ett THE FRENCH PARAS AFTER WWII By Gerry Miller LES CENTURIONS In 1952, the war in French Indo-China had been raging for seven years. On 16 October, the fight for the Thai Highlands in Tonkin had begun with the French effort to withdraw from the Red River to the Black River. To buy time for slower-moving units, a blocking force was required to slow down the Viet Minh 312th Division. The 6th Colonial Commando Parachute Batallion (6e BPC) under Major Marcel Bigeard had been chosen. The mixture of French and Vietnamese paras, with Bigeard in the lead ‘stick’, dropped at the small fortified post of Tu-Lé and dug in. armed Viet Minh 312th Division until 20 Octobe, vie ‘ually without air support. To avoid being cut off, the French retreated 40 miles over jungle paths in less than two days, fighting off ambushes most ofthe way. The 6th BPC (6e BPC) suffered 60 per cent casualties (dead, wounded, oF taken prisoner by the time they reached the Black River onthe 22nd Bigeard maintained his command over an effective fighting unit T: parachute battalion held on against the heavly- Bigeard was one of the emblematic figures of the French parachutists in the ites and sixties, There were others, The ferociously effective Colonel Jeanpierre commanded the 1st REP in 1957-58, until he was killed in a shot-down helicopter, General Jacques Massu commanded the 10th Parachute Divi sion during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. These men and many more embodied the spirit that made the paras such an effec- tive fighting force with an élan and determination reminiscent ofthe best of Napoleon's Grande Armée. ‘The French parachute units of the late fortis, fifties, and early sixties liked to think of themselves asa breed apart, and they probably were. Jean Laréguy wrote the novels Les Centurions (hich was made into the flm Lost Command) and the sequel les Prétoriens. The two novels are very much based on fact, dealing withthe paras in Indo-China and Algeria, written by a journalist who was close to some of their leading figures. His ‘main character Piere-Noel Raspeguy was based on Bigeard WHAT'S IN A NAME? Youll have noticed that the para units are excellent examples ofthe French love of intals and acronyms. I ime to shed a lite light before we move on. First the For: eign Legion. In 1948, the fist BEP (Je Batallon ranger de parachutstes) was formed, and r the st 2nd, and 31d BEPsserved in Indo- China. In 1955, the 3rd was disbanded and its electives were split between the other two, which now became REPS (Régiments évangers de parachute). A signaling Viet Minh fighter. (Other units were either metropolitan rom the French mainland) or colonial. The Metropolitan ones were RCPs (Regiments de ‘hasseursparachutses) and the Colonial were RECs (Regiments cle parachutist colonia). Previously they had been Batalons = BCPs and BPCs. Ifyou see reference to RPIMas, these are RPCS retitled (rom 1958) as Régiments parachutistes dnfanterle de ‘marine. In Algeria, there were also the Tst RHP (Ie Régiment de hussards parachutes), the 13th RDP (T3e Régiment de drag- ‘ons parachutistes) of reconnaissance dragoons, and the 35th RALP (35e Régiment carilerie egere parachutist) ORGANIZATION AND UNIFORMS All the different parachute units had broadly simitar organi- zations: four rifle companies and an HQ/Heavy Weapons ‘company (which was split ito two separate companies in Algeria). They also had broadly similar combat uniforms. The subject of exactly what uniform combination was worn at any particular time is a complicated one, and is explained with admirable clarity in the excellent Osprey books dealing with the Foreign Legion paratroops and the wars in Indo-China and Algeria, Sufice it to say that there are plenty of possibilities for painting intricate camouflage patterns. you're playing an Indo-China game, your figures could be kited out in a mic fof exUS Marine, British, and French, both older and newer, as well as lacally-made clathing and equipment. Even by the time of Algeria, there was sila fair degree of variety. ‘THE PARAS IN ACTION ‘What are you complaining about? I'll make you glorious ...” = Colonel eanplore, 1st REP to is men in Algeria ‘The parachute units frst came tothe fore in the controversial ‘war in Indo-China, asthe French struggled to keep control of their colonies and protectorates against the nationalis-com- rmunist Viet Minh France was the first western power to face the mix of revo- lutionary and conventional warfare that Mao and his com=‘anders had employed in China. The French were always seeking to make use of their conventional military supe- riority in pitched battles, whereas the highly competent self-taught military leader of the Viet Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, avoided such encounters most of the ime. The situ- ation was not dissimilar to the one the Americans were to face fiteen years later, but with one vital diference: the French never had anything remotely resembling the US's overwhelming aerial and material superiority. ‘The French war effort was always underfunded and poorly equipped (even with US assistance as the war went on), and 0 aggressive elite formations like the parachute units, with the operational potential to achieve strategic surprise, were called upon very frequently. They often achieved local suc- cess, but at the cost of high casualties. The para units, with a mix of European and Vietnamese companies (except for the Legion), fought every conceivable typeof offensive and defen- sive action, culminating in the hard-fought disaster at Dien Bien Phu, which will always be associated with them. ‘Ten para units fought, at one stage or another, during the siege, and there isa long-standing myth that they and *Ger- mans of the Foreign Legion” were the bulk of the garrison. That was far from the case, but it was certainly tue that the paras provided some of the most effective elements at Dien Bien Phu, and they were frequently used as assault ‘troops to retake lost strong points and blunt enemy attacks, ‘A ‘mafia’ of paratroop leaders under Colonel Langlais was in command of the defence. As Bigeard later sai: “Our comradeship was excellent — and after all we were fighting for our skins.” Dien Bien Phu was lost, and some of the best French shock ‘troops with it. The French High Command had chosen a dis tant battlefield that they were incapable of supplying ade- ‘quately and had underestimated the logistic capability artil- lery stength, and determination of the Viet Minh. The paras, however, came out of the siege and the grim captivity that followed with the fighting reputation that they/d established intact. “Je préfere crever!” was Bigearl’s reply (meaning “Vd rather croak"), when the victors asked him ever so nicely if held mind replaying his surrender for their cameras. GAMING FRENCH INDOCHINA Like most modetn conflicts, the paras’ wars lend themselves to skirmish games. This scenario would be suitable for Force (on Force or other similar modern rules sets. Bolt Action could be used with very little adaptation, All tables are 6” x 4" RUMBLE IN THE JUNGLE We're in late 1952 and the war for the Thai Highlands is not going wel. It as been decided to evacuate the small para garrison at Tu-Vu, combine it with that at Pak Ban, ‘and pull them both back south to Lo-Na. The Viet Minh area commander senses the way things might be going and prepares to stop any evacuation. This can he scaled down twa skirmish action or scaled up to company level, simply adjust the number of figures on the table to keep the pro- portions 2 to 1 in the Viet Minh’s favor. ‘The French Garrisons each comprise one section (around 20 men) at Tu Va and Pak-Ban, with the HQ section (20 men + one 60mm ‘mortar and one 30mm machine-gun) at Lo-Na. ‘The Viet Minh ‘There are two regular platoons (around double the French strength), with one 82mm mortar and four LMGs. ‘The Viet Minh enter anywhere on the north-eastern sides of the table between points A and B. The thick vegetation counts as dificult terrain, Victory conditions ‘The French must exit through Point C (Lo-Na} and Point 1D (ift between them). They get one victory point for each figure moved off the table. The Viet Minh get one victory point for each French figure killed.aya AFTER DIEN BIEN PHU - SUEZ AND ALGERIA After Indo-China, the 10th Parachute Division was also involved inthe futile Franco- British attack on Suez in 1956, in ‘defence’ of the Canal. Once again, the paras impressed ‘observers with thet ferocious professionalism, However, their next real war was in Algeria against the nationalist FUN’ independence suuggle (1954 to 1962). The ight was complicated by the presence othe European pied noir ele- ment in the population andthe political question of wheth- ‘er or not Algeria was really seen as part of France or as a colony whose time for independence had come. On the ground, though the parachute units were a the forefront Of the struggle against the FLN (Font de Libération Nation- ale), and this time, they were in a war that ~ militarily, at least they won. Commanders ike Bigeard (yet again) used innovative tactics and harried the ALN (the armed wing of the FLN) mercilessly. There was also a darker side to all this the use of torture for information, most notoriously in Brenna td the ‘Battle of Algiers’. Ironically, some of the very officers making use of it had themselves been tortured as Resist- ance fighters during WWI Its certainly rue that the FLN were no angels, either; but in the long run, the practice of torture, even though militarily effective in Algiers, had a bad morale effect, alienated international opinion, and did not bring the same results as the use of informers (On 23-25 May 1957, Bigeard, now a colonel, commanded the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment (RPC) at Agounenn= da. There he ambushed and smashed the FLN’s Commando 41 ‘Ali Khodja’ and two other supporting units in a running, battle, partially using helicopter lifts. His unit killed and captured 108 FLN at the cost of eight dead paras. (On 28 April 1961, after its pa inthe failed pursch in Algiers, the ‘st Foreign Parachute Regiment (REP) moved out ofthe camp it had built up from nothing at Zéralda, heading for disbandment. Kas Artizan US Paras converted to RPE. In 28mm, Redstar Miniatures have a nice range of Vietminh and French paras for Indo-China and for Algeria. They come with separate head options ‘there's the possibility offing them with either helmets, bush hats or the famous ‘lizard’ or ‘Bigeard’ cap (though remember the REPS never wore ‘ther, Quite a lot ofthe equipment in Indo-China was British and US, so some WW2 pata-troop figures may be pressed into service - British paras in berets and the US paras in helmets with netting are both useful. You can leven convert a Thompson to look like a MAT 49 by shortening the bare Both the Assault Group and Baker Company have some VC figures withthe right equipment forthe VietMinh (remem- ber, no AK 47'S or shorten the magazines so they look like SKS carbines) For Algeria, there are several companies who have resistance fighters and partisans, some of whom could be used for the FLN. Their dress was mainly modern, not necessarily traditional, so could also include female fighters and auxiliaries. The FLN had a prety eclect range of equipment, with quite a few WW2 weapons (and older in service. They also wore some American and captured French, Uniforms and equipment, a bit of ‘mixing and matching’ could be in order. Artizan Designs has goumiers ~ check out ‘their ‘Thrilling Tales’ range. There are also ranges of 20mm figures that would be suitable.2 ‘Rumble in the Jungle Map. In the tracks, the Foreign Legionnaires roared out the Edith Piaf song “Je ne regret rien, as behind them the camp they'd care- fully booby-tapped bursts into lames and explosions ‘The para units’ operational effectiveness was second to none. They occasionally jumped into operations, but most ‘of the time they were light infantry in the rugged landscape ‘on search-and-destroy missions, causing very high casu- alties amongst the ALN. Compared with Indo-China, the French were plentifully equipped with helicopters (from fone in 1954 to 80 in 1957), though still nothing like the ‘American scale in Vietnam, This allowed commanders like Bigeard and Jeanpierre to use helicopters to lift in com- ppanies once the enemy had been held by a ground-based force; the ‘ventilos’ were also used to move men around the battlefield. By the late fifties, there was in place a highly effective system of tracking by hunting comman: dos, spotting, and then fixing the enemy by ground forces, while the paras were flown in to block any escape, before ‘moving infor the kill. Such tactics made any confrontation in the countryside a high-risk situation for the FLN. [As already mentioned, the paras also proved their effective- ress in an urban setting, during the Batle of Algiers Janu- any-March 1957). Massu’s 10th Parachute Division was given responsibility fr order inthe city, after @ wave of FLN bomb attacks and a backlash from pied noir lynch mobs. Massu’s four regiments set to work with grim officiency, Bigeard’s 3rd RPC taking responsibility forthe focal point of the Casbah. ‘A combination of minute combing of commandeered police files, interrogations, checkpoints, and house-to-house search es took effect. Bigeard’s men frequently landed by helicop- ter om the flat roofs of houses to make their raids, and on 19 February they made their biggest catch ~ the bomb factory of Saadi Yacef, who led the FLN's Algiers bombing campaign By the end of March, no more bombs exploded in Algiers land Massu had won his battle, Sadly, as we know today, Map for Rock the Casbah. a “War on Terror’ often creates at least as many terrorists as it eliminates, and the FLN fought on. Even though, by late 1959, FLN activity had been reduced to sabotage and terrorism, with no major field forces operating, the politi- ‘eal tide was turning, with De Gaulle back in power and publicly recognizing the prospect of Algerian ‘se-deter- mination’, On 19 March 1962, after a second round of peace talks at Evian, a ceasefire came into effect. The war was over. The paras had won their part of it~ but the anti- De Gaulle putsch in Algiers, which involved some of them, had been too late to turn the tide of history. GAMING ALGERIA ‘As with Indochina, these scenarios lend themselves to skir mish games and we're going to take two scenario for Algeria All tables are 6f x af. These scenarios with a litle adaptation ‘could be used fr the earlier conflict in Indochina. SCENARIO 2 ~ ROCK THE CASBAH! This scenario is based on the sort of confrontation that might have taken place during the Batlle of Algiers The 3rd RPC ‘There are four fire teams, armed with rifles and sub-machi rneguns (16 figures). The unit commander is tasked with a ‘complex mission consisting of three objectives: 1, Pick up and bring o safety an informant, who is located in ether the bartabac on a comer of Place Danton and Rue des Chameaux or ina private house on the comer of Impasse Tunisie. (Roll 1D6: 1-3, bartabac; 46, house) 2. Bring in for questioning a well-known lawyer, Sidi ‘Abmane, who is suspected of links with the FLN. (It takes one game move to collect him from his office) 3. Search the Café Kabyle (on Impasse Carton), which ‘an informer suggests may be a bomb-factory. This takes three game moves.)