1998;
als over time (Swart, 2013). Moreover, it is important to note see also Bøggild and Petersen, 2016).
that it is not so much the speakers representing their coun- A large body of research has shown that actors and institu-
tries in the GA who need to be rhetorically outmaneuvered, tions – such as the police or courts – that meet standards of
as these rarely enjoy sufficient leeway from their superiors in procedural legitimacy are more likely to be accepted and
their capitals, but rather the higher policy-making echelons in complied with by their addressees (Levi et al., 2009; Murphy,
UN member states’ capitals. The debate in the GA is therefore 2017; Tyler, 2006). A key finding in social psychology is that
primarily to be seen as the focal point of a broader debate in fair procedures can compensate for weak performance (Brock-
which the latter are the G4’s main target audience. ner and Wiesenfeld, 2005). Scholars have also suggested that
If there is an audience to be won over, and if justifications procedures are more important than performance showing
matter, what makes for a good justification? Krebs and that dramatic improvements in the performance of the police

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Martin Binder and Monika Heupel
96

in the United States (US) has not entailed increases in support 24). The 2005 debate has so far been the key debate on
for their work, as legitimacy and support depended on the Security Council reform, as an important window of oppor-
procedural fairness of police work (Tyler, 2006). While the tunity had opened prior to the UN World summit in the
social psychological mechanism of procedural fairness has autumn of that year (Von Freiesleben, 2013). Furthermore,
not been investigated with regard to international institu- the debate is particularly insightful as the G4 and their com-
tions, international relations scholars have observed the rise petitors not only justify their reform proposals, but UN
of a global norm of democratic governance (Dingwerth et al., member states also state whether they accept or reject
2019) that has affected the design of international institutions, those justifications as legitimate, and why. Thus, the debate
leading to the creation of information sharing structures provides us with an opportunity to observe how norms
(Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018), civil society participation (Tallberg compete with each other as actors try to make them focal,
et al., 2013) and the establishment of parliamentary bodies and how some norms prevail while others do not (see Rost
(Rocabert et al., 2019). Studies have also shown that proce- Rublee, 2009). Of course, we cannot know whether the
dures are an important if not the most important source of expressed justifications of UN member states are sincere in
legitimacy of international institutions for states (Binder and that states truly believe in the importance of institutional
Heupel, 2015) and citizens (Dellmuth et al., 2019). performance or democratic procedures of the Council, or
We argue that the suitability of references to fair and whether they justify their support for or opposition to a pro-
democratic procedures as legitimation devices for interna- posal because they believe their justifications resonate with
tional institutions can also help explain the failure of the G4 the relevant audience. This is less of a problem, however,
to legitimate their proposal for Security Council reform and because rhetorical coercion does not require actors to
apply an effective rhetorical coercion strategy. As we show believe in what they say or persuade each other, but to be
below, the G4 have pursued a rhetorical coercion strategy able to rhetorically outmaneuver their opponents.
that puts strong justificatory emphasis on performance- From 11–26 July 2005, the GA held a debate on the Ques-
based claims about how the G4’s economic and political tion of equitable representation on and increase in the mem-
weight as well as their material contributions to the UN bership of the Security Council and related matters in which
would enhance the Council’s effectiveness in addressing UN member states discussed the draft resolution that the
international security threats and would improve compli- G4 (along with its co-sponsors) had submitted on 6 July.3.
ance with Council decisions. The G4 have also justified their The proposal envisaged an expansion of the Council by add-
proposal in terms of increased representation, but they have ing six permanent seats – four for the G4 plus two for Afri-
put far less emphasis on procedural grounds. While some can states – and four non-permanent seats – one for Asia,
UN member states have expressed acceptance of the G4’s Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, respectively. Origi-
performance justifications, the performance argument was nally, the G4 had demanded to extend the veto right to the
not strong enough to close off routes for rebuttal. The G4’s new permanent members, but they accepted to forego this
rivals have opted for making justificatory claims of a type for at least 15 years. The G4 proposal also provided for a set
that was less favorable to the G4 – namely claims about of improvements of the Council working methods – ranging
procedural fairness. UN member states that rejected the G4 from open Council meetings to timely consultations with
proposal, or came forward with competing proposals, not troop contributing countries, submitting special reports to
only justified their rejection or their alternative proposals the GA and a review of the amendments after 15 years.
overwhelmingly in procedural terms. They also managed to To investigate our claim that the G4 failed to apply a
rebut the G4 claims of enhanced representation so as to rhetorical strategy that would have coerced the P5 and two
advance their own procedural justifications – accountability, thirds of the UN membership to support their reform pro-
transparency, regional rotation and better representation of posal, we assess for each state that participated in the
African states – that finally won broader rhetorical support. debate (altogether 52 states),4. whether it justified its posi-
The next section provides empirical evidence for this claim. tion on the proposal with reference to performance- or pro-
cedures-based arguments, or by referring to both grounds
of legitimacy equally.5. Performance-based arguments refer
Empirical analysis to the implications of the proposed reform for the Council’s
ability to adopt resolutions, ensure compliance with and
Data and operationalization implementation of its decisions, remain committed to the
issues on its agenda, and to generally fulfill its mandate.
To empirically substantiate our argument, we analyze the Thus, critics of the reform proposal could, for instance, warn
2005 UNGA debate on Security Council reform in which the that the G4’s reform proposal might complicate Council
G4 presented their proposal in the form of a draft resolu- decision-making as it increases the number of veto players,
tion. As a response, two groups, namely the Uniting for Con- while the G4 might justify their proposal arguing that their
sensus (UfC) group and the African Group, submitted rival resources would help secure implementation of the Coun-
proposals, also as draft resolutions. This debate is particu- cil’s decisions. Procedures-based arguments, by contrast,
larly useful for our purpose. The GA is the main forum in refer to implications of the proposed reform for the Coun-
which states address common issues ‘in ways that legitimate cil’s representativeness, its working methods, its accountabil-
or delegitimate state conduct’ (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p. ity provisions, and the sovereign equality of UN member

© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Rising Powers and Security Council Reform
97

states. Accordingly, the G4 might justify their proposal that ‘reform of the Council would strengthen the United
claiming that it enhances the representation of states of the Nations and its ability to address the threats and challenges
global South in the Council, while critics might reject the of the twenty-first century’.13. And, responding to criticism
proposal arguing that the proposed reforms to the Council’s that was levelled against the G4 during the debate, Ger-
accountability provisions amount to nothing more than win- many argued that the suggested expansion of the Council
dow-dressing. Sometimes, speakers combine elements of to 25 members would not undermine but strengthen the
performance- and procedures-based arguments in one argu- body’s effectiveness. Germany argued that ‘some of those
ment, for example, when they assert that improvements to who oppose expanding the Council to 25 members . . .
the Council’s procedures will have a positive effect on the would certainly disagree with the notion that the NATO
Council’s performance. If an argument displays this pattern, Council has become less effective since it was expanded to
we count the argument as a mixed argument. 26 members’.14. At the same time, Germany justified the
Finally, when assessing whether speakers provide pre- proposal also with reference to its suggested procedural
dominantly performance- or procedures-based justifications, improvements, pointing out that it would include a reform
or both types of justifications in equal measure, we primarily of the Council’s working methods and would give UN mem-
take into account how much time (or space, in the debate’s ber states a ‘tool to review the Council’s composition’.15.
transcripts) speakers devoted to each type of argument. In India had not planned to contribute to the debate, but
cases in which this criterion proves inconclusive, we also decided to intervene to basically rail against states that had
consider the emphasis put on each type of argument, taking voiced opposition. India justified the proposal only briefly in
both direct and indirect forms of emphasis into account.6. terms of both grounds of legitimacy, arguing among others
We provide examples of coded statements as well as a sum- that the proposed review clause would make it possible to
mary of the results in the online appendix. hold permanent members ‘accountable for their perfor-
mance’16. and that a more representative Council would
‘reach decisions acceptable to the broad majority of the
Brazil, Germany, India, Japan
general membership’.17.
All four G4 members justified their reform proposal mostly Overall, the G4 put strong emphasis on enhanced Council
with performance-based arguments. Brazil and Japan put a performance. The group focused its rhetorical strategy on
strong emphasis on that the proposal would improve the how the G4’s economic power and material contributions to
Council’s performance. Brazil introduced the draft resolution the UN would make a difference to the Council’s effective-
and started out by arguing that the current international secu- ness and compliance with its decisions, and less on how the
rity structure built around the UN Security Council was ‘glar- reform would improve the quality of the Council’s proce-
ingly outdated’. Specifically, it pointed to a ‘sense of urgency dures. To what extent were the targeted audiences rhetori-
in promoting the Organization’s effectiveness in all areas, par- cally coerced to express acceptance?
ticularly in the field of the maintenance of peace and security’
and argued that reform was needed for the Council to ‘effec-
The permanent members
tively carry out its functions and exercise its powers’. Subse-
quently, Brazil also asserted that ‘(i)t is clear that the Council’s As noted, any Security Council reform requires the support
future effectiveness is also contingent upon the permanent (or at least the acquiescence) of all five permanent mem-
presence of major financial contributors and those who are bers. Two permanent members – France and United King-
most willing and able to contribute to the work of the United dom (UK) – publicly supported the G4 proposal in the
Nations’.7. Finally, it emphasized that Council reform would debate and even acted as co-sponsors of the draft resolu-
lead to ‘more systematic and effective compliance with the tion, though some suspect that they supported the resolu-
Council’s decisions’.8. Japan replicated Brazil’s performance- tion in order to stifle demands for a common European
based arguments. Only once did it point to improving the Union seat (Stedman, 2007). France expressed acceptance of
Council’s representativeness.9. Other than that, Japan argued the G4’s performance-based justifications, highlighting that
that the Council ‘must be provided with adequate resources the growing ‘list of crises on the Council’s agenda’ made it
to address challenges effectively’, and that ‘[c]ountries with essential ‘that we enhance the Council’s effectiveness’ by
the will and resources to play a major role in international extending membership ‘to other Powers that can make a
peace and security must always take part in the Council’s major contribution to international peace and security’.18.
decision-making process’.10. It also maintained that perma- The UK put more emphasis on procedural justifications,
nent membership was not a privilege but a ‘duty and respon- underlining that an enlarged Council would be more repre-
sibility for nations that are willing and able to contribute sentative and that the UK wanted a more ‘transparent’
effectively to international peace and security’.11. Council and one that ‘consults more effectively with the
Germany and India put an, albeit less pronounced, wider membership’.19. The UK also expressed its reservations
emphasis on performance-based arguments, too. Germany about the veto right for new permanent members. Perfor-
claimed that the G4 proposal ‘would strengthen the prob- mance-based justifications figured prominently in the UK’s
lem-solving capacity of the Security Council’, which ‘would statements as well: A reformed Council would ‘revitalize’ the
be in the interests of everyone’.12. Germany also emphasized UN by making its organs ‘capable of delivering’.20.

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Martin Binder and Monika Heupel
98

The US, China and Russia rejected the G4 proposal. The US Of the supporters, 18 of the 52 states participating in the
publicly supported a permanent seat for Japan and India, but debate expressed support for the G4’s proposal.24. Among
was unwilling to concede a permanent seat to Germany in these, one third primarily echoed the G4’ performance-
light of the controversy over the invasion of Iraq two years based justifications, one third made performance- and pro-
earlier (Stedman, 2007). Like the G4, the US used perfor- cedures-based arguments in equal measure, and one third
mance-based arguments to defend its position. It made clear made predominantly procedural arguments. Belgium, Czech
it supported a reform that would make the Council ‘more Republic, Latvia, Palau, Samoa and Ukraine rhetorically
effective’ in confronting security challenges that could only endorsed the G4’s performance-based arguments.25. Bel-
be addressed ‘by active, effective, multilateral institutions’. gium, for example, said that ‘one may wonder why a coun-
However, it expressed its staunch opposition against the G4 try such as Belgium would support the creation of new
proposal as it ‘would make the Council less effective than it is permanent seats. Quite simply, we believe that the presence
today’, warning that an expansion must not make the Council of permanent members makes the Council effective in
‘so large that it becomes ineffective’.21. China, in contrast, managing issues affecting international peace and secu-
rejected the G4 proposal with reference to its failure to con- rity’.26. Denmark, Fiji, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and Tuvalu
vincingly address shortcomings to the Council’s procedures. It also voiced support for the G4 proposal, but provided per-
argued that the Council needed to give voice to developing formance- and procedures-based justifications even-hand-
countries that are ‘seriously underrepresented on the Security edly.27. Poland stated, for instance, that ‘what we need is a
Council’.22. Russia’s rhetorical strategy occupied a middle stronger and more efficient Security Council – a Council
ground, with Russia substantiating its rejection with perfor- which is able to take decisions and has the authority to
mance-based and procedural arguments. Russia underlined ensure that they are fully implemented’ and that it accepted
that Council reform should produce a ‘more balanced Council ‘the aspirations of those countries that make important con-
membership by including major and influential developing tributions to the United Nations system’.28. But Poland also
countries’, while cautioning that making the Council ‘more put strong emphasis on the procedural aspects of the pro-
representative must not undermine its effectiveness’.23. Thus, posal, underlining that a more representative Council would
neither China nor Russia opted for a rhetorical strategy that adopt more legitimate and effectively implemented deci-
would have challenged the G4 on the rhetorical terrain of per- sions.29. Bhutan, Haiti, Iceland, Jordan, Norway, and Portugal
formance legitimacy chosen by the G4. supported the draft, too, but they justified their support pre-
Taken together, the G4 have failed to rhetorically coerce dominantly by picking up the few procedural arguments the
the P5 as a group into publicly supporting their reform pro- G4 had offered.30. Iceland, for example, justified its support
posal. The G4’s two supporters – France and UK – echoed by strongly emphasizing better representation for African
the G4’s performance-based justifications, but, in the case of and small states and proposed improvements of the Coun-
the UK, also voiced procedural justifications for their sup- cil’s working methods.31.
port. Among the remaining P5 members opposing their pro- Overall, the G4’s performance-based justifications res-
posal, the G4’s performance-based arguments were not met onated with a number of UN member states. Roughly one
with approval. Either opponents uttered procedural justifica- third of the states backing the G4 proposal justified their
tions to reject the G4 proposal, or, if they treated perfor- support in terms of increased performance, and a similar
mance as a valid criterion for judging the reform proposal, share of supporters employed performance and procedures-
they turned the G4’s argument around, claiming that the based justifications in equal measure. However, even within
proposed extension to 25 members would make the Council the group of supporters, traction of performance-based
less effective. arguments was limited in that the remaining third mostly
opted for procedural arguments.
Of the opponents, 22 states rejected the G4 reform pro-
The wider UN membership
posal. Some states, or groups of states, even put forward
The P5 are just one audience of the G4’s rhetorical coercion competing reform plans. One such group was the UfC
strategy, the second – arguably more important one – being group. The UfC comprises regional rivals of the G4, namely
the wider UN membership. The G4 argued that the support Argentina, Italy, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea, but it
of two thirds of UN member states for their proposal would also includes Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico,
make it politically very difficult for the P5 to put in a veto. San Marina and Turkey, and thus states that have no obvi-
This is precisely what had happened in 1965 when the per- ous regional power aspirations nor any ambition for a per-
manent members were opposed to the extension of Council manent seat. The African Group, composed of African Union
membership from six to ten non-permanent seats but ulti- members, came up with a counter-proposal as well. Finally,
mately had to give in, in light of strong support for Security also a number of unaffiliated states were opposed to the G4
Council reform in the GA (Von Freiesleben, 2013). After all, proposal. The vast majority of the G4’s opponents ignored
the Security Council has value for the P5 only to the extent or openly rejected the G4’s performance-based justification
that the UN membership accepts its authority. To what and they overwhelmingly justified their opposition to the
extent did UN member states express support for the G4 G4 proposal or their competing proposals in procedural
proposal, and based on what justifications? terms.

© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Rising Powers and Security Council Reform
99

In response to the G4 draft resolution, the UfC group Among the six states that spoke on behalf of the group,
tabled a competing draft resolution that envisaged to Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritius and South Africa put strong
expanding the Council to 25 members (20 of them non-per- emphasis on procedural justifications.41. South Africa, for
manent) and to distributing the elected seats evenly among instance, did not refer to performance at all, arguing instead
the regions, leaving it to each region to select candidates.32. that the African Group proposal would make the Council
Most UfC members criticized the G4 proposal and justified more transparent, accountable and representative, which
their own counter-proposal invoking procedural grounds. was especially important given that African states were a
Canada, for instance, justified its rejection with ‘the emer- frequent target of Council action.42. Egypt and Nigeria justi-
gence of values that are now fostered and cherished here fied their position by making procedural claims, too, but
and throughout the world: values such as democracy, they added performance-based claims.43. Nigeria, for exam-
accountability, flexibility and fairness – values that do not ple, argued that the proposed new distribution of seats
favour a widened notion of two-tiered privileges’. It added ‘should ensure greater representation of the developing
that ‘the Council of 1945 must be seen as an anomaly to be countries, whilst taking account of some key players with
accommodated, not as a model to be emulated’.33. The UfC significant contributions to make to the advancement of the
proposal, by contrast, would make the Council accountable goals and objectives of the United Nations’.44.
(‘Permanence is the polar opposite of accountability’) and Finally, the G4 proposal was also rejected by five unaffili-
fair.34. Canada did not make any mention of improved ated UN member states. If treated as a group, these states
Council performance as an objective of the UfC proposal. displayed the same rhetorical justificatory pattern as the UfC
Pakistan, with Italy the main protagonist of the group, and the African Group: Four states predominantly used pro-
accused the G4 of seeking ‘new and unequal privileges for cedural arguments, with Indonesia warning of an ‘underrep-
themselves’.35. ‘To add insult to injury’, Pakistan complained, resentation for Asia’,45. New Zealand and Uruguay
‘self-interest has been portrayed as altruism. The seekers of demanding stronger accountability,46. and Switzerland pro-
special privileges and power masquerade as the champions moting a proposal that focused on improved working meth-
of the weak and the disadvantaged’. Pakistan also lamented ods.47. Only the Netherlands made equally procedural and
that the G4 proposal ‘would erode, not enhance, democracy performance-based arguments, acknowledging that the G4
and accountability in the Security Council’.36. Instead, Pak- were ‘capable of . . . shouldering the extra burden of pro-
istan argued, the UfC proposal was ‘fair and equitable’, moting global security’, whilst opposing the extension of
would increase the Council’s ‘representativeness’ and ‘en- the veto right.48.
hance accountability, through the mechanism of periodic We can summarize our findings as follows: The G4 have
elections and re-elections’.37. Like Canada, Pakistan did not justified their Security Council reform proposal strongly in
justify the UfC proposal in terms of enhanced effectiveness. terms of improving the Council’s performance and less so in
Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Turkey also terms of procedural fairness. While some UN members
justified both their rejection of the G4 proposal and their expressed acceptance of the performance argument, it was
support for the UfC proposal strongly in procedural terms.38. not strong enough a justification. The opponents of the G4
Argentina, Republic of Korea and San Marino used procedu- focused mostly on procedural legitimacy and therefore situ-
ral and performance-based arguments in equal measure. No ated the debate on a legitimatory terrain that was less
UfC member made primarily performance-based arguments favorable to the G4. The G4’s main procedural justification
to criticize the G4 proposal or justify their own counter-pro- was increased representation, a weak point given that add-
posal.39. ing states like Germany and Japan to the permanent mem-
The African Group also rejected the G4 bid and presented bers does not do much to increase the Council’s
its own rival proposal.40. Like the G4, the African Group representativeness. The opponents of the G4 rejected the
demanded an enlargement in both membership categories. G4 proposal mostly in procedural terms, putting much more
They were massively wooed by the G4 and at times it emphasis on enhancing the fairness and democratic quality
seemed as if some African states would break rank with the of the Council’s procedures. They criticized the veto right for
African Group (Von Freisesleben, 2013). However, the African new permanent members, advocated a regular, binding
Group put strong emphasis on the fact that Africa was the review mechanism to ensure the accountability of new per-
only region not being represented through a permanent manent members, and demanded further improvements of
seat on the Council. The African Group called for two per- the Council’s working methods. In terms of representation,
manent seats with the right of veto and five non-permanent most states advocated the inclusion of developing countries,
Council seats for African states. It was deeply divided, how- in particular African states, or regional rotation of non-per-
ever, about which states should obtain the permanent seats. manent members.
The rhetorical strategy chosen by African Group members to Brazil, Germany, India and Japan’s strategy of rhetorical
justify the rejection of the G4 proposal and advertise their coercion thus failed to limit the space for contestation. As
own proposal was strikingly similar to that of the UfC, with noted, rhetorical coercion depends on an agreement on
most countries making predominantly procedural argu- what norms are valid and what the dominant norms in a
ments, a small subset of countries making procedural and community are (Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Goddard, 2009).
performance-based arguments in roughly equal measure, However, there is no consensus among states as to whether
and no country privileging performance-based arguments. the legitimacy of international institutions rather derives

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Martin Binder and Monika Heupel
100

from performance or procedural fairness. Rather, one legiti- suggest that a rhetorical coercion strategy that strongly
matory standard enjoys greater acceptance among UN relies on performance-based justifications is unlikely to res-
member states – but it is procedural fairness and not institu- onate among relevant audiences whose acceptance of insti-
tional performance, as the G4’ rhetorical strategy would tutional adaptations is required. Rather, because such
have suggested and as most accounts of the legitimation of justifications do not effectively narrow the space for contes-
international institutions assume. As the G4’s opponents tation, targeted audiences can rebut the justifications by
used the available rhetorical space to focus the discourse drawing on procedural arguments. Recent scholarship finds
not on the issue of performance but on procedural fairness, that procedural fairness has become the dominant legitima-
the G4 was deprived of the opportunity to rhetorically tion standard for international organizations (IOs) (Dellmuth
entrap their opponents by pointing out that their opponents et al., 2019; Dingwerth et al., 2019), giving us reason to
had likewise previously called for improvements to the believe that this finding applies to struggles over institu-
Council’s performance. If anything, it was the G4’s critics tional adaptation in other IOs. However, the importance
that managed to capitalize on rhetorical traps, as the G4 felt many states put on procedural fairness might also be due
the need to justify their proposal in terms of procedural fair- to the peculiarities of the Security Council, such as its vast
ness and especially representativeness – which opened the power and symbolic value. Future research should therefore
door for their opponents to rebut the G4 proposal on proce- examine similar reform debates in other IOs to learn more
dural grounds. This did not mean that either the UfC or the about how rhetorical coercion is applied by rising powers.
African Group would have been able to round up sufficient Second, rhetoric is not endlessly malleable. For the G4 it
support for their own reform proposal – as this would have would have been rational to devise a rhetorical coercion
at least required both groups to agree on a common pro- strategy composed primarily of procedures-based argu-
posal.49. Yet, it entailed that the G4’s rhetorical coercion ments. The G4 used procedures-based justifications, but
strategy fell through. they mostly made performance-based arguments even
though they were widely rejected – and, as the reference to
the 2018 debate above suggests, they stuck to this rhetori-
Conclusion
cal pattern for years. One explanation could be that the G4
This article sought to contribute to the framework outlined did not know about other states’ concerns or that they did
in the Introduction to this special issue (Kruck and Zangl, not really listen during the debates, which is not very plausi-
this issue) by looking at a strategy of institutional change ble.51. This suggests that rhetorical coercion is unlikely to
available to rising powers that has so far received little succeed as a strategy of institutional adaptation if the pro-
attention – rhetorical coercion (see also Fioretos, this issue; posed reform grants privileges to a small group of selected
Goddard, this issue; MacDonald, this issue). Focusing on the states. Yet, it also suggests that rhetorical coercion might be
debate about UN Security Council reform, we have shown a more effective strategy of institutional adaptation if it is
that debates about institutional reform involve struggles employed by a larger and more heterogeneous group that
over legitimacy. The G4 have lost this struggle over legiti- bids for reforms which would lead to a more equal distribu-
macy because their rhetorical strategy was unsuccessful in tion of privileges. Future research should therefore compare
closing off the possibility of justifiable rebuttal for their the success of different types of attempts at rhetorical coer-
opponents. cion across different types of actors.
Since 2005, the debate on Security Council reform in the Finally, why have the G4 after 2005 stuck to a strategy
GA has dragged along. Yet, there is little indication that the that was ineffective in that it did not sufficiently resonate
G4 have significantly changed their rhetorical strategy. For with the target audience? One possible explanation is that
instance, in the latest debate in 2018, G4 members acknowl- the G4 cared that much about the reform and were con-
edge the benefits of greater representativeness, but they vinced of the rightfulness and importance of their claim to
continue to justify their reform proposal mainly with perfor- an extent that giving up was simply not an option. How-
mance-based arguments. At the same time, frustrated with ever, the continuation of the G4’s reform campaign might
the delay of the opening of text-based negotiations, the G4 also fulfil additional functions for its members (see also Ste-
meanwhile increasingly focus on making proposals as to phen, 2015). The G4 might remain with their rhetorical coer-
how to get such negotiations started, rather than providing cion strategy because it is a vehicle for them to signal to
justifications for the reform proposal itself.50. Hence, with other states that they claim great power status. They might
the window of opportunity from 2005 closed, momentum is never be granted permanent seats, but the debate offers
being lost for the G4 to apply a strategy of rhetorical coer- them a forum to send a strong signal to the global public
cion to bolster their claim to Security Council reform. If a that they belong to the elite club of privileged states of
new window opens, for instance at the beginning of text- high status (see Ward, 2017). At the same time, the ritual of
based negotiations, we should, however, again observe the claiming a seat at the table and the status of a great power
group devise such a strategy in an effort to make their might not only be outward oriented but it might also be
opponents publicly endorse their position. inward oriented. Thus, by claiming that they belong to the
Our analysis has implications for how and why rising pow- inner circle of great powers and that their acceptance in this
ers apply rhetorical coercion in response to power shifts and inner circle makes a global organization like the UN perform
suggests avenues for future research. First, our results better, the G4 might also reassure themselves that their

© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Rising Powers and Security Council Reform
101

right to special entitlements is legitimate. Again, even if the 18. A/59/PV.111, p. 11. France alluded only very briefly to improving
entitlements are never granted and acceptance to the inner the Council’s representativeness by adding permanent seats for Afri-
circle is refused, the ritual of the debate might still be valu- can states.
19. A/59/PV.112, p. 19.
able for the G4 to reassure themselves of their self-ascribed 20. A/59/PV.112, pp. 19-20.
identity as a great power that deserves privileges (see Bar- 21. A/59/PV.112, pp. 9-10.
ker, 2001). As a result, attempts at rhetorical coercion post 22. A/59/PV.111, p. 13. Some explain China’s opposition to the proposal
2005 might not lead to institutional adaption, but the mere by its fierce resistance to Japan’s permanent membership, with
utterance of performance-related justifications might serve Sino-Japanese relations being particularly sour at the time.
other important functions for the G4, and, as future research 23. A/59/PV.112, p. 8.
24. Chile, Finland and Sweden provided some rhetorical support to the
might explore, potentially other rising powers in their search
proposal, but they expressed criticism as well and fell short of
for their place in the world. explicitly endorsing the proposal (A/59/PV/111, p. 18-19 and A/59/
PV/112, p. 6).
25. A/59/PV.111, pp. 22-23 and A/59/112, pp. 4-7, 14, 18-20, 22-23.
26. A/59/PV.112, p. 4.
27. A/59/PV.111, pp. 12-15, 19-20, 22 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 5, 16-17.
28. A/59/PV.111, p. 15.
Notes 29. A/59/PV.111, p. 15.
30. A/59/PV.111, pp. 4, 11-12, 23 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 17-18, 24-25.
1. We gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments we have
31. A/59/PV.111, pp. 11-12.
received during the authors’ workshop at the LMU Munich’s Center
32. A/59/L.68.
for Advanced Studies (CAS) as well as the logistical support and
33. A/59/PV.112: p. 2.
generous funding Martin Binder has received from CAS for an
34. A/59/PV.115, pp. 1-2.
extended stay at LMU Munich. Open access funding enabled and
35. A/59/PV.111, p. 8.
organized by Projekt DEAL.
36. A/59/PV.111, p. 8. Pakistan mentioned performance only once,
2. These are not the only grounds of legitimacy, but arguably the
claiming that the G4 proposal would ‘reduce, not improve, the
major ones. For example, Binder and Heupel (2015) add legal legiti-
effectiveness and the efficiency of the Security Council by requiring
macy while Tallberg and Z€ urn (2019) add authority.
the constant reconciliation of the interests of 11, instead of 5, per-
3. A/59/L.64.
manent members’ (A/59/PV.111, p. 8).
4. Madagascar participated in the debate as well, but it did not state
37. A/59/PV.115, p. 6.
its position or provide any justification.
38. A/59/PV.111, p. 17, A/59/PV.112, pp. 14, 21-22, 25 and A/59/PV.115,
5. Occasionally, states made additional justificatory claims, including
pp. 3-5.
the upcoming UN world summit, requests by the Secretary-General
39. A/59/PV.111, pp. 15, 19 and A/59/PV.112, pp. 10-12.
to deliver reform, or support from a heterogeneous group of states.
40. A/59/L.67, co-sponsored by 44 African states.
However, the great majority of arguments refers to either the Coun-
41. A/59/PV.111, pp. 6-7, 12, A/59/PV.112, p. 30 and A/59/PV.114, pp. 4-
cil’s procedures or its performance (or both).
6.
6. For instance, a speaker explicitly stating that she considers perfor-
42. A/59/PV.114, p. 5.
mance-based arguments particularly compelling would be an exam-
43. A/59/PV.114, pp. 1-4.
ple of direct emphasis. Exposing less explicit forms of emphasis is
44. A/59/PV.114, p. 2.
more challenging and requires considering each oral contribution in
45. A/59/PV.112: p. 21.
its entirety. However, as a general guidance, the use of strong
46. A/59/PV.112, p. 3.
adjectives and illustrative examples might be an example of indirect
47. A/59/PV.111, p. 21.
emphasis, as might be the placement of an argument at the very
48. A/59/PV.112, p. 8.
beginning or the very end of the statement.
49. That the UfC and the African Group failed to agree on a common
7. This statement by Brazil and similar statements by other G4 mem-
reform proposal suggests that both groups were primarily inter-
bers are no attempts at strategic cooptation – an alternative mecha-
ested in obstructing the G4 reform bid rather than getting a reform
nism of institutional adaptation presented in the introduction to
proposal through that would have required substantial compromise
this special issue – as the G4 did not make material contributions
(e.g. Swart, 2013) – and that they thus behaved akin to Bloomfield
to the Council conditional on Council reform or issue credible
and Scott’s (2017, p. 3) ‘creative resisters’ who may use ‘delaying
threats in this regard.
tactics to . . . sap the momentum for change’.
8. A/59/PV.111, p. 2. To a lesser extent, Brazil also made procedural
50. A/73/PV.36: pp. 8-9, 16-17, 21-11 and A/73/PV.37, pp. 18-19.
arguments. It argued that ‘[r]epresentativeness and equitable partici-
51. See, for instance, the following statement by Pakistan: ‘The views of
pation must be clearly reflected in the composition of the Security
Pakistan and other Uniting for Consensus members on draft resolu-
Council’. Brazil also claimed that the selection of the new perma-
tion A/59/L.64 is no secret. We oppose it for several reasons.’ –
nent members by the GA and the envisaged review process would
which is followed by a long list of mostly procedures-based argu-
‘establish a direct link of accountability between the new perma-
ments (A/59/PV.111, pp. 8-9).
nent members and the general membership’ (A/59/PV.111, p. 2).
9. A/59/PV.111, p. 4.
10. A/59/PV.111, p. 4. References
11. A/59/PV.111, p. 5.
12. A/59/PV.112, p. 13. Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (1998) ‘Why States Act through Formal
13. A/59/PV.112, p.14. International Organizations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1), pp.
14. A/59/PV.112, p. 13. 3–32.
15. A/59/PV.112, p. 13. Barker, R. (2001) Legitimating Identities. The Self-Presentations of Rulers
16. A/59/PV.112, p. 27. and Subjects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17. A/59/PV.112, p. 29.

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Martin Binder and Monika Heupel
102

Binder, M. and Heupel, M. (2015) ‘The Legitimacy of the UN Security Lipscy, P. Y. (2017) Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in
Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates’, International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
International Studies Quarterly, 59 (2), pp. 238–250. Lind, E. A. and Tyler, T. R. (1988) The Social Psychology of Procedural
Bloomfield, A. and Scott, S. V. (2017) ‘Norm Antipreneurs in World Justice. New York: Plenum Press.
Politics’, in A. Bloomfield and S. V. Scott (eds.), Norm Antipreneurs Lyall, J. M. K. (2006) ‘Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the
and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change. London: Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes’,
Routledge, pp. 1–19. World Politics, 58 (3), pp. 378–412.
Bøggild, T. and Petersen, M. B. (2016) ‘The Evolved Functions of McDonald, M. and Merefield, M. (2010) ‘How was Howard’s War
Procedural Fairness: An Adaptation for Politics’, in T. K. Shackelford Possible? Winning the War of Position over Iraq’, Australian Journal
and R. D. Hansen (eds.), The Evolution of Morality. Cham: Springer, of International Affairs, 64 (2), pp. 186–204.
pp. 247–276. Murphy, K. (2017) ‘Procedural Justice and its Role in Promoting
Buchanan, A. and Keohane, R. O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Voluntary Compliance’, in P. Drahos (ed.), Regulatory Theory:
Governance Institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20(4), pp. 405– Foundations and Applications. Acton: ANU Press, pp. 43–58.
437. O’Mahoney, J. (2017) ‘Making the Real: Rhetorical Adduction and the
Brockner, J. and Wiesenfeld, B. (2005) ‘How, When, and Why Does Bangladesh Liberation War’, International Organization, 71 (2), pp.
Outcome Favorability Interact with Procedural Fairness?’, in J. 317–348.
Greenberg and J. A. Colquitt (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Rocabert, J., Schimmelfennig, F., Crasnic, L. and Winzen, T. (2019) ‘The Rise of
Justice. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 525–553. International Parliamentary Institutions: Purpose and Legitimation’, The
Daßler, B., Kruck, A. and Zangl, B. (2018) ‘Interactions between Hard and Review of International Organizations, 14 (4), pp. 607–631.
Soft Power: The Institutional Adaptation of International Intellectual Rost Rublee, M. (2009) Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose
Property Protection to Global Power Shifts’, European Journal of Nuclear Restraint. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
International Relations, 25 (2), pp. 588–612. Schaefer, K. (2017) ‘Reforming the United Nations Security Council:
Dellmuth, L. M., Scholte, J. A. and Tallberg, J. (2019) ‘Institutional Feasibility or Utopia?’, International Negotiation, 22 (1), pp. 62–91.
Sources of Legitimacy for International Organisations: Beyond Scharpf, F. W. (1999) Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und Demokratisch?.
Procedure versus Performance’, Review of International Studies, 45 (4), Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.
pp. 1–20. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms,
Dellmuth, L. M. and Tallberg, J. (2015) ‘The Social Legitimacy of Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European
International Organisations: Interest Representation, Institutional Union’, International Organization, 55 (1), pp. 47–80.
Performance, and Confidence Extrapolation in the United Nations’, Schirm, S. A. (2010) ‘Leaders in need of followers: Emerging Powers in
Review of International Studies, 41 (3), pp. 451–475. Global Governance’, European Journal of International Relations, 16
Dingwerth, K., Witt, A., Lehmann, I., Reichel, E. and Weise, T. (2019) (2), pp. 197–221.
International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Stedman, S. J. (2007) ‘UN transformation in an Era of Soft Balancing’,
Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Affairs, 83 (5), pp. 933–944.
Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2018) ‘International Organizations “Going Public”? Stephen, M. D. (2015) ‘‘Can you Pass the Salt?’, The Legitimacy of
An Event History Analysis of Public Communication Reforms 1950– International Institutions and Indirect Speech’, European Journal of
2015’, International Studies Quarterly, 62 (4), pp. 723–736. International Relations, 21 (4), pp. 768–792.
von Freiesleben, J. (2013) ‘Reform of the Security Council’, in L. Swart Swart, L. (2013) ‘Reform of the Security Council’, in L. Swartand E. Perry
and E. Perry (eds.), Governing and Managing Change at the United (eds.), Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations: Reform
Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013. of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013. New York:
New York: Center for UN Reform Education, pp. 1–22. Center for UN Reform Education, pp. 23–59.
Goddard, S. E. (2006) ‘Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T. and J€ onsson, C. (2013) The
Politics of Legitimacy’, International Organization, 60 (1), pp. 35–68. Opening up of International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge
Goddard, S. E. (2009) ‘When Right Makes Might: How Prussia University Press.
Overturned the European Balance of Power’, International Security, 33 Tallberg, J. and Z€ urn, M. (2019) ‘The Legitimacy and Legitimation of
(3), pp. 110–142. International Organizations: Introduction and framework’, The Review
Gutner, T. and Thompson, A. (2010) ‘The Politics of IO Performance: A of International Organizations, 14 (4), pp. 581–606.
Framework’, The Review of International Organizations, 5 (3), pp. 227–248. Thibaut, J. W. and Walker, L. (1975) Procedural Justice: A Psychological
Holland, J. and Aaronson, M. (2014) ‘Dominance through Coercion: Analysis. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Strategic Rhetorical Balancing and the Tactics of Justification in Tyler, T. R. (2006) ‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Afghanistan and Libya’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 8 Legitimation’, Annual Review of Psychology, 57, pp. 375–400.
(1), pp. 1–20. Van den Bos, K., Wilke, H. A. M., Lind, E. A. and Vermunt, R. (1998)
Hosli, M. O. and D€ orfler, T. (2019) ‘Why is Change so Slow? Assessing ‘Evaluating Outcomes by Means of the Fair Process Effect: Evidence
Prospects for United Nations Security Council Reform’, Journal of for Different Processes in Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments’,
Economic Policy Reform, 22 (1), pp. 35–50. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (6), pp. 1493–1503.
Hurd, I. (2005) ‘The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and Ward, S. (2017) Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers. Cambridge:
the UN Sanctions; 1992–2003’, International Organization, 59 (3), pp. Cambridge University Press.
495–526. Zangl, B., Heußner, F., Kruck, A. and Lanzend€ orfer, X. (2016) ‘Imperfect
Krebs, R. R. and Jackson, P. T. (2007) ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Adaptation: How the WTO and the IMF Adjust to Shifting Power
Arms: The power of Political Rhetoric’, European Journal of Distributions among their Members’, The Review of International
International Relations, 13 (1), pp. 35–66. Organizations, 11 (2), pp. 171–196.
Levi, M., Sacks, A. and Tyler, T. (2009) ‘Conceptualizing Legitimacy,
Measuring Legitimating Beliefs’, American Behavioral Scientist, 53 (3), Supporting Information
pp. 354–375. Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and Stegmaier, M. (2000) ‘Economic Determinants of Information section at the end of the article.
Electoral Outcomes’, Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (1), pp. 183– Appendix S1. Operationalization and rhetorical strategies.
219.

© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3
 17585899, 2020, S3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12857 by European University Institute, Wiley Online Library on [17/04/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Rising Powers and Security Council Reform
103

Author Information
Martin Binder is Associate Professor in International Relations at the
University of Reading. His research centers on international institutions
and international security. His work was published in International Stud-
ies Quarterly, International Theory, the Journal of Peace Research and
others. His recent book is The United Nations and the Politics of Selective
Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave).
Monika Heupel is Professor of International and European Politics at
the University of Bamberg. Her research focuses on the legitimation of
IOs and the accountability of states and IOs for extraterritorial human
rights violations. She has published in International Studies Quarterly,
European Journal of International Relations and with Cambridge University
Press.

Global Policy (2020) 11:Suppl.3 © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.