Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities (EJOSSAH)

ISSN (online): 2520-582X ISSN (print): 1810-4487

Does Federalism Reduce Ethnic Conflict? Evidence

From the Ethiopian Experience

Zerihun Berhane and Samuel Tefera†

Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of federalism and conflicts in Ethiopia by posing the
question: to what extent does the current system of ethnic Federalism help to
reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts? Although federalism is taken by many as a
typical strategy for avoiding ethnic conflict and promoting democracy in multi-
ethnic societies, the Ethiopian experience largely suggest that the system is not
reducing ethnic tensions and conflicts. Ethnicity being the major organizing
principle of the federal system in the country, promotes conflicts stressing the
primordial notions of ethnicity and mobilization. It has encouraged differences and
competition over the control of power and resources at a local level. Thus,
conflicts are increasing, becoming more decentralized and protracted. These
suggest that in the Ethiopian context, there is a need to move away from using
ethnicity as a sole criterion and to organize the federation using geographical and
economic considerations. This would further help to reduce the current ethnic
strife by encouraging civic nationality and trust among people.

Keywords: Conflict, Ethnicity, Federalism, Ethiopia

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ejossah.v14i1.5


Corresponding Author: Assistant Professor, Center for African and Oriental Studies,
Addis Ababa University, Email: zerihunb2006@gmail.com, Tel:+251911963305, P.O
BOX: 1176/ Addis Ababa
†
Assistant Professor, Center for African and Oriental Studies, Addis Ababa University,
Email: samuelteferaalemu1983@gmail.com, Tel: +251947742183, P.O.BOX: 1176/ Addis
Ababa

This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs License.
 Zerihun Berhane and Samuel Tefera
Introduction
Federalism began to be considered as a useful tool of state/ nation building after the
end of the Second World War (Watts, 1994 and 2001) . Thus, several countries in
Africa and Asia espoused this system after gaining independence as a means of
catering for competing and conflicting aspirations for autonomy within their
territories. Examples of such countries include India, Nigeria and Malaysia
(Rothchild, 1966: 275–93).
Federalism has long been considered as a system that offers a feasible means of
integrating the interests of larger political entities, which are capable of promoting
economic development and maintaining security, versus smaller political units which
tend to be responsible to their own constituents and local interests (Watts, 1994).
The system achieves this by establishing a government where power is shared
between local and central units along with the lines of constitutionally established
duties and responsibilities for each body of the government. However, the same
system can also help to create and sustain conflicts that may threaten the existence of
the polity. Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson in their discussion of this paradoxical
tendency of federalism recognized that ―federalism has both secession inducing and
secession preventing‖ characteristics (Erk and Anderson, 2009:192).
Current debates on federalism, can be traced back to the 18th century, and are
largely shaped by two major developments that came after the end of the cold war
and led to contrasting views on the desirability and success of federalism (Burgess,
2006 and McGarry, 2005: 15). The first of these developments corresponds to the
fall and dissolution of the USSR and the then European federations of Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia which largely reinforced the doubts about the stability and the
durability of multi-ethnic federations (McGarry, 2005:15). Moreover, the
secessionist sentiment in Canada‘s Quebec state and the Belgian linguistically-based
federation added impetus to such skepticism. The second event has to do with the
reconstitution of multi-ethnic nations through federalism as a political strategy
adopted by a number of governments following the collapse of authoritarian
regimes. An example of such developments is the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia
along with other countries such as the Russian Federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
more recently Iraq (Roeder, 2009: 03–19 ).
The purpose of this article is to critically assess the nature of federalism in
Ethiopia particularly in terms of its implications for inter-ethnic relations in the
country. The main question posed in this article is therefore: To what extent does the
current system of Ethnic Federalism help to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts?
This question is imperative given the fact that concerns for peace and stability
override any development efforts or achievements in multi-ethnic nations like
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Ethiopia. As observed elsewhere, achieving a certain level of development is not
always a guarantee for not falling back into anarchy and endless conflicts (e.g.
Somalia, Ivory Coast). Ethiopia presents an interesting case to examine how
federalism works in multi-ethnic states. Ethiopia ranks 20th out of 60 countries
designated as failed states by the Foreign Policy magazine (See the Failed States
Index 2011 at Foreign Policy, 2011) and in a recent Fragile States Index of 2018
Ethiopia was ranked 15th out of 178 countries (The Fund For Peace [FFP], 2018).
What is alarming from these reports is that the country scored high on ‗factionalized
elites‘ and ‗group grievances‘ as indicators of failing states. These same indictors
can also hint the mounting ethnic tension in the country. Thus, examining how
federalism as a political system, manages conflicts is crucial since ethnic diversity
should be judiciously managed by a system of governance that ensures balanced
political representation, respect for human rights as well as democracy that are vital
for promoting development.
Previous studies on Ethiopian federalism are overwhelmingly focused on
specific case studies. Some of these studies discuss the nature of Ethiopian
federalism in relation to ethnic identity and its problems (Asnake, 2009 & 2010).
Other studies point out to the problem of managing territorially dispersed diversity
in ethnically-based boundaries of regional states (Van der Beken, 2010: 1–30) and
ethnic decentralization and inclusive governance in multi-ethnic cities such as Dire
Dawa (Asnake, 2014: 589–605). Still other studies examine the role of the
secessionist clause in the constitution and its implications for the stability of a
multi-ethnic state (Habtu, 2005: 313–35). All these studies do not provide a
holistic picture of the federal system and its effects on either reducing or
exacerbating conflicts in Ethiopia except for some studies that, albeit descriptively,
shed light on the relationship between ethnic federalism ethnic-based conflicts
(Aalen, 2002; Abbink, 2011: 596–618; Assefa, 2012: 435–73). Thus, this paper
aims to complement these few studies by using a combination of case studies and
analysis of longitudinal data obtained from conflict data sets particularly the
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to provide a rigorous
and fresh evidence on the topic.
The remainder of this article is organized into four sections. Section two
provides an overview of federalism in Ethiopia along with its origins and its main
features. Section three discusses the concept of ethnicity and looks into the theories
of ethnic conflict laying the ground for the subsequent discussion. The next section
examines the trends in ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and presents a review of the
empirical observations on the subject. The final section provides concluding remarks
based on the dominant themes that stand out from the discussions.
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The Federal System in Ethiopia
Background
Ethiopia is a country with a long history of statehood in Africa that could be traced
back to the ancient Aksumite kingdom that emerged as early as 400 BC. It is a nation
that was never colonized by a foreign power and kept its independence. However, in
its long history, Ethiopia‘s move towards a modern nation state could be associated
with the time of Emperor Theodores II from 1885 to 1868 through his land reforms,
organization of national army and other modernization efforts that gained
momentum and consolidated during the reign of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913)
and Emperor Haileselasse I (1930-1974) (Bahru, 1991 and Henze, 2000).
In 1974, a committee of disgruntled military officers (Derg) staged a coup and
took power by deposing the emperor. This set the stage for some sweeping changes
as the Derg adopted socialism as its political ideology, abolished feudalism and
nationalized land in 1975. The same year, the Tigray People‘s Liberation Front
(TPLF) started its armed struggle and joined the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front
in the northern provinces of the country. In May 1991, the Derg was ousted from
power and the TPLF led coalition of ethno-nationalist organizations under the name
Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) controlled the central
government (Markakis, 1974; Messay, 2011). The EPRDF was established in 1989
by TPLF, EPDM (Ethiopian Peoples‘ Democratic Movement) later it was re-
structured to Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), OPDO (Oromo
People‘s Democratic Organization), and SPDRF (Southern People‘s Democratic
Revolutionary Movement).
EPRDF‘s rise to power was followed by major changes in the country‘s
national politics. A transitional government was established led by EPRDF and its
affiliates that were organized on ethnic bases. These groups participated in the
ratification of the 1991 Transitional Charter that recognized Eritrea‘s secession, gave
self-determination rights to up to and including secession the various ethnic groups
and endorsed multiparty democracy with political and civil liberties. The 1995
constitution established a federation of nine states, created mainly on the basis of
ethno-linguistic criterion along with the contentious clause on the right of secession
(ICG, 2009 and Asnake, 2014). The constitution also established a bicameral
parliamentary system with the House of People‘s Representatives elected directly
every five years and the House of Federation with representatives from the countries
different nationalities (Tesfaye, 2002). The term nations and nationalities is
officially used by the state following Stalinist dictates on the question of
nationalities instead of using the term ethnic groups. Such a discourse seems to
ignore the historical intermingling and centuries-old interaction between the
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various ethnic groups in the country that have implications for supra-ethnic
nationality.

Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Origin and Features

Ethnic federalism was officially adopted by the government as a means of keeping
the unity of the nation as there were secessionist movements guided by ethnically
mobilized political organizations that intensified after the fall of the centralized
regime (Ibid). However, the reconfiguration of the state‘s politics along ethnic
lines seems to originate from the ideological motivation of the TPLF leaders that
were inspired by Stalin‘s concepts of nationalities and self-determination and used
them as tools to mobilize support for their struggle against the military regime
(Aalen, 2002). Thus, this led to the formalization of ethnicity as a basic principle
of state organization, and political representation.
This resulted in a unique system of federalism in the country where each state
that forms the federation has the right to secede from the union. This right is
enshrined in article 39 of the 1994 constitution and has been and remains to be a
bone of contention between the government and pan-Ethiopian opposition parties
(Ibid). Creating a federation along ethnic lines and the prominent position of
ethnicity in state politics has a number of implications for conflict generation and
management. Before discussing these points; however, a theoretical overview on
origin and the types of federalism comes in order.

Federalism: A Theoretical Overview

Federalism is essentially a system of government in which there is a share of
power between national and regional political units (Ariyo, 2003). This sharing of
power between the different tiers of government however is complex as it
introduces a range of issues that has to do with diversity, unity, interdependence as
well as cooperation and conflicts (Tamuno, 1998).
In terms of types of federal arrangements, Ariyo notes that ‗federalism is
about nature and form of association among interacting states‘ and suggests two
types of federalism based on the nature of how the system develops. These are the
dual federalism and the cooperative federalism. In the former case, there are
independent levels of government with distinct responsibilities as stated by law. In
the latter, there is a higher degree of partnership between the different tiers of
government with the focus on delivering effective services through cooperation. It
could be said that the dual form of federalism seems to take the arrangement as an
end by itself whereas the cooperative one implies the use of federalism as a means
to an end (Ariyo, 2003:1). Thus, the adaptability of federalism according to the
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context and specific nature of a political society is not well visible in such a
category.
The aims of setting-up a federal state are crucially related to the circumstance
of the individual countries. As such the prospect of creating a larger state and
benefit from better access to economic and military resources is one of the
advantages of federalism. Moreover, in a poly-ethnic state like Ethiopia,
federalism is argued to help promote democracy as it prevents tyranny of the
majority. It could also help to limit the power of the government by balancing it in
the institutional division of powers of branches of government and the territorial
division of power between the center and the states (Ephrem, 2010).
Another useful classification of federalism that reflects the concern for
context specific characters is the distinction made between the two main ways in
which federal systems come into being. These, according to Keller, are the
‗coming together‘ and ‗holding together‘ types of federalism (Keller, 2002). There
is also a third variant that Stepan termed as ‗putting together‘ federalism which
reflects the experience of Ethiopia (Stepan, 2001).

Coming Together Federalism

Coming-together federations emerge when two or more existing sovereign nations
consent to establish a federal system for governmental efficiency, economic
development, and security purposes. Such federations can advance economic
growth by removing barriers for trade and by promoting peace. The crucial feature
of ‗coming-together‘ federation is that the union is formed on voluntary basis
(Keller, 2002 and Ephrem, 2010).

Holding Together Federalism

This type of federation involves a division of a polity into different sub-units with
each having its own sovereignty with respect to some policies. It stands opposite to
the coming together federalism in which sovereign states come together to create a
common central government by surrendering a portion of their sovereignty. It is
often considered as a political approach employed to save a disintegrating unitary
state and to manage ethnic divisions (Keller, 2002).

‘Putting Together’ Federalism

This refers to a union that comes together through coercion or deceitful inclusion
of various units by organized elite. The former USSR is a typical example of such
nominal federation with a strong degree of centralization (Ephrem, 2010). Ethiopia
began to experiment with holding together federalism in 1991 with the various
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ethnic groups having the right of self-governance. However, as Keller argues the
country changed its course to putting together type of federalism as the political
sphere becomes ever more centralized by the TPLF-led federal government
(Keller, 2002).
Keller asserts that Ethiopia‘s ethnic federalism has not featured a democratic
federalism that devolves authority and decision making to lower levels of
government. He further argues that the system exhibits a growing tendency of
centralization in which politics and development is controlled by the centre
(Keller, 2002).
Ethiopia's decision to implement federalism was negotiated between the
regional elites. However, the relative strength of the regional elites was weaker as
compared to the TPLF or Tigran elites that led the armed struggle against the Derg
indicating that the whole process was flawed by power imbalance even at the
inception (Tesfaye, 2002). Some argue that the decision to adopt a federal
structure was made in response to the ethnic nationalism movements that
threatened the unity of the country (Frank, 2009). Without ruling out external
pressure to decentralize, this internal factor seems evident in the number of ethnic-
based secessionist political organizations that participated in the conference
summoned by TPLF/ EPRDF in July 1991 to form a Transitional Government. The
national conference named ‗Democratic and peaceful transitional Conference‘
involved representatives of 31 political movements (most of them ethnic-based
liberation fronts such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)). The conference
barred certain political groupings that follow a different ideology than EPRDF
such as Ethiopian people‘s Revolutionary Front (EPRP), all Ethiopian Socialist
Movement (MESON) and the Coalition of Democratic Ethiopian Forces
(CODEF). All these organizations have multi-ethnic political programs based on
civic nationality or they were pan-Ethiopian movements (Tesfaye, 2002).
The Ethiopian federal system is also described as asymmetric both in terms of
territorial organization and balance of power. The system created asymmetries
between states since the federation now composes populous and big states like
Oromia with that of Harar which is a city with the ethnic composition of the
Hararies accounting only 7% of the population (Asnake, 2009).
Self-government, decentralization and representation in the central (federal)
government are important elements of federalism and thus constitutionally all the
regional states in Ethiopia have their own judiciary, legislative power and are
represented in the federal government and conduct their affairs (Minasse, 1996).
Thus, on paper the country is a federation, however, according to Aalen, this
contradicts with the reality that the ruling party follows a very centralized control
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over all affairs in the country through its affiliates in the regions. Thus, a real
federation is a matter of controversy due to this tighter grip by the ruling political
elites (Aalen, 2002).

Ethnicity and Ethnic Cconflict

Theory of Ethnicity
There are two major schools of thought on ethnicity- primordialism and
constructivism. Primordialism focuses on self-determination and takes emotional
and primordial attachment to fixed social characteristics, such as blood ties, race,
language, region, and custom. Such an attachment necessarily looks for political
sovereignty as a basic means to protect and develop the valued characteristics.
According to primordialists, the ideal means to resolve ethnic conflicts is therefore
to allow for the right to self-determination up to secession (Cordell and Wolff,
2010). Such assertion seems to corroborate with the use of ethnicity in political
mobilization in the current federal system in Ethiopia.
The constructivists take ethnicity as an adaptive and flexible phenomenon and
assert that it is primarily an entity that people use opportunistically to promote
their interests. They also take ethnic identities as amenable to strategic decisions
including discarding one‘s ethnic identity when alternative affiliations promise a
better return (Ibid). Ethnic identities are therefore seen as fluid and individuals are
considered to be capable of manipulating their identities or of others when either
they feel a sharp need of cultural recognition or seek to pursue some political
agenda (Ibid).
Ethnic conflict may be defined as a conflict between two or more ethnic
groups over resources, identity, borders or against political oppression (Reatile,
2004). According to Michael an ‗ethnic community‘ is a named human population
with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements, which
has a link with historical territory or homeland, and a measure of solidarity
(Michael, 1997: 210). According to Brown, there are six criteria that must be met
for considering a group as an ethnic community. These criteria include having a
name for one's own community, believing in a common ancestry, mutual historical
experiences, a shared culture, territory, and collective self-awareness (Brown,
1997).
Generally, the term conflict refers to a situation in which two or more actors
pursue incompatible, yet justified goals (according to their points of view). Thus,
ethnic conflicts are one of such conflicts in which the goal of at least one actor in
the conflict is defined in ethnic terms with the main cause of confrontation being
ethnic distinctions and dissatisfactions (Wolff, 2006).
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According to Rothman, ‗ethnicity has never been absent from politics, and it
only achieved visible expressions in post-colonial Africa (Rothman, 1997: 43).‘ It
is common for disputants to totally miss each other when they speak about their
respective needs and aspirations. The consequences of such misunderstandings
always show us the erosion of mutual trust and the waning of tolerance. Identity-
conflicts are often hard to identify since they usually get confused with disputes
over tangible resources. More importantly, though theoretical distinctions between
identity and interest conflicts may be valid, their differences are not so precise and
clear-cut in practice. However, it is fair to say that while all identity conflicts
contain interest conflicts; not all interest conflicts contain identity conflicts.
Kaufman uses the security dilemma as explanatory variable in ethnic relations
and conflict. He considers ethnic groups not as unified entities but as arenas of
interacting elites and masses that produce the dynamics of security dilemma
leading to conflict. He also stresses on the role of elites vis-à-vis masses in shaping
ethnic identities by asserting that ethnicity needs to be viewed through the
constructionist lens (Kaufman, 1996). One of the pre-conditions for ethnic conflict
according to Kaufman, is the creation of opportunities for mobilization which can
be manifested in the political space such as political freedom, territorial base in a
neighbouring country as well as state failure (Kaufman, 2001 as cited in Cordell
and Wolff, 2010).
All these adequately reflect the history of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and the
use of ethnic identities in politics mainly by The Eritrean People Liberation Front
(EPLF) and the TPLF which have a long history of armed struggle in Ethiopia.
Thus, the country‘s advent into ethnically based federalism can be taken as an
example of the instrumental use of ethnicity for mobilizing people to gain political
power by elites (Minasse, 1996). The system of ethnic federalism according to
Messay seems to be a result of a deliberate policy imposed by the ruling elites to
promote ethnicization in the country at the expense of national integration. Such
moves contrast with how federalism is used to reduce ethnic tensions and maintain
unity in countries such as India and Nigeria (Minasse, 1996; Messay 2009).

Research Approach
This paper followed two methodological approaches to the analysis of ethnic
conflict and its relationship with ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. First, it used
document review of several cases of ethnic conflicts by organizing these cases into
similar and dominant themes. The themes provide an overview of federalism in
Ethiopia along with its origins and its main features, and discuss the concept of
ethnicity and looks into the theories of ethnic conflict laying the ground for further
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discussion. In addition, the paper uses the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED) to analyse the trend in ethnic conflict so as to provide more
rigorous empirical evidence on the subject by implementing linear regression
model, which is presented in Appendix A. The two approaches were used
concurrently to strengthen the validity of the findings and conclusions. However,
the paper does not attribute that ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are solely due to
ethnic-based federal arrangement. It rather discusses the trends in ethnic conflicts
by focusing only on those that can be associated with ethnic boundary disputes
attributable to elite mobilization and political agitation of communities.

Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: Types and Trends

The debate on the effects of the ethnic federal structure on conflict in Ethiopia has
been normative and divergent. The supporters of the current federal system argue
that the system has ushered the country into a new era of democracy by addressing
the legacy of ethnic inequality. They assert that this arrangement could reduce
conflict and tensions by promoting accommodation, self-rule, harmony and co-
existence among ethnic groups in multi-ethnic countries and help to reduce
secessionist movements and national disintegration in countries like India and
Switzerland (Andreas, 2004 and Kymlicka, 2006).
Critics, however, argue that the use of ethnicity as the main organizing device
of the federation have compartmentalized the political space by encouraging a
primordial notion of identity which in turn promotes secessionism and puts the
nation in a quagmire of endless conflicts. Such critics cite the cases of dissolved
ethno-federal arrangements such as that of the USSR, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia.
In this regard, empirical studies show that ever since the introduction of the
ethnic-based federal structure in Ethiopia, there have been an upsurge of ethnic
conflicts and the sharpening of boundaries among the different ethnic groups
(Aalen, 2002) and ethnicity has become an instrument of political mobilization and
perpetuating violence, dissension and a growing sense of separatism in Ethiopia
(Muhabie, 2015).
Essentially, the issue that ethnicity being given primacy over other notions of
state organization, political representation as well as resource entitlement led to the
constitution of institutions that legalize and drew boundaries among the different
ethnic groups. Thus, defining the identities of many communities became a
practical challenge and often led to the eruption of conflicts in many regional states
(Ibid).

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Case 1: Conflict between Oromo and Ethiopian Somali communities
Members of the elders’ council in Ethiopia Somali regional state remembered the
long years of inter-tribal conflict that prevailed in the region which obstructed
development interventions. With recognition and strong support obtained from the
regional government, the elders’ council has contributed much to the stability of
the region. The elders’ council has resolved such conflicts and studied the nature
of cross border and inter-ethnic conflicts in the region. During the 8th session of a
regional level consultative conference held in May 2017 in Jigjiga city, the issue of
inter-ethnic conflict particularly conflict between people of the Ethiopian Somali
and Oromia regional states were one of the major discussion agenda along with
drought. Participants informed the regional government how conflict took away
lives of people and resulted in IDPs in the region. According to them, competition
for land resources particularly scarce water and grazing has always been
prominently inherent sources of disputes between the two communities. Both
pastoralists and farmers needed more land to graze their livestock and produce
crops. However, these conflicts now have a political motive along the border areas
of both communities. According to key informants of this study, both communities
until recently have been in a state of war particularly in South and North west side
of the Ethiopian Somali regional state along the border extending from Moyale to
Muli Woreda near Meiso. The ever increasing ethnic conflicts and tensions
between the two groups resulted in increased population of IDPs. IOM report
supports the elders’ narrative on growing population of IDPs. According to the
report, Liben, Erer and Fafan zone alone hosted over 17,000 and about 13,000
IDPs of conflict settled in Siti zone since 2014 ( IOM, 2017). Referring to the
Ethiopian government and its humanitarian partners, IDMC also indicated around
67,800 people to have displaced due to communal conflict associated to drought in
Oromia and Ethiopian Somali regional State between 2015 and 2016 (IDMC,
2016). The conflict between the two has recurred again in the border areas
particularly around Moyale and its environs costing lives of civilians, people in
military uniform and is still ongoing prompting the national defense force to
intervene with the order of the ex-Prime Minister. The conflict re-occurred with a
political motive on the 4th of August 2018 resulting in the death of people and huge
destruction of businesses and houses in Jigjiga, Gode, Kebridahar and Degahabur
towns. A youth group known as Heego was blamed to have coordinated the attacks
on non-Somali ethnic groups and political figures of the then Ethiopian Somali
People Democratic Party (now Somali People Democratic Party including the
former president of the region, Abdi Mohammed Oumer) who are under custody of
police.
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Ethnic conflicts (Case 1) are further aggravated by drought related and natural
factors shrining the negotiation space that otherwise prevailed in the past in the use
of the commons. That is part of the reason that many scholars tend to be sceptical
about the use of ethnicity as an organizing principle in Ethiopian federalism along
with the right to secession provided in the constitution. For instance, Lyons argues
that the ethnicization of politics prompts ethnic conflict and encourages political
activism on ethnic issues and fragment national politics (Lyons, 1996). Thus, the
system has increased localized conflicts which seem to work to the advantage of
the ruling regime that wants to keep the centre free of strong political opposition.
Following the coming of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to the chairpersonship of
EPRDF, however, the nationalist and reconciliation agenda has dominated the
political discussion as reflected in many of his speeches. This is also evident in his
successful effort in restoring normal diplomatic relationships that put to rest the
twenty years old no war no peace status quo between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Case 2: Conflict between Afar and Issa clan of the Somali communities
External factors exacerbate ethnic conflicts and animosity (Soeters, 2005 and
Suhrke et al., 1977). Similar interventions in the past are to blame for continued
conflict between the Afar and the Issa clan of the Somali community. Such a
conflict is further aggravated by competition for scarce resources, territorial
expansion and cultural ethos (Getachew, 1997 and Thesiger, 1935). For most of
the period since 1997, there was tense conflict up until 2015 when a peace deal
was brokered by the federal government of Ethiopia that gave back the three
Woredas (Gedamayitu, Undufo and Adayitu) to Afar regional state. Informants of
the research disclosed that despite the political victory of re-claiming their land on
the Afar side, absolute stability is far from being reached. Conflicts between the
two communities seem to continue as the Issa demand for self-rule and special
Woreda status intensifies.

Ethnicity being the major organizing principle of the federal system has
implications for increasing localized conflicts which are indicated to have become
consistent characteristics in ethnic relations in Ethiopia. In this regard, Asnake
outlines the following four major trends of conflict in the country (Asnake, 2009:
99-104).

Federal Restructuring and Identity Conflicts

The central position of ethnicity in the Ethiopian federal system means that groups
wanted to have a recognition as a ‗nation, nationality or people‘ and representation
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in politics. This was fairly easy for the relatively larger ethnic groups. However,
defining the ethnic identity of many minority ethnic groups has emerged as one of
the areas of local/regional conflicts. Moreover, institutionalization of ethnicity
based on primordial features of identity added fuel to the conflict as groups
considered part of another ethnic group have now resorted into a struggle for
recognition of separate ethnic identities as this could lead to representation at
regional and federal tiers of government. An example of such identity conflict is
the one between the Gurage and the Silte groups in the south region that eventually
resolved through referendum.
Thus, it could be argued that such trends of Ethnic federalism based on
primordial thinking of identity could contribute to the undermining of communal
bonds and increases tensions between clans of the same ethnic or linguistic groups.
This can further erode the age-old networks and trust among people that form their
social capital which is imperative for economic growth.

Intra-federal Boundary Conflicts

The restructuring of the state into federal system required the drawing of
boundaries which is at least in theory congruent with ethnicity. However, this
process was not smooth as there is no clear overlap between ethnicity and
territories due to a great degree of mobility of ethnic groups in all directions. As a
result, this generated a number of conflicts among ethnic groups that live in the
same or neighbouring regions. Examples here include the conflict between the
Gedeo and the Guji in southern Ethiopia that used to live in the former Sidamo
province before 1992. In line with the principles of ethnic regionalization, the Guji
who belong to the Oromo ethnic group became part of the Oromia region, while
the Gedeo became part of the South region. In a very recent scenario in 2018 over
800,000 people were displaced due to the conflict resulting in the largest conflict
of IDPs in the country.

Intra-regional Conflicts in Multiethnic Regions

Ethnic based federalism created asymmetrical federal structure in which larger
ethnic groups (such as the Oromo and Amhara) were given their own ethnic
regions and the smaller (all groups in South, Gambella and Bengeshangul regions)
were put together to establish multi-ethnic regions. In all these regions, interethnic
conflicts become rampant triggered by disputes over the sharing of political power
and resources. An example here is the ongoing conflict between the Anywak and
the Nuer in Gambella region.

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Case 3: Conflict between Afar and Amhara communities
The establishment of regions along ethnic lines has, however, aggravated the
territorial nature of the conflict resulting in the disruption of negotiated access to
resources in each other’s jurisdiction. Recently, the seemingly sporadic non-
resource based conflict between the two ethnic groups is gradually getting tense.
According to key informants, demographic changes particularly settlement
expansion and the controversy over regional boundaries are the causes of such
conflict. In May 2017, over 8 people lost their lives of which security officials are
amongst them. Following the Ramadan holiday, the conflict broke out again
claiming lives of others from both sides and came to a halt by the intervention of
the federal police forces. This is an indication of how serious the conflicts have
become. Most of the conflicts between the two ethnic groups have changed their
discourse from being predominantly seasonal resource type into being territorial
political disputes recently. The majority of such conflict encounters occur in the
resource scarce and under developed border areas of the two regions further
complicating the relative development and security gains of the areas.

Conflicts between Titular and Non-titular Groups

The lack of overlap between personal and territorial ethnicity due to the settlement
of individuals and communities beyond their ethnic and administrative boundaries,
has made it impossible to maintain an ethnically homogenous states. As a result, a
significant portion of Ethiopians live out of their supposed ethnic homelands and
this has affected the relationships between titular and non-titular communities.
This problem has been worsened by the fundamentally primordialist notion of
ethnicity that conquers in the political discourse of the country. Asnake stated the
gaps federalism and territorial autonomy have while addressing multiethnic
governance and the representation of non-titular groups in local and regional
government with the exception of the informal arrangement in Dire Dawa city
(Asnake, 2014).
The federal structure changed the relationships between the titular and non-
titular groups. While the titular groups actively pursued their new autonomy to
affirm their economic and political power, the non-titular groups felt a growing
sense of insecurity and discrimination as they were excluded from politics and
become minorities. Thus, many conflicts erupted in the relationships between the
two groups in many parts of the country such as Harari.
Thus, it seems that the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has not reduced conflict
as its proponents argue. In fact, it has contributed to increasing tendencies of
conflicts that are more local and ethnic in their nature. This fact is noted by the
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International Crisis Group‘s report in 2009. ―The EPRDF‘s ethnic federalism has
not dampened conflict, but rather increased competition among groups that vie
over land and natural resources, as well as administrative boundaries and
government budgets (ICG, 2009: 3).‖
From the onset the federal system has created regional states that are not
ethnically homogenous except for the Afar and the Somali regions; there are
significant proportions of other ethnic groups that live in all regions as minorities.
The system was also imposed from the top without much debate and gave more
space for politically ambitious elites to create their own ethnic political
organizations that instigated conflicts and dislocation for such ethnic groups
designated as minorities live outside of their ethnic homelands. This could be
attested by the frequency of overall conflicts disaggregated by type of actors in
Ethiopia from 1997 to 2016 that indicates a sharp increase in major ethnic conflicts
(See Figure 1). The figure shows an increasing trend in the frequency of major
ethnic conflicts that occurred in Ethiopia between 1997 and 2016 (R2=0.30,p=0.01)
this up-ward trend in ethnic conflicts also corroborates with previous findings from
Abbink‘s study of ethnicity and conflict generation in the context of ‗ethno-
regional federalism‘ from 1991 to 2005 (Abbink, 2006). The first period roughly
corresponds to the institution of federal constitution in 1994 and the second with
climatic shocks and political instability at the centre following internal party
conflicts and the war with Eritrea. These conditions are likely to have increased
ethnic conflicts that are prompted by boarder and resource sharing.

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Figure 1: The frequency of major conflicts in Ethiopia by types of actors 1997–

20161 (Source): Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Version 5.

1
Notes

The ACLED project codes reported information on the exact location, date, and other
characteristics of politically violent events in unstable and warring states. ACLED focuses
on tracking a range of violent and non-violent actions by political agents, including
governments, rebels, militias, communal groups, political parties, rioters, protesters and
civilians. Data contain specific information on the date, location, group names, interaction
type, event type, reported fatalities and contextual notes. ACLED Version 5 data cover all
countries on the African continent from 1997-2014. Weekly, real-time data is available for
African states at acleddata.com; monthly data for South and South East Asian states is
available monthly as of 2015. Earlier versions of the ACLED dataset cover political
violence in African states in earlier years (Versions 4 through 2). In Ethiopia‘s case, rebel
forces are mainly organized and mobilized on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, for analytical
purpose, this paper merged the interaction code for rebel force with ethnic militia and treats
the two as indicators of ethnic conflict.
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According to Aalen, the South region can serve as a show case for the
dramatic increase in a number of conflicts labelled as ethnic since it hosts 56 ethnic
groups and several sub-ethnic and clan divisions (Aalen, 2002). Thus, with the
introduction of ethnic federalism, the various ethnic groups started to compete for
administrative boundaries led by entrepreneurial elites that wanted to redefine
ethnic identities in order to gain control of political power. This phenomenon
increased the number of conflicts in the region. The prominent ones include the
conflicts between the Gurage and the Silte, the Sidama and Wolayeta, and the Guji
and the Gedio. In 2018, the killings by xenophobic groups that demanded the
ethnic Wolayeta to leave Hawassa city and the conflict between Guji and Gedio
both in South Nations, Nationalities and People‘s Region are examples worth
mentioning.
Similarly, there have also been administrative units that triggered seemingly
endless demands for political boundaries which resulted in more ethnic strife in
most regional states like Beneshangul and Gambella (Asnake, 2009). Thus,
previous conflicts that were along the lines of resources and livelihoods have now
begun to be defined in terms of ethnic lines. This makes conflict mitigation
inherently difficult as it creates the mobilization of large groups (Aalen, 2002). As
noted by Roeder, ethno federal and autonomy arrangements are likely to ‗establish
incentives for politicians to engage in confrontations over decisions, rights and link
their confrontations to competing nation-state projects that can escalate to
sovereignty claims‘ (Roeder, 2009: 211).
There are also clear cases of intra-ethnic conflicts which would bring a revival
of clan identities as an important way of taking up local political positions. This
revival of clanship according to Aalen has resulted in active ethnic group markers
such as heightened inequalities between clans; discrimination against certain
groups and women as well as the practice of harmful traditions like abduction and
female circumcisions (Aalen, 2002).
There has been a revival of conflicts that are often instigated by political elites
that use identity politics as a means to capture political positions. This in some
cases led to the institutionalization of new language. A case in point is the conflict
among Wolaitta, Gamo, and Dawro over ‗WoGaGoDa‘ between 1999 and 2000 as
discussed by Abbink. Moreover, conflicts over identities and territories increased
as ethnic groups continuously vied to gain separate administrative status in the
form of special districts within regional states. As a result, in the two decades
between 1997 and 2016 close to 33 major ethnic-based conflicts erupted in the
country owing mainly to boundary disputes and demarcations fuelled by political
elites that compete for regional autonomy and power (see ACLED Fig 1).
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Moreover, as Roeder suggests, the existence of ethnic homelands can create
opportunities for ‗ethnic entrepreneurs‘ to press for their claims successfully
against a common-state government helping to protract ethnic conflicts. This has
been clearly demonstrated by the surge in the number of ethnic conflicts in
Ethiopia in recent years, which is likely to have an increasing trend (see Figure A
and B Appendix B).

Conclusion
Federalism has been and is still used as a remedy for the problem of managing
ethnically diverse countries. However, whether federalism delivers its promises of
recognition and respect for the range of political, cultural and ethnic rights and
therefore reduction in ethnic tensions and conflicts largely varies depending on the
context and the political culture. Thus, it seems that factors like the nature of the
federation, its evolvement and the role of political elites and the basic principles
used to organize the system matters a lot.
The available evidences seem to suggest that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is
not helping reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts. In fact, conflict is escalating due
to the ethnic heterogeneity of the regional states and the resource plus boundary
sharing between different groups. Conflicts are increasing and becoming
decentralized which seems to defy the argument that ethnic federalism can be a
typical strategy for avoiding conflict in multi-ethnic societies. In fact, the
Ethiopian case seems to highlight the roles of political elites and their capacity to
manipulate ethnic identities at the expense of societal stability. Thus, there is a
need to promote ties between the various ethnic groups based on civic notions of
nationality and using commonly shared values in view of the past achievements
and future economic development. In this regard, the sole criterion of using
ethnicity to organize the federation should be overhauled to accommodate for
geographical and economic considerations as well as creating unity in diversity,
recognizing the intermix of people and the cross-ethnic institutions that existed for
millennia.

Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Prof. Mitja Zagar from the University of Ljubljana
for his valuable comments to an earlier draft of this paper.

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Appendix A: Linear Regression Model
Trend refers to the rate at which a certain event such as conflict changes over a
time period and it is often determined by the relationship between this variable and
time (Zerihun and Prowse, 2013). The magnitude of trend in a time series can be
determined by parametric tests (using regression analysis) or non-parametric tests
(e.g. Mann-Kendall trend test). In this study we first implemented linear regression
model to test the existence of trend on conflict data.
The linear regression analysis is used with time as the independent variable
and the number or frequency of ethnic-based conflicts as the dependent variable.
This method is extensively used in other fields of investigation such as climate
change studies (See Cheung, Senay and Singh, 2008; Karmeshu, 2012 ; Jain and
Kumar, 2012). The linear regression model is given by:

y    βX  ε (1)

where, y is number of ethnic-based conflicts (the dependent variable);

α is the intercept;

β is the coefficient of the explanatory variable (the slope)

X is the independent variable (time) and;

ɛ is the stochastic term (the residual)

The linear trend value is represented by the slope of the simple least-square
regression line. The linear regression model makes strong assumptions about the
distribution of the dependent variable (y) over time. These assumptions mainly
apply to the residuals being normally distributed, independent (with no serial
correlation), and identically distributed (with constant variance) (Frei, 2014).
In most cases, time-series data are assumed to consist of a long-term trend
component and a white noise residual component (i.e. with no serial correlation)
(Madsen et al., 2014; Frei, 2014). In practice, due to the multi-year existence of
natural climate variability (Zhang et al., 2000), errors from adjacent time periods
may be correlated across time. In this context, assuming white noise residuals may
result in overestimating the significance of the trend (Wooldridge, 2008).
Therefore, after checking the model for the critical assumptions, the t-test
(parametric test) is used to assess whether the slope‘s coefficient of the fitted linear
regression is significantly different from zero, indicating the presence of a linear
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trend. The null hypothesis for the test is that β = 0 (data not linearly dependent on
time) and the alternative hypothesis is β ≠ 0.
The test statistic (linear regression T-Test) is given by:

t
 Y  Ŷ 
2
i i

n  2  X  X 
2
i
(2)

where,

t is distributed like students‘ t with n-2 degrees of freedom and n is the sample size
(Frei, 2014).

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Appendix B: Trend Analysis of Conflict Data

Figure A: The frequency of major conflicts in Ethiopia by types of actors 1991–

2016
Source: Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED) Version 5 and Abbink (2006).

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Figure B: The Moving Average Trend in frequency of Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia

1991–2016
Source: Authors‘ computations from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED) Version 5 and Abbink (2006).

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