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October 2016 - Philippine Supreme Court

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2016 > October 2016 Decisions > G.R. No. 191823,
October 05, 2016 - DEE JAY'S INN AND CAFE AND/OR
MELINDA FERRARIS, Petitioners, v. MA. LORINA RAÑESES,
Respondent.:

G.R. No. 191823, October 05, 2016 - DEE JAY'S INN AND
CAFE AND/OR MELINDA FERRARIS, Petitioners, v. MA.
LORINA RAÑESES, Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

1
G.R. No. 191823, October 05, 2016

DEE JAY'S INN AND CAFE AND/OR MELINDA

FERRARIS, Petitioners, v. MA. LORINA
RAÑESES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by petitioners Dee Jay's Inn and Cafe (DJIC) and
Melinda Ferraris (Ferraris) assailing the following: 1)
Decision1 dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 01877- MIN, which set aside the
Resolutions dated August 30, 20062 and November 30,
20063 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC CA No. M-009173-06 and ordered the remand of
the case to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the
monetary claims due respondent Ma. Lorina P. Rañeses
who was declared to have been illegally dismissed by
petitioners; and 2) Resolution4 dated February 8, 2010 of
the appellate court in the same case, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners and the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of respondent.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPetitioner DJIC started its

operation on December 8, 2002. It was registered under
Republic Act No. 9178 or the Barangay Micro Business
Enterprises Act. Petitioner Ferraris, the owner and
manager of petitioner DJIC, engaged the services of
respondent and a certain Moonyeen J. Bura-ay
(Moonyeen) as cashier and cashier/receptionist,
respectively, for a monthly salary of P3,000.00
each.5chanrobleslaw

Respondent filed before the Social Security System (SSS)

2
Office a complaint against petitioner Ferraris for non-
remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent also filed
before the NLRC City Arbitration Unit (CAU) XII, Cotabato
City, a complaint against petitioners for
underpayment/nonpayment of wages, overtime pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13 th month pay,
and moral and exemplary damages, docketed as NLRC
CAU Case No. RAB 12-01-00026-05. 6chanrobleslaw

After conciliation efforts by the Labor Arbiter failed, the

parties in NLRC CAU Case No. RAB 12-01-00026-05 were
ordered to submit their respective position papers. On
September 8, 2005, respondent filed her position paper,
which already included a claim for illegal
dismissal.7chanrobleslaw

Respondent averred that sometime in January 2005, she

asked from petitioner Ferraris the latter's share as
employer in the SSS contributions and overtime pay for
the 11 hours of work respondent rendered per day at
petitioner DJIC. Petitioner Ferraris got infuriated and told
respondent to seek another employment. This prompted
respondent to file her complaints before the SSS Office
and NLRC CAU XII. After learning of respondent's
complaints, petitioner Ferraris terminated respondent's
employment on February 5, 2005. Respondent submitted
the Joint Affidavit of Mercy Joy Christine Bura-ay (Mercy)
and Mea Tormo (Mea) to corroborate her
8
allegations. chanrobleslaw

Petitioners countered that respondent and Moonyeen were

not terminated from employment. According to
petitioners, petitioner DJIC incurred a shortage of P400.00
in its earnings for February 4, 2005. That same day,
petitioner Ferraris called respondent and Moonyeen for a
meeting but the two employees denied incurring any
shortage. Petitioner Ferraris lost her temper and scolded
respondent and Moonyeen, and required them to produce
the missing P400.00. However, respondent and Moonyeen

3
merely walked out and did not report back to work
anymore. To support their version of events, petitioners
submitted the affidavit of Ma. Eva Gorospe (Eva), another
employee of petitioners.

Petitioners further claimed that it was respondent herself

who requested that the SSS contributions not be deducted
from her salary because it would only diminish her take-
home pay. Thus, respondent received from petitioners the
amount of SSS contributions, with the undertaking that
she would comply with the law by paying the SSS
premiums herself as self employed. Respondent recorded
her weekly wages and payment of SSS premiums in a
notebook, which had since been missing. 9chanrobleslaw

Petitioners additionally averred that since January 2002,

respondent had been living in petitioner Ferraris's
ancestral home for free. Petitioner Ferraris even
shouldered the cost of P2,500.00 to have electrical
connections installed at the house for the use of
respondent and her family. From 2002 to 2004, petitioner
Ferraris admonished respondent several times for bringing
her child to work, which prevented respondent from
concentrating on her job at petitioner DJIC. 10chanrobleslaw

On February 21, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a

Decision11 in favor of petitioners, but granted respondent's
claim for 13th month pay.

The Labor Arbiter did not give much credence to

respondent's charge of illegal dismissal because there was
no positive or unequivocal act on the part of petitioners to
support the assertion that respondent was dismissed,
thus:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The resolution of this case hinges on our determination of

whether or not [respondent] was illegally dismissed for

4
her to be entitled to her money claims,

x x x x

In her position paper, the [petitioner Ferraris]

categorically denied having terminated [respondent]. The
[respondent] after being reprimanded for shortages, she
ceased to report for work on February 5, 2005. This fact is
attested to by [petitioners'] witness, a co-employee of the
[respondent] Ma. Eva Gorospe to the effect that
[respondent] and coemployee Moonyeen Bura-ay scolded
them for shortages during a meeting on February 5, 2005.
The witness attested that they were not terminated but
they did not report for work anymore the following day up
to the present. This gives weight to the fact that in her
complaint no illegal dismissal was contemplated by
[respondent].

The records, on the other hand, is (sic) bereft of any

evidence linking to the allegation of dismissal. In fact,
there is no positive or unequivocal act on the part of
[petitioners] that would buttressed (sic) a fact that
[respondent] was dismissed. Thus, the High Court
said:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"While the general rule in dismissal cases is that the
employer has the burden to prove the dismissal was for
just or authorized causes and after due process, said
burden is necessarily shifted to the employee ifthe alleged
dismissal is denied by the employer because a dismissal is
supposedly a positive and unequivocal act by the
employer. Accordingly, it is the employee that bears the
burden of proving that in tact he was dismissed An
unsubstantiated allegation on the part of the employee
cannot stand as the same offends due process. " (De
Paul / King Philip Customs Tailor, et al vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
129824, Marc;h 10, 1999) Underscoring Ours.

The [respondent] did not controvert the [petitioners']

categorical denial and more, she failed to demonstrate the

5
burden. As such, the allegations of the [respondent] to the
effect that she was dismissed remains (sic) gratuitous. In
fact the High Court in the same vein said:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The burden of proof lies upon who asserts it, not upon
who denies, since by the nature of things, he who denies a
fact cannot produce any proof of it. " (Sevillana vs. LT.
International Corp., et al., POEA-NLRC Case No. L-88-12-
1048, 26 March 1991; Aguilar vs. Maning International
Corp., et al., POEA-NLRC Case No. L-88-08-728, October
8, 1990).

In the case at Bench, the positive act and/or the

unequivocal act of termination is the Factum
Probandum which the [respondent] miserably failed to
demonstrate.12

The Labor Arbiter also pointed out a procedural defect in

respondent's charge of illegal dismissal against
petitioners:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Besides, the [respondent] did not aver illegal dismissal as
the same was not pleaded in her verified complaint. She
cannot be allowed to prove the same. The rule is clear that
the "verified position papers shall cover only those claims
and causes of action raised in the complaint x x x" (Rule
V, Section 4, Par. 2, Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
Amended). Incidentally, there is no prooflinking to the
allegation of dismissal.13

The Labor Arbiter also noted that petitioner DJIC, as a

registered Barangay Micro Business Enterprise (BMBE),
was exempted from the coverage of the Minimum Wage
Law.

The Labor Arbiter decreed in the end:

6
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises laid, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint in the instant case for lack
of.cause of action and for not being impressed with merit.

However, [petitioners] are hereby ordered, jointly and

severally, to pay [respondent] the amount of Five
Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) representing 13th month
pay differential.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At around the same time, Moonyeen lodged before the

NLRC CAU XII a complaint against petitioners for unpaid
overtime pay, docketed as RAB 12-01-00031-05. Later on,
Moonyeen similarly contended that she was illegally
dismissed by petitioners and demanded the payment of
her salary differential, holiday premium pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and moral
damages.15 The Labor Arbiter, in a Decision dated
February 20, 2006, subsequently dismissed Moonyeen's
complaint, also finding that Moonyeen miserably failed to
demonstrate the positive or unequivocal act of termination
of her employment; but petitioners were liable for
underpayment of Moonyeen's 13th month pay in the
amount of P500.00.

Respondent and Moonyeen timely filed their respective

appeals before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC CA Nos. M-
009173-06 and M-009174-06. Their appeals were
eventually consolidated.

The NLRC issued a Resolution dated August 30, 2006,

dismissing the appeals of respondent and Moonyeen for
lack of merit and affirming en toto the Labor Arbiter's
Decisions dated February 20, 2006 and February 21,
2006. The NLRC reasoned:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

7
We uphold the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The records
do not reveal of any written document to show that
[respondent and Moonyeen] were indeed dismissed. On
the other hand, [petitioners] vehemently denied having
dismissed them. Therefore, under these given facts, to the
[respondent and Moonyeen] is shifted the burden to prove
that their dismissal had, in fact, taken place. The rule as
exemplified by the Supreme Court is: "Where the
employee was not notified that he had been dismissed
from employment neither was [he] prevented from
returning to his work, there is no illegal dismissal["]
(Chong Guan Trading vs. NLRC, 172 SCRA 831). For,
indeed, the records do not bare any positive or
unequivocal act of [petitioners] notifying them of the
termination of their services, as observed by the Labor
[Arbiter] a quo. It is our view that [respondent and
Moonyeen] miserably failed to establish by substantial
evidence that they were dismissed. Their verbal claim
supported by self serving and biased statements of two
(2) witnesses, namely, Mercy Buraay and Mea Tormon,
who like them have an ax to grind being complainants
themselves against the same [petitioners], did not
substantially prove their case. [Respondent and
Moonyeen] did not deny [petitioners'] allegation that they
x x x were also the witnesses of Mercy Bura-ay and Mea
Tormon in a separate case the latter filed against the
same [petitioners]. Thus, we find more expressive of truth
the verbal declaration of [petitioners], supported by a
sworn statement x x x of one witness, Eva Gorospe, that
after [respondent and Moonyeen] were reprimanded,
made to explain and produce the Php400:00 shortage of
their daily collection, they voluntarily ceased to report to
work anymore. We emphasize, it is not shown in the
records that Gorospe was motivated by ill-will or was
coerced by the [petitioners] into executing her sworn
statement. [Respondent and Moonyeen] did not dispute
that they were investigated by [petitioner Ferraris] on
February 4, 2005 regarding shortages of their collections.
Such investigation cannot by any stretch of imagination be

8
considered dismissal of the [respondent and Moonyeen].
On the contrary, we can only surmise that the
investigation generated a force compelling enough for
[respondent and Moonyeen] to quit working [for
petitioners]. Their failure to report for work is an act they
alone must bear the consequences of. By their own act,
they bargained away their security of tenure under the
law.

[Respondent and Moonyeen's] money claims of overtime

pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay must
likewise fail. Overtime pay and holiday pay are some of
the extraordinary claims the burden of proof of which is
shifted to the worker who must prove he rendered
overtime work or that he worked during holidays (Julio
Cagampan, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., 195 SCRA 533). No
proof is placed on record by [respondent and Moonyeen]
to prove their claimed overtime and holiday work.
[Respondent and Moonyeen] cannot also avail of
entitlement of service incentive pay under Article 95 of the
Labor Code who regularly employs more than ten (10)
workers. Section 1, Rule of Book III of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code explicitly exempts establishments
regularly employing less than ten (10) workers from the
coverage of the said provision. Employing less than ten
(10) workers, [petitioners are] thus exempted under the
law.

However, we see no reason to disturb the award of

13th month pay. This is an admitted claim and the
[respondent and Moonyeen] must be entitled to the
same.16

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was

denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated November 30,
2006.

Respondent sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by

filing a Petition for Certiorari, imputing grave abuse of

9
discretion on the part of the NLRC in its issuance of the
Resolutions dated August 30, 2006 and November 30,
2006 in NLRC CA No. M-009173-06. The Petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01877-MIN.

In its Decision d ted April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals

granted respondent's Petition.

On the basis that any doubt should be resolved in favor of

labor, the Court of Appeals held that respondent was
illegally dismissed:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We are constrained to review [NLRC's] exercise of its
discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter's findings on
abandonment because such conclusion does not appear to
have been substantially proved and the same is repugnant
to both law and jurisprudence.

The Labor Arbiter, relying on the alleged ruling in De Paul,

contended that the employee has the burden to prove the
fact of dismissal when such dismissal was denied by the
employer, as when the defense of the employee's
abandonment was interposed. Thus, in refusing to
consider [respondent's] cause of action for illegal
dismissal, the Labor Arbiter found that [respondent]
miserably failed to demonstrate any such positive or
unequivocal act on the part of Ferraris m terminating
[respondent].

Reliance on De Paul seemed imprudent and misplaced, if

not, devious because De Paul was indefensibly misquoted
in the Labor Arbiter's Decision, in that the alleged ruling as
quoted therein does not appear in the original printed text
of the case in Volume 3[0]4 of the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA), pages 448-459.

Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter's contention on the shifting

of the burden of proof is incongruous with prevailing

10
jurisprudence which requires the concurrence of two (2)
elements before an employee may be guilty of
abandonment. The first is the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason. The second is a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship. The second element is the more
determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts.
Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer to
show the employee's clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue his employment without any intention of
returning; mere absence is not sufficient.

We agree with the observation that the joint testimony of

Mercy Bura-ay and Mea Torno in favor of [respondent],
apparently returning a favor to [respondent] who also
testified for Bura-ay and Torno in a separate labor case
against Ferraris, is tainted with bias and, thus, cannot
credibly and substantially prove the fact of [respondent's]
alleged dismissal. However, neither should the testimony
of Eva Gorospe, Ferraris's lone witness, deserve much
probative weight in proving that [respondent] abandoned
her job because mere failure to report back to work on the
part of [respondent], as Gorospe testified, falls short of
the substantial evidence required in proving the existence
of abandonment.

Therefore, the Labor Arbiter, as well as [the NLRC], failed

to appreciate that doubts shroud the evidence presented
by both parties, and both tribunals appeared oblivious of
the dictates of jurisprudence that such doubts should be
resolved in favor of the worker, as was pronounced
in Nicario v. NLRC, et al.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule
that in controversies between a laborer and his master,
doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing should be

11
resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the
doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail
of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection of labor."
The foregoing doctrine should be applied in this case,
especially since Ferraris did not prove by substantial
evidence a clear and deliberate intent on the part of
[respondent] to discontinue her employment without any
intention of returning.

Furthermore since there is an equipoise of evidence, as

there is doubt as to where the evidence of the parties tilt,
Ferraris, the employer who has the burden of proving not
only abandonment but more importantly just cause for
dismissal, is deemed to have failed in discharging such
burden.

Thus, We find no legal impediment in ruling that

[respondent] was in fact terminated and such termination
was done illegally or without any valid cause, and in
patent violation of the procedural requirements of due
process, anchored upon Ferraris's failure to discharge her
burden of proving abandonment by [respondent],
including, as a corollary, the burden of proving just cause
for [respondent's] termination. In view of [respondent's]
allegation that she was dismissed on February 5, 2005,
We shall reckon [respondent's] dismissal on said
date.17 (Citations omitted.)

The Court of Appeals, citing Rule V, Section 7(b) of the

2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and Tegimenta
Chemical Phils. v. Buensalida, 18 also ruled that the filing of
the position paper was the operative act which foreclosed
the raising of other matters constitutive of the cause of
action; and respondent, by averring facts constituting her
alleged dismissal in her position paper, had properly
pleaded a cause of action for illegal dismissal, which
should have been given cognizance by the Labor Arbiter.

12
For being illegally dismissed, the Court of Appeals found
respondent entitled to the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Corollary to our finding that [respondent] was in fact
illegally terminated, [petitioners] should be ordered
to reinstate [respondent] without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges, or, in case reinstatement would no
longer be feasible, to pay [respondent] separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service, with payment in either cases of
[respondent's] full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and her other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from February 5, 2005, the date [respondent]
was illegally dismissed, up to the time of her actual
reinstatement.

With respect [to] the other monetary claims, We find no

cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the Labor Arbiter in
awarding [respondent] only the amount of Php500.00
representing [respondent's] 13th month pay differential.19

The dispositive portion of the judgment of the Court of

Appeals reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on August 30,
2006 by [the NLRC], affirming in toto the February 21,
2006 Decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing
[respondent's] complaint, including the November 30,
2006 Resolution denying a motion for reconsideration
thereof, are SET ASIDE. The case should be remanded to
the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of the
monetary awards due to [respondent] as a result of her
illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter's grant of an award in
the amount of Php500.00, representing [respondent's]
13th month pay differential, is maintained.20

13
Petitioners and respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
respectively, which were both denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated February 8, 2010.

Petitioners now come before this Court via the instant

Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning a couple of
errors on the part of the Court of Appeals, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION BELATEDLY INCLUDED IN
THE POSITION PAPER AND NOT ORIGINALLY
PLEADED IN THE COMPLAINT CAN STILL BE GIVEN
COGNIZANCE.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THE NLRC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE BASIS THAT THE DECISION
LACKED FACTUAL PROOF AND ALSO IGNORED
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.21

Petitioners argue that the present case is governed by the

2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which had already
supplanted the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure. Under the
2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure, only the causes of action
that were pleaded in a complaint would be entertained.
Petitioners, in addition, assert that respondent was not
dismissed from employment; instead, respondent did not
report for work anymore after petitioner Ferraris scolded
respondent and Moonyeen on February 4, 2005 regarding
the P400.00 shortage in the earnings of petitioner DJIC for
the day. Petitioners insist that they never used
"abandonment" as a defense in the termination of
respondent's employment; and they merely alleged that
respondent never returned to work anymore after the
scolding incident.

14
The Court first addresses the procedural issue raised by
petitioners.

The record shows that respondent filed her complaint

sometime in January 2005 and position paper on
September 8, 2005. During said period, the 2002 NLRC
Rules of Procedure, as amended by NLRC Resolution No.
01-02, was still in effect. The 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC only took effect on January 7,
2006.22chanrobleslaw

Section 4, Rule V of the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as

amended, provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Submission of Position Papers/Memoranda. -
Without prejudice to the provisions of the last paragraph,
Section 2, of this Rule, the Labor Arbiter shall direct both
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers with
supporting documents and affidavits within an inextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice of termination of the
mandatory conference.

These verified position papers to be submitted shall

cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the
complaint excluding those that may have been amicably
settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting
documents including the affidavits of their respective
witnesses which shall take the place of the latter's direct
testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed
to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts,
not referred to and any cause or causes of action not
included in the complaint or position papers,
affidavits and other documents. (Emphases supplied.)

Stated differently, the parties could allege and present

evidence to prove any cause or causes of action included,
not only in the complaint, but in the position papers as

15
well. As the Court explained in Tegimenta Chemical Phils.
v. Buensalida23:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he complaint is not the only document from which the
complainant's cause of action is determined in a labor
case. Any cause of action that may not have been included
in the complaint or position paper, can no longer be
alleged after the position paper is submitted by the
parties. In other words, the filing of the position paper
is the operative act which forecloses the raising of
other matters constitutive of the cause of action.
This necessarily implies that the cause of action is
finally ascertained only after both the complaint and
position paper are properly evaluated.

A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission

committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
right of the plaintiff. A complaint before the NLRC does not
contain specific allegations of these wrongful acts or
omissions which constitute the cause of action. All that it
contains is the term by which such acts or omissions
complained of are generally known. It cannot therefore be
considered as the final determinant of the cause of action.
(Citation omitted.)
In the more recent Our Haus Realty Development
Corporation v. Parian,24 which cited Samar-Med
Distribution v. National Labor Relations
25
Commission, cralawred the Court further expounded:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A claim not raised in the pro forma
complaint may still be raised in the
position paper.

Our Haus questions the respondents' entitlement to SIL

pay by pointing out that this claim was not included in
the pro forma complaint filed with the NLRC. However, we
agree with the CA that such omission does not bar the

16
labor tribunals from touching upon this cause of action
since this was raised and discussed in the respondents'
position paper. In Samar-Med Distribution v. National
Labor Relations Commission, we held:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Firstly, petitioner's contention that the validity of Gutang's
dismissal should not be determined because it had not
been included in his complaint before the NLRC is bereft of
merit. The complaint of Gutang was a mere checklist of
possible causes of action that he might have against
Roleda. Such manner of preparing the complaint was
obviously designed to facilitate the filing of complaints by
employees and laborers who are thereby enabled to
expediently set forth their grievances in a general
manner. But the non inclusion in the complaint of the
issue on the dismissal did not necessarily mean that
the validity of the dismissal could not be an
issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of
verified position papers by the parties should they fail to
agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion
of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or
position paper from the time of their submission by the
parties. In view of this, Gutang's cause of action should
be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint
alone but also from a consideration and evaluation
of both his complaint and position paper. (Citations
omitted.)

The Court observes herein that respondent could not have

included the charge of illegal dismissal in her complaint
because she filed said complaint (which were for various
money claims against petitioners) in January 2005, and
petitioners purportedly dismissed her from employment
only on February 5, 2005. However, since respondent
subsequently alleged and argued the matter of her illegal
dismissal in her position paper filed on September 8,
2005, then the Labor Arbiter could still take cognizance of
the same.

17
Nevertheless, on the substantive issue of whether or not
respondent was illegally dismissed, the Court answers in
the negative.

The Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that

the Labor Arbiter's quote on the shifting of the burden of
proof in dismissal cases, supposedly from De Paul, could
not actually be found in said case. Yet, it does not
necessarily mean that the Labor Arbiter's ruling on the
matter was fallacious or entirely baseless.

In Exodus International Construction Corporation v.

Biscocho,26 the Court pronounced that "[i]n illegal
dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to
first establish the fact of their dismissal  before the burden
is shifted to the employer to prove that the dismissal was
legal." The Court then explained that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"[T]his Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of
illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof
to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause." But "[b]efore the [petitioners] must bear the
burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, [the
respondents] must first establish by substantial evidence"
that indeed they were dismissed. "[I]f there is no
dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality
or illegality thereof."27 (Citations omitted.)

The Court, in Cañedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective

Agency, Inc.,28 expressly recognized the rule that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In illegal dismissal cases, "[w]hile the employer bears the
burden x x x to prove that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service."
The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party

18
alleging and the proof must be clear, positive and
convincing. Thus, in this case, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to prove his claim of dismissal. (Citations
omitted.)

The Court reiterated in Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v.

Casas29 that "[i]n illegal dismissal cases, the employer has
the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was
legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee
must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had
been dismissed from employment."

It bears to point out that in the case at bar, the Labor

Arbiter, the NLRC, and even the Court of Appeals, all
consistently found that respondent was not able to present
substantial evidence of her dismissal. They all rejected the
joint affidavit of Mercy and Mea, submitted by respondent,
for being partial and biased. It appears that Mercy and
Mea executed said affidavits to return a favor as
respondent testified for them in their own cases against
petitioners. The Court of Appeals only deviated from the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC by also
disregarding Eva's affidavit, submitted by petitioners to
corroborate their allegations, for being insufficient to prove
abandonment. The appellate court then applied the
equipoise doctrine: with all things considered equal, all
doubts must be resolved in favor of labor, that is,
respondent.

Given the jurisprudence cited in the preceding paragraphs,

the application by the Court of Appeals of the equipoise
doctrine and the rule that all doubts should be resolved in
favor of labor was misplaced. Without the joint affidavit of
Mercy and Mea, there only remained the bare allegation of
respondent that she was dismissed by petitioners on
February 5, 2005, which hardly constitute substantial
evidence of her dismissal. As both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC held, since respondent was unable to establish
with substantial evidence her dismissal from employment,

19
the burden of proof did not shift to petitioners to prove
that her dismissal was for just or authorized cause.

As pointed out by petitioners, they never raised

abandonment as a defense as there was no dismissal in
the first place. Petitioners did not argue that respondent
abandoned her work which justified her dismissal from
employment. Petitioners merely alleged the fact that
respondent, after being scolded on February 4, 2005, no
longer returned to work beginning February 5, 2005,
which was corroborated by one of petitioners' employees,
Eva, in her affidavit.

Similar to this case is the factual background in Nightowl

Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan,30 in which
Lumahan, the employee, asserted, but failed to prove,
that he was constructively dismissed; while Nightowl, the
employer, alleged that Lumahan did not report for work
anymore by a certain date but did not raise abandonment
as a defense. Quoted extensively below are the relevant
portions from the ruling of the Court in Nightowl:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA erred in finding grave abuse
of discretion in the NLRC's factual
conclusion that Lumahan was not
dismissed from work.

In every employee dismissal case, the employer

bears the burden of proving the validity of the
employee's dismissal, i.e., the existence of just or
authorized cause for the dismissal and the
observance of the due process requirements. The
employer's burden of proof, however; presupposes
that the employee had in fact been dismissed, with
the burden to prove the fact of dismissal resting on
the employee. Without any dismissal action on the
par.t of the employer, valid or otherwise, no burden
to prove just or authorized cause arises.

20
We find that the CA erred in disregarding the NLRC's
conclusion that there had been no dismissal, and in
immediately proceeding to tackle Nightowl's defense that
Lumahan abandoned his work.

The CA should have first considered whether there

had been a dismissal in the first place. To our mind,
the CA missed this crucial point as it presumed that
Lumahan had actually been dismissed. The CA's
failure to properly appreciate this point - which led
to its erroneous conclusion - constitutes reversible
error that justifies the Court's exercise of its factual
review power.

We support the NLRC's approach of first evaluating

whether the employee had been dismissed, and find that it
committed no grave abuse of discretion in factually
concluding that Lumahan had not been dismissed from
work.

It should be remembered that in cases before

administrative and quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC, the degree of evidence required to be met is
substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. In a situation
where the word of another party is taken against
the other, as in this case, we must rely on
substantial evidence because a party alleging a
critical fact must duly substantiate and support its
allegation.

We agree with the NLRC that Lumahan stopped reporting

for work on April 22, 1999, and never returned, as
Nightowl sufficiently supported this position with
documentary evidence.

In contrast, Lumahan failed to refute, with supporting

21
evidence, Nightowl's contention that he did not report for
work on April 22, 1999, and failed as well to prove that he
continued working from such date to May 15, 1999. What
we can only gather from his claim was that he did not
work from May 16, 1999 to June 8, 1999; but this was
after the substantially proven fact that he had already
stopped working on April 22, 1999.

In addition, we find that Lumahan failed to substantiate

his claim that he was constructively dismissed when
Nightowl allegedly refused to accept him back when he
allegedly reported for work from April 22, 1999 to June 9,
1999. In short, Lumahan did not present any evidence to
prove that he had, in fact, reported back to work.

x x x x

In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain

compelling facts and misread the evidence on record by
relying on LA Demaisip's erroneous appreciation of facts.
Under the circumstances, the NLRC acted well within ·its
jurisdiction in finding that Lumahan had not been
dismissed. Otherwise stated, by reversing the ruling that
there was no dismissal to speak of, the CA committed a
reversible error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility; or in a manner so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, or
a quasi-judicial agency of the government, in the exercise
of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be
grave.

All told, we cannot agree with the CA in finding that the

22
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in evaluating
the facts based on the records and in concluding
therefrom that Lumahan had not been dismissed.

The CA erred when it considered

"abandonment of work" generally
understood in employee dismissal
situations despite the fact that
Nightowl never raised it as a defense.

As no dismissal was carried out in this case, any

consideration of abandonment - as a defense raised
by an employer in dismissal situations - was clearly
misplaced. To our mind, the CA again committed a
reversible error in considering that Nightowl raised
abandonment as a defense.

Abandonment, as understood under our labor laws,

refers to the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It is a form of
neglect of duty that constitutes just cause for the
employer to dismiss the employee.

Under this construct, abandonment is a defense available

against the employee who alleges a dismissal. Thus, for
the employer "to successfully invoke abandonment,
whether as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a
defense, the employer bears the burden of proving the
employee's unjustified refusal to resume his employment."
This burden, of course, proceeds from the general rule
that places the burden on the employer to prove the
validity of the dismissal.

The CA, agreeing with LA Demaisip, concluded that

Lumahan was illegally dismissed because Nightowl failed
to prove the existence of an overt act showing Lumahan's
intention to sever his employment. To the CA, the fact
that Nightowl failed to send Lumahan notices for him to
report back to work all the more showed no abandonment

23
took place.

The critical point the CA missed, however,. was the

fact that Nightowl never raised abandonment as a
defense. · What Nightowl persistently argued was
that Lumahan stopped reporting for work beginning
April 22, 1999; and that it had been waiting for Lumahan
to show up so that it could impose on him the necessary
disciplinary action for abandoning his post at Steelwork,
only to learn that Lumahan had filed an illegal dismissal
complaint. Nightowl did not at all argue that
Lumahan had abandoned his work, thereby
warranting the termination of his employment.

Significantly, the CA construed these arguments as

abandonment of work under the labor law construct.
We find it clear, however, that Nightowl did not
dismiss Lumahan; hence, it never raised the defense
of abandonment.

Besides, Nightowl did not say that Lumahan "abandoned

his work"; rather, Nightowl stated that Lumahan
"abandoned his post" at Steelwork. When read together
with its arguments, what this phrase simply means is that
Lumahan abandoned his assignment at Steelwork;
nonetheless, Nightowl still considered him as its employee
whose return they had been waiting for.

Finally, failure to send notices to Lumahan to report back

to work should not be taken against Nightowl despite the
fact that it would have been prudent, given the
circumstance, had it done so. Report-to-work notices are
required, as an aspect of procedural due process, only in
situations involving the dismissal, or the possibility of
dismissal, of the employee. Verily, report-to-work notices
could not be required when dismissal, or the possibility of
dismissal, of the employee does not exist. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.)

24
In a case where the employee was neither found to have
been dismissed nor to have abandoned his/her work, the
general course of action is for the Court to dismiss the
complaint, direct the employee to return to work, and
order the employer to accept the employee. 31 However,
the Court recognized in Nightowl that when a considerable
length of time had already passed rendering it impossible
for the employee to return to work, the award of
separation pay is proper. Considering that more than ten
(10) years had passed since respondent stopped reporting
for work on February 5, 2005, up "to the date of this
judgment, it is no longer possible and reasonable for the
Court to direct respondent to return to work and order
petitioners to accept her. Under the circumstances, it is
just and equitable for the Court instead to award
respondent separation pay in an amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service, computed up to
the time she stopped working, or until February 4, 2005.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 29, 2009 and
Resolution dated February 8, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 01877-MIN is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Resolution dated August 30, 2006 of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-
009173-06, affirming en toto the Decision dated February
21, 2006 of the Labor Arbiter in RAB 12-01-00026-05,
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that petitioners
Dee Jay's Inn and Café and Melinda Ferraris, for just and
equitable reasons extant in this case, are
additionally ORDERED to jointly and severally pay
respondent Ma. Lorina P. Rañeses separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service, computed up to the time she stopped working, or
until February 4, 2005.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

25
Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on official leave.
**
Leonardo-De Castro,  (Acting Chairperson).

Endnotes:

**
 Per Special Order No. 2383 dated September 27, 2016.

1
Rollo, pp. 45-58; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora
C. Lantion with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and
Edgardo T. Lloren concurring.

2
 Id. at 63-70; penned by Commissioner Jovito C.
Cagaanan with Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa
and Commissioner Proculo T. Sarmen concurring.

3
 Id. at 60-61.

4
 Id. at 21-22.

5
 Id. at 64.

6
 Id. at 46.

7
 Id.

8
 Id. at 46-47.

9
 Id. at 76.

10
 Id. at 75.

11
 Id. at 72-79; penned by Labor Arbiter Ruben B. Garcia.

12
 Id. at 77-78.

13
 Id. at 78.

14
 Id. at 79.

26
15
 Id. at 64.

16
 Id. at 68-69.

17
 Id. at 53-56.

18
 577 Phil. 534, 542 (2008).

19
Rollo, p. 57.

20
 Id. at 57-58.

21
 Id. at 9.

22
 Fifteen (15) days from its publication in Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Philippine Star on December 23, 2005.

23
 Supra note 18 at 542.

24
 G.R. No. 204651, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 351, 374-
375.

25
cralawred 714 Phil. 16, 27-28 (2013).

26
 659 Phil. 142, 146 (2011).

27
 Id. at 154.

28
 715 Phil. 625, 635 (2013).

29
 G.R. No. 200898, June 15, 2015.

30
 G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015.

31
 See Tatel v. JLFP Investigation and Security Agency,
Inc., G.R. No. 206942, December 9, 2015.

27
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October-2016 Jurisprudence                 

 G.R. No. 201809, October 11, 2016 - H. SOHRIA

PASAGI DIAMBRANG, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND H. HAMIM SARIP PATAD, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212686, October 05, 2016 - SERGIO R.
OSMEÑA III, Petitioner, v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND

29
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, EMMANUEL R.
LEDESMA, JR., SPC POWER CORPORATION, AND THERMA
POWER VISAYAS, INC., Respondents.
 G.R. Nos. 221562-69, October 05, 2016 - COMMO.
LAMBERTO R. TORRES (RET.), Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 8494, October 05, 2016 - SPOUSES EMILIO
AND ALICIA JACINTO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EMELIE P.
BANGOT, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 210903, October 11, 2016 - PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND HON. MA. GRACIA M.
PULIDO TAN, CHAIRPERSON, COMMISION ON AUDIT,
Respondent.
 A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016 - DOLORES
NATANAUAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO P.
TOLENTINO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 198127, October 05, 2016 - CO IT a.k.a.
GONZALO CO IT, Petitioner, v. ANTHONY CO, MARY CO
CHO, PETER CO AND LUCY SO HUA TAN CO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 167952, October 19, 2016 - GONZALO PUYAT
& SONS, INC., Petitioner, v. RUBEN ALCALDE
(DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY GLORIA ALCALDE,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FARMER BENEFICIARIES,
Respondent.
 A.C. No. 8168, October 12, 2016 - SPOUSES EDWIN B.
BUFFE AND KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, Complainants, v.
SEC. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, USEC. FIDEL J. EXCONDE, JR.,
AND CONGRESSMAN ELEANDRO JESUS F. MADRONA,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212483, October 05, 2016 - PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR.,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 218952, October 19, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. AURELIO GUILLERGAN Y
GULMATICO, Appellant.
 G.R. No. 219037, October 19, 2016 - RCBC SAVINGS
BANK, Petitioner, v. NOEL M. ODRADA, Respondent.

30
 G.R. No. 208535, October 19, 2016 - LEO'S
RESTAURANT AND BAR CAFÉ MOUNTAIN SUITE
BUSINESS APARTELLE, LEO Y. LUA AND AMELIA LUA,
Petitioners, v. LAARNE C. BENSING, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016 - JERWIN
DORADO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 225044, October 03, 2016 - MANILA
DOCTORS COLLEGE AND TERESITA O. TURLA, Petitioners,
v. EMMANUEL M. OLORES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016 - GREENSTAR
EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR., Petitioners, v.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION AND NISSIN
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016 - ELIZABETH SY-
VARGAS, Petitioner, v. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS,
SR. AND ROLANDO OGSOS, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 196134, October 12, 2016 - VALENTIN S.
LOZADA, Petitioner, v. MAGTANGGOL MENDOZA,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 171420, October 05, 2016 - AURORA A.
SALES, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C.
ADAPON AND TEOFILO D. ADAPON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 191825, October 05, 2016 - DEE JAY'S INN
AND CAFE AND/OR MELINDA FERRARIS, Petitioners, v.
MA. LORINA RAÑESES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 171865, October 12, 2016 - PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND
AZUCENA ALONDAY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 191150, October 10, 2016 - NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR
REFORMS (NASECORE), REPRESENTED BY PETRONILO
ILAGAN, FEDERATION OF VILLAGE ASSOCIATIONS
(FOVA), REPRESENTED BY SIEGFRIEDO VELOSO, AND
FEDERATION OF LAS PIÑAS VILLAGE ASSOCIATIONS
(FOLVA), REPRESENTED BY BONIFACIO DAZO,
Pemtitioners, v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO),
Respondent.

31
 G.R. No. 208351, October 05, 2016 - BENJAMIN
RUSTIA, JR., BENJAMIN RUSTIA, SR., AND FAUSTINO
"BONG" RUSTIA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 I.P.I. No. 16-243-CA-J, October 11, 2016 - ARTHUR F.
MORALES I, Complainant, v. LEONCIA REAL-DIMAGIBA,
JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, AND RAMON R. GARCIA, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES, FIFTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS,
MANILA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016 - NORMA C.
MAGSANO, ISIDRO C. MAGSANO, RICARDO C. MAGSANO,
ROQUE C. MAGSANO, JR., NIDA M. CAGUIAT, PERLITA
MAGSANO, AND SALVADOR C. MAGSANO, Petitioners, v.
PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. AND
SPOUSES EDDIE V. MANUEL AND MILAGROS C.
BALLESTEROS, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS: GEMMA C.
MANUELPEREZ, ANGELO JOHNDREW MANUEL, AND RESSY
C. MANUEL, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 8638, October 10, 2016 - DATU BUDENCIO E.
DUMANLAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. WINSTON B. INTONG,
Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 177857-58, October 05, 2016 - PHILIPPINE
COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED),
MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA,
SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M.
YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR,
AND RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.; WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,
OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION OF
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) AND MORO
FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
(MOFAZS), REPRESENTED BY ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN,
Intervenors.; G.R. No. 178193 - DANILO B. URSUA,
Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016 - ATTY. RUTILLO B.
PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 220761, October 03, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE OLAZO, MIGUEL

32
CORDIS, CHARITO FERNANDEZ AND ROGELIO LASCONIA,
Accused,; CHARITO FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARIELLAYAG ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLACIDO GOCO Y
OMBROG, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016 - ANTONIO
ESCOTO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 216023, October 05, 2016 - DR. RESTITUTO
C. BUENVIAJE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOVITO R. AND
LYDIA B. SALONGA, JEBSON HOLDINGS CORPORATION
AND FERDINAND JUAT BAÑEZ, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206691, October 03, 2016 - ATTY. RAYMUND
P. PALAD, Petitioner, v. LOLIT SOLIS, SALVE V. ASIS, AL
G. PEDROCHE AND RICARDO F. LO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 206534, October 05, 2016 - JULIA LIM
ROSARIO, MERCEDES LIM CUSTODIO AS REPRESENTED
BY DONNO CUSTODIO, NORMA LICARDO, AND LEILA
ESPIRITU, Petitioners, v. ALFONSO LIM, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 198782, October 19, 2016 - ALLAN BAZAR,
Petitioner, v. CARLOS A. RUIZOL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 191823, October 05, 2016 - DEE JAY'S INN
AND CAFE AND/OR MELINDA FERRARIS, Petitioners, v.
MA. LORINA RAÑESES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 207898, October 19, 2016 - ERROL RAMIREZ,
JULITO APAS, RICKY ROSELO AND ESTEBAN MISSION,
JR., Petitioners, v. POLYSON INDUSTRIES, INC. AND
WILSON S. YU, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 223561, October 19, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMY PITALLA, JR. Y
DIOSA A.K.A. "BEBE," Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 196670, October 12, 2016 - ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RODOLFO AND
GLORIA MADRIAGA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 192282, October 05, 2016 - A. NATE CASKET
MAKER AND/OR ARMANDO AND ANELY NATE, Petitioners,

33
v. ELIAS V. ARANGO, EDWIN M. MAPUSAO, JORGE C.
CARIÑO, JERMIE MAPUSAO, WILSON A. NATE, EDGAR A.
NATE, MICHAEL A. MONTALES, CELSO A. NATE, BENJES A.
LLONA AND ALLAN A. MONTALES, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 6767, October 05, 2016 - ELIZABETH RECIO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO I. FANDIÑO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 187544, October 03, 2016 - MARILOU
BALASBAS, FELIPE OLEGARIO, JOSE NARYAEZ, RODOLFO
BUMANLAG,* TEODORO MISIA, MARCELINO VILA,
HILARIO ALCALA, MACARIO CORDOVA, SALVADOR
ABAIGAR, ATILANO BACUD & LEONIDES BOLVIDO,
Petitioners, v. ROBERTO L. UY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 211539, October 17, 2016 - THAMERLANE M.
PEREZ, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR PRISCILLA RASACEÑA,
NAVARRO AND ADELFA LIM, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 179566, October 19, 2016 - SPOUSES
LORETO G. NICOLAS AND LOLITA SARIGUMBA,
Petitioners, v. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
ASSOCIATION (ARBA), AND FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF
DAVAO CITY KMPI, FELIPE RAMOS, HILARIO PASIOL,
ROGELIO ASURO, ARTURO ATABLANCO, RODRIGO
ATABLANCO, BONIFACIO ATIMANA, PATRICIO AVILA,
CRISANTO BACUS, ERNESTO DONAHAN, SR., NESTOR
LOCABERTE, MANILO REYES, ANDRES SAROL, SHERLITO
TAD-I, ANTONIO TANGARO, OLIGARIO TANAGARO,*
CRISITUTO TANGARO,** FELICIANO TANGARO,
GODOFREDO NABASCA, WENNIE ALIGARME, PEDRO
TATOY, JR., FELIPE UMAMALIN, PEDRO TATOY, SR.,
ANTONIO YANGYANG, ROMEO GANTUANGCO, VICTOR
ALIDON, JAIME TATOY AND JESUS TATOY, JR.,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 208410, October 19, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY JOY CILOT Y
MARIANO AND ORLANDO BRIGOLE Y APON, Accused-
Appellants.
 G.R. No. 168134, October 05, 2016 - FERRO
CHEMICALS, INC., Petitioner, v. ANTONIO M. GARCIA,
ROLANDO NAVARRO, JAIME Y. GONZALES AND CHEMICAL

34
INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.;
G.R. NO. 168183 - JAIME Y. GONZALES, Petitioner, v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FERRO CHEMICALS, INC.,
Respondents.; G.R. NO. 168196 - ANTONIO M. GARCIA,
Petitioner, v. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 188642 & 189425, October 17, 2016 -
AGDAO RESIDENTS INC., THE DIRECTORS LANDLESS
LANDLESS ASSOCIATION, BOARD OF OF AGDAO
ASSOCIATION, INC., IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY
NAMELY: ARMANDO JAVONILLO, MA. ACELITA
ARMENTANO, ALEX JOSOL, ANTONIA AMORADA, JULIUS
ALINSUB, POMPENIANO ESPINOSA, JR., SALCEDO DE LA
CRUZ, CLAUDIO LAO, CONSORCIO DELGADO, ROMEO
CABILLO, RICARDO BACONG, RODOLFO GALENZOGA,
BENJAMIN LAMIGO, AND ASUNCION A. ALCANTARA,
Petitioners, v. ROLANDO MARAMION, LEONIDAS
JAMISOLA, VIRGINIA CANOY, ELIZABETH GONZALES,
CRISPINIANO QUIRE-QUIRE, ERNESTINO DUNLAO, ELLA
DEMANDANTE, ELLA RIA DEMANDANTE, ELGIN
DEMANDANTE, SATURNINA WITARA, VIRGILIO
DAYONDON, MELENCIA MARAMION, ANGELICA PENKIAN,
PRESENTACION TAN, HERNANI GREGORY, RUDY
GIMARINO, VALENTIN CAMEROS, RODEL CAMEROS,
ZOLLO JABONETE, LUISITO TAN, JOSEPH QUIRE-QUIRE,
ERNESTO DUNLAO, JR., FRED DUNLAO, LIZA MARAMION,
CLARITA ROBILLA, RENATO DUNLAO AND PRUDENCIO
JUARIZA, JR., Respondents.; G.R. NOS. 188888-89 -
ROLANDO MARAMION, LEONIDAS JAMISOLA, VIRGINIA
CANOY, ERNESTINO DUNLAO, ELLA DEMANDANTE, ELLA
RIA DEMANDANTE, ELGIN DEMANDANTE, SATURNINA
WITARA, MELENCIA MARAMION, LIZA MARAMION,
ANGELICA PENKIAN, PRESENTACION TAN, AS
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS: HERNANI GREGORY,
RUDY GIMARINO, RODEL CAMEROS, VALENTIN CAMEROS,
VIRGILIO DAYONDON, PRUDENCIO JUARIZA, JR., ZOILO
JABONETE, LUISITO TAN, ERNESTINO DUNLAO, JR., FRED
DUNLAO, CLARITA ROBILLA, AND RENATO DUNLAO,
Petitioners, v. AGDAO LANDLESS RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION, INC., THE DIRECTORS LANDLESS BOARD

35
OF OF AGDAO RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., IN THEIR
PERSONAL CAPACITY, NAMELY: ARMANDO JAVONILLO,
MA. ACELITA ARMENTANO, ALEX JOSOL, ANTONIA
AMORADA, JULIUS ALINSUB, POMPENIANO ESPINOSA, JR.
JACINTO BO-OC, HERMENIGILDO DUMAPIAS, SALCEDO
DE LA CRUZ, CLAUDIO LAO, CONSORCIO DELGADO,
ROMEO CABILLO, RICARDO BACONG, RODOLFO
GALENZOGA, BENJAMIN LAMIGO, ROMEO DE LA CRUZ,
ASUNCION ALCANTARA AND LILY LOY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 183416, October 05, 2016 - PROVINCIAL
ASSESSOR OF AGUSAN DEL SUR, Petitioner, v. FILIPINAS
PALM OIL PLANTATION, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212980, October 10, 2016 - BUENAVISTA
PROPERTIES, INC., AND/OR JOSEPHINE CONDE,
Petitioners, v. RAMON G. MARIÑO, REPRESENTED BY
ATTY. OSWALDO F. GABAT AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND
COUNSEL VICE ATTY. AMADO DELORIA, FORMER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND COUNSEL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 203610, October 10, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL (HUDCC),
Petitioners, v. GONZALO ROQUE, JR., MANUELA ALMEDA
ROQUE, EDUVIGIS A. PAREDES, MICHAEL A. PAREDES,
PURIFICACION ALMEDA, JOSE A. ALMEDA, MICHELLE A.
ALMEDA, MICHAEL A. ALMEDA, ALBERTO DELURA, AND
THERESA ALMEDA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEHAR REYES, Accused-
Appellant.
 G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016 - MARIANO LIM,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 222419, October 05, 2016 - RAMIL R.
VALENZUELA, Petitioner, v. ALEXANDRA MINING AND OIL
VENTURES, INC. AND CESAR E. DETERA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 197557, October 05, 2016 - MAUREEN P.
PEREZ, Petitioner, v. COMPARTS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondent.

36
 G.R. No. 212562, October 12, 2016 - AVELINO
ANGELES Y OLANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016 - WILFREDO
F. TUVILLO, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON,
RESPONDENT.; A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1756 - MELISSA J.
TUVILLO A.K.A MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant, v.
JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 215802, October 19, 2016 - RIZALINA
GEMINA, ROSARIO ACANTILADO, JUANITA REYES, EFREN
EUGENIO, ROMELIA EUGENIO, AMADOR EUGENIO, JR.,
ANTONIO EUGENIO, LERMA E. RIBAC, ELVIRA E. SIMEON
AND TOMAS EUGENIO, ALL REPRESENTED BY CANDIDO
GEMINA, JR., Petitioners, v. JUANITO EUGENIO, LOLITA
EUGENIO-SEV1LLA, BONIFACIO EUGENIO, ELEONOR
EUGENIO, JOSE EUGENIO, AND THE SPOUSES LAUREL
AND ZENAIDA MARIANO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 224889, October 19, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MC HENRY SUAREZ Y
ZURITA, JOHN JOSEPH RAVENA Y ACOSTA AND JOHN
PAUL VICENCIO Y BARRANCO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 193321, October 19, 2016 - TAKENAKA
CORPORATION-PHILIPPINE BRANCH, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 172948, October 05, 2016 - PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. PABLITO O. LIM, MANUEL A. AGCAOILI, AND
CONSUELO M. PADILLA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 219558, October 19, 2016 - HEIRS OF
JOHNNY AOAS, REPRESENTED BY BETTY PUCAY,
Petitioners, v. JULIET AS-IL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 217455, October 05, 2016 - OYSTER PLAZA
HOTEL, ROLITO GO, AND JENNIFER AMPEL, Petitioners, v.
ERROL O. MELIVO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 195295, October 05, 2016 - REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
FOURTH DIVISION, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.
MARCOS, JR., MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC,

37
GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, AND IRENE R. MARCOS
ARANETA, Respondents.
 G.R.No. 204261, October 05, 2016 - EDWARD C. DE
CASTRO AND MA. GIRLIE F. PLATON, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, SILVERICON, INC., AND/OR NUVOLAND
PHILS., INC., AND/OR RAUL MARTINEZ, RAMON
BIENVENIDA, AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
NUVOLAND, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 201074, October 19, 2016 - SPOUSES RAMON
SY AND ANITA NG, RICHARD SY, JOSIE ONG, WILLIAM SY
AND JACKELINE DE LUCIA, Petitioners, v. WESTMONT
BANK (NOW UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILIPPINES) AND
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS
ASSIGNEE OF UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 203072, October 18, 2016 - DEVELOPMENT
ACADEMY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO TAN,
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.,
COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, AND COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220383, October 05, 2016 - SONEDCO
WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) / RENATO
YUDE, MARIANITO REGINO, MANUEL YUMAGUE,
FRANCISCO DACUDAG, RUDY ABABAO, DOMINIC
SORNITO, SERGIO CAJUYONG, ROMULO LABONETE,
GENEROSO GRANADA, EMILIO AGUS, ARNOLD CAYAO,
BEN GENEVE, VICTOR MAQUE, RICARDO GOMEZ,
RODOLFO GAWAN, JIMMY SULLIVAN, FEDERICO
SUMUGAT, JR., ROMULO AVENTURA, JR., JURRY
MAGALLANES, HERNAN EPISTOLA, JR., ROBERTO
BELARTE, EDMON MONTALVO, TEODORO MAGUAD,
DOMINGO TABABA, MAXIMO SALE, CYRUS DIONILLO,
LEONARDO JUNSAY, JR., DANILO SAMILLION, MARIANITO
BOCATEJA, JUANITO GEBUSION, RICARDO MAYO, RAUL
ALIMON, ARNEL ARNAIZ, REBENCY BASOY, JIMMY
VICTORIO BERNALDE, RICARDO BOCOL, JR., JOB
CALAMBA, WOLFRANDO CALAMBA, RODOLFO CASISID,

38
JR., EDGARDO DELA PENA, ALLAN DIONILLO, EDMUNDO
EBIDO, JOSE ELEPTICO, JR., MARCELINO FLORES,
HERNANDO FUENTEBILLA, SAUL HITALIA, JOSELITO
JAGODILLA, NONITO JAYME, ADJIE JUANILLO, JEROLD
JUDILLA, EDILBERTO NACIONAL, SANDY NAVALES, FELIPE
NICOLASORA, JOSE PAMALO-AN, ISMAEL PEREZ, JR.,
ERNESTO RANDO, JR., PHILIP REPULLO, VICENTE RUIZ,
JR., JOHN SUMUGAT, CARLO SUSANA, ROMEO
TALAPIERO, JR., FERNANDO TRIENTA, FINDY VILLACRUZ,
JOEL VILLANUEVA, AND JERRY MONTELIBANO, Petitioners,
v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, SUGAR DIVISION-
SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(SONEDCO), Respondent.
 G.R. No. 174964, October 05, 2016 - SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, Petitioner, v. CONGRESSMAN
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY,
CONCERNED STUDENTS AND THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE BATAAN POLYTECHNIC STATE COLLEGE,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 218902, October 17, 2016 - HELEN EDITH
LEE TAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 221773, October 18, 2016 - RG CABRERA
CORPORATION, INC., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AND COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 209086, October 17, 2016 - ANGELITO R.
PUBLICO, Petitioner, v. HOSPITAL MANAGERS, INC.,
ARCHDIOCESE OF MANILA - DOING BUSINESS UNDER
THE TRADENAME AND STYLE OF "CARDINAL SANTOS
MEDICAL CENTER", Respondents.
 G.R. No. 199480, October 12, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. TESS S. VALERIANO,
Respondent.
 A.C. No. 7927, October 19, 2016 - SANDY V.
DOMINGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PALMARIN E. RUBIO
AND ATTY. NICASIO T. RUBIO, Respondents.
 G.R.No. 213939, October 12, 2016 - LYLITH B.
FAUSTO, JONATHAN FAUSTO, RICO ALVIA, ARSENIA

39
TOCLOY, LOURDES ADOLFO AND ANECITA MANCITA,
Petitioners, v. MULTI AGRI-FOREST AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE (FORMERLY MAF
CAMARINES SUR EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE, INC.),
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 200087, October 12, 2016 - YOLANDA LUY Y
GANUELAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

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