South Africas Nuclear Diplomacy 1990 201

SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, 1990-2010: SECURING A NICHE
ROLE THROUGH NORM CONSTRUCTION AND STATE IDENTITY
by
JO-ANSIE KARINA VAN WYK
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor Philosophiae (International Relations)
in the Department of Political Sciences at the
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR ANTON DU PLESSIS
January 2013
DECLARATION
I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree D Phil (International
Relations) at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously been
submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.
...................................................
Jo-Ansie Karina van Wyk
30 January 2013
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Strabo, a Greek geographer and philosopher, maintained that geography is destiny

(quoted in Dawson 2005: 362). This holds true for me. I grew up approximately 60
km west of Vaalputs, South Africa’s National Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. I
became aware of its existence much later in life and this awareness gradually
resulted in an academic interest in environmental, hydro- and space politics and
more specifically an interest in the influence of nuclear science on international
relations and diplomacy.
My academic interest in nuclear politics and nuclear diplomacy was cultivated in

1995 when I was awarded the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO)
New South African Security Policy Fellowship which allowed me to spend time at the
Department of War Studies, King's College London. There I attended the lectures of
Dr Martin Navias on nuclear strategy which left me in awe of the power of the “ghost
inside the atom”.1
Discussions with Dr Kate Dewes, a Member of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, in July 2008 whilst
attending the University of Otago’s annual Foreign Policy School in Otago, New
Zealand, further consolidated my academic interest in nuclear issues.
Undeniably, the “ghost inside the atom” has been one of the major dramatis
personae of the 20th century and continues its presence well into the 21st century.
Therefore, I am grateful to have been able to study this phenomenon and its relation
to South Africa. I am also grateful to a number of individuals and institutions for
enabling me to complete this study.
My sincerest appreciation goes to my supervisor, Professor Anton du Plessis whose

academic insights, intellect, integrity and motivation have been exemplary and
career-changing. I am also greatly indebted to the University of Pretoria’s (UP)
Department of Political Sciences under the leadership of Professor Maxi Schoeman
1
This phrase is taken from South African anthropologist and singer-songwriter, Johnny Clegg’s lyric “I
call your name” which appeared on Johnny Clegg and Savuka’s 1988 album Shadow Man.
ii
for their efficient and professional assistance, and interest in and supervision of my
studies.
I have greatly benefitted from attending a conference hosted by Wilton Park (an
institution of the British FCO) and the ISS on Africa and the nuclear non-proliferation
regime in March 2012 in Pretoria, South Africa. The usual disclaimers apply.
I am grateful for the financial assistance provided by the UP (Postgraduate Bursary,

2010 - 2012), the University of South Africa (Unisa) (Masters and Doctoral Support
Programme, 2010) and Monash South Africa. I received the Monash South Africa-
Carnegie Nuclear History Fellowship in 2011 in terms of Monash South Africa’s
partnership with the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC (United
States). For this, I am particularly grateful for the support provided by Dr Anna-Mart
van Wyk.
I am grateful for the academic support I received from my home department at

Unisa. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Murray Faure
and Pieter Labuschange, and Mrs Tersia van Heerden for their support and interest
in my studies.
I am also indebted to the librarians of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in Vienna (Austria), the UP and Unisa. I am in particular grateful for the professional
assistance provided by three of Unisa’s librarians, namely Ms Karlien de Beer,
(Information Resources Subject Developer), Ms Mary-Lynn Suttie (Personal
Librarian: Political Sciences) and Ms Karen Breckon (Information Search Librarian).
I am also indebted to friends and relatives (in no particular order) for their enduring
support: Dr Paul and Mrs Lalie de Beer, Abé and Dorette du Plessis, Sally Bonthuys,
Rentia Brand, Jacqueléne Coetzer, René Laan, Sarah le Grange, Lizanne Murison,
Rothea Olivier, Ankie Pienaar, Dr Dimitri Tassiopoulos, Sylvia Strever, Elske van
Rooyen, Johannes van Wyk, Professor Andries Visagie and Jahni Wasserfall.
My parents, Kobus† and Janet van Wyk, have been my greatest academic influence.
They valued continued education and were committed to academic excellence, even
as middle-aged Unisa students. My parents’ lively interest in history, politics and
iii
contemporary affairs has inspired me since childhood. Similarly, I am thankful for the
interest and support of my sister and brother-in-law, Maryke and Alastair Fordyce of
Christchurch, New Zealand, and my brother Stephanus and his wife Joy-Linda van
Wyk of Grabouw, South Africa.
Finally, my most profound gratitude goes to you, Karlien, to whom this thesis is
dedicated. You have been my constant companion, my faithful friend and my patient
partner on this journey. Your love and support has been life-changing. There is no
way I can ever thank you for all of this.
Cursum perficio. Ex gratia, soli Deo gloria.
Jo-Ansie van Wyk

Pretoria
30 January 2013
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xi

List of Figures xv
List of Tables xvi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature survey 7
3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem 11
4. Methodology 14
5. Structure of the research 15
6. Conclusion 18
CHAPTER TWO: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction 20
2. Conceptual analysis as a research method 23
3. Constructivism: selected theoretical aspects 24
4. The strands of constructivism 29
5. Criticism made against Wendt’s constructivism 32
6. Diplomacy: selected theoretical aspects 37
6.1 Defining diplomacy 37
6.2 Typology of diplomacy 39
6.3 Parameters of diplomacy 39
6.4 Norms and diplomacy 41
6.5 Identity, interests and diplomacy 45
7. Nuclear diplomacy 48
7.1 Context of nuclear diplomacy 48
7.2 Nature and scope of nuclear diplomacy 49
7.3 Forms of nuclear diplomacy 54
7.4 The meaning, implications and utility of nuclear diplomacy 57
7.5 Elements of nuclear diplomacy 59
7.6 Power, authority and nuclear diplomacy 60
v
8. Niche diplomacy 62
9. Conclusion 64
CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
1. Introduction 67
2. Nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes: definition
and utility 68
3. The principal nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes 71
3.1 The Zangger Committee 71
3.2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group 74
3.3 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 77
3.4 The Missile Technology Control Regime and The Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 78
3.5 The New Agenda Coalition 86
4. South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export control
policy and mechanisms 89
4.1 The diplomatic context of South Africa’s involvement
in nuclear export regimes 89
4.2 The sources of South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation
export control policy 94
4.3 South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation
export control policy 95
4.4 South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export
control mechanisms 97
4.4.1 The Council for the Non-Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction 98
4.4.2 The National Conventional Arms Control Committee 99
5. Concerns about South Africa’s post-1990 commitment
to nuclear non- proliferation 104
5.1 The AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network in South Africa 109
5.1.1 The Wisser Affaire 109
vi
5.1.2 The implications of the AQ Khan legacy 112

6. An assessment of South Africa’s role and identity
regarding the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes 115
6.1 South Africa’s state identity and national interests 115
6.2 South Africa’s diplomatic roles and strategies 116
6.3 South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship and leadership 118
7. ConcIusion 119
CHAPTER FOUR: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

ENERGY AGENCY
1. Introduction 121
2. South Africa’s pre-1990 relations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency 122
2.1 South Africa’s role in the establishment of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (1953-1964) 123
2.2 South Africa’s role in the International Atomic Energy
Agency (1965 – 1989) 125
3. South Africa’s post-1990 relations with the International
3.1 The legal and diplomatic framework of South Africa’s
post-1990 relations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency 132
3.1.1 The verification process and the
implementation of the Safeguards Agreement 133
3.1.2 South Africa’s bilateral agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency 137
3.1.3 Multilateralism as South African diplomatic practice 139
3.2 Selected case studies of South Africa’s relations with
the International Atomic Energy Agency 141
3.2.1 Membership of the Board of Governors 141
3.2.2 Article VI of the Statute 141
3.2.3 Leadership of the Board of Governors 145
3.2.4 The Nuclear Fuel Reserve 152
vii
3.2.5 The AQ Khan network and the Wisser Affaire 157

3.2.6 The SAFARI-1 conversion and isotope production 161
4. An assessment of South Africa’s relations with the International
4.1 The African Agenda and South-South cooperation 167
4.2 North-South cooperation 168
4.3 Norms and state identity 169
4.4 South Africa’s diplomatic conduct at the International
5. Conclusion 171
CHAPTER FIVE: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPON

FREE ZONE TREATY
1. Introduction 173
2. Nuclear weapons free zones 174
3. The evolution of the Treaty of Pelindaba 178
3.1 The origins of Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation position 178
3.2 The resumption of negotiations on an African nuclear
weapon free zone 182
3.3 Efforts to include South Africa in negotiations 184
3.4 Negotiating and drafting the treaty on a denuclearised Africa 185
4. South Africa and the Treaty of Pelindaba 190
4.1 First Conference of Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba
(November 2010) 191
4.2 First Ordinary Session of the AFONE (May 2011) 194
5. An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa 198
5.1 South Africa’s African Agenda 198
5.2 South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa 199
5.3 South Africa’s state identity and power on nuclear
issues in Africa 200
5.4 The perfomative aspects of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy in Africa 201
6. South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy challenges in Africa 202
viii
7. Conclusion 210
CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-

PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Introduction 213
2. The origins and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons 214
3. South Africa’s pre-1991 nuclear diplomacy on the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 217
4. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference 222
4.1 South Africa’s participation in the Preparatory
Committee Conferences 222
4.2 South Africa’s preparation for the Review and
Extension Conference 223
4.3 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the
Review and Extension Conference 224
4.4 An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference 229
5. The 2000 Review Conference 230
5.1 Events preceding the 2000 Review Conference 230
5.2 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the 2000
Review Conference 233
at the 2000 Review Conference 236
6.3 The failure of the 2005 Review Conference 243
ix
7.2 South Africa’s pre- 2010 Review Conference

nuclear diplomacy 247
8. An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons 254
9. Conclusion 256
CHAPTER SEVEN: EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Introduction 258
2. Analytical and theoretical framework of the study 259
3. Summary of chapters 260
3.1 South Africa and the nuclear non-proliferation
export control regime 260
3.2 South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency 261
3.3 South Africa and the Treaty of Pelindaba 263
3.4 South Africa and the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 264
4. Main findings of study 265
4.1 South Africa’s practice of nuclear diplomacy 265
4.2 South Africa’s power and nuclear diplomacy 267
4.3 South Africa’s construction of norms, identity
and interests 269
4.4 The future of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy 273
5. Ontological contributions of study 275
6. Epistemological contributions of this study 276
7. Practical implications of the study 277
8. Recommendations for future research 278
9. Final observations 278
x
Bibliography 280
Appendix 1 337
Members of the Inaugural African Commission on Nuclear Energy
Summary 343
xi
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
99
Mo Molybdenum-99
AAM Anti-Apartheid Movement
ABMT Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AEB Atomic Energy Board of South Africa
AEC Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa
AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AFRA African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development,
and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AG Australia Group
ANC African National Congress
ANWFZ African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
ARMSCOR Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa
AU African Union
AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council
AWB Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CANE Coalition Against Nuclear Energy
CD Conference on Disarmament
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COP Conference of State Parties
CPF Country Programme Framework
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)
DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DME Department of Minerals and Energy (South Africa)
DOE Department of Energy (South Africa)
xii
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

DST Department of Science and Technology (South Africa)
€ Euro
EMG Environmental Monitoring Group
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMT Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
FNRBA Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa
FNWS Former Nuclear Weapons State
G-77 Group of 77
GC General Conference
GCIS Government Communication and Information System (South Africa)
GIF Generation IV International Forum
GNPI Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure
GNU Government of National Unity (South Africa)
HCOC The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
HE His Excellency
HEU Highly-Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
IEC International Enrichment Centre
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation
INFC International Nuclear Fuel Centre
IR International Relations
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
IRP Integrated Resources Plan
ITDB International Atomic Energy Agency Illicit Traffic Database
LEU Low-Enriched Uranium
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty
Mo-99 Molybdenum-99
MP Member of Parliament
MPI Middle Powers Initiative
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MW Megawatt
xiii
NAC New Agenda Coalition

NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NECSA Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa
NERS Network of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear Programmes
NETC Nuclear Energy Technical Committee (South Africa)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NNEECC National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee (South
Africa)
NNR National Nuclear Regulator (South Africa)
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NP National Party (South Africa)
NPA National Prosecuting Authority (South Africa)
NPC South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS Nuclear Security Summit
NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative
NTP Nuclear Technology Products Radioisotopes (Property) Limited
NWS Nuclear Weapons State
NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWFZT Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty
NUFCOR Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OTB Overberg Toetsbaan
P5 Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
PAC Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PBMR Pebble Bed Modular Nuclear Reactor
PIV Physical Inventory Verification
PREPCOM Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency
PREPCOM Preparatory Committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
PPNN Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
xiv
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

PWR Pressurised Water Reactor
R/ZAR South African Rand
REC Review and Extension Conference
REVCON Review Conference
RSA Republic of South Africa
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAFARI-1 South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation-1
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SAPS South African Police Service
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TACC Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee of the IAEA
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle System
U-235 Uranium 235
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCEAR United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
US United States of America
US$ United States Dollar
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WA Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
ZC Zangger Committee
xv
List of Figures
1 Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy 38

2 Three stages of the life-cycle of norms 44
3 Cooper’s extended framework of middle power behaviour 63
4 Elements of a constructivist approach to nuclear diplomacy 65
5 A summary and contextualisation of South Africa’s diplomatic
relations with the IAEA (1957 - 2010) 128
6 South Africa’s three-phased nuclear deterrent strategy 129
7 The verification process of South Africa’s declared
nuclear inventory (1991 - 1994) 136
8 The process of the election of the Director General
of the IAEA (2009) 151
9 Events and developments in the existence of NECSA 162
10 The schedule for the SAFARI-1 conversion 164
11 South Africa’s norm construction and state identity in the IAEA 170
12 The evolution of the Treaty of Pelindaba 179
13 The territory covered by the Treaty of Pelindaba 189
xvi
List of Tables
1 The main ontological assumptions of constructivism

and rationalism 25
2 Typology of diplomacy 40
3 SIPRI’s estimated global nuclear weapons inventories (2010) 53
4 The Zangger Committee’s Trigger List 72
5 South Africa’s missile series 80
6 South Africa’s current missile development programme 85
7 South Africa’s membership of nuclear non-proliferation
export control regimes 92
8 South Africa’s nuclear reactors 95
9 South Africa’s core nuclear non-proliferation legislation (1990-2010) 97
10 South African institutions responsible for nuclear non-proliferation 100
11 South Africa’s agreements with the IAEA (1990-2010) 137
12 Candidates and non-binding poll results for the position of the Director
General 150
13 Major reactors producing and supplying all types of
medical isotopes 165
14 Major nuclear weapons free zones 176
15 Members of the AFCONE (2010) 193
16 Protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba 209
17 The core provisions of the NPT 215
18 Members of the South African delegation to Iraq (2003) 237
19 The Non-Aligned Movement’s timeframe for nuclear disarmament 250
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Towards the end of 1989, President FW de Klerk established a committee to

oversee the dismantling and destruction of South Africa’s “nuclear devices” (De
Klerk 1993).2 In early 1990, the De Klerk government decided that:
all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed; all the nuclear
material in Armscor's [Armaments Development and Production
Corporation of South Africa] possession be recast and returned to the AEC
[Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa] where it should be stored
according to internationally accepted measures; Armscor's facilities should
be decontaminated and be used only for non-nuclear commercial
purposes; after which South Africa should accede to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to
international safeguards (De Klerk 1993).3
An immediate task of the South African government after the 1989 decision to
terminate the nuclear weapons programme was to decommission several nuclear
weapons facilities in preparation for inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) whilst maintaining the safety and security of the country’s nuclear
weapons equipment and stocks of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). More importantly,
South Africa had to convince the international community of the sincerity of its
intentions regarding nuclear non-proliferation. Apart from these developments, South
Africa was also in the early phases of its political transition to democratic rule.
2
De Klerk (1993) referred to the dismantling and destruction of “nuclear devices” and not to atomic or
nuclear bombs. Waldo Stumpf (1995a) of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa (AEC), who
had been involved in the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability also referred to
‘devices’ (and not bombs) but also mentions “South Africa’s nuclear deterrent”. In fact, Stumpf
(1995a) confirmed that South Africa produced six “fission gun-type devices”.
3
In the so-called “Completeness Report” by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to the Agency’s General Conference (GC) on 9 September 1993, the Agency referred
to the “destruction of equipment used in the development and making of the nuclear weapons” and to
the “termination of the programme” (IAEA 1993a: 27) (see Chapter 4).
2
On 24 March 1993, President de Klerk announced the extent of South Africa’s

nuclear weapons programme to the South African Parliament.4 The decision set in
motion not only speculation about the ‘voluntary’ nature of South Africa’s intention to
dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, but also the public announcement of the
scope of this nuclear weapons programme. Barely a month later 26 South African
parties established the Multi-party Negotiating Forum which subsequently adopted
the constitutional principles that formed the foundation of the South African Interim
Constitution and initiated the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to prepare the
country for its first inclusive democratic elections in April 1994. This resulted in the
establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) under the leadership of
Nelson Mandela, the President of the African National Congress (ANC) (Sisk 1995:
225-243). These developments resulted in the termination of sanctions and
embargoes against South Africa; ended the country’s global isolation and resulted in
changes in its nuclear-related relations.
South Africa is one of few countries to have terminated its nuclear weapons
programme - others being Brazil and Libya. Apart from including the dismantling of
its nuclear weapons programme, the post-1990 period has been most dynamic in
terms of South Africa’s international relations and diplomacy. During this period it
established numerous bilateral relations; acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter the NPT) in 1991; and joined or re-
joined several nuclear-related organisations, including the IAEA, the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies (hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement or WA), the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Network of Regulators of Countries
with Small Nuclear Programmes (NERS), the African Nuclear Regulators’ Group and
the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) (DFA 2009a).5
Apart from adopting a human rights-based foreign policy, South Africa reiterated that
a “primary goal” of its foreign policy is to “reinforce and promote it as a responsible
producer, possessor and trader of defence-related products and advanced
technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields” (DFA 2009a).
4
Hereafter this is referred to as De Klerk’s 1993 announcement or the 1993 announcement.
5
Hereafter the full titles of treaties and other international agreements are indicated in italics, whereas
their abbreviations, acronyms or shortened titles are in normal font.
3
The Government’s argument was that South Africa, in this way, “promotes the
benefits which non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control hold for international
peace and security, particularly to countries in Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM)” (DFA 2009a).
Accordingly, a year into the GNU, South Africa entered into one of its first major
nuclear-related diplomatic engagements. Its participation in and deadlock-breaking
diplomatic efforts during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (REC) of the
NPT have subsequently been hailed as a diplomatic success “winning it some
credibility in the west, while not damaging relations with non-aligned states” (Masiza
& Landsberg 1996: 31). At subsequent NPT conferences, South Africa achieved
similar results (Taylor 2006). The evolution of South Africa’s brand of nuclear
diplomacy has been more significant. Characterised by a combination of normative
innovation, norm maintenance, coalition building, confrontation, independence,
partnerships and parallelism, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy has developed into a
diplomatic niche role for the country.
Notwithstanding these successes, several nuclear-related issues have remained a

concern, unresolved or took a long time to resolve. Despite several appeals by the
IAEA, the protracted process of converting the country’s nuclear research reactor -
the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation (SAFARI-1) - from
operating with weapons grade HEU to operating with low-enriched uranium (LEU)
was only completed by mid-2009. Issues pertaining to the safety of radioactive waste
and the security of nuclear installations such as Pelindaba, the headquarters of the
Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA), have repeatedly been raised.
The admission by Pakistan’s leading nuclear official, Abdul Qadeer Khan (hereafter
AQ Khan or Khan), of the involvement of South African citizens in a global nuclear
black market was a cause of considerable diplomatic embarrassment and
compromised the country’s non-proliferation image (IISS 2007). Despite the
sentencing of two individuals involved, several other individuals (i.e. South Africa and
non-South African citizens) were not brought to book (NPA 2007 & 2008).
Globally, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons continue in the wake
of the Cold War as nuclear weapons states (NWS) and so-called threshold states
4
diverge on aspects of the NPT.6 Furthermore, concerns about nuclear terrorism

remain on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in terms of the
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) (UNSC 2004; IISS 2009: 1-2). In addition to this, there is the
parallel initiative of the United States (US), namely the Nuclear Security Summits
(NSS) of April 2010 in Washington (US) and of March 2012 in Seoul (South Korea).
South Africa has not been shielded from these developments and has had to adapt
its nuclear diplomacy and domestic legislation to maintain and enhance its status as
an advocate and supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. Its nuclear diplomacy with
so-called nuclear rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India has also raised
some diplomatic concerns among the traditional NWS who questioned South Africa’s
nuclear intentions.
Irrespective of its non-proliferation stance, the South African government remains

committed to an ambitious nuclear agenda. Whilst maintaining its status as a
member of a unique nuclear non-proliferation club, it has set its sights on the
construction of a pebble bed modular nuclear reactor (PBMR) (subsequently
terminated in 2010); on enriching and recycling uranium; and on improving its share
in the global medical isotope market. In February 2003, a few weeks prior to the US-
led “Coalition of the Willing” invasion of Iraq, South African President Thabo Mbeki
announced the impending departure of a team of South African disarmament experts
to Iraq following Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s acceptance of South Africa's offer
to send an envoy to the country to “share with their government, scientists,
engineers, technicians and people of Iraq its experience relevant to the mission of
the UN and Iraq to eradicate weapons of mass destruction, under international
supervision” (BuaNews 24 February 2003). Mbeki maintained that this intervention
would “help to ensure the necessary proper cooperation between the United Nations
inspectors and Iraq, so that the issue of weapons of mass destruction is addressed
satisfactorily, without resorting to war” (BuaNews 24 February 2003).
6
This study uses the definition of a NWS as defined in Article IX of the NPT, namely a state which
has “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device” before 1
January 1967. This study defines a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) as a state that do not have a
nuclear explosive capability.
5
The South African government also expressed its intention to develop its nuclear
industry in its National Nuclear Energy Policy (2008) and in its Ten Year Plan for
Science and Technology (2007) (DME 2008; DST 2007). In 2008, the Minister for
Minerals and Energy stated that the National Nuclear Energy Policy “represents the
Government’s vision for the development of an extensive nuclear energy
programme” in order to develop a national nuclear architectural capability to “supply
nuclear equipment and nuclear reactors” as well as the “ability to design,
manufacture, and market, commercialise, sell and export nuclear energy systems
and services” (DME 2008: 4 & 24).
Against the background of the aforesaid, this study is situated in the broader context
of International Relations (IR), more specifically in the context of nuclear diplomacy.
The development and use of nuclear weapons and other forms of WMDs have
dominated the study of international relations since the end of the Second World War
and, more specifically, since the end of the Cold War. One of the major strategies
employed by the superpowers during the Cold War, in addition to nuclear
deterrence, was nuclear diplomacy in an effort to achieve a Kantian “perpetual
peace” in a global stand-off. Writing at the onset of the Cold War, former US diplomat
and IR and diplomacy scholar, Henry Kissinger (1956: 351), stated that “in an
international order composed of sovereign states, the principle sanction is the
possession of superior force”. By the end of the Cold War, “superior force” was
increasingly also defined in non-material terms or, as Joseph Nye (2002: 8-12) calls
it, “soft power”.
The end of the Cold War also initiated a period of reflection by IR scholars.
Accusations of realism and its theoretical variants’ inability to foresee the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War initiated theoretical rivalries among
proponents of various IR theories. One of the major consequences of this was the
emergence of constructivism as an alternative approach to IR. Refined by Alexander
Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) but pioneered by Nicholas Onuf (1989, 1998 &
2002) and Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) constructivists propose that states construct
their reality and identity to achieve their national interests. For constructivists, this
construction or change can be explained in terms of the diffusion of models,
practices and norms. Accordingly, since norms evolve over time, norm development
6
can be explained in terms of the internationalisation and institutionalisation, or the

life-cycle of norms (Barnett 2008: 168-169).
Since 1990, South African leaders, diplomats and government-employed nuclear

scientists have repeatedly reiterated the government’s stance on nuclear non-
proliferation. Diplomatically, the country’s adaptive ability to construct or reconstruct
its nuclear-related identity, interests, role and norms has stood it in good stead.
Notwithstanding this, very little is known in scholarly terms about the country’s
nuclear diplomacy. Even less scholarly work has appeared on South Africa’s
nuclear-related economic diplomacy. Therefore, the primary aim of this study is to
analyse post-1990 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. The study, therefore,
contributes to the understanding of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, particularly as
it relates to the dismantling of its weapons and to the country’s ability to play an
active diplomatic role in terms of nuclear non-proliferation.
South Africa’s influence on nuclear diplomacy has been acknowledged by scholars,

diplomats and heads of states and governments (Geldenhuys 2006a). A question to
consider is: Why, despite possessing enough enriched uranium, technology, skills,
and clients, does the country not reverse the decision to terminate the South African
nuclear weapons programme? In response, it is contended that the following
propositions offer some explanation. Firstly, South Africa has constructed its norms,
identity, role and interests in such a way to increase its diplomatic influence,
authority, non-material power and economic incentives. Secondly, South Africa has
constructed a unique brand of niche diplomacy, involving a number of diplomatic
practices, to gain material and non-material rewards such as status, prestige and
trade opportunities. It is furthermore argued that, informed by its foreign policy and
diplomatic practice, South Africa employs the following strategies in its niche
diplomacy, including:
• Confrontation: It attempts to direct the terms of the current debate away from
realism; irrespective of some form of ideological confrontation with the major
NWS such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France.
• Parallelism: It attempts to cultivate a form of “realism lite” or enlightenment
through parallel action alongside the one superpower and its coalition
partners.
7
• Partnership: It engages in active partnership with the dominant power on a

realistic footing (Henrikson 2005: 74).
Therefore, against the background of the aforesaid, the next section offers a review
of some of the literature on South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy.
2. Literature survey
Although scholarship on South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme and its post-
apartheid foreign policy has proliferated (see for example De Villiers, Jardine and
Reiss 1993; Masiza 1993; Stumpf 1995a & 1995b; O’Meara 1996; Fig 1998; Van
Vuuren 2003; Sanders 2006; and Venter 2008) much less scholarship has been
devoted to post-apartheid South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. Several themes and
trends are evident in the existing scholarship on post-apartheid South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy. Firstly, authors have predominantly focused on the period
immediately after 1994 until 1999, namely the Mandela presidency’s nuclear
diplomacy (Motumi 1995; Muller 1996; Masiza & Landsberg 1996; Masiza 1998;
Shelton 2000a, 2000b & 2006; Long & Grillot 2000; Harris, Hatang & Liberman 2004;
Taylor 2006; Fig 2005 & 2009). This trend coincides with a general trend in post-
1994 analyses of South Africa’s foreign policy where the idealism of the Mandela era
is referred to in the context of the prodigal’s return as a middle, African and regional
power, and a bridge builder par excellence (Barber 2004).
Secondly, there is a considerable lack of literature explaining South Africa’s nuclear

diplomacy prior to the Mandela era, that is, from 1990 to 1994 under the presidency
of FW de Klerk. Regarding the latter, Barber (2004: 67-68) is a notable exception
with his reference to the nuclear diplomacy of the De Klerk presidency between 1990
and 1994. Moreover President Mbeki, as President Mandela’s successor, has
contributed to an acceleration of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. During Mbeki’s
presidential term (1999-2008) South Africa’s normative commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation was supplemented with normative innovation and norm internalisation.
This period also saw increased South African support for Iran’s nuclear programme;
South Africa’s participation in inspections of Iraq’s nuclear facilities in March 2003;
and increased South African exports of nuclear-related products. More importantly,
the nuclear ambitions of the South African government became increasingly public.
8
In 1999, for example, the South African government became one of the investors in
the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Property) Limited, a company with local and
international investors.
The Mbeki era also laid the foundation of post-1990 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
with the rest of the African continent. South Africa acceded to the African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty (hereafter the Pelindaba Treaty or the Treaty of
Pelindaba) which entered into force in July 2009.7 In contrast to this illustration of the
country’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation during the tenure of President
Mbeki was South Africans’ involvement in the nuclear proliferation network of AQ
Khan. Essentially, current literature pays little attention to these post-Mandela
nuclear-related developments.
Thirdly, the application of IR theories to analyse South Africa’s post-apartheid

nuclear diplomacy is scant with Masiza and Landsberg (1996) and Taylor (2006)
being notable exceptions. Multilateralism (Masiza & Landsberg 1996) and middle
powership (Taylor 2006) have been applied to analyse South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy, but only in the context of the NPT and not in respect of any other
international nuclear forum. This coincides with a general trend pertaining to the
theoretical poverty noticeable in most post-1990 foreign policy analyses of South
Africa and the country’s diplomatic conduct.
In the context of multilateralism, a limited number of studies on South Africa’s

nuclear diplomacy with the rest of the African continent exist. African efforts,
including South Africa’s role in these efforts, to declare the continent a denuclearised
zone have been analysed by, amongst others, former South African diplomat David
Fischer (1993 & 1995); South African academic Marie Muller (1996); and former
South African diplomats Jean du Preez (Parrish & Du Preez 2005; Stott, Du Rand &
Du Preez 2010; Du Preez & Maettig 2010), Thomas Markram (2004) and Pieter
7
Considerable differences, even in official AU and UN documents, in the spelling of the formal title of
the Treaty occur. See, in this regard, UNSC (1996), AUPSC (2006) and AU (2010) that uses African
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. For the
purposes of this study, the spelling African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty is used throughout.
9
Goosen (1995).8 In addition to this, Nigerian academic Adebayo Oyebade (1998)

and Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji (2002) have also addressed the issue.
In the fourth place, few of the above-mentioned studies link domestic and foreign
policy issues. Whereas South Africa’s civil society was locally and internationally
active prior to 1994, the intensity of its activity has waned since 1994, especially
regarding foreign policy issues (Nel & Van der Westhuizen 2004), and national and
international nuclear issues. Historically, South Africa did not have an active
domestic anti-nuclear civil society movement. However, prior to 1990 an active pro-
ANC anti-nuclear civil society movement operated outside the country; especially in
the UK and at the UN under the leadership of Abdul Minty, who later became South
Africa’s diplomatic representative at the IAEA.9 Reddy’s (1994) edited collection of
Minty’s statements and speeches are testament to this.
Since 1990, some international and national anti-nuclear civil society movements
operate in South Africa. Notable examples are Greenpeace International; the
Coalition against Nuclear Energy (CANE); and the Environmental Monitoring Group
(EMG). These and other organisations have made submissions to Parliamentary
Portfolio Committees on Energy, Foreign Affairs, and Environmental Affairs on South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. The most notable and only post-1990 South African civil
society engagement on nuclear issues has been the Conference on Nuclear Policy
for a Democratic South Africa held in Cape Town from 11 to 13 February 1994, and
which was organised by the EMG and the ANC (EMG & Western Cape ANC Science
and Technology Group 1994). This linkage of domestic sources of foreign policy and
diplomatic practice is of particular relevance as it has been repeatedly indicated by
the ANC-led government since 1994 as a prime focus of post-apartheid South
Africa’s foreign policy.
A fifth aspect is that only Auf der Heyde (2000) has analysed the development of the
country’s post-apartheid nuclear policy. His analysis focuses on the energy-related
8
These former South African diplomats joined the IAEA, the Preparatory Commission of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and the UN after they left the South African
diplomatic corps.
9
A founder-member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in London, Abdul Minty later became the
Director of the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. He
joined the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in 1994. He is the South African
Governor on the IAEA Board since 1995.
10
aspects in policy developments and excludes nuclear diplomacy. However, Fig

(2010) refers to some elements of South Africa’s nuclear policy, but only in the
context of the PBMR.
In the sixth instance, former South African diplomat Thomas Markram (2004) offers
an assessment of South Africa’s disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control
policies between 1994 and 2004. Apart from some analysis, Markram makes a
significant contribution in compiling speeches and documentation on South Africa’s
early post-1990 nuclear diplomacy. Given his background, he steers clear of
controversy and offers an assessment with little theoretical substance.
Finally, few nuclear-related issues per se have been addressed. Notable exceptions
include some analysis of export control regimes (Masiza 1998) and the NPT (Masiza
& Landsberg 1996; Van der Westhuizen 1998; Geldenhuys 2006a; Taylor 2006;
Shelton 2000a, 2000b & 2006). South Africa’s relations with multilateral nuclear
related organisations such as the IAEA and the UN is remarkably under-researched,
with former South African diplomat-turned-IAEA-official David Fischer (1997) and
Hecht (2006) the notable exceptions. Analyses of this and other related issues are
critical for an understanding of the country’s nuclear diplomacy.
Scant reference to some aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is made

elsewhere. For example, Geldenhuys (2006a: 103) has briefly analysed South
Africa’s role as norm entrepreneur in terms of the NPT; the Pelindaba Treaty; the
New Agenda Coalition (NAC); and the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI). In their study,
Long and Grillot (2000) compared South Africa and the Ukraine’s ideas and beliefs
about nuclear weapons. Although dated, their analysis represents an emerging trend
of an increase in constructivist analyses of nuclear diplomacy and nuclear security
(Das 2009). Shelton (2006: 277-278) and Cawthra and Møller (2008: 139-141)
described South Africa’s role in non-proliferation against the background of the
African continent and some African states’ nuclear ambitions. However, the absence
of more recent and comprehensive and theoretical analyses of the country’s nuclear
diplomacy is evident from the literature review.
Nuclear diplomacy can be described as niche diplomacy. First coined by Australia’s

former foreign minister, Gareth Evans, niche diplomacy is meant to refer to
11
specialisation. It also refers to “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to

generate return worth having rather than trying to cover the field” (Evans in
Henrikson 2005: 67). The ability to “generate return worth having” implies that a state
wants to achieve non-material objectives with niche diplomacy which, in turn, can
generate international prestige, status, material benefit, soft power and moral
authority. For South Africa, these incentives are of particular importance to convince
the international community of its commitment to continue with a non-weapons
nuclear programme. To acquire and maintain a diplomatic niche requires recognition,
and a secured position in a globally competitive arena requires publicity, including
advocacy, positive branding, and the moral high ground. A major implication of a
country’s niche is that it has some kind of advantage over other countries. This
advantage is either locational, traditional or consensual (Henrikson 2005: 70-72).
As will be argued, South Africa bases its nuclear diplomacy on normative innovation,
independence, and consensus-seeking techniques. Moreover, the country has
invested in the global socialisation of norms. Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert (2007:
97; 104-105) have described this socialisation process as construction, enactment
and compliance, whereas Koh (1997: 2598-2599) has described it as interaction,
interpretation and internalisation. Lastly, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905)
offer their life-cycle of norms to explain this process: norm emergence by norm
entrepreneurs, norm cascade (acceptance) and norm internalisation.
Therefore, against the background of the above-mentioned review, the purpose of

this study is to offer an original contribution in the analysis of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy since 1990 by building on some of the preliminary theoretical and
analytical contributions made by Geldenhuys (2006a: 93-107) on South Africa’s role
as norm entrepreneur. The practical relevance of the study is that it contributes to
scholarship on South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy, nuclear disarmament,
and to scholarship on the concepts nuclear diplomacy and niche diplomacy, by
applying a constructivist perspective.
3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem
The possession of nuclear weapons awards states and non-state actors with
considerable power and influence. Yet, South Africa has decided to dismantle its
12
nuclear weapons and terminate its nuclear weapons programme. It is not the aim of
this study to determine why it took that decision, but rather to clarify “the what” and
“
the why” of its nuclear diplomacy. The study concerns itself with one major question:
Why and how South Africa, as a former nuclear weapons state and developing
country, became so influential in terms of nuclear diplomacy? In response, the main
thesis of this study is that since 1990 South Africa has conducted its nuclear
diplomacy by constructing certain norms, and its identity, in a particular way to serve
its national and international interests, and in the process - as a norm entrepreneur -
aligning itself with internationally settled norms and advancing new and/or nascent
nuclear norms.
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy has not only created a practical reality (no more
nuclear weapons), but also a normative reality by bestowing upon the country a
position and a role as a state that has relinquished its weapons programme to
secure and maintain, as a norm entrepreneur, a certain moral high ground in
international negotiations. Increasingly, there is a shift of emphasis away from
Western states and Russia’s nuclear power to those of developing countries. Of the
top nine states with nuclear weapons inventories in 2009, for example, more than
half are developing countries, including China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and
Israel (Norris & Kristensen 2009: 87).10 Israel has never declared its possession of
nuclear weapons and is regarded as an undeclared nuclear weapons state although
it is widely accepted that the country has nuclear weapons. China (with 11 nuclear
power plants) and India (with 17) operate the largest number of nuclear power plants
in the developing world (Schneider et al. 2009: 2).
Therefore, the objective of the study is to:

• position and clarify the concept of niche diplomacy in the broader context of
foreign policy and diplomacy and to provide a theoretical framework for a
constructivist analysis and explanation of a diplomatic niche role through norm
construction and state identity;
• identify South Africa’s niche diplomacy, specifically its norm construction and
state identity based on four selected case studies; and
10
The choice of 2009 figures here is deliberate as it reflects some of the realities during the period
under discussion. More recent figures, where applicable, will be presented in the thesis but the aim is
to present figures that reflect the context of the period under discussion.
13
• Evaluate the research findings and make recommendations.
The research problem is demarcated with reference to the following considerations

and limitations of the study. Firstly, the study’s conceptual focus is limited to nuclear
diplomacy as earlier defined. Secondly, for analytical purposes, the study is limited to
four case studies representative of South Africa’s construction and conduct of
nuclear diplomacy. These are the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes
(especially in terms of the NSG, the ZA and the WA); South Africa’s relations with
the IAEA; South Africa and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) in
terms of the Pelindaba Treaty; and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in terms of
the NPT. These case studies represent South Africa’s approach to the practice of
nuclear diplomacy in a multilateral context which, in some instances, is
supplemented by bilateral diplomacy. These case studies have also remained on
and dominated the global nuclear agenda since 1990. Moreover, these cases
represent the most dynamic areas of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990 as
evidenced by the establishment of the ANWFZ in 2009 and South Africa’s leading
role in the establishment of continental nuclear institutions.
Thirdly, the study is limited to the South African government’s nuclear diplomacy. It
does not focus on the role of civil society. Therefore, the African and global
campaign against South Africa’s nuclear programme falls beyond the scope of this
study. Similarly, the study does not focus on the diplomatic activities of the ANC in
exile and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), amongst others, related to the
creation of global awareness of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme
(Thomas 1996; Reddy 1994; Purkitt & Burgess 2005: 183-184). In this respect, the
study does not focus on the historical anti-nuclear position and activities of
individuals, for example, the ANC anti-nuclear activists Abdul Minty, Denis Brutus
and Kader Asmal. Abdul Minty, in particular, has become synonymous with the
ANC’s nuclear diplomacy during its period in exile (Reddy 1994). In this study, the
ANC’s post-1990 position is represented by Abdul Minty whose role in the country’s
nuclear diplomacy pre-dates the chronological scope of this study but who, as an
ANC member and, since 1994, an ANC government appointee, represents continuity
in respect of the ANC’s nuclear diplomacy.
14
It also does not focus on the South African diplomatic and foreign policy institutional
framework per se as in the case of, for example, Hughes (2004) and Van Nieuwkerk
(2006: 37-49). However, some reference will be made to the institutional
environment to illustrate particular aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
Finally, the study is limited to the period 1990 to 2010. This period commences with
the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 and culminated in the 2010 Review Conference
(RevCon) of the NPT and the First Conference of Parties (COP) of the Pelindaba
Treaty. Both events are illustrative of the development of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy since 1990. Where relevant, references will be made to developments
prior to 1990 and after 2010. By limiting the study to the period from 1990 to 2010, it
will not address the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme.
Reference will only be made to some of South Africa’s successes and failures
pertaining to its nuclear diplomacy in the context of its early relations with the IAEA.
In summary, the study is therefore demarcated in terms of its conceptual focus
(nuclear diplomacy); theoretical approach and analytical framework (constructivism);
and period of enquiry (1990 to 2010).
4. Methodology
The theoretical approach of this study on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is one of
constructivism, which maintains that states construct or reconstruct their identities,
normative behaviour, roles and interests according to their interests, and vice versa
in a mutually constitutive manner (Zehfuss 2002; Reus-Smit 2005).
The study is qualitative in nature. Following an inductive method, the selected case
studies are utilised to determine certain diplomatic styles and practices and use of
instruments. To the extent that a narrative description of some of the main
developments in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy from 1990 until 2010 will be
presented, the study adds to the diplomatic history of South Africa.
The study is based on primary sources such as speeches, presentations and

statements by South African presidents, diplomats, and nuclear scientists. These are
supplemented by reports, policy statements and documents of the South African
government, and by submissions and presentations to the Portfolio Committee on
15
Foreign Affairs, which has a constitutional obligation towards the country’s

international relations.
Empirical data on South Africa’s voting at the IAEA and UN; import and export
figures; diplomatic interactions; nuclear facilities; and nuclear-related industrial
production is also used.
The aforesaid primary sources are supplemented by secondary sources that include
South African and international media reports; academic literature including books
and peer-reviewed journals; and analyses by South African and international non-
governmental research institutions and think tanks.
5. Structure of the research
This study comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to

South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990. It includes a literature review of the
topic and presents the main research questions to be addressed. It includes an
overview of the study’s methodology, structure, limitations and expected contribution.
As a theoretical framework, Chapter 2 (Nuclear diplomacy: a conceptual framework)
serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it presents constructivism as the study’s theoretical
approach. The study follows Alexander Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) and
Christian Reus-Smit’s (2002 & 2005) approach to constructivism. Chapter 2 analyses
and clarifies ontological and epistemological issues pertaining to constructivism; its
origins; main tenets; and claims. Secondly, the chapter includes a conceptual
analysis of nuclear diplomacy and positions it in the broader context of foreign policy,
diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the chapter serves as a basis
and framework to analyse and explain South Africa’s efforts to secure a diplomatic
niche through norm construction and state identity.
Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 present the theoretical and analytical framework of the
study, Chapters 3 to 6 apply these frameworks to and analyse four selected case
studies representative of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. Cutting across these four
selected case studies are South Africa’s multilateral relations with the IAEA and the
UN; and its bilateral relations with NWS, NNWS and FNWS (former nuclear weapons
states); the role of South African decision-makers such as presidents FW de Klerk,
Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma, and foreign
16
ministers such as Pik Botha, Alfred Nzo, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Maite
Nkoane-Mashabane; and the country’s domestic implementation of its international
commitments through legislation, the establishment of institutions and the continuous
regulation of nuclear issues.
The rationale behind the sequence of chapters is to present the chronological, rather
than the thematic, development of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. South Africa’s
first involvement in nuclear diplomacy began in the early 1940s and illustrates the
country’s initiation into the global nuclear export control regimes. By the 1950s,
South Africa became a founder member of the IAEA. Despite its contribution to the
nuclear non-proliferation norms at this stage, the country’s policies resulted in
increased global isolation to such an extent that, during the 1960s, African
governments joined in the global condemnation of South Africa’s domestic policies.
In fact, African states took this condemnation further by declaring Africa a nuclear
weapons free zone; a situation that could only be realised when South Africa’s
complete nuclear disarmament was confirmed by the IAEA. The final case study
addressed here is South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in terms of the NPT. With its
ratification of the NPT in 1991, South Africa came full circle in terms of its normative
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear disarmament; and the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
Chapter 3 (South Africa and the nuclear export control regimes) analyses South
Africa’s involvement in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Globally, trade in
nuclear products, services and equipment annually amounts to billions of dollars.
The global nuclear non-proliferation export regimes are controlled through various
mechanisms such as the NSG, the WA and the ZC. Since 1990, South Africa has
been a voluntary member of these groups, whose purpose it is to control nuclear
proliferation for peaceful uses, as well as to control nuclear weapons manufacturing
states.11 Therefore, this chapter traces the origins of various nuclear non-proliferation
export control regimes, as well as South Africa’s membership of, involvement in and
compliance with these regimes. It also explores the country’s nuclear diplomacy with
the various committees, groups and arrangements in terms of South Africa’s
11
The study follows Article III of the Statute of the IAEA in referring to the “peaceful uses” rather than
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Similarly it uses “peaceful purposes” rather than peaceful purpose of
nuclear energy (IAEA 1957).
17
construction of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, South Africa’s identity, roles

and interest vis-à-vis nuclear exports. The chapter also analyses developments in
and the implications of South African involvement in the proliferation network of AQ
Khan. The chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s diplomatic
instruments and achievements.
The purpose of Chapter 4 (South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency) is to analyse South Africa’s diplomacy with the IAEA. South
Africa was a founder member of the IAEA in 1957. The country lost its designated
seat on the IAEA Board of Governors (hereafter Board or IAEA Board) in 1977 due
to global condemnation of its domestic policies. However, as this chapter outlines,
subsequent to the country’s accession to the NPT in 1991, the country signed
various agreements with the IAEA which resulted in the IAEA’s verification of the
complete dismantling of the South African nuclear weapons programme in 1993. In
addition to this the chapter also analyses the legal and diplomatic framework of
South Africa’s post-1990 relations with the IAEA. The chapter focuses on six case
studies representing South Africa’s relations with the IAEA since it resumed its seat
on the Board. These case studies focus on the membership of the Board; the right of
state to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; South Africa’s effort to lead the
Agency; the country’s position on the IAEA nuclear fuel reserve; the impact of the
AQ Khan network’s activities in South Africa on the country’s relations with the IAEA;
and the conversion of the SAFARI-1 from using HEU to LEU. The chapter concludes
with an assessment of South Africa’s relations with the IAEA.
Chapter 5 (South Africa and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty) traces
the origins of nuclear weapons free zones as an expression of the norm of nuclear
non-proliferation. In addition to this, it traces the evolution of the Pelindaba Treaty as
the idea of an ANWFZ originated in the 1960s. Chapter 5 analyses South Africa’s
involvement in the Treaty process until it entered into force in July 2009. The chapter
also analyses the country’s nuclear diplomacy with the African Union (AU) and
African states in terms of the First COP of the Pelindaba Treaty and the First
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE or
hereafter the Commission). The chapter concludes with an assessment of South
18
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with Africa, the country’s state identity and its nuclear
diplomatic challenges on the continent.
The purpose of Chapter 6 (South Africa and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons) is to outline the background, purpose and content of the NPT as
a multilateral treaty. It traces South Africa’s involvement in the various NPT
conferences - including the 1995 REC and the RevCons of 2000, 2005 and 2010 -
since it acceded to the Treaty in 1991, that is, from the De Klerk presidency. South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the NPT review processes is analysed in
terms of South Africa’s construction of unresolved issues, South Africa’s identity,
roles and interest vis-à-vis the Treaty, and the country’s norm construction. The
chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s diplomatic instruments and
achievements in respect of the NPT.
As a concluding chapter, Chapter 7 (Evaluation and recommendations), provides an

evaluation of the study’s findings by revisiting the main research question and thesis
of the study. It synthesises the main summaries of each chapter, draws conclusions
from them and indicate key findings. At a meta-theoretical level, it also reflects on the
ontological and epistemological contribution of the study. The implications of the
study’s conclusions are assessed and recommendations are offered for future
research on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
6. Conclusion
This chapter presented a brief overview of several nuclear-related developments in

South Africa - since President De Klerk took office in 1989 and the ANC came to
power in 1994 - that prompt and contextualise this research. The chapter indicated
that very little scholarly research on these developments was conducted. The
chapter also outlined the rationale for a study on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. It
outlined the study’s theoretical approach and analytical framework, and identified
four case studies to illustrate South Africa’s niche role in nuclear diplomacy through
the construction of norms and a particular state identity. Finally, it indicated the
demarcation and structure of the study.
Accordingly, the next chapter presents a conceptual analysis of the core concept of
this study, namely nuclear diplomacy. The concept “nuclear diplomacy” offers an
19
analytical instrument to explain South Africa’s international behaviour (namely,

securing a niche role through norm construction and state identity) regarding its
“
nuclear past” and “nuclear future”, and provides a point of departure for the
development and application of a constructivist approach to identify and explain the
norm construction and state identity that characterises South Africa’s niche role
through nuclear diplomacy.
20
CHAPTER TWO
NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction
Once scientists split the atom and the true power of atomic energy became evident,
an increasing number of states realised the strategic value of atomic energy in power
politics, in conflict and to enhance their status and prestige. The Manhattan Project
was one of the first government-sponsored projects on the development of atomic
bombs and nuclear weapons. It ultimately resulted in the US dropping two atomic
bombs on Japanese cities in August 1945. This ended the Second World War. This
event effectively became “the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war”
(Graybar 1986: 888). Since then “(t)he connection of science with war has grown
gradually more and more intimate” (Russell 1976: 83), resulting in an arms race
between the two Cold War superpowers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). This arms race resulted in a new form of diplomacy, namely
nuclear diplomacy to conduct relations between the superpowers.
The technology and expertise to develop atomic bombs; nuclear weapons; and
WMDs continue to have an attraction for some state and non-state actors. This
attraction is evident in the continued efforts of more states to acquire nuclear
capabilities for defence purposes or to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes
such as power generation or in the field of nuclear medicine. In the wake of the
Second World War, efforts to control the development, use and trade in nuclear
technology and services soon became one of the defining features of international
relations (Kissinger 1956: 351). Of more significance was the realisation, as early as
the 1950s, that traditional diplomacy was no longer the best practice to address
issues concerning nuclear stalemates and “atomic blackmail” (Kertesz 1959a &
1959b).12 Consequently a particular brand or niche of diplomacy emerged, namely
12
“Atomic [or nuclear] blackmail” is when a state with a nuclear weapons capability threatens to use
its nuclear weapons if its demands are not met, or when it wants to advance its national interests.
21
atomic diplomacy (Alperovitz 1965; Jones 1980; Graybar 1986) or nuclear diplomacy
(Quester 1970; Bargman 1977).13
Between its onset in the 1950s and the collapse of the USSR, the Cold War
produced several nuclear crises. These included the Cuban Missile Crisis, France’s
nuclear tests in the Pacific and unwillingness of some NWS to ratify the NPT. By
2010, at a global level, the major success of nuclear diplomacy was to avert the use
of atomic bombs and weapons by warring parties. More importantly, nuclear
diplomacy contributed to the entrenchment of the so-called “nuclear taboo” (the non-
use of nuclear weapons) as a norm of international relations (Tannenwald 2005 &
2007). Once introduced, a particular weapon and its use become legitimate.
However, this has not been the case with nuclear weapons, which have been
severely delegitimised to such an extent that the “nuclear taboo” is “associated with
a widespread revulsion toward nuclear weapons and broadly held inhibitions on their
use” (Tannenwald 2005: 5). Notwithstanding this, a number of states such as the
US, Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons and maintain stockpiles
of nuclear weapons.
As this study focuses on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990, the country’s
nuclear diplomacy prior to 1990 is not discussed.14 However, it is noted that the
origins of South Africa’s atomic and nuclear diplomacy date back to the period prior
to the outbreak of the Second World War when the Prime Minister of the UK,
Winston Churchill, requested the then South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, to
conduct a geological survey of South Africa’s uranium resources in order for the UK
to secure uranium for its own nuclear programme. Donald Sole, a South African
diplomat at the time, explained in his memoirs that the “genesis of South Africa’s
atomic energy policy” could be traced back to a meeting in May 1944 between South
Africa’s Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts, and the Danish nuclear scientists Niels
Bohr (Fourie et al. 2010: 263; Fig 1998: 165). After the end of the Second World
War, South Africa became a founding member of the multilateral IAEA created under
the auspices of the UN. In 1948, South Africa established the Atomic Energy Board,
13
The concepts atomic diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy are defined later in this chapter and are, in
their respective historical and academic contexts, used interchangeably in this study.
14
South Africa’s pre-1990 nuclear diplomacy is extensively analysed by De Villiers, Jardin and Reiss
(1993); Albright (1994); O’Meara (1996); Van Vuuren (2003); Harris, Hatang and Liberman (2004);
and Venter (2008).
22
the forerunner of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEB 1968), presently known as
NECSA. In 1957, South Africa’s nuclear science and nuclear diplomacy developed
under the aegis of the IAEA’s “Atoms for Peace” programme. It was the result of the
South African government’s bilateral nuclear collaboration agreement with the US,
the US-South African Agreement for Co-operation. The latter resulted in South
Africa's acquisition of a nuclear research reactor and an assured a supply of HEU
fuel for the reactor (Masiza 1993: 36).
By the 1970s, South Africa’s international isolation and domestic instability increased
due to the global condemnation of and domestic opposition to its policy of apartheid
(Fig 1998: 166). As a result the country’s nuclear diplomacy entered a new stage.
This included UNSC sanctions against South Africa, its suspension from the IAEA
Board of Governors and secret nuclear-related bilateral relations with declared NWS,
including the US, the UK, France and Israel. International sanctions and embargoes
against South Africa and increased isolation did not deter South Africa from
enriching and exporting uranium (UN 1994) or to manufacture, according to
President FW de Klerk (1993), six “nuclear devices”.
By the end of the 1980s, the Cold War ended and with it, the USSR’s involvement in
African conflicts and support of national liberation movements on the continent.
Consequently, efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflicts in Southern and South
Africa increased. President De Klerk announced on 2 February 1990 that his
government had unbanned the ANC and other liberation movements, and would
release Nelson Mandela (on 12 February 1990) and other political prisoners. These
events ushered in a new political and diplomatic era for the country. Of particular
importance was De Klerk’s announcement that South Africa would suspend its
nuclear weapons programme which paved the way for the country’s accession to the
NPT in 1991 (NTI 2010a).
This study contends that South Africa, between 1990 and 2010, secured a niche role
for itself in the form of nuclear diplomacy through norm construction and state
identity. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework to
analyse the concept nuclear diplomacy by adopting a constructivist approach. In
order to achieve this, the chapter is divided into three main areas. The first area
concerns conceptual analysis as a methodological approach. The second area
23
includes the emergence, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of

constructivism. The third area is that of diplomacy; nuclear diplomacy in particular.
The chapter clarifies various aspects of diplomacy before proceeding to define and
explain the nature and scope of nuclear diplomacy as a type of diplomacy. With
particular reference to nuclear diplomacy, the chapter concludes with a classification
of the concept niche diplomacy.
2. Conceptual analysis as a research method
Concepts are the building blocks of theory and they provide scientific explanations of
events or phenomena. However, as Heywood (1999: 6) cautions, “(i)n politics ... the
clarification of concepts is a particular [sic] difficult task”. Two types of concepts can
be distinguished, namely normative and descriptive concepts. The former is
described as values, referring to ideals, which should or must be achieved. Value-
laden concepts include, for example, concepts such as freedom, tolerance and
equality. These concepts often advance or prescribe specific forms of conduct,
instead of describing events or phenomena. In contrast, descriptive or positive
concepts refer to ‘facts’ which have an objective or demonstrable existence; referring
to what is (Heywood 1999: 7). Therefore, the utility of conceptual analysis as a
method to the study of IR is that it provides greater clarity, which contributes to a
shared understanding of the meaning and utility of a particular concept (Baldwin &
Rose 2009: 780-781).
The rationale for conducting a conceptual analysis of nuclear diplomacy is prompted

by the following considerations. Firstly, conceptual confusion exists regarding the
definition of and aspects related to the concept of nuclear diplomacy. Apart from
being loosely defined, the concept nuclear diplomacy is often used synonymously
with other concepts such as atomic diplomacy, non-proliferation diplomacy, nuclear
disarmament, nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence.
Secondly, contemporary developments in the practice of diplomacy require greater

conceptual clarity and a shared understanding in order to articulate and entrench
new norms on nuclear weapons and energy. Thirdly, after the end of the Second
World War, international relations were defined by the nuclear arms race between
the superpowers (the US and USSR) who competed for nuclear power supremacy.
24
However, since the end of the Cold War, some middle powers and even small states
are vying for nuclear capabilities to enhance their power, status and prestige and to
meet domestic energy needs. This is a departure from the historically predominant
US-USSR nuclear rivalry and poses challenges to diplomacy and state sovereignty.
In the fourth place, states are increasingly threatened by the aims and activities of
non-state actors regarding, for example, the nuclear black market; even more so
after the 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) attacks on the US and the exposure of
the AQ Khan proliferation network (IISS 2007). This has resulted, amongst others, in
nuclear diplomacy which contributed to normative innovation concerning the concept
and phenomenon of nuclear terrorism and to the subsequent adoption of the UNSC
Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of WMDs (UNSC 2004).
Finally, an analysis of the nuclear diplomacy of a state such as South Africa, which
discontinued its nuclear weapons programme and dismantled its nuclear weapons,
can provide insight into nuclear diplomacy and a better understanding of current and
future nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
This study therefore follows Baldwin and Rose’s (2009: 782) approach to conceptual
analysis and includes concept development, concept comparison, concept
clarification, concept correction and concept identification. In this context and due to
both the suitability and utility thereof, nuclear diplomacy is accordingly analysed from
a constructivist perspective.
3. Constructivism: selected theoretical aspects
This section provides a brief overview of constructivism in order eventually to

contextualise aspects, indicators, instruments and practices of nuclear diplomacy.
The constructivist notion of the social nature of international interactions resonates
well with diplomacy as a social activity between states. This notion is supported by
the constructivist Christian Reus-Smit (in Randal 2008: 7, 101) who commented that
diplomacy is “integrated with, and embedded in, other social practices” and that state
sovereignty is “intersubjective, requiring recognition from others, shifting diplomacy
further into the realm of social practice”. Thus, the conduct of nuclear diplomacy can
be deemed to be a social practice based, inter alia, on the reciprocal recognition and
intersubjective understandings of states.
25
As one of the more recent and contested theoretical developments in IR,

constructivism’s rise in the wake of the nuclear arms race-dominated Cold War is
ascribed to four factors (Reus-Smit 2005: 195-196; Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert 1998:
x). Firstly, rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique
to a substantive analysis of international relations. Secondly, the end of the Cold War
undermined the explanatory power of neo-realism and neo-liberalism as neither
could explain or predict the systemic transformations reshaping the world order.
Thirdly, a new generation of scholars emerged in the 1990s that embraced the
propositions of critical international theory but acknowledged the need for theoretical
innovation. Finally, their frustration with the dominance of rationalist theories
contributed to their embracing of constructivism. According to Reus-Smit (2005: 192,
203), the relationship between constructivism and rationalism is a source of
discontent (see Table 1). For example, whereas constructivists emphasise interest
formation, rationalists emphasise interest satisfaction.
Table 1: The main ontological assumptions of constructivism and rationalism
Constructivism Rationalism
Actors Deeply social Self-interested and

Identities are constituted by norms, rational egoists
ideas and values Identity and interests
Norms shape identity and interests are autogenous
Interests Endogenous to social interaction Exogenous to social

and interest Learnt through communication and interaction
formation reflection on role Actors pursue interests
strategically
Interest satisfaction
paramount
Society Constitutive realm Strategic realm where

Knowledgeable and social actors rational pursuance of
Determines political agency interests occurs
Reus-Smit (2005: 189-193)

26
With its focus on norms, identity and interests, constructivism is the inverse of
realism. Unlike realism and neo-realism which focuses on the material and agency in
world politics, constructivism focuses both on the material and immaterial or social
aspects of international relations. Accordingly, this study follows Reus-Smit (2005:
188) by emphasising “the importance of the normative as well as material structures,
on the role of identity in shaping political action and the mutually constitutive
relationship between agents and structures”.
Constructivism makes the epistemological claim that meaning and knowledge are
socially constructed. Epistemologically, constructivism is not interested in how things
are but rather how things became what they are. Therefore, proponents of
constructivism share an epistemology which makes interpretation a crucial part of
social sciences and emphasise contingent generalisations. The latter, according to
Adler (2002: 101), “open(s) up our understanding of the social world”.
Constructivism makes the ontological claim that the social world is constructed. All
strands of constructivism converge on an ontology that depicts the social world as
mutually constituted intersubjective and meaningful structures and processes (Adler
2002: 100-101). Thus, material sources only acquire meaning through social
interaction and shared knowledge. From this, he deduces a number of implications.
These are that the social world consists of intersubjective understandings and
knowledge, as well as material objects; that social facts are determined by human
agreement, account for most of the subject matter of IR and depend on human
consciousness and language; and that humans operate in the context of and
reference to their collective understandings, rules and language. Finally, the mutual
constitution of agents and structures are considered to be part of constructivism’s
ontology (Adler 2002: 100-101).
Constructivists distinguish and problematise the relationship between the levels of

observation and action. Accordingly, Guzzini (2007: 25) deduces that constructivism
is defined by stressing the “reflexive relationship between the social construction of
knowledge and the construction of reality”. Therefore, reality determines knowledge,
and vice versa.
27
Wendt’s (1999: 92) introduction of ideas as a “fourth factor” laid the foundations for
an ideational view. For him, “ideas constitute those ostensibly ‘material’ causes in
the first place” (Wendt, 1999: 94). He maintains that “the meaning of the distribution
of power in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of
interests, and that the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by
ideas” (Wendt 1999: 135). He also states that:
the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that
they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as
important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power and
interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.
Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas (Wendt 1999: 135).
Thus the power-interest-ideas nexus constitutes an important aspect of international

relations. In fact, for constructivists, their core ideational element is intersubjective
beliefs which include ideas, conceptions and assumptions shared among people.
Ideas only matter once they are widely shared.
Tannenwald (in Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 166) similarly defines ideas as “mental
constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that
provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy”. She identifies four types of
ideas:
• Ideologies or shared belief systems such as Marxism, Liberalism and Fascism
that are a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs reflecting a group, class,
culture or state’s social needs.
• Normative beliefs such as human rights which consist of values and attitudes
that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong, just from unjust.
• Causal beliefs which focus on cause-effect and provide strategies for
individuals on how to achieve their objectives.
• Policy prescriptions which are specific programmatic ideas that facilitate
policy-making by specifying how to solve a particular policy issue
(Tannenwald in Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 167).
Based on these ontological assumptions, several post-Cold War studies applied

constructivism to explain the development of and changes in identities, interests,
28
ideas, norms and rules.15 Thus, the emergence of constructivism has implications for
IR. In particular and in the context of this study, it provides a theoretical approach to
analyse South Africa’s norm construction and state identity since the termination of
its nuclear weapons programme.
In conclusion, constructivism has made the following ontological, epistemological

and methodological contributions to IR and the study of diplomacy (Adler 2002: 100-
104):
• It explains why states converge around specific norms and identities which in
turn explain the origins of the interests of states (Finnemore 1996).
• It contributes to an understanding of change by explaining changes in terms
of material and non-material aspects such as the emergence of new
constitutive rules, the evolution of new structures, and the agent-structural
origins of social processes (Ruggie 1998). Moreover, constructivists have
generated empirical research on agency by focusing on social entrepreneurs,
epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks.
• It contributes to understandings of meaning through social communication.
• It highlights the importance of language and speech acts to social life
(Kratochwil 1989). Language is not only a medium for the construction of
intersubjective meanings, but is also a source of power.
• It emphasises the importance of the relationship between acting,
communicating and rationality. By advancing the concept’s practical or
communicative rationality, constructivists explain actor actions and motives in
terms of their consequences and appropriateness (Finnemore 1996).
• It re-focused attention on the main forms of power such as speech acts,
hegemonic power and moral authority (Onuf 1998; Checkel 2000; Hall 1999).
• It contributes to an understanding of concepts such as norms and identity in
order to understand an actor’s international behaviour, diplomatic practices
and change (Klotz 1995).
15
These included studies on global civil society (Chandler 2005); security communities (Adler &
Barnett 1998); European integration (Christiansen 1997; Christiansen, Jørgensen & Wiener 1999);
the European Union’s (EU) international interactions (Rumelili 2004); state sovereignty (Biersteker &
Weber 1996); security (McSweeney 1999); Kosovo (Frederking undated); language and international
relations (Debrix 2003); multilevel governance (Aalberts 2002); Japan’s responses to the 1991 Gulf
War and the 2003 US-led invasion in Iraq (Catalinac 2007); and South Africa’s post-1994 foreign
policy (Van Wyk 2004).
29
• It contributes to an understanding of sovereignty and how state boundaries

are socially constructed (Walker 1993; Bartelson 1995).
• It views institutions as “reified sets of inter-subjective constitutive and
regulative rules” (Alder 2002: 104) that coordinate, pattern and channel
behaviour, and establish new collective identities, shared interests and
practices (Ruggie 1998).
• It results in research on epistemic communities, transnational advocacy
networks and moral communities that contributed to an understanding of
international governance (Keck & Sikkink 1998).
Having outlined the origins, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of

constructivism, the next section provides a conceptual classification of and a
framework for the analysis of diplomacy, in particular nuclear diplomacy as a specific
type of diplomacy.
4. The strands of constructivism
Notwithstanding some agreement among scholars on the ontology of constructivism

(Reus-Smit 2005; Adler 2002; Omelicheva 2011), there is less agreement on the
various forms, strands or varieties of constructivism which indicates the
heterogeneity of the concept (Zehfuss 2001: 53-75; Jacobsen 2003: 39-60). In order
to illustrate these differences, a selection of these classifications and typologies of
constructivism are presented.
Referring to ‘forms’ of constructivism, Reus-Smit (2005: 199-201) distinguishes

between systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivism. Systemic constructivism
focuses on the interactions between unitary state actors only; ignores the dynamics
of a state’s domestic environment; and emphasises the interactions and relations
between states in the international arena. Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) is
regarded as the most important exponent of this form with his strong focus on
identity as the underlying text of a state’s interests. Unlike systemic constructivism,
unit-level constructivism focuses on the domestic rather than the international
environment. Its proponents, including Katzenstein (1996), focus on the relationship
between the domestic legal and social norms, and identities and interests of a state.
Holistic constructivism bridges the domestic-international divide created by systemic
30
and unit-level constructivism by focusing on all the factors that determine the identity
and interests of a state. As such, holistic constructivists are mainly concerned with
global change and its impact on a state’s sovereignty. Amongst others, Ruggie
(1998), Kratochwil (1989), and Koslowski and Kratochwil (1995) are the main
proponents of this form and focus on the development of the normative and
ideational structure of the contemporary international system and the social identities
which emerge from it.
Adler (2002: 97) identifies “various strands” of constructivism, namely modernist,

modernist linguistic, critical and radical constructivism. Identifying Adler and Barnett
(1998), Checkel (2000), Finnemore (1996), Katzenstein (1996), Ruggie (1998) and
Wendt (1999) as proponents of modernist constructivism, Adler (2002: 98) concludes
that they focus on the “causal social mechanisms and constitutive social relations” in
international relations. Elaborating on modernist constructivism, modernist linguistic
constructivists such as Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) explain and understand
social reality by identifying the processes and discourses whereby language such as
speech acts and rules constitute social facts and social realities. Adler’s (2002: 98)
third ‘strand’, critical constructivism, espoused by Linklater (1998) and Cox (1986), is
concerned with the mechanisms of knowledge and discourses which underpin social
and political orders. Radical constructivists hold the view that material reality cannot
be truly represented and focus on discourse, narratives and text. For example, a
radical constructivist such as Der Derian (1990) maintains that no discourse,
narrative or text is more valid than the other and that science thus becomes just
another discourse.
Hopf (1998: 172) differentiates between two ‘variants’ of constructivism, namely

conventional and critical constructivism. The former provides an alternative to
mainstream IR theory by reconceptualising balance-of-threat theory, the security
dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the notion of democratic peace. The
latter, namely critical constructivism closely resembles critical theory.
Kolodziej (2005) distinguishes between light and heavy constructivism as the

“principal factions” among constructivists. He includes Koslowski and Kratochwil
(1995) in the former category since they concluded that change in the USSR
occurred as a result of domestic changes (i.e. changes in the identity of Soviet
31
decision-makers) and not as a result of changes in the material capabilities of the

superpowers as suggested by Wendt (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999). Heavy
constructivists, the so-called Miami Group which includes Nicholas Onuf (1989; 1998
& 2002) and Vedulka Kubálková (Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert 1998), maintain that
actor behaviour cannot be generalised; that no specific rule or rules can exist for
actor and agent behaviour beyond the construction of rules; and that actors are
capable of redefining their identities as the unintended consequence of their
behaviour (Kolodziej 2005: 284).
In her analysis of Russia’s post Cold War interests and identity, Clunan (2009)
identifies aspirational constructivism as a particular type of constructivism. This
strand, similar to constructivism in general, maintains that social institutions and
national identities emerge from the continued interaction between human agents and
social structures. However, aspirational constructivism departs from other types of
constructivism by benefitting from social psychology and proponents of social identity
theorists. The latter maintains that identity requires “positive distinctiveness” or self-
esteem to create an identity based on historical experiences to create their
aspirations for the future (Clunan 2009: 1-3).
Yet another typology of constructivism is offered by Omelicheva (2011). Referring to

‘variants’ of constructivism, she distinguishes between sociological, feminist,
interpretive and emancipatory constructivism. In addition to these, she distinguishes
between transnational and societal constructivists. Whereas the former, espoused by
Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner (2001), stresses the influence of international norms,
institutions and other ideational structures, societal constructivists (or ‘culturalists’)
like Hopf (2002) and Katzenstein (1996) emphasise the significance of domestic
institutions, culture, and norms.
Omelicheva (2011) also refers to the distinction between so-called thick, critical or
post-modernist, and thin or conventional constructivism. For a thick constructivist like
Albert (2001) social reality is dependent on the processes associated with social
construction where research plays an active part in the construction and
reconstruction of reality and science. In contrast, Checkel (2000), Finnemore (1996),
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt (1999), who espouse
32
thin constructivism, stress the intersubjective in text meanings constituting reality,

identity and interests.
Against the aforesaid, this study positions itself in systemic constructivism in the
Wendtian (1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999) tradition by focussing on identity as the
underlying text of a state’s interests. Notwithstanding this, the study departs
somewhat from Wendt’s constructivism by also following aspects of Clunan’s (2009)
aspirational constructivism that, amongst others, maintains that identity requires
“positive distinctiveness” or self-esteem to create an identity based on historical
experiences to create their aspirations for the future. This is relevant to South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy by securing a niche role through norms construction and
state identity since 1990 as a departure from the country’s past nuclear diplomacy.
5. Criticism made against Wendt’s constructivism
Constructivists are by no means a homogenous group as the variety of approaches

indicates. Although widely lauded for his contribution to constructivism, Wendt (1992,
1994, 1995 & 1999) has been widely criticised. His critics not only include neo-
realists, Marxists and world system theorists but also fellow constructivists. In fact,
Kolodziej (2005: 261, 283) refers to the growing “internal quarrels” among
constructivists and that “many constructivists vigorously object that Wendt does not
represent their positions”. However, it is not the objective of this study to offer a
comprehensive criticism of constructivism, in general, and Wendtian constructivism
in particular. Notwithstanding this, note should be taken of the main criticism levelled
against Wendt. The criticism is sub-divided into two main areas, namely that of
ontology and epistemology by focusing on the main Wendtian themes of the state
and the international system, change and identity.
Ontologically, Wendt (1999) claims that states are the main actors and units of
analysis in IR theory, that the key structures in the state system are intersubjective
instead of material, and that state identities and interests are constructed by these
social structures and not exogenously given. Wendt (1999) justifies his emphasis of
the state by maintaining that his theory is about the interstate system. In response,
Reus-Smit (1999) and Adler (2013) criticise Wendt for failing to explain the
33
emergence and decline of international systems, and his inability to explain the
change of international systems (Adler 2013).
Wendt’s claim that the state is the principal unit of analysis is contested by the
presence of powerful non-state actors such as non- and inter-governmental
organisations in international politics. Accordingly, some constructivists like Adler
(2013) argue that constructivism opens alternative avenues to explain international
relations by focusing on actors other than states (Adler 2013). However, a scholar
like Bhakar (in Adler 2013: 133) maintains that only individuals – and not states –
can express agency. Similarly, Wight (2006), for example, maintains that, although
states are ontologically real, they are structures rather than agents.
This ontological criticism has several implications for this study. In the first instance,
in its practice of nuclear diplomacy post-1990 South Africa constructed its identity
and interests in respect of its nuclear diplomacy and not as exogenously given.
Secondly, it interacted with state and non-state actors such as the IAEA and the UN.
Wendt’s (1999) epistemological claim that meaning and knowledge are socially
constructed has been similarly criticised (Adler 2013). Whereas Wendt (1999)
argues that causal theories answer the ‘why’ and sometimes the ‘how’ questions,
constitutive theorists explain the features of objects by referring to the structures
within which these objects exist (Adler 2013: 130). For example, according to Wendt,
the factors that constituted the Cold War are not the same as the causes of the Cold
War (Adler 2013: 130).
Wendt is criticised for his view of change and for failing to explain how norms are
formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests are defined (Jervis 1998: 976).
Apart from neo-realists, Marxists are also critical of Wendt’s constructivism.
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory focuses on the material – unlike
Wendt’s non-material – structure of the international system and global capitalism
which limits the social interaction Wendt maintains exists between actors (Jackson &
Sørensen 2007: 175). Thus, although Wendt (1999) admits that identities can
change, he does not clearly explain what exactly happens when these identities
change. His claim that state identity exists a priori, reinforces his ignorance of
34
domestic processes of identity formation, and the interplay between domestic and
international levels (Zehfuss 2002: 60-61).
Wendt’s emphasis of the international system in shaping identity has also been
criticised by his fellow constructivists. Finnermore (1996), for example, departed from
Wendt’s position on the centrality of the social interaction between states as a
determinant of identity and interests and focused on the norms of international
society and its effect on identity and interests. Hopf (in (Jackson & Sørensen 2007:
172) adds to this by arguing that in order to determine how a state’s identity affects
its interests, a state’s interaction with other states as well as its interactions with its
own society should be considered. With reference to domestic factors, Keck and
Sikkink (1998), and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) demonstrate how domestic
factors such as regime type and domestic actors such as non-governmental
organisations determine state identity. Similarly, in his study on Japan, Katzenstein
(1996) illustrates how domestic – rather than international – norms influence state
identity and interests. Despite the centrality of identity to his ontology, it is unclear
when identity matters for Wendt. In this regard, Zehfuss (2002: 62-63) observes that
identity can easily be confused with behaviour as Wendt maintains that identity must
be inferred from behaviour.
Given Wendt’s (1992) rejection of neo-realism, it is expected that some of his fiercest
critics are neo-realists. Wendt’s assertion that a state’s identity and thus its interests
are constructed in its interaction with other states and through intersubjective
understanding is rejected by neo-realists. Proponents of the latter position assert that
a state’s identity and interests are given before it interacts with other actors. Wendt,
therefore, places too much emphasis on international norms as states often
disregard them by invading other states and declaring war. Moreover, neo-realists
question the constructivist claim that peaceful relations between states can be
established and maintained based simply on their social interaction. States, neo-
realists argue, operate in an international system which is anarchical and hierarchical
where each state has to fend for itself in its search for security in an uncertain
environment. Uncertainty is increased by deception. States do not, as constructivists
maintain, always engage in sincere social interactions with other states (Jackson &
Sørensen 2007: 168, 172-173).
35
This epistemological criticism against Wendt has implications for this study. Wendt
failed to explain how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests
are defined. In this respect, this study departs from Wendt. Drawing on social identity
theory, Clunan (2009) identifies the three main sources of identity and interests as
self-esteem, aspirations and ideas. For her, a state’s identities and interests rest on
two pillars, namely its political purpose and its international status. A state’s political
purpose includes beliefs about the appropriate political and economic governance of
the state. In other words, it includes ideas about “what values, principles, traits, and
symbols characterize the country and what values and principles should govern
relations between countries. It also involves ideas about what the country’s national
mission is” (Clunan 2009: 29-30). National identity’s second pillar, international
status, refers to the rank and positioning of a state in an “imagined international
hierarchy” of political, military, social, and economic power which involves
evaluations of the material power possessed by a state itself, and all other parties
(Clunan 2009: 29-30). The value of political purpose is that it informs the state about
the in-groups to which it should belong. These in-groups are defined by material
attributes such as power, wealth, political and economic governance, culture and
tradition. A state’s political purpose, therefore, also indicates whether it is a status-
seeker or a status-maintainer (Clunan 2009: 32).
Rationalists in the realist tradition hold that all states have to fulfil a number of tasks
such as providing security and improving welfare which constitute their national
interest. Material factors such as geography, military strength and economic strength
determine how (through conflict or cooperation) a state pursues its national interest
based on its identity (Clunan 2009: 4-5).
One other cause for a change in state identity can occur when a state has arrived at
a particular critical historical juncture (Clunan 2009: 19). A good example of such a
critical historical juncture is the USSR at the end of the Cold War that resulted in the
disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation. In a case
such as this a new syncretic identity, involving historical and new identities, is often
established.
Clunan (2009: 34-35) identifies three identity management strategies that the state
can employ, namely mobility, competition and creativity. Mobility (leaving one group
36
to join another group) includes assimilation. In the latter case, one group dissolves
into another and takes on the identity of the second group to acquire membership of
a more satisfactory group. Competition involves social action to change prevailing
conditions or a situation and social competition over status and prestige. Creativity
aims to redefine or change the attractiveness of existing attributes of an actor.
Despite his focus on the state, Wendt neglects to focus on diplomacy (which is a
main theme of this study) as an instrument available to a state to interact with other
actors. Diplomacy, as a settled norm in international relations, can thus be described
as one of the structures to which Wendt refers. It can also be described as one of the
intersubjective understandings between states. Wendt is, however, silent on the
origins, practice and actions of diplomacy, and how and why it changes over time.
Therefore, Wendt's (1994) “black box” on identity should be opened up in order to
understand the domestic and international dynamics that underlie a state’s identity
and interests, and its conduct of diplomacy. In fact, this has already commenced as
constructivist scholars increasingly pay attention to the domestic determinants of
change (Reus-Smit 1999; Clunan 2009) and to the domestic impact of international
norms (Checkel 2000; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999).
For Wendt, interaction between actors and their intersubjective understanding results
in routinised practices whereby social facts are created. Once a practice is
internalised it underpins social facts and constitutes identity and interests. Routinised
practices create stability and, for its part, stability reinforces an agent’s identity and
interests. Flockhart (2012: 89) similarly distinguishes between practice and action
where the former refers to automatic activities that are ‘embedded’ in daily routines
contributing to stability instead of change. Accordingly, practice-based diplomacy
involves routinised activities that contribute to predictability and stability. Therefore,
the power of diplomacy is that it is a social practice that reproduces and inculcates
intersubjective practices that constitute social structures and agents. Diplomacy as
an action refers to intentional behaviour related to a specific objective with the
intention of solving a problem or introducing new ideas which often constitute the
initial step to change a particular practice (Flockhart 2012: 88).
37
6. Diplomacy: selected theoretical aspects
Constructivists regard a state as a sovereign actor in a social relationship with other

actors. These social relationships are guided by sets of rules, norms, practices and
institutions, one of which is diplomacy. However, diplomacy is also one of the
instruments employed to achieve foreign policy objectives which originates in a
government’s domestic policy objectives; amplifying the domestic/foreign policy
nexus manifest in a state’s conduct of its diplomacy.
6.1 Defining diplomacy
Notoriously difficult to define, diplomacy has been described as the “conduct of

relations between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home
and abroad” (Berridge & James 2003: 69); as “an institution...orientated towards
problem-solving and negotiations rather than violence and coercion” (Brown 2005:
93); as a “major ingredient of power” with the purpose of “enabling states to secure
the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or law”
(Berridge 2005: 1); and as something which “is concerned with the management of
relations between states and between states and other actors” (thus also involving
non-state actors) (Barston 2006: 1).
In addition to these definitions, International Law also provides meaning to

diplomacy. By 2011, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), which
entered into force in 1964, enjoyed nearly universal support (UN Treaty Collection
2011). The Convention describes the functions of diplomacy as representation, the
protection of nationals and state interests, negotiation, gathering information and
reporting, the promotion of relations between states, and the development of
economic, cultural and scientific relations (UN 1961).
As an instrument to conduct foreign policy, maintain channels of communication and

negotiate agreements, diplomacy is a normative concept which acknowledges
mutually constituted norms such as state sovereignty, the pacific settlement of
disputes and state representation (Du Plessis 2006: 125; 2008: 96). Firstly, the
relationship between diplomacy and foreign policy (see Figure 1) can be explained in
the context of linear escalation or progression, ranging from political (diplomacy) to
military (use of force) instruments in accordance with international norms on the
38
pacific settlements of disputes and the use of force in terms of Chapters VI and VII of
the UN Charter (see Figure 1A). Secondly, the relationship between diplomatic and
military instruments of foreign policy can be explained in terms of the utility of each
instrument (see Figure 1B). Each of these instruments is versatile, ranging from
influence to coercion, depending on the context of a particular situation.
Figure 1: Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy
A) LINEAR ESCALATION
Suasion Coercion
POLITICAL ECONOMIC MILITARY
Diplomacy Aid, sanctions Use of force
PROPAGANDA
B) UTILITY MATRIX
COOPERATION
(order and peaceful change)
INFLUENCE DETERRENCE
Latent suasion (deference) Balance of power
Active suasion (persuasion) Projected threats
Preventive diplomacy 1 2 Preventive deployment
DIPLOMATIC MODE MILITARY MODE
SUASION 4 3 COMPELLENCE
Diplomatic sanctions Use of force
Levels of force projection
Types of force projection
CONFLICT
(disorder and violence)
Du Plessis (2006: 136; 2008: 96 as adapted)

39
6.2 Typology of diplomacy
In order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, a state and its designated officials
employ various types of diplomacy (as a particular instrument of foreign policy).
These types include various channels, including direct telecommunications, bilateral
and multilateral diplomacy, summitry and mediation (Berridge 2005: 91).
The classification and typology of diplomacy is based on three dimensions of

diplomacy (see Table 2). Duration refers to the nature (continuous or non-
continuous) of diplomacy by being permanent or temporary (ad hoc). Form refers to
the number of actors involved, namely bilateral or multilateral. Level-type refers to
the status of diplomatic representatives (Du Plessis 2006: 139).
6.3 Parameters of diplomacy
The parameters of diplomacy refer to “factors that provide a framework or basis for
diplomacy and prescribe, regulate or limit diplomatic practice” (Du Plessis 2006:
142). Four parameters of diplomacy can be distinguished, namely the policy,
institutional, legal and moral parameters. The policy parameter refers to decisions
concerning the ends and means of diplomacy. The institutional parameter
determines the locus and process of policy formulation that influence diplomacy,
including bureaucratic institutions and infrastructure for policy implementation. The
legal parameter refers to the provisions and prescriptions pertaining to the use of
diplomacy in terms of International Law. The moral parameter includes international
morality, ethical guidelines for international conduct and behaviour and norms
relating to diplomatic practice, which links to some of Holsti’s (2004: 178-210)
observations on diplomacy. He explained the historical changes in diplomacy and
diplomatic practice. Holsti also focused on changes pertaining to norms, institutions,
ideas and practices pertaining to diplomacy in the twentieth century. Among these
are increased specialisation, a proliferation of issues, technological innovation, the
‘democratisation’ of diplomacy and the rise of public diplomacy. For Barston (2006:
1), Holsti’s observation refers to the “widening content of diplomacy” resulting in
“changes in the substantive form of diplomacy” as reflected in specific types of
diplomacy such as, for example, environmental diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy,
40
disaster and emergency diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy. The next section
addresses nuclear diplomacy as a particular type of diplomacy.
Table 2: Typology of diplomacy
FORM
Permanent
Bilateral Multilateral
Resident mission in receiving state Resident missions at inter-

Diplomatic, consular and specialized governmental organisations (IGO)
representation such as attachés such as the UN, the European Union
and the AU
Inter-governmental
(state – state / state - IGO / IGO – IGO)
DURATION
TYPE AND LEVEL
Inter-governmental
(state – state / state - IGO / IGO – IGO)
High level and ministerial visits (by heads of Serial summits (Summits of the
government and state, ministers) AU heads of state and
Ad hoc personal diplomacy government)
(at ministerial and trans-governmental level not Ad hoc summits and/or
involving diplomats) conferences
Parliamentary diplomacy (UN
General Assembly)
Conference diplomacy on
specific issues such as climate
change and racism
Non-governmental
(at least one actor is non-governmental)
Bilateral Multilateral
Temporary
Multitrack and two-track diplomacy involving non-governmental and transnational

actors such as interest and pressure groups, multilateral corporations, non-
governmental organisations, national liberation movements, terrorist groups)
Du Plessis (2006: 140)

41
6.4 Norms and diplomacy
Diplomacy is one of the most enduring institutions and norms of international

relations (Frost 1996: 104-112). Norms also play an important role in the conduct of
diplomacy and their raison d’être is based on settled norms such as state
sovereignty, equality and diplomatic immunity. A settled norm can be described as a
norm that is “generally recognised and that any argument denying the norm requires
special justification” (Frost 1996: 105). Another indicator of a settled norm is the way
in which an act which is an infringement of it, is undertaken. According to Frost, acts
contravening norms are often undertaken ‘clandestinely’. A third indicator of a settled
norm is the “concept of the norm” which is regarded as settled, and not the
“conception of the concept” (Frost 1996: 105-106).
In the case of nuclear diplomacy, norms also play a role in the conduct of diplomacy.
Several settled norms are associated with nuclear diplomacy, namely a state’s right
to develop a nuclear capability; the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the
“nuclear taboo”. These settled norms have been entrenched in government policies,
various legal documents, and bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Several constructivists have contributed to the revival of norms in IR. Klotz (1995)
and Price (1995), for example, focused on anti-apartheid and sanctions against the
apartheid regime in South Africa; on pressures by non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) on governments to assist groups in other states fighting for human rights
(Keck & Sikkink 1998); on norms and human rights (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999); on
international systems (Hall 1999); on law as a generator and distributor of norms,
and speech acts (Frederking undated); and on development through poverty
alleviation programmes (Finnemore 1996).
For constructivists, the utility of norms in the practice of diplomacy is wide-ranging.

Firstly, norms are explanatory variables of diplomacy as norms. They are “inter-
subjective beliefs about the social and material world that tell actors what they can
and should do” in particular circumstances (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97)
or a “standard for appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore
& Sikkink 1998: 891). Secondly, norms are regulative in that they order, prescribe
and regulate diplomatic action and thereby enable meaningful diplomatic action. In
42
the third instance, norms are constitutive as they provide actors with an
understanding of their mutual or individual interests, which can affect a state’s
diplomatic stance and/or behaviour on a particular nuclear-related issue (Katzenstein
1996). Slaughter et al. (in Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007: 101) similarly
maintain that norms play a “constitutive role” in the formation of an actor’s identity
and interests as the identity of an actor can affect its compliance (or not) with a
particular norm.
International Law defines and validates state sovereignty and jurisdiction; to protect
the key values shared by all states; and to foster interstate cooperation, i.e.
diplomacy. It achieves these objectives by providing modes of legitimation,
communication, reassurance and cooperation. International Law can be defined as a
dynamic, normative and constitutive process involving transnational networks of
governmental and non-governmental actors (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007;
Reus-Smit 2004; Sharp 2009). This dynamic, normative and constitutive process
includes three stages, namely interaction between transnational actors; the
interpretation of an international norm by these actors; and the internalisation of that
particular norm in the domestic legal system of states. Therefore, Koh (1997: 2598-
2599) concludes that states obey International Law due to “internalised obedience”
instead of “enforced compliance”.
An actor’s consistent compliance with International Law and adherence to settled

norms contribute to its predictability, trustworthiness, credibility, status and prestige.
Undermining International Law and settled norms often result in an actor’s loss of
credibility and bargaining strength. The voluntary observance of International Law
and settled norms serves a state’s long-term interests as it derives benefits from the
stability and predictability of the international order (Joyner in Kegley & Raymond
2010: 262; Geldenhuys 1989). Therefore, the logic of nuclear diplomacy is to comply
with settled norms on the use of nuclear power. An actor’s norm compliance rests on
a number of considerations. Firstly, norms express the dominant ideas of society.
Non-compliance may result in detrimental sanctions and therefore actors comply in
order to avoid such actions. Secondly, compliance with norms may be beneficial to
an actor’s interests (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97).
43
Due to their focus on identity as a determinant of action or behaviour, constructivists

are interested in nuclear diplomacy as a particular type of instrument of a state’s
foreign policy. As foreign policy can also be regarded as ‘action’, proponents of
constructivism take interest in the logics of action, namely, the logic of
appropriateness and the logic of consequence, to determine how to act to maximise
their interests in line with their identity (Flockhart 2012: 85-86). The logic of
consequences focuses on calculating which action will maximise the interests of the
actor, whereas the logic of appropriateness contends that actions should be taken
with reference to the defined rules and norms that will render the proposed action
proper and legitimate behaviour.
Constructivists also concern themselves with change, especially with norm change.
For constructivists, change can be explained in terms of diffusion (of models,
practices and norms), and the internationalisation and institutionalisation of norms.
As previously indicated, norms evolve over a period of time, and can be explained in
terms of the internationalisation and institutionalisation of norms, or the life-cycle of
norms (Barnett 2008: 168-169).
Furthermore, constructivists are also concerned with the political process whereby
actors are socialised into norm construction, enactment and compliance (Armstrong,
Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97, 104-105). This socialisation process is also described by
Koh (1997: 2598-2599) as interaction, interpretation and internalisation. In addition,
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) have identified three stages in the life-cycle
of norms, namely norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation (see
Figure 2). The first stage entails the emergence of a norm through the initiative of
norm entrepreneurs in governments, inter-governmental organisations (INGOs)
and/or NGOs that call attention to a particular issue. The second stage involves the
cascade of norms when norm entrepreneurs publicise the need for the entrenchment
of a norm by socialising with governments and organisations. As a final stage, the
internalisation of a norm occurs when an actor internalises a particular diplomatic
norm through a social learning process, or socialisation. In this respect, Checkel (in
Sjöstedt 2008: 12) distinguishes between instrumental internalisation when an actor
behaves as expected and deepened internalisation when an actor accepts a
particular norm and identity discourse.
44
The impact of norms is determined by three features of norms. These are the norm’s
specificity, namely how well the norm is defined by norm entrepreneurs and how it is
intersubjectively conceptualised by divergent actors; the norm’s durability, namely
how long the norm has been in effect; and the norm’s concordance, namely, how
well a norm is diffused to different actors (Sjöstedt 2008: 11).
In the process of constructing norms, there is always some competition between

beliefs and interests. Therefore, norm construction, enactment and change are
political processes. Politics, according to Reus-Smit (in Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert
2007: 105), involves four forms of reason and action, namely idiographic, purposive,
ethical and instrumental forms. Each form of reason and action expresses and
replicates social identities, actor interests, mutual moral principles and preferred
means of action. At a global level, all of these forms of reason and action are
consolidated in International Law.
Figure 2: Three stages of the life-cycle of norms
Norm cascade
Norm Norm leaders
emergence attempt to
Persuasion by socialise other
norm entrepeneurs states to become
in governments or norm followers.
NGOS who call Norm cascades
attention to issues. through rest of
states.
Norm internalisation
States automatically
internalise norm.
Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 894-905)

45
Constructivists are also concerned with establishing the origins of interests. This
resulted in constructivists’ ontological attack on rationalist approaches to interests.
Constructivists claim that:
neither interests nor power exists independent of the social context in which
actors are enmeshed. Interests and identity are constructed socially; they are
plastic and may be redefined. International law may be understood as both a
reflection of identities and as a social artefact that reinforces identities,
interests, and power (Simmons & Steinberg 2006: xxxiv).
Thus, diplomacy is based on specific norms explaining, regulating and constituting

state interests, identity and behaviour. In its practice of diplomacy, a state either
complies with these norms, or not, depending on its interests and identity. However,
the dynamic nature of diplomacy requires a state to regularly respond and adapt to
emerging diplomatic issues in order to advance its interests. Often new diplomatic
issues result in global change which manifest in the emergence of new norms
through norm construction, enactment and compliance. The origin and evolution of
nuclear diplomacy is one example of the impact of norms on diplomacy. However, a
state’s diplomatic practice is also determined by its identity and interests as the next
section outlines.
6.5 Identity, interests and diplomacy
Wendt (1999: 231) reminds us that “identities refer to who or what actors are”
whereas “interests refer to what actors want”. For constructivists, a state has multiple
identities, including a social and a corporate identity, which determine its interests
and actions (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1995 & 1999; Finnemore 1996) and therefore the
way it conducts diplomacy.
In this respect Wendt (1999: 224-233) identifies four types of state identity, namely
personal or corporate identity; type identity; role identity; and collective identity.
Personal or corporate identity is constituted by the ‘self-organizing’ structures that
make an actor a “distinct entity”’ and always has a material base. Type identity refers
to actors who share one or more characteristics such as skills, values, attributes,
knowledge and historical commonalities. Role identity exists only in relation to
others, that is, it refers to the identity of the ‘self’ relative to the ‘other’. Collective
46
identity is regarded as a combination of role and type identities in order to overcome

collective action problems (such as the environment and global warming) defined by
international or regional actors. It merges the previous types in order to establish a
single identity.
For Wendt (1999: 230, 233), a state’s identity “can take multiple forms
simultaneously within the same actor”. This means that actors often choose a
particular social/corporate, type, role or collective identity in the light of their
interests. Since “state interests are constructions”, Wendt (1999: 234) maintains that
national interests refer to the “reproduction requirements or security of state-society
complexes", that is, to objective interests. Moreover, national interests are not merely
regarded as “normative guidelines for action” but also “causal powers that
predispose states” to act in a particular way.
Apart from his typology of state identity and reference to interests, Wendt (1990:
231-232) also distinguished between two main types of interests which have a
bearing on this study, namely:
• Objective interests which refer to the needs or functional imperatives that an
actor has to fulfil if its identity is to be reproduced, namely reproduction
requirements.
• Subjective interests which refer to beliefs that actors “have about how to meet
their identity needs”, namely an actor’s preferences.
George and Keohane (1980: 217-238) identify three national interests, namely,
physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being, a frame of reference that
Wendt (1999) also employs. To these he adds the fourth national interest of
collective self-esteem which, according to him, refers to “a group’s need to feel good
about itself, for respect or status” (Wendt 1999: 235). Accordingly, a state’s collective
self-image can either be negative or positive, depending on historical relationships
such as experiencing dominance or subjugation. Each of these state identities
(personal or corporate identity, type identity, role identity and collective identity) has
certain “production requirements”, namely objective interests that determine beliefs
about how to meet these subjective interests. National interest is therefore an
objective interest, namely survival, autonomy, welfare and collective self-esteem,
47
geared towards a state’s self-interest which can vary depending on an actor’s

construction of its identity and interests (Wendt 1999: 243).
How, then, do constructivists relate identity and interests to nuclear diplomacy? This
question presents the study with an analytical, theoretical and conceptual terra
incognita. An actor’s conduct and practice of nuclear diplomacy can be defined as an
expression of its identity and its interests. In Cold War nuclear diplomacy, some
states defined their identity in terms of their possession of nuclear weapons and
capabilities, whereas their interests referred to what the specific state wanted.
In the case of pre-1994 South Africa, the purpose of its nuclear diplomacy was to
establish a nuclear capability to protect the South African government against a
perceived global communist threat to its national interests (O’ Meara 1996; Venter
2008). During this period, South Africa’s corporate identity was constituted by the
“self-organizing” structures that make an actor a “distinct entity”. In terms of its
nuclear capabilities South Africa was on par with NWS, whereas in terms of its
identity type, the pre-1994 South African government regarded itself as a Western
enclave which shared one or more characteristics with the West. South Africa’s role
identity was blatantly anti-communist, whereas its collective identity was shared with
Western anti-communist states.
Based on these state identities, the pre-1994 South African government constructed
its objective and subjective interests, which manifested in national interests such as
state survival; the protection of its sovereignty; economic welfare; and political
autonomy despite global opposition to the then government’s policy of apartheid.
Moreover, in Wendtian terms, pre-1994 South Africa’s collective self-esteem was
based on the needs of South Africans of European descent (Whites) to feel good
about themselves; to be respected; to exercise their near Messianic Mission in
Africa; and efforts to secure their survival through the development of nuclear
weapons. Albright (1994) explained South Africa’s pre-1994 nuclear identity, namely
that South Africa’s nuclear weapons emerged from a:
technological ‘can-do’ mentality that coincided with South Africa’s increasing

international isolation in the 1970s and 1980s [due to its domestic policy of
apartheid]. The emerging strategy was to bring Western governments to
48
South Africa’s aid in the event of an overwhelming attack by Soviet-inspired

military forces then in Southern Africa.
Thus, the case of South Africa provides an illustration of the relationship between
norms; a state’s interests and its identity as seen from a constructivist point of view;
and how this influences nuclear diplomacy. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on
this relationship.
7. Nuclear diplomacy
Originating during the Cold War, the concepts nuclear diplomacy (used but not
defined by Quester 1970) or atomic diplomacy (referred to by Jones 1980: 89-117)
are often used synonymously with the concepts of arms control and disarmament.
Nuclear diplomacy is also sometimes used synonymously with the concept of
nuclear non-proliferation, which has been defined as the “prevention of the spread of
[nuclear] weapons of mass destruction” (NTI 2010b: 15). To clarify these
ambiguities, this section outlines the context, nature, scope, forms, meaning and use
of nuclear diplomacy, followed by an analysis of nuclear diplomacy as a particular
niche of diplomacy.
7.1 Context of nuclear diplomacy
The twentieth century’s technological development has been unprecedented due to

the scientific innovations and contributions of scientists such as Einstein,
Oppenheimer and Bohr in the field of nuclear physics. The harnessing of atomic
power and its subsequent political-strategic use against Japan to end the Second
World War has had major implications. An example of the failure of diplomacy is the
atomic annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945 by the US.
These events signalled the first and only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. Since
1945 the non-use of nuclear weapons (the “nuclear taboo”) has become one of the
prevailing norms driving diplomacy during the Cold War to such an extent that a
unique ‘brand’ of diplomacy, namely nuclear diplomacy, emerged to facilitate states’
interaction pertaining to all aspects of nuclear energy.
Another major implication of the harnessing of atomic power and its use in 1945
against Japan is that not only did it terminate the Second World War, but it also
49
resulted in an arms race between the US and the USSR and smaller but ambitious
powers such as the UK, France and China, and in the emergence of scholarship on
the nature of the relationship between power, diplomacy and technology. In spite of
their alliance during the Second World War, the US and the USSR soon embarked
on a competitive nuclear arms race after the Second World War that dominated the
international arena until the 1990s and beyond.
In the post-Cold War context, nuclear diplomacy remains as important as ever.

States such as North Korea and Israel have not ratified the NPT and continue to
destabilise geopolitical relations. Apart from this, an increasing number of states
including Algeria and Nigeria, for example, have announced their intention to
develop nuclear energy. Since 2000, Iran in particular has refused to comply with
international norms on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear dismantlement.
Suspected of developing nuclear weapons, the country has maintained that, on the
contrary, it is developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These developments
bring the possession and utility of a nuclear capability into question.
7.2 Nature and scope of nuclear diplomacy
The diplomatic utility of nuclear capabilities is that a state derives power, status,
prestige and influence from them (Jones 1980: 90). Despite ideological divisions and
competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War, cooperation on
nuclear-related security issues such as nuclear weapons and capabilities, and the
application of nuclear power occurred. Nonetheless, conflicts did emerge over the
threat of the use of nuclear weapons including, for example, during the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962 and on account of the superpowers’ erection of nuclear bases
in proxy states such as Cuba and West Germany. Throughout these times of conflict
and cooperation, the superpowers engaged diplomatically on these issues, resulting
in a new type of diplomacy or niche diplomacy, namely nuclear diplomacy. As a new
type of diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy focuses specifically on nuclear arms control,
nuclear non-proliferation and/or disarmament, which are related and overlapping
concepts often used interchangeably (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374).
The development of nuclear diplomacy is associated with four distinct concepts,

namely nuclear deterrence; nuclear arms control; nuclear disarmament; and nuclear
50
non-proliferation. The “power to dissuade” or deter has become a major element of

nuclear diplomacy since the publication, after the Second World War, of Bernard
Brodie’s The absolute weapon (1946). In a subsequent article in Foreign Affairs,
Brodie (1948: 23-24) explained nuclear deterrence:
The problem to which we now return is the problem of how to accomplish this
act of persuasion in an atomic age, when the already precious objective of
peace is made immeasurably more precious by the immeasurably enhanced
horror of the alternative.
Brodie explained this “horror of the alternative” as the threat of the devastation of
cities, nations and territories using nuclear weapons; a threat which became one of
the main tenets of nuclear deterrence. Defined as the persuasion of an opponent
that the cost of the use of a nuclear weapon outweighs the benefits of its use,
nuclear deterrence can also be defined as the threat to an adversary to not take a
particular course of action (Wilson 2008: 422). In The anatomy of deterrence, Brodie
(1959) outlined the elements of nuclear deterrence, namely capability and credibility.
In order for successful nuclear deterrence to occur, a state has to be able to respond
to an attack or an impending attack (capability). Successful nuclear deterrence is
also incumbent upon the fact that a state believes that it can be attacked (credibility).
Dominated by Realist scholars in the wake of the Second World War and during the
Cold War, a main element of nuclear deterrence is that the purpose of nuclear
weapons is not to wage war, but to prevent it. Moreover, to be effective, a nuclear
deterrent capability cannot be kept secret as public knowledge of nuclear weapons
capabilities can intimidate an adversary (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 351-354).
Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 515-547), and Waltz (1990: 731-745), amongst others,
explain nuclear deterrence as an example of nuclear diplomacy between the US and
the USSR. Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 515-547) explained US-USSR nuclear
deterrence in several phases. The first phase, compellence (1945-1962), involved
US nuclear weapons superiority over the USSR as well as its coercive diplomacy
involving an act of war or a threat to the USSR especially during the Korean War.
The second phase, mutual deterrence (1962-1983), saw the improvement of the
USSR nuclear arsenal and its threats to the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both
51
superpowers pursued extended deterrence to protect their territories as well as their

allies. By the 1970s the superpowers reached a nuclear stalemate, or Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD). Proponents of MAD maintained that nuclear deterrence
is achieved by a large nuclear arsenal, the capability to survive a nuclear attack and
then delivering a second-strike retaliatory attack. Therefore, proponents of MAD
support “deterrence through punishment” (Rourke 2003: 363). The nuclear arsenals
of both superpowers laid the foundation for the first diplomatic negotiations on
limiting their nuclear arsenals, namely the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in
1972 and 1979.
However, subsequent to the USSR invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, relations

between the US and the USSR worsened and accelerated the nuclear arms race in
the 1980s. Although MAD continued to dominate nuclear deterrence debates,
another debate, namely Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUT) emerged. Proponents of
NUT maintained that MAD is too much of a gamble and preferred “deterrence
through damage denial” (Rourke 2003: 363) which involves the use of nuclear
weapons in a ‘limited’ way (Kegley & Wittkopf 2001: 519).
The third phase of nuclear deterrence as nuclear diplomacy occurred between 1983
and 1993. This period marked a shift in the US nuclear posture from nuclear offense
to nuclear defence with US President Ronald Reagan’s announcement of the
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) to place ballistic missiles in space. US-USSR
nuclear diplomacy on this issue resulted in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) of 1991, 1993 and 1997 (Waller 2002: 99-117).
The concept of arms control takes conflict as a given (M ller, Fischer & K tter 1994:
2) and has been defined as “agreements designed to regulate arms levels either by
limiting their growth or by restricting how they may be used” (Kegley & Raymond
2010: 241). This presupposes the continued, but restrained and regulated, existence
of national arms and military establishments (Lamb 1988:19) deemed adequate for
security and the promotion of political objectives. Therefore, arms control seeks to:
impose some kind of restraint, regulation, or other limitations on the qualitative

design, quantitative production, method or location of deployment, protection,
command and control, transfer to third parties, and planned, threatened, or
52
actual use of military forces and weapons (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374-
375).
Therefore, as an element of nuclear diplomacy, arms control differs from

disarmament in that it involves the continued (but controlled and limited) existence
and ownership of arms.
Disarmament, on the other hand, is the “reduction or elimination of weapons”

(Kegley & Raymond 2010: 241); “a strategy to preserve peace” (M ller, Fischer &
K tter 1994: 2); and the “prohibition against their future production” (Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff 2001: 374) as a “means of reducing the likelihood of war” (Lamb
1988:19). The mere existence of nuclear weapons causes instability and insecurity.
Therefore, it is assumed that by reducing nuclear arms, conflict and insecurity can be
minimised. With regard to nuclear weapons, both nuclear arms control and nuclear
disarmament occur. But nuclear diplomacy is not only limited to arms control and
disarmament. It is also concerned with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for
civilian and medical purposes, employed in terms of the structures and norms set out
by the IAEA.
Whereas concepts such as nuclear deterrence and containment dominated Cold

War nuclear diplomacy, the concept of nuclear non-proliferation dominates post-Cold
War nuclear diplomacy (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001: 378). Sparked by fears over
the nuclear capabilities of the independent former Soviet states after the collapse of
the USSR and the emergence of the commercialisation of nuclear-related services
and goods by private enterprises, nuclear diplomacy’s focus shifted to the concept of
non-proliferation, namely the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to
additional states. Two types of proliferation are distinguished, namely vertical and
horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation refers to the increase in nuclear
stockpiles in existing NWS, defined by the NPT as “one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January
1967”, thus including China, France, the UK, the US, and the USSR (Russia) (UN
1968). Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear stockpiles by new
states or de facto NWS (Chakma 2004: 228), including India, North Korea, Pakistan
and Israel.
53
By January 2010, nuclear weapons have proliferated vertically and horizontally (see
Table 3). This proliferation, according to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, includes a total
of more than 22 000 warheads in NWS and new NWS (Kile et al. 2010; Norris &
Kristensen 2009: 86-95), compared to 20 000 in NWS in 1995 (Albright et al. 1995:
327). In 1995, the US operational inventory included 7 770 strategic and “several
hundred” tactical warheads, compared to 8 527 strategic and 2 000 to 6 000 tactical
warheads for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia. The
inventories of the UK, France and China included 250 to 300, 500, and
approximately 300 respectively (Albright et al. 1995: 327). This is far less than the
estimated 70 000 nuclear weapons which existed in NWS nuclear arsenals during
the Cold War (Tannenwald 2007: 1).
Table 3: SIPRI’s estimated global nuclear weapons inventories (2010)
State 2010
USSR/Russia 12 000
US 9 600
France 300
China 240
UK 225
Israel 80
Pakistan 70-90
India 60-80
North Korea Unknown
TOTAL 22 600
Albright et al. (2010)
Despite these figures, the number of nuclear weapons has remained relatively stable
since 1990. In addition, more states have voluntarily disarmed their nuclear weapons
and joined the NPT such as the former USSR states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the
Ukraine who decided to transfer the Soviet-era nuclear weapons on their territory to
54
Russia; a process which was completed in 1996 (Spector 2002: 122). In 1990, 141
states were party to the NPT (UN 1990: 457). By the time the 1995 REC took place,
181 states were party to the NPT (UN 1995a: 248). At the 2010 NPT RevCon, which
took place in New York in May 2010, 189 states were party to the NPT (UN 2011a).
Only three states have not signed the NPT, namely India, Pakistan and Israel.
Taiwan is not recognised as a sovereign state and North Korea withdrew in 2003.
Nuclear diplomacy includes arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation as well as

nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, in this study, nuclear diplomacy is defined as the
interaction among and between international actors (be they states, international
organisations, individuals and transnational non-state organisations) on nuclear-
related issues, actors and interests (be they material or non-material) to achieve
objectives aligned with an actor’s construction of its self- or national interests, its
particular identity and the nuclear-related norms it initiates, innovates, maintains, and
with which it is compliant or non-compliant. This definition includes a variety of actors
and is not limited to states as the traditional and only actor in the nuclear field.
Increasingly, non-state actors such as private corporations participate in scientific
research and development, and trade in nuclear material, goods, equipment and
services. Moreover, concerns have also been raised about the illicit trade in nuclear
material, goods, equipment and services.
In 1995 the IAEA established the IAEA Illicit Traffic Database (ITDB) to gather
information on “incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving
nuclear and radioactive materials” (IAEA 2007). From January 1993 to December
2006, a total of 275 incidents involving “unauthorized possession and related
criminal activities” were recorded. These incidents included “illicit trafficking”
elements such as illegal possession, movement, or attempts to illegally trade in
these materials (IAEA 2007). Currently 96 states, including South Africa, participate
in the ITDB. Thus, the practice of nuclear diplomacy is both bi- and multilateral.
7.3 Forms of nuclear diplomacy
In the context of nuclear diplomacy, the most notable case of long-term bilateral
nuclear diplomacy is that practiced between the US and USSR which culminated in
SALT in 1972 and 1979; START of 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2012; and the Strategic
55
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002 (Waller 2002: 99-117). Other bilateral
nuclear diplomatic efforts include, for example, nuclear-related cooperation
agreements between the US and China; between the US and South Africa; and
uranium trade between Brazil and Turkey.
The first examples of successful multilateral nuclear diplomacy are the Limited Test
Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 and the NPT of 1968 (Waller 2002: 103; Kegley &
Raymond 2010: 241-242). The former prohibited nuclear testing anywhere on earth
(except underground) and the latter “slowed down the expansion of the club for
nuclear powers” (Hughes 1997: 141). Multilateral nuclear diplomacy is predominantly
conducted under the auspices of multilateral organisations such as the UN; the
IAEA; the Conference on Disarmament (CD); the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW); and the Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).
Apart from multilateral conferences and summits, states also participate in

multilateral nuclear diplomacy through their accession to and ratification or signing of
international nuclear-related agreements. Another form of multilateral nuclear
diplomacy involves the interactions between a single state (as the host) and a
number of other states. President Barack Obama’s nuclear summits in 2010 and
2012 are examples of this form of diplomacy. Upon the invitation of President
Obama and on behalf of the US, 47 states met in Washington in April 2010 on
matters relating to nuclear security and nuclear terrorism (Obama 2010). A similar
follow-up meeting of the NSS took place in South Korea in 2012.
These forms of nuclear diplomacy have resulted in the establishment of new nuclear
norms (such as the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones), nuclear export
regimes, agreements and conventions on nuclear terrorism. So-called non-
proliferation export control regimes include the NSG; the Australia Group (AG); the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); The Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC); the WA; and the ZC (CNS 2011a).
Regionally, several non-proliferation organisations and regimes are in operation. In

Europe, the European Union (EU); the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE); the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); the Euro-
56
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC); the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC);
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA);
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA); the CIS; the Science and Technology Center in
Ukraine (STCU); and the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) all
serve as fora for nuclear diplomacy (CNS 2011a).
In Asia, the Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East (ACRS); the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO); the Permanent-5 Efforts for Mid-East Arms
Transfer Restraint; the Six-Party Talks on North Korea; and the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are fora for the conduct of nuclear
diplomacy. In Africa, the AU fulfils a similar function. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC); the Organization of American States (OAS); the Organization for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL);
and the Rio Group operate. Other global and regional non-proliferation organisations
include the Group of Eight (G-8); the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and the US-led Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) (CNS 2011a).
Major multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaties include the NPT; the CTBT; the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
(Partial Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT); the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM); the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management; and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) (CNS 2011b).
Regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) that are multilateral in nature are
some of the recent normative innovations of nuclear diplomacy. By 2011, several
NWFZs were operational (see Chapter 5) (CNS 2011b).
Thus, the forms of nuclear diplomacy have expanded since 1945 and now included
both bi- and multilateral diplomacy. Diplomatic interactions between states on
57
nuclear-related issues were established during the Cold War. Subsequent to the end
of the Cold War, new nuclear security concerns such as nuclear terrorism, illicit
nuclear trafficking and the danger posed by rogue or deviant states emerged, which
are addressed through export control regimes, NWFZs and multilateral organisations
and treaties.
7.4 The meaning, implications and utility of nuclear diplomacy
For the purpose of this study, the operational definition of the concept of nuclear
diplomacy was based on constructivist tenets. Therefore, in following Guzzini (2007
& 2009), the clarification of the concept nuclear diplomacy includes an analytical
assessment of its meaning and a constructivist analysis of its performative aspects
which are embedded in its conceptual history or genealogy. The latter, in particular,
involves the development of nuclear diplomacy and its conduct. According to Guzzini
(2009: 12), an analysis of a concept in terms of its meaning is “part of the social
construction of knowledge”. More importantly, the definition of a concept is in itself
an exercise of power and therefore “part of the social construction of reality”. Thus, in
defining nuclear diplomacy a particular reality is constructed.
The implications of nuclear diplomacy are wide-ranging. Nuclear diplomacy denotes

the existence of a particular type of diplomacy that determines and applies
internationally-agreed safeguards and principles to verify the nuclear facilities and
intentions of states. It also involves the safety and security of nuclear material,
scientists and installations. Lastly, it entails the enforcement of norms relating to the
development, application, maintenance and transfer of nuclear science and
technology for peaceful purposes.
A more significant implication of nuclear diplomacy is that it is an instrument of

power, authority and influence. States with a nuclear capability wield significant
power, authority and influence. However, a state such as South Africa, which no
longer has nuclear weapons, continues to wield considerable soft or normative
power. Checkel (2008: 80) refers to the ‘compulsive’ and “multi-faceted face of
power”, which refers to broader conceptions of power to capture its institutional and
productive dimensions. Institutional power is defined as actors’ “control of others in
indirect ways, where formal and informal institutions mediate between A and B;
58
working through the rules of these institutions”, whereas productive power is

generated by discourse and knowledge systems through which meaning is produced
and transformed (Checkel 2008: 80).
This study follows Baldwin (2002: 177-191) in employing power as a generic concept
that is used interchangeably with related concepts such as influence, control,
coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compliance and inducement. The departure
from “power as resources” to “relational power” reiterates the social, rather than
material, construction of power. Power is a multidimensional concept that, according
to Baldwin (2002: 178-179) includes the dimensions of scope, domain, weight and
means. Scope refers to the aspect of B’s behaviour affected by A, which implies that
an actor’s power may vary from one issue to another. The domain of an actor’s
power refers to the number of actors under its influence. This implies that an actor
can have considerable influence in one area, and almost none in another. The
weight of an actor’s power determines the probability that B’s behaviour is or could
be affected by A and A’s ability to influence B is dependent on the cost to A. For
example, is it costly or cheap to get B to do what A wants? Means refer to the
different ways in which an actor can exercise influence, namely through symbolic,
economic, military or diplomatic means.
Apart from understanding what nuclear diplomacy means, it is also instructive to

determine what nuclear diplomacy does. Therefore, the performative aspects of
nuclear diplomacy are equally important. Five performative aspects of nuclear
diplomacy can be identified, namely its official representation at bi- and/or
multilateral conferences; meetings and negotiations on nuclear-related issues; its
establishment and maintenance of nuclear-related relations with other actors; its
initiation and maintenance of ideas on the use of nuclear technology; its socialisation
in order to entrench nuclear-related norms in international relations, considering that
material resources only “acquire meaning for human action through the structure of
shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Kegley & Raymond 2010: 40); and
its intersubjective understandings of the “nuclear taboo” and the peaceful uses of
nuclear power. Therefore, nuclear diplomacy is a useful practice which has meaning
for states. Moreover, nuclear diplomacy has implications for the conduct of a state’s
diplomacy, as well as its international relations.
59
7.5 Elements of nuclear diplomacy
A number of observations can be made about the practice of nuclear diplomacy.

Firstly, it is a particular type of diplomacy or a diplomatic niche. Secondly, it is a
“Janus-faced” diplomatic practice. Actors, on the one hand, attempt to prevent the
spread and use of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, attempt to acquire
nuclear-related capabilities. In the third instance, more diplomatic instruments and
initiatives should be developed to accommodate non-state nuclear actors, as the
existing export and trade regimes are not sufficient to address pertinent issues in
respect of nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the so-called “nuclear taboo” regarding
the non-use of nuclear weapons persists, whereas the civilian use of nuclear energy
has increased substantially with scientific developments in several areas, including
medicine and physics.
The conduct of nuclear diplomacy includes a variety of practices focussing on

various aspects of controlling the use of nuclear energy. As indicated earlier, it
entails, amongst others, arms control, non-proliferation and deterrence. These
correlates of nuclear diplomacy undermine a comprehensive understanding of state
relations on the issue of nuclear power. The concept nuclear diplomacy nevertheless
provides a comprehensive approach to state practices that prevent nuclear
catastrophes but also their attempts to secure nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
As a diplomatic practice, nuclear diplomacy is no different from other modes of
diplomacy identified by, amongst others, Berridge (2010: 25-251). These modes are
telecommunications, including routine and crisis diplomacy; bilateral diplomacy,
including conventional and unconventional bilateral diplomacy; multilateral
diplomacy, including international organisations; summitry of Heads of States and
Governments; and mediation of conflict.
However, nuclear diplomacy differs from these modes in that it has a specific focus
area (nuclear energy). Actors involved in it are divided into two categories, namely
NWS and NNWS, with an increasing number of developing states with a nuclear
weapons capability.
60
7.6 Power, authority and nuclear diplomacy
A state’s nuclear capability empowers it significantly. The direct opposite of this does
not necessarily apply to states such as South Africa and Libya that have terminated
their nuclear weapons programmes. Instead of experiencing a decrease in power,
these states are regarded as having unrivalled normative, or soft, power due to their
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Like hard power, soft power also endows a
state with significant authority. The concepts power and authority are closely
intertwined. In fact, authority is regarded as a form of power. In a Dahlian sense,
power is the ability of an actor to get another actor to do something it would not do
otherwise. But in the case of authority, the subordinate actor is driven by obligation -
not by power or force - to do something it would not do otherwise. As a form of
power, authority can be defined as “legitimate domination” but, as Lake (2007: 51)
maintains, it is ‘distinct’ from but “intimately related” to coercion. The purpose of
coercion is to manipulate incentives so that the subordinate actor complies, but there
is no obligation on the subordinate actor to do so.
Authority is no longer only public authority. It has increasingly taken on private

dimensions. For Hall and Biersteker (2002: 5) “there are so many sites or locations
of authority that are neither state, state-based, nor state-created”. Moreover, the
state is no longer the “sole, or in some instances even the principal, source of
authority, in either the domestic arena or in the international system”. In fact,
Rosenau (1992: 253-272) referred to this phenomenon as the “relocation of
authority”. Hall and Biersteker (2002: 9-18) distinguish between three types of
authority: market, moral and illicit authority. Rosenau (1992: 265-269) adds
spontaneous authority as illustrated by the spontaneous convergence of
prodemocracy forces on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, in May 1989. Rosenau
(in Beeson 2004: 518) also identifies the following other types of authority, namely
moral, knowledge-based, reputational, issue-specific and affiliative authority.
Reference was previously made to the rights and obligations associated with
authority. Reus-Smit (2002: 1) argues that states’ recognition of the authority of
International Law results in their compliance with that law. Legal obligations focus on
the importance of settled norms and procedures in International Law as regulators of
international relations (Reus-Smit 2002: 2).
61
It is widely accepted by theorists that the contemporary international system lacks

political authority. This view of the anarchical nature of the international system is
shared by constructivists, most notably through Wendt’s (1992: 391-425) statement
that “anarchy is what states make of it”. For Lake (2007: 56), hierarchy exists when
one (dominant) actor possesses authority over another (subordinate) actor. In Max
Weber’s view authority derives from law, that is, law precedes authority. However, if
authority creates law, then authority must precede law (Lake 2007: 53-54). But
authority is also conceptualised as relational, namely resting on a ‘bargain’ or
‘exchange’ between ruler and ruled. Lake (2007: 55), therefore, maintains that a
relational conceptualisation of authority can also be applied to the international
system, based on a ‘bargain’ or ‘exchange’ of compliance.
Hall and Biersteker (2002: 4) assert that authority is an institutionalised form or

expression of power. For them, power and authority are distinguished by the latter’s
legitimacy claims. In other words, the latter involves both the claiming of rights and
the recognition of obligations. Moreover, possessing legitimacy indicates some form
of normative consent and recognition of an authority by the governed, ruled or
regulated. This results in an “implicit social relationship” based on trust, recognition
and norms (Hall & Biersteker 2002: 5).
For Hurd (2007: 29) legitimacy is one instrument to increase power. Hurd (2007: 7)
defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be
obeyed”. He describes it as a “subjective quality, relational between actor and
institution, and is defined by the actor’s perception of the institution”. The source of a
perception is the “substance of a rule, the procedure or source by which it is
constituted”. According to Hurd (2007: 12):
legitimacy matters to social institutions because it affects the decision calculus

of actors with respect to compliance, it empowers the symbols of the
institution, which become political resources that can be appropriated by
actors for their own purposes; and it is the key to their being recognized by
actors as ‘authoritative.
As a socially-constructed phenomenon, legitimacy affects and determines an actor’s

behaviour, identity and interests (Hurd 2007: 16 & 19). International institutions,
62
therefore, according to Hurd (2007: 19) constitute states; their interests; their
behaviour; and how institutions can be “sites for the contest between states over
status, legitimacy and power”.
For constructivists, power is a social construct, determined by a state’s identity,

interests and roles. Therefore, in its conduct of nuclear diplomacy, a state will
attempt to assert its (hard or soft) power to enhance its interests. But power also
bestows a state with authority which, according to Cutler (2002: 27), “requires a
basis of trust rather than calculation of immediate benefit”. Consequently, nuclear
cooperation between actors must involve the development of habits, norms, rules
and shared expectations. The institutionalisation of cooperation on these norms,
habits and rules means that actors recognise the legitimacy and efficacy of its
authority. One example of this authority is niche diplomacy.
8. Niche diplomacy
Niche diplomacy refers to diplomatic specialisation in a particular area. It also refers

to “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate return worth
having rather than trying to cover the field” (Evans in Henrikson 2005: 67). The ability
to “generate return worth having” implies that a state wants to achieve non-material
objectives with niche diplomacy which, in turn, can generate international prestige,
status, material benefit, soft power and moral authority. For a state to acquire and
maintain a diplomatic niche, it requires authority, influence, power, recognition, a
secured position in a globally competitive arena through publicity, advocacy and
positive branding (Henrikson 2005: 70-71).
The concept of niche diplomacy, according to Cooper (1997: 5), also focuses on “the
ability of individual countries to identify and fill niche spaces on a selective basis
through policy ingenuity and execution”. Therefore, niche diplomacy can serve as an
instrument to examine the behaviour of a state whose “leaders consider that it
cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small
group or through international institutions” (Keohane in Cooper 1997: 8). Typically,
states practicing niche diplomacy focus on a specifically selected issue, organisation
or activity. Moreover, the sources of niche diplomacy are located in the tenets of
63
middle power diplomatic behaviour, which have a strong normative foundation and
emphasise “entrepreneurial flair and technical competence” (Cooper 1997: 6, 9).
Other key features of niche diplomacy are the focus on consensus and coalition
building; cooperation on an issue-specific basis; and adopting the role of bridge-
builder, mediator, facilitator or catalyst. The latter involves planning, convening and
hosting meetings, prioritising for future meetings on a particular issue, and drawing
up declarations and manifestos (Cooper 1997: 9).
Countries engaged in niche diplomacy employ various diplomatic practices including

confrontation, parallelism and cooperation to achieve material and non-material
rewards such as status, prestige and trade opportunities. Cooper (1997: 1-24)
provides a useful analytical framework to determine the link between a state’s
identity, role and interests in respect of its nuclear diplomacy (see Figure 3). He
initially distinguishes between the form of a state’s behaviour (heroic or routine
approach) and the scope of its activity (discrete or diffuse) but then proceeds to
distinguish between the focus or target of its diplomatic activity (multilateral or
regional) and the intensity of its diplomatic style (combative or accommodative).
Figure 3: Cooper’s extended framework of middle power behaviour
INTENSITY
(of diplomatic style)
Combative
TARGET Multilateral Regional

(of diplomatic
activity)
Accommodative
Cooper (1997: 17)

64
The two latter two aspects, namely the target of diplomatic activity and intensity of
diplomatic style is used to produce a 2x2 matrix (see Figure 3) which serves as an
extended framework to describe, classify and analyse middle power behaviour. In
the context of nuclear diplomacy, Cooper’s extended framework will be applied to
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
9. Conclusion
This chapter outlined some of the key elements of constructivism relevant to the
study. It focussed primarily on the importance of identity, interests, roles and norms
(see Figure 4), which inform diplomatic behaviour in three ways. Norms are
constitutive (they constitute what is considered as activity), constraining (they limit an
actor’s action); and enabling (they allow for a certain course of action). Against this
background, this study contributes to the formulation of a constructivist approach to
nuclear diplomacy (see Figure 4). In the context of nuclear diplomacy, a state’s
identity is mainly determined by the distinction between NWS and NNWS in terms of
the NPT. A state’s role in its conduct of nuclear diplomacy is that it either complies
with nuclear norms, or not, whereas its interests are either material or non-material.
Finally, the three major norms associated with nuclear diplomacy are the three pillars
of the NPT, namely nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful
Against the aforesaid, this study traces South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy from 1990
until 2010 through four illustrative case studies. In each case, the country applied
one, or a combination, of three niche diplomatic strategies during this period, which
resulted at times in one or more particular identities, roles, interests, norms and
ideas (see Figure 4).
Constructivists maintain that diplomacy is guided by the intersubjectively shared

norms, ideas and values of actors. This opens the way for the inclusion of the social
aspect of their diplomatic behaviour. The social aspect is important since shared
ideas, norms and values constitute an ideational structure which constrain and
shape actor behaviour (see Figure 4). Moreover, these shared ideas and knowledge
are major building blocks of the international reality. The ideational structure
constitutes and regulates actors. In other words, in its interactions (or socializing)
65
ideational structures contribute to an actor’s redefinition of its interests and its

identities. These ideational structures and actors (or agents) co-constitute and co-
determine each other.
Figure 4: Elements of a constructivist approach to nuclear diplomacy
1990 2010
Niche diplomatic strategies
Confrontation Parallelism Partnership

Case studies illustrative of South Africa’s post-1990
Nuclear Identity
export Nuclear weapons state
control Non-nuclear weapons
regimes state
Elements of a constructivist
Nuclear diplomacy
nuclear diplomacy
nuclear diplomacy
IAEA Roles
approach to
Compliance
Non-compliance
Pelindaba Interests
Treaty Non-material (status &
prestige)
Material (trade & military
power)
NPT Norms & ideas

Nuclear non-proliferation
Nuclear disarmament
Peaceful uses of nuclear
energy
Author’s own compilation
Having outlined the origins, assumptions, characteristics and contribution of

constructivism, the next section provides a conceptual classification of and a
framework for the analysis of diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy in particular.
This chapter presented the analytical framework and constructivist approach that
forms the basis for the discussion and analysis of the study’s four case studies,
namely South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in respect of the nuclear non-proliferation
66
export control regimes; the IAEA; the Pelindaba Treaty; and the NPT in the next four
chapters of the study.
67
CHAPTER THREE
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT

CONTROL REGIMES
1. Introduction
On 10 July 1991 South Africa became a State Party to the NPT. However, it was
only after President de Klerk’s 1993 announcement that the country had produced at
least six “nuclear devices” that the full extent of the country’s nuclear weapons
programme became known. De Klerk’s announcement also raised the questions of
how South Africa developed its nuclear weapons capability, and which countries
assisted it during this process. In other words, it raised questions on the country’s
position, involvement and non-compliance with the norms of the nuclear non-
proliferation export control regimes operational at the time.16
Subsequent to his election as South African President on 14 September 1989, FW

de Klerk, according to Waldo Stumpf (1995a) of the AEC, “instructed that an
investigation be carried out to dismantle the nuclear deterrent completely with the
aim of acceding to the NPT as a state without a nuclear weapons capability”. A first
report on the matter was submitted to President De Klerk in November 1989 and he
subsequently appointed an Experts Committee under the chairmanship of Prof
Wynand Mouton, a nuclear physicist, to outline procedures to dismantle and destroy
South Africa’s “nuclear devices” (De Klerk 1993). These developments paved the
way for a new phase in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy and more pertinent to this
chapter is that this phase paved the way for South Africa’s greater involvement in
and compliance with nuclear export control regimes.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse South Africa’s involvement in multilateral

nuclear export control regimes as a representative case study and manifestation of
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy as a FNWS. As a former illicit importer and
exporter of nuclear-related equipment South Africa was determined to project itself
16
For the purpose of this study, the concept nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes is used
interchangeably with the concepts multilateral nuclear export control regimes; nuclear export control
regimes; or nuclear export regimes.
68
as a rehabilitated nuclear weapons state. Despite this and as will be pointed out, the
South African government’s efforts were undermined by a series of contentious
nuclear proliferation-related incidents, most notably the involvement of South
Africans in the Khan proliferation network.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section defines and
analyses the nuclear non-proliferation export control regime. The second section
analyses South Africa’s institutional framework to comply with its international
commitments due its membership of various nuclear export control regimes. The
final section includes an analysis and assessment of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy vis-à-vis these regimes. In particular, the chapter analyses the links of the
Khan network with South Africans, and their implications for the country’s niche
diplomacy and state identity.
2. Nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes: definition and utility
A regime can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations” (Krasner 2009: 113). Regimes are more than mere
temporary arrangements that change with shifts in power and interests. Regimes
imply certain norms and expectations, but also a specific form of cooperation.
Regime-governed behaviour are not based on short-term interests only but also on
the principle of reciprocity. In accepting reciprocity, a state will sacrifice its short-term
interests with the expectation that other states will reciprocate, even if they are not
obliged to do so. For Krasner (2009: 114), principles and norms “provide the basic
defining characteristic of a regime”. Several explanations for regime development
can be provided. According to Krasner (2009: 120), some explanations are based on
a state’s egotistic self-interest; political power; norms and principles; habit and
custom; and knowledge.
Global nuclear export or nuclear non-proliferation regimes originated prior to the

Second World War as the US, the UK, the USSR, Japan and Germany competed
and cooperated to develop nuclear technology, equipment and material (IISS 2007:
8). Originally established as the international “Atoms for Peace” organisation within
the UN, the IAEA was the first multilateral effort to create a nuclear export regime.
69
The Statute of the IAEA (hereafter IAEA Statute or the Statute) came into force on
29 July 1957 with the objective to:
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is
not used in such a way as to further any military purpose (IAEA 1957).
Article III of the Statute outlines the functions of the organisation, namely to
encourage and assist the development of nuclear science and technology for
peaceful uses; overseeing the safety and security of nuclear material and
installations for peaceful uses; and enforcing safeguards and verification processes
with regards to nuclear disarmament (IAEA 1957).
A former Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the UN, Jayantha

Dhanapala (2003: vii), explained the need for nuclear export controls by stating:
The exponential growth in dual-use technology around the globe is redefining

national interests and deeply complicating national capacities to regulate
trade in sensitive technologies. It is, therefore, important to pursue the
efficient and effective implementation of national non-proliferation export
controls, while ensuring their responsiveness to new challenges.
Thus, the significant range of technologies, material, equipment and raw materials
used to construct nuclear weapons also have legitimate civilian, or peaceful,
applications; hence the so-called dual-use dilemma for states (Early 2009: 3).
Multilateral nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes can be defined as “laws,

regulations and norms designed to regulate the transfer of WMD components,
materials and technologies” (Beck & Gahlaut 2003: 2). Nuclear non-proliferation
export controls, which form part of these regimes, are defined as:
laws that regulate the export and sharing of sensitive technologies,

equipment, software, and related data and services to foreign states and
citizens, including to foreign nationals or representatives of a foreign entity on
70
domestic territory, for reasons of national security and/or protection of trade

(Early 2009).
Both definitions refer to the regulation of various objects through several instruments.
These controls are not necessarily complete prohibitions. Rather, they require that
licenses or government permission be obtained for the export or dissemination of
controlled goods and dual-use technologies.
Multilateral nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes share the following

characteristics. They are voluntary, informal and impose no legally-binding obligation
on their participants; they involve like-minded states; they have exclusive
membership criteria; they rely on states’ voluntary cooperation, consensus
agreement, and communication to improve national export controls; and they enable
the coordination of national nuclear export control policies to control the proliferation
of controlled goods through the joint implementation of common export control lists
by participating governments. Therefore, members can trade more freely with one
another because they know that such trade is safe (Early 2009).
The utility of nuclear export controls is wide-ranging. Firstly, they preserve global
security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons or nuclear WMDs by deviant
international actors. In an address to the NSG, former IAEA Director General and
Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), Hans Blix (1997: 11) expressed the importance of export controls,
stating that “export control is an important component in the efforts to prevent further
nuclear proliferation”.17 Secondly, nuclear export controls can delay the acquisition of
nuclear WMDs. In the third instance, export controls “buy time” for diplomatic
channels to operate. A fourth utility is that these controls also serve as a deterrent by
increasing the cost of acquiring WMDs. In the fifth instance, they contribute to the
protection of commercial interests and secure trade in dual-use goods between
countries. Finally, nuclear export controls assist to “reinforce international non-
proliferation norms” (Beck & Gahlaut 2003: 2-4; Bertsch 2003: ix; Early 2009;
Krasner 2009: 117). Therefore, these regimes offer significant benefits to states.
17
UNMOVIC was responsible for investigating Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme prior to the US-led
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Maintaining that Iraq did not have any WMDs in contrast to the view
held by the US government, Blix resigned from UNMOVIC in June 2003.
71
3. The principal nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes
The UN Office of Disarmament cites six principal multilateral export control regimes,
namely the Zangger Committee (ZC); the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA); the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); the
Australia Group (AG); and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (UN 2011b). This
section outlines each of these regimes and, where relevant, refers to South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy pertaining to these regimes.
The decision on 31 August 1994 of the Nelson Mandela-led Cabinet to accept

Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo’s proposals that South Africa should actively
participate in various international non-proliferation regimes and suppliers groups;
use its position to promote nuclear non-proliferation publicly; and ensure that export
controls are not discriminatory against developing countries, introduced a new era
for South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy (Markram 2004: 12). The Cabinet decision also
set the tone for the country’s subsequent employment of multilateral diplomacy as an
approach to the country’s nuclear diplomacy. Some of the early results of this
decision were South Africa’s membership of multilateral nuclear export control
regimes such as the MTCR and the NSG in 1995, as well South Africa’s participation
in the 1995 REC.
3.1 The Zangger Committee
Established in 1971, the Zangger Committee (ZC) is one of the oldest nuclear export
control regimes and not formally part of the NPT regime. The purpose of the ZC, also
known as the NPT Exporters Committee, is to “harmonize the interpretation of
nuclear export control policies for NPT Parties” - especially the interpretation of
Article III (paragraph 2) of the NPT (ZC 2010a), which requires:
Each State Party to the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] Treaty undertakes not to

provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall
be subject to the safeguards required by this article (IAEA 1970).
72
In deciding to designate its status as ‘informal’, its membership as voluntary and its
decisions legally non-binding, the ZC had, in 1972, reached consensus contained in
two memoranda. These covered several issues most notably the definition of and
procedures for the export of materials and equipment described, but not defined in
Article III (paragraph 2) of the NPT (ZC 2010b: 2). Members of the ZC agreed to
apply these two memoranda as a so-called Trigger List (ZC 2010a) (see Table 4)
since they refer to the containment of equipment, items and material whose export
would ‘trigger’ the need for safeguards to be implemented (SIPRI 2005: 711).
Table 4: The Zangger Committee’s Trigger List
Memorandum Contents of Trigger List
Memorandum A Defines two categories of nuclear material:

• Source material: natural or depleted uranium and thorium
• Special fissionable material: plutonium-239, uranium-233,
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233
Memorandum B Identifies equipment and material specifically designed or

prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material in the following categories:
• Nuclear reactors
• Non-nuclear materials for reactors
• Reprocessing
• Fuel fabrication
• Uranium enrichment
• Heavy water production
• Conversion
ZC (2010b: 3)
In addition to the two memoranda, the ZC’s Understandings and Trigger List also
reflect the requirements set out in the NPT, with the following three conditions of the
export or supply of items specified in its Trigger List:
• Condition #1: Non-diversion. Exports of source or special fissionable material
to NNWS shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
• Condition #2: Subject to IAEA safeguards. Exports of source or special
fissionable material, as well as transferred equipment and non-nuclear
73
material, to NNWS shall be subject to safeguards under an agreement with

the IAEA.
• Condition #3: Re-export based on acceptance of safeguards. Source or
special fissionable material, and equipment and non-nuclear material shall
only be re-exported to a NNWS if the recipient state accepts IAEA safeguards
on the re-exported material or equipment (ZC 2010a; ZC 2010b).
Unlike the NPT and the provisions of the IAEA Statute, verification and compliance
arrangements of the ZC are informal and its decisions are not legally binding upon its
members. Member states have also agreed to exchange information about exports
or issues of licences for exports to any NNWS which is not party to the NPT, through
the ZC’s system of “Annual Returns” (CNS 2010). The establishment of the ZC and
NSG (see section 3.2) are examples of the international norm of nuclear non-
proliferation on the conduct of suppliers which should prevent the transfer of nuclear
commodities and technologies to specific users for specific purposes. Another norm
developed by these organisations is that of transparency. To advance greater
transparency, the IAEA has assisted supplier states in publicising their supplier
arrangements. The IAEA also publishes the NSG Guidelines and Trigger List, and
the Zangger Understandings and Trigger List (Thorne 1997: 25-26).
By 2010, the ZC had 37 members, including all NWS; some NNWS; and South
Africa which became a member of the ZC on 23 October 1993 (DIRCO 2011a).18
According to the South African government, the raison d’être of the ZC is to
“establish guidelines for implementing the export control provisions” of the NPT and
to “define and monitor trade in goods and equipment specially designed for nuclear
use” (DIRCO 2011a). In South Africa, the ZC Controls are implemented by NECSA,
the state-owned nuclear energy corporation (DIRCO 2011a).
18
By August 2010, the ZC’s 37 members included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US. The European Commission is permanent observer at
the ZC.
74
3.2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group
Also known as the “London Club”, the NSG was established in 1974 as an informal
voluntary institution. Its establishment followed the explosion of a nuclear device by
India (a NNWS at the time), which “demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred
for peaceful purposes could be misused” (NSG 2010a).19 In 1978, the NSG
published its Guidelines “to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help
ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle
or nuclear explosive activities” (NSG 2010a). By 1992, the NSG published additional
guidelines, the Dual-Use Guidelines, for the transfer of nuclear-related dual-use
equipment, material and technology, which could be used for an unsafeguarded
nuclear fuel cycle or a nuclear explosive activity. These Guidelines are the:
• Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, which governs the export of items that are
particularly designed or prepared for nuclear use. These items include nuclear
material, nuclear reactors and equipment, non-nuclear material for reactors,
plant and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of
nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production, and
technology associated with each of these items.
• Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials,
Software and Related Technology, which governs the export of nuclear-
related dual-use items and technologies that “can make a major contribution
to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which
have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry” (NSG 2010b).
The purpose of the NSG Guidelines is to:
ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices which
would not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field (NSG
2010b).
19
By September 2010, the states participating in the NSG included Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US.
75
In this way, the Guidelines aim to “facilitate the development of trade” by providing
the “means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be
implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation
norms” (NSG 2010b).
South Africa joined the NSG on 5 April 1995, prior to the start of the 1995 NPT REC.
According to a former South African diplomat, Thomas Markram (2004: 62), South
Africa “worked actively” in the NSG and sought to make the operations of the NSG
more transparent as the NSG is perceived by developing countries as secretive and
exclusive. By its own admission, the South African government regards its role in the
NSG as:
• the promotion of the rights of developing states to develop and maintain
nuclear energy programmes for peaceful purposes;
• efforts to make the NSG’s activities more transparent; and
• Changing the perception among some developing states that the NSG is not
an “exclusive secretive club” (DIRCO 2009a: 39).
By adopting these roles, South Africa gained some advantage as it was elected to
leadership positions within the NSG. In 1997, for example, South Africa was elected
to chair the International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls. South Africa’s
Governor on the IAEA Board, Abdul Minty, acted as the chairperson of the seminar.
Attended by all UN member states, academics, the nuclear industry and international
organisations, the seminar reiterated the need for suppliers and recipients to
evaluate the legitimacy and effectiveness of their domestic nuclear export controls
and how these contributed to nuclear non-proliferation. The seminar also proposed
steps to increase the transparency of nuclear export controls (DIRCO 2009a: 39).
The South African government often uses its participation in international nuclear-
related fora to express its normative approach to international relations, as well as to
reiterate its role and identity. One illustration of this is the statement by the South
African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2007a) speaking at
76
the opening of the Plenary of the NSG hosted by South Africa in Cape Town on 19
April 2007.20 Minister Dlamini-Zuma (2007a) stated that whilst the NSG has to:
consider how to further strengthen the controls on the export of nuclear and
nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, it is imperative that we
[members of the NSG] do not lose sight of the many people around the world
that continue to live in abject poverty.
She also reminded the participants that the efforts of the NSG should:
contribute to creating a better life for all and not hinder international co-
operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which potentially could
strengthen and accelerate the economic development of the economically
marginalized parts of the world (Dlamini-Zuma 2007a).
Minister Dlamini-Zuma (2007a) reiterated that this “renewed international focus on

the expansion of nuclear energy as [sic] renewable energy source” requires
“increased international co-operation to ensure the safety, security and peaceful use
of nuclear energy”. Explaining South Africa’s position, she stated that South Africa
‘consistently’ maintained that the ownership of advanced dual-use capabilities placed
a “special responsibility” on a state to remove any concerns and suspicions about
nuclear weapon proliferation. Her statement also reflected a level of realism through
her reference to the “activities of the illicit network in nuclear technology to
manufacture nuclear weapons” which “will continue to impact on the work of the
NSG” (Dlamini-Zuma 2007a).
One of the contentious issues faced by South Africa as a member of the NSG is how
to handle India. For years, the NSG deliberated on a special dispensation in terms of
the NSG Guidelines for India, who is not member of the NSG and not a signatory to
the NPT, but who has an extensive nuclear industry and weapons programme (DFA
2008). In 2007, members of the NSG resolved to explore ways for co-operation with
India in the civil nuclear field. The NSG’s support came at a time when India sought
20
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma first served as Minister of Health in President Mandela’s Cabinet. In
1999, President Mbeki appointed her as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position she held until the
national elections in 2009. She was appointed as President Zuma’s Minister of Home Affairs in May
2009. Accordingly, she was familiar with the South African government’s position during the whole
period from 1994 to 2010.
77
the NSG's assistance to commence trade in the nuclear sector with several
signatories of the NPT.
Since the ANC came to power in 1994, South Africa and India’s diplomatic relations
strengthened. In fact, the new South African government’s foreign policy priorities,
according to the then Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA),
Rusty Evans (1995: 100), included an “increased emphasis” on Asia and the Far
East.21 As a result, South Africa and India signed a Strategic Partnership Accord in
March 1997. Notwithstanding these diplomatic developments, South Africa’s nuclear
non-proliferation stance emerged as a contentious issue between the two countries.
For India, South Africa had aligned itself with the position of major nuclear powers in
the West on nuclear arms control (Beri 2001).
South Africa’s views on India were expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In
response to the question during a Cable News Network-Indian Broadcasting Network
(CNN-IBN) interview on 22 July 2007 on whether South Africa has “any objections to
sharing its nuclear resources with India”, Minister Dlamini-Zuma reverted to South
Africa’s preference for multilateralism in its nuclear diplomacy. She stated that the
“discussion is going to be put in a multilateral among the nuclear suppliers group”
where “we will all have to mark [sic] some consensus about it” (Dlamini-Zuma
2007b). Implicitly, the South African government supports the NSG’s special
dispensation for India, which is not a party to the NPT. This indicates South Africa’s
nuclear partnership with both the developed and developing world.
3.3 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms

and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Established in 1995, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is the first global multilateral
arrangement which covers conventional weapons as well as sensitive dual-use
goods and technologies that can be used in the development of WMDs and their
delivery systems.22 Therefore, the WA was established in the wake of the end of the
21
The position Director-General is often also spelt Director General. See http://www.dfa.gov.za and
http://www.dirco.gov.za. In 2009 subsequent to the inauguration of President Jacob Zuma, the DFA’s
name was changed to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).
22
By April 2012, the following states participated in the WA: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
78
Cold War as “a nuclear export control regime” to “contribute to regional and

international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and
technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations” (WA 2011).
In order to be admitted to the WA, a state has to comply with three requirements.
Firstly, it has to be a producer and/or exporter of arms or sensitive industrial
equipment. Secondly, it has to maintain non-proliferation policies and appropriate
national policies including the adherence to non-proliferation policies, control lists
and, where applicable, the guidelines of the NSG, the MTCR and the AG. A state
also has to adhere to the NPT; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC); the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and, where applicable, START
1, including the Lisbon Protocol. Finally, a state has to maintain fully effective export
controls (DIRCO 2011b).
South Africa became the first African member of the WA on 28 February 2006. Prior
to its membership, South Africa had incorporated the WA control lists as part of the
National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002. In addition to this, South Africa
also participated in the WA’s first outreach seminar in Vienna on 19 October 2004.
The purpose of the seminar was to “raise awareness” of the WA’s role in transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies (SIPRI 2005: 706-707).
Thus, for South Africa, its membership of the WA illustrates its compliance with the
norms of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Moreover, the country’s adoption of the principles of the WA in legislation prior to its
membership signals its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
3.4 The Missile Technology Control Regime and The Hague Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
This section specifically focuses on nuclear export control regimes on missile

technology and ballistic (i.e. nuclear) missile technology.23 In addition, it focuses on a
specific aspect of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy since 1990; namely the country’s
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US.
23
According to the UN (1991: 18), ballistic missiles are primarily regarded as nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles.
79
(ballistic) missile capability and its dismantling. The rationale for an extended
discussion of these regimes is that several developments related to them occurred
during the De Klerk presidency and prior to the country’s accession to the first of
these regimes in 1995. The development of South Africa’s ballistic missile capability
has been addressed in various sources (NTI 2009a; Steyn, Van der Walt & Van
Loggerenberg 2003) and is not the focus of this section. However, some historical
references contextualise these developments. The case of South Africa provides
useful insights into the operations of a nuclear proliferator as well as the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Despite UN and other sanctions against South Africa, the
country continued to develop a rocket and missile industry as part of its armaments
industry; thus acting as a nuclear proliferator in non-compliance with the norms of
nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear disarmament; and the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy as espoused in the IAEA Statute and the NPT.
South Africa’s missile development programme commenced in 1963 and resulted

early in the manufacturing of the 22km-range Valkiri (a tactical surface-to-surface
artillery rocket) and the 4-10km-range V3 Kukri (a tactical air-to-air missile) (UN
1991: 18). As South Africa’s missile-related expertise improved, a missile test range
was constructed in St. Lucia (close to the Mozambican border) in 1968. The National
Party (NP) government also commenced with the development of a single-stage,
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the first of what became known as the
Republic of South Africa (RSA) missile series (see Table 5). This initiative formed
part of a government-supported commercial space launch vehicle programme in the
1970s with the assistance of, inter alia, Israel and Iraq (NTI 2009a). Originally, the
intended payload for these missiles was most likely to be the “fission gun-type
devices” developed in South Africa between 1971 and 1989, to which Stumpf
(1995a) referred.
In 1978 Kentron Missiles, a subsidiary of the state-owned Armscor, was established

as the country’s dedicated missile manufacturer (NTI 2009a).24 In 1983, the South
African government announced its intention to close the St. Lucia test range and
constructed a new range, the Overberg Toetsbaan (OTB or Overberg Test Range) in
the De Hoop Nature Reserve in the Overberg in the Western Cape. This
24
While still in office, President de Klerk’s government presided over the establishment of Armscor
successor, Denel (Pty) Limited (hereafter Denel) on 1 April 1992.
80
development signaled a new era in South Africa’s missile capabilities. By the 1980s
according to Hannes Steyn (a former member of the Armscor Board); Richardt van
der Walt (a former General Manager of the AEC); and Jan van Loggerenberg (a
former Chief of the South African Air Force) South Africa’s missile arsenal included,
inter alia, air-to-air missiles and an anti-tank missile (Steyn, Van der Walt & Van
Loggerenberg 2003: 54-55).25 The RSA-3 missile could have delivered a small
warhead, and was most likely a space launch adaptation of the RSA-2 missile. In
order to support its missile development programme, the NP-led South African
government developed an indigenous solid-propellant production capability, the
RSA-4 missile, which was developed when President De Klerk announced the
dismantlement and destruction of South Africa’s “nuclear devices” and,
subsequently, its space programme. The RSA-4 missile may have been capable of
delivering a 700kg nuclear warhead from South Africa to any location in Southern
Africa (Steyn, Van der Walt & Van Loggerenberg 2003: 54-55).
Table 5: South Africa’s missile series
Name of Type Trajectory Warhead mass

missile (km) (kg)
RSA-1 Intermediate range, single-stage 1 100 1 500

ballistic missile
RSA-2 Intermediate range, single-stage 1 900 1 500
ballistic missile
RSA-3 Solid-fuel orbital launch vehicle Information Information not
not available available
RSA-4 Solid-propellant Information 700
not available
NTI (2010)
As South Africa was developing its ballistic missile capabilities, other states met in
1987 to establish the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). An informal and
voluntary regime, the purpose of the MTCR is to:
restrict the proliferation of missiles, complete rocket systems, unmanned air

vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500
25
Steyn, Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg were closely involved in various aspects of the South
African nuclear weapons programme.
81
kilogram payload at least 300 kilometres, as well as systems intended for the
delivery of weapons of mass destruction (MTCR 2011).26
Notwithstanding these restrictions, partners to the MTCR recognise the “importance

of controlling the transfer of missile-related technology without disrupting legitimate
trade and acknowledge the need to strengthen the objectives of the Regime through
cooperation with countries outside the Regime” (MTCR 2010c). The MTCR
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers (also called the MTCR
Guidelines) and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex provide states with
guidelines to legislate national control laws taking a two-category common control list
into account. It also provides guidelines to states to deny the transfer of any nuclear
weapon delivery systems development (CNS 2011c: 1).
South Africa did not initially join the MTCR. Instead, the country continued with its
missile development programme and on 5 July 1989, two months before President
De Klerk took office, successfully launched what the South African government
called a “booster rocket” but what US intelligence sources called a missile from the
OTB (UN 1991: 19; NTI 2009a). According to the UN (1991: 25), the range of this
rocket was 1 450 km. Towards the end of 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed which, inter
alia, ushered in the demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. These events
cascaded to Southern Africa with the independence of Namibia; the withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola; and the USSR’s departure from the region.
Despite President De Klerk’s announcement on 2 February 1990 on the release of

political prisoners like Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of liberation movements
such as the ANC, and his decision to commence with the dismantlement and
destruction of the country’s “nuclear devices” the international community remained
concerned about the country’s nuclear capabilities and nuclear missile proliferation
activities. Several developments contributed to this. Firstly, on 19 September 1990
US Customs officials charged a Dutch national and an accomplice for buying parts
for guided missiles intended for sale to South Africa (NTI 2009a).
26
By April 2010, the MTCR’s members included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of
Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and
the US.
82
Secondly, in November 1990, the South African government admitted that it was
conducting a second missile test-flight from an operational site in the Judaean Hills
in Israel. This test was followed by a joint Israeli-South African test of Israel’s Barak 1
missile off the South African coast in August 1991; followed by US intelligence
reports that Israel exported key ballistic missile components to South Africa (NTI
2009a). Further evidence of international concerns pertaining to South Africa’s
missile capabilities was the publication by the UN Department of Disarmament
Affairs of the 1991 report on South Africa's Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability
(UN 1991). The report outlined South Africa’s ballistic capabilities and South Africa’s
nuclear-related diplomatic relations with Israel to acquire these capabilities. In
addition to this, reports of South Africa’s missile-related nuclear diplomacy with
Taiwan and China also surfaced (NTI 2009a).
Amidst all of this, US officials were negotiating with the South African government to
terminate the manufacture of long-range missiles and to dismantle its capability to
produce large space rockets. South Africa agreed to terminate and dismantle these
missiles and capabilities on 30 June 1993. In return, according to the NTI (2009a)
South Africa was given access to the military and high-tech markets of industrialised
countries. The US government also provided financial assistance to South Africa for
the destruction of South Africa’s MTCR Category I ballistic missile delivery systems
in January 1994. The US assistance included US$ 500 000 for the destruction of
South Africa’s rocket motor static facility at Rooi Els in the Western Cape. Moreover,
the SA-US agreement also resulted in President De Klerk’s announcement of the
termination of the RSA-3 and RSA-4 space launch vehicle (SLV) programmes. By
March 1994, a month before South Africa’s first all-inclusive elections in April 1994,
negotiations between South Africa and the US on South Africa’s membership of the
MTCR had already progressed significantly.
Barely a month after the April 1994 elections, the new South African government
issued Government Notice No 88, which introduced licensing requirements for all
items that fell within the limits of the MTCR. On 4 October 1994, South Africa and the
US signed a bilateral agreement on South Africa’s termination of its missile
development programme (US 1994). Moreover, South Africa undertook to comply
with the export guidelines of the MTCR.
83
South Africa became a member of the MTCR on 13 September 1995. This

development can be regarded as one of the first successes of the nuclear diplomacy
of the ANC-led government. It can also be regarded as one of the last nuclear-
related diplomatic actions of President de Klerk’s government, which also presided
over the IAEA’s successful verification of the dismantling of the country’s nuclear
weapons programme in 1993 (see Chapter 4). In the case of the MTCR, South
Africa’s missile-related nuclear diplomacy from 1990 to 1995 was characterised by
two strategies, namely cooperation (with the US) and confrontation. The latter refers
to South Africa’s confrontation with the international community during this period on
Israeli-South African cooperation on missile development. This cooperation ended
once the ANC came to power as it favoured an independent Palestinian state.
With the government of South Africa as the sole shareholder, Denel is the largest
manufacturer of defence equipment in South Africa and operates in the military
aerospace and landward defence environment. As indicated earlier, President de
Klerk also presided over the termination of South Africa’s manufacturing programme
for long-range missiles and the dismantling of its capability to produce large space
rockets. These developments severely impacted on the operations and revenue of
state-owned Denel. There followed a series of restructurings of Denel to align South
Africa’s major armaments manufacturer with the new South African government’s
policies and interests.
Despite the termination of a large section of its missile development programme,

South Africa was able to maintain and further develop some capabilities. From 1999
onwards, Denel actively sought joint venture partners to develop its missile
programme. However, Denel’s efforts coincided with a new development pertaining
to the missile-related nuclear export control regime. The Hague Code of Conduct
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC or the Code) entered into force in 2002.
Regarded as a political rather than a legally binding instrument by its 131 subscribing
states, the Code encourages states to limit and report on their ballistic missile
activities. Moreover, it is the only global instrument that morally obliges states to
verify the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMDs (HCOC 2011).
Apart from the HCOC, another development impacted on the development of

Denel’s missile business. In July 2004, a decade after the ANC came to power, the
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US government rescinded its debarment against state-owned South African arms

manufacturing companies Armscor, Fuchs and Denel. Originally instituted in 1994 in
response to the activities undertaken in the US by these three South African state-
owned entities during the pre-1994 arms embargo era, the debarment was
suspended in 1998 as a result of an agreement between the South African and US
governments. In response to the US decision, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz
Pahad (quoted in DFA 2004) welcomed the US statement that the South African
government “instituted concrete and far-reaching measures to establish a
comprehensive and effective national export control regime". This signaled the
normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US and South Africa.
Subsequent to several restructurings and cognisant of South Africa’s obligations in

terms of the MTCR and the HCOC (South Africa became a subscribing state to the
Code on 26 November 2006), Denel aligned its nine business entities, which
currently (2012) include Denel Dynamics, the only African missile house. Denel
Dynamics is a designer, developer, system engineer, manufacturer, supplier and
provider of services in all related aspects in the domains of missiles, guided
weapons and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems (Denel 2010: 36). Denel
Dynamic’s Missile Business Unit designs, develops and manufactures five types of
missiles (see Table 6).
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) remains Denel Dynamic’s
primary local customer. However, local defence expenditure is insufficient to sustain
Denel Dynamics, making it highly dependent on its sales of a small number of
products to a limited number of international clients. Denel Dynamics and its
counterpart in Brazil cooperated to develop Denel’s fifth generation Darter air-to-air
missile, which has been integrated with Gripen, the Swedish-built fighter aircraft
acquired by the South African government in terms of the South African
government’s controversial Strategic Arms Procurement Package. The fifth
generation Darter is expected to enter production in 2012/13 (Engineering News 18
January 2012). Denel Dynamic’s Umkhonto (MK) surface-to-air missile has proved
successful in the South African Navy, while the MK 2 is in production for the Finnish
Navy and has also been selected for purchase by Sweden. By 2010, Denel
Dynamic’s 10km-range Mokopa laser-homing missile was ready for integration with
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Gripen but lacked a launch customer, whereas the laser beam-riding Ingwe has
been in production for export and will arm the South African Army's future tank
destroyer. The television-guided Raptor II boosted standoff bomb is also exported
and has been cleared on, amongst others, the Su-24 (Römer-Heitman 2010).
Table 6: South Africa’s current missile development programme
Type of missile Name of Key features of missile

missile
Air-to-air Missile A-Darter Infrared air-to-air missile

Systems
Air Defence Umkhonto-IR Vertically-launched, high-velocity, infrared
Missile Systems homing missile
Anti-Armour Ingwe Medium-range multi-purpose, anti-armour
Missile Systems missile
Mokopa Long-range, precision-guided, anti-armour
missile
Stand-off Weapon Raptor II Long-range, precision-guided weapon that
can be launched from a variety of aircraft
Denel (2009: 33-36; 2010: 36)
Addressing the 9th Regular Meeting of Subscribing States to the HCOC in 2010,
South African Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo (2010) stated that South Africa
supports efforts to achieve universality of the Code. This statement is in accordance
with South Africa’s position on global nuclear disarmament. However, South Africa
finds itself in a peculiar position. According to the South African government, the
country’s “advanced arms industry has developed technology and items which could
contribute to the development of ballistic and cruise missiles” (DIRCO 2012).
Although the country’s nuclear-related programme has been terminated, the South
African arms and missile industry is one of the country’s major export sectors.
According to, inter alia, Members of Parliament (MPs) (Feinstein 2007; Maynier
2009; De Lille 2010), these industries and the South African government drew
considerable domestic and international criticism against post-1994 South Africa due
to the country’s controversial arms sales.
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These developments indicated the South African government’s intentions and

attempts to expand the South African defence industrial complex. With a workforce of
721, Denel Dynamics Missiles had revenues of R 656 million in, for example, 2010,
up from R 575 million in 2009 (Denel 2010: 36). This adds much-needed income to
the South African government. However it is too early to determine the implications
of the draft 2012 Defence Review under the chairmanship of Roelf Meyer, a former
NP-government Minister of Defence, for the South African missile industry.
3.5 The New Agenda Coalition
Towards the end of Nelson Mandela’s presidential term, on 9 June 1998, South
Africa along with Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico and Slovenia
(collectively known as the New Agenda Coalition or the NAC) announced a joint
declaration, Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the need for a new agenda
(DFA 1998). At the announcement of the declaration, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs Aziz Pahad (1998) alluded to South Africa’s identity as a state which had
terminated its nuclear weapons programme. He stated that:
South Africa's own experience of turning away from the brink of the nuclear
weapon abyss is a telling one: not only for the recognised five nuclear weapon
states but also for the three nuclear-weapon-capable states.
Pahad further reiterated South Africa’s identity and role as a “good international
nuclear citizen” by pointing out that South Africa has ‘actively’ worked to “move the
process of nuclear disarmament forward in all disarmament forums including the
Conference on Disarmament where the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on
nuclear disarmament has been proposed (DFA 1998).
Moreover, the South African government referred to the announcement as an

“important international initiative on nuclear disarmament” (DFA 1998). With the
declaration, South Africa and these like-minded states:
underlines the threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the

indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and calls for a clear commitment to
the speedy, final and total elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapons capability (DFA 1998).
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For South Africa, this reiterated its niche role and state identity in nuclear diplomacy.
South Africa’s decision to sign the NAC declaration serves as an example of the
application of Henrikson’s (2005: 74) three niche diplomatic strategies. South Africa’s
employment of partnership is clear in its cooperation with other signatories to the
NAC declaration, and parallelism is evident in its involvement in this concurrent
initiative alongside existing nuclear regimes. Confrontation as a niche diplomatic
strategy is evident in South Africa’s support of the text of the NAC declaration:
We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon

States and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States to take that
fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy,
final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
capability and we urge them to take that step now (NAC 1998).
Moreover, NAC members declared: “We are deeply concerned at the persistent
reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an
urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons” (NAC 1998).
Coalition members also called on the governments of each NWS and “nuclear-
weapons-capable states” to:
commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear

weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work
immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its
achievement (NAC 1998).
Therefore, South Africa’s involvement in the NAC reflects some nuclear activism
(confrontation with NWS); cooperation with these like-minded states; and parallelism.
The latter is further evident in and enhanced by the country’s participation in the
NAC as well as in other regimes.
In summary, the nuclear export control regimes addressed in this section have been
criticized by non-members as “violating obligations to foster international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of the related technologies under the NPT, the CWC and the
BWC” (UN 2004: 47-48). Non-members also regard these export control regimes as
‘suspicious’ and that they serve “the defence of economic privileges by their
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predominantly more wealthy, industrialized members” (UN 2004: 47-48). In some

cases, members of these regimes from developing countries such as Brazil also
maintain that these export controls are discriminatory where the transfer of advanced
nuclear technology is concerned (Zaborsky 2003: 134). In response to these
accusations, regime members and participants have defended these regimes as
“necessary to implement their undertakings under the legal regimes or to prevent
dangers to peace and international security” (UN 2004: 47-48).
Despite differences in the nature, membership, structure and operations of each of

the existing global nuclear export control regimes, all share the same objective: to
prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, these regimes have evolved from initial
global cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to the global coordination of nuclear
non-proliferation (Zaborsky 1998: 92-93). Some regimes such as the WA and the
MTCR have coordination arms only. Consequently, non-proliferation efforts and
regimes focus predominantly on limiting technical proliferation instead of focusing on
the level of political decision-making of nuclear proliferants. The ZC Trigger List and
the NSG Guidelines are examples of the focus on technical aspects of proliferation.
As Zaborsky (1998: 94) contends, a state or a non-state actor with a strong political
will to develop a nuclear weapons capability is “likely to do so despite technical
barriers to proliferation”. Therefore, evidence suggests that there is a need for the
development of a new legal framework for international nuclear export control
cooperation (SIPRI 2005: 701).
South Africa’s defence in supplier regimes of developing countries’ right to access

advanced nuclear technology can be regarded as a strategy of confrontation against
the more advanced developed states in the supplier regimes. In reinforcing its status
as a “responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced nuclear diplomacy”
(DFA 2009a), South Africa has partnered with major nuclear states in control
regimes to combat nuclear proliferation. In this respect, former South African
diplomat Thomas Markram (2004: 61) described South Africa as a “dialogue bridge
and interlocutor between the developed and developing states”. From the analysis in
the aforesaid it is evident that nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes and
South Africa’s involvement therein give credence to the country’s recognition and
observance of the norms of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the
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peaceful uses of nuclear energy. If not managed properly and constrained, a state’s
“dual-use dilemma”, its nuclear ambitions and its need for status and prestige are a
powerful combination that contributes to nuclear proliferation.
4. South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export control policy and

mechanisms
Whereas the previous section outlined nuclear export control regimes and referred to
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy related to these regimes, this section analyses the
dynamics and processes contributing to South Africa’s compliance with the norms
associated with the export control regimes. The purpose is to indicate South Africa’s
efforts to also depart from its nuclear past on an institutional level, which informed its
foreign policy and nuclear diplomacy. Although this nuclear past on an institutional
level is not the main focus of this study and also considering that it is addressed in
detail by respectively O’Meara (1996); Steyn, Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg
(2003); and Sanders (2006), a brief historical overview is provided to contextualise
South Africa’s efforts to transform its nuclear policy and diplomacy. In the process,
reference is made to the South African link between the agents and structures of
these regimes.
4.1 The diplomatic context of South Africa’s involvement in nuclear export

regimes
In response to the country’s domestic policies, the UNSC adopted its first resolution
calling for an arms embargo against South Africa in 1963. Unanimously adopted,
UNSC Resolution 181 (1963) called on all UN member states to “cease forthwith the
sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South
Africa” against the background of an “arms build-up” by the South African
government to further “that Government’s racial policies” (UNSC 1963). However,
the resolution was not implemented by all UN members. By 1977, the UNSC
adopted another resolution, Resolution 418 (1977), against South Africa which called
for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Acting in terms of Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, the UNSC expressed its concern that “South Africa is at the
threshold of producing nuclear weapons” and decided that “all states shall refrain
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from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of
nuclear weapons”, as well as any other types of arms (UN 1977).
Subsequent to the adoption of these resolutions, the UNSC also adopted Resolution
473 (1980) to implement Resolution 418 (1977), which imposed a mandatory arms
embargo on South Africa. This resolution was extended by Resolution 558 (1984)
that prohibited the imports of arms and weapons from South Africa. Subsequently,
Resolution 569 (1985) prohibited “all new contracts in the nuclear field” with South
Africa (UNSC 1985). On 28 November 1986, the UNSC adopted yet another
resolution against South Africa. Resolution 591 (1986) called on all UN members to
strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa and included a prohibition on any
contribution to the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons by South
Africa (UN 1994: 52).
What concerned the international community was that South Africa, despite these
comprehensive UN arms and weapons embargoes, continued to improve and
maintain its nuclear weapons capability. In a further series of resolutions
(A/RES/37/69 A, 9 December 1982; A/RES/44/27 I, 22 November 1989;
A/RES/45/176 C, 19 December 1990; A/RES/46/79 C, 13 December 1991) the UN
General Assembly (UNGA) called on all UN members and in particular on the US,
Israel, the UK, France, Chile and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany,
now Germany) to terminate their cooperation with South Africa in the military and
nuclear fields. It was only in December 1993, during the final phases of the South
African constitutional negotiations and after the IAEA’s verification of the
completeness of South Africa’s dismantlement, that the UNGA lifted its call for
sanctions and embargoes against South Africa (UN 1994: 52, 114).
The above-mentioned developments highlight some of the loopholes in global

nuclear non-proliferation efforts, especially in nuclear export control regimes during
the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. President De Klerk’s 1993 announcement
paved the way for South Africa’s full disclosure of its nuclear weapons programme. It
also resulted in the country’s accession to, membership of and participation in a
number of global nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes and related
arrangements that “contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery” (UN 2011b).
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The development of domestic nuclear non-proliferation export controls in South

Africa occurred in tandem with South Africa’s diplomatic initiatives and legal
commitments to nuclear non-proliferation since 1990. Writing prior to the institution of
the GNU in his now oft-quoted article in Foreign Affairs, Nelson Mandela (1993: 87)
outlined the ‘pillars’ of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy, which included human
rights; the promotion of democracy worldwide; global peace, “including effective
arms-control regimes”; a focus on Africa; and economic development based on
international cooperation.
In 1993, prior to the 1994 democratic elections the South African government
commenced to align the country’s international nuclear non-proliferation position with
its domestic legislation. The promulgation of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993, as amended in 1995 and 1996, on 23 June 1993
was not only one of the last nuclear-related policy actions of the NP government
under President FW de Klerk but, in its amended form, one of the first nuclear-
related policy actions of the President Nelson Mandela-led GNU in South Africa.
Speaking at the Conference on Nuclear Policy for a Democratic South Africa in

February 1994 (a few months prior to the ANC’s accession to power), Trevor Manuel
(1994: 5) stated that “(w)e [the ANC] need to state unambiguously that the African
National Congress does not want a nuclear weapons capability in South Africa. We
have endorsed the OAU [Organisation of African Unity] declaration calling for the
African continent to be a nuclear weapon-free-zone. The ANC has also endorsed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.27 Years later, Manuel’s view was confirmed by
South Africa’s second post-1994 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma (2007a) who admitted that the ANC government:
at that early stage [1994] already adopted a policy whereby South Africa
should be an active participant in the various non-proliferation regimes and
suppliers groups; adopt positions publicly supporting the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction with the goal of promoting international peace
27
In the late 1980s Trevor Manuel was a founder-member of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an
ANC front organisation during the time the ANC was banned. He served on the ANC’s Economic
Desk and, after the elections of April 1994, became Minister of Trade and Industry. Subsequently, he
served as Minister of Finance until 2008. Since 2009, he served as National Planning Minister in the
Cabinet of President Jacob Zuma.
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and security; and use its position as a member of the suppliers' regimes and
of the Africa Group and the Non-aligned Movement to promote the importance
of non-proliferation and to ensure that these controls do not become the
means whereby developing countries are denied access to advanced
technologies required for their development.
Table 7: South Africa’s membership of nuclear non-proliferation export control

regimes
Nuclear export control regime Date of membership
Australia Group (AG) Not applicable
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1995
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1995
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Not applicable
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 2006
Zangger Committee (ZC) 1993
Authors own compilation
Minister Dlamini-Zuma (2007a) also reiterated that the South African government:
has therefore since its inauguration in May 1994, committed itself to a policy
of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, which covers all weapons
of mass destruction and extends to concerns relating to the proliferation of
conventional weapons.
In fact, South Africa joined the principle nuclear export control regimes prior to the
time of the Minister’s statement, i.e. during the Mandela presidency (see Table 7).
Earlier, a similar statement on South Africa’s post-1994 commitment to nuclear non-

proliferation was made by the South African government in a Note Verbale to the UN
that it has, since the new Government’s inauguration in May 1994, ‘committed’ itself
to non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. By its own admission, South
Africa is, therefore, committed to prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, transport
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or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including by non-
State actors (South Africa 2005: 2-3). Since 1994 these views and statements have
became the mantra of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
4.2 The sources of South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export control

policy
Various sources inform the South African government’s policy on nuclear non-
proliferation, arms control and disarmament practices. These include:
• Policy documents and statements by government and its officials. Since 1994,
the ANC-led government has repeatedly maintained that it has been
consistent in its non-proliferation stance. It claims that “throughout our long
liberation struggle” (Gumbi 2008a: 5) and “since its inauguration in 1994”, it
has “committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms
control which covers all weapons of mass destruction and extends to
concerns relating to the proliferation of conventional weapons” (DIRCO 2010).
The South African government’s stance on multilateralism and nuclear non-
proliferation was repeated in a statement by the DFA prior to President
Mbeki’s attendance of the UNGA’s 58th session in September 2003.
According to the DFA, “[the] goal of ensuring peace and stability in Africa
remains a high priority for the Government” (DFA 2003). Moreover, the South
African government included, amongst others, in its foreign policy objectives
to “reinforce the role of multilateralism and challenge the unilateral and
protectionist approach"; to “promote the central role of the UN in combating
terrorism and the conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention Against
Terrorism"; and to “promote arms control and disarmament in the context of
conventional arms, including small arms, and weapons of mass destruction”
(DFA 2003).
• Various Acts of Parliament, including the Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999; the
National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999; and the Non-Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993, as amended in 1995, 1996 and
2005.
• Several Government Notices such as Government Notice No 20 (3 February
2010) which include the declaration of certain nuclear-related dual-use
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equipment, materials and software and related technology as controlled

goods, and control measures applicable to such goods. Government Notice
No 21 (3 February 2010), for example, includes an additional declaration of
certain nuclear-related dual-use equipment; materials and software and
related technology as controlled goods; and control measures applicable to
such goods. In addition to this, Government Notice No 22 (3 February 2010)
contains a declaration of certain missile technology and related items as
controlled goods and control measures applicable to such goods (NPC 2010).
Apart from the above-mentioned measures, South Africa also executes its
international nuclear non-proliferation commitments through several international
instruments. These include the NPT to which it acceded on 10 July 1991; the
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or Safeguards Agreement) on 16 September
1991; and the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereafter the Additional Protocol) on 13 September 2002) with
the IAEA. Other instruments include its membership of the NSG and the ZC; and its
ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM) (17 September 2007) and the Pelindaba Treaty (DOE 2010).
In other words, South Africa adheres to the fundamental pacta sunt servanda
principle of International Law that states should comply with international
agreements. South Africa recognises, in the words of International Law expert
Malcolm Shaw (2008: 94), the “obligatory nature of treaties”. In fact, one of the
principles ‘underpinning’ South Africa’s foreign policy is “a commitment to justice and
international law in the conduct of relations between nations” (DIRCO 2009a). In
compliance with this principle, South Africa has incorporated its obligations in terms
of international agreements into its domestic legislation and policy.
95
4.3 South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export control policy
In 1994, South Africa’s nuclear energy installations included the Koeberg Nuclear
Power Station’s two nuclear power reactors (Koeberg 1 and Koeberg 2) (see Table
8) and Pelindaba’s research reactor (SAFARI-1).
Table 8: South Africa’s nuclear reactors
Reactors Type Purpose Net Megawatt Operational Since
SAFARI-1 Pool-type Research 20 1965

Research
Reactor
Koeberg 1 Pressurised Water Power 921 1984

Reactor generation
Koeberg 2 Pressurised Water Power 921 1985

Reactor generation
TOTAL 1 862
World Nuclear Association (2010); Eskom (2011) & Tillwick (2011)
The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993 served as

South Africa’s primary nuclear non-proliferation legislation. The aim of the Act is to
control and manage matters relating to the proliferation of such weapons in South
Africa (NPC 2009). The Act prohibits:
• the conduct of nuclear explosions and tests in South Africa; and
• any person to be or become involved in any activity or with goods that
contribute to WMD programmes; any person to be or become involved in any
dual-use goods or activities that could contribute to WMD with countries,
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities subject to restrictions imposed
by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and involved in
international terrorism, including non-state actors (NPC 2011a).
• South Africa’s promulgation of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act 87 of 1993 is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
legislation generated some diplomatic benefits for South Africa. Through the
Act, South Africa - after entering the NPT in 1991 - illustrated its commitment
to global nuclear non-proliferation. Secondly, by adopting the Act South Africa
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prepared itself for membership of other nuclear export control regimes such
as the MCTR and the NSG, which it joined in 1995. In the third instance, the
Act enabled the South African government, through the NPC, to maintain
control over the import and export of dual-use and sensitive goods. Finally,
the ANC’s support of the Act once in government was a continuation of the
liberation movement-turned-governing-party’s historical anti-nuclear stance
(Reddy 1994).28
In August 1994, the South African Cabinet reiterated the country’s commitment to
nuclear non-proliferation. According to former South African diplomat Thomas
Markram (2004: 12), the Cabinet on 31 August 1994 accepted a proposal by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo that South Africa should:
• actively participate in various international non-proliferation regimes and
suppliers groups;
• publicly adopt positions on nuclear and other WMD non-proliferation in order
to promote international peace and security; and
• Use its position in the NAM and suppliers groups to ensure that nuclear-
related export controls do not turn into instruments whereby developing states
are denied access to advanced nuclear-related technology.
The GNU’s term expired in 1999. From 1999, the South African government adopted
additional nuclear and non-proliferation related legislation in support of South Africa’s
nuclear non-proliferation stance. These included the:
• Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999;
• National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999; and the
• National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 (see Table 9).29
28
A review of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993 commenced in
2005 to incorporate UN and IAEA resolutions that were adopted since the promulgation of the Act in
1993. A draft of the review of the Act was submitted to the Minister of Trade and Industry in mid-2012.
29
The nuclear sector in South Africa is also governed by several other related Acts, including the
National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act 53 of 2008; the Hazardous Substances Act 15 of
1973; the Patent Act 57 of 1978; the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 as amended by
Act No 67 of 2002; the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980 as amended by Act No 47 of 1985; the
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004; the
Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996; the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of
2002; the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; the National Water Act 36 of 1998
and the Dumping at Sea Control Act 73 of 1980 as amended by Act No 73 of 1995.
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Table 9: South Africa’s core nuclear non-proliferation legislation (1990-2010)
Legislation Date of promulgation
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 1993, as amended in

Act 87 of 1993, as amended in 1995 and 1996 1995 and 1996
Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 1999
National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999 1999
National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 2002
National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute Act 53 2008

of 2008
DOE (2011)
The Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 provides, inter alia, for the establishment of
NECSA as the successor of the NP-era’s AEC. In terms of section 33(1) of the
Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999, the Minister of Energy is responsible for the
implementation of the country’s Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocols.
The Ministry of Energy delegated this function to NECSA. NECSA, therefore, also
executes South Africa’s international obligations in terms of the ZC. In addition to
this, the main functions of NECSA (2011) are:
to undertake and promote research and development in the field of nuclear

energy and radiation sciences and technology; to process source material,
special nuclear material and restricted material; and to cooperate with
persons in matters failing within these functions.
4.4 South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation export control mechanisms
South Africa employs two mechanisms or institutions to control and regulate nuclear
exports, namely the NPC and the National Conventional Arms Control Committee
(NCACC) (see Table 10). Both institutions were established after 1990. The
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members of the NPC are appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, whereas
the members of the NCACC are appointed by a higher state authority, i.e. a
Statutory Committee of Cabinet and the President.
4.4.1 The Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993 provides for

the establishment of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (NPC) administered by the Minister of Trade and Industry. In
South Africa, all transfers of listed technologies, equipment and material require
permits issued by the NPC. In terms of the Act, the NPC “on behalf of the State
protect the interests, carry out the responsibilities and fulfil the obligations of the
Republic with regard to non-proliferation”. In terms of section 6 the functions of the
NPC are, inter alia, to control and manage all activities relating to non-proliferation
and to supervise and implement South Africa’s compliance with international
conventions, treaties and agreements related to non-proliferation affairs and issues.
The NPC ensures that all relevant industries and government departments are
represented. It also oversees the implementation of South Africa’s nuclear export
control policy in compliance with South Africa’s international commitments in this
regard. For this purpose, the NPC has produced a 94-page document, Internal
compliance programme for industry, on guidelines for the South African industry
(NPC undated). The latter document outlines South Africa’s non-proliferation
policies, legislation, mechanisms, control processes and permit application
procedures. It also outlines the multilateral nuclear export control regimes which
South Africa participates in.
Finally, it includes lists of all controlled goods and activities in terms of South African
legislation (NPC 2011a). The NPC is one of the first nuclear non-proliferation
institutions established after the complete dismantlement of the country’s nuclear
weapons programme. As a regulating organisation, it ensures that the South African
government and companies comply with the various nuclear non-proliferation export
control regimes.
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4.4.2 The National Conventional Arms Control Committee
In 1994 South Africa had the most sophisticated defence force and arms industry in
Africa. Moreover, the country’s arms industry was also one of its most lucrative
industrial sectors. Between 1989 and 1993 the value of the country’s arms exports
increased by more than 160 percent (Truesdell 2009: 112). By 1994, South Africa’s
arms were the second largest export product amounting to approximately R 1 billion
and employing almost 54 000 people. However, between 1991 and 1995, the South
African defence budget decreased by 45 percent and arms production by 60 percent,
reflecting the new political realities of the post-Cold War era, as well as the new
realities in South and Southern Africa (Truesdell 2009: 112).
In May 1996 the South African government published The White Paper on Defence
and in December 1999 The White Paper on the South African Defence Related
Industries. One of the significant proposals of The White Paper on Defence was that
the NCACC should control and regulate the import, export and transit of conventional
arms through South Africa. Established in 1995 by a Cabinet memorandum, but
legislated in 2002 in terms of the National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002,
the NCACC is a statutory body which reports to Parliament (see Table 10). It is
composed of Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers, effectively making it a
subcommittee of Cabinet. In terms of section 4 of the National Conventional Arms
Control Act 41 of 2002, the functions of the NCACC include “the regulation of
development, manufacturing and transfer of conventional arms in South Africa” and
to:
• ensure compliance with the arms control policy of the South African
government;
• ensure the implementation of a legitimate, effective and transparent control
process;
• foster national and international confidence in South Africa’s control
procedures;
• provide for an Inspectorate to ensure compliance with the provisions of the
Act;
• provide for guidelines and criteria to be used when assessing applications for
permits made in terms of the Act;
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• ensure adherence to international treaties and agreements;

• ensure proper accountability in the trade in conventional arms; and
• Provide for matters connected with the work and conduct of the NCACC and
its Secretariat.
Table 10: South African institutions responsible for nuclear non-proliferation
Controlling institution
South African Council for the National

Non-Proliferation of Weapons Conventional Arms Control
of Mass Destruction (NPC) Committee (NCACC)
Date 1993 2002

established
Appointed Minister of Trade and Industry Statutory Committee of Cabinet

by and appointed by the President
Members Government officials and Cabinet Ministers and Deputy

representatives from industry Ministers
Controlled Chemical, biological, nuclear So-called ‘other’ dual-use

material dual-use and missile delivery materials and items
items
Relevant Non-Proliferation of Weapons of National Conventional Arms

legislation Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993 Control Act 41 of 2002
South Africa (2005: 3)
In terms of the National Conventional Arms Control Act, no person “may trade in
conventional arms or render foreign military assistance unless that person is
registered with the NPC and is in possession of a permit authorised by the NCACC”
(NPC 2011b). In South Africa, permits are required for:
armaments development and manufacturing, marketing, contracting,

exporting, importing or transferring (conveyance) of conventional arms, which
includes; weapons, munitions, vessels (land, sea and air) designed for war,
articles of war, and related systems, components, technologies, dual-use
goods or services (NPC 2011b).
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The proposals of the White Paper on the South African Defence Related Industries
of 1999 meant that the South African government did not regard the country’s
defence industry as a separate industrial sector and that the Government did not
intend to develop a separate industrial development policy for the defence industry
(Truesdell 2009: 117). Facing a future with relatively little government support, the
South African defence industry, including state-owned arms manufacturers such as
Armscor and Denel was forced to realign itself with these new political realities,
compounded by the controversial 1999 Strategic Defence Procurement Package
(the so-called arms deal). Despite these factors, exports by the South African
defence-related industries have increased significantly between 1996 and 2004,
most notably from 2002 when the NCACC was established. For example, exports
increased from R 517 million in 1996 to more than R 1 billion in 2001, and from
approximately R 2 billion in 2002 to more than R 2 billion in 2004 (Truesdell 2009:
118). In 2008, 111 South African companies had registered with the NCACC (2008:
6). These companies exported to 88 countries, whereas they imported material and
equipment from 61 countries (NCACC 2008: 6 & 18).
The 2009 report of the NCACC indicated that the South African government
approved contracting permits worth more than R 82 billion for 2009. Not all approved
contracts resulted in exports and sales as companies often apply for approval prior
to this in order to market their products. Figures showed that the NCACC approved
371 contracts between South African companies and approved defence procurement
authorities in 89 countries. This is over four times more than the R 19 billion
allocated for the 2008 calendar year. In 2008, the NCACC approved 370 contracts
with 90 countries. The figures are down from 388 in 2004, but up from 326 in 2003
(DefenceWeb 20 September 2010).
Few aspects of post-1994 South Africa’s international relations have been as

contentious as the country’s arms sales. In some instances, accusations were made
that South Africa had sold dual-use goods to known nuclear proliferators. However, it
is unclear whether these were nuclear or military dual-use goods in terms of the
WA’s dual-use lists. As indicated below, irregular reporting to Parliament by the
relevant South African government authorities inflamed these accusations.
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Section 1 of the South African National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002
defines “dual-use goods” as “products, technologies, services or other goods which,
besides their normal use and application for civilian purposes, can also be used for
the furtherance of general military capability” (NPC 2009). Speaking at the 1995
REC, Minister Alfred Nzo (1995: 137) stated that “democratic South Africa is a
responsible possessor of advanced technologies” and that South Africa regards its
“non-proliferation and arms control policy as being an integral part to [sic] our
commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice
and environmental protection”. In addition to this, from 1994 onwards, the South
African government admitted that “a primary goal” of its foreign policy is to:
reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and

trader of defence-related products and advanced technologies in the nuclear,
biological, chemical and missile fields. South Africa, in so doing, promotes the
benefits which non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control hold for
international peace and security, particularly to countries in Africa and the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (DFA 2009).
This position of South Africa has influenced the moderation of NAM’s position on the
export control regimes considerably (Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2011).
The National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 defines 'services' as “aid,
advice, assistance, training, and product support” (section 1), whereas the NSG
defines “dual-use goods or items” as goods or items that “can make a major
contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but
which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry” (NSG 2010b). The
NPC primarily looks at the proliferation risk of a particular transaction while it takes
note of the NCACC decisions based on the issues highlighted below. Where the
same items are controlled by both bodies, a process of consultation takes place to
ensure that both bodies’ decisions are consistent. Apart from the definitions in the
National Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002, several criteria are used by the
NCACC when it approves arms contracts and import and export permits. These are:
• respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country;
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• an evaluation based on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and

the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights;
• the internal and regional security situation in the recipient country against the
background of existing tensions or armed conflicts;
• the recipient country’s record of compliance with international arms control
agreements and treaties;
• the nature and cost of the arms to be transferred relative to the situation in the
recipient country, including the recipient country’s legitimate security and
defence needs, taking into account that the transaction should divert minimal
funding from human and economic development; and
• The degree to which arms sales are supportive of South Africa’s national and
foreign interests (Landsberg 2010: 112).
The South African government had not consistently applied these criteria. South
Africa’s arms trade, conducted predominantly by the state-owned entity Denel,
remains a contentious foreign policy and diplomatic issue. Academics such as
Sylvester and Seegers (2008); MPs of opposition parties such as the Democratic
Alliance’s Shadow Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs David Maynier (2009)
and the Independent Democrats’ Patricia de Lille (2010); and former ANC MP
Andrew Feinstein (2007) have repeatedly expressed grave concerns about South
Africa’s arms sales to countries such as Libya, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Concerns
centred around the volume of exports; the types of arms exported (including dual-
use); the imbalance between South Africa’s stated policy on human rights and its
sale of arms to undemocratic governments; and South Africa’s national economic
interests and the ideal of an ethical foreign policy.
Nonetheless, South Africa’s legislation complies with the nuclear non-proliferation

regimes referred to earlier. In some instances, as previously indicated, the South
African government had even implemented certain regulations before it joined a
particular regime. This signals the Government’s efforts to comply with the norms of
nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear disarmament; and the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy as espoused by these regimes.
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5. Concerns about South Africa’s post-1990 commitment to nuclear non-

proliferation
South Africa is one of at least 20 states that have terminated their nuclear weapons
programmes since 1945. Several explanations have been offered for South Africa’s
nuclear reversal.30 These explanations include US pressure on the NP government
(Levite 2003: 65-66; Liberman 2001: 78); De Klerk’s “anti-nuclear preferences”
(Liberman 2001: 75); changes in the decision-makers and advisors involved in
nuclear decision-making under the De Klerk-government (Liberman 2001: 75); the
NP government’s determination not to transfer a nuclear weapons capability to the
ANC government (Levite 2003: 94; Fig 2005: 70); international sanctions against
South Africa (Liberman 2001: 48); changes in the regional and domestic security
environment (De Klerk 1993; Levite 2003: 84; Liberman 2001: 45); the ANC’s
historical stance against nuclear energy and nuclear weapons (Gumbi 2008a: 5);
changes in the international environment in the wake of the end of the Cold War (De
Klerk 1993; Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2010: 665); domestic regime change (Levite
2003: 84); national ideology (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2010: 667); and international
incentives such as the US offer for future commercial and scientific cooperation
(Liberman 2001: 79).
Speaking prior to the ANC’s accession to power in 1994, Trevor Manuel (1994: 5)
observed that:
indications are that important Western powers are far more nervous about a
nuclear capability in the hands of an ANC-led government than they ever
were about the same, or even an enlarged capacity in the hands of the
apartheid regime.
Since 1993, a series of developments, events and statements cast on the post-1994
South African government’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Firstly, the
international community was concerned about the South African government’s
stance on its weapons capability. By its own acknowledgement, the South African
government “is engaged in various aspects of the trade in weapons and related
30
Nuclear reversal can be defined as the “phenomenon in which states embark in [sic] a path leading
to nuclear weapons acquisition but subsequently reverse course, though not altogether abandoning
their nuclear ambitions” (Levite 2003: 61).
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materials, equipment, technology and services” (NPC 2011a). For the South African
government, “(t)rade in weapons/armaments/defence equipment and related
materials, equipment, technology and services forms an integral part of South
Africa’s foreign-, defence-, trade- and industrial policies and initiatives” (NPC 2011a).
Moreover:
it is South Africa’s declared national interest in conjunction with its

international obligations and commitments, particularly as these relate to non-
proliferation, disarmament and arms control, and the implementation of
international humanitarian law, to exercise due restraint in the transfer and
trade in weapons and related materials, equipment, technology and services
(NPC 2011a).
The South African government also acknowledged the competitive nature of the
international nuclear-related market and that it wants to be regarded as a
“responsible and reliable supplier of weapons and related materials, equipment,
technology, aid and services” (NPC 2011a).
The South African government repeatedly emphasised that “a primary goal” of South
Africa’s foreign policy is to “reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible
producer, possessor and trader of defence related products and advanced
technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields” (Markram 2004:
12). Moreover, it is South Africa’s:
declared national interest in conjunction with its international obligations and

commitments, particularly as these relate to non-proliferation, disarmament
and arms control, and the implementation of international humanitarian law, to
exercise due restraint in the transfer and trade in weapons and related
materials, equipment, technology and services (NPC 2011a).
In addition to this, the South African government through the NPC maintains that
“(t)rade in weapons/armaments/defence equipment and related materials, equipment,
technology and services forms an integral part of South Africa’s foreign-, defence-,
trade- and industrial policies and initiatives” (NPC 2011a). This decision was the
“opening [of] a new chapter in South Africa’s nuclear history” (Shelton 2000b: 19);
particularly in respect of its obligations in terms of the nuclear export control regimes.
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Secondly, another concern was the South African government’s “nuclear inheritance”
whereby:
nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material produced by South Africa

might fall in to the hands of a radical ruling faction, black or white, which might
use or threaten to use them to advance extremist objectives (Pabian 1995: 10).
The co-called “mini nuke conspiracy”, referred to by Hounam and McQuillan (1995)
suggested that the pre-1994 South African government manufactured over 1 000
small tactical nuclear warheads that could be in the hands of an anti-Mandela, right-
wing faction. Following the “mini nuke conspiracy”, reference was also made to a
“confidential Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Unit, AWB)
report”, prepared by its intelligence unit, which claimed that “enough raw materials
and equipment might have been removed from the nuclear project site [at Pelindaba
near Pretoria] during the winding-down phase [in 1993] to enable such a device to be
assembled elsewhere” (Koch, Moodley & Porteous 1996: 150). The report also
referred to the “high level of support among personnel in the nuclear sector for the
right-wing cause” and stated that “at the very least the raw materials, parts and
expertise are available to the right to build such a device at short notice” (Koch,
Moodley & Porteous 1996: 150). However, the so-called “Completeness Report”
referred to previously by the IAEA Director General in paragraphs 28 to 32
concluded that all HEU from the South African nuclear weapons programme was
accounted for and placed under IAEA safeguarding by 1993 (IAEA 1993a).
In the third instance, the US, in particular, was concerned about the post-1994 South
African government’s nuclear-related diplomatic relations with nuclear ambitious
states such as Iran, Pakistan and Libya (Koch, Moodley & Porteous 1996: 113). The
South African government’s controversial arms sales were linked to this. These
included the sale of dual-use goods to so-called rogue states such as Iran and Libya.
The UNSC resolutions on Iran have been strictly enforced. There may be a few
areas where South African legislation is limited to the UNSC resolutions but US and
EU sanctions are much wider. However, the time factor is important as exports made
prior to UNSC Resolutions do not count as a contravention of the Resolution.
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The fourth concern was the ‘complex’ nature - according to IAEA officials von
Baeckmann, Dillon and Perricos (1995) who were involved in the process - of the
verification of South Africa’s nuclear inventory and the termination of South Africa’s
nuclear weapons programme. The international community regarded South Africa as
not always willing to cooperate. Moreover, according to the IAEA (2005: 5), South
Africa still had “several hundred kg” of HEU in the country’s inventories which are
under IAEA safeguards, whereas other sources estimated about 300kg (Fig 2005:
71). South Africa’s refusal to give up its large HEU stockpile was also regarded as a
concern (Bunn 2008: 51). This HEU inventory is a major political lever in favour of
the South African nuclear diplomacy. If South Africa forfeited this inventory, it would
lose its niche political position. This is one of the reasons why South Africa did not
support the IAEA decision to establish a nuclear fuel reserve (see Chapter 4).
These concerns were amplified when the international community realised that the
post-1994 South African government was slow in its efforts to convert the country’s
nuclear research reactor (SAFARI-1) at Pelindaba from using HEU to using LEU.
This conversion was only achieved by 2009 considering that the conversion process
began as early as 1994 (NECSA 2009).
Another concern was the fate of South African nuclear scientists who worked on the
country’s nuclear weapons programme. It was feared that these scientists may be
employed by emerging nuclear weapons states. In 2007, for example, reports stated
that Iran had been actively recruiting South African nuclear scientists for its nuclear
programme (Barletta et al. 1998:145). These concerns re-surfaced in 2010 when the
South African government announced the termination of its PBMR programme,
which once again resulted in the retrenchment of a large number of South African
nuclear scientists (Hogan 2010; Fig 2010).
A sixth concern was the safety of South Africa’s nuclear installations. For example, in
2006, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) conducted a peer-review
of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station north of Cape Town and identified “gaps in
performance in several areas” at the power station (South Africa 2007: 8). On 8
November 2007 armed attackers broke in at South Africa’s major nuclear facility,
Pelindaba, where significant volumes of weapons-grade HEU are kept, raising global
concerns about nuclear safety in South Africa (Bunn 2008: v, 3-4).
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In the seventh instance, the South African government’s stated ambition to develop
the country’s nuclear energy sector is another matter of concern. The South African
government has adopted the Nuclear energy policy for the Republic of South Africa
in 2008 (DME 2008) and has stated its intentions in the Ten Year Plan for Science
and Technology, 2008-2018 to develop the country’s nuclear-related industrial sector
(DST 2007; Economic Sectors and Employment Cluster 2010). In 2011, the Minister
of State Security, Siyabonga Cwele (2011), announced that government was
investigating the restarting of the country’s enrichment facilities. Moreover, in
2012/13, the South African government is expected to announce the successful
bidders for the construction of new nuclear power stations.
A final concern was the involvement and the subsequent charging of South Africans
in the nuclear proliferation network of AQ Khan (NPA 2007; IISS 2007) (see section
5.1). This compromised South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation
(Minty 2007a). In addition to this, the South African government seemed unwilling to
charge Asher Karni, a businessman with South African connections and a known
operator in the global nuclear illicit market, for alleged illicit activities in South Africa.
However, South African authorities conducted a search of Karni’s premises in
December 2003. Subsequent to this, Karni requested permission to go on holiday in
the US, which was granted by the NPA. He was arrested in Denver (Colorado) on 2
January 2004, less than a month after the South African authorities had opened a
case against him. The US prosecuted him and sentenced him before he could return
to South Africa. Karni was sentenced in the US to three years imprisonment on 4
August 2005 (US 2005: 1; Lacey 2010).
In response to the aforesaid concerns and developments, the South African

government employed several confidence-building measures such as portraying a
positive nuclear identity; joining major multilateral nuclear export control regimes to
reiterate the country’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation; and communicating
the country’s national interests as complementing (and not opposing) international
nuclear non-proliferation. Internationally, South Africa also aligned its international
and domestic nuclear non-proliferation export control policies. Notwithstanding this,
the activities of the nuclear proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear physicist AQ
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Khan in South Africa contributed to concerns about South Africa’s commitment to

nuclear non-proliferation.
5.1 The AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network in South Africa
The arrest of AQ Khan on 31 January 2004 confirmed the diplomatic and security
challenges posed by illicit nuclear proliferation networks. Considered the ‘father’ of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, Khan’s nuclear black market spanned the
globe and involved actors from NWS and NNWS. It included illicit trade in nuclear
equipment, expertise, goods, weapons and nuclear material by, amongst others,
Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Dubai, Malaysia, Turkey, Spain, The Netherlands,
Germany, Switzerland, the UK, South Korea and Japan. The Khan network also
operated in several African states, including Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Tunisia,
Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa (IISS 2007: 43-50; 65-88). The
involvement of South Africans in the AQ Khan network was confirmed and reported
to the IAEA by South Africa’s representative at the IAEA, Ambassador Abdul Minty.
He also confirmed that Khan’s illicit nuclear weapons proliferation network operated
in more than 30 countries and that it comprised of several entities and individuals of
different nationalities (Minty 2007a).
Prior to 1990, South Africa was an active international nuclear trader who tapped into
clandestine procurement networks in Europe, the US and Israel (Albright 1994; UN
1994: 52, 114). South Africa thus undermined global norms pertaining on nuclear
trade. For the post-1994 government, South Africans’ involvement in the Khan
network (henceforth the Wisser Affaire) was a diplomatic embarrassment which
brought into question and undermined South Africa’s constructed identity and status
as a self-professed good global nuclear actor. It also raised fears of the country’s
nuclear recidivism.
5.1.1 The Wisser Affaire
Subsequent to Khan’s arrest, the South African government instituted an

investigation into the possible involvement of two South African registered corporate
entities, namely Krisch Engineering Company (Property) Limited and Tradefin
Engineering CC, in the network’s procurement activities for Libya and Pakistan. The
110
allegations related to the import and export of a controlled flow-forming lathe as well
as the production and possession of certain components of a centrifuge enrichment
plant without the necessary permits. These items do not constitute a weapon of
mass destruction, but they are essential components of the process to enrich
uranium. It was alleged that these activities were intended to assist in the now
abandoned nuclear weapons programme of the Libyan government. On the
premises of Tradefin Engineering, the South African authorities found 11 shipping
containers containing dual-use components of a centrifuge uranium enrichment
plant. They also uncovered feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems and
machine header piping systems, defined in the NSG lists; and documentation
relating to the import and export of a flow-forming machine, classified as “nuclear
related dual-use equipment (NPC 2004; Minty 2007a).
In response to these developments, Minty as chairperson of the NPC stated that:
the South African Government shares the international community's concern

over the illicit transfer of nuclear and nuclear related dual-use technology and
materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction and encourages
the sharing of information that would identify individuals or entities involved in
such illicit activities with a view to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit
trade (NPC 2004).
Minty’s “damage control” statement confirmed South Africa’s diplomatic

embarrassment to the extent that it reminded the international community of South
Africa’s clandestine nuclear behaviour before 1990 (Minty 2007a).
The South African government’s investigation also revealed that both the flow-
forming machine and the systems formed part of Libya’s undeclared nuclear
activities. At the time, Libya was subject to UN sanctions. The South African
investigation also revealed that during the period from 1986 to 1995, South Africans
supplied controlled nuclear equipment to Pakistan. On 2 September 2004, eight
months after the arrest of AQ Khan, Johan Andries Muller Meyer formerly involved
with the South African government’s nuclear weapons programme and founding-
director of Tradefin Engineering in Vanderbijlpark was arrested. He had been
responsible for the manufacture of the feed systems/product and tails withdrawal
111
systems, and machine header piping systems. He was subsequently charged with
contravening the NSG Guidelines; the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act 87 of 1993 “by importing and exporting a flow-forming lathe without
the necessary permits"; and the Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 “by possessing and
producing certain components of a centrifuge enrichment plant without the
necessary authorisation of the Minister of Minerals and Energy” (NPC 2004).
The charges against Meyer were withdrawn once he revealed that he had been
acting on behalf of Krisch Engineering. The South African government gave Meyer
the status as a cooperating, complicit witness. On the strength of Meyer’s evidence,
the Managing and Design Directors of Krisch Engineering, namely German citizen
Gerhard Wisser and Swiss citizen Daniel Geiges - both mechanical engineers - were
arrested. Wisser and Geiges were subsequently charged with contravening South
Africa’s non-proliferation legislation (Minty 2007a). The South African National
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) indicted Wisser and Geiges on ten charges. Six of
these charges related to Libya’s nuclear weapons programme and the remaining
four to Pakistan’s programme. The NPA’s indictment alleged that Wisser and Geiges
cooperated with other members of the AQ Khan network outside South Africa (Minty
2007a). Gerhard Wisser was convicted for contraventions of the Non-Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993 and the Nuclear Energy Act 46 of
1999. On 4 September 2007, in the case of S v Gerhard Wisser, Wisser entered into
a Plea and Sentence Agreement with the State. Wisser confirmed that his crimes
had contributed to the Khan network’s activities and admitted that he had cooperated
with other members of the network outside South Africa (NPC 2007).
Wisser also pleaded guilty to charges linked to the Libyan nuclear weapons
programme, namely the import and export of a flow-forming machine between
November 2000 and December 2001; the manufacture of systems for the Libyan gas
centrifuge plant between 1999 and 2003; and an attempt to export nuclear systems
in 2003. On charges relating to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, Wisser
pleaded guilty to four charges, namely the manufacture of three autoclaves in
1994/1995; the export of the autoclaves in 1995; forgery of an order form in order to
acquire Leybold Heraeus vacuum equipment in May 1995; and forgery of an order
form in order to acquire Leybold Heraeus equipment in July 1995 (NPC 2007).
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Wisser entered into a Plea and Sentence Agreement with the State and pleaded
guilty to charges linking him to the Khan network, and to the Libyan (from 1999 to
2003) and Pakistani (from 1994 to 1995) nuclear weapons programmes. Found
guilty, Wisser's concurrent sentences included three years correctional supervision,
and three to ten year imprisonment, suspended for five years. Wisser also consented
to a confiscatory order in respect of almost € 3 million and R 6 million as being the
proceeds of crime (Minty 2007a; NPA 2007; NPC 2007).
The case against the remaining accused, Daniel Geiges, continued (NPC 2007). In
2006, he was diagnosed as being terminally ill with cancer, which resulted in him not
being able to attend certain trial hearings. The case against him was separated and
postponed, pending medical reports concerning his health status and ability to stand
trial. On 5 February 2008, a South African court convicted Geiges on charges linking
him to the Khan network. Geiges’ plea bargain with South African authorities resulted
in him receiving a 13 year suspended sentence on the condition that he assists
South African authorities in further investigations into the Khan network (NPA 2008).
The South Africans involved in the Khan network were economically - rather than
politically - motivated. This undermined global efforts to counter illicit proliferation.
The Wisser Affaire undermined not only South Africa's national security and interests
but also its identity as a former “nuclear-contender-turned-good-global-nuclear-
citizen”. Moreover, it affected South Africa's nuclear diplomacy; a niche area it was
carefully crafting for itself in the global arena.
5.1.2 The implications of the AQ Khan legacy
The social construction of the AQ Khan legacy and the Wisser Affaire as a nuclear
proliferation crisis has several implications. Jutta Weldes’ (1999) analysis of the
Cuban Missile Crisis is instructive. Weldes (1999: 37) observes that crises are
“social constructions that are forged by state officials in the course of producing and
reproducing state identity”. Despite the routine nature of crises for states, crises also
benefit states in two ways. In the first instance, crises facilitate the domestic
consolidation of state power by facilitating the establishment of state machinery,
enhancing the control exercised by a state over its citizens, and refine or elaborate
relations of power within a state. In the second instance, crises enable the
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“(re)articulation of relations of identity/difference as a means of both constituting and

securing state identity” (Weldes 1999: 58). In the case of the AQ Khan network and
the Wisser Affaire, the narrative of the ‘crisis’ (i.e. nuclear proliferation in South
Africa) included references to the dangers of nuclear proliferation to global security,
the legacy of South Africa’s nuclear past and the post-1994 government’s continuing
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, in the social construction of
these events, South Africa made every effort to maintain its identity as a state
committed to nuclear proliferation.
According to South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (2008a),
Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, described the AQ Khan network
as the “biggest threat to the NPT”, a statement with which he (Pahad) agreed. The
legacy of the AQ Khan network had several implications for South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy. Firstly, the South African government admitted that the investigations
which resulted in Wisser’s sentencing had taken place in the context of the so-called
Khan network. The South African government confirmed that certain countries were
indeed provided with nuclear technology through international networks (NPC 2004)
and that the exposure of the Khan network and the Wisser Affaire had occurred after
South Africa’s initial successes at diplomatic events such as the 1995 REC of the
NPT. Despite the arrest and sentencing of Wisser, the Affaire raised concerns about
South Africa’s commitment and ability to fulfil its obligations to the norm of nuclear
non-proliferation (Minty 2007a).
Secondly, in constructivist terms, the Wisser Affaire highlighted the social

dimensions of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. In terms of language, South Africa
had constructed a role and identity as a state that had voluntarily terminated its
nuclear weapons programme; that was a subscriber to and advocate of nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament; and that was a trustworthy nuclear actor. In contrast,
the Wisser Affaire raised concerns about South Africa’s nuclear intentions,
trustworthiness and integrity.
A third implication of the Wisser Affaire underlined the importance of multilateral

efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. In a statement to the IAEA Board, Minty
(2007a) attempted to allay the international community’s fears of a nuclear-South
Africa. Apart from stating that investigation into the contravention of non-proliferation
114
legislation was “yet another demonstration of South Africa's commitment to the

Treaty’s non-proliferation provisions”, South African authorities cooperated with other
countries as well as with the IAEA (Minty 2007a). In its response to the conviction of
Wisser and through its NPA, the South African government indicated specifically that
the governments of the US, the UK, Malaysia, Switzerland, Spain and Jordan had
provided assistance in the matter (NPA 2007).
In the fourth instance, the South African government regarded the Wisser Affaire as
one of the “first successful cases” against individuals involved in the Khan network,
with the South African experience having “illustrated the value of the IAEA and of
effective information-sharing that has allowed us to identify individuals or entities
involved in such illicit activities with a view to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit
trade” (NPC 2007).
A fifth implication was that the Wisser Affaire remained unresolved. Although the
NPC had withdrawn the charges against Meyer (NPC 2004), South Africa’s Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (2008a) confirmed the unresolved nature of
the Wisser Affaire and the impact of the network by stating that he suspected that:
many governments feel that they have evidence, but not enough evidence for
a conviction. In Germany, they have attempted a couple of prosecutions but
they did not succeed as the authorities wished to. And there are some
indications that they might be resuming some of those efforts.
Pahad (2008a) also lamented the fact that despite some countries being “well-
positioned” to assist the South African government in its investigations into the Khan
network, assistance from these countries was “not forthcoming”.
Finally, the South African government’s self-assessment of its handling of the Khan
network and the Wisser Affaire was in line with the country’s constructed identity and
role. Commenting on South Africa’s handling of the Affaire, Pahad (2008a) observed
that “we [South Africa] have acted far better than other countries involved in it”.
Pahad (2008a) also described South Africa’s handling of the issue by explaining that
when government authorities first found evidence, it cooperated with internal
authorities on the matter and conducted a “very thorough and comprehensive”
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investigation. Thus, the South African government’s handling of the matter was
another indication of its commitment to comply with international nuclear non-
proliferation norms.
6. An assessment of South Africa’s role and identity regarding the nuclear

non-proliferation export control regimes
Concerns about a possible South African nuclear reversal have persisted between
1990 and 2010. However, South Africa’s niche role and identity is evident from its
nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes.
6.1 South Africa’s state identity and national interests
Since the ANC came to power and despite diplomatic efforts to assert a new identity,
South Africa continues to grapple with “multiple identities” (Serrão & Bischoff 2009:
363). In terms of nuclear-related matters South Africa identified itself as a
“responsible possessor, producer and trader” of dual-use goods (DIRCO 2009: 42)
and as a state that has a “long and principled position on advancing the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy” (Gumbi 2008a: 5). These self-defined identities emanate
from the country’s reconstructed post-1994 foreign policy which, in turn, has resulted
in new diplomatic practices to give expression to them. In this way, South Africa
conceptualised its nuclear-related identity through both negative approximation and
positive approximation (Messari in Serrão & Bischoff 2009: 371). The former refers
to an identity that is formed and maintained through interaction with so-called
enemies. In other words, identity is defined in terms of what South Africa is not. In
this regard, South Africa has distanced itself from actors such as the AQ Khan
network contravening the nuclear export control regimes. In contrast, the latter refers
to South Africa’s positive identification with allies, like-minded states and non-state
actors when commonalities are reinforced through mutual constitution of ideas and
norms. Examples of this included South Africa’s membership of the various nuclear
export control regimes.
In order to define South Africa’s state identity in accordance with its nuclear
diplomacy, Wendt’s (1999:224) constructivist typology of identity, namely corporate
or personal, type, role and collective identities, is applied. Therefore, in the context of
the nuclear export control regimes, South Africa’s corporate or personal identity was
116
constituted by its legislation which complied with the nuclear non-proliferation norm.
South Africa’s type identity referred to its shared identity with like-minded states in
the nuclear export control regimes to prevent nuclear proliferation. The country’s role
identity was evident from its ability to play various roles in these regimes. These
roles include that of a compliant state and a state that promoted nuclear non-
proliferation. South Africa’s collective identity was a combination of its roles as well
as its type identity as a state committed to nuclear non-proliferation.
6.2 South Africa’s diplomatic roles and strategies
South Africa’s social identity as a reflection of its diplomatic roles consists of a set of
meanings that the South African state attributes to itself while taking those of other
states into account. Therefore, the meaning(s) that South Africa ascribes to actors,
events and developments becomes the basis for the country’s actions and
interactions. For South Africa, the material and non-material incentives associated
with niche diplomacy were of particular importance in its attempt to convince the
international community of its commitment to continue with a civilian nuclear
programme. With the dismantling of its nuclear weapons programme and nuclear
weapons, South Africa has accrued moral authority and legitimacy. It has also
secured a niche role through the construction of the country’s nuclear identity.
Speaking at the 1995 NPT REC, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo (1995: 137) stated that
“democratic South Africa is a responsible possessor of advanced technologies” and
that South Africa regards its “non-proliferation and arms control policy as being an
integral part to [sic] our commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable
development, social justice and environmental protection”. This nuclear identity
includes an identity of self-proclaimed leadership in nuclear matters. Addressing the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs in May 1995, Rusty Evans
(1995: 106), the then Director-General of the DFA, for example, stated that due to
South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT, it is
“able to play a leading role in multilateral disarmament fora”.
South Africa’s diplomatic behaviour pertaining to multilateral nuclear export control

regimes exemplifies that of a typical middle power. In fact, South Africa is recognized
as a middle power by Van der Westhuizen (1998); Nel, Taylor and Van der
Westhuizen (2001); and Schoeman (2000 & 2003); and as an “emergent para-
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Western middle power” (Serrão & Bischoff 2009: 378). As Ungerer (2007: 396)
indicates, middle powers more often than not have substantial technical and
scientific expertise that contributes to their diplomatic competence in negotiations on
these issues. South Africa falls into this category. At the height of its nuclear
weapons programme, the AEC, predecessor of NECSA employed about 8 200
scientists (Liberman 2001: 77).
In its practice of nuclear diplomacy, South Africa has employed all the strategies of
confrontation, parallelism and partnership on the international nuclear non-
proliferation export control regimes. In engaging on international nuclear non-
proliferation export controls, South Africa has applied partnership as a diplomatic
strategy, as evidenced by its collaborative partnership with NWS and emerging NWS
in voluntary export control regimes such as the ZC and the WA. Its use of parallelism
is evidenced by its parallel action alongside one or more nuclear superpowers and
its coalition partners in the NAC. In supporting India, for example, a special
dispensation outside the NSG, or supporting Iran’s nuclear programme for some
years (Du Preez 2006), South Africa also confronted some NWS. South Africa is
strongly supporting the principles of Article III of the NPT which provides states an
“inalienable right” to nuclear power for peaceful purposes (see Chapter 4). More
recently in 2011, South Africa cooperated with NWS in the call upon Iran to
implement the requirements set by several UN Resolutions calling on Iran to
terminate its nuclear weapons programme (Minty 2011a).
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy provided it with locational (one of the few African
states to have acquired and give up nuclear weapons); traditional (the country has a
nuclear history); and consensual (South Africa’s non-proliferation commitment is
reflective of the country’s post-apartheid commitments) advantages over other
countries. Therefore, South Africa has increased its diplomatic influence, authority,
non-material power and economic incentives. Moreover, the country has constructed
a unique brand of niche diplomacy by employing a number of diplomatic practices
which have provided some material and non-material rewards such as status,
prestige and trade opportunities. For South Africa, these rewards were particularly
important to convince the international community of its commitment to continue with
a civilian nuclear programme rather than reverting back to a nuclear weapons
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programme or becoming involved in illicit nuclear networks. By dismantling its

nuclear weapons programme and destructing its “nuclear devices”, South Africa has
accrued moral authority and legitimacy. South Africa has evolved as a normative
power from the developing South in the area of nuclear diplomacy.
The South African government has also expressed its preferred form for its nuclear
diplomacy, i.e. “all bilateral and multilateral initiatives to prevent the proliferation and
development of such weapons on the one hand and to promote total disarmament of
these weapons on the other” (DIRCO 2011a). In fact, the South African government
maintained that it regards multilateralism as an important instrument for the
“resolution of global challenges” such as disarmament and the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons (DIRCO 2010c: 41).
6.3 South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship and leadership
In terms of Young’s (1991) leadership autonomy, South Africa has displayed at least
two out of three types of leadership in the multilateral nuclear export regimes.
Young’s (1991) first type of leadership is structural leadership. This is exhibited when
leaders, or a leading country, make decisions about resources available to them to
achieve a multilateral bargain. With regards to South Africa’s role exposing the Khan
network, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) stated that South Africa “worked closely”
with the IAEA after investigations of a South African connection to the Khan nuclear
non-proliferation network (NTI 2010a).31 The South African government has admitted
that South Africa’s experience has “shown that no control regime, no matter how
comprehensive, can fully guarantee against abuse” (Dlamini-Zuma 2007a).
Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership refers to leaders who are not in a position of

power but nonetheless use their diplomatic negotiating and bargaining skills to
achieve a particular outcome. South Africa has positioned itself as a norm
entrepreneur (Geldenhuys, 2006a). Moreover, South Africa has also positioned itself
as a “responsible possessor, producer and trader” in dual-use goods (DIRCO 2009a:
42); especially in its handling of the Wisser Affaire and the Khan network. South
Africa’s norm construction in its nuclear diplomacy is evident in the South African
31
Established in 2001, the NTI is a US-based non-governmental organisation under the co-leadership
of US Senator Sam Nunn. The NTI focuses, inter alia, on nuclear disarmament and uranium security
(NTI 2011).
119
government’s legislation and policies on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and

arms control that incorporates the obligations of the CWC, the BTWC, the NSG and
the WA (DIRCO 2011a). South Africa has incorporated these obligations sometimes
prior to its accession to or membership of these conventions or groups.
Predominantly, most governments require only export permits for the export or re-
export of controlled goods. However, according to the South African government, the
country is one of a small number of states that require both import permits for the
import of controlled goods and export permits for the export or re-export of controlled
goods (South Africa 2005a: 8). In terms of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act 87 of 1993, it is required that for the import and export of chemical,
nuclear dual-use and missile controlled goods, import and export permits should be
obtained from the NPC. In addition to this and in terms of the Nuclear Energy Act 46
of 1999, the South African government requires that for the “import, export or
transport of nuclear material”, import, export or transport permits should be obtained
from the Minister of Minerals and Energy (since May 1990, the Minister of Energy).
For the import, export or re-export of conventional armament items or dual-use
items, import or export permits should be obtained from the NCACC (South Africa
2005a: 8-9).
Finally, intellectual leadership can change the normative or ideational environment to

create opportunities for the achievement of a particular objective (Browne, Shetty &
Somerville 2010: 381). South Africa has styled itself and gained global recognition as
a leader in the global nuclear arena. Some global recognition for South Africa’s
nuclear non-proliferation efforts occurred. In January 2010, the NTI, amongst others,
maintained that South Africa “has emerged as a champion of both global nuclear
nonproliferation and equal access to peaceful nuclear energy” (NTI 2010a).
7. ConcIusion
Since 1990, South Africa has constructed its norms, identity, role and interests in
such a way that it has increased its diplomatic influence, authority and non-material
power in terms of nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes. Moreover, the
country has constructed a brand of nuclear diplomacy by employing a number of
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niche diplomatic practices which have provided some material and non-material
rewards in the form of status, prestige and even trade opportunities.
This chapter traced South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in the multilateral nuclear non-
proliferation export control regimes. It explained the nature and utility of these
regimes prior to outlining the principles of export control regimes and it traced South
Africa’s ascension to these regimes. South Africa’s involvement in these regimes is
voluntary and only places a moral responsibility on the country. Thus, it indicated the
sincerity of the South African government to comply with its international nuclear
non-proliferation obligations. However, the period between 1990 and 1993 - the
interregnum between a nuclear-armed South Africa and a global nuclear icon - was
particularly problematic. During this period, South Africa continued with testing
ballistic missiles and importing nuclear-related equipment. Subsequent to the IAEA’s
verification of the dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme in 1993,
the South African government introduced aspects of these regimes in its legislation
prior to its membership of some of these regimes.
South Africa’s nuclear export control establishment and policies are wide-ranging
and comply with its international obligations. However, despite these comprehensive
institutional frameworks, several concerns about South Africa’s sincerity remained.
These international concerns were amplified with the involvement of former
government nuclear scientists and foreign nationals’ involvement in the AQ Khan
network. Nevertheless, South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy in such a
manner as to secure a niche role and state identity by employing three main
strategies.
South Africa’s membership and partnership of these regimes illustrates the country’s
departure from its previous nuclear identity as a state with nuclear weapons.
Moreover, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to these regimes resulted in
the construction of a niche role and state identity as a FNWS that complies with
nuclear non-proliferation norms.
The next chapter analyses South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA as an
expression of South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism and nuclear non-
proliferation norms in its conduct of nuclear diplomacy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1. Introduction
Since its inception in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA
or the Agency) has been the primary multilateral institution to prevent nuclear
proliferation, to oversee the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to secure the safety
of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA can also be regarded as the
“implementation agency” of the NPT. As a founder member of the IAEA, South Africa
has subscribed to these principles. However, once the NP-led government’s nuclear
weapons programme went ‘critical’ and global opposition to the Government’s
domestic policies increased, relations between South Africa and the IAEA
deteriorated.32 South Africa was suspended from the IAEA Board of Governors
(hereafter Board or IAEA Board) which is the IAEA’s principal decision-making body.
It was only by the beginning of the 1990s, after South Africa had again taken up its
position in the IAEA that relations normalised. However, following the return of the
“prodigal nuclear son” relations have at times been strained due to South Africa’s
stance and the IAEA’s demands on particular issues.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA
since the country terminated its nuclear weapons programme. Although the period
between 1990 and 2010 is considered, references to earlier relations will be made.
The main emphasis is the IAEA’s verification of the dismantling of South Africa’s
nuclear weapons programme; the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement between South Africa and the IAEA from 1989 to 1994; the process of
converting the SAFARI-1 nuclear research reactor from using HEU to LEU (1991-
2005); South Africa’s position in favour of greater representation for developing
countries on the Board (1995 onwards); its ambition to be elected to the position of
Director General (2008-2009); and its refusal to support the establishment of a
nuclear fuel bank in Russia under the IAEA’s auspices (2009-2010).33
32
The term ‘critical’ refers to the minimum mass of a uranium-235 (U-235) isotope required to cause a
nuclear chain reaction.
33
The IAEA uses the spelling Director General instead of Director-General. See http://www.iaea.org.
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Accordingly, the objective is to show how South Africa constructed a brand of niche
diplomacy in its relations with the IAEA by employing the diplomatic practices of
confrontation, parallelism and partnership. It is argued that these practices have
provided South Africa with material and non-material rewards that include status,
prestige and trade opportunities. One of the raisons d’être of niche diplomacy is its
ability to “generate return worth having” (Henrikson 2005: 70-71), implying that a
state wants to achieve non-material objectives. This, in turn, can generate
international prestige, status, material benefit, soft power and moral authority. These
incentives are of particular importance to convince the international community of
South Africa’s commitment to continue with a non-weapons nuclear programme and
to uphold its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
Four main themes dominate South Africa’s diplomacy with the IAEA. These are
South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation; its call for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons; its support of the inalienable right of all states to
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and its call for more representation of
developing countries in the IAEA. In order to contextualise these themes, the next
section chronicles South Africa’s involvement in the establishment of the Agency, as
well as the country’s relations with the Agency until 1990. The chapter then proceeds
to an analysis of South Africa’s relations with the IAEA between 1990 and 2010 by
focusing on selected case studies. The selected cases include the membership and
leadership of the Board of Governors; the expansion of the membership of the
Board; the IAEA nuclear fuel reserve; the Khan network; and the conversion of
SAFARI-1. The chapter concludes with an assessment of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy with the IAEA.
2. South Africa’s pre-1990 relations with the International Atomic Energy

Agency
The “Atoms for Peace” address to the UNGA by US President Dwight D Eisenhower
on 8 December 1953 paved the way for the establishment of the IAEA. In his
address, Eisenhower (1953) proposed the establishment of an atomic energy
commission by stating that governments developing nuclear energy:
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should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their
stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international
atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up
under the aegis of the United Nations.
Eisenhower (1953) also proposed that the purpose of the agency should be to
“devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the
peaceful pursuits of mankind”. Eisenhower’s address resulted in a series of
developments; most notably the establishment of the IAEA. Moreover, for South
Africa it signalled its first multilateral involvement in nuclear diplomacy.
2.1 South Africa’s role in the establishment of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (1953-1964)
Typical of most Cold War relations, the USSR dismissed Eisenhower’s proposal. By
November 1954, the US presented more concrete proposals to the UNGA for the
establishment of an atomic energy agency. In December 1954, the UK presented the
US with a proposed draft of a Statute for the agency to which the US responded with
a revised draft of its own. In the beginning of 1955, the US, the UK, France, Canada,
Australia, South Africa, Belgium and later Portugal commenced with negotiations in
Washington on the Statute of the new agency based on the US/UK draft. South
Africa’s involvement - as a member of the Eight-Nation Negotiating Group that also
included Australia, Belgium (due to the uranium-rich Belgian Congo), Canada and
Portugal (Hecht 2006: 27) - stemmed from its status as a major uranium-producing
country. The main purpose of the Eight-Nation Negotiating Group was to reach
agreement on the text of a Statute for the agency, establish the agency and invite
other states to join as members (Fischer 1997: 30). When the USSR finally joined
the negotiations on 18 July 1955 - the “first major thaw in the post-war relations
between Moscow and Washington” (Fischer 1997: 31) - the proposed agency was
already named the IAEA.
From 8 to 20 August 1955 the UN convened the first major international conference
on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Switzerland. The so-called “First Geneva
Conference” was attended by 1 500 delegates, including scientists and engineers.
More importantly, the Conference was the first ever inter-governmental gathering on
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the peaceful uses of atomic energy and paved the way for the formal establishment
of the IAEA. However, South Africa was not part of the negotiating group (the US,
USSR, UK, France, Canada and Czechoslovakia) which met at the Geneva
Conference to “consider the technical questions that would arise in drawing up a
system of safeguards” (Fischer 1997: 33). At the UNGA session in 1955 it was
agreed that the Eight-Nation Negotiating Group would be expanded to 12 as per a
proposal of the USSR. The UNGA also took a decision that a revised version of the
draft Statute would be circulated to all UN members and specialised agencies, and
that the UN would host a conference towards the end of 1956 to review and finally
approve the Statute (Fischer 1997: 31-34).
However, in March 1956, while the Twelve-Nation Negotiating Group met in

Washington, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld implemented the UNGA’s
call for an atomic agency and established the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). His decision ensured that the UN - rather than the
IAEA - would play the major role in securing global nuclear safety (Fischer 1997: 46).
When the US distributed the draft Statute to all UN members in April 1956, the
question of China’s representation (as a permanent member of the UNSC) was still
unresolved. The matter was eventually resolved and on 20 September 1956, 82
states attended the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA at the UN headquarters in
New York. This was an ad hoc meeting of concerned states and not of the UN itself.
By 23 October 1956, the Conference approved the complete revised text of the
Statute. On 29 July 1957, the IAEA Statute entered into force with the ratification of
the Statute by 26 states (Fischer 1997: 47, 49).
South Africa, as indicated in Section A of the Annex of the IAEA Statute, along with
18 other states, became a member of the First Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)
on 26 October 1956 (the day that the Statute opened for signature) and remained a
member of the PrepCom until the formal establishment of the IAEA on 3 October
1957 (IAEA 1957). These 18 states included the Twelve-Nation Negotiating Group
and six other states elected by the Statute Conference. The PrepCom designated
the members of the first Board of the IAEA, including:
• Canada, France, the USSR, the UK and the USA;
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• Five states from other regions leading in nuclear technology (Australia, Brazil,
India, Japan and South Africa);
• Two producers of uranium (Czechoslovakia and Portugal); and
• A purveyor of technical assistance (Sweden) (Fischer 1997: 64).
South Africa became a member of the IAEA on 6 June 1957. Reflecting on these
negotiations, a South African diplomat and delegate at these meetings, Donald Sole
(1997: 21), admitted that his “major concern in the drafting of the IAEA Statute was
to secure for South Africa a seat on the Governing Body of the new agency”. Sole,
who was later elected as the third Chairman of the IAEA Board, acknowledged that
the South African delegation had achieved their “primary objective - a seat on the
Board of Governors” (Sole 1997: 21). However, according to Sole (1997: 20), at this
early stage in the life of the Agency pressure was already mounting against South
Africa as a “pariah state” due to its domestic policies.
The first phase of South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA demonstrated its
use of partnership as a diplomatic strategy. During this phase, South Africa’s
diplomatic relations also focused on the institutionalisation of the norms of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear disarmament; and nuclear non-
proliferation. This is further evidenced in South Africa’s support for the
institutionalisation of the IAEA as the main global organisation to promote and
maintain nuclear safeguards for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the
next phase (1965-1990) of South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA turned
out to be more confrontational as a result of international opposition to the country’s
domestic policies and the development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons
programme and the “nuclear devices” announced by FW de Klerk in 1993.
2.2 South Africa’s role in the International Atomic Energy Agency (1965 - 1989)
With the onset of the Cold War and the increase in the number of NWS, the need to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons culminated in the signing of the NPT in
1968 and its entry into force in 1970 (see Chapter 6). As part of nuclear export
control regimes and in terms of Article I of the NPT, NWS undertook “not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices” and not to “assist, encourage, or
126
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices” (NPT 1970). For their part, according to Article II, NNWS
undertook not to “receive the transfer”, not to “manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons” or not to “receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (NPT 1970).
Therefore, the NPT reiterated and expanded the IAEA’s authority by requiring that all
state parties accept and apply IAEA safeguards to “all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere”. In addition to this, the NPT
also requires state parties not to provide “source or special fissionable material” or:
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use

or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material shall
be subject to the safeguards required” [by the IAEA] (IAEA 1970).
During the first years of IAEA membership South Africa had complied with the IAEA
Statute. This initial phase of partnership and cooperation lasted until 1964, after
which South Africa’s relationship with the IAEA gradually regressed into one of
confrontation. This was mainly due to the country’s domestic policies and suspicions
of norm deviance as far as nuclear energy was concerned. As a result, from 1965
when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd inaugurated the first nuclear reactor on the
African continent (SAFARI-1) the relations between South Africa and the Agency
changed. South Africa embarked on a collision course with the aforesaid normative
and legal framework. For years the NP-led government denied the country’s nuclear
capabilities and weapons.34 Until the full extent of its nuclear weapons programme
from 1969 to 1989 became evident, the relationship between South Africa and the
34
Walters (1987) and Moore (1987) reported the existence of a secret South African nuclear weapons
programme prior to President de Klerk’s announcement in March 1993. Further archival and primary
research by Reiss (1995); Hounam and McQuillan (1995); Van Vuuren (2003); Purkitt and Burgess
(2005); Venter (2008) and Van Wyk (2010) revealed the extent of South Africa’s nuclear weapons
programme from 1969 to 1989. This archival and primary research was supplemented by
presentations and publications by South African scientists and military officials such as Waldo Stumpf
(1995a & 1995b); and Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt and Jan van Loggerenberg (2003).
127
Agency deteriorated and changed.35 This was evidenced by a series of

developments which, amongst others, contributed to South Africa losing its
designation as a member for the African region on the Board in 1976 and being
replaced by Egypt in 1977 (Nzo 1994: 28; Hecht 2006: 46) (see Figure 5).
Between 1969 and 1979, all research and development on South African nuclear
explosive devices were undertaken by the South African Atomic Energy Board
(AEB), the predecessor of the AEC. In 1979, this responsibility was transferred to
Armscor, which operated from its so-called Circle facilities, 15km from Pelindaba
where the AEC was located. The AEC, however, remained responsible for the
production and supply of HEU and for theoretical and development studies on
nuclear weapons technology (Von Baeckmann, Dillon & Perricos 1995: 47).
Although South Africa’s nuclear explosives programme was “officially still aimed at
peaceful uses until about 1977…the emphasis changed officially to a strategic
deterrent capability” (Stumpf 1995a). As an adjunct of this shift in April 1978, Prime
Minister John Vorster approved a three-phased “deterrent strategy” for South Africa
(see Figure 6). More pertinent were the results of the South African nuclear weapons
programme that underpinned the deterrent strategy. The first South African ‘device’
was completed in 1978 with more ‘devices’ completed at an “orderly pace of less
than one per year” (Stumpf 1995a). The first aircraft-deliverable vehicle was
completed in 1982. Eventually, six “nuclear devices” were produced (De Klerk 1993).
South Africa ignored repeated calls by the IAEA to subject itself to IAEA safeguards
and inspections. According to Ambassador Ampie Roux (1970), the South African
delegate at the IAEA, some states are “understandably reluctant to surrender, almost
irrevocably, long-held sovereign rights without having precise details of all the
implications”. This view became South Africa’s nuclear mantra until it finally ratified
the NPT in 1991. South Africa’s refusal to ratify the NPT meant that none of the
country’s nuclear research facilities and activities was covered by IAEA safeguards
and inspections.
35
Waldo Stumpf (1995a) indicated that results from an indigenous uranium enrichment process were
achieved as early as 1969.
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Figure 5: A summary and contextualisation of South Africa’s diplomatic relations

with the IAEA (1957 - 2010)
Member of Eight
Eisenhower's Formal
Nation Negotiating Member of First
"Atoms for Peace" establishment of
Group drafting PrepCom
Address to UNGA IAEA
IAEA Statute (26 October 1956)
(8 December 1953) (3 October 1957)
(1955)
Egypt challenges
Member of first and South Africa's Suspended from
Member of IAEA
subsequent Boards designation as Board
(6 June 1957) Board member
(1957 - 1977) (1977)
(1977)
De Klerk Signs NPT and

Koeberg IAEA consultations terminates Safeguards
operational with South Africa weapons Agreement with
(1984) (1980s) programme IAEA
(1989) (1991)
IAEA verification De Klerk confirmed Inauguration of

process of nuclear Returns to take up
that South Africa GNU with Nelson
weapons its seat as Board
has six "nuclear Mandela as
programme member
devices" President
(1991-1993) (1995)
(March 1993) (April - June 1994)
Signs First Country

Signs Additional South Africans
Programme Announces PBMR
Protocol with IAEA involved in AQ
Framework with programme
(13 September Khan network
IAEA (2002)
2002) (2004)
(1999)
Minty's candidature
Consultations with Minty loses to
Signs Second CFA for IAEA Director-
IAEA on SAFARI-I Japanese
with IAEA General
conversion candidate
(2006) (12 September
(July 2005) (2009)
2008)
Author’s own compilation
In contrast, South Africa eagerly informed the Agency of its nuclear development
activities. In 1972, for example, Ambassador Roux (1972) informed the IAEA
General Conference (GC) that the construction of South Africa’s small-scale
enrichment plant was progressing and that South African advances in nuclear
129
36
science had “far exceeded expectations”.
e In 1975 Roux informed the
th IAEA that
“apart from developing its enrichment capability, South Africa was
as constantly
intensifying its prospecting activities”;
a that the first phase of the co
ountry’s pilot
enrichment plant was success
ssfully commissioned; and that feasibility stu
tudies for the
construction of a “full-scale commercial
c plant” were completed ‘satisfacctorily’ (Roux
1975).
Figure 6: South Africa’s thre

ree-phased nuclear deterrent strategy
Phase 1
Strategic uncertainty in which nuclear

nuc deterrent capability will not be acknowledge
ged or denied.
Phase 2
Should South Africa be threatened

ened by Warsaw Pact countries through surrogate C Cuban forces
in Angola, covert acknowledg
dgement to certain international powers, e.g. the US
S would be
contemplated.
Phase 3
In case partial disclosure does not result in the removal of the threat, public ackno
nowledgement
or demonstration by an undergr
rground test of South Africa's capability, would be e cconsidered.
De Klerk (1993) & Stu

tumpf (1995a)
The IAEA also made various attempts to persuade the South African go
overnment to
terminate its nuclear weapon
ons programme. Amongst others these incl
cluded South
Africa’s suspension from the
he IAEA Board of Governors in 1977, a position the
country held from 1957; the adoption
ad of several resolutions against South
th Africa; and
the institution of South Africa’
a’s nuclear weapons programme as a standi
ding issue on
the IAEA GC agenda. Moreo
reover, the credentials of the South African
an delegation
attending the IAEA GC in 1979
1 were refused and several calls were
ere made by,
36
The IAEA GC is the highest polic
licymaking body of the Agency. Composed of repressentatives of all
member states of the IAEA, the GC G meets annually to discuss and approve the Ag Agency's annual
programme and budget. The GC also a considers and decides on any other matters bro
brought before it
by the Board of Governors, the Dire
rector General or any member state (IAEA 1957 & 201
012a).
130
amongst others, Nigeria and the Group of 77 (G-77), to terminate South Africa’s
membership of the IAEA (Khan 1997: 307) (see Figure 6).
Once it became clear that the IAEA attempts to influence South Africa had failed, the
confrontation between the IAEA and South Africa shifted to the main organs of the
UN. When the UNGA urged South Africa in December 1982 to stop the development
of its nuclear weapons capability, it also requested the IAEA to discontinue its
assistance to South Africa on nuclear issues and to exclude South Africa from all of
its technical working groups. As the political situation in South Africa deteriorated,
the IAEA Board and the GC considered the suspension of South Africa’s privileges
and rights of membership of the IAEA. Amidst all of these concerns, South Africa’s
first nuclear power station, the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, began to supply the
national power grid on 4 April 1984 (Xingwana 2004: 20).
Whereas the calls for South Africa’s suspension mainly emanated from African
member states such as Egypt and Nigeria, Western governments such as the US
and the UK pressurised South Africa to ratify the NPT. They argued that South
Africa’s suspension would undermine the IAEA’s efforts to engage South Africa on
the termination of the country’s nuclear weapons programme. Subsequent to South
Africa’s suspension from the Board, the GC adopted various resolutions condemning
South Africa’s domestic policies and its nuclear weapons programme. In addition to
this, several IAEA reports on the South African nuclear weapons programme served
before the GC and various resolutions calling on South Africa to submit its nuclear
facilities to IAEA safeguards were also adopted (IAEA 1985 & 1986).37
Communication between the Agency and South Africa during 1984 revealed that
South Africa was considering the application of IAEA safeguards for the nuclear
facility Valindaba. Subsequent to meetings between the IAEA and South Africa in
May 1985, an IAEA delegation visited the country in August 1985 and met with the
AEC to discuss drafts of a safeguards agreement with the South African government
(IAEA 1985). Despite these interactions, the South African government refused to
accept the IAEA proposals. Consequently, the IAEA decided to take stricter action
against the country. Despite the efforts of Western countries to influence South
37
These included resolutions of the GC, namely GC(XXVIII)/RES/423 (1985) and GC(XXX)/RES/789
(1986).
131
Africa to accede to the NPT, the Board decided to suspend South Africa from the
Agency in June 1987 and recommended that the GC should proceed with South
Africa’s suspension from the Agency (Fischer 1997: 109-110).
However, South African State President PW Botha announced on 21 September

1987 that the South African government “hopes that it will soon be able to sign the
NPT and has decided to open discussions with others to this end” (UN 1991: 9).
Consequently, the Board decided to defer its decision to suspend South Africa’s
membership of the Agency. Subsequent to President Botha’s announcement
diplomatic efforts shifted to influencing the South African government to accede to
the NPT. From August 1988, a series of talks between South African officials and the
NPT depository countries, the US, the Soviet Union and the UK took place at the
IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Led by South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik
Botha, the South African delegation was mainly interested in “clarifying the cost and
benefits of adherence” as well as the responsibilities under the IAEA Safeguards
Agreement (UN 1991: 11). These commercial - rather than security and military -
concerns date back to 1968 when South Africa explained to the UNGA that it would
not submit to IAEA safeguards as it was concerned about commercial espionage.
This view was repeated in 1970 when the South African Prime Minister explained to
Parliament that South Africa was willing to accept IAEA safeguards on the condition
that the safeguards “did not allow commercial espionage or hinder South African
civilian nuclear research” (UN 1991: 11).
The next round of talks between the South African government and the depository
countries took place in Vienna in December 1989. This time the South African
delegation, composed of pro- and anti-NPT delegates, expressed concern about the
practicalities of acceding to the NPT. The talks concluded with the South African
delegation indicating that domestic concerns about accession to the NPT should first
be addressed before the country could accede. However, it took almost a year to
address these domestic concerns.
By September 1990, a written statement by Minister Pik Botha was circulated at the
34th Regular Session of the GC. In the statement, Botha indicated that South Africa
was “prepared to accede to the Treaty” - but with a caveat - “in the context of an
equal commitment by the other states in the Southern African region” (Minister of
132
Foreign Affairs 1990: 1). Moreover, Botha also indicated that his government
intended to commence with talks with the IAEA on concluding a safeguards
agreement with the Agency. South Africa’s diplomatic effort paid off. At its
conclusion, the IAEA Director General indicated that the Agency was ready to
commence with talks with South Africa “without delay” (UN 1991: 11).
Thus, South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA between 1965 and 1990 were
characterised by confrontation as the country deviated from IAEA norms. The
Agency pressurised the South African government to reveal the extent of its nuclear
weapons programme, whereas the South African government refused to yield on any
of the IAEA’s demands due to the government’s threat perception and the country’s
increased isolation. South Africa also faced increasing UN sanctions and was
severely criticized by, amongst others, the G-77. However, as forthwith indicated,
once South Africa ‘returned’ to the IAEA, it became a vocal campaigner for the right
of developing countries to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
3. South Africa’s post-1990 relations with the International Atomic Energy

Agency
The first years of South Africa’s ‘return’ to the IAEA overlapped with the
constitutional negotiations and the political transition in the country. Since 1994,
successive Government statements to meetings of the IAEA reiterated the good
technical cooperation between the country and the IAEA (Nzo 1994; Mlambo-
Ngcuka 1999; Xingwana 2004). This was a repetition of South Africa’s historical
stance on the technical - rather than political - role of the IAEA since the
establishment of the IAEA (Hecht 2006: 30).
3.1 The legal and diplomatic framework of South Africa’s post-1990

relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency
In 1991, South Africa concluded two major international nuclear-related agreements,

namely the ratification of the NPT (10 July 1991) and the conclusion of a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (16 September 1991) (see
Chapters 3 and 6). The Safeguards Agreement was preceded by the approval of the
dismantling and destruction of South Africa’s nuclear weapons and programme by
President de Klerk and the assurance that “all of the HEU from the weapons, [was]
133
melted down and returned from Armscor to the AEC” by 6 September 1991 (IAEA
1993a: 7).
3.1.1 The verification process and the implementation of the Safeguards

Agreement
Comprising 98 articles, the Safeguards Agreement between South Africa and the
Agency entered into force on 16 September 1991 (IAEA 1991). The implementation
of the Safeguards Agreement, including ad hoc inspections of South African facilities
by a team of senior IAEA officials specially appointed by the Agency’s Director
General, began in November 1991. This followed the IAEA’s receipt of South Africa’s
Initial Report (submitted on 31 October 1991) as well as the Report on the
completeness of the inventory of South Africa’s nuclear installations and nuclear
material as of 30 September 1991 produced by the AEC in 1991 (AEC 1991).
Notwithstanding these two South African reports, the IAEA maintained that the initial
assistance provided by the South African government “was not considered to be
sufficient” (AEC 1991: 2).
Between November 1991 and September 1993 the IAEA carried out 22 inspection
missions in South Africa. These missions included more than 150 inspections at
individual South African nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities (IAEA 1993a:
1) to “implement the [Safeguards] agreement and verify the completeness and
assess the correctness of South Africa’s Initial Report” (IAEA 1993b: 27). The IAEA
team found “no evidence that the list of facilities and locations outside facilities”
provided by South Africa in its Initial Report was ‘incomplete’ (IAEA 1993a: 2).
However, the IAEA inspection team reported that “the uranium-235 [U-235] balances
they had calculated for both the pilot enrichment plant and the semi-commercial
enrichment plant showed apparent discrepancies” (IAEA 1993a: 2).
Subsequent to this report, the IAEA inspection team made additional visits to South
Africa to examine these U-235 discrepancies. Based on historical records provided
by the AEC, the IAEA team concluded that, at the time, South Africa’s U-235 balance
of the HEU, LEU and depleted uranium produced by the pilot enrichment plant “is
consistent with the uranium feed” and that the amounts of HEU “which could have
been produced by the pilot enrichment plant are consistent with the amounts
134
declared in the initial report [by the South African government]” (IAEA 1993a: 2-3).
The “apparent discrepancy” in the U-235 balance of the semi-commercial enrichment
plant was not resolved at the time (IAEA 1993a: 3). Against the background of the U-
235 discrepancies, the US expressed concerns about the South African programme
by stating that the US had “serious questions about South Africa’s compliance” with
its obligations in terms of the NPT (Lockwood & Wolfsthal 1993: 253).
According to Von Baeckmann, Dillon and Perricos (1995: 42), the South African
verification process was ‘complex’ and “further complicated” by President de Klerk’s
announcement on 24 March 1993 which meant that the IAEA was required to extend
its assignment and include nuclear weapons experts in its teams verifying the
destruction and dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear weapons and its programme. In
addition to this, the IAEA (1993a: Annex 1; 1993a: 7) alleged that President de Klerk
ordered the destruction and damage of “classified documents” and ‘sensitive’
equipment. In response to these allegations, the South African government invited
the IAEA inspection team to assess the status of South Africa’s former nuclear
weapons programme. These visits occurred from 22 April to 4 May; from 3 to 11
June; and from 9 to 13 August 1993. The team had to determine the ‘adequacy’ of
the measures taken by the South African government to destroy sensitive
components of its nuclear weapons and to recover the nuclear material involved in
terms of the Safeguards Agreement with South Africa (IAEA 1993a: 3).
When the IAEA inspection team visited South Africa, the dismantling and the
destruction of weapons components and technical documentation (during what was
designated as Operation Masada) of the country’s nuclear weapons programme had
been “nearly completed” (IAEA 1993a: 8). No records had been kept of the
dismantling of the demonstration device or on “any of the pre-production
experimental devices or on the destruction of their components” (IAEA 1993a: 8). In
response to this, the IAEA inspection team recommended the “complete destruction”
of all remaining “components, photographs and drawings” which could reveal any
information of the nuclear material core and components (IAEA 1993a: 8-9).
The IAEA inspection team concluded that it found “substantial evidence” of the
destruction of non-nuclear material components; that it found “no indication” that
“substantial amounts of depleted or natural uranium used in the nuclear weapons
135
programme are unaccounted for”; and that South Africa’s nuclear weapons
programme had been terminated (IAEA 1994a: 157). Unlike previous inspections,
South African authorities provided “extensive co-operation” with the Agency in the
implementation of safeguards, the IAEA inspection team “encountered a highly
cooperative attitude on behalf of the South African authorities” and in arranging
access to all the facilities, concluded that no information about the existence of “any
undeclared facilities” could be determined and that the Vastrap test site in the
Kalahari Desert was “rendered useless” (IAEA 1993a: 2, 9, 10 & 27). Despite the
destruction of documentation during Operation Masada, the South African
government was complimented for the “transparency and openness shown” during
the verification process (Von Baeckmann, Dillon & Perricos 1995: 48). South Africa’s
norm compliance was confirmed by several IAEA publications and officials (see
IAEA 1993a).
The IAEA’s verification process was, according to the Agency’s publication entitled
History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The first forty years, “made easier
by the co-operation of the South African nuclear authorities, who provided the IAEA
with access and data beyond those required by its NPT safeguards agreement”
(Fischer 1997: 110). Moreover, the IAEA confirmed that the South African
government provided the IAEA verification team with “all the operating records of
South Africa’s previously unsafeguarded enrichment plant, and permitted the IAEA
inspectors ‘to go any place, any time’” (Fischer 1997: 110).
By September 1993, the IAEA (1993a: 10) concluded that the status of the
Safeguards Agreement between South Africa and the IAEA was ‘satisfactory’ (see
Figure 7). In particular, the IAEA (1993a:10, 11 & 27) reported that:
• the HEU amounts presented to the IAEA were “consistent with amounts
declared in the initial report”;
• there was nothing “to suggest that substantial amounts of depleted or natural
uranium used in the nuclear weapons programme are unaccounted for”; and
• There was nothing “to suggest that there remain any sensitive components of
the nuclear weapons programme which have not been either rendered
useless or converted to commercial non-nuclear applications or peaceful
nuclear usage”.
136
With this, the IAEA concluded that South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme had
been terminated, that all South Africa’s HEU had been accounted for and that no
evidence of any sensitive components of the nuclear weapons programme existed
as these components had been rendered useless or converted to commercial non-
nuclear applications.
Figure 7: The IAEA verification process of South Africa’s declared nuclear

inventory (1991-1994)
South Africa signs IAEA compiles list of

South Africa submitted
Comprehensive South African nuclear
initial report of nuclear
Safeguards facilities nuclear
programme to IAEA
Agreement with IAEA material inventory
(30 October 1991)
(16 September 1991) (November 1991)
IAEA-South Africa
IAEA carried out
seminar on
IAEA commences ad successful physical
accountancy
hoc inspections inventory verification
procedures for
(November 1991) (PIV)
Safeguards
(October 1992)
(Date unspecified)
Visit by IAEA Further IAEA

inspection team to inspection team visits
Further IAEA PIV
Armscor/Circle (22 April - 4 May, 3 -11
facilities (August 1993)
June and 9-13 August
(25 March 1993) 1993)
FinaI IAEA PIV

(October 1994)
Von Baeckmann, Dillon & Perricos (1995: 42-43, 45)
In summary, the post-1990 South African government cooperated with the IAEA
during the Agency’s verification process and the implementation of the Safeguards
Agreement in South Africa. Employing cooperation as a diplomatic strategy paved
the way for greater acceptance of South Africa’s intention to comply with nuclear
137
non-proliferation norms. The next section outlines South Africa’s bilateral

agreements with the IAEA as a further indication of the Government’s norm
compliance during the final stages of the NP Government.
3.1.2 South Africa’s bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency
Apart from the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, South Africa concluded several
other agreements with the IAEA (see Table 11), most of them since the termination
of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme.
Table 11: South Africa’s agreements with the IAEA (1990-2010)
Agreement Status Date
NPT-related agreement Entry into force 16 September

1991
African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Entry into force 18 May 1992
Research, Development and Training related
to Nuclear Science and Technology
Improved procedures for designation of Accepted 19 July 1995

safeguards inspectors
First Country Programme Framework Implemented 1999-2004
Second Extension Agreement Entry into force 4 April 2000
Protocol Additional to the Agreement Entry into force 13 September

between the Government of the Republic of 2002
South Africa and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Second Country Programme Framework Implemented 2006-2010
Supplementary Agreement on provision of Entry into force Not available

technical assistance by the IAEA
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities Entry into force Non-party
BuaNews (5 December 2006) & IAEA (2009a)

138
Of the bilateral agreements the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter the Additional Protocol) is one of the
most important SA-IAEA agreements since 1990. The Additional Protocol is
designed for states which have already signed a Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA. The purpose of the Additional Protocol is to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to
“detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in order to provide credible
assurances of and confidence in the peaceful application of nuclear energy” (South
Africa 2011). Signed by South Africa on 13 September 2002, the Additional Protocol,
according to the South African government, placed an “extra burden on South Africa
in terms of comprehensive information to be submitted and kept up to date in terms
of Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol” (South Africa 2005b). In terms of the Additional
Protocol, IAEA inspectors also have greater access to South Africa’s nuclear sites,
facilities and activities. According to the South African government, this “additional
burden” is outweighed by the “advantages in terms of strengthening our goals of
nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation” (South Africa 2005b).
South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA was also techno-political in nature.
In 2006 South Africa concluded a second Country Programme Framework (CPF)
agreement with the IAEA, following on the first CPF (1999-2004). This made South
Africa the only African country to have concluded a second CPF with the IAEA. The
latter outlines South Africa’s future needs for nuclear technological cooperation and
development and its main objective is for the IAEA to establish a system of
“supervision and controls” in order to prevent the Agency’s assistance programmes
or distributed materials being used for military purposes (DST 2006). Moreover,
according to the DST Director General at the time, Philemon Mjwara, the CPF is a
“mutually agreed strategy for matching nuclear technology to priorities identified by
South Africa for its sustainable development” (Independent Online 5 December
2006). By 2010, the review of South Africa’s third CPF with the IAEA commenced
(NECSA 2010: 25).
Apart from bilateral agreements with the IAEA, South Africa has hosted several IAEA
conferences and seminars. In June 2002, for example, South Africa and the Agency
139
co-hosted an intergovernmental seminar for African states which was attended by 80

government representatives from at least 33 African countries. According to the
South African government, the seminar aimed to “encourage African countries to
honour their commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” (BuaNews 20
June 2002). From 14 to 18 December 2009 South Africa’s National Nuclear
Regulator (NNR) hosted the IAEA International Conference on Effective Nuclear
Regulatory Systems (Peters 2009). The IAEA also provided South Africa with
technical assistance in preparation for South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 Fédération
Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) World Cup (Peters 2009).
Thus, South Africa maintains comprehensive bilateral links and agreements with the
IAEA. It illustrates the country’s norm compliance and its application of cooperation
as a diplomatic strategy. Moreover, it also signals a return to the relations South
Africa initially had with the IAEA in the early years of the Agency.
3.1.3 Multilateralism as South African diplomatic practice
Since the establishment of the IAEA, South Africa has reiterated the technical -
rather than political - role of the IAEA. However, as the Cold War intensified, the
IAEA took on a more political role. Once South Africa’s nuclear intentions and
activities became known, the relations between South Africa and the Agency also
took on a more political nature.
South Africa’s position on this was reiterated in 2005 when its delegation stated that
the IAEA remains the:
internationally recognised competent authority responsible for verifying and

assuring compliance with the safeguards agreements of States [sic] Parties
concluded in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the
[Nuclear Non-Proliferation] Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the
IAEA in this regard (South Africa 2005b).
140
A similar view was expressed in 2006 by the South African Minister of Energy,
Buyelwa Sonjica (2006), when she informed the 50th Regular Session of the IAEA
GC that South Africa is “fully committed” to the objectives of the IAEA. In 2007,
Sonjica (2007) reconfirmed that, for South Africa, the IAEA is the “sole internationally
recognised authority” responsible for nuclear verification. This position was further
reiterated by Abdul Minty (2007b) when he informed the Board that South Africa will
continue to:
support activities aimed at strengthening and developing verification

capabilities to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament
agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free
world.
Minty (2008a) is also on record for recognising the IAEA as the only global
competent authority pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation:
My delegation has on numerous occasions stated that the IAEA is the only
internationally recognised competent authority responsible for verifying and
assuring compliance with the safeguards agreements concluded with the
agency.
Once the political transition in South Africa resulted in the inauguration of the GNU,
South Africa’s membership in numerous international organisations, including the
IAEA, was normalised. A feature of South Africa’s diplomatic relations from 1990 to
1999 was the emphasis on bilateral diplomacy. Once Thabo Mbeki became the
South African president, multilateral diplomacy became a dominant feature of South
Africa’s diplomatic relations (Lee, Taylor & Williams 2006). Within the context of
nuclear diplomacy, South Africa continued to emphasise the importance of
multilateral diplomacy to achieve global nuclear non-proliferation. The importance
South Africa ascribed to multilateralism was reiterated by Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs Aziz Pahad (2004) when he stated that South Africa maintains that
“multilateralism should be and could be the only cornerstone of global security”.
141
3.2 Selected case studies of South Africa’s relations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency
A selection of case studies illustrates South Africa’s relations with the IAEA. Each of
these cases, as will be explained, is of particular significance to South Africa.
3.2.1 Membership of the Board of Governors
Article VI of the Statute refers to the composition, responsibilities and powers of the
Board of Governors, whereas Article VII refers to the role and powers of the Director
General of the Agency. Appointed by the Board with the approval of the GC, the
Director General is the chief administrative officer of the Agency (IAEA 1957).
Membership of the Board is based on two discriminatory requirements. It includes
not only a geographical requirement, but also a high level of technical competency or
as Article VI stipulates, members should be among the “most advanced in the
technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials” (IAEA
1957). For South Africa, these discriminatory requirements have been unacceptable
since it resumed its seat on the Board in 1995. Subsequently, they became a key
area of the country’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA.
South Africa’s position on this issue is informed by the statement of President Mbeki
(2006) that one of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives is to terminate global
apartheid and any form of discrimination: “we [South Africa] have a duty to fight
against domestic and global apartheid”. This was reconfirmed by the Government
publication BuaNews (22 September 2010) and the DFA document South African
foreign policy (DFA 1996). The discussion below elaborates on this policy position in
the context of South Africa’s relations with the IAEA. Therefore, this section outlines
South Africa’s position on the membership of the Board, as well as South Africa’s
efforts to lead the Board by nominating its representative on the Board, Abdul Minty,
for the position of the Director General of the Agency.
3.2.2 Article VI of the Statute
Historically, South Africa’s position on Article VI of the Statute had been to expand its
membership (Sole 1997). Since 1995, South Africa has continued to take the
142
position that membership should be increased to include more developing countries,

thereby also removing the discriminatory geographical requirement.
In terms of Article VI of the Statute, the Board is the principal decision-making body
of the Agency. Of its current 35 members, 13 are designated, including the ten “most
advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source
materials” and the most advanced members from each of the three geographical
areas not represented among the ten (IAEA 1957). The remaining 22 Board
members are elected from eight area groups, namely North America, Latin America,
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, South
East Asia and the Pacific, and the Far East (IAEA 1957). Since its establishment in
1957, the number and proportion of African and Middle Eastern members of the
IAEA have increased significantly. However, the Statute initially allocated only one
elective seat to Africa and the Middle East respectively. As previously indicated,
South Africa’s representation on the Board dates back to 1957 when it held the
designated seat for Africa on the Board until 1977 (BuaNews 2 December 2008).
Since the Agency’s establishment, South Africa proposed the increase of the number
of African seats on the Board (Sole 1997). South Africa’s proposal was accepted
when, in 1961, the Board and the GC approved the first amendment to the Agency’s
Statute by adding two more elective seats for the African region. A second
amendment entered into force on 1 June 1973, resulting in the increase of Board
membership to 34 with developing states having a small majority (Fischer 1997: 90).
Developing countries used this majority to their advantage in September 1976 when
the G-77 requested the Board to review the designation of South Africa as a Board
member from Africa. Egypt’s challenge of South Africa’s membership proved
beneficial to it when, in June 1977, the Board decided by a vote of 19 to 13 with one
abstention, to uphold the nomination of Egypt as the member state in Africa, being
the “most advanced in nuclear technology including the production of source
materials” as per the requirement of Article VI of the Statute (IAEA 1957).
The 1977 decision introduced a new phase of South Africa’s diplomatic relations with
the IAEA as the Agency’s members joined the international community in its
condemnation of South Africa’s domestic policies as well as the country’s alleged
nuclear weapons programme. One of the earliest actions against South Africa was
143
the rejection of its delegation’s credentials for the session of the GC in September
1979. The diplomatic relations between South Africa and the IAEA became tenser
between 1977 and 1989.
However, with the political transition underway in South Africa, at the 38th Regular
Session of the IAEA GC in 1994, South Africa was invited to “resume participation in
all activities of the Agency” as a result of “her dismantling her nuclear weapons
programme” (IAEA 1994b: 1). Moreover, the GC requested the Board of Governors
to “review the designation of South Africa to the Board” (IAEA 1994b: 2). Once the
IAEA concluded its verification process in South Africa and with Egypt’s
concurrence, South Africa regained its seat on the Board in 1995 (Fischer 1997: 93-
94). It was only on 25 September 1995 that South Africa returned to the Board as the
representative of the African region since its suspension in 1977 (Nzo 1996).
Once reinstated as a Board member in 1995, South Africa sought to improve the
representation of developing countries on the Board. South Africa’s call for a
“stronger voice for developing countries” (BuaNews 22 September 2010) is in line
with South Africa’s stated foreign policy, as well as its self-proclaimed role as a
bridge between developed and developing countries. In March 1995, Alfred Nzo
formulated South Africa's position:
The position in which South Africa finds itself is that it has features both of the
developed and the developing world. It is truly at the point of intersection
between both worlds - an industrialised state of the South which can
communicate with the North on equal terms to articulate the needs, the
concerns and the fears of the developing world. Conversely we can interpret
the concerns and the fears of the developed world (DFA 1996).
Moreover, South Africa’s call for a “stronger voice for developing countries”
(BuaNews 22 September 2010) was in line with the “characteristics and crucial
elements of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations”, which included:
• A self-ascribed role as an African leader: “South Africa should assume a
leadership role in Africa in all those areas where a constructive contribution
could be made without politically antagonising the country's African partners”.
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• An orientation of non-alignment: “The Government should continue to pursue

a non-aligned approach, with due regard for South Africa's SADC, OAU, NAM
and other membership commitments”.
• A specific diplomatic style and role as a bridge builder: “A diplomacy of
bridge-building between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ should be pursued”.
• Multilateralism as the preferred diplomatic practice as well as the promotion of
its national interests: “In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to
promote its interests in regard to the major global issues such as respect for
human rights, democracy, global peace, security and the protection of the
environment”.
• A self-ascribed role as an agenda setter and norm entrepreneur: “South Africa
should constantly endeavour to positively influence and change the direction
of events and developments internationally, to the extent that they affect
South Africa” (DFA 1996).
Against this background, South Africa on numerous occasions expressed its position
on the representation of the Board members of the IAEA. As early as 1998 South
Africa stated that it “regretted deeply” the little progress that has been made on the
expansion of the membership of the Board of Directors, which could have “benefited
Africa” (Maduna 1998: 22). South Africa indicated that it felt that this situation is
“unreasonable and unfair to the Africa Group” in the GC (Maduna 1998: 22). In
advocating for the expansion of the membership and representation on the Board,
South Africa is cognisant of the growing interest in nuclear energy to meet the
energy requirements of developing countries.
Speaking at the Symposium on International Safeguards: Addressing Verification

Challenges in 2006, Abdul Minty (2006) observed that there is “growing concern,
especially among developing countries, at the growing resort to unilateralism and
unilaterally imposed prescriptions”. Moreover, according to Minty, “developing
countries believe that the IAEA-established multilateral mechanism is the most
effective way to address verification and safeguards issues and challenges”.
A similar view was expressed in 2007 when South Africa’s Minister of Minerals and
Energy, Buyelwa Sonjica (2007), stated: “I need to encourage the Secretariat to work
145
tirelessly in ensuring that representation of developing countries is improved.” More

recently, in September 2010, Abdul Minty stated that a failure to achieve greater
African and developing country representation “would delay the agency’s
democratisation” (BuaNews 22 September 2010). Explaining South Africa’s position,
Minty (2010a: 5) reiterated South Africa’s position that there should be an increase in
the number of African countries on the Board in order to reflect the “proportionate
increase to 42 African countries” which are members of the IAEA. This duality in
South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA is not new. As Hecht (2006)
indicates, since the negotiations on the establishment of the IAEA began in the
1950s, South Africa used this position as well as its identity as a unique case or a
bridge builder to promote its interests in the IAEA.
3.2.3 Leadership of the Board of Governors
With his election as IAEA Director General on 4 June 1997, Egyptian Mohamed
ElBaradei became the Agency’s first Director General from a developing country. By
the time ElBaradei’s 12 year tenure ended in 2009, deep divisions between the
Board’s advanced nuclear states on the one hand, and developing and non-aligned
IAEA member states that form the majority of the Board’s members on the other
hand became increasingly evident (Hibbs & Persbo 2009: 21). With ElBaradei’s
departure, Board members from advanced nuclear states intensified their search for
a “candidate who would scale back the IAEA’s ambitions” (Hibbs & Persbo 2009:
22), preferring a “strong consensus candidate bridging divisions between
industrialised and developing nations” (Reuters 14 May 2010).
ElBaradei’s departure presented South Africa with an opportunity to nominate a

South African candidate to lead a major multilateral organisation. By 2008, South
Africa had already hosted conferences of several multilateral organisations such as
the AU and the NAM, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). On 12 September 2008, Ayanda Ntsaluba (2008), the
Director-General of the South African DFA announced the nomination of Abdul Minty
for the position of the Director General of the IAEA. This followed Ntsaluba’s
successful request to Parliament in 2006 to extend Minty’s employment contract with
the DFA (Portfolio Committee on Local Government and Administration 2006). He
admitted that it is “the first time that South Africa is going to engage such a senior
146
position”. Ambassador Minty’s candidature was endorsed by the AU Summit of

Heads of State and Government held in Sharm El Sheik in Egypt. According to
Ntsaluba (2008), South Africa requested the “[AU’s] endorsement on condition that
the current Director General [Egyptian Mohamed Elbaradei] would not stand” as a
gesture of African solidarity.
South Africa’s efforts to become elected to the position of the IAEA Director General
can be analysed in terms of Muller’s (1976) typology of foreign representation.
Minty’s candidature is indicative of South Africa’s symbolic representation at the
IAEA. The country is a founder member that had served on the Board during the
early years of its existence. Moreover, with South Africa’s verified dismantling of its
nuclear weapons programme, the country’s election would be a symbolic ‘return’ to
the country’s nuclear non-proliferation origins. Moreover, Minty’s election would be
an example of substantive representation. This refers to the qualities and
qualifications of the representative. Therefore, given Minty’s background as an anti-
apartheid and anti-nuclear activist, he combines these two types of foreign
representation.
In presenting Minty’s candidature, Ntsaluba (2008) provided the rationale for the
South African government’s decision. From his explanation and Minty’s (2008b)
comments at the announcement, there were three main reasons for the decision,
namely South Africa’s identity and unique nuclear experience; Minty’s personal
background and credentials as a disarmament activist; and South Africa’s role as a
bridge between developed and developing countries. With regards to the latter, Minty
(2008b) reiterated South Africa’s role as a bridge between these countries by stating
that South Africa will be “combining the developed world and the developing world’s
perspective of these global issues”. Minty (2008b) also returned to the duality of
South Africa being:
part of the developing world and so the combination of this means we will try
to bring together the perspectives of the developing countries and the
developed world’s perspectives to try and produce and have a possible global
consensus on the kind of issues that we face.
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With regard to his personal background and credentials as a disarmament activist,

Ntsaluba (2008) referred to Minty’s involvement in multilateral disarmament fora and
issues since 1977. Amongst others, Minty served as a special consultant at the
second UN-OAU Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, where the establishment of the
World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa
(hereafter World Campaign) was initiated.38 Established under the patronage of
Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and other leaders of the Frontline States (FLS),
the World Campaign’s sponsors included Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme; David
Steel of the UK; and Coretta Scott King, wife of the late US civil rights activist Dr
Martin Luther King (Ntsaluba 2008). Between 1977 and 1994, Minty also gave
evidence to the UNSC and the UNSC Arms Embargo Committee on South Africa’s
apartheid policies. Once Minty returned from exile to South Africa, he was appointed
to the DFA in 1994 (Ntsaluba 2008).
Other aspects of Minty’s candidature were his leadership qualities and contribution to
the activities of the IAEA. Minty regularly attended the annual GC of the IAEA in
Vienna to lobby for sanctions against the NP-led South African government. This,
and other efforts, eventually resulted in the removal of South Africa from the
designated seat for Africa on the Board of Governors (Ntsaluba 2008). Since his
appointment as Governor for South Africa on the Board, Minty has developed a good
working relationship with the African Group of the NAM and other members of the
IAEA. Minty also “played a major role in shaping key decisions” of the Board
(Ntsaluba 2008). In addition to this, Minty has served as an advisor to South Africa’s
delegation to the 1995 REC of the NPT. In 2000 and 2005, he also led the South
African delegations to the RevCons of the NPT. Since June 1995, he served as the
chairperson of the South African NPC and has been a member of the UN Secretary-
General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2001 to 2002); President of the
50th Session of the IAEA GC on behalf of Africa (2006); and chairperson of the NSG
(April 2007 to May 2008) (Ntsaluba 2008).
At the announcement of his candidature, Minty (2008b) explained the diplomatic

process pertaining to the election of the IAEA Director General. Minty’s explanation
is produced verbatim and divided into distinguishable phases. The purpose is to
38
Refer to Reddy’s (1994) collection of Minty’s speeches, statements and writing during this period.
148
provide insight into the operations of the IAEA and a procedure South Africa had
been involved in earlier with the election of Donald Sole, the third Chairman of the
Board in the 1960s. Moreover, it provides an account of South Africa’s diplomatic
history and nuclear diplomacy in the words of one of its most important post-1990
diplomats in the field of nuclear issues:
Phase 1: Commencement of process

The formal process is that the new Board of Governors will be
confirmed, some elected, at the GC of the IAEA which will be at the
end of September this year [2008].
Phase 2: Meeting of new Board, circulation of procedures and formal invitation

to members to submit candidatures
In the first week of October the new Board of Governors will meet and
the Chairman of the Board of Governors will then circulate a document
which will outline the procedures. The procedure is that countries will
be formally invited to submit candidatures and that process will be
terminated at the end of December this year [2008].
Phase 3: Chairperson of Board employs methods to determine candidate(s)

with largest support
Then from January to June [2009] the Chairman [of the Board of
Governors] can use a number of methods, or a number of methods
together, to determine which candidates has [sic] the largest support.
The Chair has in the past consulted with members of the Board - 35
including South Africa - and through that consultation if they find that
some candidates have the support of five or six members, they may
request them to withdraw - some may withdraw and some may remain
in the race. In the end the procedure is that if they have to take a vote
then you need two thirds support for any one candidate for the Chair -
a lady this time - to feel she can then put it forward as the decision of
the Board of Governors. That then goes formally to the GC next year
[2009] in September and the conference endorses it. It has never
happened that the GC takes a decision different from the Board so far.
Phase 4: Vote
The Board also meets in March next year [2009] and should they make
remarkable progress and decides [sic] on the candidate in March
[2009] then it would be clear from March [2009] that the Board will
make a recommendation. But often because of the high level political
and other interaction that takes place the Board usually makes the
decision by June when it meets. That is the last meeting of the Board
before the GC where it has to submit all the documentation. So the
decision will be made by the Board no later than June [2009].
Phase 5: Confirmation by GC
Decision needs to be confirmed by the GC in September [2009].
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Phase 6: Incumbent completes term

The current Director-General then completes his term at the end of
November in 2009.
Phase 7: New incumbent takes office

The newly-elected Director-General will have to take over the Agency’s
helm by the first of December 2009.
From Minty’s explanation it is clear that the election process can be divided into
seven phases and that it was relatively short, its duration ranging from October 2008
until July 2009 when the election took place.
On 27 November 2008 South Africa submitted the nomination of Minty for the
position of Director General to the Chairperson of the IAEA Board. In a statement on
the submission, the DFA (2008b) made reference to South Africa’s identity as
“founder member of the IAEA” and the “most advanced country in the nuclear field
on the African continent”; its role as promoter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
and its preferred diplomatic practice (multilateralism) as it “firmly believes in a
multilateral approach as the only sustainable road” to address global issues.
Minty’s main contenders included experienced candidates from Spain, Belgium,

Slovenia and Japan (see Table 12). Realising the strength of Minty’s contenders,
Ntsaluba (2008) stated that:
We [the South African government] will obviously doing [sic] what is

necessary to support ambassador Minty’s candidature up to and including the
fact that he will have to obviously, as this is the normal practice for this sort of
things [sic], visit quite a number of capitals so that people could have the
opportunity to pose the questions that they may wish to pose to be sure that
he has the necessary credentials.
Speaking on the agenda item of the election of the Director General on 5 March
2009, Minty (2009a) outlined his commitment and intentions should he be elected by
focusing on the following issues:
• The “need to maintain the Agency’s impartiality and integrity”;
• The role of the IAEA as the “leading international organisation seeking to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health
150
and prosperity throughout the world, but without contributing to any military
purpose”;
• Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;
• Strengthening the safeguards system;
• Improving the human, financial and technical resources, and operation of the
IAEA;
• The political and technical role of the IAEA by stating that the Agency “by its
very nature has a political role”; and
• “Inclusive and consultative leadership” and decision-making based on
consensus.
Table 12: Candidates and non-binding poll results for the position of the
Director General
Candidate Nationality Position Votes

received
Luis Spanish Head of the Organisation for Economic 4

Echávarri Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) nuclear arm
Jean-Pol Belgian Former Belgium Defence and Foreign 0

Poncelet Minister
Ernest Petri Slovenian Judge 0
Yukiya Japanese Japan’s Ambassador to the IAEA 20

Amano
Abdul Minty South South Africa’s Ambassador to the IAEA 11

African
IAEA (2009c) & Reuters (14 May 2010)
Minty (2008a) made very few references to developing countries in his first
statement on the elections but in his second statement on 27 March 2009, he
returned to the issue of developing countries’ right to nuclear energy by stating that
he “will also be vigilant that developing countries are not denied access to the
151
benefits of nuclear energy and advanced technologies needed for their own
development” (Minty 2008b); a position that has often resulted in diplomatic
confrontation between South Africa and NWS on the Board, especially on South
Africa’s support of Iran’s nuclear programme.
On 9 June 2009 the Board of Governors conducted an informal non-binding poll on

the five candidates. The purpose of the poll was to indicate to member countries if
their prospects of success were declining or not (NTI 2009b). The Japanese
candidate, Yukiya Amano, received the most votes, with Minty receiving the second
highest number of votes. Amano beat Minty in the March 2009 run-off, but did not
achieve the majority vote (IAEA 2009c).
Figure 8: The process of the election of the Director General of the IAEA (2009)
AU endorses Minty's South Africa Members submit

candidature as the announces Minty's name of candidates
African candidate candidature to Board
(July 2008) (12 September 2008) (27 November 2008)
South Africa's Foreign Outcome of secret

Minty's statement on
Minister hosts ballot: no candidate
election of Director
delegation of Board in received required
General to Board
Cape Town two-thirds majority
(5 March 2009)
(21-22 March 2009) (26-27 March 2009)
South Africa re-

Minty's second Chairperson of Board
nominates and
statement to the requests new
submits Minty's
Board on election nominations
nomination
(27 March 2009) (27 April 2009)
(26 April 2009)
Candidates' Japan's candidate Amano elected during

presentation to out-polled Minty but secret vote in closed
closed-door informal failed to receive session of the Board
Board meeting majority of votes
(2 July 2009)
(26 May 2009) (9 June 2009)
Minty (2008a & 2008b); DFA (2008b & 2009b); NTI (2009b); IAEA (2009c) & Reuters
(14 May 2010)
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In accepting defeat after the final secret vote on 2 July 2009, Minty (2008c) admitted
that the election process “has been a long drawn out and hard fought campaign” and
declared South Africa’s support for Amano’s tenure as Director General (see Figure
8). Ntsaluba’s (2008) “doing what is necessary” eventually amounted to more than R
3 million, which the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite
Nkoana-Mashabane, confirmed (News24 6 September 2010).
The election of the Director General is an extremely political process requiring

intense diplomatic efforts. The election of past Director Generals likewise involved
their own diplomatic wrangling with both Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei being
elected as ‘compromise’ candidates (McGoldrick 2009: 2). Eventually, South Africa’s
identity and unique nuclear experience, Minty’s personal background and credentials
as a disarmament activist and South Africa’s role as a bridge between developed
and developing countries did not contribute to the election of the country’s candidate
as the Director General. Minty’s election failure may be regarded as a failure of
Despite a concerted effort by South Africa to support Minty’s candidature, Western

countries with nuclear capabilities supported the Japanese candidate. The South
African candidate whose activist credentials may have worked against him, whereas
developing countries preferred a “moderate G-77 candidate” (Reuters 14 May 2010),
namely South Africa’s Abdul Minty, who was “intensely opposed by most advanced
nuclear members” (Hibbs & Persbo 2009: 22). Another aspect which may have
undermined Minty’s election was the South African government’s ongoing support of
Iran’s nuclear programme.
3.2.4 The Nuclear Fuel Reserve
South Africa has repeatedly expressed the view that there should be “no
unwarranted restrictions on the inalienable right of states to the peaceful application
of nuclear energy” (Minty 2007b). In this way, South Africa has adopted a position on
the upholding of all states’ nuclear sovereignty.39 Its support of Iran’s right to develop
39
Nuclear sovereignty refers to a state’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In Chapter
7, the concept is discussed in the context of the provisions of the NPT. Article IV of the NPT provides
for “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”.
153
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has resulted in several diplomatic

confrontations between South Africa and other Board members.
South Africa’s support of the “inalienable right” of all states to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes has also resulted in diplomatic partnerships on the
issue with India, Brazil and the NAM (Pahad 2006b & 2008b). As a NAM member
South Africa subscribed to the Movement’s support of the “basic and inalienable
right” of a state (including Iran) to “develop research, production and use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their
respective legal obligations” in terms of Article IV of the NPT (Pahad 2008b). In an
indirect reference to the opposition of states such as the US and the UK to Iran’s
nuclear programme and their efforts to influence the IAEA in this matter, the 2008
NAM Ministerial Conference reiterated the role of the IAEA as the:
sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards

obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue
pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification
process, which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency
(Pahad 2008b).
Apart from its support of Iran and the right of developing countries to develop nuclear
energy, South Africa’s position on nuclear sovereignty and the inalienable rights of
states to develop nuclear energy was illustrated by its opposition to the nuclear fuel
reserve established under the auspices of the IAEA.
The origins of the idea of a nuclear fuel reserve go back to 2006. Addressing a
summit of the Eurasian Economic Community on 25 January 2006 in St. Petersburg,
Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Global Nuclear Power
Infrastructure (GNPI) which would establish a network of service providers to provide
full fuel-cycle services; including uranium enrichment; fuel fabrication; and
reprocessing to states lacking such capabilities. He also suggested that these
facilities should be placed under IAEA safeguards and that they would provide states
with fuel cycle services on a non-discriminatory basis. According to Putin, his
proposed initiative aimed to limit the proliferation of sensitive technologies while
154
providing nuclear fuel supply assurances to states that refrain from acquiring full fuel-
cycle capabilities (UN 2006).
In a subsequent interview, Minty indicated that South Africa would not support the
Russian initiative since it would ‘preclude’ South Africa and developing countries
from pursuing uranium enrichment (quoted in News24 22 March 2006); especially as
the South African Nuclear energy policy for the Republic of South Africa of 2008
indicated the Government’s intention to enrich uranium (DME 2008). South Africa’s
stance on the NWS position to limit newcomers’ efforts to develop nuclear energy
was linked to South Africa’s relations with developing countries.
Speaking at the GC of the IAEA in September 2006 (a few months after Putin’s
proposal), the South African Minerals and Energy Minister, Buyelwa Sonjica, stated
that South Africa cannot support “unwarranted restrictions” on countries that have
decided to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in terms of the NPT (BuaNews
19 September 2006). She repeated a common theme of South Africa’s diplomacy,
namely the prevalence of global inequities and observed that the:
imposition of additional restrictive measures on some NPT member states,

while allowing others to have access to those capabilities, only served to
aggravate existing inequalities that were already inherent; and undermined
one of the central bargains contained in the treaty (BuaNews 19 September
2006).
Sonjica also referred to another theme, namely the support of “the unambiguous
principle” enshrined in Article IV of the NPT which states that nothing in the NPT:
shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to develop

research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II (BuaNews 19 September
2006).
Russia’s 2006 proposal also included the establishment of several global

International Nuclear Fuel Centres (INFCs) and its offer to host the first INFC.
Kazakhstan joined the Russian initiative and, on 26 October 2006, the construction
of a joint Russian-Kazakh enrichment centre at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical
155
Plant in eastern Siberia along with plans to enrich uranium from Kazakhstan was
announced (UN 2006).
At the Board of Governors meeting in June 2009, Director General Mohamed

ElBaradei (2009a) proposed the establishment of a LEU reserve under IAEA
auspices. In addition, Russia proposed the idea of an “assurance of supply
mechanism” (ElBaradei 2009a). In presenting the idea of a LEU bank to IAEA
members, ElBaradei reassured members that the purpose of the IAEA LEU bank
and the Russian proposal was to “provide assurance of supply over and above
countries’ existing rights”. Moreover, he reiterated that the proposed fuel bank “does
not limit countries’ rights in any way” and that “no state would be required to give up
any of its rights, including the right to develop its own fuel cycle”. The Director
General’s proposal entailed a physical LEU bank at the disposal of the IAEA as a
“last-resort reserve for countries with nuclear power programmes which face a
supply disruption for non-commercial reasons” and accessible to all states in order
for states that “they might not need their own enrichment or reprocessing capability”
(ElBaradei 2009a & 2009b). The rationale for ElBaradei’s (2009b) proposal was to
“move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle”.
Developing states, including South Africa, perceived ElBaradei’s nuclear fuel cycle
initiative as intended to prevent them from benefitting from nuclear energy and
technology (Hibbs & Persbo 2009: 22). ElBaradei’s proposal to commence with the
planning of a multilateral civilian nuclear fuel supply was blocked by the Board on 18
June 2009 (NTI 2009c). However, later in 2009, the IAEA approved the
establishment of the first international nuclear fuel repository. Twenty-eight IAEA
member states voted in favour of the establishment of the facility, whereas six
members abstained. In abstaining from the vote, South Africa agreed with Tunisia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina not to support the nuclear fuel reserve.
Pakistan did not vote.
In what can be regarded as a reaction to the IAEA decision to establish a nuclear

fuel reserve, South Africa’s Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters (2009), reiterated South
Africa’s intention to secure its own fuel supply for “future national energy needs” at
the 53rd Regular Session of the IAEA GC in 2009. The Minister also indicated that
various feasibility studies were undertaken by NECSA with the cooperation of some
156
“international players in fuel cycle services” (Peters 2009). In addition to this, Peters
(2009) also announced that laboratories and facilities were under construction to
“facilitate [the] re-establishment of fuel cycle operations in South Africa”.
By December 2010, the repository referred to above opened a uranium enrichment

facility at the International Enrichment Centre (IEC) at Angarsk in Siberia (Russia).
This followed an IAEA-Russian agreement to reduce nuclear proliferation and
uranium processing by providing LEU to any IAEA member country that could be
denied access to conventional nuclear fuel markets (NTI 2010c; World Nuclear News
1 December 2010). Under IAEA safeguards, the IEC would ensure an uninterrupted
supply of LEU for nuclear power generation. Apart from funding the establishment of
the 120 tonnes reserve, Russia also funded the maintenance, storage, safety,
security and safeguards of the IEC.
At the time of Russia’s initial proposal of a global nuclear fuel reserve in 2006, Abdul
Minty (2006) reiterated that developing countries maintain that it is “the basic and
inalienable right of all states” to “develop research, production and use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes” and that this right “should be without any
discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations”. Minty (2006)
pre-empted the outcome of the vote by some development countries on the
establishment of the nuclear fuel reserve by stating their:
choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and
its fuel cycle policies must be respected. Just as for developed countries,
developing countries also have a sovereign right to make their own decisions
consistent with their national priorities and interest.
The decision by the South African government on nuclear fuel announced by

Minister Peters (2009) signals a major departure from IAEA policies as well as the
use of parallelism as a diplomatic strategy with South Africa initiating nuclear fuel
facilities parallel to the IAEA’s nuclear fuel reserve.
South Africa employed confrontation as a diplomatic strategy in the IAEA’s

establishment of the nuclear fuel reserve. It regarded NWS to be promoting their
interests above those of other members of the IAEA despite the provision of Article
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IV of the NPT. In addition to this, the South African government’s decision not to
support the initiative may have also undermined Minty’s candidature. South Africa
was protecting its national interests, especially since it was conducting feasibility
studies to recommence with its uranium enrichment programme.
3.2.5 The AQ Khan network and the Wisser Affaire
Since 1994, it was very important for the Government to gain the trust of the
international community on South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
Presidents Mandela (1998) and Mbeki (2004a) and the government officials have
repeatedly reiterated South Africa’s commitment not only to nuclear non-proliferation
but also to complete disarmament (DIRCO 2010c: 42). On this, ambassador Minty
(2008a) clearly formulated South Africa’s position:
The South African national liberation movement and after 1994, democratic
South Africa has a long and consistent record of commitment to and
engagement on the need to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction.
A few months after the involvement of South Africans in the AQ Khan network, Minty
(2005) reconfirmed South Africa’s position on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament:
South Africa continues to believe that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and
irreversible progress on both fronts. We are convinced that the only real
guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their
complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced
again ... South Africa believes that nuclear weapons do not guarantee
security, rather, they distract [sic] from it. The longer nuclear weapons exist,
the longer the world will have to wait to be free from the use or threat of use of
such weapons. Many also fear that such weapons could also fall into the
wrong hands. However, our belief is that nuclear weapons are illegitimate,
irrespective of whose hands these weapons are in. Those who rely on nuclear
weapons to demonstrate and exercise power should recognise that such
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dependence on weapons of mass destruction only serve [sic] to increase

insecurity rather than promote security, peace and development.
Speaking at a symposium on safeguards in October 2006, Minty (2006) yet again

reiterated South Africa’s position on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament and reminded the audience that South Africa's position on the
“mutually reinforcing processes” of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament is widely documented:
The total elimination of all nuclear weapons is our common objective, and,
therefore, the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are
inextricably linked to each other. Our concerted efforts to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons should be matched by a concurrent effort to
eliminate, in a verifiable and irreversible manner, all nuclear weapons and
universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).
This position has resulted in South Africa confronting states such as the US and
China who support the idea of the limitation (rather than elimination) of nuclear
weapons. South Africa’s position on this has also resulted in partnerships. One such
partnership is the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). As early as
IBSA’s second summit in 2007, India, Brazil and South Africa repeated their
commitment to the goal of the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons and
expressed concern over the lack of progress in the realisation of this goal”. These
states also emphasised that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are
“mutually reinforcing processes requiring continuous, irreversible progress on both
fronts”. IBSA members also stated that the objective of non-proliferation can be
achieved by the “systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons in a
comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner” (Minty 2008a).
Nevertheless, South Africa’s partnership with its fellow IBSA states requires more
reflection. In the context of the NSG, South Africa supported the exception granted to
India not to require an Additional Protocol in terms of the NSG Guidelines in terms of
the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement. South Africa, however, opposed the
proposal to grant an exception to Argentina and Brazil (NTI 2012). In both cases,
159
South Africa maintained that nuclear non-proliferation norms were compromised but
it continued to cooperate with other states to protect the integrity of the export control
regime as a member of NAM and in terms of its identity as a middle power.
More importantly, for South Africa the “primary goal” of its nuclear-related activities
and diplomacy remains the promotion of South Africa as a “responsible producer,
possessor and trader of advanced nuclear technologies and should adopt positions
publicly supporting international peace and security” (DIRCO 2010c: 42). It was,
therefore, a diplomatic embarrassment when a series of events caused the
international community to raise concerns about South Africa’s commitment to non-
proliferation (see Chapter 3).
In an effort to control the diplomatic damage caused by the Wisser Affaire, South
Africa requested the IAEA to seal the 11 containers confiscated at Tradefin
Engineering. Through the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Government
maintained control over the containers and equipment. In updating the IAEA Board
on the events, Minty (2004: 2) confirmed that all material, documentation and
instruments confiscated at various locations were placed “under IAEA seal” (Minty
2004: 2). In further efforts to counter the diplomatic damage caused by the Khan
network and the Wisser Affaire, the South African government issued several
statements at IAEA gatherings reiterating its “principled policy regarding nuclear
disarmament” while warning against the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities
by states and non-state actors (Xingwana 2004: 21).
In a statement on safeguards; non-proliferation; and nuclear weapon free zones

made in New York in May 2005, the South African government outlined the
diplomatic process it followed in order to address the issue. It indicated that South
Africa (2005b), in cooperation with other affected countries and the IAEA, conducted
a “thorough and urgent investigation” into the Khan network. South Africa (2005b)
also expressed its gratitude to the IAEA for the “important role” that it has played in
the investigation of the network that had led to the prosecution of those contravening
South Africa's non-proliferation legislation. The South African government also
indicated that it would “continue to closely co-operate with these and others involved
in the investigations into the international illicit network and efforts to ensure its
elimination” (South Africa 2005b).
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During the period that Wisser’s case served before a South African court, Minty
(2007b) once again reiterated South Africa’s position on illicit nuclear proliferation
networks. He maintained that South Africa:
remains concerned about the illicit clandestine nuclear networks” and he also
called on states that “[i]t is imperative that all countries that have been
affected by the network closely co-operate to eliminate this threat. Our own
experiences with the illicit network for the transfer of and trade in nuclear
material, equipment and technology have clearly shown that States need to
provide their pro-active and full support to the Agency in its verification
obligation.
A few months after the sentencing of Wisser, Minty addressed the second PrepCom
for the 2010 NPT RevCon in Geneva on 29 April 2008. Repeating South Africa’s
earlier views on illicit nuclear networks, he warned of the dangers of these networks
as they pose “one of the most serious challenges to the international community”
(Minty 2008c). Minty also suggested that the international community “effectively and
decisively take appropriate action” against these networks.
For South Africa, its response to the Wisser Affaire had several diplomatic
implications. As previously indicated, South Africa’s use of multilateral diplomacy
throughout the process is clear from its cooperation with affected European states
and the IAEA. South Africa was also required to improve its diplomatic
communication on its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation (Minty 2007). These
measures resulted in cooperation and partnership as diplomatic strategies.
A third implication for South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy was the opportunity to
demonstrate leadership; the opportunity to assert its identity as a state committed to
nuclear non-proliferation; and renewed norm entrepreneurship. To the extent that it
related to the IAEA, South Africa (2005b) proposed the review and improvement of
controls over nuclear material, technologies and equipment in order to “prevent
nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking”. Once the establishment of an
Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification to improve the effectiveness of
the IAEA’s safeguards system took effect, South Africa also proposed that IAEA
members should use the opportunity to “evaluate and possibly agree on
161
recommendations that could improve the safeguards system” (Minty 2006).

Following the break-in at NECSA’s headquarters, Pelindaba, on 8 November 2007,
South Africa invited the IAEA to assist the country in assessing and improving the
security of Pelindaba. At the time South Africa observed that the IAEA’s visit could
also benefit other IAEA members in the “implementation of their nuclear security
policies and the improvement of relevant guidelines”.
A similar request for the improvement of safeguards was made by South Africa’s
Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters (2009), in her address to the IAEA GC in
September 2009. South Africa also made a greater diplomatic effort to emphasise
the role of the Agency as the “sole competent authority in the field of nuclear
safeguards and verification”, reiterating that it “attaches great importance to the role,
authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency and would not wish to do anything
that would reduce or undermine its solemn responsibilities” (Minty 2006). Continuing
with its self-ascribed role as the voice of developing countries at the IAEA, South
Africa also proposed that developing countries should receive more support in the
implementation of their agreements with the IAEA.
Whereas this section focused on South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation experience

since it terminated its nuclear weapons programme and on its diplomatic strategies
of cooperation, confrontation and parallelism, the next section outlines the country’s
relations with the IAEA against the background of the provision in the IAEA Statute
that all states have an inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.
3.2.6 The SAFARI-1 conversion and isotope production
In the wake of 9/11, international concerns about the threat of nuclear terrorism
increased. Through its Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009, the IAEA and its members
cooperated to improve nuclear security worldwide and counter illicit nuclear
trafficking (IAEA 2008a). One of these efforts was to shift the use of HEU to LEU in
commercial applications through the conversion of nuclear reactors (IAEA 2010a: 8).
However, these initiatives were preceded by IAEA diplomatic efforts to influence the
South African government to convert South Africa’s nuclear research reactor,
SAFARI-1, from using HEU to LEU.
162
Initiated in 1960 as a 20 megawatt (MW) tank-in-pool type light water reactor, the
operation of the SAFARI-1 nuclear reactor was affected by South Africa’s
international isolation.40 In 1976 an international embargo was instituted against the
supply of nuclear fuel to SAFARI-1. This did not deter the South African government
from using SAFARI-1 to commence with uranium enrichment, inter alia, for its
nuclear weapons programme.
Figure 9: Events and developments in the existence of NECSA
Construction and operation IAEA verification and

Establishment of AEB of SAFARI-1 and Koeberg safeguarding
Cabinet approval for Four Uranium enrichment, fuel
Point Nuclear Research Ratification of NPT
fabrication and development
and Development of nuclear weapons (1989-1993)
Programme
(1960-1989)
(1959)
Restructuring of nuclear
arena
Establishment of NECSA South Africa signs
Commercialisation of
and NPC Additional Protocol
nuclear and related products
(2000) (13 September 2002)
(1993-1999)
Break-in at Pelindaba
Arrest of former NECSA Release of national Nuclear
(8 November 2007) Energy Policy
scientist involved in Khan's
network IAEA assist with Pelindaba's (2008)
(2004) security
(2008)
Nuclear fuel cycle reviewed
LEU medical isotope NECSA investigating re-

production establishment of nuclear Conversion of SAFARI-1
Major Mo-99 producer fuel cycle in SA (Completed in 2009)
(on the increase since 2007) (2008/09 onwards)
IAEA (1994b, 2008b & 2010b); Damane (2001); NECSA (2003 & 2009); DME
(2008) & Adam (2009)
40
SAFARI-1 was inaugurated by Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1965.
163
Following the post-1994 developments, the diplomatic focus between South Africa
and the IAEA also shifted to the conversion of SAFARI-1 from HEU to LEU as some
IAEA members remained cautious of South Africa’s nuclear intentions. By 1993,
SAFARI-1’s operations shifted from military purposes to commercial applications,
especially producing medical isotopes, using HEU from South Africa’s inventory
verified by the IAEA (Vlok 2006: 2). However, the IAEA demanded the conversion of
the nuclear reactor; an issue South Africa was hesitant to address as SAFARI-1’s
HEU-based operations provided South Africa with considerable scientific status and
prestige; valuable income from its isotope production; and even some deterrent
status.
As the successor of the AEB, NECSA is the contact point between the South African
government and the IAEA (see Figure 9). NECSA is also, in terms of the Nuclear
Energy Act 46 of 1999, responsible for the management of South Africa’s
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the country’s nuclear material to prevent
nuclear proliferation. Subsequent to the efforts of the IAEA, the South African
government authorised the conversion of SAFARI-1 in July 2005 and financed the
conversion to the amount of R 12 million per annum for three years (De Waal &
Galeni 2005).
According to Piani (2007: 4), a SAFARI-1 nuclear scientist at NECSA, the original
conversion process was to be completed over three to four years in two main
phases, namely the establishment of a local LEU manufacturing capability, which
NECSA manufactured (NECSA 2010: 11), and the conversion of the SAFARI-1 core
from HEU to LEU fuel. By 2010, the latter phase had already resulted in NECSA
(2010: 21) producing 83 LEU fuel elements and 18 control rods (see Figure 10).
By 2008, NECSA (2008: 16) reported that “good progress” had been made with the
conversion of SAFARI-1 through a cooperation agreement with AREVA-CERCA, a
French state-owned nuclear power utility which provided NECSA with LEU fuel
plates. On 25 June 2009, SAFARI-1 used LEU for the first time since it went critical
on 18 March 1965 (IAEA 2009d). Announcing the successful conversion, NECSA
(2009) stated that the conversion was “in line with international norms to reduce
proliferation risks” and that it will ‘enable’ South Africa to promote South African
products as “non-proliferation compliant” and enable “preferential treatment” in key
164
markets such as the US, and in other international joint ventures. This statement
correlates with Colby’s (2011) observation that states base the conversion of their
nuclear reactors on economic, political, military and technical considerations. From
2009 to 2010 NECSA’s subsidiary, NTP Radioisotopes (Property) Limited (hereafter
NTP), earned South Africa considerable foreign exchange amounting to R 623
million, exceeding its sales target for the period by 21 percent (Reuters 1 March
2010). Moreover, the NECSA (2009) statement is indicative of the strategies of
cooperation and partnership, especially as they relate to South Africa’s relations with
the IAEA.
Figure 10: The schedule for the SAFARI-1 conversion
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Technical Feasibility
Completion of Economic Repeat of Technical and
Study of conversion with
Feasibility Study of Economic Feasibility
Argonne National
conversion Studies
Laboratory in US
(1995) (2001)
(1994)
Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6

Government approval of Commencement of test Supply of LEU fuel
HEU to LEU conversion irradiations of LEU fuel plates to form hybrid fuel
(2005) (2006) elements for reactor
(2007/8)
Phase 9
Phase 7 Phase 8
Conversion of target
Commencement of HEU Completion of
plates for radioisotope
to LEU conversion conversion
production to LEU
(September 2008) (25 June 2009)
(June 2009 onwards)
Phase 11
Phase 10 Establishment of LEU
Full conversion to LEU and target plate
manufactured Mo-99 manufacturing capability
(December 2010) (December 2010
onwards)
Piani (2007: 4) & NECSA (2008: 16; 2009 & 2010: 21)
165
More important than the aforesaid considerations are the diplomatic considerations
of and diplomatic ‘returns’ on the conversion (Colby 2011). For South Africa, the
successful conversion was beneficial in non-material terms. Not only did it receive
international recognition from the IAEA, but its status and prestige were advanced by
the scientific expertise, as well as by the moral authority, associated with the
conversion. By April 2010, during President Obama’s NSS in Washington, South
Africa announced that it “quite ambitiously, had not only adopted a national policy of
HEU-free production of medical isotopes - that is, using only LEU for both fuel and
targets - but it also had developed the technology to carry it out” (Pomper & Potter
2010). In 2010, NECSA announced that its subsidiary, NPT Radioisotopes, had
become the first and only company in the world producing the medical isotope
Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) on a commercial scale using LEU-based technology
(NECSA 2010: 5; World Nuclear News 14 April 2010).41
Table 13: Major reactors producing and supplying all types of medical isotopes
Reactor producing Country of Years Share of

and supplying origin in global
medical isotopes operation production
(in 2009) (percentage)
NRU (Chalk River) Canada 52 40
BR-2 (Mol) Belgium 48 10-15
HFR (Petten) The Netherlands 48 30
Osiris (Saclay) France 43 5-8
SAFARI-1 (Pelindaba) South Africa 44 10-15
IAEA (2010a: 156; 2010b: 3)
The South African Minister of Energy (2010) also observed that South Africa “will be
the first radioisotope producing country to have completed this conversion process,
which is a requirement for supplying radio isotopes into certain key markets”.
Reporting on South Africa’s activities to the 54th Session of the IAEA GC,
41
The medical isotope Mo-99 is used in diagnostic tests for illnesses such as cancer and heart
disease.
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ambassador Minty (2010a: 4) announced that, since July 2010, South Africa had
been the world’s largest supplier of Mo-99 based on LEU. Subsequently, the IAEA
(2010b: 8) recognised that South Africa’s conversion of SAFARI-1 to LEU as the
“first step” towards LEU target conversion by a ‘major’ 99Mo producer.42
In 2010, the IAEA (2010a: 18-19) acknowledged that subsequent to the conversion
of SAFARI-1, South Africa became the world’s “first large scale” producer of Mo-99,
whereas it was only the world’s third largest isotope producer in 2007, according to
NECSA Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Rob Adam (2007). Moreover, in 2010, the
IAEA (2010b: 2) recognised SAFARI-1 as one of the world’s major five isotope
producers. In 2010, South Africa (NTP); Canada (MDS Nordion); Belgium (Institut
National des Radioéléments); France (Osiris); and The Netherlands (Covidien)
produced 95 percent of the medical isotope Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) (Ahmad 2009:
286; IAEA 2010a: 151) (see Table 13). Other Mo-99 producing countries include
Australia, Argentina, China, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, Poland, France, India,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Ahmad 2009: 286-287; IAEA 2010a: 153).
Through SAFARI-1’s conversion, South Africa has contributed to a redefinition of the

concept “nuclear symbolism”, which previously referred to the idea that a state’s
nuclear weapons capability “symbolizes a strong, independent and modern state”.
By referring to the LEU requirements set by some isotope-importing countries to
which South Africa now complies with, NECSA (2009) has added “nuclear leverage”
to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. Through the conversion, the country also acted
as a norm entrepreneur as a state that previously had a HEU-based nuclear
weapons programme. In addition to this, it has become a country that produces
medical and other isotopes from LEU, thereby illustrating its commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With this, South Africa has
consolidated its identity as a major nuclear power and moral authority in the
developing world.
42
The IAEA (2010b: 8) has been involved in ‘fostering’ developments in the production of Mo-99 for
more than three decades. Since 2007, disruptions such as planned and unplanned shut-downs of
major Mo-99 producing reactors in Canada and The Netherlands affected the global production and
supply of Mo-99 (IAEA 2010a: 155).
167
4. An assessment of South Africa’s relations with the International Atomic

Energy Agency
In an assessment of South Africa’s international relations policy from 1994 until

2010, DIRCO (2010c: 38-42) identified South Africa’s major foreign policy “priorities
and objectives” which includes, amongst others, the consolidation of the African
Agenda; the strengthening of South-South cooperation; the strengthening of North-
South cooperation; participation in the global system of governance; and the
strengthening of political and economic relations. This section assesses South
Africa’s relations with the IAEA and all these foreign policy priorities and objectives in
the context of norm compliance and state identity.
4.1 The African Agenda and South-South cooperation
With regards to its position on the consolidation of the African Agenda and
strengthening South-South cooperation, South Africa has cooperated and
established partnerships with African and other developing countries on issues such
as the reform of the IAEA, and has advocated the expansion of developing countries’
representation on the IAEA Board (hence also Minty’s nomination for the position of
Director General of the IAEA) as well as their right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. South Africa’s position has also been evident in discussions on
the establishment of the IEC in Russia as South Africa maintains that the nuclear
fuel reserve will prevent some countries from obtaining enriched uranium for
developmental purposes. Moreover, South Africa exports medical isotopes to several
developing countries and therefore promotes the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs); a key objective of the IAEA. This application of South Africa’s nuclear
expertise and industry is a major departure from the earlier position taken by the
head of the ANC Environment Desk, Thami Sokutu (1994: 238) in February 1994.
Addressing a conference on Nuclear policy for a democratic South Africa he stated
that: “The nuclear industry should be phased out in the shortest possible time”.
In 2001, the South African Minister of Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka (2001) declared that “(t)he nuclear energy industry in South Africa, although
relatively small, plays an important role in our country”. According to her, the South
African nuclear industry, at the time, employed approximately 2 700 people and
168
accounted for foreign exchange earnings of R 330 million in 2000 through the export
of uranium oxide by the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (NUFCOR) and of
medical isotopes by NECSA (Mlambo-Ngcuka 2001).
4.2 North-South cooperation
On the issue of strengthening North-South cooperation, South Africa has used its
position as a member of the IAEA Board to cooperate and form partnerships with
traditional diplomatic partners of the North. Addressing the National Assembly on 18
May 1995, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo (1995: 114-115) highlighted some
of South Africa’s earliest foreign policy dilemmas, namely balancing relations
between the developing and industrialised countries while South Africa sought to
expand its relations with Africa and the developing world. Nzo cautioned that South
Africa cannot afford to “overlook or downgrade the importance of the industrialised
countries” to South Africa’s national interests. Moreover, South Africa also advocated
that IAEA members from developed countries should assist members from
developing countries to comply with the IAEA Statute and with other IAEA
obligations. However, South Africa’s conversion of SAFARI-1 to use LEU provides a
very good indicator of North-South cooperation, as well as cooperation and
partnerships in the IAEA.
South Africa’s intention to participate in the global system of governance has been
clearly evident in its membership of the Board once it resumed its seat in 1995 after
its suspension in 1977. According to the Government, its foreign policy attaches
great importance to multilateralism for the “resolution of global challenges and places
the UN [and hence the IAEA as an agency of the UN] at the centre of the multilateral
system” (DIRCO 2010c: 38-42). An example of this is its cooperation with the IAEA
on its verification process in South Africa.
More importantly, South Africa’s participation in the global system of governance is

also evident in its repeated commitment; diplomatic actions; and statements on
nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control to promote international
peace and security. On this issue, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma (2007a) noted that the ANC-led government had at an “early stage” decided
that the country should be an active participant in various non-proliferation regimes
169
and suppliers groups; that it should adopt positions publicly supporting the non-
proliferation of WMDs; and use its position as a member of the nuclear export control
regimes, the Africa Group in the IAEA and the NAM to promote nuclear non-
proliferation. In pursuance of this, South Africa in the IAEA supported the “inalienable
right of nations to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes” (DIRCO 2010c: 42).
4.3 Norms and state identity
From 1989 onwards, South Africa engaged in norm re-enactment by ratifying the
NPT and allowing the IAEA to verify the dismantling of its nuclear weapons
programme. South Africa has reconstructed its state identity as a NWS to a state
that has terminated its nuclear weapons programme and that complies with the IAEA
Statute’s nuclear non-proliferation norms (see Figure 11). In this respect, South
Africa acted as a morally responsible and good global citizen. Moreover, it acted as a
leader on behalf of the developing countries on the Board.
Once the IAEA completed the verification of the termination of South Africa’s nuclear
weapons programme in 1993, South Africa engaged in norm compliance by
restructuring its nuclear regulatory environment and adherence to the IAEA Statute.
South Africa’s construction of a norm-abiding identity as a responsible producer,
possessor and trader of advanced nuclear technology is even more significant in this
respect.
South Africa has also exerted its influence as a norm entrepreneur in the context of
the IAEA. This is evident in South Africa’s stance on the use of LEU and the
representation of developing countries on the IAEA Board.
4.4 South Africa’s diplomatic conduct at the International Atomic Energy

Agency
South Africa’s diplomatic conduct at the IAEA follows the country’s stated foreign
policy objectives. It maintains its preference for multilateral diplomacy; especially in
the context of the G-77 and the NAM at the IAEA. It has emerged as a campaigner
for more representation of developing countries and their right to the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA and its members
170
display several aspects of the country’s nuclear diplomacy since 1989. South Africa
has not only constructed a new state identity and role but has also constructed and
advanced its national interests in its diplomatic relations with the IAEA. Apart from
gains in its material interests through the conversion of SAFARI-1 and the increase
in its isotope production and exports, South Africa also gained in a non-material
sense through the status and prestige it acquired due to its often quoted “unique
identity”. Finally, South Africa has consistently promoted the norm of nuclear non-
proliferation; the norm behind the existence of the IAEA and the idea of the peaceful
uses of nuclear development to improve human security.
Figure 11: South Africa’s norm construction and state identity in the IAEA
Enactment and Norm compliance and

Norm entrepreneur and socialisation of norm internalisation
norm construction State identity: African State identity: Good
State identity: uranium- leader, technologically international citizen
producing country advanced Adherence to IAEA
(post-World War II) Establishment of IAEA Statute
(1957) (1957-1970s)
Norm digression Norm re-enactment

Norm compliance and State identity: Good global
norm entrepreneur State identity: Nuclear
weapons state, citizen and support of total
State identity: Claiming threatened state, rogue elimination of nuclear
African identity state weapons
South Africa calls for Development of nuclear Termination of nuclear
more developing country weapons programme weapons programme,
representation Safeguards Agreement with
(1970s-1989) IAEA, ratification of NPT
(1960s)
(1989-1994)
Norm compliance and norm entrepreneur

Norm compliance State identity: Leader/voice of the South,
bridge builder, reliable partner of North,
State identity: Good global citizen and support
responsible producer, possessor and trader
of total elimination of nuclear weapons
of advanced nuclear technologies
Adherence to IAEA Statute
South Africa calls for more developing
(1995 onwards) country representation
(1995 onwards)
DFA (1996); Koh (1997: 2598-2599); Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 894-905); Farrell &
Lambert (2007: 97; 104-105) & DIRCO (2010c: 38-42)
171
5. Conclusion
This chapter considered South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA in respect of
two major phases. The first phase covered South Africa’s relations with the Agency
since its establishment in 1957 until 1990. The second phase covered the period
subsequent to 1990. Initially the first phase (until 1964) was characterised by the
country’s initial norm entrepreneurship and norm compliance. The period subsequent
to the inauguration of SAFARI-1 and the development of a nuclear deterrent strategy
contributed to the increased isolation of South Africa. In the context of the Cold War,
the NP government attempted to protect the integrity and national security of South
Africa. In the IAEA, South Africa’s eventual refusal to comply with non-proliferation
norms entrenched in the IAEA Statute resulted in the country’s suspension from the
Board in 1977, and the rejection of the South African delegation’s credentials and
Egypt’s replacement of South Africa as the designated African country on the Board
in 1979. As South Africa’s nuclear capabilities increased, the Agency adopted a
more strict approach towards the country. This resulted in a decision in 1987 to
suspend South Africa from the Agency. However, subsequent decisions by President
PW Botha resulted in the IAEA deferring this decision. Nonetheless, the latter part of
this first phase was characterised by confrontation as a diplomatic strategy.
The second phase coincided with the presidency of FW de Klerk with South Africa
cooperating with the IAEA to verify the complete dismantlement of the country’s
nuclear weapons programme. South Africa’s norm compliance is evident in a series
of agreements it signed with the IAEA. Despite its identity as a state that had
dismantled its nuclear weapons programme, South Africa’s diplomatic strategy
towards the IAEA also involved confrontation on issues such as the expansion of the
membership of the Board, the establishment of a nuclear fuel reserve and the right of
developing countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Although the
conversion of SAFARI-1 was eventually concluded, it took a number of years to
complete. Finally, South Africa’s leadership ambitions were also evident during the
post-1990 period. However, Abdul Minty’s candidature for the position of the Director
General of the Agency failed despite Government efforts to prevent this.
As a founder member, South Africa’s return to the IAEA Board of Governors in 1995
represents a major development in its post-1990 nuclear diplomacy. The IAEA’s
172
verification of South Africa’s terminated nuclear weapons programme and the

country’s membership on the Board added weight to its nuclear diplomacy and,
amongst others, paved the way for South Africa’s ratification and the entry into force
of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty).
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE TREATY
1. Introduction
The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (hereafter the Pelindaba Treaty or
the Treaty of Pelindaba) entered into force on 15 July 2009. The idea of an African
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ) originated in the OAU during the 1960s. After
those initial attempts to denuclearise Africa, the diplomatic process lost momentum
with the entry into force of the NPT on 5 March 1970. Further impinging factors were
the nuclear ambitions of some African states, as well as South Africa’s hawkish
nuclear posture and nuclear weapons programme.
The Pelindaba Treaty entered into force simultaneously with what has been
described as a global “nuclear renaissance”, namely the renewed interest in nuclear
energy to address energy shortages. This nuclear revival was driven by increased
energy demands, the quest for energy security and efforts to mitigate global warming
and climate change (Findlay 2011). The uneven distribution of energy resources and
increased energy shortages in Africa had contributed to the decision by some African
leaders to pursue nuclear energy. Countries in this position include Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, Namibia and Nigeria (Khripunov 2007: 1; Cawthra & Møller 2008: 133-153;
Gourley & Stulberg 2009: 22-24; Meshesha 2011). Moreover, as previously
discussed, South Africa had also indicated its intention to expand its nuclear energy
programme.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with Africa,
particularly the country’s nuclear diplomacy on to the evolution; entry into force; and
implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty. It is argued that since 1990, South Africa
has conducted its nuclear diplomacy with African states in a manner to convince the
continent of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and its support of the
continental norm of a denuclearised Africa.
Accordingly, the chapter traces this norm cycle through an analysis of the origins of
nuclear weapons free zones (as an expression of the norm of nuclear non-
174
proliferation), as well as South Africa’s involvement in the Pelindaba Treaty process.

It also covers the country’s nuclear diplomacy with the AU and African states
regarding South Africa’s compliance with the norms espoused by nuclear weapons
free zones, and its identity, roles and interest concerning nuclear weapons and
Africa. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the country’s diplomatic
instruments and achievements.
Three caveats apply to this chapter. Firstly, as the Pelindaba Treaty only entered into
force in 2009, it is arguably premature to assess the full extent of South Africa’s
nuclear-related relations in this regard. Secondly, since the African Commission on
Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), the Treaty’s compliance mechanism was only
established in 2010, this prevents a comprehensive analysis of AFCONE and South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.43 Finally, the chronological scope of the chapter extends
beyond the 1990 to 2010 period. As a point of departure and to contextualise the
Pelindaba Treaty, the next section covers the origins and meaning of nuclear
weapons free zones as an expression of the norms of nuclear non-proliferation, the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament.
2. Nuclear weapons free zones
The establishment of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) has been one of the
most significant post-1945 multilateral efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. In the
context of this study, a NWFZ is deemed to be an international regime (see Chapter
2) since it includes mutually agreed upon norms and operating procedures on
nuclear issues (Ruggie 1998; Keohane & Nye 1977; Haas 1980; Young 1980;
Krasner 1993). However, NWFZs are not a normative innovation but rather an
instrument and innovative expression to prevent nuclear proliferation. The
institutionalisation of NWFZs continues well into the 21st century with efforts to also
declare the Middle East a NWFZ.
Underpinned by the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, NWFZs exist, in constructivist

terms, due to states’ intersubjective understanding of the dangers of nuclear
weapons proliferation. In fact, NWFZs do not prevent states from developing nuclear
43
The acronym AFCONE is used throughout this study. Initially, the AU used the acronym ACNE, but
changed it subsequently in 2011 to AFCONE. See, in this regard, AU (2011a, 2011b & 2011c) and
Minty (2011).
175
energy for peaceful purposes, based on their “inalienable right” in Article IV of the
NPT. Their raison d’être is to provide national and regional security. In contrast to
NNWS, who deem that the NPT serves to perpetuate certain nuclear inequalities in
favour of NWS, NWFZs are perceived as not serving to perpetuate these inequalities
and insecurities. More importantly, the existence of NWFZs limits the use and
development of nuclear weapons in a specific geographically-defined area and
therefore contributes to regional and international security (Reddy 1997: 275-276).
In their analyses of NWFZs in the post-Cold War era, Parrish and Du Preez (2005: 2-
3) and Hamel-Green (2007: 6-8) similarly regard NWFZs as effective instruments to
express the nuclear non-proliferation norm. They observed that these zones place
geographical limitations on the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons;
prevent nuclear tests; build confidence and trust among states in an insecure region;
and advance regional cooperation on nuclear energy.
As an institution, NWFZs originated in the early days of the Cold War in Europe with
Poland acting as a norm entrepreneur. Fearing West Germany’s emergence as a
nuclear power and the Soviet Union’s troop deployment on its territory, Poland, on 2
October 1957, proposed the so-called Rapacki Plan (after Poland’s foreign minister,
Adam Rapacki) to the UNGA. The Plan called for a NWFZ in Central Europe -
comprising of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany -to
prevent nuclear proliferation in the region. As the Cold War intensified, norm leaders
failed to socialise other states to become norm followers, the Rapacki Plan had little
chance of implementation (Goldblat 1997: 18; Epstein 2001: 155).
Despite this failure of norm cascade, the idea of NWFZs as instruments of the norm
of nuclear non-proliferation did not disappear. On the contrary, barely two years after
the Rapacki Plan, the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1959, became the
first expression of the norm of nuclear proliferation in the form of a NWFZ. The Cold
War delayed further expressions of the norm. However, in 1967 the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), declaring
Latin America a NWFZ, entered into force. Today, the ideas encapsulated in the
Rapacki Plan continue to be recognised as the foundation for all current NWFZs (see
Table 14). Moreover, the Rapacki Plan is recognised as one of the earliest pre-NPT
176
expressions of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation; another being the

establishment of the IAEA.
Table 14: Major nuclear weapons free zones
Nuclear Treaty Short title Entry

weapons free of Treaty into force
zone
Antarctica Antarctic Treaty Antarctic 1959

Treaty
Latin America Treaty for the Prohibition of Treaty of 1967
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Tlatelolco
and the Caribbean (LANWFZ)
Outer Space Treaty on Principles Governing the Outer Space 1967

Activities of States in the. Treaty
Exploration and Use of Outer
Space
Seabed Treaty on the Prohibition of the Seabed Treaty 1971

Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof
Moon Agreement governing the Activities Moon Treaty or 1979
of States on the Moon and other Moon
Celestial Bodies Agreement
South Pacific South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1995

(SPNFZ) Rarotonga
Southeast Asia Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon- Bangkok 1997

Free-Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) Treaty
Central Asia Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon- Treaty of 2006

Free-Zone (CANWZ) Semipalatinsk
Africa African Nuclear-Weapon-Free- Pelindaba 2009

Zone Treaty (ANWFZ) Treaty
Goldblat (1997: 18-19) & CNS (2011b)
The legacy of the Rapacki Plan is also evident in the NPT, notably Article VII of the
NPT that affirmed the right of states to establish NWFZs in their territories “in order
177
to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories (UN
1968).
Thus, the NPT recognises regional treaties (on which NWFZs are based) as
instruments of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation. A similar view on the rationale
of socialisation of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation was expressed by the UNGA.
In 1974, the UNGA initiated a comprehensive study of NWFZs. Subsequently, the
UN encouraged the establishment of NWFZs as regimes expressing the norm of
nuclear non-proliferation and in UNGA Resolution 3472B (1974) of 11 December
1974, described NWFZs as the “most effective means for preventing the
proliferation, horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons” (quoted in Mukai 2005: 80).
In clarifying its position, the UNGA maintained that the objective of a NWFZ is to
provide a legally binding instrument between two or more states to establish a
specific region as free from nuclear weapons. Moreover, the objective is also to
institute a series of verification and compliance mechanisms and negative security
guarantees by all NWS (UNGA in Mukai 2005: 80). The NWFZ regime was further
entrenched in 1975 when the UNGA adopted several guidelines that states should
follow when establishing a NWFZ.44 The First Special Session of the UNGA on
Disarmament in May 1978 also reiterated the importance of NWFZs as a
“disarmament measure” (UNGA 1978). However, since the UN first addressed the
question of NWFZs in 1974, it took five years for the establishment of the next
NWFZ, namely the Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement). It was only when the Cold War ended that
more NWFZs were established with the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing the first
post-Cold War NWFZ in the South Pacific (see Table 14). One possible explanation
for this is that, as Cold War superpowers, the US and the USSR prevented these
developments as both had stationed their nuclear weapons in several locations
outside their national territories. Therefore, the presence of their nuclear weapons in
44
These guidelines that were included in a consensus report of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission of 1999 stated that NWFZs should emanate exclusively from states in the region and be
based on mutually agreed upon legally binding arrangements by all states in the region; it should be
recognized by extra-zonal states; NWS should be consulted prior to the ratification of the Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone Treaty (NWFZT); state parties can decide on the access of nuclear aircraft, ships
or submarines; the NWFZT should have a compliance mechanism; states have the right to develop
and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; the obligations of the NWFZT should comply with
International Law; and international assistance, including UN assistance should be provided to states
to establish a NWFZ (Goldblat 2004: 54-55).
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a particular region (or zone) was counterfactual to the idea of a nuclear weapons
free area. This did not apply to an ANWFZ as forthwith discussed.
3. The evolution of the Treaty of Pelindaba
The idea of an ANWFZ was first raised in the 1960s and coincided with the
development of South Africa’s nuclear programme. This section chronicles the
origins of the African nuclear non-proliferation position; the delays and the repeated
resumptions of negotiations on a NWFZ treaty; and post-1990 efforts to include
South Africa in negotiations on the treaty. It also describes the final phases of
negotiating and drafting the treaty on a denuclearised Africa.
3.1 The origins of Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation position
The origins of the Treaty of Pelindaba (see Figure 12) reside in the preoccupation of
African states with nuclear energy since the dawn of the nuclear era. As a major
repository of uranium, Africa has obtained strategic importance to emerging nuclear
powers with the discovery of uranium in the former Belgian Congo (the current
DRC). Like the Belgian Congo, South Africa’s entrance into the nuclear era also
resulted from its abundant uranium resources.
The early developments in this regard were confirmed by the South African diplomat,
Donald Sole. In May 1944, a meeting took place between South Africa’s Prime
Minister, General Jan Smuts, and the Danish nuclear scientist Niels Bohr. Sole,
serving in London at the time, described the event as the “genesis of South Africa’s
atomic energy policy” (quoted in Fourie et al. 2010: 263). Subsequently, the UK
government requested General Smuts in 1945 to conduct a secret survey of the
country’s uranium reserves. Prior to this request, geological reports on radioactive
materials in South Africa had already been released between 1915 and 1923 (Fourie
et al. 2010: 264).
Towards the end of the 1940s, a uranium processing pilot project began operations
in South Africa. The country’s uranium production increased significantly with its
exploration and extraction of uranium in South West Africa (now Namibia), which
South Africa at the time administered as a League of Nations C-Class Mandate.
179
Figure 12: The evolution of the Treaty of Pelindaba
UNGA Resolution
OAU resolution declaring
French nuclear testing in entitled "Consideration of
Africa a denuclearised
Sahara Desert Africa as a denuclearized
zone
(1960) zone" approved
(July 1964)
(November 1961)
UNGA endorses the UNGA adopts annual

France terminates
OAU Declaration resolutions focusing on
nuclear tests in Sahara
obstacles to the
on a denuclearised Africa Desert
achievement of ANWFZ
(December 1965) (1966)
(1970 – 1990)
UNGA mandates Group

UNGA commissions
of Experts to conduct a South Africa accedes to
"South Africa’s nuclear
study on "South Africa’s the NPT and destroys
tipped ballistic missile
plan and capability in the six nuclear devices
capability" study
nuclear field" (1990)
(1989)
(1979)
UNGA mandates Group Group of Experts holds

OAU affirms the
of Experts to drafting a workshops in Windhoek
implementation of Cairo
treaty on the and Addis Ababa on draft
Declaration
denuclearisation of Africa treaty provisions
(1992)
(1992) (1994)
Group of Experts meets

to finalise the draft treaty Signing of the ANWFZT
OAU agreed to ANWFZ
in Pelindaba, South by all OAU members
Africa (June 1995)
(11 April 1996)
(29 May - 2 June 1995)
Entry into force of First Conference of Election of members of

Pelindaba Treaty Parties AFCONE
(15 July 2009) (4 November 2010) (2011)
UNSC (1996); Lamamra (2010); Stott, Du Rand & Du Preez (2010: 5)

180
As South Africa’s isolation increased, South African mining operations in South West
Africa were repeatedly criticised as being “the illegal acquisition of Namibian
uranium” at IAEA GCs (IAEA 1985 & 1986), and at the UNGA (UN 1994). Apart from
Belgium’s uranium exploration in the Belgian Congo, France also commenced
uranium exploration in Africa and its early operations in Gabon, Niger and the
Central African Republic (CAR) continue to this day. As France’s nuclear energy and
weapons programme developed, the country’s uranium exploration in Africa
correspondingly increased (Adeniji 2002: 25-26).45
The 1960s was a geo-political and nuclear turning point for Africa. Considering that
most African states gained independence in the 1960s; that the Cold War had
intensified; that the OAU was established; and that France conducted nuclear
atmospheric tests in the Sahara Desert in February 1960 (Goldblat 1997: 24; Epstein
2001: 155), African states responded by expressing their opposition to these tests by
terminating diplomatic relations (e.g. Nigeria); freezing French assets (e.g. Ghana);
and by sponsoring a 1960 UNGA resolution condemning the French tests. The
resolution, however, was not adopted due to a lack of international support.
As more African states became independent and faced new national and continental
security threats, Kwame Nkrumah (1961: 231), Ghana’s first post-independence
president, observed:
There are two threatening swords of Damocles hanging over the continent,
and we must remove them. These are the nuclear tests in the Sahara by the
French government and the apartheid policy of the Government of the Union
of South Africa.
Nkrumah’s government, as indicated, was one of the African governments to freeze

French assets in response to French atmospheric nuclear tests in Africa. Moreover,
Nkrumah’s stature as Africa’s first post-independence president added weight to
anti-nuclear sentiments on the continent. In 1961, a larger number of African states
supported the adoption of UNGA Resolution 1652 (XVI) (1961) on the Consideration
45
Oluyemi Adeniji, a Nigerian diplomat and later Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, served in
numerous international positions relating to nuclear non-proliferation. His publication is unique as a
first-hand account of the evolution of the Pelindaba Treaty and, inter alia, South Africa’s role in the
diplomatic process which resulted in the entry into force of the Treaty in 2009.
181
of Africa as a Denuclearized Zone, which declared Africa a nuclear weapon free

zone. This resolution also called on UN members to refrain from testing, storing or
transporting nuclear weapons in Africa (Epstein 2001: 155-156).
The UN initiative was endorsed by the OAU. At the Inaugural Summit of the OAU
from 22-25 May 1963 French nuclear tests in Africa which were eventually
terminated in 1966 were discussed under the agenda item of general disarmament.
Resulting from this discussion, the summit unanimously adopted a resolution to
declare “Africa a denuclearized zone” and to “promote the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy” (OAU 1963). At the first Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of
the OAU in July 1964, the organisation adopted Resolution AHG/Resolution11(1)
(1964) on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (hereafter the
Declaration). Moreover, the OAU committed itself to negotiate an international
agreement on this matter under the auspices of the UN (OAU 1964a). When the
Declaration was submitted to the UNGA in November 1965, the UNGA furthermore
endorsed another resolution, Resolution 2033(XX) (1965), on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons in Africa (UNGA 1965).
Despite these developments in the 1960s and the subsequent formulation of a Draft
Convention for the Denuclearization of the Continent of Africa by the OAU in 1964
(OAU 1964b), a treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) on Africa as a nuclear weapon free
zone only entered into force in July 2009. Several explanations for this can be
offered. As the Cold War intensified, calls for a universal rather than a regional
(African) nuclear non-proliferation treaty increased. The resultant treaty, the NPT,
only entered into force in March 1970. Several African states participated in the
negotiations on the NPT, thus delaying the negotiation of a treaty on an African
nuclear weapon free zone, and they eventually became party to the NPT (see
Chapter 6). In addition to this and at the same time, South Africa’s status as a state
with a nuclear weapons capability contradicted the purpose of such an African treaty.
In fact, South Africa’s nuclear capability was a negation of Africa’s aim to keep the
continent free from nuclear weapons.
The detection of an underground nuclear test site in the Kalahari and the so-called
“double flash” incident left no doubt that South Africa indeed had a nuclear weapons
capability (see Chapters 3 and 4). For African states, these incidents confirmed
182
South Africa’s nuclear intentions on the continent (Saxena 1998). Therefore, several
African states including Egypt and Nigeria embarked on a global campaign to force
the South African government to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme and
change its domestic policies. This campaign included diplomatic actions, UN
sanctions and OAU resolutions against South Africa. While the majority of African
states’ rhetoric on a denuclearised Africa and post-apartheid South Africa continued
unabated, a small number of African states embarked on the development of their
own nuclear capability when Egypt, Libya and Nigeria commenced with nuclear
development programmes in the mid-1970s (Oyebade 1998: 97).
These African developments further delayed negotiations for a denuclearised Africa.

Thus, despite earlier initiatives to declare the continent a NWFZ, Cold War realities
and the nuclear ambitions of certain African states contributed to the delay of the
establishment of an ANWFZ. A further impediment was the South African
government’s unwillingness to join other global and continental nuclear non-
proliferation efforts. This serves as a further illustration of South Africa’s non-
compliance (as a founder member of the IAEA) with, for example, the nuclear non-
proliferation norms espoused by the IAEA Statute. Moreover, South Africa refused to
accede to the NPT.
3.2 The resumption of negotiations on an African nuclear weapon free zone
The ending of the Cold War; the new political era in South Africa; and the legacy of
the country’s nuclear past and De Klerk’s 1993 announcement had several nuclear-
related diplomatic consequences. The country returned to the fold of the international
community, along with its re-admittance to multilateral organisations and the
establishment and re-establishment of new and old diplomatic relations; acceded to
the NPT in 1991; and dismantled its nuclear weapons programme as verified by the
IAEA, thus paving the way for the resumption of negotiations on an international
agreement on the denuclearisation of Africa. Within the framework of UNGA
Resolution 2033(XX) (1965) on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the
UN and OAU convened a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1991 to
“examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a
convention or treaty” (Adeniji 2002: 50). Despite its nuclear expertise, South Africa
was not invited to this meeting, which was the first in a series of meetings on the
183
denuclearisation of Africa and included participants from the OAU Secretariat;

government officials from Nigeria, Zaire (now the DRC), Algeria, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe; representatives of the IAEA Secretariat; and several observers from
NFWZs in existence.
Since this meeting was held prior to De Klerk’s 1993 announcement and the IAEA’s
verification, concerns about the nuclear capability, status and position of South Africa
were discussed despite the country’s absence (see Adeniji 2002: 49-55 for detail).
Nonetheless, a working group of the meeting discussed how to deal with South
Africa. It was concluded that there was an “absolute need for South Africa to be an
integral part of the zone and subjected to its obligations” (Adeniji 2002: 53).
By the time the Secretary-General considered the report on the Addis Ababa
meeting, South Africa had already acceded to the NPT and signed a Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General and
subsequent to a UNGA Resolution 46/43B (1991), a second meeting of the UN/OAU
Group of Experts took place in Lomé, Togo, from 28-30 April 1992. Once again,
South Africa was excluded from the proceedings. Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria was re-
elected as the second meeting’s chairperson and provided a comprehensive account
of the proceedings and decisions of the meeting (Adeniji 2002: 55-60). Once again,
South Africa’s position was discussed. Some participants (unspecified by Adeniji
2002: 58) proposed that South Africa, as the most advanced nuclear power on the
continent, should be required to ratify a continental agreement on denuclearisation
before it entered into force. Other participants (also unspecified by Adeniji 2002: 58)
viewed this proposal as conferring a veto if not implemented. The issue of the
ratification of the agreement, with the inclusion of South Africa, was referred to the
drafters of the first draft text of an agreement as envisaged in UNGA Resolution
2033(XX) (1965) and UNGA Resolution 46/43B (1991) for further consideration.
When the OAU Council of Ministers met in Dakar, Senegal, from 22-28 June 1992,
to, inter alia, consider the report on the Addis Ababa meeting, it decided that the
OAU Group of Experts should draw up a draft treaty and distribute comments to
OAU members before the Council’s meeting of June 1993.46 Apart from drafting the
46
The OAU Group of Experts consisted of representatives from Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Zaire (now the DRC) and Zimbabwe.
184
treaty, another challenge was the inclusion of South Africa in the treaty-making
process, despite the opposition to this (Adeniji 2002: 58).
3.3 Efforts to include South Africa in negotiations
South Africa’s exclusion from the initial negotiations was justified by the OAU
negotiators on the basis that the country was still governed by the minority NP and
not by an all-inclusive majority government. However, the reports of the Group of
Experts emphasised the importance of South Africa’s inclusion in the ANWFZ.
Parallel to this was President De Klerk’s diplomatic strategy to embark on official
visits to about 33 African states by mid-1992 in an effort to improve South Africa’s
relations with the continent (Du Pisani 1994: 60; Oyebade 1998: 104-106). According
to De Klerk (1993) these visits, amongst others, took place in an effort to reach
agreement on the use of medical isotopes and training programmes. Despite these
developments, some scepticism about the South African government’s nuclear and
domestic intentions remained.
As constitutional negotiations progressed in South Africa, De Klerk (1993) repeated

his government’s commitment to the ANWFZ in Parliament in March 1993. It also
became clear that the ANC would continue with its historical anti-nuclear stance
despite some ANC support for the continuation of a nuclear weapons programme for
South Africa (Muller 1996: 39; Oyebade 1998: 107, 115; Mackerdhuj 1999: 7). As an
ANC-led government posed no threat to African security and Nelson Mandela (in
Oyebade 1998: 107) publicly expressed support for an ANWFZ, continental attitudes
towards South Africa on nuclear issues began to change.
In an early effort to include South Africa in the negotiations on the continent’s nuclear
future, the Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) (an
NGO) acted as a broker between African and the South African government. The
PPNN’s facilitation included regional meetings promoting nuclear non-proliferation.
Amongst others, it scheduled a meeting from 1-4 April 1993 in Harare, Zimbabwe, in
collaboration with the University of Zimbabwe. De Klerk’s 1993 announcement
prompted the PPNN to invite South Africa to this meeting. Waldo Stumpf, the CEO of
the AEC, was invited to address the meeting. In his presentation Stumpf emphasised
South Africa’s “determination to be transparent and its acceptance in principle of a
185
NWFZ for the continent” and expressed South Africa’s willingness to assist African
states with the peaceful uses of nuclear technology (Adeniji 2002: 61).
Two important consequences of South Africa’s participation in this meeting of the

PPNN were the emergence of African confidence in the country’s commitment to
nuclear non-proliferation on the continent and an invitation to South Africa participate
as an observer in the negotiations to draft an African nuclear weapons free treaty
(Adeniji 2002: 62). An additional consequence was that the country’s continental
nuclear diplomacy gradually expanded. For example, South Africa joined the African
Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related
to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) (De Klerk 1993). As an organisation that
operates under the auspices of the IAEA, AFRA coordinates peaceful nuclear energy
projects in Africa and nuclear-related cooperation among African states. Immediately
after it joined, relations with AFRA developed to such an extent that South Africa
indicated its support of two AFRA projects on the continent; that it was designated as
the host country for the 1995 AFRA annual meeting; and that it offered its assistance
for AFRA and IAEA training programmes (Muller 1993: 39).
South Africa’s inclusion in the negotiations of what became known as the Pelindaba
Treaty was the result of a combination of factors, including domestic changes and
the country’s nuclear diplomacy such as the country’s accession to the NPT and the
conclusion of a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. More importantly, several
African efforts were made to include South Africa notwithstanding the fact that when
the OAU resumed its efforts to draft a treaty on the denuclearisation of Africa which
coincided with De Klerk’s reforms the OAU’s official position was not to engage with
the South African government. Therefore, calls to include South Africa in the treaty-
making process were indicative of a changing continental position on South Africa.
3.4 Negotiating and drafting the treaty on a denuclearised Africa
The PPNN meeting was immediately followed by a meeting of the proposed treaty’s
negotiating group in Harare from 5-8 April 1993 to negotiate the draft text of the
treaty. By now the negotiating group consisted of representatives of Mauritius, Egypt,
Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Senegal; two representatives of the OAU; and a
representative of the UN. In contrast to the previous inter-governmental meetings
186
which excluded South Africa, the country attended the Harare meeting as an invited
observer and was represented by a troika consisting of representatives of the NP-led
government, and representatives of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress of
Azania (PAC).
The negotiations at the second Harare meeting focussed on the title of the
instrument; the geographical application of the NWFZ; the declaration, dismantling
and destruction of nuclear weapons facilities; peaceful nuclear activities; the
mechanism of implementation; safeguards; the complaints procedure; the role of
non-African states; and the physical protection of nuclear materials, which were
included in the so-called Harare Report to the UN Secretary-General. At this
meeting, the title of the instrument (the name of the treaty) was, for the first time,
presented as The African Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. Until then declarations,
documents and resolutions on the treaty referred to the denuclearization of the
continent. Despite its observer status at this meeting, South Africa’s nuclear
weapons experience was often cited and resulted in several innovations to NWFZs
in general. One example of this is the inclusion of an article on the declaration,
dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and facilities
operational prior to the entry into force of the NWFZ treaty. On the question of
peaceful nuclear activities, one of the South African observers emphasised the
contribution that nuclear energy could make to Africa’s socio-economic development
(Adeniji 2002: 64-69); an issue Abdul Minty referred to during his election campaign
for the IAEA Director General (see Chapter 4).
Subsequent to the second meeting in Harare in 1993, the UNGA requested the
Secretary-General to arrange a follow-up meeting of the Group of Experts in 1994.
Accordingly, meetings took place in Windhoek (March 1994) and in Addis Ababa
(May 1994) (Adeniji 2002: 71-155). Commenting on the ANC-government’s position
on nuclear non-proliferation Stumpf (1995b: 7), an observer in the above-mentioned
meetings, commented that South Africa in the period subsequent to the ANC’s
election victory and Nelson Mandela’s presidential inauguration “on numerous
occasions committed itself to a policy of transparency” on the non-proliferation of
WMDs. Examples of this are the Cabinet decision of 31 August 1994 and Mandela’s
statement in 1994 at the OAU Heads of State Summit to this effect.
187
At the Harare meeting (1993), the definitions of “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone”

and ‘territory’ caused considerable debate, especially as the definition of the zone
affects the territories of some NWS and a non-African state such as Spain. Three of
Spain’s territories, namely the Canary Islands and two coastal enclaves in Morocco,
Ceuta and Melilla, fall within the territory specified by the Pelindaba Treaty.
As some issues remained unresolved at the Harare meeting such as a map of the
zone and certain functions of the AFCONE, the UNGA proposed a follow-up meeting
in 1995 to finalise the drafting of the ANWFZ treaty for UNGA’s consideration by its
50th Session in 1995. This provided South Africa with a unique opportunity
considering that the UNGA recommended the final meeting be held in
Johannesburg, South Africa, from 29 May to 2 June 1995 (Adeniji 2002: 71). By now
South Africa was a full participant in the negotiations (and no longer an observer)
and the country’s GNU had been governing for approximately a year since the
elections of April 1994. The meeting’s location (South Africa) was symbolic as it
indicated the OAU’s acceptance of the country as being committed to nuclear non-
proliferation on the continent. Moreover, South Africa at the time was most recent
OAU member and the choice of venue also signalled the acceptance of the country
as a full OAU member.
Both the Harare and Windhoek meetings were of significance to South Africa. Both
drafts of the treaty negotiated at these meetings included an article on the
establishment of a continental commission on nuclear energy which South Africa in a
subsequent OAU meeting proposed to host; a proposal which was accepted by the
OAU (1996). Moreover, the Johannesburg meeting agreed on the short title of the
treaty, namely the Pelindaba Treaty. Suggested by a South African representative,
the name of the treaty refers to the headquarters of South Africa’s AEC, Pelindaba,
west of Pretoria. Moreover, South Africa’s involvement in the denuclearisation
concluded a drawn-out process. Apart from this, the word ‘Pelindaba’ is derived from
two Zulu words “pelile indaba”, which means “the matter is settled” or “the discussion
is closed”. Another diplomatic kudo for South Africa which resulted from the
Johannesburg meeting was the proposal to host the formal adoption of the final draft
text at the AEC headquarters at Pelindaba. The final adoption at Pelindaba on 2
188
June 1995 was attended by the chairman of the AEC, JWL de Villiers, and Waldo
Stumpf (Adeniji 2002: 154-155).
The 62nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in June 1995 considered
the final draft treaty. This meeting recommended that the draft treaty should be
adopted at the 31st Ordinary Session of the Heads of State of the OAU. The Council
also endorsed Egypt’s proposal to host the treaty’s signing ceremony and South
Africa’s proposal to host the headquarters of the AFCONE. These three proposals
were approved by the 31st Ordinary Session on 23 June 1995 and by the UNGA on 6
November 1995 (CNS 2011d: 1).
On 11 April 1996, OAU member states signed the Pelindaba Treaty in Cairo, Egypt,
and adopted the Cairo Declaration (OAU 1996). As indicated previously, the OAU
had adopted its first resolution on the denuclearisation of Africa in Cairo in 1964. In
the 1996 Cairo Declaration, members of the OAU recognised the “valuable
contribution” of NWFZs to nuclear non-proliferation. In addition to this, OAU
members called on all NWS to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty’s Protocols and to pursue
the “complete elimination” of nuclear weapons (OAU 1996). Despite the initial
positive reaction by African states to the Pelindaba Treaty (47 of the 53 OAU
members signed it on 11 April 1996) and the adoption of the Cairo Declaration, most
states delayed the ratification and deposit of the Treaty with the AU.
A decade later, in 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) expressed
concerns about the long delay in the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty since it
was signed in 1996. At the time and after ten years, only 20 of the 28 required states
had deposited their instruments of ratification with the AU (AUPSC 2006: 1). The
Pelindaba Treaty entered into force on 15 July 2009 when the required 28th state
deposited its ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty. This formalised the territory covered
by the ANWFZ. Annex I in the Pelindaba Treaty includes a map of the ANWFZ (see
Figure 13) which “extends across the entire continent of mainland Africa” and several
islands, including the Agalega Island, Bassas da India, the Canary Islands, Cape
Verde, the Cardagos Carajos Shoals, the Chagos Archipelago - Diego Garcia,
Comoros, Europa, Juan de Nova, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Prince Edward
and Marion Islands, Reunion, Rodrigues Island, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles,
Tomelin Island, and Zanzibar and Pemba Islands.
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Figure 13: The territory cove

vered by the Pelindaba Treaty
Pelindaba Trea
eaty (Annex I)
The provisions of the Pelinda

aba Treaty (2009) require signatory states tto undertake
the following:
• renounce nuclear weap
apons (Article 3);
• prevent the stationing
goof nuclear explosive devices (Article 4);
• prohibit the testing off nuclear
n explosive devices (Article 5);
• declare, dismantle, des
estruct or convert nuclear explosive devicess a
and facilities
for their peaceful devel
elopment (Article 6);
• prohibit the dumping and
a storage of radioactive waste (Article 7);
190
• promote peaceful nuclear uses and verification of these peaceful uses

(Articles 8 and 9);
• provide physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and prohibit
armed attacks on nuclear installations (Articles 10 and 11);
• establish the AFCONE (Article 12); and
• Report and exchange information on nuclear activities (Article 13).
The Pelindaba Treaty is an innovative development of NWFZs and the norm of

nuclear non-proliferation. The AU (2006:3) identifies five innovations in the Pelindaba
Treaty as a NWFZ treaty. Firstly, it bans research into nuclear explosive devices by
any means in the zone’s territory (Articles 3, 4 and 5). Secondly, it requires the
destruction of nuclear devices that a state may have had prior to the Treaty’s entry
into force (Article 6). Thirdly, it prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste and other
radioactive matter anywhere in the ANWFZ (Article 7). The fourth innovation is that
armed attacks by conventional and other means against nuclear installations in the
ANWFZ are prohibited (Articles 10 and 11). Finally, the Treaty supports the states’
use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes (Article 8).
4. South Africa and the Treaty of Pelindaba
Since the idea of an ANWFZ was first mooted, South Africa practically held the
African continent to ransom until 1991 when it acceded to the NPT. It was only after
the IAEA verified the completion of South Africa’s nuclear dismantlement in 1993
that the country was invited, albeit at first as an observer, to participate in African
efforts to establish an ANWFZ. Characterised by a combination of partnership and
cooperation as diplomatic strategies, South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy on
the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty is a major departure from its pre-1990
strategy of confrontation with Africa. South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy on the
Pelindaba Treaty resulted in several symbolic achievements. The country
successfully used its identity as a country that had dismantled its nuclear weapons
programme to host the final draft conference in Johannesburg, as well as name the
ANWFZ treaty after the country’s nuclear headquarters. Both these achievements
illustrated post-1990 South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and its
acceptance on the continent.
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The Pelindaba Treaty introduced a new phase in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
on the African continent, also considering that the Treaty outlines specific obligations
regarding the First COP and the establishment of a mechanism of compliance.
4.1 First Conference of Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba (November 2010)
The First COP to the Pelindaba Treaty took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 4
November 2010 in accordance with Articles 12 and 14 of the Treaty. Article 14
prescribes that a COP should be convened once the Treaty entered into force to
establish and elect the members of AFCONE and to determine its headquarters (AU
2010a: 1). In this respect, the Pelindaba Treaty is unique among NWFZ treaties in
that it provides for the establishment of a continental nuclear energy commission as
the Treaty’s mechanism of compliance. In the opening address of the First COP on 4
November 2010, Ramtane Lamamra (2010), Commissioner for Peace and Security
of the AU, reiterated the “important role” that the AFCONE has to play in Africa’s
“collective security and development”. Lamamra (2010) also indicated that the
AFCONE would undertake four main tasks. These are to serve as an “African
mechanism” to ensure African states’ compliance of their obligations under the non-
proliferation requirements; to ensure Africa’s protection from nuclear testing and
dumping of nuclear materials; to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science and
technology in Africa; and to develop outreach activities to states eligible to ratify the
Treaty.
In essence, one of the AFCONE’s major tasks is to assist African states to comply
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations in terms of the Pelindaba Treaty and
the NPT. More specifically, the Commission’s purpose and objectives outlined in
Article 12 (“Mechanism of compliance”) and Annex III (“African Commission of
Nuclear Energy”) of the Treaty include collating reports and the exchange of
information; arranging consultations; convening conferences; reviewing the
application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA; administering a
complaints procedure; encouraging regional and sub-regional cooperation
programmes for peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology; and promoting
international cooperation (Pelindaba Treaty 2009). The composition and term of the
AFCONE are also contained in Annex III. Accordingly, the AFCONE consists of 12
members, each elected for a period of three years. The composition of the
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Commission will also be ‘equitable’ and geographically representative, and include

African states with “advanced nuclear programmes” (Pelindaba Treaty 2009).
According to the AU (2010b: 2), the First COP was attended by a wide variety of
representatives of African countries, international observers, NWS and international
organisations, including AU member states parties to the Treaty (Algeria, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe); AU states not yet party to the Treaty (Egypt, the
DRC, Djibouti, Ghana, Namibia, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sudan and
Uganda); Parties to Protocols I, II and III of the Treaty are expected to become
parties to these instruments (China, France, the Russian Federation, Spain and the
UK); AFRA; the IAEA; the PrepCom for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organisation (CTBTO); and the UN.
The First COP elected Mali (Chairperson); Rwanda (1st Vice Chairperson); Algeria
(2nd Vice Chairperson); Cameroon (3rd Vice Chairperson); and Zambia (Rapporteur)
as the Bureau to conduct the Conference’s proceedings (AU 2010b: 2). The COP
discussions focused on the “promotion of safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear
energy; nuclear security and combating of illicit trafficking; and the prohibition of
testing of nuclear explosive devices” (AU 2010b: 4). Apart from these issues, the
structure and budget of the AFCONE were also discussed. Final decisions on these
matters were referred to the next meeting of the AFCONE.
The First COP also elected the members or Commissioners of the AFCONE (see
Table 15). The 12 elected AFCONE Commissioners included several individuals who
were already involved with or held positions in AFRA and the IAEA; several career
scientists, some of whom rose through the ranks of various government
departments; a career diplomat (who served in India and in Pakistan) and a military
man. Only Abdul Minty of South Africa and Togo’s Lieutenant-Colonel Manzi
Pidalatan appear to have had extensive background experience of WMDs or nuclear
non-proliferation (see Appendix 1).
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For South Africa, the First COP produced some diplomatic success. The COP
endorsed South Africa as the host country of the AFCONE. This endorsement was
preceded by “considerable debate” on the issue (DIRCO 2010d: 5) despite the fact
that the AU in the Cairo Declaration of 11 April 1996 agreed that South Africa would
host the AFCONE. Some countries, unspecified by DIRCO (2010d), questioned the
earlier decision that South Africa should host the AFCONE by referring to Article 14
of the Pelindaba Treaty which prescribes that the First COP should determine the
Commission’s headquarters. South Africa’s position on the issue resulted in
confrontation with some conference delegates. Senegal, amongst others, indicated
that it sent a Note Verbale to the AUC on its offer to host the AFCONE. The AUC
indicated that it did not receive Senegal’s Note Verbale.
Table 15: Members of the AFCONE (2010)
Country elected to AFCONE Commissioner representing country
Algeria Messaoud Baaliouamer
Burkina Faso Badiori Outtara
Cameroon Augustin Simo
Ethiopia Atnatiwos Zeleke Meshesha
Kenya Shaukat Abdurazak
Libya Bulgasem Hammouda Ali El-Fawaris
Mali Tezana Coulibaly
Mauritius Anund P Neewor
Senegal Christian Sina Diatta
South Africa Abdul Samad Minty
Togo Manzi Pidalatan
Tunisia Mourad Telmini
AU (2010b: 4); CNS (2011d: 3) & Stott (2011: 3-4)

194
South Africa reiterated that the AU in the Cairo Declaration (11 April 1996) endorsed
South Africa as the host of the AFCONE. For South Africa, the 1996 AU decision
was taken two years into the ANC-led government. Furthermore, the decision also
symbolised the continent’s confidence in South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation
commitments. Subsequent to further debate on the matter, the conference finally
proceeded to endorse South Africa as the AFCONE’s host as originally intended.
According to DIRCO (2010d: 5), South Africa received “strong support” from Algeria
and “most countries in the SADC region”, with Zimbabwe trying to “avoid
endorsement” on a ‘technicality’ to host the AFCONE. Zimbabwe and Gabon also
‘insisted’ that Commission members should be re-elected after three years and that
the AU principle of regional rotation should apply. This is prescribed by Annex III of
the Pelindaba Treaty which also requires that Commission members should meet
specific criteria.
Another diplomatic success for the country was its election as one of the
Commissioners of the AFCONE. Abdul Minty, who failed to be elected as the
Director General of the IAEA, became South Africa’s Commissioner on the
AFCONE. Irrespective of these successes, some continental opposition was evident.
During the tenure of President Mbeki (1999-2008), South Africa promoted the idea of
an African Renaissance and an African Agenda in its foreign policy. This may have
strengthened perceptions that South Africa was too ambitious and dominant in
continental affairs. By the time the First COP took place, President Zuma had been
in office since May 2009. Like President Mbeki, he is also a strong promoter of the
African Agenda in South Africa’s foreign policy. The establishment of the AFCONE
did not mean that the Commission was operational. In order to achieve this, a First
Ordinary Session of the AFCONE was scheduled for May 2011, which was attended
by South Africa.
4.2 First Ordinary Session of the AFCONE (May 2011)
Prior to the First Ordinary Session of the AFCONE in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 4
May 2011, the AU (2011b: 1) announced that it intended to “intensify its efforts” to
achieve the “early operationalization” of the AFCONE. The main objective of the
Session was to address matters relating to the operation of the Commission (AU
2011a:3). This included the finalisation of the AFCONE’s Rules of Procedure; the
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programme of work for 2011-2013; its structure, as well as the position of the
AFCONE’s Executive Secretary (AU 2011c: 1-4). The AFCONE session was
attended by representatives of its member states and, as observers, representatives
of AFRA; the IAEA; the CTBTO; and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies
(FNBRA). Kenya, Libya and Togo, a quarter of the AFCONE’s elected members,
failed to attend the Session (AU 2011d).
In the opening address of the Session, Ramtane Lamamra (2011: 2), Commissioner
for Peace and Security of the AU, reiterated its purpose, namely to operationalise the
AFCONE in order to assist state parties to the Pelindaba Treaty to comply with their
treaty obligations. More specifically, the Session’s deliberations focused on several
operational matters and procedures, including the election of the chairperson and
vice-chairperson of the Board of Representatives of the AFCONE; the adoption of
the roles of procedures of the AFCONE Board; the structuring of the AFCONE and
the terms of reference of the Executive Secretary of the AFCONE Board; the
programme of work of the AFCONE; and the scale of assessment and the
Commission’s budget (AU 2011a: 3).
At this point it is important to take note of the Executive Secretary’s responsibilities.

H/she is tasked to collaborate with the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the
AFCONE and report on nuclear-related developments in Africa; lead the
implementation of the strategic goals and objectives of the AFCONE; serve the
AFCONE’s Commissioners and Conference of State Parties and provide reports and
information on the activities of the Secretariat and the AFCONE; resolve issues
arising from the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and recommend a course of
action to Commissioners; liaise with States, intergovernmental organizations,
specialized agencies and energy-related industries on matters concerning the
peaceful, safe and secure application of nuclear science and technology as well as
nuclear non-proliferation; solicit and receive suggestions from State Parties,
organizations, agencies and industries regarding the activities of the AFCONE;
mobilize technical and financial support required to assist in the work of the
AFCONE and negotiate partnership agreements; promote greater understanding and
support for the Treaty of Pelindaba and the work of the AFCONE; commission
consultants to advise on special matters related to the work of the AFCONE or
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conduct expert studies when such work cannot be undertaken by the Secretariat;
ensure and protect the confidentiality of the work of the AFCONE; inform State
Parties of their share of contribution to the scale of assessment of the AFCONE’s
annual budget, and report thereon to the Commissioners on a regular basis; ensure
the efficient management of human and financial resources of the Secretariat;
prepare the draft budget and other financial reports of the AFCONE, as well as
periodic reports on the implementation of the Programme of Work; and carry out any
other tasks as may be assigned by the Commissioners (AU 2011c: 1-4). The secrecy
clause of the Executive Secretary (“ensure and protect the confidentiality of the work
of AFCONE”) is a disturbing inclusion as it may compromise the transparency of
nuclear development in Africa.
For South Africa, the First Session produced some diplomatic successes. Firstly,
South Africa’s Abdul Minty was unanimously elected as the chairperson of the
AFCONE (AU 2011d). For South Africa, both the hosting of the AFCONE’s
headquarters and Minty’s chairmanship advanced its national interests and
strengthened its identity as a leader in nuclear diplomacy and as a responsible and
committed supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. Moreover, Minty’s chairmanship
offers some diplomatic reward after South Africa’s failure to head the IAEA. In
addition to this, South Africa’s Home Affairs Minister (and a former Minister of
Foreign Affairs), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faced a fierce behind-the-scenes battle
for the Presidency of the AU Commission in 2012, the body that will oversee the
Pelindaba Treaty and thus the AFCONE. Dlamini-Zuma won the contest against the
incumbent Jean Ping in July 2012.
In addition, undercurrents are increasing over South African dominance in atomic

development and its political role on the continent, irrespective of Abdul Minty’s
election as the AFCONE chair and despite his country’s well-developed atomic
expertise. Obviously, this may pose a threat to the implementation of the AFCONE.
When the Pelindaba Treaty opened in 1996, it was intended that the AFCONE would
“supervise the implementation of the (Pelindaba) treaty, with headquarters in South
Africa” (AU 1996). However, more African states including Egypt, Kenya, Namibia
and Nigeria are increasingly vying for prestige and leadership in Africa’s nuclear
sector. This appears to be a spin-off from the extent to which the IAEA has become
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integrated with African states in various collaborative projects that have escalated in
number over the past 20 years.
Secondly, South Africa’s attendance of the First COP and its election to and
leadership of the AFCONE realised some of the country’s foreign policy objectives
outlined as “Key Priority Area 1: Enhanced African Agenda and Sustainable
Development” in DIRCO’s Strategic Plan 2011-2014 (DIRCO 2011c: 29, 31). The
Strategic Plan outlined the objective to ‘strengthen’ the ANWFZ; utilise South Africa’s
membership of the AFCONE to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation and the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and prepare for hosting the headquarters of the
AFCONE. In this respect, South Africa’s position is similar to that of the AU during
the NPT RevCon meeting that was held from 3-28 May 2010 at the UN headquarters
in New York (see Chapter 6).
Despite the decision of the AFCONE’s First Session to meet again in July 2011 to
discuss the next steps to speed up activities (AU 2011e), no record of this meeting or
its cancellation could be found. Instead, on 8 July 2011, another AU statement after
the 17th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Equatorial Guinea, again
urged remaining African states as well as Protocol countries to ratify the Pelindaba
Treaty without delay. The AU also called on its members to provide the AFCONE
with the necessary support, alluding to possible reasons for the AFCONE’s second
meeting being skipped (AU 2011d). Consequently, indications are that the AFCONE
already lacks sufficient backing, not only for reasons stated by the AU, but also due
to political tensions among and the different agendas of its member states. The
nature of contentious issues that were raised between its members remains
undisclosed. Additionally, the issue of the AFCONE’s funding remains unclear.
Overall, the prognosis for a fully operational AFCONE is unclear and not positive.
The First Ordinary Session of the AFCONE did not address all the outstanding
matters pertaining to the operation of the Commission. The election of Abdul Minty
as the AFCONE chairperson points to some success of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy. Similar to his election to other leadership positions, Minty’s election yet
again enhanced the country’s status and prestige, and with the hosting of the
headquarters of the AFCONE, will bring some material benefit for the country.
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Despite these successes, an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy

with Africa in the context of the Pelindaba Treaty is required.
5. An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa
Several caveats to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with Africa in terms of the
Pelindaba Treaty were stated at the outset of this chapter. Against this background,
this section assesses aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in terms of its
African Agenda; its niche diplomacy in Africa; its state identity and power on nuclear
issues in Africa; and the performative aspects of its nuclear diplomacy in Africa.
5.1 South Africa’s African Agenda
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with its African counterparts is conducted against
the background of its post-1994 foreign policy, which places Africa high on the
foreign policy agenda. This Africanist turn has accelerated the country’s integration
in continental affairs and decision-making. Moreover, South Africa - especially during
the presidency of Thabo Mbeki - has positioned itself as the ‘voice’ of Africa and the
global South (Hamill 2006: 118-140; Serrão & Bischoff 2009: 363-380; Becker 2010:
133-146). This posture is complemented with that of an emergent middle power
(Schoeman 2000 & 2003) and a good international citizen (Serrão & Bischoff 2009).
South African foreign policy and diplomacy also displayed some characteristics of
transformational diplomacy that signifies a return to the use of the traditional
instruments of diplomacy, partnership and the idea that norms matter more than
material power (Landsberg 2010:12-13).
South Africa’s diplomatic relations with other African countries on nuclear issues
show all the signs of transformational diplomacy. In Africa, South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy is aimed at undoing the legacies of its nuclear weapons programme and
at convincing Africa that the country remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation.
Moreover, South Africa also attempted to undo existing global nuclear-related power
structures by working towards a denuclearised African continent. In addition to this,
South Africa’s state identity as a domestic reformer proved to be useful in a
diplomatic sense by advocating and supporting African and global nuclear-related
reforms. Thus, the country achieved some of the objectives of its African Agenda.
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5.2 South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa
A major implication of South Africa’s diplomatic niche is that it has some advantage
over other African countries due to its nuclear past. This advantage has been
locational, traditional or consensual. It has been locational to the extent that South
Africa is one of a few African states to have acquired and given up nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the country maintains a globally-competitive nuclear science capability.
The traditional advantage of South Africa is that the country has a nuclear history
and its consensual advantage resides therein that its non-proliferation commitment is
reflective of post-apartheid commitments.
South Africa’s ability to “generate return worth having”, implies that it wants to
achieve non-material objectives with its niche diplomacy in Africa. This in turn
generates African prestige, status, material benefit, soft power and moral authority.
With the dismantling of its nuclear weapons programme and nuclear weapons, South
Africa has accrued unprecedented moral authority and legitimacy for a former
nuclear weapons state. These non-material incentives are of particular importance to
convince the rest of Africa of South Africa’s intentions to use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.
South Africa has constructed a new identity and interests on nuclear matters post-
1990. Typically, states practicing niche diplomacy focus on a selected issue,
organisation or activity. By focusing on an issue, a country therefore constitutes its
identity and interests. South Africa is no exception in this regard. The sources of
South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa are located in the tenets of middle power
diplomatic behaviour, which has a strong normative foundation and of emphasising
“entrepreneurial flair and technical competence” (Cooper 1997: 6, 9). Other key
features of South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa are its focus on consensus and
coalition building and its willingness to cooperate on nuclear issues. As a result,
South Africa plays the roles of bridge-builder between Africa and NWS; mediator
between African states on, for example, the headquarters of the AFCONE; facilitator
of African gatherings on nuclear issues such as the Johannesburg meeting referred
to earlier; and as a catalyst by changing its nuclear posture on African nuclear
issues. The latter involved South Africa’s planning, convening, and hosting meetings,
prioritising for future meetings on a particular issue, and drawing up declarations and
200
manifestos. Thus, South Africa’s constructed identity since 1990 has resulted in its
norm compliance on continental nuclear non-proliferation and in the promotion of
niche diplomacy as a particular type of diplomacy in Africa.
5.3 South Africa’s state identity and power on nuclear issues in Africa
An actor’s conduct and practice of nuclear diplomacy is an expression of its identity

and its interests. Therefore, the main purpose of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in
Africa has been to achieve objectives aligned with its construction of self/national
interests, its particular identity and the nuclear-related norms it maintains and
complies with. Moreover, according to Serrão and Bischoff (2009: 370), South Africa
has attempted to construct a “new conception” of its foreign policy identity, with the
‘other’ being its apartheid past, rather than other international actors. In this sense,
South Africa has managed to construct a nuclear identity in Africa through “positive
approximation”, that is, by associating or identifying with the positive nuclear norms
and identities of other African states. This nuclear identity has also been achieved
through “negative approximation”, namely by distancing the country from its historical
nuclear conduct, capabilities and posture.
South Africa’s improved status can be ascribed to several factors, including its soft
power and influence. Its departure from “power as resources” to “relational power”
reiterates the social - rather than the material - construction of power. Accordingly,
several dimensions of power can be applied to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with
Africa. In terms of the scope of its power, South Africa’s power varied from one issue
to another within the context of the Pelindaba Treaty. Although South Africa had little
influence in the initial establishment of the AFCONE it wielded considerable
influence by re-asserting its niche role as the host of the AFCONE.
In terms of the number of actors under its influence, South Africa attempted on
several occasions to re-direct the focus of the Pelindaba Treaty and the AFCONE
away from nuclear safety and security - which it regards as imperative - to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy to contribute to the continent’s development. This
emanated from the country’s broader African foreign policy agenda and its role in the
establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the time
of the negotiation of the Pelindaba Treaty.
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In terms of the weight of its power, South Africa succeeded in naming the ANWFZ
Treaty to a South African installation; to lead the AFCONE; and to host the
Commission. Finally, in terms of the means to exercise, South Africa has been able
to exercise its power and influence through diplomacy.
The implications of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa have been wide-
ranging. Not only did it contribute to the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty but it
enhanced the country’s status and prestige. South Africa, which no longer has power
in the form of nuclear weapons, continues to wield considerable soft or normative
power on the continent. Checkel (2008: 80) refers to the ‘compulsive’ and “multi-
faceted face of power”, thus to broader conceptions of power to capture the
institutional and productive dimensions of power. Moreover, as the leading country in
the AFCONE, South Africa assumes the responsibility to lead the continent in
applying and enforcing norms on the development and application of nuclear science
and technology for peaceful purposes. A more significant implication of South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa is that it is an instrument of power and authority.
5.4 The performative aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa
Apart from understanding what South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy means it is also
instructive to determine what the country’s nuclear diplomacy does, namely to
determine the performative aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy. These
performative aspects are the following:
Firstly, South Africa maintained official representation at bi- and/or multilateral

conferences, meetings and negotiations on nuclear-related issues. South Africa’s
foreign policy identity has informed the conduct of its nuclear diplomacy on the
continent. South Africa employed various diplomatic strategies in Africa, ranging
from confrontation to cooperation. Engaging predominantly in multilateral diplomacy
in Africa (Lee, Taylor & Williams 2006), South Africa initially employed non-
governmental representatives such as Waldo Stumpf, the CEO of the AEC, and
representatives of the chief negotiating political parties and liberation movements. As
South Africa’s influence, identity and status as a state committed to a denuclearised
Africa improved, the status of its diplomatic representation and representatives also
202
changed from observer to official diplomatic representatives. This included having

career diplomats at negotiations and institutions such as the AFCONE.
Secondly, South Africa established and maintained additional nuclear-related

relations with African states through its membership of AFRA and the signing of
bilateral agreements on nuclear energy with France, the US and the UK. Thus,
South Africa regards this as an additional framework for cooperation.
Thirdly, South Africa initiated and supported ideas on the use of nuclear technology.
Closely related to this performative aspect is a fourth aspect, namely the
intersubjective understandings of the “nuclear taboo” and the peaceful uses of
nuclear power. At the First COP of the Pelindaba Treaty, for example, South Africa
emphasised the importance and utility of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for
Africa’s development.
Finally, South Africa engaged in socialisation with other African states in order to
entrench nuclear-related norms in international relations. This socialisation also
included scientific cooperation, as indicated by President De Klerk (1993) and by the
country’s involvement in African organisations such as AFRA and the FRNBA. South
Africa has also socialised with African states at AU and NPT gatherings and at the
UN, the NAM and the IAEA where African states often meet to discuss common
positions on particular nuclear-related issues. Despite the early positive indications
of South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa, the country’s nuclear diplomacy
continues to face several challenges.
6. South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy challenges in Africa
As the host and chairperson of the AFCONE, South Africa is confronted with several
challenges in Africa. Firstly, with regard to foreign policy South Africa’s African
Agenda has resulted in what Hamill (2006: 119) refers to as “continental
overstretch”. Whereas Presidents Mandela and Mbeki had a clearly defined African
Agenda, President Zuma simply builds on the foundations of his predecessors’
agenda. Mbeki’s erstwhile African Renaissance rhetoric seems to have disappeared
since his departure from office. Moreover, South Africa’s self-acclaimed role as the
‘voice’ of Africa has been met with distrust elsewhere on the continent.
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Secondly, the authority and operation of the AFCONE are problematic in its early
stages. The Commission is already experiencing budget constraints, which will affect
its operation and, therefore, its contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. Moreover,
tension is emerging between the Commission and certain African states. Nigeria, for
example, which is not a member of the AFCONE, has called on the AU in September
2011 to “fast track” the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty by operationalising
the AFCONE to “ensure nuclear security in the continent” (Daily Champion 19
September 2011). Nigeria’s Science and Technology Minister, Ita Okon Bassey Ewa,
called for a ‘stronger’ IAEA and cited the “uncoordinated desire for political control”
as being among the disturbing dangers that seem to be propelling nuclear non-
proliferation in Africa. He also made a strong case for the Nigerian Defence
Academy’s involvement in the AFCONE’s nuclear security agencies in the first
explicit link between the use of military power and atomic development in Africa. Ewa
implied that Nigeria hoped to counter the perceived interference from AFRICOM, the
US African Command. Discontent is rife over AFRICOM’s role in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation-led (NATO) military intervention in Libya in 2011, and there is
further discontent over the manner in which African developmental objectives are
coupled with sovereignty issues and the viability of Africans “doing it for themselves”.
Without divulging details, Minister Ewa also spoke of unsecured HEU stockpiles in
Africa; of “anti-social activities involving the use of nuclear materials”; of “misdirected
technological diffusion”; and of anticipated dangers in nuclear proliferation propelled
by the “uncoordinated desire for political control”. Nigeria’s anxiety, in part, stems
from an emerging nuclear envy among African states vying for prominence in African
politics and Africa’s atomic development. Ewa’s statements followed the
announcement by Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan in September 2011 that his
country had revived its Atomic Energy Commission to push ahead with plans to
develop its own nuclear power (Reuters 16 September 2011).
In the third instance, nuclear security on the continent remains a concern. For
example, illicit nuclear trafficking and thus nuclear proliferation on the continent
predates the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. The most notable cases are
South Africa and Libya’s previous nuclear weapons programmes. The implication is
that these two countries’ nuclear facilities and material can still be used in
proliferation activities. Since the signing of the Pelindaba Treaty some African
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countries were implicated in the Khan nuclear proliferation ring, including South
Africa and Libya, among others (IISS 2007). Since nuclear security in Africa
continues to attract global attention, the IAEA and the US remain involved in the
continent. However, in 2010 President Obama invited only five African states to the
NSS in Washington, US, to address the question of nuclear security. Broader African
participation was required for Obama’s second NSS held in Seoul, South Korea, in
2012 to strengthen commitment to nuclear security in Africa if the continent intends
to further develop its peaceful nuclear programmes without endangering its citizens.
For South Africa, as host and leader of the AFCONE, the question of nuclear
security will have to be addressed at the continental level.
In the fourth instance, South Africa faces the challenge of improving treaty
compliance among African states. Africa’s new sovereignty regime, described by
Geldenhuys (2006b: 1-29), offers the continent and South Africa the opportunity to
hold African leaders and states accountable to their commitments to the AU and the
AFCONE decisions.47 Notwithstanding this new regime, some African states are
notorious for non-compliance with international agreements. In this regard, Dye
(2008) refers to African states’ poor performance in the submission of the reports
required by UNSC Resolution 1540. The resolution adopted in 2004 came in the
wake of 9/11 and was intended to prohibit states providing support to non-state
actors from acquiring WMDs, and provides for the development and maintenance of
measures and controls over WMDs, related materials and delivery systems. By
2008, only 19 African states had submitted reports, most of which were incomplete.
All 53 AU-recognised states have either signed and ratified, or acceded to the NPT
that came into force in 1970. Unlike their commitment to the NPT, African states’
signature or ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty is less convincing. By January 2012,
the AU confirmed that it logged 33 deposited ratifications and 51 signatories.
Equatorial Guinea and Madagascar have still not signed the Treaty, but both have
ratified it. However, 20 of these signatory African states are yet to deposit their
instruments of ratification with the AU as the Treaty depository, indicating some
progress (AU 2012). In this respect, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy could promote
treaty compliance through such instructive methods as reminding states of their
47
This sovereignty regime refers to the AU’s departure from the OAU’s position on the non-
intervention in African states.
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treaty-related interests and socialising states to adhere to the fundamental

International Law norm of obedience to treaties. However, non-compliance in terms
of the International Law principle of obedience to treaties is often a result of
ambiguities in the Treaty, a lack of capacity to comply and time constraints, so South
Africa needs to pre-empt these issues in an appropriate manner.
In the fifth instance, the Pelindaba Treaty in Article 8 does not prohibit the “peaceful
use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes”. The Article also
requires states to “promote individually and collectively the use of nuclear science
and technology for economic and social development” (Pelindaba Treaty 2009).
These provisions may pose some challenges to nuclear security. Several African
states have already declared their intention to develop nuclear energy. According to
the Interim Secretary of the FNRBA and member of the AFCONE, Atnatiwos Zeleke
Meshesha (2011) they are Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Namibia,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and eight unspecified African
countries. South Africa has also indicated its intention to expand its existing nuclear
energy facilities. Article 8 of the Treaty also requires states to “establish and
strengthen mechanisms for cooperation” and therefore stresses that it is imperative
for states to cooperate. However, increased competition among African states and
foreign investors to gain access to Africa’s nuclear market may compromise these
provisions. In terms of verification, Article 9 makes it clear that all states who
undertake activities for peaceful purposes shall conclude a Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA to verify compliance and shall not provide any material which may be
used for the construction of a nuclear device (Pelindaba Treaty 2009).
In the sixth instance, South Africa will be required to coordinate relations and
cooperation between AFRA, the African Energy Commission (AFREC), the FNRBA
and the AFCONE. Established in 1990 by the IAEA and African states, AFRA
predates the AFCONE by more than two decades and has already achieved some
successes (Edwerd 2009: 53-56). South Africa will have to address African states’
entrenched interests in AFRA in order to establish an equal role for both
organisations. With only 12 members, the AFCONE is a much smaller organisation
than the more influential AFRA which has 39 partnered African member states, up
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from 32 in 2005. This is more than the ratified members of the Pelindaba Treaty.48
The intended role for AFRA, which entered into force on 4 April 1990, may pose
difficulties and cause it and other recently established atomic organisations such as
the FNRBA to compete with rather than complement the AFCONE. This scenario
may arise irrespective of the fact that both AFRA and IAEA officials have been
elected as AFCONE Commissioners. Article 12 of the Pelindaba Treaty intended that
the AFCONE should exert greater control over the development of nuclear projects
on the continent and work closely with AFRA and the FNRBA to ensure greater
security of radioactive materials (Pelindaba Treaty 2009). AFRA’s purpose is to
maximize the use of infrastructure and skills present in Africa and help countries to
move towards self-sufficiency by using peaceful applications of nuclear techniques.
AFREC was created during the 37th Conference of AU Heads of State in July 2001 to
devise policies, strategies and plans for energy development in Africa, and is also
likely to jump into the fray and consider nuclear options. The FNRBA, which was
created in 2009 due to the increasing use of radioactive materials for peaceful
applications of nuclear energy in the areas of health, agriculture and energy
production, is a network of regulatory bodies which promote nuclear safety and
security in Africa (IAEA 2012b). FNRBA membership is “open to all national nuclear
regulatory bodies in Africa on a voluntary basis” and it collaborates with the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the IAEA and other state regulatory bodies
(Meshesha 2011). By September 2011, the FNBRA’s members included 31 African
member states.49 The General Deputy Director of the IAEA, Tomihiro Taniguchi,
regards it as important to strengthen nuclear safety and security in Africa.
Abdul Minty (2011b: 2) pinpointed the Pelindaba Treaty’s unique nature by

describing it as the “only nuclear weapon free zone having a strong developmental
focus” which thus “offer(s) many opportunities for cooperation with AFRA and the
IAEA to enhance ongoing efforts to address development needs and challenges” in
48
In December 2011 AFRA’s National Liaison Officers in Africa included Algeria, Angola, Burundi,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
49
These are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia,
Uganda and Zimbabwe (Meshesha 2011).
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Africa. Speaking at the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee

(TACC) in November 2011, Minty (2011b: 3) repeated the developmental focus of
these bodies. Minty encouraged the Agency to “consider ways of collaborating with
the African Commission of Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), to complement its support
activities for the Region”. By working together (and with the IAEA) the AFCONE,
AFRA and the FNRBA are supposed to avoid redundant activities in order to
strengthen Africa's commitments on disarmament and non-proliferation, and to find a
balance between the needs of security and development in Africa.
In the seventh place, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy within the AFCONE context
may be challenged on the contentious issue of the geographical area subject to
denuclearisation in terms of Article 1 of the Pelindaba Treaty. The issue of the
geographical territory of the ANWFZ is not unique as a similar problem is
experienced with the Southeast Asian NWFZ in terms of the Bangkok Treaty (Chin
1998: 175-190). This issue is aggravated by various territorial claims. The UK
‘detached’ the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 to establish the British Indian
Ocean Territory (BIOT). However, Mauritius still claims Chagos and Diego Garcia; a
claim supported by the AU, but denied by the US and the UK (Harvey 2009). In
addition to this, Diego Garcia (a UK possession) and the Chagos Archipelago both
host US naval bases in accordance with several US-UK bilateral agreements (Sand
2009; Rosen 1997). The US military base on Diego Garcia, according to Harris
(2011: 498), is ‘subverting’ non-proliferation and the anti-nuclear weapons regime as
envisaged by the Pelindaba Treaty.
In the eighth instance and related to the previous issue, South Africa will have to
ensure that extra-zonal states comply with security assurances. Three Protocols to
the Pelindaba Treaty require extra-zonal states to comply with the Treaty’s
provisions (see Table 16). The AU has repeatedly indicated that the failure of non-
African countries and NWS to ratify the Treaty’s Protocols has hindered some
African states from ratifying it. This weakens the Treaty and poses a challenge to
global non-proliferation. On 8 July 2011, the AU supported by the US and the UN
repeated calls on non-member African states to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and for
NWS and Spain to ratify its Protocols as prescribed without further delay (AU
2011b). The AU issued this call despite welcoming the long-awaited Russian
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Federation’s ratification of the Treaty’s Protocol I and II on 11 March 2011, albeit

conditional and thus contrary to the text of the Pelindaba Treaty.
On 8 July 2011, the AU also welcomed President Obama’s undertaking of 2 May

2011 to seek consent for Protocol I and II from the US Senate, reversing a long-
standing reluctance on the part of the US to ratify them. Obama expressed the belief
that it is in the interest of the US to ratify Protocols I and II to strengthen US relations
with African allies. This would improve the security of the US by serving the overall
objective of non-proliferation and arms control; demonstrate US commitment to the
decisions taken at the 1995 REC of the NPT; and contribute to the achievement of
an ANWFZ (Mukhatzhanova & Pomper 2011). China has ratified Protocol I and II,
while France has ratified Protocols I, II and III. The UK and Russia have ratified
Protocols I and II but with provisos. The UK objected to the inclusion of the Chagos
Archipelago in the Treaty as an infringement of the UK’s sovereignty, whereas
Russia objected to the military base of the US, a NWS, on Diego Garcia. For Russia,
the presence of a NWS in an area subject to denuclearisation is counter to the
objective of the Treaty (Goldblat 2002: 211). Spain has neither signed nor ratified
Protocol III. However, it remains equally disturbing that the AU has not called on the
world’s risky atomic weapons states in Asia and the Middle East, namely India, Iran,
Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty.
In the ninth instance, the regime changes brought about by the so-called “Arab
Spring” since 2011 in North Africa may pose the challenge of nuclear reversal to
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa. Nuclear reversal, according to Levite
(2002: 61 & 67), can be described as the process whereby states embark on an
officially-sanctioned nuclear weapons programme, then reverse the programme
without necessarily abandoning their nuclear ambitions. This is closely related to
Levite’s (2002: 69) conceptualisation of nuclear hedging, which refers to a “national
strategy of maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the
relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons” based on a domestic technical
capability (such as nuclear fuel-cycle facilities and nuclear scientists) to produce
these weapons in a relatively short period. Both Libya and Egypt, for example, have
not yet stabilised since the removal of Colonel Muammar Al-Qaddafi and President
209
Hosni Mubarak respectively.50 Middle Eastern and North African countries such as
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan and Egypt have also
expressed their intention in September 2011 to initiate nuclear construction and
operation projects amounting to US$ 400 billion (Your Nuclear News, 6 September
2011). Egypt may be described as a potential nuclear hedger. Its nuclear ambitions
can be ascribed to, amongst others, its perception of Israel as a threat; the ambition
to lead the Arab world technologically and politically; and strong historical domestic
support for a national nuclear capability (Levite 2002: 63).
Table 16: Protocols of the Pelindaba Treaty
Protocol Obligations Open for Signed Ratified

ratification by
I NWS not to use or By all NWS By all France

threaten to use a nuclear NWS China
weapon against any Party UK
to the Treaty and against
any territory within the
ANWFZ
II NWS not to participate or

assist in or encourage the
testing of a nuclear
explosive device in the
ANWFZ
III Parties de jure or de facto France France France

in control of territories Spain Spain
within the zone (France &
Spain) to apply the
Treaty’s principles in the
territories under their
control
Pelindaba Treaty (2009)
Finally, South Africa may face challenges posed by efforts to establish a Middle East
NWFZ. Briefing Parliament on the Pelindaba Treaty in 2002, Deputy Foreign Minister
50
The spelling of Qaddafi is in line with the spelling in documents of the Qaddafi-led Libyan
government. See Libya (undated).
210
Aziz Pahad (2002) stated that one of the reasons for the delay in the entry into force
of the Pelindaba Treaty was the campaign by North African states to establish a
NWFZ in the Middle East. This resulted in the low priority given to the Pelindaba
Treaty. South Africa may be required to promote the establishment of a Middle East
NWFZ. To this end, South Africa has, for example, participated in the IAEA Forum
on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone in the Middle East in Vienna, Austria, from 21 to 22 November 2011. In
addition to this, Ambassador Lamamra (2010), Commissioner for Peace and
Security of the AU, referred to a NWFZ in the Middle East in his opening address to
the First COP of the Pelindaba Treaty. Lamamra raised an expectation of African
involvement in the establishment of the Middle East zone by stating that the AU
“strongly believes” that the establishment of a NWFZ, in the Middle East would
enhance African security.
South Africa’s hosting and leadership of the AFCONE will test the country’s
normative power. South Africa’s maintenance of its normative power on nuclear non-
proliferation on the continent and elsewhere is dependent on the legitimacy of the
country’s nuclear diplomacy. On its part, this legitimacy is dependent on the
country’s persuasive actions to promote nuclear non-proliferation on the continent
and on the AFCONE’s activities. More importantly, South Africa’s normative power
will be determined by the impact and consequences of the country’s socialisation of
the norms espoused by the AFCONE.
7. Conclusion
This chapter analysed South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy with Africa, particularly the
country’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the Pelindaba Treaty. The Pelindaba
Treaty made an innovative contribution to the institutionalisation of NWFZs as
functional regimes by, for example, providing for a mechanism of compliance
through the establishment of a continental commission, the AFCONE, with clearly
defined tasks.
Since 1990, South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy with African states in
such a manner as to convince the continent of its commitment to nuclear non-
211
proliferation. By ascribing to the continental norm of a denuclearised Africa, South

Africa constructed its identity accordingly to serve its national interests.
It is concluded that NWFZs are an effective instrument to express nuclear non-

proliferation as a norm. Africa’s interest in this normative instrument has originated in
the 1960s. However, despite this early commitment to the norm and the African
acceptance of an ANWFZ, the Pelindaba Treaty only entered into force in 2009. One
of the reasons for the delay was the unwillingness of the pre-1989 South African
government to join the continent’s nuclear non-proliferation efforts. By the time
continental efforts to resume negotiations on the ANWFZ treaty commenced in 1991,
changes in South Africa’s nuclear position had changed. Initial continental
negotiations on the treaty excluded South Africa. Once the IAEA verification process
was completed, South Africa was invited to join the continental and international
efforts to draft a treaty.
Throughout this treaty-making process, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy followed

two main strategies, namely cooperation and partnership. Its identity as a country
with nuclear expertise and a former nuclear proliferator-turned-norm-complier
resulted in the country being able to fulfil a particular role in these deliberations.
Several diplomatic successes resulted from this. South Africa was endorsed as the
host of the AFCONE; it was elected to serve on the AFCONE; and a South African
was elected to lead the AFCONE.
Efforts to denuclearise Africa slowed down once the NPT entered into force in 1970.
By 1990, political changes in South Africa included exposing the country’s nuclear
past. Once the continent accepted South Africa’s nuclear non-proliferation
commitments, it invited the country to deliberations on the ANWFZ treaty. This
marked the beginning of South Africa’s integration into the continent’s nuclear affairs.
Subsequently, South Africa played a significant role in the final draft of the Treaty
and was elected as the leader and host of the Treaty’s mechanism of compliance,
the AFCONE.
South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy in Africa has undergone several

changes. Most notably, the country has ascribed to the continental norm of nuclear
non-proliferation. It has acquired a niche role in nuclear diplomacy on the continent
212
and has constructed a new identity as a state complying with the norm of nuclear
non-proliferation as expressed, inter alia, through the continent’s nuclear weapons
free zone. South Africa’s involvement in the Pelindaba Treaty coincided with the
country’s accession to the NPT in 1991. Hence the need to consider the country’s
nuclear diplomacy in respect of the NPT.
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CHAPTER SIX
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Introduction
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter NPT) entered

into force on 5 March 1970 and rests on three major pillars or principles, namely
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and technology (NPT 1970). In order to achieve the objectives and
obligations set out in the NPT, the IAEA is regarded as its “implementation agency”.
It took South Africa 21 years to accede to the NPT since the Treaty entered into
force in 1970. This remains one of the major legacies of President FW de Klerk.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, the chapter analyses South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy in the context of the NPT in terms of South African involvement in
various RevCons and PrepComs since 1991, the year South Africa acceded to the
NPT.51 South Africa’s participation in the 1995 REC and subsequent conferences in
2000 and 2005 have previously received scant attention. Secondly, this chapter
analyses specific events preceding and surrounding each of these NPT conferences
which, apart from the content of the Treaty, significantly influenced not only South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, but also the negotiations at these conferences. The
chapter therefore traces South Africa’s construction of its identity, roles and interest
in terms of the NPT, and the country’s norm construction and involvement in related
conferences and events. In conclusion, an assessment is made of South Africa’s use
of diplomatic instruments and its achievements.
51
Pursuant to the NPT, parties to the Treaty meet every five years at a RevCon, usually held in New
York, to assess the status and implementation of the Treaty’s main pillars. In the three preceding
years a RevCon, a Preparatory Committee Conference (PrepCom) is held in preparation of the
RevCon. For the 2010 RevCon, for example, three PrepComs were held in Vienna (2007), Geneva
(2008) and New York (2009).
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2. The origins and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons
The origins of the NPT coincided with the onset of the Cold War (Fischer 1993;
Joyner 2011; Lodgaard 2011). The idea to consolidate the norm of nuclear non-
proliferation in an international agreement (later the NPT) was first proposed by
Ireland. As a norm entrepreneur, Ireland brought the issue of nuclear proliferation to
the UN in 1959 and requested action to prevent the existing nuclear weapons states
from supplying nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Subsequently, in 1961, the
UNGA adopted the “Irish Resolution” which called for limitations on the transfer of
nuclear weapons, as well as limitations on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
non-nuclear as well as nuclear states. Negotiations to consolidate the “Irish
Resolution” into a treaty stalled for some years. A breakthrough came with the
adoption of UNGA Resolution 2028 (1965) and the tabling of a joint US-Soviet draft
treaty on 11 March 1968. Following further amendments, a further draft was
submitted to the UNGA on 12 June 1968 which was signed by most members of the
UN on 1 July 1968. The NPT formally entered into force on 5 March 1970, with
Ireland and Norway as the first signatories (Joyner 2011: 13-20). Since its inception,
the NPT has been regarded as the basic global normative framework for nuclear
non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Consisting of a mere eleven articles, the core of the NPT corresponds with the
substantive structure of the Treaty text in that it rests on three pillars or norms,
namely, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy (see Table 17).
Article VIII of the NPT provides for a five-yearly review process to determine whether
the purpose and provision of the Treaty are being realised, and to review the
operation of the Treaty. In addition to this review provision, Article X of the Treaty
provides for an additional review of the Treaty by providing for a review conference
25 years after the entry into force of the NPT (thus 1995) to decide whether the
Treaty will continue indefinitely or be “extended for an additional fixed period or
periods” (NPT 1970).
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Table 17: The core provisions of the NPT
Norm Article Provision

(Pillar)
I NWS undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or to grant any
other state control over them.
II NNWS may not receive nuclear weapons or control nuclear

Non-proliferation
weapons.
III NNWS undertake to conclude safeguard agreements with the

IAEA. This is intended to prevent peaceful nuclear energy
programmes from being misused for military purposes.
IV The NPT should not affect the right of all parties to develop,
Peaceful uses of nuclear
research, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in

conformity with Articles I and II. State Parties are encouraged to
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
V Each state party (on this matter the Preamble reads: NWS) to the
energy
NPT have to share the potential benefits from any peaceful

application of nuclear explosions available to NNWS in a non-
discriminatory way.
VI All parties to the NPT commit themselves to pursuing negotiations
Disarmament
in good faith on effective measures to end the nuclear arms race

at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and to a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
X Any state party can withdraw from the NPT giving three months’
Procedural
notice and with reference to extraordinary events jeopardising its

supreme interests.
NPT (1970) & Joyner (2011: 26)
The NPT reflects the Cold War power relations at the time of its negotiation, and
hence contains several contradictory, even discriminatory, provisions (Joyner 2011).
Firstly, the Treaty distinguishes between two classes of state parties, that is, NWS
and NNWS. A further distinction is made, based on the technological capabilities,
status and privileges of the state parties. A NWS is defined in Article IX as a state
which has “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
216
device” before 1 January 1967 (NPT 1970). States not in this category are defined
as NNWS.
Secondly, the Treaty distinguishes between states on the grounds of the status and
privileges afforded to NWS but not to NNWS. Thirdly, the Treaty distinguishes on the
grounds of states’ obligations. For example, in terms of Article III, NNWS are obliged
to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA “for the exclusive purpose of
verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty” (NPT 1970).
Article V requires states to share the benefits of nuclear energy with NNWS. These
divergent obligations contribute to the quid pro quo nature of the obligations in the
NPT, which has often resulted in major disputes in proceedings related to the NPT.
Essentially, as Joyner (2011: 33-35) observes, the NPT is a three-pillared

compromise agreement between two classes of state parties with different sets of
obligations. Unique to the NPT are the quid pro quo elements on benefit sharing. In
addition to this, Joyner (2011: 35) maintains that the NPT is essentially concerned
with the regulation and application of the dual-use nature of nuclear energy and not
only, as its title suggests, with nuclear weapons.
When the NPT opened for signature on 1 July 1968, South Africa had already
established a nuclear-related Research and Development Programme which, inter
alia, prioritised the implementation of nuclear power in the country. The Programme
resulted in the establishment of a Nuclear Power Committee which included
members of the AEB, Eskom, and representatives from the industrial and mining
sectors. It was upon the recommendation of the Nuclear Power Committee that the
South African government decided to construct two nuclear power reactors at
Koeberg (Steyn, Van der Walt & Van Loggerenberg 2003: 32).
Barely two months before the NPT’s opening for signature, the AEB (1968: 2), in
May 1968, published a feasibility study, Report on the investigation into the possible
introduction of nuclear power in the Republic of South Africa. The report resulted
from a request by the Minister of Mines and Planning, JFW Haak, in June 1965 to
investigate the possible application of nuclear power in South Africa. Although this
report focused on the possible use of nuclear energy for electricity generation, it
217
paved the way for South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme and the “nuclear
devices” FW de Klerk (1993) referred to.
Moreover, in terms of the NPT at the time of its opening for signature and entry into
force, South Africa was categorised as a NNWS. In addition to this, South Africa was
also benefitting from assistance provided by NWS, most notably France and the UK
(AEB 1968: 2), in the development of South Africa’s nuclear capability. More
pertinent to this study, South Africa also refused to sign and ratify the Treaty.
Ironically, as is the case today, South Africa then argued, that the Treaty is inherently
discriminatory, albeit on different grounds.
As a point of departure it is necessary to provide a historical background to South

Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy. Accordingly, before proceeding to South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the NPT, the next section provides a brief
overview on South Africa’s position on the NPT prior to its ratification of the Treaty.
3. South Africa’s pre-1991 nuclear diplomacy on the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
As the South African government’s apartheid policies increased in scope and the
country ignored international objections to it, the international community
increasingly became concerned not only with the secrecy surrounding South Africa’s
nuclear programme but also with the South African government’s rationale for the
programme. Suspicions about South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability, according
to the New York Times (27 September 1987), increased when South Africa
repeatedly refused to sign and ratify the NPT.
South Africa explained and justified its refusal to join the NPT on a number of
occasions. When, for example, South Africa was pressurised by the IAEA in 1970
over its reluctance to ratify the NPT, South Africa’s Ambassador to Austria and the
country’s permanent representative at the IAEA, Ampie Roux (1970) explained that
the country was reluctant to “surrender, almost irrevocably, long-held sovereign
rights without having precise details of all the implications”.
South Africa’s refusal to ratify the NPT meant that none of the country’s nuclear
research, facilities and activities was covered by IAEA safeguards and inspections.
218
In contrast, South Africa eagerly informed the Agency of its nuclear development
activities. In 1972, for example, Ambassador Roux (1972) informed the IAEA GC that
the construction of South Africa’s small-scale enrichment plant was progressing well
and that South African advances in nuclear science had “far exceeded expectations”.
By 1975, Ambassador Roux (1975) announced that “apart from developing its
enrichment capability, South Africa was constantly intensifying its prospecting
activities”. The South African government also informed the Agency that the first
phase of the country’s pilot enrichment plant was successfully commissioned and
that feasibility studies for the construction of a “full-scale commercial plant” was
completed ‘satifsfactorily’ (South Africa 1975). Despite its unwillingness to ratify the
NPT, South Africa continued to regularly report to the international community on its
nuclear-related activities.
Despite diplomatic efforts to influence South Africa to accede to the NPT, existing
international concerns about South Africa’s nuclear ambitions and intentions during
the late 1970s escalated with the Soviet Union’s detection of a nuclear test site in the
Kalahari Desert in August 1977, and the detection by the US of a “double flash”
towards the end of the 1970s in the South Atlantic Ocean. The latter, which was
regarded as a possible nuclear test, raised international concerns about South
Africa’s nuclear intentions and resulted in the country’s increased international
isolation. By then, calls for South Africa’s suspension from the IAEA increased, and
emanated predominantly from African states. Western governments such as the US
and the UK, however, increasingly pressurised South Africa to ratify the NPT arguing
that South Africa’s suspension from the IAEA would undermine the Agency’s efforts
to engage South Africa on the termination of the country’s nuclear weapons
programme which, by then, was widely accepted to exist. Parallel to these
international developments, the international community increased its efforts to
isolate South Africa through a series of embargoes and sanctions. Increasingly,
South Africa began to feel the pressures which paved the way for some nuclear
disarmament initiatives by the South African government (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5
for a detailed discussion on these developments).
State President PW Botha announced on 21 September 1987 that the South African
government “hopes that it will soon be able to sign the NPT and has decided to open
219
discussions with others to this end” (South Africa 1990: 1). This was the first sign of
political and nuclear-related changes afoot in South Africa. Subsequent to Botha’s
announcement, diplomatic efforts focused on influencing the South African
government to accede to the NPT. From August 1988, several meetings between
South African officials and their counterparts of the NPT depository countries,
namely the US, the Soviet Union and the UK, took place at the IAEA headquarters in
Vienna. Led by Pik Botha in his dual capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the
Minister of Energy and Minerals Affairs, the South African delegation was mainly
concerned with “clarifying the cost and benefits of adherence” as well as the
responsibilities under the IAEA safeguards agreement (UN 1991: 11). This view was
later repeated when the South African Prime Minister explained to the South African
Parliament that South Africa was willing to accept IAEA safeguards if these
safeguards “did not allow commercial espionage or hinder South African civilian
nuclear research” (UN 1991: 11). These commercial - rather than security and
military - concerns date back to 1968 when South Africa explained to the UNGA that
it would not submit to IAEA safeguards as the country was concerned about
commercial espionage (see Chapter 4).
The New York Times (15 July 1988) reported that the South African government
requested negotiations with the UK, the USSR and the US to discuss “renouncing
nuclear weapons and opening all its atomic establishments to international
inspection” and signing the NPT (New York Times 14 August 1988). Fearing
expulsion from the IAEA, South Africa approached these NWS to acquire
assurances that these countries would not support motions to suspend South Africa
from the Agency.
A major implication of South Africa’s ratification of the NPT was that it would have to
negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to allow Agency officials to visit all of South
Africa’s nuclear plants, and declare and place under safeguard any stocks of HEU it
may have acquired in the past (New York Times 15 July 1988). At the time, Pik
Botha articulated some of Pretoria’s concerns about the NPT. He maintained that his
government required assurances on whether the NPT’s provisions “would be applied
to us [South Africa] in a non-discriminatory manner if we [South Africa] are to
consider joining it” (New York Times 14 August 1988) and that there would be no
220
interference with South Africa’s “research and development programme in producing

products for peaceful purposes” (Botha in Papenfus 2010: 732); a position and
requirement dating back to the 1970s as indicated earlier. The July 1988
negotiations produced some preliminary results.
Ending years of speculation on these issues, Pik Botha admitted in August 1988 that
South Africa had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. As The Citizen (22
September 1988) reported at the time, Botha refused to admit that South Africa had
produced nuclear weapons. However, Botha (in Papenfus 2010: 732) admitted that
he knew of the existence of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme since his
appointment as Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs and had accompanied PW
Botha to one of the facilities where South Africa’s six atomic bombs were kept.52
Subsequent to Pik Botha’s public denial, US diplomat Herman (Hank) Cohen “kept
up the pressure” on South Africa to sign the NPT (Botha in Papenfus 2010: 733). By
the end of September 1988, the international community once again appealed to
South Africa to sign the NPT.
The next round of negotiations between the South African government and the
depository countries took place in Vienna in December 1989. This time the South
African delegation, composed of pro- and anti-NPT delegates, was concerned about
the practicalities of acceding to the NPT. The talks concluded with the South African
delegation indicating that domestic concerns about South Africa’s accession to the
NPT should first be addressed before the country would accede to the Treaty.
However, it took almost a year to address these domestic concerns as the country
was by now preoccupied with the release of Nelson Mandela; the unbanning of
liberation movements; and the initial negotiations on the country’s future
constitutional dispensation.
By September 1990, a written statement issued by Pik Botha was circulated at the
34th Regular Session of the IAEA GC. In the statement Botha indicated that South
Africa was ‘prepared’ to accede to the NPT, but with a caveat “in the context of an
equal commitment by the other states in the Southern African region” (South Africa
52
Unlike De Klerk (1993) and Stumpf’s (1995a & 1995b) references to “nuclear devices”, Pik Botha
referred to “atomic bombs” (Papenfus 2010: 733). Steyn, Van der Walt and Van Loggerenberg (2003)
refer to “nuclear weapons” and “nuclear devices”.
221
1990: 2). Moreover, Botha also indicated that his government intended to commence
talks with the IAEA on concluding a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency (South
Africa 1990: 2). The South African diplomatic effort paid off: the IAEA Director
General indicated that the Agency was ready to commence talks with South Africa
“without delay” (UN 1991: 11).
In June 1991, Pik Botha announced that the South Africa government intended to
reverse its years of opposition to the NPT and sign the Treaty. At the time, the New
York Times (21 March 1990) reported that the development that “appears to have
swung South Africa around in favour of signing the treaty, officials say” was an
assurance from the US, the UK and the USSR that “for procedural reasons” the
IAEA:
would not be in a position to start inspecting South Africa's plants for about
two years after it signed. Britain also assured South Africa that if it signed the
treaty, European countries were likely to lift their ban on nuclear cooperation
with South Africa.
On 8 July 1991, the New York Times (9 July 1991) reported that Pik Botha had
signed South Africa’s accession to the NPT at a ceremony in Pretoria. This was later
confirmed by the South African government and the IAEA.
South Africa’s signing of the NPT coincided with major political developments in the
country. Moreover, the signing of the NPT paved the way for the IAEA’s verification
process in the country, which was successfully concluded by 1993. With this
completed, South Africa was recognised as a unique case of nuclear roll-back. As
previously indicated, this bestowed the country with significant moral and normative
power and a unique nuclear identity as a state that terminated its nuclear weapons
programme. Important in terms of its signature of the NPT, South Africa as a state
party to the NPT could now participate in the conferences on the NPT such as the
RevCons and PrepComs. Ironically, South Africa’s attendance of its first NPT-related
conference in 1995, the REC, coincided with the 25 year review conference of the
NPT as prescribed in Article X of the Treaty. The latter had to determine the future
life-span of the very Treaty South Africa had been repeatedly called upon to sign
since 1968.
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Thus, South Africa’s accession to the NPT in 1991 illustrated a departure from its
pre-1990 nuclear diplomacy. Since the 1970s South Africa has followed a policy of
deliberate nuclear opacity.53 The latter refers to a situation where the existence of a
nuclear weapons programme “has not been acknowledged by a state’s leaders, but
where the evidence for the existence of such a programme is enough to influence of
[sic] other nation’s perceptions and actions” (Cohen in Abraham 2009: 117). In this
respect, the notion of nuclear opacity sheds light on South Africa’s position on the
NPT as the country never confirmed the existence of its programme despite the
existence of its programme at the time.
South Africa’s accession to the NPT also indicated the country’s acceptance by the
international community due to its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. South
Africa’s first opportunity to attend an NPT conference occurred in 1995, which is the
focus of the next section.
4. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference
The 1995 REC of the NPT was significant for a number of reasons. In pursuance of
Article VIII of the NPT, it had to review the Treaty. More importantly, in pursuance of
Article X of the NPT, the 1995 conference took place 25 years after the entry into
force of the Treaty and, in addition, had the task of deciding whether the NPT will
continue indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods (NPT
1970). For South Africa, due to its absence from earlier NPT conferences, this meant
that considerable preparation would be required. Not only was a new government in
power in South Africa, but the South African diplomatic corps also had no experience
of participation in NPT conferences. In an effort to prepare for the REC, South
African officials participated in a series of PrepComs prior to the REC.
4.1 South Africa’s participation in the Preparatory Committee Conferences
The PrepCom for the 1995 REC held four sessions, respectively in New York (May
1993 and January 1994), in Geneva (September 1994) and again in New York
(January 1995). South Africa was able to attend all of these sessions (UN 1995b: 1),
53
The concept of nuclear opacity is preferred to the concept nuclear ambiguity. The latter refers to the
uncertainty of the presence of a nuclear weapons programme, or the indecision by decision-makers in
respect of the utility, efficacy and morality of nuclear weapons (Abraham 2009: 117).
223
with the session in New York from 10-14 May 1993 being the country’s first-ever
attendance of the proceedings of an NPT conference. In fact, South Africa
contributed 0.28 percent, thus more than any other African state, to the cost of these
PrepComs (UN 1995b: 17-24). South Africa’s participation in these PrepComs was
relatively low-key, which could be explained by the country’s inexperience.
Moreover, its participation in the first session of the PrepCom took place a few
weeks after President De Klerk’s 1993 announcement which caused considerable
international interest. South Africa’s participation also coincided with the IAEA’s final
verification of the dismantling of the country’s nuclear weapons programme.
At the PrepComs for the 1995 REC, South Africa’s position on the NPT built on the
ANC’s historical position on the Treaty. This was maintained by ANC activist Denis
Goldberg (1994: 217; 218, 228) when he spoke at the conference on Nuclear Policy
for a Democratic South Africa convened by the ANC in Cape Town in February
1994, and he pointed out that the Treaty “perpetuates the historically imposed
inequalities” between NWS and NNWS, and that the ANC is in favour of the
extension of the Treaty for a “shorter or longer period” (see Chapter 1). At the third
session of the REC’s PrepCom, South Africa’s delegation, led by Riaan Eksteen,
reminded delegates that the GNU had been in power only for a few months and that
the country required more time to formulate a position on the extension of the Treaty
(Masiza & Landsberg 1996: 21). However, the position which South Africa seemed
to have favoured at the time was close to the NAM’s position, which was to support a
fixed extension of the Treaty. In the period leading up to the REC, the US as a NWS,
indicated that it preferred an unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT (Taylor
2006: 166), which was contrary to the position of the NNWS and the NAM in
particular. Against the background of Eksteen’s observations, the South African
government commenced with its preparations for the REC.
4.2 South Africa’s preparation for the Review and Extension Conference
Prior to various PrepComs for the 1995 REC, through South African diplomat Peter
Goosen (1995: 2), who was a member of the South African delegation at the 1995
REC, South Africa applied certain diplomatic strategies and instruments in
preparation of the country’s participation in the PrepComs and the REC. Goosen
(1995: 2) explained that South Africa ‘consulted’ with OAU members, the NAM and
224
other states in an effort to “understand the perspectives of other countries and to

analyse what might happen at the Conference [the REC]”. He also indicated that
South Africa considered various extension options and their implications prior to the
various PrepComs and the REC. Subsequent to these consultations the high-level
meeting (also referred to by Markram 2004: 24) took place. According to Goosen
(1995: 2), the high-level meeting concluded that South Africa realised that the NPT
provides security guarantees to the country and that the NPT “has been successful”
in achieving some level of nuclear disarmament.
“Thus, we concluded”, Goosen (1995: 3) indicated, that the NPT was in “South
Africa’s national security interests, and that the best way to retain the Treaty would
be by supporting indefinite extension in principle”. The question that now emerged
was: How to achieve an extension without threatening the NPT? Goosen (1995: 3)
explained that, in order not to jeopardise the NPT, South African diplomats and
principals in Pretoria formulated a series of principles as a political - rather than as a
legal - instrument because the Treaty could not be easily amended. It was against
this background that the South Africa government attended the 1995 REC.
4.3 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the Review and Extension

Conference
South Africa attended the 1995 REC in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995.
Apart from reviewing the implementation of the NPT, the REC had to decide whether
to extend the NPT for one or more periods or indefinitely. More importantly, the 1995
REC had to address the several unresolved issues of the previous RevCon in 1990.
Since the 1990 RevCon NNWS maintained that some security assurances were not
kept by NWS; that NWS did not implement the Treaty’s provisions; and that an
indefinite extension of the Treaty should be approved by the majority of the parties to
the Treaty. The NNWS, mostly composed of members of the NAM, maintained that
they constituted the majority of State Parties to the NPT and therefore preferred a
limited extension of the NPT.
The 1990 RevCon could not reach an agreement on these matters and therefore
carried these debates over to the 1995 REC. Although the 1990 RevCon produced
no substantial results, several developments concerning nuclear disarmament were
225
apparent. In the wake of the collapse of the USSR, the future of the former USSR’s
nuclear arsenal at the time was questioned since it was based in newly-independent
states not party to the NPT. This resulted in a process whereby 38 countries, mainly
former Soviet Union republics, France, China and South Africa, amongst others,
acceded to the NPT between 1990 and the 1995 REC. Moreover, concerns about
the intentions of NWS remained despite the end of the Cold War. The NNWS were
of the opinion that NWS did not comply with Article VI of the Treaty, which requires
all state parties to the Treaty to negotiate on the “cessation of the nuclear arms race”
and nuclear disarmament (NPT 1970).
By the time of the 1995 REC, the ANC had been elected into power (albeit in a GNU
with the NP) subsequent to South Africa’s 1994 election. This meant that the country
enjoyed considerable international goodwill, a position it put to good use in the
negotiations at the REC. In fact, in the opening statement of the President of the
REC, later recalled by South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo (1995),
the Conference President referred to South Africa’s unique position as the “first
country to have unilaterally and voluntarily” dismantled its nuclear weapons
programme and devices.
Intense debates, most notably on the provisions on disarmament (Article VI),

safeguards (Article III) and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV), followed
the opening of the REC. Divergences of opinion between developing and developed
NNWS emerged on the need for NWS disarmament in terms of Article VI. Although
the NWS stated that the nuclear arms race had ended and that they had reduced
their arsenals, the NNWS forming part of the NAM in particular were not convinced
and demanded more security assurances (Reaching Critical Will 2011).54 Despite
these debates insufficient time was devoted to issues concerning the review of the
Treaty as more time was devoted to debates on the extension of the NPT, which was
preferred by most states. However, divergent views also emerged on the nature of
the extension, a provision of Article X of the Treaty. These divergent views were
contained in three draft texts submitted by Mexico, Canada (on behalf of 102 states)
54
Two types of security assurances exist. A negative security assurance is a guarantee by a NWS
that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS. A positive security
assurance is a guarantee by a NWS that it will come to the aid of a NNWS if it is attacked by another
state with nuclear weapons (Reaching Critical Will 2012).
226
and a group of non-aligned, predominantly developing states. Some NNWS

preferred an extension for a fixed period of 25 years with a subsequent review of the
NPT’s continuance in an effort to curb NWS. Contrary to this position the NWS
preferred an indefinite extension of the Treaty.
South Africa’s position on the extension of the NPT, as expressed by its Foreign
Minister, put the country in a diplomatic quandary. Whereas South Africa’s position
at the PrepCom corresponded with that of the NAM, its position at the REC
resembled that of the US. This risked South Africa’s alienation from the NAM, an
organisation which had supported the liberation struggle in South Africa and to whom
the ANC owed considerable political debt. Moreover, as the largest grouping of
NNWS (compared to only five NWS), the NAM yielded considerable influence at
NPT conferences.
South Africa’s amended stance on the extension of the Treaty since its position at
the PrepCom is ascribed to the intense diplomatic pressure of the US during the
period between the PrepCom and the 1995 REC. The US warned of the danger to
“mutual interests” if South Africa took a position contrary to that of the US (Taylor
2006: 167). South African diplomat Thomas Markram (2004: 24) who was part of the
country’s delegation to the 1995 REC provided the following first-hand account of
how these changes occurred. According to him, South Africa’s “strategies and
tactics” for the REC were finalised two weeks prior to the start of the Conference in
New York in a meeting at the Diplomatic Guest House in Pretoria:
Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President of South Africa guided the discussions
that concluded that the Treaty was too valuable for nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation to put into jeopardy by only permitting a limited extension of
time and that South Africa consequently had no other option but to support
the indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was, however, agreed that such an
extension should not be agreed to without the reciprocal agreements on the
accomplishment of the provisions of the Treaty. The task of giving definition to
these broad directives was handed to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
to officials working on these issues. Based on the proposal from the Foreign
Affairs officials Deputy President Mbeki subsequently wrote a letter to [US]
227
Vice President Al Gore of the United States setting out the position that would
be adopted by South Africa at the Conference.
Although not mentioned by Markram (2004), Taylor (2006: 167) states that Gore
“personally lobbied” Mbeki and that US President Bill Clinton wrote to President
Mandela “demanding support” for the US position as South Africa was seen to have
influence over the NAM and African countries. Eager to attract US goodwill and
investment, South Africa adopted the US position but offered some solutions to
break the impasse between NWS and NNWS on key issues.
South Africa used various strategies and instruments to conduct its nuclear
diplomacy at the REC. Initially, South Africa preferred a limited extension of the NPT,
as explained by Goldberg (1994). In this, the country cooperated with some NNWS.
At the PrepComs for the 1995 REC, South Africa developed a new position, resulting
in confrontation with some of the countries of the developing world and some NNWS.
It cooperated with the NWS, most notably with the US, in achieving the indefinite
extension of the NPT.
South Africa’s proposals on a mechanism for strengthening the review process were
developed in consultation with other countries. The first draft of this document was
compiled in Pretoria and finalised prior to the REC in New York. Goosen (1995: 3)
explained that the “ideas in the original South African draft on the review mechanism
were not this of South Africa alone, as was the case with the draft on principles”.
On 19 April 1995, two days into the conference, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Alfred Nzo, addressed the REC. According to Nzo (1995), South Africa
played an “active part” in the PrepCom meetings and had, in compliance with a
Nigerian-sponsored UNGA resolution, provided legal analysis of the extension
options to the Treaty’s future. Nzo (1995) also stressed South Africa’s position that
the NPT should not be jeopardised and that the Treaty should be strengthened and
not weakened. He reiterated that the NPT is the “only international instrument on
nuclear disarmament” which binds all five NWS. Referring to the “inequalities
inherent” in the Treaty, Nzo stated that it should be dealt with in such a manner as
not to threaten the security provided by the NPT. More importantly, he confirmed that
228
South Africa “in principle supports the view that the NPT should be extended
indefinitely. The termination of the treaty is not an acceptable option”.
Nzo (1995) also proposed that a mechanism must be found to address these
concerns in order to fully implement the NPT. In order to achieve this, Nzo proposed
the adoption of a set of Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
(hereafter Principles) to be taken into account when the implementation of the NPT
is reviewed. He made it clear that these Principles were not intended to amend the
Treaty but were intended to consider the current international environment, which
differs from time to time. Nzo also proposed that these Principles should be renewed
at every RevCon. He did not identify these proposed Principles but referred to issues
which should be considered when formulating these Principles. These were:
• a restatement on the commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
• the strengthening of and full compliance with the IAEA safeguard agreements;
• access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes;
• progress in the Cut-Off Convention negotiations;
• progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals;
• progress in the negotiations for the CTBT;
• a commitment to the establishment of regional NWFZs; and
• Enforcing binding security assurances for NNWS (Nzo 1995).
Nzo also proposed a strengthened review process by recommending the

establishment of a committee to study the review process, which should make
recommendations to strengthen the NPT and its implementation. These
recommendations, Nzo (1995) proposed, should be considered by the PrepComs for
the 2000 RevCon.
South Africa’s proposals served as the basis for the package of decisions presented
by the President of the Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala from Sri
Lanka. According to Thomas Markram (2006: 24), the package of decisions
“provided a way for all State Parties to support the indefinite extension” and the
means for achieving progress on nuclear disarmament. The final decisions adopted
by the REC reflected South Africa’s initial proposals. Two of the REC’s three major
decisions, Decision I (Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty) and Decision
229
II (Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament) were based on South Africa’s
proposals presented by Minister Nzo.
4.4 An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the 1995 Review

and Extension Conference
In its nuclear diplomacy at the REC, South Africa developed a niche role to achieve
its objectives. Constructing its identity as a state with a unique nuclear identity which
bestowed on it a certain normative power, South Africa was able to play the role of a
norm entrepreneur by facilitating the socialisation of certain non-proliferation norms
by other states. South Africa identified and filled specific niche areas, as described
by Cooper (1997: 5), pertaining to the NPT. It deliberately focused on the “elements
of the NPT”, according to Goosen (1995: 3), to “identify the various issues which
could be addressed”. South Africa’s behaviour in this case was typical of middle
powers whose behaviour, as explained by Keohane (in Cooper 1997: 8), was that of
a state “whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able
to have a systemic impact in a small group or through international institutions”.
For South Africa, the norms espoused by the NPT formed the foundation of its
diplomatic practice prior to and at the REC. South Africa’s “entrepreneurial flair and
technical competence” (Cooper 1997: 6, 9) are evident in its decision to focus on the
“elements of the NPT” and to consult with other actors such as the OAU, the NAM
and other countries (Goosen 1995: 1-3). Furthermore, South Africa’s
“entrepreneurial flair” was also recognised by the President of the REC, Ambassador
Jayantha Dhanapala (1995: 2) of Sri Lanka when he referred to South Africa’s “very
imaginative proposal of having a statement of principles and a strengthening of the
review process” which “led to the other two parallel decisions that were taken
together with the decision on the extension”. South Africa’s diplomacy, therefore,
was based on consensus and coalition building, and cooperation with other states on
two specific issues (the indefinite extension of the Treaty and a review of the Treaty).
In this South Africa adopted the roles typical of middle powers practicing niche
diplomacy as identified by Cooper (1997: 9), namely bridge-builder, mediator,
facilitator and catalyst. The latter involved South Africa’s planning; convening and
hosting of consultations on the NPT; and drawing up an initial statement which it
amended after more consultations at the REC in New York.
230
Some critics, most notably Masiza and Landsberg (1996), and Taylor (2006) referred
to South Africa’s ‘betrayal’ of the “non-aligned position”. Masiza and Landsberg
(1996: 25), for example, questioned South African diplomats’ consultation with non-
aligned countries as having been too time-consuming. However, Masiza and
Landsberg (1996: 25) and Taylor (2006: 170) maintain that there was no “common
non-aligned position”. Although the 1995 REC achieved some consensus on the
review of the Treaty and its extension, it could not reach a decision on the
implementation of Article VI; an issue which was carried over to the 2000 RevCon
and which confirmed the historical gap that exists between NWS and NNWS on
nuclear disarmament.
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at its first NPT conference produced significant
diplomatic results for the country. It produced non-material rewards such as status
and prestige. Moreover, it also signalled the country’s compliance with the norms
espoused in the NPT. It is against this background that South Africa prepared for the
NPT’s 2000 RevCon.
5. The 2000 Review Conference
Several events pre-empted the 2000 NPT RevCon, which ultimately affected the
goodwill generated at the 1995 REC. Moreover, it required South Africa to react to
these events which impacted on its nuclear diplomacy at the NPT.
5.1 Events preceding the 2000 Review Conference
In the wake of the 1995 REC, the French President, Jacques Chirac, announced on
13 June 1995 that France had decided to resume its nuclear weapon testing
programme in the South Pacific. In response to this, the South African government
employed several diplomatic strategies. Along with several other NNWS, South
Africa expressed its regret at the decision in the strongest terms. France’s decision
was not the only one made by a NWS in the wake of the 1995 REC. China also
conducted nuclear tests on 15 May 1995 (CNS 1998), a mere three days after the
REC.
231
From South Africa’s perspective, France and China’s decisions “seriously undermine
the decisions” and “contradicts the spirit of the decisions” taken at the REC (DFA
1995). Moreover, the South African government stated that France and China
participated in the consensus decision which approved and adopted the Statement
of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, as a
result of proposals made by South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo. With regard
to nuclear testing, South Africa indicated that the Statement of Principles and
Objectives states that:
4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full

realisation and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme
of actions listed below:
I. The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a

universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a CTBT
the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint (DFA 1995).
For South Africa, the French and Chinese decisions remained matters of concern.
Firstly, France and China are NWS that gave certain undertakings at the 1995 REC,
which included exercising restraint in nuclear tests pending the entry into force of the
CTBT. Secondly, the French announcement coincided with what South Africa
regarded as “sensitive negotiations” for the CTBT (DFA 1995). In response to the
French announcement, the South African government ‘urged’ the French
government to ‘reconsider’ its decision (DFA 1995). These views were expressed
directly to the French government at meetings with the French Charge d'Affaires in
Pretoria subsequent to the announcement in June 1995. At the time, the South
African government also indicated its intention to “use further diplomatic measures”
through its mission in Paris and “other important capitals abroad to impress upon the
Government of France its opposition to any further nuclear tests” (DFA 1995).
One positive development in the run-up to the 2000 RevCon, in contrast to the
French and Chinese tests, was the UNGA’s adoption of the CTBT. South Africa’s
reaction to the Chinese and French tests emanated, inter alia, from South Africa’s
commitment to the CTBT. The CTBT originated from an ad hoc committee of the CD
232
in Geneva, which commenced with negotiations on the text for a CTBT in January
1994. At the 1995 REC, state parties of the NPT undertook to complete negotiations
on the CTBT “no later than 1996”. The CTBT was adopted on 10 September 1996.
The most important provision of the CTBT is contained in Article 1. In terms of this,
each State Party to the CTBT undertakes not:
to carry out any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear

explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any
place under its jurisdiction or control (DFA 1999).
South Africa, along with 70 other states, signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996
(Taylor 2006: 175). Subsequent to this, the South African Parliament approved its
ratification and, on 30 March 1999, South Africa deposited its Instrument of
Ratification of the CTBT with the UN Secretary-General in New York. South Africa
was one of the members of the core group of states that facilitated the process of the
resolution on the CTBT adopted in New York in September 1996. According to the
South African government, two of the items of the CTBT text could be “attributed to
South African proposals”, namely those addressing funding the International
Monitoring System and the levels of explosions (DFA 1999). In addition to this, the
then Director-General of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Jackie
Selebi, while serving as South Africa's Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, was
elected to serve as the first chairperson of the PrepCom of the CTBTO in recognition
of South Africa’s role in the CTBT.
Another development in the run-up to the 2000 RevCon resulted from indications
that NWS were not delivering on their commitments agreed to at the 1995 REC.
Prior to the RevCon, South Africa, in 1998, became one of the founder-members of a
new grouping of NNWS states, namely the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) (see
Chapter 3). This grouping shared the NNWS frustrations with the NWS on the
matter. Moreover, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan raised further concerns about
the future of commitments to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
Apart from South Africa, the NAC mainly consisted of middle powers or emerging
middle powers including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Mexico and Sweden.
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Amidst these international developments, South Africa also experienced certain

changes which ultimately affected the country’s nuclear diplomacy. The presidential
term of Nelson Mandela ended and Thabo Mbeki was inaugurated as the country’s
second post-apartheid President in 1999. Widely regarded as a “foreign policy
President”, a reference to his years as an ANC official serving on the ANC’s
international relations desk, Mbeki’s tenure had significant implications for South
Africa’s diplomacy. He also appointed a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma. At a bureaucratic level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also underwent
changes and restructuring to reflect the country’s foreign policy direction. It was
against these domestic and international developments that South Africa joined other
state parties to the NPT for the 2000 RevCon.
5.2 South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the 2000 Review Conference
The 2000 RevCon followed a series of PrepComs in 1997, 1998 and 1999. South
Africa and Canada took an active role in PrepCom II prior to the 2000 RevCon from
14 April to 19 May 2000. Following South Africa’s proposal at the 1995 REC on the
establishment of committees to review the implementation of the NPT, the PrepCom
meetings for the 2000 RevCon agreed that the business of the RevCon should be
organised into three main committees:
• Main Committee I to address issues relating to Article VI.
• Main Committee II to address issues relating to the IAEA and regional issues.
The addition of regional issues emanated from a proposal by the NAM to
address nuclear issues relating to the Middle East and nuclear disarmament.
• Main Committee III to address the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The recently-established NAC’s major objective at the 2000 RevCon was to convince
the NWS to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In their joint declaration,
Towards a nuclear free world: the need for a new agenda, members of the NAC
(1998) maintained that the “indefinite possession” of nuclear weapons by NWS and
nuclear-weapons-capable states pose a “continued threat to humanity”. The 2000
RevCon was the NAC’s first attendance of a RevCon. According to DIRCO (the
erstwhile South African Department of Foreign Affairs), South Africa and other
members of the NAC’s focus at the 2000 RevCon was to negotiate agreements on “a
234
series of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts” to implement the
provisions on nuclear disarmament of Article VI of the NPT (South Africa undated).
The NAC also required an “unequivocal undertaking” by the NWS to eliminate their
nuclear arsenals. By now, the NAC incorporated members of the NAM and began to
articulate common positions on behalf of the organisation. However, as NWS
realised that the NAC is becoming increasingly influential in the RevCon, the US
requested a meeting with the NAC on 13 May 2000. Prior to the RevCon, according
to US Ambassador Norman Wulf (2000) who led the US delegation during
PrepComs and at the RevCon, the US held several meetings with individual
members of the NAC.
In presenting South Africa’s case at the RevCon, Abdul Minty (2000) reminded
delegates of the undertakings agreed to at the 1995 REC. Expressing concerns over
the status of the NPT and the implementation of nuclear disarmament by NWS, he
reminded delegates of South Africa’s experience whereby the possession of nuclear
weapons does not guarantee a state’s security but rather results in an arms race due
to other states’ insecurity. Minty also referred to several unresolved issues and
developments since 1995 which contradict and are counter-productive to the
achievement of the NPT’s objectives. These issues were:
• NWS continued reliance on nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines;
• compliance issues with the NPT in the case of Iraq and North Korea;
• nuclear tests in South Asia;
• delays in implementing START II and the commencement of START III;
• the repercussions of modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty;
• delays in the entry into force of the CTBT; and
• Delays in the CD negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) (Minty 2000).
Minty’s (2000) criticism was not limited to the NWS inability to present an
“unequivocal undertaking to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear
weapons”. He also proposed steps which should be taken by the NNWS in
compliance with the NPT. Minty referred to states such as Israel, India and Pakistan
who were not complying with the Treaty’s provisions or who had not acceded to the
Treaty or intended as a matter of urgency. Minty also called upon states to accede to
the CTBT in order for this Treaty to enter into force.
235
Unlike the 1995 REC, South Africa’s position at the 2000 RevCon was much more
critical of the NWS due to the fact that South Africa shifted its position form a
reformist to a revisionist middle power (Leith & Pretorius 2009). At the 1995 REC,
South Africa was criticised for abandoning the NNWS position in favour of that of the
NWS. Now, South Africa’s position was much more aligned to that of the NNWS as,
for example, South Africa’s efforts at the REC to commit the NWS to terminate
nuclear testing proved to be a failure due to the series of nuclear tests by NWS
subsequent to the REC.
According to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, the country has
“played an active role” at the 2000 RevCon that adopted a Final Document (South
Africa undated). Praising itself as part of the NAC, the South African government
maintained that the “successful achievement of these objectives was instrumental in
ensuring the success” of the 2000 RevCon (South Africa undated).
Despite initial major differences, the 2000 RevCon produced a final consensus
document, the first in the history of the NPT. In the three-volume Final Document of
the RevCon, states undertook to implement 13 agreed steps. These were to:
• sign the CTBT to secure the entry into force of the Treaty;
• terminate nuclear weapons testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT;
• negotiate a FMB Treaty;
• continue within the CD to achieve nuclear disarmament;
• implement the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament;
• procure an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to totally eliminate their
nuclear arsenals;
• ensure NWS compliance with existing treaties such as START II and the
commencement with START III;
• introduce a step-by-step approach by NWS to nuclear disarmament;
• put excess fissile material under the control of the IAEA;
• achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament;
• all states to report regularly on the implementation of the NPT; and
• Improve the verification process to assure compliance with the NPT (UN
2000).
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Similar to the 1995 REC, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy produced results which
confirmed the country’s identity and its diplomatic role.

Conference
South African diplomatic strategies for the 2000 RevCon included confrontation (with
the NWS) and cooperation (with the NNWS). South Africa’s membership of the NAC,
as Geldenhuys (2006: 93,103) concluded, is illustrative of the country’s norm-related
activities since 1994. These norm-related activities, which constitute an identity as a
norm entrepreneur, include the upholding; advocating; and formulating of
internationally-acceptable norms and behaviour. This identity and role as a norm
entrepreneur, which advocated and maintained the norms espoused by the NPT,
illustrates the country’s identification and pursuit of opportunities. This “opportunity
niche”, as Geldenhuys (2006a: 93) refers to it, subsequently resulted in South Africa
gaining niche diplomacy on nuclear matters.
Like its predecessors, the 2005 RevCon was preceded by three PrepComs (in 2002,
2003 and 2004). Moreover, like previous RevCons, a series of international events
set the scene for the 2005 RevCon. These events provided several opportunities for
On 11 September 2001, Al-Qaeda attacked the US in what became known as 9/11.

Subsequent to these attacks the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan (2001) and
Iraq (2003). In his State of the Union Address in January 2003, President George W
Bush referred to a “War on Terrorism” in which the US was engaged. Unable to
persuade the UNSC to intervene in Iraq the US increasingly considered unilateral
options in this regard. One of the justifications for the US threats of an impending
invasion of Iraq was the claim that Iraq’s Sadam Hussein had developed and
maintained WMD. This was not only in contravention of a series of UN resolutions
and the NPT, but also posed a real risk to US national security.
237
A series of diplomatic efforts ensued to address the Iraqi issue after 9/11 until the
US-led invasion in 2003. Apart from UN efforts, President Mbeki offered South
Africa’s assistance to resolve the matter which posed a major threat to the provisions
of the NPT; also considering that as Iraq was a NNWS and the US a NWS. In
February 2003, Mbeki requested seven South African disarmament experts to visit
Iraq in an effort to avert a US-led invasion (see Table 18).
Table 18: Members of the South African delegation to Iraq (2003)
Member of delegation Position
Aziz Pahad Leader of delegation and South African Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs
Colonel Ben Steyn Chemical and biological advisor to the Surgeon-General of

the South African National Defence Force and advisor to
the NPC
Dr Philip Coleman Technical advisor to the Chemical Weapons Convention
Daan van Beek Director of Non-Proliferation and Space, South African

Department of Trade and Industry
Deon Smit General Manager of Procurements, Armscor
Super Moloi Member of the Presidential Support Unit
Pieter Goosen Chief Director of Peace and Security, South African

Department of Foreign Affairs
Thomas Markram Director of Peace and Security, South African Department

of Foreign Affairs
Markram (2006: 105)
South African diplomat Thomas Markram (2004: 105-106) outlined some of the
elements of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy pertaining to the country’s norm
construction and maintenance, and its identity construction in this matter:
The experts were tasked to impart the manner in which South Africa had
undergone its own disarmament process through co-operation and
transparency with the international community, and the manner in which it had
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developed policy and gained the world’s confidence as a responsible

producer, trader and possessor of advanced technologies. It was hoped that
Iraq could be persuaded to open themselves to full co-operation with UN
weapons inspectors and thereby remove the basis for intervention as a
perceived ‘imminent’ threat to international security due to their possession of
weapons of mass destruction.
According to Markram (2006: 105), the South African delegation visited Iraq with
some diplomatic clout and “with the full support” of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-
General, and a “tacit positive nod” from the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the
George W Bush Administration. Not mandated to act as weapons inspectors, the
delegation had access to Iraq’s Deputy President, Tariq Aziz, and individuals
involved in the country’s weapons programme. The South African delegation visited
destroyed WMD sites. However, as Markram (2006: 105) observed, the Iraqis had
been ‘negligent’ in their documentation of the destruction processes. However,
interviews on the extent of the destruction could be conducted. The South African
delegation succeeded in at least one instance. Once the South African delegation
left Iraq, it became known that the Iraqi government had commenced with the
dismantling and destruction of its missiles; an issue in respect of which, according to
Markram (2006: 105), the South African delegation “had tried to persuade the Iraqis”.
Once back in South Africa the delegation prepared a report for President Mbeki, a
copy of which was also delivered to Kofi Annan. Markram (2006: 106) summarises
the findings of the South African delegation, which concluded that “Iraq had
undergone a considerable disarmament process and conceivably did not possess
any weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international security”.
However, the report acknowledged that Iraq continued to have some of the
resources required to produce WMDs but that its general ability has been severely
limited by international actions against the country.
Markram’s (2006: 106) observations on the diplomatic significance of the South

African delegation’s visit to and findings on Iraq had a direct bearing on South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy and its international standing and identity on nuclear
issues. Moreover, it confirmed Geldenhuys’ (2006) observations on South Africa’s
role and identity as a norm entrepreneur. Markram (2006: 106) reiterated this by
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referring to the confidence in South Africa, its acknowledgement by the international

community, its identity, role and technical capabilities:
The pre-emptive and preventative action on Iraq underlines the confidence

South Africa has acquired in dealing with its inherited past and the ability to
utilise this experience to contribute to international peace and security. The
acceptance by key players that South Africa has the technical capacity and
political standing to play a peace role and encouragement to do so
emphasises the country’s status and reputation as an influential, credible and
honest broker in an area traditionally reserved for major powers.
Despite the efforts of South Africa and the international community, a US-led
coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003.
Libya’s announcement on 19 December 2003 on its decision to terminate its nuclear

weapons programme was a welcome and positive development in terms of the NPT.
However, by 2004 the world, including South Africa, discovered the nuclear
proliferation activities of the Khan network, which spanned Libya and several
continents. In addition to this, was North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship through its
non-compliance with the NPT and its eventual withdrawal from the Treaty in 2004. In
an effort to reiterate South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation against
the background of the Wisser Affaire and multilateralism (see Chapter 3), President
Mbeki (2004b) stated in the South African Parliament on 21 May 2004 that South
Africa “will intensify” its preparations to participate in the 2005 RevCon. Mbeki joined
other world leaders in signing the UN International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in New York on 14 September 2005 (DFA 2005). It was
against this background that South Africa attended the 2005 RevCon.
Despite these events and efforts prior to the 2005 RevCon, it commenced with major
differences between the NWS and the NNWS, and without an agreed agenda, which
was only adopted on the ninth day of the conference. The US refused to
acknowledge the outcome of the 2000 RevCon contained in its Final Document,
which was reached by consensus and espoused in the Thirteen Practical Steps
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referred to earlier. The US also refused to accept these outcomes as a basis for the
2005 agenda. It also maintained that global conditions changed dramatically since
2000 and that the RevCon should reflect that. The US also demanded that Iran and
North Korea should receive more attention at the RevCon, whereas Egypt, Iran and
the NAM, for example, demanded feedback on progress made on previous
commitments (Johnson 2005).
Opposing the US position, the NAC and other delegates refused to accept any
agenda which did not take the 2005 decisions into account. The US refusal to accept
the outcomes of the 2000 RevCon resulted in significant delays in debates on
substantive issues. Procedural differences resulted in the RevCon’s failure to
achieve results on substantial issues for which as little as four days were left and
failure to force NWS to comply with the Treaty (Johnson 2005).
Most participating states maintained that the CTBT’s entry into force, a prerequisite
required by previous RevCons, was too slow. Here, NWS like the US and China
ended in a stand-off with NNWS. Both the US and China have not ratified the CTBT
and opposed the RevCon’s emphasis on the CTBT. On the banning of fissile
materials, controversy erupted on the CD’s failure to proceed with negotiations on
the decisions taken at the 1995 REC. Reminding delegates of this decision, the NAM
continued to call for a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty” (Johnson 2005), whereas the NWS and their allies
preferred not to delve too deeply into the matter.
The issue of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and Iran’s nuclear ambitions
also resulted in considerable debate. A number of states and the EU urged Iran to
suspend its enrichment programme to which Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamal
Kharrazi (quoted in Johnson 2005), responded that his country is “determined to
pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for
peaceful purposes”. The universality of the NPT drew little debate, except for calls on
India and Pakistan to comply with the NPT and to ratify the CTBT as a confidence-
building measure.
Whereas the issue of NWFZs received considerable attention at previous RevCons,

the issue received very little attention in 2005, except for a reference to the Middle
241
East and Central Asia where NWFZs could greatly contribute to peace and stability
as these regions have several states outside the NPT with nuclear weapons
capabilities (Johnson 2005).
In the wake of 9/11, the US-led invasion of Iraq and the exposure of the Khan
network, considerable attention was paid to the changed security environment and
the risks that terrorism were perceived to pose. Some delegates from the US, the UK
and France raised concerns about the risks of terrorists acquiring nuclear technology
despite existing global efforts such as UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) to counter
these. Despite its concerns about terrorism, South Africa was one of the few states
who warned against the over-legislation of terrorism since this could affect other
treaty commitments. South Africa also expressed concerns about a “savings clause”
on terrorist activities in other multilateral agreements and its definitions, which could
undermine the NPT (Johnson 2005).
Whereas the NAC played an important role during the 2000 RevCon, it lost
momentum at the 2005 RevCon. Apart from submitting a report on its activities in
compliance with the NPT since 2000, the Coalition allowed it to be subjugated by
procedural debates. Another factor which undermined the effectiveness of the NAC
was rivalry between two NAC members, South Africa and Egypt. This rivalry was
partly due to these countries’ competition for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC
(Müller 2005a: 12). In addition to this, other NAC members, most notably Sweden,
New Zealand and Brazil, were involved in the RevCon’s proceedings by serving as
chairpersons, which also resulted in the Coalition’s inability to perform optimally as it
had lost its most experienced diplomats (Müller 2005a: 12).
Egypt’s strong stance enabled the NAM to remain unified. The NAM maintained its
position that the 1995 and 2000 decisions and undertakings should be honoured. In
this, the NAM targeted the US as a NWS for its non-compliance with the NPT (Müller
2005a: 13).
In presenting South Africa’s position during the General Debate of the 2005 RevCon,
Abdul Minty (2005) reminded delegates of the state of the NPT and proposed that
the Conference adopt a “constructive and positive approach”. Referring to the
challenges previous conferences had faced in trying to achieve consensus, Minty
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(2005) also called on delegates to reach “consensus agreements on the obligations,

commitments and undertakings” that are “implementable and achievable in the
period before 2010”. Minty then proceeded to identify 12 measures which, if agreed
upon by consensus, could form the foundation for the NPT-related work to be
undertaken until 2010 (the date of the next RevCon). These were:
1. The necessity for all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal
adherence to the NPT, and the early entry into force of the CTBT;
2. Measures to address the proliferation threat posed by non-State actors;
3. Further reinforcing the IAEA safeguards norm as a means to prevent

proliferation;
4. The special responsibility of States owning the capability that could be

used to develop nuclear weapons to build confidence with the
international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear
weapons proliferation;
5. The requirement that all States must fully comply with commitments
made to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to
act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race;
6. The necessity to accelerate the implementation of the 13 practical

steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear
disarmament agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference;
7. The need for the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce
their non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and not to develop new types of
nuclear weapons in accordance with their commitment to diminish the
role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;
8. The completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-

weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military
purposes under international verification;
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9. The need to resume in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations

on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable fissile material treaty taking into account both nuclear
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;
10. The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference

on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament;
11. The imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all
nuclear disarmament measures, and the need to develop further
adequate and efficient verification capabilities; and
12. The negotiation of legally binding security assurances by NWS to

NNWS.
Despite these proposed measures, the 2005 RevCon failed for several reasons
which be discussed below.
6.3 The failure of the 2005 Review Conference
The 2005 RevCon failed to adopt a final document due to a lack of consensus. This
had much to do with the prevailing political climate at the time of the conference (see
section 6.1). Moreover, the 2005 RevCon highlighted historical positions on the NPT.
The so-called “Grand Bargain” bestowed the NWS at the time of the entry into force
of the Treaty with privileged rights. This institutionalised discrimination has resulted
in a perception of insecurity on the part of the NNWS.
This perception was further entrenched by the slow compliance of the NWS with
Article VI of the NPT’s provision to disarm their nuclear arsenals, and by the nuclear
ambitions of certain NNWS which are prohibited by Article II of the NPT. By 2005,
the NPT had resulted in some success regarding non-proliferation. Complete
disarmament remained an unfulfilled objective as treaty compliance, according to the
NNWS, was only adhered to by them. However, the coherence of the normative non-
proliferation regime established in terms of the Treaty was increasingly compromised
(Müller 2005b: 36-41).
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The failure of some states such as the NWS to implement the provisions of the NPT
had considerable consequences for international security by contributing to the
acceleration of nuclear weapons programmes and tests in some countries. Finally,
the disintegration of the NAC (which played such a critical role at the 2000 RevCon
by introducing the Thirteen Practical Steps) due to the reasons outlined above,
affected the diplomatic process and the achievement of consensus (Johnson 2005).
In 2000 the NAC’s role as a bridge between the NWS and the NNWS proved to be
critical in achieving a final document based on consensus and, as concerns this
study, for South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
The failed RevCon had two implications. Firstly, the 2005 RevCon did not contribute
to a greater sense of international security. Instead it deepened divisions on nuclear
disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation.
Secondly, it strengthened the already privileged position of the NWS by a failure to
get the NWS to comply with the provisions of the NPT. Instead, the NWS selected
compliance with the provisions of the NPT undermined the NNWS sense of security.
Brazilian career-diplomat and unanimously elected President of the 2005 RevCon,
Sergio Duarte (2005), referred to the deepening divisions between the NWS and the
NNWS. Duarte observed: “There seems to exist a much deeper gulf between the
aims and interests of those who possess atomic weapons and of those who took the
decision to forgo the nuclear military option”. According to him, some states
maintained that the NPT could no longer provide security assurances.
For Duarte (2005), this position was already evident in his “round of consultations in
several capitals prior to the opening of the Conference” where he noted a “high level
of mistrust” in the RevCon’s ability to achieve an outcome based on consensus. In
his assessment of the 2005 RevCon, Duarte (2005) observed: “The result (or lack
thereof), of the 2005 Review Conference indicates that the international community
has reached a crossroads with regard to nuclear disarmament and proliferation”. Kofi
Annan, the UN Secretary General, described the RevCon as a failure which “sent a
terrible signal - of waning respect for the Treaty’s authority, and a dangerous rift on a
leading threat to peace and prosperity” (UN News 21 June 2006), which did not bode
well for the PrepComs for the 2010 RevCon and the 2010 Conference itself.
245

Conference
Unlike previous RevCons, South Africa took an opposing stance on disarmament to

NWS at the 2005 RevCon and publicly associated itself with the activist views of the
NAM and the NAC (South Africa 2005d: 2). In this, South Africa’s diplomatic strategy
included confrontation (with NWS) and partnership (with the NAM and the NAC).
Egypt’s activist role at the RevCon affected South Africa’s position at the
Conference. Egypt was successful in its efforts to put its national and regional
interests on the agenda. This resulted, amongst other things, in South Africa’s
“unusual passivity” (Johnson 2005) so as not to alienate its fellow members of the
NAM. Moreover, South Africa never presented any statement on behalf of the NAM
at the RevCon. These statements were presented by Malaysia or Egypt. Thus, for
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy, the 2005 RevCon could easily be described as
one of its failures. The failure of the 2005 RevCon put an additional burden on South
Africa’s preparations for and participation in the 2010 RevCon.
By the time South Africa prepared for the 2010 RevCon, some internal and
international developments had occurred which set the scene for the Conference.
Moreover, the failure of the 2005 RevCon loomed large over the preparations for the
2010 RevCon.
For South Africa, the most notable event was the “soft coup” in September 2008
which removed Thabo Mbeki from office and replaced him with Kgalema Motlanthe
whose presidential tenure was very brief. By May 2009 and following the national
elections, Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as South Africa’s President. Zuma’s former
wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who served as Mbeki’s Foreign Minister, was
replaced by career diplomat Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. In addition to this, a South
African campaign to get Abdul Minty elected as the Director General of the IAEA
commenced (see Chapter 4).
246
As the date for the 2010 RevCon neared, renewed concerns were expressed about
the outcome of the Conference. Two events prior to the RevCon raised expectations
about a softer approach by the NWS to the Conference. The first event was
President Obama’s speech in Prague, the Czech Republic, on 5 April 2009. Unlike
his predecessors, Obama outlined new directions in the US disarmament and non-
proliferation agenda. Obama (2009) referred to “America's commitment to seek the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. He also outlined how his
administration intended to achieve this. The US intended to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in its national security strategy; to commence with the reduction of
its nuclear arsenal; to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
with Russia in 2009; to “immediately and aggressively pursue” the US ratification of
the CTBT; to commence with negotiations on a new treaty that “verifiably ends” the
production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons; and to ‘strengthen’ the
NPT as a basis for cooperation on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. These
commitments outlined in Prague were complemented with the publication of the
Nuclear Posture Review of the Obama administration, which enhanced expectations
on the outcome of the 2010 RevCon.
The second event which paved the way for greater expectations of the 2010 RevCon
was President Obama’s hosting of the NSS from 12 to 13 April 2010 in Washington,
US. South Africa was one of more than 40 states invited to the NSS as a precursor
to resolve tensions which may arise at the 2010 RevCon.55 At the NSS, South Africa
and Kazakhstan were commended for the termination of their nuclear weapons
programmes. Obama met separately with President Zuma and Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev prior to the NSS. Obama commented that South Africa “has
special standing in being a moral leader” on nuclear issues and that the country:
is singular in having had a nuclear weapon program; had moved forward on it,
and then decided this was not the right path; dismantled it; and has been a
55
The following countries participated in the NSS: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, the European Union (EU), Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, the IAEA, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, the UAE, the UK, the UN, the US and Vietnam (US 2010a).
247
strong, effective leader in the international community around nonproliferation

issues.
Obama also mentioned that South Africa could assist in guiding other countries
“down a similar direction of nonproliferation” (US 2010b). Against the background of
these developments, South Africa prepared to participate in the 2010 RevCon. The
country’s diplomatic successes in the 1995 REC and 2000 RevCons were
overshadowed by the 2005 RevCon which failed to reach any consensus.
7.2 South Africa’s pre-2010 Review Conference nuclear diplomacy
Reflecting on the 2010 RevCon, Abdul Minty (2010b) admitted that South Africa’s
approach to the RevCon was to “convey a kind of consensus approach” to the
proceedings of the Conference. He also admitted that South Africa attended the
RevCon realising that the country would face several challenges at the Conference,
that, for South Africa, the NPT was at a crossroads and that the RevCon was
regarded as a “critical litmus test” (Minty 2010b). Another challenge concerned the
opposition of some states to the strengthening of the NPT and the inalienable right in
the NPT of all states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Minty (2010b)
referred to the historical “North-South polarisation” on this issue but admitted that
President Obama adopted a more conciliatory approach which reduced the
polarisation at the RevCon.
Minty (2010b) provided valuable insight into the diplomatic negotiations around the
2010 RevCon by describing the diplomatic process as a series of diplomatic
interactions, which included several diplomatic actors:
• Prior to the 2010 RevCon, the P5 (the five permanent members of the UNSC)
engaged with South Africa. At the time, South Africa served its first term as a
non-permanent member of the UNSC.
• South Africa was invited to and participated in President Obama’s NSS.
• South Africa met on the margins of meetings with representatives such as the
New Zealand Minister of Disarmament. Like South Africa, New Zealand is a
member of the NAC.
• South Africa had bilateral discussions with the US representatives in Pretoria
when a delegation of 30-40 US government officials visited South Africa.
248
Apart from this delegation, the Obama Administration dispatched Special

Envoy Susan Burk to Pretoria in February 2010 for consultations with Minty.
According to Burk, South Africa’s relinquishment of its nuclear weapons put it
in “a special position to advance the goals of the upcoming [2010 NPT]
conference” (Global Security Newswire 23 February 2010). Burk also
observed that states party to the NPT, including South Africa, “have been
frustrated by the slow pace” at which NWS eliminate their nuclear arsenals
(Global Security Newswire 23 February 2010). In response to President
Obama’s speech in Prague in 2009, Minty welcomed the US commitment to
multilateralism with regard to the NPT but warned against raising expectations
and not meeting them (Global Security Newswire 23 February 2010).
• South Africa held bilateral discussions with Russia.
• During the RevCon informal dinners were held with the delegates of other
states.
• Regular consultations were held with Pretoria on major decisions and
positions.
Minty (2010b) also described South Africa’s diplomatic strategies to the NPT. These
included diplomatic engagements with states on:
• common doctrines pertaining to the pillars of the NPT;
• their deterrence mindset by delegitimizing nuclear weapons as a source of
security;
• states’ security concerns; and
• How to terminate nuclear weapons programmes and give up nuclear
weapons.
Against the background of South Africa’s preparation for the 2010 RevCon, it is
evident that South Africa wanted the conference to achieve a consensus outcome.
Moreover, the conference also preceded Ambassador Minty’s election campaign for
the position of the IAEA Director General and thus wanted to make a good
diplomatic impression.
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The first session of the PrepCom took place in Vienna in May 2007. In his address to
the PrepCom, Abdul Minty (2007b: 2) observed that the NPT was ‘tested’ during the
preceding years, but that South Africa maintained that the NPT “has and can
continue to make a significant contribution to international peace and security” and
that the NPT “remains as relevant as ever”. He also reiterated South Africa’s position
on the “complete elimination” of nuclear weapons. Minty also took issue with the
selective compliance to the provisions of the NPT, most notably Article VI, by some
NWS and reminded delegates of the agreements reached at the 2000 RevCon which
should be adhered to by all.
Similar to previous statements at NPT-related gatherings, Minty (2007b: 2) also

reminded delegates of South Africa’s unique identity as a state that has destroyed its
nuclear weapons. He also referred to the discriminatory nature of the NPT, an issue
which South Africa regards as “incompatible with our common objective” of a nuclear
weapon free world and with the obligations of the NPT. Minty also called on all
NNWS states with nuclear weapons programmes, or with intentions of having similar
programmes, to adhere “unconditionally and without delay” to the NPT. He also
called on states that have ratified the CTBT to do so as a matter of urgency.
During the RevCon Minty (2010c) contributed a number of important points outlining
South Africa’s position on the NPT and its agenda on non-proliferation. These
included an emphasis upon:
• the continued relevance of the NPT due to the positive recent developments
in disarmament and non-proliferation;
• the need for step-by-step processes to eliminate nuclear weapons;
• hope for renewed interest and an undertaking by NWS to dismantle their
nuclear arsenals, as outlined in Article VI of the NPT;
• support for the IAEA as the only competent and internationally-recognised
authority responsible for versifying and assuring compliance to the Treaty;
• the recognition of the potential of the currently voluntary Additional Protocol as
an indispensable instrument of the new strengthening of IAEA safeguards;
and
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• Support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Minty 2010c).
In its practice of niche diplomacy in the NPT context, South Africa employed various
diplomatic strategies, including cooperation and confrontation. For example, South
Africa often quoted Article IV of the NPT which provides for the “inalienable right of
all State Parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes” to explain its support of
Iran. South Africa’s resort to nuclear sovereignty has often resulted in some form of
conflict with certain NWS such as the US and the UK. During the proceedings of
Main Committee I (on nuclear disarmament) state parties called on the NWS to
respect their commitments under Article VI and to work towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. While South Africa stressed the need for the NWS to engage in
accelerated negotiations in this regard, both the Ukraine and South Africa - countries
which unilaterally dismantled their nuclear weapons programmes - called on the
NWS to ensure that the disarmament process is irreversible and verifiable.
During the Main Committee I debate on a “time bound framework” for implementing
disarmament commitments most delegates at the RevCon supported it. During the
2010 RevCon, South Africa (a member of the NAM) supported Egypt who, on behalf
of the NAM (2010), submitted a working paper. This paper, Elements for a plan of
action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, proposed a three-phased approach to
eliminate nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe (see Table 19).
Table 19: The Non-Aligned Movement’s timeframe for nuclear disarmament
2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 and beyond
Reducing the nuclear Reducing nuclear arsenals Consolidation of a nuclear

threat and nuclear and promoting confidence free world
disarmament between States
NAM (2010: 2-4)
In response to the NAM proposals, South Africa’s Ambassador to the UN in Geneva,

Jerry Matjila (2010) stated that the provisions of the NPT; the 1995 Principles and
Objectives; and the practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to in 2000
provide “a blueprint for a step-by-step process that would reduce the threat of
nuclear weapons, de-emphasize their importance and lead to their elimination”. In an
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oblique reference to the British decision to build new submarines for a future
generation of nuclear weapons, Matjila warned that such a move would be
interpreted as a clear signal that some NWS are determined to maintain nuclear
weapons indefinitely.
France, a NWS, argued that setting a timeline would undermine the non-proliferation
regime since timelines have not been adhered to before and, therefore, such time
limits should not be imposed as they risk the chances of not being met again.
France, a major investor in South Africa’s nuclear industry, was backed by the US
and Russian delegates on this issue but faced strong opposition from Brazil, Iran,
South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Libya, Cuba and Canada. New Zealand pointed out
that France’s proposal was unacceptable. South Africa argued that there was a
sense of desperation on the part of the NNWS because of the lack of progress on
Article VI by the NWS (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 2010).
Although a comprehensive discussion on the issue of nuclear terrorism was

expected during the 2010 RevCon, the topic was not on the primary agenda. Out of
78 working papers presented during 2007 PrepCom for the 2010 RevCon, only one
paper was dedicated to nuclear terrorism. In the wake of President Obama’s NSS in
April 2010 where nuclear terrorism was a major concern, much was expected on this
issue at the RevCon, as addressed in UNSC Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006)
and 1810 (2008). The issue of nuclear terrorism was also absent from the draft
reports of Main Committee II and Main Committee III. In the first draft report of Main
Committee II, paragraph 50 welcomed the establishment of the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. To the disappointment of many states, the final draft did
not make any reference to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Speaking at the first session of the PrepCom for the RevCon in May 2007, Minty
(2007b: 5) reiterated that South Africa “remains concerned” about the operations of
“illicit clandestine nuclear networks” which poses a serious threat to the NPT:
It is imperative that all countries that have been affected by the network
closely co-operate to eliminate this threat. Our own experiences with the illicit
network for the transfer of and trade in nuclear material, equipment and
technology have clearly shown that States need to provide their pro-active
and full support to the Agency in its verification obligation.
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Iran, which is avidly developing its nuclear capability, if not an arsenal, was one of
the prescient issues addressed at the May 2010 RevCon. During the proceedings,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated the country’s position on nuclear
weapons proliferation. He also charged the NWS with the non-compliance of their
treaty obligations. During RevCon, much emphasis was put on Iran and the security
threat posed by its suspected nuclear weapons programme. Apart from differences
on disarmament, the issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme also caused
divisions. The NWS demanded that Iran and all other NNWS surrender their right to
produce HEU, which can be applied in the peaceful uses of nuclear power and the
manufacture of nuclear weapons. At the time, India, Pakistan and North Korea, as
the NNWS in terms of the NPT, admitted their manufacturing of nuclear weapons
contrary to the provisions of the NPT. South Africa defended Iran’s right to develop
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Independent Online 4 May 2005).
While South Africa stood firm in its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation vis-à-vis
Iran’s weapons capability, it supported the sharing of knowledge and development of
nuclear capability for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet the former issue took
centre stage at RevCon 2010. Thus, as part of the NAC, at RevCon 2010 South
Africa affirmed its commitment to the NPT and non-proliferation, supporting Egyptian
Ambassador Hisham Badr’s (2010) statement on behalf of the NAC that the NAC
“firmly wished to reiterate their belief in the NPT and its tenants of global
disarmament and non-proliferation, and 40 years after the entry into force of the
Treaty”, and felt that “all nations should fulfil their Treaty commitments and
obligations”. Moreover, the NAC reaffirmed the belief that under Article VI all the
NWS states should comply with disarmament commitments, so as to achieve the
NPT universally.
Similarly, as a member of the African Group, South Africa emphasised the

statements made by Ambassador Tommo Monthe (2010) of Cameroon on behalf of
the African Group that Africa calls for the “total, universal, verifiable and irreversible
elimination of nuclear weapons as provided by” the NPT, and that the continent
believes in the three pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-
proliferation; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The African Group also
reaffirmed the need for a renewed commitment of NWS to all Thirteen Practical
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Steps, including the necessity to diminish the role of nuclear weapons outlined in
their security policies. This would secure the non-use of these weapons during the
time pending their complete elimination, precisely reflecting South Africa’s policy.
Against the background of these deliberations, the next section assesses South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy at the 2010 RevCon.

Conference
For South Africa, according to Abdul Minty (2010b), the outcome of the 2010
RevCon was ‘satisfactory’ and achieved in a much better atmosphere than before.
Several explanations for this can be offered.
Firstly, Conference President, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines,

convened a Focus Group very early during the RevCon, which served as the main
arena for debating contentious issues before presenting them to the RevCon for
reaching agreement. Consisting of 16 states including the five NWS, Germany,
Spain (representing the EU), Japan, Norway, Indonesia, Mexico, Cuba, Iran, Brazil,
South Africa and Egypt (the only African states included in the group), the Focus
Group on some occasions also included diplomats from Argentina, Arab states,
Uruguay, other EU members and the League of Arab States (Hubert, Broodryk &
Stott 2010: 2). Similar to the President of the 1995 REC, Ambassador Jayantha
Dhanapala’s “Friends of the Chair” model, the Focus Group contributed to the
success of the RevCon by deliberating on contentious issues in a small group prior
to its referral to the Conference (Potter et al. 2010: 6, 20). The Focus Group initiative
was complemented by the establishment of three subsidiary bodies; one for each
Main Committee to focus on practical disarmament issues. This also served to
enhance decision-making and consensus.
Secondly, the single largest political grouping of the NPT review conferences, the
116 members of the NAM, which historically focused on disarmament issues and
issues relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proposed a timeframe for
disarmament. Although the NWS did not agree to this, the question of disarmament
schedules will become more pertinent in subsequent RevCons as the NWS have to
report on their progress on certain benchmarks for disarmament by the 2015
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RevCon. The mere fact that the issue of timeframes elicited much debate indicated,
according to Potter et al. (2010: 8), that the idea is already under consideration.
More importantly, the NAM was not as disruptive as at previous conferences. Egypt
as the NAM and the NAC chair and as a leading state in the League of Arab States
was courted by the US in efforts to garner Egypt’s support for the nuclear objectives
of the US (Potter et al. 2010: 4).
African states make up almost a third of all NPT state parties, therefore representing
an influential group. The Pelindaba Treaty shares many common features with the
NPT and has created the world’s largest NWFZ. The Treaty of Pelindaba is regarded
as a major reinforcement of the NPT through its ban on the deployment of nuclear
weapons within the territory covered by the Treaty; its prohibition on research or
development of nuclear explosive devices; its Protocol for binding negative security
assurances from NWS; and its physical security and environmental controls.
Following the entry-into-force of the Treaty of Pelindaba on 15 July 2009 (see
Chapter 5), African support for a nuclear weapons free world has gained momentum;
evident in the significant role that some African states played in the RevCon, both
individually and as members of regional groupings. Zimbabwe along with the
Ukraine, Austria, Ireland and Uruguay chaired various committees and subsidiary
bodies and contributed by facilitating on-going negotiations in the wider conference.
In the third instance, unlike previous RevCons, the 2010 RevCon was not
undermined by procedural issues and attention could be paid to substantive issues.
In the fourth instance, the NWS security assurances to the NNWS resulted in less
disputes on the issue. In its Nuclear Posture Review, the US undertook not to attack
a NNWS party to the NPT. A similar option is under consideration by the UK. Finally,
the agreement reached on the implementation of the 1995 Middle East NWFZ
Resolution constituted a major achievement of the 2010 RevCon (Hubert, Broodryk
& Stott 2010).
8. An assessment of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in the context of the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Speaking at the first session of the PrepCom for the 2010 RevCon of the NPT in
Vienna, Austria, in May 2007, Abdul Minty (2007b) reiterated that South Africa
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regards the NPT as “the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
regime”, while the country “remain(s) convinced that this instrument has and can
continue to make a significant contribution to international peace and security”.
However, upon South Africa's accession to the NPT in 1991, the country:
accepted the inherently discriminatory nature of the NPT, whereby some

states are recognised as nuclear-weapon states and all other states are
recognised as non-nuclear-weapon states. However, all non-nuclear-weapon
states, including South Africa, believe that maintaining this indefinite
discriminatory approach is incompatible with our common objective of a world
free of nuclear weapons, and indeed also with the obligations contained in the
NPT (Minty 2007b).
More importantly, South Africa has not limited itself to rhetoric on the issue as was
illustrated by its stand-offs with France, China and North Korea on their nuclear
tests; by their involvement in resolving the impasse over Iraq’s WMDs in 2003; and
by its initiation and maintenance of norms on nuclear energy. Closely related to
these norm-related activities was the self-ascribed and acquired identity in the
international nuclear arena as a roll-back state, a bridge-builder, a problem-solver
(especially at the 1995 RevCon) and a good international citizen.
South Africa has acted almost as a textbook example of middle power behaviour á la
Cooper’s (1997: 1-24) extended framework of middle power behaviour. Firstly, the
form of state behaviour (heroic or routine approach): In the context of the NPT,
South Africa had repeatedly engaged in bridge-building, problem-solving and
sometimes also in confrontational behaviour with the NWS and the NNWS alike if
these states contravened the normative foundations of the NPT. This heroic
behaviour of South Africa was recognized by one observer prior to the 2010 RevCon
in anticipation of a positive outcome:
Traditionally the review conference operates using international consensus

rules, allowing all members to contribute if they so wish; however there are
certain states that have traditionally been more successful in brokering new
discussions in the past, such as the key players of the nuclear weapons
states, include: the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and
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China; and those of the non-nuclear weapon states include, Egypt, the chair
of the Non-aligned Movement, concerned itself with forming a statement
representative of all these states, and South Africa who has traditionally
played an important role in bridging the gap between nuclear-weapon and
non-nuclear weapon states (Deepti 2010).
Secondly, the scope of state activity (discrete or diffuse): South Africa has
consistently displayed discretion in negotiation fora by maintaining its consistent
stance in compliance with the NPT.
In the third instance: the focus or target of state diplomatic activity (multilateral or
regional): South Africa has consistently employed both multilateral (which includes
regional diplomacy) and bilateral diplomacy in the conduct of its nuclear diplomacy.
Finally, the intensity of state diplomatic style (combative or accommodative): In

carving its niche role in nuclear diplomacy, South Africa repeatedly used a
combination of diplomatic strategies. In the context of the NPT, South Africa had
predominantly employed confrontation and cooperation strategies. South Africa’s
employment of parallelism is relatively scant in respect of the NPT and is limited to
the Iraqi case and its multiple membership of the NAC, the NAM and the African
Group at NPT conferences.
9. Conclusion
The NPT rests on three major norms, namely nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-
proliferation; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the NPT entered into
force a large number of states had been socialised in these norms and subscribe to
the notion of a “nuclear taboo”. However, due to its inherently discriminatory nature
and the nuclear ambitions of states, the NPT has come under severe pressure since
the end of the Cold War.
South Africa has come full circle on the NPT. A reluctant signatory of the NPT at first,
South Africa secured a niche role for itself in the NPT regime. It has repeatedly
expressed its unequivocal support of the norms espoused by the NPT. Since signing
the NPT in 1991, the country has actively participated in the NPT review
conferences. South Africa’s first attendance of a RevCon was in 1995 at the REC.
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Whereas the country was once accused of contravening the NPT, South Africa has
successfully constructed a role for itself in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Through the construction of new norms or through the entrenchment of existing
norms, South Africa has crafted a unique brand of diplomacy and established a new
state identity.
South Africa’s overall compliance with the provisions of the NPT is a major departure
from its stance at the time the Treaty entered into force. This has improved the
country’s status and prestige and has contributed to an understanding of the
concepts of niche diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy and nuclear roll-back.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Introduction
The South African NP-led government commenced with the termination of its nuclear
weapons programme in 1989; a process which, once completed, was verified by the
IAEA in 1993. Thus, by the time the ANC came to power as the first democratically-
elected governing party after the April 1994 elections, South Africa no longer
possessed nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapons programme. However, the
country maintained some of its nuclear-related capabilities through the operation of
the country’s research reactor, SAFARI-1.
From 1990, following President FW de Klerk’s announcement on 2 February 1990,

until 1994, negotiations on South Africa’s constitutional future dominated the
country’s domestic political agenda. These negotiations culminated in the adoption of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 106 of 1996. Parallel to these
constitutional negotiations were the changes in South Africa’s international relations
and diplomacy. Sanctions and embargoes - many related to the country’s nuclear
capabilities - were lifted; new bi- and multilateral relations established; and old
relations rekindled. Relations pertaining to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy are
pertinent to this study.
Whereas South Africa’s international isolation was one of the hallmarks of its pre-
1990 diplomacy, the country’s post-1990 diplomacy signifies a major departure in
terms of focus, scope, intensity and diversity. Consequently, the country’s nuclear
diplomacy was also transformed. Prior to 1990, the “Janus-faced” nature of South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy included, on the one hand, international condemnation
and reactions to these condemnations and, on the other hand, secret diplomatic
interactions in an effort to either pressurise the South African government to
dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, or to by-pass bi- and/or multilateral
sanctions against the country.
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Post-1990, South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy was a direct departure from previous
practices. As an instrument of foreign policy, South African diplomacy reflected these
changes. One of the illustrations of this departure is South Africa’s role and influence
in international nuclear diplomacy at multilateral institutions such as the AU, the
IAEA and the UN. Bilaterally, a similar trend is evident.
This study concerned itself with one major question: Why and how did South Africa
became such an influential former nuclear weapons state and developing country in
nuclear diplomacy? As outlined earlier, the main thesis of this study is that since
1990 South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy by constructing certain
norms and its identity in a particular way to serve its national and international
interests. Consequently, this has created both a practical and normative reality by
bestowing on the country a particular state identity as a state that has relinquished
its weapons programme to secure and maintain a certain moral high ground in
nuclear-related negotiations and fora. This was achieved through the skilful conduct
of niche diplomacy in specific areas and issues identified in this study.
2. Analytical and theoretical framework of the study
This study addressed the transformation of South Africa’s state identity and norm
construction pertaining to its nuclear diplomacy by applying constructivism as the
preferred theoretical approach. This theoretical approach to South African diplomatic
practice and international relations is significantly neglected in scholarship on these
issues. Constructivism’s utility lies in its focus on the role of ideas, identity and
interests for a state in the conduct of its international relations and diplomacy.
Constructivism’s utility is also rooted in its focus on norms in international relations
and diplomacy. In essence, constructivists argue that ideas and norms inform a
state’s identity, which, in turn, informs a state’s interests. This results in a perpetual
cyclical process where construction and re-construction follow upon one another.
When applied to South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy, this cyclical process
remains prevalent. South Africa’s rhetorical adherence to the norms of non-
proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - the normative
foundation of the NPT - had been consistent and repetitive. Informed by these
norms, as well as the norms espoused by the ANC-led government’s domestic and
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foreign policies, South Africa constructed a state identity as a unique nuclear state,
which, in compliance with international norms, has terminated its nuclear weapons
programme, subscribes to export control regimes and strongly supports the
inalienable right of all states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. From this
flowed another state identity, namely that of a good international citizen.
Analytically, the study focused on the concept nuclear diplomacy as diplomacy sui
generis. For this purpose, a conceptual analysis of nuclear diplomacy was
conducted. This study benefitted from this approach as the concept nuclear
diplomacy as a particular type or brand of diplomacy, namely niche diplomacy, could
be explored. Predominantly but not exclusively associated with middle powers, niche
diplomacy refers to a specific brand of diplomacy characterised by a high-level of
expertise and speciality which aims to utilise the diplomatic, scientific and technical
expertise of a state to advance a state’s national interests. This enables a state to
focus its resources on specific issues where its diplomatic return is estimated to be
the highest. Therefore, constructivists’ claim that a state’s power derives from non-
material rather than material resources is aligned with the conduct of niche
diplomacy. Due to their lack of abundant material resources to strengthen
themselves as superpowers, middle powers typically specialise in one or more
diplomatic fields in which they have often achieved significant successes.
3. Summary of chapters
Four main case studies were selected for examination. These were South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy on the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes; the IAEA;
the Pelindaba Treaty; and the NPT. This section outlines the objectives and main
preliminary findings of the chapters on each of these case studies.
3.1 South Africa and the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes
Given South Africa’s pre-1990 history of “sanctions busting” of the nuclear non-
proliferation export control regimes, these regimes were selected as a case study to
indicate South Africa’s departure from non-compliance to compliance with the norm
of nuclear non-proliferation.
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The nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes are, in Krasnerian terms, a set
of internationally-accepted norms, laws, rules, principles and institutions which
regulate the export, sharing and transfer of components, materials, services and
technologies which can be utilised for dual-use purposes. Institutionally, these
regimes consist of the WA; the MTCR; the NSG; and the ZC. Despite the existence
of these regimes, illicit nuclear proliferation continues.
Chapter 3 outlined the historical record pertaining to South Africa’s “sanctions

busting” prior to an analysis of the country’s behaviour subsequent to 1990. It also
analysed South Africa’s involvement in multilateral nuclear export control regimes
against the background of the country’s nuclear diplomacy to establish a niche role
for itself as a FNWS. As a former illicit importer and exporter of nuclear-related
equipment, South Africa was determined to project itself as a rehabilitated nuclear
state. Despite this, the South African government’s efforts were undermined by a
series of contentious nuclear proliferation-related incidents, most notably the
involvement of South Africans in the AQ Khan network. This chapter also analysed
South Africa’s identity, roles and interests in the Khan network in South Africa and
nuclear exports.
South Africa’s membership of some of these institutions reflects its socialisation of

the norms of non-proliferation; disarmament; and the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy; more so as membership of these organisations is voluntary. Moreover,
South Africa has incorporated aspects of this regime in its nuclear export trade
policies and institutions such as the NCACC and the NPC. With this, South Africa
has, since 1990, constructed a state identity as a norm compliant good international
citizen. More importantly, the country has enhanced its international influence, status
and prestige.
3.2 South Africa and the IAEA
In 1957, South Africa was a founder-member of the IAEA, the primary international
multilateral institution which prevents nuclear proliferation; oversees the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy; and secures the safety of nuclear material and facilities. The
IAEA is also regarded as the “implementing agency” of the NPT. Despite South
Africa’s privileged position in the IAEA due to South Africa being the only African
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state with a nuclear weapons capability at that time, the country came face-to-face
with the international community at the IAEA in the 1970s. By the early 1970s, the
international campaign against apartheid paid increasing attention to South Africa’s
nuclear programme. Consequently, under the leadership of Abdul Minty, nuclear
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation became the major focus areas of the
international anti-apartheid movement.
One of the consequences of this campaign was opposition to South Africa in the
IAEA Board of Governors and the GC. Diplomatic actions in this matter included
attempts to suspend the credentials of South African delegates and efforts to
suspend the country from the Board. In 1976 South Africa lost its designation as a
member for the African region on the Board and in 1977 Egypt became the country
designated to represent Africa. Once it became clear that the IAEA attempts to
influence South Africa to terminate its nuclear weapons programme had failed, the
confrontation between the IAEA and South Africa were elevated to the higher organs
of the UN. Moreover, at three of its GCs (1987, 1989 and 1990), the IAEA met to
decide on South Africa’s suspension as a member of the IAEA. In each case, the
IAEA deferred its decision. Subsequent to the post-1990 changes in the country, its
relations with the IAEA stabilised. In 1995 South Africa returned to the Board to
resume its position as the most advanced African nuclear state. This presented a
major development in South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy.
South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the IAEA and its members revealed insights
into the country’s post-1989 nuclear diplomacy. In constructivist terms, it has not only
constructed a new state identity and role, but it also constructed and advanced its
national interests in its diplomatic relations with the IAEA. South Africa’s niche
diplomacy in this case displays middle power characteristics. It was strengthened by
its expertise in nuclear issues, which was advantageous to South Africa compared to
other states. These advantages were locational, traditional and consensual. South
Africa is the only African state to have acquired and given up its nuclear weapons
(locational), the country has a nuclear history (traditional) and South Africa’s non-
proliferation commitment is reflective of the country’s post-1990 non-proliferation
commitments (consensual).
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3.3 South Africa and the Pelindaba Treaty
The Pelindaba Treaty entered into force on 15 July 2009; almost five decades after
the idea of ANWFZ originated from the OAU in the 1960s. Since 1990, South Africa
has conducted its diplomacy with African states in such a manner as to convince the
continent of its commitment to the continent. The same applies to its nuclear
diplomacy with Africa. By ascribing to the continental norm of a denuclearised Africa,
South Africa constructed its identity accordingly to serve its national and international
interests. For South Africa, it has not only created a practical reality (no more nuclear
weapons), but it has also resulted in the normative reality of the country elected to
the position of custodian of the Pelindaba Treaty by chairing the Treaty’s instrument
of compliance, namely the AFCONE. This illustrates not only the life-cycle of norms
as indicated previously, but also South Africa’s completion of this cycle from norm
emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. Chapter 5 traced this norm
cycle through an analysis of the origins of the norm of nuclear weapons free zones,
as well as South Africa’s involvement in the treaty-process. Characterised by a
combination of normative innovation; norm maintenance; coalition building;
confrontation; independence; partnerships; and parallelism, South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy with other African states has soon developed into a diplomatic niche for
the country.
South Africa also attempted to undo existing global nuclear-related power structures
by working towards a denuclearised African continent. In addition to this, South
Africa’s state identity as a domestic reformer proved to be a diplomatically useful
identity to export to its diplomatic relations by advocating African and global reforms
pertaining to the country’s status as a denuclearised territory.
Typically, states practicing niche diplomacy focus on a specifically selected issue,

organisation or activity. South Africa is no exception in this regard. The sources of
South Africa’s niche diplomacy in Africa is located in the tenets of middle power
diplomatic behaviour, which therefore provides a strong normative foundation,
emphasises the country’s entrepreneurial flair and technical expertise. Other key
features of South Africa’s niche diplomacy are its focus on consensus and coalition
building in Africa; cooperation on nuclear issues; adopting the role of bridge-builder
(between Africa and the NWS); mediator (between African states on the
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headquarters of the AFCONE); facilitator (of African gatherings on nuclear issues

such as the Johannesburg meeting referred to earlier); or catalyst (changing its
nuclear posture) in African nuclear issues. The latter involved South Africa’s
planning, convening and hosting meetings, prioritising for future meetings on a
particular issue and drawing up declarations and manifestos.
South Africa has attempted to construct a “new conception” of the country’s foreign
policy identity with the ‘other’ being its apartheid past, rather than another
international actor. South Africa has also managed to construct a nuclear identity in
Africa through “positive approximation” by associating or identifying itself with the
positive nuclear norms and identities of other African states. This nuclear identity has
also been achieved through “negative approximation” by distancing the country from
its historical nuclear actions, capabilities and posture.
The implications of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy in Africa have been wide-
ranging. Not only did it contribute to the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty but
also to enhancing the country’s status and prestige. South Africa, which no longer
has nuclear weapons, continues to yield considerable soft or normative power on the
African continent.
South Africa’s hosting and leadership of the AFCONE will test the country’s
normative power. Its maintenance of its normative power pertaining to nuclear non-
proliferation on the continent and elsewhere is dependent on the legitimacy of the
country’s nuclear diplomacy. This legitimacy is dependent on the country’s
persuasive actions to promote nuclear non-proliferation on the continent and the
AFCONE’s activities.
3.4 South Africa and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The NPT which entered into force on 5 March 1970 rests on three major pillars or
norms, namely nuclear disarmament; nuclear non-proliferation; and the peaceful
South Africa came full circle on the NPT. At first a reluctant signatory of the NPT,
South Africa has constructed its niche role in the NPT regime. It has repeatedly
expressed its unequivocal support of the norms of the NPT. Since South Africa
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signed the NPT in 1991, it has actively participated in the Treaty’s review
conferences. South Africa’s first attendance at these RevCons was in 1995 when it
attended the REC. Whereas the country was once accused of contravening the NPT,
it successfully constructed a niche role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Through the construction of new norms or through the entrenchment of existing
norms, South Africa has crafted a unique brand of diplomacy and established a
particular new state identity.
4. Main findings of study
Although preliminary findings were included at the end of each chapter, this section
elaborates on these findings. This research supports the main thesis of this study,
namely that from 1990 South Africa has in its practice of nuclear diplomacy, skilfully
secured a niche role for itself through norm construction and state identity
4.1 South Africa’s practice of nuclear diplomacy
South Africa’s practice of nuclear diplomacy cannot be divorced from its general
practice of diplomacy as one of the instruments of the country’s foreign policy.
Consistent with its post-1994 foreign policy, the South African government has
maintained its preference for multilateralism; focusing on Africa and the developing
world; and maintaining its status as a good international citizen with regards to its
nuclear diplomacy.
South Africa has acted almost as a textbook example of middle power behaviour in
its practice of nuclear diplomacy. Middle power behaviour is characterised by the
form of a state’s behaviour. South Africa has repeatedly displayed heroic behaviour
in its bridge-building; its problem-solving; and its sometimes confrontational
behaviour to NWS and NNWS alike. As a middle power, the scope of South Africa’s
activities pertaining to its nuclear diplomacy has consistently displayed discretion in
negotiation fora by maintaining its consistent stance in compliance with the norms of
the NPT. Thirdly, with regards to the focus and targets of South Africa’s diplomatic
activity, it has consistently employed both multilateral (which here includes regional
diplomacy) and bilateral diplomacy in the conduct of its nuclear diplomacy. Finally, a
middle power’s niche diplomacy is also characterised by the intensity of its
diplomatic style. In carving its niche role in nuclear diplomacy, South Africa
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repeatedly used a combination of confrontation, parallelism and cooperation as

diplomatic strategies.
As indicated previously, conceptual confusion with regards to the concept of nuclear

diplomacy prevails. An analysis of a concept in terms of its meaning is, according to
Guzzini (2009: 12), “part of the social construction of knowledge”. The definition of a
concept is an exercise of power and therefore “part of the social construction of
reality”. Thus, in defining nuclear diplomacy a particular reality is constructed. The
implications of the practice of nuclear diplomacy are wide-ranging. It illustrates the
existence of a particular type of diplomacy to determine and apply internationally-
agreed safeguards and principles of verification of states’ nuclear facilities and
intentions; it entails the safety and security of nuclear material, scientists; and it
entails the enforcement of norms relating to the development and application of
nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, nuclear diplomacy is defined as
a political entity’s intentions and interactions with other political entities on matters
pertaining to the behaviour, norms and practices relating to nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The use of the
concept “political entity” rather than state is deliberate. Notwithstanding the fact that
this study focuses on a state’s (South Africa) nuclear diplomacy, it contends that
increasingly, non-states actors are conducting various forms of nuclear-related
international relations and interactions. This is evident in the social construction of
the discourse on the dangers of non-states actors’ acquisition of nuclear weapons. In
an effort to address this, intersubjective understandings of the threat posed by non-
state actors’ use of nuclear weapons have manifested in practices such as
compliance with UN resolutions on the matter. This has resulted in, amongst others,
nuclear diplomacy which contributed to normative innovation pertaining to the
concept and phenomenon of nuclear terrorism, and the subsequent adoption of the
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of WMDs (UNSC 2004). In
South Africa, the Wisser Affaire and its link with the Khan network had highlighted
this intersubjective understanding of the role of non-state actors in nuclear
proliferation.
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Therefore, this study concludes that South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy has
maintained a normative foundation, employed various diplomatic strategies and was
conducted in compliance with the set objectives of the country’s foreign policy. In
this, the analysis of the nuclear diplomacy of a state such as South Africa, which
discontinued its nuclear weapons programme, provided insights into nuclear
diplomacy in general and the nuclear diplomacy of states similar to the South African
situation. Firstly, nuclear diplomacy continues to be conducted bi- and multilaterally.
Secondly, schisms prevail between NWS and NNWS. Thirdly, as a roll-back state,
South Africa was catapulted to certain positions of influence due to its historical
nuclear past.
4.2 South Africa’s power and nuclear diplomacy
A number of observations about the practice of nuclear diplomacy can be made.

Firstly, it is a particular type of diplomacy, or a diplomatic niche. Secondly, it is a
“Janus-faced” diplomatic practice. Actors, on the one hand, attempt to prevent the
spread and use of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, attempt to acquire
nuclear-related capabilities. Thirdly, more diplomatic instruments and initiatives need
to be developed to accommodate non-state nuclear actors, as the existing export
and trade regimes are not sufficient to address pertinent questions in relation to
nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the so-called “nuclear taboo” persists whereas the
civilian use of nuclear energy has increased substantially with scientific
developments in medicine and physics.
The conduct of nuclear diplomacy includes a variety of practices focussing on

various aspects of controlling the use of nuclear energy. As indicated previously, it
entails arms control, non-proliferation and deterrence. These antecedents of nuclear
diplomacy prevent a comprehensive understanding of states’ relations on the issue
of nuclear power. The concept nuclear diplomacy provides a comprehensive
approach to states’ practices to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, but also to secure
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Constructivists’ preoccupation with power was discussed previously and is

elaborated upon in this section. A significant implication of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy is that it is an instrument of the country’s power, authority and influence.
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Pre-1990, South Africa yielded some authority, influence and power due to its
nuclear weapons capability. However, South Africa, which no longer has nuclear
weapons, continues to yield considerable power; specifically soft or normative
power. The country no longer conceptualises its power pertaining to nuclear matters
in terms of power’s institutional and productive dimensions. Instead, a departure
from “power as resources” to “relational power” reiterated South Africa’s social rather
than material construction of power. This is clearly evident in South Africa’s
construction of its power in the 1995 REC and subsequent RevCons of the NPT.
South Africa’s soft and normative power in nuclear diplomacy is evident in the
various dimensions of power. Firstly, the scope of South Africa’s power in nuclear
diplomacy varies from one issue to another. With the establishment of the NAC,
South Africa flexed its muscle as part of a multilateral arrangement whereas in the
case of the 1995 REC, it acted alone.
Domain is another dimension of a state’s power. Here, it refers to the number of

actors under South Africa’s influence in nuclear diplomacy. The domain of a state’s
power also implies that it can have considerable influence in one area, and almost
none in another. South Africa’s influence in global nuclear affairs indicates its
considerable influence in this area and over other actors compared to its influence in
other domains.
Weight as a dimension of a state’s power determines the probability that South

Africa’s behaviour is or could be affected by one or more actors. South Africa’s
weight in nuclear matters has affected the nuclear-related behaviour of states which
supported its position on the extension of the NPT.
Means as a dimension of power refer to the ways South Africa exercises influence.
These ways can be categorized as symbolic, economic, military and diplomatic
means. South Africa repeatedly employs its unique identity as a roll-back state to
symbolically flex its diplomatic muscles. Economically, it expresses its power in
nuclear diplomacy through its relative success related to the export regimes based
on the country’s production of, for example, medical isotopes. The country’s non-use
of its military power reinforces its power in nuclear diplomacy as South Africa opted
to employ diplomacy, rather than military means, to enhance its nuclear interests.
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The performative aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy refer to what the
country’s nuclear diplomacy does, namely what is achieved. This includes South
Africa’s official and voluntary representation at bi- and/or multilateral conferences,
meetings and negotiations on nuclear-related issues. This is evident in South Africa’s
voluntary involvement in various organizations related to the nuclear non-
proliferation export regime. It is also evident in the country’s formal involvement in
organizations such as the IAEA and the AFCONE.
The second performative aspect of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy refers to the
country’s establishment and maintenance of nuclear-related relations with other
states and multilateral organisations such as the cases selected for this study.
Thirdly, the performative aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy include the
initiation and maintenance of ideas relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear
technology. This is particularly evident in South Africa’s advocacy of all states’
inalienable right, especially in terms of the NPT and the Pelindaba Treaty, to use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
A final performative aspect of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy refers to the

country’s norm entrepreneurship and the socialisation of non-proliferation norms in
order to entrench nuclear-related norms in international relations. This is closely
related to the country’s intersubjective understandings of the “nuclear taboo” and the
peaceful uses of nuclear power.
4.3 South Africa’s construction of norms, identity and interests
The skilful construction of South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear identity and interests
coincided with the country’s norm entrepreneurship and its socialisation of nuclear
non-proliferation norms. The political process whereby South Africa was socialised
into norm construction, enactment and compliance on nuclear non-proliferation
norms corresponds with the socialisation processes identified earlier. In following
Koh (1997: 2598-2599) South Africa’s socialisation process relating to the norm of
nuclear non-proliferation included interactions with like-minded states and
multilateral organisations and its interpretation and internalisation of the meaning of
norms such as nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. In addition to this, South Africa also subscribed to Finnemore and
270
Sikkink’s (1998: 894-905) three stages of the life-cycle of norms. The first stage in
this cycle entailed the emergence of a norm through the initiative of norm
entrepreneurs in governments that call attention to a particular issue. In the case of
post-1990 South Africa, this role was played by Presidents De Klerk and Mandela,
and South African diplomats, most notably Abdul Minty.
The second stage in this cycle involved norm cascade. This occurred when South
Africa attempted to publicise the need for the entrenchment of a norm by socialising
with governments and organisations. The final stage involved the internalisation of
the norm of nuclear non-proliferation; an issue which manifested in its legislation and
institutions such as the NPC and the NCACC.
Therefore, South Africa’s compliance with nuclear non-proliferation norms provided

for the standard(s) for its appropriate behaviour as a nuclear roll-back state with a
given identity. Secondly, South Africa’s norm compliance in ordering, prescribing and
regulating its diplomatic action on nuclear matters enabled its diplomatic interactions
with other actors. Nuclear non-proliferation norms were constitutive as they provided
South Africa with an understanding of its own, and of other states’, mutual or
individual interests that could affect South Africa’s diplomatic stance and/or
behaviour on a particular nuclear-related issue.
Therefore, South Africa’s repeated support of nuclear non-proliferation norms played

a constitutive role in the formation of its nuclear-related identities and interests.
South Africa’s consistent voluntary compliance with International Law and adherence
to settled norms on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy contributed to its predictability, trustworthiness, credibility,
status and prestige. South Africa’s voluntary membership of organisations and
initiatives such as the NSG, the WA and the ZC serves its long-term interests as it
derives benefits from the stability and predictability of the international order.
Therefore, the logic of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is to comply with settled
norms on the use of nuclear power. South Africa’s norm compliance rests on a
number of considerations. Firstly, norms express the dominant ideas of society. Non-
compliance may result in detrimental sanctions and therefore actors comply in order
to avoid such actions. Secondly, compliance with norms may be beneficial to an
actor’s national interests.
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All states strive to achieve and advance four national interests, namely physical
survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. South Africa is
no exception in this regard. In its conduct of nuclear diplomacy, it strove to advance
these interests which emanate from its identity. This study followed the typology of
state identities put forward by Wendt (1990 & 1992). A state’s identity performs
various functions: it indicates ‘who’ a state is, it is the driving force behind a state’s
foreign policy, it indicates what motivates a state, and explains its intentions and
interactions. More importantly, a state’s identity ensures predictable patterns of
behaviour. When applied to South Africa’s conduct of nuclear diplomacy, its identity
included multiple state identities.
In this study, South Africa’s personal or corporate identity was revealed as

constituted by the self-organizing structures (norms, beliefs and resources) that
make it a distinct political entity that advances its national interests. This identity is
particularly evident in its construction of internal self-organising structures such as
the NCACC, the NNR and the NPC to comply with norms on the use of nuclear
energy and the nuclear non-proliferation export control regime.
Another significant aspect of South Africa’s corporate identity refers to the

international recognition it received since 1990 for its nuclear roll-back. In various
diplomatic arenas, such as its bi- and multilateral relations, South Africa’s role was
recognised. South Africa’s nuclear roll-back and its proposals for the 1995 REC and
subsequent NPT conferences are only two of several examples of international
recognition.
South Africa’s type identity refers to the country’s commonly-shared characteristics

with other states. Its type identity was clearly evident in its membership of nuclear
non-proliferation organisations such as the NAC, the NSG, the WA and the ZA. Its
type identity also refers to the historical commonalities it shares with other states
such as the members of the NAM and other African states. More importantly, it also
includes South Africa’s identity as one of the few states which historically had a
nuclear weapons programme, but had dismantled it.
Another type of state identity of South Africa is its social identity which consisted of a
set of meanings it attributed to itself. This identity refers to South Africa’s identity of
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the ‘self’ relative to the ‘other’. This type of state identity is clearly evident in the
country’s social identity in its reference to its unique identity as a country which
terminated its nuclear weapons programme compared to other states that continue
with theirs. Moreover, in terms of its nuclear diplomacy, the construction of South
Africa’s post-1990 social identity revolved around its identity as a state that has
socialised nuclear non-proliferation norms indicative of its departure from a country
with nuclear weapons to a completely nuclear disarmed state. South Africa has
repeatedly referred to its self-image in this regard. Its identification with the ‘other’ is
another aspect of its social identity. Since 1990 it has identified itself not only with
roll-back states, but also with the position of NWS and developing countries on the
right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This identification is evident in
South Africa’s support for the NAM and the NAC at NPT RevCons.
South Africa’s construction of a niche role in nuclear diplomacy evolved from the
deliberate attempts by foreign policy decision-makers of the NP-led government, the
subsequent GNU and the ANC-led government. South Africa’s niche role resulted in
policy-makers’ own definition or role conception of the country’s obligations towards
external actors and these actors’ expectations of South Africa (role prescription). In
this study, South Africa’s ascribed and prescribed roles in its nuclear diplomacy is
clearly evident. The country’s return to the IAEA Board of Governors is one example
of this as is its accession to the NPT and the Pelindaba Treaty.
South Africa’s social identity as a middle power was also outlined in this study.
Employing several strategies by focusing on the specific area of nuclear issues,
South Africa has employed its expertise pertaining to nuclear issues to carve a
middle power role. Its ability to initiate proposals to prevent deadlocks, such as the
deadlock that occurred at the 1995 REC and its participation in such initiatives as the
nuclear non-proliferation export regimes and the NAC also reflected South Africa’s
middle power identity.
For South Africa an important function of its newly constructed state identities is
often imposed or self-imposed international leadership. This is clearly evident in its
nuclear diplomacy. It served in various leadership positions, hosted international
nuclear-related meetings, proposed solutions at conferences and is a voluntary
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member of various export regimes. Moreover, this is also clearly evident in the
country’s preference for multilateralism as a form of global interaction.
In its practice of niche diplomacy, South Africa employed a number of diplomatic

practices which had provided some material and non-material rewards such as
status, prestige and trade opportunities. Employing confrontation as a diplomatic
strategy, South Africa often confronted NWS such as the US, the UK, China, Russia
and France. This has been the case at various NPT conferences.
South Africa’s employment of parallelism as a diplomatic strategy is illustrated in its

parallel diplomatic actions alongside superpowers and its coalition partners. This
was the case in its involvement in the NAC at the NPT RevCons. However, South
Africa predominantly preferred partnership and cooperation as its preferred
diplomatic strategies.
Closely related to its leadership role is South Africa’s social identity as an

accommodator, mediator or bridge-builder in nuclear matters. This is evident in its
involvement in various NPT conferences and at the IAEA where it often articulated
and advanced the interests of NNWS and developing countries.
The third type of South Africa’s state identity refers to its collective identity. This
identity is constructed when a state’s social identity generates collective interests.
Expressions of solidarity, community and loyalty emerge from these collective
interests. South Africa’s collective identity is a combination of role and type identities
to overcome collective action problems (such as nuclear proliferation) as defined by
international actors. This identity merged the previous types of identity in order to
establish a single identity. This is clearly evident in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
with African states in the context of the Pelindaba Treaty.
4.4 The future of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy
Apart from the findings derived from the main thesis of this study, the study also
offers some preliminary findings on the future of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.
The dangers of speculation notwithstanding, several aspects pertaining to this matter
can be identified.
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The most pertinent question relating to a roll-back state is the possibility that a state
would return to developing its nuclear weapons capability. South Africa constructed
its roll-back credentials over two decades. Despite this, these efforts were at times
undermined by several events. Firstly, the IAEA’s initial verification was incomplete
which resulted in questions on South Africa’s commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament. Once the verification was completed in 1993, the
country’s credentials were accepted.
Secondly, South Africans’ involvement in the Khan network also undermined the
country’s status and prestige as a roll-back state. Moreover, as a voluntary member
of various nuclear non-proliferation export regimes, the involvement of South
Africans here raised concerns over the possibility of other similar instances.
In the third instance, South Africa is blatantly ambitious to carve a unique position in
the global nuclear arena. This was clearly illustrated in its campaign for Abdul Minty’s
election as the IAEA Director General. However, South Africa underestimated the
interests of the NWS, who went ahead to appoint a Japanese Director General, a
citizen from the only country to have suffered the devastation of atomic bombs.
In the fourth place, South Africa’s nuclear intentions remain in question; especially
against the background of the South African government’s declaration that it is a
responsible producer, possessor and trader of nuclear expertise, products and
services. In April 2011, the South African government’s adopted the Integrated
Resources Plan (IRP) which paves the way for the expansion of the country’s
nuclear power generation capacity. Dipuo Peters (2011: 4), South Africa’s Minister of
Energy, confirmed that “nuclear and renewable energy will have a significant
contribution” to the country’s future energy supply. Subsequent to this decision, the
South African Cabinet approved the establishment of the National Nuclear Energy
Executive Coordination Committee (NNEECC) and its Nuclear Energy Technical
Committee (NETC) to “implement a phased decision making approach to the nuclear
programme” (South Africa 2011b).
Finally, South Africa’s nuclear intentions are also questioned due to the
announcement by the Minister of State Security, Siyabonga Cwele (2011: 4).
Referring to the country’s forthcoming National Security Strategy, Minister Cwele
275
alluded to the country’s nuclear future. According to Cwele (2011:4), Government

has identified dual-use technologies as involving “major aspects of our country’s
competitiveness and innovative capacity for commercial market access and national
security”. He also announced that an Inter-Departmental Task Team is conducting
an “assessment of resources and activities of the peaceful programs related to the
field of nuclear, biological, chemical, aerospace and missile technologies”. Cwele
further announced that the Task Team will develop a national strategy to promote
research, technological development, innovation, coordination, integration and
oversight in the field of these dual-use technologies in South Africa. These
developments will undoubtedly influence South Africa’s future nuclear diplomacy.
5. Ontological contributions of study
This study makes several ontological contributions. Its main ontological contribution
relates to the theoretical approach employed in this study: constructivism.
Constructivist ontology engages with three main components, namely inter-

subjectivity, context and power. With regards to intersubjectivity, the study
emphasised the interactions between nuclear-related structures and agents. Agents’
intersubjective understandings of the norms of nuclear non-proliferation; nuclear
disarmament; and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constructed identities,
interests, role and meanings, and vice versa. This resulted in the mutual constitution
of agents and structures. This explains the descriptive narrative presented in this
study as narratives highlight the agency of states. For constructivists, once these
intersubjective understandings and meanings manifest in settled norms, institutions
or structures are established. South Africa’s intersubjective understanding of the
settled norms mentioned earlier contributed to its decision to comply with these
norms and accede to the Pelindaba Treaty and the NPT.
Context is another ontological dimension of constructivism. South Africa’s nuclear

diplomacy is contextually linked to the Cold War (historical context); the nuclear arms
race (social context); its domestic policies (social context); and its regional threat
perception (spatial context). Developing nuclear weapons for deterrence, South
Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is linked with this past and its future to undo this legacy as
its context changed.
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The third dimension of constructivists’ ontology is power. For decades one of the
dominant intersubjective understandings of South Africa is that it has been a country
with a nuclear weapons capability and internationally unacceptable policies that
violated the human rights of the majority of South Africans. South Africa derived its
power from a material, rather than an immaterial, base. Once it terminated its
nuclear weapons programme, acceded to the NPT and had successfully undergone
the IAEA verification process, it was able to construct a new identity due to the
changed nature of its interests. This newly won identity as a roll-back state reversed
the dominant intersubjective understanding of South Africa and bestowed it with
significant normative power. In this study, South Africa’s power in nuclear diplomacy
was analysed in terms of its nature as a middle power state.
6. Epistemological contributions of this study
Constructivists share the notion of the mutual constitution of reality. This undermines
the notion of objective facts as intersubjective understandings that constitute these
facts. Therefore, constructivists maintain that what is defined as ‘facts’ and ‘reality’ is
subjectively rather than objectively constructed. Therefore, norms as “social facts”
are mutually constituted based on inter-subjective understandings.
South Africa’s niche role and state identity in nuclear diplomacy can be interpreted in
several ways. Knowledge about South Africa’s nuclear past only became known with
President De Klerk’s 1993 announcement. The South African government, which
denied the existence of its nuclear weapons programme prior to 1989, constructed a
regime of truth (i.e. knowledge in service of power) to support this. Similarly, the
ANC-led government constructed a similar regime of truth; now to perpetuate its
stance on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
This study makes several epistemological contributions. It provides insights into state
behaviour relating to a state’s decision to terminate its nuclear weapons programme
and its reconstruction of identity, power and interests in the absence of these
instruments of power. The study also contributes to insights into nuclear diplomacy
as a particular diplomatic practice emanating from a state’s foreign policy. In addition
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to this, the study contributes to an understanding of middle power behaviour as it

relates to a middle power from the developing world.
Only a small number of countries have completely terminated their nuclear weapons
programmes. These countries include Brazil, South Africa and Libya, all developing
countries and NNWS. Their commitment to the norms of nuclear disarmament,
nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy signify normative
entrepreneurship by middle to small powers. Moreover, it also refers to the role of
regional powers in regional and international security.
7. Practical implications of the study
The main findings of this study have several implications. The study raises further
ontological and epistemological questions about the implications of agency, identities
and interests. If norms and identities are constructed, they can be reconstructed,
giving rise to their fluid nature. Constructivists agree on mutual constitution as a
common ontological claim. For this study, it raises questions about the fluidity of
South Africa’s roles, norms and identities in nuclear diplomacy. Essentially, it raises
the question whether South Africa will restart a nuclear weapons programme. Given
its current context, ceteris paribus, it is not in the country’s current interests to
reverse its nuclear roll-back.
A second implication relates to the conduct, content and scope of South Africa’s
diplomacy in general and its nuclear diplomacy specifically. The implications of
South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy are wide-ranging. It illustrates the existence of a
particular type of diplomacy to determine and apply internationally-agreed
safeguards and principles of verification of states’ nuclear facilities and intentions; it
entails the safety and security of nuclear material, scientists and installations; and it
entails the enforcement of norms relating to the development and application of
nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.
A more significant implication of nuclear diplomacy is that it is an instrument of

power, authority and influence. States with a nuclear capability wield significant
power, authority and influence. However, South Africa, which no longer has nuclear
weapons, continues to wield considerable soft or normative power.
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8. Recommendations for future research
The main findings of this study were presented above. Given the limited scope of the
study, various issues related to South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy necessitate further
exploration in the future.
Firstly, apart from the necessity of more analytical and theoretical research on
nuclear diplomacy, several empirical issues require further attention. Secondly, more
empirical research on South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy should be conducted. The
focus could be on the role of emerging powers’ nuclear diplomacy; South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy in the context of President Obama’s NSS; and South Africa’s
nuclear diplomacy in respect of the AFCONE.
Thirdly, an assessment of the role of South African diplomat Abdul Minty in the
country’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy is required. This will provide valuable insights
into the role of agency in nuclear diplomacy.
A fourth recommendation for future research is to conduct research on the training

required for South African diplomats in order to conduct the country’s nuclear
diplomacy.
The nuclear diplomacy of the ANC and the AAM prior to 1990 remains an under-
researched area. Therefore, the fifth recommendation of this study is that future
research on the legacy of the ANC and the AAM in respect of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy should be conducted.
A final recommendation is to conduct research on South Africa’s bilateral nuclear

diplomacy with countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India.
9. Final observations
In the first address by a South African delegate representing a democratically

elected government to the GC of the IAEA, South Africa’s first post-apartheid
Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo (1994), reflected on its transformation as a nuclear
weapons producer into a country that has terminated its nuclear weapons
programme and has “changed the nuclear sword into a nuclear ploughshare”. Nzo’s
reference to the prophet Isaiah’s oft quoted and often paraphrased passage from
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Isaiah 2:4 is apt as South Africa spent decades wielding a “nuclear sword”. South
Africa’s nuclear history and diplomacy is among the most unique since the dawn of
the nuclear era in international relations. It has skilfully constructed a niche in nuclear
diplomacy through the construction and maintenance of the norms of nuclear
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
a unique state identity.
On 7 April 1994, Pik Botha, Nzo’s predecessor, presented the IAEA with a sculpture
of a ploughshare made of non-nuclear material from a dismantled South African
nuclear device. The inscription on the sculpture, exhibited in Block A of the Vienna
International Centre, Vienna, Austria, which is the location of the IAEA’s
headquarters, reads: “The sculpture made from non-nuclear material from a
dismantled nuclear device symbolises the commitment of the Republic of South
Africa to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. For more than the past two
decades, this sculpture continues to symbolise this commitment.
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337
APPENDIX 1
MEMBERS OF THE INAUGURAL AFRICAN COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR

ENERGY56
Mr Messaoud Baaliouamer, Algeria: Mr Baaliouamer has been serving as the

Director for Foresight Studies and Nuclear Applications at the Algerian Atomic
Energy Commission (COMENA) since 1999. He has also been a member of the
African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training
related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) Field Management Committee
since 2000 and the AFRA Programme Management Committee since 2009. He
coordinated the AFRA National Programme from 1999 to 2006. From 1995 to 1998,
he served as the Chair of the Scientific Committee at Birine Nuclear Research
Centre as well as directed the Center from 1991 to 1992. From 1988 to 1998 he
was the Head of the Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Department. He actively
contributed to the commissioning of the AURES 1 Subcritical Assembly in 1986, the
1 MW NUR Nuclear Research Reactor in 1988 and the 15 MW Multi Purpose Heavy
Water (MPHW) Reactor Es Salam and associated Laboratories (1992-1996). In
2000, Mr Baaliouamer was awarded the scientific grade ‘Maitre de Recherche (MR)’
or Senior Fellow. He was awarded a Master of Sciences in Nuclear Engineering in
1980 and has thirty years of experience in the field of nuclear research and
development. Since 2007, he has been leading the team in charge of the creation
and implementation of the Algerian Institute of Education and Training in Nuclear
Engineering (IAGN/ COMENA). In January 2007, he chaired the Scientific
Committee of the African Regional Conference on Nuclear Energy (Contribution to
Peace and Sustainable Development), held in Algiers, whose declaration and plan of
action have been adopted by the African Union Head of States Summit in January
2007, in Addis Ababa.
Dr Baidori Outtara, Burkina Faso: Dr Outtara, holder of a Masters Degree in

AgriPedology, and has been serving as the Permanent Secretary of the Technical
Secretariat for Atomic Energy and National Liaison Officer for Technical Cooperation
56
This was taken verbatim from AU (2011b: 3-8).
338
with the IAEA and National Coordinator of AFRA since 2007. He previously served
as Director General for the Improvement of Life Setting at the Ministry of
Environment and Life Setting from 2005 to 2007, and Chief of Environmental
Research at the Center for Environmental research, Agriculture and Training
(CREAF) from 1995 to 2003. At the regional and sub‐regional levels, Dr Outtara
served as Chairman of the Steering Committee of the West and Central Africa
Sorghum Research from 1995 to 2000, national coordinator of the sub regional
research project on the survey of the aggregation mechanism of tropical poorly
swelling clays soils from 1990 to 1994, and national coordinator of the research
project on the optimization of rainfall resources at the international network for
research on drought tolerance in western and central Africa from 1985 to 1989.
Dr Augustin Simo, Cameroon: Dr Simo is currently the Director General of the

National Radiation Protection Agency, and has served as the Head of the Energy
Research Laboratories at the Institute of Geological and Mining Research since
1980. He is also currently the National Liaison Officer for the IAEA and National
Coordinator for AFRA as well as a Member of the AFRA Programme Management
Committee. He served as the AFRA Chairperson from 2009 to 2010, as well as
Member of Cameroon’s delegation to the IAEA’s Board of Governors from 2009 to
2011. From 2007 to 2010, he served as the Permanent Secretary of the National
Committee for Technology Development. In 1982, Dr Simo was awarded a
Doctorate in Energy from the University of Aix Marseille III in France. He taught at
the Center of Atomic Physics, Molecular and Quantum Optics at the University of
Douala and at the Department of Physics at the University of Yaoundé. He was a
Research Fellow at the Energy Research Laboratories of the Institute for Geological
and Mining Research from 1980 to 2009.
Mr Atnatiwos Zeleke Meshesha, Ethiopia: Mr Meshesha has been serving as

Director of the Inspection & Enforcement Directorate and Head of the Regulatory
Control Department at the Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority (ERPA) since
2007. From 2004 to 2006, he was Acting General Manager of the Ethiopian
Radiation Protection Authority and prior to that he served for over four years as
Senior Expert and Head of the Regulatory Control Coordination Unit of the Authority.
He is currently serving as the Acting Director General of ERPA and the Deputy
339
Secretary of the Forum of the Nuclear Regulatory Body in African (FNRBA). In

2000, Mr Meshesha was awarded a Post Graduate Diploma in Radiation Protection
from the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa and
an MSc in Radiation and Environmental Protection by Surrey University, UK.
Professor Shaukat Abdurazak, Kenya: Since 2008, Professor Abdurazak has

been serving as the Executive Secretary of the National Council for Science and
Technology at the Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology. He is also
currently the National Liaison Officer for the IAEA and National Coordinator for AFRA
as well as the Chairman of its Programme Management Committee. Professor
Abdurazak is a Board Member of various national institutes, including: the Radiation
Protection Board, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, Kenya Institute of Research
and Development, Kenya Medical Research Institute, Kenya Marine and Fisheries
Institute and Kenya Forestry Research Institute. He is also a Board Member of the
Inter-University Council of East Africa. Professor Abdurazak was awarded a PhD in
1995 by the University of Aberdeen, UK, and a Post Doctorate certificate in 2001 by
Shimane University, Japan. He has been a Professor at the Egerton University since
2005 and served as Deputy Vice‐Chancellor for Research and Extension at Egerton
University from 2002 to 2007.
Dr Bulgasem Hammouda Ali El Fawaris, Libya: Dr El Fawaris has been a

member of the Central Steering Committee of the Libyan Atomic Energy
Establishment since 2008 and a member of the Network Operation Center
Environmental Surveillance Committee related to oil and gas NORM contamination
since 2007. In 2007 he was appointed national representative in the IAEA
Radioactive Waste Management Technical Committee for a three-year term. In
1982, he joined the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment as Head of Radiation
Control and Health Physics at which he served for eight years. Dr El Fawaris was
awarded a Master of Science degree in Ecology and another one in Nuclear Science
and Radiation Protection from Louisiana State University, USA, in 1980 and 1981,
respectively. In 1990 he joined the Department of Radioecology at Uppsala
University, in Sweden, for a doctorate programme which he was awarded in 1995.
He served as Associate Professor at Tajoura Nuclear Research Center from 1995 to
340
2004, and has been serving as Full Professor at the Renewable Energy and Water
Desalination Research Center from 2005 to date.
Mr Tezana Coulibaly, Mali: Mr Coulibaly has served at the National Directorate of

Energy of Mali since 2000 as Chief of the Energy Saving Section and later as Chief
of the Energy Management Division. He has also been serving as the National
Coordinator for AFRA since 2008. Prior to that, Mr Coulibaly served for five years as
Deputy General Manager of the Regulation Office of Traffic and Uurban Transport of
the district of Bamako.
HE Mr Anund P Neewoor, Mauritius: Mr Neewoor, a career diplomat, has been

serving as Secretary for Foreign Affairs since 2005. From 1999 to 2001, he served
as the Permanent Representative and Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Mauritius to the United Nations. From 1993 to
1996, he served as Ambassador to the United States and High Commissioner to
Canada and Guyana and, from 1983 to 1993, as Ambassador to Russia, Thailand,
Myanmar and Nepal, and High Commissioner to India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Sri
Lanka. He concurrently served as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in India, from 1990
to 1993, and Dean of the African Ambassadors Corps in New Delhi, from 1988 to
1993. Mr Neewoor also served for varying periods in other high level diplomatic
positions including Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Ambassador
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of Multilateral Affairs. He was decorated
by the Government of Mauritius as Commander of the Star and Key of the Ocean in
2003 and Grand Officer of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean in
2008.
Dr Christian Sina Diatta, Senegal: Dr Diatta is a member of the AFRA High‐Level

Steering Committee on Human Resource Development and Nuclear Knowledge
Management. He served as Minister for eight years in charge of Bio-fuels and
Renewable Energy Scientific Research. In 1988, he founded and directed the
Laboratory of Plasma Physics and Interdisciplinary Research at the University of
Cheikh Anta Diop, in Dakar, as well as directed, from 1988 to 2001, the Institute of
Applied Nuclear Technology and the Research Institute on Teaching Mathematics in
Physical Sciences and Technology from 1985 to 1993. Dr Diatta has extensive
experience in the field of scientific research. From 1984 to 1986, he was visiting
341
researcher at the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics in Colorado, US; visiting
researcher at the Laboratory of Organic Chemistry of Wroclaw, Poland, in1975; and
researcher at the National Centre of Scientific Research in France, from 1969 to
1977. Dr Diatta was awarded a Doctorate degree in Science by the University of
Orleans, France, in 1977.
Mr Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa: Mr Minty currently serves at the South
African Department of International Relations and Cooperation as Ambassador and
Special Representative for Disarmament and NEPAD, as well as the Personal
Representative of the President on the NEPAD Steering Committee. Mr Minty served
as Deputy Director General for Multilateral Affairs in the South African Department of
Foreign Affairs, from 1995 to 2004, and acting Director General of the Department
for over two years. He is currently the Convener of the Council of the South
Centre. Mr Minty has been serving as the chairperson of the South African Council
for Non-Proliferation of WMD since 1995 and the representative of the Department of
International Relations and Cooperation on the South African National Conventional
Arms Control Committee, as well as a member of the Board of the South African
Nuclear Energy Corporation. He has been South Africa’s Governor in the IAEA
Board of Governors since 1995 and was President of the IAEA Conference in 2006.
Mr Minty was also a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters for two years. Mr Minty served as an Honorary Secretary of
the British Anti-Apartheid Movement from 1962 to 1995 and Director of the World
Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa from 1979 to
1994. He was awarded a Masters degree in International Relations by the University
College of London in 1969, and was Senior Research Fellow at the International
Peace Research Institute at Oslo from 1994 to 1995.
Lieutenant-Colonel Manzi Pidalatan, Togo: Lt-Colonel Pidalatan is a member of

the National Authority on Weapons of Mass Destruction and is responsible for
matters of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. He is also Head of Office for
the Training of General Staff. Lt-Colonel Pidalatan also received several decorations,
including Knight of the National Mono, Officer of the Order in Central Africa, Medal of
the African Union, Medal of Peace of the United Nations and Medal of the French
National Defense.
342
Dr Mourad Telmini, Tunisia: Dr Telmini is presently the Director General of the

National Centre for the Nuclear Science and Technology, full Professor of Physics at
the Faculty of Science of Tunis, Head of the Research Group in Atomic and
Molecular Physics at the Faculty of Science of Tunis, Vice‐President of the Tunisian
Physical Society, Fellow of the Institute of Physics, Liaison Committee representative
of Tunisia in the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP), member
of C13 IUPAP commission on Physics for Development and member of the Tunisian
delegation in the IAEA Board of Governors. Dr Telmini served as Senior Scientific
Advisor at the National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology from 2008 to
2010, Associate Professor of Physics at the Faculty of Science of Tunis, from 2004
to 2009, and President of the Tunisian Physics Society from 2005 to 2007. Dr
Telmini was awarded a Doctorate degree in Atomic Physics in 1993 by (Université
Paris-Sud) 11, France.
343
SUMMARY
SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, 1990-2010: SECURING A NICHE

ROLE THROUGH NORM CONSTRUCTION AND STATE IDENTITY
by
Jo-Ansie Karina van Wyk

Supervisor: Professor Anton du Plessis
The main thesis of this study is that since 1990 South Africa has conducted its
nuclear diplomacy by constructing certain norms and its identity in a particular way to
serve its national interests. A constructivist analysis of South Africa’s nuclear
diplomacy concerning the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes; the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the Pelindaba Treaty; and the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) suggests that South Africa’s
application of three typical middle power diplomatic strategies, namely confrontation,
cooperation and parallelism have enabled the country to secure a niche role for itself
that has provided the country with some material and non-material rewards.
South Africa’s membership of some of the major nuclear export control regimes
reflects its socialisation of the norms of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. South Africa has incorporated aspects of this
regime in its nuclear export trade policies and national nuclear-related institutions.
Despite this, the South African government’s efforts were undermined by a series of
contentious nuclear proliferation-related incidents, most notably the involvement of
South Africans in the AQ Khan network.
South Africa was a founder member of the IAEA in 1957. Despite this early role in
norm construction, South Africa’s relations with the IAEA deteriorated as
international opposition to its apartheid policies escalated. Defying international
isolation, the country embarked on a nuclear weapons programme that produced six
atomic devices. South Africa returned to its designated seat for Africa on the IAEA
Board of Governors in 1995. A vocal opponent of the discriminatory nature of the
344
IAEA Statute and supporter of all countries’ right to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, South Africa’s influence in the Agency expanded. Despite this, the country’s
candidate for the position of IAEA Director General was not elected.
Africa’s position on nuclear non-proliferation originated in the 1960s. Once South

Africa’s domestic policies became known and suspicions of its nuclear weapons
programme grew, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) turned its focus to
condemnation of South Africa. As a result of the political transition in South Africa; its
ratification of the NPT; and the IAEA’s verification process, South Africa joined Africa
to establish the African nuclear weapons free zone in terms of the Pelindaba Treaty.
As a result the country was elected to chair and host the AFCONE.
Despite its historical opposition to the NPT, the country ratified the Treaty in 1991
and has constructed its niche role in the NPT regime through its problem-solving and
bridge building roles at various NPT conferences.
Therefore, this study concludes that South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy has
maintained a normative foundation; employed various diplomatic strategies; and was
conducted in compliance with the set objectives of the country’s foreign policy. In
this, the analysis of the nuclear diplomacy of a state such as South Africa, which
discontinued its nuclear weapons programme, provided insights into nuclear
diplomacy in general and the nuclear diplomacy of states similar to the South African
situation.

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SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, 1990-2010: SECURING A NICHE

ROLE THROUGH NORM CONSTRUCTION AND STATE IDENTITY

JO-ANSIE KARINA VAN WYK

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor Philosophiae (International Relations)

in the Department of Political Sciences at the

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR ANTON DU PLESSIS

Strabo, a Greek geographer and philosopher, maintained that geography is destiny

My academic interest in nuclear politics and nuclear diplomacy was cultivated in

My sincerest appreciation goes to my supervisor, Professor Anton du Plessis whose

I am grateful for the financial assistance provided by the UP (Postgraduate Bursary,

I am grateful for the academic support I received from my home department at

Cursum perficio. Ex gratia, soli Deo gloria.

Jo-Ansie van Wyk

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

5.1.2 The implications of the AQ Khan legacy 112

CHAPTER FOUR: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

3.2.5 The AQ Khan network and the Wisser Affaire 157

CHAPTER FIVE: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPON

CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-

7.2 South Africa’s pre- 2010 Review Conference

CHAPTER SEVEN: EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAC New Agenda Coalition

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

1 Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy 38

1 The main ontological assumptions of constructivism

Towards the end of 1989, President FW de Klerk established a committee to

On 24 March 1993, President de Klerk announced the extent of South Africa’s

Notwithstanding these successes, several nuclear-related issues have remained a

diverge on aspects of the NPT.6 Furthermore, concerns about nuclear terrorism

Irrespective of its non-proliferation stance, the South African government remains

can be explained in terms of the internationalisation and institutionalisation, or the

Since 1990, South African leaders, diplomats and government-employed nuclear

South Africa’s influence on nuclear diplomacy has been acknowledged by scholars,

• Partnership: It engages in active partnership with the dominant power on a

Secondly, there is a considerable lack of literature explaining South Africa’s nuclear

Thirdly, the application of IR theories to analyse South Africa’s post-apartheid

In the context of multilateralism, a limited number of studies on South Africa’s

Goosen (1995).8 In addition to this, Nigerian academic Adebayo Oyebade (1998)

aspects in policy developments and excludes nuclear diplomacy. However, Fig

Scant reference to some aspects of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy is made

Nuclear diplomacy can be described as niche diplomacy. First coined by Australia’s

specialisation. It also refers to “concentrating resources in specific areas best able to

Therefore, against the background of the above-mentioned review, the purpose of

3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

Therefore, the objective of the study is to:

• Evaluate the research findings and make recommendations.

The research problem is demarcated with reference to the following considerations

The study is based on primary sources such as speeches, presentations and

Foreign Affairs, which has a constitutional obligation towards the country’s

5. Structure of the research

This study comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to

construction of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, South Africa’s identity, roles