IMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS, PETITIONER, VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 210731 February 13, 2019

Doctrine: Warrantless arrest; review under rule 45

Facts:

Lapi, Allen Sacare (Sacare), and Kenneth Lim (Lim),   were charged with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic

Act No. 9165 after they were caught  ingesting and introducing to their bodies a dangerous drug known as

methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.According to the prosecution, , operatives conducted a stake-out

operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation PO2 Villeran heard noises from one of the

houses. He "peeped through its window" and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot session."On arraignment,

Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to

guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation for six months at a government-recognized center. Only Lapi was

subjected to trial on the merits.

the Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was

caught in flagrante delicto.

Issue

whether or not the warrantless arrest against petitioner Simeon M. Lapi was valid.
       

Ruling:

2.     YES. The arrest was valid.

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since PO2 Villeran had to peep through the window to

ascertain that something illegal was occurring.

However, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment.  He did not move to

quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he entered his

plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. 

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the

person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have

also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the

quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured

when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioner does not deny that his drug test yielded positive for illegal drugs. What he questions is the alleged illegality

of his arrest.

Petitioner, however, has already waived the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him

during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs. Thus the trial court and the Court of

Appeals did not err in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act

No. 9165.

ase Brief: Luz vs. Philippines

M AY 8, 2017 JEF F R EY
G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and so
he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic
enforcer. The accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet while driving said motor vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching something
from his jacket. He was alerted and told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket’s pocket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket
which included two plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of
methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.
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R EPO RT T HI S A DPR IV AC Y S ET TI NG S

Held:
Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At
the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.

CaseDig: Pestilos vs. Generoso

G.R. No. 182601, 10 Nov. 2014
Posted by: Yvonne a. Bioyo, 01 Dec 2018

FACTS:

At 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso. The latter called the police station to report the incident. Acting on the
report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier, with the augmentation
personnel from the Airforce, A2C Sayson and Galvez, to go to the scene and
render assistance. They arrived at the scene and saw Atty. Generoso badly
beaten. The latter pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to the police station
for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the prosecutor found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon, but the latter
fortunately survived. Petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.

The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on

the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were
just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the
motion and also the motion for reconsideration. The petitioners challenged the
lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They
attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. The
appellate court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

HELD:

YES. To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon
the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived
almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired. 

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did
not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners
in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed
the crime.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of

the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a
crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission
of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

People vs. Gerente G.R. No. 95847-48

March 10, 1993 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
Facts: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking
liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is
about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness
who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men
talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Appellant allegedly
agreed: “Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren
and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00
p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first
blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when
he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house
of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the
Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The
cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and
heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo
de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a
piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of
marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen
proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They
told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse
in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.
The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A
joint trial of the two cases was held. The trial court rendered a decision
convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

Issue: Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime

committed by the accused is justified and valid in arresting the latter
without securing an arrest and search warrant.

Held: Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.” The policemen arrested
Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death:
a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had
used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and
of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law
as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerente’s
person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that Search incident to lawful
arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant.” The frisk and search of
appellant’s person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed.

COMERCIANTE V. PEOPLE (763 SCRA 57)

 
Facts:
 
Comerciante not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession, custody and control a dangerous drug known as shabu.
 
The police spotted Comerciante and Dasill standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking
that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached them
and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets which was later on confirmed contained shabu.

 
Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal.
However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.

 
Comerciante averred that the police were looking for "Barok", who was a notorious drug
pusher in the area. They were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police
officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release.
 
The RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165, The RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the
warrantless arrest. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03
Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly
performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. Comerciante appealed. The CA
affirmed Comerciante's conviction.
 
Issue:
 
WON the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction
 
Held:
 
No. Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
 
The exclusionary rule is not an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, as follows:
 
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
 
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
 
the Court finds it highly implausible that the police, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small
plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could
be properly attributed to Comerciante, the acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions
set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting
officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a
crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Trinidad v. People

G.R. No. 239957

February 18, 2019

FACTS:

RTC and CA convicted Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition. RA 10591 Sec. 28 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) (1), Art. V. The
police conducted a buy bust operation which consummated to sale of illegal drugs and while
frisking Trinidad, they discovered a .38 caliber revolver loaded with 6 live ammunitions, .22
caliber rifle loaded with 7 live ammunitions and two magazines. In his defense, he was acquitted
in the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Then formally offered in
evidence the said acquittal ruling which was objected by the public prosecutor for being
immaterial and irrelevant to the present case. The RTC admitted said evidence only as part of
Trinidad’s testimony.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Trinidad’s conviction for the crime charged.

HELD:

Sec. 2 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. Sec. 3(2) provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. The resolution in the drugs cases is immaterial in this case as they involve different
crimes and the “the ground for the acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search or
seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug.” The general rule
is that the courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the other case has a close
connection with the matter in controversy in the case at hand. The drugs caes and this caes are
so interwoven and interdependent of each other since, the drugs, as well a the subject firearms
and ammunition, were illegally seized in a singular instance that is, the buy-bust operation.
Hence, the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy-bust
operation as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases. In the drugs cases, the finding
of unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1
Sanoy’s testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said
testimony was found to be highly doubtful and incredible. This circumstance similarly obtains
here as in fact, the testimonies of both PO1 Nidoy and PO1 Sanoy in this case essentially just
mirror on all material points the latter’s implausible narration in the drugs cases. In view of the
foregoing, the Court concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition are also inadmissible
in evidence for being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs
cases. Since the confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime
charge in this case, Trinidad’s acquittal is in order. Wherefore, petition is granted. Jesus
Bersamin is acquitted of the crime charged.
PEOPLE vs. MADERAZO
GR No. 235348 Date: December 10, 2018Ponente: PERALTA

DOCTRINE:
A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with a specific
offensealleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his
witnesses. This is thesubstantive requirement for the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probablecause is a personal task of the judge before whom
the application for search warrant is filed, as he has toexamine the applicant and his or her
witnesses in the form of "searching questions and answers" in writingand under oath.
FACTS
Police Superintendent Jaycees De Sagun Tolentino (Tolentino) filed two (2) separate
applicationsfor search warrants against Maderazo, Nestor Alea (Alea), Daren Mabansag
(Mabansag) and Lovely JoyAlcantara (Alcantara). In his search warrant applications, Tolentino
alleged that he has been informed by barangay offcials, Loida Tapere Roco (Roco) and Rexcel
Lozano Rivera (Rivera), that Maderazo, alongwith Alea, Mabansag and Alcantara, is keeping an
undetermined quantity of dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms of unknown caliber
and ammunitions inside his residence in Barangay Lazareto,Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro.Calapan City Police Station served a warrant of arrest against Maderazo for attempted
murder. AfterManderazo was arrested, Roco and Rivera (as barangay officials) decided to talk
to Maderazo, whoadmitted to them that he is keeping inside the subject house approximately 40
grams of illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. Tolentino allegedly verified said
informations through casing andsurveillance.After the preliminary investigation of witnesses
Roco and Rivera, under oath, Executive JudgeTomas C. Leynes (Judge Leynes) issued 2
Search Warrants, one for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.9165 and second, for violation of
R.A. No. 10591. By virtue of the search warrants, police officersrecovered heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets which were suspected to be containing shabu, various drug
paraphernalia, a .38 caliber revolver, live ammunitions, mobile phones, computer laptop, cash,
amongothers, from the premises. Maderazo, Alea, and Mabansag were, subsequently, charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, and illegal possession of
firearms.Maderazo filed the Motion to Quash, arguing that the Search Warrants were issued
without probablecause thus, all items seized by virtue of their enforcement were inadmissible in
evidence. However, the trialcourt rendered its Order denying the motion to quash. Maderazo
moved for reconsideration, but the samewas denied. Maderazo filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court when it denied the motion to quashsearch warrants. The CA granted
the petition for certiorari, and nullified and set aside the Search Warrants.It, likewise, held that
the items allegedly seized in the house being rented by Maderazo by virtue of the saidsearch
warrants are inadmissible in evidence against him since the access therein by the police officers
usedvoid search warrants.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Search Warrants issued by Judge Leynes are void because such warrants
were issuedwithout probable cause.

Facts:
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3,... Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the
victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.[5] In
support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC
and there testified that... he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December
2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.[6]
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued
Search Warrant No. 09-14407[7]
The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.[8]
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent
Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence[9
July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud "after a careful consideration [of]
the grounds alleged [therein]."... espondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed
a Motion for Reconsideration[1... which was, however, denied in an Orde... the fact that the
alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the search warrant application was
filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable cause;[21]... nconvinced, the People filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA... the CA granted the People's petition and thereby
annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness Avasola
deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in
December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims two bodies in
each of the... three (3) caves.[29] Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to consider
the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case,
stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the... application of a
search warrant.[30] Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a protruding
human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola's first-hand eye witness account
both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that... the crime of Murder had
been committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud
Compound.[31]... issatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied
in a Resolution
Issues:
The issues for the Court's resolution... whether the requirements of probable cause and
particular description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated
Ruling:
Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of Search Warrant No.
09-14407 and the One-Specific-Offense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-
14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that
he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of
the... group that buried the victims:
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was
personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that  more likely than not the crime
of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that  the human remains in...
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence
of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended the search
warrant's application from the crime's commission does not, by and of itself, negate the...
veracity of the applicant's claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA
correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness's fear of reprisal and
natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case.[50] Ultimately, in... determining the
existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by
the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable complications
and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court's mind, the supposed... delay in the
search warrant's application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine,
the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement
that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."
Principles:
In order to protect the people's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the... judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized:
SEC. 2.  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon... probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant
shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant... and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147677 : December 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ROGELIO PIJO MILADO, Appellant.

MILADO, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport five and one fourth (5 ) kilos of
indian hemp or marijuana leaves, buds and stems in brick form/shape .

Police Officers Dominic Faclangen and Glen Apangchan proceeded to the edge of Samoki Bridge at the Chico River,
to set up a checkpoint. The policemen flagged down about four or five vehicles before coming across a jeepney that
had on board appellant, who fitted the description given by the asset including the fact that he was carrying a black
bag. Certain that appellant was the man earlier described by their asset as the person transporting marijuana, the
policemen boarded the jeepney and invited appellant and the driver to the police station.

Upon arriving at the police station, but while still inside the vehicle, the policemen told appellant to open the black
bag. Appellant opened his bag and the policemen found what looked like 6 bricks individually wrapped in
newspapers.

Issue

won

trial court erred in not considering the fact that the evidence allegedly seized from the accused was the product of an
illegal search and seizure and, hence, inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence and Article II, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution.

ruling

The aforecited argument is without merit.

The Court finds that the evidence seized from appellant was the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,6 the Court discussed the nature of an arrest:

Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of
the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ

vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.
120744-46, June 25, 2012
Doctrine:Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton

Accused public officers were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated
murder in three Informations,. Allegedly,they were confederating and mutually helping one
another, and while responding to information about the presence of armed men in a barangay
and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did
then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.

Issue: a.)Whether the Petitioners had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing
them
b.) Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exerciseof such right.

Held: a.)The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva,and that they deserve an acquittal together with the
other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims. The
firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber
carbine.1 While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they
are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the
jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even
killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon
while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and
target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed
even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do
not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless
elements in the streets.Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney
and the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passengernext to the driver and in fact even the
driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be
precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to
fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their
authority. And ininstances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle
by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt.
The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the
latter. This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all
the consequences arising from their deed. Thecircumstances of the shooting breed no other
inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack
of skill.At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure.In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a factwhich, if
true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution.Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all
to the belief or stateof mind ofany other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires:a)
that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and(c) that it negate
the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to anelement of the offense.The leading authority in mistake of
fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong, but in that setting, the
principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances ofthe case
had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There,
the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being
broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification,
believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he
was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving thathe was under
attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the
accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018

LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza Reyes y
Capistrano (Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated
January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165,
the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
possess and have in her custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained
in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance was found positive to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a
group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson
Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal
when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a
dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes,
a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like liquor
passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it
out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her
back, pulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right
hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station
where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents, conducted
the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles.9 Thereafter, PO1
Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item
for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10
that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.11

For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5,
2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to
board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After
answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in
motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and
bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the
police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange
for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for
inquest proceedings.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165. Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with an order for her immediate arrest.14
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and
thereupon, found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police
officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was
sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, which was not ill-motivated.15

Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime
charged.18 It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was
valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on
account thereof.19 The CA likewise found substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule
and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item were properly preserved.20

However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04 gram
in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the penalty
imposed to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, as maximum.21

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.22 "The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law."23

"Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),25 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.26

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.28

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a
general rule – be complied with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an
arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.29

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.30

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure [contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of
the same, [the officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed."31

Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test,
showing that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers
suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she] was apprehended."32
Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered
invalid, as in a case where a person was apprehended for merely carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously.33 Similarly, in People v. Racho,34 a search
based solely on a tip describing one of the passengers of a bus was declared illegal, since at
the time of apprehension, the said accused was not "committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers," nor did he commit a crime or was about to commit one.35

In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything
as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime when she was just passing by.36 During cross-
examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:

[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information that they
gave you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?

[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.

Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?

A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.

Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?

A: None ma'am.

COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?

A: I think it was a Dragon sir.

Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon tattoo
can be possessed by any other person aside from the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

xxxx
Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?

A: Not anymore ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?

A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic) coming
towards us who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.

Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did nothing
wrong against you?

A: Yes ma'am.

xxxx

Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?

A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.

Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit a response
from you?

A: None ma'am.

x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1
Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing
anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal
basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be
considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify
a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime."41 In this case,
records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers'
tip and that, everything happened by "chance."42 Surely, to interpret "personal knowledge" as
to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests,
rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113.43

Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject
item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1
Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she purchased shabu, she
turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet containing the same which she
retrieved from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of a witness's
testimony is determined by its conformity with knowledge and consistency with the common
experience of mankind.44 As the Court observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human
experience for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or her
conviction for a crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do
so.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet of shabu to
the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest, Reyes was so
intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46
but later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued that Reyes was actually "in her right senses
when she reminded the police officers" that they were not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These
material inconsistencies clearly render suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and
likewise, destroy the credibility of the police officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to
deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and
in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof
established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this case.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their admission
that only the Barangay Captain was present during the marking and inventory of the seized
items.51 Records are further bereft of any showing that efforts were made by the police officers
to secure the presence of the other necessary personalities under the law or provide any
justification for their absence, which could have excused their leniency in strictly complying with
the said procedure.52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,53
requires, among others, that the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.54 It is well-settled that unjustified non-
compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in the acquittal of the accused,55
as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution
dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
 G.R. No. 175700 : July 5, 2010

SALVADOR V. REBELLION, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The threshold issue confronting us is whether the facts presented in this case make out
a legitimate instance of a warrantless arrest, i.e. under circumstances sufficient to
engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed or
had just been committed.

This petition for review assails the September 26, 2006 Decision1  of the Court of cralaw

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248 which affirmed with modification the December
8, 2004 Decision2  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209,
cralaw

finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No.
6425, as amended (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended).

Factual Antecedents

On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion
with violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the accusatory portion
thereof reads:chan robles virtual law library

That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
having been lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03
gram of white crystalline substance and one (1) piece of aluminum foil strip with trace
of white crystalline substance, which were found positive [for] Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license and prescription, in violation of the above cited law.

Contrary to law. 3 cra cralaw

When arraigned on September 6, 2000, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After
pre-trial, trial on the merits forthwith commenced.

At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and
PO3 Romeo Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael Fermin and Joseph
Apologista, all members of the Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City,
were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon
two individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers
introduced themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding.
Petitioner took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia
confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained
white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was
"shabu", he confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later
identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the
contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three
strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu.

On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City
Prosecutor's Office.

Petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was merely standing in
front of a store waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was suddenly
accosted by the MAC team.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and
four months of prision correccional as maximum. The trial court gave credence to the
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and ruled that the elements of
the offense charged were duly established.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not
committing any crime when he was arrested.

On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification.
The appellate court sustained the validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding
that the latter was caught by the MAC team in flagrante delicto or while he was in the
act of giving to Clarito a plastic sachet of shabu. The CA brushed aside the self-serving
version of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
chan robles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated December 8, 2004 of the trial court is
affirmed, subject to the modification of accused-appellant's imprisonment sentence
which should be six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty,
to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as
the maximum penalty.

SO ORDERED. 4 cra

Issue

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us raising a singular issue
on:chan robles virtual law library

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time
he was apprehended, he was not committing or attempting to commit an offense.
Petitioner argues that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was
also unlawful. Thus, the illicit items confiscated from him are inadmissible in evidence
for being violative of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Our Ruling

We sustain the appellate court in affirming petitioner's conviction by the trial court.

Petitioner's claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere
in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of
his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 5  In this case, petitioner was duly
cra cralaw

arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused. 6 cra cralaw

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual
under any of the following circumstances:7 cralaw

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.

Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.  The
MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing
their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3
Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able
to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. At the first
opportunity, the team members introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia
what petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of aluminum foil which the
former confiscated. At a distance, PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the
plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance. There and then, petitioner
and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested

in flagrante delicto  as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting team. Thus, his case comes under the
exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the
results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his
guilt of the offense charged. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in
addressing the matter of the purportedly invalid warrantless arrest: chan robles virtual law library

In any event, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was lawful because he was
caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto  or while he was in the act of handing to
Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu". Upon seeing the exchange, PO3 Sotomayor
and PO3 Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito Yanson and introduced
themselves as members of the MAC. PO3 Sotomayor confiscated from accused-
appellant the plastic sachet of "shabu" while PO3 Garcia confiscated the aluminum foil
strips which accused-appellant was also holding in his other hand.

Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has
the authority to search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate those that may
be used to prove the commission of the offense. x x x

Petitioner's version, on the other hand, cannot stand against the positive evidence of
the prosecution. It strains our credulity to believe his version that at the time of his
arrest, he was merely standing in front of the store waiting for the change of
his P500.00 bill and that the small plastic sachet was in fact recovered from another
male individual standing in front of him. Petitioner is thus suggesting that he was
arrested for no cause at all. We are not swayed by his account. His version of the
incident is simply incredible. Moreover, he was positively, categorically and consistently
identified by the prosecution witnesses who were shown to have no ill motive on their
part in testifying against him. Consequently, their testimonies should prevail over the
alibi and denial of petitioner whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. 8 cra cralaw

In fine, we defer to the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate
court, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. Well-settled is the
rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case. 9 cra cräläwvirtualibräry

The essential elements in illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess
the said drug. All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case.

We now proceed to determine the propriety of the penalty imposed upon petitioner.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA
6425, as amended, for having possessed a sachet of shabu with a weight of 0.03 gram.
Section 16 provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to
four years and a fine ranging from P600.00 to P4,000.00 on any person found in
possession or use of any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, irrespective of the volume or amount of the drug involved. However, said
Section 16 was amended by RA 765910  which took effect on December 31, 1993. As cralaw

amended, Section 16 now provides: chan robles virtual law library

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug
without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section
20 hereof.

Section 20 of RA 6425 was likewise amended by Section 17 of RA 7659 where the

imposable penalty now depends on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved. Thus,
as amended by Section 17, the pertinent provision of Section 20, Article IV of RA 6425
now reads: chan robles virtual law library

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
 xxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride

xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correcional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Thus, in People v. Tira,11  we classified the penalties and graduated the same by degree
cralaw

where the quantity of the shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride involved is less

than 200 grams, viz:

Under Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject
of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

less than one (1) gram to 49-25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98-50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Following the above illustration and considering the shabu found in the possession of

the petitioner is only 0.03 gram, the imposable penalty for the crime
is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellate court
correctly sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional as maximum.

RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,

increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu  to an imprisonment of 12 years and one day
to 20 years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Said law, however,
not being favorable to the petitioner, cannot be given retroactive application in this
case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 26, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248 affirming the conviction of petitioner Salvador V.
Rebellion for the unlawful possession of 0.03 gram of shabu and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional as maximum is affirmed.
G.R. No. 174774 August 31, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias "Mac-Mac,"
Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated September 23, 2003 of Branch
214 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-
D. The Court of Appeals found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G.
Reyes (Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation
to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:

On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal
possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City, in its Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict
accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
and resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned.
The criminal information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, filed with the
RTC, reads:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES y SANTOS @
BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE CLARO y
ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC. 16
ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the manner herein narrated as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess any regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, commit to sell, deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten
(10) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with the
following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5, 99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a
total of 980.9 grams, which substance when submitted for drug examination, were found
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license and prescription.3

On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-
Tom, insisting on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC,
which said trial court granted in an Order4 dated March 15, 2000.

After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3,
2000, recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
and Lantion-Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events
presented by the parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except
accused-appellant Reyes who did not participate in the proceedings), which it summarized as
follows:

In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the Intelligence and
Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National Capital Region Police Office
(NCRPO) claims that on 17 February 2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a
narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel,
Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched to verify the reports and conduct police
operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically
positioned themselves at the vicinity parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m.,
accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a red Toyota Corolla,
arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and
Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling accused/respondent
[Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular phone; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latter’s parked Mazda car where
respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was
taken, which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a
plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having in their
possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed
transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a total weight of 980.9 grams turned
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

In his "Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay," accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes claims that

on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a
neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness; that
while looking for a parking space, several men with firearms suddenly appeared, with one
shouting, "buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan at kung hindi babasagin ko ito"; that he and
Marlon David were forced out of their vehicle with one of the armed men bringing out a plastic
shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking where the said bag allegedly containing "shabu" came from;
that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes answered "hindi ko alam," that he and Marlon
David were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the group’s vehicle and continuously asked who
the source of the shabu was, with respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes replying, "hindi
ko alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan;" that Marlon David was separated from
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and later released on 18 February 2000; that when
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes’ blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

xxxx

To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes’ claim, that he was arrested in Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and Restaurant in
Mandaluyong City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claro’s spouse submitted a certified
true xerox copy of barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, reflecting the entry on
19 February 2000 made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:

"BLOTTER"

"Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia Delos Reyes, upang
ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa
17 ng Pebrero taong dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon David, ay
hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang lalaki sa Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin
kung ang nasabing insidente ay coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay."

(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes

Nagpapahayag"

The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos Reyes of the
incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one Joel Navarro, claims
having seen the actual incident confirming the events as narrated to by accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon David.

Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent Lantion-Tom,
submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the charges and claiming that they
were at the Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to respondent Lantion-Tom’s accountant Ms.
Daisy Milan regarding the Mayor’s Permit, Business Location Clearance issued by the Office of
the Barangay Captain, insurance documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business;
that they were with accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro’s brother, Roberto and a friend,
James, with the two remaining outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to
accompany Ms. Milan, while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was left inside; that after
Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by men who introduced
themselves as police officers and were arresting them for being the source of "shabu" in a drug
deal; that all of them, accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and James were
likewise arrested and continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they
were taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further investigation;
that Roberto and James were released the following day. Both respondents maintain that the
allegations of the arresting officers as to the circumstances on the alleged "drug deal" leading to
their arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.

During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the arresting officers
manifested that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March 2000. However, no such
reply-affidavit was submitted.5

The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes’ counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-
La Plaza in Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal, as corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective
sworn statements (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City
Prosecutor also observed that Lantion-Tom was "merely in the company of the other
respondents without performing any overt act showing her to be part of the illicit transaction"
and her drug test revealed negative results. On the other hand, it considered the conflicting
claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally arrested and that the drug deal was a
mere fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the seller/pusher
in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle) would be best ventilated during the
trial on the merits.
In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with
leave of court to admit amended information.

In its Order6 dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecution’s motion. Contrary to the
finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not
only against accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes as well.

Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,7 while Emmanuel de Claro was arraigned
on July 12, 2000.8 All three pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio
Santiago,9 Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,10 PO3 Angel Yumul,11 and SPO1
Benjamin David,12 members of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) who apprehended and/or
investigated the case against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and
P/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, Jr.13 (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom
on February 17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold
Aguilar, received information from a confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that
would take place between Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in
Madaluyong City. Botong and Mac-Mac were identified during the investigation as accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes, respectively.

As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was organized by Major
Aguilar, composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1 Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3
Elmer Corbe, PO3 Marcelo Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3
Edwin dela Cruz. At around 1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using
four vehicles, to the location of the drug deal and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential
informant to arrive. When the confidential informant arrived at around 3:30 p.m., he told the
police team that the drug deal would possibly take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and
that the suspects would utilize a red Toyota Corolla with plate number TRP-868 and a white
Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police team then positioned their cars
strategically in such a way that they could see the vehicles coming from St. Francis Street and
EDSA.

PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected vehicles arrived, both
stopping along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked
to each other. The confidential informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-
Mac and the driver of the red Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on
his cellular phone and then proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac
behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked to another person, who was identified during the
investigation as Emmanuel de Claro alias Cocoy. PO3 Santiago was about three to five meters
away. Thereafter, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a car parked
right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on identified as Lantion-Tom, handed
to Cocoy a white plastic bag containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who, in turn,
handed the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant.

PO3 Santiago related that their team leader "sensed" that the drug deal had already been
consummated, so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the suspected drug
dealers. PO3 Santiago and PO3 Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura
and the remaining police team members arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag
containing the box was seized from Mac-Mac. The arrested suspects were brought to the police
office for investigation. The plastic bag, the box, and the 10 heat-sealed sachets of white
crystalline substance inside the box, were marked for identification and physical examination at
the police office.

According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each of the 10 heat-
sealed sachets yielded positive test results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3
Santiago then signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other
arresting police officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and
PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.

On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the
plastic bag and that he did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From
PO3 Santiago’s position, he could not conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal
drug deal as he had no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the
other arresting officers just relied on the information relayed by the confidential informant. Also,
the police team did not recover any money from the arrested suspects. The confidential
informant merely informed the police the following morning that the money for the illegal drugs
was already deposited in the bank. The police, however, failed to make further queries from the
confidential informant about the bank.

SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a confidential informant
about an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader
of the team that will bust said illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lectura’s team
proceeded to the subject location.
The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lectura’s team at around 3:30 p.m. SPO1
Lectura conducted a short briefing then positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The
confidential informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00
p.m. and 11:00 p.m. At around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected
drug dealers Botong and Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a
moment with Mac-Mac, Botong went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong
and Cocoy then went outside the restaurant and approached another car. Cocoy took a white
plastic bag from the car, which he handed to Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside the
restaurant, while "[Botong] proceeded to his car near [Mac-Mac]." SPO1 Lectura was positioned
at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15 meters away from the suspects. At that
moment, SPO1 Lectura "sensed" that the drug deal had been consummated, so he decided to
already arrest the suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the white
plastic bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago apprehended
Cocoy. The police team brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation.

SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-
sealed plastic sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles
with his initials. After physical and chemical examinations revealed that the contents of the
sachets were shabu, SPO1 Lectura signed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David was with Botong
when the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also arrested Marlon David.
Marlon David was brought to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested
suspects, for "verification," and was released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted
that during the preliminary investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier,
answered that it was PO3 Santiago who seized the shabu from Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura
explained that what the investigating prosecutor actually asked during preliminary investigation
was who saw where the shabu came from and that he signed the minutes of the preliminary
investigation without reading the same. SPO1 Lectura maintained that it was he who recovered
the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly, SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily relied on
the information given by the confidential informant in identifying the suspects in the illegal drug
deal, who were eventually arrested.

PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and
SPO1 Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division
of the RMG based in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Padpad, and several other police officers at the vicinity of
Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City, conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-
off illegal drug deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Padpad in the car parked in front of
Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and their confidential informant were in
another car also parked along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3 Santiago, PO3 Arcancia,
and PO3 Corbe were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant. PO3 Yumul could
not recall where the other members of the team were located.
At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate cars, stopping in
front of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each
other. At that time, PO3 Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects. Moments
later, Botong called someone on his cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop
Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the restaurant and
saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3 Yumul though did not hear the conversation between
Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a
parked car. From his position about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the
back seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over "a white plastic bag
with carton inside" to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned
inside the restaurant and "[Botong] went back to [Mac-Mac]." PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside
the restaurant. A few minutes later, PO3 Santiago also went inside the restaurant informing PO3
Yumul that they would be arresting Cocoy, and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already arrested
outside the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted by PO3 Yumul, approached Cocoy and arrested
him. The police team proceeded to the police office with all the arrested suspects for further
investigation. PO3 Yumul, however, failed to join the other arresting officers in signing the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the RMG at
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant case following the arrests of
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for
inquest to the Office of the City Prosecutor.

SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag
containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told
SPO1 David that the articles were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked
his initials "BSD" on the confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination of the specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he prepared the
Affidavit of Arrest of the arresting officers.

The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Insp.
Cruto was the forensic chemist who conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory
examinations of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-
NCRPO on February 18, 2000.

P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents of each sachet,
revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one
sachet, 99.2 grams; two sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9
grams; and one sachet, 93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each
plastic sachet and proceeded with his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The contents of
the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto recorded the result of the examinations in his Physical
Sciences Report No. D-097-2000.14

The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest15 dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3
Arcancia, PO3 Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1
Lectura;16 the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets recovered from the possession of accused-
appellants;17 the PNP-RMG Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-
sealed plastic sachets;18 the PNP Crime Laboratory Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000
dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets
positively tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride;19 and the Letter (Referral of the case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor)20 dated February 18, 2000. The RTC admitted all the
aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its Order21 dated March 1, 2001.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon David,22 accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes,23 Emmanuel de Claro,24 Roberto de Claro,25 and Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom.26 Accused-appellant Reyes did not testify.

Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal High School in
Pasig City. He recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas
Market in Cainta, Rizal, to collect some money.

While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside their car at the
parking area of said market, another car suddenly arrived, from which an armed male
passenger alighted and approached them. Four other armed men followed and poked their guns
at accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire,
were carrying an SM plastic shopping bag and questioned accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes if he knew the owner of said plastic bag. Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied
any knowledge about the plastic bag. Marlon David was also asked and he answered that he
knew nothing about the plastic bag.

Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police officers, pulled accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat of the latter’s car, transferred him and
Marlon David to the back seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men
sat in the front seats of the car, while one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The
armed men then separated accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes from Marlon David. They
ordered Marlon David to alight from the car and transfer to another vehicle. While in the other
car, the armed men boxed and mauled Marlon David to force him to admit to be the source of
the plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one punch. Marlon David remained
blindfolded until they arrived at the police camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where he again saw
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David was released the following morning,
leaving accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes behind at the police camp. Marlon David went
home and told Virginia delos Reyes, the wife of accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about
the incident.

Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with the name Mac-
Mac. Marlon David additionally relayed that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes that the latter was likewise mauled by the armed men.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of the incident that
took place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas
Market in Cainta, Rizal. Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked
their guns at him and Marlon David, shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car
window and the armed men opened the car door. The armed men forced him and Marlon David
to get down from the front seats of the car and to transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them,
and asked them who were the owners of the SM plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market, he
noticed that they were just driving around. The car stopped only when Marlon David was taken
out and transferred to another car. It was already late in the evening when the car finally
stopped. He then realized, after his blindfold had been removed, that he was at Camp Bagong
Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police that he was selling
or delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant
in Mandaluyong City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal.
Accused-appellant Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-
appellant Reyes agreed to meet at Buenas Market for the settlement of the latter’s loan, but the
meeting did not take place because the armed men arrived. He further claimed that he only met
Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de
Claro before that time, and he found out the latter’s name only when they were already detained
at the Mandaluyong City Jail.

Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around 10:00 a.m., he was
at the Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife
Mary Jane Lantion-Tom to follow up their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m.,
they had lunch at Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-
Tom passed by the house of his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for them.
James, Roberto de Claro’s friend, also went with them.

The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own car was in the
auto shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las
Piñas City to check on Emmanuel de Claro’s car at the auto shop. From there, they proceeded
to Libertad in Pasay City and ate dinner at the Duty Free Philippines. Afterwards, the group
made their way to Mandaluyong City where Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with
Daisy Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom met Milan at Whistle
Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Milan and Lantion-Tom
discussed matters pertaining to the business permit. Emmanuel de Claro stepped outside the
restaurant for a moment to smoke a cigarette, then, returned inside to wait for the meeting
between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-Tom walked Milan outside
the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for Lantion-Tom inside.

Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and introduced themselves as
police officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro not to make a scene and just go with them
peacefully. Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced
to get into a waiting car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched, handcuffed,
blindfolded, and told to bow down his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something
about the shabu, but he denied knowing anything about it. He heard from the radio inside the
car that the police officers were waiting for another car. After three hours of traveling, the car
finally stopped and when his blindfold was removed, he learned that they were already at Camp
Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an hour, until he was
called into another room where he met his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-
Tom at the office of one of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police and being
forced to admit that the drugs being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer
but their plea was ignored. The police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody
should be held responsible for the shabu so they were made to choose whether both of them or
only one of them would be charged. Emmanuel de Claro was compelled to choose the latter
option.

Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claro’s testimony. On February 17, 2000, Roberto
de Claro was at home playing video games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the
latter’s wife, Lantion-Tom, arrived and requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was
not feeling well. James, Roberto de Claro’s friend, rode with them. They first went to Las Piñas
City to check on Emmanuel de Claro’s car at the auto shop, then they proceeded to Libertad,
Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty Free Philippines. They next drove to Whistle Stop
Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet "Ms. Milan." Only Emmanuel de
Claro and Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and James stayed in the
car.

Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and "Ms. Milan" walking towards them. As
the two women were approaching, armed men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and
pointed guns at them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery ("hold-up")
was taking place. The armed men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro
opened the window, then the door of the car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were
made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of the armed men sat on the front seats of the car,
while one sat at the back with Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom. The armed men
introduced themselves as police officers.

Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de Claro, James, and
Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering them to keep their heads bowed down. The police officers
drove the car for two hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment,
Roberto de Claro was able to raise his head but was immediately told to bow down his head
again. Roberto de Claro also heard from the police officers’ radio that they were still waiting for
somebody. They travelled again for quite a long time and stopped in a dark place. The police
officers took Roberto de Claro’s wallet containing ₱7,000.00 cash. Early in the following
morning, they arrived at the police station where Roberto de Claro saw his brother Emmanuel
de Claro once more. They stayed in one room until Roberto de Claro and James were released
by the police the next day.

When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense agreed to consider
her Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000
as her direct examination.

On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those arrested on February
17, 2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in
an illegal drug deal. At the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de
Claro, and James. She was also brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was
interrogated without a lawyer. She was shown a box containing shabu which she had never
seen before. Lantion-Tom insisted that she was in Mandaluyong City to meet her accountant,
Milan, regarding her application for a business permit. Lantion-Tom pointed out that the charge
against her was eventually dismissed.

The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claro’s Counter Affidavit
dated March 23, 2000,27 Lantion-Tom’s Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,28 Emmanuel
de Claro and Lantion-Tom’s Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,29 Roberto de
Claro’s Witness Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,30 Marlon David’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
March 14, 2000,31 Virginia delos Reyes’ Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,32
Navarro’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,33 accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes’ Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,34 and a Barangay Blotter dated
February 19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes.35 The RTC admitted all these documentary
evidence for the defense in its Order36 dated September 13, 2002.
In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel
de Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and decreed:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering, transporting and distributing
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug, without lawful
authority in violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00 each and the costs of suit.

Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and seized from the accused
during the aforesaid operation are forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government shall be
turned over to the PDEA pursuant to law for proper disposal without delay.37

Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal38 on October 23, 2003. Accused-appellants
Roberto delos Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of appeal39 on October 29, 2003 and
December 30, 2003, respectively.

Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of appeal,40 instead,
filing before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings
Pursuant [to] Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court41 on October 30, 2003, and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration42 on November 3, 2003. Emmanuel de Claro asked
the RTC to review its judgment of conviction based on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACCUSED

DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL THE THREE (3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-UP
AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA PLAZA HOTEL.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE, DELIVERY AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED
DRUG.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION ON
THE BASIS MAINLY OF A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE
ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE
FACT THAT ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT AFFORDED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.43

Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal
drug deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul was suspicious, if not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these
police officers testified that Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing
the box with sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges against
Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly argued that the prosecution failed to contradict
his well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and his brother went to Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City to meet his wife’s accountant, so they could attend to several documents
pertaining to a business permit. Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC should have
highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes’ testimony which directly contradicted
the police officers’ statements.

In its Order44 dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de Claro’s motion to
withdraw his notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for
reconsideration.

The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition45 on December 19, 2003, objecting to Emmanuel
de Claro’s motions for reconsideration and maintaining that its police-witnesses’ categorical,
consistent, and straight-forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.

In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order46 dated
January 12, 2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly
admitted that it erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense.
Thus, the RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby GRANTED and a

new one entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. Consequently, his immediate release
from detention is hereby ordered unless he is detained for other cause or causes.47
Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants, the RTC
forwarded the complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course
to the said appeals in our Resolution48 dated June 21, 2004.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellant’s Brief49 on September 15, 2004,
while accused-appellant Reyes filed his Appellant’s Brief50 on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to
our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,51 we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.52 Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its Consolidated Brief53 on
January 21, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-
appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to
reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the police officers’ testimonies deserve
credence than accused-appellants’ defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to
rebut the presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duties.

The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution54 dated January 31, 2007,
we required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-
appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes filed their manifestations55 on March 14, 2007,
April 10, 2007, and April 13, 2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already
filed before the Court of Appeals.

In his Appellant’s Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the following errors of
the RTC:

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTORY

TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE ARREST IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF PO3 VIRGILIO
SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.

III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PROSECUTION’S

EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN THE COURT A
QUO GRANTED BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.56

Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellant’s Brief:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS VALID, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF R.A.
6425.57

Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them
by the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the
material inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct
examination that accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes handed the "plastic bag with box
inside" to accused-appellant Reyes, but he admitted during cross-examination that he did not
see such transfer. The prosecution was unable to present any evidence to prove the source of
the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu, and the money paid as consideration
for the illegal drugs. The prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes’ straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by Marlon David, that he
was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in
Mandaluyong City.

Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecution’s version of the arrests of the
suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-
appellants’ fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the
exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-
appellants, were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant
and not because of any apparent criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a
warrantless arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized
from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants,

maintaining that:

I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES

HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID SINCE IT FALLS
SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN SUFFICE TO
CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

V. MERE DENIAL AND "HULIDAP," WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT EXCULPATE APPELLANTS

FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY

UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT HAD NOT
BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.58

Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers’ statements, as pointed out
by accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while
accused-appellants’ defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus,
should be looked upon with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for
the illegal drug deal, since consideration is not an element of the crime charged.

Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a

crime or in flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act
of distributing, without legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, on the night of February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the
warrantless arrests executed by the police officers enjoy the presumption that "official duty has
been regularly performed."

We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the
facts surrounding accused-appellants’ arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Lantion-Tom from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of
the Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still
finding probable cause against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.59

Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision60 dated
September 23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro,
but acting on Emmanuel de Claro’s motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order61
dated January 12, 2004, totally reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the
RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by the defense.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de
Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving
absolute credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-
appellants of the crime charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of
Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its assailed decision that "when the issue involves the
credibility of a witness, the trial court’s assessment is entitled to great weight."62

Guided by the settled rule that "where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced
fail[ed] to meet the test of moral certainty,"63 we find that the findings and conclusion of the
RTC in its subsequent Order64 dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de
Claro) is more in keeping with the evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the
very same evidence were presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the
evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.

Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC
correctly observed that:

Viewed vis-à-vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the insistence by the
accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or reassessment of the evidence by
the prosecution be considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the
prosecution through the crucible of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration
of every circumstance of the case.

It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense
are diametrically opposed to each other. While this court had already made its conclusion that
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are
given full faith and credit and reject the frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant
[Emmanuel de Claro], nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it appears that the court
erred.

In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them
police officers, with regard to the material facts of how the crime was allegedly committed
engenders doubt as to their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave
identical testimonies of the events that happened from the moment they arrived at 2 o’clock in
the afternoon until the arrest of the accused at 10:30 o’clock in the evening at the EDSA
Shangri-La premises. This uniform account given by these witnesses cannot but generate the
suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well
thought-out and prefabricated story. Because of the close camaraderie of these witnesses who
belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the same story. Furthermore,
their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly that they testified uniformly only as
to material facts but have not given the particulars and the details having relation with the
principal facts. While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in
the evening, they were not able to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at the
premises without being noticed by their target. They could not also gave (sic) an explanation
how their confidential informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was
supposed to take place on that date involving several personalities. Except for their bare
allegation that they have that information regarding the drug deal they were not able to present
any proof of such report, say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot report.
Even their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented. Worth
remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is said that: . . . "[i]t often
happens with fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of." It has also
been said that "an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a
material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the
case incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness
may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable."65 (Emphasis supplied.)

There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses’ sworn statements
following accused-appellants’ arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers
attested in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that "upon sensing suspicious
transactions being undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted
the suspects and introduced themselves as ‘Police Officers’ and after that, subject persons
deliberately admitted that they have in their possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed the
same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest."66 Yet,
during trial before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they brought accused-
appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the four
suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of the suspects’ purported admission.

We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement
even when, according to the prosecution’s version of events, she was the first person to deliver
the shabu. This seriously dents the prosecution’s sequence of events on the night of February
17, 2000.

In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their

defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal,
not at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to
incriminate themselves for possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon
David’s testimony and Navarro’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel
de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La
Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Tom’s accountant, regarding documents for a business permit
(photocopies of the said documents were presented during trial); and that they were illegally
arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These
pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the presumption of regularity in
the performance by the arresting police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable
doubt in accused-appellants’ favor.

Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecution’s version of the events that took place on the
night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants’ persons,
incidental to their arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants’
possession.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3,

paragraph 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thus:

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)

The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations.67

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners).68

In People v. Molina,69 we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding the
search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:

In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as
recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly
indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension."

Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . .
. [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts
and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to
the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled
that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic
baby chairs.

Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was
attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer
(sic) to them."' In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.

It went on to state that —

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.70 (Emphases supplied.)

Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the
in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the
arrests.

A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal
that they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal
drug deal was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the
suspects pass from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police
team was already able to conclude that the box contained shabu and "sensed" that an illegal
drug deal took place.

SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:

Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?

A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.

Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do after briefing?

A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza,
what happened next, if any?

A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the informant that they
were the personalities involved.

xxxx

Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?

A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir.

xxxx

Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong?

A: Through our informant, sir.

Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?

A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after that they went out,
sir.
xxxx

Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?

A: One (1) minute, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you say they who is the companion?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after they went out to the car?

A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and handed to Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car?

A: White plastic bag, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir.

Q: With the bag?

A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.

xxxx

Q: What did you do?

A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx

Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?

A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.

Q: How about De Claro?

A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?

A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.71 (Emphases supplied.)

PO3 Santiago’s testimony also did not offer much justification for the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants and search of their persons:

Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the place where blue
Mazda car was parked, what happened next?

A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic bag with a box
inside to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando
Delos Reyes [Botong], sir.

Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from inside that Mazda
car?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?

A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what happened after that?

A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro [Cocoy] returned back
inside the said restaurant, sir.

Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?

A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.

Q: After that what happened next?

A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box inside to Mac-Mac,
sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we apprehended
them, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular place and time?

A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.

Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?

A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a drug-deal, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do?

A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.

Q: At your office, what else did you do?

A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory examination was
made and other pertaining papers regarding the arrest of the accused.

Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated evidence that you
are saying?

A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance
suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.

Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?

A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from Mac-Mac?

A: They were placed inside the box, sir.72 (Emphases supplied.)

PO3 Yumul’s narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago:

Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?

A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.

Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential informant?

A: The identities of the persons, sir.

Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the confidential informant at
the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?

A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived together with their car, sir.
xxxx

Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the information?

A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically positioned ourselves in the
place where the drug-deal will occur, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza and
Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened next after that?

A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .

Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?

A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.

Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?

A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.

xxxx
Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?

A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then, what happened next, if any?

A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.

Q: When you say "nag-usap sila" to whom are you referring?

A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?

A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.

Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?

A: No, sir.
xxxx

Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was the subject of their
conversation?

A: No, sir.

Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each other?

A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop?

A: He talked to somebody inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?

A: No, sir.

Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the Whistle Stop?

A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to the side of Whistle
Stop in front of the blue car, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did you do then?

A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.

Q: And then what happened next, if any?

A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And who received that item or article from the car?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to Cocoy the white plastic
bag?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was that person?

A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

xxxx

Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to Cocoy, what did you do?

A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they walked in different
direction, Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and then Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir.
xxxx

Q: And then what happened next after that?

A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do then?

A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went inside and told me
that we will going to get them, sir.

Q: Why are you going to get them?

A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?

A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago to avoid
commotion, sir.

Q: Then what did you do next after that?

A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.

Q: And then what did you do, if any?

A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office, sir.73 (Emphases
supplied.)

Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and
searched the latter’s persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic
bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These
circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of a felonious enterprise." SPO1
Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects’ identities, and
they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of
the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the
confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to
confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic
bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish
a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of
the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal
drug deal.

Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity
of the shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.

In People v. Sy Chua,74 we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the
same one presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the
place where it was taken, to wit:

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant
were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial
field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they
were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of
the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory.75 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the
RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura
and PO3 Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box
inside the white plastic bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes
and before proceeding to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-
examination76 that he saw the shabu for the first time at the police office. At any rate, all three
police officers recounted that the shabu was marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police
office.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of
accused-appellants’ persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu
from accused-appellants’ possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu
is excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime
charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.

As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua77 :

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much
more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant.
Neither can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in
aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that —
a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.
Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds,
otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.78

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes
and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are
ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another
crime.

G.R. NO. 181546 : September 3, 2008]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO ALUNDAY, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164 dated 9
October 2007 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,
Mountain Province, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 1528, finding accused-appellant Ricardo
Alunday guilty of violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."

On 7 August 2000, two informations were filed against accused-appellant before the RTC of
Bontoc, Mountain Province, for violating the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,2 and Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866.
In Criminal Case No. 1528, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6425, committed in the following manner:

That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning thereof at a marijuana plantation with an area
of TEN (10) hectares, more or less, and which form part of the public domain at Mount Churyon,
Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, and with intent to plant and cultivate,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture marijuana
fruiting tops weighing more than 750 grams, with an estimated value of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that the same is a prohibited
drug or from which a dangerous drug maybe manufactured or derived.3

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 1529, accused-appellant was additionally charged with
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,4 committed as follows:

That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning therof at a marijuana plantation situated at
Mount Churyon, Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any license or permit thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession an M16 Rifle, a high powered
firearm, bearing Serial No. 108639, with engraved marks of "COREY BOKZ" on the left side of
the gun butt and six (6) letter "x" on the handgrip which he carried outside his residence without
any written authority or permit previously acquired from the authorities to carry or transport the
same.5

On 22 November 2000, accused-appellant assisted by a counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty6 to

both charges. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 1 George Saipen; (b) SPO1 Felix Angitag; (c) Police Officer (PO) 2 Joseph Aspilan; (d)
Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad, Chief, Intelligence Section, Police Provincial Office,
Mountain Province; (e) PO2 Roland Ateo-an; (f) Edward Sacgaca, Philippine Information
Agency; (g) SPO1 Celestino Victor Matias; and (h) Emilia Gracia Montes, Forensic Analyst,
Philippine National Police (PNP), Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet.

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant Ricardo Alunday, Wayto Alunday
and Linda Dalasnac, aunt and daughter respectively, of accused-appellant.

The prosecution's version of the case is as follows:

Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of Mountain
Province received a report from a confidential informant of an existing marijuana plantation
within the vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province. Acting on the confidential
information, Chief of the Intelligence Section of Mountain Province, Police Senior Inspector
Andrew Cayad (Cayad), engaged the services of another confidential informant to validate said
report. After a series of validations, the confidential informant confirmed the existence of the
subject plantation.7

Cayad reported the matter to the Provincial Director, who immediately directed Cayad to lead a
70-men police contingent to make an operation plan. A joint operation from the whole Mountain
Province Police Force was formed.8 The police operation was termed Operation Banana.

On 2 August 2000, a contingent composed of policemen from Bauko, Sabangan, Tadian,

Sadanga, Provincial Headquarters and Bontoc Municipal Headquarters proceeded to Mount
Churyon. Edward Sacgaca of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) was invited to videotape
the operation.9 The team left Bontoc for Betwagan, Sadanga, in the afternoon of 2 August
2000.10 They reached Betwagan at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon and slept there up to
midnight. Thereafter, they proceeded to Mount Churyon where they arrived at around 6 o'clock
in the morning of the following day or on 3 August 2000.11 A group of policemen, one of whom
was SPO1 George Saipen (Saipen) of the Bontoc PNP, was dispatched to scout the area ahead
of the others, while the rest stayed behind as back-up security. At a distance of 30 meters,
Saipen, together with the members of his group, saw Ricardo Alunday (Alunday) herein
accused-appellant, cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1 Saipen and others
approached Alunday and introduced themselves as members of the PNP.12 SPO1 Saipen,
together with the other policemen, brought said accused-appellant to a nearby hut.

Inside the hut, the operatives saw an old woman, an M16 rifle and some dried marijuana leaves.
The other members of the raiding team uprooted and thereafter burned the marijuana plants,
while the team from the Provincial Headquarters got some samples of the marijuana plants and
brought the same to their headquarters. The samples were turned over by Police
Superintendent Rodolfo Anagaran to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Emilia Gracia
Montes, Forensic Analyst, PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, received 17 pieces of fully grown suspected marijuana plants for laboratory
examination and analyses. She tested the subject specimens and found all to be positive for
marijuana.13

Accused-appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident.

He vehemently denied the accusations. He maintained that on 2 August 2000, he went to Mount
Churyon to haul the lumber that he had cut and left by the river. He spent the night at the hut of
an old woman named Ligka Baydon.

At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day or on 3 August 2000, he went out of
the hut to search for squash to cook for breakfast. A group of policemen suddenly came. Two of
them approached him and asked if he owned the marijuana plants growing around the premises
and the land on which these were planted. He answered in the negative and further stated that
he did not even know how a marijuana plant looked like. The policemen then proceeded to
uproot and burn the supposed marijuana plants. Subsequently, the policemen took him with
them to the PNP Headquarters in Bontoc despite his refusal to go with them.

Wayto Alunday and Linda Dalasnac, the aunt and daughter of Ricardo Alunday, respectively,
corroborated the latter's testimony that he was indeed at Mount Churyon on 3 August 2000 to
get some lumber.14

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty in Crim. Case No. 1528 but was
acquitted in Crim. Case No. 1529. The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision, dated 8
May 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered -

1. Sentencing Ricardo Alunday alias "Kayad" in Criminal Case 1528, to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos-the land involved in the
commission of the offense not having been shown to be part of the public domain;
andcralawlibrary

2. Acquitting the above-named accused in Criminal Case 1529 on reasonable doubt.15

From the decision of conviction, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.16

On 11 November 2004, accused-appellant filed an appellant's brief17 before the Supreme

Court. On 4 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the People's Brief.18
Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was reclusion perpetua, the case was remanded to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.19

On 9 October 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the RTC, the
fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 8 May 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province is hereby AFFIRMED.20

Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal21 on 5 November 2007. Thus, the Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.

In our Resolution22 dated 19 March 2008, the parties were notified that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. People23 opted
not to file a supplemental brief on the ground that it had exhaustively argued all the relevant
issues in its brief, and the filing of a supplemental brief would only entail a repetition of the
arguments already discussed therein. Accused-appellant submitted his supplemental brief on 12
June 2008.

In the beginning, accused-appellant raised a lone error, thus:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.24

Later, in his supplemental brief dated 11 June 2008, he added another alleged error, thus:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE DESPITE ITS INADMISSIBILITY FOR BEING THE RESULT OF
AN UNLAWFUL ARREST.25

As regards the guilt of accused-appellant, we find the expostulations of the Court of Appeals
worth reiterating:
It is jurisprudential that factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve on matters
of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions,
can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.

We have carefully scrutinized the record and found no cogent reason to depart from this rule.

xxx

Indeed, in the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the following with conviction:

(1) On 3 August 2000, a police continent raided a marijuana plantation located in Mount
Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province.

(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen cutting and gathering marijuana plants from the
premises.

(3) There were no other plants except marijuana which were growing in the said area.

(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant and an old woman as a camp or temporary
dwelling which existed alone within the area of the subject plantation.

(5) The samples taken from the said plantation were all found to be positive for marijuana.

On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's bare denials
must necessarily fail. Moreover, it is interesting to note that appellant never mentioned his aunt,
Wayto Alunday, in his testimony. In fact, she contradicted appellant's testimony when she said
that he ate and slept in her hut. This only bolsters the conclusion that Wayto Alunday was not
present when appellant was captured by the police.26

Needless to state, the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused.27
Contrarily, we find accused-appellant's posturings tenuous. Again, we cannot deviate from the
Court of Appeals' valid observation:

Aside from appellant's preposterous claim that he was looking for squash in the subject area
where only marijuana plants were planted, he did not advance any explanation for his presence
thereat. Besides, prosecution witness Saipen categorically stated that he caught appellant red-
handed harvesting marijuana plants. Thus, We find it facetious that appellant did not even know
what a marijuana plant looked like.

Appellant asserts that the plantation in question was maintained by the Cordillera People's
Liberation Army which witness Cayad confirmed likewise. Thus, appellant theorizes that he
could not have been the perpetrator of the crime charged.

We find appellant's assertion specious. A perusal of Section 9, Art. II of R.A. No. 6425 shows
that a violation exists when a person shall cultivate, plant or culture on any medium Indian
hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum) or any other plant which may hereafter be classified
as dangerous drug. Indeed, ownership of the land where the marijuana seedlings are planted,
cultivated and cultured is not a requisite of the offense.28

Accused-appellant further assails his conviction for being improper and illegal asserting that the
court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was arrested without a
warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court. He insists that the arresting
officers had three months within which to secure a warrant from the time they received the
information about an existing marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000,
until they effected accused-appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000. Also, accused maintains that
the arresting officers' failure to secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the
situation.

Accused-appellant's claim of irregularity in his arrest is, at the most, limp.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
andcralawlibrary

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.29 In
flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the
arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime,
or is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the
arresting officer.30

It must be recalled that the Intelligence Section of the Provincial Office of the Mountain Province
received the information sometime in May 2000, and accused-appellant was arrested by SPO1
Saipen during the police raid at the plantation at Mount Churyon, Sadanga, only on 3 August
2000. This is so because the arrest was effected only after a series of validations31 conducted
by the team to verify or confirm the report that indeed a marijuana plantation existed at the area
and after an operation plan was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental brief,
the information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally confirmed only on 2 August
2000.32 On 3 August 2000, the arresting team of SPO1 Saipen proceeded to the marijuana
plantation. SPO1 Saipen saw accused-appellant personally cutting and gathering marijuana
plants. Thus, accused-appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was caught in
flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers.33

In People v. Sucro34 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof,
he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In
essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto
or caught in the act of committing a crime.

SPO1 George Saipen testified on direct examination, thus:

Q. When you reached that Mount Churyon at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of August 3,
2000, what did you see there Mr. Witness, if any?cralawred

A. We were able to see a man cutting plants which we came to know as marijuana plants.

Q. You said we, who were you companions when you saw a man cutting marijuana?
cralawred

A. The Bontoc Operatives.

Q. All of you?cralawred

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You mentioned a while back about marijuana plantation, will you describe to us why you
say that [it] is a marijuana plantation?cralawred

A. That is marijuana plantation because I think, more or less four (4) hectares were planted
with marijuana plants.

Q. And how tall were these marijuana plants in that marijuana plantation Mr. Witness?
cralawred

A. Some are fully grown around 4 to 5 feet while some are still young about 2 feet while
some are still seedling.

Q. And you said that you saw a man gathering marijuana plants, how far were you when you
saw this man? Could you give us an estimate?cralawred

A. From this witness stand up to there.

COURT:
You stipulate counsel.

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

About 30 meters, Your Honor.

PROS. DOMINGUEZ:

And how was the terrain of that Mount Churyon, is it flat?

A. Where the plantation is located it is somewhat slope and a little bit flat.

Q. You mean rolling hills?cralawred

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you do when you saw a man cutting or gathering marijuana plants?cralawred

A. Upon seeing that man cutting marijuana plants, I cautioned my companions at my back
telling them that there is a man down cutting marijuana which prompted them to move; that
others proceeded to the camp while me and my one companion went to the man and cautioned
him not to make unnecessary movements.35

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.36 We have also
ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to
move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment.37 And since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any
defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.38 We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of
an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused.
Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only
during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his
arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his
arraignment.

It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information
has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him.39

Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest,
because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the
voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active
participation in the trial thereafter.40

In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts questionable, if

not improper, motive on the part of the police officers. Unfortunately for appellant, jurisprudence
instructs us that in cases involving illegal drugs, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who
are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.41 Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses
for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so
moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit.42 In this case, the
records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the
police officers. The following observations of the trial court are, indeed, appropriate, thus:

Absent as it is in the record indications of personal interest or improper motive on their part to
testify against the accused, the witnesses for the prosecution being government law enforcers
and/or officials, actually present during the incident in question in the performance of their
duties, are trustworthy sources. And the recollections in open court of such witnesses of the
events that transpired on the occasion, given in clear and direct manner, corroborating and
complimenting each other on material points, and highly probable in the natural order of things,
are easy to believe and thus accorded full credence.

In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified in behalf of the former
are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on account of self-interest and blood kinship.
Situated as they are, their inclination to be truthful is highly suspect. And quite aside from being
self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are inconsistent, and manifestly concocted or
improbable to be seriously considered.43
All told, the cultivation of marijuana fruiting tops by accused-appellant having been established
beyond reasonable doubt, we are constrained to uphold appellant's conviction. The penalty
imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, being in accord with law, is likewise
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 1528,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991,
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards
P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling
in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard
at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect
had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information
could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor
an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that
the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion,
wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to
expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and
ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be
suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail
of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the
following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48
hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July
1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his
right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same
date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous
hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and
22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He
alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier
filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled
to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon
the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its
first witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing

the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation.
At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him.
During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified
petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He
waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the
trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment
order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner
was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be
granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's
conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991,
the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the
criminal case below until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a
lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We
consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman
who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor
General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v.
Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although
effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been
arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing
the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated.
Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses
constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which
petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and
completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal
shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within
the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding
rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty
of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there
was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as
noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule
112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been
accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at
the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and
that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary
investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional
Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his
omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information
sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the
case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and
not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor
himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion
for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's
omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial
court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the
very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial
court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day
reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied
with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal
or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity
to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right.
To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure
of his right to due process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation
in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is
that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or
at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously
insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after
their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not
have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for
release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we
cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact,
when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation,
he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a
legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the
statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to
bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence
of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of
respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no
evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to
respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before.
It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4)
witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to
be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the
merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he
may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant
a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not
accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to
undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with
extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted
to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking .
During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and
objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout,
promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its
first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial
without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection."
29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge
the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's
witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio
selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use
what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled
to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning
petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move
in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the
record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to
benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out
ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And,
in any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the
rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to
respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order
of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any
lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move
for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 145318-19 : May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SONNY BUENDIA y BENJAMIN,

Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan City,
finding accused-appellant Sonny Buendia guilty of two counts of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case and to indemnify the offended party,
Maribel Caliwag, in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and an additional P50,000.00
as moral damages per count of rape, or P200,000.00 in totality, and to pay the costs.

The complainant in the two cases, Maribel Caliwag y Garcia, is the sister of the common law
wife of accused-appellant Sonny Buendia.

The information in Criminal Case No. C-42738 alleged

That on or about the month of September, 1992 in Kal. City, MM, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and taking
advantage of his superior strength, by means of force, threats and intimidation employed on the
person of one, MARIBEL CALIWAG y GARCIA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with the undersigned, a minor of sixteen (16)
years old, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. C-42739 charged

That on or about the month of November, 1992 in Kal. City, MM, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and taking
advantage of his superior strength, by means of force, threats and intimidation employed on the
person of one, MARIBEL CALIWAG y GARCIA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with the undersigned, a minor of sixteen (16)
years old, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon the cases were
jointly tried.
The prosecution presented evidence to the following effect:

Sometime in September 1992, at about 4 oclock in the afternoon, Maribel Caliwag was alone
lying in the sala of their house in Mulawin Street, Amparo Subdivision, Novaliches, Caloocan
City, when accused-appellant Sonny Buendia arrived. Accused-appellant proceeded to the
kitchen, got a knife, and with it ordered Maribel to get up. He held her hand and dragged Maribel
inside a room. He then removed her shorts and panties, raised her T-shirt, and pushed her
down on a low wooden bed (papag). Maribel pleaded with him, saying, Hwag, natatakot ako sa
iyo! (Dont, Im afraid of you!), but accused-appellant ordered her not to make any noise or he
would harm her. He placed himself on top of Maribel, and lowered his pants and briefs down to
his knees. Maribel resisted accused-appellants advances, but the latter proved to be stronger.
Accused-appellant kissed her on the lips and cheeks and spread her legs apart. He then held
his penis and inserted it into her vagina. Maribel felt pain as accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her for about two minutes. When accused-appellant was through, Maribel
noticed a white and thick substance coming out of his organ. Accused-appellant left, but not
before warning her not to tell anybody about the incident or else he would kill her and her family.
Maribel could not do anything but cry. She told no one of the incident because she was afraid of
the threats made by the accused.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Two months later, in November of the same year, she was again raped by accused-appellant.
According to Maribel, at about 11 oclock in the morning, she was asked by her mother to get a
bowl from her sister Remys house, located about 50 meters from their house. When she
reached the house, only Remys children, aged five and three years old, were there playing in
the backyard.

While Maribel was in the kitchen of the house, accused-appellant Sonny Buendia, whose house
was beside that of Remy, came. He locked the door behind him and ordered Maribel not to
shout. When she asked him what he wanted, accused-appellant took a small knife, poked it at
her waist, and forced her to go upstairs. As before, accused-appellant began kissing her on the
lips and the cheeks. He lowered her shorts and panties, and then his own shorts and briefs
down to his knees. Accused-appellant lifted Maribel and pushed her to the floor. She pleaded
with him, saying, Hwag po! (Please, dont!), but he did not heed her.5 Accused-appellant put his
body on top of her, pinned her hands, and spread her legs, as complainant continued pleading,
Hwag, natatakot ako! (Dont, Im afraid!) Maribel struggled to free herself, but accused-appellant
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Maribel said she felt pain in her vagina.
Maribel claimed she could not shout even if she wanted to because she was afraid accused-
appellant might harm her. When he had finished with her, accused-appellant warned her not to
report the incident to anyone or he would kill all of them and then left.

On March 21, 1993, no longer able to contain her fear as accused-appellant kept following her
around with evident evil desire, Maribel finally asked her classmate, Florida Tadea, to help her
go to the house of their former classmate, Rex Babuyog, who was a member of the Bantay
Bayan, so that they could seek assistance from the authorities. Bantay Bayan is a group of male
residents living in their area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community and
is an accredited auxiliary of the Caloocan City PNP. Upon Maribels complaint, members of the
Bantay Bayan arrested accused-appellant and turned him over to the Caloocan City Police Sub-
Station at Urduja, Caloocan City.6cräläwvirtualibräry

Florida Tadea corroborated Maribels testimony. According to her, at about 3 oclock in the
afternoon of March 21, 1993, Maribel went to her house, crying. She appeared to be frightened.
(Takot na takot at umiiyak.) Florida said Maribel told her that she (Maribel) had been raped
twice by her brother-in-law, accused-appellant Sonny Buendia. Florida therefore accompanied
Maribel to the house of Rex Babuyog, their former high school classmate and a member of the
Bantay Bayan, who in turn took them to Sonny Alberca, Chief and Organizer of the Bantay
Bayan. The party went to the house of accused-appellant, but the latter was not in his house
when they arrived thereat. Hence, the three proceeded to the house of Maribel and told her
parents about the incidents that befell their daughter.

Upon learning what had happened, Maribels mother fainted, while her father raged. On the
other hand, Imelda, the common law wife of accused-appellant, pulled Maribels hair and
slapped her to reproach her for not telling them about the incidents earlier.

In the evening of the same day, Bantay Bayan members went back to accused-appellant Sonny
Buendias house and finally arrested him.7 Rex Babuyog,8 Sonny Alberca9 and Alberto
Caliwag10 corroborated the testimony of Florida Tadea.

PO3 Dicoroso Domingo, Police Investigator of the Caloocan City Police Station II, testified that
at around 7 oclock in the evening of March 21, 1993, he conducted an investigation on the
charges against accused-appellant. He said that when accused-appellant was presented to
Maribel Caliwag, the latter positively identified the former as the person who had raped her.
According to PO3 Domingo, he took the statement of the complainant11 and prepared the
letter-request addressed to the NBI for the examination of complainant12 and the Referral
Slip13 addressed to the City Prosecutor.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Louella Nario, medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that she conducted a physical and
genital examination on Maribel Caliwag and recorded her findings in Living Case Report No.
MG-93-253,15 the pertinent portions of which state:

LIVING CASE REPORT NO. MG-93-253

GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

Height: 150.0 cms. Weight: 43.5 Kgs.

Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, ambulatory subject. Breasts,

developed, hemispherical, doughy. Areolae, brown, 3.5 cms. in diameter. Nipples brown,
protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter. No extragenital physical injuries noted.

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax.
Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, moderately thick, moderately tall, intact. Hymenal orifice,
annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance. Vaginal walls, tight.
Rugosities, prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.

2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (2.0 cms in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration
by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury.

For the defense, accused-appellant Sonny Buendia testified in his own behalf. He said that
Maribel Caliwag is his sister-in-law because she is the sister of his wife Imelda. He denied
having raped her. He claimed that, in the month of September 1992, when the first rape was
allegedly committed, he was working at the Marble Supply Company in Sauyo, Novaliches,
Quezon City. This place, according to him, was very far from his house and would take two
jeepney rides to reach from his house. He said he worked there six days a week, from 8 oclock
in the morning up to 5 oclock in the afternoon. He left home for work at 6 oclock in the morning
and arrived home from work at about 8 oclock in the evening, so that it was impossible for him
to have committed the crime at 4 oclock in the afternoon. Buendia further claims that he often
went to the cockpit on Sundays from 9 oclock in the morning up to 8 oclock in the evening so
that he could likewise not have committed the crime on this day. In the month of November
1992, when the second incident allegedly took place, Buendia claimed he was working at the
same Marble Supply Company. On Sundays, he was likewise at the cockpit from 9 oclock in the
morning up to 8 oclock at night.
Buendia said that he talked to his father-in-law sometime in 1996, after the criminal case against
him had been filed, and that he asked the latter if it was possible to drop the rape charges
against him. His father-in-law allegedly asked for P50,000.00 as a condition for settling the
cases against him, but accused-appellant said that he could afford to pay only
P10,000.00.16cräläwvirtualibräry

On August 28, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds the accused SONNY BUENDIA y BENJAMIN guilty as principal of TWO
(2) COUNTS of rape as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. C-42738 and C-42739, and there being
no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, hereby
sentences him to suffer for each count the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law. He is further sentenced to pay to the complainant
MARIBEL CALIWAG y GARCIA the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages in each case, or a total of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this appeal.

I. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (a) in giving credence to the testimony of
private complainant which allegedly is contrary to human experience; (b) in not taking into
account that private complainant did not put up any resistance when accused-appellant
allegedly made advances at her; (c) in not considering the delay of six months before private
complainant reported the crime; and (d) in disregarding the presumption of innocence in his
favor.18cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant argues that the testimony of complainant Maribel Caliwag is incredible and
contrary to human experience. Accused-appellant asserts that if the victims panties and shorts
had been pulled down to her knees, it was impossible for her to climb the wooden bed or papag,
in the same way that he could not have climbed the same to perform the sexual act because he
too was supposed to have lowered his shorts and briefs down to his knees. Accused-appellant
likewise contends that Maribels testimony that some white substance from accused-appellants
sex organ fell on her panties is also incredible since her panties had been drawn down to her
knees. Furthermore, accused-appellant asserts that it was not natural for Maribel to have seen
the former everyday after the rape incident without showing fear or anger at what he had
allegedly done to her.19cräläwvirtualibräry
These contentions are without merit.

A. Maribel never said that her panties and shorts were wrapped around her knees as were
accused-appellants pants and briefs so as to make it impossible for both of them to have
climbed the wooden bed (papag) where he had sexual intercourse with her. What she said was
that accused-appellant removed her shorts and panties to her knees, laid her down on the
papag, and spread her legs in order to insert his penis into her vagina. Maribels testimony is as
follows:

Q What did the accused do after you had entered the room?

A He removed my shorts and my panties.

Q By the way, what were you wearing at that time?

A Shorts and panties.

Q How about the upper part of your body?

A T-shirt.

Q Who removed your shorts and panties?

A Sonny Buendia.

Q When he removed your shorts and panties, what was your position?

A I was standing.

Q How about your T-shirt?

A He just raised it.

Q What happened after removing your shorts and panties and raising your T-shirt?

A He laid me down on the papag.

Q This papag is inside the room?

A Yes.

Q How did the accused make you lie on the papag?

A He pushed me.

....

Q By the way, what was the accused wearing at that time?

A Pants.

Q What kind of pants?

A Maong pants.

Q How about the upper part of his body?

A T-shirt.

Q When you said he placed his body on top of you, what did he do with his pants?
A He removed it.

Q Did the accused remove his pants completely?

A No.

Q How did the accused remove his pants?

A He just lowered it up to his knees.

Q How about his briefs?

A He did the same.

....

Q Could you tell us how [was] the accused able to insert his sex organ to your sex organ?

A He held it.

Q How about your position at that time, what was your position?

A My legs were spread apart.

Q How about the legs of the accused?

A They were between my legs.

Q What did you feel when the accused you said was able to insert his sex organ to your sex
organ?
A It was painful.

Q When the sex organ of the accused was inserted in your sex organ, what motion did he
make?

A He was making a push and pull movement.

B. Contrary to accused-appellants claim, Maribel did not say that the white substance she saw
coming out of accused-appellants organ directly dropped on her panties which were supposedly
lowered to her knees. Although she seems to have said that after seeing a white substance
come out of accused-appellants organ she also found the same on her panties which were then
lowered down to her knees, what she in fact meant was that after putting on her panties she
noticed it smeared with the white substance coming from her own organ.20 Thus, she testified
as regards the alleged first rape:

Q When the accused removed his sex organ from your sex organ, according to you about two
(2) minutes, was there something that came out of his sex organ?

A Yes.

Q What was that came out from the sex organ of the accused?

A Something white and thick.

Q Where did you see that something white and thick?

A On my panties.

Q Where were your panties then?

A On my knees.
Q After two minutes, what did you do when the accused left warning you not to tell anybody
about what happened or what he did to you because if you will do that, he will kill you and the
members of your family?

A None, I just cried.

Q What else after you cried?

A None.

Q When the accused had already left, what did you do?

A I went out of the room and went to the sala.

Q Before going to the sala, what did you do? Did you put on your shorts and panties?

A Yes.

Q What happened when you put on your panties? What did you see on your panties?

A Something white and thick.

Q You said that after you put on your panties and shorts, you saw that white thick substance,
did you examine for yourself what was that white and thick substance coming out of your sex
organ and dropping on your panties?

A Yes.

Q What did you find out?

A Only that white and thick.21cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the alleged second rape, she explained that the whitish substance came from her:

Q After you stood up and have on your panties, what did you see when you put on your
panties?

A There was something whitish like mucus, mam.

Q And did you know where that like mucus came from where?

A From me, mam.22cräläwvirtualibräry

C. Accused-appellant claims that Maribel did not offer any resistance.23 But physical resistance
is not the sole test to determine whether or not a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of
the accused.24 In this case, Maribel resisted although perhaps less feebly than the usual
resistance shown by normal adult women, but this was more due to fear. She said that, on both
occasions when she was raped, she was threatened with a knife if she did not yield to accused-
appellants desires.

Nor does the failure of Maribel to immediately report the rape to the immediate members of her
family or to the police authorities detract from her credibility. She was threatened with harm if
she told anyone what accused-appellant had done to her. But on March 21, 1993, she finally
summoned enough courage to ask the authorities for assistance because she believed that she
would be molested again by accused-appellant. We have upheld convictions in cases where the
rape incidents were not reported until after more than four months.25 In People v. Bugarin,26
this Court held:

Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair the credibility of a witness if such
delay is satisfactorily explained. In People v. Coloma, where the complainant was also only 13
years old when first molested by her father, the Court adverted to the fathers moral and physical
control over the young complainant in explaining the delay of eight years before the complaint
against her father was made. In this case, Maryjane must have been overwhelmed by fear and
confusion, and shocked that her own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very close to
him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother because the latter might be
angered, so that she finally confided to her aunt.
Moreover, the moral ascendancy of accused-appellant over Maribel in this case should be taken
into account. Accused-appellant is not only the common law husband of Maribels sister. Maribel
also received money from him on many occasions.

II. But while there is no merit in the assignment of errors of accused-appellant, there are some
aspects of the prosecution evidence which create doubts about complainants claim that she had
been raped.

A. Complainant claimed that she had been twice raped by accused-appellant, in September
1992 and again in November of that year. She said that on both occasions, accused-appellant
inserted his organ to my sex organ;27 that the result was painful;28 that accused-appellant
made a push and pull movement for about two minutes;29 and that she saw a white and thick
substance coming out of accused-appellants penis as it was removed from her organ.30
However, Dr. Louella Nario, the NBI medico-legal officer who examined complainant and who
testified for the prosecution, made some findings and expressed some conclusions during her
testimony in court which render complainants claim doubtful.

Dr. Narios certificate stated that the hymen [was] intact and its orifice small (2.0 cms. in
diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in
full erection without producing any genital injury. Explaining her finding, Dr. Nario said that she
found no hymenal laceration and that the hymenal orifice, 2 centimeters in diameter, was the
normal size of the orifice, without laceration. There was not even evidence of partial penetration.
Dr. Nario was asked if these could be because of the time lapse of five months between the last
alleged rape of complainant and the date of the examination, but the medico-legal officer said it
was not. She said:

ACP REYES:

Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance, what do
you mean by that?

A We inserted a tube in the hymenal orifice and we found it is a 2.0 cm. in diameter, mam.

Q What is the normal or ordinary hymenal orifice without laceration?

A Usually it is two (2) centimeters or below, mam.

Q Two (2) centimeters or below two (2) centimeters, mam. In your conclusion doctor, the
findings or conclusions states that (1) No evident sign or extragenital physical injuries noted on
the body of the subject at the time of examination. Now doctor the examination was conducted
on March 22, 1993, and the commission was on November 1992, could it be possible that you
did not find any physical injuries on the body of the victim because of the length of time, from
the time of the commission up to the time of the examination?

A Well, it is possible except if the laceration are so serious to be present at the time of the
examination, mam.

Q Doctor, so it is possible if the examination was conducted earlier you could find injury on the
subject?

A Yes, if the subject was examined three (3) to four (4) weeks after laceration was inflicted,
mam.

Q Number 2, Hymen, intact and its orifice small (2.0 centimeters in diameter) as to preclude
complete penetration by an average-sized, adult, Filipino, male organ in full erection without
producing any genital injury. Now, doctor could it be that there was a partial penetration?

A If there was any partial penetration on the size of the hymenal orifice it could be bigger than
two cms., mam.

Q Even if there is a long gap from the commission up to the time of the examination?

A Yes, mam.

Q Another term in this kind as to preclude complete penetration, in your opinion doctor, could it
be very slight penetration of the sex organ, as to the touching of labia minora and majora?

A Yes, it could be possible that there was an abrasion if she was examined earlier, or few days
after the alleged date of commission, mam.

Q So in this case, there will be a slight touching of the penis or vagina of the victim?
A Not the vagina, but the labia majora or minora or vestibule, mam.31cräläwvirtualibräry

To be sure, full penetration of the female organ is not required to sustain a conviction for rape
because the mere entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is sufficient.32 But the question here is not whether the alleged rape
was consummated or only attempted. The question is whether the alleged rape took place at all.
Complainant claimed that accused-appellant had in fact inserted his penis into the vagina and
that for two minutes he did the sexual act by push and pull motion so much as a result of which
she suffered great pain. This, however, is difficult to believe considering the medical finding that
her hymenal orifice was only 2 centimeters in diameter, which is the normal size of an orifice
without injury, and that its size was so small as to preclude complete penetration by an average-
sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. The finding of
the medico-legal officer puts in grave doubt complainants claim that accused-appellant raped
her, each time fully penetrating her.

B. Complainant described the manner by which she was raped by accused-appellant in exactly
the same fashion on each of the two occasions she was allegedly molested: accused-appellant
started by kissing her on the lips and the cheeks, then lowered her panties and her shorts with
one hand and raised her T-shirt with the other; then lowered his body on her while holding her
hands; then spread her legs; and then inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the
sexual act. Except for the place of the crime, the alleged rapes were committed in exactly the
same way.

C. Although the molestations allegedly occurred just four months to the date she made a report
to the authorities, complainant could not give the dates they happened. All she could say was
that the first took place in September, while the second one in November. She could not even
approximate the alleged dates when the rape incidents took place. While the time of
commission is not an essential element of rape, complainants inability to give the dates on
which she was allegedly raped puts her credibility in question. She was already 16 years old
when she was allegedly raped, yet she could not remember when it was she was abused. For a
16-year old lass just coming to womanhood, such a harrowing experience as what complainant
was supposed to have gone through could not have failed to make an indelible impression on
her mind.

In short, the evidence for the prosecution fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence required for
conviction in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan City, finding
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape, is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly
within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 129035 August 22, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE TABLAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed
under surveillance after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were
engaged in selling shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4
Alberto San Juan of OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant before
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122
M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report1 of SPO2 Teneros. It stated that
Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be
one of Federico Verona’s runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the
assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of Verona.2 The search warrant3 was subsequently
issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M.
Hizon Street, Caloocan City.

Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting
inside the second floor master’s bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon
Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened
the front door. Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for
about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they refused to answer. It
was only at the police station where she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2
Teneros. The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad
Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant
and seized the following:4

1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing white crysthalline (sic)
substance or methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with markings by the undersigned
inside the house of subjects’ residence weighing (230) two hundred thirty (sic) grams of
methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu by Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2. Several plastics in different sizes;

3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;

4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner improvised;

5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;

6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;

7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;

8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;

9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;

10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.

The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of
keys, an ATM card, bank books and car documents.

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in an information5 which
reads:

That about 10:30 o’clock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No. 122 SCL M. Hizon St.,
Kalookan City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused
grouping herself together with some other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in
a preliminary investigation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and/or control,
methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total
weight of 230 grams, without the corresponding license and/or prescription to possess, have
custody and/or control over the aforesaid regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant6 asserting that she and her live-in
partner Federico Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, District
2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the present as certified by the owner of the
apartment unit.

On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,7 after which, trial on the merits ensued.

The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant. It
rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE premises considered, and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of the Accused for Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659
and considering that the total net weight of subject drugs consists of 230 grams, this Court in
the absence of any modifying circumstance hereby imposes upon the Accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00 pesos, and to pay the costs.

The period of Accused’s preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in the service of her
sentence pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subject drugs and paraphernalia are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with law.

The return to the Accused of the two (2) cellular phones, (Motorola Micro Fac) (sic) Nos. S-
2968A and S-3123A, which were turned over by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Manila
RTC, Br. 3 to her counterpart in this sala (Exh. "30") as well as the deposit of cash money in the
amount of P22,990.00 with the Manila RTC Clerk of Court JESUS MANINGAS as evidenced by
acknowledgment receipt dated 21 May 1996, are hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.8

On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:9

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF SHABU;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED WAS
ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AFTER FINDING
THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT
DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the reasonableness of the search conducted
by the police officers at accused-appellant’s residence.

The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that:10

Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was served at apartment No. 120
and not at the specific address stated therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not
by itself render as illegal the search and seizure of subject stuff seized by the operatives
pursuant thereto. While it is true that the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural
requirements that the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched is to
the end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure may not be made (sic) and abuses
may not be committed, however, this requirement is not without exception. It is the prevailing
rule in our jurisdiction that even a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended
(People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, Oct. 20, 1925).

Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2 Teneros was principally the
concerned official who conducted an active surveillance on the Accused and subject house
(Surveillance Report, Exh. "9") and pursued this case by filing the corresponding application for
the issuance of a search warrant. Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to have prior and personal knowledge of particular house intended in the warrant
which definitely refer to no other than the very place where the same was accordingly served.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was grossly infirm as the
subject search warrant authorized the police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City. However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan
City.

The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a person, his home and his
possessions against unreasonable intrusions of the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution, which reads:

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS,

AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER
NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT
OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE
DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR
AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR
THINGS TO BE SEIZED.

For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The rule is that
a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places
in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that leads the officer
unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.11

Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.12

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.13
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for authority to search
specifically the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was
accompanied by a sketch14 of the area which bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue
drawn vertically on the left-hand side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other parallel
lines drawn horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on the left-hand side of the upper
parallel line of the lines identified as M. Hizon, is a square marked as "Basketball Court." A
similar drawing placed near the right-hand side of the upper parallel line is another square
marked as "PNR Compound". Beneath the lower parallel line of the lines marked as "M. Hizon"
and right at the center is also a square enclosing an "X" sign marked as "122", presumably No.
122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police asset Dante Baradilla
described the house to be searched as:

Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga bintana ay may rehas na
bakal at sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng
shabu.15

The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out that No. 122 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred
windows and a terrace. It was owned by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore
no house number. The house marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two
houses away from accused-appellant’s house at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three apartments enclosed
by only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120. The different units within No. 120 Hizon St.
were not numbered separately. Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance which
was supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound had an area of approximately
ninety (90) square meters. The second unit was located at the back of the first unit and the third
unit was at the rear end of the compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street
was only through the first two units and the common gate indicated as No. 120. The occupants
of the premises stated that they commonly use No. 120 to designate their residence.

In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that "even a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended."16 The description of the building in the application for a search warrant in
Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself refer to "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City
of Manila, Philippine Islands" which was considered "sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched."17
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in Veloso. At
first glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient.
However, from the application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the
police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended precisely because it was wrongly described as No. 122, although it may have been
located on the same street as No. 120. Even the description of the house by police asset
Baradilla referred to that house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid
the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to
nullify the actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge of
the place. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself
and not the place identified by the police.18

It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the subject of the actual
search. However, as indicated in the witness’ affidavit19 in support of the application for a
search warrant,20 No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days
after the search warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St., SPO2
Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search warrant21 that the warrant "was
properly served at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City, Metro Manila as indicated in the search
warrant itself."

SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the house to be
searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.22
But as this Court ruled in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,23 thus:

The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place
indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended it to be the subject of their application.
Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

"x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside
the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was]
neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the warrant
—[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officer’s theory,
in the context of the facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail’s Variety
Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search."

All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:

Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS
OR THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY
PROCEEDING.

Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in
evidence. Absent these items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant
for the crime charged loses its basis.

As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with
the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.24

On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by the searching team in this
case. In the return of search warrant, they admitted the seizure of cellular phones, money and
television/monitoring device – items that are not within the palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia,
which were the only items authorized to be seized. What is more disturbing is the suggestion
that some items seized were not reported in the return of search warrant, like the Fiat car,
bankbooks, and money. In an attempt to justify the presence of the car in the police station,
SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a most incredible story that the accused-appellant, whose
pregnancy was already in the third trimester, drove her car to the police station after the
intrusion at her house even if the police officers had with them several cars.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.25

It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this
constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with.
To quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v. United States: "It is the duty of courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis."26

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.27

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act
No. 6425 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00 as well as the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco y David @
Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement,
unless she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
G.R. No. 174570 : December 15, 2010]

ROMER SY TAN, PETITIONER, VS. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY
TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, AND BRYAN SY LIM,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy
Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September
1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611
and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] wherein respondents
informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for
the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents
prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject
search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal
case.

In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration
of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed
upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on
the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper
court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents were required to
submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted
their motion to withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Court's directive and submitted a certified
true copy of the Order.[5]

In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29,
2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice
that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation,
were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the
Information.[6] The RTC also considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed
by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents' motion to withdraw the information without
prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is
DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the
subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable
cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents' alleged
acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to
further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical
legal effect.[8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same
incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized
items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioner's contention, he cannot use the
items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search
warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only
one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant's personal knowledge
and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of
the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of
Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the
CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the
crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential
element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime
of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN,
MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to
invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for
reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216
of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995, 4

2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days "to be
released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned
in the Search Warrant."

The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain
was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail
Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-
shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and
P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The
sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on
respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces
of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items
described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm
pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f)
assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.

3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without
mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private
respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To
Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15,
1996;

5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition

for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was
conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in
the order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's
Variety Store;

2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it is correspondingly called
only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment
No. 1;

5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for
ingress and egress.

There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be reduced on the
records.

SO ORDERED.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting the motion to quash
search warrant**; 5

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss** ;

8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;

9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed opposition/comment
and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration** ;

10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated
motion to dismiss**.

Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack
of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: 6

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search
warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings
wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The
place searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment
No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent
to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant.

2. The public prosecutor's claim — that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the
application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched — was
effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not
signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the
Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store
Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated December 15, 1995" — this, too, being the address
given "in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR
INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made more
patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but)
merely attached to the motion for reconsideration." 7

Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge
Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.: 8

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the
Search Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco
Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their
tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant
the words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not
able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT"
or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid."**.

3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place
(herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and
immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant
itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section
11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 10

5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant
to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Paño (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the
previous ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof
and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the
warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the
presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).

6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of "Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil action of
certiorari.

The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the
issuing Court and overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and particularity of
the place to be searched;"

2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application
for warrant despite the clear evidence** to the contrary;"

3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"

4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by
which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal
although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that
rule;" and

6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant
when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof."

The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly
issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or
more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the
warrant.

The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place
to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the
Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the
search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken
therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind — the first of four (4) separate apartment units
(No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" — was not what the Judge who issued warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.

The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises
to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a
description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the
search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made
more particular — and more restrictive — by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the
search be "limited only to the premises herein described."

Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate
and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could
pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of
the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the
rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the
store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla
understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the
warrant — which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described,"
"Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" — thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the
store — they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply
assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched — clearly indicated, according
to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their
application — was sufficient particularization of the general identification of the place in the
search warrant.

The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.

Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued — No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made
to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was
hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously
typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants for the
search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants
specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82
(b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to be searched
when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the
"obviously typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the records in the
official court file. 12

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error"
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In
Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the
warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same;
and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated
in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the
warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the
officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's
finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however
shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the
police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies,
being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts
on which the search warrant was founded.

The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before
Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is,
to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant — which, of course, is the only place
that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof — was not that which the police officers who
applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-
and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was
none for Apartment No. 1 — the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then residing.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: 14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the things to be seized.

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause,
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe
the place to be searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to
the place so described.

There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily
brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation **
(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. 16

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be
made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units — the place to be searched being plainly
marked — was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among
others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the
return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence which
** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the
remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously
availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that
the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant
is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument
that anyway the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.

Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a
search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case,"
the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing
court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is
afterwards filed. 17 In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this
Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and
the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second guideline reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues
the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said
court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it
is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may
be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the
issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative,
not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the
other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against
forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court,
the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is
offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress
evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.

In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or
for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly
been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal
action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress
evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September
11, 1996 — which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders
of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal
Case No. 43-M-96 — is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. BUREAU OF INTERNAL

REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.

On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged
in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to
be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit1 stating:

1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to

as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management
of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines
without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue
Code.

2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;

(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned sardines
processed by UNIFISH;

(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from UNIFISH
without any receipt of his purchases;

(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the
different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;

(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn payable to
cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted (sic);

(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn from the
corporation;

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale
of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that
UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain
exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned
tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the
oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold
unprocessed as is to local customers.

4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to
other food processing companies.

5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being
controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t
that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated
by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH
AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street,
Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices,
delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as
ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be
found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture
and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,

7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and
he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.

On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of
the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.

After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first2 is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR:
VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU

7th Judicial Region

Branch 28

Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,

Unifish Packing Corporation

Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

x-------------------------/

(with sketch)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
(sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy
Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his
possession, care and control, the following:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE

Judge

The second warrant3is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION
OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost
identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It
consisted of only one page.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU

7th Judicial Region

Branch 28

Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and

Unifish Packing Corporation

Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City

x-------------------------/

(with sketch)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a
[sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy
Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has
in his possession, care and control, the following:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles
above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge

Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,4 which was docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-
10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant
B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant
(Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of
unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu ,
Branch 28.

On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice.
The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch
28 of the Cebu RTC.

The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a),
Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:

a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy
thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other
pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).

The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash,
(2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.

The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying
the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to
post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on
the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:

Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other
remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for
certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same
should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These
remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail
for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the
charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the
Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D. 911); 3. if their petition for review
does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the information in the trial court. (Rule 117,
Rules of Court). 4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the
case shall have been tried on the merits.

x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in
the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held that when a motion to quash a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on
the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.

xxx

In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search
Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that
the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the
Search Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of
probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the
properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by
certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.5cräläwvirtualibräry

In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review.

Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and
documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration.
An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in
their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to
the Petition.

Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its
credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been
decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them
essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third,
in a similar case,6 we held that the submission of a document together with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
requiring the submission of a certified true copy of material portions of the record as are referred
to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So
should it be in this case, especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a
constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be
defeated.7cräläwvirtualibräry

The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the
resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of
Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in
220 SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners,8
appears to have been taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA
245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a
complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash a search warrant.

The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,9 where we held that the issuing judges
disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of
discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:

Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that
certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge
de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders
the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order
complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be
entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.

Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor
speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her
personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had
been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and
expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage
and injury to a party.

This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge,
RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10 which also involved a special civil action for
certiorari:11cräläwvirtualibräry

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with
this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not
complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search
warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also
alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the
corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an
adequate remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.12cräläwvirtualibräry

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.13 The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under
it.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in
Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and
A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as
another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify
the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not described
with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible
in evidence.15

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched

Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho
alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrant states the
address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B
consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized.16 The rule is
that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended17and distinguish it from other places
in the community.18 Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the
place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.19 Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,20 where the search warrant
mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the
adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of
sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the
premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified
the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants
invalidation in this case.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants

Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1
and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search
Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
Unifish Packing Corporation.

These discrepancies are hardly relevant.

In Miller v. Sigler,21 it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require
the warrant to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search
warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of
a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search
warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises
sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the
legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left
to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.22cräläwvirtualibräry

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could
not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of
the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.23

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place

In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.

Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that
Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the
warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be
more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the
description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a
single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense.
Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search
Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.

The alleged absence of probable cause

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject
search warrants.

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.24cräläwvirtualibräry

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.25
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance
of a valid search warrant.26cräläwvirtualibräry

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.27 Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor
on mere suspicion or belief.28cräläwvirtualibräry

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish.
Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:

Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?

A. No.

Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?

A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.

Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?

A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of
the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.

Q. From where did you get that information?

A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.29cräläwvirtualibräry

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal
activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by
Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot
justify the issuance of the search warrants.30cräläwvirtualibräry

The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was
apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the
schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the
place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:

Q Do you know Frank Uy?

A Yes.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.

Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?

A Hernan Cortes St.

Q What is it being engaged of?

A It is engaged in canning of fish.

Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings
that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q How is it done?

A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these
products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes
it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he
does not issue any invoices.

Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?

A Thru delivery receipts.

Q Is the delivery receipt official?

A No. It is unregistered.

Q For how long has this been going on?

A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.

Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?

A August, 1993, last month.

Q How did you happen to know about this last month?

A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not
go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods
that he sold.

Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?

A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q How did you know this fact?

A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last
three years. I was the Operating Chief.

Q Until now?

A No. I was separated already.

Q When?

A August, 1993.

Q How does he do this manipulation?

A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.

Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?

A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the BIR
but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not
made to be shown to the BIR.

Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?

A Yes.

Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?

A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.

Q Based on what?

A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.

Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts,
sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which
are only for the consumption of the company?

A Yes, not for the BIR.

Q Where are they kept now?

A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of
the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the
confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and
notebooks.

Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?

A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.

In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the
records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The
second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.

This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".

Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina
because according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?

A Yes.

Q But how can you enter the bodega?

A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight
there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.

Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by
Gina?

A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.

Q Where are they now?

A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).

Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially
this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of
January, February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies
which appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?

A As far as I know, it did not appear.

Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what
does it show?

A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.

Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?

A As far as I know, it does not reflect.

Q What are these xerox copies of checks?

A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.

Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?

A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna
for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they
profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another
company.

Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?

A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.

Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but
instead they are selling it locally?

A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was
the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.

Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling
(sic) it?

A Yes, at a profit.

Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?

A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials.
When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that
exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.

Q Do you have proof to that effect?

A No, but we can get it there.

Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since
according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by
Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?

A Yes. I have received information.

COURT: Alright.31cräläwvirtualibräry

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records,
and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the
deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to
be sufficiently probing.

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized

Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject
warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,32 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,33 and Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.34cräläwvirtualibräry

In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.

This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by
the Constitution since:

x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its
major object: the elimination of general warrants.

In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those in
Stonehill:

The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 in this manner:

Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages;
business communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records
of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966
to 1970.

The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.

xxx

In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities.

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos,
J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein
search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be
seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates,
amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of
stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
others, enumerated in the warrant.

In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of
loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general
ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid:

x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several
motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of
their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its
workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued
by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the
charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of
old.

In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents
from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.35 The use by the issuing judge of the
terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register
books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory
lists, stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank
statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this
case.

As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales invoices,
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of
these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear
that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.37 Although it
appears that photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos
to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter to specify each and every
receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. In United States v. Cook,38 the United States Court of Appeals
(Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement:

x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr.
415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described
books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court
held that only the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court
acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the
court chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that
were not particularly described.

Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the
named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not
rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles.

xxx

x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state
courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge
should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See
United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described
with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the
fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of
only the items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong
and removes the court from considering illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of
only those items that were not particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in
the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description.
As the leading commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which
was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be
invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting
a search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).

Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.

Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by
the enforcing officers:

1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,

2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,

3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,

4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,

5. One (1) bound gate pass,

6. Surety Agreement.39cräläwvirtualibräry

In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.

The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the
constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder.40 In Tambasen vs. People,41 it was held:

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro v.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy
Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso,
212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally
protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48
Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and
seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista,
65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614
(1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be
seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the
present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.42cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14
May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants
authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and
sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants.
The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items
seized from the subject premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.

G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,

RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA,
NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL,
ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I.
ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS
UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be
struck down.
The Case

Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him
to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167.

In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic
Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6
agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply
to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.

In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5,
1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for
the public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the
Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on
October 31, 1997 within which to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's
manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the
case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special
Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within
thirty days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for decision." 9 Even
after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.

Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a
waiver of its privilege to do so.

The Facts

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10

1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein
described.

2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2)
UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s],
ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for
said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.

Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2
Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S.
Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or
control the following:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56

Ten (10) M14 US rifles

Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)

Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]

Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.

Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]

Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]

Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]

Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms

Ten (l0) handgrenades

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and

Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime
between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the
articles above-described and make an immediate return there[of] 14

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized the following: 15

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco

02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco

03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco

05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco

06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco

07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco

08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco

09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco

10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco

11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco

12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco

13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco

(With pending

case-Casaway Case)

14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco

15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco

16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco

17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco

20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco

01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco

02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco

01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal

01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin

02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin

01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield

02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

(Paltik)

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.

02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.

03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.

04 BAR 19 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 M16 2,023 rounds

03 Carbine M1 276 rounds

04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds

05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds

06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds

07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.

02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.

02 M16 (long) 1 pc.

03 M14 8 pcs.

04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.

05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 M16 73 rounds

02 M14 160 rounds

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco

03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco

04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec

Pistol

05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

Shotguns

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.

02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

03 Intratec 1 pc.

04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 M16 147 rds.

02 Cal .30 5 rounds

03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds

04 Carbine 5 rounds

05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds

06 9 MM 30 rounds

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor

05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor

07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor

08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor

09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor

10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor

11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor

12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor

13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor

14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB

15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB

16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not

Indicated

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.

02 M16 2,349 rds.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.

02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs

03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.

04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.

05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.

07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
"Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17

On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners' motions.
18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20

Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause: 21

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or
has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause
[has] not . . . been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general
warrant.

II

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or
has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground
that it was unlawfully served or implemented.

III

Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of
discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of
illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we
shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
factual questions.

This Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:

Alleged Factual Questions

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain
that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity
of its implementation. 22

This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not
question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which
those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the which those
Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law,
which may be resolved in the present case.

Main Issue:

Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:

Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25

In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched
was not described with particularity.

No Personal Examination

of the Witnesses

In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid,
stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the
applicant and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable cause . . .." 26
(Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which
argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound
searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he
produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by
(1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary
of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for
Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared
before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of
the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28

COURT:

Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?

P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:

SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.

COURT:

Swear the witness.

STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)

Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth before this Court?

WITNESS:

Yes Ma'am.

STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal
circumstances.

WITNESS:

SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City,
SOU, TMC.

xxx xxx xxx

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed
even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound
questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod
(whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly
on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may procedure
and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

xxx xxx xxx

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 29

Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to

Facts Personally Known to Him

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of
PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition,
he stated:

Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the offense?

A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days, we gathered
informations from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are in their possession and
control [are] the herein described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of Information dtd
Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30

When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:

Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at
PICOP Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come that you have
knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?

A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the alleged
assassination plot of Congressman Amante.

Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?

A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees of
PICOP.

Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do?

A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon.

Q What did you find . . .?

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.

Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.

Q By what means?

A By pretending to have some official business with the company.

Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP.

Q Where are those located?

A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.

Q Inside the compound?

A Located inside the compound.

Q Then what?

A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.

Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards?

A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained?

A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the verification at
FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)

Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?

A I conducted the inquiry.

Q What did you find out?

A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their own?

A No high-powered firearms.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of
PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.

Q What else?

A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber
pistols, several handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound
was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard were not licensed.
He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement
before the trail court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those
firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a
copy aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of
the PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained,
considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also
based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court held:

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in
cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged — for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case — and such evidence
is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if
the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.

Particularity of the

Place to Be Searched

In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be
searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this
constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in particular place. 35

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It
simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such
premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The
PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares."
36 Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search
all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. 37

In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement,
because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the
warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because
they were not among those identified during the hearing. 38

These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not
made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the
raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed
firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. 39
Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant — the place indicated in
the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or
abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.

Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to
search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if
they intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot
be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the
instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done
was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor
licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — [was] exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in the supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs
they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the
context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store
would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Seized Firearms and Explosives

Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint
docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State
Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.

Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued,
as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal
Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same
fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State
Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No.
95-167." 41

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree."
Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of
coercing evidence . . .." 44

In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and
other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State
Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.

This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so
only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.

Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason." 45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement
as to costs.