Recit Consti Day 2
Recit Consti Day 2
Recit Consti Day 2
Belgica v. Ochoa
Keyword: Pork Barrel - Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the
"collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary
powers to determine its distribution as political largesse
FACTS
Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government
has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores
of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
Petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), Pedrito M. Nepomuceno
(Nepomuceno) filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional,
ISSUE
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
HELD
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of
Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution the
power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view
of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are
not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar
as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a
stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability
Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
FACTS
For resolution is petitioner’s "Motion for Reconsideration dated February 25,
2011 Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither
substantial nor cogent reason to reconsider its Decision. Petitioner’s Motion concedes
that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes
the House’s initial action on the complaint. petitioner abandons her earlier claim that
per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an
impeachment complaint. Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in
propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be
reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
"constructive initiation by legal fiction
ISSUE
Did the Court deviate from Francisco v. House of Representatives regarding
the proper initiation of an impeachment complaint?
HELD
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are
not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the
entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in
designing even its details. Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the
12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an
impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding
of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the
Committee’s finding the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action are
merged into a single act. Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to
coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum. Contrary
to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to
when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the
House’s conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment proceeding. Francisco
doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate
committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.
To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to
commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment
proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion.
The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of
one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint. IN SUM, the
Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the
present case.
ISSUE
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
HELD
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June
8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. The
fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer
subject of litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
People vs. Perfecto this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of
the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph
because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official
capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers Directly or indirectly having
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest. Respondent
Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. It
does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue
advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement
in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
against it in court.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959
(R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly
Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under
Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as
much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys
and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations
or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course. but if a Judge
does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official
actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends.
Mark Anthony v. Zabal et al., vs. Rodrigo R. Duterte
FACTS
Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made
public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime
February 2018. 5 This was followed by several speeches and news releases stating
that he would place Boracay under a state of calamity. This was followed by several
speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a state of
calamity. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr.
in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the total
closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26,
2018. Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and
military personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd
dispersal management. They also allege that the DILG had already released
guidelines for the closure. Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's
closure came about, fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and
Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families.
ISSUE
Whether or not the present business or of a particular mode of living can
prevent the exercise of police power of the State
RULING
No, the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of
police power cannot be disputed. Verily, the statutes from which the said measure
draws authority and the constitutional provisions which serve as its framework are
primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the
people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of
governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general.
Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure. To repeat,
police power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number
Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of their
right to work and earn a living. They are free to work and practice their trade
elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay, at least for the duration of its
closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power measure to close and
rehabilitate the island
Sama y Hinupas v. People
FACTS
Accuses DIOSDADO SAMA y HINUPAS, DEMETRIO MASANGLAY y
ACEVEDA, BANDY MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, residents of Barangay Baras,
Baco, Oriental Mindoro with the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.
PO3 Villamor D. Ranee (PO3 Ranee) testified that on March 15, 2005, his
team comprised of police officers and representatives of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) surveilled Barangay Calangatan, San
Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro to address illegal logging operations in the area.
While patrolling the mountainous area of Barangay Calangatan, they heard the
sound of a chainsaw and saw a tree slowly falling down. They immediately crossed
the river and traced the source of the sound. In the area where the sound was coming
from, they caught the accused in the act of cutting a dita tree. They also saw a bolo
stuck to the tree that had been cut
The team inquired from the accused if they had a license to cut down the tree.
The latter replied they had none. After informing the accused of their violation, the
team invited them to the police station for further investigation. The team left the
illegally cut tree in the area because it was too heavy. Pictures of the accused and the
cut down tree were also taken.
ISSUE
Whether or not the IP rights to preserve cultural integrity and claim or title to
ancestral domains and land are subject to the State’s police power
RULING
Section 77 of PD 705, as amended is an exercise of police power, the validity
of which is not negated by the fact that the objects thereof are owned by those charged
with the offense, a police power measure is judged by the traditional test, the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power. Police power trumps objections on the basis of
ownership
As police power invariably trumps ownership, the subject IP rights are not
themselves the same as the ownership proscribed as a defense in this type of offense.
Section 77 as a police power measure was legislated - the protection and promotion of
a healthy and clean ecology and environment through sustainable use of timber and
other forest products.
GENUINO, et al. vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA
FACTS
On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ
Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs.
The said issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which
impinge on the people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ
Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance and
implementation of watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons with criminal cases
pending preliminary investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it
states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an ADO to a person subject of a WLO who
intends to leave the country for some exceptional reasons.6 Even with the
promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 18, however, DOJ Circular No. 17 remained the
governing rule on the issuance of HDOs by the DOJ.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the
assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will
govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs, WLOS, and ADOs. Section 10 of
DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules and regulations contained in DOJ
Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with its provisions.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and her subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal
complaints were filed against her before the DOJ.
GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.
ISSUE
Whether or not the DOJ can issue DOJ circular under the guise of police
power
RULING
No, Police power may only be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority
pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the
President, it must first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment
evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. This, the DOJ failed to do.
There is likewise no showing that the curtailment of the right to travel imposed by
DOJ Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its
investigatory duties.
In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and
not repugnant to the Constitution.116 It must never be utilized to espouse actions that
violate the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the
Constitution.117 In the clear language of the Constitution, it is only in the interest of
national security, public safety and public health that the right to travel may be
impaired. None one of the mentioned circumstances was invoked by the DOJ as its
premise for the promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 41.
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
FACTS
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the
lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria
Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or
"entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did
they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional
for the following reasons
1.) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels
2.) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial
zone with certain restrictions
3.) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected
4.) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation
of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment
5.) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ordinance has the power to exercise police power
RULING
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under
the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right.
Acosta v. Ochoa
FACTS
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and
two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of
provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable
exercise of police power.
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance,
being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because
it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift.
It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around
the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted
taking of property without due process because the landowners were thereby
compelled to cede portions of their property without just compensation; that the
exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because there was no
finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare; and
that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the absence
of a separability clause.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07, SERIES OF 2007 IS
OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF DELEGATED
POLICE POWER
RULING
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed
ordinance because it would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and
business in the interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of
promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does
not thereby oblige the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the
respondents only choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the
transition period by erroneously adding the months required for each of the stages
without considering other steps that may be simultaneously undertaken
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is
a valid exercise of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable;
that the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a
portion of their landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer
zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone does
not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their property; and that
the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property owners
that the use of property bears a social function
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone
under Section 5 of the ordinance constitutes an improper exercise of police power;
that the ordinance will require all landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby
diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of usable and productive land for every
hectare of the plantation bounding residential areas, with the zone being reserved for
planting "diversified trees;" that this requirement amounts to taking without just
compensation or due process; and that the imposition of the buffer zone unduly
deprives all landowners within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their property
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a
two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent
merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution
and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy)
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government.110 A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
EMINENT DOMAIN
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz
FACTS
Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc. (respondent) is a duly
incorporated corporation composed of the heirs of Jose Gamir and Consuelo Diaz. It
was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,836 square meters
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7550.
On August 9, 2005, after a series of negotiations, respondent and the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where it was agreed that
respondent would sell the above-mentioned property to petitioner in consideration of
P275,099.24. The property was eventually registered in petitioner's name under TCT
No. T-3906396 after respondent's receipt of the full consideration. The said parcel of
land forms part of Sta. Ana Avenue, a national road
On November 15, 2006, respondent filed a Complaint before the RTC. It
alleged that the subject parcel of land was taken by the DPWH sometime in 1957; the
value of P275,099.24 as just compensation stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, was
based on the value of the property in 1957; it made verbal and written demands to
petitioner for the payment of interest from 1957; and it had a right to receive interest
because the DPWH had not paid just compensation when it occupied the property in
1957
ISSUE
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT OF
INTEREST NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF ANY STIPULATION IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WITH PETITIONER.
RULING
It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and
respondent does not contain any provision or stipulation for the payment of interest.
Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest
In other words, reliance on the terms of written contract is practicable because
it is understood that whatever stipulations appearing therein was a result of
negotiation, posturing and bargaining between the parties. Whatever is not included in
the document is deemed waived or abandoned
Without prompt payment, the compensation cannot be considered just. In
other words, just compensation in the context of eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings pertains to the timely or prompt payment of an adequate value sufficient
to recoup the loss suffered by the property owner.
Provided all the requisites for its exercise are present, a private individual
cannot resist the state's exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
Nevertheless, there is nothing that precludes the government from entering into a
negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a property to be devoted for a
public purpose
As above-mentioned, expropriation and voluntary sale have different legal
effects, especially considering that in the latter, the parties could freely negotiate the
terms and conditions of the contract, i.e., they could include a stipulation concerning
the payment of interest. In addition, in entering into a voluntary purchase or sale, the
state does not exercise its power of eminent domain
In sum, the award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires
private property through voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases where
the state exercises its power of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation
proceedings and other similar actions, in negotiated sale, there is an existing contract
that governs the relations of the parties and determines their respective rights and
obligations
Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corp. v. National Power Corp
FACTS
Lloyds Richfield is a cement manufacturing corporation. With a plant site in
Danao City, it purchased parcels of land within its vicinity and quarried limestones
from these areas, which would then be used to manufacture cement.
Sometime before June 25, 1996, the National Power Corporation entered into
negotiations with Lloyds Richfield to create an easement of right of way over the
parcels of land. Transmission lines would be constructed over the parcels of land for
the 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A location map drawn by the
National Power Corporation depicted the lots that would be affected by the project,
with the lots owned by Lloyds Richfield denominated as Lot Nos. 1859, 1861, 1860,
1833, 1832, 1830, and 1829
When negotiations failed, the National Power Corporation filed a Complaint
for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. It also filed an ex
parte motion, upon which the trial court issued a Writ of Possession allowing it to take
immediate possession of Lloyds Richfield's properties
Lloyds Richfield initially moved to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied
it.13 It then filed its Answer, demanding by way of compulsory claim that the
National Power Corporation pay the fair market value of the parcels of land, since the
construction of transmission lines over its properties would render the properties
useless to it. It also demanded to be paid the fair market value ofthe limestone
deposits in the parcels of land.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corporation is entitled to just
compensation for the value of the limestone deposits found in its lots.
RULING
No, Lloyds Richfield, however, is not entitled to just compensation for the
limestone deposits in its properties. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution,
the State owns all minerals found in Philippine soil. While Lloyds Richfield has title
to the properties, it does not own the minerals underneath them, as shown by the
permits and the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement it had to secure from the
government to conduct quarrying activities in its properties.
Court cited Republic V. Court of Appeals wherein, Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use
Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being
exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of
their land, subject however to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable
NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable that they
be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity