Gonzales Vs COMELEC
Gonzales Vs COMELEC
Gonzales Vs COMELEC
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof,
on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of
respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine
Constitution Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA —
were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.
Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred
until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before
the Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and
whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court — had
been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on the
identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review
by certiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing the
petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on
November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the
memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-
28224.
JURISDICTION
THE MERITS
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is
urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals
for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held
under such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the
people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and
implications of said amendments.
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution,
which provides:
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no
apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the
Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal;
that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or
de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed
Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic
Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within
three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass
a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said
apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the
ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made
according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of
Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the
Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in
consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de
facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress
is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify,
however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered
Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de
facto officers.
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period
to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or
becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall
continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the
expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in
1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily
before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could
foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period,
after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in
1938.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows
that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963,
or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question,
therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or
constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the
Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners
herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress
became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of
Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were
de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a
reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision
creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not
aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion.
Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress,
upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political
law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure
to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result
in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative
to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in
consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within
three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in
1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the
legal provisions creating Congress — with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts
as they existed at the time of said elections — remained in force, we can not
see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as
de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a
reapportionment within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the
President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main
function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory
duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or
ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with
Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title
thereto is not automatic.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because
the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are
not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before
Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason
that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that
the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de
facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted
that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko
was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered
decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence
of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to
say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions
herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has
nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
consideration is untenable.
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose,
but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact
that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other
circumstances — and none has brought to our attention — supporting the
conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes,
been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law
warrants it.26
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof
anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve
the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in,
different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And,
neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of
authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred
to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to
do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority
to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and
in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy
"shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling
place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling
place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the
ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably
inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for
amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said
measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform
the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of
the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution
down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution,
Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political
parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution —
except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, consequently, debated
thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand,
said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments
now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the
same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may
have taken place — on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for
amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic
organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced
their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of
the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its
constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than
those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or
omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place
subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the
proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R.
B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable,
however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or
that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may
enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed
amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and
the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots
they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize
or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional
Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell
such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of
the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No.
3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should
run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike
down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth
in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of
powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere.
The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments
shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the
legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913.
Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on
the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human
endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be
constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said
Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic
Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions
in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.