India GDI-2020-Assessment FinalEXT 14nov21-1

GDI 2020
GDI 2020
Scores
Bands
(0-100)
Overall Country Score C 50

Political Risk C 53
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny B 67
Q2 Defence Committee A 88 Range of Scores
Q3 Defence Policy Debate D 38
Q4 CSO Engagement D 33 A 83 - 100 Very robust institutional re
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD A 88 B 67 - 82 Robust institutional resilie
Q6 Public Debate A 100 C 50 - 66 Modest institutional resilie
Q7 Anticorruption Policy A 88 D 33 - 49 Weak institutional resilien
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units C 58
E 17 - 32 Very weak institutional re
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions NS
F 0 - 16 Limited to no institutional
Q10 Risk Assessments E 25
Q11 Acquisition Planning B 75
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail B 75 NEI = Not enough information to score
Q13 Budget Scrutiny B 75 NS = Indicator is not scored for any co
Q14 Budget Availability C 58 NA = Not applicable

Q15 Defence Income C 50
Q16 Internal Audit C 50
Q17 External Audit B 75
Q18 Natural Resources C 58
Q19 Organised Crime Links D 38
Q20 Organised Crime Policing C 58
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight F 0
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment E 25
Q23 Export Controls (ATT) F 0
Q76 Lobbying F 0
Financial Risk D 40
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls E 25
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny A 83
Q26 Secret Spending F 0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information E 25
Q28 Secret Program Auditing F 13
Q29 Off-budget Spending E 17
Q30 Access to Information B 75
Q31 Beneficial Ownership C 50
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny B 75
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise C 63
Q77 Defence Spending E 19
Personnel Risk B 73
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity B 75
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel B 75
Q36 Whistleblowing E 17
Q37 High-risk Positions C 58
Q38 Numbers of Personnel D 42
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances A 100
Q40 Payment System A 100
Q41 Objective Appointments C 58
Q42 Objective Promotions B 75
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription NA
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings A 92
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment A 100
Q46 Miltary Code of Conduct A 94
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct A 94
Q48 Anticorruption Training B 67
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions C 58
Q50 Facilitation Payments C 58
Operational Risk E 20
Q51 Military Doctrine F 0
Q52 Operational Training C 50
Q53 Forward Planning F 0
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations E 25
Q55 Controls in Contracting E 25
Q56 Private Military Contractors NS
Procurement Risk C 62
Q57 Procurement Legislation C 63
Q58 Procurement Cycle B 67
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms B 75
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed C 50
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed E 25
Q62 Business Compliance Standards C 50
Q63 Procurement Requirements C 50
Q64 Competition in Procurement NEI
Q65 Tender Board Controls B 69
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls C 50
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery C 56
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms B 75
Q69 Supplier Sanctions B 75
Q70 Offset Contracts B 75
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring B 69
Q72 Offset Competition C 50
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries B 75
Q74 Financing Packages B 75
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions NS
cores Corruption Risk
100 Very robust institutional resilience to corruption Very low

82 Robust institutional resilience to corruption Low
66 Modest institutional resilience to corruption Moderate
49 Weak institutional resilience to corruption High
32 Very weak institutional resilience to corruption Very high
16 Limited to no institutional resilience to corruption Critical
NEI = Not enough information to score indicator

NS = Indicator is not scored for any country
NA = Not applicable
GDI 2020
GDI 2020
Scores
Bands
(0-100)
Overall Country Score C 50

Political Risk C 53
Q1 Legislative Scrutiny B 67
1A Formal rights 75 Range of Score
1B Effectiveness 50
1C Independent legislature scrutiny 75 A 83 - 100
Q2 Defence Committee A 88 B 67 - 82
2A Formal rights 100 C 50 - 66
2B Expertise 50 D 33 - 49
2C Responsive policymaking 100
E 17 - 32
2D Short-term oversight 100
F 0 - 16
2E Long-term oversight 100
2F Institutional outcomes 75
Q3 Defence Policy Debate D 38 NEI
3A Scope of involvement 50 NS
3B Scope of debate 50 NA
3C Public consultations 0
3D Transparency 50
Q4 CSO Engagement D 33
4A Policy of openness 25
4B CSO protections 50
4C Practice of openness 25
Q5 Conventions: UNCAC / OECD A 88
5A Signatory and Ratification status 100
5B Compliance 75
Q6 Public Debate A 100
6A Public debate 100
6B Government engagement in public discourse 100
Q7 Anticorruption Policy A 88
7A Anti-corruption policy 100
7B Effective implementation 75
Q8 Compliance and Ethics Units C 58
8A Mandate and resources 75
8B Independence 50
8C Effectiveness 50
Q9 Public Trust in Institutions NS
9 Public Trust in Institutions NS
Q10 Risk Assessments E 25
10A Risk assessments 50
10B Regularity 0
10C Inputs to anti-corruption policy 25
Q11 Acquisition Planning B 75
11A Acquisition planning process 75
11B Transparency 75
11C External oversight 75
Q12 Budget Transparency & Detail B 75
12A Comprehensiveness 50
12B Timeliness 100
Q13 Budget Scrutiny B 75
13A Formal rights 100
13B Influence on decision-making 50
Q14 Budget Availability C 58
14A Proactive publication 50
14B Comprehensiveness 50
14C Response to information requests 75
Q15 Defence Income C 50
15A Transparency 25
15B Institutional scrutiny 75
15C Public scrutiny 50
Q16 Internal Audit C 50
16A Activity 50
16B Enabling oversight 50
16C External scrutiny 50
16D Institutional outcomes 50
Q17 External Audit B 75
17A Activity 100
17B Independence 100
17C Transparency 50
17D Institutional outcomes 50
Q18 Natural Resources C 58
18A Legal framework 0
18B Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice 100
18C Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice 75
18D Transparency NA
18E Scrutiny NA
Q19 Organised Crime Links D 38
19A Penetration of organised crime 75
19B Government response 0
Q20 Organised Crime Policing C 58
20A Existence of policing function 75
20B Independence 50
20C Effectiveness 50
Q21 Intelligence Services Oversight F 0
21A Independence 0
21B Effectiveness NA
Q22 Intelligence Services Recruitment E 25
22A Objective selection criteria 0
22B Selection bias 25
22C Vetting process 50
Q23 Export Controls (ATT) F 0
23A Signatory and Ratification 0
23B Compliance NA
23C Parliamentary scrutiny 0
Q76 Lobbying F 0
76B Disclosure: Public officials NA
76C Lobbyist registration system NA
76D Oversight & enforcement NA
Financial Risk D 40
Q24 Asset Disposal Controls E 25
24A Controls 50
24B Transparency of disposal process 0
24C Transparency of financial results of disposals 25
Q25 Asset Disposal Scrutiny A 83
25A Scrutiny 100
25B Independence 100
25C Transparency 50
Q26 Secret Spending F 0
26 Secret Spending 0
Q27 Legislative Access to Information E 25
27 Legislative Access to Information 25
Q28 Secret Program Auditing F 13
28B Parliamentary scrutiny 0
Q29 Off-budget Spending E 17
29A Permitted exceptions 0
29B Recording mechanisms 0
29C Prevalence 50
Q30 Access to Information B 75
30B Classification of information NS
Q31 Beneficial Ownership C 50
31A Extent of commercial ventures 25
31B Transparency 75
Q32 Military-Owned Business Scrutiny B 75
32A Independent scrutiny 100
32B Transparency 50
Q33 Unauthorised Private Enterprise C 63
33A Prohibition 50
33B Prevalence 75
Q77 Defence Spending E 19
77A Proactive publication 25
77B Comprehensiveness 50
77C Timeliness 0
77D Comparison against budget 0
Personnel Risk B 73
Q34 Public Commitment to Integrity B 75
34A Chiefs/Ministers: Internal communications 75
34B Chiefs/Ministers: Public commitment 75
34C Unit commanders and leaders 75
Q35 Disciplinary Measures for Personnel B 75
35A Sanctions 75
35B Enforcement 75
Q36 Whistleblowing E 17
36A Legal provisions 25
36B Prioritisation 25
36C Effectiveness 0
Q37 High-risk Positions C 58
37A Coverage of sensitive (higher-risk) positions 50
37B Selection process 50
37C Oversight 75
Q38 Numbers of Personnel D 42
38A Accuracy 50
38B Transparency 25
38C Ghost soldiers 50
Q39 Pay Rates and Allowances A 100
39A Pay rates 100
39B Allowances 100
Q40 Payment System A 100
40A Timeliness 100
40B Accuracy 100
40C Transparency 100
Q41 Objective Appointments C 58
41A Formal process 100
41B Scrutiny 25
41C Transparency 50
Q42 Objective Promotions B 75
42A Formal process 50
42B Exceptions 50
42C Comprehensiveness 100
42D Frequency 100
Q43 Bribery to Avoid Conscription NA
43A Policy NA
43B Sanctions NA
43C Enforcement NA
Q44 Bribery for Preferred Postings A 92
44A Policy 100
44B Sanctions 100
44C Enforcement 75
Q45 Chains of Command and Payment A 100
45 Chains of Command and Payment 100
Q46 Miltary Code of Conduct A 94
46A Code of conduct 75
46B Transparency 100
46C Enforcement 100
46D Training 100
Q47 Civilian Code of Conduct A 94
47A Code of conduct 75
47B Transparency 100
47C Enforcement 100
47D Training 100
Q48 Anticorruption Training B 67
48B Regularity 75
48C Coverage of personnel 75
Q49 Corruption Prosecutions C 58
49A Policy 50
49B Transparency 50
Q50 Facilitation Payments C 58
50B Enforcement 50
50C Prevalence 25
Operational Risk E 20
Q51 Military Doctrine F 0
51A Military doctrine 0
51B Transparency NA
Q52 Operational Training C 50
52 Operational Training 50
Q53 Forward Planning F 0
53A Forward planning 0
53B Application 0
Q54 Corruption Monitoring in Operations E 25
54A Corruption monitoring 25
54B M&E policy 25
54C Transparency 25
Q55 Controls in Contracting E 25
55B Training 50
Q56 Private Military Contractors NS
56A Policies NS
56B Scrutiny NS
56C Enforcement NS
Procurement Risk C 62
Q57 Procurement Legislation C 63
57A Legal framework NS
57B Corruption risks 50
Q58 Procurement Cycle B 67
58A Formal procedures 100
58B Transparency 75
58C Implementation 25
Q59 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms B 75
59A Independence 100
59B Effectiveness 50
59C Transparency 75
Q60 Potential Purchases Disclosed C 50
60A Policies 75
60B Notice of planned purchases 25
Q61 Actual Purchases Disclosed E 25
61B Accessible data 0
Q62 Business Compliance Standards C 50
62A Formal policies 50
62B Consistent implementation 50
Q63 Procurement Requirements C 50
63A Procurement requirements 0
63B Scrutiny 75
63C Purchases 75
Q64 Competition in Procurement NEI
64A Open competition NEI
64B Scrutiny of single/restricted competition procedures 50
Q65 Tender Board Controls B 69
65A Conflicts of interest 75
65B Audit Trail 50
65C Transparency 100
65D Scrutiny 50
Q66 Anti-Collusion Controls C 50
66B Sanctions 50
66C Enforcement NA
66D Training 50
Q67 Contract Award / Delivery C 56
67A Reporting policies & procedures 100
67B Transparency 25
67C Monitoring 50
67D Enforcement 50
Q68 Complaint Mechanisms B 75
68A Complaints mechanisms 100
68B Effectiveness and Accessibility 50
68C Retaliation 75
Q69 Supplier Sanctions B 75
69A Sanctions 50
69B Undue influence 75
69C Application of sanctions 100
Q70 Offset Contracts B 75
70B Due diligence 100
Q71 Offset Contract Monitoring B 69
71A Policies & procedures 100
71B Transparency 25
71C Monitoring 50
71D Enforcement 100
Q72 Offset Competition C 50
72 50
Q73 Agents and Intermediaries B 75
73A Policies 75
73B Enforcement 75
Q74 Financing Packages B 75
74 75
Q75 Political Pressure in Acquisitions NS
75A Prevalence: selling nations NS
75B Justification NS
75C Prevalence: domestic pressures NS
Range of Scores Corruption Risk
A 83 - 100 Very robust institutional resilience to corruption Very low

B 67 - 82 Robust institutional resilience to corruption Low
C 50 - 66 Modest institutional resilience to corruption Moderate
D 33 - 49 Weak institutional resilience to corruption High
E 17 - 32 Very weak institutional resilience to corruption Very high
F 0 - 16 Limited to no institutional resilience to corruption Critical
NEI = Not enough information to score indicator

NS = Indicator is not scored for any country
NA = Not applicable
Parliament has the right to employ formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny
over defence policy. India has a Committee System; and two Committees
scrutinise defence policy.
GDI 2020 Indicator
Question Indicator 100 75 50 25 0 Indicator Notes
Score
GDI Standing
The 2020 Indicator Qualitative
Committee Data(SCoD) is constituted under Rule 331C
on Defence GDI 2020 Indicator Sources
of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. It
scrutinises MoD Demands for Grants, bills, policies and annual reports. The
observations and recommendations of the Committee are contained in their
reports which after factual verification by the Ministry of Defence, are
presented to the Lok Sabha and laid on the Table of Rajya Sabha by the
Chairperson and the authorised members. The MoD is required to take
action on the recommendations contained in the reports and furnish action
taken replies thereon, within three months of the presentation of the report. 1. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,
Action Taken Notes (ATN) received from the MoD are examined by SCoD accessed 9 January 2019
Parliament has formal powers (in law) to and Action Taken Reports are presented to the Lok Sabha and laid on the http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
Parliament has the right to employ
approve or veto laws on security, and to Table of the Rajya Sabha [1]. CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
formal mechanisms to conduct
reject or amend defence policy. It also Parliament has no formal powers
1A Formal rights
has the right to review budgets, major
scrutiny over defence policy, but
lacks some of the powers listed in
over defence laws or policy. 75 The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is constituted every year under Rule 2. Lok Sabha, “PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE”, accessed
arms procurements and defence 308 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. It 9 January 2019
score 4.
decisions. scrutinises defence expenditure, the Appropriation Accounts and reports by http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). PAC selects the most CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=26&tab=0
important subjects/paragraphs on which oral examination is to be conducted.
The Government is required to intimate to PAC the action taken or proposed
to be taken by it on the recommendations contained in the report normally
within six months of the presentation. The ATN replies of the Government are
considered by the Committee and after due classification of the replies, an
Action Taken Report is presented to the Parliament. The government is
further required to intimate to PAC the action taken or proposed to be taken
by it and also to furnish final replies in respect of the earlier
recommendations contained in the original report in respect of which either
no replies had previously been received or only interim replies had been 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,
received. The action taken thus reported by the Government is laid on the "STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
Table of the House in the form of a Statement without any further comments (2018-19) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY-NINTH
by the Committee [2]. SCoD and PAC do not have veto powers. REPORT", accessed 16 January 2019
http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
16_Defence_49.pdf
Parliament performs all the
Parliament regularly approves or vetoes Parliament debates or reviews Parliament debates or reviews defence policy and attempts to influence
functions of score 4, but not Parliament debates or reviews
laws on security, exercises budgetary defence policy, but fails to take policy through formal mechanisms. The Standing Committee on Defence 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, February 2019,
regularly. There are clear defence policy and attempts to
power, and reviews or approves major advantage of its formal powers of Parliament does not debate or puts forth recommendations, however there is no binding force on the “SIXTEENTH REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
1B Effectiveness
arms procurements and decisions.
instances where parliament fails to
effectively scrutinise defence
influence policy through formal
mechanisms, but these attempts
oversight. It may exercise informal review defence policy. 50 government to act and the Committee does not have the power to veto DEFENCE (2015-2016) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”,
Parliament can also reject or amend influence over policy in the case of defence policy, “the Recommendations of the Committee have persuasive accessed 16 January 2019
policy, but these are occasional are limited.
defence policy. no formal powers. value and are treated as considered advice given by the Committee" [1][2][3]. http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
lapses.
16_Defence_16.pdf
3. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,

accessed 16 January 2019
Q1. Is there http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
formal CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
provision for
effective and
independent
legislative
scrutiny of
defence 1. Abhijit Bhanare, 30 April 2018, “Parliament Logjam Part 4:
policy? Strengthening committee system can improve quality of
drafted laws, fast-track implementation”, PRS Legislative
Research, accessed 16 January 2019
https://www.prsindia.org/media/articles-by-prs-team/
parliament-logjam-part-4-strengthening-committee-system-
can-improve
2. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, 12 March 2019, “Indian defence forces

out of funds, won't sustain 10-day war, says Parliament
Ministers are not permitted to be part of any Departmentally Related Standing Standing Committee”, India Today, accessed 16 January 2019
Committees (DRSCs) [1]. As the recommendations from the Standing https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-defence-forces-
Committee on Defence are not binding, it is ultimately up to the Houses to out-of-funds-won-t-sustain-10-day-war-says-parliament-
take executive decisions in policymaking. There is no recent evidence of the standing-committee-1188583-2018-03-13
military or executive unduly influencing Parliament. There is evidence that
recommendations are at times implemented, as was the case in 2018 when 3. Business Standard, updated 9 November 2018 “Govt
on the behest of the Standing Committee on Defence, the government enhances financial powers of Armed Forces' vice-chiefs by 5
Either the executive branch or the Either the executive branch or the
enhanced financial powers of the Armed Forces' Vice Chiefs [2][3]. times”, accessed 16 January 2019 https://www.business-
military may occasionally coerce military may regularly coerce or
Independent Neither the executive nor the military Both the military and the executive standard.com/article/defence/govt-enhances-financial-powers-
or unduly influence parliament to unduly influence parliament to
1C legislature
scrutiny
coerce or unduly influence parliament to
vote in their favour.
vote in its favour, or either may vote in its favour, or either may
regularly undermine parliament
scrutiny of defence policy.
75 There has been criticism from members of the opposition that a record
number of bills have been passed [4]. Critics believe that the government
of-armed-forces-vice-chiefs-by-5-times-118110801089_1.html
undermine parliamentary scrutiny regularly undermine parliamentary
introduces bills as Money Bills in the Lok Sabha or Lower House (where it 4. Anand Kumar Patel, 29 July 2019, “Budget Session: Modi
of defence. scrutiny of defence.
has a majority) and rarely passes balls across to the Standing Committees government creates record, most bills passed in 15 years”,
[5]. The Rajya Sabha or Upper House can recommend amendments to a accessed 3 February 2021
Money Bill but cannot make amendments themselves. The government https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/budget-session-modi-
refutes the criticism and seems to view the passing of bills as efficiency. After government-creates-record-most-bills-passed-in-15-years-
its recent re-election, the government passed a record number of bills in the 1574637-2019-07-29
Budget session [6].
5. Derek O’Brien, 17 February 2018, “The BJP Is Killing Our
Institutions”, The Wire, accessed 8 August 2019
https://thewire.in/government/bjp-killing-institutions
6. Anand Kumar Patel, 29 July 2019, “Budget Session: Modi

government creates record, most bills passed in 15 years”,
India Today, accessed 8 August 2019
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/budget-session-modi-
government-creates-record-most-bills-passed-in-15-years-
1574637-2019-07-29
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/CommitteeInforma
tion.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,

As described in Q.1, there is a Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD). The “FORTY THIRD REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
Committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of performance of Ministry DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”, pg. 4,
of Defence or agencies, e.g., budgets, personnel management, policy accessed 16 January 2019
planning, arms acquisition and demand information on these areas. The http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_43.p
Committee can when required, call upon expert witnesses. The Committee df
There is a defence committee or similar
does not have veto powers [1][2]. In addition, there are Committees such as
institutions with extensive formal rights.
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Estimates Committee and Committee 3. Lok Sabha, “Committee Home”, accessed 8 August 2019,
The committee (or similar such
There is a defence committee or There is no defence committee or on Public Undertakings who deal with a range of issues related to defence. http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/CommitteeHome.aspx
organisation) has the power to
similar institutions with some similar institutions that is tasked There is powerful oversight from other agencies such as the Comptroller and
scrutinise any aspect of performance of
formal mechanisms to conduct with oversight and scrutiny of the Auditor General of India (CAG) which undertakes financial, performance and 4. Lok Sanbha, “Financial Committees”, accessed 8 August
2A Formal rights defence ministry or agencies, e.g.,
budgets, personnel management, policy
scrutiny over defence policy, but it defence sector OR the committee 100 compliance audits on regular basis. CAG reports are examined by 2019
lacks some of the powers listed in or institution exists but has no Parliamentary Committees [3][4][5]. http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
planning, arms acquisition, and demand
score 4. formal powers. CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=10&tab=0
information on these areas. The
It is noteworthy to mention that in August 2018, the Defence Planning
committee is in a position to require
Committee (DPC) under the National Security Adviser was established by the 5. Lok Sabha, “Public Accounts Committee”, accessed 8
expert witnesses to appear in front of it.
government. The DPC is tasked with analysing and evaluating all relevant August 2019
inputs relating to defence planning; and preparing defence related drafts [6]. http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
Though not a Parliamentary Committee, it is interesting to see its addition to CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=26&tab=0
the government's existing apparatus, the Cabinet Committee on Security.
6. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 3 May
2018,“Inaugural meeting of the Defence Planning Committee”,
http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
PRID=1531278&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

The Standing Committee on Defence consists of elected members from both “Introduction”, accessed 16 January 2019
Houses, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The Chairman of the http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
Committee is appointed by the Speaker from amongst the members of the CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
Committee from the Lok Sabha. Members can have expertise in defence and
There are some committee can also be new members of Parliament with no prior expertise. The latter 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,
The committee is comprised of
members with expertise in the Most or all of its members have If no committee or institution can build sector knowledge. The Committee invites experts whilst scrutinising “FORTY THIRD REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
members with expertise in the defence
2B Expertise
sector who are able to influence
defence sector, but they are
outnumbered or limited in their
little expertise in the defence
sector.
exists, this sub-indicator should
be marked Not Applicable.
50 bills. The current Committee consists of a former Prime Minister, a retired
Army Colonel, senior politicians with wide portfolio experience and members
DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”, pg. 4,
decisions.
ability to influence decisions. with professional backgrounds in law, physics, mathematics, and medicine http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
[1][2]. 16_Defence_43.pdf

http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
2. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE:

REPORTS PRESENTED”, accessed 16 January 2019
The Committee analyses budget allocations, policy documents, annual MoD
reports; and examines bills referred to the Committee [1]. The Standing
The committee fails to review 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,
The committee reviews major defence If no committee or institution Committee on Defence is active, working across the year. Indian Parliament
Responsive major defence policies and STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
2C
policymaking
policies and decisions every 5 years or
earlier if new threats arise.
decisions every 5 years or earlier
100 has three sessions: Budget, Monsoon, and Winter session totaling 9 months
of the year. Between 2015 and 2018, 38 reports have been presented by the
(2018-19) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY-NINTH
if new threats arise. REPORT, accessed 16 January 2019
Committee [2]. Observations and recommendations cover a wide array of
defence topics [3][4].
16_Defence_49.pdf

“FORTY THIRD REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”,
16_Defence_43.pdf
Q2. Does the

country have
an
identifiable
and effective
parliamentary
defence and
security
committee (or
similar such
organisations
) to exercise
oversight?
Q2. Does the 1. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,
country have accessed 16 January 2019
an http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
identifiable CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
and effective
parliamentary 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,
defence and STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
security (2018-19) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY-NINTH
committee (or REPORT, accessed 16 January 2019
similar such http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
organisations 16_Defence_49.pdf
) to exercise
oversight? 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,
The committee meets at least once a The committee issues The Committee issues recommendations on a regular basis and requires the
The committee issues DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”,
month, and issues budget amendments amendments to budgets and The committee occasionally The committee does not exercise government to respond within a suitable timeframe [1]. The Minister
amendments to budgets and If no committee or institution accessed 16 March 2019
Short-term and recommendations. It also requires recommendations on a regular issues amendments to budgets any short-term oversight over concerned makes a statement once in six months in the House regarding the
2D
oversight ministries to consider, and respond to, basis, but does not require
recommendations on a regular
basis, but fails in major instances
and recommendations, but not on defence policy, or it is extremely
100 status of implementation of recommendations contained in the reports of the
16_Defence_43.pdf
recommendations within specific time ministries to respond, or allows a regular basis. limited in nature. Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) [2][3]. As alluded to
to do so.
frames. indefinite time frames. above, the Committee is active throughout the year [4][5].
4. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 9 January 2019, “Parliamentary
standing committee criticises government for inadequate
allocation of funds to Army”, The Economic Times, accessed
8 August 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
parliamentary-standing-committee-criticises-govt-for-
inadequate-allocation-of-funds-to-army/articleshow/
67427334.cms
5. PRS “Demand for Grants 2018-19 Analysis: Defence”,

accessed 8 August 2019
http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/budgets/demand-
grants-2018-19-analysis-defence

http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “STANDING

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
REPORT”, January 7th, 2019, accessed January 16th, 2019
The committee conducts long-term The Committee looks at areas such as procurement on a rolling-basis thus http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
The committee conducts long-term
investigations on current activities, If no committee or institution providing long-term oversight. It can appoint sub-committees and study 16_Defence_49.pdf
Long-term investigations on current activities, Long-term investigations are not
2E
oversight including operations, or it can
or it can commission an external
body to do it. However, operations
conducted or commissioned.
100 groups to make a detailed study/examination of certain areas [1][2].
Operations and national long-term policy documents are included in the 3. The Economic Times, 18 July 2018, “Parliamentary panel to
commission an external body to do it.
are excluded from its scope. Committee's scope [3][4]. examine operational preparedness of armed forces”, accessed
January 16th, 2019
parliamentary-panel-to-examine-operational-preparedness-of-
armed-forces/articleshow/61072994.cms
4. News 18, 18 July 2019, “Parliamentary Defence Panel

Briefed on Surgical Strikes”, accessed August 8th, 2019
https://www.news18.com/news/india/parliamentary-defence-
panel-briefed-on-surgical-strikes-1301686.html
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,

“STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
REPORT”, accessed 16 January 2019
16_Defence_49.pdf

DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”,
In the March, 2018 report by the Standing Committee on Defence, 34 accessed 16 January 2019
If no committee or institution
observations/recommendations were given [1][2]. The government accepted http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
exists, or if the committee does
Ministries sometimes incorporate Ministries fail to incorporate 20 of these. Scrutiny of past data from 2015 to present, suggests that the 16_Defence_43.pdf
Institutional Ministries regularly incorporate not provide any
2F
outcomes recommendations into practice.
recommendations into practice,
but not regularly.
recommendations into practice, or
only incorporate minor changes.
recommendations, this sub- 75 government accepts over half of the Committee’s recommendations. This is
concluded after sampling Committee reports and seeing what percentage of 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, May 2016,
indicator should be marked Not
recommendations have been accepted [3][4]. “EIGHTEENTH REPORT
Applicable.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2015-2016)
(SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)”, accessed 16 January 2019
16_Defence_18.pdf
4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, December 2017,

“THIRTY FIFTH REPORT
STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2017-18)
(SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA), accessed 16 January 2019
16_Defence_35.pdf
January 10th, 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737
India has displayed a preference for strategic restraint since Independence in
1947. The country adopted a policy of Non-Alignment during Jawaharlal 3. Ministry of Defence (Navy), October 2015, “Ensuring Secure
Nehru’s tenure as Prime Minister and continues to be a member of the Non- Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, accessed January
ALigned Movement (NAM) [1]. India adopted a No First Use policy for 10th, 2019
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and believes nuclear weapons are for https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/
deterrence purposes alone [2]. Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
Besides the above, India does not appear to have a well-defined defence 4. IISS, December 2015, “Strategic Comments: India’s new
policy or a unified national security strategy that is publicly available. Instead, maritime strategy”, accessed January 10th, 2019
there are some individual documents pertaining to a particular aspect of https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2015/
security such as the 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy publication [3][4]. indianavy
Historically, the lack of strategic culture can find its roots in Indian political 5. Stephen P. Cohen & Sunil Dasgupta, 29 September 2010,
leaderships’ discomfort with the military as an institution for fear of it gaining “The Drag on India’s Military Growth”, Brookings Institution,
too much power. As a result, India has struggled to truly articulate its core accessed 10 January 2019
This indicator refers to public strategic and defence vision beyond defence indigenisation [5]. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-drag-on-indias-
debate that falls outside of any military-growth/
The defence policy or security formal consultation process. It is The current Ministry of Defence (MoD) website makes no mention of a
strategy is debated by the The defence policy or security a reflection of the extent of defence policy but does have a defence production policy which is available 6. Ministry of Defence India, 1 January 2011, “Defence
Individuals within the executive or
The defence policy or security strategy executive, legislature, and the strategy is debated by the public discussion and dialogue to view and download [6]. The closest semblance to a defence policy in Production Policy”, accessed January 10th, 2019
legislature speak about the The defence policy or security
Scope of is debated by the executive, legislature, public. Public debate involves the executive, legislature, and the that arises between media, civil recent times is the 2017 Joint Armed Forces Doctrine [7]. According to a https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DPP-POL.pdf
3A
involvement and the public. Public debate involves media (interviews, op-eds, public, but not consistently. There
defence policy or security strategy, strategy has not been debated at
but there is little active debate or all in the last year.
society, policymakers, and 50 statement by the Ministry of Defence, “The Joint Doctrine Indian Armed
the media (interviews, op-eds, articles). articles). However, debate is is no in-depth dialogue with the policy leadership, and may Forces will serve as a cornerstone document for application of Military Power 7. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 25 April
discussion.
inconsistent and not sustained media or civil society actors. occur through a variety of in a synergized manner leading to enhanced efficiency, optimum utilization of 2017, “Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chairman
over time. venues: newspapers, television, resources and financial savings. It will also establish a broad framework of COSC & CNS Releases Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces –
radio, online platforms, journals, concepts and principles to understand our approach to Joint Planning and 2017”, accessed 10 January 2019
offiicial statements, etc. conduct of operations across all the domains of conflict i.e. land, air, sea, http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
space and cyber-space. In addition, the Doctrine will also serve as a PRID=1488591
reference document for all the three Services to plan integrated operations.”
The Doctrine mentions a National Security Strategy and outlines it in a 8. Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, April 2017, "Joint
paragraph [8]. According to the Doctrine, “Direction in the Civil-Military Doctrine Indian Armed Forces", accessed 10 January 2019
Relationship in any democracy is strictly the right of the political leadership http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
and not bureaucracy.” The Doctrine recognises the need to strengthen civil- Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf
military relations.
9. Ministry of External Affairs, 11 August 2017, “SIXTEENTH
There is some active debate by the Executive through a number of forums REPORT COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS(2016-17)
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), Strategic Policy Group (SPG), (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA), MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL
National Security Council (NSC) and Monday Morning Meeting of Defence AFFAIRS INDO-PAK RELATIONS”, accessed 8 August 2019
Minister. The legislature has number of Committees that including Standing http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/External%20Affairs/
Committee on Defence (SCoD) and External Affairs. The Commitee on 16_External_Affairs_16.pdf
External Affairs, for example, submitted a comprehensive reports on India-
Pakistan relations and Doklam conflict with China [9][10]. 10. Ministry of External Affairs, 4 September 2018, “TWENTY
SECOND REPORT COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(2017-18) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) MINISTRY OF
1. CNN-News18, 26 February 2019, “Pakistan Confirms Indian

Air Force Attacked 6 Targets In The Region | Breaking”,
accessed February 27th, 2019
https://youtu.be/hVVP7oo3yhU
2. India Today, 4 January 2019, "Rafale debate: Rahul Gandhi

Q3. Is the slams Nirmala Sitharaman, questions her silence on Anil
country’s Ambani", accessed 8 August 2019
national Discussion is in-depth and addresses all https://www.indiatoday.in/india/video/rafale-debate-rahul-
defence of the following issues: (1) clear As there is no well-defined defence policy or strategy, the scope of informal gandhi-slams-nirmala-sitharaman-questions-her-silence-on-
policy or articulation of the security threats that Discussion of the defence policy public debate centers on major threats, defence procurement and defence anil-ambani-1423565-2019-01-04
national If there is no debate in a
the country is facing, (2) procurement or security strategy focuses Discussion of the defence policy spending [1]. Debates in Parliament are mentioned in the Press. National
country, this sub-indicator
security
strategy
3B Scope of debate decisions (5 year plan) and level of
defence spending, (3) link between
primarily on major threats
(potential and existing), and level
or security strategy is superficial
without discussion on key issues.
should be marked Not 50 media outlets such as CNN-News18, Times Now, NDTV and Republic
discuss defence issues through live panel discussions, encouraging
3. Times Now, 8 January 2017. “Major Army Reforms –
Exclusive”, accessed 27 February 2019
debated and Applicable.
threats and decisions on procurement, of defence spending. members of the public to watch/listen/comment/share [2][3][4][5]. https://youtu.be/-CJMpaWdjg0
publicly personnel, and budget, (4) use of
available? defence capability (operations). 4. NDTV, 23 October 2018, “CBI vs CBI: Is This A Turf War
Within The Modi Government?”, accessed 10 January, 2019
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICRy7NHDttM
5. Republic World, 21 February 2019, “Congress Calls

Pulwama Terrorist As 'Home-Grown' | The Debate With Arnab
Goswami”, accessed February 27th, 2019
https://youtu.be/cDOAmwvmaus
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, accessed January

10th, 2019 https://www.mod.gov.in/about--ministry
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Year End

Review- 2018 Ministry of Defence”, 31 December 2018,
Consultation is an active
accessed 12 May 2019
There are formal public process in which a government
There are formal public https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=186966
There are formal, regular public consultations on defence policy or agency or department opens India has no formal consultation process involving the general public. The
consultations on defence policy or Consultations take place with
consultations on defence policy or the the security strategy. The defence There has been no formal formal and informal MoD has engaged in consultations with the Indian defence industry regarding
Public the security strategy. However, the public actors that are either very 3. Make In India website, accessed January 10th, 2019
3C
consultations
security strategy. The defence policy or policy or the security strategy
the security strategy incorporate incorporate subsequent findings.
defence policy or the security supportive of, or are explicitly
consultation process involving the communication channels
public in the last 5 years. between the organisation and its
0 procurement and acquisition but this is not set in policy [1][2]. Indigenous
content determination and procedures for “Buy and Make (Indian)” were
http://www.makeinindia.com/about/
strategy fails to incorporate funded by, the government.
subsequent findings. But these consultations are not stakeholders. It is characterised based on recommendations from industry after consultations [3][4].
findings. 4. Sandeep Verma,7 November 2014, “Make In India in
advertised well or held regularly. by formal mechanisms for
Defence: Embedding Industry-wide Dialogue and
sharing opinions and inputs
Consultation”, IDSA, accessed 10 January 2019
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/
MakeInIndiainDefence_sverma_071114
1. Ministry of Defence India website, accessed 10 January
2019
https://mod.gov.in/
2. Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, April 2017, "Joint

As there is no well-defined defence policy or strategy, there is not a lot of Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, Directorate of Doctrine" ,
information outlining these areas. This does not seem to be due to a lack of accessed 10 January 2019
The public can easily access The public can easily access While generally complete, transparency but more due to a lack of defined strategic vision [1]. http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
documents and regularly updated documents and regularly updated information and documents are Documents that are available publicly are the 2017 Joint Armed Forces Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf
Information and documents on the
information on all aspects of the information on all aspects of the not available on all aspects of the Documents on the defence policy Transparency of information Doctrine and the India Stands Strong 2018 Defence Ebook [2][3]. The latter is
defence policy or security strategy
3D Transparency defence policy or security strategy.
Documents are released at least four
defence policy or security strategy.
However, documents are not
defence policy or security strategy,
and there may be significant
are available to the public only in
or security strategy are not
released to the public at all.
occurs within and outside formal
consultation processes.
50 easily discoverable on the MoD website and is a well-designed and
informative document pertaining to a variety of defence topics. Unlike other
3. Ministry of Defence India, May 2018, “India Stands Strong”
Ebook, accessed 10 January 2019
part or abbreviated form.
weeks before decisions are made to released with adequate lead time delays in the timing of their major powers, no unified document exists which details the strategic https://mod.gov.in/ebook-2018/mod-ebook.html#p=1
allow for public scrutiny. before decisions are made. release. environment, MoD's objectives and India's strategic objectives [4].
4. US Department of Defense, 2018, “Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Military Edge”, accessed
27 February 2019
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-
National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
1. George Cheriyan, 2013, “Government-CSO Partnerships

and Collaborations: Lesson2s from India”, World Bank,
Today, India has more than 3 million Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) [1].
accessed 10 January 2019,
The current government has taken to the digital sphere and created a
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/
platform for civil society engagement through the portal ‘Self4Society’
MNA/yemen_cso/english/
launched on 26th July 2014 [2]. The NGO-Partnership System (NGO-PS)
Yemen_CSO_conf_Pres_India_ENG.pdf
earlier maintained by the erstwhile Planning Commission, has been replaced
by the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India) portal NGO
2. Self4Society website, accessed 10 January 2019
Darpan on 1st January, 2015: https://ngodarpan.gov.in. The website is a free
https://self4society.mygov.in/
facility offered by the NITI Aayog in association with National Informatics
There is a policy that requires defence There is a policy that requires Centre to bring about greater partnership between the government and the
There is no formal or informal 3. NGO Darpan website, accessed 10 January 2019
and security institutions to be open defence and security institutions to voluntary sector to foster better transparency, efficiency and accountability.
Policy of policy that requires openness https://ngodarpan.gov.in
4A
openness
towards CSOs and the establishment of
mechanisms to that end (e.g.
be open towards CSOs. However,
there is no explicit mention of how
towards CSOs in the defence 25 The website has a list of NGOs state and sector-wise as well as a blacklist. It
states government departments that engage with VOs and NGOs who have
sector. 4. IDSA, “About”, accessed 10 January 2019
consultation and sharing of information). to do that. registered with the portal. The Ministry of Defence is not mentioned [3].
https://idsa.in/aboutidsa
There is no presence of policy or evidence of CSOs working with defence
5. IDSA, 26 July 2019, “Roundtable Discussion on Defence
and security institutions. CSOs can use the Right to Information Act 2005 to
Budget 2019-20 Organised”, accessed 8 August 2019
obtain non-sensitive information from the defence establishment. There is
https://idsa.in/idsanews/roundtable-discussion-on-defence-
evidence of think tanks engaging with the latter, including the Institute for
budget-2019-20-organised
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) which is funded by the Ministry of
Defence and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) [4][5][6].
6. ORF, “Who We Are”, accessed 10 January 2019
https://www.orfonline.org/about-us/
1. PTI, 11 November 2016, “No more foreign funds for 1,736

NGOs”, The Economic Times, accessed 9 January 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/no-more-foreign-funds-for-1736-ngos/articleshow/
55376434.cms?from=mdr
2. AFP, 4 September 2015,“Greenpeace in India barred from

receiving foreign funding”, The Guardian, accessed 9 January
Q4. Do 2019
defence and https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/04/
security greenpeace-in-india-barred-from-receiving-foreign-funding
institutions India has a vibrant civil society and CSOs are allowed to operate without
have a policy, interference from the government. There has been criticism lately that the
3. Bharti Jain, 17 January 2019,“NGOs registered under FCRA
or evidence, current government has been seemingly more hostile towards CSOs. The
no longer need to be registered with DARPAN portal”, The
of openness government has noted the activity of some CSOs as anti-national with
Times of India, accessed 17 January 2019
towards civil interference from foreign interest groups. In 2016, the government utilised the
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ngos-registered-
society existing Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) to stop renewal of
under-foreign-contributions-regulation-act-no-longer-need-to-
organisations foreign funding licenses to a number of CSOs [1]. A notable case was that of
be-registered-with-darpan-portal/articleshow/67575776.cms
(CSOs) when Greenpeace [2]. As of January 2019, NGOs registered under the FCRA no
dealing with CSOs enjoy a range of protections There is very little or no space for longer need to be registered with the Darpan portal for availing of FCRA-
CSOs enjoy a range of protections (e.g. CSOs enjoy a range of protections CSOs are allowed to operate 4. David Kode, 9 November 2017,“India: Democracy
issues of from government interference, and civil society organisations to related services such as registration and renewal. The relief comes after
rights to freedom of expression or from government interference, and within the country, but the threatened by growing attacks on civil society”, Civicus,
corruption? are able to operate without operate within the country. many NGOs complained of technical difficulties experienced on the portal [3].
CSO freedom of association) from are able to operate within the government uses manifestly accessed 9 January 2019
4B
protections government interference, and are able
intimidation from the government.
However, they may not have
country. However, they experience restrictive laws to silence them or
Independent CSOs may be
accused of / charged with treason,
50 This is an encouraging indicator of the government engaging with CSOs and
acting upon their recommendations.
http://www.civicus.org/images/
to operate openly and without or fear potential reprisals by establishes burdensome India_Democracy_Threatened_Nov2017.pdf
complete access or freedoms in espionage, subversion, foreign
intimidation from the government. government. registration and tax requirements.
some sensitive areas. interference, or terrorism. According to a 2017 report by NGO CIVICUS ‘India: Democracy Threatened
5. Mandeep S. Tiwana, 23 August 2017, “openIndia:
By Growing Attacks On Civil Society’, there have been incidences of attacks
Squeezing civil society hurts India’s economy and democracy”,
on members of civil society and independent media [4][5]. According to
openDemocracy, accessed 9 January 2019
Reporters sans frontières (RSF) 2018 World Press Freedom Index, India
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openindia/mandeep-s-
ranks 138 out of 180 countries. According to RSF since the current
tiwana/squeezing-civil-society-hurts-india-s-economy-and-
government took office in 2015, 17 journalists have been killed. The same
democracy
number were killed in the 2 years preceding 2015 during the previous
government’s rule [6][7].
6. Reporters sans frontiers, Country Profile, accessed 9
January 2019
https://rsf.org/en/india
7. Mythili Sampathkumar, 28 March 2018, “Three journalists

killed in 24 hours highlights India press freedom problem,
watchdog groups warn”, The Independent, accessed 9
January 2019
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-
journalist-killed-dead-sandeep-sharma-death-press-freedom-
a8278641.html
There has been some
consideration of engaging CSOs
There is no evidence suggesting CSOs' requests to work with the
and meetings may have taken
Defence and security institutions have government have been denied. There seems to be no specific formal
Defence and security institutions place with the defence sector, but
specifically worked with CSOs on Defence and security institutions government policy in the defence sector towards CSOs when dealing with
are open towards CSOs but have they tend to take place with CSOs There is no engagement between
corruption issues on a regular and/or in are seeking (or are beginning to issues of corruption. There is some evidence on the Darpan portal that 1. NGO Darpan website, accessed 12 January 2019
Practice of infrequently or superficially worked that are either very supportive of, the defence sector and CSOs,
4C
openness
depth basis. This includes not only
civilian representative of government
on issues of corruption. The
seek) CSO engagement from a
range of CSOs, but not on
or are explicitly funded by, the and/or requests by CSOs to work 25 suggests the government intends to bring about greater partnership with the
voluntary sector to foster better transparency, efficiency and accountability
https://ngodarpan.gov.in
military does not engage with government. OR CSO activity is with the defence sector are denied
(head of internal audit, PR person), but corruption issues. with the addition of more government departments engaging in the process.
CSOs on corruption issues. extremely minimal in this area,
also military representatives. This may in the future include the MoD [1].
and defence and security
institutions rarely engage for this
reason.
1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Profile,

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CAC/country-profile/
India is a signatory to United Nations Convention Against Corruption CountryProfile.html?code=IND
(UNCAC) and ratified it in May 2011 [1][2][3]. India has been actively
participating in the Review process in accordance with the Resolution 3/1. 2. Interviewee 3, Officer at the United Nations, 16 Feburary
The Second cycle of the review started in 2016. It is assessing the 2019, Geneva
Note: If the country is not a
implementation of Chapter-II on Preventive Measures (Article 5-14 of
significant defence exporter, the
UNCAC) and Chapter-V on Asset Recovery (Article 51-59 of UNCAC). It is 3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Legal Library,
UNCAC Convention is the
due in the 5th year of the second cycle [4]. accessed 9 January 2019
relevant document.
https://track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/pages/
If the country is a significant
India is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and LegalResources.aspx?country=India
defence exporter, the OECD
Development (OECD) but is one of the non-member economies the OECD
The country is not a significant defence Convention on Combating
The country is a significant has working relationships with. India is defined as a Key Partner after the 4. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 20 June
exporter, and it has signed up and The country has signed up to but Bribery of Foreign Public
Signatory and defence exporter and has not 2007 OECD Council Resolution on Enlargement and Enhanced Engagement 2017,“CVC, Shri K.V. Chowdary’s country statement at the
ratified at least the UNCAC Convention. not ratified all relevant instruments The country has not signed up to Officials in International
5A Ratification
status
The country is a significant defence depending on its status as defence
signed the OECD Convention, but
it has signed and ratified the
either instrument. Business Transactions is the 100 and is included in OECD analysis and statistical databases. India has also
been a member of the OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the
Eighth Session of the Implementation Review Group of
UNCAC at Vienna, Austria”, accessed 9 January 2019
exporter, and it has signed up and exporter. relevant document.
UNCAC convention. Pacific since 2001 and has endorsed the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Action http://pibphoto.nic.in/documents/rlink/2017/jun/p201762004.pdf
ratified at least the OECD Convention. See page 2 here for a list of
Plan for Asia and the Pacific. India is not a signatory to the OECD
significant defence exporters:
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 5. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
https://www.sipri.org/publication
Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) [5]. Country Profile, accessed 9 January 2019,
s/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-
http://www.oecd.org/india/indiaandtheoecd.htm
international-arms-transfers-
The Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of Public
2018
International Organisations Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha in 2011 to 6. Indian Kanoon, “Report No.258 Prevention Of Bribery Of
comply with international standards. As of date, the Bill has not been passed Foreign Public Officials”, accessed 19 January 2019
[6]. India is not a significant defence exporter [7]. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87167657/
7. SIPRI, "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018",

March 2019, accessed 8 August 2019
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/
fs_1903_at_2018.pdf
In July 2018, the government passed the Prevention of Corruption

Q5. Has the
(Amendment) Act, 2018, which amended and brought significant changes to
country 3. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 20 June
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to bring the legal framework in
signed up to 2017, “CVC, Shri K.V. Chowdary’s country statement at the
conformity with current international practices of UNCAC. India widened the
the following Eighth Session of the Implementation Review Group of
definition of criminal misconduct to include the briber giver [1][2]. As alluded
international UNCAC at Vienna, Austria”, accessed 9 January 2019
to above, India has been actively participating in the Review process. It
anti- http://pibphoto.nic.in/documents/rlink/2017/jun/p201762004.pdf
underwent a review by Uganda and Kazakhstan. The report was received in
corruption
March 2017, it has yet to be made publicly available [3].
instruments:
UNCAC and 4. G20, 2018,“G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP
India has an institutional and legislative framework for fighting corruption
the OECD ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018”, pg.133, accessed 19
including an independent Central Vigilance Commission, Central Information
Convention? January 2019
Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, the Judges (Inquiry)
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/
Act ,1968 and a number of legislations including the Whistle Blowers
anticorruption_accountability_report_2018.pdf
Protection Act , 2014; the Lokpal Act, 2013; the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002; the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and
5. Bulbul Sen, 15 August 2018, “Welcome changes to anti-
Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 and the Benami Transactions
corruption law”, The Hindu Business Line, accessed 19
(Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 [4][5].
January 2019
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/
The government has taken a number of steps to address corruption in recent
welcome-changes-to-anti-corruption-law/article24697638.ece
years including abolishing the system of attestation or authentication by
government servants for submission of certificates by those seeking jobs or
6. Patrick W. Watson, 1 December 2016, "India's
for other government facilities, abolishing personal interviews for recruitments
Demonetization Could Be The First Cash Domino To Fall",
The country has complied with most of The country has major or If the country has not ratified the to lower level posts in the Federal Government and its organisations to help
The country has minor issues of The country has largely failed to Forbes, accessed 19 January 2019
its obligations in priority areas covered significant issues of compliance relevant instrument, this sub- eliminate scope for subjectivity and corruption in the selection process and
5B Compliance
by the relevant convention/s it has
compliance with one or both
conventions it has ratified.
with one or both conventions it has
comply with its obligations under
ratified Conventions.
indicator should be marked Not 75 demonetisation of high value currency to eliminate black money and
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2016/12/01/
indias-demonetization-could-be-the-first-cash-domino-to-fall/
ratified. ratified. Applicable. corruption in 2016. The latter was deemed controversial by some. The
#4abcfc4163db
government still maintains it was an effective measure [6][7][8].
7. PTI, 14 December 2018,“Govt doesn't comment on views of
Pursuant to the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan for 2017-2018, India
ex-RBI chiefs demonetisation, GST expressed before media:
participates in the meetings of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group which
Arun Jaitley”, The Times of India, accessed 19 January 2019
monitors implementation and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/
Convention. India was included in the G20 Self-Assessment Report on
govt-doesnt-comment-on-views-of-ex-rbi-chiefs-on-demo-gst-
Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials [9].
expressed-before-media-arun-jaitley/articleshow/
67092745.cms
India participates in selected OECD Committees and their subsidiary bodies.
India became the first Key Partner country to join the OECD Network on
8. Madan Sabnavis, 20 January 2019, “Book Review: The Big
Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government in 2013. India is an important
Reverse: How Demonetisation Knocked India Out by Meera H
contributor to a range of OECD standard-setting activities. It adheres to
Sanyal”, Financial Express, accessed on 20 January 2019
twelve OECD legal instruments. India signed the Multilateral Convention to
https://www.financialexpress.com/lifestyle/book-review-the-
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit
big-reverse-how-demonetisation-knocked-india-out-by-meera-
Shifting in June 2017 [10].
h-sanyal/1449107/
It has also participated in efforts to develop inclusive and progressive legal
9. G20, 2019 “G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING GROUP
instruments for corporate governance and competition on equal footing with
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018”, pg.133-151, accessed 19
OECD Member countries. The OECD values India’s contribution and
January 2019
believes accession to the Anti-Bribery Convention can enhance India’s efforts
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/
to combat transnational bribery [11].
anticorruption_accountability_report_2018.pdf
1. Vinay Kaushal, 4 February 2019, “Defence Budget 2019-20:
The Slide Continues", IDSA, accessed 5 February 2019
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/defence-budget-2019-20-
vkaushal-040219
2. Sandip Unnithan, 1 February 2019, “Defence Budget 2019:

Why highest ever Rs 3 lakh crore grant is still not enough”,
India Today, accessed 2 February 2019
https://www.indiatoday.in/business/union-budget-2019/story/
defence-budget-2019-why-highest-ever-rs-3-lakh-crore-grant-
is-still-not-enough-1444578-2019-02-01
3. The Times of India, 27 January 2019, “100 per cent FDA in

defence sector will hit security”, accessed 28 January 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/visakhapatnam/100-fdi-
in-defence-sector-will-hit-security/articleshow/67705401.cms
4. Liz Mathew, 8 February 2019, “PM Modi tears into

Congress, warns against mahamilavat ki sarkar” The Indian
Outside government, there is Outside government, there is Outside government, there is Express, accessed 8 February 2019
Outside government, there is regular
occasional public debate among regular public debate among occasional public debate among https://indianexpress.com/elections/pm-tears-into-congress-
public debate among academics, Outside government, there is no or
academics, journalists, opinion- academics, journalists, opinion- academics, journalists, opinion- There is robust regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion- warns-against-mahamilavat-ki-sarkar-lok-sabha-narendra-
journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs extremely limited public debate
formers, and CSOs about defence formers, and CSOs about defence formers, and CSOs about defence formers, and CSOs about defence issues [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. High modi-5574723/
6A Public debate about defence issues. Debate persists
on high priority issues over a period of
issues. However, when debate issues. However, debate often issues. Debate also addresses
among academia, opinion-
formers, and CSOs about defence
100 priority issues are discussed with continuity through media outlets by way of
occurs, it addresses high priority addresses issues superficially, issues superficially, rather than print, online and television news segments. 5. NDTV, 24 September 2018 “Rafale Row: One Deal, Multiple
time, rather than being superficially issues.
issues with intensity and in-depth rather than persisting through in- persisting through in-depth and U-Turns?”, accessed 28 January 2019
addressed.
discussion. depth and regular discussion. regular discussion. https://youtu.be/94DywbUn5hI
6. NDTV, 18 February 2018, “We The People: Making The

Army A Political Tool?”, accessed 28 January 2019
https://youtu.be/nmBXoxE721o
7. Republic TV, 30 January 2019, “ParrikarExposesRahul Lie

On Meeting | The Debate With Arnab Goswami”, accessed 29
November 2020
https://youtu.be/MgjW25oHTHE
8. Republic TV, 30 September 2017, “Lt Gen DS Hooda On

Nation Wants To Know With Arnab Goswami | Exclusive”, 30
January 2019, accessed 29 November 2020
https://youtu.be/QI-6Av3mjoA
Q6. Is there
evidence of
9. Times Now, 2 November 2014, “Robert Vadra Debate:
regular,
Brazen attack, shameless defence - Part 3”, accessed 30
active public
January 2019
debate on
https://youtu.be/4mM9uavGO-U
2019, “DAC approval for Indigenous construction of Six Project
issues of
75(I) submarines under strategic partnership model”, accessed
defence? If
8 February 2019
yes, does the
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=187912
government
participate in
2. Times Now, 8 February 2019, “Defence Minister Nirmala
this debate?
Sitharaman rejects Rafale report, questions 'unethical news
report'”, accessed 8 February 2019
https://youtu.be/0t60-gez81g
3. TImes Now, 29 March 2018, “Defence Minister Nirmala

Sitharaman At IEC 2018 | Full Interview”, accessed 8 February
2019
https://youtu.be/E_bwdpMogd0
4. Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman Speaks To Arnab

Goswami | #FinalRafaleInterview, 8 January 2019, accessed 8
February 2019
https://youtu.be/ABy-97wvkf4
The government engages in 5. India Today, 5 October 2016, “BJP, Opposition Debate Over
The government engages in regular The government engages in regular discussion with the public about defence
discussion with the public about Evidence Of Indian Armys Surgical Strikes”, accessed 8
debate with academia, opinion-formers, The government engages in There is no government issues through media briefings, public forums, in-studio live television
defence issues through open Where communication does occur, February 2019
Government and CSOs about defence issues in regular discussion with the public engagement in public discourse interviews on multiple television channels and televised panel discussions [1]
forums, an active website, or at it is likely to be one-way: officials https://youtu.be/IASH5f5HcZ0
6B engagement in collaborative ways. The government co-
public discourse organises discussions with independent
about defence issues through
open forums, an active website, or
media briefings. However this may provide some information but
about defence issues or official
communications contain no
100 [2][3][4][5][6][7][8]. Citizens can watch live proceedings on Parliament’s Lok
Sabha television channel. Lok Sabha TV airs ‘Saksham Bharat’ a half an
does not happen regularly, or may may not answer public questions. 6. NewsX, 4 April 2019, “Agusta Westland Scam: BJP MP
think tanks or civil society organisations, at media briefings. meaningful information. hour weekly discussion programme with defence experts on India's
exclude very important issues that Subramanian Swamy Reacts on Agusta Congress Notes”,
or through joint media briefings. preparedness, challenges, missions and achievements [9][10].
the government chooses to avoid. accessed 8 August 2019
https://youtu.be/r5PPU9leFXw
7. PBI, 14 December 2018“Livestream Press Conference by

Finance Minister Arun Jaitley and Defence Minister Nirmala
Sitharaman”, accessed 8 August 2019
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsKMVw42cCE
8. India Today, 26 May 2019, “No question of FIR registration

or CBI probe into Rafale deal, Centre tells Supreme Court”,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/no-question-of-fir-
registration-or-cbi-probe-into-rafale-deal-centre-tells-supreme-
court-1535121-2019-05-26
9. Lok Sabha TV, “Live LSTV”, accessed 8 February 2019

http://loksabhatv.nic.in/
10. Lok Sabha TV, “Special Programme During Live

Proceeding of Lok Sabha”, accessed 8 February 2019
https://www.loksabhatv.nic.in/programs
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to bring the legal framework in ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2018”, pg.133, accessed 19
conformity with current international practices of the United Nations May 2019
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). India widened the definition of http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/
criminal misconduct to include the briber giver [1][2]. This Act is applicable to anticorruption_accountability_report_2018.pdf
the defence sector.
4. Reed Smith, 16 October 2018, “Significant Updates to
India has an institutional and legislative framework for fighting corruption India's Anti-Corruption Law”, 19 May 2019
including an independent Central Vigilance Commission, Central Information https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2018/10/
Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, the Judges (Inquiry) significant-updates-to-indias-anti-corruption-law
Act ,1968 and a number of legislations including the Whistle Blowers
Protection Act , 2014; the Lokpal Act, 2013; the Prevention of Money 5. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 12 March 2019 “Army’s new
Laundering Act; the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police personnel”, The
and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 and the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Economic Times, accessed May 19th, 2019
Amendment Act, 2016 [3][4]. All of the aforementioned are applicable to the https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/armys-
defence sector. new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-personnel/
articleshow/68367369.cms?from=mdr
The Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s Vigilance Division is entrusted with the task
of dealing with complaints regarding corrupt practices, misconduct and 6. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 19 May
irregularities in respect of employees of the MoD and the various units under 2019
it. As part of new defence reforms, the MoD recently approved the https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
establishment of a Vigilance Investigation Unit in the Army under the new ARMYACTS190216.pdf
There is an openly stated anti-
ADG Vigilance. The unit will call upon Corps of Military Police (CMP)
corruption policy, but it is unclear if
There is no anti-corruption policy, personnel to conduct independent investigations into corruption [5]. Each of 7. Bharat Electronics Limited, “INTEGRITY PACT AND IEMS”,
Anti-corruption There is an openly stated anti-corruption it applies to the defence sector or
7A
policy policy that applies to the defence sector. the government is in process of
or there is one but it does not
apply to the defence sector.
100 the branches of the Armed Forces have an Act which governs them. These
Acts such as the Army Act, 1950 cover corruption and mention penalties. The
http://www.bel-india.in/ContentPage.aspx?
developing one that applies to the
Indian Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV Section 53 states: MId=27&CId=4195&LId=1&link=4195
defence sector.
“53. Extortion and Corruption. - Any person subject to this Act who commits 8. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July
any of the following offences, that is to say : (a) commits extortion ; or (b) 2018, “Corruption in Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019
without proper authority exacts from any person money, provisions or http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
service; shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment
for a term which may extend to ten years or such less punishment as is in 9. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence
this Act mentioned.” [6] Procurement Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement
(Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019), accessed
The MoD has an Integrity Pact provision in procurement. Bidders and the 10 May 2019
MoD need to sign an Integrity Pact committing to not offering or accepting https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pd
bribes and ensuring integrity in public procurement. Submission of Integrity
Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) is needed. The Seller must confirm and declare 10. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, accessed 19 May
to the Buyer that it is the original manufacturer of the stores contracted and 2019
that no third party has been engaged who can influence or manipulate award https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/407_06_2013-AVD-IV-
of the contract, or indulge in corrupt and unethical practices [7][8][9]. 09012014_0.pdf
Q7. Does the
country have 11. Comptroller General of Defence Accounts, “Mandate and
an openly India has attempted to address country-wide systemic corruption with the Charter of Audit”, accessed 19 May 2019
stated and Lokpal Act which came in to force in 2014, encouraging anti-corruption efforts http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
effectively from the Center. Its efficacy has yet to be measured given the delays in
implemented appointing a Lokpal. India does have a strong institutional framework to 12. Lok Sabha, “PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE”,
1. KPMG, 2019, “The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment)
anti-
Act 2018: Key Highlights”, accessed 19 May 2019
corruption
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/09/
policy for the
prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
defence
sector?
2. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 12 March 2019,“Army’s new
vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police personnel”, The
Economic Times, accessed 19 May 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/armys-
new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-personnel/
articleshow/68367369.cms?from=mdr
3. CBI, 26 May 2015,“CBI ARRESTS TWO OFFICIALS OF

One can conclude from above, that the government is robustly addressing PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS
corruption at the Centre, encompassing defence. From the significant (PCDA), WESTERN COMMAND IN A BRIBERY CASE OF
changes to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to the new Vigilance RS.20,000/-“, accessed 19 May 2019
Investigation Unit in the Army, the government is taking an holistic approach. http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2015-05-26-1.php
Evidence of CBI cases filed against defence personnel shows that there is
legal apparatus at work and implementation of the anti-corruption measures 4. CBI, 13 May 2016, “CBI REGISTERS A CASE AGAINST
There is an action plan at the
[1][2][3][4][5]. DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF CRPF IN A CASE RELATING
ministry level that reflects the There is an action plan at the
TO RECRUITMENT IN CRPF”, accessed 19 May 2019
The action plan at the ministry level institutional weaknesses in the There is an action plan at the ministry level but it is superficial, If a country does not have an
The area of defence that has courted the most controversy historically in http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2016-05-13-1.php
reflects the institutional weaknesses in system. While steps have been ministry level that reflects the and does not address the There is no action plan to anti-corruption policy that also
Effective India is procurement. It seems that this is acknowledged and the Defence
7B
implementation
the system, and implementation has
progressed according to the estimated
taken to implement the plan, it is
either behind schedule, or
institutional weaknesses in the
system, but no actions have been
institutional weaknesses in the
system, OR there efforts to
implement the policy, nor have
any actions been taken.
applies to the defence sector,
this sub-indicator should be
75 Procurement Procedure (DPP) mechanisms are being tightened to allow less 5. CBI, 16 May 2019,“PROBE IN BOFORS CASE TO
room for corruption, greater transparency and probity. There is evidence that CONTINUE”, accessed May 19 2019
timeline. implementation is not addressing taken to implement it. implement an action plan at the marked Not Applicable.
sanctions have been recently applied such as suspension and banning. As of http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2019-05-16-1.php
the priority items in the action national level.
2018, six firms were debarred from further business dealings with Ministry of
plan.
Defence for a period of ten years [6][7]. This also applied to allied and 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 19 February 2018,
subsidiary firms of each of the debarred firms. Business dealings with “Details of firms debarred/put on hold/suspended etc. from
fourteen firms were suspended. Orders were issued restricting procurement doing business with MoD”, accessed 10 May 2019
from two other firms. In the past, Lockheed Martin, Textron, and Boeing have https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/firmshold.pdf
all been fined for failing to meet offset obligations [8].
7. Defence-Aerospace, 19 February 2018, “India MoD
Updates Blacklist of Debarred Defense Contractors”, accessed
11 May 2019
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/
3/190891/india-updates-blacklist-of-debarred-defense-
contractors.html
8. Manu Pubby, 4 September 2018, “Upset over offsets: India,

US to fix old problem to take ties to new heights”, The
nation/upset-over-offsets-india-us-to-fix-old-problem-to-take-
ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/65664071.cms
1. Ministry Of Defence Government of India, “Chief Vigilance
Officer (CVO)”, accessed 18 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/chief-vigilance-officercvo
2. Central Vigilance Commission, “About Central Vigilance

Commission”, accessed 18 May 2019
http://www.cvc.nic.in/?q=about/background
There are no defence and security specific institutions within defence tasked 3. Neeraj Chauhan, 18 December 2018, “CBI files case
with countering corruption and building integrity. There are however, bodies against two Army officers”, The Times of India, accessed 2
whose remit covers these areas. February 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-files-case-against-
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a Vigilance Division looking after matters two-army-officers/articleshow/67148491.cms
Note 1: These institutions could pertaining to the Service HQs/ Inter Service Organisations under Department
also be internal and/or external of Defence, Department of Defence Research & Development and 4. CBI, 26 May 2015, “CBI ARRESTS TWO OFFICIALS OF
audit units, or anti-corruption Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare with respect to corrupt practices, PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS
agencies if their mandate irregularities and vigilance cases [1]. (PCDA), WESTERN COMMAND IN A BRIBERY CASE OF
extends to defence institutions. RS.20,000/-“, accessed 15 May 2019
There are identifiable compliance The MoD liaises with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2015-05-26-1.php
Compliance and ethics units in the
There are identifiable compliance and and ethics units within defence Note 2: Wherever the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The latter is the primary agency
defence sector are in place. But There is no evidence of such
ethics units within defence and security and security that are mandated to There are no compliance or ethics institutions are located, they investigating corruption. Since 1987, it has an Anti-Corruption Division. Over 5. Lok Sabha, “PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE”, accessed
Mandate and there are extensive weaknesses in units, but there is evidence that
8A
resources
that are mandated to handle integrity
and corruption in defence, and they are
handle integrity and corruption in
defence, but there are some
both staffing and funding, and the country is making proactive
units in place and no effort to
establish them.
need to have mandate to
engage with defence institutions
75 the years, the CBI has arrested and chargesheeted individuals carrying out 9 January 2019
corruptive practices [2][3][4]. http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
expertise or their mandate is efforts to establish them.
suitably staffed and funded. weaknesses either in staffing and actually use that mandate. CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=26&tab=0
unclear.
and funding, or expertise. So if there is a unit in another As alluded to in Q.1, the MoD’s expenditure is scrutinised by Comptroller and
department, we'd be looking for Auditor General (CAG) and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) [5]. In the 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Procurement
evidence that they have a area of procurement, the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) certifies if Manual 2016 Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO)”, accessed
mandate to engage defence high-value procurement has been undertaken in accordance with prescribed 9 May 2019
institutions and have exercised procedures [6]. The MoD has a system of appointing Independent Monitors https://www.drdo.gov.in/sites/default/files/procurement-
that mandate. (IM), whose role is to ensure that there is transparency in business dealings manuals-document/procurement-manual-2016.pdf
[7].
7. Ministry of Defence Government of India, Acquisition Wing,
As alluded to in Q.7, the MoD has approved the establishment of a new 14 July 2017, “Appointment of Independent Monitors (IMs) in
Vigilance Investigation Unit in the Army, entrusted with conducting the Ministry of Defence”, accessed 8 August 2019
independent investigations into corruption [8]. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/appointims.pdf
8. Indian Defence News, 8 March 2019, “Govt approves mega

reform in Indian Army including wings for vigilance, human
rights”, accessed 19 May 2019
http://www.defencenews.in/article/Govt-approves-mega-
Q8. Are there reform-in-Indian-Army-including-wings-for-vigilance,-human-
independent, rights-583483
well-
resourced,
and effective
institutions
within 1. Central Vigilance Commission, “About Central Vigilance
defence and Commission”, accessed May 18th, 2019
security http://www.cvc.nic.in/?q=about/background
tasked with
building 2. Central Vigilance Commission, “Inquiry/disciplinary
integrity and matters”, March 7th, 2018, accessed May 18th, 2019
countering http://www.cvc.nic.in/sites/default/files/expp070317.pdf
corruption? CVC is conceived to be the apex vigilance institution. It is independent from
any executive authority. It is tasked with monitoring all vigilance activity under
3. CAG, “CHAPTER II : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE”, 2013,
the Central Government and advising various authorities in Central
accessed May 15th, 2019
The institutions/ units are not in the The institutions/ units may be in The institutions/ units are under Government organisations in planning, executing, reviewing and reforming
https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/
chain of command of the defence and the chain of command of the political control or they are If a country does not have these their vigilant work [1]. The CVC does however depend upon pre-inquiry from
Union_Compliance_Defence_Army_and_Ordnance_Factories
security institutions which they oversee. defence and security institutions misused. The work of the institutions or units, this sub- the MoD itself before investigating further. So though there is independence
8B Independence
They report directly to a senior member that they oversee. However they institutions can be shut down by indicator should be marked Not 50 in functioning, there is a dependency in procedural matters [2].
_30_2013_Chap_2.pdf
of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of can not be shut down by these other defence and security Applicable.
4. Lok Sabha, “PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE”, accessed
Staff). institutions. institutions. As mentioned above, CAG and PAC scrutinise MoD expenditure. They are
January 9th, 2019
independent bodies [3][4]. IMs are appointed by the MoD and are retired
Central Government Officers [5].
5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, Acquisition Wing,

“Appointment of Independent Monitors (IMs) in the Ministry of
Defence”, July 14th, 2017, accessed August 8th, 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/appointims.pdf
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 26 October

2018, “Vigilance Awareness Week 2018 to be observed from
29th Oct-3rd Nov// Theme for this year is ‘Eradicate
Corruption-Build a New India’”, accessed 18 May 2019
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report

Staff within the units understand the On the whole, anti-corruption mechanisms are in place. Units with the MoD
Staff within the units understand 16-17”, pg.190, accessed 18 May 2019
corruption risks specific to their Staff within the units understand Staff within the units understand do identify corruption risks. There is evidence of the CVC’s efforts to build
the corruption risks specific to their https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
institutions. They are able to address the corruption risks specific to their the corruption risks specific to their If a country does not have these integrity through the annual Vigilance Awareness Week, hosting workshops
institutions, and are able to These institutions or units are not
risks independently and to ensure that institutions, but they are not able institutions, but they fail to prepare institutions or units, this sub- for all military and civil personnel from the Ministry [1][2]. The CBI has been
8C Effectiveness
other departments or units handle risks
address some risks independently.
But they are not able to ensure
to address risks appropriately or an effective action plan with
even aware of corruption risks
within their institution.
indicator should be marked Not 50 proactive in pursuing corruption matters within the MoD [3][4]. There is
3. CBI, 26 May 2015, “CBI ARRESTS TWO OFFICIALS OF
PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS
appropriately. Actions to handle risks adequately, either through their appropriate mitigation measures Applicable. training, oversight and policy recommendations. The challenges lay with
other departments address risks (PCDA), WESTERN COMMAND IN A BRIBERY CASE OF
may include training, oversight, or policy own work or by compelling others. which address the risks. timely coordination of internal units and external bodies to effectively address
adequately. RS.20,000/-“, accessed 18 May 2019
recommendations. and mitigate corruption. Diffused accountability is a major hindrance.
http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2015-05-26-1.php
4. CBI, 13 May 2016, “CBI REGISTERS A CASE AGAINST

DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF CRPF IN A CASE RELATING
TO RECRUITMENT IN CRPF”, accessed 18 May 2019
5. Edelman Trust Barometer 2019, accessed 20 January 2019
https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-
01/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report.pdf
6. Transparency International, 7 March 2017, “People and

Corruption: Asia Pacific, Global Corruption Barometer”, 19
January 2019
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/
people_and_corruption_asia_pacific_global_corruption_barom
eter
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
7. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 3 May 2019
The Indian public has traditionally had a deep reverence for its Armed
https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
Forces. It sees the Armed Forces as pillars of integrity and honour. Defence
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
institutions are well-respected and are viewed as separate from the political
apparatus [1][2].
8. Indian Air Force, “The Air Force Act, 1950”, accessed 3 May
2019
According to a 2017-2019 study on Politics and Society between Elections by
https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/
Q9. Does the Azim Premji University and Lokniti (CSDS), 80% of people in India trust the
123456789/1819/1/195045.pdf
public trust military [3][4]. According to the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer 74% trust the
the current government [5]. Transparency International’s 2017 Global Corruption
9. Indian Navy, “The Navy Act, 1957”, accessed 3 May 2019
institutions of The public view is that there is a clear Barometer stated 53% of people in India think the current government is
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/NavyAct1957.pdf
defence and commitment from the defence doing well to tackle corruption despite India having a bribery rate of 69% [6].
This indicator is not scored.
security to establishment that bribery and
Please discuss conditions in the 10. India Today, 26 January 2016, “Two Army officers to face
tackle the
issue of
9 corruption are not acceptable and must
be prosecuted, and that their efforts to
country context related to good NS Each branch of the Armed Forces is governed by an Act. All Acts state
conflict of interests, acquiring goods (gifts), forms of hospitality, situations
CBI probe for corruption”, accessed 2 February 2019
practice (Score 4). https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/two-serving-army-
bribery and tackle the problem are sincere and which constitute as bribery; the punishments of such offences and the judicial
generals-face-cbi-bribe-probe-306042-2016-01-29
corruption in effective. process [7][8][9]. The Armed Forces are viewed as being efficient and
their effective at tackling corruption when such incidences occur. The public view
11. Bikash Singh, 15 October 2018, “7 armymen, including a
establishmen is that there is a clear, sincere and effective commitment from the Armed
Major General, given life sentence by Army court for fake
ts? Forces that bribery and corruption are unacceptable and must be prosecuted
encounter”, The Economic Times, accessed 17 August 2019
[10][11][12][13].
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/7-
armymen-including-a-major-general-given-life-sentence-by-
Generally, corruption in India’s defence sector seems to have occurred more
army-court-for-fake-encounter/articleshow/66206498.cms?
in defence procurement, where the government is responsible. There has
from=mdr
been acknowledgement from the current government about this. In January
2020 Prime Minister Modi spoke out against the previous government and
12. Neeraj Chauhan, 18 December 2018, “CBI files case
accused them of damaging India’s defence sector [14][15]. There is evidence
against two Army officers”, The Times of India, accessed 2
of clear commitment to investigate cases of corruption [16][17][18].
February 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-files-case-against-
two-army-officers/articleshow/67148491.cms
13. Rumel Dahiya, 1 November 2010, “Probity in the Armed

Forces”, IDSA, accessed January 19th, 2019
ProbityintheArmedForces_rdahiya_011110
There is no evidence of regular assessments of the areas of greatest

corruption risk for Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Armed Forces personnel.
However, under the New Functional Paradigm for Internal Audit in the 1. Controller General of Defence Accounts, Ministry of
Defence Accounts Department (DAD) introduced in 2016, each organisation Defence, Govt. of India, May 2016, "Policy Paper On New
is to have an "internal audit and risk management" framework. This process Functional Paradigm For Internal Audit in DAD", accessed 7
includes "assessing, monitoring and responding to risks in order to reduce August 2019 http://cgda.nic.in/audit/new_paradigm010616.pdf
There is some awareness
their impact is achieved through the implementation of a risk management
regarding risk areas, but an official
framework which consists of risk identification; risk prioritization; risk 2. Transparency International, 2015, "Government Defence
Corruption risks are clearly identified. Corruption risks are clearly risk assessment has not been
There has been a partial mitigation; implementation of mitigation plans; and review and monitoring of Anti-Corruption Index, India"
Individual departments conduct their identified, but risk assessments conducted for the ministry or No defence-specific assessment
assessment of corruption risks, mitigation plans". It is believed that a risk management framework serves as http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/india/
Risk own risk assessments in a process that are conducted on the ministry or armed force as a whole, or within of corruption risk has been
10A
assessments reflects "business-as usual," whereby armed force as a whole, rather
but it does not clearly articulate
risks for the ministry or armed
individual departments. The commissioned or taken place in 50 an “effective governance model” [1]. Periodic reviews by the Audit Advisory
Committee for the risk profile are suggested every three years. There is no 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July
corruption risk assessment is a regular than with focus on individual government may have the last 2-3 years.
forces. evidence of any such review in the public domain. Neither is there evidence 2018,“Corruption in Defence Deals”, accessed 17 May 2019
practice. departments. commissioned or taken part in ad
of defence-specific corruption assessments in the last few years such as http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
hoc assessments done by external
Transparency International’s Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index in
parties or agencies.
2013 or 2015 [2]. 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 29 March
Q10. Are
2017, “Zero Tolerance Policy”, accessed 17 May 2019
there regular
Following corruption scandals, the government at times identifies vacuums http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=160118
assessments
where corruption can arise, primarily in procurement. The implementation of
of the areas
Integrity Pacts and ratification of UNCAC are examples of this [3][4].
of greatest
corruption
risk for
ministry and
armed forces 1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July
personnel, 2018, “Corruption in Defence Deals”, accessed 17 May 2019
and are the http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
findings used
as inputs to 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Zero
the anti- There is a schedule for risk If risk assessments are not As alluded to above, there is evidence to suggest a paradigm shift in the MoD
Tolerance Policy”, 29 March 2017, accessed 17 May 2019
Risk assessments are conducted on an assessments, but they are There is no regular schedule for conducted, this sub-indicator and its incorporation of a risk management framework. There is no evidence
corruption
policy?
10B Regularity
annual basis or more frequently. conducted on a less-than-annual risk assessments. should be marked Not 0 of regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for MoD and
basis. Applicable. Armed Forces personnel, in the past few years [1][2][3].
3. Controller General of Defence Accounts, Ministry of
Defence, Govt. of India, May 2016, "Policy Paper On New
Functional Paradigm For Internal Audit in DAD", accessed 7
August 2019 http://cgda.nic.in/audit/new_paradigm010616.pdf
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July

2018, “Corruption in Defence Deals”, accessed 17 May 2019
http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
Risk assessment findings may be 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Zero
Risk assessment findings are used to If risk assessments are not
used to develop an anti-corruption Risk assessment findings are not As mentioned above, there is no evidence of regular corruption risk Tolerance Policy”, 29 March 2017, accessed 17 May 2019
Inputs to anti- develop and regularly update the anti- conducted, this sub-indicator
10C
corruption policy corruption policy and institutional action
policy or action plan, but they are
not used to regularly update either
used to inform anti-corruption
policy or practice.
should be marked Not 25 assessments but there is evidence of identification of corruption risks that
affect policy [1][2][3].
plans. Applicable.
policy or practice. 3. Controller General of Defence Accounts, Ministry of
Defence, Govt. of India, May 2016, "Policy Paper On New
Functional Paradigm For Internal Audit in DAD", accessed 7
August 2019 http://cgda.nic.in/audit/new_paradigm010616.pdf
1. Vinod Misra, 2015, “CORE CONCERNS IN INDIAN
DEFENCE AND THE IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA,
pg. 144, accessed 12 May 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 25 August

2018, “DAC Approves Procurement for Services amounting to
There is a process for acquisition India has a clear process for the whole acquisition planning cycle. The Nearly Rs. 46,000 Crores”, accessed 12 May 2019
There is a clear process for the entire There is a clear process for
planning in place, internal The process for acquisition Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) is entrusted with coordinating the fifteen http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183066
acquisition planning cycle in place, with acquisition planning in place, but
acquisition functions are planning is in place but it is not years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five years Services
formally separate internal acquisition internal acquisition planning
Acquisition separated, e.g. budget, clear, and internal functions are Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and an Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) from 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 14 March
planning functions, e.g., budget, functions are not separated, e.g. There is no defined process for
11A planning
process
commercial, and finance. Connections budget, commercial, and finance.
commercial, and finance. There
are few, if any, explicit
not separated. There are very few,
if any, explicit connections made
acquisition planning. 75 each of the services. DAC approves the LTIPP and SCAP; and the Defence
Procurement Board (DPB) approves AAPs [1][2][3]. Explicit connections
2018, “Modernisation of Defence”, accessed 12 May 2019
between specific purchases and Connections between specific
connections between specific between specific purchases and between defence purchases and requirements are usually made, though
defence strategy requirements are purchases and defence strategy
purchases and defence strategy defence strategy requirements. there is no well-defined defence policy or strategy publicly communicated [4] 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 28 May
made explicit. requirements are made explicit.
requirements. [5]. 2018, “DAC approves procurement of equipment for Defence
Forces”, accessed 8 June 2019
Q11. Does the 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 28 May

country have 2018, “DAC Approves Procurement of Equipment Worth Rs
a process for 1. Ministry
9,100 of Defence
Crores”, Government
accessed 8 June 2019of India, 2016, “Defence
acquisition Procurement Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement
planning that (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019), pg. xi,
involves clear accessed 12 May 2019
oversight, https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
and is it
publicly 2. Vinod Misra, 2015, “CORE CONCERNS IN INDIAN
available? The public has access to information DEFENCE AND THE IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA,
The public has limited access to
about the entire process itself so that The public has access to pg. 144, accessed 12 May 2019
The public has access to information about the process Procedures and guidelines related to defence acquisition are publicly
information can be obtained as needed. information about the process https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
information about the process itself, because a great deal of There is no transparency of the available as is information regarding assessment of needs. However, given
11B Transparency Information that is proactively published
includes justification of purchases, lines
itself, but information may be
itself, but some items of
information may be excluded from
information is excluded from acquisition planning process. 75 the complexity of defence acquisition in India, there can remain ambiguities
delayed or not timely published. publication, or not provided upon [1][2][3].
of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, publication. 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18
request.
and outcomes. September 2018, “DAC Approves Procurement of Equipment
Worth Rs 9,100 Crores”, accessed 12 May 2019
Oversight of defence acquisitions is primarily undertaken by the Comptroller PRID=1546476
and Auditor General (CAG), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the 1. IDSA, 2015, “Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the Standing Committee on Imperatives for Reforms”, Pg. 153, New Delhi, accessed 15
Defence. Independent monitors who are retired civil servants with necessary May 2019
There are strong external oversight These oversight functions assess
These oversight functions assess expertise monitor Pre-Integrity Pacts and any issues that arise during the https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
functions that assess the country's long- performance, and the country's
basic performance, but fail to These oversight functions either acquisition process [1]. Oversight seems to focus on timely fulfilment of Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
term acquisition plans, their legitimacy long-term acquisition plans, but
External assess long-term outcomes or the simply review the figures or check There is no external oversight of contractual obligations and procedural compliance. There have been recent
11C
oversight
and likelihood that plans are going to
function properly. Parliament is also
they fail to assess the legitimacy
of plans. Parliament is also
legitimacy of plans. Parliament is that the internal audit have the acquisition planning process. 75 concerns raised regarding redactive pricing in the ‘Performance Audit Report 2. K.P. Shashidharan, 14 May 2019, “Redactive pricing audit
not involved in oversight of reviewed the figures. of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Capital Acquisition in and the CAG’s duties”, The Hindu, accessed 15 May 2019
involved in oversight of acquisition involved in oversight of acquisition
acquisition planning. Indian Air Force (Union Government – Defence Services, Air Force, Report https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/redactive-pricing-
planning. planning.
No. 3 of 2019)’. It is believed that the redactions due to the Ministry’s audit-and-the-cags-duties/article27119997.ece
concerns about security, obscure the pricing component of procurement
decisions such as the Rafale deal [2].
1. Union Budget, 2019, “Ministry of Defence (Misc.)”, accessed

2 February 2019
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2019-20/eb/sbe19.pdf
2. Union Budget, 2019, “Defence Services (Revenue)”,

accessed 2 February 2019
3. Union Budget, 2019, “Capital Outlay on Defence Services”,

4. Union Budget, 2019, “Defence Pensions”, accessed 2

February 2019
No stand-alone comprehensive defence budget document exists in the public 5. Union Budget, “Notes on Demands for Grants, 2019-2020”,
The defence budget contains
domain. A series of detailed documents in PDF and Excel format can be accessed August 9th, 2019
comprehensive and disaggregated
viewed and downloaded respectively on the Ministry of Finance’s Union https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe19.pdf
information on expenditure across The defence budget contains
The defence budget may be Budget website pertaining to revenue, outlays and pensions [1][2][3][4]. The
functions. Information includes comprehensive information on A topline figure is published for the
Q12. Is the completely missing areas listed in Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget is further explained in two documents: 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2017, “Annual
Comprehensive personnel (salaries, allowances), expenditure across functions, but defence budget, but it is not There is no information available
defence 12A
ness military R&D, training, construction, information on some functions
score 4, or information that is
provided is highly aggregated or
broken down into functions or about the budget. 50 Detailed Demands for Grants and Defence Services Estimates [5]. An
overview of service/department-wise break up of defence
Report 2016-17”, pg. 12, accessed 2 February 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
budget procurement/acquisitions, maintenance listed in score 4 may be not be areas.
transparent, vague for most functions. expenditure/estimates and allocations can be found in MoD’s Annual Reports
of equipment, disposal of assets, and available in disaggregated form.
showing key and on its website [6][7]. Further information can be found in reports from the 7. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Budget and
administrative expenses (Ministry of
items of Standing Committee on Defence [8]. Reports from media outlets provide at Accounts”, accessed 9 August 2019
Defence or other services).
expenditure? times, detailed particulars [9][10]. https://mod.gov.in/dod/budget-and-accounts
And it is
provided to 8. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,
the "STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2018-19)
legislature in (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY-NINTH REPORT",
a timely accessed 2 February 2019
fashion? http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
16_Defence_49.pdf
9. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Defence

Budget 2019-20”, February 2nd, 2019 accessed February 2nd,
2019
10. NDTV, “Live Budget 2019”, accessed 2 February 2019

https://www.ndtv.com/budget
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 2 February
2019, “Defence Budget 2019-20”, accessed 2 February 2019
PRID=1562374
The legislature either receives no The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal in a timely 2. Laxman Kumar Behera, 4 February 2019, “Interim Defence
The legislature receives an accurate The legislature receives an
information, or it receives manner ahead of the start of the budget year. There is no evidence to Budget 2019-20”, IDSA, accessed 9 August 2019
defence budget proposal between 2-4 accurate defence budget proposal
12B Timeliness
months before the start of the budget less than two months before the
misleading or inaccurate
information on proposed defence
100 suggest otherwise [1]. From 2017-18, the budget presentation is advanced by
a month to February 1st. The budget is passed before the financial year
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/interim-defence-budget-2019-20-
lkbehera-040219
year. start of the budget year.
expenditures. starts on April 1st [2][3].
3. Union Budget, “Notes on Demands for Grants, 2019-2020”,
accessed August 9th, 2019
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe19.pdf
1. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE
ON DEFENCE; Committee Information”, accessed 2 February
2019
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
The Standing Committee on Defence is responsible for defence budget 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “STANDING
scrutiny and analysis. It considers the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
Defence (MoD) and makes reports on the same to the Houses. After the (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY SECOND
There is a defence committee with
general discussion on the budget in the House is over, the Lok Sabha is REPORT”, accessed 2 February 2019
extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the
There is a defence committee with adjourned for a fixed period. The Committee considers the Demands for http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
defence budget. The committee has the No such legislative committee
formal rights of scrutiny of the Grants of the Ministry of Defence under its jurisdiction during this period and 16_Defence_42.pdf
13A Formal rights power to scrutinise any aspect of budget
and expenditures. The committee is in a
defence budget, but lacks some of
exists, or it lacks any formal
powers over the defence budget.
100 presents/lays reports. The Committee may appoint Sub-Committees and
the powers listed in score 4. study groups from amongst the members of the Committee to make detailed 3. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE
position to require expert witnesses to
studies/examinations of the subjects selected by it and scrutinise the actions ON DEFENCE; Committee Information”, accessed 2 February
appear in front of it.
taken by the government on the Observations/Recommendations contained 2019
in the original Reports [1]. The Committee is in a position to call expert http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
witnesses in front of it [2][3][4]. CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
4. Ministry of Defence, January 2019, Action Taken by the

Q13. Is there Government on the Recommendations/Observations
a legislative contained in the 32nd Report of the Standing Committee on
committee (or Defence (Sixteenth Lok Sabha), accessed 9 August 2019
other 164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_44.pdf
appropriate
body)
responsible
for defence 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “STANDING
budget COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
scrutiny and (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY SECOND
analysis in an REPORT”, accessed 2 February 2019
effective http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
way? 16_Defence_42.pdf
2. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE

ON DEFENCE; Committee Information”, accessed 2 February
The Standing Committee on Defence carries out in-depth analysis of the
The committee has introduced 2019
The committee performs all the Demand for Grants through formal mechanisms and provides written
amendments to the budget and there The committee reviews the http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/
functions of score 4, but this may The committee reviews the recommendations in reports [1]. There is a sphere of influence but ultimately,
is evidence that in some instances defence budget, but fails to take If there is no committee or it CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=7&tab=1
not be in a timely fashion or there defence budget and attempts to as stated by the Lok Sabha, “Demands for Grants are considered by the
Influence on these have resulted in changes to the advantage of its formal powers of The committee has no impact on lacks any formal powers, this
13B
decision-making budget. The committee engages in mid-
may be clear instances where the
committee fails to scrutinise
influence budgetary decisions
through formal mechanisms, but
scrutiny. It may exercise informal defence budget decision-making. sub-indicator should be marked 50 House in the light of the Reports of the Committee.” [2] As alluded to in Q.2,
the government on average accepts over half of the Committee’s
3. Ministry of Defence, January 2019, Action Taken by the
year expenditure review and can strike influence over the budget in the Not Applicable. Government on the Recommendations/Observations
effectively aspects of the budget these attempts are limited. recommendations. At times SCoD does not find the government’s response
out expenditures before they are case of no formal powers. contained in the 32nd Report of the Standing Committee on
before the start of the fiscal year. adequate as recently seen regarding the recommendations related to the
incurred. Defence (Sixteenth Lok Sabha), accessed 9 August 2019
creation of a non-lapsable capital fund account [3][4].
164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_44.pdf
4. Manoj Joshi, 22 August 2018, "Scraping the bottom of the

barrel: Budgets, organisation and leadership in the Indian
defence system", ORF, accessed 9 August 2019
https://www.orfonline.org/research/43496-scraping-the-bottom-
of-the-barrel-budgets-organisation-and-leadership-in-the-
indian-defence-system/
1. Union Budget, “Ministry of Defence (Misc.)”, accessed 2

February 2019
2. Union Budget, “Defence Services (Revenue)”, accessed 2

February 2019
As alluded to in Q.12, no stand-alone comprehensive defence budget
3. Union Budget, “Capital Outlay on Defence Services”,
document exists in the public domain. A series of detailed documents in PDF
and Excel format can be viewed and downloaded respectively on the Ministry
of Finance’s Union Budget website pertaining to revenue, outlays, pensions
and Demand for Grants [1][2][3][4][5]. The Ministry of Finance publishes an
4. Union Budget, “Defence Pensions”, accessed 2 February
interactive presentation of sector-wise components of the budget displaying
The approved defence budget is 2019
key takeaways. Interestingly, the defence sector is not shown on the
proactively published for the public in The approved defence budget is https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2019-20/eb/sbe22.pdf
The approved defence budget is microsite [6]. In an IDSA publication, it was stated that, “While budget
disaggregated form. It is accompanied proactively published for the public
Proactive published for the public in The approved defence budget is documents are presented annually to parliament, the data provided by them
14A
publication
by an explanation of the budget
intended for experts, as well as a
in disaggregated form. They
provide some budgetary
aggregated form with limited or no not made publicly available at all. 50 offer limited opportunity for in-depth research. Annual reports of Ministry of
accessed August 9th, 2019
budgetary explanation. Defence(MoD) are sanitised documents, often containing less information
concise summary with clear language explanation but it is superficial. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe19.pdf
than provided by newspapers. Available materials on planning and budgeting
for non-experts.
are individual recollections of authors based on their subjective
6. Ministry of Finance, "UNION BUDGET 2018-2019",
interpretations or judgements.” [7].
https://mofapp.nic.in/budgetmicrosite/index.html
The topline of the approved defence budget is proactively published for the
public [8].
7. Narendra Singh Sisodia & Amit Cowshish, 2015 “CORE
CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE IMPERATIVES
FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, pg. 10, accessed 2 February 2019

2019 “Defence Budget 2019-20”, accessed 2 February 2019
Q14. Is the
approved
defence
budget made
publicly
available? In
practice, can
citizens, civil
society, and
the media
obtain
detailed
information
on the
defence
budget?
February 2019

Q14. Is the February 2019
approved https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2019-20/eb/sbe20.pdf
defence
budget made 3. Union Budget, “Capital Outlay on Defence Services”,
publicly accessed 2 February 2019
available? In https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2019-20/eb/sbe21.pdf
practice, can
citizens, civil 4. Union Budget, “Defence Pensions”, accessed 2 February
society, and As discussed in Q.12, no comprehensive unified defence budget document 2019
the media exists in the public domain directly from the government. A series of detailed https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/ub2019-20/eb/sbe22.pdf
obtain documents in PDF and Excel format can be viewed and downloaded
detailed Most areas of the approved
The vast majority of the approved respectively on the Ministry of Finance’s Union Budget website pertaining to 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report
information defence budget are not published
defence budget is fully disclosed to the revenue, outlays and pensions [1][2][3][4]. An overview of 16-17”, pg. 12, accessed 2 February 2019
on the in detail but there is still evidence If there is no defence budget
media and civil society actors. There Most areas of the approved service/department-wise break up of defence expenditure/estimates and https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
Comprehensive of oversight by other suitable published at all, this sub-
defence
budget?
14B
ness
may be exceptions made for legitimate
sensitive areas, but there is clear and
authorities. Certain areas of the
defence budget are not publicly
available.
indicator should be marked Not 50 allocations can be found in MoD’s Annual Reports [5]. Further information
can be found in reports from the Standing Committee on Defence [6]. 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,
budget are undisclosed but this is Applicable.
robust oversight of the full budget by Reports from media outlets provide at times, detailed particulars [7][8]. STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2018-19)
neither made clear nor publicly
other suitable authorities. (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY-NINTH REPORT,
justified.
A breakdown and analysis is at times published by think tanks offering accessed 2 February 2019
greater clarity and insight [9]. http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
16_Defence_49.pdf

2019, “Defence Budget 2019-20”, accessed 2 February 2019
8. NDTV, “Live Budget 2019”, accessed 2 February 2019

https://www.ndtv.com/budget
9. Laxman Kumar Behera, 5 February 2018, “Defence Budget

2018-19: The Imperative of Controlling Manpower Cost”,
IDSA, accessed 2 February 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/issuebrief/ib-defence-budget-2018-
19-manpower-cost-lkbehera.pdf
Under the Right To Information Act, 2005, citizens can request and obtain
government information [1]. Under Chapter II, Section 4 (b)(xi): 1. Right to Information Website, “About RTI Portal”, accessed
“(xi) the budget allocated to each of its agency, indicating the particulars of all 2 February 2019
plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made” [2]. https://rti.gov.in/aboutrti.asp
The disposal of the request has to be in a timely manner. Under Chapter II, 2. Right To Information Act, 2005, accessed 2 February 2019
Section7: https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
“7. Disposal of request.—(/) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (2) of
Information requested by citizens, Information requested by citizens, Information requested by citizens, There is a serious and systematic
section 5 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 6, the Central Public 3. Right To Information Act, 2005, accessed 2 February 2019
media, and civil society about the media, and civil society about the media, and civil society about the failure to release information. This
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
defence budget is provided in a timely defence budget is provided, but defence budget is provided, but may be in specific areas
Response to It is extremely difficult or on receipt of a request under section 6 shall, as expeditiously as possible,
fashion, without systematic and there may be unjustifiable delays. there may be occasional delays or accessibility to requested
14C information
requests
unjustifiable delays. There are few There are few instances where without obvious justification. There information may vary according to
impossible to obtain any detail on
the budget.
75 and in any case within thirty days of the receipt of the request. either provide
the information on payment of such fee as may be prescribed or reject the
4. The New Indian Express, 6 January 2019, “MHA rejected
highest proportion of RTI requests, Finance Ministry second in
instances where information is unduly information is unduly refused or may also be a pattern of unduly the identity of the individual or
request for any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9: list”, accessed 2 February 2019
refused or redacted for national security redacted for national security refusing or redacting information organisation requesting
Provided that where the information sought for concerns the life or liberty of a http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/jan/06/mha-
reasons. reasons. for national security reasons. information.
person, the same shall be provided within forty-eight hours of the receipt of rejected-highest-proportion-of-rti-requests-1921133.html
the request” [3].
5. Central Information Commission, “Annual Report 2017-18”,
According to a recent 2019 report, the MoD has one of the lowest RTI accessed 2 February 2019
rejection rates [4]. The 2017-2018 report of the Chief Information https://cic.gov.in/sites/default/files/Reports/AR-
Commission (CIC) stated that the MoD received 80,233 RT applications but 2018%20English%20%2802-01-2019%29%20-%20final.pdf
rejected only 4,043 requests seeking disclosure of information [5].

May 2019

September 2019
There is full publication of income
There is full publication of all sources, but there may be little or There is only selective publication 3. Union Budget, “Capital Outlay on Defence Services”,
There is no publication of non-
There is full publication of all sources of sources of income, the amounts no release of information about of income sources, and no There are no publicly available official financial statements containing non- accessed 15 May 2019
central government sources of
15A Transparency income, the amounts received, and the received, but inadequate
allocation of this income. information on the allocation of
amounts received or the allocation
of this income, or there may be full
information released on amounts
received or the allocation of this
funding, or the information that is 25 central government defence income particulars [1][2][3][4]. There are other
financial statements available such as the Defence Services Estimates [5].
published is considered unreliable.
income. publication but only of selected income. 4. Union Budget, “Receipts Budget, 2016-2017”, accessed 15
income sources. May 2019
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2016-2017/ub2016-17/
rec/allrec.pdf

Q15. Are
sources of
defence
income other
than from
central
government
allocation
(from
equipment
sales or
property
disposal, for
example)
published
and
scrutinised?
Q15. Are
sources of 1. Comptroller General of Defence Accounts, “Internal Audit”,
defence accessed 15 May 2019
income other http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=ia
than from
central 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Finance
government Division”, accessed 15 May 2019
allocation Mechanisms of scrutiny are in As stated above, there is no official information on non-central government https://mod.gov.in/dod/finance-division
(from place and administered involving a Mechanisms of scrutiny are in defence income particulars. Internal audits are carried out by the Comptroller
equipment Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and central government department place and administered by the Any institutional scrutiny that is General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) and the Secretary (Defence 3. CAG, “CHAPTER II : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE”, 2013,
sales or administered by a central government such as the supreme audit internal audit office within the conducted on non-central There is no institutional scrutiny of Finance)/Financial Adviser (Defence Services) [1][2]. There is scrutiny by accessed 15 May 2019
Institutional
property 15B
scrutiny
department, i.e., supreme audit institution. However, the internal
institution, and the internal audit office audit office within the defence
defence ministry. However, the
supreme audit institution does not
government sources of funding
suffers from political influence so
non-central government sources
of funding.
75 CAG and PAC and in 2013, audit reports stated that the MoD has in a few
instances over time misused land and earmarked “Inordinate delay in
https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2013/
Union_Compliance_Defence_Army_and_Ordnance_Factories
disposal, for
example) within the defence ministry. ministry may either fail to conduct scrutiny of non-central as to be unreliable. renewal of leases of Defence land resulting in non-realisation of revenue”, _30_2013_Chap_2.pdf
published scrutinise funding, or may not be government funding. “unauthorized occupation of Defence land by other departments” and “non-
and allowed to release findings. recovery of service charges from Railways”[3][4]. 4. Kartikeya Sharma, 17 October 2013, “Defence land not
scrutinised? being managed properly, unauthorised use for golf and other
activities”, accessed 15 May 2019
https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/ministry-of-defence-
defence-estate-management-army-indian-army-golf-214559-
2013-10-17
1. Kartikeya Sharma,17 October 2013, “Defence land not

being managed properly, unauthorised use for golf and other
activities”, accessed 15 May 2019
https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/ministry-of-defence-
defence-estate-management-army-indian-army-golf-214559-
There is public scrutiny if misappropriations are reported in the media, as 2013-10-17
There is some scrutiny by the
There is considerable and consistent Public scrutiny of non-central there is no official information on non-central government defence income
public, including media and CSOs,
15C Public scrutiny scrutiny by the public, including media
and CSOs.
but it may not be in-depth or
government sources of funding is
minimal or non-existent.
50 particulars publicly available and accessible. The misappropriation is debated 2. Times of India, 5 February 2018, “PCB to take up land
by media outlets, the public is encouraged to share their thoughts and the ‘misuse’ with 12 eateries, serve closure notices”, accessed 15
consistent.
topic becomes a talking point [1][2]. May 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/pcb-to-take-up-
land-misuse-with-12-eateries-serve-closure-notices/
articleshow/62796277.cms
1. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “About DAD”,

The Comptroller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) is head of the http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=abtdad
Defence Accounts Department (DAD) and undertakes the internal audit of the
Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) defence expenditure. The DAD corresponds 2. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “Mandate and
broadly to the organisation of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Charter of Audit”, accessed 15 May 2019
Ordnance Factories, Defence Research & Development Organisation http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
(DRDO), Canteen Store Department, Coast Guard, Border Roads
Organisation and Inter-Service Organisations [1]. The Audit 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Finance
conclusions/findings relating to serious irregularities are submitted to the Division”, accessed 15 May 2019
Secretary (Defence Finance)/Financial Adviser (Defence Services) and https://mod.gov.in/dod/finance-division
Defence Secretary in the form of Internal Audit Report. An Annual Audit
Certificate is rendered by the CGDA for inclusion in the Appropriation 4. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “Internal Audit”,
Account, which are countersigned by CAG and placed in Parliament. accessed 15 May 2019
Appropriation Accounts of the Defence (Civil) and Defence Pensions are http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=ia
prepared by the office of the CGDA and signed by the CGDA [2].
5. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “Mandate and
The internal audit unit engages in The internal audit unit engages in The Secretary (Defence Finance)/Financial Adviser (Defence Services) Charter of Audit”, accessed 15 May 2019
The internal audit unit engages in
ongoing reviews of defence ministry ongoing reviews of defence performs an advisory role and discharges the responsibility for payments and http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
ongoing reviews of defence The internal audit unit engages in
expenditures and has the flexibility to ministry expenditures but may not internal audit of defence expenditure through the CGDA [3].
ministry expenditures but there are irregular and superficial reviews of
build its own work programme for the have flexibility to build its own There is little to no internal audit of 6. Controller General of Defence Accounts, Ministry of
16A Activity
year. Staff expertise is appropriate (e.g. work programme for the year.
questions over effectiveness. Staff defence ministry expenditure.
expertise may not be appropriate There may be regular deviation
defence ministry expenditure. 50 Financial Advisor (Defence Services) is responsible for the preparation of the Defence, Govt. of India, May 2016, "Policy Paper On New
there is low staff turnover rate). Its Staff expertise is generally Appropriation Accounts of the Defence Services and for their submission to Functional Paradigm For Internal Audit in DAD", accessed
or its findings may not be valued from formalised processes.
findings are valued by the defence appropriate and findings are CAG and the Director General of Audit, Defence Services [4]. The internal August 7th, 2019
by the defence minister.
minister. valued by the defence minister. audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures. http://cgda.nic.in/audit/new_paradigm010616.pdf
There is no evidence to suggest staff expertise is not appropriate. Staff 7. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on
turnover figures are not available. It is unclear if the internal audit units have Working of Canteen Stores Department, Union Government
the flexibility to build their own work programme for the year. Audit is guided (Defence Services - Army) Report No. 38 of 2016
by principles laid down in the Defence Audit Code, instructions in Local Audit (Performance Audit),
Manuals of each branch, with instructions periodically reviewed with https://cag.gov.in/webroot/uploads/download_audit_report/
reference to risk assessment and mitigation of the risks in the prescribed 2017/
procedures [5]. Under the New Functional Paradigm for Internal Audit in the Report_38_of_2016_Union_Government_Defence_PA.pdf
Defence Accounts Department (DAD) introduced in 2016, each organisation
is to have an "internal audit and risk management" framework [6]. 8. The Economic Times, 11 July 2018, "CAG slams Defence
Ministry over poor execution of health scheme for ex-
Q16. Is there There has been some criticism that internal audit has at times been weak. servicemen", accessed 9 August 2019
an effective This was evident in the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme where 1. Comptroller General of Defence Accounts, “Mandate and
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/cag-
internal audit there were discrepancies in the internal audit of medical bills [7][8]. Charter of Audit”, accessed May 15th, 2019
slams-defence-ministry-over-poor-execution-of-health-
process for http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
scheme-for-ex-servicemen/articleshow/50286292.cms?
defence from=mdr
ministry 2. Rahul Tripathi, “Defence accounts scam: 6 officials removed
expenditure in Jabalpur” The Times of India, July 29th, 2010, accessed
(that is, for May 15th, 2019
example, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Defence-accounts-
transparent, scam-6-officials-removed-in-Jabalpur/articleshow/
Internal audit processes are comprehensive and according to procedures, full
conducted by Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical Oversight occurs for sensitive or There may be no oversight for 6234222.cms
There is no oversight for sensitive This refers to parliamentary reports should be available to oversight bodies such as the Standing
appropriately issues. Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. critical issues. Enabling oversight sensitive or critical issues or There is no enabling oversight of
or critical issues and enabling oversight committees only. If Committee on Defence and CAG [1]. There is evidence of external scrutiny
skilled parliamentary committees) are provided bodies (e.g. parliamentary enabling oversight bodies (e.g. the internal audit function of 3. “Chandigarh: CBI nabs two defence accounts officers for
Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. there is no internal audit of by the likes of CAG and at times the CBI. In 2010, the CBI had started a
individuals, 16B
oversight
with non-redacted reports, which allow
them to be effective in their oversight
committees) are provided with
reports that may contain some
parliamentary committees) are
provided with reports that contain
parliamentary committees) are
defence ministry expenditure, or
there is no form of report provided
defence ministry expenditure, 50 crackdown on the CGDA office and arrested defence accounts officials on
corruption”, Hindustan Times, May 26th, 2015, accessed May
15th, 2019
and subject
provided with reports in summary this sub-indicator should be charges of bribery and loss to the exchequer on a few separate occasions [2]
to role. gaps/redactions, or they are in gaps/ redactions, or they are in to the oversight committee. https://www.hindustantimes.com/chandigarh/chandigarh-cbi-
form only. marked Not Applicable. [3][4]. One cannot ascertain the extent of inclusion of sensitive issues as
parliamentary summary form only. summary form only. nabs-two-defence-accounts-officers-for-corruption/story-
internal audit reports are not publicly available to peruse.
oversight)? eSPgnH3meZFErWFA5DFgDP.html
1.
4. Controller General of TWO
CBI, “CBI ARRESTS Defence Accounts,OF
OFFICIALS “Mandate and
PRINCIPAL
Internal audit reports are Charter of Audit”,OF
CONTROLLER accessed
DEFENCE15 May 2019
ACCOUNTS (PCDA),
Internal audit reports are rarely
Internal audit reports are proactively proactively released to legitimate Internal audit reports are http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
WESTERN COMMAND IN A BRIBERY CASE OF
released to legitimate external
released to legitimate external audit external audit bodies (e.g. anti- sometimes released to legitimate If there is no internal audit of As alluded to above, there is evidence of external scrutiny by CAG and the RS.20,000/-“, May 26th, 2015, accessed May 15th, 2019
audit bodies. When they are it is in There is no external scrutiny of the
External bodies (e.g. anti-corruption corruption organisation). The external audit bodies and the defence ministry expenditure, CBI [1][2]. External audit and oversight agencies can examine the internal 2. CBI, 26 May 2015, “CBI ARRESTS TWO OFFICIALS OF
16C
scrutiny organisations). The internal audit internal audit process is subject to internal audit process is subject to
summary form only, and the
internal audit process is rarely
internal audit function of defence
ministry expenditure.
this sub-indicator should be 50 audit reports. It is not clear if internal audit reports are available to external
PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS
process is subject to regular and in in depth but not necessarily sporadic or superficial reviews by marked Not Applicable. anti-corruption organisations. Given the secrecy of the MoD, it is unlikely. (PCDA), WESTERN COMMAND IN A BRIBERY CASE OF
subject to reviews by external
depth reviews by external audit bodies. regular reviews by external external auditors. RS.20,000/-“, accessed 15 May 2019
auditors.
auditors. http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2015-05-26-1.php
parliamentary
oversight)?
1. Dinesh Narayanan, 11 July 2018, “How pay, pensions and

sloth eat up India's defence funds”, The Economic Times,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/how-pay-
At times, audit findings are recognised and at times, inadequacies are
pensions-and-sloth-eat-up-indias-defence-funds/articleshow/
overlooked. AK Saxena former Additional Controller General of Defence
52843465.cms
Accounts (CGDA) at the time of his retirement in May 2016, wrote letters to
the Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Defence Minister “lamenting the
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 3 January
state of affairs in the country’s defence establishment.” He highlighted that
2018, “Recommendations of Shekatkar Committee”, accessed
widespread mismanagement, wasteful expenditure and lack of transparency
15 May 2019
was eating away at public funds allocated for defence each year and that
despite submitting many system studies, no institutional action had been
If there is no internal audit of
The ministry sometimes The ministry fails to address audit taken [1].
Institutional The ministry regularly addresses audit defence ministry expenditure, 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Report of
16D
outcomes findings in its practices.
addresses audit findings in its
practices, but not regularly.
findings in its practices, or only
incorporates minor changes.
this sub-indicator should be 50 Later that year a Committee of Experts (CoE) was constituted by the MoD
Shekatkar Committee”, Febraury 4th, 2019, accessed May
marked Not Applicable. 15th, 2019
under the chairmanship of Lt Gen (Retd) DB Shekatkar to recommend
measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance defence expenditure
of the Armed Forces [2]. The Committee was mandated and conducted a
4. Sandip Dighe, 8 November 2017, “Key recommendations
comprehensive internal audit. The findings of the report within the term of
ignored by defence ministry: Shekatkar panel”, accessed 9
reference of the Committee were implemented according to a government
August 2019
press release in 2018. In total 188 recommendations were made and 99 were
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/key-
accepted by the MoD [3][4].
recommendations-ignored-by-defence-ministry-shekatkar-
panel/articleshow/61558168.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campa
ign=cpps
1. CAG, “Our Mandate”, accessed 2 February 2019

https://cag.gov.in/en/page-constitutional-provisions
2. CAG, “Defence and National Security Audit Reports”,

Military defence expenditure is externally audited by the Comptroller Auditor accessed 2 February 2019
General of Accounts (CAG) who has mandate under the provisions of the https://cag.gov.in/en/audit-report?
Indian Constitution [1]. CAG reviews the defence sector and regularly audits ts=allwords&title=defence&gt=&udt=&state=&state%5B
The external audit unit has the military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. CAG undertakes %5D=&lbt=&sector=&sector%5B
The external audit unit has the mandate
mandate to review the defence The external audit unit has the The external audit unit has the compliance, financial and performance audits [2]. %5D=41&report_type=&report_type%5B
to review the defence sector, and
sector, and regularly audits mandate to review the defence mandate to review the defence %5D=&od=&yrf=&yrt=
regularly audits military defence
military defence spending in a sector, and audits military defence sector, but does not do so There is little to no external audit There is additional oversight by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that is
17A Activity spending in a formal, in-depth process.
Both financial audits and performance
formal, in-depth process. Review spending on a semi-regular, regularly or in much depth. There of defence ministry expenditure. 100 constituted every year under Rule 308 of the Rules of Procedure and 3. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “Rules of Procedure and
consists of primarily financial formal basis. Only financial and may be regular deviation from Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha [3]. The primary function of PAC is to Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha: Section 308”, pg.112,
audits (value for money) of defence
audits, rather than performance compliance audits are performed. formalised processes. ascertain that money granted by Parliament has been spent by the accessed 2 February 2019
spending are conducted.
audits. government "within the scope of the demand."[4]. It has been observed that http://164.100.47.194/loksabha/rules/RULES-2010-P-
PAC reports regarding defence are few in number, despite active publication FINAL_1.pdf
in other sectors.
4. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “Public Accounts Committee
Information”, accessed 2 February 2019
1. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Commentary”,

https://cag.gov.in/en/page-duties-power-and-conditions-of-
services-act
2. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “CAG pulls up Ministry of Defence for

Boeing Anti-submarine aircraft deal”, India Today, 8 August
The external audit unit is
CAG is independent and functions autonomously [1][2]. PAC constitutes of 2018, accessed 2 February 2019
independent of the Defence The scrutiny of the external audit
The external audit unit is independent of 15 members from the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and 7 members from the https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/cag-pulls-up-ministry-of-
Ministry but reports to the unit is regularly undermined (e.g.
the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. If there is no external audit of Rajya Sabha (Upper House). Each member has a term of one year. The Lok defence-for-boeing-anti-submarine-aircraft-deal-1308702-
executive. It has its own budget by military and/or the executive)
passed by parliament rather than defence ministry expenditure, Sabha Speaker appoints the Chairman of PAC [3]. PAC is a Parliamentary 2018-08-08
17B Independence
government), and there are legal
(e.g. passed by parliament rather
than government), and there are
and this might be due to significant
influence from the Defence
this sub-indicator should be 100 committee and is representative of the will of the people.
protections in place for this budget not marked Not Applicable. 3. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “Public Accounts Committee
legal protections in place for this Ministry or lack of control of its
to be altered during the budget year. The salary of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India is determined by Information”, accessed 2 February 2019
budget not to be altered during the own budget.
Parliament [4]. http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Committee/
budget year.
4. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Article 148 -

Comptroller and Auditor-General of India”, accessed 8 June
2019
Q17. Is there
effective and
transparent
external
auditing of
military
defence
expenditure?
1. CAG, 28 July 2017,“Report No.26 of 2017 - Performance
audit Union Government Disbursement of Defence Pension
Reports of Defence Services”, accessed 19 February 2019
Report_No.26_of_2017_-
_Performance_audit_Union_Government_Disbursement_of_D
efence_Pension_Reports_of_Defence_Services.pdf
2. CAG, 21 July 2017, “Report No.19 of 2017 - Compliance

audit Union Government (Defence Public Sector Undertakings
– Ministry of Defence)”, accessed 19 February 2019
Report_No_19_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Governme
nt_Defence_%20Defence_PSU%20_Ministry_of_Defence.pdf
3. Lok Sabha, February 2019, “ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY

SEVENTH REPORT PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE
Q17. Is there (2018-19) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA): PROCUREMENT OF
effective and AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING INSTRUMENTATION
Audit reports are published by CAG and PAC and are available online [1][2]
transparent SYSTEM”, accessed 19 February 2019
External audit reports are [3][4]. These reports are presented in Parliament hence are public
external http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Public%20Accounts/
External audit information is published published online (e.g. reports on documents.
auditing of 16_Public_Accounts_137.pdf
online proactively (in accordance with audited accounts, oral briefings, It is noted that CAG has not released any Defence and National Security
military External audit reports are rarely If there is no external audit of
existing FoIA regulations), within a expert advice, investigative work), reports online since the beginning of 2018. Findings of reports have been
published online and are not defence ministry expenditure, 4. Lok Sabha, “ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIRST
defence
expenditure?
17C Transparency reasonable timeline and in detail (e.g.
including analysis on audited accounts,
but with some redactions, in
summary form, or only with a
provided upon request. this sub-indicator should be 50 cited in the media [5]. Recently, a CAG report had to be redacted and a
dissent note was apparently written by CAG. The government cited national
REPORT PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (2018-19)
marked Not Applicable. (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA): AVOIDABLE PROCUREMENT
oral briefings, expert advice, superficial treatment of the issue, security concerns for disallowing the publication of certain details of the
OF A MOBILE NITROGEN GAS GENERATOR PLANT;
investigative work). and may not be made available Rafale deal with France. The unredacted report will be shared with PAC
INFRUCTUOUS PROCUREMENT OF MATERIAL;
within a reasonable timeline. according to the media [6].
DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED AEROSTAT
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM; AND IRREGULAR
EXPENDITURE ON CONSTRUCTION OF VEHICLE
TESTING GROUND”, February 2019, accessed February 19
2019
http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Public%20Accounts/
16_Public_Accounts_131.pdf
5. K.P. Shashidharan, 14 May 2019, “Redactive pricing audit

and the CAG’s duties”, The Hindu, accessed 17 May 2014
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/redactive-pricing-
audit-and-the-cags-duties/article27119997.ece
6. Manu Pubby, 14 February 2019, “Not allowed to present

unredacted report: CAG records dissent”, The Economic
Times, accessed 14 May 2019
nation/not-allowed-to-present-unredacted-report-cag-records-
dissent/articleshow/67985262.cms
1. KP Shashidharan, 10 May 2019, “Tragic destiny – Part-II”,

The Statesman, accessed 14 May 2019
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/governance-tragic-
destiny-part-ii-1502753614.html
2. CAG, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of

The Ministry acknowledges audit findings by way of replies to observations India for the year ended March 2015: Union Government
and recommendations. According to former Director General of CAG, KP (Defence Services) Army, Ordnance Factories and Defence
Shashidharan, in a recent opinion piece: “Public administrators seem to give Public Sector Undertakings
less importance to correct the chronic systemic and procedural bottlenecks, Report No. 19 of 2016”, pg.13, accessed 9 August 2019
but rather get busy in replying routinely to the CAG reports and the queries of https://cag.gov.in/webroot/uploads/download_audit_report/
the Parliamentary Committees. Lessons from the past are seldom learnt, and 2016/
as a result such deficiencies in project execution get repeated year after year Union_Government_Defence_Services_Army_Ordnance_Fact
in every report on different departments of the government.” [1] ories_and_Defence_PSUs_Report_19_2016.pdf
As previously observed, CAG has not released any Defence and National 3. CAG, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of
Security reports online since the beginning of 2018 though some of its India for the year ended March 2015: Union Government
If there is no external audit of findings are cited in the media. On the basis of the information available, (Defence Services) Navy and Coast Guard Report No. 17 of
The ministry sometimes The ministry fails to address audit
Institutional The ministry regularly addresses audit defence ministry expenditure, scrutinising CAG reports before and during the time period between 2016 2016, pg.11, accessed 9 August 2019
17D
outcomes findings in its practices.
addresses audit findings in its
practices, but not regularly.
findings in its practices, or only
incorporates minor changes.
this sub-indicator should be 50 and 2018- it is noted that there are outstanding Action Taken Notes (ATN) https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2016/
marked Not Applicable. where responses to Audit Paragraphs/Reports on ATNs by the government Union_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard_Report_N
are pending as of 2018. Some seem to be legacy issues, with responses o_17_of_2016.pdf
pending for 10 years [2]. In the 2016 report on Indian Navy and Indian
Coastguard, Audit Paragraphs/ Reports on which ATNs were not submitted 4. CAG, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of
by the Ministry even for the first time was 3. In the 2017 report, Audit India
Paragraphs/ Reports on which ATNs were not submitted by the Ministry even for the year ended March 2016: Union Government (Defence
for the first time was 1. Audit Paragraphs/ Reports on which revised ATNs Services)
were awaited was 36. In the previous year it was 27 [3][4]. Though 2018 and Navy and Coast Guard Report No. 20 of 2017, pg.11,
2019 CAG reports are not publicly available online, the 2018-19 MoD report accessed 9 August 2019
states that as of 2019, only 1 ATN is awaiting submission suggesting that the https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2017/
current government has dealt with the backlog and responses have been Report_No.20_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Governme
given [5]. nt_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard.pdf
5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report

2018-2019”, pg. 272, accessed 9 August 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf
Defence institutions are, by

Defence institutions are, by statutory or There are no restrictions on
statutory or constitutional means,
constitutional means, entirely prohibited defence institutions or individuals 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Act &
somewhat removed from having There is no evidence that defence institutions are, by statutory or
Legal from having controlling or financial having controlling or financial Rules”, accessed 14 May 2019
18A
framework interests in businesses associated with
controlling or financial interests in
businesses associated with the
interests in businesses associated 0 constitutional means, removed from having controlling or financial interests in
businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation [1].
https://mod.gov.in/acts
the country’s natural resource with the country’s natural resource
country’s natural resource
exploitation exploitation
exploitation
Q18. Is there
evidence that
the country’s
defence
institutions
have
controlling or
financial
interests in
businesses
associated
1. Arup Roychoudhury, Mayank Bhardwaj, Ross Colvin &
Robert Birsel “Indian navy prepared to deploy to South China
Sea”, Reuters, December 3rd, 2012, accessed 14 May 2019
https://in.reuters.com/article/south-china-sea-india-navy-oil-
ongc-idINDEE8B209U20121203
Research did not identify evidence of defence institutions being involved in
businesses relating to natural resource exploitation. Interests seems to be
2. Indian Navy, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian MARITIME
purely strategic, as illustrated by the Indian Navy example. As natural
Security Strategy”, 2015, pg. 5, accessed 14 May 2019
resources are connected with national security, Indian defence institutions
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/
Defence There may be instances of There may be instances of have interests in monitoring and safeguarding them [1]. A prime example is
Defence institutions involvement in Defence institutions involvement in Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
institutions: There are no cases of defence defence institutions involvement in defence institutions involvement in India’s maritime strategy. India’s dependency on the seas for its external
businesses relating to the businesses relating to the
Financial or institutions being involved in businesses businesses relating to the businesses relating to the trade and sustaining its energy needs has increased [2]. The pivot to Asia
18B
controlling relating to the country’s natural resource country’s natural resource country’s natural resource
exploitation is widespread, but
exploitation is widespread and
100 further bolsters this imperative. Since the 1980s, India has had Ecological
3. Indian Army, “Write up on Ecological TA”, accessed 18
February 2021
interests in exploitation. exploitation, but activity is exploitation, but activity is Task Force (ETF) Battalions. The ETFs consist of Army veterans and are
considered legal. mostly illicit. https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/
practice regulated. unregulated. tasked with restoration of fragile ecosystems through ecological restoration,
frmTempSimple.aspx?
biodiversity protection and conservation. They are funded by the Ministry of
MnId=hY0ZJ+sRuOc0N4siTWFtcQ==&ParentID=F7dSh0DYj
Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF& CC) and/or by respective
Q18. Is there Eyd2x9FyBvZ7w==
State Governments [3][4].
evidence that
the country’s 4. Climate Diplomacy, “Climate Diplomacy and India’s
defence Ecological Task Force”, 25 April 2017, accessed 18 February
institutions 2021
have https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/news/climate-diplomacy-
controlling or and-india%E2%80%99s-ecological-task-force
financial
interests in
businesses 1. Kartikeya Sharma, 17 October 2013, “Defence land not
associated being managed properly, unauthorised use for golf and other
with the activities”, accessed 14 May 2019
country’s https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/ministry-of-defence-
natural defence-estate-management-army-indian-army-golf-214559-
Individual defence personnel
resource Individual 2013-10-17
There are no cases of individual involvement in businesses relating
exploitation defence There may be isolated cases of Individual defence personnel Individual defence personnel
defence personnel being involved in to the country’s natural resource
and, if so, are personnel: individual defence personnel being involvement in businesses relating involvement in businesses relating There is no recent evidence of individual defence personnel being involved in 2. Times of India, “Army orders probe into land misuse”, 24
businesses relating to the country’s exploitation may be common in
these 18C Financial or
controlling
natural resource exploitation, OR there
involved in businesses relating to
the country’s natural resource
areas with major revenue streams.
to the country’s natural resource
exploitation may be common in
to the country’s natural resource
exploitation is widespread and
75 businesses relating to the country’s natural resource exploitation. However, April 2013, accessed 3 February 2019
there has in the past been incidences of misuse of defence land [1][2][3]. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/Army-orders-
interests may be isolated cases, but activity is The government is actively
publicly interests in exploitation, but activity is illicit. areas with major revenue streams. mostly illicit. probe-into-land-misuse/articleshow/19704106.cms
legal. seeking to tackle or regulate the
stated and practice
issue.
subject to 3. Times of India, “Adarsh probe indicts ex-Army chiefs, top
scrutiny? officers”, 9 July 2017, accessed 3 February 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/most-military-officers-
named-in-probe-own-flats-in-adarsh-cooperative-housing-
society/articleshow/59508952.cms
1. Indian Navy, 2015, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian

MARITIME Security Strategy”, pg. 5, accessed 14 May 2019
These interests are publicly declared, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/
with details of sources of income, These interests are publicly If there is no evidence that such Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
These interests are not publicly This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that
operations, and expenditures being declared, though details of their interests exist, this sub-indicator
18D Transparency
transparent, fully disclosed, and with operations and expenditures are
declared and are wholly non-
transparent.
should be marked Not NA such interests exist. Overarching interest in natural resources seems to be
strategic and not business related [1][2].
2. Arup Roychoudhury, Mayank Bhardwaj, Ross Colvin &
standards of governance equivalent to not transparent. Applicable. Robert Birsel “Indian navy prepared to deploy to South China
publicly owned commercial enterprises. Sea”, Reuters, December 3rd, 2012, accessed 14 May 2019
https://in.reuters.com/article/south-china-sea-india-navy-oil-
ongc-idINDEE8B209U20121203
1. Indian Navy, 2015, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
MARITIME Security Strategy”, pg. 5, accessed 14 May 2019
These interests are subject to https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/
These interests are subject to public public and/ or parliamentary If there is no evidence that such This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as there is no evidence that Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf
and/ or parliamentary scrutiny that scrutiny that explicitly analyses the These interests are subject to no interests exist, this sub-indicator such interests exist. As mentioned above, overarching interest in natural
18E Scrutiny
explicitly analyses the potential for potential for impropriety, but the form of scrutiny. should be marked Not NA resources seems to be strategic and not business related [1]. Any impropriety 2. Outlook India, 25 March 2011, “CAG Finds 'Unauthorised'
impropriety. scrutiny is superficial in nature or Applicable. would be scrutinised by CAG [2]. Holes in Army Golf Courses”, accessed 3 February 2019
rarely conducted. https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/cag-finds-
unauthorised-holes-in-army-golf-courses/716425
1. William K. Stevens, 14 October 1984, “ORGANIZED

CRIME A GROWTH INDUSTRY IN INDIA”, The New York
Times, accessed 11 February 2019
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/14/world/organized-crime-a-
growth-industry-in-india.html
2. Dr Gary K. Busch, 8 February 2019, “Organised Crime in

Asia – An [In]convenient Relationship”, Lima Charlie News,
https://limacharlienews.com/asia/organised-crime-in-asia/
India has a history of organised crime in the country. As early as 1984, the
New York Times reported organised crime was a growth industry in India. 3. Interviewee 2, Professor in International Affairs and Security
Q19. Is there The crime syndicates mainly operated in metropolitan cities such as Mumbai Studies, Research University, India, 11 February 2019
evidence, for and were involved in smuggling, extortion and local drug trafficking [1]. Since
example then, their operations have expanded [2]. 4. The Indian Express, 14 January 2019, “'Honey-trapped’
through There is moderate likelihood of There is a strong likelihood that Army jawan arrested for sharing information with Pakistani
There is very low likelihood of military
Penetration of penetration by organised crime organised crime has penetrated There is penetration or collusion of organised crime syndicates with police. spy”, accessed 11 February 2019
media
investigation
19A
organised crime
involvement in sectors in which
organised crime operates.
into the defence and security the sector, or there is confirmation 75 There are many regions in India where the nexus between police and https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-army-
s or sector. that it has done so. organised crime is acute. However, there is no conclusive evidence of the honeytrapping-isi-pakistan-spy-air-force-5536487/
prosecution penetration of organised crime into the defence sector at an institutional level.
reports, of a Though there are periodical reports of members of defence forces being 5. Mukesh Singh Sengar & Neeta Sharma, updated 9
penetration of implicated in criminal activities, these are isolated cases where involvement February 2018, “Air Force Officer Arrested In Delhi, Was
organised is at the individual level and not likely to be institutionalised [3][4][5][6]. Seduced By ISI Spies On Chat”, NDTV, accessed 11
crime into the February 2019
defence and https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-force-officer-arrested-in-
security delhi-for-allegedly-spying-for-pakistans-isi-1810501
sector? If no,
is there 6. Amitabh Srivastava, 22 April 2019, “Village of AK-47 guns:
evidence that Two more assault rifles recovered in Bihar's Mirzapur”, India
the Today, accessed 7 August 2019
government https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/village-of-ak-47-guns-two-
is alert and more-assault-rifles-recovered-in-bihar-s-mirzapur-1507070-
prepared for 2019-04-22
this risk?
crime into the
defence and
security
sector? If no,
is there
evidence that
the
government
is alert and
prepared for
this risk?
1. Press Information Bureau Government Of India website,

The government is aware of the
possibility of organised crime in the The government is aware of the
http://pib.nic.in/indexd.aspx#
defence and security sector, and is possibility of organised crime in
taking action, or would be in a position the defence and security sector,
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India website, accessed
to take action quickly should organised but its actions are unclear or The government is not actively There is no evidence to suggest that the government recognises the need to
Government 11 February 2019
19B
response
criminal activity take place. If there is a
likelihood of organised criminal action
inconsistent. This issue may be
included in the anti-corruption
trying to tackle the problem, or
only gives it lip service.
0 prepare for the risk of organised crime penetrating the defence sector [1][2]
[3].
https://mod.gov.in/
taking place, the issue is included in policy, but only superficially.
3. Central Bureau of Investigation, “Press Releases”,
the anti-corruption policy, and military Military leaders fail to publicly
leaders have publicly acknowledged the address this specific issue.
http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pressrelease.php
clear risk on this issue.
1. Indian Army, “Corps of Military Police: Role and Task”,

https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/
There exists a law enforcement agency in the Army called the Corps of
frmTempSimple.aspx?
Military Police (CMP). The CMP has a broad mandate which includes
MnId=LGbV4BrjCG0GixMTQmM36g==&ParentID=hBbiRt3jBy
assisting in the maintenance of good order and discipline; and investigating
Fxutj8V3IqmA==&flag=8CKP966uzg96kLov0aWdfQ==
cases in the Army [1]. Organised crime and corruption falls within its scope.
There is a unit within the national police There is a unit within the national
No policing function is exercised Oversight of the defence services is entrusted to Comptroller Auditor General
force that deals with organised crime police force that deals with 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report
Existence of over the defence services to of Accounts (CAG), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Standing
20A
policing function
and corruption in the defence services,
or there is a unit within the military
organised crime and corruption,
which may be authorised to work
investigate corruption or organised 75 Committee on Defence. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the
17-18”, pg. 189, accessed 14 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf
crime. the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) monitor any illegal activities which
police with the same mandate. on issues in the defence sector.
encompass corruption and organised crime respectively [2][3].
3. Central Bureau of Investigation, 9 December 2016, “CBI
ARRESTS THEN CHIEF OF AIR STAFF AND TWO OTHER
ACCUSED IN AN ON-GOING INVESTIGATION OF A CASE”,
1. Indian Army, “Corps of Military Police: Role and Task”,

https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/
frmTempSimple.aspx?
CAG, PAC, CVC and CBI have autonomy and in theory cannot be influenced
If no policing function is MnId=LGbV4BrjCG0GixMTQmM36g==&ParentID=hBbiRt3jBy
These policing functions are by the executive or military officials. The CMP is a branch of the Indian Army
These policing functions operate These policing functions are exercised over the defence Fxutj8V3IqmA==&flag=8CKP966uzg96kLov0aWdfQ==
nominally independent, but in so is not independent [1]. As of this month, May 2019, members of the CMP
independently of the bodies that they subject to considerable and services to investigate
20B Independence
investigate, and their budget is ring-
practice their work or budgets can
be interfered with by top military
regular undue influence from top corruption or organised crime, 50 will be a part of the Indian Army’s new Vigilance Investigation Unit which has
been set up to independently investigate cases [2].
2. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung,12 March 2019, “Army’s new
fenced. military officials or the executive. this sub-indicator should be vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police personnel”, The
officials or the executive.
marked Not Applicable. Economic Times, accessed 14 May 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/armys-
Q20. Is there new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-personnel/
policing to articleshow/68367369.cms
investigate
corruption
and
organised
crime within 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report
the defence 17-18”, pg. 189, accessed 14 May 2019
services and https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf
is there
evidence of 2. BBC, “Indian army officer arrested for looting gold”, 6 May
the 2016, accessed 14 May 2019
effectiveness https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36226402
of this
policing? 3. PTI, 23 August 2017, “Army officer convicted of corruption
after 27 years of trial”, Hindustan Times, accessed 2 February
2019
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-officer-
convicted-for-corruption-after-27-years-of-trial/story-
efVL6EoV2BmWtqL4JtYzaK.html
Though there is no public material on CMP investigations, there is evidence
Cases are investigated or Cases are investigated but not If no policing function is to suggest that the function of policing through joint vigillance activities with 4. The Economic Times, 18 July 2018, “CAG examining
prosecuted through formal often prosecuted. There is clear Cases are superficially exercised over the defence CAG, PAC, CVC, CBI and state law enforcement have had an effect. Cases Rafale deal; CBI probing 4 graft cases in defence deals:
Cases are investigated or prosecuted There is a complete failure to
processes, but undue political undue influence in the decision investigated, or receive "show" services to investigate are investigated and can lead to prosecution [1][2][3]. It is possible that Subhash Bhamre”, accessed 14 May 2019
20C Effectiveness through formal processes and without
undue political influence.
influence is attempted, and making process, or it may be that hearings in which defendants are
investigate or prosecute, even in
the face of clear evidence.
corruption or organised crime, 50 groundwork laid by the CPM can lead to further CBI and CVC investigations https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/cag-
sometimes effective at derailing only certain types of cases are not punished. this sub-indicator should be into illegal and corrupt practices. It is noted that no CPM equivalent exists in examining-rafale-deal-cbi-probing-4-graft-cases-in-defence-
prosecutions. prosecuted. marked Not Applicable. the other Forces but activities of CAG, PAC, CVC, CBI and state law deals-subhash-bhamre/articleshow/65043227.cms?from=mdr
enforcement do lead to investigations and prosecutions [4][5][6].
5. Central Bureau of Investigation, 9 December 2016, “CBI
ARRESTS THEN CHIEF OF AIR STAFF AND TWO OTHER
ACCUSED IN AN ON-GOING INVESTIGATION OF A CASE”,
6. India Today, “Indian Navy honeytrap case: 13 personnel

apprehended in espionage probe”, 16 February 2020,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-navy-honeytrap-
espionage-pakistan-intelligence-social-media-1647041-2020-
02-16
1. R Banerji, PK Upadhyay & Harinder Singh, 2012, “A Case
For Intelligence Reforms In India”, IDSA, pg. 42-44, accessed
20 January 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
2. National Investigative Agency website, “About Us”,

India has a number of civilian and military intelligence agencies and most are
https://www.nia.gov.in/about-us.htm
shrouded in secrecy. The most publicly prominent are the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) which is the country’s premier investigative agency; the
3. Manoj Joshi & Pushan Das, 2015, “India's Intelligence
Intelligence Bureau (IB), India’s internal intelligence agency; Research &
Agencies: In Need of Reform and Oversight”, ORF, accessed
Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s foreign intelligence agency; and the newly-
20 January 2019
formed National Investigative Agency (NIA), the Central Counter Terrorism
https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/
A parliamentary committee or Law Enforcement Agency in India [1][2].
A parliamentary committee or IssueBrief_98.pdf
independent body (e.g., appointed There is no oversight or there is
independent body (e.g., appointed by
by PM) is designated to scrutinise considerable and regular undue The intelligence services do not have constitutional authority and there are no
PM) is designated to scrutinise the 4. PTI, 1 February 2018,“10.5 per cent hike in MHA budget;
the intelligence service’s policies, influence in the oversight of the independent oversight mechanisms. Executive oversight is currently carried
intelligence service’s policies, gets Rs 92,679.86 cr for 2018-19”, The Economic Times,
administration, and budgets. It intelligence service’s policies, out by the National Intelligence Board (NIntB) and the Joint Intelligence
Q21. Are the 21A Independence administration, and budgets. It functions
without undue influence from the
may occasionally be subject to administration, and budgets. It is 0 Committee (JIC). There currently is no legal base for the intelligence
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/
policies, undue influence from the likely its mandate results in limited agencies in India and they function on executive orders. Their policies and
administratio executive or the military. Its mandate is finance/10-5-per-cent-hike-in-mha-budget-gets-rs-92679-86-
executive or the military or its power and resources to carry out administration are not disclosed [3]. Budgets for some agencies are
n, and matched by the body’s powers and cr-for-2018-19/articleshow/62743421.cms
mandate is not always matched by the oversight. mentioned in budget reports. For the fiscal year 2018-2019, The IB has been
budgets of resources.
the body’s powers and resources. allocated Rs 1,876.44 crores ($263.5 million) [4].
the 5. Sandeep Unnithan, 21 November 2012, “PIL asks for
intelligence accountability, oversight over intelligence agencies”, India
In 2016, the Supreme Court refused to admit a plea for greater scrutiny of the
services Today, accessed 20 January 2019
actions and funds of the country’s key intelligence agencies. The bench
subject to https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pil-asks-for-
stated that auditing these agencies will create a dent in their functioning and
effective and accountability-oversight-intelligence-agencies-india-today-
security [5][6].
independent 122047-2012-11-21
oversight?
6. PTI, 23 February 2016,“Supreme Court Junks Plea Seeking
To Make Intelligence Agencies Accountable”, NDTV, accessed
20 January 2019
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/supreme-court-junks-plea-
seeking-to-make-intelligence-agencies-accountable-1280316

The oversight function has access For Intelligence Reforms In India”, IDSA, pg.106, accessed 20
The oversight function has access to
to classified information and meets The oversight function has access January 2019
classified information and meets at least If there is no independent
at least every 6 months to review to classified information and meets https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
every 2 months to review budget and The oversight function does not oversight of the intelligence
budget and expenditures, at least every 6 months to review The oversight function has little to This indicator has been scored Not Applicable because, as stated above,
expenditures, personnel issues, and have regular access to classified service’s policies,
21B Effectiveness
policies of the intelligence services.
personnel issues, and policies of budget and expenditures,
the intelligence services. Though personnel issues, and policies of
information. It may meet less
no influence over the intelligence
services.
administration, and budgets, this NA there are currently no independent oversight mechanisms. There does
appear to be executive oversight [1][2].
2. Manoj Joshi & Pushan Das, 2015, “India's Intelligence
Agencies: In Need of Reform and Oversight”, ORF, accessed
Though meetings are held behind frequently than every 6 months. sub-indicator should be marked
meetings are held behind closed the intelligence services. Findings 20 January 2019
closed doors, a summary of findings is Not Applicable.
doors, a summary of findings is are rarely published. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/
published.
published. IssueBrief_98.pdf
For Intelligence Reforms In India”, IDSA, pg. 42-44, accessed

20 January 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
2. National Investigative Agency website, “About Us”,

India has a number of intelligence agencies and most are shrouded in accessed 20 January 2019
secrecy. The most publicly prominent are the Central Bureau of Investigation http://www.nia.gov.in/about-us.htm
(CBI) which is the country’s premier investigative agency; the Intelligence
Bureau (IB), India’s internal intelligence agency; Research & Analysis Wing 3. National Investigative Agency website, “Recruitment Rules”,
(R&AW), India’s foreign intelligence agency; and the newly-formed National accessed 20 January 2019
Investigative Agency (NIA), the Central Counter Terrorism Law Enforcement http://www.nia.gov.in/recruitment-rules.htm
Agency in India. Officer level recruitment to these agencies is generally
through university recruitment, the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) 4. Department of Personnel & Training Government of India
and lateral appointment from other Armed Forces and civil service cadres [1] website, “About Us”, accessed 20 January 2019
[2][3]. https://dopt.gov.in/about-us/functions/roles-responsibilities-0
The Department of Personnel & Training ensures recruitment of personnel 5. Union Public Service Commission website, “Functions”,
for the Government through the UPSC and the Staff Selection Commission accessed 20 January 2019
(SSC) [4]. The UPSC is constituted under a provision of the Constitution and https://upsc.gov.in/about-us/functions
is responsible for conducting examinations for appointment to the higher civil
services and civil posts under the Union Government; including recruitment 6. Tashi Mishra, “Research and Analysis Wing of India”, SSB
to the All India Services [5]. There is a mandatory provision for consulting the Crack, accessed 20 January 2019
Senior positions within the intelligence There is objective selection Commission on all matters relating to methods of recruitment, principles to be https://www.ssbcrack.com/2013/12/research-and-analysis-
Objective The criteria for selection of senior
22A
selection criteria
services are subject to objective
selection criteria.
criteria, but it is unclear if it is
applied.
positions are unclear. 0 followed in making promotions and transfers from one service to another and wing-of-india.html
on all disciplinary matters.
7. Saikata Datta, 28 February 2011, “Ghosts Who Walk”,
In the case of R&AW, direct recruitment is through Research & Analysis Outlook, accessed 20 January 2019
Service (RAS) with its own exams; and at times absorption of UPSC Group A https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/ghosts-who-
officer cadre. Direct recruitment at the Class I executive level can be from walk/270538
civil service officers undergoing the Foundation course at Lal Bahadur Shastri
National Academy of Administration [6]. 8. The Hindu, 18 September2017, “Y.C. Modi appointed NIA
chief”, accessed 20 January 2019
Senior appointments are often through promotions and deputations from the https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/yc-modi-named-nia-
state police at the SP, DIG or IG level, All India Services and secondment of chief/article19708485.ece
military personnel [7]. The Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC)
helps decide senior appointments [8]. 9. Manish Tewari, 11 November 2018, “Intelligence agencies
need a legal base”, The Asian Age, accessed 20 January
There currently is no legal base for the intelligence agencies in India and no 2019
legislation regarding selection criteria. In 2011, Member of Parliament Manish http://www.asianage.com/opinion/columnists/101118/
Tewari moved a Private Members Bill- The Intelligence Services (Powers & intelligence-agencies-need-a-legal-base.html
Regulation Bill), 2011. The bill lapsed [9][10].
10. Shri Manish Tewari, 2011, The Intelligence Services
(Powers and Regulations) Bill, The Hindu
https://www.thehindu.com/migration_catalog/article13408525.
ece/BINARY/THE%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICES
%20(POWERS%20AND%20REGULATION)%20BILL,
%202011, accessed 9 August 2019
Q22. Are
senior
positions
within the
intelligence
services filled
on the basis
of objective
selection
criteria, and
are
appointees
subject to
investigation
of their
suitability
and prior
conduct?
1. Praveen Swami, 26 November 2013, "Five years after
26/11, Intelligence services still crippled by staff shortage",
The Hindu, accessed 9 August 2019
Q22. Are There has been criticism that the Indian Police Service (IPS) has had a
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/five-years-after-2611-
senior favoured status in the recruitment processes of a number of intelligence
intelligence-services-still-crippled-by-staff-shortage/
positions services [1]. Therefore, it can be noteworthy to analyse the IPS selection
article5391698.ece
within the process. According to the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954,
intelligence recruitment to the Service is though competitive examination and by
2. IPS website, “Recruitment”, accessed 20 January 2019
services filled promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service. Recruitment is
https://ips.gov.in/ActsRules/
on the basis determined on each occasion by the Central Government in consultation with
Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_III_IPS_Rule_03.pdf
of objective the State Government concerned [2].
selection 3. IPS website, “Cadre Rules”, accessed 20 January 2019
criteria, and According to the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954:
are “1.3. The senior posts as notified in the schedule of each State cadre were
appointees divided into three main categories, viz:-
subject to 4. India Today, 26 June 2019, “Balakot strategist Samant Goel
investigation (a) Senior posts under the State Government;
is new RAW chief, Kashmir expert Arvind Kumar IB director”,
of their There is no opportunity for intervention (b) Central Deputation Quota;
Impartiality may be an issue, for Senior positions in the intelligence accessed 9 August 2019
by third parties that may result in (c) Deputation Reserve.
suitability
and prior
22B Selection bias
selection bias or undue influence in the
example, because of links to the
ruling party.
services are primarily a gift of the
executive.
25 https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/balakot-strategist-samant-
goel-is-new-raw-chief-kashmir-expert-arvind-kumar-ib-
conduct? selection of candidates. The other categories and reserves, such as leave and training reserves and
director-1556415-2019-06-26
the
junior posts are ancillary to the three main categories described above” [3].
5. Shaswati Das & Gireesh Chandra Prasad, 26 June 2019,
“Centre appoints new IB, RAW chiefs; Amitabh Kant
As alluded to in the previous question, senior appointments are often through
reappointed as NITI Aayog CEO”, Live Mint, accessed 9
promotions and deputations from the state police at the SP, DIG or IG level,
August 2019
All India Services and secondment of military personnel. The ACC headed by
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/centre-appoints-new-ib-
the Prime Minister, makes senior appointments in the intelligence agencies.
raw-chiefs-amitabh-kant-reappointed-as-niti-aayog-ceo-
Looking at recent appointments, there is no evidence of selection bias [4][5].
1561547546285.html
Given that the intelligence services are exempt from RTI, there’s no known
6. Rumu Banerjee, 6 November 2018, “Bring CBI, NIA & IB
legislature to cover the functioning of the intelligence services and
within RTI ambit, says info panel chief”, The Times of India,
disqualification for recruitment is not well documented [6]. This lack of
transparency can potentially create high risks for bias.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/bring-cbi-nia-ib-
within-rti-ambit-says-info-panel-chief/articleshow/
66531292.cms
Given the secrecy shrouding India’s intelligence agencies, no central

recruitment handbook is in existence at present but analysis of the IAS and
IPS recruitment processes are indicative of the degree of scrutiny. The
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) helps decide senior
appointments and infers that there is a level of oversight [1]. Selection is
primarily based on aptitude tests and promotion. After closely inspecting the
recruitment regulations from the IPS, it seems that a vetting process is not
explicitly referred to. This does not mean it does not exist. It is stated in the
Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954: 1. The Hindu, 18 September 2017, “Y.C. Modi appointed NIA
chief”, accessed 20 January 2019
“1.7. Select Lists are intended to provide a ready list of screened State https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/yc-modi-named-nia-
Service chief/article19708485.ece
There is full investigation of candidates’ Officers who can be appointed to vacancies that may occur in the promotion
Investigation of candidates’
suitability through vetting by external There is little or no investigation of quota 2. IPS website, “Cadre Rules”, accessed 20 January 2019
suitability is questionable, because
22C Vetting process party. This includes a hiring panel with
security clearance, and the right to call
elements of the vetting process
individuals’ suitability or prior
conduct.
50 during a particular year” [2]. https://ips.gov.in/ActsRules/
are compromised or of low quality.
witnesses and demand information. The definition for ‘screened’ is not defined but is likely alluding to vetting.
According to a report by IDSA, “In an effort to counter stagnation at various For Intelligence Reforms In India”, IDSA, accessed 20 January
levels, the concept of ‘in situ promotion’ has recently been introduced, with 2019
newly specified yardsticks of evaluation that are however discriminatory https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
when compared to the prevailing norms for promotion in other services of
Government of India at equivalent levels. This, coupled with the fact that
deputation officers often earn promotions on the basis of work done by them
in their parent departments in an entirely different environment, has led to
needless heartburn and loss of morale at fairly senior levels of the
intelligence services. This definitely needs to be reviewed to ensure a
uniformity of practice and a balance between merit, objectivity and
performance over a period of time” [3].
1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 24

December 2014, "Arms Trade Treaty", accessed 19 January
2019
https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf
Signatory and The country has both signed up to and The country has signed up to the The country has neither signed up
23A
Ratification ratified the ATT. ATT, but not ratified it. to nor ratified the ATT. 0 India has neither signed up to nor ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) [1][2].
2. ATT, "Status of ratifications and accessions", accessed 19
January 2019
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/ATT-status-of-ratifications-and-accessions-23-Jan-
2019.pdf
1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 24
December 2014, "Arms Trade Treaty", accessed 19 January
2019
If the country has not ratified the https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
The country has failed to comply The country has failed to comply ATT, or has only recently ratified content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf
The country has complied with each of The country has complied with just The country has complied with India has not signed or ratified the ATT [1][2]. As such, this indicator has
23B Compliance
three ATT articles. two of the articles. only one of the articles.
with any of the articles, but it
taking steps to do so.
with any of the articles, and is not
taking any steps to do so.
it in the past six months, this
indicator should be marked Not
NA been scored Not Applicable.
2. ATT, "Status of ratifications and accessions", accessed 19
Applicable January 2019
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/ATT-status-of-ratifications-and-accessions-23-Jan-
Q23. Does the 2019.pdf
government
have a well-
scrutinised
process for
arms export
decisions
that aligns
with Articles
7.1.iv, 11.5,
and 15.6 of
the Arms
Trade Treaty
(ATT)?
Q23. Does the
government
have a well-
scrutinised
process for 1. Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992,
arms export India though not a signatory to the ATT, has a well-scrutinised arms control
“Chapter IV A”, accessed 19 January 2019
decisions process as stated earlier. Chapter IVA of Foreign Trade (Development &
https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1947/3/A1992-
that aligns Regulation) Act, 1992 was incorporated by way of amendment in 2010 to
22.pdf
with Articles regulate the export of specified goods, services and technology which have
7.1.iv, 11.5, applications as WMDs and aligning it with the provisions of The Weapons of
2. Department of Defence Production, “STRATEGY FOR
and 15.6 of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition Of Unlawful
DEFENCE EXPORTS”, accessed 19 January 2019
the Arms Activities) Act, 2005 [1].
https://ddpmod.gov.in/sites/default/files/STRATEGY%20FOR
Trade Treaty %20DEFENCE%20EXPORTS.pdf
(ATT)? At present, defence exports are regulated by two departments- the
If the country does not export Directorate of Foreign Trade (DGFT) and the Department of Defence
3. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, “SCOMET”,
any arms, this sub-indicator Production. Dual-use items containing those on the updated SCOMET
Upcoming arms exports are should be marked Not (Special Chemicals, Organism, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list,
Upcoming arms exports are Upcoming arms exports are https://dgft.gov.in/sites/default/files/
Upcoming arms exports are subject to subject to parliamentary approval Applicable. Please verify this by export licences are granted by the Directorate of Foreign Trade (DGFT)
Parliamentary subject to parliamentary approval subject to parliamentary debate, Upcoming arms exports are not SCOMETHelp04092018.pdf
23C
scrutiny
robust parliamentary approval and
debate.
and debate, but debate may be
and debate, but approval is
subject to undue political influence
but parliament has limited ability to debated by parliament at all.
checking the last three years of
data with SIPRI
0 based on the Inter-Ministerial Working Group set up by the DGFT. For
military stores, No Objection Certificates (NOCs) are issued by the
superficial or brief. influence decision-making. 4. Swarnim Jain, 16 September 2016, “India’s Changing
from the executive or military. (http://www.sipri.org/) or PRIO Department of Defence Production [2][3][4].
SCOMET Control Landscape”, Thomson Reuters, accessed
(http://www.prio.org/)
19 January 2019
databases. The current government has simplified the Standard Operating Procedure
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/indias-changing-scomet-
(SOP) and will be put in the public domain to increase transparency. The
control-landscape/
government plans to constitute a Defence Exports Steering Committee
(DESC) under the Chairmanship of Secretary, Department of Defence
5. The Economic Times, 11 July 2018, “Major initiatives taken
Production. The Committee will comprise of representatives from the Armed
by the government to promote India's defence exports”,
Forces, DRDO, PIC Wing, Acquisition Wing, MEA, DGFT. The functions of
the DESC will include consideration and taking decisions on cases of export
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/major-
permissions particularly of export of indigenously developed sensitive
initiatives-taken-by-the-government-to-promote-indias-
defence equipment, monitor the progress in defence exports and make
defence-exports/articleshow/48264298.cms
suggestions to boost exports [5]. Though Parliament does not scrutinise
every arms export, it has the power to question them.
2. Diljeet Titus, “Corporate Lobbying and Corruption-

Manipulating Capital”, Indian Law Journal, accessed 14 May
2019
http://www.indialawjournal.org/archives/volume4/issue_3/
article_by_diljeet_titus.html
India has no framework for regulating lobbying activity. In August 2013, a
press release was published by the government stating that at that point in 3. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, accessed 14 May 2019
time it was not considering any proposal to legalise lobbying by companies http://cbi.gov.in/rt_infoact/pcact.pdf
[1]. The aforementioned still prevails today.
4. KPMG, 2018, “The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment)
Lobbying is not recognised in a statutory or non-statutory form [2]. The only Act 2018: Key Highlights”, accessed 19 January 2019
law that has had relevance to lobbying is in Section 7 of the Prevention of https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/09/
Corruption Act, 1988, which makes it illegal for a public servant taking prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official Act [3]. As
mentioned in Q.5, under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 5. Kunal Gupta, 5 September 2018, “Not Just Old Wine In A
2018, the definition of criminal misconduct has now been widened to include New Bottle: –Global Companies and the New Fortified Anti
the briber giver [4]. There are specific provisions regulating the conduct of, Bribery Regime”, Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas Blog, accessed
The country has a framework for and laying down requirements for, commercial organisations carrying on 14 May 2019
regulating lobbying activity: it business in India [5]. https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2018/09/not-just-
The country has a robust framework for
ensures coverage of the lobbying old-wine-new-bottle-global-companies-new-fortified-anti-
regulating lobbying activity: it ensures The country has no framework for
community but it is not Lobbying activities do take place in India and have so for many years. These bribery-regime/#more-2515
comprehensive coverage of the regulating lobbying activity, or it
comprehensive and does not activities have been conducted by public relation firms and representatives
76A Legal framework lobbying community through broad but
clear definitions of lobbyists and their
cover all types of activities.
has a framework that regulates
lobbying but the defence sector is
0 from companies who make presentations to government officials. In 2013, 6. Ronak D. Desai, 31 August 2015, “Political Lobbying In The
Lobbying legislation applies to the Walmart found itself at the centre of controversy after a routine disclosure U.S. And India: How It's Different And Why It Matters”, Forbes,
activities. Lobbying legislation applies to exempted.
defence sector. report to U.S. Congress which indicated the retailer had spent $25 million on accessed 14 May 2019
the defence sector.
lobbying activities in Washington over the past four years, including activities https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronakdesai/2015/08/31/political-
related to “enhanced market access for investment in India.” [6]. The Indian lobbying-in-the-united-states-and-india-how-its-different-and-
government launched an inquiry investigating these allegations [7]. why-it-matters/#86c05535174f
Note to researcher: By
comprehensive coverage and In August 2017, business lobby U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) wrote 7. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 4 March
clear definitions, we assume to India’s Defence Minister seeking a guarantee that U.S. firms would retain 2013,“Inquiry into Wal-Mart’s Lobbying Activities”, accessed
that the legislation specifies: control over sensitive technology - even when joint venture junior partners [8]. 14 May 2019
- Types of organisations and Earlier that year, a USIBC led delegation attended Aero India 2017 in http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=92985
lobbyists covered Bengaluru [9].
- Form of contact e.g. phone, 8. Aditya Kalra, & Sanjeev Miglani, 19 September 2017,
in-person, email. It is evident that lobbying does take place in India and the absence of “Exclusive: U.S. defence firms want control over tech in Make-
- Definition of lobbying e.g. re: regulatory framework creates an environment conducive for confusion and in-India plan”, Reuters, accessed 14 May 2019
policy, procurement decisions, corruption. https://in.reuters.com/article/india-defence/exclusive-u-s-
public affairs generally. defence-firms-want-control-over-tech-in-make-in-india-plan-
Q76. Does the - Exemptions e.g. is there a idINKCN1BU15Q
country minimum threshold under which
regulate certain organisations don’t have 9. Business Standard, 5 February 2017, “US-India Business
lobbying of to register, such as those with a Council leads executive mission to Aero India 2017”, accessed
defence budget for lobbying under 14 May 2019
institutions? $10,000. https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/us-india-
If the country does not have
legislation that regulates
lobbying in the defence sector,
Public officials in defence
Public officials in defence this sub-indicator should be
institutions are required to
Public officials in defence institutions institutions are required to marked as Not Applicable.
regularly publish and update Public officials in defence
are required to regularly publish and regularly publish and update Public officials in defence
records of lobbying meetings but institutions are not required to
update records of lobbying meetings by records of lobbying meetings but institutions are not required to Note to researcher: Details of
are not required to specify the publish or update records of 1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 5 August
specifying the details and frequency of without specifying all the details or publish records of lobbying interactions with lobbyists This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as country does not have
76B
Disclosure: Public officials
interactions with lobbyists. They are
details or frequency of interactions
with lobbyists. They are also
frequency of interactions with
lobbying meetings. They are
required, however, to publish any
meetings or to publish any include: NA legislation regulating lobbying in the defence sector [1].
2013, “Lobbying by Companies”, accessed 14 May 2019
also required to publish any conflicts of lobbyists. They are also not conflicts of interest risks that have - Names of lobbyist
required to publish any conflicts of conflicts of interest risks that have
interest risks that have been identified required to publish any conflicts of been identified. - Purpose of lobbying
interest risks that have been been identified.
and the mitigating actions taken. interest risks that have been - Form of communication
identified and the mitigating
identified. - Amount spent on activity
actions taken.
(within bands)
- The target of the
lobbying
The country has a mandatory The country has a mandatory The country has a mandatory
registration system that allows public registration system but which registration system but which The country has a voluntary
disclosure of a lobbyist’s identity, their allows public disclosure of fewer allows public disclosure of fewer registration system. If the country does not have
Lobbyist clients, issue areas, targets, activities details of a lobbyist’s identity and details of a lobbyist’s identity and legislation that regulates 1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Lobbying
The country has no registration This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as country does not have
76C registration
system
and financial information. activity than required in score 4. activity than required in score 4. Public officials do not have to
confirm whether the lobbyist has
system for lobbyists.
NA legislation regulating lobbying in the defence sector [1].
by Companies”, August 5th, 2013, accessed May 14th, 2019
Public officials may agree to meet a Public officials may agree to meet Public officials do not have to been entered in the register of marked as Not Applicable.
lobbyist only after checking whether the a lobbyist only after checking confirm whether the lobbyist has lobbyists before meeting them.
lobbyist has been entered in the register whether the lobbyist has been been entered in the register of
of lobbyists. entered in the register of lobbyists. lobbyists before meeting them.
There is a well-resourced
There is a well-resourced oversight oversight entity with a clear and There is an oversight entity, but it
There is a weak and poorly If the country does not have
entity with a clear and strong mandate strong mandate for oversight of either has a weak or vague
resourced oversight entity. There is no oversight or legislation that regulates 1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Lobbying
for oversight of lobbying. Sanctions for lobbying. Sanctions for mandate or, is poorly resourced. This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as country does not have
76D
Oversight & enforcement
misconduct include criminal offences for misconduct include criminal Sanctions do not include criminal
Sanctions do not include criminal
offences and are in any case
enforcement of lobbying
legislation.
NA legislation regulating lobbying in the defence sector [1].
by Companies”, August 5th, 2013, accessed May 14th, 2019
serious breaches of policies and offences for serious breaches of offences or are not always
rarely enforced. marked as Not Applicable.
procedures and are regularly enforced. policies and procedures but these enforced.
are not always enforced.
GDI 2020 Indicator
Score
GDI 2020 Indicator Qualitative Data GDI 2020 Indicator Sources
1. Minsitry of Defence, The Army and Air Force (Disposal of

Private Property) Act,1950, accessed 2 February 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Armyactpro1950.pdf
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India,

“Parliamentary Affairs”, February 4th, 2014, accessed
February 2nd, 2019
The Army and Air Force (Disposal of Private Property) Act,1950, outlines measures for controls over the http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=1018
disposal of assets of those personnel who are subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950
There is a clear policy or regulatory [1]. 3. Bombay High Court, Army & Air force (Disposal of
process, and there is an internal unit Private Property Amendment Bill, 2000, accessed 2
There is a clear policy or
responsible for advising or In 2000, both Houses passed the Army & Air Force Disposal of Private Property Amendment Bill, 2000 February 2019
regulatory process, but there is no
overseeing the procedures, e.g., There is no formalised, clear and the Amendment Act was brought into force [2][3]. Indian Air Force asset disposal is carried out by a http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/libweb/actc/yearwise/
24A Controls
internal audit. There is a
internal unit responsible for
advising or overseeing the
process for asset disposal. 50 government agency, MSTC Ltd. The disposals take place through auctions for which tenders are called 2000/2000.31.pdf
coordinating body within ministry for [4].
procedures, e.g., internal audit.
that is responsible for aggregating 4. MSTC Ltd, “Calendar-View: Category View”, accessed 2
disposal database reports. There have been reports in the past of disposed assets such as assault rifles having components re- September 2019
assembled and illicitly sold [5]. https://www.mstcindia.co.in/CalenderView/FirstLevel.aspx
5. Amitabh Srivastava, 22 April 2019, "Village of AK-47

guns: Two more assault rifles recovered in Bihar's
Mirzapur", India Today, accessed 2 September 2019
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/village-of-ak-47-guns-
two-more-assault-rifles-recovered-in-bihar-s-mirzapur-
1507070-2019-04-22
There is little information publicly available about the process of asset disposal. A case of Army officers
Q24. How effective are selling illegal Non-Service Pattern (NSP) weapons to Arms Dealers was reported in 2014. An Army
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 12
controls over the disposal Planned disposals are known in Planned disposals are known in Court of Inquiry carried out a detailed investigation regarding the role of 140 persons, including retired
December 2014, “Sale Illegal Weapons”, accessed 2
of assets, and is advance and are published publicly advance and are published officers, lady wives and civilians. After investigation, the Court of Inquiry found 72 officers and 01 Junior
February 2019
information on these on the ministry's website, before a publicly on the ministry's website, Planned disposals may not be Information on planned disposals Commissioned Officer (JCO) blameworthy. A revised Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on
There is little to no information http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=113226
Transparency of buyer has been identified. before a buyer has been identified. known in advance and are not may be missing key information or sale/disposal of Non Standard Pattern (NSP) weapons was issued to prevent recurrence of such activity
disposals, and the
proceeds of their sale,
24B
disposal process Comprehensive information is While information is usually regularly published publicly on the available in highly abbreviated
publicly available about the
process of asset disposal.
0 [1].
2. MSTC Ltd, “Calendar-View: Category View”, accessed 2
transparent? published, including specific details comprehensive, there may be ministry's website. form.
February 2019
on the items that are being sold instances of incomplete or missing As alluded to above, Indian Air Force asset disposal is carried out by a government agency, MSTC Ltd.
https://www.mstcindia.co.in/CalenderView/FirstLevel.aspx
(location, timing, type of item, etc.) information. The disposals take place through auctions for which tenders are called for. The accounts on sales are
open to internal and external scrutiny [2].
1. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report No.20

of 2017 - Compliance audit Union Government (Defence
Services) Navy and Coast Guard”, accessed 2 February
2019
Report_No.20_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Govern
ment_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard.pdf

There is limited information available publicly on the proceeds of all disposals. There is some of 2017 - Compliance audit Union Government Army and
The financial results of disposals
The financial results of disposals The financial results of disposals If there is no evidence of information found in CAG audit reports on asset disposals but not much else otherwise [1][2]. An Ordnance Factories Reports of Defence Services”,
Transparency of The financial results of disposals are are regularly publicly available but
are regularly publicly available and are not regularly publicly available There is little knowledge about the asset disposal, this sub- illustration of this is: in the Navy and Coast Guard Report No.20 of 2017, information on disposal of accessed 2 February 2019
24C financial results of
disposals
regularly publicly available and they
are disaggregated.
disaggregated but key information
in aggregate form OR They are
disaaggregated but irregularly
and are released in aggregate financial results of asset disposals. indicator should be marked 25 inventory was given. The data provided was the year, Material Organisation (MO) location, number of https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2017/
is often missing. form Not Applicable. items disposed and the value realised. The date range was from 2010 to 2016 [3]. Report_No.15_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Govern
available.
ment_Army_and_Ordnance_Factories_Reports_of_Defenc
e_Services.pdf

2019
ment_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard.pdf

2019
Asset disposals are scrutinised by
Asset disposals are regularly ment_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard.pdf
an audit body, either the Supreme
scrutinised by an audit body, either Asset disposals are regularly Asset disposals are scrutinised by The audit body must be There is independent scrutiny of asset disposals. CAG carries out audits with regularity and reports on
Audit Institution or Parliament, but Asset disposals are not scrutinised
25A Scrutiny the Supreme Audit Institution or
Parliament. Scrutiny is thorough and
these instances are irregular in
scrutinised by an audit body, but
scrutiny is superficial in nature.
an audit body, but scrutiny is
irregular and superficial in nature.
by an oversight body of any form.
external to the defence
institutions.
100 the same; it is noted that information in asset disposals are not available with the same regularity as
other audits [1][2].
of 2017 - Compliance audit Union Government Army and
nature. However, scrutiny is
formalised. Ordnance Factories Reports of Defence Services”,
thorough and formalised.
e_Services.pdf
1. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Commentary”,

Q25. Is independent and https://cag.gov.in/en/page-duties-power-and-conditions-of-
transparent scrutiny of services-act
If asset disposals are not
asset disposals conducted Neither the executive nor the military Either the executive branch or the Both the military and the executive
scrutinised by an oversight
by defence unduly influence scrutiny by the military unduly influences scrutiny regularly undermine scrutiny by Neither the executive nor the military unduly influence scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset 2. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “CAG pulls up Ministry of Defence for
establishments, and are
25B Independence
audit body regarding asset by the audit body regarding asset the audit body regarding asset
body of any form, this sub-
indicator should be marked
100 disposals. CAG is an independent body and functions autonomously [1][2]. Boeing Anti-submarine aircraft deal”, India Today, August
the reports of such disposals. disposals. disposals. 8th, 2018, accessed 2 February 2019
Not Applicable.
scrutiny publicly https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/cag-pulls-up-ministry-
available? of-defence-for-boeing-anti-submarine-aircraft-deal-
1308702-2018-08-08

2019
Audit reports are released within a Audit reports are released with If asset disposals are not ment_Defence_Services_Navy_and_Coast_Guard.pdf
Comprehensive audit reports are
Comprehensive audit reports are reasonable time frame, but only significant delays, and only Audit reports on asset disposals scrutinised by an oversight Audit reports are released with regularity within the prescribed timeframe. Reports are available online
available to the public, but there
25C Transparency available to the public within a
reasonable time frame.
may be significant delays in
summary information on asset
disposals is made publicly
summary information on asset
disposals is made publicly
are not made available to the
public.
body of any form, this sub-
50 containing some information pertaining to asset disposals however it is not in depth [1][2]. It is noted that 2. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report No.15
2018 CAG reports are not available online but are referenced by the media. of 2017 - Compliance audit Union Government Army and
release of information.
available. available. Not Applicable. Ordnance Factories Reports of Defence Services”,
e_Services.pdf
Note:
- Check first whether the 1. PTI, 1 February 2019, “Union Budget 2019: Nominal cut
overall budgets of the in budget allocation for CBI”, The Times of India, accessed
intelligence and security 2vFebruary 2019
Q26. What percentage of agencies is available. If it isn’t https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/union-budget-
defence and security or cannot be estimated from 2019-nominal-cut-in-budget-allocation-for-cbi/articleshow/
As stated in Q.12, no stand-alone comprehensive defence budget document exists in the public domain.
expenditure in the budget The percentage is not available to existing documents, then the 67791687.cms
Three per cent or less, but more Eight per cent or less, but more More than eight per cent of Secret items are not listed in any documents that are available. At times, media reports publish budget
year is dedicated to One per cent or less of expenditure the public, or the information that score should be 0. If the
spending on secret items
26
is dedicated to secret items.
than one per cent, of expenditure than three per cent, of expenditure expenditure is dedicated to secret
is dedicated to secret items. is dedicated to secret items. items.
is published is considered overall budget can be
0 outlay figures of some of the intelligence agencies such as the CBI and the IB [1][2]. The percentage of
secret items cannot be ascertained. According to an expert, given the magnitude of India's defence and
2. PTI, 13 July 2018, “Rs 78,000 crore budget for MHA; Rs
relating to national unreliable. estimated – for example, 1,577 crore for Intelligence Bureau in Budget 2017”, The
security expenditure, the percentage share of intelligence agencies would not exceed 3%.
security and the whatever is left in the material Economic Times, accessed 2 February 2019
intelligence services? and administrative section https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rs-
after expenses on other 78000-crore-budget-for-mha-rs-1577-crore-for-intelligence-
issues of the security bureau-in-budget-2017/articleshow/56919421.cms
apparatus are accounted for,
plus what is spend on
procurement, etc., then base
the score on the model
answers. It might not be
possible though as not all the 1. PTI, 1 February 2019, “Union Budget 2019: Nominal cut
information might be available in budget allocation for CBI”, The Times of India, accessed
to work out. 2 February 2019
Q27. Is the legislature (or - Where the agencies conduct
The appropriate legislative The legislature is generally https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/union-budget-
the appropriate legislative The legislature is provided with
committee or members of the provided with extensive public procurement, do 2019-nominal-cut-in-budget-allocation-for-cbi/articleshow/
committee or members of information on spending on secret The legislature is provided with If there is no access to the There is no information publicly available regarding the depth of information provided to the Standing
legislature are provided with information on spending on secret mention that. Is there a way 67791687.cms
the legislature) given full items, but description of very limited or abbreviated The legislature is provided with no actions of the committee, this Committee on Defence regarding secret items related to national security and defence. There is some
extensive information on all items, which includes detailed, line of estimating overall budgets
information for the budget
year on the spending of all
27
spending on secret items, which item descriptions of expenditures,
expenditures is generalised into
categories, or some data is
information on secret items, or
expenditure on secret items is
information on spending on secret sub-indicator should be
items.
on the basis of what was
marked
25 information publicly available on intelligence agencies’ outlays so one can deduce that the Committee
2. Narendra Singh Sisodia & Amit Cowshish, 2015, “CORE
includes detailed, line item and disaggregated data. spent onas No Information
procurement? For could have access to this information [1]. As alluded to in Q.14, India is guarded when it comes to
CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE
secret items relating to presented in an aggregated entirely aggregated. Available.
example, does it say defence budgetary disclosures. The degree of parliamentary oversight cannot be ascertained [2].
descriptions of all expenditures, and However, there are some IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, pg. 10, accessed 2
national security and manner.
disaggregated data. omissions of information. anywhere what percentage of February 2019
military intelligence?
the security & intelligence https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
services’ budgets is spent on Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
procurement? If not, include
this in the reasoning.

Duties and Powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General”,
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has audit jurisdiction that encompasses all ministries [1].
Article 150 of the constitutional provisions of CAG states: 2. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Article 150 -
Form of Accounts of The Union and of The States”,
“The accounts of the Union and of the States shall be kept in such form as the President may, on the accessed 2 February 2019
advice of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, prescribe” [2]. https://cag.gov.in/en/page-constitutional-provisions
Therefore, CAG may receive some account information from the security sector but not in detail. 3. Amit Anand Choudhary, 20 August 2015, “Intelligence
Intelligence agencies do not come under the ambit of CAG. In 2015, the Centre told the Supreme Court agencies can’t be subject to CAG audit: Centre to SC”, The
Legislators are provided with audit at a PIL hearing that Parliament and the government held substantial control over the functioning of the Times of India, accessed 2 February 2019
Legislators are provided with
Legislators are provided with audit Legislators are provided with audit reports on the security sector and Legislators are not provided audit intelligence agencies and there was no need to make them more accountable and cannot come under https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Intelligence-
detailed audit reports related to the
reports on the security sector and reports on the security sector and secret items that provide basic or reports on the security sector and the ambit of CAG [3]. agencies-cant-be-subject-to-CAG-audit-Centre-to-SC/
28A Comprehensiveness security sector and other secret
programmes. Audit reports examine
secret items that exclude some secret items that provide basic or highly abbreviated information, secret items, or secret 25 articleshow/48550409.cms
details. highly abbreviated information. and there are considerable programmes are not audited at all. A Directorate of Accounts (DACS) was set up in 1963. It was declared as an organised accounts cadre
all expenditures (major and minor),
omissions. for the intelligence agencies. The monitoring of accounts, with detailed head-wise break up is done on a 4. R Banerji, PK Upadhyay & Harinder Singh, 2012, “A
monthly basis by the DACS. Expenditure is also reviewed by examination of enhancement or reduction Case for Intelligence Reforms in India”, IDSA, pg. 104,
proposals at revised estimates stage. This procedure is generally similar to that followed in other accessed 2 February 2019
Q28. Are audit reports of government departments with the exception that they remain a secret and are not apparently accessible https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
the annual accounts of the to legislators or the public. DACS audits the intelligence agencies and not CAG [4]. It is unclear if upon book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
security sector (the request, legislators can view the accounts. Some information is publicly available on intelligence
military and intelligence agencies’ outlays so one can deduce that the Standing Committee on Defence could have access to 5. PTI, 18 July 2017, “Rs 78,000 crore budget for MHA; Rs
services) subject to some information [5]. 1,577 crore for Intelligence Bureau in Budget 2017”, The
parliamentary debate? Economic Times, accessed 2 February 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rs-
78000-crore-budget-for-mha-rs-1577-crore-for-intelligence-
bureau-in-budget-2017/articleshow/56919421.cms
1. R Banerji, PK Upadhyay & Harinder Singh, 2012, “A

Case for Intelligence Reforms in India”, IDSA, pg. 104,
Parliament or the appropriate As mentioned previously, CAG audits the MoD and will have the jurisdiction to scrutinise items but accessed 2 February 2019
Parliament or the appropriate Parliament or the appropriate If legislators are not provided
committee regularly requires sensitive/secret items are likely concealed. https://idsa.in/system/files/book/
committee regularly requires committee discusses the audit audit reports on secret items,
documentation or testimony from book_IntellegenceReform.pdf
documentation or testimony from the findings but does not request Legislative/committee debate on or secret programmes are not
the military and/or intelligence DACS audits the intelligence agencies. As alluded to earlier, legislators in theory do not have access to
28B Parliamentary scrutiny military and/or intelligence services
regarding the findings of the audit
services regarding the findings of
documentation or testimony from
the military and/or intelligence
the contents of audit reports may
be limited or non-existent.
audited at all, then this sub-
0 their accounts. Executive oversight is vested with the heads of the agencies [1]. Some information is 2. PTI, 18 July 2017, “Rs 78,000 crore budget for MHA; Rs
the audit report. However, it publicly available on intelligence agencies’ outlays so one can deduce that the Standing Committee on 1,577 crore for Intelligence Bureau in Budget 2017”, The
report. It also highlights any services. It may not comment on Not Applicable.
doesn't highlight any shortcomings Defence could have access to some information [2]. Economic Times, accessed 2 February 2019
shortcomings in the audit process. the quality of the audit process.
in the audit process. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rs-
78000-crore-budget-for-mha-rs-1577-crore-for-intelligence-
bureau-in-budget-2017/articleshow/56919421.cms
Please note the difference
between off-budget and extra-
budgetary expenditure. Extra-
budgetary and off-budget
military spending can both
compromise transparency
There is no evidence suggesting that off-military expenditures are not permitted by law.
and accountability. The first is
A The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report on the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
spending on the military from
Management (FRBM) covering 2016-2017, said off-budget financing was being used to defer fertiliser
other sections of the state
arrears, food subsidy bills and outstanding dues of Food Corporation of India (FCI) through borrowings
budget. This may include e.g.
and that there should be a framework specifying the rationale and objective of off-budget financing,
the science or infrastructure
quantum of off-budget financing and sources of fund, among others and stated:
budgets, special Presidential 1. Business Standard, 9 January 2019, “Off-budget
funds, or loans whose financing understates govt's expenditure, creates liability:
“Ministry maintained (July 2018) that off-budget borrowings remain within the scope of Union Budget as
repayments come from the CAG”, accessed 17 May 2019
provisioning of repayment of principal and of interest of off-budget borrowings is being made through the
Ministry of Finance. Such https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
Budget. Expenditure Budget contains the details of Extra Budgetary Resources (EBRs). Statement for
spending is often not clearly policy/off-budget-financing-understates-govt-s-expenditure-
‘Resources of Public Enterprises’ contains details of Ministry-wise Internal and Extra Budgetary
disaggregated and reported, creates-liability-cag-119010800655_1.html
Resources of the public enterprises. Ministry also stated that amendments to FRBM Act in 2018 now
making it hard or impossible
include a debt target and widens the scope of the Central Government debt which inter-alia includes
to disentangle all elements of 2. CAG, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of
such financial liabilities of any body, corporate or other entity owned or controlled by the Central
Offf-budget expenditures are military spending. Off-budget India on Compliance of the Fiscal Responsibility and
Government, which the Government is to repay or service from the annual financial statement. Thus, it
permitted by law, for some very spending comes from outside Budget Management Act, 2003 for the year 2016-17”,
is incorrect to say that there is no direct legislative control over off-budget borrowings.” [1][2] There is
limited exceptions (e.g. military Off-budget military expenditures the state budget altogether. accessed 17 May 2019
Off-budget expenditures are not speculation that there are off-budget expenditures as seen elsewhere in other government depar.
29A Permitted exceptions
permitted by law
involvement in natural disaster
relief efforts may, for example, be
are permitted by law for general or This may include dedicated
broad exceptions. natural resource funds used
0 https://cag.gov.in/webroot/uploads/download_audit_report/
2018/
In the Standing Committee on Defence 25th Report (2016-2017) Recommendation 27 and 27A on
one such type of military for arms purchases, Report_No_20_of_2018_Compliance_of_the_Fiscal_Respo
mismatch between projections and allocations at BE and RE stage each year for the Navy, the
expenditure). payments from the private nsibility_and_Budget_Management_Act_2003_Department
Committee stated:
sector for security, or military _of_Economic_Affairs_Minis.pdf
business activities. Off-
“Since a financial crunch is always present, the Committee also desire that the Ministry of Defence to
budget finance may allow the 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, March 2017,
explore other alternatives of raising of resources for the Navy by way of leasing out ships etc. within the
military to conduct TWENTY FIFTH REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
country during peace time and for extending bilateral assistance to friendly countries”.
procurement without going DEFENCE (2016-17) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA),
Q29. In law, are off-budget through the Parliament or the accessed 17 May 2019
military expenditures The government replied with:
Ministry of Defence, so that http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
permitted, and if so, are purchases are not assessed 16_Defence_25.pdf
they exceptional “This Ministry has been taking up the issue of lesser allocation than projections with the
against strategic needs. Off-
occurrences that are well- Ministry of Finance time and again. However, no positive response is received from Ministry of Finance
budget spending means that
controlled? In practice, are in this regard. The suggestions made by the Committee for exploring alternatives of raising resources
resources are allocated to the
there any off-budget has been shared with the Navy. The Committee will be apprised of the
military outside of any general
military expenditures? If outcome in due course” [3]. This could increase the potential for off-budget spending.
budget deliberations, and in
so, does evidence suggest many cases automatically,
this involves illicit without relation to an overall
economic activity? assessment of defence
needs, and without the
possibility of weighing them
against other possible uses.
1. Laxman Kumar Behera, 20 August 2018, “Examining the

Feasibility and Affordability of Raising the Share of Defence
Expenditure to Three Percent of GDP”, IDSA, accessed 12
September 2019
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/feasibility-and-affordability-defence-
Only some off-budget
India does not have a defined and unified defence budget. As alluded to in earlier questions, the expenditure-gdp-lbehera-200818
expenditures are recorded in the
Off-budget military expenditures If there are no off-budget Defence Services Estimates serves as the accepted budget. Yet, it does not always comprehensively
Recording All off-budget expenditures are budget. Or, all off-budget
29B
mechanisms recorded in the respective budgets. expenditures are recorded but in
are not officially recorded in the
budget.
expenditures, this indicator
should be marked N/A
0 capture defence expenditure. In 2018, two Demands for Grants no. 20 and 21 were not included in the
DSE [1]. Recent SCoD reports do not show off-budgetary expenditure [2]. It is clear that off-budgetary
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, March 2017,
TWENTY FIFTH REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
an incomplete or highly 1. Business(2016-17)
Standard,(SIXTEENTH
9 January 2019,
expenditure is not disallowed but there is no clear recording mechanism outlined. DEFENCE LOK“Off-budget
SABHA),
aggregated manner. financing
accessed understates
17 May 2019 govt's expenditure, creates liability:
CAG”, accessed 17 May 2019
https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
16_Defence_25.pdf
policy/off-budget-financing-understates-govt-s-expenditure-
creates-liability-cag-119010800655_1.html
2. Laxman Kumar Behera, 20 August 2018, “Examining the

Feasibility and Affordability of Raising the Share of Defence
Expenditure to Three Percent of GDP”, IDSA, accessed 12
Off-budget military expenditures September 2019
Off-budget military expenditures There are substantial off-budget
happen occasionally, and either There are substantial off-budget It can be deduced that off-budget military expenditures could be occurring sporadically as seen in other https://idsa.in/issuebrief/feasibility-and-affordability-defence-
Off-budget military expenditures are happen occasionally, but this is military expenditures, but this
29C Prevalence
rare. not a widely practiced
this is commonplace, or the extent
to which this is a regular practice
involves legitimate economic
military expenditures and this
involves illicit economic activity.
50 departments, the extent to which this is a regular practice is unclear due to lack of written evidence [1][2] expenditure-gdp-lbehera-200818
[3]. Scrutiny of the DSE and other budgetary documents do not yield financials on defence pensions [4].
phenomenon. activity.
is unclear. 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, March 2017,
"TWENTY FIFTH REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON
DEFENCE (2016-17) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA)",
to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
in the working of every public authority, the constitution of a Central Information Commission and State 16_Defence_25.pdf
Information Commissions and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto” [2].
4. Union Budget, “Notes on Demands for Grants, 2019-
The Ministry of Defence comes under its remit. The MoD has a section dedicated to RTI on its website. 2020”, accessed 9 August 2019
It includes proactive disclosures, CPIOs and Appellate authority and comprehensive contact details for https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe19.pdf
MoD personnel ranging from the Defence Minister to officers in charge of parliamentary work [3].
Under Section 24 of the Act, the Act does not apply to some Intelligence and Security organisations
mentioned in the Second Schedule due to security reasons:
“Act not to apply to certain organizations.—

[1] Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations specified in the
Second Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any information
furnished by such organisations to that Government: Provided that the information pertaining to the
allegations of corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub‑section:
Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of allegations of violation of 1. “About RTI Portal”, accessed 2 February 2019
human rights, the information shall only be provided after the approval of the Central Information https://rti.gov.in/aboutrti.asp
There is legislation and
Commission, and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, such information shall be provided
implementing guidelines that clearly
within forty‑five days from the date of the receipt of request.” 2. Ministry of Law and Justice, 2005, "Right To Information
stipulate: 1) how the public can
Act", accessed 2 February 2019
access defence information; 2) what There is legislation and
The organisations are: https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
information is and is not available 3) implementing guidelines that There is no legislation or
how classified information is clearly stipulate access to implementing guidelines that
30A Legal framework
categorised 4) how the public can information for the defence sector, clearly stipulate access to 75 Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Ministry of Finance
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Right to
appeal those decisions 5) that there but it may not contain all the information for the defence sector.
Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Finance https://mod.gov.in/dod/right-information
is an active, accessible, elements listed in score 4.
Directorate of Enforcement, Ministry of Finance
independent, external appeal or
Narcotics Control Bureau 4. Central Information Commission, “About Us”, accessed 9
review body to review access to
Aviation Research Centre August 2019
information decisions.
Special Frontier Force https://cic.gov.in/
Border Security Force, Ministry of Home Affairs
Central Reserve Police Force, Ministry of Home Affairs
Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Ministry of Home Affairs
Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry of Home Affairs
National Security Guard, Ministry of Home Affairs
Research & Analysis Wing of The Cabinet Secretariat
Assam Rifles, Ministry of Home Affairs
Sashastra Seema Bal, Ministry of Home Affairs
Special Protection Group
Defence Research and Development Organisation
Border Road Development Organisation
Financial Intelligence Unit
Directorate General Income Tax (Investigation)
National Technical Research Organisation
Q30. Are mechanisms for National Security Council Secretariat [2].
accessing information
from the defence sector Appeals from RTI decisions go to an Appellate Authority. Appeals against the order of the Appellate
effective?
Q30. Are mechanisms for
accessing information
from the defence sector
effective?
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Right to
https://mod.gov.in/dod/right-information
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “CPIOs and

Appellate Authority”, accessed 2 February 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/cpios-and-appellate-authority
The government operates a system 3. Moneylife, 7 October 2014, “How exactly is ‘Top Secret’,
This indicator is not scored.
of classification of information under The government operates a system of classification of information under a clear legal framework within ‘Secret’, ‘Confidential’ and ‘Restricted’ defined?”, accessed
Classification of Please discuss conditions in the
30B
information
a clear legal framework to ensure
that information is adequately
country context related to good NS RTI to ensure that information is adequately protected [1][2][3]. There has been criticism of the Ministry
of Home Affairs for not publishing its method of classification of information yet publishing DoD
2 February 2019
https://www.moneylife.in/article/how-exactly-is-top-secret-
practice (Score 4).
protected. classification. This reinforces that there is definitive categorisation of information, adherence to it and secret-confidential-and-restricted-defined/39033.html
data protection [4].
4. RTI Foundation of India, 9 October 2014, "RTI
Foundation of India Criteria for marking official records 'Top
Secret', 'Secret' and 'Confidential' made public", accessed 9
August 2019
http://www.rtifoundationofindia.com/criteria-marking-official-
records-top-secret-secre#.XOUBRJMzZmA
1. The New Indian Express, 6 January 2019, “MHA

rejected highest proportion of RTI requests, Finance
Ministry second in list”, accessed February 2 2019
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/jan/06/mha-
rejected-highest-proportion-of-rti-requests-1921133.html
2. Central Information Commission, “Annual Report 2017-

According to a recent 2019 report, the MoD has one of the lowest RTI rejection rates [1]. The 2017-2018 18”, accessed 2 February 2019
The public is able to access
The public is able to access The public is rarely able to access report of the Chief Information Commission (CIC) stated that the MoD received 80,233 RT applications https://cic.gov.in/sites/default/files/Reports/AR-
information, but there may be
30C Effectiveness information regularly, within a
reasonable timeline, and in detail.
delays in access or key
information from the defence
sector, if at all.
75 but rejected only 4,043 requests seeking disclosure of information, one of the lowest rates across all
government ministries and departments [2]. There seems to be speed with addressing RTI applications,
2018%20English%20%2802-01-2019%29%20-%20final.pdf
information missing.
even if there is dissatisfaction with information obtained at times [3]. 3. Venkatesh Nayak, 30 April 2018, “Sanction to prosecute
defence personnel in J&K: Why RTI replies by Defence
Dept, Indian Army contradict”, Counterview, accessed 8
February 2019
https://counterview.org/2018/04/30/sanction-to-prosecute-
defence-personnel-in-jk-why-rti-replies-by-defence-dept-
indian-army-contradict/
1. Department of Defence Production Government of India,

“Defence Public Sector Undertakings”, accessed 3
February 2019
https://ddpmod.gov.in/defence-public-sector-undertakings
2. Ministry of Defence, May 2018, “India Stands Strong”, pg.

57, accessed 3 February 2019
The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Department of Defence Production administers 9 Defence Public
https://mod.gov.in/ebook-2018/mod-ebook.html#p=19
Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). They are Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bharat Electronics
Defence institutions have Limited (BEL), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), BEML Limited (BEML), Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited
Defence and security institutions 3. Ordnance Factory Board, “About Us”, accessed 9 August
Defence and security institutions do ownership (or are believed to have (MIDHANI), Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd.
have some ownership of 2019
Extent of commercial not own commercial businesses of ownership) of commercial (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) [1][2]. These are PSUs
31A
ventures any significant scale. (Equivalent to
commercial businesses, but
totaling less than 10% of the
businesses that are major 25 where the government has a 51% or more stake. In addition there is the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB)
http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=aboutus&lang=en
1% of the defence budget or less.) enterprises, or constitute more which has 41 factories and several repair depots. The combined production share could amount to more
defence budget. 4. SIPRI, “Trends in world military expenditure, 2019”,
than 10% of the defence budget. than 10% of the defence budget according to one expert [3]. In 2019, India’s total defence spending was
$71.1 billion [4]. From this, it is estimated $9 billion was for DSPUs and OFs [5].
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/
fs_2020_04_milex_0.pdf
5. Defense News, “India looks to make $25B from defense

production by 2025”, 6 August 2020, accessed 16 February
2021
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/
2020/08/06/india-looks-to-make-25-billion-in-defense-
production-by-2025/
Q31. Do national defence

and security institutions
1. Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, accessed 3
have beneficial ownership
February 2019
of commercial
http://www.mazagondock.in/
businesses? If so, how
transparent are details of
2. Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd, accessed
the operations and
3 February 2019
finances of such
http://grse.in/
businesses?
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2017, “Annual
Report 2016-2017”, pg. 53, accessed 29 January 2019
4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2019, “Annual

Report 2018-2019”, pg. 59, accessed 9 August 2019
Any ownership of commercial If national defence and
businesses is publicly declared, with All or most ownership of security institutions do not
These businesses are publicly Only some businesses are publicly Details of the operations and finances of DSPUs are transparent and information is publicly available [1]
details of their operations and commercial businesses is publicly These businesses are not publicly have any beneficial
declared, though details of their declared. Details of their [2][3][4]. The overall operations and finances of the OFB can be found but little information is available 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2019, “Annual
31B Transparency finances being transparent, fully
disclosed, and with standards of
declared. Either operations and
finances are transparent, but not
operations and finances are not operations and finances are not
declared and are wholly non-
transparent.
ownership of commercial
businesses, this sub-indicator
75 on its repair/maintenance institutions [5]. CAG reports upto 2017 on Ordnance Factories are available Report 2018-2019”, pg. 80, accessed 9 August 2019
transparent. fully transparent. [6][7]. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf
governance equivalent to publicly both. should be marked Not
owned commercial enterprises. Applicable.
6. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ended
March 2016 Union Government (Defence Services) Army
and Ordnance Factories Report No.15 of 2017, accessed
11 August 2019
e_Services.pdf
7. Ordnance Factory Board, “CAG Audit Reports”, accessed

11 August 2019
http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=cag&lang=en
Military-owned businesses are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India (CAG); Defence
Estates Management is reported on too [1]. CAG can audit all business undertakings such as Base
Repair Depot of the Air Force, Naval Dockyard and Army Base Workshops [2].
In Section 312A of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the function of a
Committee on Public Undertakings is stated:
Duties and Powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General”,
“312A. There shall be a Committee on Public
Undertakings for the examination of the working of the
https://cag.gov.in/content/duties-and-powers-comptroller-
public undertakings specified in the Fourth Schedule. The functions of the Committee shall be—
and-auditor-general
(a) to examine the reports and accounts of the
2. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report of the
public undertakings specified in the Fourth
Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Working of
Schedule;
Army Base Workshops for the year ended March 2016”,
(b) to examine the reports, if any, of the
There are no military-owned Comptroller and Auditor-General on the
businesses, or where military-owned public undertakings;
Military-owned businesses are Report_36_of_2016_Union_Government_Defence_PA.pdf
businesses exist they subject their Military-owned businesses are not (c) to examine, in the context of the autonomy
subject to some scrutiny, but it is
32A Independent scrutiny financial statements to an
independent external audit, based
known that such processes lack
subject to any scrutiny or auditing
processes.
100 and efficiency of the public undertakings,
whether the affairs of the public undertakings
3. “RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF
independence or reliability. BUSINESS IN LOK SABHA”, pg. 115, accessed 3 February
on relevant international auditing are being managed in accordance with sound
2019
standards. business principles and prudent commercial
http://164.100.47.194/loksabha/rules/RULES-2010-P-
practices; and
FINAL_1.pdf
(d) to exercise such other functions vested in the
Committee on Public Accounts and the
4. “RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF
Committee on Estimates in relation to the
Q32. Are military-owned BUSINESS IN LOK SABHA”, pg. 157, accessed 3 February
public undertakings specified in the Fourth
businesses subject to 2019
Schedule as are not covered by clauses (a),
transparent independent http://164.100.47.194/loksabha/rules/RULES-2010-P-
(b) and (c) above and as may be allotted to
scrutiny at a recognised FINAL_1.pdf
the Committee by the Speaker from time to
international standard?
time:” [3]
The DSPUs which come under the Committee’s jurisdiction are Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) and Garden Reach
Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. (GRSE) [4].
Therefore there is an independent oversight mechanism in-line with international standards.
1. Pradeep Thakur, 19 December 2018, “Why CAG stopped

putting defence reports online”, The Times of India,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-cag-stopped-
putting-defence-reports-online/articleshow/67153548.cms
Generally, audit details are publicly available. In a slight departure from this, according to a recent Times 2. Controller General Defence Accounts Government of
If there are no military-owned
Though available to the public, of India article, CAG has stopped putting defence reports publicly online [1]. None of the seven defence India website accessed 29 January 2019
Full audit details are available to the Audit details are not generally businesses, this sub-indicator
32B Transparency
public.
audit details may be incomplete or
abbreviated.
made available to the public. should be marked Not 50 reports from CAG in 2018 are available online. This is verifiable on the CAG website where no 2018
reports from the Defence and National Security sector are available [2][3]. CAG reports must be
http://cgda.nic.in/
Applicable.
submitted to Parliament so are therefore public documents and are available in the Parliament library. 3. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Audit report
search, accessed 29 January 2019
https://cag.gov.in/en/audit-report?
ts=allwords&title=&gt=&udt=&state=&lbt=&sector=&sector
%5B%5D=41&report_type=&report_type%5B%5D=52&od=
%3D&yrf=2018&yrt=
As alluded to in earlier questions, there has been controversy surrounding the misuse of defence land
for private enterprise [1].
As per Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964:
“15. Private trade or employment

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), no Government servant shall, except with the previous
sanction of the Government-
1. Outlook India, 25 March 2011, “CAG Finds 'Unauthorised'
(a) engage directly or indirectly in any trade or business, or
Holes in Army Golf Courses”, accessed 3 February 2019
(b) negotiate for, or undertake, any other employment, or
https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/cag-finds-
(c) hold an elective office, or canvass for a candidate or candidates for an elective office, in any
unauthorised-holes-in-army-golf-courses/716425
body, whether incorporated or not, or
The government strictly outlaws any The government either does not The government does not outlaw (d) canvass in support of any business of insurance agency, commission agency, etc., owned or
2. Department of Personnel and Training Government of
unauthorised private enterprise, with explicitly outlaw private private enterprise under the managed by any member of his family, or
33A Prohibition
appropriate sanctions in place to enterprises, or its sanctions are umbrella of the state’s defence 50 (e) take part except in the discharge of his official duties, in the registration, promotion or
India, “CCS (CONDUCT) RULES, 1965”, accessed 3
February 2019
deal with offenders. weak. and security operations. management of any bank or other company registered or required to be registered, under
https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/
the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law for the time being in force, or of any
CCS_Conduct_Rules_1964_Updated_27Feb15_0.pdf
co-operative society for commercial purposes.
(f) participate in or associate himself in any manner in the making of-
3. Interviewee 5: Retired Colonel, New Delhi, 23 May 2019
(i) a sponsored media (radio or television) programme; or
(ii) a media programme commissioned by Government media but produced by a private
agency; or
(iii) a privately produced media programme including video magazine”
Q33. Is there evidence of The above explicitly prohibits civil service employees from engaging in private enterprise [2]. These
unauthorised private regulations and codes of conduct are binding on all defence and security personnel [3]. Participation in
enterprise by military or such enterprises are not permitted.
other defence ministry
employees? If so, what is
the government’s reaction
to such enterprise?
1. Man Aman Singh Chhina"Civilians to lose playing
privileges on Army golf courses", The Indian Express, July
26th, 2015, accessed August 9th, 2019
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/civilians-
to-lose-playing-privileges-on-army-golf-courses/
2. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report No. 35

In 2011, CAG and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) had cited the unauthorised use of defence
of 2010 - Performance Audit of Defence Estates
land for golf courses operated by Army Zone Golf [1]. In addition to the aforementioned, the use of parks
Management”, accessed February 3rd, 2019
and clubs on defence land for commercial purposes, using defence land for unauthorised shopping
Unauthorised private enterprise is https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2010/
Defence employees are engaged complexes, private colleges, cinemas and banks without proper sanction were cited [2].
Unauthorised private enterprise is a common occurrence across Union_Performance_Defence_Indigenous_Construction_N
Unauthorised private enterprise in unauthorised private enterprise The government openly operates
33B Prevalence
does not occur.
a problem with a few select
individuals or institutions.
individuals or institutions, but
private enterprise is still mostly
to the extent that some industries unauthorised private enterprises. 75 After examining CBI press releases and Standing Committee on Defence reports since 2015, there
aval_Warships_35_2010.pdf
are majority captured. seems to be no mention of other branches of the military engaging in unauthorised commercial activities
uncaptured. 3. Central Bureau of Investigation, “Press Releases”,
[3]. The Army occupies 79.66% of defence land in stark contrast to the Air Force (8.72%) and the Navy
accessed February 3rd, 2019
(2.13%) [4].
http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pressrelease2017.php
4. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Report No. 35

of 2010 - Performance Audit of Defence Estates
Management”, accessed February 3rd, 2019
Union_Performance_Defence_Indigenous_Construction_N
aval_Warships_35_2010.pdf
1. Narendra Singh Sisodia & Amit Cowshish, 2015, “CORE
CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE
IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, pg.10, 19 May
2019
2. Open Budgets India, "Union Budget, Ministry of Defence

(Misc.)", accessed 9 August 2019
https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/ministry-of-defence-
misc-2019-20
3. Open Budgets India, "Union Budget, Defence Services

(Revenue)", accessed 9 August 2019
https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/defence-services-
revenue-2019-20
In an IDSA publication, it was stated that, “While budget documents are presented annually to
4. India Budget, “Notes on Demands for Grants, 2019-
parliament, the data provided by them offer limited opportunity for in-depth research. Annual reports of
2020”, accessed 9 August 2019
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are sanitised documents, often containing less information than provided
by newspapers. Available materials on planning and budgeting are individual recollections of authors
Details of actual spending on
Details of actual spending on based on their subjective interpretations or judgements” [1].
defence and security are 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Defence
defence and security are proactively Details of actual spending are
proactively published in Figures for actual spending are Budget 2019-20”, February 2nd, 2019 accessed May 19th,
published in disaggregated form. proactively published in Reports on actual spending are Data on budget allocations and defence spending in the year are published in a disaggregated form but
disaggregated form. They are proactively published but there is 2019
77A Proactive publication They are accompanied by an
explanation intended for experts, as
accompanied by an explanation
disaggregated form. There is
some explanation provided but it is
no explanation provided and/or
not made available to the public at
all.
25 without explanations, thus in-depth analysis is not feasible [2][3][4][5][6]. The MoD publishes actual
expenditure against budget estimates for each year on its website and in its annual reports.
but there may be some spend is not disaggregated.
well as concise summaries with superficial. Organisation and sector-wise breakups are given but again, without explanation [7][8].
shortcomings, e.g. they may be 6. STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2016-2017)
clear language for non-experts.
overly broad or general in parts. (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA). MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The Defence Services Estimates serves as the accepted budget but does not always comprehensively
DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (2017-18), accessed 9 August
capture defence expenditure. In 2018, two Demands for Grants no. 20 and 21 were not included in the
2019
DSE [9].
16_Defence_28.pdf
7. Government of India, Ministry of Defence, "Department of

Defence, Budget and Accounts", accessed 9 August 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/budget-and-accounts
8. Government of India, Ministry of Defence, 2018, "Annual

Report 2017 – 2018", accessed 9 August 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR1718.pdf
9. Laxman Kumar Behera, “Examining the Feasibility and

Affordability of Raising the Share of Defence Expenditure to
Three Percent of GDP”, IDSA, August 20th, 2018, accessed
September 12th, 2019
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/feasibility-and-affordability-defence-
expenditure-gdp-lbehera-200818
https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/ministry-of-defence-
misc-2019-20
2. Union Budget, “Defence Services (Revenue)”, accessed

9 August 2019
https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/defence-services-
revenue-2019-20-budget
3. Union Budget, “Capital Outlay on Defence Services”,

https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/capital-outlay-on-
defence-services-2019-20
4. Union Budget, “Defence Pensions”, accessed 19 May

Q77. Is comprehensive 2019
data on actual spending https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/defence-pensions-
on defence published 2019-20
during the budget year?
Defence related expenditure data is publicly available on the Union Budget microsite [1]. Though the 5. Laxman Kumar Behera, 20 August 2018, “Examining the
MoD has an Annual Reports area on its website, it is empty and no data sets are available. The Notes Feasibility and Affordability of Raising the Share of Defence
The vast majority of actual
on Demands for Grants documents on the Union Budget microsite are sanitised with one-line particulars Expenditure to Three Percent of GDP”, IDSA, accessed 9
The vast majority of actual defence defence spending is fully Significant areas of spending are
Significant areas of spending are in columns that show ‘Actuals’, ‘Budget, ‘Revised’ then current ‘Budget’. Sensitive items are not featured August 2019
spending is fully disclosed. There disclosed. There may be undisclosed, without there being
undisclosed, without there being If no information on actual [2][3][4]. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/feasibility-and-affordability-defence-
may be exceptions made for exceptions made for legitimate clear justification for this. There is The vast majority of actual
clear justification for this. There is spend is publicly available, expenditure-gdp-lbehera-200818
77B Comprehensiveness legitimate sensitive areas, but there
is clear and robust oversight of the
sensitive areas. There is provision
for oversight of the full budget by
provision for oversight of the full
budget by other suitable
no evidence of oversight of the full
defence spend is not publicly
available.
this sub-indicator should be 50 The Defence Services Estimates (DSE), conventionally known as India's defence budget, contains
budget by other suitable marked as Not Applicable. details on manpower, stores, procurement and R&D. Though the document is not available publicly 6. CAG, “Defence and National Security Audit Reports”,
full budget by other suitable other suitable authorities but it is authorities but it may not be clear
authorities. online, it is available in the Indian Parliament Library and the library of a leading think tank in New Delhi accessed 2 February 2019
authorities. not clear how effective this how effective this oversight is.
[5]. https://cag.gov.in/en/audit-report?
oversight is.
ts=allwords&title=defence&gt=&udt=&state=&state%5B
There is clear and robust oversight from CAG, CGDA, PAC and SCoD [6][7][8][9]. %5D=&lbt=&sector=&sector%5B
%5D=41&report_type=&report_type%5B
%5D=&od=&yrf=&yrt=
7. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “Mandate and

Charter of Audit”, accessed 15 May 2019
http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=mandate
8. Parliament of India Lok Sabha, “Public Accounts

Committee Information”, accessed 2 February 2019
9. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “STANDING

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE
(2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA) FORTY SECOND
REPORT”, accessed 2 February 2019
1. Tojo Jose, 24 October 2016, “How to understand

Government’s Budget? – I”, Indian Economy, accessed 9
August 2019
https://www.indianeconomy.net/splclassroom/how-to-
understand-governments-budget-i/
Data on actual expenditure is available after two financial years. Under the Indian budgetary system,
expenses are accounted for under the Budget Estimate (BE) (for the years the budget is presented), 2. Union Budget, “Defence Pensions”, accessed 19 May
Details of actual spending are If no information on actual
Details of actual spending are Details of actual spending are Revised Estimate (RE) for the immediate preceding year and Actual Expenditure for the year before last 2019
published more than twelve spend is publicly available,
77C Timeliness published within six months of the
end of the financial year.
published within twelve months of
the end of the financial year.
months after the end of the this sub-indicator should be 0 year [1][2]. https://openbudgetsindia.org/dataset/defence-pensions-
2019-20
financial year. marked as Not Applicable.
As 2019 is an election year, the government has published an interim budget in February [3].
3. Union Budget, “Budget at a Glance (2019-2020),
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2019-20/doc/
Budget_at_Glance/bag1.pdf
1. Union Budget, “Union Budget 2019-2020”, accessed 19

May 2019
Variances between the published
https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/
budget and actual spend are If no information on actual
Variances between the published Variances between the published Explanation on variances between the published budget and actual defence spend has not been found.
Comparison against explained but there may be some spend is publicly available,
77D
budget
budget and actual spend are
detailed and explained.
shortcomings, for example they
budget and actual spend are not
explained at all.
this sub-indicator should be 0 The Budget and Accounts section of the DoD on the MoD’s website states figures on Actuals, BE and
RE but provides no explanation [1][2].
2. Minstry of Defence Government of India, Department of
Defence, “Budget and Accounts”, accessed 9 August 2019
may be explained only in broad marked as Not Applicable.
https://mod.gov.in/dod/budget-and-accounts
and general terms.
eliminate corruption, give full freedom to soldiers: PM
Modi”, accessed 19 May 2019
https://youtu.be/4ME_wm2nRSE
3. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 25 July

2018, “Prevention of Corruption Act”, accessed 19 May
2019
4. KPMG, 2018, “The Prevention of Corruption

(Amendment) Act 2018: Key Highlights”, accessed 19 May
2019
GDI 2020 Indicator The current government’s election success in 2014 was centred on prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
Score
bringing greater transparency in governance and combating corruption [1].
5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 21 November
Prime Minister Modi has sought to fight corruption and since taking office,
2016, "Guidelines of the Ministry of Defence for Penalties
has implemented a number of anti-corruption measures [2]. In July 2018,
in Business Dealings with Entities”, accessed 11 August
the government passed the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act,
2019
2018, which amended and brought significant changes to the Prevention
https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/guideentities_0.pdf
There is a clear commitment to anti- of Corruption Act, 1988 to bring the legal framework in conformity with
There is a clear commitment to
corruption and integrity measures by current international practices of UNCAC. India widened the definition of
anti-corruption and integrity 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 19 Febraury
the Defence Ministry, as declared by criminal misconduct to include the briber giver. This Act is applicable to
measures by the Defence Ministry, 2018, “Details of firms debarred/put on hold/ suspended…”,
the Defence Minister, the Chief of the defence sector [3][4].
as declared by the Defence There is internal willingness to accessed 11 August 2019
Defence, and Single Service Chiefs. There are no internal
Minister, the Chief of Defence, and carry out processes, as There is very little commitment by https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/firmshold.pdf
Internal commitment is communications about the There is a clear commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by
Single Service Chiefs. Internal demonstrated by internal strategic the Defence Minister, Chief of
demonstrated through proactive anti- commitment to integrity and anti- the MoD. The MoD has taken steps to suspend companies which have
Chiefs/Ministers: Internal commitment is demonstrated communications. However, Defence, or Single Service Chiefs. 7. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 12 July 2019,
34A
communications
corruption measures, and regular
communications about integrity from
through proactive anti-corruption internal messaging is sporadic and Internal communications regarding
corruption by the Defence
Minister, Chief of Defence, or
75 indulged in corrupt practices as seen in internal communication [5][6][7].
Defence Ministers Parrikar and Sitharaman have been vocal about
“Suspension of business dealings with M/S Pilatus Aircraft
measures, and occasional limited in nature regarding support anti-corruption measures are Ltd”, accessed 11 August 2019
top level officers in service Single Service Chiefs or the commitment to anti-corruption measures [8][9][10]. As has newly
communications about integrity of anti-corruption and integrity superficial and infrequent. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Subus.pdf
publications. There is a consistency ministry as an institution. appointed Defence Minister in the second Modi government, Rajnath
from top level officers in service measures.
of message, speaking to current Singh [11].
publications. However, there may 8. Ajit Kumar Dubey, 6 February 2017, “Defence Minister
violations and evidence that the
be some inconsistency in Manohar Parrikar forms committee to make promotion
integrity system is being There is evidence of internal commitment to anti-corruption measures.
messaging among top officials system fair, transparent”, India Today, accessed 3
implemented. Army Chief General Bipin Rawat recent remarks on corruption and
February 2019
measures to tackle it serve as a warning to all those involved in “corrupt
https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/manohar-
practices” in directives circulated by him on the internal Army Wide Area
parrikar-army-promotion-system-959111-2017-02-06
Network [12].
9. Zee News, 7 November 2014, “Exclusive: Corruption is
1.
theDaily
biggestMailproblem
India, 10
forNovember
the nation,2014,
says“'Mr Clean' means
Parrikar”,
business:
accessed New Defence
3 February Minister Manohar Parrikar
2019
promises swift, transparent decisions”, accessed 3
https://youtu.be/uvvzZDC3hz8
February 2019
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-
10. NDTV, 9 October 2018, "On Bad Loans, Nirmala
2829272/New-Defence-Minister-Manohar-Parrikar-
Sitharaman Blames Congress-Led Government”, accessed
promises-swift-transparent-decisions.html
3 February 2019
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/on-bad-loans-nirmala-
2. Ajit Kumar Dubey, 6 February 2017, “Defence Minister
sitharaman-blames-congress-led-government-1929508
Manohar Parrikar forms committee to make promotion
system
11. Press fair, transparent”,
Information IndiaGovernment
Bureau Today, accessed 3
Of India,21
February
August 2019,2019“Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh approves
https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/manohar-
decisions regarding re-organisation of Army
parrikar-army-promotion-system-959111-2017-02-06
Headquarters”, accessed 29 August 2019
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192736
3. NDTV, 9 October 2018, ”On Bad Loans, Nirmala
Sitharaman Blames
12. Rajat Pandit, 11 Congress-Led
July 2018 “Army Government”,
chief declaresaccessed
war on
Communications staff make
3 February
graft, waste2019and sycophancy”, The Times of India,
statements and issue publications
Public commitment is demonstrated https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/on-bad-loans-nirmala-
about integrity and anti-corruption
through interviews with journalists Commitment is publicly stated – Defence Ministers who have served under the current government sitharaman-blames-congress-led-government-1929508
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-chief-
as apparently declared by top Public commitment to anti-
and CSOs, and statements at events though perhaps not strongly. Parrikar and Sitharaman have been vocal about commitments to anti- declares-war-on-graft-waste/articleshow/64938918.cms
officials, but top officials do not corruption and integrity measures There is no public commitment by
and conferences. Anti-corruption is Chiefs and Ministers may publicly corruption measures [1][2][3]. This has been demonstrated through 4. Hindustan Times, 4 January 2019, “Nirmala Sitharaman:
Chiefs/Ministers: Public address these issues at public consists of general the Defence Minister, Chief of
34B
commitment
part of public talking points for top
level officers, with explicit reference
speak about values or code of
conduct, but fail to mention
events. Although the ministry communications statements of a Defence, or Single Service Chiefs 75 speeches, interviews with media outlets and political mandates [4][5].
Newly appointed Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has committed to
‘Bofors doomed Congress, Rafale will bring back Modi”,
might be going through a reform superficial nature, with no or the ministry as an institution.
to integrity and good defence specific integrity measures and enhance transparency and strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms in the https://youtu.be/PxAUNhhBa-s
process and made integrity reference BY Chiefs or Ministers.
Q34. Do the Defence governance, and management of management of risk. Armed Forces [6][7].
commitments, few top officials are
Ministry, Defence Minister, corruption risks. 5. Times Now, 29 March 2018, “Defence Minister Nirmala
speaking to the public about these
Chiefs of Defence, and Sitharaman At IEC 2018 | Full Interview”, accessed 3
measures.
Single Service Chiefs February 2019
publicly commit, through, https://youtu.be/E_bwdpMogd0
for example, speeches,
media interviews, or 6. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 21
political mandates, to anti- August 2019, “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh approves
corruption and integrity decisions regarding re-organisation of Army
measures? Headquarters”, accessed 29 August 2019
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192736
7. Abhishek Bhala, 21 August 2019, “Army HQ

restructuring: Rajnath Singh approves setting up of human
rights cell, moving 200 officers to field”, India Today,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/army-hq-restructuring-
rajnath-singh-approves-setting-up-of-human-rights-cell-
moving-200-officers-to-field-1588596-2019-08-21
1. Rajat Pandit, 11 July 2018, “Army chief declares war on

graft, waste and sycophancy”, The Times of India,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-chief-
declares-war-on-graft-waste/articleshow/64938918.cms
2. Hindustan Times, 11 May 2019, "Army Lt Gen faces

action for alleged corruption over misuse of Govt funds",
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-lt-gen-
faces-action-for-alleged-corruption-over-misuse-of-govt-
funds/story-h5VfdcheNSYyYyQTtBHplN.html
There is some evidence that Unit commanders and leaders make public
This commitment is reflected
This commitment is reflected statements about moral codes and conduct, recognition of issues that
throughout the defence ministry 3. National Defence Academy Khadakwasala India, “Vision
throughout the defence ministry and need to be addressed and at times, measures to address them. Army
and armed forces by statements This commitment is reflected in and Mission”, accessed 11 August 2019
armed forces by similar statements There is some commitment Chief General Bipin Rawat has recently publicly stated, "Rising cases of
by senior ministry staff and senior service publications, through https://nda.nic.in/Vision%20&%20Mission.html
from senior ministry staff and senior reflected in service publications, moral turpitude are a matter of concern. Strict punishment, including
armed forces officers about values regular statements by senior
armed forces officers, at unit through statements about values There are few (if any) statements dismissal without pension, is being given to the offenders.” His statements
Unit commanders and and conduct. Locations include ministry staff and senior armed 4. Indian Army website, “Our Ethos”, accessed 12
34C
leaders
parades, graduation ceremonies,
and in writing through service
unit parades, graduation forces officers about values and
and conduct by senior ministry
staff and senior armed forces
of commitment by senior ministry
of defence or armed forces staff.
75 serve as a warning to all those involved in “corrupt practices” in directives
circulated by him on the internal Army Wide Area Network [1][2].
February 2019
ceremonies, or in writing through conduct. Officials do not address https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/site/formTemplete/
publications. There is explicit officers. But these statements
service publications. However, integrity measures or frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=jLCdQtnN0TlJ6Rrkn+
reference to integrity and good happen only occasionally. Moral codes and conduct are imbibed in cadet training and published on
officials fail to speak in depth management of risk. +5cA==&ParentID=0zlQz2C9tDluljpzirzTxQ==&flag=8CKP
defence governance, and Armed Forces’ websites [3][4][5]. The commitment to anti-corruption is
about integrity measures or 966uzg96kLov0aWdfQ==
management of corruption risks. reflected in service publications [6].
management of risk.
5. Indian Air Force, “Air Warrior’s Code”, accessed 12
February 2019
http://indianairforce.nic.in/content/air-warriors-code
6. Indian Army website, 14 November 2018, “INDIAN

ARMY OBSERVES VIGILANCE AWARENESS WEEK”,
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/Site/PressRelease/
PressRelease.aspx?
n=bniEtbbo9LN7kb4q3kupGg==&NewsID=wirQpvCrHRp8
VdCqppxCNw==
The Armed Forces have an Act which governs each branch. These are
the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957, the
Border Security Force Act,1968 and the Coast Guard Act,1978 (1).
Herein, the code of conduct is clearly defined. Offences are delineated in
depth and include corruption [1]. The Indian Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV
Section 53 states:
“53. Extortion and Corruption. - Any person subject to this Act who
commits any of the following 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &
offences, that is to say :- Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
(a) commits extortion ; or https://mod.gov.in/acts
(b) without proper authority exacts from any person money, provisions or
service ; 2. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 2
There are a range of clearly defined Bribery and/or corruption are
Bribery and/or corruption are shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a February 2019
offences in law that clearly apply to defined offences in law that clearly
defined offences in law that clearly term which https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
the defence sector. These offences apply to the defence sector, but 2
apply to the defence sector, but 2 Bribery and/or corruption are not may extend to ten years or such less punishment as is in this Act ARMYACTS190216.pdf
cover (at a minimum) offering, or more of the following
or more of the following defined offences in law that apply mentioned.” [2]
giving, receiving, or soliciting of any mechanisms are not provided for:
mechanisms are not provided for: to the defence sector, but there Offences are not defined, or there 3. OECD, “INDIA: THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
item of value to influence the actions offering, giving, receiving, or
offering, giving, receiving, or are wider legal mechanisms in is no evidence of other formal The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, CHAPTER V, Section 25 states: ACT, 1988”, accessed 2 February 2019
35A Sanctions of an official or other person in
charge of a public or legal duty.
soliciting bribes.
soliciting bribes.
place (e.g. national laws mechanisms, or the military are 75 https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/
supported by policies, regulations, exempt from law. “Military, Naval and Air force or other law not to be affected. — (1) Nothing 46814376.pdf
Sanctions exist in law, but
Possible sanctions include or other laws) used to address in this Act shall
Possible sanctions include criminal maximum penalties constitute less
criminal prosecution/ this. affect the jurisdiction exercisable by, or the procedure applicable to, any 4. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 12 March 2019, “Army’s new
prosecution/ incarceration, than 1 year imprisonment or weak
incarceration, dismissal, and court or other authority under vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police personnel”,
dismissal, and considerable financial fines that would not act as a
considerable financial penalties. the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957, the The Economic Times, accessed May 19th, 2019
penalties. deterrent.
Border Security Force Act, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
1968, the Coast Guard Act, 1978 and the National Security Guard Act, armys-new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-
1986. personnel/articleshow/68367369.cms?from=mdr
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes
of any such law as is referred
to in sub-section (1), the Court of a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a
court of ordinarily criminal
justice.” [3]
Q35. Are there effective As alluded to in Q.7, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has approved the
measures in place for establishment of a new Vigilance Investigation Unit in the Army, entrusted
personnel found to have with conducting independent investigations into corruption [4].
taken part in forms of
bribery and corruption,
and is there evidence that
these measures are being
carried out? 1. PTI, 23 August 2017, “Army officer convicted of
corruption after 27 years of trial”, Hindustan Times,
There is evidence to suggest that cases are being investigated through convicted-for-corruption-after-27-years-of-trial/story-
formal procedures. In 2017 after 27 years of investigation and trial, a efVL6EoV2BmWtqL4JtYzaK.html
former Army Colonel was convicted by a special CBI court for amassing
disproportionate assets [1]. In a recent case, the CBI filed a case against 2. Neeraj Chauhan, 18 December 2018, “CBI files case
two Army officers in 2018 for taking bribes from a civilian supplier in the against two Army officers”, The Times of India, accessed 2
procurement of ration for troops in Nagaland India, between 2012 and February 2019
2016 [2]. In 2018, the CBI booked 12 Army officials for corruption in https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-files-case-
recruitment of religious teachers in 2013 [3]. The area of concern seems against-two-army-officers/articleshow/67148491.cms
not to be enforcement but pertains to the duration of prosecution, as the
Indian judicial system is generally slow. 3. PTI, 25 April 2018, “CBI books 12 Army officials for
corruption in recruitment of religious teachers”, The Times
Instances of bribery or corruption
Instances of bribery or corruption In 2018, 356 officers, including 52 colonels and 80 battalion commanders, of India, accessed 2 February 2019
Instances of bribery or corruption are are investigated or disciplined If there are no measures in
are investigated but not often Instances of bribery or corruption There is a complete failure to filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking protection against First https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-books-12-
investigated or disciplined through through formal processes, but place, this sub-indicator
35B Enforcement
formal processes and without undue undue political influence is
disciplined. There is clear undue
influence in the decision making
are superficially investigated or
rarely disclipined.
investigate or discipline even in
should be marked as Not 75 Information Reports (FIRs) and prosecution for actions carried out in the
line of duty in areas coming under the Armed Forces (Special Powers)
army-officials-for-corruption-in-recruitment-of-religious-
teachers/articleshow/63913613.cms
political influence. attempted and sometimes Applicable
process. Act, 1958, like in Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur [4]. The case relates
effective at derailing prosecutions.
to the Army believing it is being harassed, as there have been a number 4. Harish V. Nair, 15 August 2018, “'Harassed' Army
of CBI probes into ‘unlawful’ killings and ‘fake encounters’ by Army personnel at SC door to challenge prosecution in AFSPA
personnel. The Army vehemently denies that any killings are unlawful and areas”, accessed 2 February 2019
they are repeatedly prosecuted for doing their bona fide duties. This https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/-harassed-army-
petition suggests that legal measures are being enforced. personnel-at-sc-door-to-challenge-prosecution-in-afspa-
areas-1314899-2018-08-15
The MoD publishes annual reports with a section on the activities of
vigilance units, detailing the number of complaints, sanctions and 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
penalties imposed on those convicted, finalisations of disciplinary Report 16-17”, pg. 190-191,
hearings, exonerations, recordable warnings and appeals [5][6]. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual

Report 17-18”, pg. 189,
[
Whistleblowing is neither explicitly encouraged nor discouraged by the
government; legal provisions are in place to support and protect
whistleblowers through the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 [1]. The
defence and security sector come under its remit. The Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC) also affords whistleblowers protection [2]. Prior to the
1. Christine Liu, 5 June 2014, “India's Whistleblower
aforementioned, the RTI Act, 2005, provided information to the public but
Protection Act - An Important Step, But Not Enough”,
no protections.
Harvard University Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics,
Whistle Blowers Protective (Amendment) Bill, 2015 was passed in the Lok
https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/indias-whistleblower-
Sabha. Amendments were aimed at safeguarding against disclosures
protection-act-important-step-not-enough
affecting the sovereignty and the integrity of India. The amendments
would address concerns relating to national security. Safeguards against
2. Central Vigilance Commission, “Whistle Blower
disclosures which may prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of
Complaints”, accessed 29 January 2019
the country, security, strategic, scientific or economic interest of the State,
http://www.cvc.nic.in/?q=citizens-corner/whistle-blower-
relations with a foreign State or leads to incitement of an offence, would
complaints
be strengthened. The salient features are:
Legislation on whistleblowing and
reporting corruption exists and is 3. Anjali Bhardwaj & Amrita Johri, 31 July 2017, “Don’t
- Amendments in section 4 prohibit disclosures prejudicially affecting the
applicable to military and official shoot the messenger”, The Hindu, accessed 29 January
Legislation on whistleblowing and Legislation on whistleblowing and Legislation on whistleblowing and sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or
personnel. There is explicit 2019
reporting corruption exists and is reporting corruption exists but may reporting corruption exists but is economic interests of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or
reference to protection of https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-shoot-the-
applicable to military and official not be explicitly applicable to weak on protections for No legislation applicable to military lead to incitement to an offence, etc. These amendments have been
whistleblowers, including: protection messenger/article19397939.ece
personnel. There is explicit military and official personnel. whistleblowers. Explicit reference and official personnel exist to modelled on the provisions of section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act,
36A Legal provisions of identity, protection against
retribution, reversed burden of proof
reference to protection of There is explicit reference to to protection of whistleblowers facilitate corruption reporting or 25 2005.
4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 2 August
whistleblowers, but only some of protection of whistleblowers, but may be absent or few of the protection of whistleblowing.
regarding retaliation, waiver of 2018, “Delay in operationalising Whistle Blowers
the protections listed in score 4 only some of the protections listed protections listed in score 4 are - Amendment to section 5 provides that the Competent Authority shall not
liability for the whistleblower, no Protection Act”, accessed 29 January 2019
are established in law. in score 4 are established in law. established in law. inquire into any public interest disclosure which involves information of the
sanctions for misguided reporting, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=181386
nature specified in the amended section 4.
right of the whistleblower to refuse
participation in wrongdoing. 5. Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, 22 February 2019, "Five Years
- Amendment in section 8 provides that no person shall be required to
After Passing Law to Protect Whistleblowers, Govt Yet to
furnish any information or answer any question or produce any document
Operationalise It", The Wire, accessed 11 August 2019
or render any other assistance in an inquiry under this Act, if the same is
https://thewire.in/government/whistle-blowers-protection-
likely to result in the disclosure of any information of the nature specified
act-five-years
in the amended section 4.
6. Anjali Bhardwaj & Amrite Johri,1 August 2017, "Don’t
The said Bill has been sent to the Rajya Sabha and is presently pending
shoot the messenger", The Hindu, accessed 11 August
in the Rajya Sabha [3][4]. There has been criticism that the Act has not yet
2019
been operationalised by the current government and as such, there is no
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-shoot-the-
provision of statutory protections to whistleblowers. There is additional
messenger/article19397939.ece
criticism that the 2015 Amendment Bill attempts to dilute the Act, by
removing immunity provided to whistleblowers from prosecution under the
Official Secrets Act for disclosures which can lead to up to 14 years in
prison; and disregarding information that has not been obtained under the
RTI Act [5][6].

November 2015, “Committee of Experts Constituted by
Q36. Is whistleblowing As alluded to above, whistleblower law applies to the defence sector. In
Defence Minister on review of litigation and redressal of
encouraged by the 2016, the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar gave the go-ahead to
grievances submits its report”, accessed 30 January 2019
government, and are improve the complaints redressal system in the defence sector [1]. The
whistle-blowers in military Whistleblowing is encouraged Committee of Experts had noted that there was a lack of opportunity of
and defence ministries through training, information, and personal hearing/interaction while deciding the representations and
Whistleblowing is actively Whistleblowing is encouraged 2. Man Aman Singh Chhina, 13 November 2016,
afforded adequate guidance on the reporting of complaints of defence personnel and recommended the same. The
encouraged through training, through training, information, and Whistleblowing is weakly “Manohar Parrikar gives go ahead to improve complaints
protection from reprisal corruption and protections for Whistleblowing is not encouraged complaints were found to be have been dealt with “by way of one-way file
information, and guidance on the guidance on the reporting of encouraged. Although guidance redressal system in defence”, The Indian Express,
for reporting evidence of whistleblowers. However, internal by the government. There are very noting system”. The Committee also recommended that complaints by
reporting of corruption and corruption and protections for materials are available, training accessed 30 January 2019
corruption, in both law and campaigns to promote few (if any) guidance or lower ranks should not be rejected on hyper-technical reasons such as
protections for whistleblowers. There whistleblowers. However, internal and internal campaigns to promote https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/
practice? 36B Prioritisation
is a well-resourced independent unit campaigns to promote
whistleblowing are sporadic and
superficial, and the unit intended
whistleblowing are sporadic and
information materials, and there is
no training or information
25 non-adherence to formats and should be strictly decided within the time
frame of a maximum of 6 months [2].
manohar-parrikar-gives-go-ahead-to-improve-complaints-
that handles claims, and institution- whistleblowing are sporadic and superficial. A unit may have been redressal-system-in-defence-4372616/
to handle claims is either poorly- campaigns. There is no unit
wide campaigns about superficial. Even so, there is a designated to handle claims but as
resourced or not independent, intended to handle claims. Given that the complaints redressal mechanism is still not conducive to
whistleblowing that covers personnel well-resourced independent unit of yet is not in place. 3. Major Navdeep Singh, 20 January 2017, “Grievance
e.g., assigned to an existing personnel complaints being raised without retaliation and the climate
at all levels. that handles claims. Redressal Systems In Defence Forces Need Fixing, And
department that reports to the surrounding whistleblowing in India in general seems to be hostile despite
Urgently”, Indian Defence Review, accessed 30 January
defence minister. the presence of legal provisions, it can be deduced that there is not
2019
adequate will nor protection to/from recording corruption activity [3].
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/grievance-
redressal-systems-in-defence-forces-need-fixing-and-
urgently/
1. Christine Liu, 5 June 2014, “India's Whistleblower

Protection Act - An Important Step, But Not Enough”,
Under the current Whistle Blowers Act, 2014 and proposed amended Bill, Harvard University Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics,
the law empowers the competent authorities to accord whistleblowers accessed 29 January 2019
protection and penalising those who victimise them [1]. There has been https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/indias-whistleblower-
criticism that the Act has not yet been operationalised by the current protection-act-important-step-not-enough
government and as such, there is no provision of statutory protections to
whistleblowers [2][3]. 2. Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, 22 February 2019, "Five Years
After Passing Law to Protect Whistleblowers, Govt Yet to
There has been criticism from civil society activists due to cases of Operationalise It", The Wire, accessed 11 August 2019
intimidation and murder of civil society whistleblowers. The efficacy of the https://thewire.in/government/whistle-blowers-protection-
legal provisions in place can be questioned. Whistleblowers have been act-five-years
Officials and personnel may doubt
harassed, assaulted and murdered before and after the passing of the
that whistleblowers are adequately
current Act and proposed amended Bill. According to Civicus, “India is a 3. Anjali Bhardwaj & Amrite Johri, 1 August 2017, "Don’t
Officials and personnel are confident protected. There may be vague or
There is little trust among officials dangerous environment for human rights activists as they are often shoot the messenger", The Hindu, accessed 11 August
that adequate protections (and unclear language used by top
and personnel that they would be subjected to intimidation, harassment and attacks for defending the rights 2019
36C Effectiveness protection of identity) are provided
for whistleblowers and individuals
officials that casts doubt on the
process. Although adequate
provided adequate protection if 0 of others, including victims of human rights violations.” The report goes on https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/dont-shoot-the-
they reported corrupt activity. to state that most of these acts are perpetrated by police, security forces, messenger/article19397939.ece
reporting corruption claims. protections are in place, there are
non-state actors, including state-sponsored vigilante groups, armed
some doubts about its
gangs, sections of communities and private sector interests have also 4. David Kode, 9 November 2017, “India: Democracy
effectiveness in action.
violated the rights of human rights defenders [4]. threatened by growing attacks on civil society”, Civicus,
In 2017, Roy Mathew an Indian Army soldier was found hanging from the http://www.civicus.org/images/
ceiling of a room in an abandoned army barrack in Deolali cantonment in India_Democracy_Threatened_Nov2017.pdf
Nasik. The suicide was questioned by the soldier’s family and a fresh
autopsy requested as they alleged there were marks of beating on his feet 5. PTI, 4 March 2017, “His body has marks of beating,
and blood had clotted in some parts. The soldier had gone missing after blood clots, says kin of Army jawan found hanging”, India
he supposedly featured in an expose by a news portal on the abuse in the Today, accessed 29 January 2019
orderly system in the Army [5]. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/army-jawan-found-
hanging-sting-video-sahayak-system-buddy-system-roy-
mathew-963910-2017-03-04
1. Department of Personnel & Training Government of
India, “Transfer Policy and Transfer Orders”, accessed 29
January 2019
https://dopt.gov.in/transfer-policy-and-transfer-orders
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 3 July

2015, “Framing of Rotational Transfer Policy by Cadres
Authorities”, accessed 29 January 2019
There is evidence to suggest that some special attention is paid to the 3. Department of Defence Production Government of India,
Special attention is paid to personnel Some attention is paid to selection, time in post and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions. “In Pursuit of Reliance”, pg.56, accessed 29 January 2019
in sensitive positions, i.e., personnel in sensitive positions, Sensitive positions are identified and rotational transfers are made as per https://ddpmod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DDP_Booklet.pdf
individuals with significant autonomy i.e., individuals with significant the Rotational Transfer Policy in place [1][2]. Special attention is also paid
There is no recognition that certain
over personnel, resources, and the autonomy over personnel, to time in post of personnel in sensitive positions in the Defence Public 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2017, “Annual
Coverage of sensitive positions may be more open to
37A
(higher-risk) positions
policies/plans that determine them.
This includes decision-making power
resources, and the policies/plans
that determine them. Only one or
corruption opportunities than 50 Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFBs)
[3]. The Vigilance Division in the MoD carries out oversight across all
Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 29 January 2019
others.
in procurement, recruitment, two areas may be targeted as high defence departments [4]. Clearance from the Interlligence Bureau is
contracting, financial and risk (e.g., procurement), leaving required for appointment of top government posts [5]. 5. Aloke Tikku, 3 February 2014, “Appointment to top govt
commercial management. other areas without special focus. posts only after strict IB scrutiny”, accessed 11 August
2019
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/appointment-to-top-
govt-posts-only-after-strict-ib-scrutiny/story-
yQbxn1jDHWE6G4F90MKMQM.html
Q37. Is special attention

paid to the selection, time
in post, and oversight of
personnel in sensitive 1. India Today, 20 Apri 2015, “Army guards promotion
positions, including policy of Command Exit Model for Colonels”, accessed 29
officials and personnel in There has been criticism of the government’s 2009 Command Exit Model January 2019
defence procurement, (CEM) [1]. The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) had remarked that the CEM https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-army-colonels-
contracting, financial was discriminatory, with the policy deeply dividing the Army as it is seen promotion-policy-command-exit-model-249301-2015-04-20
management, and favouring infantry and artillery officers. The government maintained that
commercial management? the policy which includes short term tenures was to ensure the Army 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 17 January
remained agile. 2017, “Constitution of a committee to review the promotion
policy for officers in the Indian army”, accessed 29 January
There was some effort from the MoD in 2017 to reform promotions policy 2019
There are have specific but weak
within the Army. A committee consisting of Lt General (Ret.) G.S. Katoch https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Promotion.pdf
There are specific procedures in procedures in place which limits
Significant discretion is employed If there is no recognition that and Lt General (Ret.) A K Ahuja was set up to give their recommendations
place which limits conflicts of interest conflicts of interest for these
in the recruitment and selection of certain positions may be on changes in promotion policy and the Quantified System of Selection 3. Ajit Kumar Dubey, 6 February 2017, “Defence Minister
for these sensitive positions. This sensitive positions. Alternatively,
personnel in sensitive positions. more open to corruption (QSS) for officers [2][3]. Manohar Parrikar forms committee to make promotion
includes revolving door limitations these position-specific procedures
37B Selection process
and stringent vetting. Standard are stringent but not regularly
Open recruitment is not the
standard operating procedure, and
than others i.e. recognised
as high-risk or sensitive, this
50 In a 2012 IDSA publication, it was stated that, “the Comptroller and
system fair, transparent”, India Today, accessed 29
January 2019
appointment/recruitment processes followed. Regardless, standard
position-specific conflict of interest sub-indicator is not Auditor General (CAG) noted the fact that system of acquisitions being https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/manohar-
are followed for particular technical appointment/recruitment
procedures are absent. applicable. handled by unspecialised personnel posted for three year tenures was parrikar-army-promotion-system-959111-2017-02-06
competencies. processes are followed for
simply not adequate. It emphasised that “defence acquisition is a cross-
particular technical competencies.
disciplinary activity requiring expertise in technology, military, finance, 4. Mrinal Suman, 2012, “Defence Acquisition Institute: A
quality assurance, market research, contract management, project Viewpoint”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol-6, Issue-2. pp-
management, administration and policy making. ” [4] 01-12, accessed 29 January 2019
http://www.idsa.in/jds/
Though posts are not openly advertised, selection for sensitive posts are 6_2_2012_DefenceAcquisitionInstitute_MrinalSuman
made by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC), headed by
the Prime Minister [5]. 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 26 June
2019, “ACC approvals”, accessed 12 August 2019
1. Vinod Misra (Editor), 2015, “Core Concerns in Indian

Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms”, Pentagon
Press, Pg.324, ISBN 978-81-8274-818-7
There is internal oversight in the There is internal oversight in the If there is no recognition that
The government has a number of oversight mechanisms in place in the 2. Department of Defence Production Government of
ministry of defence to scrutinise ministry of defence to scrutinise certain positions may be
defence sector. These include CAG, CVC and Parliamentary committees India,“Vigilance Wing Of DDP”, accessed 29 January 2019
appointment and promotion appointment and promotion more open to corruption
There is no special scrutiny of who look into aspects of defence planning, deployment and preparedness https://ddpmod.gov.in/vigilance-wing-ddp
37C Oversight decisions of personnel in sensitive
positions. Higher risk and sensitive
decisions of personnel in sensitive
positions. However, there is no
personnel in sensitive positions.
than others i.e. recognised
as high-risk or sensitive, this
75 [1][2]. Promotions of government officials are based on the Annual
Appraisal done at the MoD. Vigilance clearance. Clearances from the 3. Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions
positions are also subject to external external scrutiny of higher-risk sub-indicator is not
intelligence agencies are required for sensitive posts [3]. Government of India, 2 November 2012, “Office
scrutiny. sensitive positions. applicable.
Memorandum”, accessed 12 August 2019
http://documents.doptcirculars.nic.in/D2/D02est/
22034_4_2012_Estt_D.pdf
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, Department of

Defence, “About Us”, accessed 29 January 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/organization-structure
There is a plethora of information on organisation, structure and command
available across the Indian government’s defence websites but Force
2. Open Government Data Platform India website search
strengths are not easily found [1][2]. Annual reports from the Armed
result, accessed 1 February 2019
Forces include annual National Cadet Corps (NCC) enrolment numbers,
https://data.gov.in/resources/state-rank-wise-sanctioned-
intake of candidates for pre-commission training as officers across training
strength-and-vacancy-civil-police-including-district-armed
The number of civilian and military The number of civilian and military institutes but no clear breakdown of the three Armed Forces [3]. More
It is expected that the MoD
The number of civilian and military personnel is updated on at least a personnel is either annually or less The number of civilian and military information on civilian personnel is available from the government’s
or Armed Forces will 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
personnel is updated on at least a six-month basis. There are frequently - the number published personnel is updated less websites. Military personnel numbers information can be found via the
The number of civilian and military release official numbers. If Report 2016-2017”, accessed 29 January 2019
quarterly basis. There are established processes for is generally considered to be frequently than every year, and Indian government’s Press Information Bureau but only after sifting
38A Accuracy
established processes for publishing publishing and verifying statistics reflective of reality, but there may there is considerable uncertainty
personnel is not accurately known
or officially collected.
official numbers are
released by another ministry
50 through a number of press releases [4]. Third parties such as the
and verifying statistics on the on the composition of the armed be some systematic inaccuracies surrounding the accuracy of the International Institute for Strategic Studies do state clear personnel
(e.g. Finance), this will 4. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 5 March
composition of the armed forces. forces, but there may be (e.g. some figures may be out of numbers. numbers [5].
score only a 1. 2018, “Recruitment of Pilots in Armed Forces”, accessed
occasional inaccuracies. date)
29 January 2019
The above suggests that numbers are officially collected on at least an
annual basis. Accuracy of data publicly cannot be determined but given
the IISS’ global reputation, one can conclude that their data is the most
5. Internal Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, "The
current and accurate.
Military Balance", Routledge, accessed 29 January 2019
https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-
military-balance-2018
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, Department of
Defence, “About Us”, accessed 29 January 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/organization-structure
2. Open Government Data Platform India website search

result, accessed 1 February 2019
As stated above, data directly from government sources is not easily https://data.gov.in/resources/state-rank-wise-sanctioned-
attainable [1]. The Open Government Data Platform can yield some strength-and-vacancy-civil-police-including-district-armed
Information on the number of civilian Aggregated or summarised results but requires usage type, purpose and name and one’s name and
and military personnel is made information on the number of Information on the number of email address to be submitted [2]. A recent government Press release 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 24 July
38B Transparency available publicly by the Ministry of
Defence, disaggregated by rank
civilian and military personnel is
made available publicly by the
civilian and military personnel are
not made publicly available.
25 stated some strength numbers but admitted that “Information cannot be
divulged in the interest of the National Security” [3]. The MoD does not
2019, “Strength of Defence Forces”, accessed 12 August
2019
bracket. Ministry of Defence. directly release all manpower data. The Parliamentary Committees http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
provide some information on uniformed personnel. The aggregated PRID=1580095
civilian number is published by the Ministry of Finance [4].
4. Ministry of Finance Government of India, “ANNUAL
REPORT ON PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF CENTRAL
Q38. Is the number of GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES 2016-17,
civilian and military accessed 12 August 2019
personnel accurately https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/PayAllowance2016-
known and publicly 17%28English%29.pdf
available?
1. Transparency International, 2015, “Government Defence

Anti-Corruption Index 2015: India”, accessed 29 January
2019
http://government.defenceindex.org/generate-report.php?
country_id=6295
2. Rediff News, 21 August 2012, “Army procures ration for

In the previous Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: India
2.5L 'ghost' soldiers; questioned”, accessed 29 January
report, a case of ghost soldiers was documented. Since then, there has
2019
been no information publicly available on the matter [1]. The source cited
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/army-procures-ration-
had stated that, “the defence ministry's Controller General Defence
for-25l-ghost-soldiers-questioned/20120821.htm
Accounts has questioned the army for procuring ration for 14 lakh
personnel during 2010-11 while its actual strength is only about 11.5 lakh”
3. Pradeep Thakur, 19 December 2018, “Why CAG
[2]. Currently no reports from this department are publicly available on
stopped putting defence reports online”, The Times of
their website. Which leads one to look at CAG’s website for any insight.
India, accessed 29 January 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-cag-stopped-
As alluded to in Q.32, according to a recent Times of India article, CAG
putting-defence-reports-online/articleshow/67153548.cms
has stopped putting defence reports publically online [3]. CAG reports
The military has not been presented Ghost soldiers have been an issue must be submitted to Parliament so are therefore public documents but
4. Controller General Defence Accounts Government of
38C Ghost soldiers with the problem of ghost soldiers in
the last five years.
for the military in the past five
years.
50 according to the article, none of the seven defence reports from CAG in
2018 are available online. This is verifiable on the CAG website where no
India website, accessed 29 January 2019
http://cgda.nic.in/
2018 reports from the Defence and National Security sector are available
[4][5]. An expert stated that there are enough checks and balances to
5. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, "Audit report
prevent misappropriation of funds in the name of ghost soldiers. The CAG
search", accessed 29 January 2019
also examines the recruitment and officers and other personnel of the
https://cag.gov.in/audit-reports?
Armed Forces [6].
combine_op=word&combine=&field_government_type_tid=
All&field_union_department_type_tid=All&field_local_body
Given the above, sufficient information is not publicly available to deduce
_types_tid=All&field_report_sector_tid%5B
if there have been documented cases of ghost soldiers or undocumented
%5D=41&date_filter_op=%3D&date_filter%5Bvalue%5D
instances through scrutiny of accurate force numbers and allocations in
%5Byear%5D=2018&date_filter%5Bmin%5D%5Byear
recent years.
%5D=&date_filter%5Bmax%5D%5Byear
%5D=&sort_by=field_date_of_laying_of_report_value&audi
t_report_listing_page=Apply
6. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Defence

Audit”, p. 413, accessed 12 August 2019
https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/footer_pdf/chap_8.pdf
1. Indian Army,"Pay allowances", accessed 31 January

2019
http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/pay-allowances.htm
2. Indian Navy, "Pay scale of officers", accessed 31

January 2019
https://www.joinindiannavy.gov.in/en/page/pay-scale-of-
officers.html
3. Indian Air Force, "Pay and allowances", accessed 31

Pay rates for all civilian and military Pay rates for all civilian and
January 2019
personnel are published in service military personnel are published in Pay rates are for civilian and Pay rates for civilian and military personnel in a disaggregated form are
Pay rates are published only for http://careerairforce.nic.in/index1.asp?
publications, disaggregated by rank. service publications, military personnel are available No information on pay rates is openly published and available for public viewing via the Armed Forces'
39A Pay rates
Summarised information is made disaggregated by rank. But no
selected civilian and military
personnel.
only in a cursory, abbreviated, or available. 100 websites, MoD website, recruitment portals and third-party websites [1][2]
lang=1&ls_id=86&lid=70&level=2&pid=84
available to the general public, e.g., information is made available to unreliable way. [3][4][5]. 1.
4. Ministry
SSBCrack,of Defence Government
“Indian Army Officer’sofPay
India, “Seventh
Scale &
on the ministry website. the general public. Central Pay 2019”,
Commission”, accessed 31 January
Allowances accessed 31 January 2019 2019
Q39. Are pay rates and commission
https://www.ssbcrack.com/2013/02/indian-army-officers-
allowances for civilian and https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/seventh-central-pay-
pay-scale.html
military personnel openly commission
published? 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Civilians in
2. Indian Services
Defence Army, "Pay allowances",
(Revised accessed
Pay) Rules, 31 accessed
2016”, January
2019
31 January 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/
cdsenglish2016_0.pdf
3. Indian Navy, "Pay scale of officers", accessed 31
January 2019
https://www.joinindiannavy.gov.in/en/page/pay-scale-of-
officers.html
4. Indian Air Force, accessed 31 January 2019

Allowances for all civilian and Allowances for all civilian and Allowances for civilian and military personnel are openly published and
http://careerairforce.nic.in/index1.asp?
military personnel are openly military personnel are published, No information on allowances is available for public viewing via the MoD website, Armed Forces' websites,
39B Allowances
published, including criteria for but do not include criteria for available publicly. 100 recruitment portals and third-party websites [1][2][3][4][5]. Criteria for
lang=1&ls_id=86&lid=70&level=2&pid=84
eligibility and calculation methods. eligibility and calculation methods. eligibility and calculation methods are included [6][7].
5. “Indian Army Officer’s Pay Scale & Allowances 2019”,
SSBCrack, accessed 31 January 2019
https://www.ssbcrack.com/2013/02/indian-army-officers-
pay-scale.html
6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Seventh

Central Pay Commission”, accessed 31 January 2019
commission
https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/seventh-central-pay-
commission
7. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Revised rates

of risk and hardship allowances/concessions”, accessed 31
January 2019
https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/
Revisedrates.pdf
Personnel receive the correct pay on time [1]. Pay and allowances of
Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR) of the Indian Army including JCOs
holding Honorary Commissioned Ranks are maintained Corps/Regiment- 1. Interviewee 1, Retired Senior Indian Air Force Official,
wise on the Individual Running Ledger Account (IRLA) System in 44 Pay India, 1 February 2019
and Accounts Offices (PAOs) of the Defence Accounts Department (DAD)
There are occasional instances of
There are occasional instances of Payment is delivered up to 3 There are regular delays in spread across the country. This system began in 1946. 2. Controller General of Defence Accounts Government of
40A Timeliness Personnel receive pay on time. late payment, but these are
corrected within a few days.
late payment of 1-3 months. months late on a regular basis. payment of over 3 months. 100 India, ““Samarth” and “Dolphin””, accessed 1 February
In August 2009, a Monthly Payment System was launched under ‘Project 2019
Samarth’ in an effort to re-engineer the system to ensure that Army http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=samarthN
personnel pay accounts are closed every month and their net monthly
entitlements are remitted into their bank accounts [2].
1. Indian Army, “Press Releases”, accessed 1 February

2019
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/Site/PressRelease/
frmPressReleaseDetail.aspx?s=2017
Personnel generally receive the accurate pay on time. After analysing
records, there seems to be no grievances surrounding accuracy of
monthly pay [1].
November 2015, “Highlights of Recommendations of
Seventh Central Pay Commission”, accessed 1 February
Grievances pertain to the longstanding issue of military personnel earning
There are occasional instances of Personnel are not guaranteed to 2019
Basic pay may occasionally be less than civilian personnel. The Seventh Central Pay Commission had
incorrect payment, but these are receive the correct salary because Basic pay is regularly subject to http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=131719
40B Accuracy Personnel receive the correct pay.
corrected within a few days or
subject to discretionary
adjustments.
of systematic problems with the discretionary adjustments. 100 fixed Rs 5,200 as MSP per month for JCOs and jawans while putting it at
Rs 15,500 for officers between Lieutenant-rank and Brigadier-rank [2].
Q40. Do personnel receive weeks. payment system. 3. PTI, “Government rejects demand for higher military pay
The proposal for higher MSP for JCOs and equivalent rank of the Navy
the correct pay on time, for over 1 lakh military officers; Army anguished”, The
and the IAF was rejected by the Finance Ministry in December 2018. The
and is the system of Economic Times, December 5th 2018, accessed 1
three services, particularly the Army, was pressing for increasing the
payment well-established, February 2019
monthly MSP of JCOs from Rs 5,500 to Rs 10,000 [3].
routine, and published? https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
1. Indian Army, "Pay and allowances for officers",
government-rejects-demand-for-higher-military-service-
pay-for-1-lakh-personnel-army-upset/articleshow/
66936459.cms
2. Indian Navy, "Pay scales for officers", accessed 31
There are considerable January 2019
shortcomings in the transparency https://www.joinindiannavy.gov.in/en/page/pay-scale-of-
The payment and allowances of the payment system. officers.html
system is openly published. It
includes all of the following, at a Two or more of the following are Information on personnel pay, allowances and systems are publicly 3. Indian Air Force, "Pay and allowances", accessed 1
minimum: not visible: available and comprehensive; including pay brackets for all ranks, February 2019
- Pay brackets for all ranks, The payment system should disaggregated by seniority, calculation methods, permitted allowances http://careerairforce.nic.in/index1.asp?
- Pay brackets for all ranks, disaggregated by seniority. differentiate between and expenses, entitlement criteria and caps on entitlement [1][2][3][4][5]. lang=1&ls_id=86&lid=70&level=2&pid=84
disaggregated by seniority. - Details on how individual pay is different types of staff e.g. In August 2010, under ‘Project Dolphin’ the existing Common Business-
- Details on how individual pay is calculated, including time starting The payment system is not unit vs. administrative staff Oriented Language (COBOL) based system was shifted to a Relational 4. Controller of Defence Accounts (CC), “PAY AND
40C Transparency
calculated, including time starting in in post / away from post published. vs. audit staff. This should 100 Data Base Management System (RDBMS) based online system. The ALLOWANCES OF JCOs/OR 2018”, accessed 15 August
post / away from post - A list of all permitted allowances avoid all staff being grouped project facilitates to provide monthly entitlement information to personnel. 2019
- A list of all permitted allowances and expenses, the entitlement together under the same This helps them to lodge complaints and grievances speedily unlike the http://pcdacc.gov.in/download/
and expenses, the entitlement criteria, and caps on entitlement bracket. earlier system where personnel received a statement of accounts only PayAllowancesHandbook.pdf
criteria, and caps on entitlement - Separate responsibilities for after the quarterly closing. The system establishes authority and
- Separated administrative, unit and administrative staff, the accountability [6]. 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Revised rates
audit responsibilities individual's unit/command chain, of risk and hardship allowances/concessions”, accessed 31
and internal audit January 2019
https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/
Revisedrates.pdf
6. Controller General of Defence Accounts Government of

India, “‘Samarth” and “Dolphin’”, accessed 1 February
2019
http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=samarthN
1. Interviewee, retired colonel, New Delhi, 23 May 2019
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “TENTH

REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2014-
2015) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA), accessed 2 February
2019
There is an established appointment system for the selection of military http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
personnel at middle and top management level. 16_Defence_10.pdf
Appointments to the level of Lieutenant General are made through 3. Cabinet Secretariat Government of India, “THE
promotion boards, with independent scrutiny representatives from other GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS)
Armed Forces. These boards perform stringent scrutiny. Names of RULES”, accessed 2 February 2019
candidates are concealed to ensure objective decision-making [1]. The https://cabsec.gov.in/files/allocation/
Appointment Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) oversees higher abr_rules_archive_299.pdf
The system for appointment of The system for appointment of Appointments do not always apply appointments and promotions. The Establishment Officers Division
military personnel at middle and top military personnel at middle and objective job descriptions and processes these proposals to the ACC [2][3]. 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 3
There are formal processes in
management applies objective job top management applies objective standardised assessment October 2008,“Cabinet Approves Phase-II of AV Singh
place, but they are regularly
descriptions and standardised job descriptions and standardised processes, e.g., decisions may be The Ajay Vikram Singh Committee made recommendations Committee Report Promotional Avenues in Higher Ranks
undermined by undue influence or There is no established
assessment processes. Promotion assessment processes, though unjustifiable based on objective encompassing a wide spectrum of service related issues to address the in Services Open Up”, accessed 2 February 2019
41A Formal process
boards are open and representatives there is little independent scrutiny criteria, or promotion boards may
inappropriate conduct in the
promotion process. The civil
appointment system for military
personnel.
100 twin aspects of reducing the high age profile and improving cadre mobility http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=43370
from other branches of the armed being paid to the promotion of have members from within the of officers. Based on the recommendations of the Committee, a number of
service is not involved in the
forces are invited and regularly sit on senior personnel, e.g., promotion chain of command. However, this measures have been implemented as Cadre Review. These include time 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 26 April
appointment process at all.
the board. The civil service is boards may not have independent is not a widespread or common based promotion up to the rank of Lt Colonel; introduction of Colonel 2010, “Restructuring OF Officers’ cadre in Defence
involved for very high level ranks. observers. practice. (Time Scale) rank; upgradation of 750 posts of Lt Colonel to Colonel; Services”, accessed 2 February 2019
upgradation of 1896 posts in the ranks of Colonel, Brigadier, Major http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=60939
General and Lt General and their equivalents in Navy and Air Force [4][5].
6. Col (Dr) PK Vasudeva, 20 September 2018, “Cadre
A new Cadre Review is currently underway [6]. Review: Lean and Mean Indian Army”, Indian Defence
Review, accessed 2 February 2019
The government recently announced on Indian Independence Day that http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/cadre-review-
India will have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) [7]. lean-and-mean-indian-army/
7. Sandeep Unnithan, 23 August 2019, “Chief of Defence

Staff: Can the new superchief call the shots?”, India Today,
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/
Q41. Is there an 20190902-enter-the-superchief-1590316-2019-08-23
established, independent,
transparent, and objective
appointment system for
the selection of military
personnel at middle and
top management level?
Q41. Is there an
established, independent,
transparent, and objective
appointment system for
the selection of military
personnel at middle and
top management level?
2. Dhananjay Mahapatra, 11 September 2017, “Over 100

Army officers move Supreme Court claiming
‘discrimination’ in promotion”, The Times of India,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/over-100-army-
officers-move-sc-claiming-discrimination-in-promotion/
Appointments are subject to external
Appointments are subject to Appointments are externally articleshow/60454829.cms
scrutiny for high profile positions, Information on the appointment process is publicly available. There does
external scrutiny for high profile audited for high profile positions, Appointments are only
which includes both process audits There is no external scrutiny of the not seem to be official scrutiny by Parliament of senior appointments. An
positions, but this is not a regular but this process is not elaborate superficially audited for high profile 3. Col Mahesh Chadha (retd), 1 June 2018, “Review of the
41B Scrutiny and a sample of individual
promotions. Parliament also
practice. Parliament also and may even be superficial. positions, and parliament has no
appointments of military personnel
at middle and top management.
25 expert states that there is unofficial legislative oversight [1]. There has
been criticism at times regarding discrimination in promotions and the
officer cadre in the army”, The Tribune, accessed 2
scrutinises decisions for very high Parliament scrutinises decisions involvement. February 2019
scrutinises decisions for very high seniority versus merit debate that arose after the Cadre Review [2][3][4].
level appointments. for very high level appointments. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/review-of-the-
level appointments.
officer-cadre-in-the-army/598202.html
4. Rahul Singh, 30 December 2016, “New army chief Bipin

Rawat expects support from superseded generals”, The
Hindustan Times, accessed 2 February 2019
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-army-
chief-bipin-rawat-expects-support-from-superseded-
generals/story-mdLkuLe3R8GhPXQ46zowHI.html
Appointments are released through formal and informal mechanisms. 1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 4 August
Specific selection criteria is not always publicly available. According to a 2017, “Transparent Promotion Policy for Army”, accessed
government Press release in August 2017, “Bringing transparency in 2 February 2019
promotion policy is a continuous process and all necessary steps are http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=169614
Information on the appointment taken from time to time” [1].
Information on the appointment
processis only partially available 2. Ajit Kumar Dubey, 6 February 2017, “Defence Minister
process is publicly available and Little to no information is released
41C Transparency
includes the selection criteria for
on websites or to the public and/or
may be incomplete with regards to
about the appointment process. 50 As alluded to in Q.37, in 2017, former Defence Minister, the late Manohar
Parrikar formed a high-level committee consisting of Lt Gen G S Katoch
Manohar Parrikar forms committee to make promotion
system fair, transparent”, India Today, accessed 2
each rank.
selection criteria. and Lt Gen A K Ahuja to make promotion systems fair and transparent. February 2019
They would give their recommendations to the government on the https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/manohar-
changes in promotion policy and the Quantified System of Selection parrikar-army-promotion-system-959111-2017-02-06
(QSS) of the Indian Army [2].
1. Indian Army, “Terms and Conditions of Service”,

PS010113.pdf
2. Rumel Dahiya, 30 November 2012, “Officers’ Promotion

Policy in the Army”, IDSA, accessed 2 February 2019
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/
In theory, the promotions mechanism is objective and meritocratic across
OfficersPromotionPolicyintheArmy_DahiyaChadha_301112
the branches. A Special Promotions Board makes recommendations
based on criteria such as length of service, discipline and medical [1]. The
3. Cabinet Secretariat Government of India, “THE
inputs before the Selection Board for empaneling officers for higher ranks
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS)
are Confidential Reports (CRs) [2]. In the case of high-level appointments,
RULES”, accessed 2 February 2019
the Establishment Officers Division processes proposals to the
https://cabsec.gov.in/files/allocation/
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) [3]. Recommendations of
abr_rules_archive_299.pdf
the internal boards are subject to MoD scrutiny. An expert has suggested
that the ACC can be open to political coercion [4].
Personnel promotions are conducted
Personnel promotions are Personnel promotions do not There has been controversy surrounding the mechanisms. The Indian
through formal appraisal processes 5. Nitin Gokhale, 9 August 2014, “Alleged Favouritism at
conducted through formal always follow formal appraisal There is no indication of any Navy courted such controversy in 2014, after the promotion of a key aide
and promotions boards for all the Top Angers Navy Officials”, NDTV, accessed 2
appraisal processes and processes, e.g., decisions may be There are formal processes in formal processes, boards or to the Chief of Naval Staff. The officer was promoted without serving the
personnel. Promotions to senior February 2019
promotions boards for all unjustifiable based on objective place, but they are regularly oversight of the promotions mandatory time at sea, which was seen as nepotism. The one-time
ranks are open to scrutiny by https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/alleged-favouritism-at-
42A Formal process
independent personnel that are
personnel, though there is little
independent scrutiny being paid to
criteria, or promotion boards may
have members from within the
undermined by undue influence or
process. Undue influence and
50 exception declared at the same time gave officers who have not qualified
for the key Command Examination another chance to appear and qualify
the-top-angers-navy-officials-647225
outside the chain of command.
the promotion of senior personnel, chain of command. However, this promotion process. promotions process may be for the rank of captain. This was viewed unfavourably by the naval
Service members from separate 6. Man Aman Singh China, 15 March 2015, “AFT upholds
.e.g., promotion boards may not is not a widespread or common widespread. establishment [5].
branches sit on the boards as army HQ changes for higher command courses”, The
have independent observers. practice.
independent observers. Indian Express, accessed 2 February 2019
In 2015, the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) upheld Army HQ’s changes for
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/aft-
Higher Command Courses. An officer filed a petition stating, “The
upholds-army-hq-changes-for-higher-command-courses/
changes which are effected from time to time by the Military Secretariat
are arbitrary and are not based on detailed study.” [6] Changes to the
7. Mayank Singh, 21 December 2018, “Army changes
system, rendered the officer ineligible for the Higher Command Course.
promotion policy, widens pool”, The New Indian Express,
The courses help to identify outstanding personnel at higher ranks. In
2018 it was reported that, the Army issued a directive to the Military
http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/dec/21/
Secretary’s Branch to delay the consideration of such courses in
Q42. Are personnel army-changes-promotion-policy-widens-pool-1914528.html
promotions from Brigadier to Major Generals and Major General to
promoted through an Lieutenant General by a year to help ‘widen’ the talent pool [7][8].
objective, meritocratic 8. Ajay Banerjee, 18 December 2018, “Army changes
process? Such a process promotion norms for Major General”, The Tribune India,
would include promotion accessed 2 February 2019
boards outside of the https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/army-changes-
command chain, strong promotion-norms-for-major-general/700228.html
formal appraisal
processes, and 1. Indian Army, “Terms and Conditions of Service”,
independent oversight. accessed 2 February 2019
PS010113.pdf
In the case of high-level appointments, the ACC is the supreme authority 1. Cabinet Secretariat Government of India, “THE
in monitoring and permitting appointments [1]. Therefore a Force cannot 2. Ministry of Defence
GOVERNMENT Government
OF INDIA of India,OF
(ALLOCATION “PART IV THE
BUSINESS)
in theory, solely permit any other means of awarding rank without INDIAN
RULES”,NAVAL AUXILARY”,
accessed 2 February accessed
2019 18 February 2021
If a force permits any other means of If a force permits any other means If a force permits any other means
requirements needed for further progression. Field promotions or acting https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/
https://cabsec.gov.in/files/allocation/
awarding rank, such as acting rank of awarding rank, there are of awarding rank, there are no RegsNavyIV.pdf
ranks may be possible as exceptions. These are however, temporary and abr_rules_archive_299.pdf
or battlefield promotion, there are regulations that limit the possible regulations that limit the possible
only in active field areas.
42B Exceptions regulations that clearly limit the
possible circumstances and place
circumstances and place
requirements on further
circumstances and place
requirements on further
50 3.
2. Ministry of Defence
Nitin Gokhale, Government
9 August of India,
2014, “Alleged “Regulations
Favouritism at
That said, there have been accusations of nepotism in promotion in the for
the the
TopAir Force”,
Angers 2000,
Navy pg. 116,NDTV,
Officials”, accessed 18 February
accessed 2
specific requirements on further progression, but these regulations progression or, if they exist, they 2021
Forces as mentioned earlier [2]. February 2019
progression. are vague or unclearly stipulated. are not applied in practice. https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/alleged-favouritism-at-
AFRegulations.pdf
the-top-angers-navy-officials-647225
4. The Gazette of India, “Home”, accessed 18 February

The following information is 2021
The following information is publicly
publicly declared for all officers http://egazette.nic.in/(S(4cngsemyopxfq3ii2ljdvuh5))/
declared for all officers above OF-4:
above OF-4: Postings and promotions are Information on rank, promotion timescales and policies are publicly Default.aspx
- Name,
- Name, published but they include only available [1][2][3]. Promotions are published on a weekly basis in The
- rank, Little to no information is released
- rank, some of the details listed in score Gazette of India, both in print and digital for online distribution. Name, 5. The Gazette of India, “NEW DELHI, SATURDAY,
42C Comprehensiveness - new post
- effective date
- new post 4. This is regardless of whether
about postings and promotion
cycle.
100 rank, new post and effective date are given [4][5]. High-level appointments MARCH 14—MARCH 20, 2020 (PHALGUNA 24, 1941)”,
- effective date equivalent information is available are published in the government’s Press Information Bureau releases and accessed 18 February 2021
for civil service counterparts. mainstream media outlets [6][7][8]. http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2020/218659.pdf
Equivalent information is available
However, equivalent information is
on request for civil service
NOT available on request for civil 6. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Dr Ajay
counterparts.
service counterparts. Kumar appointed Defence Secretary”, 22 August 2019,
https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1582585
7. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Vice

Admiral SN Ghormade, AVSM, NM takes over as Chief of
Staff, Eastern Naval Command”, 14 February 2019,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
PRID=1564599
8. India Today, “Air Marshal RKS Bhadauria appointed as

new Indian Air Force chief”, 19 September 2019, accessed
18 February 2021
1. The Gazette of India, “Home”, accessed 18 February
2021
http://egazette.nic.in/(S(4cngsemyopxfq3ii2ljdvuh5))/
Default.aspx
2. The Gazette of India, “NEW DELHI, SATURDAY,

MARCH 14—MARCH 20, 2020 (PHALGUNA 24, 1941)”,
http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2020/218659.pdf
3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Dr Ajay

Kumar appointed Defence Secretary”, 22 August 2019,
As aforementioned, promotions are published on a weekly basis in The accessed 18 February 2021
Details of postings and promotions Postings and promotions are
If no information is released Gazette of India both in print and digital for online distribution. Name, rank, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1582585
are published regularly (at least published regularly, but less Postings and promotions are
about postings and new post and effective date are given [1][2]. High-level appointments are
42D Frequency annually) within the system, and in
advance of their effective date.
frequently than annually. Or
postings for only some positions
published either very rarely or not
at all.
promotion cycle, this 100 communicated when they occur, through the government’s Press
indicator should be N/A. Information Bureau releases and mainstream media outlets [3][4][5]. 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Vice
are published.
Admiral SN Ghormade, AVSM, NM takes over as Chief of
Staff, Eastern Naval Command”, 14 February 2019,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
PRID=1564599
1. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 23 April
This indicator has been scored Not Applicable, as India does not have 2008 “Ministry
5. India Today,of Defence:
“Air MarshalRediscover the Sainik
RKS Bhadauria Schools”,
appointed as
compulsory conscription. There has been debate on whether to introduce accessed new Indian1 Air
February 2019 19 September 2019, accessed
Force chief”,
it to bridge the gap in numbers [1][2][3]. In 2018, compulsory military http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=37831
18 February 2021
service for aspirants of government employment was being considered by https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/air-marshal-rks-
the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) with recommendation 2. BBC, 28 June 2018, “Reality Check: Which countries
bhadauria-appointed-as-new-air-chief-1600955-2019-09-
There is a policy and strict rules If compulsory conscription
from the Standing Committee on Defence. Chapter 1V, Recommendation have 19 military service?”, accessed 1 February 2019
addressing bribery for avoiding does not occur, mark this
(Para No. 9): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44646267
compulsory conscription that clearly Bribery and/or corruption are sub-indicator not applicable.
apply to all parties engaging in this. defined offences in law, but 2 or
There are no known policies or “The Committee had, in their Report presented earlier recommended for 3. P. K. Gautam, 25 January 2008, “Conscription is not the
Bribery offences cover (at a more of the following mechanisms There must be explicit
43A Policy
minimum) offering, giving, receiving, are not provided for: offering,
rules against bribery for avoiding
compulsory conscription.
probition of bribery to avoid NA providing five years compulsory military service to such aspirants wanting
to directly join Central and State Government Gazetted services. In their
answer”, IDSA, accessed 1 February 2019
https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/
or soliciting of any item of value to giving, receiving, or soliciting conscription. Bribery laws
response, the Ministry of Defence have submitted that this Conscriptionisnottheanswer_PKGautam_250108
influence the actions of an official or bribes. that apply only to
recommendation is still under consideration with Department of Personnel
other person in charge of a public or government employees do
and Training (DoPT) whose response is awaited. Taking serious note of 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March
legal duty. not suffice.
the perennial and alarming situation of shortage of Officers and PBOR in 2018, “THIRTY - SEVENTH REPORT STANDING
Armed Forces, the Committee opine that it is high time the Ministry COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2017-18) (SIXTEENTH LOK
consider their recommendation seriously and expedited the process of its SABHA), accessed 1 February 2019
implementation” [4]. http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/
16_Defence_37.pdf
Q43. Where compulsory 1. Brig Amrit Kapur, 5 April 2016, ”Does India Need
conscription occurs, is Compulsory Military Training”, Indian Defence Review,
there a policy of not accessed 4 April 2019
accepting bribes for http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/does-india-
avoiding conscription? need-compulsory-military-training/
Are there appropriate Sanctions exist in law, but
procedures in place to If compulsory conscription
Possible sanctions include criminal maximum penalties constitute less There are no sanctions for 2. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 23 April
does not occur, mark this India does not have compulsory conscription [1][2][3]. As such, this
deal with such bribery,
and are they applied?
43B Sanctions prosecution/incarceration, dismissal,
and considerable financial penalties.
than 1 year imprisonment or weak
fines that would not act as a
avoiding compulsory conscription
through bribery.
sub-indicator not NA indicator has been scored Not Applicable.
2008 “Ministry of Defence: Rediscover the Sainik Schools”,
applicable.
deterrent. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=37831
3. BBC, 28 June 2018, “Reality Check: Which countries

have military service?”, accessed 1 February 2019
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44646267
1. Brig Amrit Kapur, 5 April 2016, ”Does India Need

Compulsory Military Training”, Indian Defence Review,
accessed 4 April 2019
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/does-india-
need-compulsory-military-training/
If compulsory conscription
Appropriate sanctions or
Sanctions are inconsistently No sanctions are applied when does not occur, mark this India does not have compulsory conscription [1][2][3]. As such, this 2. Press Information Bureau Government Of India, 23 April
43C Enforcement punishments are applied when
bribery occurs.
applied in the event of bribery. bribery occurs. sub-indicator not NA indicator has been scored Not Applicable. 2008 “Ministry of Defence: Rediscover the Sainik Schools”,
applicable. accessed 1 February 2019
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=37831
3. BBC, 28 June 2018, “Reality Check: Which countries

have military service?”, accessed 1 February 2019
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44646267
There is no specific policy relating to bribery for soliciting preferred

postings. All nation-wide anti-corruption policies and legislation are
applicable to the defence sector. There is also regulation in each Armed
Forces branch’s Act covering bribery offences, for example the Indian
Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV Section 53 states:
“53. Extortion and Corruption. - Any person subject to this Act who
commits any of the following
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &
offences, that is to say :-
Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
(a) commits extortion ; or
(b) without proper authority exacts from any person money, provisions or
service ;
2. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 2
shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a
February 2019
This indicator refers to the term which
There is a policy and strict rules entire military, regardless of may extend to ten years or such less punishment as is in this Act
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
relating to bribery for soliciting Bribery and/or corruption are whether conscription mentioned.” [2]
preferred postings. Bribery offences defined offences in law, but 2 or occurs.
There are no known policies or 3.OECD, “INDIA: THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
cover (at a minimum) offering, more of the following mechanisms The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, CHAPTER V, Section 25 states:
44A Policy
giving, receiving, or soliciting of any are not provided for: offering,
rules against bribery for soliciting
preferred postings.
Bribery laws that apply to 100 ACT, 1988”, accessed 2 February 2019
https://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/
item of value to influence the actions giving, receiving, or soliciting government “25. Military, Naval and Air force or other law not to be affected. — [1]
46814376.pdf
of an official or other person in bribes. officials/employees are Nothing in this Act shall
charge of a public or legal duty. appropriate for this affect the jurisdiction exercisable by, or the procedure applicable to, any
4. Manjeet Singh Negi, 3 June 2017, “CBI arrests Army
indicator. court or other authority under the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950,
officers running racket of favourable transfers for money”,
the Navy Act, 1957, the Border Security Force Act, 1968, the Coast Guard
India Today, accessed 19 May 2019
Act, 1978 and the National Security Guard Act, 1986.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/cbi-army-officers-
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes
racket-illegal-posting-transfers-army-hq-980732-2017-06-
of any such law as is referred
03
to in sub-section (1), the Court of a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a
court of ordinarily criminal
justice.” [3]
There have been reports of the CBI arresting Army officials involved in a
preferred postings racket in 2017. An FIR was filed under Sections 7, 8,
12, 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act, 1988
Q44. Is there a policy of and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) [4].
refusing bribes to gain
preferred postings? Are
there appropriate
procedures in place to
deal with such bribery,
and are they applied?
Q44. Is there a policy of
refusing bribes to gain
preferred postings? Are
there appropriate
procedures in place to
deal with such bribery, 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &
and are they applied? Rules”, accessed February 2nd, 2019
Technically, as bribery is an offence in the Armed Forces, sanctions for
Sanctions exist in law, but
Possible sanctions include criminal any bribery offence include criminal prosecution/incarceration and 2. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed
maximum penalties constitute less There are no sanctions for
prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal and the aforementioned can be applied in the case of bribery for February 2nd, 2019
44B Sanctions
dismissal, and considerable financial
than 1 year imprisonment or weak
fines that would not act as a
soliciting preferred postings
through bribery.
100 soliciting preferred postings [1][2]. Gifts of Rs 150 upwards cannot be https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
penalties. accepted and if after an inquiry it is proven that the accused has accepted ARMYACTS190216.pdf
deterrent.
such a gift, it will lead to a Court Martial [3].
3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Senior Indian Air
Force Official, India, May 19th, 2019

03
2. Deccan Chronicle, 4 June 2017, “Transfer racket: Army

men paying lakhs for postings, claims CBI”, accessed 19
There is evidence to suggest that cases are being investigated through
If no sanctions for soliciting May 2019
formal procedures. In 2017, the CBI arrested Army officials including a Lt.
preferred postings through https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/crime/040617/
Appropriate sanctions or Colonel for seeking monetary gratification from officers in exchange for
Sanctions are inconsistently No sanctions are applied when bribery exist in law, or there transfer-racket-army-men-paying-lakhs-for-postings-
44C Enforcement punishments are regularly applied
when bribery occurs.
applied in the event of bribery. bribery occurs. are no cases of bribery, this 75 granting them favourable postings [1][2]. The accused were charged
under Sections 7, 8, 12, 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of
claims-cbi.html?
sub-indicator should be fromNewsdog=1&utm_source=NewsDog&utm_medium=re
Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) [3]
marked Not Applicable. ferral
[4].
3. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, accessed 19 May
2019
http://cbi.gov.in/rt_infoact/pcact.pdf
4. Indian Penal Code, Section 120B, accessed 19 May

2019
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1897847/
Chains of command are separate from chains of payment. The Defence

1. Controller General of Defence Accounts Government of
Accounts Department (DAD) comes under the Ministry of Defence with
India, “About DAD”, accessed 1 February 2019
Chains of command are strictly Chains of command are generally the Controller General of Defence Accounts as the Head of the
Q45. Are chains of http://www.cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=abtdad
separated from chains of payment separated from chains of payment, Chains of command are not Department. The duties of the DAD are broadly audit, payment and
command separate from
chains of payment?
45
throughout the ministry and armed though there are exceptions in separated from chains of payment. 100 accounting of all charges pertaining to the Armed Forces, including bills
2. Interviewee 1: Retired Senior Indian Air Force Official,
forces. certain areas. for supplies and services rendered and for construction/repair works, pay
India, 1 February 2019
and allowances, miscellaneous charges, pensions etc [1]. All three military
branches have their own Accounts branch and budget [2].
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &

Rules”, accessed 3 May 2019
2. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 3 May

There is no single code of conduct that applies to all military personnel but
2019
as alluded to in Q.35, the Armed Forces have an Act which governs each
branch. These are the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, the Navy
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
Act, 1957, the Border Security Force Act,1968 and the Coast Guard
Act,1978 [1][2][3][4][5][6]. Chapter XII of the Defence Service Regulations
3. Indian Air Force, “The Air Force Act, 1950”, accessed 3
for the Air Force provides detailed guidelines on discipline. Herein, codes
May 2019
of conduct are defined and give guidance with respect to the offences:
https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/
bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest and post-separation
123456789/1819/1/195045.pdf
activities; the punishment for such offences and the judicial procedure [7].
The Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules are also binding on all defence
4. Indian Navy, “The Navy Act, 1957”, accessed 3 May
personnel [8].
2019
Note: Please make sure to
answer the question in Each branch has its own honour code such as the Air Force’s ‘Air Warrior
There is a code of conduct, as a
There is a Code of Conduct, relation to an actual Code of Code’. Herein, core moral conduct values are explicitly expressed [9].
simple, readily understandable 5. “Border Security Force Act,1968”, accessed 3 May 2019
There is a Code of Conduct for all however, its content is not Conduct (or equivalent), not
guide, for all military personnel, http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1968-47.pdf
civilian personnel, but it does not comprehensive. For example, it There is a Code of Conduct but it general measures for Each Act is specific to the Force. The scenarios that can arise, the crimes,
which comprehensively explains
cover all aspects listed in source addresses corruption issues but it is largely unknown. Or, it is known There is no code of conduct for all personnel involved in remedies, punishments etc. are in accordance with this. In this context, all
46A Code of conduct bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts
of interest, and post-separation
4. It does provide specific is too vague. It does not provide but does not address corruption military personnel. bribery and corruption. 75 Acts state conflict of interests, acquiring goods (gifts), forms of hospitality,
6. Indian Coast Guard, “The Coast Guard Act, 1978”,
accessed 3 May 2019
guidance on how to proceed in the specfic guidance on how to issues at all. Please specify whether the situations which constitute as bribery; the punishments of such offences
activities. It provides specific https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Coast%20Guard
face of these events. proceed in the face of these Code addresses bribery, and the judicial process. For example, in the Navy Act regarding gifts:
guidance on how to proceed in the %20Act%2C%201978.pdf
events. gifts and hospitality,
face of these events.
conflicts of interest, and “57. Taking unauthorised goods on board ship.—Every officer subject to
7. Government of India, DEFENCE SERVICES
post-separation. naval law in command of any ship of the Indian Navy who receives on
REGULATIONS, 2000, accessed 12 September 2019
board or permits to be received on board such ship any goods or
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AFRegulations.pdf
merchandise whatsoever other than for the sole use of the ship or persons
belonging to the ship, except goods and merchandise on board any ship
8. Government of India, “THE CCS (CONDUCT) RULES,
which may be ship-wrecked or in imminent danger either on the high seas
1964”, accessed May 14th, 2019
or in some port, creek, or harbour, for the purpose of preserving them for
https://dopt.gov.in/ccs-conduct-rules-1964
their proper owners, or except such goods or merchandise as he may at
any time be ordered to take or receive on board by order of the Central
9. Indian Air Force, “AIR WARRIOR'S CODE”, accessed 3
Government or his superior officer, shall be punished with dismissal from
May 2019
the naval service or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned.”
http://indianairforce.nic.in/content/air-warriors-code
[10]
10. Indian Navy, “The Navy Act, 1957”, pg.23, accessed 12
September 2019
Q46. Is there a Code of

Conduct for all military
personnel that includes,
but is not limited to,
guidance with respect to
bribery, gifts and
hospitality, conflicts of
interest, and post-
separation activities? Is
there evidence that
breaches of the Code of
Conduct are effectively
addressed?
Conduct for all military 1. National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, India, “Cadet
The Acts which encompass codes of conduct are incorporated during
personnel that includes, Brief”, accessed 12 September 2019
cadet/officer training. All defence academies and colleges in India state
but is not limited to, https://www.nda.nic.in/cadet-brief.html
the importance of a code of conduct. For example at the premier National
guidance with respect to Defence Academy, Khadakwasala it is stated:
bribery, gifts and 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &
hospitality, conflicts of Rules”, accessed 3 May 2019
“Academy Honour Code
interest, and post- https://mod.gov.in/acts
separation activities? Is The code of conduct is effectively The code of conduct is distributed The code of conduct exists but is If a country has no code of
The code of conduct is available to The code of conduct is not "I believe that a cadet must be loyal, truthful, trustworthy, honest and
distributed to all military personnel to military personnel on an ad hoc not distributed to military conduct, this sub-indicator 3. Join Indian Army, “The Ethos of Indian Army”, accessed
there evidence that
46B Transparency the public and effectively distributed
to all military personnel.
but is not made readily available to basis, and may or may not be personnel. It is not available to the
available to the public or military
personnel.
should be marked Not 100 forthright under all circumstances. I will not lie, cheat or steal, nor will I
mislead or deceive any one. I undertake to faithfully live up to this code
3 May 2019
Conduct are effectively the public. available to the public. public. Applicable. http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/the-ethos-of-indian-army.htm
and to continuously encourage my comrades to do so" [1].
addressed?
4. Indian Air Force, “AIR WARRIOR'S CODE”, accessed 3
The contents of codes of conduct are publicly available online on the MoD
May 2019
website and respective websites of all branches of the military. Personnel
http://indianairforce.nic.in/
are to strictly adhere to the Act that governs their branch in the Armed
Forces [2][3][4].
1. PTI, 23 August 2017, “Army officer convicted of

corruption after 27 years of trial”, Hindustan Times,
As alluded to earlier, there is evidence to suggest that breaches of codes
of conduct are being investigated through formal procedures. In 2017 after
Breaches of the code of conduct 27 years of investigation and trial, a former Army Colonel was convicted
February 2019
Breaches of the code of conduct are are regularly investigated, even if If a country has no code of by a special Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) court for amassing
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-files-case-
regularly investigated, even if the the oversight mechanism is The Code of Conduct lacks conduct,or if it is impossible disproportionate assets [1]. In a recent case, the CBI filed a case against
Breaches of the code of conduct Breaches of the code of conduct against-two-army-officers/articleshow/67148491.cms
46C Enforcement oversight mechanism is confidential.
Cases are pursued where there is
confidential. However, cases may
not always be pursued where
are only occasionally investigated. are rarely investigated.
credibility and as a result is not
used or enforced.
to assess its enforcement,
100 two Army officers in 2018 for taking bribes from a civilian supplier in the
procurement of ration for troops in Nagaland India, between 2012 and
3. PTI, 25 April 2018, “CBI books 12 Army officials for
evidence of criminal behavior. there is evidence of criminal marked Not Applicable. 2016 [2]. In 2018, the CBI booked 12 Army officials for corruption in
corruption in recruitment of religious teachers”, The Times
behavior. recruitment of religious teachers in 2013 [3]. The Vigilance Division in the
of India, accessed 2 February 2019
Ministry of Defence (MoD) carries out oversight across all defence
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-books-12-
departments [4].
army-officials-for-corruption-in-recruitment-of-religious-
teachers/articleshow/63913613.cms

Report 16-17”, pg.190, accessed 29 January 2019
1. “Cadet Brief”, National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla,

India, accessed 12 September 2019
https://www.nda.nic.in/cadet-brief.html
Guidance on the code of conduct If a country has no code of
Guidance on the code of conduct is Ad hoc guidance may be provided No guidance of any kind is 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts &
is available to all military conduct, this sub-indicator The Acts which encompass codes of conduct are communicated to
46D Training included in induction training for all
military personnel.
personnel, but is not part of
to military personnel by
commanding officers.
provided to military personnel on
the code of conduct.
should be marked Not 100 personnel during cadet/officer training [1][2][3].
Rules”, accessed 3 May 2019
induction training. Applicable.
3. Join Indian Army, “The Ethos of Indian Army”, accessed
3 May 2019
http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/the-ethos-of-indian-army.htm
1. “THE ALL INDIA SERVICES (CONDUCT) RULES,

1968”, accessed 14 May 2019
Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_I_Rule_10.pdf
2. Government of India, “THE CCS (CONDUCT) RULES,

https://dopt.gov.in/ccs-conduct-rules-1964
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Armed Forces

Headquarters Civil Service Rules, 2001”, accessed 14 May
2019
There is no unified Code of Conduct but civil servants in India are bound
http://www.caomod.nic.in/d_MPR/service_rules/
by codes of conduct as prescribed in the All India Services (Conduct)
afhq_civilServiceRules_2001.pdf
Rules,1968 and the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Civilian
defence personnel are bound by the aforementioned and the Armed
4. Indian Penal Code, 1860, accessed 14 May 2019
There is a code of conduct, as a Forces Headquarters Civil Service Rules, 2001 [1][2][3]. Codes and
There is a Code of Conduct, https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?
simple, readily understandable guidance include but are not limited to gifts, hospitality and conflicts of
There is a Code of Conduct for all however, its content is not view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/1362
guide, for all civilian personnel, interest. There is a zero tolerance policy on corruption and bribery would
civilian personnel, but it does not comprehensive. For example, it There is a Code of Conduct but it
which comprehensively explains fall under this. Guidance on post-separation activities is not found.
cover all aspects listed in source addresses corruption issues but it is largely unknown. Or, it is known There is no code of conduct for all 5. KPMG, 2019, “The Prevention of Corruption
47A Code of conduct bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts
of interest, and post-separation
4. It does provide specific is too vague. It does not provide but does not address corruption civilian personnel. 75 All public servants can be penalised under the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
(Amendment) Act 2018: Key Highlights”, accessed 14 May
guidance on how to proceed in the specfic guidance on how to issues at all. 2019
activities. It provides specific the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, the Prevention of
face of these events. proceed in the face of these https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/09/
guidance on how to proceed in the Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
events. prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
face of these events. Amendment Act, 2016 [4][5][6][7]. The Vigilance Division in the Minitry of
Defence carries out oversight across all defence departments [8].
6. Government of India, 2002, "The Prevention of Money
Laundering Act", accessed 14 May 2019
http://www.enforcementdirectorate.gov.in/
PreventionOfMoneyLaunderingAct2002.pdf?
p1=117281489017600032
7. The Gazette of India, 2016, "The Benami Transactions

(Prohibition) Amendment Act", accessed 14 May 2019
http://www.naredco.in/notification/pdfs/Benami
%20Transactions%20Act,%202016.pdf

Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 14 May 2019

Conduct for all civilian
personnel that includes,
but is not limited to,
guidance with respect to
bribery, gifts and
hospitality, conflicts of
interest, and post-
separation activities? Is
there evidence that
Conduct are effectively
addressed?
Q47. Is there a Code of Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_I_Rule_10.pdf
Conduct for all civilian
personnel that includes, 2. “THE CCS (CONDUCT) RULES, 1964”, 1. “THE ALL
but is not limited to, INDIA SERVICES (CONDUCT) RULES, 1968”, accessed
guidance with respect to 14 May 2019
bribery, gifts and https://ips.gov.in/ActsRules/
hospitality, conflicts of The code of conduct is effectively The code of conduct is distributed The code of conduct exists but is If a country has no code of Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_I_Rule_10.pdf
interest, and post- The code of conduct is available to The code of conduct is not
distributed to all civilian personnel to civilian personnel on an ad hoc not distributed to civilian conduct, this sub-indicator Codes of conduct are given to civilian personnel and are publicly available
separation activities? Is 47B Transparency the public and effectively distributed
to all civilian personnel.
but is not made readily available to basis, and may or may not be personnel. It is not available to the
available to the public or civilian
personnel.
should be marked Not 100 [1][2][3][4]. 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2001, “Armed
there evidence that the public. available to the public. public. Applicable. Forces Headquarters Civil Service Rules”, Indian Gazette,
breaches of the Code of accessed 14 May 2019
Conduct are effectively http://www.caomod.nic.in/d_MPR/service_rules/
addressed? afhq_civilServiceRules_2001.pdf

https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?
view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/1362

There is evidence of breaches of conduct by civilian personnel being
Breaches of the code of conduct investigated. During 2016-2017, 16 disciplinary cases of Group ‘A’ officers
Breaches of the code of conduct are are regularly investigated, even if in the Department of Defence were finalised. In the same year, 21 cases
If a country has no code of 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
regularly investigated, even if the the oversight mechanism is The Code of Conduct lacks of investigation were concluded in the Department of Defence Production,
Breaches of the code of conduct Breaches of the code of conduct conduct, this sub-indicator Report 17-18”, pg. 189, accessed 14 May 2019
47C Enforcement oversight mechanism is confidential. confidential. However, cases may
Cases are pursued where there is not always be pursued where
are only occasionally investigated. are rarely investigated.
credibility and as a result is not
used or enforced.
should be marked Not 100 out of which 10 cases were for administrative action and 9 cases were
referred for disciplinary action [1]. During the period 2017-2018, sanctions
Applicable.
evidence of criminal behavior. there is evidence of criminal for prosecution were conveyed against 26 officials and 27 disciplinary
behavior. cases were finalised [2]. During the period 2018-2019 penalties were
imposed on 14 officers and 15 officers have been chargesheeted [3].

2. “THE CCS (CONDUCT) RULES, 1964”, 1. “THE ALL

INDIA SERVICES (CONDUCT) RULES, 1968”, accessed
14 May 2019
Guidance on the code of conduct If a country has no code of
Guidance on the code of conduct is Ad hoc guidance may be provided No guidance of any kind is
is available to all civilian conduct, this sub-indicator Guidance on the codes of conduct is included in induction training and 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2001, “Armed
47D Training included in induction training for all
civilian personnel.
personnel, but is not part of
to civilian personnel by
commanding officers.
provided to civilian personnel on
the code of conduct.
should be marked Not 100 strict adherence is expected throughout employment [1][2][3][4][5]. Forces Headquarters Civil Service Rules”, Indian Gazette,
induction training. Applicable. accessed 14 May 2019
http://www.caomod.nic.in/d_MPR/service_rules/
afhq_civilServiceRules_2001.pdf

https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?
view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/1362
5. Department of Personnel and Training, “FORWARD

(NOTIFICATION), accessed 15 February 2021
https://dopt.gov.in/forewordnotification

Report 16-17”, pg.190, accessed 14 May 2019
Some level of anti-corruption training takes place for all military and
civilian personnel. As per the directives of the Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC), training takes place during annual Vigilance Week [1]
[2]. The 2017 theme was ‘My Vision – Corruption Free India’ and activities
included Integrity Pledge, workshops and lectures [3]. The 2018 theme
was ‘Eradicate Corruption-Build a New India’ [4].
Anti-corruption training addresses
Anti-corruption training addresses October 2017, “Vigilance Awareness Week to be observed
the connection between corruption As stated in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 2018-19 report in Chapter 16:
the connection between corruption from 30th October to 4th November, 2017 with theme “My
and some but not all the following
and the following topics: Anti-corruption training only Anti-corruption training is Vision-Corruption Free India”, accessed 14 May 2019
topics: organisational values and “16.4 In keeping with the need to ensure transparency, fair play,
organisational values and standards, addresses organisational values superficial in nature and does not No anti-corruption training takes http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=171955
48A Comprehensiveness
impact of the organisation, military
standards, impact of the
organisation, military
and standards, and identification address more than values or place. 50 accountability and integrity, efforts are being made continuously in the
Ministry of Defence for sensitization of all the stakeholders against corrupt
effectiveness; identification and and reporting of corruption. standards. 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 26
effectiveness; identification and practices.
reporting of corruption, and risk October 2018, “Vigilance Awareness Week 2018 to be
reporting of corruption, and risk
management. observed from 29th Oct-3rd Nov // Theme for this year is
management. 16.5 The Chief Vigilance Officer (CVO) maintains liaison with all
‘Eradicate Corruption-Build a New India”, accessed 14 May
concerned offices to ensure timely completion of various reports/ cases/
2019
tasks relating to vigilance work.” [5]
http://www.pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
PRID=1550839
Anti-corruption training seems to mainly focuses on organisational values,
standards and identification/reporting of corruption.
Report 17-18”, pg.220, accessed 20 August 2019
Q48. Does regular anti-

corruption training take
place for military and
civilian personnel?
As stated earlier, there is evidence of annual anti-corruption training as
Q48. Does regular anti- part of CVC directives and Vigilance Awareness Week [1][2]. The MoD 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
corruption training take has publicly committed to continually sensitise all stakeholders against Report 17-18”, pg. 189, accessed 14 May 2019
place for military and corrupt practices. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) between 2018- https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf
civilian personnel? 2019 conducted 39 sessions to sensitise HAL employees on vigilance
related topics for preventing corruption. There is evidence of professional 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
anti-corruption training in DSPUs separate from that which is conducted Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 14 May 2019
during Vigilance Awareness Weeks. The Zonal Directors from the https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
Anti-corruption training is
Anti-corruption training is If a country has no anti- Department of Defence Production held a workshop on preventative
delivered upon induction, once a
Anti-corruption training is delivered Anti-corruption training is delivered conducted irregularly for entry into Anti-corruption training is done corruption training, this sub- vigilance in December 2018. Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) is conducting 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
year and upon entry to high
once a year, and upon entry into once at induction and upon entry high risk positions and completely ad hoc, and may be indicator should be marked orientation programmes, presentations and lectures to newly inducted Report 17-18”, pg.220-227, accessed 20 August 2019
48B Regularity risk positions and environments, and
once a year for high risk personnel.
high risk positions and into high risk positions and environments. No training is only provided by donors or Not Applicable. 75 executives, supervisors, Ministerial staff and Central Industry Security https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoDAR2018.pdf
environments. environments. provided at induction or at regular external parties. Force (CISF) [3].
It is also woven into promotion
intervals. 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
courses at all levels.
There is evidence found in MoD Annual Reports of implementation of Report 17-18”, pg. 189, accessed 14 May 2019
preventative vigilance measures such as surprise checks, continuous https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf
analysis of data and system improvements thus indicating that there must
be regular anti-corruption training of personnel in order to carry out such 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Chief
directives [4]. Given that there is an MoD Vigilance Division and corruption Vigilance Officer (CVO)”, accessed 20 August 2019
cases are being pursued, it is likely that further training is given to military https://mod.gov.in/dod/chief-vigilance-officercvo
and civilian personnel, that which is not documented [5].

From what minimal information can be found, there is evidence of anti-
Coverage of anti-corruption corruption training covering all MoD departments, organisations and units
Anti-corruption training is delivered Training is delivered to higher rank If a country has no anti- 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
Training is only delivered to Training is integrated as a small training is discretionary or such as the Navy, Air Force, Defence Research and Development
to personnel at each rank bracket of brackets of military personnel and corruption training, this sub- Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 14 May 2019
48C Coverage of personnel
the military and the equivalent for the equivalent for civilian
selected personnel in high-risk
positions.
portion of other compliance
training modules.
sporadic, included in "moral"
training or social conversations
indicator should be marked 75 Organisation (DRDO), Director General Border Roads (DGBR) and
Directorate General Defence Estates (DGDE) [1][2][3].
civilian personnel. personnel. Not Applicable.
among officers.
Report 17-18”, pg.220-227, accessed 20 August 2019
1. Government of India, “Defence Services Regulations:

Regulations for the Air Force”, accessed 17 August 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AFRegulations.pdf

There is some evidence of policies in existence that require the outcomes 03
of the prosecution of defence personnel to be made public. The Defence
Services Regulations for the Air Force, 2000 states: 3. India Today, 26 January 2016, “Two Army officers to
face CBI probe for corruption”, accessed 2 February 2019
“Fullest possible publicity through air force orders in the case of air force https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/two-serving-
personnel will be given in all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud, army-generals-face-cbi-bribe-probe-306042-2016-01-29
There is a formal policy of the There is an informal policy of the
There is no policy of the defence misappropriation and other malpractices in which there has been a
defence institution to make defence institution to make
49A Policy
outcomes of prosecution publicly outcomes of prosecution publicly
institution to make outcomes of
prosecution publicly available.
50 conviction either by a civil court or a court martial. In cases of investigation 4. Bikash Singh, 15 October 2018, “7 armymen, including a
by Special Police Establishment two copies of the air force orders will be Major General, given life sentence by Army court for fake
available. available.
sent to the Inspector General, Special Police Establishment, Ministry of encounter”, The Economic Times, accessed 17 August
Home Affairs” [1]. 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/7-
There are cases where crimes and prosecution outcomes are made public armymen-including-a-major-general-given-life-sentence-
and are published by the media [2][3][4]. by-army-court-for-fake-encounter/articleshow/
Q49. Is there a policy to

make public outcomes of 1. Central Bureau of Investigation, 9 December 2016, “CBI
the prosecution of defence ARRESTS THEN CHIEF OF AIR STAFF AND TWO
services personnel for OTHER ACCUSED IN AN ON-GOING INVESTIGATION
corrupt activities, and is OF A CASE”, accessed 14 May 2019
there evidence of effective http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2016-12-09-2.php
prosecutions in recent
years? 2. India Today, 11 May 2019, “Army Lt Gen faces action for
alleged corruption over misuse of govt funds”, accessed 14
There is material on charges and results of prosecutions publicly May 2019
available. Cases include both lower and higher ranking officers and https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-army-lt-
Both the charges and results of
officials. Information is available through CBI press releases and media genereal-corruption-misuse-government-funds-1522697-
prosecutions are made publicly
The results of prosecution are reports [1][2][3]. In-depth information about the hearing is not usually 2019-05-11
available. For court martials above a
made publicly available, but there Information on prosecutions is available. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) publishes annual reports with a
certain rank, information is released No information on prosecutions is
49B Transparency
to public as matter of course. This
is little or no access to information rarely or inconsistently made
on the charges or the hearing, or available, without much detail.
made publicly available. 50 section on the activities of vigilance units. Here, details on the number of
complaints against staff, sanctions and penalties imposed on those
includes the date, location and
other key details. convicted, finalisations of disciplinary hearings, exonerations, recordable February 2019
details of the charge, and
warnings and appeals are given [4][5]. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cbi-files-case-
information on the hearing.
against-two-army-officers/articleshow/67148491.cms

Report 16-17”, pg. 190 - 191, accessed 17 August 2019

Cases are investigated or There is a complete failure to 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
prosecuted through formal investigate or prosecute, even in Report 17-18”, pg.189, accessed 14 May 2019
Cases are investigated or Cases are investigated but not Cases of corruption are investigated and prosecuted [1][2]. Concerns lay
processes, but there may be the face of clear evidence. Or, https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf
prosecuted through formal often prosecuted. There is clear with the duration of the judicial process, with convictions taking multiple
49C Effectiveness
processes and without undue
cases where undue political
influence is attempted, and
undue influence in the decision
cases are superficially
investigated, or receive "show"
75 years in some cases [3]. There is no clear evidence of undue influence
3. Hindustan Times, 23 August 2017, “Army officer
political influence. making process. being attempted.
occasional cases where it is hearings in which defendants are convicted of corruption after 27 years of trial”, accessed 14
effective at derailing prosecutions. not punished. May 2019
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 30 April
2015, “Data of Corruption Cases”, accessed 2 February
2019
1. National
2. Indian Penal
CrimeCode, 1860,Bureau
Records accessed 2 February 2019
India,“Prevention of
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/report42.pdf
Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and Related Sections of IPC
Cases Registered by AntiCorruption Bureau, Vigilance and
Facilitation payments are illegal in India and punishable under the Indian 2. KPMG, 2019,
Lokayukta “The Prevention
in States/UTs – 2016”,of Corruption
accessed 2 February
Facilitation payments are strictly and There law is insufficiently clear on Facilitation payments are not
50A Legal framework
clearly illegal. the issue of facilitation payments. criminalised. 100 Penal Code (IPC),1860 and the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment)
Act (PCA), 2018 [1][2].
(Amendment) Act 2018: Key Highlights”, accessed 2
2019
February 2019
https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/content_table/Table
%208C.2.pdf
prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
According to the CBI, 3,296 corruption cases were registered under the
3. Ruchi Bambha, 18 July 2018, “Five things to know about
PCA, 1988, between 2010 and 2015. Out of these 2,187 were charge-
AgustaWestland VVIP chopper scam”, The Economic
sheeted and 169 persons were convicted [1]. In 2016, total crimes under
Times, accessed 11 May
the PCA and IPC were 4,439. Out of this 1,136 cases were public
2019https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/fi
Cases are investigated or There are clear failures to servants taking gratification in remuneration [2]. The AgustaWestland
Cases may be investigated but are ve-things-to-know-about-agustawestland-vvip-chopper-
prosecuted through formal investigate or prosecute cases, If facilitation payments are VVIP helicopter controversy has been investigated, where there was a
not often successfully prosecuted. scam/articleshow/51992563.cms
processes. There is little substantive even in the face of strong not criminalised, this sub- possible case of facilitation payments. The deal was also cancelled on the
50B Enforcement
concern expressed from
There is credible evidence to
indicate undue influence in the
evidence. Specific concerns may indicator should be marked 50 grounds of breaching the PCIP [3][4][5].
4. Alasdair Pal, 31 January 2019, “Court holds two more
independent commentators over be expressed by a range of Not Applicable.
decision making process. people sent from UAE in AgustaWestland helicopter
undue political influence. independent commentators. The Amendment Act brings welcomed changes that can help better
bribery case”, Reuters, accessed 11 May 2019
enforce the legal provisions in place including the completion of trial for
https://in.reuters.com/article/india-agustawestland/court-
corruption cases by a special judge within a period of two years from filing
holds-two-more-people-sent-from-uae-in-agustawestland-
ey-bribery-and-corruption-ground-reality-in-india-india-
of the case [6]. Given the aforementioned, it is justified to conclude there
helicopter-bribery-case-idINKCN1PP29E
score.pdf
is active investigation into bribery and ‘greasing of palms’.
5. Ruchi
2. Business Today,
Bambha, 1822 April
July 2019,
2018, “AgustaWestland
“Five things to know VVIP
about
choppers case: Delhi
AgustaWestland VVIPcourt extends
chopper Sushen
scam”, Gupta's
The Economic
judicial custody
Times, accessedtill 11
May 3”, accessed 11 May 2019
May
https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/agustawestland-
2019https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/fi
vvip-choppers-scam-delhi-court-extends-sushen-gupta-
ve-things-to-know-about-agustawestland-vvip-chopper-
judicial-custody-till-may-3/story/339207.html
scam/articleshow/51992563.cms
Q50. Are there effective India has a poor reputation for corruption in the public sector. In 2017, EY 6. Central
3. KPMG, 2019,
Bureau“The Prevention of29
of Investigation, Corruption
February 2016,
measures in place to and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) (Amendment)
“FOUR YEARS Act 2018: Key Highlights”,
RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENTaccessed
TO 2
THEN
discourage facilitation published a report based on a survey conducted. Respondents February 2019
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF GNCT, DELHI IN
payments (which are represented a mix of Indian enterprises with domestic operations, as well https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/09/
BRIBERY CASE AND THREE YEARS RI TO THEN
illegal in almost all as Indian subsidiaries of MNCs in the UK and US, whose annual incomes prevention-corruption-amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE &
countries)? exceed $698 million [1]. CUSTOMS AND THEN MANAGER OF FCI IN SEPARATE
CASES OF DISPROPORTIONATE ASSETS”, accessed 2
Around 89% of the respondents felt that there should be greater February 2019
enforcement of laws to curb the proliferation of bribery and corruption. http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2016-02-29-1.php
Aerospace and defence were seen as one of the most vulnerable sectors
to corruption. Cash was the most preferred mode of paying bribes- 89% of 4. Central Bureau of Investigation, 19 February 2016, CBI
the respondents selected it. 31% of respondents were unaware that ARRESTS AN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CUSTOMS &
Facilitation payments
Rather than facilitation payments, Facilitation payments in the making facilitation payments is illegal in India and controversially, 44% of CENTRAL EXCISE FOR ACCEPTING A BRIBE OF RS.
Facilitation payments in the defence occassionally occur in the
50C Prevalence
and security sector are very rare. defence and security sector, but
there is extensive patronage in the defence and security sector are
defence and security sector. widespread.
25 the respondents were in favour of legalising facilitation payments under
Indian laws, similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
TEN LAKH, accessed 2 February 2019
are not widespread.
Analysing the CBI’s public disclosures of arrests related to bribery and 5. Central Bureau of Investigation, 8 December 2017, CBI
corruption from 2016 to present, it is evident that these practices are still REGISTERS A DISPROPORTIONATE ASSETS CASE
prevalent in the public sector in India but are investigated. The 2010 AGAINST “PREVENTIVE OFFICER” OF DEPARTMENT
AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter controversy – which is still under OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS, accessed 2
investigation, illustrates that the defence sector is not immune from February 2019
facilitation payments, though cases do seem to be rare or underreported http://cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2017-12-08-2.php
[2].
6. Central Bureau of Investigation, 16 April 2018, CBI
As alluded to earlier, the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 FILES A CHARGESHEET AGAINST FOURTEEN
is a further step in the right direction for what is required- a systemic ACCUSED INCLUDING THEN RAILWAY MINISTER &
change from the roots up [3][4][5][6][7][8]. OTHERS IN AN ON-GOING INVESTIGATION OF A
CASE, accessed 2 February 2019
7. Central Bureau of Investigation, 3 December 2018, CBI

FILES A CHARGE SHEET AGAINST A MINISTER OF
DELHI GOVERNMENT (GNCTD) AND OTHERS IN A
DISPROPORTIONATE ASSETS CASE, accessed 2
February 2019
GDI 2020 Indicator
Score
The country has a comprehensive The Armed Forces do not have a military doctrine that addresses corruption as a strategic issue. As
and detailed military doctrine alluded to in Q.35, each branch of the Armed Forces has an Act which governs it [1]. Herein, the code 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts
addressing corruption issues for of conduct is clearly defined. Offences are delineated in depth and include corruption. In the Indian & Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
peace and conflict operations at The country has a comprehensive Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV states: https://mod.gov.in/acts
strategic, operational and tactical and detailed military doctrine
levels. The doctrine recognises that addressing corruption issues for The country has a military doctrine Corruption has been identified “53. Extortion and Corruption. - Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following 2. Indian Army, “Indian Army Act, 1950”, accessed 2
international actors can contribute to peace and conflict operations, addressing corruption issues for within military strategic documents offences, that is to say :- February 2019
increasing corruption risks and offers including the recognition that peace and conflict, which briefly as an important issue for The country does not consider (a) commits extortion ; or https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
51A Military doctrine guidance on mitigating these risks. deployments can exacerbate
Issues addressed by the doctrine corruption risks. However, the
addresses how to mitigate this
challenge, but there is little
operations e.g. the national
defence strategy or similar, but
corruption a strategic issue for
operations.
0 (b) without proper authority exacts from any person money, provisions or service; shall, on conviction
by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years or such
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
include support for political actors, doctrine may not address risks at emphasis on the practicalities of there is no explicit doctrine on less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.” [2] 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
Q51. Do the armed contracting, interaction with local all levels or may not provide implementation. corruption. Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 2 February 2019
forces have military population, partnering with local detailed and practical guidance for The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Vigilance Division is entrusted with the task of dealing with https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/
doctrine addressing forces, and security sector reform in implementation. complaints regarding corrupt practices, misconduct and irregularities in respect of employees of the AnnualReport1617.pdf
corruption as a operational contexts. The doctrine MoD and the various units under it [3].
strategic issue on also details the practicalities of
operations? implementation.
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts

If the country has no military This indicator has been scored Not Applicable. As stated above, there is no core military doctrine that &Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
Some aspects of the doctrine are doctrine that considers corruption addresses corruption but there are laws and regulations within the branches of the military that list https://mod.gov.in/acts
The doctrine is made publicly No aspect of the doctrine is made
51B Transparency
available.
made publicly available, but not all
of them.
publicly available.
a strategic issue for operations,
NA corruption as an offence thus indicating that the MoD is attune to the issue [1][2]. The Acts are publicly
available to view on the MoD website [1][2]. Further information on each branch’s code of conduct can 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
marked Not Applicable. be found on their respective websites. Report 16-17”, pg. 190, accessed 2 February 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/
AnnualReport1617.pdf

February 2019
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
Prescribed codes of conduct as per the Acts from each branch of the military serve as the foundation 2. Interviewee 5: Retired Colonel, New Delhi, 23 May
Take into account:
for training [1]. Given that as per the Acts, corruption is a punishable offence, it is possible that there is 2019
1) Whether the government
an element of anti-corruption training before deployment. According to a retired Army colonel there is
provides training / guidelines /
Q52. Is there training an anti-corruption element in generic training for commanders at all levels and at times, specific anti- 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual
monitoring before deploying their
in corruption issues There is comprehensive training in There is comprehensive training in There is training in corruption corruption courses [2]. Report 16-17”, pg.190, accessed 2 February 2019
troops under the foreign country’s
for commanders at all corruption issues that is required for corruption issues that is required issues that is required for https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/
There is comprehensive training in command; and/or
levels in order to commanders at all levels. Training is for commanders at all levels. commanders at some levels or in The country has no known training The Minister of Defence (MoD) has stated that, “In keeping with the need to ensure transparency, fair AnnualReport1617.pdf
corruption issues that is required 2) Whether it is government who
ensure that these
commanders are clear
52 delivered as part of military
education e.g., at military
However, training is delivered
either only in pre-deployment
for commanders at some levels or
some units, but not all. The in corruption issues for
content of training only addresses commanders.
ensures that there is training to 50 play, accountability and integrity, efforts are being made continuously in the Ministry of Defence for
sensitization of all the stakeholders against corrupt practices” [3]. 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 31
in some units, but not all. counter corruption risk, regardless
on the corruption academies, and in pre-deployment training for specific missions or as a few known risks (e.g. October 2018, “President of India graces Vigilance
of whether the government
issues they may face training for specific missions. part of military education. procurement). In accordance with the directives of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the Army, Navy, Air Awareness Week 2018 function; says checking
themselves or a foreign
during deployment? Force, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Director General Border Roads corruption is essential to creating a New India //
government or a multilateral/non-
(DGBR), Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) and all departments under the MoD ‘Vigilance Excellence Awards’ presented MoS Dr
government organisation leads the
observe Vigilance Awareness Week on an annual basis. Activities include training workshops [4]. Jitendra Singh lauds CVC’s efforts towards preventive
training.
vigilance”, accessed 2 February 2019

&Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
As discussed in Q.51. and Q.52, the Armed Forces do not have a military doctrine that addresses
corruption as a strategic issue. Each branch of the Armed Forces has an Act which governs it [1].
February 2019
Prescribed codes of conduct as per the Acts from each branch of the military serve as the foundation
Corruption as a strategic issue is Corruption as a strategic issue is Corruption issues are not taken for training [2]. Given that as per the Acts, corruption is a punishable offence and there is evidence of
ARMYACTS190216.pdf
Q53. Is corruption as a 53A Forward planning taken into account in the forward
strategic issue planning of operations.
taken into account in the forward
planning of very few operations.
into account at all in forward
planning.
0 anti-corruption training workshops for all personnel- it is plausible that corruption could be an issue
that is being considered in forward planning of operations [3]. However, there is no tangible evidence
considered in the at present to support this as documents are classified. According to a retired Army colonel, corruption
Report 16-17”, pg.190, accessed 2 February 2019
forward planning of is not considered in the forward planning of operations; but it could be considered in administrative
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/
operations? If so, is planning [4].
AnnualReport1617.pdf
there evidence that
commanders at all
levels apply this
knowledge in the
field?
Note: If the country does not
Corruption is taken into account in
conduct significant operations, 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts
planning for operations, and in Corruption is taken into account in Corruption is taken into account in Corruption is taken into account in Corruption issues are not taken
then consider exercises or support &Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019
execution of some actions during planning for operations, and in planning for operations, but planning for very few operations, into account in planning or
to peace operations (e.g. by UN, As discussed above, there does not seem to be evidence that corruption is an issue that is being https://mod.gov.in/acts
53B Application operations (e.g. procurement). execution of larger operations mitigation approaches are not and mitigation approaches are not execution, and are regularly
EU), civil relief efforts. If there is 0 considered in forward planning of operations [1][2].
Larger operations have independent where the country has the biggest implemented consistently during implemented consistently during mishandled by officers during
no involvement of the military in 2. Interviewee, retired colonel, New Delhi, 23 May 2019
evaluations conducted by an deployments. deployments. deployments. deployment.
any operations, this can be
Inspector General or similar body.
marked N/A.
1. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “Army’s

new vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police
personnel”, The Economic Times, updated
Expert personnel capable of Expert personnel capable of It is unclear if trained professionals are regularly deployed at present to monitor corruption risk in the March 12th, 2019, accessed May 9th, 2019
monitoring corruption are regularly monitoring corruption are regularly field of operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new branch for https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/arm
Expert personnel capable of
deployed and report on the status of deployed and report on the status vigilance in the Indian Army. The new vigilance unit is to monitor corruption cases handled by field ys-new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-
monitoring corruption are regularly
corruption within mission at least of corruption within mission at Corruption monitors are irregularly The country deploys no trained commands (1). personnel/articleshow/68367369.cms
deployed and report on the status
once every six months. Reports least once every year. Reports deployed. They may not have the personnel for corruption
Corruption of corruption within mission at
54A
monitoring
contain assessments of the most
significant corruption risks, the
contain assessments of the most
significant corruption risks, the
least once every year. However,
right expertise for the task. They
may produce weak reports or may
monitoring, or informally monitors Note removed
corruption with non-expert
25 All UN peacekeeping operations troop contributing nations such as India, deploy trained professionals
to monitor corruption including risk assessment for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in the field of
2. Interviewee 3: Officer at the United Nations, Geneva,
18 February 2019
reports fail to adequately assess
manner in which corruption can manner in which corruption can not report at all. personnel. peacekeeping operations. However a few countries are more consistent than others and have more
corruption risks and mitigation
affect the goals of the mission, and influence the goals of the mission, rigorous training [1]. According to Transparency International, none of the top 25 TCCs follow best 3. Transparency International, 2016, “Corruption &
measures being employed.
the effectiveness of mitigation and addresses mitigation practice and deploy anti-corruption monitors to missions [2]. Peace Operations”, accessed 18 February 2019
measures being employed. measures being employed. http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/160330CorruptionRiskTCCsTIIDSPFIN.pdf
Q54. Are trained

professionals
regularly deployed to
monitor corruption
risk in the field
(whether deployed on
operations or
peacekeeping
missions)?
Q54. Are trained M&E guidance for the mission 18 February 2019
M&E guidance for the mission
professionals refers to monitoring corruption As previously stated, it is unclear if trained professionals are currently deployed to monitor corruption
clearly specifies how to monitor There is no M&E guidance for the
risks, but in a general manner. It risk in the field of operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new 2. United Nations Peacekeeping Resources Hub,
regularly deployed to
monitor corruption
54B M&E policy corruption risks, and establishes the
procedural basis for personnel to
may fail to establish the
mission on how to monitor
corruption risks.
25 branch for vigilance in the Indian Army. In peacekeeping operations, it is possible that there is “Evaluation”, accessed 18 February 2019
risk in the field procedural basis for personnel to monitoring and evaluation but the frequency and extent are not easy to ascertain [1][2]. https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/
monitor corruption.
(whether deployed on monitor corruption. evaluation
operations or
peacekeeping
missions)?

18 February 2019
2. United Nations Peacekeeping Resources Hub,

“Evaluation”, accessed 18 February 2019
https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/
It is unclear if trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field of
evaluation
operations. However, as of March 2019, the Defence Ministry has approved a new branch for
Reports are made available to the
Reports are made available to the vigilance in the Indian Army. The new vigilance unit is to monitor corruption cases handled by field
public and relevant oversight If the country does not deploy any 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 19
public and the relevant oversight Reports are not made available to commands (4). It is possible that the reports would be made available to oversight bodies with some
bodies, at least in summary form. personnel for corruption June 2018, “CUNPK Training of Trainers Course”,
54C Transparency bodies such as the parliament. Any
content that is withheld is
However, critical information is
the public or oversight bodies in
any form.
monitoring, this sub-indicator 25 information given publicly.
missing from the reports and this should be marked Not Applicable. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=180044
legitimately justified. In peacekeeping operations, it is possible that there is monitoring and evaluation with reports
exclusion may not be justified.
available to oversight bodies but the frequency and extent are not easy to ascertain [1][2]. India has
4. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 12 March 2019, “Army’s
held training courses for DPO trainers [3.
new vigilance unit to use Corps of Military Police
personnel”, The Economic Times, accessed 9 May 2019
armys-new-vigilance-unit-to-use-corps-of-military-police-
personnel/articleshow/68367369.cms

&Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019

February 2019
Take into account: https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/
As discussed in previous questions, the Armed Forces do not have a doctrine that specifically
1) Whether the government ARMYACTS190216.pdf
addresses corruption. Each branch has an Act which serves as the foundation for training [1[[2]. As
provides training / guidelines /
Guidelines exist specifically for per the Acts, corruption is a punishable offence and there is evidence of anti-corruption training
monitoring before deploying their 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 31
operations (e.g. standard operating workshops for all personnel [3]. There is a possibility that guidelines relating to corruption in
troops under the foreign country’s October 2018, “President of India graces Vigilance
procedures at the level of procurement apply to the context of operations but this is not explicitly mentioned anywhere.
There are guidelines for command; and/or Awareness Week 2018 function; says checking
contracting). The guidelines address
Comprehensivene addressing corruption risks in There are no relevant guidelines 2) Whether it is government who corruption is essential to creating a New India //
55A
ss
the following risks in contracting in
operations: asset disposals, local
contracting, but they are for corruption risks in contracting. ensures that there is training to 0 India contributes to UN peacekeeping missions. There is an Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption
Framework for the UN Secretariat, including all personnel that is also translated into training for
‘Vigilance Excellence Awards’ presented MoS Dr
incomplete or very general. counter corruption risk, regardless Jitendra Singh lauds CVC’s efforts towards preventive
power brokers, contract delivery peacekeepers [4]. There are training programmes including the mandatory online UN training on
of whether the government vigilance”, accessed 2 February 2019
monitoring, security of equipment corruption and fraud. Direct and indirect anti-corruption measures exist, focusing both on the
themselves or a foreign http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=184506
and personnel. peacekeepers behaviour but also the environment they work in. It is however, questionable whether
government or a multilateral/non-
the trainings topics are really transferrable into everyday peacekeeping practice [5].
government organisation leads the 4. United Nations, 2016, “Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption
training. Framework, accessed 18 February 2019
https://www.un.org/es/ethics/pdf/
anti_fraud_framework.pdf
Q55. Are there 5. Interviewee 3: Officer at the United Nations, Geneva,

guidelines, and staff 18 February 2019
training, on
addressing corruption
risks in contracting
whilst on deployed
operations or
peacekeeping 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “MOD Acts
missions? &Rules”, accessed 2 February 2019

As mentioned above, as per the Acts, corruption is a punishable offence and there is evidence of anti-
October 2018, “President of India graces Vigilance
corruption training workshops for all personnel [1][2]. There is a possibility that guidelines relating to
Take into account: Awareness Week 2018 function; says checking
corruption in procurement apply to the context of operations but this is not explicitly mentioned
1) Whether the government corruption is essential to creating a New India //
anywhere and the degree of training is not ascertainable.
provides training / guidelines / ‘Vigilance Excellence Awards’ presented MoS Dr
Staff are specifically trained on the monitoring before deploying their Jitendra Singh lauds CVC’s efforts towards preventive
With regards to peacekeeping missions, all peacekeepers are trained in corruption risks. The ‘Ten
types of corruption risks in Staff are not specifically trained on troops under the foreign country’s vigilance”, accessed 2 February 2019
Rules/Code Of Personal Conduct For Blue Helmets’ is the guideline and is included in mandatory
contracting that are prevalent during the types of corruption risks in command; and/or http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=184506
There is no training provided on training. It has several references to acts of corruptions such as, “have pride in your position as a
operations or peacekeeping contracting that are prevalent 2) Whether it is government who
55B Training
missions. These risks include: asset during operations or peacekeeping
corruption risks in procurement, or
any general corruption risks.
ensures that there is training to 50 peacekeeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority” [3].
3. United Nations Peacekeeping,“STANDARDS OF
disposals, local power brokers, missions, but they do receive counter corruption risk, regardless CONDUCT”, accessed 9 May 2019
In the 2015 Ramos-Horta led UN High Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the need for UN
contract delivery monitoring, security general corruption training. of whether the government https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct
peacekeeping operations to ensure that its country analysis encompasses the dynamics and drivers
of equipment and personnel. themselves or a foreign
of corruption, advocating for appropriate attention to corruption and providing political support to those
government or a multilateral/non- 4. Interviewee 3: Officer at the United Nations, Geneva,
providing technical assistance in that area, were identified. It was recommended that civil society
government organisation leads the 18 February 2019
efforts to support transparency and accountability should be included. Any future complementary
training.
framework should take this into consideration [4][5].
5. United Nations Peacekeeping, “Report of Independent
High-level Panel on Peace Operations”, accessed 9 May
2019
https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=S/2015/446
Note: A clear policy on use of
PMCs should include a well-
1. Dr. Shantanu Chakrabarti,“Growth and Implications of
established procedure for
Private Military Corporations”, IDSA, 2008, accessed
selecting PMCs, criteria for
February 2nd, 2019
dealing with PMCs which had
The use of private military https://idsa.in/jds/
been convicted of corruption, and
contractors is forbidden by law or the 2_1_2008_GrowthandImplicationsofPrivateMilitaryCorpo
provisions for contract language
law may allow them to be employed This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. rations_SChakrabarti
which enables the state to fire
in extremely limited circumstances
PMCs for offence, including those
which do not expose them to risk of This indicator is not scored. Private military contractors are not employed. Private sector participation in the Indian defence sector 2. Grant Thornton & FICCI, “Private security services in
related to integrity. The policy
corruption. The legal standard Please discuss conditions in the is restricted to defence production and procurement [1]. India, 2015”, accessed February 2nd, 2019
56A Policies
applicable to PMCs does not vary country context related to good
should also address the ways in
which PMCs' work will be
NS http://ficci.in/spdocument/20673/FICCI-GT-Report.pdf
widely from standards applied to practice (Score 4). India does have a robust private security industry valued at Rs 570 billion [2]. Ex-military personnel
contracted and overseen,
state representatives in the same are employed by private security companies in India [3]. 3. PwC & FICCI, “Indian private security industry
specifying that the contracting
roles, and it criminalises corruption- Preparing for the next leap”, 2017, accessed February
states will have oversight over
related offences for PMCs. 2nd, 2019
subcontractors and laying out the
http://ficci.in/spdocument/20966/FICCI-PwC-Report-on-
policy for increases in costs and
Private-Security-Industry.pdf
monitoring of results. Check
Q56. Are private whether the state implements The
military contractors Montreux Document on Private
employed and if so, Military and Security Companies.
are they subject to a
similar level of 1. Dr. Shantanu Chakrabarti, 2008, “Growth and
scrutiny as for the Implications of Private Military Corporations”, IDSA,
armed forces? accessed 4 April 2019
https://idsa.in/jds/
Laws of the contracting state contain
This indicator is not scored. If the country has no policies or 2_1_2008_GrowthandImplicationsofPrivateMilitaryCorpo
clear provisions for oversight of This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI.
Please discuss conditions in the laws on the use of PMCs, this sub- rations_SChakrabarti
56B Scrutiny PMCs. Active scrutiny is conducted
by the relevant oversight bodies
country context related to good indicator should be marked as Not NS Private military contractors are not employed [1][2].
practice (Score 4). Applicable. 2. PwC & FICCI, 2017, “Indian private security industry
such as the parliament.
Preparing for the next leap”, accessed 4 April 2019
1. Dr. Shantanu Chakrabarti, 2008, “Growth and
Implications of Private Military Corporations”, IDSA,
accessed 4 April 2019
https://idsa.in/jds/
Policies and laws on the use of This indicator is not scored. If the country has no policies or 2_1_2008_GrowthandImplicationsofPrivateMilitaryCorpo
PMCs are rarely violated, and when Please discuss conditions in the laws on the use of PMCs, this sub- rations_SChakrabarti
56C Enforcement
they are, sanctions are regularly country context related to good indicator should be marked as Not NS Private military contractors are not employed [1][2].
applied. practice (Score 4). Applicable. 2. PwC & FICCI, 2017, “Indian private security industry
Preparing for the next leap”, accessed 4 April 2019
1. Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think Tank, London,
As part of the implementation of the report of the Group of Ministers on 12 May 2019
reforming the National Security System, new Defence Procurement
Management Structures and Systems were set up in the MoD in 2001. In order 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2016, “Defence Procurement
GDI 2020 Indicator
Score
to
GDIimplement the provisions
2020 Indicator laid out
Qualitative in the new Defence Procurement
Data Procedure 2016 Capital
GDI 2020 Indicator Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30
Sources
Management Structures and Systems, the Defence Procurement Procedure - April 2019), pg. 1, accessed 9 May 2019
2002 (DPP-2002) came into effect from December 2002 and was applicable for https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
procurements flowing out of ‘Buy’ decision of Defence Acquisition Council
(DAC). The scope was enlarged in June 2003 to include procurements flowing 3. Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 1999, accessed 9 May
out of ‘Buy and Make’ through Imported Transfer of Technology (ToT) decision. 2019
The DPP has since been revised in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013, http://knnlindia.com/pdf/KTPP%20act%20(%20including%20circulars).pdf
enhancing the scope to include ‘Make’, ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ categories,
Offsets and Ship Building procedure. This DPP was revised once more in March 4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “General
2016, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is determined to treat DPP 2016 as a Financial Rules”, accessed 23 August 2019
dynamic and an evolving document and is committed to making improvements https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539033
based on emerging data and anecdotal evidence, to realise the vision of ‘Make
The country has clear and This doesn’t need to be
This indicator is not scored. in India’ in the defence sector [1][2]. 5. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
comprehensive legislation that defence specific legislation
Please discuss conditions in the Goods”, accessed 23 August 2019
57A Legal framework covers all defence and national
security purchases with no
country context related to good
but a procurement law that is
applicable to the defence
NS Defence procurement in Indian is governed by policy and not legislation. The https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
practice (Score 4). Constitution of India does not contain provisions for public procurement despite %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
exemptions. sector.
its importance. There exists some State-wise legislature such as Karnataka and
its Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 1999 but Parliament has 6. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017 “Manual for Procurement of
yet to pass central legislation [3]. Consultancy & Other Services”, accessed 23 August 2019
https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
In order this
Despite to mitigate
absence corruption risks,there
of legislation, ensurearetransparency,
General Financial accountability
Rules (GFR) and %20Consultancy%20and%20Other%20Services%202017_0.pdf
probity in defence
2017, manuals andprocurement,
a strong focus theonfollowing
Integritysteps
Pactshave beenPublic
[4][5][6]. taken in the DPP-
2016:
Procurement must conform to the Canons of Financial Propriety under Rule 21 7. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
of the GFR. The Code of Integrity for Public Procurement (CIPP) must be Goods”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
The DPP-2016
followed by the envisages signing of an
procuring authorities, Integrity
bidders, Pact between
suppliers, Government
contractors and and https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
the bidders for
consultants. all capitalpractices
Prohibited procurementin the/ CIPP
schemes of Rs. 20 crores
comprehensively coverandcorrupt
above as %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
against
practice,the earlier provision
fraudulent practice,ofanti-competitive
signing of suchpractice,
a pact only in cases
coercive involving Rs.
practice,
12 May 2019
100 cores and
obstructive above.
practice and DPP-2016
conflict ofprovides
interest.that all vendors
Indulgence including
in any of the foreign 8. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
vendors disclosecan
aforementioned full lead
details of any such
to punitive person,such
measures party,
asfirm or institution
cancellation of contracts Goods”, pg.28, accessed 23 August 2019
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in
engaged
in parallelby to them
legal for marketing
provisions thatofare
their equipment
applicable [7].inThe
India, either onofaIntegrity
provisions country https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019
specific
Pacts are basis or asby
covered a part of alegislation
central global or regional
such as thearrangement.
PreventionDPP 2016 further %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
of Corruption
requires
(Amendment)that the Seller
Act, 2018confirms
and the andIndiandeclares to the1860
Penal Code Buyer[8]. that it is the original
manufacturer of the stores contracted and that no agent has been engaged to
Q57. Does the 3. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
influence or manipulate award of the contract, or indulge in corrupt and unethical
country have Goods”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
practices. Penal provisions are included in Standard Clauses of Contract.
legislation The legislation recognises the risks The legislation superficially https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
Legislation covering defence and Submission of Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) is also essential. Violation
of corruption and makes clear and recognises the risks of corruption %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
covering defence 57B Corruption risks
and security comprehensive provisions to or has vague provisions on how to
security procurement does not 50 of Pre-Contract Integrity Pact (PCIP) may result in calling off negotiations,
make reference to corruption risks. cancellation of contract, encashment of the bank guarantee and debarment from
procurement with mitigate these risks. mitigate these risks. 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2016, “Defence Procurement
future procurement. Ascertaining vigilance status of L1 vendor before seeking
clauses specific Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30
Competent Financial Authority (CFA) approval is also prescribed in DPP-2016
to corruption April 2019), pg. 1, accessed 9 May 2019
[1][2]. The provisions of Integrity Pacts are covered by central legislation such as
risks, and are any https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Indian Penal Code
items exempt 1860.
from these laws? 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 25 September 2018, “Defence
If there is no procurement Acquisition Council Meets Today”, accessed 10 May 2019
As alluded to earlier, prohibited practices in the CIPP comprehensively cover
legislation that covers the http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183688
corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti-competitive practice, coercive practice,
defence sector, this indicator obstructive practice and conflict of interest. Indulgence in any of the
should be scored 0. aforementioned can lead to punitive measures such as cancellation of contracts
in parallel to legal provisions that are applicable [3].
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2016, “Defence Procurement
In September 2018, DAC discussed and approved several amendments to DPP- Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30
16, to further streamline the procurement process and reduce timelines [4][5]. April 2019), pg. 1, accessed 9 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018,“General

Defence purchases are generally to be procured in accordance with the DPP-
Financial Rules”, accessed 23 August 2019
2016 [1]. Procurement must conform to the Canons of Financial Propriety under
https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539033
Rule 21 of the GFR and the CIPP must be followed by the procuring authorities,
bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants [2][3].
Defence purchases are gennerally Procurement requirements 3. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
The legislation on defence
procured in line with legislation. outlined in legislation are regularly Goods”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
procurement is thoroughly There is evidence to suggest that the policy guidelines are usually followed but
57C Effectiveness
implemented and followed for all
There are some exceptions to the
processes laid out by law, but they
bypassed, or exceptions to the law
are significant either in terms of
75 there can be discrepancies. At the end of 2017, India cancelled a $500 million
https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
%20Goods%2020 17_0_0.pdf
defence procurement. deal to develop Spike anti-tank guided missiles with an Israeli defence firm. The
are minor. number or scale.
apparent reason for cancellation was that the Israeli firm expressed reservations
4. The Economic Times, 3 January 2018, “India cancels $500 million defence
in ensuring full Transfer of Technology (ToT) as per the 'Make in India' initiative
deal, says Israeli arms firm”, accessed 9 May 2019
requirements [4]. It was reported in 2018 that the deal was ‘back on’ [5].
If the country has no https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-cancels-500-million-
legislation regulating defence defence-deal-says-israeli-arms-firm/articleshow/62352536.cms
procurement this sub-
indicator should be marked 5. Ori Lewis, 17 January 2018, “Israel-India guided missile deal back on track:
Not Applicable. A general Netanyahu”, Reuters, accessed 9 May 2019
procurement code is https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-india-missiles/israel-india-guided-
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure”,
missile-deal-back-on-track-netanyahu-idUSKBN1F62DS
acceptable if it covers accessed May 9th, 2019
defence procurement. https://mod.gov.in/dod/defence-procurement-procedure
India’s Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) is formalised and publicly
available in a 489 page document on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) website [1].
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Manual 2009
The Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) is also publicly available and consists
Amendment 1/2015”, accessed May 9th, 2019
of element of the procurement cycle [2]. The DPP-2016 encompasses Capital
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/DPM0001.pdf
Acquisitions, Defence Services and the Indian Coast Guard. Ordnance Factory
Board (OFB), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) however, follow their own
2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
procurement procedures. The procurement categories are Buy (Indian - IDDM),
Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), Buy and Make and Buy (Global) [3].
The entire defence procurement The defence procurement cycle, This indicator refers to The DPP Preamble outlines the complexity of the defence procurement cycle
cycle, from: 1) assessment of needs; from 1) assessment of needs; 2) whether there is a formal process:
The defence procurement cycle is 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
58A Formal procedures 2) contract implementation and sign-
off, and 3) asset disposal, is fully
contract implementation and sign-
off, and 3) asset disposal, is
not formalised at all.
process for defence
procurement that is laid out
100 “1. Defence acquisition is not a standard open market commercial form of
pg. xi, accessed 9 May 2019
formalised. partially formalised. in policies or regulations. procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints,
technological complexity, foreign suppliers, high cost, foreign exchange
5. Vinay Kaushal, 22 February 2019, “MMRCA Mess and the Need for
implications and geo-political ramifications. While maintaining highest standards
Professionalism in the Defence Acquisition Process”, IDSA, accessed 9 May
of transparency, probity and public accountability, a balance
2019
between competing requirements such as expeditious procurement, high quality
https://idsa.in/issuebrief/mmrca-professionalism-in-def-acq-vkaushal-220219
standards and appropriate costs needs to be established. As a result, decision
making pertaining to defence procurement remains unique and complex” [4].
6. Harsh V. Pant & Pushan Das, 8 May 2019, “India’s defence policy challenge”,
ORF, accessed 9 May 2019
Given the secrecy of the MoD, it is difficult to guarantee that the DPP is fully
https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-defense-policy-challenge-50601/
implemented at all times given the deficiencies that are apparent in the way
contracts are at times processed and executed [5][6][7].
7. PRS India, “Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force”, accessed September
27th, 2019
https://www.prsindia.org/report-summaries/capital-acquisition-indian-air-force
Q58. Is the
defence
procurement
cycle process,
from assessment
of needs,
through contract
implementation
and sign-off, all
the way to asset
disposal,
disclosed to the
public?
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Procurement Manual 2016 Defence

R & D Organisation (DRDO)”, accessed 9 May 2019
https://www.drdo.gov.in/sites/default/files/procurement-manuals-document/
procurement-manual-2016.pdf
3. Make In India, “Defence Manufacturing: Reasons To Invest”, accessed 9 May

Procurement procedures and guidelines are publicly disclosed [1][2]. Information
2019
is publicly available regarding assessment of needs [3]. Procurement tenders for
http://www.makeinindia.com/sector/defence-manufacturing
Q58. Is the departments with autonomous procurement procedures such as the DRDO and
defence the DPSUs are publicly available to view online via the Central Public
Detailed procedures for the entire 4. Central Public Procurement Portal, “Active Tender Organisation Name :
procurement Procurement Portal and its ancillary e-portals [4][5].
defence procurement cycle are Some elements of the defence Defence Research and Development Organisation”, accessed 9 May 2019
cycle process, disclosed, with clear explanation and procurement cycle are disclosed The defence procurement cycle is https://eprocure.gov.in/cppp/tendersearch/by/
from assessment As discussed previously, the MoD is reticent in public disclosure of full details of
in disaggregated form. This includes with clear explanation and in disclosed, with clear explanation The defence procurement cycle is dGVuZGVyL0RlZmVuY2UgUmVzZWFyY2ggYW5kIERldmVsb3BtZW50IE9yZ2
of needs, The defence procurement cycle is approved defence purchase contracts. Purchase name, vendor, value and
through contract
58B Transparency assessment of needs, contract
implementation and sign-off, asset
disaggregated form; other
elements, though openly
and in disaggregated form. But
some elements from the list in
disclosed only in a very
abbreviated or general way.
not disclosed. 75 delivery timelines are available [6]. Total number of procurement contracts,
FuaXNhdGlvbi9zZWxlY3QvbnVsbC9udWxs
implementation value and branch breakdown is available [7]. Detailed information of works in
disposal; process of awarding disclosed, are only summarised or score 4 are completely absent. 5. Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, homepage, accessed 9 May 2019
and sign-off, all progress and activities between the agreed parties is not readily available.
contracts, and mechanisms for are otherwise less clear. https://eprocuremdl.nic.in/nicgep/app
the way to asset contract implementation.
disposal, As of May 2019, the MoD publicly stated it will adopt a new procurement policy
6. The Economic Times, 5 October 2018, “India, Russia formally ink the $ 5.2
disclosed to the defining the level of indigenous defence equipment and give a higher preference
billion deal for S-400 air defence system”, accessed 9 May 2019
public? to domestic vendors in contracts [8].
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-formally-ink-
the-5-2-billion-deal-for-the-s-400/articleshow/66082930.cms
7. Ministry of Defence Government of India, India Stands Strong ebook,

“Defence Acquisition”, pg. 14, accessed 9 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/ebook-2018/mod-ebook.html#p=14
8. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 10 May 2019, “Defence ministry to adopt new

procurement policy”, The Economic Times, accessed 10 May 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-ministry-to-adopt-
new-procurement-policy/articleshow/69260391.cms

2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Procurement Manual 2016 Defence

There are policies and procedures https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/procurement-manual-2016.pdf
There are detailed policies and There are detailed policies and
for each step of the There is a lack of detailed policies There are no policies or
procedures for each step of the procedures for each step of the This indicator refers to the Procurement procedures and guidelines are publicly disclosed [1][2]. Given the
implementation process of the and procedures for each step of procedures for the implementation 3. Vinay Kaushal, 22 February 2019, “MMRCA Mess and the Need for
implementation process of the implementation process of the implementation of any secrecy of the MoD however, it is difficult to guarantee that the DPP is fully
58C Implementation
procurement cycle and there is procurement cycle, but there are
procurement cycle, but they lack
detail and there are shortcomings
the procurement cycle and there is
no evidence that they are used in
process of the procurement cycle.
Or, there is no evidence that they
defence procurement, 25 implemented at all times given the deficiencies that are apparent in the way
Professionalism in the Defence Acquisition Process”, IDSA, accessed 9 May
2019
evidence that these are followed in some shortcomings with formalised or informal. contracts are at times processed and executed [3][4][5].
with implementation. practice. are used in practice https://idsa.in/issuebrief/mmrca-professionalism-in-def-acq-vkaushal-220219
practice. implementation.
4. Harsh V. Pant & Pushan Das, 8 May 2019, “India’s defence policy challenge”,
ORF, accessed 9 May 2019
https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-defense-policy-challenge-50601/
5. PRS India, “Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force”, accessed 27 September

2019
https://www.prsindia.org/report-summaries/capital-acquisition-indian-air-force
The DPP-2016 states that the acquisition process for the five categories of
procurement under the ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy & Make’ schemes will involve the
following processes:-
(a) Request for Information (RFI).
(b) Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs).
(c) Acceptance of Necessity (AoN).
(d) Solicitation of offers.
(e) Evaluation of Technical offers by Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC).

(f) Field Evaluation. 12 May 2019
(g) Staff Evaluation. 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Procurement Manual 2016 Defence
(h) Oversight by Technical Oversight Committee (TOC), if required. https://www.drdo.gov.in/sites/default/files/procurement-manuals-document/
Procurement oversight mechanisms Procurement oversight
Procurement oversight procurement-manual-2016.pdf
are independent, formalised mechanisms are independent, Procurement oversight
mechanisms are not formalised. (j) Commercial negotiations by Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC).
processes. Parliament, the military, formalised processes. They may mechanisms are formalised, but
Or they are formalised but are There are no procurement 3. Vinod Rai, “CORE CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE
59A Independence business, or politically well-
connected individuals have no
be subject to occasional undue
influence from parliament, the
they may be subject to persistent
undue influence, e.g. by
dominated by undue influence and oversight mechanisms. 100 (k) Approval of the Competent Financial Authority (CFA). IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, 2015, pg. 310-322, accessed 12 May
are not independent due to 2019
undue influence on their military, business or politically parliament or the military.
widespread undue influence. (l) Award of contract/Supply Order (SO). https://idsa.in/system/files/book/Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
performance. well-connected individuals.
(m) Contract Administration and Post-Contract Management. 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019, STANDING
COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2018-19) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA), accessed
12 May 2019
TOC when constituted must provide expert oversight over the technical http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_49.pdf
evaluation process. The DG (Acquisition) may constitute a TOC for acquisition
cases in excess of Rs 300 Crores and for any other case recommended by the
Defence Secretary/DPB/DAC. The oversight committee will check whether the
process of Fast Track Procedure (FTP) as per DPP has been followed and bring
out deviations, if any. The committee will also review and bring out the status of
grievances or complaints in the case. The Committee will submit the report to
Defence Secretary within 10 days of its constitution (1)(2).
Q59. Are defence
procurement In addition to the aforementioned, the Acquisition Wing is mandated with
oversight oversight. Further oversight comes from the Standing Committee on Defence,
mechanisms in CVC, CAG and at times PAC (3)(4). Procurement oversight mechanisms are
place and are thus formalised. These mechanisms are autonomous with regular activity. It is
these oversight unclear if their activity is immune from changes in government or Parliament.
mechanisms
active and
transparent?
Q59. Are defence
procurement
oversight
mechanisms in
place and are
these oversight
mechanisms
active and
transparent? 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019, STANDING
12 May 2019
http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_49.pdf
Procurement oversight mechanisms
are highly active in summoning
If there are no defence 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report 16-17”, Appendix III
witness and documents, demanding Procurement oversight
Procurement oversight procurement oversight Procurement oversight mechanisms are robustly active. They engage in pg.211, accessed 12 May 2019
explanations, issuing mechanisms are active but they
59B Effectiveness
recommendations or conclusions do not consistently engage in all
mechanisms are highly inactive, or mechanisms, this sub-
not active at all. indicator should be marked
50 demanding explanations, issuing recommendations or conclusions that are
being followed or implemented [1][2][3].
that are being followed or the activities listed in score 4.
as Not Applicable. 3. Hindustan Times, 10 January 2019, “CAG report points to unfair process in e-
implemented, and they can exercise
procurement during BJP rule in Chhattisgarh”, accessed 12 May 2019
their ability to cancel projects.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cag-report-points-to-unfair-process-
in-e-procurement-during-bjp-rule-in-chhattisgarh/story-
QeAAFfcITVnyvoQvNaEGlL.html
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019, STANDING

12 May 2019
2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 19 February 2018, “Details of firms

Comprehensive evidence of activity debarred/put on hold/suspended etc. from doing business with MoD”, accessed
(e.g. reports, announcements in the 12 May 2019
press of the cancellation of Evidence of activity is occasionally There is evidence of active oversight activity by way of reports, announcements https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/firmshold.pdf
Evidence of activity is made public If there are no defence
procurement programmes, the made public by the relevant Evidence of activity is rarely made in the press of the cancellation of procurement programmes and the release of
by the relevant procurement Procurement oversight procurement oversight
release of financial information) is procurement oversight institutions public by the relevant procurement financial information by oversight institutions and the material is publicly 3. Central Vigilance Commission, “Tender Guidelines”, accessed 12 May 2019
59C Transparency
made available to the public by the
oversight institutions but content is
limited to the justification or
but content is either completely oversight institutions and the
mechanisms are entirely non-
transparent about their activities.
mechanisms, this sub-
75 available [1][2][3][4][5]. As alluded to in Q.32, no 2018 CAG reports have been https://cvc.gov.in/?q=guidelines/tender-guidelines
relevant procurement oversight aggregated or missing key content is missing key information. uploaded to the CAG website but some of the findings have been mentioned in
rejection of procurement. as Not Applicable.
institutions (e.g. parliamentary information. media reports. 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report 16-17”, Appendix III
committee, a national audit function pg. 211, accessed 2 February 2019
or bureau of public procurement). https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
5. PRS Legislative Research, 26 February 2019, “CAG Report Summary Capital

Acquisition in Indian Air Force”, accessed 12 May 2019
https://www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/parliament_or_policy_pdfs/CAG
%20Report%20Summary_Capital%20Acquisition%20in%20IAF.pdf
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 14 March 2018,

“Modernisation of Defence”, accessed 10 May 2019
2. India Juris, “Decoding Defence Offset”, 2015, accessed 10 May 2019

http://www.indiajuris.com/uploads/publications/pdf/k1437479445mdecoding
%20offset.pdf
3. The Wire, 6 October 2016, “The State of Economic Decision Making Within
The process of defence acquisition in India is based on the fifteen years Long India's Armed Forces is Deteriorating”, accessed 10 May 2019
Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five years Services Capital https://thewire.in/economy/economic-decision-making-within-indian-armed-
Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and an Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) from each of the forces-deteriorating
The Government publishes services [1][2]. As India does not have a National Defence Strategy, defence
Forward planning for potential There is no forward planning for
comprehensive forward planning for Forward planning for potential Forward planning for potential procurement can be reactionary [3]. 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2013, “TECHNOLOGY
purchases extends less than 5 potential purchases, or it is less
potential purchases which extends purchases extends 10-15 years in purchases extends 5-9 years in PERSPECTIVE AND CAPABILITY ROADMAP (TPCR)”, accessed 24 August
60A Policies
10-15 years in advance, e.g. through advance, but it is rarely advance, and it is rarely
years in advance. There is no
strategic defence review or white
than a year in advance. There is
no strategic defence review or
75 Some information is publicly available in the Technology Perspective and 2019
a strategic defence review, white comprehensive. comprehensive. Capability Roadmap (TPCR) which gives an overview of equipment to be https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/TPCR13.pdf
paper. white paper.
paper or similar. inducted up to the late 2020s, so it's 10 to 15 years in advance [4][5]. Non-
Q60. Are sensitive defence tenders are published on the government’s Defence 5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2018, “TECHNOLOGY
potential defence eProcurement Portal [6]. The Indian Army regularly publishes tenders and RFIs PERSPECTIVE AND CAPABILITY ROADMAP (TPCR)”, accessed 24 August
purchases made on its website [7]. 2019
public? https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/tpcr.pdf
6. Defence eProcurement Portal, accessed 16 February 2021

https://defproc.gov.in/nicgep/app
7. Indian Army, “Tender and RFI”, accessed 24 August 2019

https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/site/formTemplete/frmArchive.aspx?
MnId=a5rFbfdJlasG0zYC4rCtpg==&ParentID=2yP/
The government publishes the plans Q3h2MQpbo9eRuArRqQ==&flag=8CKP966uzg96kLov0aWdfQ==
for defence purchases in detail for at
least the next 4 years. The adequate
1. Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think Tank,
and timely information (e.g.
London,12 May 2019
elements of the defence equipment Notice of planned purchases is subjective and depends on the specific defence
plan, itemized budget proposals) is purchase. High-profile defence purchases are made public by the media, prior to
There may be some information 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 28 May 2018, “DAC approves
sufficient to enable prospective The government publishes the There may be some information their actual completion [1][2].
on forward purchase plans, but it There is no information made procurement of equipment for Defence Forces”, accessed 12 May 2019
Notice of planned suppliers to prepare and seek further plans for defence purchases in on forward purchase plans for the
60B
purchases information, and enough for detail for 2 years in advance. The next two years, but it is not
is only for a year or less, or it is publicly available on forward
lacking in so much detail so as to purchase plans.
25 As alluded to above, the MoD’s TPCR gives a comprehensive overview of
oversight agencies and civil society information published is extensive. extensive. equipment to be inducted up to the late 2020s across nineteen categories, 10 to
be incomplete. 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2018, “TECHNOLOGY
to debate the necessity of the 15 years in advance [3].
PERSPECTIVE AND CAPABILITY ROADMAP (TPCR)”, accessed 24 August
proposed purchases (e.g. the
2019
average procurement duration, Some information on forward planning is publicly available in the Technology https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/tpcr.pdf
justification of exceptions, and Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) which gives an overview of
specific overview records by type of equipment to be inducted upto the late 2020s (3).
bidding procedure).
1. Interview with Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think
Tank, London, May 12th, 2019
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 2 December 2016, “Ultra Light

Howitzers”, accessed 12 May 2019
Defence purchases are made public http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=154790
in detail, with almost no exceptions.
Very little data from the 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 2 January 2019, “Missile
Note: Exemptions for
tender/contract is redacted for Defence System”, accessed 12 May 2019
security restricted items is an Actual defence purchases are made public through an official press release by
national security reasons. For both Defence purchases are made http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=187046
Some defence purchases are not acceptable reason, but only the Government of India’s Press Information Bureau; some strategic purchases
confidential and non-confidential public with almost no exceptions. Some defence purchases are not Defence purchases are rarely (if
made public. Security or where it is clear that the bulk are not made public [1]. Information provided usually includes a description of
purchases, there is disclosure of the Most of the information listed in made public, and there is no ever) made public, even though an 4. The Economic Times, 11 July 2018, “India has signed 182 defence deals over
61A Comprehensiveness
tender and the contract award. For score 4 is released, but some
confidentiality is often given as a
reason for such secrecy but this is
security justification as to why this aggregate total spend may be
of defence purchases are
disclosed and this restriction
50 the item purchased, the winning bidder, the price paid, the reason for the and the
proposed delivery/completion date [2][3][4][5][6]. Information on beneficial
last 3 years and current year”, accessed 24 August 2019
the contract, there is a description of information is in aggregate or information is withheld. disclosed. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-has-signed-182-
partly, but not fully, justified. is therefore credible. owners, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing and costs of parts is not
the item purchased, the winning abbreviated form. defence-deals-over-last-3-years-and-current-year/articleshow/50041882.cms
readily available.
Q61. Are actual bidder, the beneficial owners, price
defence paid, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 28 May 2018, “DAC approves
purchases made servicing, costs of parts, and procurement of equipment for Defence Forces”, accessed 24 August 2019
public? delivery/completion date. www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1533669
6. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 September 2018, “DAC

Approves Procurement of Equipment Worth Rs 9,100 Crores”, accessed 24
August 2019 www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1546476
Q61. Are actual
defence
purchases made
public?
1. Indian Army, “Tender and RFI”, accessed 12 May 2019

https://indianarmy.nic.in/site/formTemplete/frmTendor.aspx?MnId=/
dslWs+YRV+Izr4tSXPdNA==&ParentID=FSqNZ7Ylkkh985w/0I2Csw==
Data on tenders is available online. Non-sensitive defence tenders are published 2. Defence eProcurement Portal, accessed 16 February 2021
Data is almost always released in an on the government’s Defence eProcurement Portal and the Indian Army https://defproc.gov.in/nicgep/app
accessible format (e.g. excel file) provides information on its website under “Tenders/RFI” [1][2]. Information on
Data is sometimes released in an Data is rarely, if ever, released in
61B Accessible data which allows for useful comparisons
(e.g. how many tenders a company
accessible format. a accessible format. 0 annual defence purchases are available in annual ebooks published by the
government [3] and through official press releases [4]. No data seems to be
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, India Stands Strong ebook,
“Defence Acquisition”, pg. 15, accessed 12 May 2019
has won). available in an accessible format such as an Excel sheet which allows for https://mod.gov.in/ebook-2018/mod-ebook.html#p=15
comparisons.
4. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Ultra Light Howitzers”,
December 2nd, 2016, accessed 12 May 2019
Bidders and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) need to sign an Integrity Pact
committing to not offering or accepting bribes, ensuring integrity in public
procurement for all capital procurement/schemes of Rs. 20 crores and above.
Submission of Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) is needed. The Seller must
confirm and declare to the Buyer that it is the original manufacturer of the stores
1. Bharat Electronics Limited, “INTEGRITY PACT AND IEMS”, accessed 10 May
There are laws and procedures contracted and that no third party has been engaged who can influence or
2019
detailing how the government manipulate award of the contract, or indulge in corrupt and unethical practices.
There are laws and procedures http://www.bel-india.in/ContentPage.aspx?MId=27&CId=4195&LId=1&link=4195
discriminates in its selection of Penal provisions are included in Standard Clauses of Contract for use of undue
detailing how the government
suppliers and sub-contractors on the influence including engagement of agents. Violation of the Pre Contract Integrity
discriminates in its selection of 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in
basis of their integrity. For example, Pact (PCIP) may result in cancellation of the contract, encashment of bank
suppliers and sub-contractors on There may be laws and There are no laws or procedures There are no laws or procedures Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019
suppliers and sub-contractors are guarantee and debarment from future procurement. Vigilance status of L1
Q62. What the basis of their integrity. procedures detailing how the detailing how the government detailing how the government http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
required to show that they have a vendor before seeking Competent Financial Authority (CFA) approval is also
procedures and Companies may be required to government discrminates in its discriminates in its selection of discriminates in its selection of
formal and publicly declared anti- prescribed in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). All vendors including
show that they have a formal and selection of suppliers and sub- suppliers and sub-contractors, but suppliers and sub-contractors, and 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2016, “Defence Procurement
standards are
companies
62A Formal policies corruption programme in place that
adheres to minimum standards
publicly declared anti-corruption contractors. Some anti-corruption periodically suppliers or sub- suppliers or sub-contractors are 50 foreign vendors need to disclose full details of any such person, party, firm or
institution engaged by them for marketing of their equipment in India, either on a
Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30
required to have programme in place, but some standards are included in the main contractors may be required to not required to sign anti-corruption April 2019), accessed 10 May 2019
established and specified by the country specific basis or as a part of a global or regional arrangement [1][2][3].
– such as minimum standards are not contract or subcontracts sign anti-corruption clauses in clauses in contracts with the https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
procurement authority. The
compliance specified. These standards are throughout the supply chain. contracts with the government. government.
substance of the programme and There is no evidence suggesting that companies are required to show that they
programmes and included in the main contract as 4. Government of India Ministry of Finance, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
standards are included in the main have a formal and publicly declared anti-corruption programme in place that
business well as subcontracts throughout Goods”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
contract as well as subcontracts adheres to minimum standards established and specified by the procurement
conduct the supply chain. https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
throughout the supply chain. authority. As alluded to in Q. 57, bidders must adhere to the Code of Integrity for
programmes – in %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
Public Procurement (CIPP). Prohibited practices in the CIPP comprehensively
order to be able cover corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti-competitive practice, coercive
to bid for work practice, obstructive practice and conflict of interest. Indulgence in any of the
for the Ministry aforementioned can lead to punitive measures such as cancellation of contracts
of Defence or and debarring in parallel to legal provisions that are applicable [4].
armed forces?
1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Corruption in Defence
Deals”, July 18th, 2018, accessed May 10th, 2019
There is some evidence that the procedures outlined above are implemented.
The government endeavours to ensure procedures will demonstrate the highest
2. Central Bureau of Investigation, “CBI REGISTERS A CASE AGAINST A
degree of probity and public accountability, transparency in operations, free
PRIVATE PERSON; TWO FIRMS BASED AT BRAZIL & SINGAPORE AND
There is evidence that these competition and impartiality. In 2016, the CBI registered four cases of corruption
If there are no such policies UNKNOWN OTHERS RELATING TO SUPPLY OF THREE MODIFIED EMB-
There is evidence that these policies policies and laws are consistently There is evidence that these There is evidence that these There is evidence that these in defence deals. Six firms were debarred from further business dealings with
Consistent and laws, this sub-indicator 145 AIRCRAFT”, October 21st, 2016, accessed May 10th, 2019
62B
implementation
and laws are consistently
implemented, including for
implemented, but not always i.e. policies and laws are sometimes
for strategically important implemented.
policies and laws are rarely
implemented.
policies and laws are not
implemented.
should be marked Not 50 Ministry of Defence for a period of ten years. This was further made applicable
to all allied/subsidiary firms of each of the debarred firms. Orders were issued
Applicable
strategically important suppliers. suppliers. restricting procurement from two firms. Two firms have been taken off from the
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Details of firms debarred/put on
list of restricted procurement based on a closure report filed by the investigating
hold/suspended etc. from doing business with MoD”, February 19th, 2018,
agency and acceptance by the Court (1)(2)(3). One cannot ascertain if
procedures are consistently implemented encompassing strategic suppliers too.
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/firmshold.pdf
India currently does not have a public National Security Strategy [1]. This
document is reported to be under review within government. The IISS Military
Balance 2019 states that the overall capability of the conventional forces is
limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition and
spare parts. India continues to modernise its conventional military capabilities
and its nuclear forces, particularly its delivery systems, but many equipment
projects have experienced significant delays and cost overruns, particularly 1. Vinod Misra, “CORE CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE
indigenous systems [2]. The government’s ‘Make in India’ policy aims to IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, 2015, pg. xxiii, accessed 12 May 2019
strengthen the defence-industrial base in line with its core objective of self- https://idsa.in/system/files/book/Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
reliance.
The MoD does have a procurement planning process which is based around 12 May 2019
long-term, medium-term and short-term perspectives. The process is as follows:
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2016, “Defence Procurement
It is impossible to assess whether
- (a) 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP). (b) 5 years Procedure 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30
procurement requirements derive
Procurement requirements are in Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP). (c) Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP). April 2019), accessed 12 May 2019
from a national defence and
Procurement requirements are part derived from a national Procurement requirements are in - Based on the Defence Planning Guidelines, Headquarters Integrated Defence https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
Procurement requirements are security strategy, even if a national
derived from a national defence defence and security strategy. If theory formally derived from a Staff (HQ IDS), in consultation with the Service Headquarters (SHQs), would
derived from a national defence and strategy exists. There is no formal
Procurement and security strategy, but there the strategy is weak, vague or not national defence and security formulate the 15 years LTIPP for the Armed Forces. 4. Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think Tank, London,
63A
requirements
security strategy, and there is logical
flow down from strategy to individual
may be occasions where sufficient to derive procurement strategy. The strategy is likely to
procedure in place for defining
purchase requirements. Or the
0 - The Five Year Defence Plans for the Services would also be formulated, by 12 May 2019
procurements are not justified requirements, work to quantify the be weak, vague or insufficient to HQ IDS, which would include requirements for the next five years under the
procurement with no exceptions. defence strategy may be secret so
based on the national strategy. need for significant purchases is derive procurement requirements. SCAP. The SCAP should indicate the list of equipment to be acquired, keeping 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 3 May 2018, “Inaugural
it is impossible to verify how
occasionally conducted. in view operational exigencies and the likely availability of funds. - The planning meeting of the Defence Planning Committee”, accessed 12 May 2019
procurement requirements are
process would be under the overall guidance of the Defence Acquisition Council http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179109
derived.
(DAC); its decisions, as approved by the Defence Minister, will flow down for
implementation to the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) (3)(4). 6. Harsh V. Pant, 17 October 2018, “Modi govt streamlining national security
planning”, accessed 12 May 2019
There has been criticism in inner circles that in the absence of defence https://www.orfonline.org/research/modi-govt-streamlining-national-security-
acquisition training for personnel involved in procurement, the procurement planning-45037/
procedure has its flaws.
The Modi government has started to streamline national security planning. This
includes the establishment of a Defence Planning Committee (DPC) comprising
the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, three service chiefs, the defence,
expenditure and foreign secretaries, under the national security adviser; and the
formation of the three Tri-Services agencies for cyber, space, and special
operations across all branches of the Armed Forces (5)(6).
Q63. Are
procurement
requirements
derived from a
national defence
and security
strategy, and are
procurement
decisions well-
audited? Are
defence
purchases based
on clearly
identified and
quantified
requirements?
Q63. Are
procurement 1. Rahul Singh, 14 February 2019, “CAG points to flaws in defence
requirements procurement”, Hindustan Times, accessed 12 May 2019
derived from a https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cag-points-to-flaws-in-defence-
national defence procurement/story-YiAbBV6GptbMbps9Q0Sv0J.html
and security
strategy, and are 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
procurement 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
decisions well- accessed 12 May 2019
Scrutiny is occasionally conducted As alluded to in Q.59, scrutiny is conducted actively by a number of legally or
audited? Are There is active scrutiny conducted https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms such as CAG and the
defence by a number of legally or
constitutionally mandated Acquisition Wing [1]. According to the DPP-2016, the MoD can exercise its right
purchases based constitutionally mandated oversight 3. Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think Tank, London,
oversight mechanisms (e.g. the to conduct an audit of all certifications and costs relevant to indigenous content
on clearly mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary 12 May 2019
parliamentary oversight at all or any stages (tiers) of manufacturing/production/assembly, starting from
oversight committee, the inspector There is no scrutiny of actual
identified and
quantified
63B Scrutiny
general, or the national audit office)
committee, the inspector general,
or the national audit office) to
purchases. 75 the prime (main) contractor downwards. The audit(s) could be conducted by the
Ministry itself and/or by an agency/institution/officer(s) nominated by the
4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report 16-17”, Appendix III
requirements? to confirm that procurement is in line pg. 211, accessed 2 February 2019
confirm that procurement is done Ministry, as may be decided by the Ministry [2][3][4]. However, the oversight
with national security strategy or that https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf
in line with national security agencies do not generally question the quantity. This scrutiny is the prerogative
work is undertaken to quantify the
strategy or that work is undertaken of the MoD. There is no National Security Strategy against which the quantity
need for purchases. 5. Vinod Misra, 2015, “CORE CONCERNS IN INDIAN DEFENCE AND THE
to quantify the need for purchases. can be benchmarked [5][6].
IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMS”, IDSA, pg. xxiii, accessed 12 May 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/book/Book_CoreConcernsinIndianDefence.pdf
6. Arvind Gupta, 20 October 2011, “A National Security Strategy Document for

India”, accessed 26 August 2019
ANationalSecurityStrategyDocumentforIndia_arvindgupta_201011
1. The Economic Times, 13 July 2018, “Rigid rules trip Modi's $250 billion plan
to modernise India's defence”, accessed 12 May 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rigid-rules-trip-modis-250-
billion-plan-to-modernise-indias-defence/articleshow/60370605.cms?from=mdr

Overall, the MoD seems to base their major purchases on identified
pg.15, accessed 10 May 2019
requirements on the basis of LTIPP, SCAP and AAPs. “The idea of the defense
procurement procedures is to ensure that the armed forces are equipped with
the best the country can afford”, according to K.V. Kuber, a New Delhi-based
3. Shauraya Karanbir Gurung, 10 May 2019, “Defence ministry to adopt new
independent defence analyst who has worked on government procurement
procurement policy”, The Economic Times, accessed 12 May 2019
policies [1]. Revenue and capital procurement are carried out as per the
The Ministry of Defence and https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-ministry-to-adopt-
approved plans. The Statement of Case prepared for each procurement is
The Ministry of Defence and Armed Armed Forces base at least their new-procurement-policy/articleshow/69260391.cms
Purchases often are outside of the vetted by the Finance Wing of the MoD [2].
Forces systematically base all major purchases on the clearly
63C Purchases
purchases on clearly identified and identified requirements, but there
national strategy and appear to be
opportunistic in nature.
75 In recent years, the government has pushed to increase indigenous content
4. Pushan Das, 25 September 2018 “How did Govt go ahead with only 36 Rafale
quantified requirements. are opportunistic and unplanned jets?”, ORF, accessed 26 August 2019
which is a factor in the procurement vendor selection process [3]. Procurement
purchases. https://www.orfonline.org/research/44508-how-did-govt-go-ahead-with-only-36-
controversies continue such as Rafale [4]. There has been criticism by some
rafale-jets/
that despite sincere efforts by the government, out-of-box measures are needed
in improving procurement procedures that are at times, hampered by an over
5. Lt. General KJ Singh, 12 May 2019, “Think out of the box, when it comes to
cautious bureaucracy [5]. With the process of streamlining national security
defence modernization”, The Times of India, accessed 12 May 2019,
planning underway, the country is closer to realising this [6].
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/generals-jottings/think-out-of-the-box-
when-it-comes-to-defence-modernization/
6. Harsh V. Pant, 17 October 2018, “Modi govt streamlining national security

planning”, accessed 12 May 2019,
https://www.orfonline.org/research/modi-govt-streamlining-national-security-
planning-45037/
Note: TI-DS defines ‘single

source procurement’ as ‘the
noncompetitive purchase of
goods or services that takes 1. Interviewee 4: South Asia Research Analyst, Geopolitical Think Tank, London,
place after negotiating with 12 May 2019
only one supplier’ (see here: There is not enough evidence to score this indicator, as the proportion of
http://ti-defence.org/wp- 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
defence procurement conducted as open competition cannot be ascertained.
content/uploads/2016/03/140 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) aims to ensure timely procurement
910-Single-Sourcing.pdf – accessed 10 May 2019
of military equipment, systems and platforms as required by the Armed Forces
also for some analysis of https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
in terms of performance capabilities and quality standards, through optimum
corruption risks around utilisation of allocated budgetary resources. The new L1-T1 methodology in the
single sourcing). The key 3. Laxman K Behera, “DPP-2016: An Analytical Overview”, IDSA, 12 April 2016,
DPP-2016 is intended to buy equipment with Enhanced Performance
issue here is absence of accessed 10 May 2019
Parameters (EPP), this helps to widen the competition as final selection is based
competition, usually https://idsa.in/specialfeature/dpp-2016_lkbehera_120416
on a combination of price and superior technology offered by qualified vendors.
accompanied by absence of The DPP strives for the highest degree of probity, public accountability,
an open bidding process. 4. The Competition Act, 2002, accessed May 10th 2019
transparency, fair competition and level-playing field. Appropriate publicity may
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/The_competition_Act_2002.pdf
be given to the proposed procurement with a view to generate maximum
competition [1][2][3].
5. Competition Commission of India, 2018, “Towards Competitive Tenders:
Diagnostic Tool for Procurement Officers”, accessed 10 May 2019
The vast majority (90%+) of defence Less than half (30-50%) of Very few (less than 30%) of The Competition Commission of India (CCI) established under the Competition
The majority (70%+) of defence Most (50%+) defence https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Final
procurements are conducted as an defence procurements are defence procurements are Act, 2002, promotes and sustains competition in Indian markets [4][5].
procurements are conducted as procurements are conducted as %20Diagnostic%20Tool%2019032018-1.pdf
open competition, except in clearly conducted as open competition. A conducted as open competition. A
an open competition, though a an open competition, though a
Q64. Is defence 64A Open competition defined and limited circumstances.
There is a relatively small
significant minority of the value of significant percentage of the value
majority of procurements are majority of procurements are
either restricted competition (i.e. 2- either restricted competition (i.e. 2-
NEI India is promoting a policy of ‘Make In India’, where there is a preference for
domestic manufacturing where possible. The aims of this policy are not fully
6. The Wire, 17 November 2018, “Full Text of Modi Government's Note on How
procurement contracts (10% to 30%) are single- of contract (30% to 50%) are it Decided to Buy 36 Rafale Jets”, accessed 26 August 2019
generally component (less than 10%) of 3 suppliers invited to compete) or 3 suppliers invited to compete) or realised yet. The government has also stated on record when submitting
sourced. single-sourced. https://thewire.in/government/full-text-of-modi-governments-note-on-how-it-
conducted as single-sourcing. single-sourced. single-sourced. documents regarding the Rafale deal, that 40% of defence procurement is
decided-to-buy-36-rafale-jets
open competition through Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGAs) [6].
or is there a 7. Vivek Raghuvanshi, 20 November 2018, "India OKs $1.5 billion purchase of
significant Russian firm Rosobornexport won the $1.5 billion contract for India's VSHORAD
Russian missile system", Defense News, accessed 26 August 2019
element of program, despite complaints by competitors that it had failed two initial technical
https://www.defensenews.com/smr/2018/11/20/india-finally-oks-15b-russian-
single-sourcing tests, that should have resulted in its expulsion from the bidding process [7].
missile-system-purchase/
(that is, without
competition)? India has a strong defence industrial base with 41 Ordnance Factories (OFs)
8. Ordnance Factory Board, “Our Units”, accessed 26 August 2019
and 9 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), forming the public sector
https://ofb.gov.in/pages/our-units2
component; and more than 100 private companies [8][9]. The DRDO has over
50 laboratories. India’s current defense production is approximately $11.42
9. Department of Defence Production, “Defence Public Sector Undertakings”,
billion. $9 billion comes from DSPUs and OFs, with the private sector accounting
for $2.42 billion; $2 billion of defence expenditure goes to private defence
https://www.ddpmod.gov.in/defence-public-sector-undertakings
companies including approximately 3,500 micro and small enterprises [10].
10. Defense News, “India looks to make $25B from defense production by
2025”, 6 August 2020, accessed 16 February 2021
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/08/06/india-looks-to-
make-25-billion-in-defense-production-by-2025/
competition)?
1. The Wire, 17 November 2018, “Full Text of Modi Government's Note on How
it Decided to Buy 36 Rafale Jets”, accessed 26 August 2019
https://thewire.in/government/full-text-of-modi-governments-note-on-how-it-
decided-to-buy-36-rafale-jets
2. CAG, 2016, “Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the
year ended March 2015”, pg. 95, accessed 10 May 2019
All single source and restricted https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/
All single/sole source and Single-source defence procurement statistics are not readily available. However,
competition procedure contracts Oversight agencies have some Union_Government_Defence_Services_Army_Ordnance_Factories_and_Defen
Scrutiny of restricted competition procedure Oversight agencies have powers as noted in indicator 64A, the government has stated on record recently that
must be justified and subject to powers to question Oversight agencies have no ce_PSUs_Report_19_2016.pdf
single/restricted contracts are justified to external to question the competition 40% of defence procurement is through Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGAs)
64B
competition
external scrutiny (such as
parliament or the external audit
scrutiny who have powers to procedure selected and actively
single/sole/restricted competition
procedure selected or purchase
powers to question single/sole or
restricted competition procedures.
50 [1]. Single/sole source and restricted competition procedure contracts are
3. Competition Commission of India, 2018, “Towards Competitive Tenders:
procedures question the competition do so in a number of cases. subject to external scrutiny by the CAG and the CCI [2][3]. There is recent
office), who have the power to reject and occasionally do so. Diagnostic Tool for Procurement Officers”, accessed 10 May 2019
procedure selected. evidence of this [4].
the competition procedure selected. https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Final
%20Diagnostic%20Tool%2019032018-1.pdf
4. Manu Pubby, 13 February 2019, “Rafale CAG report: A mixed bag for both
opposition
1. Ministry and government”,
of Defence The Economic
Government Times, accessed
of India, “Defence 26 August
Procurement 2019
Procedure
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rafale-cag-report-a-mixed-
bag-for-both-opposition-and-government/articleshow/67972931.cms
Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
decisions, are subject to clear regulations and codes of conduct that are
Officials with a role in designing designed to prevent conflict of interest [1]. The 2017 Manual for Procurement of 2. Ministry of Finance Government of India, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
tender specification, or in tender Goods outlines the Code of Integrity for Public Procurement (CIPP) and states Goods”, pg.25, accessed 10 May 2019
Officials with a role in designing
board decisions, are subject to that: https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
tender specification, or in tender
regulations or codes of conduct that %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
board decisions, are subject to Officials with a role in designing
are designed to prevent conflict of “Procuring authorities as well as bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants
regulations or codes of conduct tender specification, or in tender
interest. Procurement officials are Officials with a role in designing should observe the highest standard of ethics and should not indulge in the 3. Ministry of Finance Government of India, “Training Programs on Public
that are designed to prevent board decisions, are subject to
subject to restrictions on tender specification, or in tender following prohibited practices, either directly or indirectly, at any stage during the Procurement for Government Officers at NIFM Faridabad”, 6 December 2018,
conflict of interest. Procurement regulations or codes of conduct Officials with a role in designing
professional activity (e.g., board decisions, are subject to procurement process or during execution of resultant contracts: accessed 10 May 2019
officials are subject to restrictions that are designed to prevent tender specification, or in tender
shareholders of contracting firms, regulations or codes of conduct i) Corrupt practice https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Training%20Programs%20on%20public
on professional activity (e.g., conflict of interest. Procurement board decisions, are not subject to
65A Conflicts of interest board member, advisor, or company
officer of private firm, post-
shareholders of contracting firms, officials may be subject to some
that are designed to prevent
conflict of interest. Procurement
any regulations or codes of 75 ii) Fraudulent practice
iii) Anti-competitive practice
%20procurement%20for%20government%20officers%20at%20National
%20Institute%20of%20Financial%20Management%20%28NIFM%29%2C
board member, advisor, or vague restrictions on professional conduct to prevent conflict of
employment, etc.) and are required officials may be subject to some iv) Coercive practice %20Faridabad.pdf
company officer of private firm, activity. Training is provided to interest.
to file financial disclosure reports to vague restrictions on professional v) Conflict of interest
post-employment, etc.) but are not procurement officials to avoid
demonstrate that neither the official activity. No training is provided. vi) Obstructive practice” [2] 4. NIFM, “Training Program on Public Procurement (Basic)”, accessed 10 May
required to file financial disclosure conflicts of interest, but it is not
nor his or her family have financial 2019
reports. Annual training is regularly conducted.
conflicts of interest in their work. There is evidence of procurement officials undergoing training at the National https://eprocure.gov.in/cppp/trainingdisp/
provided to procurement officials
Annual training is provided to Institute of Financial Management. Training provided is 'basic' and advanced, kbadqkdlcswfjdelrquehwuxcfmijmuixngudufgbuubgubfugbububjxcgfvsbdihbgfGh
to avoid conflicts of interest.
procurement officials to avoid and is delivered throughout the year [3][4]. Procurement officials are prohibited dfgFHytyhRtODY=
conflicts of interest. from having financial or business transactions with a bidding firm, therefore any
professional activity. They are obliged suo-moto to proactively declare any 5. Ministry of Finance Government of India, 2017, “Manual for Procurement of
Q65. Are tender conflicts of interest [5]. Goods”, pg.26, accessed 10 May 2019
boards subject to https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
regulations and %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
codes of conduct
and are their
decisions subject 1. Comptroller and Auditor of India, March 2016, “Report of the Comptroller and
to independent There is an audit trail of which Auditor General of India”, accessed 10 May 2019
There is a comprehensive audit trail There is some audit trail of which
audit to ensure officials were involved in selecting The tender board officials do not There is no audit trail that Tender boards are subject to regular auditing by the Comptroller and Auditor https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2017/
of which officials were involved in officials were involved in selecting This indicator refers to the
due process and suppliers and designing tender keep satisfactory records of the oversight agencies can access, General (CAG). The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) conducts regular Report_No.15_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Government_Army_and_Ord
selecting suppliers and designing suppliers and designing tender quality of evidence employed
specification;but which is missing tender process and, therefore, it is which details individuals involved review meetings and conducts a technical examination of public procurement. It nance_Factories_Reports_of_Defence_Services.pdf
fairness? 65B Audit Trail tender specification. There is also an
audit trail of which officials (including
some information. There is also an
specification. There might not be
an audit trail of which officials
difficult for oversight agencies to in setting tender specifications,
for external scrutiny of tender
specifications and tender
50 consults the Ministry and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). It is unclear
audit trail of which officials access a comprehensive audit supplier selection and tender if the audit trail comprehensively states names of all officials, including 2. Central Vigilance Commission, “Monthly Performance Report”, accessed 10
politicians) are involved in tender (including politicians) are involved award decisions. 1. Ministry
(including politicians) are involved trail. award. politicians, who were involved in tender award decisions [1][2]. May 2019 of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
award decisions. in tender award decisions. 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
in tender award decisions. http://www.cvc.nic.in/?q=reports/monthly-performance-reports
2. Ministry of Finance Government of India, “Manual for Procurement of Goods

2017”, pg.25, accessed 10 May 2019
Tender boards regulations and Tender boards regulations and https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
There is no transparency of tender Tender board regulations, codes of conduct and procedures seem to be fully
65C Transparency codes of conduct are fully
transparent
codes of conduct are only partially
transparent.
board procedures. 100 transparent [1][2][3][4].
%20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
3. Ministry of Defence, 10 November 2015, “Defence Procurement Manual 2009/

Amendment 1-2015”, accessed 10 May 2019
http://cgda.nic.in/ifa/circulars/dpm2009_amend_311215.pdf
1.
4. Comptroller and Auditor
Central Vigilance of India,“Tender
Commission, March Guidelines”,
2016, “Report of the Comptroller
accessed 10 May 2019and
Auditor General of India”, accessed 10 May 2019
https://cvc.gov.in/?q=guidelines/tender-guidelines
There is some external verification This indicator refers to the Report_No.15_of_2017_Compliance_audit_Union_Government_Army_and_Ord
There is robust external verification There is no external verification Tender boards are subject to regular auditing by CAG. The CVC conducts
that the particular specifications of strength of external nance_Factories_Reports_of_Defence_Services.pdf
65D Scrutiny that the particular specifications of
the tender are appropriate.
the tender are appropriate, but it is
that the particular specifications of
the tender are appropriate.
verification of tender 50 regular review meetings and conducts a technical examination of public
procurement. It consults the Ministry and the CBI. [1][2].
not comprehensive. specifications. 2. Central Vigilance Commission, “Monthly Performance Report”, accessed 10
May 2019
https://cvc.gov.in/?q=reports/monthly-performance-reports
A legal framework is in place that discourages collusion in the defence sector,

primarily the Competition Act, 2002 [1]. The Competition Commission of India 1. The Competition Act, 2002
(CCI) was established under the Competition Act, 2002, to promote and sustain http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/The_competition_Act_2002.pdf
competition in Indian markets, to prevent effect on competition, to protect the
interests of consumers and ensure freedom of trade. The CCI has the authority 2. Competition Commission of India, 2018, “Towards Competitive Tenders:
to impose penalties on entities violating the Act. The CCI’S “Diagnostic Tool - Diagnostic Tool for Procurement Officers”, accessed 10 May 2019
Laws are in place that prohibit
Laws are in place that prohibit Towards Competitive Tenders” provides guidance on procurement and https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Final
collusion within the defence sector, There is no legislation covering
collusion within the defence identifying collusion practices and competition issues; it further encourages %20Diagnostic%20Tool%2019032018-1.pdf
66A Legal framework where collusion is defined as
between an official and a bidder or
sector, but collusion is limited to
defence procurement that
addresses collusion.
50 procurement officers to be trained [2].
bidders only. 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
between bidders.
Additionally, in the DPP-2016, under Pre-Contract Integrity Pact, it is stated: 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
pg. 188 accessed, 26 August 2019
“6.3 The Bidder will not collude with other parties interested in the contract to https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
impair the transparency, fairness and progress of the bidding process, bid
evaluation, contracting and implementation of the contract” [3].
There is clear legislation and

implementing guidelines There is clear legislation and
Procurement officials have limited
Q66. Does the empowering procurement officials to implementing guidelines Procurement officials have limited The CCI can grant a temporary injunction restraining parties from violating the 1. The Competition Act, 2002
authority to exclude companies
country have exclude companies and senior empowering procurement officials authority to exclude companies Competition Act, 2002. Under Section 27 of the Act, the CCI can impose http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/The_competition_Act_2002.pdf
and senior company officials If there is no legislation that
legislation in company officials where there is a to exclude companies and senior and senior company officials Procurement officials have no financial penalties. Violations can lead to civil imprisonment under Section 42
where there is a conviction or applies to the defence
conviction or reasonable evidence of company officials where there is a where there is a conviction or authority to exclude companies or [1]. 2. A Subramani, “Competition commission working without jurisdiction”,
place to
discourage and
66B Sanctions
bribery & corruption related conviction or reasonable evidence
reasonable evidence of bribery &
corruption related offences. The
reasonable evidence of bribery & individuals implicated in bribery or
sector, this sub-indicator
should be marked Not
50 December 10th, 2018, accessed May 10th, 2019
punish collusion offences. An offence can result in of bribery & corruption related corruption related offences. corruption related offences. There has been criticism from the Bar Council of India that the CCI is operating https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/competition-commission-
range of sanctions available is Applicable. 1. Competition Commission of India, 18 September 2018, “PRESS RELEASE
between bidders prosecution, debarment from current offences. But the range of Available sanctions are vague or without jurisdiction as it is not headed by a former judge [2]. working-without-jurisdiction/articleshow/67024711.cms
likely to be limited (e.g. to No. 11/2018-19”, accessed 10 May 2019
for defence and and future competitions, or other sanctions available is limited to inadequate.
debarment). https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/press_release/Press%20Release-
security sanctions, including heavy fines or debarment.
imprisonment. %20Ethanol%20112018-19.pdf
contracts?
Cases are investigated or 2. Aditya Kalra, 10 May 2019, “Exclusive: India orders anti-trust probe of Google
Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal If there is no legislation in for alleged Android abuse – sources”, Reuters, accessed 11 May 2019
Cases are investigated but not Cases are superficially
prosecuted through formal processes, but third-party There is a complete failure to place, or if there are no Evidence of enforcement in other sectors exists but there is no evidence of https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-india-antitrust-exclusive/exclusive-
often prosecuted. There is clear investigated, or receive "show"
66C Enforcement processes and without third-party
interference (e.g. undue political
interference (e.g. undue political
influence) is attempted, and
interference (e.g. undue influence) hearings in which defendants are
known cases of collusion,
NA collusion in defence sector bidding and the prosecution of such activities [1][2]
[3]. As such, this indicator is scored 'Not Applicable'.
india-orders-anti-trust-probe-of-google-for-alleged-android-abuse-sources-
idUSKCN1SG17O?il=0
in the decision making process. not punished.
influence). sometimes effective at derailing marked Not Applicable.
prosecutions. 3. Competition Commission of India, 17 July 2017, “PRESS RELEASE: CCI
issues order against Public Sector Insurance Companies for Bid Rigging”,
https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/press_release/pr17.pdf
between bidders
for defence and
security
contracts?
The CCI’S “Diagnostic Tool - Towards Competitive Tenders” provides guidance

on procurement and identifying collusion practices and competition issues; it
further encourages procurement officers to be trained [1].
There is evidence of the government’s acknowledgement of the need for

continuous professional training for officers in defence procurement but the
number of trained officials and the frequency of training are not ascertainable. In
2018, the then Minister of State for Defence Dr Subash Bhamre in a written reply 1. Competition Commission of India, 2018, “Towards Competitive Tenders:
Procurement officials are to the now late Shri Hariom Singh Rathore in the Lok Sabha stated: Diagnostic Tool for Procurement Officers”, accessed 10 May 2019
occassionally trained to identify https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Final
Procurement officials are trained to No training is provided to
collusion patterns and report “In addition, officers dealing with defence procurements are encouraged to %20Diagnostic%20Tool%2019032018-1.pdf
66D Training identify collusion patterns and report
potential malpractice.
potential malpractice. Or training is
procurement officials with regards
to collusion.
50 attend seminars, capsule courses or other similar events conducted by various
provided but it does not cover all industry chambers and institutes such as National Institute of Financial 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 7 February 2018, “Training for
the issues of collusion. Management, Faridabad. All these assist in developing the required knowledge Defence Procurement”, accessed 27 August 2019
base among the officers for handling issues related to defence procurement. https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1519474
There are an adequate number of experienced and trained officers to handle

defence procurement. However, in view of the position indicated in reply to part
(a) and (b) above, training of officers on procurement matter being a continuous
The DPP-2016
process lays outupgradation,
of knowledge procedures itforis contract and post-contract
not possible management.
to give exact number of
The concerned
trained officers.”Service
[2] Head Quarter (SHQ) is entrusted with contract
management and administration. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) Acquisition
Wing is entrusted with post-contract monitoring.
It is stated that:
“(a) Simple Projects. Projects involving one time off the shelf buys, without any
design and development, shall be reviewed by the Acquisition
Manager/equivalent service officer in the SHQ.
(b) Complex Projects. Projects which require design, development and testing in
consultation with the users, with likely ToT and have enlarged scope in terms of
basic
complexities, depth of design and development and consideration of a large
number of participants, would be reviewed by a steering committee headed by
DG (Acquisition) in the MoD or Principal Staff Officer (PSO) at SHQ, with
members from MoD, MoD (Fin), Defence Research and Development
There are formal policies and 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
Organisation (DRDO), Department of Defence Production (DDP) and SHQ. In
procedures that outline how to pg.6, 29, 174 and 398, accessed 19 May 2019
There are no formal policies or such cases, the Acquisition Wing will submit quarterly Contract Implementation
monitor, assess and report upon a There are some formal policies https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
procedures that outline how to Reports
Reporting policies & supplier's service and or delivery and procedures but they do not
67A
procedures obligations. These include resolution address all the activities listed in
monitor, assess and report upon a 100 (CIR) to the DPB.
supplier's service and or delivery
or sanctioning procedures for score 4. 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
obligations. 95. Equipment Induction Cells (EICs). EICs will be raised for major projects on a
incomplete or inadequate service pg.162-192, accessed 27 August 2019
caseto-case basis in SHQ at the discretion of SHQ. The EICs will deal with the
delivery. https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
induction of major
equipment and help in planning the requirement of facilities essential for the
serviceability and maintainability aspect of that acquisition.
95(a) In the event of the Seller's failure to submit the Bonds/

Guarantees/Documents or/and supply/ perform the items/services as per
Delivery schedule specified in the contract, the Buyer may, at his discretion,
withhold any payment until the completion of the contract. The Buyer may also
deduct LD as per Para 6 of Appendix L to Schedule I of Chapter II.
(b) In cases where Seller offers to carry out upgradation/ alteration in the
specifications of equipment as concluded in the contract, imposition of LD
Clause will be as per Guidelines at Appendix J of Chapter II.” In the case of
Indigenous Content (IC), Performance-cum-Warranty Bank Guarantee shall also
be forfeited upon failure to discharge IC obligations as per the contract.
The DPP has provisions on Commercial Clauses and Standard Clauses of the
Contract that address delivery obligations [1][2].
Contract modifications post award 1. The Times of India, 3 January 2018, “India has cancelled $500 million defence
All contracts are publicly available
(such as change of sub-contractor, deal, says Israeli arms firm”, accessed 19 May 2019
including modifications post award
change of beneficial owner, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/israels-rafael-says-india-cancels-order-
(such as change of sub-contractor,
additional costs, such as a Contract modifications post award for-spike-anti-tank-missile/articleshow/62351673.cms
change of beneficial owner,
consultant) are not always publicly are mostly publicly available but
additional costs, such as a Information is rarely released on There is not much information publicly available pertaining to contract failures
available, and sometimes in always in redacted format. There is no transparency in the 2. Anna Ahronheim, 21 April 2019, “INDIA APPROVES 'EMERGENCY
consultant) are publicly available contract failures and modifications and modifications. There are a few reports in the media such as the on-off-on
67B Transparency
alongside the original contract award
redacted form, alongside the
original contract award enabling
Oversight agencies receive limited
information that would enable
post award. Oversight agencies
reporting and delivery obligations
of contractors.
25 deal with Israel for Spike missiles [1][2]. These rarely contain contractual
PURCHASE' OF ISRAELI-MADE SPIKE MISSILES”, The Jerusalem Post,
Q67. Are there enabling scrutiny and oversight of receive limited information. insights such as reasons for delay and defaults.
scrutiny and oversight of changes. them to scrutinise quality of https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/India-approves-emergency-purchase-of-
mechanisms and changes. Oversight agencies 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
Oversight agencies receive some product and service delivery. Israeli-made-SPIKE-Missiles-587482
procedures that receive information on and scrutinise 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
information that would enable
ensure that quality of product and service pg.29, accessed 19 May 2019
them to scrutinise quality of
contractors meet delivery. There are elements of monitoring. The Acquisition Wing submits quarterly https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
their obligations Officials regularly produce contract product and service delivery.
Contract Implementation Reports (CIR) to the DPB [1]. The MoD at any
on reporting and monitoring and completion reports.
stage/tier of production can request for an audit. As per the DPP, the MoD's 2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
delivery? These include supplier and
procurement procedures stipulate stern action against bidders’ 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
subcontractors performance Officials conduct some of the Procurement offices are not
non-fulfilment/performance of contract provisions. Provisions include Liquidated pg. 116, accessed 27 August 2019
67C Monitoring appraisals, which is separately activities listed in score 4, but not conducting reporting and delivery 50 Damages (LD) and in extreme cases- cancellation of the contract [2]. https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
verified. If the contract was not on a regular basis. obligations at all.
sufficiently completed, action is
It was reported in 2018 that MoD has begun to build IT systems that would help 3. Surabhi Agarwal, “Ministry of Defence project to add tech muscle to arms
taken for breach of contract.
streamline procurement and enable quicker decision-making [3]. procurement”, The Economic Times, updated July 11th, 2018, accessed May
19th, 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ministry-of-defence-project-
to-add-tech-muscle-to-arms-procurement/articleshow/63262840.cms?from=mdr
mechanisms and
procedures that
ensure that
contractors meet
their obligations
on reporting and
delivery?
2. Manu Pubby, 4 September 2018, “Upset over offsets: India, US to fix old
problem to take ties to new heights”, The Economic Times, accessed 13 May
2019
There is strong evidence of enforcement in cases of corrupt practices and failure
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/upset-over-
to meet offset obligations [1][2]. The deficiency seems to lay in the timely
offsets-india-us-to-fix-old-problem-to-take-ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/
fulfilment of obligations on delivery by contractors. Resolution or sanctioning
65664071.cms
procedures for incomplete or inadequate service delivery though in existence,
are not effectively carried out. In a January 2019 report from the Standing
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019, “FORTY-NINTH
Committee on Defence, it was stated by the Committee that it observed delays
REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2018-19) (SIXTEENTH
in projects referencing the DRDO and went on to state in Recommendation
LOK SABHA)”, accessed 19 May 2019
(Para No. 21 ):
“… accountability has to be bestowed at some level for the continued delays.
4. Dalip Bhardwaj, 7 May 2018,“‘Make in India’ in defence sector: A distant
Such a dismal scenario cannot be allowed to go on perpetually and wastage of
dream”, ORF, accessed 27 August 2019
resources cannot be taken for granted as a routine phenomenon. The
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-
Committee have also
dream/
been informed that various measures are being taken to curb delays that are a
regular feature. However, the Committee would like to emphasise that the efforts
5. The Economic Times, 2 January 2019, “Indian Army's Rs 60,000-crore FICV
Most breaches of contract are should bear the desired results. Therefore, an inherent system needs to be
project stuck in procedural delays: Official sources”, accessed 19 May 2019
All breaches of contract are Most breaches of contract are adequately acted upon. Issues are developed where specific roles and responsibilities are demarcated and
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-armys-rs-60000-
adequately acted upon. Issues are adequately acted upon. Issues are either dealt with internally, or specified within the organizational structure of DRDO. The progress made in the
crore-ficv-project-stuck-in-procedural-delays-official-sources/articleshow/
either dealt with internally, or raised either dealt with internally, or raised with higher management in direction may be brought to the knowledge of the Committee.”
67349313.cms
with higher management in the raised with higher management in the ministry. However where Few breaches of contract are It is not clear if breaches of
67D Enforcement
ministry. If not resolved, issues are the ministry. If not resolved, issues issues are unresolved, they are adequately acted upon. contract are acted upon. 50 The government replied stating that and concluded:
6. Anurag Kotoky & Iain Marlow, 20 February 2019, “Elusive $15 billion arms
referred for further external scrutiny are referred for further external not generally referred for further
deal frustrates Boeing to Lockheed”, The Economic Times, accessed 19 May
e.g. to the national audit office and scrutiny e.g. to the national audit external scrutiny e.g. to the “…It is submitted that, it is difficult to fix accountability solely on DRDO as our
2019
defence committee. office and defence committee. national audit office and defence projects are dependent on number of external agencies including Users,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/elusive-15-billion-arms-
committee. Production/QA agencies, Certification agencies etc.” [3]
deal-frustrates-boeing-to-lockheed/articleshow/68073690.cms?from=mdr
Delays in delivery seem to be endemic; this could be attributed to complexity of
7. Dinakar Peri, 11 February 2018, “Inter-Governmental Agreements, the
procurement procedures exhaustively outlined in the DPP and bureaucracy [4]
preferred route for defence deals”, The Hindu, accessed 19 May 2019
[5][6]. Purchases made through IGAs seems to have faster delivery and are the
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/inter-governmental-agreements-the-
preferred route [7]. Examples of speedy delivery include M777A2 Ultra
preferred-route-for-defence-deals/article22723261.ece
Lightweight Howitzers where the deal was signed in 2016 and delivery received
in 2018; and the Dassault Rafale fighter jets where the new deal was signed in
8. BAE, 9 November 2018, “Indian Army inducts its first M777 Ultra Lightweight
2016 and delivery of the first jet will be shortly, in October 2019 followed by
Howitzers”, accessed 27 August 2019
additional jets in May 2020 [8][9].
https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/indian-army-inducts-its-first-m777-ultra-
lightweight-howitzers
Enforcement mechanisms for reporting and delivery do exist through a number
of contractual provisions such as LD, Performance Bank Guarantee, Pre-
9. Rajat Pandit, 10 September 2019, “With first Rafale to be delivered next
Dispatch Inspection, suspension and blacklisting [10]. The full extent of
month, IAF resurrects "Golden Arrows" Squadron”, The Times of India,
enforcement on defaulting on timely delivery is unclear.
accessed 10 September 2019
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/with-first-rafale-to-be-delivered-next-
month-iaf-resurrects-golden-arrows-squadron/articleshow/71068507.cms

As per the guidelines:
“19.1 Complaints received in the Ministry of Defence in respect of cases falling

under delegated powers of SHQs/IDS/CGHQ, will be handled in the following
manner:-
(i) Acquisition Wing will forward the complaints to respective CFAs in the
SHQ/IDS/CGHQ.
(ii) The CFA will direct the concerned Directorate (of SHQ/IDS/CGHQ as the
case may be) to enquire and submit a factual report on the complaint. The CFA
will get the factual report examined and dispose off the complaint by taking
appropriate action after having obtained opinion of Ombudsmen wherever so
required.
19.2. Complaints received directly by SHQs/IDS/CGHQ will be examined within

30 days of receipt of complaint to the extent possible and disposed off. 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 21 September 2015, “GUIDELINES
Complaints by competing vendors shall be disposed off as at Paras 15, 16 and FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS”, accessed 10 May 2019
17 above. https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Guidlines.pdf
19.3. Complaints related to the procurement cases other than those under 2. Manu Pubby, 11 July 2018, “Defence Ministry to ignore anonymous
delegated powers will be processed in the following manner:- complaints; new guidelines to speed up procurement”, The Economic Times,
Formal mechanisms are in place to In the case of no formal
allow companies to complain about mechanisms, informal Complaints mechanisms
Companies have no opportunity to (i) Complaints relating to the capital acquisition will be marked to the Acqn Wing https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-ministry-to-ignore-
Complaints perceived malpractice in communication channels are used may be specific to defence
68A
mechanisms procurement. This may include both by companies to complain about
complain about perceived
malpractice in procurement.
procurement or intended for 100 for further processing. In the Acqn Wing, the complaints related to technical
aspects, i.e., RFP, TEC, FET etc will be handled by respective TMs, and those
anonymous-complaints-new-guidelines-to-speed-up-procurement/articleshow/
a court process and an internal perceived malpractice in all procurement processes.
pertaining to other procurement stage(s) after FET, i.e., CNC stage, will be
complaints mechanism. procurement.
handled by respective JS&AMs. 3. The Economic Times, 9 September 2018, “'Innuendoes' against defence
(ii) The TMs/JS&AMs, as the case may be, will forward the complaint to the contractors can't be basis to blacklist them: HC”, accessed 10 May 2019
concerned SHQ for comments/factual report. The concerned SHQ will get the https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/innuendoes-against-
Q68. Are there
complaint examined and, with the approval of PSO, forward its defence-contractors-cant-be-basis-to-blacklist-them-hc/articleshow/
mechanisms in
comments/recommendations to the concerned TM/JS&AM, as the case may be. 65741876.cms?from=mdr
place to allow
All the above activities at SHQ will be completed within 30 days of receipt of
companies to
complaint.
complain about
(iii) The TM/JS&AM will further examine/analyse the comments forwarded by
perceived
SHQ. They may obtain views/advice of the concerned FMs in MoD (Finance),
malpractice in
wherever so required, and thereafter will submit the file with their
procurement,
recommendations for approval of RM. Complaints by competing vendors shall
and are
be disposed off as per procedure given at Para 16 above.
companies
(iv) Complaints received from public representatives/VIPs will also be examined
protected from
and processed in a similar manner and, in addition to the acknowledgement as
discrimination
per Appendix ‘A’, a reply to the complainant would also be submitted for
when they use
consideration of Defence Minister/Defence Secretary, as the case may be,
these
as required under the procedure for the disposal of VIP references
mechanisms?
(v) All the above activities will be generally completed within a period of 60 days
of receipt of complaint.” [1][2] This is then followed by addressal by
Ombudsmen.
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 21 September 2015, “GUIDELINES

FOR HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS”, accessed 10 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Guidlines.pdf
The mechanisms seem to be accessible and cost effective. A vendor is required
The complaints mechanisms The complaints mechanisms The complaints mechanisms If the country has no formal to file a complaint within two weeks, leaving a short window. The duration of the 2. Amit Cowshish, 26 October 2015, “Bugbears in MoD Guidelines on Handling
Effectiveness and available to companies are efficient available to companies may be available to companies are costly complaints mechanisms, this complaint process could be a concern as would the conflict of interest arising of Complaints”, IDSA, accessed 10 May 2019
68B
Accessibility and reasonably priced, and are inefficient or expensive, but are and inefficient, and are thus rarely sub-indicator should be 50 from involvement of the concerned directorate in the complaints process, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/
regularly used. occasionally used regardless. used. marked as Not Applicable. ensuring uniformity between the CFA and Ombudsmen and adherence to bugbears__mod_guidelines_handling_complaints_acowshish_261015
timeframes [1][2][3].
3. Devika Malhotra, 2012, “Study on Government Procurement: Study for
Evidence Based Competition Advocacy”, Indian Institute of Technology,
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING OF
accessed 27 August 2019 http://sps.iitd.ac.in/PDF/SGP.pdf
COMPLAINTS”, September 21st, 2015, accessed 10 May 2019
https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Guidlines.pdf
2. The Economic Times, 9 September 2018, “'Innuendoes' against defence

contractors can't be basis to blacklist them: HC”, accessed 10 May 2019
Under Section VI (23) of the guidelines for handling complaints in DPP,
For genuine (non-malicious) Companies rarely complain Companies believe that if they If the country has no formal https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/innuendoes-against-
protection will be given to whistleblowers as per CVC guidelines [1]. As alluded
complaints, companies believe that because they believe that they will complain they will be unfairly complaints mechanisms, this defence-contractors-cant-be-basis-to-blacklist-them-hc/articleshow/
68C Retaliation
they will not be discriminated against be discriminated in future disadvantaged or debarred from sub-indicator should be 75 to earlier, there is evidence of companies successfully complaining through the
formal mechanisms [2]. However, it is plausible that there can be some sort of
in future procurements. procurement cycles. future procurements. marked as Not Applicable.
retaliation or hostility [3].
3. Yatish Yadav, 26 April 2019, “Vigilance chief recommends action in Rs 7,900-
cr IAF project scam, even as BEL's management hunts down whistleblowers”,
Firstpost, accessed 10 May 2019
https://www.firstpost.com/india/vigilance-chief-recommends-action-in-rs-7900-cr-
air-force-project-scam-even-as-bels-management-hunts-down-whistleblowers-
6522311.html
1. KPMG, 2019, “The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018: Key
Highlights”, accessed 10 May 2019
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/09/prevention-corruption-
amendment-anti-bribery-fcpa.pdf
There is no comprehensive central legislation which exclusively covers public 2. India Code, "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", accessed 10 May 2019
procurement in the defence and security sector. Offending suppliers are https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2390/1/A1930-3.pdf
punishable primarily under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018
[1]. The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 3. Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Amendment) Act, 2015, accessed 10 May
(Amendment) Act, 2015 could also be applied [2][3]. 2019
There is clear legislation and
https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?
implementing guidelines Procurement officials have limited
As of 2016, the Ministry of Defence published guidelines on Penalties in actid=AC_CEN_3_46_00004_199626_1517807323919&type=statute&filename=
empowering procurement officials to authority to exclude companies Procurement officials have no
Business Dealings with Entities which encompasses capital and revenue arbi%20amend%202015.pdf
exclude companies and senior and senior company officials authority to exclude companies or
69A Sanctions
company officials where there is a where there is a conviction or individuals implicated in bribery or 50 procurement of goods and services. Sanctions stated include suspension,
banning and financial penalties. The ban period has been reduced from 10 to 5 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 Novermber 2016, “Guidelines of
conviction or credible evidence of reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences.
years [4]. the Ministry of Defence for Penalties in Business Dealings with Entities”,
bribery & corruption related corruption related offences.
offences.
Violation of the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact (PCIP) may result in cancellation of https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/guideentities.pdf
the contract, encashment of bank guarantee and debarment from future
procurement. Violation of Integrity Pacts can lead to sanctions such as 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in
blacklisting and heavy fines [5][6]. Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019

debarred/put on hold/suspended etc. from doing business with MoD”, accessed
10 May 2019
1. Vinay Kumar, “Chargesheet filed against Hindujas in Bofors case”, The Hindu,
October 9th, 2000, accessed 11 May 2019
https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2000/10/10/stories/01100007.htm
Q69. What
sanctions are
2. Ruchi Bambha, 18 July 2018, “Five things to know about AgustaWestland
used to punish
VVIP chopper scam”, The Economic Times, accessed 11 May 2019
the corrupt
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/five-things-to-know-about-
activities of a
agustawestland-vvip-chopper-scam/articleshow/51992563.cms
supplier?
In the past, there is evidence of undue political influence, notably in the Bofors 3. Alasdair Pal, 31 January 2019, “Court holds two more people sent from UAE
scandal where the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was implicated. After a in AgustaWestland helicopter bribery case”, Reuters, accessed 11 May 2019
If procurement officials have change in hands in power to the BJP, the CBI filed chargesheets against the https://in.reuters.com/article/india-agustawestland/court-holds-two-more-people-
Cases are investigated or
no authority to exclude aforementioned, key middleman Ottavio Quattrochi and others [1]. sent-from-uae-in-agustawestland-helicopter-bribery-case-idINKCN1PP29E
Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal Cases are investigated but not Cases are superficially
There is a complete failure to companies or individuals
prosecuted through formal processes, but undue political often prosecuted. There is clear investigated, or receive "show"
69B Undue influence
processes and without undue influence is attempted, and undue influence in the decision hearings in which defendants are
implicated in bribery or
corruption related offences,
75 In recent times, there is evidence of cases being investigated. In 2014, the
AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter deal was cancelled on the grounds of
4. Business Today, 22 April 2019, “AgustaWestland VVIP choppers case: Delhi
court extends Sushen Gupta's judicial custody till May 3”, accessed 11 May
political influence. sometimes effective at derailing making process. not punished.
this sub-indicator should be breaching the PCIP [2]. The case still continues [3][4]. 2019
prosecutions.
marked Not Applicable. https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/agustawestland-vvip-choppers-scam-
There is evidence of companies being blacklisted [5][6] . delhi-court-extends-sushen-gupta-judicial-custody-till-may-3/story/339207.html

10 May 2019
6. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in

Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019

If procurement officials have
An offence can regularly result in a There is evidence that sanctions have been recently applied such as suspension 10 May 2019
no authority to exclude
range of sanctions, including An offence can regularly result in and banning. As of 2018, six firms were debarred from further business dealings https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/firmshold.pdf
Offences sometimes result in companies or individuals
Application of prosecution, exclusion from current softer sanctions (e.g. It is not clear if offences result in with Ministry of Defence for a period of ten years. This also applied to allied and
69C
sanctions and future competitions, or other administrative fines), but not
appropriate sanctions, but not on a Offences rarely result in sanctions.
regular basis.
sanctions.
implicated in bribery or
corruption related offences,
100 subsidiary firms of each of the debarred firms. Business dealings with fourteen 2. Defence-Aerospace, 19 February 2018, “India MoD Updates Blacklist of
sanctions, including heavy fines or prosecution or exclusion. firms were suspended. Orders were issued restricting procurement from two Debarred Defense Contractors”, accessed 11 May 2019
imprisonment. other firms [1][2]. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/190891/india-
marked Not Applicable.
updates-blacklist-of-debarred-defense-contractors.html

Offset contracts are permitted and regulated by legislation. The government pg.75, accessed 27 August 2019
conducts due diligence on contractors and third parties during offset contract https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
negotiations as per the DPP. The general terms and clauses of the main
procurement contract also apply to the offset contract [1]. As mentioned in Q.57, 2. Government of India Ministry of Finance, “Manual for Procurement of Goods
provisions of the CIPP must be followed by the procuring authorities, bidders, 2017”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
suppliers, contractors and consultants. Prohibited practices in the CIPP https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
comprehensively cover corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti-competitive %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
practice, coercive practice, obstructive practice and conflict of interest [2].
3. Department of Defence Production Defence Offsets Management Wing,
The contract process is monitored and the contractor is audited as is the “About Us”, accessed 16 May 2019
agreement. The Defence Offsets Management Wing (DOMW) of the MoD https://domw.gov.in/Index/Page/about-us
monitors the discharge of offset obligations, including auditing and review of
Whether or not the progress reports received from contractors [3]. As discussed in Q. 62, bidders 4. Bharat Electronics Limited, “INTEGRITY PACT AND IEMS”, accessed 10 May
government engages in and the MoD need to sign an Integrity Pact committing to not offering or 2019
The government prohibits offset Offset contracts are permitted and There is no law or policy that
70A Legal framework
contracts by law. regulated by legislation. regulates offset contracts.
offset contracts, they should
be regulated. Countries must
50 accepting bribes, ensuring integrity in public procurement for all capital
procurement/schemes of Rs 20 crores and above. The range has been dropped
http://www.bel-india.in/ContentPage.aspx?MId=27&CId=4195&LId=1&link=4195
be scored. to this amount to bring smaller defence deals under the Integrity Pack remit to 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in
reduce corruptive practices. Submission of Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019
(IPBG) is needed. The Seller must confirm and declare to the Buyer that it is the http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
original manufacturer of the stores contracted and that no third party has been
engaged who can influence or manipulate award of the contract, or indulge in 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
corrupt and unethical practices [4][5][6]. 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
As of 2015, any changes to offsets need to be approved by the Secretary for https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
Defence Production. This procedural change is to facilitate speedier executions
of contracts [7]. 7. Amit Cowshish, 27 August 2015, “Defence Offset Guidelines – A Long
Overdue Tweak”, IDSA, accessed 27 August 2019
Q70. When
The above procedures have been implemented over the course of the last few https://idsa.in/idsacomments/
negotiating offset
years, thus more time is needed to truly measure their effectiveness. DefenceOffsetGuidelinesALongOverdueTweak_acowshish_270815
contracts, does
the government
specifically
address
corruption risk
by imposing anti-
corruption due
diligence on
contractors and
third parties?
Q70. When
negotiating offset
contracts, does
the government
specifically
address
corruption risk
by imposing anti-
corruption due
diligence on
contractors and 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
third parties? The government conducts due diligence on contractors and third parties during 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
offset contract negotiations as per the DPP. The general terms and clauses of pg.75, accessed 27 August 2019
the main procurement contract also apply to the offset contract [1]. As https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
mentioned in Q.57, provisions of the CIPP must be followed by the procuring
authorities, bidders, suppliers, contractors and consultants. Prohibited practices 2. Government of India Ministry of Finance, “Manual for Procurement of Goods
in the CIPP comprehensively cover corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, anti- 2017”, pg. 25-26, accessed 23 August 2019
competitive practice, coercive practice, obstructive practice and conflict of https://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/Manual%20for%20Procurement%20of
interest [2]. %20Goods%202017_0_0.pdf
The contract process is monitored and the contractor is audited as is the 3. Department of Defence Production Defence Offsets Management Wing,
agreement. The Defence Offsets Management Wing (DOMW) of the MoD “About Us”, accessed 16 May 2019
monitors the discharge of offset obligations, including auditing and review of https://domw.gov.in/Index/Page/about-us
The government imposes some
This indicator should be progress reports received from contractors [3]. As discussed in Q. 62, bidders
The government imposes stringent anti-corruption due diligence on The government imposes no anti-
marked Not Applicable only and the MoD need to sign an Integrity Pact committing to not offering or 4. Bharat Electronics Limited, “INTEGRITY PACT AND IEMS”, accessed 10 May
anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties corruption due diligence or
70B Due diligence
contractors and third parties during during offset contract negotiations, auditing requirements on offset
in cases where the
government explicitly
100 accepting bribes, ensuring integrity in public procurement for all capital
procurement/schemes of Rs 20 crores and above. The range has been dropped
2019
http://www.bel-india.in/ContentPage.aspx?MId=27&CId=4195&LId=1&link=4195
offset contract negotiations but they may be superficial in contracts.
prohibits offset contracts. to this amount to bring smaller defence deals under the Integrity Pact remit to
nature.
reduce corruptive practices. Submission of Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee 5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 18 July 2018, “Corruption in
(IPBG) is needed. The Seller must confirm and declare to the Buyer that it is the Defence Deals”, accessed 10 May 2019
original manufacturer of the stores contracted and that no third party has been http://www.pib.nic.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539032
engaged who can influence or manipulate award of the contract, or indulge in
corrupt and unethical practices [4][5][6]. 6. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
As of 2015, any changes to offsets need to be approved by the Secretary for accessed 10 May 2019
Defence Production. This procedural change is to facilitate speedier executions https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
of contracts [7].
7. Amit Cowshish, 27 August 2015, “Defence Offset Guidelines – A Long
The above procedures have been implemented over the course of the last few Overdue Tweak”, IDSA, accessed 27 August 2019
years, thus more time is needed to truly measure their effectiveness. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/
DefenceOffsetGuidelinesALongOverdueTweak_acowshish_270815
India’s Defence Offset Policy primary objective is to leverage the capital

acquisitions to develop India’s defence industry. It aims to do this through
encouraging development of internationally competitive enterprises, augmenting
capacity for R&D of defence services and products, creating synergy between
sectors such as civil aerospace. There are formal policies and procedures that
outline reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts, laid out in the DPP-
2016. This includes procedures for reporting on completed work, for addressing 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
deficiencies and penalties [1]. 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
There are formal policies and pg.67-90, accessed 10 May 2019
procedures that outline the reporting There are some formal policies In 2018, amendments were made to the Defence Offset Guidelines. These https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
This indicator should be
and delivery obligations for offset and procedures that outline the There are no formal policies or consist of providing additional ways in which foreign Original Equipment
marked Not Applicable only
contracts. This includes procedures reporting and delivery obligations procedures that outline the Manufacturers (OEMs) can discharge their obligations at higher multipliers
71A Policies & procedures
for reporting on completed work, for for offset contracts, but they do not reporting and delivery obligations
in cases where the
100 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulated funds which can be 2. Karishma Maniar, 29 July 2018, “India’s proposed offset policy: Can it be the
addressing inadequate work, for address all the activities listed in for offset contracts. used for the discharge of offset obligations and opportunities for investment in new dawn?”, Fortune India, accessed 10 May 2019
prohibits offset contracts.
sanctioning, and for following the score 4. defence corridors. Previous amendments include the Defence Offset https://www.fortuneindia.com/opinion/indias-proposed-offset-policy-can-it-be-the-
chain of command. Management Wing (DOMW) may now recommend a change in the offset new-dawn/102194
partner/ offset component on being convinced that the change is necessary; and
can give vendors the option of furnishing the details of the Indian Offset Partners
(IOPs) a year before claiming the offset credit or at the time of claiming the
credit. This makes it easier for vendors to re-phase the implementation schedule
and change its IOPs [2]. Indian vendors involved in all categories of defence
procurement can be protected against unanticipated Exchange Rate Variation
(ERV).
1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018, “FORTY SECOND

REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2017-2018) (SIXTEENTH
LOK SABHA), DEMANDS FOR GRANTS (2018-19) CAPITAL OUTLAY ON
DEFENCE SERVICES, PROCUREMENT POLICY AND DEFENCE PLANNING
(DEMAND NO. 21), accessed 10 May 2019
2. CAG, 7 August 2018, “C&AG’s Audit Report No. 9 of 2018 on Defence

Services, Navy & Coast Guard tabled in Parliament today”, accessed 10 May
2019
https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/press_release/Press_9_of_2018.pdf
Information on offset projects can be found in Standing Committee on Defence
The government makes public
The government makes public a list reports and CAG reports/press releases. Some information is made public in the
considerable detail of offset 3. Business Standard, 12 February 2019, “India has signed 21 offset defence
of the contracts (including details of media [1][2][3]. The information is often basic and does not include financial
contracts and programmes, The government makes public contracts worth US $ 5.67 billion in last three years: MoS for Defence Dr
the investments and the supplying details and delivery schedule [4].
including a list of the contracts some details of offset contracts This indicator should be Bhamre”, accessed 10 May 2019
companies), details of the current
(including details of the and programmes, including, at the The government makes public The government does not make marked Not Applicable only https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/india-has-signed-21-offset-
performance of offset programmes, In September 2018, the government issued a press statement providing
71B Transparency
and copies of the contracts
investments and the supplying
companies), and copies of the
least, a full list of the contracts,
including details of the
only basic details of the offset
programmes.
any details about off-set contracts in cases where the
transparent. government explicitly
25 clarification on Dassault’s choice of its Indian Offset Partner. The opposition
defence-contracts-worth-us-5-67-billion-in-last-three-years-mos-for-defence-dr-
bhamre-119021200361_1.html
themselves. It also makes public the party blamed the government for choosing Reliance Defence over the DPSU
contracts themselves and investments and the supplying prohibits offset contracts.
details of planned offsets contracts Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL); a claim the government has vehemently
substantive information of the companies 4. Laxman Kumar Behera, October-December 2015, “Indian Defence Offset
to enable public and civil society denied stating that the OEM chose its IOP and that the government played no
current performance of the offset Policy: An Impact Analysis, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4”, pg. 111-
comment before contract award role in this selection [5][6].
programme 132, accessed 27 August 2019
https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds_9_4_2015_DefenceOffsetPolicy.pdf
Q71. How does
5. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 22 September 2018,
the government
“Clarification on Offset Policy”, accessed 10 May 2019
monitor offset
contracts?
6. Indian Express, 7 January 2019, “The Congress has alleged that Reliance
Defence was named as the offset partner instead of the public company HAL in
the defence deal on the behest of the Modi government”, accessed 10 May 2019
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rahul-gandhi-rafale-hal-5526691/
CAG had observed from 2007-2011 that there were deficiencies in management 1. CAG, 2011, “Report for the year ended March 2011 Union Government
of offsets. These included invalid selection of IOPs, zero value addition by the (Defence Services) Air Force and Navy No. 17 of 2012-13(Compliance Audit)”,
IOP, award of the offset contract in violation of provisions and weak monitoring pg.17-25, accessed 10 May 2019
of offset projects. https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2012/
Union_Compliance_Defence_Air_Force_and_Navy_17_2012_Index.pdf
This indicator should be Since then, over the past few years there has been strengthening of monitoring
Officials regularly produce a Officials occasionally produce a Officials occasionally produce a
Procurement offices are not marked Not Applicable only mechanisms. The DOMW is entrusted with monitoring the discharge of offset 2. Make In India, “DEFENCE OFFSET GUIDELINES”, accessed 10 May 2019
completion report with supplier completion report with supplier completion report with supplier Officials rarely produce a
71C Monitoring
performance appraisals, which is performance appraisals, which is performance appraisals, which completion report.
conducting reporting and delivery in cases where the
obligations at all. government explicitly
50 obligations, including audit and review of yearly progress reports received from
vendors. The DOMW administers penalties to vendors who have defaulted,
http://www.makeinindiadefence.gov.in/admin/writereaddata/upload/2018-09-11-
185655DefenceOffsetGuidelines.pdf
separately verified. separately verified. may not be separately verified.
prohibits offset contracts. assists with offset policy formulation and offset banking guidelines. It is the
repository for all offset contracts. The Acquisition Wing submits an annual report 3. Controller General of Defence Accounts, “About DAD”, accessed 27 August
to DAC in June each year regarding the details of offset contracts signed during 2019
the previous financial year [1][2]. The Controller General of Defence Accounts http://cgda.nic.in/index.php?page=abtdad
(CGDA) is additionally responsible for auditing of offset contracts [3].
1. FORTY SECOND REPORT STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2017-
2018) (SIXTEENTH LOK SABHA), 13 March 2018, pg.79, accessed 10 May
2019
There is evidence suggesting that there is robust enforcement. In February
2. Amit Cowshish, 20 March 2019, “Making the offset policy work better”, IDSA,
2018, the MoD informed the Standing Committee on Defence that out of 42
offset contracts signed, 11 had a final/interim penalty administered to them,
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/making-the-offset-policy-work-better_acowshish-
totalling $38.19 million. The penalties had been imposed because of defaulting
200319
This indicator should be vendors [1][2]. In-built mechanisms put penalties on defaulting contracts as per
If the contract is not sufficiently If the contract is not sufficiently If the contract is not sufficiently If the contract is not sufficiently marked Not Applicable only the offset guidelines.
Breaches of contract are not acted 3. Manu Pubby, 4 September 2018, “Upset over offsets: India, US to fix old
71D Enforcement completed, action is always taken for completed, action is in most cases completed, action is sometimes
breach of contract. taken for breach of contract. taken for breach of contract.
completed, action is rarely taken
for breach of contract.
upon.
in cases where the
100 In the past, Lockheed Martin, Textron and Boeing have all been fined for failing
problem to take ties to new heights”, The Economic Times, accessed 13 May
2019
prohibits offset contracts. to meet offset obligations [3]. There has been criticism that the MoD stringently
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/upset-over-
enforces penalties without revising mechanisms in place that can facilitate better
offsets-india-us-to-fix-old-problem-to-take-ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/
fulfilment of obligations. The Modi government has made amendments to the
65664071.cms
DPP that addresses this [4].
4. Kabir Bogra & Tarang Shashishekhar, 11 July 2018, “Defence offset policy:
Amendments by Modi government exactly what have been long required”, The
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-offset-policy-
amendments-by-modi-government-exactly-what-have-been-long-required/
articleshow/48986763.cms
India’s offset policy has centered on the nation’s core defence objective of
promoting indigenisation to achieve self-reliance. It was created to reduce the
level of defence imports and essentially build a domestic defence manufacturing
hub. The government’s Make In India initiative seeks to achieve this [1]. At
present, defence purchases are acquired through standard procurement, Inter 1. Make In India, “About Us”, accessed 13 May 2019
Government Agreements (IGAs) and strategic deals. http://www.makeinindiadefence.gov.in/pages/about-us
Offset policies have been routinely updated to address industry concerns and 2. Department of Defence Production, “Defence Investor Cell”, accessed 13 May
supposedly be more investor friendly. A Defence Investor Cell has been created 2019
to educate and help investors navigate policies and regulatory framework. Steps https://defenceinvestorcell.gov.in/
Offset contracts are conducted as
have been taken to promote greater participation of industry such as FDI has
open competition, except in clearly Offset contracts are conducted as Offset contracts are generally
Q72. What level This indicator should be been increased to up to 49% through automatic route and above 49% with 3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY
defined circumstances. All single open competition, except in clearly conducted as open competition,
of competition There is little open competition in marked Not Applicable only government approval and the introduction of a Strategic Partnership model. 2018”, accessed 13 May 2019
source contracts are justified and defined circumstances. However, but circumstances are not always Single source offset contracts are
are offset
contracts subject
72
subject to external scrutiny (such as single source contracts are clearly defined. Single source
offset contracts, with most
contracts being single-sourced.
rarely (if ever) justified.
in cases where the
50 Time for banking offset credits has been increased with multipliers introduced
[2]. In the draft Defence Production Policy 2018, it is stated that:
http://www.makeinindiadefence.gov.in/admin/writereaddata/upload/files/Clean
%20Copy_Defence%20Production%20Policy%20%7Br05072018%20email
parliament or the external audit sometimes conducted without contracts are often conducted
to? prohibits offset contracts. %20on%2023.08.2018).output.pdf
office), who have the power to reject clear justification. without clear justification.
“Necessary enabling provisions will be brought in to enable Startups and
the purchase.
MSMEs to participate in transparent and fair manner, without having restrictions 4. The Hindu, “India to buy 10 C-17 heavy-lift transport aircraft for IAF”, updated
of turnover, prior experience if they meet technical and functional requirements” 18 August 2016, accessed 13 May 2019
[3]. https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/india-to-buy-10-c17-heavylift-
transport-aircraft-for-iaf/article2082458.ece
As stated in Q.64, the proportion of open competition cannot be ascertained. As
illustrated previously, these offset agreements have often been government-to-
government, with the US having the largest share among foreign vendors [4].
FDI limits could be further raised under the new DAP-2020 and offset policy
simplified further. All of this points to India’s willingness to create a fairer playing
field and encourage broader public and private sector participation.
1. A.M. Jigeesh & Richa Mishra, 15 February 2013, “Despite ban, middlemen
abound in defence deals”, The Hindu Businessline, accessed 13 May 2019
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/despite-ban-middlemen-
abound-in-defence-deals/article20579242.ece1
2. The Tribune, 5 February 2000, “CVC to probe post-85 defence deals”,

Historically, the ‘dalal’ or broker has been an integral part of business dealings
https://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000206/main1.htm
for time immemorial in the subcontinent. In recent times, India has had a
The use of agents and
chequered past with suspicions of ‘middlemen’ cutting deals when this was
intermediaries is either prohibited by 3. Central Vigilance Commission, “Annual Report 2001”, pg. 27, accessed 13
strictly banned by the government [1][2][3]. In modern times, with the relaxation
law or regulated by a strict and clear May 2019
in procedure, the government has regulated the use of intermediaries and
policy which requires as a minimum https://cvc.gov.in/sites/default/files/ar2001.pdf
agents, though guidelines have been contradictory. Defence Procurement
that anti-corruption clauses are The use of agents and There are no controls over the use
The government imposes no Procedure (DPP) required foreign vendors to give details of any agent they have
included in contracts with agents, intermediaries is regulated by a There are some controls over the of agents and intermediaries, but 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
restrictions on the use of agents engaged yet in the same vein had stated that a seller will be debarred if
73A Policies companies register agents and
declare all forms of remuneration,
strict and clear policy, but this
policy does not include all the
use of agents and intermediaries, the government has clearly
but no clear policy. indicated that it intends to rectify
and intermediaries, nor has it 75 engaging an agent on their behalf [4].
publicly committed to doing so.
agents receive payments into local requirements laid out in score 4. this issue. https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
The DPP-2016 brought better clarity. The new guidelines allow companies to
Q73. How accounts and company contracts
appoint agents, with strict oversight from the government. The vendor is required
strongly does the outline the right to audit agent 5. NDTV, 14 June 2016, “New Guidelines For 'Agents' Who Broker Defence
to disclose full details of agent engaged by them for marketing of their
government financial accounts by government Deals”, accessed 13 May 2019
equipment in India, either on a country-specific basis or as a part of a global or
control the agencies. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/new-guidelines-for-agents-who-broker-
regional arrangement [4][5][6].
company’s use defence-deals-1419028
of agents and
intermediaries in 6. Manu Pubby, 11 July 2018, “Defence procurement policy 2016: Government
the procurement allows foreign entities to engage agents for defence deals”, The Economic
cycle? Times, accessed 13 May 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/defence-procurement-
policy-2016-government-allows-foreign-entities-to-engage-agents-for-defence-
deals/articleshow/52738009.cms?from=mdr
1. NDTV, 14 June 2016, “New Guidelines For 'Agents' Who Broker Defence
Deals”, accessed 12 May 2019
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/new-guidelines-for-agents-who-broker-
The DPP-2016 guidelines clarifying the nature and use of agents, brings better defence-deals-1419028
If the country has no transparency and probity in defence dealings. Violations of the guidelines would
Sanctions are usually applied when Sanctions are sometimes applied Sanctions are not generally restrictions on the use of lead to penal action but the nature of punishment is not specifically prescribed 2. Business Standard, 4 December 2018, “VVIP chopper scam: Accused
73B Enforcement policies and laws on the use of
agents are violated.
when policies and laws on the use
of agents are violated.
applied when policies and laws on agents and intermediaries,
the use of agents are violated. this sub-indicator should be
75 [1]. A middleman in the AgustaWestland deal was extradited to India in middleman Christian Michel brought to India”, accessed 13 May 2019
December 2018 and taken into Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) custody [2]. https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/for-cong-defence-sector-is-
marked as Not Applicable. In 2019, a Swiss company Pilatus was suspended for the engagement of agents only-about-brokering-deals-pm-119021000400_1.html
[3].
3. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 12 July 2019, “Suspension of
Business Dealings with M/s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd.”, accessed 27 August 2019
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Subus.pdf
Q74. Are the 1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 2018, “India Stands Strong”, pg. 14,
principal aspects accessed 9 May 2019
of the financing https://mod.gov.in/ebook-2018/mod-ebook.html#p=14
package
surrounding 2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 2 January 2018, “Raksha
Some details of the financing
major arms Principal aspects of the financing Mantri clears two procurement proposals”, accessed 9 May 2019
package are made publicly
deals, (such as package surrounding major arms Most details of the financing http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=175099
available, and key elements such The existence of a financing Elements of the principle aspects of the financing package surrounding arms
payment deals are comprehensively detailed package are made publicly Details of the financing package
as the sums involved and the package and the identity of the deals are publicly available prior to the fulfilment of contracts. These are
timelines, and made publicly available after the available prior to the signing of the are not publicly available. There 3. The Economic Times, 5 October 2018, “India, Russia formally ink the $ 5.2
interest rates,
74
signing of the contracts. This contract, though some aspects of
payment deadlines are included.
However details on matters such
provider are normally made public,
but no further details are likely to
may be no information on whether 75 primarily the value of the deal and the proposed timeline [1][2][3]. Draft payment
terms such as deadlines, interest rates and rules and regulations surrounding
billion deal for S-400 air defence system”, accessed 9 May 2019
commercial information includes payment the package are less precisely a financing package exists at all. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-formally-ink-
as interest rates and rules and be available. default penalties are as per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) [4].
loans or export timelines, interest rates, commercial detailed than other aspects. the-5-2-billion-deal-for-the-s-400/articleshow/66082930.cms
regulations surrounding default
credit loans or export credit agreements.
penalties are likely to be limited.
agreements) 4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Defence Procurement Procedure
made publicly 2016 Capital Procurement (Incorporating all amendments upto 30 April 2019),
available prior to accessed 13 May 2019
the signing of https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf
contracts?
1. SIPRI, “The state of major arms transfers in 8 graphics”, accessed 16 May

2019
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/state-major-arms-transfers-8-
graphics
In the past, Cold War ties could have played a role in India’s decision-making.
2. OECD, 2017, “OECD DAC Aid at a glance by recipient”, accessed 16 May
According to SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database 2017, India’s largest exports are
2019
still from Russia followed by the USA, Israel, UK and France in descending
https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/
order [1]. It was interesting to see if there was a correlation between the
Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?
exporting nations and nations who provide foreign aid to India. According to the
&:showVizHome=no
Please ensure that the latest OECD figures, the top 5 donors of gross official development assistance
scoring and comments focus (ODA) are Japan, International Development Association (IDA), Germany, EU
3. World Bank, 2017, “IDA 2017 contributions”, accessed 16 May 2019
on political influence by Institutions and France in descending order [2]. IDA contributor countries include
This indicator is not scored. http://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ida17-contributions.pdf
Almost no acquisitions are granted (other) selling countries in Russia, USA the UK and France with the UK and USA being the largest
Prevalence: selling Please discuss conditions in the
75A
nations
as a result of political influence by
country context related to good
arms imports, not by the NS contributors in the IDA [3]. There is a pattern with a few countries (excluding
4. India Budget, 2017, “Receipts Budget, 2016-2017”, accessed 16 May 2019
selling nations. country being assessed. Japan and Israel) [4]. This could be a sign of some political pressure or that the
practice (Score 4). https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2016-2017/ub2016-17/rec/allrec.pdf
SIPRI can be a useful source exporting and donor countries have advanced defence products that India is
when answering this keen to acquire and have a Transfer of Technology (ToT), strengthening its
5. Russia Today, 15 May 2019, “US wants India to swap Russian S-400s for
question. defence industrial base and making progress towards the core objective of self-
THAAD & Patriots, but will it take the bait?”, accessed May 16th, 2019
reliance [5].
https://www.rt.com/news/459287-india-us-russia-s400-thaad/
Generally, as alluded to in Q.60, the process of defence acquisition in India is
Q75. How 6. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 14 March 2018,
based on the fifteen years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), five
common is it for “Modernisation of Defence”, accessed 10 May 2019
years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and an Annual Acquisition Plan
defence http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=177432
(AAP) from each of the services; there is no concrete evidence of political
acquisition influence by selling nations [6][7].
decisions to be 7. India Juris, “Decoding Defence Offset”, 2015, accessed 10 May 2019
based on http://www.indiajuris.com/uploads/publications/pdf/k1437479445mdecoding
political %20offset.pdf
influence by
selling nations?
1. Interviewee
The Economic 4: South
Times,Asia Research
11 July 2018, Analyst, Geopolitical
“India has signed 182Think Tank,
defence London,
deals over
12
lastMay 2019and current year”, accessed 16 May 2019
3 years
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-has-signed-182-
This indicator is not assigned a score in the GDI. 2. The Indian Express, 4 January 2019, “We don’t do defence dealings, we deal
defence-deals-over-last-3-years-and-current-year/articleshow/50041882.cms
in defence: Sitharaman on Rafale charges”, accessed 16 May 2019
The government cites clear and This indicator is not scored. The government usually cites a justifiable military need for purchases and from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nirmala-sitharaman-parliament-lok-sabha-
2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 25 March 2019, “Induction of
justifiable military need for Please discuss conditions in the particular supplier,
is notadhering
assignedtoaascore
formalin process
the GDI.after technical evaluation of
75B Justification
purchases and from particular country context related to good NS This indicator
needs and the supplier’s suitability [1][2][3]. There may be instances with smaller
debate-rafale-deal-congress-5523149/
Chinook Helicopters in Indian Air Force”, accessed 16 May 2019
supplier. practice (Score 4). defence purchases,
According to experts,where the government
this requires does not
a case-by-case publiclyFor
analysis. comment/justify.
example, with 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 10 April 2019, “Supreme
There
the is no evidence
controversy to suggest
over the that procurement
Rafale deal, which has ledistoundertaken for reasons in Court’s order dated 10 April 2019 on 36 Rafale Procurement Case”, accessed
a political controversy 3. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 11 May 2019, “First Apache
beyond
India a clear
over military need.
the purchase of 36 twin-engine fighter jets from France. The deal is 16 May 2019
Helicopter formally handed over to The IAF”, accessed 16 May 2019
estimated to cost India Rs 58,000 crore, however, the opposition parties in India http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1570349
claimed that the deal has cost India three times the amount it was supposed to,
and that an Indian partner favoured by the government was unfairly chosen as a 4. Business Today, 4 May 2019, “Rafale defence deal: Centre files affidavit in
partner in the deal. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had put out a statement that Supreme Court against review petitions”, accessed 16 May 2019
By domestic political
Dassault had the freedom to choose the Indian company and neither the Indian https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/rafale-defence-deal-
pressure, TI-DS means
government nor the French government influenced that decision [1]. Defence affidavit-supreme-court-review-petitions/story/343178.html
This indicator is not scored. pressure that derives from
Almost no acquisitions are granted Minister Nirmala Sitharaman alleged the opposition party never intended to
Prevalence: domestic Please discuss conditions in the the political elites of the
75C
pressures
as a result of domestic political
pressures.
country context related to good country (e.g. NS purchase the fighter jets [2]. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) filed a 5. Times of India, 25 August 2019, “CAG to table Rafale deal report in winter
report that questions the credibility of the government’s budgeting. As of May session”, accessed 26 August 2019
practice (Score 4). parliamentarians, opposition
2019, the government has filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court saying that the https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cag-to-table-rafale-deal-report-in-winter-
politicians, politicised senior
apex court order on 14 December 2018, giving clean chit to it could not be session/articleshow/70834248.cms
bureaucracy, etc.)
relooked on the basis of unsubstantiated media reports and incomplete file notes
[3][4]. CAG is scheduled to table a report in the upcoming winter session [5]. The 6. The Economic Times, 23 August 2019, “First Rafale jet to reach India in
jets are to be delivered in September 2019 [6]. September, confirms French President”, accessed 26 August 2019
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/first-rafale-jet-to-reach-
There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that defence acquisitions are india-in-september-confirms-french-president/articleshow/70799874.cms
granted as a result of domestic political pressures [7]. The Finance Ministry does
scrutinise demands for grants and this can have an impact on spending by the 7. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 25 March 2019, “Induction of
MoD [8]. Chinook Helicopters in Indian Air Force”, accessed 16 May 2019
8. Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 12 April 2019, “DAs to report to the ministry on

defence purchases across the world and about potential export opportunities”,
The Economic Times, accessed 16 May 2019.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/das-to-report-to-the-
ministry-on-defence-purchases-across-the-world-and-about-potential-export-
opportunities/articleshow/68855505.cms?from=mdr
Acronym Full name
ACC Appointments Committee of the Cabinet
AAP Annual Acquisition Plan
AFT Armed Forces Tribunal
ATN Action Taken Notes
ATT Arms Trade Treaty
AoN Acceptance of Necessity
BDL Bharat Dynamics Limited
BEL Bharat Electronics Limited
BEML BEML Limited
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General
CAPF Central Armed Police Forces
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
CDS Chief of Defence Staff
CEM Command Exit Model
CFA Competent Financial Authority
CGDA Controller General of Defence Accounts
CIC Chief Information Commission
CIDS Chief of Integrated Defence Staff
CII Confederation of Indian Industry
C-in-C Commander in Chief
CIPP Code of Integrity for Public Procurement
CIR Contract Implementation Reports
CISC Chief of Integrated Staff to the Chairman
CJS Chief of Joint Staff
CNC Contract Negotiation Committee
CNS Chief of Naval Staff
COBOL Common Business-Oriented Language
CoE Committee of Experts
COSC Chief of Staff Committee
CR Confidential Reports
CVC Central Vigilance Commission
CVO Chief Vigilance Officer
DAC Defence Acquisition Council
DACS Directorate of Accounts
DAD Defence Accounts Department
DAP Defence Acquisition Procedure
DAPA Defence Acquisition Programme Administration
DCC Defence Committee of the Cabinet
DCP Defence Capability Plan
DDP Department of Defence Production
DDR&D Department of Defence Research & Development
DE&S Defence Equipment and Support
DESC Defence Exports Steering Committee
DESW Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare
DG Director General
DGBR Director General Border Roads
DGFT Directorate of Foreign Trade
DGAQA Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance
DGDE Directorate General Defence Estates
DGFT Director General of Foreign Trade
DGMO Director General Military Operations
DGWE Director General Weapons and Equipment
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DIB Defence Industrial Base
DIPP Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
DoD Department of Defence
DOMW Defence Offset Management Wing
DPoT Department of Personnel & Training
DPB Defence Procurement Board
DPC Defence Planning Committee
DPM Defence Procurement Manual
DPP Defence Procurement Procedure
DPS Defence Planning Staff
DPSUs Defence Public Sector Undertakings
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation
DRSC Department Related Standing Committee
DSE Defence Services Estimates
DWP Defence Works Procedure
EIC Equipment Induction Cells
ERV Exchange Rate Variation
ETF Ecological Task Force
EU European Union
EPP Enhanced Performance Parameters
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FET Field Evaluation Trial
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry
FIR First Information Report
FRBM Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
FRBMA Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act
FTP Fast Track Procedure
GFR General Financial Rules
GoM Group of Ministers
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
GRSE Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd
GSL Goa Shipyard Limited
HAL Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd
HIPPO High Level Panel on Peace Operations
HSL Hindustan Shipyard Limited
HQs Head Quarters
HQIDS Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
IAF Indian Air Force
IAS Indian Administrative Service
IC Industrial Cooperation
ICA Industrial Cooperation Authority
ICG Indian Coast Guard
IDA International Development Association
IDS Integrated Defence Staff
IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
IGA Inter Government Agreement
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IM Independent Monitor
IMA Indian Military Academy
IOP Indian Offset Partner
IP Integrity Pact
IPC Indian Penal Code
IPBG Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee
IPS Indian Police Service
ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation
JCO Junior Commissioned Officer
JV Joint Venture
LD Liquidated Damages
LPP Last Purchase Price
LTIPP Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
MDL Mazagon Dock Ltd
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
MES Military Engineer Services
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs
MO Material Organisation
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoEF & CC Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
MoF Ministry of Finance
MNC Multinational Corporation
MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NCC National Cadet Corps
NCNC No Cost No Commitment
NDA National Defence Academy
NMS National Military Strategy
NOC No Objection Certificate
NSA National Security Advisor
NSC National Security Council
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OF Ordnance Factory
OFB Ordnance Factory Board
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PAO Pay and Accounts Offices
PBOR Personnel Below Officer Rank
PCDA Principal Controller of Defence Accounts
PCIP Pre-Contract Integrity Pact
PM Prime Minister
PPP Public Private Partnership
PSO Principal Staff Officer
QA Quality Assurance
QDR Quadrennial Defence Review
QR Qualitative Requirement
QSS Quantified System of Selection
R&D Research & Development
RDBMS Relational Data Base Management System
RE Revised Estimate
RFI Request for Information
RFP Request for Proposal
RTI Right To Information
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India
SCAP Services Capital Acquisition Plan
SCoD Standing Committee on Defence
SCOMET Special Chemicals, Organism, Materials, Equipment and Technologies
SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review
SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SFC Strategic Forces Command
SHQ Service Head Quarter
SO Supply Order
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SQR Services Qualitative Requirement
TCC Troop Contributing Country
TEC Technical Evaluation Committee
TOC Technical Oversight Committee
TCPR Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap
ToT Transfer of Technology
USIBC U.S.-India Business Council
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
USA United States of America
USIBC U.S.-India Business Council
VIP Very Important Person
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

India GDI-2020-Assessment FinalEXT 14nov21-1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

India GDI-2020-Assessment FinalEXT 14nov21-1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

India GDI-2020-Assessment FinalEXT 14nov21-1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

GDI 2020

Overall Country Score C 50

Q13 Budget Scrutiny B 75 NS = Indicator is not scored for any co

Q14 Budget Availability C 58 NA = Not applicable

100 Very robust institutional resilience to corruption Very low

NEI = Not enough information to score indicator

Overall Country Score C 50

A 83 - 100 Very robust institutional resilience to corruption Very low

NEI = Not enough information to score indicator

3. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,

2. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, 12 March 2019, “Indian defence forces

6. Anand Kumar Patel, 29 July 2019, “Budget Session: Modi

2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,

1. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,

1. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,

2. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE:

4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,

Q2. Does the

5. PRS “Demand for Grants 2018-19 Analysis: Defence”,

1. Lok Sabha, “STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE”,

2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “STANDING

4. News 18, 18 July 2019, “Parliamentary Defence Panel

1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 7 January 2019,

2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, 13 March 2018,

4. Ministry of Defence Government of India, December 2017,

1. CNN-News18, 26 February 2019, “Pakistan Confirms Indian

2. India Today, 4 January 2019, "Rafale debate: Rahul Gandhi

5. Republic World, 21 February 2019, “Congress Calls

1. Ministry of Defence Government of India, accessed January

2. Press Information Bureau Government of India, “Year End

2. Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, April 2017, "Joint

1. George Cheriyan, 2013, “Government-CSO Partnerships

1. PTI, 11 November 2016, “No more foreign funds for 1,736

2. AFP, 4 September 2015,“Greenpeace in India barred from

7. Mythili Sampathkumar, 28 March 2018, “Three journalists

1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Profile,

7. SIPRI, "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018",

In July 2018, the government passed the Prevention of Corruption

2. Sandip Unnithan, 1 February 2019, “Defence Budget 2019:

3. The Times of India, 27 January 2019, “100 per cent FDA in

4. Liz Mathew, 8 February 2019, “PM Modi tears into

6. NDTV, 18 February 2018, “We The People: Making The

7. Republic TV, 30 January 2019, “ParrikarExposesRahul Lie

8. Republic TV, 30 September 2017, “Lt Gen DS Hooda On

3. TImes Now, 29 March 2018, “Defence Minister Nirmala

4. Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman Speaks To Arnab

7. PBI, 14 December 2018“Livestream Press Conference by

8. India Today, 26 May 2019, “No question of FIR registration

9. Lok Sabha TV, “Live LSTV”, accessed 8 February 2019

10. Lok Sabha TV, “Special Programme During Live

3. CBI, 26 May 2015,“CBI ARRESTS TWO OFFICIALS OF

8. Manu Pubby, 4 September 2018, “Upset over offsets: India,

2. Central Vigilance Commission, “About Central Vigilance

8. Indian Defence News, 8 March 2019, “Govt approves mega

5. Ministry of Defence Government of India, Acquisition Wing,

1. Press Information Bureau Government of India, 26 October

2. Ministry of Defence Government of India, “Annual Report

4. CBI, 13 May 2016, “CBI REGISTERS A CASE AGAINST