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The Postnormal
Times Reader
978-1-56564-958-3
Books-in-Brief
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The
Postnormal Times Reader
Edited by Ziauddin Sardar

Abridged by C Scott Jordan
This edition published by International Institute of Islamic Thought, in

cooperation with Centre for Postnormal Policy & Futures Studies, and MAHYA.
www.iiit.org
www.cppfs.org
www.postnormaltim.es
www.mahyayayincilik.com.tr
© Copyright 2020 International Institute of Islamic Thought,

and Centre for Postnormal Policy & Futures Studies.
All rights reserved.
Articles from Futures reproduced with the kind permission of Elsevier.
The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

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This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and

to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no
reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of the publishers.
The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of
the contributors and not necessarily those of the publishers.
978-1-56564-958-3
Series Editors
Dr. Anas S. al-Shaikh-Ali
Shiraz Khan
Printed in USA
IIIT Books-In-Brief Series

The IIIT Books-In-Brief Series is a valuable collection of the
Institute’s key publications written in condensed form designed
to give readers a core understanding of the main contents of the
original. Produced in a short, easy to read, time-saving format,
these companion synopses offer a close, carefully written over-
view of the larger publication and it is hoped will stimulate
readers into further exploration of the original.
We live in a period of accelerating change. New trends, technologies and

crisis emerge rapidly and transform familiar social and political land-
scapes. Established and cherished ideals, with deep historical roots, can
be overturned overnight. Unconventional and uncommon notions and
events can appear as though from nowhere, proliferate, and become
dominant. The last few years alone have witnessed the emergence of
populism and the far right in Europe and the US, Brexit, cracks in the
European Union, cyber wars accompanied by the re-emergence of the
Cold War. China as increasingly dominant new superpower. Pandemics
like Ebola and Zika virus. Climate change leading to extreme weather
events. Driverless cars. AI. ‘False News’. ‘Alternative Facts’. ‘Post-Truth’.
‘Disruptive technologies’ that disrupt and often corrupt everything. All
seems to be in flux, nothing can be trusted. All that we regard as normal is
melting away right before us.
The postnormal times theory attempts to make sense of a rapidly chang-

ing world, where uncertainty is the dominant theme and ignorance has
become a valuable community. The Postnormal Times Reader is a
pioneering anthology of writings on the contradictory, complex and
chaotic nature of our era. It covers the origins, theory and methods of
postnormal times; and examines a host of issues, ranging from climate
change, governance, the Middle East, to religion and science, from the
perspective of postnormal times. By mapping some of the key local and
global issues of our transitional age, the Reader suggests a way of

navigating our turbulent futures.
Abridged Edition of the Original

The Postnormal Times Reader
Edited by Ziauddin Sardar
ISBN pbk: 978-1-56564-991-0
2017
What Just Happened

Introduction by Ziauddin Sardar
Are you paying attention at the back? Lee Gates, in the film Money Monster
states “You don’t have a clue where your money is. See once upon a time you
could walk into your bank, and open your vault and point to a gold brick.
Not anymore. Your money, that thing you bust your ass for, it’s nothing more
than a few photons of energy traveling through a massive network of fibre
optic cables. Why do we do it? We did it to make it go faster because your
money better be fast. Faster than the other guys. But if you want faster
markets with faster trade, faster profits, faster everything, sometimes you are
going to blow a tyre”.
A sane and timely observation; except, it is not an odd tyre that’s had a
puncture—the car and the road itself are in complete disrepair. Blowouts are
everywhere and seem to be occurring simultaneously with frightening
regularity. In 2016, we witnessed a string of unprecedented events. Ongoing
conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq leading to a refugee crisis of unparalleled
proportions. Mass shootings in France, Germany, and the US. Left wing
populism that produced Jeremy Corbyn as the leader of the Labour Party in
Britain, and Bernie Sanders as the leader of ‘political revulsion’ in the US.
Right-wing populism in France, Austria, Holland, Poland, Hungary that
could bring the far right to power in Europe. Zika virus. The rejection of a
landmark peace deal in Colombia. Escalating tensions between China and
Japan in the South China Sea. President Rodrigo Duterte who defends the
killing of the poor as necessary in his ambitious drug war in the Philippines.
Brexit. Cracks in the European Union. And, of course, Donald Trump.
Something is not quite right with the world.
Just what is going on?
A number of academics, thinkers, writers and commentators have been

trying to figure this out for well over a decade. Essentially, what they are all
saying is that we have either lost, or are losing, our faith and trust in what we
have thus far considered to be normal, conventional or orthodox.
So normal, no matter how it is defined, is evaporating. We are moving

towards what I have called ‘postnormal times’. This Reader charts the
development of the theory of postnormal times, with its origins in post-
normal science, and brings some of the key papers and articles together. My
aim here is both to provide an overview of postnormal times theory and show
how recent events can be understood through this lens.
The Postnormal Times Reader embodies and speaks to the values of

polylogues, the essential tool for navigating our way out of the pile-up that
is building on the highway to the future. The discourse of postnormal times
remains a work in progress. Hence, the Reader will itself change and evolve
over time with new editions. But it will always be a text with diversity and
plurality at its core; and a space that welcomes your contributions.
ORIGINS AND THEORY
Science for the Post-Normal Age

Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz
After centuries of triumph and optimism, science is now called on to remedy

the pathologies of the global industrial system of which it forms the basis.
The old dichotomies of facts and values, and of knowledge and ignorance,
are being transcended. The science appropriate to this new condition will be
based on the assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control, and a
plurality of legitimate perspectives. The appropriate science for this epoch is
‘post-normal’.
In post-normal science, uncertainty is not banished but is managed, and

values are not presupposed but are made explicit. The model for scientific
argument is not a formalized deduction but an interactive dialogue.
In this new sort of science, the evaluation of scientific inputs to decision

making requires an ‘extended peer community’ []. This extension of
legitimacy to new participants in policy dialogues with mutual respect among
various perspectives and forms of knowing, increases the possibility for the
development of a genuine and effective democratic element in the life of

science.
Reinvasion of the Laboratory by Nature

Nature itself no longer needs to be approached as wild and threatening. Our
technology and medicine together have made Nature predictable and in part
controllable. The obverse side of this achievement is that it may well be
unsustainable. The triumph of the scientific method has led to its domination
over all other ways of knowing. Common-sense experience and inherited
skills of making and living have lost their claim to authority. The rationality
of public decision making must appear to be scientific. Now scientific
expertise has led us into policy dilemmas which it is incapable of resolving
by itself.
Centrality of Uncertainty and Quality

Uncertainty and quality are moving in from the periphery of scientific
methodology, to become the central, integrating concepts. New policy issues
have common features that distinguish them from traditional scientific
problems. They are universal in their scale and long-term in their impact.
Data on their effects are radically inadequate. The phenomena, being novel,
complex and variable, are themselves not well understood. Policy cannot
proceed on the basis of factual predictions.
New methods must be developed for making our ignorance usable []. For
this there must be a radical departure from the total reliance on techniques,
to the exclusion of methodological, societal or ethical considerations.
Problem-solving Strategies
Uncertainty and decision stakes are the opposites of attributes which
traditionally characterized science, namely its certainty and its value
neutrality. The term ‘systems uncertainties’ conveys the principle that the
problem is concerned with the comprehension or management of an
inherently complex reality. By ‘decision stakes’ we understand all the various
costs, benefits, and value commitments that are involved in the issue through
the various stakeholders. Understanding this we can characterize the three
kinds of problem-solving strategies.
Applied Science
The explanation of problem-solving strategies starts with the most familiar
strategy: applied science. This is involved when both systems uncertainties
and decisions stakes are low. The decision stakes will be simple as well as
small. The problem is likely to be soluble by a normal, puzzle-solving

approach. Where both uncertainties and external decision stakes are low, the
traditional processes of peer review of projects and refereeing of papers have
worked well enough despite their known problems.
Professional Consultancy
Professional consultancy includes applied science, but deals with problems
which require a different methodology for their complete resolution. Personal
judgments depending on higher level skills are required, and uncertainty,
now more complex, is at the methodological level. The decision stakes are
also more complex. For the purposes relevant to the task will be in conflict,
involving various human stakeholders and natural systems as well.
Professional tasks deal with unique situations. The personal element becomes
correspondingly important. The public may become confused or disillusioned
at the sight of scientists disagreeing strongly on a problem apparently
involving only applied science. The gain in clarity should more than
compensate for the loss of mystique of scientific infallibility.
Postnormal Science
We now consider the third sort of problem-solving strategy, where systems
uncertainties or decision stakes are high. We call it ‘postnormal’ to indicate
that the puzzle-solving exercises of normal science are no longer appropriate
for the resolution of policy issues of risks and the environment.
Post-normal science has the paradoxical feature that in its problem-solving

activity the traditional domination of ‘hard facts’ over ‘soft values’ has been
inverted. Out of this must come a set of forecasts which will provide the
scientific inputs to decision processes. But all the causal elements are
uncertain in the extreme; to wait until all the facts are in, would be another
form of imprudence.
The uncertainties go beyond those of the systems, to include ethics as well.

These new policy issues involve the welfare of new stakeholders, such as
future generations, other species, and the planetary environment as a whole.
Only a dialogue between all sides can achieve creative solutions to such
problems.
Extended Peer Communities

In post-normal science, the manifold uncertainties in both products and
processes require that the relative importance of persons becomes enhanced.
Those whose lives and livelihood depend on the solution of the problems
will have a keen awareness of how the general principles are realized in their
‘back yards’. They will also have ‘extended facts’, including anecdotes, informal
surveys, and official information published by unofficial means.
Conclusion
The new policy issues of risk and the environment are global not merely in
their extent, but also in their complexity, pervasiveness, and novelty as a
subject of scientific inquiry. The activity of science now encompasses the
management of irreducible uncertainties in knowledge and in ethics, and the
recognition of different legitimate perspectives and ways of knowing. The
post-normal response is to recognize the challenge and then to start towards
a reintegration, through the acceptance of uncertainty and the welcoming of
diversity.
References
. S. O. Funtowicz and J. R. Ravetz, “Three types of risk assessment and the emergence
of postnormal science”, in D. Colding and S. Krimsky (Eds.), Theories of Risk (New
York: Greenwood Press, ).
. J. R. Ravetz, “Usable knowledge, usable ignorance: incomplete science with policy
implications”, in J. R. Ravetz, The Merger of Knowledge with Power (London: Cassell,
).
Welcome to Postnormal Times

Ziauddin Sardar
It never rains but it pours, says the proverb. And it has been pouring a lot in
recent times. If the multiple threats from climate change were not enough to
give us sleepless nights, we are now in the grip of one of the worst recessions
in history. Before we had time to draw breath, a pandemic of swine-flu
threatened to engulf the globe. Lurking behind all this is the energy crisis,
dwindling natural, the continued threat of nuclear proliferation, and the ever-
present menace of terrorism. We hate the bankers, distrust our politicians
and worry constantly about the security of our jobs, safety of our children
and the blight of our communities. Nothing is definite, truly guaranteed, or
totally safe.
Welcome to postnormal times. The espiritu del tiempo is characterised by

uncertainty, rapid change, realignment of power, upheaval and chaotic
behaviour. We live in an in-between period where old orthodoxies are dying,
new ones have yet to be born, and very few things seem to make sense. It is a
time when all choices seem perilous, likely to lead to ruin, if not entirely over
the edge of the abyss.
Much of what we have taken as normal, conventional and orthodox just does
not work anymore. The world itself is now a far more uncertain place. There
is hardly a country where politicians are either trusted or respected. Even the
cycles of our weather cannot be trusted – thanks to global warming. These
are times of multiple and simultaneous crises. It is not just that things are
going wrong; they are going wrong spectacularly, on a global scale, and in
multiple and concurrent ways. We thus find ourselves in a situation that is
far from normal; and have entered the domain of the postnormal.
All of these incoherencies are related to three c’s: complexity, chaos and
contradictions – the forces that shape and propel postnormal times.
Complexity
Almost everything we have to deal with nowadays is complex. Complexity is
a natural by-product of the fact that most of our problems have a global scale.
Globalisation enhances complexity not simply by making us interdependent

but also by increasing our interconnections. Nothing exists or happens in
isolation. If this wasn’t enough, there is yet another trend that makes things
even more complex; things change rapidly and often happen simultaneously.
We find the emerging complexity hard to comprehend; and almost
impossible to cope with.
Complexity teaches us an important lesson: the notions of control and

certainty are becoming obsolete. In our time we no longer have the luxury
of time to reflect, to observe and respond to undesired outcomes, to debate
and manage with some semblance of order.
Chaos
Complexity is a precursor to, and a necessary condition for chaos. Chaotic
behaviour is not an uncommon phenomenon. But it is rather unusual to see
civilisations, whole societies or indeed the entire inhabitants of the globe,
behaving according to the dictates of chaos theory.
Since everything is linked up and networked with everything else, a break

down anywhere has a knock-on effect, unsettling other parts of the network,
even bringing down the whole network. Moreover, the potential for positive
feedback is enormous. Thanks to mobile phones, e-mails, blogs, tweets and
-hour news media, we are constantly in the know. We are thus primed to
react instantly, equipped with the means to set off new patterns of chain
reactions.
Like complexity, chaos too has a fundamental lesson to teach us: individual
and social responsibility and accountability are all paramount for our
collective survival. Individualism is a recipe for catastrophe.
Contradictions
A complex, networked world, with countless competing interests and
ideologies, designs and desires, behaving chaotically, can do little more than
throw up contradictions. In postnormal times, there are two contradictions
that need our particular attention.
The first concerns change. Things have always changed but they have not
changed with the accelerating pace we are witnessing nowadays. Exponential
acceleration has now become the norm. Yet, vast segments of the planet and
swathes of our social life are quasistatic. The more things change, the more
they seem to stay the same.
The second contradiction concerns knowledge. While our knowledge has

increased, and is increasing, by leaps and bounds in almost all spheres, we
also seem to be more ignorant than ever.
Ignorance is not soluble by means of ordinary research; we therefore have

no notion of its existence. So, we are faced with a triple whammy of ignorance
– or ignorance-cubed: the ignorance of our ignorance, the in-built ignorance
of the potential risks of recent developments, and the ignorance generated
from information overload. Ignorance requires radically new ways of
thinking.
Uncertainty
When contradictions, complexity and chaos combine with accelerating
change the only definite outcome is uncertainty. Uncertainty may be the only
thing of which we can be sure, but it is not a comfortable, nor as yet a
politically or socially acceptable, basis on which to debate real hard choices.
The combination of ignorance and uncertainty, as well as a tendency to

chaotic behaviour, contradictory analysis and the complex issues of safety
and risks – all this means that our current options for ‘business as usual’ are
now dangerously obsolete.
Virtues
We need to negotiate our way towards new normal times. The problem,
however, is that the space, time and willingness to engage in coherent debate
has become scarcer, the more complex, contradictory and chaotic things have
become. To negotiate our way out of postnormal existence we have to learn
how to negotiate, how to translate aspiration into transformation.
The moral to be drawn from the characteristics of postnormal times are age
old virtues: humility, modesty and accountability. Humility, modesty and
accountability are indispensable virtues, essential requirements of living with
uncertainty and complexity. The failure to acknowledge the uncertainty and
complexity of certain situations is not only a technical error, but also an
ethical one []. Indeed, it is ethics, and only ethics, that can guide us out of
the postnormal impasse.
Every social, cultural, political, philosophical and religious outlook known

to humanity needs to relearn how to engage with its own ethical precepts.
The ethical debate and accountability we need to create must begin with
accepting the postnormal axiom that there is no monopoly on truth. When
there are no right or wrong answers everyone, every perspective, has a
contribution to make, anyone is as likely as another to have some part of a
potential solution. What we have to add to this is an ethical clarity, a state of
mind which acknowledges we are all beset by ignorance and none of us has
all the right answers. In postnormal conditions, flexibility, adaptation and
sensitivity to markedly different initial conditions require that we develop
our ethical acuity to increase the diversity of our response.
Imagination
The most important ingredients for coping with postnormal times are
imagination and creativity.
Why?
Because we have no other way of dealing with complexity, contradictions

and chaos. Imagination is the main tool which takes us from simple reasoned
analysis to higher synthesis. We will have to imagine our way out of the
postnormal times.
To a very large extent our current impasse represents a failure of imagination.

Of course, we will learn from our mistakes and the future will be better and
more prosperous. This is a dangerous illusion. We have to imagine better
ways.
We need an ethical imagination that can acknowledge the uncertainty and

risks we face and work through complexity and diversity cherishing the
virtues we are most in need of. It is our best hope of taking responsibility for
the choices we will have to make to ensure we can arrive at our imagined
futures with our humanity and our planet intact.
References
. Paul Cilliers, “Complexity, deconstruction and relativism”, Theory, Culture & Society
 (), , pp. –.
Postnormal Times Revisited

Ziauddin Sardar
In ‘Welcome to Postnormal Times’, I attempted synthesis of ideas culled from

the fabric of foresight and futures studies. Postnormal analysis has now
spread from science to futures studies, political analysis, economic
intelligence and architecture and cultural heritage.
Here, I would like to critically engage with some of the rejoinders to the
paper, attempt to answer some of the questions that have been raised, pin
down a few characteristics of the postnormal condition, highlight the
postnormal that lurks over the horizon, and explore what it means to ‘be
postnormal’.
PNT and Its (Dis)Content

An obvious question is: how can we have postnormal when there is no such
thing as normal? Who defines what is normal?
In postnormal analysis, we take normal to be that which is frequently

encountered: what is accepted as the dominant way of being, doing and
knowing, conventionally seen as the standard, dictated by convention and
tradition, backed by disciplinary structures and scholarship and what we are
able to predict and control. It postnormal times (PNT) theory, the accepted
normal does not work.
Those of us working on PNT theory have opted for postnormal times for
five basic reasons. First, it avoids apocalyptic tones. Second, it emphasises
agency. Third, it emphasizes and focuses our attention on complexity,
contradictions and uncertainty that we need to really understanding how the
world is changing. Fourth, PNT has a sound theoretical base. Fifth, theoretical
work enables us to develop policies in a plethora of areas and issues to
actually navigate postnormal times towards positive futures.
Rakesh Kapoor [] has argued that PNT is a western theory or concept.
Nothing could be further from the truth. First, the boundaries of East and
West have not only changed but have become blurred and indistinguishable.
PNT is neither western nor eastern concept; it is simply a theoretical
framework which describes and explains our epoch.
What about the argument that we have faced similar hurdles and ‘strange
times’ in the past and, as Sam Cole [] states, given our ‘sufficient latent
reserves of knowledge’ and our superior state of evolution, we can solve all
our problems and therefore should continue in our present path. This is,
Merryl Wyn Davies notes, “optimism of a monumental nature based on the
assumption that because we have managed to solve our problems in the past
we will continue to do so forever” []. The conventional disciplines are part
of the problem in that they have led us to our current predicament and a
great deal of what modernity has produced is steeped in ignorance. We have
never faced so many problems simultaneously; we have never experienced
such accelerating pace of change, or such globalised interconnections and
complexity, and have never been so steeped in ignorance of things that have
such extensive consequences beyond our own context.
Surely, a system that is not networked or full of self-contradictions, cannot

exhibit chaotic behaviour and go postnormal? The answer to this query lies
in the answer to the question raised by Merryl Wyn Davies: ‘Are we there yet?’
Yes, and no. Postnormality is not a homogenous phenomenon: it does not
affect all segments of the planet equally. So not every part of the world has
gone postnormal; but every part of the globe can go postnormal.
The Postnormal Condition

The postnormal condition is the particular mode of existence we find
ourselves in. We are facing problems that are vastly different in scale and are
interconnected and embedded in accelerating pace of change. Scale, networks
and acceleration generate the C’s of PNT, which lead us towards uncertainty
and ignorance.
Recent political events demonstrate that we are no longer dealing with

isolated sequences of events, local in nature, separable in time, affecting a
handful of individuals or a small community, and perturbing a small number
of processes. Yet, under postnormal conditions, events and situations develop

rapidly to become chaotic and envelope the world.
The Postnormal Extended Present

Postnormality is set to increase in the near future. In postnormal theory we
call it the ‘extended present’ – that is the immediate future that will be shaped
by the entrenched trends and developments we can identify today. Trend is
not destiny. But if these trends continue, we are bound to find ourselves in
an increasingly postnormal world.
It is worth noting that the Cs do not operate at equal levels on all situations.
In some cases, complexity may be the biggest component; in others, it may
be chaos or contradiction. But, in general, as the Cs accelerate and grow, they
combine to produce a postnormal situation.
‘Be Postnormal’
So how do we cope with postnormal times? How do we move forward
without falling prey to chaos? How do we survive increasing uncertainty and
the different varieties of ignorance that we face? The answers to these, and a
plethora of other questions raised by postnormal times, begin with awareness
and end with creativity and imagination.
We need to be aware that we cannot manage and control postnormal times,

but we can navigate through them. We need to be aware of the fact that the
multitude of problems we face simultaneously cannot be solved in isolation:
when you look at a problem you also have to look at all the other problems
it is connected with and to. Thus, plurality, diversity and multiple perspectives
are essential for understanding and steering through postnormal conditions.
To be aware of this actuality is to ‘be postnormal’.
Almost all the changes that postnormal times are ushering have deep ethical
connotations. Ethics is not just about being-in the world, but also about
being-with the world. It is about how we are related to the rest of the world.
Futures studies cannot simply be about what could happen in the future. It
has to be largely about what ought to be done for the preservation of sane,
ethical futures.
Perhaps the most fundamental shift that postnormal times will usher will be
in the power to define. The real power of the West rested on its power to
define the key concepts of humanity and human society. But postnormal
times tell us that these definitions have passed their ‘sell by’ date. This is where
creativity and imagination enter the equation.
Creativity and imagination need to be utilized to produce new definitions of

everything from art to architecture, politics to policy, science to spirituality
and what it means to be human in postnormal times. It is time for us all to
take a page out of the book of the Canadian experimental band, ‘Post
Normal’. In their song, ‘Arctic Blood and Ice’, they sing that something is
terribly wrong with our times and that we ought to be able to do better.
References
. Rakesh Kapoor, “Is there a postnormal time? From the illusion of normality to the
design for a new normality”, Futures , , pp. –.
. Sam Cole, “Alliterative Logic: A Theory of Postnormal Times”, Futures  (), March
, pp. –.
. Merryl Wyn Davies, “Postnormal Times: Are We There Yet?” Futures  (), March
, –, alexander-cyberwar/all/
METHODS AND QUESTIONS
The Three Tomorrows of

Postnormal Times
Ziauddin Sardar and John A. Sweeney
Introduction
In light of such far-reaching, rapid, and simultaneous changes an important
new question arises for futurists and foresight researchers and practitioners:
are existing methods able to cope with futures that are intrinsically complex,
chaotic, contradictory, uncertain, and rapidly collapsing in and upon
themselves? Traditionally, Futures Studies deals with plurality of alternative
futures by differentiating between plausible, probable, possible, and
preferable futures []. But what is probable in a world where uncertainty and
chaos is the norm? What is plausible in futures dominated by contradictions?
Are our conventional methods, such as forecasting, scenarios, and modelling
fit for purpose in PNT? Do scenarios about future(s) take note of changing
change? Do existing scenario modelling methods adequately allow for the
requisite pluralism and polylogues, including amongst humans, non- and,
un-humans, needed to confront PNT? How do we produce viable policies to
navigate PNT?
Current futures methods are not irrelevant but carry inherent limitations –
particularly in relation to PNT. What we believe is that futures methods are
not keeping up with the forces and drivers that are actually disturbing the
present and moving us toward unthought futures.
What is needed? Polylogues of various scope and scale []. Polylogues denote
‘multiple logics, speeches, and existences’ []. As we see it, polylogues require
the creation of new physical and mental spaces where diversity, pluralism,
and contending perspectives are present on their own terms but also deeply
invested in engaging others in creating and sharing and knowledge. In
addition to finding better and more egalitarian ways to share what and how
we know, we must continuously seek out collaborative and dynamic means
to craft and share our stories. Any analysis of the present and futures also
needs to acknowledge that many things we take for granted are going to get
weird.
Normalcy, Postnormalcy, Postnormal Creep and Burst

The first weird fact that we must acknowledge is that normalcy and
postnormalcy both overlap and exit side by side. Many ‘normal’ systems will
not continue to operate ‘normally’ in PNT – sooner or later, the C’s will have
a direct or indirect impact on them.
The notion of normalcy itself is somewhat weird, especially in PNT. It is a

decidedly ‘manufactured normalcy’ []. It is ‘manufactured’ in the sense that
such norms have been developed by powerful international institutions and
organisations that function by relying on market forces, internal,
unquestioned assumptions, and subtle manipulation to generate ideological
and consumer desires and dreams.
The Manufactured Normalcy Field (MNF) is a means of re-orienting our

perceptions of what is and is not normal, and as a field that expands and
contracts relative to our individual or communal focus, the MNF is shaped
by the forces of ignorance and uncertainty.
‘Normal’ phenomena move towards postnormalcy through the process of

Postnormal Creep (PNC). Although the forces driving PNC can be powerful,
not all embrace the flows of such strong currents. There are some who cannot
see, or rather ignore or refute, the emergence of PNC. They suffer from
Postnormal Lag (PNL): a perceptual condition of denial. Thus, PNL is a
disavowal—one that can only be overcome through Postnormal Burst (PNB):
when the system goes totally postnormal and there is no place to hide.
The Three Tomorrows of Postnormal Times Framework

Given our age’s weird characteristics, exploring futures within the PNT
framework presents us with specific challenges. We need to focus on
simultaneity and complexity as well as the dynamic nature of PNT. We need
an appreciation of uncertainty as well as of different levels of ignorance and
incorporate as much imagination and creativity in the whole exercise as
possible.
The framework we have developed to understand and navigate PNT, as well

as explore futures, is The Three Tomorrows of Postnormal Times (T).
The Extended Present is the first tomorrow; it is what most people mean
when they talk about ‘the future’. The Extended Present is dominated by and
populated with trends and emerging issues or weak signals that cannot be
averted; they simply expand and extend the present. Here the best we can do
is use the lens of PNT to identify systems that may be creeping towards
postnormality, or on the verge of PNB.
After the Extended Present comes the Familiar Future(s), which seems
familiar because it is mediated by images and imaginings of the future(s)—
from data-driven projections to science fiction. Trends embedded in the
Extended Present along with images from advertising, corporate visions,
popular ‘futurology’ and science fiction novels, films and television shows
are extrapolated and projected to create a picture of the future that is all too
familiar.
Beyond the Familiar Future(s) lies the Unthought Future(s), a horizon of

pure possibility. The Unthought Future(s) is not unthinkable but rather a
horizon where something always remains unthought. The Unthought
Future(s) is not simply something that is not expected or anticipated; rather,
it is something outside the framework of conventional thought.
Ignorance, Uncertainty and Menagerie of Postnormal Potentialities

Each tomorrow has a particular type of uncertainty and ignorance attached
to it. The most basic variety of uncertainty emerges when the direction of
change is known but the magnitude and probability of events and
consequences cannot be estimated. This is the situation we find within the
Extended Present. We call this Surface Uncertainty, which can be managed
to some degree with adequate knowledge and foresight tools. In the Familiar
Future(s), we are presented with a broad range of alternatives and a plethora
of possible futures. But we do know that many of these futures are simply a
projection of common images of the future. We call this Shallow
Uncertainty. Finally, the Unthought Future(s), where anything can happen

and nothing is known, presents us with Deep Uncertainty. Here, we are not
only unaware of the direction, dimension and impact of change, but we are
also incapable of knowing what is happening to the system because our
worldview or epistemology is totally inadequate.
Each type of uncertainty is associated with a particular category of ignorance.

The simple or Plain Ignorance (signified as i). This is the ignorance that
may be overcome by understanding the complex networks involved, or
appreciating the simultaneous ‘truths’ of actors with contradictory demands.
This is the dominant variety of ignorance in the Extended Present: it can be
overcome, and reduced, through learning, research, appreciating the
viewpoints of others, and asking the right questions. The Familiar Futures
present us with a deeper level of ignorance when we do not even know what
questions to ask. We call it Vincible Ignorance (signified as i): it cannot be
overcome in the present by learning as there is nothing to learn, but it creates
an awareness of what we do not know and must seek to know in the future.
Then, of course, there are Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’: ‘the ones we
don’t know we don’t know’ []. It is related to the Deep Uncertainty of the
Unthougtht Future(s) and is categorized as Invincible Ignorance (signified
as i).
Postnormal phenomena are most easily seen in the Extended Present. It is

like a Black Elephant in the room, which either no one can see or chooses to
ignore. A Black Elephant, notes Vinay Gupta, “is an event which is extremely
likely and widely predicted by experts, but people attempt to pass it off as a
black swan when it finally happens” [].
Taleb’s popular notion of the ‘Black Swan’ captures the essence of the Familiar
Future(s). Black Swans are not perceptible or articulated, even by experts;
they appear as ‘outliers’ and come ‘out of the blue,’ as Taleb notes, they are
“very fragile to miscalculation, with a general severe underestimation mixed
with an occasional severe overestimation” []. Black Swans can be positive,
which is to say that their impact might illuminate previously unimagined
opportunities. However, they can equally be negative and serve as a signal
for emerging PNC or PNB.
Postnormal phenomena are not easy to foresee in the Unthought Future(s).

We represent the postnormal potentiality of the Unthought Future(s) with
Black Jellyfish. Black Jellyfish are ‘high impact’, but they are ‘normal’
phenomena driven towards postnormalcy by positive feedback. Black
Jellyfish are all about how normal situations and events become postnormal;
how they mutate through PNC by becoming interconnected, networked,
complex and contradictory.
Collectively, we call Black Elephants, Black Swans, and Black Jellyfish the
Menagerie of Postnormal Potentialities (Menagerie). As an ensemble aimed
at challenging deeply held convictions, illuminating entrenched contradic-
tions, and enlivening novel considerations, we believe our Menagerie does
just that.
Working with 3T
The T framework has three specific functions: to aid our exploration of
alternative futures, with an emphasis on plurality and postnormal
potentialities; to critique existing projections and extrapolation; and to
structure and shape policies that are specifically geared to navigating
postnormal times.
Shaping policy to cope with PNT requires an appreciation of T’s

spatiotemporal simultaneity. Collectively, the three varieties of ignorance and
uncertainties and the menagerie point towards PNC: the process through
which normal things and events become chaotic and go postnormal.
Postnormal Policy’s (PNP) aim is to be aware of our ignorance in its three

varieties, to understand the complexity and uncertainties involved, to
anticipate postnormal potentialities, and thus chart a viable, even if
unpalatable, way forward.
3T’s Place in the Futures Field

While Futures Studies emphasises alternatives, many methods of futures and
foresight seldom incorporate pluralism and diversity intrinsically in their
frameworks, and few emphasise the dynamic and merging nature of futures
possibilities. The T framework offers a multi-layered approach that can serve
as a useful tool of critique and exploring critical futures. T can also serve as
an analytical tool for situating and contextualizing trends, emerging issues,
and imaginings of the future(s) and we believe it can be complimentary to
many other futures methods and research.
In PNT, pushing the boundaries of plausibility requires a new kind of

thinking coupled with creativity and imagination, and we must be able to
deal with complexity and incomplete knowledge. Our approach must be both
radical and modest to be realistic and efficacious. This is the direction the T
framework ultimately takes us—towards the unthought.
References
. N. Henchey, “Making Sense of Futures Studies,” Alternatives: Perspectives on Society

and Environment, Winter .
. J. Kristeva, Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, ).
. H. Chen, “The Concept of the ‘Polylogue’ and the Question of ‘Intercultural’ Identity”,
Intercultural Communication Studies, vol. XIX, no. , , pp. –.
. V. Rao, “Welcome to the Future Nauseous”, ribonfarm: experiments in refactored
perception,  May . Available: http://www.ribbonfarm.com////
welcome-to-the-future-nauseous/ [Accessed:  April ].
. E. Morris, The Unknown Known (Participant Media, ).
. V. Gupta, “On Black Elephants”, Available: http://vinay.howtolivewiki.com/blog/flu/
on-black-elephants- [ Apr ].
. N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random
House, ).
Infectious Connectivity:
Illustrating the Three Tomorrows
John A. Sweeney
Until , Le Roy, New York was only known for having given birth to the
American delicacy Jell-O. All this changed when a group of teenagers at Le
Roy High School began displaying uncontrollable spasms, tics, seizures, and
stuttering. A diagnosis of mass psychogenic illness (MPI). Early reports note
how the initial group of affected teenagers were watching videos on YouTube
and mimicking what they saw. Dr. David Lichter commented “I think you
do have the potential for people going online and witnessing other student’s
behaviour, then I think this medium has the potential to spread it beyond
the immediate environment” [].
Dr. Lichter’s premonition seems to have come to fruition as Marge

Fitzsimmons, a -year old nurse who had no direct contact with any of the
students, started displaying the same symptoms. Dr. Robert Bartholomew
put forward an ominous potentiality: one of “a far greater or global episode,
unless we quickly understand how social media is, for the first time, acting
as the primary vector or agent of spread for conversion disorder” [].
The symptoms of mental illnesses are not fixed and unchanging, but can be
modified by changing cultural milieus. If cultural background is a
contributing factor in such incidents, how might this help one understand
what happened in Le Roy?
Affect has become a popular concept in theoretical circles as it points toward

our inherent plasticity as “porously open systems” []. Affect suggests a host
of social and political implications – the most profound of which is that our
brains and bodies are so highly susceptible to a range of epigenetic forces
that the very categories used to designate individuality are, at best,
ambiguous, if not entirely arbitrary. Infectious connectivity is the nagging
impulse to check your email; the desire to click the refresh button on your
social media feed when you have just loaded the page.
Can affect explain the outbreak in Le Roy? Does the World Wide Web
(WWW) have the capacity to infect someone? Could infectious connectivity
be exploited or perhaps even weaponized? Using the lens of Postnormal
Times to investigate the WWW’s infectious connectivity, this study deploys
a new foresight method to explore the emerging forces and issues pushing
and weighing the WWW in the years to come.
How are Postnormal Times?

Ultimately, postnormal times demand new modes of inquiry and analysis, if
only to deal with the chaos, contradictions, and complexity of life in an era
of recalcitrant uncertainty and accelerating change. The three tomorrows
(T) is a method to model these dynamics and provide a more robust
framework and approach for futures research. T uses a single phenomenon
or theme, in this case affect and the WWW, to investigate possibilities for
what might lie ahead. As such, scenarios produced using T method focus
on emerging issues and are meant to raise previously unthought concerns
and questions.
The Extended Present’s Black Elephants

In , an online coupon site performed a survey of , parents on gadget
usage with small children. % of respondents admitted to using a
smartphone to either pacify or babysit an upset child []. The American
Academy of Paediatrics encouraged parents to “discourage screen media
exposure for children <  years of age” []. As the rising ubiquity of
smartphones and tablets is a fairly recent phenomenon, there are no long-
term studies that can substantiate, or even speculate on the far-ranging
impacts or affects. What infectious connectivity might arise from such
interventions?
The Familiar Future(s)’s Black Swans

There is no shortage of scenarios for the future of the Internet. As most
images of the Internet’s future focus on access, services, and infrastructure,
Black Swans within this horizon ought to land within convergence of the
WWW’s possible affects. Given the broad interest in securitization of the
Internet – from personal privacy to cyber war – generating a wildcard, which
might act as a push toward the Familiar Future(s), within this sphere is
critical.
Zbigniew Brzezinski provides a sweeping take on a range of future

possibilities. Brzezinski writes: “It may be possible to exploit for strategic-
political purposes the fruits of research on the brain and on human
behaviour. […] ‘One could develop a system that would seriously impair the
brain performance of very large populations in selected regions over an
extended period’ […] []”.
“Another devastating terrorist attack leads to not only total neural

information awareness policies but legitimizes the wartime strategy of enemy
mind control. Mind-altering drugs and weaponized neural technologies
become standard military operations” []. What if the attention of non-state
actors turns from securing nuclear, biological, and/or cyber arms to
clandestine neurosomatic weaponry? Could one weaponize social media?
The Unthought Future(s)’s Black Jellyfish

Over the past decade, the population of Green Bank, West Virginia has
swelled to  residents. All of the hamlet’s most recent transplants relocated
due to the community’s position within the National Radio Quiet Zone
(NRQZ). How might people endure without accessing the WWW? Although
Electromagnetic hypersensitivity (EHS) remains an unrecognized medical
syndrome, many report physical ailments based on varying degrees of
sensitivity to electromagnetic fields (EMF). If EHS victims are not actually
sensitive to EMFs but rather the perceived presence of EMFs, then the
condition’s pathology is acutely neurosomatic, an effect of infectious
connectivity. What if a positive feedback loop emerged surrounding the
perceived effects of EMF? Could the NRQZ be expanded? Might the afflicted
become refugees? How might national and international interests collide and
compete over the public health implications? Such inquiries are very clearly
not unimaginable, but the potential ramifications require one to confront
the unthought.
Scenarios
The Extended Present

A mysterious pandemic has thousands of children in  countries displaying
a range of abnormal behaviours – from uncontrollable spasms to near-
catatonic states. The only common denominator linking the afflicted is the
utilization of a popular early-childhood language learning application, which
became a global phenomenon in . By mid-, the app had registered
millions of downloads, although it instantly drew warnings from medical
professionals concerned over its engrossing interface and addictive gameplay.
An investigation by the Centre for Disease Control has not yet returned any
conclusive results, and political leaders have called numerous hearings in an
effort to assuage irate constituents.
The Familiar Future(s)

Following the release of thousands of classified government documents in
the wake of yet another whistle-blower scandal, one report is reigniting anger
amongst bereaved parents who lost their children during a mysterious
pandemic that struck over a decade ago. Chronicling the government’s
involvement in aiding research and development of neuro-affective
manipulation technology via a range of online media interfaces, which was
later used to build innovative child learning applications, the report also notes
how the technology was part of a cache of data lost during a massive cyber-
attack in . Compounding the situation, a prominent extremist group in
the region has proclaimed the dawn of a new age of combat and exuberantly
pronounced how “new weaponry” will secure victory and allow them to
conduct large-scale offensive strikes abroad.
The Unthought Future(s)

When news outlets began reporting on the content of a recovered video from
an extremist group announcing an attack on New York City using an
unstoppable, invisible weapon, the public response was fear. Fuelled by
rampant speculation and wariness from suspicious outbreaks in the recent
past, including damaging information from an array of leaked documents,
panic transformed into phobia as thousands began to seek medical attention
for an array of symptoms, though most were given a clean bill of health.
Online support groups for the afflicted grew exponentially driven by the
hypothesis that shielding one’s self from electronics, specifically Internet-
enabled devices, would provide relief. What began as the migration of a few
families quickly turned into the departure of thousands seeking refuge.
Pushing and Weighing the Future(s)

Much like the networks infected by a computer virus, our porous humanity
is also prone to accidents, but affect as invited accident is only one way of
reading the dynamics of the MPI outbreak in Le Roy, children’s exposure to
and usage of WWW interfaces, the possibility of non-state actors deploying
neurosomatic weaponry, and the potential scaling-up of EHS into a
significant public health problem.
Human beings have always employed tools to enhance the limits of our being
in the world, but increasingly our tools are becoming more pronounced
prostheses, which portend a range of radical possibilities whose very sociality
has come to rely upon a range of things.
References
. Admin WKBW. “Social Networking to Blame for Spreading LeRoy Illness?” February
. http://www.wkbw.com/news/Social-Networking-to-Blame-for-Spreading-LeRoy
-Illness-.html
. L. Dimon, “What Witchcraft is Facebook?”, The Atlantic (, September ). Retrieved
from http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive///what-witchcraft-is-face
book/ /
. J. A. Dator, Sweeney, J. A., & Yee, A. M., Mutative Media. Lecture Notes in Social
Networks (Cham: Springer International Publishing, ). http://link.springer.com/
./–-––
. Mi. Amodio, “High-tech babysitters: Gadgets as attention grabbers for little ones”
(June , ). Retrieved from http://zone.tmcnet.com/topics/articles/-high-
tech-babysitters-gadgets-as-attention-grabberslittle.htm
. Council on Communications and Media, “Children, adolescents, and the media”,
PEDIATRICS, (), , pp. –. doi:./peds.–
. Z. Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era (New York:
The Viking Press, ).
. Jake F. Dunagan, “Politics for the Neurocentric Age”, Journal of Futures Studies  (),
, pp. –.
Ignorance, Uncertainty and ‘What-If?’

Jerome Ravetz
It is now, nearly universally, acknowledged that the heart of the scientific

enterprise is no longer discovery. The leading problems for science now
derive from the challenges (and threats) presented by the hitherto blind and
uncontrolled growth of our total scientific-technical-industrial system.
Let us consider the following statement:

‘With issues as complex as the impact of human activity on the natural

environment, the search for simple truths may obscure the uncertainty of
reality. Almost anything we do, consume, or are exposed to has some risks.
We have to decide which risks require tackling, with what priority, in what
way, to what extent, and at what cost. Environmental science is complex;
describing technical data and detailed risk evaluation is difficult, but it reflects
the reality of the choices society must make. The issues are not simple and
science matters.’
This quotation is from Dr. Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive of Shell
UK Limited. Dr. Fay received an education about the social problems of
scientific knowledge which was not easily available in universities, but which
was presented to him, rather unexpectedly, in the course of his work.
The quotation reminds us that the loss of certainty and the intrusion of ethics
are central to this new syndrome of science. With it comes the loss of
hegemony of scientific experts in the area of discussion and debate of science
related policy questions. ‘Objectivity’ has been made a problem rather than
a foundation for science. We use the term ‘post-normal science’ to provide a
historical location for this new sort of science.
Leading Questions
Accepting the idea of different styles of research, we can proceed to my
classification, which is organized around ‘leading questions’. We may start
with three sorts of enquiry, which we may call research, design and
exploration. For each of them, we have the relevant questions: respectively,
‘what/how?’, ‘how/why?’ and ‘what-if?’.
These ‘leading questions’ are intended to illuminate rather than to define;

and the term ‘leading question’ allows us to imagine that in any particular
inquiry, all three sorts of questions appear in their appropriate places.
In the context of the new challenges for science, ‘what-if?’ becomes the
leading question, with a new urgency. Now our ignorance is no longer
benign, but threatening. Perhaps nothing, for some, most or all of the time;
but perhaps something, just once, or once too often.
With ‘what-if?’ as the leading question, our whole conception of the scientific
enterprise could evolve in a fruitful way. The task is to ensure that the
uncertainties of the working environment of the system intrude only to an
acceptable degree so that the problem-solving exercise deals mainly with
these well-defined proxies for an uncertain reality.
Along with the uncertainty of the real world, we also need to deal effectively
with its complexity. This approach pervades our whole scientific and
technological culture. When we are accustomed to asking ‘what-if?’, and
expecting the unexpected that we fully appreciate how no single perspective
can completely capture any real situation.
The adoption of ‘what-if?’ as a scientific style will also have important effects
on the policy process. We now know that the application of science to policy
is very different from a simple process of ‘getting the facts’. To secure them
requires an initial setting of priorities so that research is supported; and then
the research must be designed around appropriate questions; for every policy
issue is complex, including aspects of both nature and society, and where the
‘cause’ of the problem will be equally complex.
The style of ‘what-if?’ is also an expression of the Precautionary Principle. It

protects scientists against a premature choice of research problems to be
investigated. Imagine a continuous dialogue among the participants of the
different sorts of inquiry. Although ‘what-if?’ necessarily moves from centre
stage once the research effort gets underway, it should always be fostered as
an essential complement to the puzzle-solving from which the relevant ‘facts’
eventually emerge.
Finally, there are the social implications of the ‘what-if?’ style of science.
Insights and suggestions from people with different sorts of expertise or even
none at all, must be accepted into the dialogue. Since so many of the ‘what-
if?’ questions are prompted by such unorthodox data, the adoption of the
‘what-if?’ style is inseparable from the recognition of extended facts, extended
peer communities, and the approach of post-normal science.
Conclusion: The Contexts of ‘What-if?’

What about the ‘critical science’ of a generation ago []? There are two related
reasons for my setting aside such a politicised approach. For a while, when
the reality of the ‘military-industrial-scientific complex’ was a fresh discovery
for a broad public it seemed possible that a radical movement could be
organized around science itself. However, that enthusiasm could not be
sustained. In the meantime, politics itself has changed. If science is to become
a central issue within that new context, debate will focus less on distributional
aspects and more on its philosophical foundations.
This new focus is expressed in Sardar’s campaign for ‘Others’[]. As it

matures, this should provide us with the precious gift of ‘seeing ourselves as
others see us’. On that basis, we might accomplish the necessary reform of
science, in its social functions, working methods, and conceptual objects. A
complementary development could now be taking place within accidental
culture, among the tendencies variously labelled ‘green’, ‘feminist’, or ‘New
Age’. The variety of names indicates the great variety of issues and styles,
some overlapping but some mutually incompatible and hostile. Any
consistent vision of science based on one section of this diverse movement
would certainly alienate most of the other sections in some way.
References
. R. Ravetz, “Critical Science: Politics and Philosophy”, in Scientific Knowledge and its
Social Problems (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, ), pp. –.
. Z. Sardar, “Conquests, chaos, complexity. The Other in modern and postmodern
science”, Futures, (), , pp. –.
Here Be Dragons: Exploring the

‘Unknown Unknowns’
Shirin Elahi
Introduction
Engraved on the copper face of the Lenox Globe are the evocative words: HIC
SVNT DRACONES. This phrase, ‘here be dragons’, was used to signify
dangerous or unexplored territories. For any user of the map, understanding
where the boundaries of knowledge lay was almost as important as the
knowledge itself. Illusion of knowledge was the greatest danger of all [].
In the modern world of today, where be dragons? It is becoming increasingly

clear that they lie all around us. In each instance they are the unacknowledged
blind spots, spanning scientific, geographical, temporal and institutional
boundaries but unrecognised due to the challenges they represent to our
human desire for order and control.
Examples of ‘Here be Dragons’

‘Here be Dragons’ are unrecognised, therefore there is little research on the
subject. This paper has identified three examples, namely ‘wicked problems’,
‘Black Swans’ and ‘Post Normal Science’.
‘Wicked problems’ or messes are ambiguous, highly constrained, tightly

interconnected complex dilemmas. Their changing nature and complex

interdependencies, makes it almost impossible to define them collectively
because there are so many different perspectives and issues at stake [].
The ‘Black Swan’ is an unpredictable, improbable event characterised by its

massive impact on the status quo [].
Post Normal Science is characterised by high stakes, uncertain facts, disputed

values and urgent decisions. In these situations, peer acceptance is low or
non-existent, theoretic structures are based on statistical processing and data
input and the uncertainty tends towards ignorance.
They all deal with interactions between multiple interconnected inter-

dependent systems with many different actors, so information will always be
incomplete. Another marked similarity is their ability to challenge
conventional thinking and the status quo.
Acknowledging the ‘Here be Dragons’

Human psychology, institutional frameworks and scientific convention have
all conspired to remove ‘Here be Dragons’ from the collective consciousness.
This process might be countered, utilising the new digital tools and processes
available to draw on wider societal framing. By doing so, it should be possible
to incorporate disparate cultural values and worldviews, so achieving greater
societal legitimacy and also acknowledging and locating more ‘Here be
Dragons’.
The critical question is whether these new digital tools and processes could
result in growing awareness and acknowledgement of the ‘Here be Dragons’.
Used in conjunction with scenarios and foresight, these tools could ensure
that the ‘Here be Dragons’ become located on our collective mental maps.
Scenarios as Meta Risk Analysis

Foresight allows us to imagine what has not yet happened in order to protect
ourselves from the harsh realities of actual experience. We undertake this
process in order to understand and shape the direction in which the future
might unfold.
The scenarios methodology is a foresight methodology that lends itself to

the exploration of complexity as well as conflicting belief systems. Scenarios
offer a means of collectively exploring uncertainties and so generating a
common understanding of the underlying dynamics and issues that might
impact the future.
There has never been greater need for societal adaptability in the face of
exponential change. Societies today are so interconnected and interdependent
that there is a great need for resilience, yet this will require recognition of the
‘Here be Dragons’ and strategies to deal with their materialising.
Conclusion
It is now time to acknowledge the ‘Here be Dragons’ and explore which ones
pose the greatest risk to the society we desire for ourselves and our offspring.
Ignorance, ambiguity and scientific uncertainty have all too often been
conveniently airbrushed off our knowledge maps. The world is forever
changing. The ‘Here be Dragons’ are around us, and human beings
dependent on the complex webs of interconnected systems ignore them at
their peril.
References
. J.R. Ravetz, “Usable knowledge, usable ignorance: incomplete science with policy
implications”, in W.C Clark, R.C. Munn (Eds.), Sustainable Development of the
Biosphere (New York: Cambridge University Press, ), pp. –.
. H. Rittel, M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences ()
(), pp. –; R. Ackoff, Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal
Problems (NJ, London: John Wiley & Sons, ).
. N.N. Taleb, The Black Swan (London: Allen Lane, ).
SPACE AND TIME
Postnormal Artefacts
Ziauddin Sardar
From the perspective of postnormal times, a natural question arises: if

postnormal times is a distinct epoch of history, and marks a departure from
other recent periods of history, what artefacts and unique features has it
produced or is likely to produce? ‘Stuff ’, as the jargon has it, which identifies
it as a distinct period?
If postnormal times have produced their own artefacts we should be able to

distinguish them from the artefacts of other Contemporary Periods such as
the Modern or Postmodern Age. Let us, for the purpose of this exercise,
divide Contemporary Period into four divisions:
Classic: –
Modern: –
Postmodern: –
Postnormal: –
This division is just as arbitrary as other attempts to categorise history into

named blocks. But the point is that we can identify artefacts and see if
postnormal times have produced something that is distinctively different.
So, here then, is my cautious list of emerging postnormal artefacts.
Meaning
Classic: ‘I think, therefore I am’
Modern: ‘I progress, therefore I am’
Postmodern: ‘I shop, therefore I am’
Postnormal: ‘I share, therefore I am’
Truth
Classic: Monolithic
Modern: Monolithic
Postmodern: Relative and Pluralistic
Postnormal: Contradictory
Identity
Classic: ‘I am tradition and culture’
Modern: ‘I am science and technology’
Postmodern: ‘I am what I buy’
Postnormal: ‘I am my Facebook page’
Change
Classic: Quasi static, slow
Modern: Fast
Postmodern: Increasingly Rapid
Postnormal: Accelerating, Chaotic
Systems
Classic: Simple, Closed
Modern: Complicated, Closed
Postmodern: Complex, Open
Postnormal: Open, Interconnected, Complex, Chaotic
Key Concepts
Classic: Conquest, Supremacy, Progress
Modern: Progress, Efficiency, Modernization
Postmodern: Dissolution of Grand Narratives (meaning), Multiple
Truths, Plural Voices
Postnormal: Complexity, Chaos, Contradictions, Uncertainty, Ignorance
World Order
Classic: Competing Colonial Powers (Britain, France, Holland, USA)
Modern: Bi-Polar World; ‘Cold War’ (USA, Soviet Union)
Postmodern: Unipolar World (USA)
Postnormal: Multi-Polar World (USA, China, Russia, EU, India, Brazil)
Knowledge
Classic: Pursuit of Reasoned Inquiry…
Modern: …Acquired through Scientific Progress and Development
Postmodern: Socially Constructed and Relative, Wikipedia
Postnormal: ‘Extended Facts’, Embedded in Uncertainty and Ignorance
Science
Classic: Pursuit of Truth, funded largely by the State
Modern: Scientific Method as Neutral, Objective Truth; funded
by the State and Corporations (Military-Industrial Complex);
Peer Reviewed Publication
Postmodern: Socially Constructed; funded largely by Military-Industrial-
Corporations Complex; Peer Reviewed Publication
Postnormal: ‘Facts are Uncertain, Values in Dispute, Stakes High and
Decisions Urgent’; Driven by Mega Corporations (Google, Microsoft)
and Billionaire Philanthropists; ‘Extended Peer Communities’ but still
largely funded by Military-Industrial-Corporations Complex
Technology
Classic: Slow Application of Science to Make Work Easier
Modern: Ideologically Driven to ‘Improve Society’, Antibiotics but also
Nuclear Weapons
Postmodern: Embedded in Politics; Genome Sequencing, Biotechnology,
Information and Communication Technologies
Postnormal: Human-Machine Synthesis, DNA editing, Drones, Cyborgs
Medicine
Classic: No Antibiotics, or appropriate Anaesthetics
Modern: ‘Modern Surgery’, Antibiotics, Electrocardiogram (EKG)
Monitoring, Open Heart Surgery, Kidney Transplantation
Postmodern: Electronic Monitoring of Patients, Microsurgery,
Face Transplant
Postnormal: Remote Surgery, Stem Cell Therapy, Synthetic Organs
Communication
Classic: Telephone, Telegraph, Morse Code, Radio
Modern: Microwave, Television
Postmodern: Mobiles, e-mail, Internet, World Wide Web
Postnormal: Instant, Perpetually Connected, -hour Global News
Channels, Facebook, Twitter, ‘Internet of Things’
Political Organization
Classic: Empires
Modern: Nation States
Postmodern: Regional Groupings and Alliances (EC, ASEAN, OIC)
Postnormal: Power shifts to Non-State Actors
Governance
Classic: Representative Democracy
Modern: Interest-Based Democracy (neo-liberal, hyper modern)
Postmodern: Deliberative Democracy (diversity, plurality,
‘politics of difference’)
Postnormal: Complex, Chaotic, Unmanageable
Economy
Classic: Classical Macroeconomics (Adam Smith)
Modern: Capitalist (free market), Communist (centrally controlled)
Postmodern: Neo-Liberal Economic Globalization (large-scale, corporate
commerce and the privatization of resources)
Postnormal: Digital, Runway Monetarism
Religion
Classic: Monotheism
Modern: Monotheism
Postmodern: New Age, Fundamentalism
Postnormal: Eclectic, Fundamentalist, Polytheistic
Equality
Classic: Legislated discrimination, Poor Law
Modern: Welfare State, Equality before the Law (assumed)
Trickle Down Effect will improve the lot of the poor
Postmodern: Multiculturalism, Integration, Assimilation
Postnormal: Acceleration of Inequality, Rich Grow Richer
at Lightning Speed
Boundaries
Classic: Fixed
Modern: Flexible
Postmodern: Porous
Postnormal: Dissolving
Nature
Classic: To be Tamed, and Exploited
Modern: Tamed, Under Control, but ‘Limits to Growth’
Postmodern: Social Construction of Nature, Eco-Politics
Postnormal: Feral, Climate Change, Disappearing species
Environment
Classic: Relatively Healthy
Modern: Polluting
Postmodern: Toxic
Postnormal: Catastrophic, Climate Change
God
Classic: God is Everywhere and Everywhen
Modern: God is Truth (big T) (early Modern) God is Dead (Late Modern)
Postmodern: God is the machine or God is me
Postnormal: God is Ignorance
Religion
Classic: Religion Explains the World
Modern: Religion Helps Us Understand the World
Postmodern: Religion was a Lie; Liberal Secularism is the new
Theory of Salvation
Postnormal: Religion is Uncertain, therefore must be Open
to Multiple Interpretations and made Complex
War
Classic: ‘The First World War’
Modern: ‘Holocaust’
Postmodern: ‘The Gulf War’ (as seen on TV)
Postnormal: Drone Attacks, Cyber War, Militarised Robots
(war is a game, removed of humanity)
Protests
Classic: Civil Disobedience (African American Civil Rights Movement),
Non-Violent Resistance (Gandhi)
Modern: Anarchist Subversion, Violent Demos (Black Panthers), Peaceful
Marches (CND)
Postmodern: Mass Mobilization (‘Gay Pride’, Gulf War Protests)
Postnormal: Propelled by Digital Media, Interconnected, Complex and
Chaotic (‘Arab Spring’, Truckers Protests in Britain, US and elsewhere,
Argentinian Public Transport Protests)
Terrorism
Classic: Urban Gorillas, Terrorism for Independence (‘Battle for Algiers’)
Modern: Local, with Specific Goals (IRA, Basque Separatist)
Postmodern: Global, Suicide Bombers, non-State Actors (al-Qaeda)
Postnormal: Global, Interconnected, Social Media Savvy, Seeking
Territory (‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, Taliban, Boko Haram)
Body
Classic: Muscular
Modern: Athletic
Postmodern: Androgenic
Postnormal: Enhanced
Cities
Classic: Mississippi, Cape Town (under apartheid)
Modern: New York, London, Paris
Postmodern: Tokyo, Dubai, Putra Jaya (Malaysia)
Postnormal: Baghdad (after the Allied withdrawal), Cairo
(after two Uprisings), Aleppo, Ferguson, U.S.A.
Films
Classic: Mr Smith Goes to Washington
Modern: Invasion of the Body Snatchers

Postmodern: Sex, Lies and Videotapes
Postnormal: Her
Television
Classic: I Love Lucy
Modern: Mission Impossible
Postmodern: Star Trek: The Next Generation
Postnormal: Silicon Valley
Music
Classic: Jazz, Big Band Swing
Modern: Pop, Rock n Roll, Disco, Heavy Metal
Postmodern: New Age, Psychedelic, East-West Fusion, Punk,
Grunge, and House
Postnormal: Yet to make an appearance (but Canadian experimental
band ‘Post Normal’ is making an effort)
Hollywood Heroes
Classic: Clark Gable – ‘Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn’
Modern: James Dean – ‘The bad boy from a good family’
Postmodern: Arnold Schwarzenegger – ‘Hasta la vista, baby’
Postnormal: Johnny Depp – ‘Honestly it’s the honest ones you have
to watch out for; you never can predict if they’re going to do
something incredibly stupid.’
Sex Symbol
Classic: Mae West – ‘Is that a gun, or are you just pleased to see me?’
Modern: Marilyn Munroe – ‘Gentlemen Prefer Blondes’
Postmodern: Madonna – ‘I am a material girl’
Postnormal: Laverne Cox – ‘Faking It’
Sex
Classic: The Hayes Code (no double beds, no kisses lasting more
than ten seconds, no nudity)
Modern: ‘Wham, Bam, Thank You Mam’
Postmodern: Cybersex – Log on, Log up, Log off.
Postnormal: Pornography is Normal
Marriage
Classic: Monogamy
Modern: Serial Monogamy
Postmodern: Serial, Multiple, Monogamy
Postnormal: Hetero, Homo, Trans, Serial, Plural
Buildings
Classic: The Empire State Building, New York
Modern: The Guggenheim Museum, New York
Postmodern: The Portman’s Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles
Postnormal: The Clock Tower, Mecca
Painters
Classic: Picasso
Modern: Jackson Pollack
Postmodern: Andy Warhol
Postnormal: Banksy
Novels
Classic: Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby
Modern: Camus, The Stranger
Postmodern: Rushdie, Midnight’s Children
Postnormal: Wilson, Alif the Unseen
Global Weirding
John A. Sweeney
Bandar Mahshahr is no stranger to heat. It is not uncommon for this

northern Iranian hamlet to experience consistent highs above  degrees
Celsius during the summer. But, when the heat index topped  degrees
Celsius, the second highest heat index ever recorded globally, the world took
notice. For years, reports have warned that extremes would overtake the
global climate system. However, just because we have been told to expect
more extremes does not mean that we have, or will gain, the capacity to
forecast and/or mitigate them. The climate system as we know it is going
postnormal, and attempts to map the territory ahead are appearing
increasingly Sisyphean.
How weird are things going to get? This might be the defining question of
the st century.
The Mauna Loa Observatory reported in May  that atmospheric carbon
dioxide reached  parts-per-million. The last time atmospheric carbon
levels were this high ‘the globe’s temperature averaged about  degrees C
warmer, and sea level lapped coasts  meters or more higher,’ one absent of
humanity. We have weirded the global climate system, and as this process is
ongoing, we live in a world subject to extreme weirding.
Global Weirding, rather than global warming, is more than just a play on
words—it is a prognosis. Global weirding ‘is a fitting moniker for the
emerging meshwork of
• increasing technological advancement, dependence, and ubiquity,

• impending ecological catastrophe(s), and
• the transnational drive and reach of postnormal actants.’
When a street cart vendor immolated himself in Tunisia in , few could
forecast the impacts to come. In a time of extreme weirding, Mohamed
Bouazizi is a quintessential example of a postnormal actant. Thanks to
networked media, the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa
spread like wildfire. How can we think through such changes? What
conceptual lenses might aid in making sense of the seemingly implausible?
How weird are things going to get?
The advent of the ecosystem concept did much to further the systemic
analyses of human activities on the biosphere, but a host of thinkers around
the turn of the century were already making grander claims about the role
and possible outcomes of human-driven changes to the planet’s operations,
which is to say that some had theorized the world as a single, unified
system—one increasingly coming to grips with the extremes of human
control.
So many things we take for granted as ‘normal’ have now become extreme
that it is not easy to have all extreme behaviour encapsulated in a single term.
Our technology has become extreme, modernity has acquired extreme
connotations, our economic system is extreme, corporate behaviour is
extreme; almost every ideology has gone extreme.
The extreme weirding brought about by climate change has led some to
consider radical ‘solutions.’ While some believe that the only way humanity
might abate extreme weirding is through climate modification initiatives,

others have turned to consider more confined ‘remedies.’ Arguing that “the
biomedical modification of humans” should be on the table in the light of
the extreme weirding to come, the authors suggest that enhancing empathy,
fostering a pharmacological intolerance to carbon-intensive products like
red meat, and engineering shorter people are reasonable and less risky than
largescale climate engineering initiatives [].
In a world overcome by extreme weirding, humans might not only have to

worry about novel threats but also dangers from the past that are expected
to resurface as the global climate system goes postnormal. This dynamic is
most apparent in the tundra region where permafrost traps the things of
nightmares. Scientists concede the possibility that ‘dangerous viruses do lurk
in suspended animation deep belowground’ as the prehistoric permafrost
creates conditions whereby infectivity endures. Although such a scenario
comes off sounding like science fiction, the effects of extreme weirding
cannot be underestimated. This is what the epoch of extreme weirding can
teach us: the unthinkable is increasingly becoming the unavoidable.
References
. Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, ).
East-West in Postnormal Times

Ziauddin Sardar
,   ,    ,

     ,
     
 ’    [].
Ideas conquer more territory and maintain more authority than all the
armies of the Queen Empress eulogized by Kipling. Despite the evidence of
history, politics, economy and culture, Kipling’s simplistic dictum still
remains the preferred approach to understanding the world.
What is just so about Kipling’s lines is not its beginning. East and West are
different, and the differences are substantive and of enduring import. The
problem arises because difference is taken to be an unbridgeable gap: ‘never
the twain shall meet’. What is encoded by this negative value is the basis for
fear, doubt of the other, perpetual insecurity and prejudice. The East, in all
its complexity, continues to be seen as the provision of ‘bogey men’ and
villains to the West.
But time has now come for us to transcend this pernicious binary logic. The
boundaries and dividing lines of East and West have not only changed but
have become blurred and indistinguishable. There is as much East in the West
as there is West in the East. The potency of the ideas that impelled western
imperialism is alive and well and operated by the East within itself, by itself.
Searching out the original miscreant and apportioning blame is a way of

continuing the game of implacable opposition – suspicion, military
preparedness, manipulation of public opinion, double standards and neglect
of pressing human needs. The East has been complicit in the perpetuation
of the ethos of binary oppositions. Condemnation of the West for its acts of
commission suffices. East is East and West is West serves everyone.
Any attempt to move from binary oppositions must take into account the
goodness in East and West as well as the evils within both. Only by
acknowledging there is no-one with clean hands can we accept that we all
have to find new ways of washing away the grime of our own imperfections.
The need to bring East and West together becomes even more urgent when
we consider the truly global nature of many problems that beset us. None of
these problems can be ‘fixed’ by individual states; and they affect every person
on the planet. The first decades of the twenty-first century have made it
abundantly clear that we are living in postnormal times.
East and West both need new methodologies for dealing with the
predicaments of postnormal times. Diversity and plurality are essential both
to understand and deal with complexity. Chaos teaches us that individual
and social responsibility and accountability are all paramount for our
collective survival. In postnormal times, the world can really be laid to waste
by the actions of a few individuals.
Postnormal times have brought specific types of contradictions to the fore.

We need to negotiate the future in a state of constant uncertainty, and if not
in total ignorance, then at least with only partial or inadequate knowledge.
That means we need to put our differences aside, East and West, and manage
contradictions and complexity through negotiated consensual dialogue,
where all participants are given equal voice. There are no violent means to
resolve contradictions or dealing with complexity. Humility, modesty,

accountability, responsibility, diversity, and dialogue are not added extras but
an essential requirement for surviving postnormal times
There is no place in postnormal times for Kipling’s simplistic dictum. East

and West have to come together and employ the best that their tradition,
history and societies have to offer to negotiate our turbulent times with our
sanity and humanity intact. To get beyond the impasse of the just so
predicament of our times we need new questions and new insights before
we can hope to have new, better answers.
References
. Rudyard Kipling, “The Ballad of East and West”, () available from http://www.
bartleby.com//.html
European Union’s Contradictions

Jordi Serra
A spectre is haunting the European Union (EU) — the spectre of its own
contradictions. These contradictions suggest that the EU is turning into a
truly postnormal institution. The contradictions are a product of the EU’s
economic policies, the main driving force that shaped the Union. But it is its
political, social and even cultural dimensions that will ensure its significance
in the future.
The evolution of the EU was founded over a multiplicity of treaties. By 

it was clear that the Union needed a qualitative step forward, a European
constitution. The aim was to unify the diverse legislation and to galvanize its
political momentum. But the fact is that what should have been the
foundation of a truly supra-state entity became the blueprint of a state-only
members club.
The European constitution emerged as the first contradiction ailing the EU:
it falls short as an international body and it goes too far as a state club. Bluntly
put, too often the EU lacks the muscle to deploy joint policies, but the states
also frequently lack enough influence to defend its specific interests. As a
result, many policies are not ambitious enough to tackle the deep issues
affecting Europe.
Nevertheless, the EU was seen as an example of successful international

governance; at least, until the  crisis came along. The specificity of this
crisis is that it is systemic and global. On the whole, the financial meltdown
presented both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU. But the challenge
was not taken up, and the opportunity was missed. The European institutions
embraced austerity with the faith of new converts and told the people of
continent to accept it without question or be doomed.
Paradoxically, the severe budget cuts look like the most consistent solution
given the constraints of the European design. The Euro was defined in ,
enacted in , and turned into usable coins and banknotes in . It
epitomized the political push to attain a higher level of integration, a
common currency for a stronger Union; it has also become a metaphor for
a lack of political will. The Euro was and is insufficient to generate a joint
economic policy and without a joint policy it is doomed.
Thus, the Euro suffers from two severe weaknesses. First, it defines a common
currency for countries with deeply divergent economic conditions and
dynamics. Second, its management is in the hands of an institution, the
European Central Bank (ECB), which is totally independent from state
control. The ECB has only been able to offer cheap money to European
private banks in the hope that these banks would help their national states.
Ultimately, austerity has been more an attempt to provide a dubious moral
foundation for budget cuts than a real economic argument.
The obsession with austerity has led to the emergence of a second

contradiction: capital comes before people. The EU has poured millions into
a programme to ensure the viability of the financial systems, but very few of
them have been lending to struggling businesses or hard-pressed mortgage
dependent individuals. Still, let us not forget that the source of this funding
is public money, money that comes from citizen’s taxes and ultimately from
the pockets of everyone in the Union. The rationale has been that the fall of
the banks would have had a systemic effect that would have worsened the
crisis and extended its effects.
The end product of the EU’s attempts to navigate the financial crises has
produced a deep fracture within its boundaries, generating more contradic-
tions. Currently, there is a split amongst citizens within the Union; people
from rescued countries versus the rescuing ones. The real division within
each country is between those who are doing well and those who are not.
More and more Europeans are coming to terms with the certainty that their
children and grandchildren may never achieve the welfare level they have
enjoyed. Globally, the bailout has revealed just how fragile the fabric of the
European Union is. But within the Union, the bailout has reinforced the
perception that the EU favours economic stability over democratic
legitimacy.
The EU has to make a transcendent decision. Is its purpose to unite its

citizens, promote flow of people and labour between European states, bring
the people of Europe closer, celebrate their intellectual and cultural histories,
or enrich its bankers and financial institutions? At the very least, the
European Community has to ask, is it:
• A market?
• A currency?
• An unfinished project on supra-state governance?
• All of the above?
The future of the EU and its relevance in the postnormal age depends on the
answer.
I would argue that limiting the EU to its economic dimension, or letting

economic logic dictate how it functions, is a great mistake. Europe has always
been a tapestry of territories, peoples, cultures and all sorts of allegiances; it
has never operated in harmony and it can hardly be considered as a
homogenised unit by any stretch of the imagination. But even when it is
made to work as an economic unit, economic features do not really reflect
the real essence of the EU. As a coherent union, its real success lies elsewhere.
Two examples come particularly to mind: rights and environmental

protection. If we consider the normative corpus of the EU, the so-called
‘Community acquis’, we can acknowledge that it is a remarkable com-
pendium of rights that perhaps define the most democratic region in the
world. The EU has developed one of the most advanced legislation on
environmental questions. European commission reports on subjects such as
health, education, gender equality, labour conditions, and minority rights
have forced several states to move forward in their respective legislations to
conform to EU principles.
I would argue that most citizens of the EU now realise that a turning point
has been reached. The European elections in  were the first sign. With
far-right parties on the rise, the parliament accommodated the highest
percentage of anti-Europe representatives in its history. For the right (and
far-right) wing parties the solution is less EU, for other the only logical
alternative is just the opposite: more EU.
Yet, the events in  proved both sides right and wrong. Millions of
refugees, from Syria and other countries started to get into Europe. Few
rejected them openly at the beginning. But as the numbers escalated,
objections grew as well. The management of this humanitarian crisis has
been a source of shame for many Europeans ever since. Nowadays, very few
people feel that the EU serves their interest or needs; and it is no wonder that
most consider that there is nothing in the Union for them.
The option now is either to take the EU to a civilized and dignified end, or
for it to transcend its contradictions, and navigate postnormal times with
insight and anticipation. First, the awareness of the people about the
importance of regional dimension in a progressively interconnected, complex
and chaotic world has to be improved. Second, the EU needs a new design
fit for postnormal times that takes into account both the economic wellbeing
of its entire people as well as its governance structure. Third, the European
Union is in urgent need of new leadership. To survive the future, the EU
needs a new generation of ethical leaders able to navigate postnormal times.
Postnormal America at the Movies

C Scott Jordan
At moments of key transformation, American cinema has used Others to

measure itself against. The pre-war classics used African-American
characters. Post-World War II cinema was haunted by the spectre of
communism. Orientalist imagery came to the vogue in the s and s,
before the ‘Arab terrorist’ emerged as a menace in cinema []. There has been
a slight shift during the last decade: the fear of the Other has now replaced
the fear of our times: the fear of climate change []; the panic about financial
crisis; the anxiety about the internet; and the apprehension about
automation, artificial intelligence and cloning. Given this zeitgeist reflected,
it is not surprising that contemporary film now tackles postnormal times.
I would like to discuss two films that I think reflect postnormal America:
Clint Eastwood’s American Sniper () and Alejandro Gonzáles Iñárritu’s
The Revenant (). Ostensibly, they appear to have little or no relation to
postnormal times. But we can derive metaphors [] that shed considerable
light on America’s fears, ignorant angsts, and its apprehension of

uncertainties.
American Sniper gives us the story of the late Navy SEAL, Chris Kyle – a man
who became famous for killing people. An American hero. Clint Eastwood’s
film takes this tragic American alloy and turns his story into a surreal
metaphor for postnormal America. Much of the film has the all too familiar
feel of your prototypical dystopian post-/ American war flick. By its
conclusion, Kyle remains, at the very least, a metaphor for the good ole U. S.
of A.
A metaphor of what the United States has become since its rise to global
dominance, leaving the audience with a choice as to the trajectory of the
future course. Kyle loves Texas, he loves guns, and he wants to be a cowboy.
More importantly he has the classic American, preternatural sense of justice.
The metaphor used resembles countless other empty metaphors that exists
in the radical realist American psyche. In the film, Kyle watches a news report
of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya in  as though he is seeing his
little brother beneath a bully’s pummel. A society so bent on a fundamentalist
individualism suddenly feels for strangers only when connected to them by
the word ‘American’.
The news commentary spews forth chaotic fear and a deep uncertainty over
the new enemy, and then there is /. The Communist, The Japanese, The
German, all with distinguishable characteristics easily caricatured, now are
usurped by a shadow. The enemy is a spectre, almost inhuman. Thus,
America must also lose its humanity. We watch Kyle’s SEAL training, which
is expected to be a striping of humanity, but instead the training feels more
like manual online training. Then reality settles in.
Just as Kyle has it all, a perfect bride, a child on the way, the American dream,
we learn shooting game or paper targets is no preparation for killing living
humans. America watches the world through a high-powered scope and to
be the shield the world needs. The very term ‘hero’ is put to the pitch like a
soccer ball, kicked back and forth, transformed before the audiences’ eyes.
Chris Kyle is our hero. All the clearly shown contradictions in his values pull
Kyle into the deep uncertainty of postnormal times. The result is a self-
detached, quixotic hero whom the audience is perpetually shifting between
rooting for and hoping he fails.
But the world is no longer that simple. The hero of postnormal times cannot
simply defeat the bad guy or defuse the bomb. The postnormal hero is a
navigator above all. The postnormal hero is faced with taking our old
conceptions, putting them to the test, and demanding that we re-educate
ourselves or be doomed to fall at the hands of the true enemy – ourselves.
The first of these heroes are almost certainly damned to become tragic heroes,
for an unfamiliarity with postnormal times will prove a deadly challenge.
Some will accept the complexity and contradictions all around us, others will
look to transcend it, and still others will be killed by it. These characters will
be swallowed by the uncertainty surrounding them; and their options are
limited to how they handle their own ignorance.
Quite unconsciously, the film portrays the basic dilemmas, internal

contradictions and deep ignorance of America in postnormal times. I live in
an America where there are more guns than human beings, campus shootings
are the norm, and exporting war is foreign policy. American Sniper is a mirror
presented, revealing our half-cocked mind-set that is hurling us towards
perpetual violence.
Postnormal Times are turbulent and uncomfortable. A hint of how America

can come to terms with postnormal times is provided in Iñárritu’s The
Revenant. Iñárritu provides us with his attempt at a navigation of these
worrisome times.
To set up our navigation, the film begins in running water, a key element of
life. A father and a son. Glass and Hawk. Then there is something not of the
Earth per say, their guns. A buck with countless delineation within its antlers,
the tree of life made flesh. BANG! The unnatural sound begets our journey.
Nearby we see an encampment of men living in nature. The progression of
morning is paused by the gunshot. John Fitzgerald expresses concern over
the unnatural noise to the authority figure of Captain Andrew Henry. The
ominous Other lurks all about.
The story here is essentially a father’s guide to postnormal times. Glass’s role
as a father is interestingly complicated. The simple metaphor is that Glass,
like the misguided political view of America, is carrying the beaten
uncivilized world into prosperity. Glass cannot foresee a light at the end of
the tunnel in this journey. He is just trying to get them to the safety of a
nearby fort. He is coerced into being the father of this group of white men
who look to only him to save them from the ever-present possibility of
another attack by the Arikara tribe. The quest has a high probability of
failure, and even upon reaching the fort, what then?
Fitzgerald, likewise, is a sort of father. Let us call him the father of ignorance
and Postnormal Lag. Fitzgerald takes the young Bridger as his son, corrupting
him with the old paradigms that are slowly crumbling at the end of an epoch.
His philosophy is every man for himself, suffering is completely unnecessary,
and lying is justifiable. All of these will collapse in the face of uncertainty.
Captain Henry is the false father. This is the father that we demand our
governments and various subscribed organizations be. The tragedy being
that they are at the mercy of experts and public opinions, both subject to the
damning fate of chaos and inevitable contradictions. Henry cannot save his
children, his men. Chief of the Arikara provides a sort of antithesis to Captain
Henry. He is motivated, and thus his tribe, to find his daughter. He remains
true to his identity but embraces the advantages of the white man’s guns and
learning their language. His defiance of ignorance provides a potential for
all the false fathers as they face tomorrow’s uncertainty.
This film is a story of the convergence of these various fatherly technics and
gives us an interesting experiment in postnormal times. This convergence is
wrought with confrontation, the most noticeable being that of Glass with
the Grizzly Father, or in this case, Mother.
My own father’s view of bears is greatly influenced by his Cold War life. The
Soviets. The Reds. In my own life time, bears have gone from pacified cartoon
to force of nature. I grew up with Winnie the Pooh, Yogi Bear, and Baloo.
Then came Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man (). This documentary was
fuelled by the spirit of saving nature and respecting its beauty, but taught us
a valuable lesson. Nature is wild and those who walk on its territory are
bound by its rules. The bear is the king of the American jungle. So why not
let it be the natural father in Iñárritu’s film?
The tragedy of this film is that the conflict is amongst fathers. Like a father-
son picnic, the winner of this competition is not dependent on who loves the
most, who has the most innate fatherly prowess, or some other sense of the
romanticized parental bond. Glass, Fitzgerald, Henry, the Arikara Chief, nor
the Bear are heroes in this story. These characters only converge due to the
ignorance they all bear and in their approach to the uncertain future.
One of the closing images of the film leaves us with running water charging
through a tundra landscape, but now a massive blood stain dements the
water’s bank. Wind, water, and a fresh snow can return it to the beauty at the
film’s start. These are the stakes of postnormal times. The truth is not simply
empirical, but requires the second degree of reflection. Ignorant breaths will
be defeated by nature’s wind.
How will America make its breaths in postnormal times?
References
. See Matthew Berstein and Gaylyn Studlar (Eds.), Visions of the East: Orientalism on
Film (London: I B Tauris, ); and Ziauddin Sardar, Orientalism (Buckingham:
Open University Press, ).
. E Ann Kaplan, Climate Trauma: Foreseeing the Future in Dystopian Film and Fiction
(Rutgers University Press, ).
. Trevor Whittock, Metaphor and Film (Cambridge University Press, ).
Postnormal Governance
Jordi Serra
Modernity appeared as the answer for a new kind of power that needed a
new legitimate source that would break up with medieval traditions and
structures. But these assumptions of an assumed monolithic world, with a
single source of power are no longer valid in a multipolar, multicultural
world. Modernity is in a state of crisis; and its successor, postmodernism
simply turned out to be a “new imperialism of the Western culture” [].
The conventional modes of governance are becoming dangerously obsolete;

society is in a state of total confusion. As a result, most people have lost all
interest in politics. The zeitgeist of the moment is a mix between uncertainty
and anxiety provoked by our inability to understand what is happening.
Truth and facts lose their value. Populism is a natural outcome of postnormal
times. Political developments emerge and proliferate at such a pace that we
barely cope.
Consider the case of Ukraine. It all began with demonstrations against the
government in Kiev. President Viktor Yanukovych’s government was indeed
corrupt but it was democratically elected. His main crime was that he wished
to align Ukraine with Russia. The western preference was that he instead
move to join NATO. Soon armed protestors in Kiev took over government
buildings and demanded a change of government and constitution. When
the parliament voted to oust the Yanukovych, he fled to Russia; and the
equally corrupt former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, was wheeled out
from jail to address the demonstrators.
A decade or so ago, that probably would have been the end of the affair.
Western powers would have established a government of their choosing in
Ukraine, just as they had done in numerous other places. But the generalized
acceptance of the conventional distribution of power and the hierarchy of
interests are not valid. The reality that power has genuinely shifted is hard to
comprehend let alone face.
Notice the complexity and the resulting contradictions in the Ukraine affair.
It is not just the interests of two competing powers that are at stake, Ukraine
has  different minorities, each with its own reasonable and unreasonable
demands. The contradictions were equally glaring. Western interests were
paramount, but Russian interests were irrelevant. The democratically elected
president was replaced by an entirely unconstitutional and undemocratic
takeover. The democratic demands of the mob in Kiev were seen as
legitimate; but the democratic demands of the mob in Crimea, where a
referendum was held, were deemed ‘illegal’. Our fascists, who are an integral
part of the new government in Kiev are benign; their fascists are racist brutes.
If you light a touch paper in the postnormal world, you are as likely to burn
yourself as much as your intended target. This is well illustrated in the case
of Egypt. The initial demonstrations against the Morsi government were
initiated through Facebook and rapidly escalated into a chaotic phenomenon
that led to the overthrow of the regime. The Egyptian military took advantage
of the chaos, and the secularists played into their hands. The end product: a
legitimate, democratically elected government, albeit an autocratic one, was
replaced by military rule. A ‘coup’ was not a coup. Far from nudging Egypt
towards more democracy, the secularists succeeded in turning it into a
nightmarish police state.
Consider the postnormal plight of Spain. After a golden period in real estate
business, the subsequent burst of the housing bubble came as a chaotic
implosion. Spain asked for a European Union bailout to sanitize its banking
system. Spain had to endure severe budget cuts and some structural reforms
that have resulted in a drastic reduction of the Spanish welfare system. The
unemployment rate in Spain escalated over % producing no less than five
million unemployed people during this period. For a number of years,
Spanish politics grinded to a halt thanks to a four-way deadlock. The
resulting deadlock has kept Spain paralysed for several years.
The resolution has brought Spain back to the status quo with a caretaker
government. The population is interested only in making profit at the
expense of the society. Roy’s conservative government won the  elections.
The conservative government ended up doing just the opposite of what it
said it would do: far from reducing, they increased taxes, far from decreasing
unemployment, they saw it rise sharply. But the economy was not its main
challenge. That came from Catalonia. Catalonia wanted to secede from Spain
and become an independent state.
So, what have the Spanish Conservative government, the ‘acting’ and previous
one, done to tackle these issues?
First, it granted the Catholic Church an authoritative position on several

social issues. Second, it truncated or simply abolished many democratic
rights. The right to demonstrate has been curtailed by the so-called ‘Gag Law’.
The strategy is to turn street rallies and demonstration into administrative
misdemeanours []. Third, policy has made it so that Spanish mortgages are
not really mortgages; they are personal credits with real (meaning housing)
guaranties. In this case, the loss of the property only entails the end of credit
if the selling value covers the total amount of the credit, otherwise the former
owners will still owe the remaining part of the borrowed money. By , it
was estimated that over , families have been evicted from their homes.
The real tragedy is that most of these people are unemployed and still owe a
lot of money to the banks.
Policies are made on the conventional direct linear cause and affect basis.
Nowadays phenomena are the result of complex networks of causality in
which many causal factors are intermingled; in such cases, action on just one
element is not only futile but often also quite dangerous. Policy has to take a
quantum leap to be meaningful in postnormal times.
We do not really know how to shape viable policies for postnormal times.
But there are three basic principles that can guide us. First, we need to
acknowledge that no one is in control. So, policymaking must consider and
involve a host of different perspectives and competing, even contradictory,
interests. Second, we need to appreciate that in a complex environment the
guiding mechanism must itself be complex. Plurality and diversity have to
be at the heart of governance for democracies to endure. Third, a policy
worthy of the name must consider the impact of positive feedback loops.
How are we going to cope with myriads of unintended consequences? How
are we going to negotiate chaotic upheavals? While we cannot predict the
outcome of a policy, we ought to have some awareness of its potential
consequences.
The answer to postnormal challenges is to understand and embrace the

dynamics of postnormal times and act accordingly.
References
. Ziauddin Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other (London: Pluto, ).

. Ashifa Kassam, “Journalists take fight against Spanish ‘gag law’ to European court”,
The Guardian, December , , accessed October , , https://www.
theguardian.com/world//dec//journaliststake-fight-against-spanish-gag-law-
to-european-court
Postnormal Japan
C Scott Jordan
There is nothing ‘normal’ about Japan. Japan has been dealing with internal
chaos, uncertainty and contradictions for decades. The movement towards,
turned hastily into an endorsement of, postnormal times in Japan was not a
killing of tradition, but rather a systematic shedding of classical elements
from its society. An extrapolation of Japanese policy and actions reveals how
the country practically navigated itself through postnormal times.
How this system of navigation developed provides needed insight into the
concept of change. In the past, change has been a concept states have kept a
close eye on in their efforts to maintain control and order. The Republic of
Japan, standing currently without a national motto, has bravely donned the
c’s of postnormal times: contradictions, complexity, and chaos as it paces
towards a new tomorrow.
To understand why Japan is best equipped for postnormal times, we must

first see how the country navigated the c’s in history.
Complexity can be illustrated with the example of the Rubik’s Cube. At first
look, with all the small squares mixed up, the Cube is found to be quite
complex. Yet, there is a pattern by which the cube can be solved, making each
of its six sides one solid colour. In fact, the Rubik’s Cube is not complex, but
rather simple. Let us change the rules slightly. First you are colour blind,
second for every shift you make in the cube, another automatic and random
shift is made.
Complexity is by no means a foreign concept to Japanese society. Life and

the structures of society in Japan are riddled with rigid expectations of
hierarchy, loyalty, respect, and ritual. Japanese history is more a story of the
fusing of the new, the outside, with what was local and indigenous, to make
something anew, yet that retains its traditional values.
Always new and yet always thoroughly Japanese. Education is still held
paramount, yet new concepts are added to the curriculum and student gain
a conglomerate education accumulated abroad. The absolute rule of the
emperor is supplemented by a very Western style parliament, but this
parliament practices ritualistic respect alongside the idea of democracy.
Eventually, all elements of a warring society are removed, only to be reshaped,
years later, to a military loyal to ‘peace and the security of all humanity’.
The Japanese have morphed into an organic flux of East and West. Let us add
an extra layer to our now complex Rubik’s Cube. For each shift you make in
the cube, one of the nine squares on each side randomly changes. Chaos now
grips the reins of this postnormal ride and the smallest changes produce
radical outcomes.
Chaos in Japan has largely been observed through its power struggles. The
object of power, and those who sought after it, drove a tumultuous military
evolution, ending in its eventual extinction. Post-war Japan was heavily
influenced by foreign inspiration and the embrace of such ideals as efficiency
and development heavily controlled Japanese Policy. Most recently, tight
ropes are walked between economic dominance and economic catastrophe,
technological leadership and environmental plunder, and harmonious peace
and hostile security.
Let us return to our Rubik’s Cube. A random move is made for each one you
make and a random square is allowed to change its colour with each move
you make. The random changing of small squares allows, for example, for
the cube to contain ten red squares. This contradiction prevents the game’s
objective from completion.
Contradictions are seen in the post-war Diet; meant to be one of the greatest
success stories for democracy. Although the country had many opposition
parties, there was only one clear ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP). A current debate is the contradiction between the security of the state
and the strict mandate presented in Article  of Japan’s Constitution
preventing the formation and maintenance of a standing military.
Even in the business world, Japan’s approach to capitalism appears conflicted

to Western business professionals. Capitalism is fuelled by competition.
Japanese tradition does not regard competition as a virtue. Monopoly is not
a dirty word in Japan, if one business comes to control a certain market, the
Japanese respect that and other businesses look else ware. Internal competi-
tion is virtually non-existent. Instead, Japanese businesses compete on the
global market against other corporations on a global scale.
Three elements of the Japanese navigation plan provide important

knowledge for postnormal times.
The first one is simply the Japanese Diet. What started as a council of scholars
for the emperor has evolved into civic minded academics fighting to preserve
Japan’s deeply rooted ritual; a ruling body of many voices. While other
legislative bodies tend to be comprised of duelling extremes, the Diet has
been reformed so as to allow for the greatest representation of the Japanese
voice.
The second element of Japanese postnormal navigation is having a global

consciousness. Japan knows it both effects and is affected by what is going
on around the rest of the planet. Their very survival depends upon it.
The third element is forward thinking. It sounds simple but in balancing

domestic and foreign policy it proves difficult to move beyond the extended
present. Japan must remain several steps ahead in its policy in order to
survive. Being a nation without a standing military, with neighbours who
have rapidly become major military powers, and historical tensions
resurfacing, the country is forced to give priority to international peace.
Becoming a top economic power requires more than a casual understanding
of international markets and finance.
As the phenomenon of postnormal times becomes ever more evident, it

would be interesting to see how Japanese decision makers shape their state
policy and adjust to an increasingly uncertain global environment. The new
randomized Rubik’s Cube cannot be solved, but from it we can learn a great
deal about ourselves and how we ought to walk upon this planet.
LIVES AND WORKS
The Game of Religious Thrones

C Scott Jordan
You have your opinions and I have mine. Until I chose to kill you. We think
we live in a secular age, yet God is everywhere. Power over decision-making
has been ceded to God. We are left wondering, why the youth are joining
Christian evangelical movements in huge numbers or flocking to the cause
of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and other such radical
religious extremists so prevalent in the day’s headlines.
The world George R. R. Martin created in his book series, A Song of Fire and
Ice, made popular HBO television series, Game of Thrones [], respects and
explores religion as it exists in the real world. In doing this he gives us a clever
allusion to the religious interactions of our own world and the contradictions
that arise therein.
The episode titled ‘What is Dead May Never Die’, Tyrion Lannister, Hand to
the King of Westeros, is posed a riddle. “Three great men sit in a room, a king,
a priest, and a rich man. Between them stands a common sell sword. Each
great man bids the sell sword kill the other two. Who lives? Who dies?” The
question poser, Varys, responds to Tyrion’s silence with his wise lesson:
“Power resides where men believe it resides. It’s a trick, a shadow on the wall
and a very small man can cast a very large shadow.”
Varys has explained the postnormal state of the Seven Kingdoms, but also
gave us a vital reflection on religion in contemporary times. But something
strange has happened: thanks to social media, -hour news channels, and
other forms of instant communication, small men can now cast really large,
global, shadows.
Consider, for example, the Reverend Fred Phelps and his followers known as
the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC). They are known for their extravagant
and pot stirring protests against funerals of military service members and
the LGBT community. This church at the time of Phelp’s death was reported
to have  members []. Phelps’ has managed to accumulate a lot of
America’s attention, the world’s attention, and thus cultivated enormous
power.
Pastor Terry Jones of the Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida
gives us another example. He was one of many anti-Islamic Christians who
announced one day that he is going to burn the Qur’an []. Through the
actions of Jones, who had no more than two dozen followers, and the speed
with which communication technology turned his intention into a global
phenomenon. Jones did not end up burning a Qur’an and it is unclear that
he had any intention of carrying the act out.
What we witness it not a simple paradigm shift, but a fundamental

reconstruction of what is and what is not normal in religions. The outreach
of the extremist, the literal fanatic, the puritan and violent adherents, who
would normally exist on the fringes, has expanded: it has become global in
scale and scope.
Ironically, while we are constantly connected to virtual communities, real

communities have almost disappeared. Rather than talk to each other face
to face, people increasingly prefer to communicate via text, Facebook, Twitter,
and other social media platforms. Young people have become more and more
alienated. In an age where meaning has been abolished, they seek meaning
in their increasing alienated, uncertain, ambiguous lives.
Recent headlines have been painted with the youth flocking to the cause of
the Islamic State. This is not a phenomenon of the oppressed and secluded.
It is global. And it is a specific product of our postnormal times, where the
God-shaped hole in people’s mind can only be filled with something
spectacular.
The analysis of Hans Küng [], Talal Asad [], and Karen Armstrong []
suggests that religion often expresses itself as a super-self belief: not just a
belief in the supernatural but also a belief in one’s conviction of possessing
the Absolute Truth. Religion moves out of the boundaries of faith and
becomes a decision-making process; and inevitably comes in conflict with
other decision-making processes such as politics, science, state and
secularism. Now, religion becomes the sole source of certainty for the
believers. An attack on religion is perceived as an attack on the Self, the
abandonment of religious principles in society is seen as a loss of the Self.
And the lost Self is a dangerous thing.
In postnormal times, this phenomenon is going to multiply manifold: the

cycle of a lost Self making an unpalatable pronouncement that gets tweeted
endlessly on social media till it breaks a trending threshold and goes out of
control. The platform developed to bring people together, only brings us

together to push us apart, and demolishes our Selfs in the process.
In postnormal times, the actions of separate individuals assemble into an

intricate stage play of false stereotypes and billowing ignorance. Yet, the
individuals themselves can also exist in an insulated cocoon: exposed only
to views that reflect their own and they can acquire all the necessary skills
and equipment needed to enact their plans with the click of a mouse. You
thus exist in a manufactured normalcy: a field is created giving you the
impression that everyone believes like you, thinks like you, behaves like you,
and wants to be like you. And if you are a believer, it is a small step to
conclude that it is the will of God. That’s what God wants you to do.
Postnormal times produce a feeling of helplessness in those with religious

and spiritual leanings. In a world where very little makes sense, meaning
evaporates. But our longing for meaning increases – and we often find it
wherever we seek it. And beliefs often translate both as identity and meaning.
This dementing of the self ’s identity, far from providing a true sense of
belonging and meaning, actually increases alienation.
Yet, there has never been a greater need for people and communities with
genuine religious and spiritual values. Many of the contradictions of
postnormal times require old fashioned religious virtues of humility,
patience, love, compassion, and compromise to transcend. I would suggest
that the purpose of religion cannot be to perpetuate super-self belief but to
show love, compassion and provide service to others. The diversity and
plurality of postnormal times can only be navigated by acknowledging that
the faith of others is as important to them as our faith is to us. Above all,
religion must stand against ignorance of all types, and see uncertainty not as
a threat but an opportunity to shape more desirable futures.
A beautiful optimism resides in the initiative known as ‘hug a terrorist’ in

Denmark, where citizens welcome back and help reacclimatize, as appose to
ostracize, youth who have fled to Syria to join ISIS [].
Postnormal times have made  characters as powerful as any quote from
the religious text of your choice. We return to Vary’s riddle and are left
wondering who lives and who dies. And are forced to ask: where do we want
power to reside in the future?
References
. George R. R. Martin, A Game of Thrones (A Song of Ice and Fire, Book ), (New York:
Harper Voyager, ); Home Box Office, New York, .
. Michel Paulson, “Fred Phelps, Anti-Gay Preacher Who Targeted Military Funerals,
Dies at ”, The New York Times, March , .
. Paul Harris and Paul Gallagher, “Terry Jones defiant despite murders in Afghanistan
over Qur’an burning”, The Guardian, April , .
. Hans Küng, Theology for The Third Millenium: An Ecumenical View. Translated by
Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, ).
. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and
Islam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, ), pp. – .
. Karen Armstrong, The Great Transformation: The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions
(New York: Random House, ), pp. –.
. Hanna Rosin, “How A Danish Town Helped Young Muslims Turn Away From ISIS.”
NPR. July , .
Islamic Futures in Postnormal Times

Ziauddin Sardar
Prelude
Today’s Islamic discourse is, for the most part, a future free zone. The future
is a subject that should concern every Muslim. Yet, talk of the future is
conspicuously absent in Muslim circles.
Why is this so? It doesn’t help that there are hardly any scholarly works on
the future of Islam and Muslim societies that one could engage with. There
are some books where the word ‘future’ appears in the title. But the term
‘future’ here is an appendage; there is no acknowledgement that ‘the future’
is a developed and sophisticated field of exploration and study.
For a book that lives up to the title, we have to turn to Wilfrid Scawen Blunt’s
The Future of Islam []. Blunt was concerned with certain trends in Muslim
societies; these pointed towards a particular future. Blunt illustrates the basic
ingredients of a futures-based analysis. It is about understanding change and
the rate of change. It is about understanding trends and extrapolating them
to see what kind of future they could generate. And it is about formulating
policies and taking actions in the present that promote a desirable future [].
Blunt also illustrates another key point: if Muslims do not engage in thinking
and shaping their own futures, others would happily do it for them [].
The only way out of the current impasse is to think boldly in terms of long-
range futures. We need to chart a path towards a desirable future, develop

insights into managing and anticipating change, and work systematically to
achieve our desired goals. Most of all, we need intellectual boldness and
imagination, to imagine what has been impossible to imagine, to develop
ideas that have hitherto been seen as heretical or exist only on the margins,
and envision alternative ways of what it may mean to be a Muslim in the
coming decades and centuries.
In other words, we need to develop a vibrant future consciousness.
Locating the Future

What exactly do I mean by a ‘future consciousness’? I mean an appreciation
of accelerating change, an awareness of potentials and pitfalls lucking over
the horizon in the not-too-distant future, and a commitment to shaping a
desirable future.
Thinking about the future is daunting. The future is unknown; and in most
Muslim traditions it has largely been consigned to the domain of ‘God’s will’.
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the future does not really exist:
it is always a time that has yet to arrive. However, just because the future does
not exist, and indeed cannot exist, it does not mean that we cannot study it,
develop ideas, images and metaphors about it, and attempt to understand
and shape its direction. The future may be elusive and uncertain but it is a
domain over which we can exercise some power.
How can we proactively shape futures of Muslim societies a generation or

two from today, twenty or forty years from hence?
We need two essential tools. We need to have an understanding, a picture, or

what futures await us if things continue as they are. And we need an image,
a vision, of alternative possibilities: the futures we desire and prefer. Both
require creativity and imagination; and there are different types of methods
for dealing with each approach.
Positioning the Past

Our futures are also a product of decisions our ancestors took in the past.
All societies have living histories, often described as tradition, which mould
their identity. A future without identity is no future at all. However, not all
our history has a part in our futures.
Consider also the idea that ‘Islam is a complete way of life’. The statement
suggests that all issues of ethics, morality, law, governance, indeed all human
life, have been settled in history. If this were so then ethical and moral
evolution, developments in law and other critical areas of human thought,
come to a grinding halt.
They (we) are responsible for the fact that Muslim societies have been drifting
from one undesirable future to the next for centuries; and represent the most
serious threat to shaping viable and more fruitful futures for ourselves.
Muslim history also brims with concepts with liberating potential that open
up the future to multiple alternatives. Perhaps the most proactive idea, that
involves constant engagement with the present as well as the future, is ijtihad,
normally translated as ‘independent reasoning’. Clearly, reasoning is not
something that can be done once and for all; and reasoning often leads to
innovation. It’s about thinking boldly and imaginatively about possible,
probable and desirable futures.
We can also see an awareness of the future in the life of the Prophet
Muhammad. For example, he forbade cutting of trees and hunting of wildlife
in the woodlands around cities because they provided sustenance for humans
and animals and protected the cities with a green belt. The hijra was planned
meticulously, and the path for the migration was systematically cleared over
several months. The Prophet anticipated the Quraysh uprising against him.
Months before the battle of trenches the Prophet anticipated the coming
conflict and prepared to defend Medina by digging a trench around the city
thus actually preventing a major conflict.
I would argue that Islam is intrinsically future oriented; and insists that the
believers should actively shape their futures.
Situating the Present

This very moment in history – now – is the present; and it has a natural role
in determining our futures. But the present is not static. Indeed, the present
is forever changing. So, we need to see the present as dynamic, changing and
constantly incorporating new elements and situations of contemporary
reality. There are five distinct elements of this dynamic present that we need
to consider in shaping sustainable futures.
First: the obvious fact that we live in a globalised world. Second: the problems
we face nowadays are not simple. Third: we are constantly on the edge of
chaos []. Fourth: the present is full of contradictions and they cannot be
resolved; they can only be transcended. Fifth: uncertainty is the norm [].
There are other options: possible futures, an amalgam of different

possibilities we can imagine; plausible futures, that is futures we determine,
given current conditions and historic momentum, that has a high probability
of being realised; and preferable futures which we actually desire and
consciously work towards.
Preparing for Futures

Suppose we were to ask a random selection of Muslims what kind of future
they envision for their societies. Most of them would surely want a future
that is free of sectarianism and civil strife, violence and terror, torture and
brutality, where their children can grow healthy and prosperous and where
society is at peace with itself and people of different faiths and people of little
or no faith.
We need a new base from which to move forward. This requires us to bring
back the human in Islamic discourse. The Prophet is seen not as a human.
But, contrary to what the Qur’an declares, as a superhuman whose every
action is perfect, to be copied to minutes detail. The problem is if everything
is God given there is no role for human effort and imagination. The believers
have no agency. No mechanism for the evolution of religious thought and
morality, no way of constructing a new ethics for our times.
Ironically those who are most concerned and obsessed with ‘Islam’, beat their
chests and shout the loudest about ‘defending Islam’ and ‘Islamic Sharia’,
insist on politicising their identity and expressing it stridently and visibly (in
their niqabs or hijab, or the lengths of their beards), represent the greatest
threat to Islam and its future.
There are two prerequisites in preparing and working towards preferable,

plausible and viable futures. First, the goal that Muslims cherish above all
others: to impose a single truth on a diverse society and a plural globe.
Second, we need to appreciate that the Sharia is a human construction of
fallible man in history.
Coda
In our quest for preferable, worthwhile futures for Islam and Muslim
societies, we need to ensure that the future is open to all potential and
dissenting possibilities. We don’t wait for things to change; but actively
change things and thereby make history.
By far the biggest problem in thinking about the future from an Islamic
perspective is the absence of an appropriate language. A language is not just
a tool of communication; it is also a tool through which social and cultural

needs required to survive are negotiated. There is thus an urgent need to
infuse Islamic discourse with future consciousness and develop a language
that motivates us to look forward rather than backwards.
References
. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, The Future of Islam (London, ); reprinted by Sind Sagar
Academy, Lahore, . All citations from this edition.
. See Ziauddin Sardar, Future: All that Matters (London: Hodder, ), for a general
introduction to how we study the future.
. For more detail on how the future can be colonised see Ziauddin Sardar, “Colonising
the Future: The ‘Other’ Dimension of Future Studies”, Futures  ()  and “Other
Futures: Non-Western Cultures in Futures Studies” in Richard A. Slaughter (editor),
The Knowledge Base of Future Studies: Directions and Outlook (vol. three), DDM Media
Group/Futures Study Centre, Hawthorn, Victoria, ; and Ziauddin Sardar, editor,
Rescuing All Our Futures: The Future of Future Studies (London: Adamantine Press;
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, ).
. For a more analytical explanation of what happens at the ‘edge of chaos’, see Ziauddin
Sardar, Introducing Chaos (Cambridge: Icon Books, ), see also “What Chaos? What
Coherence? Across the River I Called” in Mika Mannermaa, Sohail Inayatullah and
Rick Slaughter (Eds.), Coherence and Chaos in Our Uncommon Futures: Visions, Means,
Actions (Turku: Finland Future Studies Centre, ) and “Conquests, Chaos,
Complexity: The Other in Modern and Postmodern Science”, Futures  (), pp. –
 (July/August ).
. See Gabriele Bammer and Michael Smithson (Eds.), Uncertainty and Risk:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (London: Earthscan, ).
Science and Scientists in the

Postnormal Age
Jerome R. Ravetz
It is well known that the new technologies of information are revolutionising

practice in a great variety of fields. The powers of research science in many
fields are being enhanced and even transformed. They are important new
developments, but not necessarily ‘new forms’ of science. Here we consider
the practices and structures that cause surprise and concern when they are
noticed, and that have their own momentum to continue rapid change.
Historical Background
About a half-century ago there was an awareness among scientists that things
had changed. The current situation of science is one of very rapid change.
The changing self-consciousness of science during that previous period is a

reminder that in the socio-technical system of science, the intellectual and
material aspects of the system are deeply implicated in one another.
Science became ‘industrialised’ in several respects: in overall size, in scale of

individual enterprises, and in its ever-closer relations with industry. It also
became ‘incorporated’ [], that is involved in a variety of ways in the affairs
of the state. Somewhat naively scientists believed that they were being asked
to speak ‘truth to power’, when their clients frequently wanted ‘policy-based
evidence’. In its relations to the broader society, the manipulations and
distortions of research that are now familiar in connection with profit-
making industry are mirrored in the less notorious, but equally important
practices of ministries and state agencies.
Structures of Scientific Activity

It is now commonly appreciated that the old picture of ‘the scientist’ making
a discovery and then turning it over to ‘society’ is very radically over-
simplified. First, the possible motivations for engaging on, or supporting,
research are varied. That initial motivation is but the first step in a multi-
phased cycle that explains the complexity and confusion that attends debates
when science is involved with policy.
More to our present concerns, quality has replaced truth as the effective
guiding principle for science. It requires an ethical commitment, one that
must be seen to be practiced at the top of any institution. In its absence,
corruption and vacuous research is sure to follow.
Persons
There has been a growing recognition that policy-relevant science is done
better if the early stages draw on a broader experience than that of politicians,
science advisors and experts. Involvement of citizens has become increasingly
accepted as desirable and useful. In conventional scientific research, there is
a long continuous tradition of amateurs making a contribution, but more
recently they had been relegated to the role of lower-status assistants. But a
more active involvement is developing all the time. As a result, the status of
‘scientist’ is being progressively diluted.
Procedures
A similar process of change, variously seen as erosion or democratisation,
affects Procedures. For a long time, there was a common belief in a Scientific
Method, those procedures whereby science unerringly produced the correct
answers to its problems. With the rise of uncertainty and then of complexity
in knowledge and policy, this motivating faith gradually lost plausibility. The
inability to specify a Method that is not logically fallacious has contributed
to the difficulty. As to models, the best that can be said is the classic ‘all models
are wrong; some are useful’. But there does seem to be a much-heightened
awareness of these problems within scientific communities; and this could
simultaneously have the opposite effects of stimulating reform while also
reinforcing cynicism.
Property
In the previous epoch, the social relations of Property had not been changing
with great rapidity; there was a steady displacement of the traditional ‘public
knowledge’ by what we might call ‘corporate know-how’. However, there has
been a recent recognition of a deeply paradoxical situation in the
management of intellectual property. There has been a recent warning that
the progress of the field is being seriously impaired by the thickets of property
rights that surround the various bits of knowledge and technique that are
necessary for research.
Publicity
Innovation is even more rapid in the phase of Publicity, which is after all the
life-blood of science and which consists of information. What is significant
for the self-consciousness of science is the sudden discovery that there
actually is an urgent and deeply problematic political economy of publicity.
Scientific publication is not free, nor even particularly cheap. The problems
of cost and recompense in the digital age that had already afflicted the creative
industries have suddenly arrived in science. Thanks to digital publication,
the on-going inquiry can now be a focus of a continuous flow of communal
dialogue and development, in which there may be a temporary crystallisation
of a ‘product’ as a matter of convenience.
Quality Assurance
The effects of the new technologies on the quality assurance cycle are, if
anything, even more dramatic. Traditionally the quality assurance systems
of science were run largely informally and largely confidentially. As Wikipedia
itself has shown, all the editorial processes can be both convenient and
transparent. What had been a remarkably closed institution, with little public
scrutiny of its workings and hardly any investigative journalism is now
starting to be opened up.
Consequences
Near the end of the cycle is Consequences. Traditionally, the consequences
of science were assumed to be essentially good and overwhelmingly benign
in practice, and so the scientist could, with a good conscience, turn over his
products to society. Now the issue of consequences is recognised as crucial
in policy debates on new technologies as well as in broader policy debates.
We will know that science has genuinely entered its new epoch, when the
science of bads becomes recognised as a subject worthy of being taught as
part of a liberal education in science.
A Role for Post-Normal Science

Consciousness always lags behind practice as the world changes. The task of
forging a new ideology for science under these new conditions is urgent, for
the corruption of the scientific enterprise is well advanced. There is no
guarantee that science as we know it will survive.
Since in the course of a scientific education students are totally shielded from
such problems, they become disoriented when they first encounter them in
practice. When they try to share their worries with colleagues, they are
frequently shunned as the bearers of uncomfortable knowledge. In many
cases, the thesis of postnormal science has served as liberation.
Postnormal science opens the way for plurality of perspectives, of the right
to be wrong, of awareness of ignorance, of humility. With its simple core
ideas, it enables us to see how the received image of science has fostered
narrow-mindedness, intolerance and pride. In this sense science as an
institution is being forced to look at itself realistically and not through
ideological spectacles. That may still be a little way in the future.
References
. S. and H. Rose, Science and Society (London: Allen Lane, ).

Creativity and Leadership in

Postnormal Times
Alfonso Montuori and Gabrielle Donnelly
Introduction
The complexity, pluralism, and uncertainty of life appear overwhelming.
Imagination, and its broader umbrella, creativity, are essential ‘to imagine
our way out of the postnormal times.’ Creativity has gone from being a
fascinating, marginal, odd and inexplicable phenomenon to becoming the
engine of social change and transformation.
In transitional time such as ours, we need to understand where we have come

from, and how we have been shaped by our times, in order to move towards
a different future.
Historical Roots
Until the s, research on creativity in the West was situated mostly in the
discipline of Psychology. It focused primarily on Person, Process, and Product
[]. The unit of analysis was almost exclusively the exceptional or ‘eminent’
individual [].
The Changing Face of Creativity and Leadership

The way we understand, practice, and express our creativity is changing.
Creativity leads to change, and change leads to creativity. Three main trends
involve a) viewing creativity as a more networked, collaborative process, b)
as an everyday, everywhere, everyone process, rather than something
confined to exceptional geniuses [][], and the articulation of creativity as
a form of leadership and leadership as a form of creativity [][][]
[][][][].
Leadership and creativity are shifting from a Heroic, Great Man view to a
more relational, distributed, everyone/everywhere/everyday process.
Leadership can be a form of self-creation in the context of social
responsibility and the development of possibilities and alternatives in the
world. How do we channel our creativity? Leadership needs to account for
and be responsible for the direction and application of human creativity, and
creativity needs to infuse leadership with new possibilities and opportunities
to move beyond postnormal times.
Transforming Creativity
Research on the psychology of creativity now includes a strong emerging
focus on everyday creativity. The Where of creativity is now potentially
everywhere. This can be found in new research on innovation, group
creativity, jazz, and an increasing appreciation of ‘the wisdom of crowds,’ the
creative potential of ‘open innovation,’ where difficult problems are shared
with the public and useful answers emerge [][][][][][][].
Questions are now being raised as to whether what we are calling ‘everyone,
every day, everywhere’ creativity will lead to a growing narcissism, a
consumerist self-absorption, and a flattening of all values that will make the
‘Me Generation’ seem positively altruistic, or whether it can be channelled
towards worthy human aspirations [][][].
Reinventing Leadership
In an era of transition, we are not bound by fixed roles or destinies. The new
leadership does not assume one has to be a leader all the time. Leadership is
also increasingly viewed as heteroarchical, based on aptitude for a particular
context, task, and situation.
Tribes and Factories

Seth Godin’s popular Tribes provides us with two useful images that can
orient us to the emerging understanding of leadership. His argument is that
we are moving out of the age of the Factory and are now in an age of Tribes.
“A tribe,” he writes, “is a group of people connected to one another, connected
to a leader, and connected to an idea” [].
Factories are large, hierarchical, unwieldy, inflexible, and generally not prone
to innovation. In a factory, leadership is confined to a few. Command and
control are the central features of leadership in factories. Tribes are
networked, flexible, and heteroarchical, allowing leadership to emerge in a
plurality of sources []. The democratization of leadership is becoming an
increasingly mainstream perspective.
Concluding Reflections
We live in postnormal times. Creativity and imagination are necessary to
envision the new world. Creativity is leading us into this new world – it is
the way we conceive of alternatives. This means that creativity requires more
responsibility than ever before. Creators are leaders. People are learning to
work together, across differences, to develop creative solutions to old prob-
lems. Life may never be ‘normal’ again, but we may actually have something
to look forward to.
References
. M. Runco, Creativity. Theories and Themes: Research, Development, and Practice

(Amsterdam: Elsevier, ).
. V. P. Glaveanu, “Paradigms in the study of creativity: Introducing the perspective of
cultural psychology”, New Ideas in Psychology, , , pp. –.
. A. Montuori, “Beyond postnormal times: The future of creativity and the creativity
of the future”, Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Future Studies, (), ,
pp. –.
. A. Montuori, “Creativity and the Arab Spring”, East-West Affairs, (), .
. J. M. Burns,Transforming Leadership: The Pursuit of Happiness (New York: Grove,
).
. M. Csikszentmihalyi, Good Business: Leadership, Flow, and the Making of Meaning
(New York: Penguin, ).
. H. Gardner, Leading Minds (New York: Basic Books, ).
. C. Hooker, and M. Csikszentmihalyi, “Flow, creativity, and shared leadership” in C. L.
Pearce & J. A. Conger (Eds.), Shared Leadership: Reframing the Hows and Whys of
Leadership (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, ), pp. –.
. A. Montuori, “Transformative leadership for the st century. Reflections on the design
of a graduate leadership curriculum.” ReVision, (–), , pp. –.
. D. K. Simonton, Genius, Creativity, and Leadership: Historiometric Inquiries
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ).
. R. J. Sternberg, “A Systems Model of Leadership”, WICS. American Psychologist, (),
, p. .
. F. Barron, “All Creation is a Collaboration”, in A. Montuori & R. Purser (Eds.), Social
Creativity (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, ), vol. , pp. –.
. M. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, ).
. N. C. Andreasen, The Creative Brain: The Science of Genius (New York: Plume, ).
. A. Montuori, “The complexity of improvisation and the improvisation of complexity.
Social science, art, and creativity”, Human Relations, (), , pp. –.
. P. B. Paulus & B. A. Nijstad (Eds.), Group Creativity: Innovation Through Collaboration
(New York: Oxford University Press, ).
. M. Schrage, Serious Play: How the World’s Best Companies Simulate to Innovate (New
York: Harvard Business School Press, ).
. J. Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor, ).
. A. Toffler & H. Toffler, Revolutionary Wealth (New York: Knopf, ).
. E. Greenberg & K. Weber, Generation We: How Millennial Youth are Taking Over
America and Changing our World Forever (Emeryville: Pachatusan, ).
. J. M. Twenge & W. K. Campbell, The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in an Age of
Entitlement (New York Free Press, ).
. S. Godin, Tribes. We Need You to Lead Us (New York: Portfolio, ).
. Z. Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other (London: Pluto Press, ).
Contributors
Gabrielle Donnelly, writer and social change and innovation expert, obtained her PhD in
Transformative Inquiry from the California Institute of Integral Studies. She is an Associate of Collective
Wisdom Solutions, a consulting service that works with the public, private and not-for-profit sectors to
make ideas happen, based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Shirin Elahi is an expert on risks, uncertainty, change, and scenario planning. She has lectured widely,
including at the Said Business Centre, Oxford University; hec, Paris; International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg; and Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre, University College
London (UCL). She is the Managing Director of Scenarios Architecture, a strategic consultancy of network
specialists who work on complex global risks.
Silvio O Funtowicz has taught mathematics, logic and research methodology in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. He was a Visiting Scientist at the European Community Joint Research Centre at Ispra, Italy,
for many years where he worked as an analytic philosopher in the field of science and technology
studies. Together with Jerome Ravetz, he created the NUSAP notational system for characterising
uncertainty and quality in quantitative expressions, and introduced the concept of post-normal science.
Currently, he is Professor at the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities (SVT), University
of Bergen, Norway.
Scott Jordan, philosopher and political scientist, is attached to the Asian World Center at Creighton
University in Omaha, Nebraska. He is a member of the Nonkilling Consortium International, and has
worked with the Soong Ching Ling Foundation in China. A regular contributor to the quarterly Critical
Muslim, he hosts a radio podcast show, Tea Talk Asia. His research is focussed on the postnormal
dimensions of international policy, politics and governance, which he often explores through films.
He is a Fellow of the Centre for Postnormal Policy and Futures Studies.
Alfonso Montuori, Professor in the Transformative Inquiry Department at California Institute of

Integral Studies, is the author of several books on creativity, complexity, social change, management,
and education, including co-edited two-volumes Social Creativity (Hampton Press, 1999), and, most
recently, Journeys in Complexity (Routledge, London, 2015). He is the General Editor of Advances in
Systems Theory, Complexity, and the Human Sciences at Hampton Press, and Associate Editor of World
Futures: The Journal of General Evolution.
Jerry R. Ravetz, a renowned philosopher of science, is known for his challenging works on risks,
scientific objectivity and history of science. His Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (OUP,
1971) is regarded as a seminal work. His other books include The Merger of Knowledge with Power
(Cassell, London, 1990); (with S.O. Funtowicz) Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy (Kluwer,
Dordrecht, 1990); and (with Ziauddin Sardar) Cyberfutures (Pluto, London, 1997) and Introducing
Mathematics (Icon, Cambridge 1998). Regarded as the father of postnormal science, he developed,
together with Silvio Funtowicz, a notational system, ‘nusap’, for the representation of uncertainty in
quantitative information. Currently he is an Associate Fellow at the James Martin Institute for Science
and Civilization at the University of Oxford.
Ziauddin Sardar, writer, futurist and educator, is an internationally renowned public intellectual. He
has published over 50 books, including Rescuing All Our Futures (Adamantine, New York, 1998), Islam,
Postmodernism and Other Futures: A Ziauddin Sardar Reader (Pluto, London, 2003), and most recently,
Future: All That Matters (Hodder, London, 2013). He was editor of Futures, the monthly journal of
policy, planning and futures studies, from 1999 to 2012, and served as a Commissioner on the UK
Equality and Human Rights Commission from 2006 to 2009. He is the Director of the Centre for
Postnormal Policy and Future Studies.
Jordi Serra, futurist, consultant and educator, is Associate Professor in the Communication and
International Relations Faculty, Blanquerna, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain. Formerly, he
was head of Foresight Research, Risk Governance Centre, Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is
on the editorial Board of Futures, World Future Review and Revista IAPEM. He has published a number
of books in Spanish, most recently Inteligencia y análisis prospectivo: La gestión de la incertidumbre
(Secretaria de Inteligencia, Quito, 2014). He is the Research Director of the Centre for Postnormal Policy
and Futures Studies.
John Sweeney is a futurist, consultant and educator. He has worked with universities, international
development and humanitarian aid agencies, nonprofit foundations, and educational and cultural
organizations, including UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP’s Global Centre for Public Service Excellence, the
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, and the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies. Co-author of Mutative Media: Communication Technologies and Power Relations
in the Past, Present, and Futures (Springer, Dordrecht, 2015), he is the Deputy Director of the Centre
for Postnormal Policy and Futures Studies.
The Centre for Postnormal Policy and Futures Studies (CPPFS) is an international research and
consultancy network with a particular focus on marginalised peoples and communities. The Centre
promotes futures literacy and an understanding of postnormal times, with emphasis on new means
of navigating contradictory, complex and chaotic situations and phenomenon. It aims to foster critical
inquiry, action learning, and an ethical imagination for shaping decolonized, alternative, and preferred
futures.
BIB PNTR Cover_Layout 1 14/10/2019 11:48 Page 1
IIIT Books-In-Brief Series is a valuable collection of the

Institute’s key publications written in condensed form to give
readers a core understanding of the main contents of the
original.
The Postnormal
Postnormal times are best defined as ‘an in-between period
where old orthodoxies are dying, new ones have yet to be
born, and very few things seem to make sense’. or, as Ezio
Times Reader
Mauro puts it: ‘we are hanging between the “no longer”
and the “not yet” and thus we are necessary unstable –
nothing around us is fixed, not even our direction of travel.’
The postnormal times theory attempts to make sense of a

rapidly changing world, where uncertainty is the dominant
theme and ignorance has become a valuable community.
The Postnormal Times Reader is a pioneering anthology of
writings on the contradictory, complex and chaotic nature
of our era. It covers the origins, theory and methods of
postnormal times; and examines a host of issues, ranging
from climate change, governance, Middle East to religion
and science, from the perspective of postnormal times. By
mapping some of the key local and global issues of our
transitional age, the Reader suggests a way of navigating
our turbulent futures.
978-1-56564-958-3
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Edited by Ziauddin Sardar

This edition published by International Institute of Islamic Thought, in

© Copyright 2020 International Institute of Islamic Thought,

The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

IIIT London Office

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and

IIIT Books-In-Brief Series

We live in a period of accelerating change. New trends, technologies and

The postnormal times theory attempts to make sense of a rapidly chang-

global issues of our transitional age, the Reader suggests a way of

Abridged Edition of the Original

What Just Happened

Just what is going on?

A number of academics, thinkers, writers and commentators have been

So normal, no matter how it is defined, is evaporating. We are moving

The Postnormal Times Reader embodies and speaks to the values of

ORIGINS AND THEORY

Science for the Post-Normal Age

After centuries of triumph and optimism, science is now called on to remedy

In post-normal science, uncertainty is not banished but is managed, and

In this new sort of science, the evaluation of scientific inputs to decision

development of a genuine and effective democratic element in the life of

Reinvasion of the Laboratory by Nature

Centrality of Uncertainty and Quality

small. The problem is likely to be soluble by a normal, puzzle-solving

Post-normal science has the paradoxical feature that in its problem-solving

The uncertainties go beyond those of the systems, to include ethics as well.

Extended Peer Communities

Welcome to Postnormal Times

Welcome to postnormal times. The espiritu del tiempo is characterised by

Globalisation enhances complexity not simply by making us interdependent

Complexity teaches us an important lesson: the notions of control and

Since everything is linked up and networked with everything else, a break

The second contradiction concerns knowledge. While our knowledge has

Ignorance is not soluble by means of ordinary research; we therefore have

The combination of ignorance and uncertainty, as well as a tendency to

Every social, cultural, political, philosophical and religious outlook known

Because we have no other way of dealing with complexity, contradictions

To a very large extent our current impasse represents a failure of imagination.

We need an ethical imagination that can acknowledge the uncertainty and

Postnormal Times Revisited

In ‘Welcome to Postnormal Times’, I attempted synthesis of ideas culled from

PNT and Its (Dis)Content

In postnormal analysis, we take normal to be that which is frequently

Surely, a system that is not networked or full of self-contradictions, cannot

The Postnormal Condition

Recent political events demonstrate that we are no longer dealing with

of processes. Yet, under postnormal conditions, events and situations develop

The Postnormal Extended Present

We need to be aware that we cannot manage and control postnormal times,

To be aware of this actuality is to ‘be postnormal’.

Creativity and imagination need to be utilized to produce new definitions of

METHODS AND QUESTIONS

The Three Tomorrows of

Normalcy, Postnormalcy, Postnormal Creep and Burst

The notion of normalcy itself is somewhat weird, especially in PNT. It is a

The Manufactured Normalcy Field (MNF) is a means of re-orienting our

‘Normal’ phenomena move towards postnormalcy through the process of