Robert B. Talisse & Scott F.

Aikin

Why Pragmatists
Cannot be Pluralists

Contemporary pragmatists often maintain that their doctrine is intrinsically

allied with pluralism.' This claim has become so common that it has taken on the
lively hue of self-evidence. We contend that pragmatism and pluralism are in fact
not compatible, that pragmatists cannot be pluralists. Our demonstration of this
thesis will proceed in an ordinary way: We shall first identify three distinct types
of pluralism.^ We shall then identify two general styles of pragmatism.' Then we
shall demonstrate that although certain varieties of pluralism are logically
consistent with pragmatism, no pluralism is compatible with pragmatism; that is,
we will argue that in cases where pragmatism and pluralism are consistent there
are good pragmatic reasons to reject pluralism. Thus the lively hue of self-
evidence that once attended the thought that the two are deeply connected
should turn to a sickly pall of implausibility.
Our mission is not simply negative or polemical. We do not seek merely to
reRite a self-conception popular among pragmatists. Rather, we aim to flirther
the positive agenda of encouraging pragmatists to make more explicit the nature
of their commitments in a way that better enables them to engage critically and
fruitflilly in a broader set of philosophical conversations concerning pluralism. As
we shall indicate in the closing section of this essay, we see this kind of cross-
traditional engagement as essential to the health of any philosophical tradition,
and absolutely essential in the case of the American pragmatist tradition, which
has always upheld the importance of critical exchange. In this way, we see the
following essay as a positive contribution to pragmatist philosophy and a decisive
step forward in advancing American philosophy.

Pluralism: Three Distinct Types

Although pluralism comes in many forms, every variety of pluralism begins
with a purportedly undeniable fact of moral experience,* namely, the persistence
of disagreement even among well-intentioned and sincere persons at the level of
what Bruce Ackerman has fittingly called "Big Questions" (1989, p. 361).^
According to the pluralist, experience teaches that the moral universe contains a
rich fiind of values, not all of which can be synthesized into a single system.

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

Winter, 2005, Vol. XLI, No. 1
102 Robert B,Talisse& Scott F,Aikin

Among goods, many appear incompatible, incompossible, and incommensurable

with other goods. Choice among competing but incommensurable goods is
inevitable, and such choices form, as Isaiah Berlin claimed in an almost
existentialist mode, "an inescapable characteristic of the human
condition" (1969, p. 169). However, as the goods among which we must choose
are incommensurable, there is no decision procedure that we can appeal to and
no summum bonum by means of which the competing options can be ranked.
Thus it is no surprise that we find among persons deep differences at the most
Rindamental moral, religious, and philosophical levels. Moreover, because it is
unclear how these differences can be rationally adjudicated, the expectation that
we might soon reach widespread moral consensus seems misplaced.*
At the most fundamental level, then, all pluralisms are committed to the
claim that the persistence of deep moral disagreement is not due entirely to
human frailty, ignorance, stupidity, or wickedness. Stated positively, all pluralisms
agree that there are some value conflicts in which every party to the dispute holds
a position that Rilly accords with the best possible reasons and evidence. Hence
moral conflict persists because of some facts about the ontology or epistemology
of values, not because of some failing of human reason, intellect, or psychology.
According to the pluralist, such disagreement is, as Rawls has claimed, a
"permanent condition" of human life (1996, p. 129),^ This is the sine qua non of
pluralism,
Pluralists divide on the issues of how best to explain this feature of the
human moral predicament, and how to respond to it. We identify below the three
prescriptive programs that form the basis of our taxonomy of pluralism, but let us
first sketch two general explanatory strategies adopted by pluralists.
Some pluralists offer an epistemic zccount of the persistence of moral dispute.
The exemplar of this approach is John Rawls.* Appealing to what he calls the
"the burdens of judgment" (1996, p, 56), Rawls contends that wide moral
consensus is unattainable because human rationality, even at its best, cannot
decide questions that admit of the kinds of complexity characteristic of
fundamental moral questions. Were we a different kind of creature, with different
cognitive abilities, we might be able to reach consensus; but as we are, we
cannot.
Another style of pluralism offers an ontoiogical account of the persistence of
moral dispute. According to the ontoiogical account, the moral facts are
themselves in conflict; consequently there is a number of true moral propositions
that nonetheless do not form a consistent set. Hence even a cognitively perfect
being, one not subject to Rawls's burdens of judgment, must confront moral
conflict.^ Given this, to expect moral consensus among mere humans is
unreasonable.
There are of course subtle differences of nuance within each explanatory
style, and the two are not mutually exclusive; one can, of course, see the
epistemic obstacles to moral consensus as following from the ontoiogical fact of
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 103

value conflict. The important point here is that these different explanatory
approaches give rise to different prescriptive programs; these in aim form the
basis of our taxonomy of pluralism into three types: (1) shallow pluralism, (2)
deep pluralism, and (3) modus vivendi pluralism.
Shallow pluralism typically arises out of a stricdy epistemic approach to value
conflict. It is, most fundamentally, the norm and procedure of tolerating
difference. Holding that certain conflicts simply cannot be rationally adjudicated,
the shallow pluralist recommends the epistemically modest position that
tolerance should prevail. In some cases, the prescribed tolerance proceeds from
contexttialization. We can understand why physicists, painters. Native Americans,
rock-climbers, and mystics all view the Grand Canyon differently. Insofar as these
competing visions are placed in context, their inconsistency can be tolerated.
They sometimes, perhaps, can come into dialogue, criticize each other, and
inform each other.
Deep pluralism, by contrast, is generally the prescriptive outcome of a strong
ontological account of value conflict. Given that conflict is interminable and built
into the very fabric of moral reality, one must adopt a kind of agonistic attitude
toward all values, where there could be no moral reason to adopt any view over
another.'" That is, the deep pluralist lives in a world where conflicts among goods
are arational and consequendy often violent, and the only prescription could be
to secure or protect one's own values. Hence Levinas (1961) takes power to be
the only condition for decisions, not reason or rational persuasion. Further, he
denies that such a situation is ever avoidable; there can never be anything such as
a moral reason, only power.'^ In a similar vein, Carl Schmitt argues that the
outcome of deep pluralism is that, when confronted with a value conflict.

Each has to decide for himself whether in the concrete

situation the otherness of the stranger signifies the
negation of his own way of life so that he has to be
fended off and fought in order to preserve the way of
life that is existentially important. (1976, p. 27)

Schmitt sees no problem with the implication that value conflict involves "the
real possibility of physical killing, existential negation of the enemy" (1976, p.
33).'^
Modus vivendi pluralism is the more liberal response to an ontological
explanadon of value conflict. Unlike deep pluralism, the modus vivendi
prescription is not agonism, but tolerance. Unlike the shallow pluralist, who also
prescribes tolerance, the modus vivendi pluralist does not see tolerance as a kind
of epistemic modesty in the face of different answers to Big Questions, but rather
as a Hobbesian truce. The agenda for modus vivendi pluralism is to shape the
political and intellecttial terrain so that individuals and groups can co-exist in
common institutions they accept as legitimate (Gray 2000, p. 122). This is a
104 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin

"live-and-let-live politics"; but it can be achieved by way of only two means:

either (a) ignoring and remaining indifferent toward competing values, or (b)
recognizing and respecting the competing values.
The indifferentist perspective is driven by the idea that since there is no
rational basis for holding one conception of the good rather than another, none
has any greater normative weight than any other. Recognizing that the agonist
prescription that one should seek to eliminate opposing value structures itself
implies a value judgment regarding one's opponents, the indifferentist
recommends that we simply ignore those with whom we disagree (Rescher 1993,
p. 103). Hence indifferentist modus vivendi pluralism requires the institutional
and cultural space by which proponents of opposing goods can be kept out of
each other's way; the confrontation of different ways of life hinders indifference.
Recognitionist modus vivendi pluralism is precisely the flip side of the
indifferentist outlook — on this view, all competing values are equally rational, so
they must be treated as such. Instead of being indifferent to them, one must
respect them all as instantiations of their own unique brand of goodness. As a
consequence, what is necessary for the recognitionist program is not just space for
those goods to avoid confrontation, but reciprocity between those who espouse
conflicting goods. Not only must advocates of competing goods agree to
disagree, but they must also agree to disagree in a respectftil and non-interfering
way. They must make space for each other and positively recognize the value of
each other's existence (Gray 2000, 138).

Pragmatism: Two Varieties

We turn now to a taxonomy of pragmatisms. Pragmatism, at least in its
classical expressions, comes in roughly two forms: inquiry pragmatism and
we«»m^ pragmatism.'^ To help fix the distinction, note that some key exponents
of meaning pragmatism are James (1909), the Peirce of "How to Make our Ideas
Clear," Quine (1969), John Stuhr (1997), Richard Rorty (1979; 1998), Robert
Brandom (1994; 2000), and Joseph Margolis (2002). Among the inquiry
pragmatists are Dewey (1938), the Peirce of "The Fixation of Belief," Sidney
Hook (1940), Susan Haack (1993; 2003), Nicholas Rescher (1993), and Cheryl
Misak (2000).
Meaning Pragmatism is first and foremost a method of clarification. William
James's famous solution to the campsite quibble concerning the squirrel is the
touchstone. The dissolution of the dispute, James claims, is achieved by an
application of the "pragmatic method of interpreting each notion by tracing its
practical consequences" (1977, p. 377). He identifies the requirement for
difference in meaning as follows:

If no practical difference (between alternatives) can be

traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same
thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 105

serious, we otight to be able to show some practical

difference that mtist follow from one side or the other's
beingright. (1977, p. 377)

On James's view, since differences in meaning are differences in practice, there

could be no difference in meaning without difference in practice.
The consequence of the meaning pragmatist program, according to James, is
that disputes that otherwise would be "interminable' are setded peaceflilly (1977,
p, 377), In fact, on James's view, the very fi.mction of pragmatist philosophy is to
trace defmite practical differences for interested subjects were one metaphysical
system true or false (1977, p, 379), The primary objective of Jamesian
pragmatism is to "smooth misunderstandings and to bring in peace" (1977,
p, 349). Hence the two sides in the squirrel debate get contextualized and are
rendered compatible, Similady, the tension between materialism and theism is
decided by James in terms of their hopes for the persistence of value, and is
contextualized in the form of how the opposing viewpoints fit our respective
temperaments. Insofar as we see the meaning of these commitments as practical
(and temperamental), they are not in contradiction since they are not
incompatible plans for action. What theoretically seemed contradictory becomes
consistent when interpreted pragmatically.
The crucial thought is that theoretical tensions can be tolerated and perhaps
even ignored insofar as they have no practical corollaries of conflict. In turn, it is
easy to see how such a theory of meaning would seem amenable to a pluralism,
James explicidy endorses metaphysical pluralism as pragmatism's doctrine, as the
theory of meaning cannot accommodate an absolute monism in light of the
diversity of experience. The world is not yet complete, and as such, it is
"imperfecdy unified" and perhaps destined to remain so (1977, p, 477).
Peirce's application of his criterion of meaning has similar consequences. If
our ideas of objects are our ideas of their sensible effects (5.401),''* many debates
in metaphysics can be resolved easily. The tension between free will determinism,
for example, can be resolved because, once the positions arc interpreted
pragmatically, they are not in contradiction — they do not differ on some fact or
other, but on some arrangement of facts {SA03). Though he does not go so far as
to say that both sides are right, Peirce does suggest that this method allows us to
resolve controversies into livable pluralities (5.403),
The bottom line for meaning pragmatism as a philosophical method, then, is
to translate cases of theoretical disagreement into a tractable practical vocabulary.
Some cases are ones where the translation yields a clear winner — as in, for
example, Peirce's dismissal of transubstantiation as "senseless jargon" (5,401) —
whereas other cases are ones where the tension is not resolved by choosing one
side of the debate over another but by creating a space for peacefi.il co-existence
of the competing conceptions. In this respect, meaning pragmatism seems
consistent with modus vivendi pluralism. The prescriptive project for the modus
106 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin

vivendi pluralist is to create a series of institutions for peaceflil coexistence of

competing conceptions of the good, and meaning pragmatism is the policy of
resolving those competing differences into co-habitational practices.
It is unclear whether or not the Jamesian or Peircian meaning pragmatism
require either recognition or indifference to drive their policies, and perhaps the
decision between them may depend on the circumstances. However, for Peirce, it
often seems more a matter of indifference between competing camps, once their
tension has been resolved, since the differences that survive the analysis are ones
more curious than usefi.il (5.410). For James, recognition seems more likely,
since the perspectives behind tensions serve as a source of enrichment for
inquirers and they demand attention.'^
For the inquiry pragmatist, however, it is not the meaning of terms or
theories that drives the tension between competing conceptions of the good, but
rather our current situation of not having an adequate criterion for judgment.
What is required for inquiry pragmatism, then, is not a dissolution of the conflict,
but a research program designed to arrive at positive resolution. Disagreements
for inquiry pragmatists are not semantic puzzles arising from inept or unfortunate
vocabularies (as they are for meaning pragmatists), but real problems to which we
must respond. The search for solutions requires experimentation —we must cast
about for answers and put them to the test.
The Peirce of "The Fixation of Belief is an inquiry pragmatist par excellence.
On this kind of view, inquiry is the project of settling beliefs and pursuing truth
(Haack 2003, pp. 135ff.). We are agitated by some doubt, arising from a crisis, in
Dewey's terms, an "indeterminate situation" (1989, p. 109). In the face of such
conflict, inquiry is the response of producing and refming beliefs and policies that
coincide with reality. Truth is our tool for conflict resolution (5.387).
A community of inquiry is not committed to any particular set of beliefs, but
rather to the policy of pursuing the integrity of belief (5.387). Some
communities may be committed to saving some special subset of their beliefs, but
a community of inquiry is willing to sacrifice any belief for one that capuires what
is. Proper inquiry, then, is not a method of belief preservation, but of belief
revision and correction (Talisse 2001, pp. 564-567). This prerequisite for inquiry
is fallibilism. For Peirce, it is a constitutive feature of genuine inquiry.
As a consequence, only beliefs and policies that survive inquiry are worth
holding. The process of winnowing current beliefs down is that of
experimentation. If, as meaning pragmatism contends, the content of a belief is its
practical consequences, then we can test our beliefs in terms of their
consequences actually obtaining or not. Dewey characterizes the features of the
experimental component as (i) locating the sources of knowledge in practical
consequences, (ii) self-corrective inquiry, and (iii) hypothesizing solutions with
the hope of undertaking flirther inquiry (1988, p. 336). Experiment comes out
of the territory of current solutions and problems, but it also opens the ground
for new solutions and problems. We arrange our materials and theories in a way
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 107

that new information can come to us in the experiment's outcome, but that
information must always be held conditionally — as a consequence of that
arrangement of theories and materials. That information cannot stand alone, as it
has its force and (if the meaning pragmatist is right) its content insofar as it is
derived from that arrangement.
In this hypothetical feature of experimentalism we find an additional
determinative component of inquiry pragmatism: holism. Holists reject the
standard verificationist line according to which propositions can be tested apart
from the theories of which they are a part. According to the holist, theories and
beliefs are tested together. When an experiment is am, one does not just set the
stage for the production of a new belief or the rejection of an old one.
Experiments test the coherence and cogency of theories as a whole; as Quine
would have it, "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense
experience not individually but as a corporate body" (1953, p. 41).
Inquiry pragmatism hence is marked by three features: fallibilism,
experimentalism, and holism. These features seem to make this form of
pragmatism amenable to shallow pluralism, since it would be hasty for any
inquirer to rule a form of the good out or infer it can be trumped by another
form of the good unqualifiedly, since all experiments occur holistically. They can
be judged only against a fallible background. Given this holist-fallibilist
requirement, competing goods and those that espouse them can more fruitfiilly
be seen as alternative experimental programs and researchers. And so, just as
scientists do not (or ought not) interfere with the experiments of their peers and
competitors, those of us pursuing the good life ought not interfere with the
experiments in living others perform.

Pragmatism and Pluralism: Incompatible Doctrines

So far, we have discussed three kinds of pluralism (shallow, deep, and modus
vivendi) and two kinds of pragmatism (meaning and inquiry). Meaning
pragmatism, we have shown, seems a good fit with modus vivendi pluralism, and
inquiry pragmatism seems allied with shallow pluralism. Yet all is not well. In this
section we will argue for three theses: (I) neither pragmatism is consistent with
deep pluralism, (II) modus vivendi pluralism is practically unstable and thus is a
pragmatically ineffective prescriptive response to value conflict, and (III) shallow
pluralism is pluralism in name only. So, despite the fact that meaning pragmatism
is consistent with modus vivendi pluralism and inquiry pragmatism is consistent
with shallow pluralism, neither can be wedded to pluralism for long. That is to
say, pragmatism and pluralism, even when strictly consistent are not compatible
doctrines. Divorce between them is inevitable, and that is a good thing, too.

/. That Pragmatists Cannot be Deep Pluralists

The deep pluralist is committed to a strong ontoiogical thesis regarding
value. The deep pluralist is not only an unabashed moral realist, but also holds
 108 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin

that pracdcal value conflict is the product of a deep fact about the ontology of
value. As we have argued above, the prescripdve consequence is agonism — since
there could be no rational reladons between opposing goods, only power counts,
and one should exercise power in order to eliminate opposition.
Meaning pragmadsm is inconsistent with deep pluralism for two rea.sons.
First, the plurality of values and world-views allowed by the meaning pluralist
program are those translatable into either idendcal or coherent pracdcal
consequences. So, the Peircian and Jamesian pluralisms of free will and
determinism, or opdmism and pessimism, are possible only insofar as the two
competing programs can be translated into a set of consistent practices or
temperaments. Peirce's meaning pragmadsm tolerates no inconsistency on the level
of practical content; thus when the issue of transubstandadon comes to a head,
Peirce dismisses one of the compedng oudooks:

We can consequendy mean nothing by wine but what

has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon the sense;
and to talk of something as having the sensible
characters of wine, yet being in reality blood is senseless
jargon. (5.401)

If the Catholic side of the transubstandadon debate is dropped in this way,

Peirce's meaning pragmadsm must first require that meaning come in a singular
form and second require that all condidons for adjudicadng debates refer only to
that form. In this respect, Peirce's meaning pragmadsm is at bottom descdpdvely
inconsistent with deep pluralism, since Peirce holds that there is but one criterion
for meaning. Further, his prescdpdve program is one that legidmates the variety
of values according to that singular standard. Such jtidgments, for the deep
pluralist, are impossible.
The ontological feature of deep pluralism generates a second point of
conflict with meaning pragmadsm. If, as meaning pragmadsm runs, content must
be translatable into pracdcal consequences, how are the metaphysical claims of
the deep pluralist to be understood.> How could the strong ontological claims
about the incommensurablity of moral enddes be rendered in pracdcal
consequences.* Surely Peirce's Occamite atdtude toward non-pracdcal enddes
and "make believes" would stdp such a theory of its weight (5.416). That is to
say, any account of the incomparability of values that explains that
incomparability in terms of features beyond our pracdces of compadson will be of
no more content that the useless verbiage of transubstandadon theories. And as a
consequence, meaning pluralism cannot accommodate t|->e deep pluralist's strong
ontological commitments.
Inquii-y pragmadsm is inconsistent with deep pluralism for similar reasons.
First, inquiry pragmadsm's fallibilist component is inconsistent with the strong
modal aspect of deep pluralism, according to which certain value conflicts are of
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 109

necessity inevitable, interminable, and unadjudicable. Such an attitude, the inquiry

pragmatist will object, is simply a block on the road of inquiry. The deep pluralist
prescription against even trying theories that promise to overcome or adjudicate
conflicts is a positive hindrance to inquiry. Any theory that impedes or
discourages fiirther inquiry barricades the advance toward truth and is an
unpardonable offense in reasoning (1.135). Given the kind of prescriptive weight
of the deep pluralist account of adjudication, any theory that runs afoul of the
prescription is a priori known to be totalizing, imperialist, or worse. For the
inquiry pragmatist, such a position cannot be adopted by a genuine inquirer.
Second, deep pluralism fails to take any of the competing conceptions of the
good as experiments or incomplete or open to revision and correction. Instead,
each conflicting viewpoint gets treated as static and perfect.'* But such an
atdtude is anti-fallibilist and anti-experimentalist. If we take both sides of a
conflict to be perfecdy right in a valuational conflict, there is no room for
adjudication between them (which was the first objection) or inquiry within
either side. That is, just as the parties in a conflict cannot enter into corrective
dialogue with each other, they cannot even do so with themselves. To the inquiry
pragmatist, such an attitude not only obstructs the road of inquiry, but it renders
inquiry altogether impossible.

II. That Modus Vivendi Pluralism is Pragmatically Ineffective

Meaning pragmatism is consistent with modus vivendi pluralism. However,
meaning pragmatists ought not be modus vivendi pluralists because such a
prescriptive program is not a pragmatically viable response to value conflict.
Recall that modus vivendi pluralism contends that each side of a conflict must be
given the space for its own projects and that one maintains that space either by
recognition or by indifference. But, as Rawls has argued in a different context,
modtts vivendi arrangements are unstable and likely to collapse into agonism
(1996, pp. 133ff.). When modus vivendi policies are in place, all parties to a
conflict will take the current arrangement as less than ideal, since all parties accept
the order as a compromise. There is still an order that is much better for the
partisans, namely, that of totally holding sway, and there is one that is much
worse, namely, that of total disenfranchisement. But such a balance of power is a
reasonable compromise only if the two competing sides already have equal
power. If one side has or comes to have more power than its competitors, such a
society will not remain modus vivendi for long, but will quickly devolve into a
agonistic war among the competing factions.
One way for a modus vivendi amngcmcnt to remain stable, even in contexts
where the power relation is asymmetric, is for it to be in place against a
background of recognition between competing lifestyles. Parties may be in
competition, but they nevertheless recognize the internal legitimacy of each
other's programs (Gray 2000, p. 20). But such a background policy of
recognition is one that is \ist\f inconsistentW\t\\ pluralism, since it requires that the
110 Robert B, Talisse & Scott F, Aikin

duties of recognition and reciprocity override the values driving the conflicts. The
only way for such a policy to have a hold on a population of competing
partisanships is for those partisanships to already agree on the value of cross-
partisan recognition. But no population of partisans has such a valuational
structure — those who espouse values in competition with the partisanship are
invariably seen as morally deficient, ignorant, or immoral. The recognitionist
version o^ modus vivendi ipXurzWsm is internally incoherent (Talisse 2000, p, 454).
Another way to maintain modus vivendi policies in the face of instability is to
promote indifference between differing camps. Instead of getting the partisans to
accept each other, the indifferentist pushes the competing groups to develop an
attitude of apathy toward one another. This is accomplished by way of skeptical
arguments that challenge the justification one has for a certain world view or
value or policy. Compelling versions may go: From the perspective of the
universe as a whole, does it matter who gets to vote and who doesn't.' Whether
some people have whiskey on Sundays.' From such an extreme perspective, the
conflicts seem miniscule and arbitrary, certainly not the kind of thing to fight
over. Once we've achieved this perspective, we can co-exist with those with
whom we disagree. It is the "don't sweat the small stuff' attitude from the
perspective where everything looks small (Rescher 1993, p. 104).
But such a solution is theoretically unappealing to the pragmatist, since it
addresses valuational conflict by deflating the values; it thus betrays moral
experience. Surely this price is too high. Nor does such a deflated set of values
actually reduce the conflict — values conflict, deflated or not. Moreover, the
solution is psychologically unstable, because the perspective of eternity is difficult
for most people to maintain. In fact, it may be positively harmflil and
detrimental. From the perspective of the universe as a whole, does it matter if I
go to work, or feed my dog, or pay rent, or even breathe? And as a consequence,
we see that we naturally return to the perspective of interested subjects. And with
that return, the conflicts will flare up again. So, it seems the indifferentist solution
to instability is itself perhaps more unstable. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine
such a solution supporting the pragmatist's meliorist program. Though meaning
pragmatism is consistent with modus vivendi pluralism, no pragmatist could be
such a pluralist,

///, That Shallow Pluralism is Pluralism in Name Only

Shallow pluralism is consistent with inquiry pragmatism. Shallow pluralism's
commitment to tolerance in its contextualist form meshes well with the inquiry
pragmatist's experimentalism fallibilism. If we view those who pursue different
lifestyles as co-inquirers, experiments must be given their space to come to
fruition.
But we must remember that shallow pluralism's prescription is derived from
a philosophically modest account of the moral universe. First, shallow pluralism is
a weakly epistemic pluralism. On the shallow view, although there may be no
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 111

current criterion for judgment, there is also no reason to hold that this is a
permanent condition. The shallow pluralist acknowledges that flirther inquiry,
some discovery or other, or the application of good judgment, may provide that
criterion for use. As a consequence, the prescriptive force of shallow pluralism is
that those criteria should be pursued. The shallow pluralist, then, must not only
tolerate moral inquiry but actively do it. This is precisely the aim of inquiry
pragmatism. The inquiry pragmatist is duty-bound to subject disagreement to
critical examination, and the principal direction of that research must be that of
rational adjudication. Shallow pluralism and inquiry pragmatism, then, are a good
match.
The second modest feature of shallow pluralism is its lack of any strong
ontological commitments. On the shallow view, conflicts among goods are not
taken to be clashes between existentially incommensurable entities, but rather
procedural puzzles and occasions for inquiry. Even if there are no certainly
overriding goods or failsafe decision-procedures, there are, nevertheless, decision
procedures that are on the whole better, more reliable and rational, than others.
Our obligation is to flnd and make the best ones we can.
We must ask whether such an oudook is really pluralist at all. Because
shallow pluralism's commitments are modest, it bears only a faint resemblance to
the stronger versions. Its only real similarities to stronger pluralisms are in (a)
recognizing and tolerating the prevalence of disagreement, and (b) in
acknowledging that we do not currently have the criteria for adjudicating those
disagreements. But neither of these commitments is distinctly pluralist] Consider
that Plato's dialectic proceeds from both concessions, but is recognized as a
paradigmatic monism. Similarly, Descartes' invitation to take up the meditative
method evokes the same commitments, but the method is one of unifying the
sciences. Acknowledging the persistence of moral disagreement and the epistemic
difficulty of the situation does not yet make one a pluralist, yet it seems shallow
pluralism commits to litde more than that. Thus shallow pluralism is pluralism in
name only.
Further, shallow pluralism's prescriptive component of contextualism
requires a deeper monism that explains the seeming variety. For example,
Rescher's contexuialism proceeds from the intuition that human variety is what
drives disagreement and the lack of unanimity with most objects of inquiry, but
that does not mean that the objects themselves are plural. There may be (and
often is) still a singular object, but multiple perspectives. "Nature is to some
extent a mirror: what looks out depends on who looks in" (Rescher 1993, pp.
75-6). But the important thing for Rescher's contextualism is that these different
conceptions of the world are all responses to the same world, and they are to be
understood and explained, and even adjudicated in terms of how this variety
springs from one world. We may not strive to bring that plurality of voices to
speak as one; however, we do, when the voices come together as a cacophony,
evoke a criterion based on the unity of the world to bring such anarchy to a
112 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin

close.
In fact, this thought of the unity of the world giving rise to a plurality of
perspectives is the flip side of the very fact of conflict. If the forest for an
environmental activist and the forest for a logger were not the same forest, then
the two perspectives would not have the conflict they do. If they were two
separate objects, then the loggers could turn their trees into planks and sawdust,
and the activists could hug theirs as much as they like. But it is because these are
different conceptions of the same thing thzt there is enmity between two camps.
To go any fiarther ontologically is to make the very fact of conflict unintelligible.

Conclusion: Pragmatists as Anti-Pluralists

We've here set out a taxonomy according to which pluralism comes in three
forms and pragmatism comes in two forms. We first argued that neither form of
pragmatism is consistent with deep pluralism, due to the latter's strong
ontoiogical commitments. We then acknowledged that meaning pragmatism is
consistent with modus vivendi pluralism, and inquiry pragmatism is consistent
with shallow pluralism. However, we have argued that modus vivendi p\ur3.\ism is
not a pragmatically acceptable response to value conflict, and shallow pluralism is
pluralism in name only. Therefore pragmatism and pluralism are incompatible
doctrines; pragmatists cannot be pluralists.
We expect that this result will strike many pragmatists as unacceptable. We
should like, therefore, to conclude by preempting a likely line of response. In the
course of this preemption, we shall come to the even bolder conclusion that
pragmatists must be anti-pluralists.
Pragmatists may retort that 'pluralism' as pragmatists employ the term does
not fit in our proposed taxonomy. They may then argue that there is a type of
pluralism that is fiilly a piece with pragmatism. That is, the pragmatist might
object to our argument by claiming that of course pragmatists cannot be pluralists
if by 'pluralism' one means what non-pragmatist philosophers mean by the term.
They may say that the conclusion that pragmatists cannot be pluralists certainly
follows, but is merely verbal and trivial. The pragmatist may additionally contend
that a non-trivial argument would have to show that pragmatists cannot be
pluralists in the sense of 'pluralism' that they intend. Short of such a
demonstration, we have cast no shadow over the claim that pragmatism and
pluralism are closely allied.
It is clear to us that when pragmatists speak of pluralism they mean to
indicate a prima facie dedication to habits of inclusiveness, non-repressive
toleration, openness, experimentalism, anti-dogmatism, and other admirable
moral and political commitments. Surely, these commitments are not necessarily
incompatible with pragmatism. However, our project in the present essay has not
been that of showing that that the pragmatist conception of pluralism is
incompatible with other elements of pragmatism; rather, we have tried to show
that the pragmatist conception of pluralism is incompatible with those conceptions
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 113

of pluralism that are in currency in the present philosophical debate. That is, we
have demonstrated that the term 'pluralism' operates in the more general
philosophical arena to denote a series of posidons that are not in agreement with
pragmadsm. The stiggesdon is that, if pragmadsts want to join the current
debate, they must at the very least take careRil nodce of this fact of vocabulary.
Here we imagine our interlocutor objecdng to the very idea that pragmadsts
should try to engage in philosophical discussion with those who employ a
philosophical vocabulary that is foreign to pragmadsm. This reply is
understandable. Pragmadsm has always been in part a commitment to subjecdng
philosophical terminology to careflil philosophical scrudny; in fact, one may say
that one of the disdncdve features of pragmadst philosophy is its insight into how
philosophical vocabulades are never neutral, but actually play a role in generadng
philosophical problems. This sensidvity to the power of terms is endrely
appropdate. However, the pragmadst virtue of seeing the need to reconstruct
philosophical terminology has a corresponding vice in a semandc insularity that
insists that an antecedent pragmadst vocabulary is the only intellectually
responsible way of talking. That pragmadsm should itself become a stolid,
specialized vocabulary that on a priori grounds excludes non-pragmadst opdons
from philosophical relevance is a troubling development. That pragmadst
philosophers should spend so much dme talking about themselves to each other
consdtutes an ironic betrayal of the pragmadst tradidon, and is and-pluralist in
even the pragmadst's sense of the term.
Pragmadsts may at this point concede that the term 'pluralism' has come to
denote commitments they cannot accept. They might then conclude that the
term is not worth fighdng for, resolving to abandon the term and instead talk
about those commitments for which 'pluralism' was a blanket term:
experimentalism, toleradon, inclusion, openness, and contextualism. Hence they
will be less likely to be misunderstood by the broader philosophical community.
We endorse this tacdcal move, for nothing is lost by jetdsoning the term. Yet
the issue we have raised is not simply one of turf and vocabulary. Even if they
elect to desert the term, pragmadsts should confront the more general debates
concerning pluralism because if pluralism is true, then pragmadsm is a bankrupt
philosophical program. Pragmadsts are hence implicitly committed to tht falsity
of pluralism. Pragmadsts shotild, then, attend to pluralist arguments and devise
cridcisms of them. Proper cridcism must address the view to be cridcized in
terms that proponents of that view can recognize as, at the very least, not
quesdon-begging. Hence, it will not do to recite chapter and verse of one's
favorite pragmadst text; one must rather engage direcdy the arguments advanced
in favor of pluralist theses and demonstrate their flaws. Unless there is a cridque
of pluralism that is consistent with pragmadsm, pragmadsm is jeopardized. In
this way, our argument has not only shown that pragmadsts cannot be pluralists;
we have also demonstrated the stronger claim that pragmadsts must be acdvely
anti-pluralist.
 114 Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin

Vanderbilt University
Robert.Talisse@vanderbilt.edu
scott.faikin@vanderbilt.edu

NOTES
1. Hence Stuhr, "Pragmatism's Universe is pluralistic" (2003, p. 184)
and "To make philosophy pragmatic, it is necessary to take pluralism seriously" (1999, p.
41); Shook, "Pragmatic realism ... offers a pluralistic ontological alternative to the stark
extremes of global relativistic phenomenalism and global realism" (2002, p. 115); Parker,
"James's radical empiricism thus implies a radical pluralism, and this pluralism is manifest
in all areas of his thought" (1999, p. 212); and Gouinlock, "Dewey is properly regarded
as a moral pluralist" (1999, p. 236). The classical source of this idea is William James
(1996); on James and pluralism, see O'Shea 2000. For additional instances of the claim
that pragmatism is closely allied with pluralism, see Burke 2002, p. 127; Capps 2002;
Keith 2001, p. 126; Caspary 2000, p. 15; Hoy 1998, p. 42; Seigfried 1998, pp. 197-88;
Posnock 1997, p. 335; Carlson 1997, p. 382; Wilshire 1997, p. 104; Alexander 1995, pp.
132-138; Colapietro 1995, p. 28; Rosenthal 1994, p. 126.
2. There will be significant room for variation within each type; our
taxonomy does not attempt to accurately describe in foil detail every pluralism in currency.
3. There are many forms of pragmatism in currency these days. "Ironist,"
"anti-theory," and "prophetic" versions of pragmatism will not be directly engaged here.
By "pragmatism" we mean principally the so-called "classical" versions of pragmatism and
their current incarnations.
4. Hence Galston: "moral pluralism offers the best account of the moral
universe we inhabit" (2002, p. 30); "concrete experience ... provides the most compelling
reasons for accepting some form of value pluralism" (2002, p. 33).
5. See also Rawls 1996, p. 13. Note also that we are using "pluralism" to
denote what would be more properly called "moral pluralism" or "value pluralism". One
can be a pluralist about things other than value, but since contemporary pragmatists most
often use "pluralism" to refer to a commitment about value, we restrict the extension
similarly.
6. Rawls refers to the "absolute depth" of the "irreconcilable latent
conflict" among different comprehensive views (1996, p. xxxvi); he argues that a
consensus on a single doctrine "can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state
power" (1996, p. 37). See also Mouffe 2000; Honig 1997; and Hampshire 2000. For a
criticism of Ilawlsian pluralism, see Talisse 2003.
7. For more comprehensive articulations of pluralism, see Berlin 1969,
Galston 2002, Gray 2000, Keekes 2000, Crowder 2002, Talisse 2004, and die es.says
collected in Baghramian and Ingram (eds.), and Dworkin, Lila and Silvers (eds,).
8. Rawls is followed by Joshua Cohen (1993), Thomas Nagel (1987),
Bruce Ackerman (1989), Charles Larmore (1987), and Daniel Dombrowski (2001),
among many others.
9. Dworkin expresses the point well, "values conflict even if we get all the
breaks" (2001, p. 78).
10. Brian Barry has argued that pluralism is simply another name for
relativism (2001, p. 133).
 Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists 115

11, Hence Levlnas's distinction between politics and ethics: "The art of
foreseeing war and winning it by every means — politics — is henceforth enjoined as the
very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naivete" (1961, p,
21),
12, Schmitt goes on to claim that "When a people no longer has the
power or the will to maintain itself in the political sphere, so politics does not disappear
from the world. All that disappears is a weak people" (1976, p, 53),
13, We are of course not claiming that this difference is a strict disjunction.
Many contemporary pragmatists working in the classical idiom will insist that pragmatism
is at once a claim about inquiry and a claim about meaning. We are simply pointing to a
difference of emphasis among classical pragmatists, one that we think has clear textual
support in the literature, not to mention in the responses Peirce, James, and Dcwey had to
each other's work,
14, We follow the convention in citing Peirce's Collected Papers: (volume
number,paragraph number),
15, See especially James's "On a Certain Blindness in Human
Beings" (1977),
16, We say "perfect" because it seems to run afoul of deep pluralism to say
of one side of a dispute that it could have made its case better.

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