G.R. No.

208224, November 22, 2017

DR. JOSEPH L. MALIXI, DR. EMELITA Q. FIRMACION, MARIETTA MENDOZA,

AURORA AGUSTIN, NORA AGUILAR, MA. THERESA M. BEFETEL, AND MYRNA
NISAY, Petitioners, v. DR. GLORY V. BALTAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
praying that the January 22, 20132 and July 16, 20133 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. SP No. 127252 and the October 17, 2011 Decision4 and July 17, 2012 Resolution5 of the
Civil Service Commission be reversed and set aside.6 The Civil Service Commission dismissed
the administrative complaint of herein petitioners Dr. Jose L. Malixi (Dr. Malixi), Dr. Emelita Q.
Firmacion (Dr. Firmacion), Marietta Mendoza (Mendoza), Aurora Agustin (Agustin), Nora
Aguilar (Aguilar), Ma. Theresa M. Befetel (Befetel), and Myrna Nisay (Nisay) against herein
respondent Dr. Glory V. Baltazar (Baltazar) for violating the rule on forum shopping.7 The Court
of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners on procedural grounds.8

In their Complaint9 dated December 15, 2010, petitioners prayed before the Civil Service
Commission that respondent Dr. Baltazar be held administratively liable for gross misconduct
and that she be dismissed from service.10

Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following positions: Dr.
Malixi was the Vice President of the Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Bataan General Hospital, Dr.
Firmacion was a Medical Specialist II, Mendoza and Agustin were both Nurse III, Aguilar and
Befetel were both Nurse II, and Nisay was a Nursing Attendant II. Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was
the Officer-in-Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital.11

Petitioners alleged that sometime in May 2008, the Department of Health and the Province of
Bataan entered into a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the construction of Bataan General
Hospital's three (3)-storey building. While this Memorandum was in effect, the Department of
Health, through then Secretary Francisco T. Duque (Duque), issued Department Personnel Order
No. 2008-1452, appointing Dr. Baltazar as the hospital's Officer-in-Charge.12

According to petitioners, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into a
Supplemental Memorandum.13 One (1) of the provisions stated that the parties agreed to give the
supervision of the hospital to the Secretary of Health or "his duly authorized representative with
a minimum rank of Assistant Secretary[.]"14 A third Memorandum of Agreement was executed
by the parties on June 16, 2009, but the Department of Health refused to renew the agreement
"due to a complaint already filed before the Honorable Congresswoman Herminia Roman, and
before the Department of Health."15

In their Complaint, petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and
qualifications.16 They alleged that her appointment was "without any basis, experience[,] or
expertise[.]"17 They claimed that she was appointed only by virtue of an endorsement of the
Bataan Governor and without the prescribed Career Service Executive Board qualifications.18
Thus, her appointment violated Sections 8(1)(c), 8(2), 21(1), and 22 of Book V of the
Administrative Code which provide:

SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career
service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as
follows:
....

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

(2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be through
competitive examinations, which shall be open to those inside and outside the service who meet
the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level does not require previous
qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by the Career
Executive Service Board.

....

SECTION 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. — (1) Opportunity for government
employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract
the best qualified to enter the service. Employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to
perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions.

....

SECTION 22. Qualification Standards. — (1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum
requirements for a class of positions in terms of education, training and experience, civil service
eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for successful performance. The degree
of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be determined by the appointing authority on the
basis of the qualification standard for the particular position.

Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in
the career service, as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in the
adjudication of protested appointments, in determining training needs, and as aid in the
inspection and audit of the agencies' personnel work programs.

It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and

employees towards professional growth and foster the career system in the government service.

(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be the
responsibility of the department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil Service
Commission and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification Office.19 (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
Petitioners pointed out that Dr. Baltazar's appointment was by virtue of a secondment pursuant to
the Memorandum of Agreement. Her third year as Officer-in-Charge via secondment already
violated the law for failing to comply with the required qualification standards. 20 Granting that
there was compliance, secondment that exceeds one (1) year is subject to the Civil Service
Commission's approval under Section 9(a),21 Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 and Department of Health Administrative Order No. 46, series of
2001. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999 likewise provides
that the contract of secondment should be submitted to the Commission within 30 days from its
execution. A year after Dr. Baltazar's secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority
for her to continue to hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the hospital. Hence, her assumption
without the required authority was deemed illegal. 22

Petitioners averred that the non-renewal of the Memorandum of Agreement by the

Department of Health rendered her appointment ineffective. Her holding of the position after
this non-renewal was already illegal. 23

In addition to Dr. Baltazar's alleged invalid appointment and lack of qualifications, petitioners
contended that she committed several abusive and malevolent acts detrimental to Bataan General
Hospital's officers and employees.24 She authorized the collection of fees for the insertion and
removal of intravenous fluids and fees for the Nurse Station without any legal basis. 25 She also
caused the removal from payroll of an employee, who, up to the filing of the Complaint, had yet
to receive remuneration, hazard pay, subsistence, and other allowances. 26

Petitioners likewise alleged that Dr. Baltazar manipulated the creation of the Selection and
Promotion Board to give her control over the personnel's employment and promotion. She also
disregarded the next-in-line rule when it comes to appointment and promotion of employees. 27

Furthermore, Dr. Baltazar allegedly employed two (2) doctors as contractual employees who
were paid P20,000.00 but worked only half the time rendered by an employee-doctor of Bataan
General Hospital. Lastly, petitioners claimed that Dr. Baltazar allowed her doctor siblings to
accommodate private patients while expressly prohibiting other doctors to do the same. 28

On October 17, 2011, the Civil Service Commission rendered a Decision 29 dismissing the
Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. The Civil Service Commission found that all
elements of forum shopping were present in the case and that petitioners' letter dated September
7, 2010 filed with the Department of Health contained the same allegations against Dr. Baltazar
and sought for the same relief Finally, the judgment by the Department of Health would result to
res judicata in the case before the Civil Service Commission. It also noted that another case was
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman in relation to the alleged removal of an employee
in the hospital's payroll.30

Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission resolved the issue of Dr. Baltazar's appointment
"[f]or clarificatory purposes[.]"31 It held that Dr. Baltazar was not appointed as Officer-in-Charge
of Bataan General Hospital but was merely seconded to the position. Section 6 of the Civil
Service Commission Circular No. 40, series of 1998, only requires that seconded employees
occupy a "professional, technical and scientific position[.]" 32

The Civil Service Commission added that the approval requirement for secondments that exceed
one (1) year was already amended by Civil Service Commission Circular No. 06-1165. 33 The
new circular merely required that the Memorandum of Agreement or the secondment contract be
submitted to the Commission "for records purposes[.]"34 Failure to submit within 30 days from
the execution of the agreement or contract will only make the secondment in effect 30 days
before the submission date.35

On the alleged violation of the next-in-line rule, the Civil Service Commission held that
"[e]mployees holding positions next-in-rank to the vacated position do not enjoy any vested right
thereto for purposes of promotion." 36 Seniority will only be considered if the candidates possess
the same qualifications.37

The dispositive portion of the Civil Service Commission Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the complaint of Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion, Marietta
Mendoza, Aurora Agustin, Nora Aguilar, Ma. Theresa M. Befetel and Myrna Nisay against Dr.
Glory V. Baltazar for Dishonesty; Misconduct; Oppression; Violation of Existing Civil Service
Law and Rules or Reasonable Office Regulations; and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and Being Notoriously Undesirable is hereby DISMISSED for violation of the rule
against forum-shopping.38 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners moved for reconsideration and argued that the letter before the Department of Health
was simply a request to meet the Secretary, and not a Complaint. Furthermore, the letter before
the Department of Health and the Complaint before the Civil Service Commission did not
contain the same parties or seek the same relief.39

On July 17, 2012, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a Resolution40 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration. It held that it was the Department of Health that considered petitioners'
letter as their complaint, and not the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, the Department of
Health already exercised jurisdiction over the case when it required Dr. Baltazar to comment on
the letter-complaint.41

Petitioners elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.

On January 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued a Minute Resolution,42 dismissing the appeal:

The petition is DISMISSED in view of the following:

1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for
Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not indicated;
2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere
photocopies;
 3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of
compliance is not indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.43

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 16,
2013 Minute Resolution.44

On September 4, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Review 45 against Dr. Baltazar before this
Court. They pray for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and of
the Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. 46

Petitioners maintain that they indicated the important dates in their appeal before the Court of
Appeals and that they attached certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. 47
However, they admit that they failed to indicate the date of their counsel's Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) compliance and to provide proof of "competent evidence of
identities."48

Petitioners also deny that they committed forum shopping. The alleged Complaint sent to the
Department of Health was a mere letter stating the employees' grievances and objections to the
illegalities and violations committed by respondent. It was a mere request for the Department of
Health Secretary to tackle the issues and investigate the concerns in the hospital's management.
This letter was not intended to serve as a formal Complaint. They request that this Court set aside
the issue on forum shopping and that the case be resolved on its merits. 49

On January 14, 2014, respondent filed her Comment 50 and prayed for the dismissal of the
petition. She argues that the procedural infirmities of petitioners' appeal are fatal to their case. 51

On February 27, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply.52 They reiterated their request for the
relaxation of procedural rules and the resolution of the case based on its merits. They also
disclosed that Civil Service Commission Chairman Duque, who signed the October 17, 2011
Decision, was formerly the Department of Health Secretary who seconded respondent as Bataan
General Hospital's Officer-in-Charge. Lastly, petitioners added that their letter to the Department
of Health was not a Complaint since it was not assigned a case number.53

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition based on procedural grounds.

Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural rules
in the adjudication of disputes has been reiterated in numerous cases.54 In Santos v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:55

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to provide for a system under
which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. The other alternative is
the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a gun.56

Moreover, in Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc,. et al. v. Sanchez, et al.:57

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of,
our judicial system.58

In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed out four (4) procedural infirmities:

1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for
Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not indicated;
2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere
photocopies;
3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of
compliance is not indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.59

Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing their
case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and every
issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the objective of a
more efficient judicial system.

On the first procedural rule that petitioners allegedly failed to comply with, this Court explained
the rationale of the requisite material dates in Lapid v. Judge Laurea:60

There are three material dates that must he stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule
65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second,
the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when
notice of the denial thereof was received . . . As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule,
failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.

The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As
stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the
timeliness of the petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore,
that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to
determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself
was filed on time since the material dates were not stated . . .

Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, . . . "As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal
as required by law renders the judgment final and executory."61 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

On the second procedural rule, this Court discussed the necessity of certified true copies in
Pinakamasarap Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:62

There is a sound reason behind this policy and it is to ensure that the copy of the judgment or
order sought to be reviewed is a faithful reproduction of the original so that the reviewing court
would have a definitive basis in its determination of whether the court, body or tribunal which
rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave abuse of discretion.63 (Citation omitted)

On the third procedural rule, this Court clarified the importance of complying with the required
MCLE information in Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari:64

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhanc[ing] the standards of the
practice of law."65

Lastly, proofs of competent evidence of identities are required to ensure "that the allegations are
true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith."66

II

Time and again, this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial
justice.67

In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,68 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Petition for Review for
failure to state the date he received the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the date
he filed his Motion for Reconsideration.69 This Court held:

[F]ailure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his
receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of the RTC Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition. In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime
Services Corporation v. Acuña, we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement
of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records."
The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of
the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The other material dates may be
gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.

....

Accordingly, the parties are now given the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and
defenses brushing aside technicalities in order to truly ascertain the merits of this case. Indeed,
judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of
technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case. In Aguam
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:

The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power
conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede
the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice.  "A litigation is not
a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their
merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to
be  applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of
justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice.70 (Citations omitted)

In Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, et al.,71 petitioner likewise failed to state in
his Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the date he received the assailed Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission and the date he filed his Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.72 This Court held that "this omission is not at all fatal because these material
dates are reflected in petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration[.]"73 This Court, citing
Acaylar, further held:

In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be
excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court
that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of
receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner
has duly complied with this rule.

....

The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure
and not to override substantial justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution
of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. The CA thus should not have
outrightly dismissed petitioner's petition based on these procedural lapses.74 (Citations omitted)

In Paras v. Judge Baldado,75 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari
on purely procedural grounds. It found that petitioners failed to attach the required certified true
copy of the assailed Regional Trial Court Order in their petition.76 This Court set aside the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals and held:

[T]he records reveal that duplicate original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to
one of the seven copies of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals; moreover, copies of the
same orders, this time accomplished by the clerk of court, were submitted by petitioners in their
motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the
requirement and the Court of Appeals should have given the petition due course.

"Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that
way, the ends of justice would be served better."77 (Citations omitted)

In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,78 petitioner also failed to attach certified true
copies of the assailed decisions of the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations
Commission in their petition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on procedural grounds; but this Court, upon review, decided the case on its merits.79 This
Court held:

[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a
case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial
justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised
by the parties.

It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of
justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they
are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends.
Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.80 (Citations
omitted)

In Manila Electric Company v. Gala,81 respondent sought for the denial of petitioner's Petition
for Review on Certiorari before this Court for allegedly violating procedural rules. Among the
grounds that respondent relied upon was the failure of petitioner's counsels to state in the petition
their updated MCLE certificate numbers.82 This Court brushed aside the technical infirmity and
held:

We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the
labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly
observed. In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper
to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the
labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S.
Ventures  International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, "the application of technical rules of
procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice."83 (Citations
omitted)

In Doble, Jr. v. ABB, Inc.,84 this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to provide information regarding
his MCLE compliance.85 Citing People v. Arrojado,86 this Court held:

On point is People v. Arrojado where it was held that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or
her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no
longer result in the dismissal of the case:

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's
failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014
which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the
counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under  the amendatory Resolution,
the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to
the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

Granted that the Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013 even before
the effectivity of En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922, it
bears to stress that petitioner's counsel later submitted Receipts of Attendance in the MCLE
Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on March 3, 2014 and the Certificate of
Compliance albeit on January 26, 2015. Hence, the CA erred in issuing the assailed November
28, 2014 Resolution denying Doble's motion for reconsideration, there being no more reason not
to reinstate the petition for certiorari based on procedural defects which have already been
corrected. Needless to state, liberal construction of procedural rules is the norm to effect
substantial justice, and litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities.87 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,88 one (1) of the grounds cited by the Court of Appeals to
support its dismissal of the Petition for Review was petitioners' failure to provide competent
evidence of identities on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.89 On this
point, this Court held:

As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records
show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation of his Office of
the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12, as
amended, provides:

Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to
the identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver's license,
Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police
clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare
and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008];
or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent
identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was
compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA, attachment of a
photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it Thus,
the CA's dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiant's identity on the
attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.

Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-
attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held
that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of
the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective. It
is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act
on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be served . . .

....

Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, the
rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really impair the
proper administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that
the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De La Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch in the
evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the interest of
justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the petition.

The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by
precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law
abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.90 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,91 respondent prayed for this Court's outright denial
of the Petition for Review due to petitioner's failure to provide competent evidence of identity in
the verification page.92 This Court brushed aside this technicality and held:

Contrary to Uniwide's claim, the records of the case show that the petition's verification page
contains Trajano's competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport No. XX041470.
Trajano's failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his competent evidence of
identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush aside in the interest of
substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the application of the Rules of
Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance with it. In these cases, we have held
that the rules of procedure should not be applied in a very technical sense when it defeats the
purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of
cases. We maintain this ruling in this procedural aspect of this case.93 (Citations omitted)

Despite the number of cases wherein this Court relaxed the application of procedural rules, this
Court has repeatedly reminded litigants that:

[T]he bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed." The Court reiterates that rules of procedure . . . "have oft been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
business. . . . The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts
would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice . . . .
Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial
functions." Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only
in "exceptionally meritorious cases."94 (Citations omitted)

Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes v.
Hon. Quijano Padilla,95 citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals:96

In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide justification for a
court to resist a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given
due course by a suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.97

In Republic v. Dagondon,98 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to
timely file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court decision.99 The Court of Appeals held
that the trial court decision "could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments."100 This Court relaxed its application of the doctrine on immutability
of judgment and held:

The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not
designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the
doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice.

....

[A] departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would, in effect,
circumvent and undermine the stability of the Torrens System of land registration adopted in this
jurisdiction. Relatedly, it bears stressing that the subject matter of the instant controversy, i.e.,
Lot 84, is a sizeable parcel of real property. More importantly, petitioner had adequately
presented a strong and meritorious case.

Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to
suspend procedural rules and to resolve the present controversy according to its merits.101
(Citations omitted)

In People v. Layag,102 this Court likewise relaxed the rule on immutability of judgment due to a
special or compelling circumstance. This Court held that the death of accused-appellant is a
compelling circumstance that warrants a re-examination of the criminal case.103

In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Yeung,104 petitioner belatedly filed its Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.105 Nonetheless, this Court gave due course to the
Petition for Review and held:

[W]e find the delay of 7 days, due to the withdrawal of the petitioner's counsel during the
reglementary period of filing an MR, excusable in light of the merits of the case. Records show
that the petitioner immediately engaged the services of a new lawyer to replace its former
counsel and petitioned the CA to extend the period of filing an MR due to lack of material time
to review the case. There is no showing that the withdrawal of its counsel was a contrived reason
or an orchestrated act to delay the proceedings; the failure to file an MR within the reglementary
period of 15 days was also not entirely the petitioner's fault, as it was not in control of its former
counsel's acts.

Moreover, after a review of the contentions and the submissions of the parties, we agree that
suspension of the technical rules of procedure is warranted in this case in view of the CA's
erroneous application of legal principles and the substantial merits of the case. If the petition
would be dismissed on technical grounds and without due consideration of its merits, the
registered owner of the property shall, in effect, be barred from taking possession, thus allowing
the absurd and unfair situation where the owner cannot exercise its right of ownership. This, the
Court should not allow. In order to prevent the resulting inequity that might arise from the
outright denial of this recourse – that is, the virtual affirmance of the writ's denial to the
detriment of the petitioner's right of ownership – we give due course to this petition despite the
late filing of the petitioner's MR before the CA.106 (Emphasis in the original)

In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,107 petitioner failed to file its
appellant's brief within the extended period granted by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal.108 This Court reversed the dismissal and held:

Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner's appeal is denied due
course, a government institution could lose a great deal of money ever a mere technicality.
Obviously, such an appeal is far from being merely frivolous or dilatory.

....

Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the rules' primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be used to
defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.109 (Citations omitted)

In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,110 respondents prayed for the denial of
the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to file 12 copies of its brief, in violation of Rule
45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.111 This Court dismissed the technical defect and held:

We have ruled that when non-compliance with the Rules was not intended for delay or did not
result in prejudice to the adverse party, dismissal of appeal on mere technicalities — in cases
where appeal is a matter of right — may be stayed, in the exercise of the court's equity
jurisdiction. It does not appear that respondents were unduly prejudiced by petitioner's
nonfeasance. Neither has it been shown that such failure was intentional.112 (Citation omitted)

III

Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of
procedural rules. First, Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452,113 which designated
respondent as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital, was signed by then Department of
Health Secretary Duque. Duque was also the signatory in the 2008 Memorandum of
Agreement,114 the undated Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement,115 and the June 16, 2009
Memorandum of Agreement,116 which were the bases of respondent's secondment. Duque was
later appointed as Civil Service Commission Chairman and signed the October 17, 2011
Decision and the July 17, 2012 Resolution of the Civil Service Commission, dismissing the
complaint against respondent. Clearly, a conflict of interest existed when the public officer
authorizing the secondment of respondent was also the same person dismissing the complaint
questioning respondent's secondment.

Second, resolving the merits of the case would "give more efficacy to the constitutional mandate
on the accountability of public officers and employees[.]"117 In Executive Judge Paredes v.
Moreno,118 this Court found respondent "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service"119 for his continued absence of almost three (3) months.120 This Court held:

His misconduct is prejudicial to the service. Although a mere employee/laborer in the City Court
of Manila, respondent is as much duty-bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency as all other public officers and employees . . . We find
respondent's shortcomings to warrant a sanction to serve as deterrent not only to him but also to
other court employees who shall commit the same or any and all forms of official misconduct
which undermine the people's faith in their fitness for public service.121

Furthermore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should avoid dismissal of
cases based merely on technical grounds. Judicial economy requires the prosecution of cases
"with the least cost to the parties"122 and to the courts' time, effort, and resources.123

IV

On a final note, this Court clarifies the concept of forum shopping.

Forum shopping is generally judicial. It exists:

[W]henever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts,

simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." It has also been defined as
"an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking
and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition." Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient administration of
justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the
judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes.124 (Citations omitted)
The test to determine whether or not forum shopping was committed was explained in Dy, et al.
v. Yu, et al.:125

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor
to ask is whether the clement of litis pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping
is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a
party's commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exists (either pending
or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.126 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)

In Ligtas v. People,127 this Court reiterated that res judicata may also be applied to "decisions
rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
proceedings[.]"128 In Salazar v. De Leon,129 this Court further held;

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the
hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by
the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded
as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial
powers have been conferred.130 (Citations omitted)

Thus, forum shopping, in the concept of res judicata, is applicable to judgments or decisions of
administrative agencies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2013 and July
16, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 127252 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the merits of the
case.

SO ORDERED.