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Principal USAF bases in Southeast Asia. From Aces & Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force
in Southeast Asia 1965-1973. Air University and Office of Air Force History, AF/HO, Headquarters
USAF, Washington DC, 1976, p. 23.
GLORY DAYS
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE MEN
WHO FLEW THE B-66 DESTROYER
INTO THE FACE OF FEAR

Wolfgang W.E. Samuel

Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Ret)

Schiffer Military History

Atglen, PA ,
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Copyright © 2008 by Wolfgang W.E. Samuel.

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 PREFACE AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Some years ago my daughter Shelley returned home over spring-break from
Virginia Technical Institute in Blacksburg, better known as Virginia Tech, a
university openly proud of the honorable military service many of its graduates
rendered to the nation . Shelley said to me, "Dad, you flew the B-66 in Vietnam,
didn't you? My cadet friends at Virginia Tech say there never was such an
airplane." I never forgot my daughter's comment. Never forgot the twinge of pain
I felt when she told me that my service and the sacrifices of so many of my friends
had not only been forgotten, but had never even been remembered. In the years
that followed I looked in vain for a book that told the story of the B-66 and the
men who flew and maintained it. I began to do some research into the airplane's
history, a plane in which I have less than 500 flying hours and of which I knew
all too little. I came away from my research humbled by the bravery of those who
flew their unarmed aircraft into the missile tainted skies of North Vietnam so that
others might live. I decided it was time to write the story of this Cold War warrior,
the story of the B-66 Destroyer and the men who flew it into the face of fear.
The B-66 was an interim medium jet bomber and reconnaissance aircraft to be
retired as soon as the ultimate medium bomber came along. Like so many things
in life, the interim became the ultimate. Its name Destroyer was a misnomer from
the start since for the briefest period of its nearly twenty years of service it carried
guns and bombs. Rather than being a destroyer, the B-66 for many years served as
the eyes and ears of the tactical air forces as a day and night photo and electronic
reconnaissance platform. The Destroyer '.s claim to fame, however, came in the

5
 Glory Days

early years of the Vietnam War when the United States Air Force found itself
confronted by a sophisticated North Vietnamese radar guided anti-aircraft and
surface-to-air missile defense network for which it was ill prepared. The only
aircraft in being to effectively counter the North Vietnamese radar threat was a
small number of aging and often neglected electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipped EB-66 aircraft. These few 'whited out' the screens of North Vietnamese
radars trying to direct anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missiles against bomb-
laden F-105 and F-4 fighters. The men flying the unarmed EB-66s saved many a
fighter pilot's life, and as a result they were hunted by North Vietnamese MiGs
and surface to air missile battalions charged to gun them down. The EB-66 flyers
took their losses, yet prevailed. They were there in the beginning, and they were
there to the end, the very last combat planes to leave the field of battle. Glory
Days is the untold story of an airplane and its brave flyers who deserve to be
remembered like all others who valiantly served our nation in time of war. The
two EB-66 combat squadrons which flew from bases in Thailand from 1965 to
the end of the air war in 1973 earned the Presidential Unit Citation for valor in
combat, as well as numerous Outstanding Unit Awards with V-device for valor in
combat, and the equivalent U.S. Navy citation. EB-66 flyers earned Silver Stars
and Distinguished Flying Crosses for heroism, Air Medals galore, and all too
many Purple Hearts, attesting to their courage and sacrifice.
In Glory Days I tell the B-66 story the way men experienced and lived it, and
as much as possible in their own words . Interviews and correspondence if needed
were edited for clarity, brevity and word choice. Although I tried to minimize the
use of Air Force jargon, that wasn't totally possible nor desirable. After all, Glory
Days is a story about Air Force flyers and their flying machines, so feel free to
make good use of Appendix 1 - Terms and Abbreviations. I also set the story within
the context of its time, a time when the Soviet military juggernaut came close to
taking our world into nuclear war. The Cold War, including major confrontations
between East and West over Berlin (1948 to 1949), Korea (1950 to 1953), Cuba
(1962) and Vietnam (1962 to 1973), was at times rather hot incurring the loss of
nearly 100,000 American lives, and many more wounded. The B-66 and its flyers
played a significant role in the outcome of this long-lasting struggle. In the end,
we, the free world, prevailed over darkness and oppression, and the Soviet threat
collapsed and vanished. Glory Days is one story of how it was done.
I would not have been able to put together this tale of courage and dedication
without the support and cooperation of many organizations and individuals,
including Dr. James 0. Young, Chief Historian at the Air Force Flight Test Center
at legendary Edwards Air Force Base in California. Dr. Young provided essential
pictures and test data of the B-66 as it went through flight test at Edwards and

6
 Preface and Acknowledgments

Wright-Patterson Air Force Bases. Ms. Yvonne Kinkaid at AF/HO at Bolling AFB,
Washington, DC., was equally helpful in supporting my research efforts to retrieve
historical records of B-66 units and operations from a vast Air Force historical data
base, as was Mr. Louie Alley, Freedom of Information Act Manager at Kirtland
Air Force Base. Mr Alley's enthusiastic support provided accident reports without
which it would have been impossible to accurately reconstruct the history of the
airplane and how it was flown . In the process of doing my research I met Mr.
Clifford Parrott, better known in the B-66 community as 'the B-66 Doctor.' As the
senior Douglas Aircraft Corporation technical representative at Shaw Air Force
Base, South Carolina, Cliff Parrott shepherded the B-66 through its early growing
pains, and more than any other individual helped make the B-66 a safe combat
plane to fly . Fortunately Cliff was in the habit of never throwing anything away and
generously provided me access to his files . I extend my appreciation and thanks
to Colonel James Milam for his and the B-66 Association's support, to Colonel
Paul Duplessis for developing and maintaining an extensive interactive B-66
website, to Colonel Paul Moore for supporting my research efforts at the Museum
of the United States Air Force, and to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mendonca,
one of the last commanders of the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron at
Korat, Thailand, for providing historical data of the last years of the squadron's
operation in Southeast Asia. Mr Robert Kempel of Lancaster, California, a long
time aerospace engineer at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, generously
provided engineering advice and valuable suggestions.
I also want to express my appreciation and thanks to the many who consented
to be interviewed for the B-66 story, who shared personal experiences through
letters and emails, as well as pictures dating back to the earliest days of the aircraft
as it was undergoing flight test. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stamm was a most
generous contributor of written and pictorial material, as were William Starnes,
David Frankenberg, William McDonald, Joseph Snoy, Toni Tambini, Ted Pruss,
Robert Webster, Vern Luke, John Norden, Ken Hintz, David Cooper, Joe Yeater,
Lloyd Neutz, Stan Tippin, Bob Welch, Tom Taylor, Gayle Johnson, Edward
Monger and many others mentioned in the book. David Holland, Kermit Helmke
and Donald Harding were more than generous in providing critical insights into
the shoot-down of an RB-66 over East Germany in 1964, and about the role of
the B-66 in the 47th Bombardment Wing at RAF Sculthorpe, England. My thanks
go to Major General Harrison Lobdell, USAF (Retired), for allowing me to quote
from his interview, and to Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Reponen for sharing his
extensive unpublished autobiography which covered much of the period when the
B-66 first deployed to Germany, France and England. My thanks go to everyone
who contributed in any fashion and made this long overdue book possible - a

7
 Glory Days

story of American courage, dedication to and love of country. I regret that I could
not mention everyone by name, there were so many of you who reached out and
contributed. I thank you all .

Wolfgang W.E. Samuel

Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Fairfax Station, Virginia

8
 CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgments ...................................................... 5

Dedication ... .. ..... ....... ................. ................................. ...... ....... .... 11

Chapter 1 The Price of Victory ...... .. ............................................................. 13

Chapter 2 An Airplane With One-Way Engines ....................................... .... 24
Chapter 3 Flight Testing the Destroyer ................ ... ..................................... 39
Chapter4 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field ....... ...................... ... ......... ..47
Chapter 5 The Red Devils of RAF Sculthorpe ............................................. 59
Chapter6 The 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron ............................... 71
Chapter 7 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base ......... ................. .. ....... 82
Chapter 8 Operations Red Berry and Double Trouble .. ...................... .......... 95
Chapter 9 Ravens, Crows, and EWOs ............ ....................... ............... ..... . 106
Chapter JO Hours of Boredom - Moments of Stark Terror ......... .. ......... ...... 117
Chapter 11 The Missiles of October. .... .... ........................ .... ........ ........ .. ...... 126
Chapter 12 One Man's Story .. ...... .... ......................... .............. ...... ...... ......... 137
Chapter 13 The Black Sheep Squadron ofToul-Rosieres .... ........................ 148
Chapter 14 Of Brown and Blue Cradles ....................................................... 165
Chapter 15 Moonglow ....... ......... ......... ... ....... ...... .......................... .. ....... ...... 176
Chapter 16 Not for the Timid .............................. .. .............. ............ ............ . 187
Chapter 17 The Brown Cradle Pathfinders ... '. ... ........................................... 198
Chapter 18 Dodging SAMs and MiGs ......................................................... 208
Chapter 19 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud ....................................................... 219
Chapter 20 To Change an Air Force ............................................................. 231
Chapter 21 The 4lst Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron ...................... .. 240
Chapter 22 Pete Pedroli and the MiG-21 ..................................................... 251
Chapter 23 Poets, Priests, and Flight Surgeons ............................................ 262
Chapter 24 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth of the EB-66E ...................... 275
Chapter 25 Winding Down a Failing War .................................................... 286
Chapter 26 The Tragedy of 53-498 ...... ........................................................ 296
Chapter 27 The Peace that Would Not Come ............................................... 305
Chapter 28 The 39th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron ........................ 316
Chapter 29 Bat 21 ....... ................... ............................................................... 329
Chapter 30 Operation Linebacker Jl............................................................ .340
Chapter 31 A Time for War and a Time for Peace ........................................ 351

Notes .......................................................................................... 357

Appendices
Appendix 1: Terms and Abbreviations ....................................... 372
Appendix 2: U.S . Post WW-II Jet Aircraft Developments ......... 377
Appendix 3: B-66 Squadrons 1956-1974 ................................... 380
Appendix 4: Significant Events of the Vietnam War 1954-75 ... 388
Appendix 5: B-66 Combat Losses and Major Accidents ...........395

Bibliography ..................................... ........................................ .413

Index ......................................................................................... .421
 DEDICATION

DEDICATED TO THE MEN WHO PERISHED

IN SERVICE TO THEIR COUNTRY

1956 A/IC JULIUS J RAUSCH

CAPTAIN GEORGE MORRIS MR GEORGE E SARABALE
CAPT JAMES M STITZEL
1957 CAPT HOWARD E STRANDBERG
I/LT RICHARD J DINGER CAPT GEORGE A TAYLOR
N2CARTHUR J DUFRESNE JR CAPT ROGER E TAYLOR
I/LT DAN K HENDERSON T/SGT BERNARD M VALENCIA
TISGT STANLEY P KLATZ
CAPT ARTHUR J MANZO 1959
CAPT JOHN A RUNION I/LT CHARLES L BOONE
2/LT GLEN D WATSON I/LT GARY R COAD
CAPT ALLEN H DAY
1958 I/LT HAROLD W GLANDON
I/LT THOMAS C BRYCE CAPT JAMES L JUNGE
CAPT WILFRED E CATHER A/2C MICHAEL J KEMP
CAPT DONN F CHANDLER I/LT WILLIM H MCCASLAND
I/LT ROBERT A CHASE N2C RALPH L NOELL
I/LT SMITH DAVIS JR CAPT JAMES T POWELL JR
I/LT ROBERT B HANDCOCK CAPT JULIANT STEWART JR
CAPT ROBIN W GRAY
I/LT HELMlIT HEIMANN 1961
S/SGT HOWARD M HICKS CAPT HARRY V ARMAN!
CAPT RICHARD W HUGHES MAJ PAUL BROOKS
CAPT JOSEPH D LOEFFLER CAPT RALPH DAVENPORT
MR BLAINE L MAINS CAPT DANIEL HARVEY
I/LT LAWTON D MUELLER CAITT JESSE KENDLER

11
 Glory Days

CAPT PAUL J SAVAGE l/LT PAULS KRZYNOWEK

I/LT FRANKL WlflTLEY JR MAJ WILLIAM E MCDONALD
CAPT LARRY A MOORE
1962 MAJ MAX E NICHOLS
l/LT WILLIAM R BECRAFf LT/COL RUSSELL A POOR
S/SGT LEROY DAUGHENBAUGH JR COL WOODROW H WILBURN
l/LT REYNOLDS W MCCAABE LT/COL JACK M YOUNGS
l/LT JAMES T WEYMARK
1968
1963 MAJ POLLARD H MERCER JR
CAPT WILLIAM H COX JR
1969
1965 LT/COL EDWIN P ANDERSON JR
CAPT ROBERT L MANN CAPT JOHN A HOLLEY
l/LT JAMES A MCEWEN MAJ KENNETH H KELLY
CAPT JOHN WEGER CAPT JOSEPH M ORLOWSKI
LT/COL JAMES E RICKETTS JR
1966 MAJ EDWIN B WELCH
T/SGT CHARLES BORDELON
CAPT JOHN B CAUSEY 1972
l/LT DONALD E LAIRD CAPT WILLIAM R BALDWIN
CAPT DWIGHT A LINDLEY COL WAYNE L BOLTE
l/LT CRAIG R NORBERT CAPT ROBIN F GATWOOD
COL ANTHONY R GIANNANGELI
1967 COL CHARLES A LEVIS
LT/COL HERBERT DOBY MAJ HENRY J REPETA
CAPT REY L DUFFlN MAJ GEORGE F SASSER
CAPT KARL D HEZEL LT/COL HENRY M SEREX
l/LTTHEODORE W JOHNSON

12
 CHAPTER ONE

THE PRICE OF VICTORY

World War 11 was a rude awakening for an America that thought itself safely
isolated from the wars and conflicts of a historically strife ridden Europe. Two
oceans, benign neighbors, and a large fleet to defend its shores, provided an
illusionary sense of security few other nations on earth enjoyed. That insularity
of thought and ill-founded sense of security was shattered when Imperial Japan
surprised America's fleet at Pearl Harbor on a sunny Sunday morning in December
1941 . Days later, an arrogant Nazi Germany declared war on the United States, not
because of any belligerent acts committed by the United States against Germany,
but solely because Germany was allied with Japan . Germany, Japan and Italy, the
Axis powers, pledged mutual support to each other in case of war, no matter the
reason. With its fleet sorely wounded, faced by aggressive enemies, the nation took
inventory and discovered that its armies and air forces were in terrible shape: too
small for the task at hand , poorly trained and equipped with obsolete arms - from
the rifles soldiers carried, to the helmets they wore, to the tanks they drove, to the
airplanes they flew. Less than three years later America not only had recovered
from the initial shock of finding itself at war, but had Imperial Japan and Nazi
Germany on the proverbial ropes . American industry was producing so much war
related equipment that the materiel losses incurred in battle were nearly irrelevant.
In 1944 alone the United States produced 96,318 war planes of all types, more than
any other nation, friend or foe .' Not only did America's awakened industrial might
and ingenuity produce the planes to overwhelm its enemies, but the hundreds of
thousands of reciprocating engines needed to p9wer them, the bombs, bullets and

13
 Glory Days

~
-- ---
---- ~

--..:. ..., -
A hastily assembled group of 3rd Bombardment Wing B-26s awaits take-off instructions at Ashiya Air
Base, Japan , late June 1950. As the Korean War began, America 's tactical air force was still largely
of World War II vintage .

14
 The Price of Victory

guns to arm them, and the pilots, navigators, bombardiers, radio operators, and
gunners to fly them into harm's way. When war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945,
the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe , USSTAF, was deployed on 152
air bases and 226 lesser installations manned by 450,000 airmen who flew or
supported an armada of over 17 ,000 aircraft of all types.'
War came to America in December 1941 in the form of 400 Japanese combat
planes launched from six aircraft carriers off the Hawaiian Islands, inflicting
damage that was soon repaired . That war was effectively terminated on August 9,
1945, when a single B-29, named Rock's Car, of the 20th Air Force, dropped on the
city of Nagasaki the second of two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. The Japanese
surrender was officially signed on September 2 on board the USS Missouri anchored
in Tokyo Bay. The flimsy airplane of an earlier day had matured, determining the
very outcome of battle, and ending World War II in favor of the United States
and its allies . In August 1945 it appeared to many Americans that the world was
finally at peace, able to go ahead and rebuild itself. The most optimistic thought
that the rest of the world might just be ready for the ultimate human experience
- democracy. In 1945 the United States of America was the undisputed military
and economic power in the world, the sole possessor of the awe inspiring and
feared atomic bomb, with its territory and people largely unscathed by the war it
entered so reluctantly less than four years earlier.
At war's end the 'boys' clamored to come home, to go on with their lives, take
advantage of the innovative GI Bill of Rights to gain an education, perhaps have
a family and participate in the building of a vibrant and exciting new America.
With over sixteen million men and women under arms at the height of the war,
America's ~orces soon shrank to less than two-million. The U.S. Navy's
battle fleet of 6,768 ships declined to a mere 634. 3 Disarmament was the very first
postwar task politicians threw themselves into with a vigor difficult to imagine
unless you were there to see it happen for yourself. Colonel Marion C. Mixson
vividly remembers his own experience. Born in 1918, a South Carolina boy, he,
like so many of his generation always wanted to fly, and soloed in a little 45-horse
power Aeronca in 1939 at the age of twenty-one. "What a thrill it was to soar
above Charleston on my very own," he recalls. ''I'll never forget that first flight."
By 1944 he found himself piloting a B-24 bomber out of Italy against targets
in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Hack, as his friends called
him, flew 35 combat missions, some so brutal, he still wonders how he survived.
After the war ended he remained in Italy for another year and sadly recalls, "All
those B-25 and B-17 bombers in Italy were destroyed. None were sent home.
For a while I flew a brand-new B-25. German prisoners took the armor out of it,
stripped the paint, and polished the airplane to a high gloss. Although I had orders

15
 Glory Days

to tum the plane in to be destroyed like all the other bombers, I kept stalling for
about two months . Finally, I got a message that if I didn't tum in the plane I was
going to be courts-martialed. I flew it down to the Pomigliano Depot. My buddy
came in a C-47 to take me back. By the time we finished filing our clearance for
our return trip, they had drained the gas out of that beautiful B-25, cut the engines
off, cut holes in the crankcase and into the propeller blades. That airplane was
completely smashed in about an hour."4
At Landsberg-am-Lech in bucolic Bavaria, a former Luftwaffe airfield was
filled with B-26 bombers of the 1st Tactical Air Force (Provisional). The planes
were lined up wing tip to wing tip by the hundreds to be burned and turned into
scrap by Germans who only weeks earlier tried hard to shoot them down. Most
of the 1st TAF's P-4 7 Thunderbolts were simply stripped of their instruments and
destroyed, smashed, buried in place. John Hay, who lives in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
remembers while stationed at Holzkirchen, Bavaria, in 1945, helping to remove
the radios and batteries from 186 brand-new B-17 bombers never flown in combat,
then placing one-and-a-half-pound TNT charges in their cockpits and blowing
them up.5 The 12th Air Force inactivated on 31August1945. The 15th Air Force
followed suit on September 15 . And the fabled 9th Tactical Air Force inactivated
on 2 December. The process of inactivation continued into 1946. At the end of
that year a force of a mere 33,000 airmen remained in Europe, scattered across
33 airfields and miscellaneous installations, with less than 2,300 airplanes of all
types, mostly transports, trainers and liaison aircraft.6
In 1948, when the first open confrontation between East and West occurred
over access to occupied Berlin, then Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay,
commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe, USAFE, the former
USSTAF, recalled, "When they [the Soviets] clamped down on all surface traffic
and transportation, we in the Occupation needed suddenly to consider something
beyond the demolition or housekeeping duties which had concerned us during
previous months. It looked like we might have to fight at any moment, and we
weren't self-assured about what we had to fight with ... At a cursory glance it
looked like USAFE would be stupid to get mixed up in anything bigger than a
cat-fight at a pet show. We had one Fighter group, and some transports, and some
radar people, and that was aboutthe story." 7 By 1948, United States military power
had been stripped by an over exuberant Congress beyond what was needed for a
prudent defense of homeland and national interests abroad. The Air Force boasted
of few jet aircraft, and the U.S . Army had been largely reduced to a constabulary
force in Germany and Japan. Clearly, American military power deployed in
occupied Germany was no match for the artillery heavy Soviet armored divisions
across the inner German border, the future boundary between East and West.

16
 The Price of Victory

Fortunately, not all politicians saw the world through rose-colored glasses.
None other than the former Prime Minister of wartime England, Winston
Churchill, warned on March 5, 1946, in an address at Westminster College in
Fulton, Missouri, that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Triest in the Adriatic, an Iron
Curtain has descended across the Continent." Even before Churchill's address,
George Kennan, serving in Moscow, wrote a lengthy telegram on February 22,
1946, to his State Department colleagues, giving his considered professional
assessment of the Soviets, and providing rules of how to deal with them: "A.
Don 't act chummy with them . B. Don't assume a community of aims with them
which does not really exist. C. Don 't make fatuous gestures of good will," and so
on. Although 'The Long Telegram," a real eye-opener for many, was read widely
in political Washington, it was an article published in the July 1947 issue of
Foreign Affairs which firmly set America on its course for the coming Cold War.
Entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," commonly referred to as The Article X
because Kennan just put an X where his signature would have been, spoke of the
containment of the Soviet Union and its territorial ambitions. Although Kennan
insisted that his article "was not intended as a doctrine," that is precisely what it
became.' The "doctrine of containment" became the intellectual foundation for
the future United States military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union . With a clear
national strategy at hand, our military structure began to adjust ever so slowly to
the evolving postwar world, a world of the atomic bomb, the jet plane, the ballistic
missile, and the Soviet Union , a former ally turned adversary.
Even before the Army Air Forces became the United States Air Force, USAF,
and a co-equal partner of the Army and Navy as the result of the National Security
Act of 1947 , on March 21, 1946, SAC (Strategic Air Command), TAC (Tactical Air
Command) and ADC (Air Defense Command) were formed as major combatant
commands. This was a long overdue action sorting out the roles and missions
previously carried out by a multitude of numbered air forces. The creation of the
three commands was also a clear indication of the maturation of airpower doctrine
and concepts, and recognition of its three principal functions - strategic, tactical,
and homeland defense . The Strategic Air Command task was clearly stated and
unambiguous: "To be prepared to conduct long range offensive operations in any
part of the world ... conduct maximum range reconnaissance over land or sea"
and "provide combat units capable of intense and sustained combat operations
employing the latest and most advanced weapons," meaning the atomic bomb. 9
The Tactical Air Command was given the mission to provide the necessary
trained forces to provide close air support for Army operations, interdict enemy
forces and supplies moving toward the battle area, conduct essential aerial
reconnaissance to satisfy its own needs and those of the U.S. Army, and to achieve

17
 Glory Days

and maintain air superiority over the field of battle. Not only was TAC required
to work closely with the Army to effectively perform its mission, it found itself
with the responsibility to train the combat squadrons for its two sister commands,
USAFE (the United States Air Forces in Europe) and FEAF (the Far Eastern Air
Forces), headquartered in Germany and Japan respectively. While SAC tightly
controlled all of its combat squadrons regardless of location from one centralized
headquarters - at first Andrews AFB in Maryland, later Offutt AFB at Omaha,
Nebraska - the tactical air forces responded to three separate headquarters, all
with their own planning staffs, unique geographically dictated requirements, and
parochial interests. Unity of command, a cherished principle of successful warfare,
was solidly imbedded in the SAC architecture, but hard to find in the tactical air
forces organizational structure. Tactical Air Command, headquartered at Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia, found its principal mission to be training rather than war
fighting - training combat ready fighter and bomber squadrons for USAFE and
FEAF (redesignated Pacific Air Forces, PACAF, on July 1, 1957). Who was going
to train and who was going to fly and fight became a contentious and divisive
issue, symptomatic of the lack of unity of command within the tactical air forces.
The fractured tactical air force structure was to have consequences in terms of
aircraft and weapons procurement and aircrew training, consequences which
would not become apparent until a distant war in Southeast Asia.
Air Defense Command was left with the mission of providing the necessary
radar network to detect enemy intruders, to provide ample warning time for SAC
and its bombers to get airborne, and to intercept and destroy enemy bombers
before they reached the United States. In contrast to the strategic and tactical air
forces, ADC had a strictly defensive mission of homeland protection. However,
it was a mission still less clear than SAC's, requiring coordination not only with
the other military services, but a foreign country as well - Canada. Still, ADC like
SAC, was organized around a single unifying command structure, unlike the three
tactical air forces which largely retained their World War II derived relationships.
Roles and missions arguments among the services and among the newly created
Air Force commands were endemic. Who should own and control long-range
surface to air missiles was an early issue to be resolved between the Army and
Air Force. Other technology driven issues soon followed and required resolution,
among them ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, then referred to as unmanned
aircraft. Who would own and operate them? Who would receive the funding, and
with that the political clout that came with budgets and force structure. Once
the Army Air Forces gained independence the question arose if the Army should
surrender all of its aircraft to the fledgling Air Force, or did the Army have a right
to retain an air component of its own? If so, where was the line to be drawn?

18
 The Price of Victory

Helicopters versus fixed wing aircraft? Large, long-range versus small, short-
range aircraft? If so, what type? Transports, liaison, close air support? The issue
was never cleanly resolved and is still with us today. Issues needing resolution
within and among the military services seemed endless. Answers came slowly,
and often only after contentious and acrimonious debate . It was all about money
and power, and of course national defense.
It was one thing to create new combat commands - SAC, TAC and ADC
- and to assign them missions to execute, it was quite another to translate noble
words into combat power. On October 16, 1948, when Lieutenant General LeMay,
soon to be promoted to four-star rank, took over the Strategic Air Command, there
wasn't much substance there for him to actually execute the mission SAC had been
given. None of SAC's airplanes could reach Moscow. Of the 837 diverse aircraft
assigned to SAC in 1948, 515 were B/RB-29s - World War II vintage airplanes.
Only 35 long-range Convair B-36 bombers had joined the command. But even the
B-36 was a World War II design, developed when it appeared that England might
not survive the Nazi onslaught. Aside from two heavy bomber groups of B-36s,
SAC had 12 medium bombardment groups, and two fighter groups equipped with
F-5ls and F-82s to escort the bombers. LeMay observed on taking command,
"There's not a single realistic mission being flown. Practically nothing in the
way of training . Sorry shape? You can say that again." So he directed "the whole
damn command. By radar," to attack Wright Field. "So we ran a Maximum Effort
mission against Wright Field at Dayton, Ohio. Oh, I'll admit the weather was
bad. There were a lot of thunderstorms in the area; that certainly was a factor.
But on top of this, our crews were not accustomed to flying at altitude. Neither
were the airplanes ... Most of the pressurization wouldn't work, and the oxygen
wouldn't work. Nobody seemed to know what life was like upstairs ... Not one
airplane finished that mission as briefed. Not one ."' 0 Over the years SAC grew
into the most powerful air force in the world, an air force within an air force, with
thousands of bombers and aerial refueling tankers under its control. In its early
days, however, SAC had little combat power to point to.
LeMay, with his mission clearly defined and unity of command assured
through a centralized headquarters organization, decided early on what kind of
an air force he wanted to create, and what kind of men he wanted to have fly his
airplanes. LeMay's approach to training and mission execution shaped SAC, and
was to fundamentally differentiate SAC flyers from those in the tactical air forces .
"No longer did we stress cross-training. We did not dissipate our energies . We made
every man concentrate on being as nearly perfect as possible in his own specific
enterprise. Hell, we made every man concentrate on being perfect."" That meant
flying by a checklist, making on-time take-offs within plus or minus five-seconds

19
 Glory Days

at any time of day or night, in any kind of weather - sunshine, rain, snow and ice.
When given an order to launch, the message was, you will launch or die trying.
SAC would have a checklist and procedure for everything, and mistakes were not
tolerated. The Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, CINCSAC,
was in no need of innovative thinking over the battlefield. He wanted men to
execute their assigned missions without fail, wanted men who could be counted
on to be where they were told to be and deliver their weapons - or perish trying.
In time, this iron clad concept of controlling the delivery of nuclear weapons on
specified targets in the Soviet Union evolved into the Single Integrated Operations
Plan, the SIOP, which controlled the delivery of nuclear weapons by bombers,
land based intercontinental missiles, and those launched from nuclear submarines
- the 'boomers.' The focus for SAC was nuclear war, an all or nothing type of
conflict, soon to be emulated by the tactical air forces - because that's where the
money was . Conventional capabilities atrophied. Limited war was not a phrase in
the vocabulary of planners or strategic thinkers.
Colonel Kevin Gilroy earned the Air Force Cross as an Electronic Warfare
Officer, EWO, in the backseat of an F-105F Weasel, killing SAM sites in North
Vietnam. Earlier in his career Mike flew in SAC B-52s. Mike experienced SAC
and TAC in peace and war. In an interview he described the differences between
SAC and TAC flyers this way: "SAC probably never made the same mistake
twice. Once you made a mistake, there was a procedure put in place to keep that
from happening again . In TAC you were supposed to be a free thinker. 'We are not
going to give you any unnecessary restrictions,' was the message. 'Go do it."' 12
SAC flyers and TAC flyers - two different breeds.
Lieutenant Harrison Lobdell Jr., who rose to the rank of major general,
provides another perspective of a flyer's life in the tactical air forces . Lobdell
graduated from one of the accelerated West Point classes in 1946. He didn't go
into the Army, instead chose the Army Air Forces . "I think I just wanted to fly," he
recalls. "I was a gymnast in college at West Point and I just thought I could handle
that and thought it would be fun . I applied for Air Cadet status . I had wanted to
be a fighter pilot and actually went through fighter transition, but they sent me to
RB-26s at Brooks . We were there just a short time and I thought my career had
come to an end, because I was sent away for a three-day TDY to Langley. It lasted
six weeks. I had just gotten married, and when I got back, my wife had the car
all packed with our belongings, which was just one suitcase. She said, 'You're
going to Supply School at Keesler.' And again I thought my career was done.
While I was at Keesler, my squadron moved to Langley Field. My wing, the 363rd
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 363TRW, consisted of two RF-80 squadrons, they
were just coming into the inventory, and one RB-26 squadron. I can't recall more

20
 The Price of Victory

than three or four times when I ever dropped a flash bomb during the time I
was in the unit. My reconnaissance squadron , the 162nd, did lots of interesting
things . I remember going to McChord Field with the RB-26s. We mapped Seattle.
My wife's family has a dude ranch in Montana. Up the Blackfoot River Valley
from Missoula. My friend, Whitey Yeoman, and I flew out there in formation and
buzzed the ranch. Of course , I was very proud of myself, and called back to my
wife 's cousin and said, 'Well, did you see us?' She was just beside herself. All
the dudes were out on horseback having a treasure hunt, and my wife's uncle, on
horseback, was putting a clue on a rock in the middle of the river. Of course he
was dumped in the river when we flew over. Guys would be doing acrobatics over
their girl friends houses, do all sorts of crazy things. And you just never did hear
much about it. If somebody got caught, or if there was some damage, well, they'd
get chastised. You could fly almost anywhere you wanted to in the United States.
You could take your wife up once a year, and I did. It's an era that's long gone. It
will never come back, obviously. The air force then, compared to today's air force,
was almost unprofessional.""
While disarmament dominated the immediate postwar years , and defense
budgets became exceedingly tight, the Army Air Forces and private industry
managed to continue the development of a new type of airplane - the jet powered
swept wing fighter and bomber which could fly faster, higher and farther than any
other type of plane before . While World War Il was still on-going, the engineers
at Wright Field had turned to industry and asked them to participate in a design
competition for a futuristic jet bomber. Then Colonel Donald Putt, a member of
the Wright Field evaluation board and future three-star general and commander
of Air Materiel Command, AMC, recalled, "The jet aircraft was pooh-poohed by
a lot of people that were authorities in their day ... My one big job just before I
went overseas in December 1944 was the running of the competition that had the
B-45, B-46, B-47 and B-48 in it. All of them were straight-wing aircraft, very
conventional looking except for hanging some engines on the wings th~t had no
propellers on them." 14 Things changed quickly once captured German technology
became available. We built a few of the quite conventional looking B-45 jet
bombers, but the all-jet Wundervogel of its day was the Boeing B-47 with its
six jets slung under 35 degree swept-back wings . The B-47, of which a total of
2,032 were produced, put SAC on the map, and led to the even more capable
B-52 bomber. North American Aviation, like Boeing, took advantage of German
aeronautical test data and dropped what it was doing on the XP-86 . The once
straight-wing XP-86 was redesigned and featured 35 degree swept-back wings,
automatic leading edge slats, a moveable tailplane, and other advanced design
features which allowed the F-86 Sabrejet to best the Soviet designed and German
inspired MiG-15 in a war yet to come. 15

21
 Glory Days

Jets, however, were still a rarity when the newly independent Air Force found
itself caught up in an epic roles and missions battle with the U.S. Navy. Always
adept at correctly fathoming the future implications of new technology, the
Navy had responded admirably when the airplane threatened the viability of the
battleship. The aircraft carrier fit nicely into the fleet of the future, an appropriate
follow-on to the one time queen of the seas , the battleship. The Navy understood
that in the postwar world the atomic bomb was the weapon of the future and felt
challenged by the newly established Strategic Air Command. Who did those SAC
folks think they were anyway? Their bombers couldn't get anywhere without first
landing on foreign bases to refuel. We, the United States Navy, have a much more
practical and elegant approach. We will build a super-carrier, the USS United
States, of 80,000 tons displacement, the largest aircraft carrier the world has
ever seen, allowing us to launch our equally new, twin-jet, atom-bomb carrying
A3D Skywarrior against any belligerent from off their shores. This was going to
be an ugly fight - it was about the future, about money, about flag and general
officer positions, about who was going to wield the most influence in the soon
to be formed Department of Defense. SAC responded to the Navy challenge by
slapping four J-47 jet engines under its lumbering B-36 strategic bomber to give
the 360,000 pound behemoth additional speed and range. On December 8, 1948,
a B-36 flew nonstop from Fort Worth, Texas, to Hawaii and back- 9,400 miles, a
distance great enough to reach most targets in the Soviet Union from the United
States. The U.S . Navy took note. 1•
Even before LeMay took command of SAC, the Air Staff in the Pentagon got
serious about aerial refueling, realizing the implications behind the lack of range
of its bombers and fighters. Eighty B-29 bombers were converted at Boeing to
KB-29M refueling tankers and B-29MR receivers . On June 30, 1948, the 43rd
Air Refueling Squadron was established at Davis-MonthanAFB,Arizona, and the
509th at Walker AFB, Roswell, New Mexico. Although the looped-hose refueling
system developed by the Royal Air Force had its limitations - soon to be replaced
by a more practical probe and drogue concept - it allowed the Air Force to stage a
spectacular around the world flight in February 1949. In great secrecy KB-29Ms
were positioned at Lajes in the Azores; Dharan, Saudi Arabia; Clark Air Base
in the Philippines , and at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. On February 26, 1949, Lucky
Lady II, a modified B-50 bomber, took off from Carswell AFB in Fort Worth,
Texas, and flew nonstop around the world, again landing at Carswell on March
2.' 7 This was not only a message from SAC to the Soviet Union, but to the U.S.
Navy as well: Take note, we can do our job anywhere, anytime. Defense spending
was extremely tight, and when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, on April 23,
1949, canceled the USS United States five days after its keel laying, the admirals

22
 The Price of Victory

revolted.' 8 As anticipated, the struggle between the services was intense and
impassioned, but the choice had been made who would carry war to the heartland
of the Soviet Union should that become necessary. The U.S . Navy, as always,
recovered from its setback. On January 21, 1954, the nuclear powered submarine
USS Nautilus was launched at Groton, Connecticut. And on June 9, 1959, the first
ballistic missile carrying submarine, the USS George Washington, slipped into
Atlantic waters.
Limited defense budgets and roles and missions struggles continued to
divert attention from threatening developments in other parts of the world . The
infighting between the three military services got so bad that in March 1948, only
six months after the Air Force gained its independence, President Truman, while
vacationing at Key West, Florida, agreed to settle some of the thorniest disputes.
The informal Key West Agreement , or Functions Papers , was formalized in August
1949 in an amendment to the National Security Act, which also established the
Department of Defense. That same August the North Atlantic Treaty was signed
and NATO came into being, the result of the Berlin blockade and continued Soviet
intransigence. And on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic
bomb. The Soviets finally had our full and undivided attention. War, if it came,
would of course be nuclear, and we scrambled to get ready. But seldom do things
go the way of the planners. On June 25, 1950, on a warm Sunday morning, the
North Korean Peoples Army crossed the 38th parallel with the aim of unifying the
country on its own terms. There was nothing nuclear about the invasion, it was
conventional in every sense of the word.

23
 CHAPTER TWO

AN AIRPLANE WITH
ONE-WAY ENGINES

"We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean War broke
out, and there was absolutely no excuse for it," wrote General Ridgway. "The
state of our Army in Japan at the outbreak of the Korean War was inexcusable.
The outbreak of that war came to me as a complete surprise, as it did to all our
military men - from Seoul to Washington."' The North Korean invasion was
indeed a total intelligence failure, comparable to the disaster that befell America
one December morning in 1941 ; and another yet to come in the far distant future,
on September 11, 2001. General Matthew B. Ridgway's surprise was shared by
many Americans . Captain Charles E. Schreffler, an F-51 pilot in the 18th Fighter
Bomber Group at Clark Air Base in the Philippines had just transitioned from
the F-51 to the F-80 jet. He received orders to return to the United States. "Our
household goods were picked up as scheduled. That evening my wife mentioned
a curious thing . The household goods people had contacted her and asked if she
wanted to change the destination of our shipment. When she asked them why she
would want to do that, they told her that her husband wouldn't be accompanying
her. 'Is that true?' she asked me. That's how I learned about the invasion of South
Korea . My wife took the ship home to San Francisco, while I left for Johnson
Air Base, near Tokyo, Japan, to pick up an old and familiar F-51. By the time her
ship docked in San Francisco harbor, some of the returning wives learned that
their husbands had died in South Korea, in a war of which they knew nothing."2
Schreffler's F-51, and hundreds like it, decimated the North Koreans' onslaught
in daylight hours. B-26s took over searching for enemy columns at night. In

24
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

Douglas Aircraft Corporation test pilots and support personnel celebrate the /OOthjlight of RB-668
53-441 on April 10, 1957, at Edwards Air Force Base , California. The first operational RB-668, 53-
442, had been delivered to the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group at Shaw AFB, South Carolina,
on January 31, 1956.

25
 Glory Days

self-sacrificing attacks, flying their aging and vulnerable fighters and bombers,
these airmen slowed the enemy's advance, then brought it to a halt at the Pusan
perimeter. An F-51 pilot, Major Louis J. Sebille, and a B-26 pilot, Captain John
S. Walmsley, earned the Medal of Honor posthumously flying close air support
for beleaguered Army troops. Their sacrifice is representative of the fierceness of
combat and with what valor it was waged. 3
Two years earlier, in 1948, young Lieutenant Lobdell had received
an assignment from the RB-26s at Langley Field to the 8th Tactical Photo
Reconnaissance Squadron at Johnson Air Base, Japan. Lobdell flew the RF-61,
the photo reconnaissance version of the Black Widow night fighter. "My wife
joined me about eleven months later. Then the 8th Squadron was deactivated and
I moved over to the 13th Bomb Squadron, the Grim Reapers, of the 3rd Bomb
Group at Yokota," flying B-26s. It was June 1950, and "we were scheduled to go
on this mobility exercise to Matsushima where we flew against the air defenses on
Okinawa. Then the war began and the North Koreans came down [the peninsula].
We were immediately sent toAshiya. We had two squadrons, the 8th and the 13th,
and we could muster, I guess, 12 airplanes among us. We sat around the briefing
room for about three hours, they had canceled the mission and told us to standby.
So we were standing by. Our group commander was supposed to lead the mission,
and the squadron commanders the flights. Then they came and took the group
commander's name off the board and made me the group lead. Took the squadron
commanders off and put captains up as flight leads. I was a lieutenant at the
time. Then they came out and briefed the mission -you're going to Pyongyang.
I remember everyone writing their will and handing it to the guy next to him to
sign, and we turned them in to the intelligence officer.
"'OK,' the briefer said, 'you are going to use fragmentation bombs.' People
were looking around. We didn't have any bomb tables. So Frank Bullis who was
my bombardier and a guy by the name of Barnett went off in the comer and did
some trigonometric calculations and figured out the bomb tables. There were only
two bombardiers in the whole outfit. We took off late in the afternoon on June 28
with 12 airplanes . Our target was the airfield at Pyongyang. We went in at about
ten to twelve-thousand feet. A lovely evening I remember, it was just beautiful.
We droned on and of course thought, 'Holy smoke, when we get to Pyongyang
things are really going to happen.' There was some flack way off in the distance.
I think I dropped a bomb on an airplane taking off and that was about it. And we
turned around and came home. I concluded if I ever go to war again, I'm going on
the first day because nobody knows what they are doing.
"We moved from Ashiya to lwakuni and set up operations . I became the
armament officer and didn't know anything about armaments. We had both the

26
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

glass nosed airplanes, the bombers, with Norden bomb sights and six forward
firing guns in the wings, and some hard-nosed airplanes that had eight forward
firing guns in each wing [and in the nose] for a total of 16. None of the guns had
ever been bore-sighted. Nobody knew how to do that. We finally found a kit and
figured out how to bore-sight these things . It took us a long time. When you'd
attack with one of those airplanes it would scare everybody to death, I'm sure. We
went to the night intruder mission in July or August, and you'd fire those things
off. They 'd blind you immediately. So we'd root around in the dark and see lights
coming down the road and would hope to get to them before they turned off their
lights. We tried various techniques. We finally would fly out of Iwakuni, then
cycle back to Taegu to refuel and rearm, then fly another mission and go back to
Iwakuni. I flew a total of sixty combat missions."•
The Korean War, a total surprise to an unprepared military, should have been
anything but that. After all, the military's business is to be vigilant and ready to
defend the country, not let itself be surprised by a third rate military power. It also
quickly became apparent that the old World War II airplanes carrying the brunt
of the fighting in Korea were wearing out. The Air Staff in Washington and TAC
at Langley, Virginia, were searching for a quick replacement for the aging fleet
of fighters and bombers. It was not that TAC's staff officers had fallen asleep
at the wheel as the saying goes, instead they were aiming too high, looking for
the ultimate tactical fighter, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. This ultimate
tactical airplane they were looking for was to fly high above the reach of enemy
air defenses, perform equally well at very low altitudes, have a range of at least
1,000 miles, carry a big pay-load, be able to operate from airfields with short
runways, and fly supersonic. Such unrealistic and often mutually exclusive
requirements ensured that nothing truly useful evolved. The airplane TAC put
its faith in for years was the Martin XB-51, an innovative design resulting from
a light bomber competition in February 1946. Air Force and TAC continued to
change requirements as the XB-51 evolved. On October 28, 1949 the XB-51
made its maiden flight. Testing continued and a second airplane was built. In May
1952, during a low level demonstration at Edwards AFB, California, one of the
two XB-5 ls crashed, killing its pilot. The second aircraft soon crashed as well.
The contract, for what once was thought of as TAC's ultimate tactical bomber,
was canceled.5 The XB-51 was a true disappointment to the TAC staff, but plenty
of studies, concepts and starry eyed alternatives emerged and were vigorously
pursued. It was clear, however, that what was needed in the summer of 1950 were
airplanes on the ramp, rather than more studies.
About this time the term 'weapons system' began to creep into the tactical
requirements vocabulary. The weapons system' approach was a SAC concept

27
 Glory Days

introduced with the B-47 jet bomber. Using this approach meant designing
essential mission related equipment directly into an airplane, rather than, as was
the practice in World War II, acquire an airframe first, then fill it with whatever
equipment was needed to make it a bomber, photo-reconnaissance aircraft, or
what have you . The SAC B-47, first flown on the very day the Korean War began,
had its K-5 radar bomb system designed directly into the airframe. TAC became
enthusiastic about the weapons system approach as well. It made sense, and
promised substantial savings . But it didn't seem to work for the multiplicity of
missions TAC aircraft had to fulfill. "One of the reasons why the weapons system
method was not succeeding," lamented the author of the 1954 TAC Headquarters
Aircraft Requirements History "was the policy of incorporating the capability
of more than one mission into the design of any weapons system."6 Yet the
basic approach remained valid in a budget constrained environment, and helped
rationalize conflicting demands to a scrutinizing Congress .
Within weeks of the outbreak of the war in Korea the USAF Board of Senior
Officers began looking at options to replace the aging Douglas B!RB-26 lnvader.
The board agreed that what was needed was a light jet bomber that could operate
from short runways and unimproved airfields, one with a ceiling of 40,000 feet,
a range of about l ,000 miles, and a maximum speed of around 550 knots. The
board looked at what was available, including foreign aircraft. The Martin XB-
51 was the first choice of course, but it was still undergoing flight testing and
probably would not be available for a number of years. The North American B-
45 was looked at but found unsuitable for the tactical bomber role, limited by a
conventional airframe with little growth potential. The Canadair CF-100 failed on
many counts, as did the British Vickers Valiant and SAC's B-47 medium bomber.
The one aircraft that looked as close to an off-the-shelf combat airplane as one
could hope for was the English Electric Canberra. Air Force technical intelligence
officers attached to the London embassy were impressed when witnessing its first
flight at RAF Wharton in 1949. The Air Staff tasked Brigadier General Albert
Boyd, the Air Force chief of test and evaluation at Edwards Air Force Base, to
take a look. Boyd generally liked what he saw. But he wanted the Canberra to
undergo rigorous tests and evaluation. 1\vo British Canberras were purchased
and flown to the Martin Company in Baltimore. Although the British aircraft
exhibited many shortcomings as they underwent detailed examination and tests,
the Canberra gained more friends than enemies and became a serious contender
to replace the B-26 as an interim night intruder and reconnaissance aircraft for
employment in Korea. On February 26, 1951, the Senior Officer and USAF
Weapons Board each chose the Canberra as the best interim aircraft available for
service in Korea. General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff, signed
off on the recommendation. It was a done deal.7

28
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

The Martin Company, testing the XB-51, seemed the logical choice to build
the American copy of the Canberra and was selected to build what eventually
became a buy of 403 B-57 aircraft of all types . The plane was never given an
American name, instead becoming and remaining the B-57 . The immediate need
was for a bomber in the role of night intruder, and an equally night capable RB-57
reconnaissance aircraft. Eight B-57 A bombers were built before it was realized
that this really was not an off the shelf airplane . It showed numerous shortcomings
which had to be fixed, not the least of which was the 165 engines which took the
place of the British Rolls Royce turbojets . The B-57 program stalled. The first
flight of a production B-57 did not take place until July 20, 1953. The Korean
Armistice was signed on July 27. The RB-57 A was much the same airplane as the
bomber, but instead of bombs it carried cameras. The entire program was nearly
killed by a string of spectacular accidents. By July 1954, the first of 67 RB-57s
were assigned to the 345th Bomb Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, and the 363rd
Tactical Reconnaissance Group at Shaw AFB, South Carolina. Several of the B-
57 As trickle down to the 17th Bomb Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and still
others to squadrons of the 66th Tactical Reconnaissance Group based at Sembach
Air Base, Germany, and Laon Air Base, France. However, the B/RB-57 A accident
rate remained high, groundings for one reason or another frequent. Structural
problems soon arose and required modification . Then, in 1955, the entire B-57
fleet was grounded for engine compressor stalls.
Yet, with all its limitations, it was the B/RB-57A which was to serve as the
principal aircraft for pilots to transition from the conventionally powered B-26
into the twin-jet B/RB-66B Destroyer, another interim aircraft selected by TAC
and the Air Staff. The RB-57 As were withdrawn as the RB-66 began to arrive on
the scene in numbers, and were subsequently modified to serve in special Cold
War reconnaissance programs and as electronic countermeasure training aircraft
for ADC radar sites. With the overall failure of the B/RB-57 A program one might
expect that the B-57 would have been canceled, and there were efforts underway
to do just that. However, prudence prevailed, and the needed time and funding
was invested in the airplane to make it work. In years to come, in another war, the
B-57B bomber, of which 202 were built, would many times over justify its initial
high development cost.
In her book Post-World War II Bombers, Marcelle Size Knaack writes, "The
Air Force accepted a grand total of 403 B-57s. Production ended in 1957, but at
the close of the year USAF records showed that 47 of the 403 aircraft had been
destroyed in major accidents . The B-57 was not easy to fly. Prior to modification
of its longitudinal control and stabilizer systems, the B-57 was uncontrollable if
one of its two engines failed on take-off or landing. Fifty percent of the major

29
 Glory Days

accidents resulted from pilot error, with 38 percent occurring on landing. Yet,
while the number of accidents was high - 129 major and minor accidents as of
1958, the rate compared with that of the B-47 and other jet powered aircraft." 8
While the B-57 selection appeared to be a knee-jerk response by the Air Staff
and TAC to a pressing need forced by the unexpected war in Korea, a follow-on
aircraft was being considered even before the B-57 made its maiden flight. In June
1951 the Air Staff initiated action to select a B-57 replacement, to be delivered
to operational units in 1954. Pretty much the same palette of existing aircraft was
considered as had been looked at during the initial B/RB-57 selection process,
with the addition of the Navy XA3D-l. When the Navy had its supercarrier, the
USS United States, canceled during the B-36 controversy in 1949, it chose to
continue with the design and development of the A3 nuclear bomber - the largest
and heaviest carrier based aircraft ever built. The B-47, which was entering
squadron service with SAC in 1951, was recommended by the Air Research and
Development Command, ARDC, as an option, but its high support requirements
and questionable availability eliminated it as a viable contender. The B-57 itself
was too small to carry existing special weapons, a euphemism for nuclear bombs,
and a principal reason why another interim follow-on aircraft was required until
the XB-51 became available. The Navy A3D looked attractive although it had yet
to be built. Again, the promise of an off-the-shelf aircraft had great appeal and
entertained visions of cost savings and quick delivery.
The Douglas Aircraft Company, designer and future builder of the A3D, and
long time provider of U.S. Navy aircraft under the able tutelage of Edward H.
Heinemann (Mr. Attack Aircraft), quickly put together a proposal and submitted
it to the Air Staff for consideration. Changes proposed by Douglas didn't seem
all that major: deletion of carrier provisions such as folding wings, catapult
equipment, and arresting gear; addition of ejection seats and anti-icing provisions
to give the aircraft an all-weather capability; increasing the airframe load factor to
handle up to 3.67Gs at 70,000 pounds gross weight to compensate for the stresses
of low altitude high speed operations; and an enlarged search radar antenna to
increase radar capability. On 29 November 1951 the USAF Aircraft Weapons
Board accepted the Douglas proposal and recommended the aircraft, designated
B-66, for both the bomber and reconnaissance roles.1\vo months later, in January
1952, the Air Force issued a GOR, a General Operational Requirement document,
for RB-66A, RB-66B and RB-66C aircraft.
The original RB-66A buy was for five pre-production aircraft to be used for
test purposes. It was decided that no X-coded test aircraft were required. It was
after all an off the shelf aircraft, and time was of the essence. The logic was flawed
since the Navy A3D had yet to be built and flown. The RB-66B, of which a total of

30
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

145 aircraft were eventually procured, was a day and night photo reconnaissance
jet designed to use both flash bombs and cartridges . The RB-66C, a surprise
addition, was a tactical electronic reconnaissance aircraft similarly equipped to
SAC's RB-4 7H strategic reconnaissance bomber which began flying with the 55th
Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 55SRW, out of Forbes AFB, Topeka, Kansas, in
1954. Eventually, 36 RB-66C electronic reconnaissance airplanes were acquired .
Three months later, in April of 1952, the Air Staff issued the expected GOR for
the procurement of B-66B bombers. The bombers were to be configured with
the sophisticated state of the art K-5 radar bombing system designed for use on
the SAC B-47 . Seventy-two B-66B bombers would eventually be produced to
serve with the 47th Bombardment Wing at RAF Sculthorpe, England, replacing
the North American B-45A, America's first all jet bomber. Not until three years
later, in August 1955 , did the Air Staff issue a final procurement directive for 36
WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft in lieu of an equal number of RB-66C
electronic reconnaissance aircraft. The total B-66 buy when production ceased
in January 1958 was 294 aircraft; a small quantity compared to the huge World
War II bomber and fighter buys. Aircraft costs had increased dramatically along
with capabilities, and buys of quantities of less than 1,000 combat aircraft of a
particular type became the rule rather than the exception. (See Appendix 2)
The production schedule Douglas signed up to would have been achievable
had no further changes been required than those initially anticipated, and if the
engine selected by the Air Force to power their new jet had been available. Neither
was the case. In addition , there was a significant shortage of grinders , planers,
and milling machines . These had to be imported from Germany.• It is actually
remarkable that the Douglas Aircraft Corporation managed to design a practically
new aircraft and build four distinct versions with only a two year schedule slip. As
a result of flight test and Air Force and TAC initiatives, additional changes to the
B-66 continued to accumulate. Wouldn't it be nice to have larger tires to permit
landing on runways built for lighter fighter aircraft? Done. Rudder pedal nose
wheel steering certainly made sense, but the Navy designed hydraulic system had
too many potential single points of failure to accommodate that change, so it had
to be redesigned . Of course Air Force electronics had to be substituted for Navy
electronics, and an in-flight refueling capability certainly made sense and was
quickly added. The landing gear had to be beefed-up to accommodate all the extra
weight. Other design changes were not optional. When flight testing revealed
significant wing-flutter problems, the solution was to put 250 pound weights in
the wing tips, changing the center of gravity for the aircraft. Every change induced
more change. Excessive landing roll was dealt with by incorporating anti-skid
breaking and a brake chute. And so it went.

31
 Glory Days

Then the TAC staff insisted that the airplane needed a pair of guns to defend
itself. Quickly a General Electric A-5 fire control system with two 20mm tail guns
was added, requiring a gunner, ejection seat and life support system, and 500
rounds of 20mm ammunition for each gun - adding extra weight which reduced
speed, range, and increased take-off roll. When at a later date the gun-system was
removed from the aircraft and replaced with an electronic countermeasure, ECM,
tail cone, the weight reduction resulted in a measurable increase in air speed,
reduced take-off roll, increased altitude and a 113 mile range improvement. 10 Even
the 20mm guns seemed inadequate to some, and proposals were circulated around
TAC and the Air Staff to replace them with 30mm guns. TAC Operations Analysis,
TAC/OA, took a dim view of that proposal and quickly shot it down. "The take-
off ground roll on a standard day at sea level is increased from about 6,400 feet to
6,800 feet," cautioned TAC/OA, and "on a hot day the increase is much more. The
take-off distance over a 50 foot obstacle is increased from 9100 to 9750 feet," and
cruise altitude and maximum speed will be reduced. Most important though, the
center of gravity of the aircraft will shift backwards with significant consequences
in a breakaway maneuver for special weapons delivery. 11 The 30mm gun proposal
died. Even while the 20mm gun system was being installed, forward thinking staff
officers at the Air Staff were planning to do away with the guns all together and
substitute ECM equipment.
Changes to the aircraft continued into the production cycle, including
modifications to the spoilers, a revised fuel management system, increased cockpit
pressurization, and modifications to the leading edge slats to deal with a pitch-up
problem. A seemingly endless parade of smaller modifications materialized such
as the addition of an external AC/DC power receptacle to eliminate the use of
aircraft power when performing ground electrical maintenance. Provisions for a
periscopic sextant seemed necessary should the aircraft be operated in the polar
region. 12 For aircraft which had already gone through the production line it meant
they had to be recycled through the Douglas Long Beach or Tulsa facilities for
modification, or be modified in the field by Douglas and Air Force maintenance
teams. When all was said and done, the B-66 was a new airplane and bore little
resemblance to its Navy A3D counterpart other than an external likeness. Karl
Schroder, a Douglas design engineer responsible for flight and mechanical control
systems on the B-66 lamented, "While the TAC types are reported to have liked
the bird, the Wright-Patterson Weapon System Project Office almost killed it with
add-ons and alterations via the Engineering Change Proposal, ECP, route." 13
The B-66 aircraft TAC asked for in the beginning to perform the tactical
bomber and day and night photographic and electronic reconnaissance missions
was supposed to have a 1,000 nautical mile radius, be able to use short runways,

32
 An Airplane with One- Way Engines

maintain commonality among models to keep logistics and maintenance simple,

be fast , highly maneuverable, and able to operate equally well at high and low
altitudes in all kinds of weather. Even without the additional weight added to
the aircraft as a result of the many modifications, it would have been difficult
to achieve many of the stated requirements . At 80,000 pounds gross weight and
with the less powerful 171 engine, rather than the J57, neither short landing or
short take-off distances nor other flight parameters once deemed essential were
achievable . Although the airplane would perform well as a bomber, photo- and
electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and in a role none of the earlier planners ever
envisioned, as the principal electronic warfare aircraft of the Vietnam War, the one
decision that would limit the B-66 throughout its twenty years of service in every
role it was assigned was the choice of the 171 Allison engine.
In the early '50sjet turbines were still a work in progress. Only ten years earlier
the German Me 262 jet fighter made its appearance. Its engines had to be replaced
and overhauled after only ten hours of combat flying. 14 Although Kelly Johnson
designed the P-80 for General 'Hap' Arnold in 185 days in 1943 to counter the Me
262 threat , the P-80 never saw combat in World War II. It wasn 't Kelly's fault: we
couldn't come up with a reliable engine. Our ace of aces in World War II, Major
Richard I. Bong, was killed in a P-80 jet taking off from Burbank, California, on
August 6, 1945. His loss was only the latest of many pilots to perish in the P-80
due to engine failure. 15 By 1948, as the Soviets put the squeeze on Berlin, there
were no F-80 jet fighters sitting on a tarmac somewhere in Germany. They were
all at home getting modified once again. Early engines, such as the J47 in the B-
47, or the 165 in the F-84F and B/RB-57 A, had too little thrust to be considered
viable candidates for the B-66. (See Appendix 2) The engine of choice at the time
was the Pratt & Whitney J57, and the engine recommended for the B-66 by the
Douglas Aircraft Corporation.
SAC's B-52 heavy bomber, which first flew in 1952, was powered by eight
J57s, each providing 13,750 pounds of thrust with water injection. In the early
'50s, that much thrust from an engine was viewed as phenomenal. The KC-
135A Stratotanker, a private Boeing initiative based on its 707 commercial jet
liner, was slated to have J57s as well . TAC's F-100 Super Saber, which first flew
in 1953, was powered by the J57, as was the F/RF-101 Voodoo, ADC's F-102
Delta Dagger, and the Navy's F4D Skyray . Although every aircraft flew different
versions of the J57, every J57 produced a static thrust rating without after burner
or water injection of over 10,000 pounds, soon to reach 15,000 pounds. The May
31, 1954, issue of Aviation Week notes, "Power is the Key-The 10,000-lb thrust
Pratt & Whitney Aircaft J57 split-compressor axial turbojet is the most powerful
American engine now flying in production aircraft' .. . New Air Force contracts for

33
 Glory Days

F-101 s and F-102s were disclosed last week in a Commerce Department summary
of government contract awards ... Both the F-101 and F-102 are powered by Pratt
& Whitney 157 jet engines." 16
As early as May 1952 Air Materiel Command, AMC, initiated an engine
competition for the B-66 considering the General Motors Allison 171, the General
Electric 173, the Westinghouse 140, and the Pratt & Whitney 157. The 140 and
173 were quickly eliminated for technical reasons . The favored Pratt & Whitney
157 engine was dropped from consideration. The official reason for selecting the
unproven 9 ,570 pound thrust 171 was: it was available and the B-66 had a lower
priority than other weapons systems. "It was felt there would not be enough engines
to go around," was AMC's position. 11 SAC of course received the blanie for taking
every 157 it could lay its hands on for the B-52 Stratofortress program. Its soon to
appear companion aircraft, the KC-135 Stratotanker, was to be powered by four
157 turbines; the B-52 used eight. SAC's 157 requirements were indeed enormous.
But the 157 availability issue for the B-66 wasn't solely a SAC creation, it was
really a TAC and AMC issue. TAC in effect let the Materiel Command dictate
the engine choice for the B-66 and by so doing willingly compromised aircraft
operational requirements for payload and its ability to "use makeshift or short
runways." 18 It didn't help that the B-66, primarily a reconnaissance aircraft, was
represented by action officers from the TAC Bomber Branch whose interests lay
elsewhere. In effect, there was no one at TAC to stand up for the airplane and argue
its requirements, much less have the courage to point out to senior officers the
long term consequences of selecting a marginal power plant. As for re-engining
an aircraft at some future date, that was rarely ever done. And who knew how long
an airplane would really be around, what missions it might be required to fly? The
best and only responsible course of action at the time would have been to give the
B-66 the best power plant available - the 157.
TAC's commander, General John K. Cannon, whose career dated back to
the 6th Pursuit Squadron at Luke Field in 1925, was focused on the F-100 Super
Sabre, not the B/RB-66 program. The F-100 made its first flight on May 25,
1953, at Edwards AFB, and was of course powered by a 157. It was the kind of
airplane that made a fighter general's heart beat faster, unlike the twin-engine
subsonic B-66. "What an airplane," swooned one TAC staff officer about an F-
100 demonstration at Palmdale, California. Its "appearance was made spectacular
by the aircraft's achieving a speed of approximately 750 miles per hour, shattering
windows and splitting door frames." 19 In fairness to General Cannon, he had
genuine concerns that the F-100 could be delayed by a diversion of 157 engines
to higher priority programs. The F-100 was at the heart of giving TAC a credible
nuclear strike force, tum TAC into a 'mini-SAC,' and make TAC a contender in

34
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

the bitter budget battles on the 'Hill' for scarce defense dollars. To the neglect
of conventional precision bombing capabilities TAC commanders, from John
Cannon to Gabriel Disosway, pursued the nuclear option, and succeeded all too
well. It is ironic to note, that when then Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Chilstrom, in
July 1957, presented the nuclear delivery capability of TAC's new F-105 fighter
to the recently appointed vice chief of staff of the Air Force, General Curtis E.
LeMay, the general's terse comment to Chilstrom was, "Sending a boy to do a
man's job." 00
On July 23. 1953, General Cannon sent a letter to the Air Staff requesting
light weight J57 engines for his new F-lOOA jet fighter on a first priority basis.
Colonel Bruce K. Holloway, the same Holloway who 15 years later would become
commander of SAC, then serving as deputy director of requirements at the Air
Staff, responded by explaining that a program was underway to substitute titanium
alloy for steel in the J57 , and that "AMC was directed by this headquarters to
allocate titanium J57 engines in the following order of priority: a. B/RB-52 b. F-
101 c. F-100 d. F-102. The latest aircraft production schedule indicates that B-52
and F-101 production is such that it will absorb completely the initial quantity of
250 titanium engines. No estimate can be made at this time when such engines
will be available for F-100 aircraft." 21 The F-101, like the B-52, was of course
a SAC airplane, intended as an escort fighter. The priorities were clear - SAC
was number one with the Air Staff and the Congress. With the Korean War over,
money was drying up quickly for everything but the strategic forces . "There was
a real fear that the development and production of the F-100 might be impeded by
plans for the allocation of the J57 engine to other programs ." 22
Lieutenant Lobdell, the same young airman who flew the first raid of the
Korean War against Pyongyang airfield in a Douglas B-26 light bomber, finished
his combat tour in late 1950 and was assigned to headquarters USAF in Washington
DC. "One of the interesting things," he recalls, "I was in the Pentagon at the
time the B-66 was started. Both the RB-57 and the RB-66 work came out of the
shop that I was in. My tactical division was very much a part of all that and the
configuration of those airplanes . What I didn't realize at the time was that we had
a reconnaissance branch, a bomber branch and a fighter branch. The bomber guys
handled all the B-66 stuff." 23 The B-66 was of course principally a reconnaissance
aircraft, only 72 bombers were built out of a total aircraft buy of 294. The fighter
boys were pushing J57s for the F-100 , and the bomber boys were busy focusing
on the ultimate tactical bomber, the XB-51, not the interim B-66. 24 Not having an
advocate on the Air Staff or at Headquarters TAC was a fatal flaw for the B-66.
There was no one willing to take on AMC when it selected the inferior 171.
'

35
 Glory Days

The Allison people had significant problems with the engine even after
AMC made its choice. They had difficulty passing a 50-hour qualification test,
leading the AMC program office at Wright-Patterson AFB to actually have second
thoughts and start looking for an alternative engine. Allison suddenly managed to
complete the 50-hour qualification test by October 1953, causing, yet surviving,
a production slippage of four months for the B-66 program. Certainly, it would
have been prudent at this time for the AMC program office to take a hard look at
what might be going on at Allison. Unfortunately AMC was already behind the
proverbial power-curve - a slipping B-66 production schedule and pressure from
above to get the airplane to fly all combined to move on with the program. It was
the last opportunity for AMC to right a wrong for good and valid reasons. Instead,
nothing was done. Allison continued to experience problems meeting its 150
hour qualification test. Production 171-9 engines were slow to accelerate, surged,
flamed out and stalled even while taxiing. On October 8, 1955, test pilots at the
Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base flying RB-66B aircraft
filed an unsatisfactory report against the 171-9 and -11 engines: "Several pilots,
while flying the RB-66B aircraft have experienced compressor stalls. The stall
condition has occurred at different RPM settings and at times when the throttle is
being advanced and other times when the throttle is being retarded ... Some pilots
have experienced compressor stalls during ground taxiing operations ... Pilots are
of the opinion that this is a very hazardous flight condition. The cause for the
compressor stall cannot be determined. However, it is believed that the 171-9
and -11 engines may not have been completely developed prior to acceptance by
the Air Force. It is recommended that consideration be given to provisioning a
different engine for the B-66 type aircraft." 25 In spite of all its documented flaws
and short-comings, the General Motors Allison 171 remained the engine choice for
the B-66 aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Clifford T. Manlove in 1955 was assigned
to the AMC B-66 Weapons System Program Office. "I immediately was briefed
and became aware of the B-66 problems. Believe me they had them. Douglas was
on hold and 18 months behind production schedule. The A3D had 15,000 pound
thrust engines; the B-66 9,500 pound thrust engines. With TAC adding numerous
engineering changes, the B-66 was rapidly becoming a heavy bomber with not
enough power. Word was that on a hot day in Denver the B-66 would not get off
the ground with a combat load." 26
Surely other than technical factors played a role in the selection and retention
of the 171 jet turbine for the B-66 aircraft. Charles E. Wilson was Secretary
of Defense from January 1953 to October 1957. Wilson came to the Defense
Department from General Motors, and Allison, the maker of the 171, was a
division of General Motors. The loss of the 171 contract at the time would have

36
 An Airplane with One-Way Engines

been a severe blow to Allison, possibly forcing the division out of the jet turbine
business at a time when demand was high. Also , the Air Staff certainly wanted to
maintain more than just one viable production line for jet turbines, especially after
both General Electric with its 173 engine and Westinghouse with its fatally flawed
140 experienced severe technical difficulties resulting in their quick elimination
as a source of power plants for the B-66 program. The Allison 171-11 engine was
installed on production aircraft "starting with the 18th B-66B and the 21st RB-66B.
Thirty-seven earlier airplanes received the -11 engine by retrofit."" The changes
Allison made to come up with the -11 did not entirely solve the stall and surge
problems encountered under conditions of high acceleration, so there evolved the
171-13. The -13 had a dry thrust rating of 10 ,200 pounds vice 9 ,700 pounds for the
- 11, and largely dealt with the problems of the -9 and -11, but not entirely. Over
the years the Allison 171-13 provided reasonable performance, having no more
than the usual problems for engines of that generation - until the Vietnam War
came along. In 1965 the B-66 was suddenly the only tactical airplane available to
provide ECM support to both Air Force and Navy strike forces going after targets
in North Vietnam defended by radar controlled anti-aircraft, AAA, guns, and SA-
2 surface to air, SAM, missile batteries . The airplane, never enjoying more than
minimum support for maintenance and spare parts, was practically 'flown into the
ground.' High sortie rates in a high temperature, high humidity environment, with
engines which often had more than 10,000 hours flying time on them, resulted
in a spectacular crash of an EB-66B ECM aircraft on April 8, 1969. The aircraft,
53-498 , one of the original Brown Cradle airplanes, was on its take-off roll from
Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base when its number one, left engine, failed at
about the 5 ,200 foot point of the runway. The B-66 never did attain single engine
speed until well after climb out. The crew of three perished in the ensuing crash.
A lengthy grounding of EB-66 aircraft followed. I was at Takhli at the time flying
with the 41 st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron and remember many engines
being flown back to the United States for re-certification. It was at this time in
the life of an aging airplane when younger aircrew learned that the 171 had also
powered the Snark cruise missile, and began to refer to the B-66 as the airplane
with the one-way engines .
As for the issue of J57 availability. It turned out that Pratt & Whitney had a
good thing going, knew it , and ramped up J57 production to provide engines to
anyone willing and able to buy them. The Navy A3D, which we in the Air Force
referred to in gallows-humor as the All Three Dead airplane - since it didn't have
ejection seats but only a rudimentary escape chute - was configured with J57s. So
was the Navy's F-8E Crusader which first flew in 1955. There was a Navy seaplane
under development, the Seamaster, that was power~d by J57s . A spectacular crash

37
 Glory Days

and lack of a clear mission assured that the Seamaster never went anywhere. Both
the Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8 airliners, then in development, were of
course powered by J57s, the most powerful and reliable jet engine of its time. In
view of the J7l 's inadequacies, and the B-66's significant increase in gross weight,
it was a tragic oversight not to have reinstalled the arresting gear provisions into
the B-66 airframe - a capability which would have saved many lives and aircraft.
Ironically, in the summer of 1956, the Northrop Snark cruise missile, which gave
the J71 the one-way engine nickname, swapped its J71 for a J57. The Snark was
an unmanned aircraft built to intentionally crash into a target - no one but enemy
combatants would die in the process. When a B/RB-66 crashed because of J71
engine failure, up to seven aircrew were at risk. One can only presume that no one
in authority sitting behind a mahogany desk in a leather swivel chair ever gave
that simple fact a second thought.

38
 CHAPTER TH REE

FLIGHT TESTING
THE DESTROYER

Since the inception of the B-66 program in 1952 the Cold War assumed form and
substance. On April 17, 1952, three RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft of the 322nd
Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, based at Lockbourne AFB, Ohio, manned by
British aircrews, flew deep into the Soviet Union on a provocative spy-mission. The
flights emanated from RAF Sculthorpe in County Norfolk, England, home of the
47th Bombardment Wing (Light) equipped with 50 nuclear armed B-45 bombers.'
The Soviet response to the overflight was mute . The war in Korea ended in July
1953, six months after General Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman as
president. The workers' uprising in East Berlin on June 17, 1953, gave an early
indication that not all was well in the ' peoples paradise.' Perhaps Communism
was not as homogeneous as politicians and strategists thought it to be . Nor was
it necessarily the wave of the future, as President Eisenhower made it appear ten
months later when he spoke of 'dominoes falling' at a news conference on April
7. The war in Korea may have ended, but relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union could not have been frostier. To emphasize the point, in January
1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke of 'massive nuclear retaliation'
as a viable defense strategy for the United States and its allies against any type of
Soviet aggression . SAC underlined that point by rolling out its first eight-jet B-52
bomber on March 18 to much fanfare at the Boeing plant in Seattle. In a mere six
years since General LeMay assumed command, the Strategic Air Command had
grown from puny beginnings to a force of 2,640 aircraft, including 342 B/RB-36
heavy bombers, 1,060 B/RB-47 all-jet medium bombers, and 597 KC-97 tankers
deployed at home and on bases in England, Spain and North Africa.2

39
 Glory Days

Acceleration tests revealed a seriously flawed canopy design. A number of B-668 and RB-668 aircraft
had to be returned to the Douglas Long Beach production line for modification .

40
 Flight Testing the Destroyer

SAC flexed its muscle in other ways as well. On March 5, 1954, the entire
22nd Bombardment Wing flew 6,000 miles from England to March AFB near
Riverside, California. Reported Aviation Week, "By this nonstop mass B-47 flight
the Strategic Air Command has underscored global air power. Congratulations to
the United States Air Force! Your triumph over time and space gives new security
to the free world. Colonel John B. Henry, pilot of the lead aircraft in the record
smashing flight" was shown in an accompanying photo flanked by Major General
Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., 15th Air Force Cornrnander. 3 General Sweeney believed
in leadership by example and on June 21, 1954, led a flight of three B-47s on a
non-stop flight from March AFB to Yokota Air Base near Tokyo, Japan - 6,700
miles in less than 15 hours. And on November 17 Colonel David A. Burchinal
flew a distance and endurance record in a B-47 bomber when after taking off
from Sidi Slimane, French Morocco, weather kept him from landing in England.
He flew back to Sidi Slimane, only to find the base socked in. Colonel Burchinal
remained airborne for over 47 hours, flying 21,163 miles, with the help of nine
aerial refuelings. The message was clear: SAC could reach any target anywhere
in the world. 4 SAC, however, was not only flexing its muscle with show-case
flights of its B-47 bombers. Although the RB-45C had been transferred to TAC
as SAC's force of RB-47E reconnaissance squadrons increased to four wings,
General LeMay nevertheless arranged for a second overflight of the Soviet Union
by three of TAC's recently acquired RB-45Cs. The aircraft were assigned to the
19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 19TRS, at Shaw AFB, South Carolina.
Colonel Marion C. Mixson, mission coordinator for earlier RB-45C overflights,
had been reassigned to the RB-47E equipped 9lst SRW which had deployed to
Nouasseur AB, Morocco . Mixson was summoned to Offutt AFB to meet with
General LeMay - irnrnediately. "Once I got to Offutt, LeMay told me to get down
to Shaw, pick up four RB-45s and take them to Wright-Patterson for modifications
to their radars. Then fly them over to Sculthorpe. TAC crews flew the aircraft
to Wright-Patterson . The radars were peaked by British engineers until the
picture was crisp and clear. When the aircraft arrived at Sculthorpe in early April,
Squadron Leader Crampton and his bunch were waiting for the airplanes . They
were repainted in RAF colors, and the night of April 28 the Brits flew them on
routes nearly identical to those flown in 1952." All returned safely, not that the
Russians didn't try to shoot them down. The "Ruskies frightened the life out of
me over Kiev when they finally got our height right and sent up a highway of
predicted flak, fantastic it was, but by the grace of God they got our speed wrong
and chucked the stuff just ahead of us," recalled Squadron Leader Crampton.'
Ten days later, General LeMay sent Captain Harold R. Austin in an RB-47E
photo-reconnaissance aircraft on a daring daylight flight over the Kola Peninsula

41
 Glory Days

to photograph Soviet air bases and determine if the Russians had moved any of
their strategic Bison bombers, shown-off at the May Day Parade days earlier, onto
airfields where their presence posed a threat to the United States. Austin returned
to RAF Fairford, England, after surviving the attacks of scores of Soviet fighters
and nearly having his flying career terminated by a MiG-17 firing a 30mm cannon
shell into the innards of his RB-47E.6 The Soviets were furious at the brazen Brits
and Americans, and not the least at their own impotence.
While LeMay was making life miserable for the Soviets, General Nathan
Twining, the Air Force chief of staff, did the same type of work at home. He
warned Congress and the nation that "the Russians have thousands more combat
planes than the U.S. military combined." 7 The 'bomber gap' arose. The Air
Force rhetoric of escalation was all about budgets and funding to continue the
expansion of SAC strike forces and their supporting tankers, fighter escort and
transport elements. ADC and TAC were hard pressed to get funds for even their
most essential programs. The Eisenhower administration was aiming for reduced
defense budgets at a time when the Air Force and SAC were painting a picture of
strategic weakness. Other troubling events occurred in the fateful year of 1954,
events which were noted but deemed not sufficiently important to figure in the
greater national security picture. Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh on May 7,
the day before Hal Austin flew his RB-47E over the Kola Peninsula. The French
pleaded with President Eisenhower for intervention in Indochina. Eisenhower
replied, "I can conceive of no greater tragedy then for the U.S. to become involved
in an all-out war in Indochina."8 Prescient words indeed. On July 21 Vietnam was
partitioned into North and South at the Geneva peace conference, and divided
by a Demilitarized Zone similar to one on the Korean peninsula. It was the very
beginning of a tragedy.
The B-66 program in 1954 found itself in a precarious position - behind
schedule and its funding threatened by expanding strategic bomber programs.
Program cancellation was a distinct possibility.9 The Douglas Company was very
much attuned to the political situation. When Douglas staged a Contractor Technical
Compliance, CTC, Inspection for the RB-66A at its Long Beach plant on March
22, 1954, Douglas made sure that it was done right. The CTC Inspection was
attended by Air Force representatives from any and all offices that had anything
remotely to do with the RB-66. The CTC inspection was an important 'do or die'
affair in the evolution of the RB-66. No detail was too small not to be gone over
with a fine tooth comb. A fancy, hard-cover folder outlining the four day agenda
was provided to every attendee. There were live indoor demonstrations on the first
RB-66A built to convince the customer that Douglas had complied with directions
and was providing the expected product. It was a meticulously organized and
executed event. On Tuesday, 23 March, the schedule called for:

42
 Flight Testing the Destroyer

8:30: Demonstrate actuation of camera doors and flash cartridge doors .

9:00: Demonstrate operation and removal of cameras and mounts.

I0:00: Demonstrate operation of driftmeter fairing . Demonstrate operation of

horizontal stabilizer.

10:30: Turret operation - no ammunition will be fed, however, loaded

ammunition box will be loaded and removed.

11 :00: Demonstrate operation of surface lock and power control interlock.

Demonstrate release of 1 JATO bottle, each side of airplane. Demonstrate
installation of 12 JATO bottles .

12:00: Demonstrate actuation of bomb bay doors . Demonstrate operation of

aileron, rudder, and elevator surface boost systems. Demonstrate operation
of speed brakes.

Other demonstrations were equally detailed in execution and the company passed
its customer's close scrutiny. A similar demonstration was held for the B-66B
bomber in August 1954.' 0 The first flight of an RB-66A occurred on June 24, three
months after the CTC Inspection. Problems arose almost immediately and were
addressed energetically by Douglas engineers and test pilots. The B-66B bomber
made its first flight on January 4, 1955. A substantial number of bombers then
became part of the test program, not only because of the various special weapons
test requirements, but also to assure the effective integration of the B-47 K-5
bomb/navigation system into the aircraft. It turned out that the K-5 system had
to undergo significant adaptation to fit into the B-66 airframe . Nothing seemed
to come easy and no money was saved by adapting a Navy aircraft to Air Force
needs. The RB-66B, incorporating the many changes required as a result of flight
tests in the A-model, flew for the first time on October 29, 1955, the same day
the RB-66C, built at the Douglas Tulsa plant, made its maiden flight. Only three
months later, on January 31, 1956, the first RB-66B photo-reconnaissance aircraft
was delivered to Shaw AFB, flown by Captain Thomas Whitlock and his navigator
First Lieutenant Griffin. Whitlock, along with Captain Click D. Smith, who later
rose to the rank of major general, had been sent to Edwards AFB to become
familiar with the RB-66B and participate in flight tests . Whitlock and Smith
would subsequently check out other pilots on the new twin-jet aircraft in the 16th
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. Shaw AFB was the tactical reconnaissance

43
 Glory Days

base of the U.S . Air Force and host to the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group,
soon to become a Wing.
The Air Force committed a total of 25 B-66s to the flight test program,
including the five A-models which were not to be delivered to combat units ."
The test pilots were the best available, having gone through a rigorous Air Force
selection and training process. In the abbreviated two year period allotted for flight
testing, Captains Charles C. Bock, as lead test pilot, and John C. Carlson and John
E. Allavie, wrung out the airplane and made it what Tom Whitlock later spoke
of as "a very stable airplane with good control response which gave you plenty
of stall warning. A pleasure to fly." 12 The purpose of the tests was two-fold: to
detennine the flight characteristics and performance parameters of the aircraft and
to discover any defects and deficiencies . If categorized as affecting safety of flight
such defects would be fixed; other defects flyers would be made aware of and had
to cope with as best they could. For instance, the pilot's ability to see anything aft
of the 35 degree swept back wings of the B-66 was zero - a condition duly noted
by the test pilots, but there was nothing that could be done short of designing a
new airplane. The flight performance and stability tests were principally flown at
Edwards AFB, while adverse weather testing was done at Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio, by Captains Ralph W. Lusk and John A. Porter. Test piloting in the early
postwar years was a precarious profession requiring the utmost skill and depth of
system knowledge. Taking an airplane to its limits, at times beyond, and surviving
to fly another day was all part of a day's work. All too often pilots did not survive
the idiosyncracies of the aircraft they were testing. 13
The five RB-66A aircraft committed to the test program turned out to have a
number of serious flaws, one of which was canopy design. While most subsequent
aircraft were configured with individual escape hatches for the pilot, navigator
and gunner, the A-models featured a single canopy that covered the entire flight
deck. If the crew elected to eject and an ejection handle was pulled by one of
the three crew members, it activated a set of rocket thrusters mounted on each
side at the rear of the canopy which then jettisoned the cockpit canopy. If the
aircraft was moving at 425 knots, a violent blast of air would hit the crew with
the most likely result that no one would survive the ejection sequence. Why this
design seemed attractive to engineers at one point in time is not known . Captain
Bock's group, however, found the design wanting even before taking off in the
aircraft for the first time. It was decided to do some realistic testing . Chimpanzees
were strapped into the ejection seats of a B-66 cockpit mounted on a sled. When
the sled was fired and the canopy ejected, the air blast was so great it bent the
ejection seat rails backward when the seat was near the end of its travel. The
navigator's instrument panel broke free and came back into the navigator's seat.

44
 Flight Testing the Destroyer

Rocket thrusters used to jettison the canopy and to eject the seats burned seat
occupants. Cliff Parrott, who would spent much of his professional career as
the lead Douglas RB-66 technical representative to the 363TRW at Shaw wrote
"About 15-20 aircraft were manufactured with the canopy system and had to be
put back through a modification program. The flight deck had to be taken apart
and the revised three hatch cockpit configuration installed. Anytime you have to
re-do something during production you are asking for trouble, and these airplanes
would give me plenty of trouble at Shaw." 1•
Captains Lusk and Porter had two RB-66B aircraft assigned for flight testing
at Wright-Patterson AFB - 53-416 and 53-419. To learn how the aircraft behaved
in a thunderstorm they had to go out and find one to fly into. "Take-offs were
made at gross weights ranging from 49,000 to 73,000 pounds. Directional control
was satisfactory during the entire take-off roll," they noted in their reports. "To
provide adequate control immediately after take-off in gusty surface winds
and when the 90 degree crosswind component exceeded 15 knots, the take-off
airspeed was increased by 10 knots . Handling characteristics were satisfactory
with bank angles as high as 45 degrees using normal VFR climb schedule." The
test pilots wrote of how the aircraft behaved in a holding pattern, in descents , and
during instrument approaches, missed-approaches and on landings - noting every
possible flight parameter for subsequent evaluation . Pilots of course are warned
not to enter thunderstorms - but if they do how will the airplane behave? How
should the pilot behave?
"The recommended penetration speed in turbulence is 250KIAS ," knots
indicated airspeed, their report noted . "The power setting and pitch attitude
for this airspeed should be established before entering the thunderstorm and, if
maintained throughout the storm, will result in approximately a constant average
airspeed regardless of any false reading of the airspeed indicator." To paraphrase
what they were so calmly reporting: Once you enter a thunderstorm all hell will
break loose. You can 't trust your instruments, so stay with what you have until
you get through the worst of it. "Prepare the aircraft prior to entering a zone of
turbulent air," and make certain "all safety belts are fastened." I've never forgot
to do that one . "Do not chase the airspeed indication, since doing so will result in
extreme aircraft attitudes ." What they are saying is that you will probably crash
if you insist on doing so. And "use as little elevator control as possible in order
to minimize the stresses imposed on the aircraft." You don't want to have to pick
up the pieces once you get on the ground. By the way "the altimeter may be
unreliable because of differential barometric pressure within the storm. A gain of
several thousand feet may be expected." 15

45
 Glory Days

Flying in adverse weather conditions is not all that unusual in a military

environment and therefore tests, as flown by Captains Lusk and Porter, were
essential. Our two test pilots did the same sort of thing to learn what it was like
when the airplane iced up. Their report again notes calmly that "the aircraft is
capable of maintaining flight in icing conditions with as much as two inches of ice
accumulated on the wing and empennage leading edges with an airspeed loss of 8
to 10 knots. With the operation of both engine and surface ice removal systems, a
loss of five percent rpm and 8 to 10 knots in airspeed will occur. Advance throttles
to recover these penalties." 16 In the 21st century flight testing is much safer and
more comprehensive as a result of computer assisted simulation. In the '50s the
computer was the slide rule, and a test pilot did the rest.
In 1962 I reported to my first operational duty assignment as a First
Lieutenant with the 55SRW at Forbes AFB, Topeka, Kansas, after two years of
flight training. The 55th flew top of the line six-jet RB-47H/K reconnaissance
aircraft. Within two-months of my arrival we lost three airplanes - eleven men
died. It was a shocking experience for a young officer just entering the military
flying profession. Two-thousand flying hours later in the B-47 I didn't give such
things a second thought, it was a part of the career choice I had made. Military
flyers often perished when their airplanes were involved in catastrophic events,
all too many of which occurred in realistic combat training. But the first B-66
related death was not caused in flight, but by an aircraft parked on the tarmac after
returning from a test flight.
On April 3, 1956, Captain Edward Kayworth of the 3245th Test Group, Eglin
AFB, Florida, was involved in engine suitability tests for high elevation take-
offs at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. He performed two take-offs and landings
in one of the early production RB-66Bs, serial number 53-418. After his second
landing, Captain Kayworth turned off the runway and returned to the parking
area. He did not use excessive braking during either landing nor while taxiing,
although some smoke was observed from tires and wheels during the final portion
of the landing roll. That smoke was ascribed to the anti-skid cycling device
which tended to cause smoke under normal conditions. Sitting on the ramp the
right wheel assembly began to smoke and an airman applied C02 from a fire
extinguisher. About six minutes later white smoke was observed coming from the
same wheel assembly. The crew chief, Technical Sergeant Richards, determined
it had to be a magnesium fire. Based on his training and experience Sergeant
Richards cautioned everyone in the vicinity of the aircraft to move away from
the wheel, expecting an explosion. Just then the base provost marshal, Captain
George Morris, drove up and parked his car about 80 feet from the RB-66, got out,
and began walking toward the airplane when the wheel assembly exploded. Parts
of the wheel assembly struck Captain Morris. He died instantly. 11

46
 CHAPTER FOUR

THE BLACK KNIGHTS

OF HURLBURT FIELD

If not beautiful, I always thought the B-66 elegant. Its 35 degree wing sweep
making it look as if it could conquer the sound barrier. It couldn't. In contrast to
the two-pilot bombers and tankers populating the SAC inventory, all versions of
the B-66 required only one pilot. One pilot, as in a fighter, makes for a different
kind of flying. There are no shared functions, no shared responsibilities, no
opportunities to rest or daydream while another flew the aircraft. Flying the B-66
required a fighter pilot mentality, and those who possessed that independence of
spirit and judgment were clearly the men who flew it best. Although many TAC
generals with a bomber background tried, they never succeeded in changing the
Tactical Air Command flyer into the rigid, response type aircraft operator General
LeMay required for his SAC bombers. By 1956, both bomber and reconnaissance
versions of the B-66 began flowing into their designated squadrons in the United
States, England, Germany and Japan.(See Appendix 3) On March 16, 1956,
Colonel Howard F. Bronson, commander of the 17th Bomb Wing, the Black
Knights, based at Eglin Auxiliary Field #9, adjacent to the sugar-white beaches of
the Florida panhandle, flew the first B-66 bomber from Norton AFB, California,
to Hurlburt Field in four hours and forty-five minutes at an average ground speed
of 580 knots . Bronson was pleased with the way the aircraft flew and handled. He
also knew that the days ahead would be filled with daunting challenges.'
The Black Knights had returned from duty in Japan and Korea in April 1955,
flying war-weary B-26 twin-engine Douglas Invaders. Within days of their arrival
at Hurlburt they learned that they were slated to convert to the new B-57B twin-

47
 Glory Days

Aircraft 53-483, the second B-66B bomber to come off the production line at the Douglas Long Beach
plant, is shown using JATO, jet/rocket assisted take-off, from Long Beach, California, on March 18,
1957. JATO was used in the '50s to get B-66 aircraft off short runways such as at Midway Island and
Clark Air Base in the Philippines . JATO fell into disuse as air-refueling became routinely available to
tactical aircraft crossing the Pacific and Atlantic.

48
 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field

jet bomber. Hurlburt Field began to undergo a major make-over to get ready for
the new jets. Everything from the main runway to the hangars, field lighting,
taxiways, refueling systems, to the workshops and administrative buildings was
refurbished, renovated or rebuilt. Conversion plans were proceeding on schedule
when, in September, Colonel Bronson was informed that there had been a change
in plans: the 17th Wing was slated to receive the even newer B-66 twin-jet bomber,
rather than the B-57. It was enough work for any organization to convert from
one type of aircraft to another, converting from prop-jobs to jets was a horse of
. a different color. Yet no one at higher headquarters thought of it as anything but
routine . It certainly appeared that way when the 17th Bomb Wing was directed
to maintain its three squadrons combat ready in the B-26 while at the same time
transitioning into the new B-66 jet.
Not only did TAC headquarters require every pilot to have at least 150 hours
jet time before stepping into the cockpit of a B-66, but 50 of the 150 hours were
to be flown in twin-jet aircraft. Other than SAC's six jet B-47 and USAFE's
obsolescent and few in number B-45, there were hardly any multi-jet aircraft in
the Air Force inventory available to nascent B-66 flyers. The first of 50 twin-jet
F-101A Voodoos did not arrive in TAC until May 1957, and the trouble-plagued
F-89 Scorpion was an ADC bird not available to TAC. Several single-engine T-
33 jet trainers were provided to the 17th Bomb Wing to allow its pilots to gain
their initial jet flying experience; and six B-57B twin-jet bombers, which arrived
at Hurlburt before the decision to convert to the B-66 was announced, remained
behind to provide multi-engine jet training. Six B-57s were hardly enough to
satisfy the 50 hour multi-jet flying requirement for three squadrons of 17th Bomb
Wing pilots. More often than not these six airplanes were unavailable because
of frequent groundings. When not grounded, the B-57s were restricted in flight
altitude, speed and maneuvers in which they could be flown. So the Black Knights
were forced to look for a home-grown solution. They turned to SAC's 3245th
Test Group at nearby Eglin AFB, and worked out an arrangement allowing 17BW
pilots to acquire multi-jet flying time in the group 's B-47 aircraft. 2 It's not the way
an air force should be run , but that's how it was done .
The disjointed 17th Bomb Wing transition from conventional aircraft to
jets was unfortunately representative of the Air Force as a whole. In an article in
the Winter 2005 issue of Air Power History, Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell, a 1960 Air
Academy graduate and professor emeritus at Radford University, writes about
flying safety in the 1950s. "The new powerplant and greater performance of jets
brought a new set of difficulties unappreciated by the system. The early jet engines
were unreliable and required different techniques and skills in both maintenance
and flying . The service may have recognized, but certainly did not adequately

49
 Glory Days

respond to the fact that jets were fundamentally different than prop-powered
aircraft requiring different training and procedures. The Air Force did not provide
an adequate program for transitioning prop-trained pilots into jets or preparing
new pilots for operational service flying jets."3 Not until General LeMay's
training regime was implemented in SAC, and accidents were not shrugged off
but viewed as unprofessional, did the other part of good flying training receive
adequate attention - flying safety. At Hurlburt Field, the B-26 to B-66 transition
experience was one of on-the-job training , with a disturbing lack of attention,
direction and positive support from higher headquarters, explaining many of the
accidents and incidents experienced by the 17th Bomb Wing. Pilot error was all
too frequently the label attached to aircraft accidents, when in fact it should have
read training error.
In addition to the pressures of transitioning from prop to jet aircraft, the 17th
Bomb Wing was burdened with flying and maintaining eight different types of
airplanes, a maintenance nightmare under the best of circumstances. There were
the jets - the B-57, B-66 and T-33. The conventional aircraft included the B-
26 bomber, C-47 and C-119 transports, and one each T-29 and B-50 trainers.
The C-47 and C-119 were essential to keep the Wing flying, hauling spare parts
from depots and manufacturers. There were never enough qualified maintenance
personnel around, so the out of commission rates for parts and maintenance were
high. Under these troubling circumstances the Wing found it necessary to go to
TAC headquarters and ask for a waiver to reduce the number of hours required
in multi-engine jet aircraft before its pilots could move into B-66 training. The
waiver was granted.
Navigators had to train in the sophisticated K-5 radar bomb system. The Air
Force Armament Center at Eglin accommodated the Wing and installed a K-5
system in a B-50 bomber to allow the navigators to at least obtain a minimum of in-
flight training until sufficient numbers of B-66 aircraft became available. Nothing
came easy for the Wing. By November 1956 the Wing had received 40 B-66s,
and many of the aging B-26 twin-engine bombers were finally flown to Arizona
for desert storage. But things did not get any easier for the stressed unit. With the
arrival of the new aircraft, and before the Wing became combat ready, numerous
requests came in from politicians and civic leaders to participate in static displays
and air shows. TAC could hardly say no. There was a fly-over of three B-66s at
MacDill AFB near Tampa on November 10 in conjunction with the first annual
convention of the newly formed Medal of Honor Society. To insure a successful
fly-over two airborne spares were provided - five aircraft days were expended on
this exercise. A firepower demonstration at Eglin required three B-66 bombers to
drop 14 750 pound bombs each. Requests for static displays were numerous-the

50
 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field

National Air Show at Oklahoma City required a B-66 with a typical conventional
bomb load of 14 inert 500 pound bombs, and the U.S. Military Academy air
indoctrination course wanted a B-66 as part of its curriculum. The requests for
static display aircraft were as diverse as they were numerous . All this had to be
accommodated while acquiring proficiency in the new aircraft and getting three
bomb squadrons ready to fight.4
Training began in an organized fashion in November 1956 when sufficient
numbers of the new B-66 became available to dedicate aircraft both to aircrew
and maintenance training. Four pilots and two navigators had been sent to
Edwards AFB to participate in the flight test program of the B-66 to acquire the
necessary skills to teach others in the 17th Bomb Wing . Lieutenant Colonel James
B. Story was one of those pilots. "For six months I and the others flew the Band
RB-66, checked out its air refueling capability, and drafted a training syllabus
for a flight simulator we had never seen. Upon completion of our training we
ferried aircraft back to Hurlburt and began transition training for our pilots. Since
no provisions had been made to accommodate instructor pilots in the aircraft,
we improvised a jump-seat which we called the 'MA-I Milk Stool.' It consisted
of an empty ammunition box and an attached lap-belt for use in our checkout
program. Later we used the same rudimentary set-up to give instrument training
and flight checks."' The issue of a dual-control B-66, like the dual control B-
57C, had been raised by Air Force with TAC as early as 1953. TAC agreed that
sufficient numbers of B/RB-66 dual-control aircraft should be built to provide
each wing with several aircraft of the type to use for training purposes. In the
ever more difficult budgetary environment of the post Korean War years, coupled
with the insatiable appetite of SAC to acquire ever more bombers, the B-66 dual
control trainer dropped through the proverbial cracks.• Instructor pilots, IPs, were
required to get out of the gunner's seat, which they occupied on take-off and
landing, and sit on a home-made stool or ammunition box behind the pilot to
instruct and observe. It was not a safe set-up and should have never been allowed .
There simply was no one at either TAC headquarters or the Air Staff to stand up
for the B-66 and its requirements when program cuts were made.
General Otto P. Weyland took the reigns of the Tactical Air Command from
John Cannon on April 1, 1954, and remained around as one of the longest serving
TAC commanders, until July 31, 1959. 'Opie' Weyland was a former commander
of FEAF, the Far Eastern Air Forces, the predecessor organization to the Pacific
Air Forces, PACAF, and came to TAC to shake things up. In his eyes SAC was
the organizational model to emulate. To start with, he was going to instill in his
aircrews a greater sense of discipline by establishing command and control centers
at Wing level, ala Strategic Air Command. Such centers were to be manned 24-

51
 Glory Days

hours a day and tasked to track all aircraft and crew movements. The TAC flight
crews hated this heavy handed approach and never quite took to it. Then Weyland
implemented his dream, a rapid reaction force, which went by the name of CASF
- Composite Air Strike Force. CASF envisioned tailored tactical strike forces,
including fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, deploying on short notice
to world trouble spots. To go along with the CASF concept, Opie made a subtle
but important change in the mission statements of his wings. Before July l, 1956,
the primary mission of the 363rd TRW, for instance, was "to train replacement
reconnaissance crews" while the secondary mission was "to prepare for and
maintain combat effectiveness of assigned or attached tactical reconnaissance
units." 7 General Weyland reversed the order and put war-fighting first, training
second.
The mission realignment fit right in with Weyland's CASF concept, as
well as an ongoing NATO reorganization which stripped USAFE, TAC's sister
command in Europe, of its unique specified command status. That authority, the
employment of special weapons, was transferred to the U.S. Commander-in-
Chief Europe, USCINCEUR, who also became the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, SACEUR. USCINCEUR, headquartered at Patch Barracks in Vaihingen,
Germany, commanded both U.S. Army and Air Force di visions, wings, armies and
air forces, while SACEUR commanded all NATO forces from his headquarters
in Paris, later Brussels. Not being able to be in two places at once, SACEUR's
deputy largely took care of the national USCINCEUR functions at Vaihingen. The
arrangement worked most of the time, and assured national control over America's
nuclear arsenal. The fact that the NATO Supreme Commander was always going
to be an American was the issue that soon was to cause President Charles de
Gaulle of France to withdraw his forces from the military component of NATO.
While USAFE became just another component of the USCINCEUR/SACEUR
force structure, the Strategic Air Command remained a specified command,
reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JCS, in the Pentagon, on war-
fighting matters - not the Air Force chief of staff.
General Weyland decided the time was right to put his new CASF concept
to the test. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE, in Paris,
scheduled an atomic joint forces - Army, Air Force - exercise code-named
Operation Whipsaw . The 17th Bomb Wing, still in the process of converting from
B-26 to B-66 aircraft and not yet combat ready, was directed to support a task
force, Mobile Baker, with four B-66B bombers. The call came in late August
for the four aircraft and their supporting elements to deploy in September. There
was little time to get ready for this important first employment of the B-66 in
an operational exercise. With no aerial tanker support available the four aircraft

52
 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field

needed to carry pylon mounted fuel tanks for additional fuel. A problem quickly
arose . The mounting lugs for the tanks did not match the aircraft installation. The
sway braces had been reversed during installation at Douglas. Of course the fuel
feed lines from the pylons to the tanks did not match either. The on-site Douglas
support team and Air Force maintenance men installed the drop tanks and got the
aircraft ready. On September 18 the four B-66s departed for Loring AFB, Maine.
From there they flew in loose trail formation to Lajes Field in the Azores, then
to Sidi Slimaine, French Morocco, and on to Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany.
The USAFE Air Operations Center, AOC, controlled all air tasking for the
exercise. It turned out that the USAFE people had expected RB-66Bs and didn't
know what to do with the bombers. There were no target materials available,
and the targets that were assigned within 150 miles of Spangdahlem did not take
advantage of the capabilities of the B-66, namely its sophisticated K-5 bomb
system. States a 17th Bomb Wing report, "It is doubtful if the AOC was aware
of the capability and performance of the B-66 or the navigational and bombing
equipment installed in the aircraft." However, as far as the CASF concept went,
it was considered "sound and workable," by the participating aircrews. 8 The four
aircraft returned along nearly the same route as the one flown from Hurlburt to
Spangdahlem, substituting Harmon Air Base, Newfoundland, in place of Loring,
Maine. B-66B 54-497 was piloted by Captain Zacheus W. Ryall, Captain Darrell
E. Selby served as navigator, and Airman First Class Call ix J. Perusse was the
gunner. Approaching Harmon on October 5, 1956, Captain Ryall experienced
fluctuating fuel flow on his number one engine about 50 miles out of Harmon at
an altitude of 37 ,000 feet. Shortly thereafter the right, number two engine began
to lose power. Both engines ran at low power, flaming out on occasion. Ryall
broke through a 1,500 foot overcast and established a pattern for a no power
landing. While turning on base-leg both engines regained full power and Captain
Ryall made an uneventful landing. The maintenance officer and Douglas techrep
(technical representative) who were in place at Harmon checked the fuel tanks for
water, presuming the most likely cause to be icing in the fuel system. The engines
operated normally on the ground. The following day, October 6, all went well until
the aircraft, again cruising at 37 ,000 feet, came near Front Royal, Virginia, when
both engines began to lose power. It was a cloudy day. Captain Ryall contacted
a nearby Ground Control Intercept, GCI, radar site and requested a vector to a
suitable airfield. The radar site gave him a heading to Blackstone. The weather at
Blackstone: a 300 foot ceiling, 3/4th of a mile visibility. Ryall was at 13,000 feet,
between cloud layers, and realized there was no way he could take the aircraft
down safely. He asked for a vector to an unoccupi~d area. Gunner, navigator and
pilot ejected in that order. The crew survived without sustaining injuries. The loss

53
 Glory Days

of the first B-66 aircraft was an unfortunate end to an otherwise flawless overseas
deployment.9 (See Appendix 5)
Many problems are discovered during flight-test of a new aircraft. Some,
however, do not surface until aircraft enter operational service. Examination of the
wreckage revealed that a combination of flat and very fine mesh fuel screen was to
blame for the loss of engine power. At altitude, in sub-freezing temperatures, JP-4
jet fuel thickened and became jelly like. The jelled fuel could not pass through the
fine mesh of the screens designed to keep out impurities. The screens collapsed,
blocking the flow of fuel to the engines. A cone-shaped filter with a larger mesh
was substituted and solved the problem. The ill-designed fuel screens were to
be removed from the supply system to preclude the same thing from happening
again. Someone, somewhere, rather than removing the filters, pushed them to the
back of the shelf, or something on that order. On September 5, 1961, Captain Jesse
B. Kendler flew a WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft on a standard weather
track out of Kindley Air Base, Bermuda. On the return leg to Kindley both engines
flamed out. They restarted when Captain Kendler got to a lower altitude, then
failed again. Captain Kendler gave the signal to eject. The two weather personnel
in the back of the aircraft ejected downward. Then the navigator and an observer
on a familiarization ride ejected. All were rescued. Captain Kendler perished in
the crash of the aircraft, to the last moment trying to restart the on-again-off-again
jets. The suspected cause of the flame-out was the previously condemned fuel
filter. Negligence had now caused the loss of a life.' 0
Only five months later, on February 7, 1962, an RB-66C electronic
reconnaissance aircraft with a crew of seven crashed at RAF Chelveston, England,
when the engines faltered on landing, killing four of the crew. The cause of the
crash: fuel filter icing caused by a flat, fine mesh filter, the same filter that killed
Captain Kendler. 11 This time the old filters were purged for good from the supply
system. The obvious thought comes to mind that if somewhere some nameless
supply sergeant or supply officer had done his job lives would have been saved.
And what about the airman who replaced the filters during maintenance? Shouldn't
he and his supervisor have become at least a bit suspicious when a flat, fine mesh
fuel filter suddenly replaced a cone shaped filter with a coarser mesh? Fuel filter
design was to be only the first of several problems to beset the B-66 in its early
years, an experience not all that different from its sister aircraft, the B-57.
Wile TAC was struggling to integrate the B-57 and B-66 into its inventory,
SAC continued to expand in both size and influence. Tasked to "conduct long
range offensive reconnaissance operations in any part of the world" General
LeMay aggressively employed his resources to do just that. Between March 21
and May 10, 1956, 20 RB-47E/H photo and electronic reconnaissance aircraft,

54
 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field

flying out of Thule AB, Greenland, photographed the length and breadth of Siberia
from 'Banana Island,' as aircrews referred to banana shaped Novaya Zemla, to the
Bering Strait. Operation Homerun was only part of an extensive and top secret
war of reconnaissance waged by the Strategic Air Command and other military
services and agencies to gain the Soviet Union's military secrets, a war about
which the American public knew next to nothing . On the 4th of July 1956, only
eight weeks after Operation Homerun, the Central Intelligence Agency launched
the first high flying U-2 photo surveillance aircraft from Wiesbaden Air Base,
Germany. over the Soviet Union . That first flight was quickly followed by others on
July 5, July 8, and many more thereafter. Overflights of the Soviet Union became
nearly routine by the apparently 'untouchable' U-2. 12 Not one to let himself be
outdone by the CIA , on June 11, 1957, General LeMay took delivery of the first
U-2 at Laughlin AFB, Texas, equipping his 4080th Strategic Wing.' 3 If LeMay
was a thorn in the side of the Russians , he was equally ruthless in the pursuit of
his assigned mission toward the Eisenhower administration, putting them on the
defensive in public statements and testimony before congressional committees.
"The Russians are building the comparable Bison at a higher rate than the B-
52," LeMay pointedly remarked to the press in May 1956. Eisenhower and his
Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, fired back that LeMay was parochial and
only focused on SAC. To LeMay's credit, that was in fact his task. Before the
1
•

Senate Air Power Investigating Committee in May 1956 LeMay stated that "within
three years the USSR will have the capability to deliver a knock-out blow which
would destroy the U .S ... There is grave doubt that SAC would present an effective
deterrence in the 1958-1960 period." He cautioned against reliance on defensive
forces, "and it is one of the principles of war" he lectured, "that the advantage
lies with the offense."" Whatever the case, no one, military or politician, dared to
seriously oppose the general - nor touch his budget. B-52s continued to roll off
the production lines at an increasing rate , while ADC and TAC aircraft buys and
operating budgets were reduced.
Plagued by manpower shortages, parts shortages and training deficiencies for
nearly every aspect of the conversion from the B-26 to the B-66B jet bomber, the
17th Bomb Wing struggled on during the remainder of 1956. Accidents continued
to plague the Wing. After the loss of Captain Ryall's aircraft over Virginia on
October 6, an aircraft returning from an instrument training flight in November
had to make a gear up landing when its right gear would not extend. No one was
injured, but damage to the aircraft was extensive. In December a B-66 ran off the
end of the runway in an attempt to abort its take-off. The nose wheel collapsed,
again resulting in substantial damage to the aircraft. Losing airplanes in peacetime
is not what commanders are rewarded for. Early in 1957 Colonel Reginald J.

55
 Glory Days

Clizbe assumed command, a highly decorated World War II veteran who made
full colonel at age 25, attesting to the high losses of his bomb group. Clizbe went
by RJ, never allowing the use of his first name if he could help it. The hectic
pace at Hurlburt continued. Training began for ground crews to learn to load and
handle special weapons, and aircrews were certified in the Bomb Commander's
Course. Nothing was left to chance when it came to atomic bombs.
The remainder of 1957 was marked by the tragic loss of two more aircraft,
both from the 95th Bomb Squadron. On April l, 1957, Lieutenant Richard Dinger
launched early in the morning into light rain and thunderstorms, losing an escape
hatch soon after lift-off. As he entered a turn to return to base, the ground control
approach, GCA, radar operator watched the aircraft disappear from his scope,
hitting trees and crashing into a swamp one mile short of the runway. The crew
of three was killed. They were the first aircrew fatalities experienced by the 95th
Bomb Squadron, by the 17th Bomb Wing, and by the B-66 community at large.16
Early in September a routine practice radar bombing mission against a radar bomb
scoring, RBS, site near Houston, Texas, turned into tragedy. Caught up in a violent
thunderstorm, the pilot lost control of the aircraft and the crew ejected. Captain
Arthur Manzo, the navigator, was killed.17
In November 1957, soon after becoming combat ready, the 17th BW was
tasked to participate in Operation Mobile Z,ebra. Mobile Z,ebra was another short
notice deployment similar to Mobile Baker the previous year. Two B-66s, one
flown by Colonel Clizbe, the other by Captain Jack McClenny, deployed in just 17
hours non-stop from California to Clark Air Base near Manila in the Philippines.
They then flew simulated bombing missions out of Clark - at least that's what
the Air Force public relations machine cranked out for the press. What really
happened was much less glamorous. A CASF was a composite force of fighters,
light bombers, reconnaissance and support aircraft as dictated by the situation that
was to be dealt with. Within short notice the force was supposed to be deployable
anywhere in the world. It did two things for Weyland's Tactical Air Command:
it put the emphasis on combat rather than training replacements for the overseas
tactical air forces, and it was an imaginative, if ultimately unsuccessful, first
attempt to diminish reliance on overseas bases. The CASF was pulled together
from various flying units as needed and commanded by Brigadier General Henry
Viccelio. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, of 'What's good for General
Motors is good for the country' fame, was thinking of reducing U.S. forces in the
Pacific region. To reassure a doubtful Philippine government, Wilson called on
General Weyland to exercise his Composite Air Strike Force.
"Our flight surgeon saw a wonderful opportunity to experiment a bit," recalls
Ken High, then a young 17th Bomb Wing lieutenant. "He started designing low

56
 The Black Knights of Hurlburt Field

residue meals the crews would be fed prior to the 17 hour flight from George
AFB, California, to Clark Field. Wing operations set up a training program that
included 17 hour flights in the simulator. That didn't last long because simulator
flying consisted of take off, level off at altitude and going on autopilot, playing
bridge with your pals, and every four hours descending to 15,000 feet and
saying: Refuel. Then climbing back to cruising altitude until the 17 hours were
up. The crews and planes assembled at George AFB in California for a week of
preparation. Each day we rose at 5 a.m., ate our low residue meals, and retired at
9 p.m. There was absolutely no alcohol allowed and no snacks between meals .
One of my best friends, Charlie Gravat, met a waitress in the Officers' Club who
recognized him from when she worked at a club in Fort Walton Beach, Florida.
Charlie, being a quick thinker, gave her some money and told her he wanted her
to substitute martinis for water in his and my glass at dinner time. This went well
until Thursday night , her day off. She had briefed her replacement, who showed
up with our martinis in water glasses served with an olive. Colonel Clizbe, our
wing commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Fulton, the 37th squadron commander,
sat across from us at our table. Charlie and I had to look like the cat that ate the
canary with our hands wrapped around our glasses - not daring to take a sip.
"The KB-50 tanker squadron that was to give us our first load of gas as we
headed for Hawaii had formed only six weeks earlier. All were inexperienced
at refueling. On the morning of the flight we got word that the KB-50 tankers
that were to meet us over the Pacific had big-time problems. Only three were at
the refueling point, the others either aborted or couldn't find their way. Colonel
Clizbe was lead of the first flight - three primary aircraft and one spare. We were
to take off in ten second intervals. Our flight consisted of Colonel Clizbe, Jack
McClenny, and I was number 3. Warren Gould was number 4, the designated
spare. When I got up to about 120 knots, Colonel Fulton, who was sitting in a
plane of the second flight started transmitting over the radio, 'Number three,' that
was me, 'your flaps are up.' A B-66 trying to take off with its flaps up will roll all
the way to China before it will fly. Other pilots joined in telling me my flaps were
up. I checked the flap indicator, it showed 60 percent. I checked the hydraulic
pressures, they read 3,000psi. By this time I was well over lift-off speed and
decided to hold the airplane on the ground for a bit longer. I put the flap handle
all the way down, and when I did the airplane popped nearly straight up for about
100 feet. I slowly milked the flaps up and everything seemed to be working fine.
What I didn't know was that Warren Gould, our spare, had forgotten to put his
flaps down, and they were yelling at the wrong aircraft. Warren went off the end
of the runway. Luckily he made it.

57
 Glory Days

"By the time we got to the coast we learned that only two tankers had made it
to the refueling area. I became the spare. We found the tankers and Colonel Clizbe
hooked up, then backed off, saying he wasn't receiving fuel. The airplane had an
IFR, inflight refueling, switch that dumped the pressure in the tanks so the fuel
from the tanker could flow in. I told my navigator, Ralph Davenport, 'He forgot
to flip the IFR switch.' Jack McClenny then came on the air and said, 'Colonel,
check your IFR switch.' The next time Clizbe tried he was getting gas . I was not
too pleased with my friend Jack knocking me out of the trip. The 12 bombers
and 4 reconnaissance aircraft that started from Hurlburt for Clark ended up a two
airplane flight. I don't know how Colonel Clizbe explained all that, but he had 17
hours to think of something."' 8
In 1953 TAC planned on two wings of B-66 bombers. In May 1955 that plan
was changed by the Air Staff to one wing. Instead of the 345th Bomb Group at
Langley AFB, Virginia, getting the B-66, it was the 17th Bomb Wing at Hurlburt
Field. Langley converted to the B-57B instead. Budget pressures after the end
of the Korean War, and the subsequent build-up of SAC forced the Air Staff to
continually reevaluate its objectives. Instead of 143 wings, the Air Staff downsized
to 120 wings in 1954.' 9 By 1956, the number was back up to 137 wings - 51
for SAC, 41 for TAC, 34 for ADC and 11 for airlift.20 That number remained in
flux as budgets shrank and the pressures for strategic superiority over the Soviets
continued to mount. In November 1956, while two of its B-66 bombers were
flying across the Pacific to the Philippines, the 17th Bomb Wing was notified by
Headquarters TAC that it would be inactivated. Its bombers were to "replace the
B-45s assigned to the 47th Bombardment Wing and serve as USAF's all-weather
Atomic Strike Force in Europe," stated the operations plan that implemented the
movement of aircraft and personnel. Rather than a unit move, it became a transfer
of aircraft, equipment and supplies peculiar to the B-66 from the 17th Bomb
Wing to the 47th Bomb Wing in England, and every "effort was to be made to
insure maximum utilization of personnel assigned to the 47th BW to insure that
minimum numbers are deployed with the 17th Bomb Wing." 21 Money, or the lack
of it, was the driving force behind the instructions. The three squadrons transferred
to the United Kingdom. Through a paper exercise they were returned in name
only to Hurlburt Field where they and their parent wing were stricken from the
rolls of active Air Force units on June 25, 1958.(Appendix 3) However, the 17th
Bomb Wing designation was not yet ready to die, it was after all the group to
which Doolittle's Raiders belonged when they launched their epic attack against
ImperialJapan off the USS Hornet on April 18, 1942. The 17th was to come to life
again in 1963, this time flying SAC B-52B bombers out of Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio. One of its young bombardier/navigators was a Captain 'Pete' Pedroli.

58
 CHAPTER FIVE

THE RED DEVILS

OF RAF SCULTHORPE

"I was born in 1929 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Went to high school there, then attended
the Spartan School of Aeronautics. When I turned 15 I began taking flying lessons
and soloed on my 16th birthday. On my 17th birthday I got my private pilot's
license. Once I had my license I flew anything I could Jay my hands on. Then I
joined the Air Force," Donald Harding recalled wistfully when I interviewed him
in October 2006 at a B-66 Destroyer Association reunion in San Antonio, Texas .
Don and I had flown together in the EB-66 years earlier. He was by far one of the
best pilots I had the privilege to share an airplane with in my Air Force career. "I
went through the first jet engine mechanics course at Chanute AFB, Illinois," Don
continued. "While there I qualified for aviation cadets. It was 1948 and I was 19
years old. One day the instructor handed out assignment forms and told us to sign
up for either the 1st Fighter Wing in Alaska, or the Slst Fighter Wing on Okinawa,
the first F-80 equipped fighter wings overseas. I told the sergeant, 'I'm going to air
cadets . I don't want to fill out this form.'
'"Well,' he said, ' you have to put down something.' I put down South Pacific,
and that's where they sent me. I was very unhappy. All I ever wanted to do was
fly airplanes. I went to Okinawa as a crew chief on the F-80 in the Slst Fighter
Wing, 26th Fighter Squadron . I played basketball on the squadron team with
Jimmy Jabara. In Korea Jimmy would become a triple-ace. Nobody could out-
shoot Jimmy in the squadron . The ground target we used for practice was a large
sheet, like an oversized bedsheet. Jimmy put more bullet holes in the thing than
anybody else. He was very good and had excell'ent eye sight. When I returned

59
 Glory Days

53-506 was one of72 B-66B bombers built. First.flown by the 17th Bomb Wing at Hurlburt Field,
Florida, then transferred to the 47th Bomb Wing at RAF Sculthorpe, Norfolk, England. The bombers
had only a UHF radio capability. An HF antenna was built into the vertical stabilizer of the RB and
WB series of aircraft.

60
 The Red Devils of RAF Sculthorpe

from Okinawa I became an instructor at Sheppard AFB in Wichita Falls, Texas.

I never heard anything more about my cadet application, so I applied for OCS,
Officer Candidate School, and I was accepted . They sent me to pilot training at
Grant Aviation in Florida, a civilian contract school, where I flew the PA-18,
which I had flown before, and the T-6, which I dearly loved. I aced the program
because I already had a lot of flying time . The flight commander had many other
duties besides teaching, so he 'd say to me, 'Harding, go fly.' I got more solo time
than anyone else in the class. Then I went to Laredo AFB, Texas, for basic in the
T-28 and T-33. After I got my wings I remained at Laredo as an instructor pilot.
"I loved flight training, loved taking students and making good pilots out
of them. The time came when I had to move on. It was early 1959. A friend of
mine had applied for RF-lOls at Shaw, so I did the same. When we got there they
shunted us into the B-66 program. I was very unhappy, didn't even know what a
B-66 looked like. We then went out on the flight line and looked at one. It looked
like a fast machine, and I began to feel better about my new assignment. We went
through the photo-reconnaissance course at Shaw, learned to take pictures, then
they assigned us to the 47th Bombardment Wing at RAF Sculthorpe in England.
They flew bombers, not reconnaissance aircraft." 1
Royal Air Force Station Sculthorpe, some 100 miles northeast of London,
was one of many World War II bases dotting the eastern part of England. At war's
end the base was moth-balled. In 1948 the Berlin Airlift brought it back to life.
B-29 Superfortresses and B-36 Peacemakers made Sculthorpe their home for a
while. In May 1952 the 47th Bomb Wing arrived with three squadrons of B-45 jet
bombers . I personally remember RAF Sculthorpe, my first overseas assignment as
an airman from 1955 to 1956, having a temporary look about it; made up mostly
of flimsy barracks-like structures with corrugated metal roofs and Quonset huts .
Major Mengel's chapel was a Quonset hut, the large cross above the door the
only feature identifying its purpose. The shopping center, including the base
exchange and numerous vendor shops carrying everything from Harris tweed
to fine English bone china and lead crystal , was a sorry-looking assemblage of
small concrete buildings with corrugated metal roofs. The wing headquarters,
officers' and noncommissioned officers' clubs were not much more than barracks,
differentiated from each other only by the signs above their doors. The hospital,
where I gave up my four wisdom teeth, was a refurbished World War II barracks,
primitive to the extreme. If any money was spent on this barren airfield it was on
the concrete of its runways and ramps, and on the aircraft hangars, certainly not
on the facilities which served the men and their families . I was assigned a very
small room, more like a large walk-in closet, in one of the few permanent looking
structures on base; a room I shared with another airman . He had squatter's rights

61
 Glory Days

because he arrived before me , so I got to sleep in the upper bunk. We shared a

small closet, a tiny table and a lamp; no room for anything else. Toilets, showers
and washbasins were down the hall in one large unheated concrete floored room.
I remember the quaint villages with their squat little houses built of stone, and
the incessant rain and cold wind. The 47th Bomb Wing's three squadrons - 84th,
85th, and 86th - had a nuclear mission. Only the 84th and the 85th squadrons were
initially at Sculthorpe; the 86th was bedded down at nearby RAF Alconbury. The
47th was at the time the most powerful American combat unit in Europe facing
the Soviet colossus across the inner German border. I left Sculthorpe before the
Wing turned in its B-45 bombers for the newer and more capable B-66 in 1958,
which Don Harding came to fly.
A significant change was made to the wing's combat posture almost
immediately after the B-66 bombers arrived. "Higher headquarters decided to
emulate the Strategic Air Command by having strip alerts," recalls retired Major
General David V. Miller, then a colonel and Director of Operations for the 47th
Bomb Wing. "We had four aircraft, two from each of the Sculthorpe squadrons,
on five minute alert with weapons on board and crews at their duty stations. We
were not manned nor organized for strip alerts. It was a real chore to comply
with the orders, but of course we did.',, When the 86th Bomb Squadron moved to
Sculthorpe in 1959 the number of aircraft on alert increased to six.
"It was May 1959 when I arrived in the 84th Bomb Squadron," Don Harding
remembers . "I checked out right away and before I knew it I was sitting Victor
Alert. The planes on Victor Alert were ready to go, loaded with A-bombs, two
planes from each squadron, a total of six. The first eight months I was there we
had the Mark V weapon - essentially the same bomb that was used against Japan,
known as Fat Man. The thing filled the whole bomb-bay. There was a place up
front, near the crawlway, for a canister they would bring out with the bomb, it held
a ball of uranium we referred to as the 'nukki.' It had a threaded hole, and with
special clamps, wearing a hood and rubber gloves, we'd screw this big, shiny,
threaded rod into the nukki . You never lifted anything so heavy in your life. There
was a rack in front of the bomb. It would slide down and we'd pop the top half
back and then clunk this thing into a holder, clamp it off, and push it into the center
of the bomb and lock it. The bomb worked on the implosion principle. All these
' sticks' of TNT were molded around it, and everyone had a detonator attached, a
gillion wires ran here, there and everywhere. To make it work they all had to go
off at once, the way I learned it in Bomb Commander's School. Our plans called
for us to fly in at 38,500 feet. After I dropped the bomb it armed at 14,000 feet, and
it was set for a 3,000 foot above ground-level air burst. In the cockpit there was
an instrument panel with a number of dial-like gauges, they all had to read right

62
 The Red Devils of RAF Sculthorpe

or we were instructed to abort our mission. Lots of switchology was involved . It

about drove me nuts. We had a checklist, but you really had to have it all in your
head . Every six months we had to take the Bomb Commander 's Test- me and my
radar navigator, Chester Burnett.
"We operated under a two-man concept, meaning nobody could approach
the airplane by himself once the bomb had been loaded. The guards, with live
ammunition chambered in their carbines, couldn't come closer to the plane than
50 feet. Later, hallelujah, we got the Mark 28 weapon. It was two feet in diameter,
18 feet long, and you just uploaded it and plugged it in . Then I'd go to the tail of
the bomb and open a little flip- door and punch in the Y-settings, one through four,
which determined the yield . If it called for Y-1, that was the greatest yield, 1.1
megatons , I'd punch in a one, and zeroes on the other settings. The target would
call for a certain yield level, and we ' d program the weapon accordingly. At that
setting there was no safe fly-over of the target. At 38,000 feet, the bomb would
blow us out of the sky. So the procedure was to drop , break hard left or right into
a 135 degree tum, and go as fast as you could to get away from the bomb blast. In
our squadron we were limited to Mach .98 . If you flew faster than that the plane
started to do strange things. We had white, beaded, reflective blast curtains which
wrapped around the inside of the cockpit. Going into the target I would zip the
blast curtain. The chances of us getting away were small. We carried one of the
older Big Boy type, and two of the new Mark 28 H-bombs. We never flew with
the weapons over England.
"We pulled Victor Alert for seven days at a time. It was a self-contained
compound. There were a lot of bridge games going on, and a lot of reading and
studying. I'd take a couple of my golf clubs with me and hit wedge shots on a
grassy area near the fence . Victor Alert got to be a real drag . Our Wing command
post just loved to ring the bell in the middle of the night to test us. We'd all pile
out of bed, jump into our boots and flying suit and head for the airplanes . The
power unit was already connected to the alert planes, so we'd do everything but
start the engines. Every time there was a guard change someone would get me and
introduce me to the new guard - within the compound everything was based on
personal recognition. Security was very tight. The gunner on my crew was a staff
sergeant. Bill would stay outside, pull the pins on the landing gear, and if we had
to go he would disconnect the power unit, then jump on board, and off we'd go .
We'd practice that on alert days. The squadron would have a simulated alert, bring
the bombs out, upload the bombs, we'd go through our cockpit checks, then they
would download the bombs, and we would race as fast as we could to the end of
the runway and take off.

63
 Glory Days

"For practice we dropped Blue Beetles, inert cement practice bombs. They
had the same trajectory as the Mark 28, and we'd drop them from the same
altitude at the Jurby Bombing Range, between Ireland and the British west coast.
A 60 by 90 foot metal covered raft was our target. It was easy for the bombardiers
to put their cross hairs on that target. The Brits who ran the range had three bomb
scoring radars on shore and would get a triangulation fix on the geyser that came
up when the bomb hit the water to determined where the bomb hit in relation to
the raft. We had a top secret additive by which they communicated to us how we
did. It was a string of numbers, only some of them were valid. The Brits would
read us our score using the additive. I'd subtract one from the other to learn that
I had a 200 footer, for example, at 90 degrees from the raft, or something like
that. Captain Ken High was a pilot in StanEval, the Wing Standardization and
Evaluation section, and he gave me my first tactical evaluation ride. We went up
and I dropped the Blue Beetle. Ken was sitting in the gunner 's seat and came up
behind me to watch. Within 45 seconds of dropping the practice bomb the Brits
would usually say, 'Bomb's out.' Then one waited for the score. When the Brit
was ready he'dcall 'Ready to copy?' Then you would copy your additive numbers
to get your score. That day we waited and waited. There was no call that a bomb
had been observed. After well over a minute I called in, 'Any bombs?' The Brit
replied, 'Stand-by, sir. We are checking.'
"I wondered what the hell could they possibly be checking? A couple of
minutes later he came back on the radio with his string of numbers and said, 'You
hit the bloody raft, sir.' A 'shack' in our language. In telling me so he compromised
our top secret code. After we dropped a Blue Beetle we' d go down below 20,000
feet, the gunner would get out of his seat and visually check that the bomb left
the bomb-bay. That done, we'd climb back up to altitude and fly to a radar bomb
scoring site and make RBS-runs . They had those sites all over England and
Scotland. We'd call Edinburgh Control, a radar site, and simulate bombing power
plants, factories, that sort of thing. Again, we would get scored on how we did.
When we ran against London, we'd pick Buckingham Palace for our target. The
Serpentine made a marvelous radar return.
"My actual target was a Russian naval headquarters in one of the Baltic states.
The damn thing sat about a quarter of a mile up in the city. We would have killed
everybody just to get the Russian naval headquarters. Then I would have broken
away and headed for Katowicz airfield to drop my second bomb. We had a look-
alike radar target on the Riviera in southern France. It was almost the identical radar
return of my assigned targets, and we'd fly all the way down there and 'bomb' it
and fly back toward Chateauroux, France, meet a KB-50 tanker, get some fuel and
go home, or land a Chateauroux. I kept the same targets for three years. Chester,

64
 The Red Devils of RAF Srnlthorpe

my bombardier, got very familiar with them. Chester was the best bombardier in
the Wing. He had the lowest CEP, circular error probable, of any bombardier in
the squadron. CEP was averaged over the last 11 practice bombs we dropped at
Jurby Range . A crew was removed from combat ready status if their CEP average
dropped below 1,500 feet. Our squadron commander, Big Jim Morrow, demanded
1,000 feet. He would make a crew go through remedial training if their CEP was
above 1.000 feet. l really enjoyed my years at Sculthorpe. Didn't like the seven
days on Victor Alert away from the family, but it came around only about every
six weeks .
"Big Jim Morrow didn 't make things easy for his air and ground crews . He
was so dedicated to the mission, so demanding , he expected everyone else to be
like him . One couldn 't go to the base exchange in the middle of the day to run
an errand. When you came to work, you stayed at your place of work until five
o'clock or whatever your schedule called for. The word DUTY was written in
capital letters for him ."' John Davis summarizes the times from the perspective of
a B-66 crew chief at Alconbury and Sculthorpe: "It was a time of no recognition
for us, and lots of very hard work with extremely long hours on the flight line." 4
"We had a monthly competition," Harding recalls, "between the three bomb
squadrons called Operation Gift. This competition rotated among the squadrons
and went off rain or shine. My squadron, the 84th, had won Gift for the month. We
launched ten out of twelve airplanes at ten minute intervals . If you launched less
than the ten airplanes, you were down a bunch of points before the competition ever
got underway. Each airplane in the competition dropped a Blue Beetle, then you
flew three RBS runs, came back and hit a KB-50 tanker. We had a tanker squadron
at Sculthorpe, the 420th Air Refueling Squadron. You had to spot the tanker at the
prearranged orbit without making radio contact, chase him down, pull up on his
wing, then the tanker pilot visually cleared you in for the refueling. You'd plug in,
get your 5,000 pounds of fuel, a token amount, then we'd fly down to the Leman
Banks Gunnery Range, get down really low, like 500 feet, and I'd authorize the
gunner to fire 50 rounds from each gun - bm1m1m1. It was a reliability check,
we didn 't shoot at anything . Finally, we'd get to go home. Two airplanes out of
the ten would be designated for extra points. I got tagged this time around. Ken
High came over and yelled , 'Bring your chutes and seat-packs with you .' The seat
pack was hooked to the chute and contained the survival kit, life raft, and all that
other good stuff that keeps you alive when you need it most. We three crawled
out of our airplane with chutes and seat packs . Ken High said, 'I have a letter
signed by the wing commander, Colonel Kenneth C. Dempster, authorizing you
to dump your chutes and packs on the ramp. Go d9 it.' Fortunately it was a sunny
day. We pulled the ripcords on the chutes, opened the survival packs, inflated our

65
 Glory Days

life rafts, then we had to demonstrate how to use our survival equipment. We
won that competition. Big Jim Morrow was so happy, he threw a beer, beans and
hamburger party outside the squadron. The Red Devils, the 84th Squadron, won
the majority of the competitions.
"The 20mm tail guns we carried were quite reliable. On occasion I flew in the
gunner's seat when we gave check rides and I'd tum on the gun-laying radar. The
guns could be locked, but I could still use the tracking handle and run the cross
hairs around. We frequently had F-lOOs and Brits in their fighters come up and
play with us . I'd put the cross hairs on them, and the radar would show how close
they were. You were not supposed to point the guns at anyone. They were always
loaded. All you had to do is hit the charging switch and they were ready to fire.
One time a couple of F-lOOs came up and decided to play with us. They'd dive in
and come up right under us, uncomfortably close. They did this about five times.
When they came again I said to my gunner, 'Bill, unlock the guns and point them
at them - but make sure the charging button is off.'
"'OK, sir. You really want me to do that?'
"'Yea, Bill. Do it.' Bill aimed the guns at them, and off they went. They didn't
come back.
"We had very few problems with the airplanes. They were new and flew well.
I did have one experience though which scared me half to death. I was getting a
check ride from my flight commander, Major Jack Mcclenny, who was the first
pilot to get 1,000 hours in the airplane. Jack was one of the early guys who started
with the 17th Bomb Wing at Hurlburt. He was riding in the gunner's seat when
I started to smell fuel. Jack said, 'We better check the back.' I let down to about
1,000 feet above ground level and depressurized. Jack unstrapped from his chute
and went down in the crawlspace and looked in the bomb bay. He came back,
buckled back in, and said on the intercom, 'There is fuel nearly a foot deep in the
bomb bay.' He turned to the navigator, 'Tum your manual handle RIGHT NOW.
DO NOT hit the electrical switch.' The nav pulled the manual bomb bay door
handle and dumped the fuel. Both the navigator and I could open the bomb bay
doors electrically, but he also had an emergency manual handle he could pull to
open the doors hydraulicly. Jack said, 'We better fly it this way. There is a pipe
running from the front tank to the back tank through the CG, center of gravity,
valve that is leaking.' Normally we never flew with the bomb bay doors open.
'Just add a few extra knots Harding, and you'll be OK.'
"The worst thing in England was the weather. We flew in some horrendous
conditions. Big Jim Morrow was a lieutenant colonel, later made full colonel. He
liked to show up the other squadron commanders. He would launch ten airplanes
into the weather. We often blasted off betting on the come that when we returned

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 The Red Devils of RAF Sculthorpe

the weather was good enough to land. The runways were painted beautifully- big
white stripes along the edges. line check marks so you could cross check your
speed on take-off. You could see them flash by and you 'd say to yourself 2,000
foot check - OK; 4,000 foot check - OK, and after that you knew you had the
speed and lifted right off. I taxied in conditions when I couldn 't see the lines
- after all, ours was a nuclear mission, and we were to respond regardless of
weather. Once the weather didn 't cooperate . It was February 1960. We were sitting
over London Bomb Plot , going back and forth, waiting for things to improve at
Sculthorpe. Big Jim checked in with the squadron on the radio and said, 'Let's go
home boys .' Everybody gets in line and heads for Sculthorpe. One lands, then the
bottom dropped out again . By then we were running low on fuel, below bingo fuel
for our nearest alternate at Chateauroux, France. Everything in Britain was down .
We high tailed it to Chateauroux. There was this big snow storm obliterating
Europe and we were right in the middle of it. I was last in line to come down,
really getting low on fuel. The snow was banging against the windshield. Jack
McCienny, my flight commander, was with me again flying in the gunner's seat. I
said to him, 'You want to take over?'
'"Nah,' he said, ' you'll be alright.'
"Guy Bumpas, a Virginia boy with a deep southern drawl , broke in on GCA
final and said, 'Don , you better hurry, it's really bad down here.' We had what
we called a bug on the K-5 bomb radar. The navigator/bombardier could set the
altitude on his radar, and it was tied into the altimeter. I told him to set it at 50
feet. On my altimeter a red light would come on when we hit 50 feet AGL, above
ground level. I wanted to concentrate on my descent, keep the wings level and fly
my instruments . The red light came on and I couldn't see the runway. I told the
guys, ' We don't have enough fuel to go around . It's do or die.' Suddenly I saw
concrete. I rounded out, pulled the power back, pulled the brake chute, didn't hit
hard, just kinda skipped a little, then I couldn't see anything. I let the nose down,
and it was going pum, pum, pum, pum. I looked over, and the center line was to
my left. I was running over the runway lights . Fortunately the concrete extended
way past the lights. That was a landing to remember. I earned my flight pay that
day. I got behind a Follow-Me jeep. Its driver couldn't see the taxiway, so we just
sat there for a while. We remained at Chateauroux for five days, snowed in . Big
Jim flew us hard, but we had one helluva combat ready squadron. You either knew
how to fly that airplane in all kinds of weather, or you died trying.
"We experimented with LABS, low altitude bomb system, maneuvers in
the B-66, a low-level toss bombing technique . The airplane wasn't built for that.
There were only a few among us who could get thf: airplane across the top, that's
where you had to release the bomb. In 1962, when we got the news that the 47th
Bomb Wing would disband it was a sad day for us all. I flew one of the planes to

67
 Glory Days

the boneyard at Davis-Monthan AFB, in Tucson, Arizona. I taxied off the runway,
up a dirt road and parked it. In less than two years they sold all 54 bombers for
scrap."5
The B-66B had an excellent safety record at Sculthorpe, losing only two
aircraft. On March 30, 1958, soon after the 84th Squadron transitioned from the
B-45 to the B-66, Lieutenant William H. Fulton was caught in a bad weather
situation. Only the short 6,000 foot runway was open. Fulton wanted to divert
to his alternate, Chateauroux, but was directed by the wing commander, Colonel
John G. Glover, to land even though the 10,000 foot runway was closed. Fulton
could not bring the aircraft to a full stop before running off the end. There was
damage, but the airplane was repairable. Instead, it was used for spare parts and
eventually written off. 6 Major General Miller recalls Colonel Glover's penchant
for declaring Sculthorpe at or above landing minimums when in fact the field
was well below minimums, as in the case of Lieutenant Fulton's experience. "I
was returning from a photo mission over Germany," General Miller wrote me.
"The ceiling was about 500 feet, quite high for Sculthorpe. So I decided to make
a touch-and-go landing. As I went around and entered the base leg to land, the
tower called and said the field was below minimums and closed. The exhaust
from my first touch-and-go had generated a dense fog closing the field. About
that time I heard John Glover come on the radio, he was in his car at the end of
the runway, telling me that he had a 200 foot ceiling and one-half mile visibility
- our weather minimums. From the sound of his voice I knew that conditions
were zero-zero. I landed with the able assistance of the GCA controller. After
landing I proceeded straight to the bar."7 The next and final accident occurred
on a night training mission soon after take-off on October 26, 1961. The 85th
Bomb Squadron aircraft entered an uncontrollable spin when attempting to avoid
a collision with a passing DC-8 KLM airliner bound for New York. The two pilots
and the navigator perished.8
There were lighter moments as well, not driven by unrelenting training
requirements, when it was fun just to fly the friendly skies. In December 1959
President Eisenhower went on an eleven nation goodwill tour dubbed by the
Air Force Operation Monsoon. The President was flying in his new Boeing 707
jet, redesignated VC-137, leased from Continental Airlines. The 707 replaced
Columbine, a four-engine Lockheed Constellation. Unfortunately the new jet
had virtually no navigation equipment for travel outside the United States. A
navigator's seat was squeezed in behind the pilot's seat, but the radar, according
to Major Ken High who toured the airplane with its navigator, "was lucky to pick
up Long Island when they flew over." 9
In 1958 the Russians lured a U.S. Air Force C-130 intelligence plane across
the border from Turkey into Armenia, then shot it down, killing its seventeen man

68
 The Red Devils of RAF Sculrhorpe

crew. The President 's scheduled trip was to take him to Athens, Greece. From there
to Ankara , Turkey, and then to Karachi , Pakistan, passing near the Soviet border
region where the C-130 had been lured into Armenia. New Delhi , India; Kabul ,
Afghanistan, and Tehran. Iran. were on the President's schedule as well. The Air
Staff directed two B-66s from the 47th Bomb Wing to escort Air Force One from
Ankara , Turkey. on December 7, to Tehran, Iran, and again from Tehran to Ankara
on December 14. Headquarters USAFE in Wiesbaden upped the number from two
to four B-66 bombers . The stated purpose of the escort was to "support Operation
Monsoon with airborne radar as a navigation aid to Air Force One." Crews selected
to perform the honor of escorting the President's plane were identified to Colonel
Draper, the President 's Air Force aide and pilot, by name , as were the aircraft
tail numbers. Captain Kenneth High , pilot, Lieutenant Bobby H. Lynn, navigator,
and SSGT Paul 0 . Morris, crew chief, were to crew B-66B 53-499. 54-481 was
crewed by Captains Robert C. Hanson , Vincente Rodriguez-Mattei, and SSGT
Charles P. Manor; 54-550 by Major Donald E. Orr, Captain William Thomas, and
N2C William R. Cox. And the fourth aircraft, 54-479, was manned by Captains
George J. Parkhurst, Robert A. Gould and Frederick W. Carter, another pilot.
Parkhurst was to transfer to Air Force 1 in Turkey and serve as 47BW liaison
officer. Major Orr, the operations officer for the 84th Bomb Squadron, was to lead
the four-ship Presidential escort. By direction from the Secret Service the B-66s
were to come "at no time nearer than 5,000 feet vertically or horizontally" to Air
Force 1, and they were to be unarmed.
"On 5 December 1959 ," recalls retired Lieutenant Colonel Donald Orr,
"two C-130 transports carrying our support team departed from RAF Sculthorpe,
followed by two KB-50 tankers from the 420th Air Refueling Squadron . We
rendezvoused with the tankers over Elba, refueled, and continued on to Incirlik at
Adana, Turkey. The two KB-50s and two C-130s arrived later in the day. On the
7th of December, two of our B-66s intercepted Air Force One as it was departing
Ankara. The other two proceeded to a prearranged refueling area, and we assumed
the prescribed escort formation through Turkey into Iran . We overflew Tehran,
and proceeded on to the Pakistan border where our escort duties terminated and
Air Force 1 continued on its own to Karachi, Pakistan . We recovered at Tehran
Mehrabad airport and remained there until the 14th of December. On the 14th
only I took off from Mehrabad and intercepted Air Force 1 at first light as it
came over the Afghanistan border east of Birjand, Iran . Air Force One then landed
at Mehrabad where the President met with the Shah." 10 "The Iranians laid a red
carpet from the airport to the gate of the Shah's palace, and the road was lined by
a flower throwing throng of people," recalls Ken High. 11
Between 1956, when the B-66 bombers first arrived at Hurlburt Field, and
their final departure from RAF Sculthorpe in June 1962, the world changed in

69
 Glory Days

ways few had foreseen. The launch of Sputnik/, the first artificial satellite to orbit
earth on October 4, 1957, and the subsequent launch of Sputnik II by the Soviet
Union on November 3, carrying a little dog named Laika, announced that the
space age had arrived. As an airman stationed at South Ruislip Air Station, 3rd
Air Force Headquarters, on the outskirts of London, I recall the shock on the faces
of officers. They couldn't believe what the Russians had done. Everyone knew it
was a turning point: the space age had arrived, but not the way we had envisioned
it. On January 31, 1958, the U.S. finally launched Explorer I as an answer to the
Soviet challenge, an answer that was significantly diminished by five spectacular
launch failures of the Navy Vanguard rocket, Eisenhower's choice, between
February and September 1958. Finally, in February 1959, the first Titan ICBM
lifted off a launch pad, restoring America's prestige, followed on June 9 by the
launch of the U.S. Navy's first ballistic missile carrying submarine, the USS
George Washington armed with Polaris missiles. Bombers were to share more
and more of their strategic nuclear role with intercontinental ballistic missiles
launched from silos on land and submarines at sea. The demise of the small B-66
nuclear bomber force was hastened by the shoot down of Gary Francis Powers'
U-2 by a salvo of SA-2 surface to air missiles over the Soviet Union. To survive,
bombers had to change tactics - fly low instead of high, and deliver their weapons
using the preferred LABS toss-bombing maneuver, something the B-66 was not
built to execute. Then there were of course the incessant budgetary pressures to
put more money into the strategic forces, especially missiles. One way to do that
was to stop funding the old, such as the B-66B bombers .
Within the NATO alliance relationships changed as well. As early as July
1959 President Charles DeGaul ordered U.S. nuclear forces out of France,
resulting in the total withdrawal of U.S. combat units from France by 1966. The
only thing that never seemed to change was change itself. And then there was a
book published in 1961 by Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, which presented a
vivid portrait of the French debacle in Indochina in the 1950s. Fall would die in
1967 alongside U.S. Marines on the road north of Hue, the street without joy. It
was a book that should have been read by every senior American government
official, but especially the President and his secretary of defense.
Colonel Harris B. Hull from Headquarters PACAF in Hawaii wrote his long-
time friend, retired General Ira Eaker, on February 3, 1958, "Everyone here is
pepped up that we finally got a satellite in orbit. I have the feeling that we have a
lot to learn about running a real good Cold War. As I feel that a Cold War is a war
that can be won, in contrast with a general war, which I think both sides will lose
... I expect I am not telling you anything very new. But I do feel it is a war that can
be won, and probably will be won by someone. Sincerely, Harris." 12 Colonel Hull
was right, but it was to be a close thing - cold war versus hot war.

70
 CHAPTER SIX

THE 19TH TACTICAL

RECONNAISSANCE SQ!)ADRON

The 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, lOTRG, at Spangdahlem Air Base,

Germany, received its first B-66 aircraft in November 1956, an electronic
reconnaissance C-model - aircraft number 54-459. Other squadrons based in
Germany and Japan assigned to the 66th and 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wings
completed their conversion from the RB-26 and the problem plagued RB-57 A in
1957; as did the 9th, 16th,41st and 43rd Reconnaissance Squadrons at Shaw AFB.
The last aircraft delivered by the Douglas Corporation were 36 WB-660 weather
reconnaissance models, arriving at their squadrons at Yokota, Spangdahlem and
Shaw in 1957 and 1958.(See Appendix 3)
Among the squadrons converting to the new RB-66B in January 1957 was
the 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photographic) commanded
by Major John B. Anderson . Major Anderson assumed command of the 19th
on July 20, 1953 , when the squadron was activated at Shaw AFB and equipped
with RB-45C spy-planes released by the Strategic Air Command. At Shaw the
squadron was attached to the 363TRG for administrative and logistic purposes,
but remained operationally assigned to 9th Air Force, also located at Shaw. The
reason for a higher headquarters retaining operational control of the 19th was its
unique mission - flying secretive spy flights over the Soviet Union . Few assigned
to Shaw AFB in those days ever recalled seeing an RB-45C sitting on the ramp or
flying overhead. The aircraft were kept out of sight, and while at Shaw had their
tail guns reinstalled which SAC had chosen to remove . Then four of its aircraft
were flown to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, for extensive modifications to their

71
 Glory Days

The 19th TRS.formed at Shaw AFB, SC, and was initially equipped with RB-45C photo-reconnaissance
aircraft released by SAC. The squadron soon transferred to RAF Sculthorpe, England. Jn March
1955, three 19TRS RB-45Cs flew deep into the Soviet Union on a daring reconnaissance mission .
RB-66B 53-453 is shown after the 19th TRS, having converted to RB-66B aircraft, transferred to the
10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base , Germany. The vertical stabilizer is
decorated with the 10th Wing emblem, a fallin g star. The black stripe in the vertical stabilizer is the
HF antenna isolation strip.

72
 The 19th Tactical Reconnais.rnnce Squadron

ground mapping radar before participating in yet another top secret spy mission
over the Soviet Union on April 28, 1954. It was a night reconnaissance mission
flown out of RAF Sculthorpe along routes similar to an April 1952 overflight. The
aircrews on both flights were British. Three weeks later, on May 7, 1954, Major
Anderson led the remaining l 9TRS aircraft from Shaw AFB via Newfoundland
and Iceland to RAF Sculthorpe . At Sculthorpe the 19th was again attached to the
47th Bomb Wing for administrative and support purposes, but the 3rd Air Force,
headquartered at South Ruislip Air Station, a London suburb, retained operational
control over the squadron, just as the 9th Air Force had at Shaw. Ten months after
the 19th arrived at Sculthorpe, on the night of March 27, 1955, Major Anderson
led three of its RB-45C aircraft on a deep penetration over the Soviet Union,
Anderson flying the longest and most exposed route taking him beyond Moscow.
They all returned safely and the three aircrews were awarded the Distinguished
Flying Cross for obtaining essential radar photography needed by the Fat Man
type bomb carrying B-45 bombers at RAF Sculthorpe.
The 19th TRS, attached to the 4 7th Bomb Wing upon arrival at RAF Sculthorpe
and assigned to the 3rd Air Force in London, England, underwent a number of
re-attachments and reassignments without ever leaving Sculthorpe, until finally,
in January 1958, the squadron was attached to the 10th Reconnaissance Wing
at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Two months later, on March 8, 1958, the
squadron was officially assigned to the 10th Wing. There would be no more
overflights of the Soviet Union for the 19th TRS. The squadron became just
another of several ordinary photo reconnaissance squadrons based in Europe.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis J. 'Doc' Partridge assumed command of the 19th on
October 4, 1958, a position Doc held longer than any other l 9TRS commander,
until February 1962. One of Doc's first tasks was to move the 19TRS from RAF
Sculthorpe to Spangdahlem. With the arrival of the 19th at Spangdahlem in
January of 1959, the base hosted four 24-aircraft reconnaissance squadrons - 1st,
19th, 30th and 42nd. The 10th TRW was the largest Air Force combat wing in
Europe.
The families of l 9TRS flyers had barely settled at Spangdahlem when
President Charles De Gaulle had second thoughts about French sovereignty and
ordered American atom bomb carrying aircraft out of France. The F-1 OOD fighters
based in France were moved to Spangdahlem, and the 10th Wing relocated to
England- including, of course, the hapless 19th TRS. On August 25, 1959, seven
months after moving from Sculthorpe to Spangdahlem, the 19th opened shop at
an old World War II bomber training base with the barest of accommodations
and facilities, RAF Bruntingthorpe. The battle lines, should war come, would
of course be drawn in central Germany. England was a bit far removed for its

73
 Glory Days

reconnaissance squadrons to be of much use to Army and Air Force commanders

battling an enemy in Germany. So the 19th, along with other reconnaissance
squadrons moved again in 1962, this time back to our reluctant ally France. The
squadron bedded down at Toul-Rosieres Air Base, then, in October 1965, it moved
for the last time to nearby Chambley.
Major General David V. Miller, then a colonel and the Director of Operations
for the 47th Bomb Wing in 1957 when the 19th TRS transitioned from the RB-
45C to the RB-66B recalls being sent to Sembach, Germany "to go through the B-
66 simulator. This was a 15-hour course and included more emergency situations
than one would encounter in flying the aircraft for years. Once back at Sculthorpe
I was briefed by a recently qualified B-66 pilot and took off with a navigator and a
flight engineer. I felt very comfortable making my first take-off because I thought
I could handle nearly any emergency that might arise. The only thing I needed was
to get the feel of the airplane. It turned out flying the B-66 was very different from
'flying' the simulator. The aileron boost for instance was 20 to 1; the rudder boost
10 to 1; and the elevator boost about 8 to 1. I climbed out at mach .78. The RB-66
flew like ajet fighter. I loved it." 1
All went well for the 19th TRS the first year of operation. Then on April 14,
1958, Captain Roger Taylor and his crew, Lieutenant Robert Handcock, navi-
gator, and TSGT Bernard Valencia, gunner, took off on what they referred to as a
round-robin flight - a training mission originating at Sculthorpe and returning to
Sculthorpe. The weather was about as good as it got in rain soaked County Norfolk
with a 500 foot ceiling and several layers of broken and solid cloud. Three and
one-half hours later, their mission complete, Captain Taylor began his approach to
Sculthorpe. Visibility was one mile. "The traffic pattern was normal and the aircraft
was handed to the final controller on the base leg approximately eight miles out.
Final approach was normal." Then the aircraft drifted above, below and to the left
of the glide slope. The GCA controller told Captain Taylor "to go around because
he was high and to the right" of the glide slope. The aircraft vanished from view
of the GCA radar controller and did not respond to instructions. Two minutes later
a crash was reported by the village of Fakenham police.2
The crash of 54-422 and the accompanying loss of life was a shock to a
squadron with an excellent flight safety record. What happened? The weather was
fine. The aircraft was new. It was just a routine training flight. Sergeant Ken Weiand,
a gunner in the 19th TRS remembers, "they were about three miles out from touch-
down when an explosion occurred within the aircraft. Then it apparently nosed
down and exploded on contact. There wasn't much left of anything."' Sergeant
Weiand did not know that less than three months later he would be involved in an
accident himself, although not with the tragic consequences of Captain Taylor's

74
 The 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

flight. His was a round robin out of Sculthorpe as well. A training mission, on July
2, 1958,for Lieutenant Harvey, the navigator. Ken Weiand flew as gunner and acted
as crew chief when necessary. The weather 'tanked' on them and they decided to
divert to their alternate - Chateauroux, France. Lieutenant Van Young, the pilot,
and Sergeant Weiand helped the alert crew at Chateauroux refuel the aircraft. A
spare drag chute was installed, and Sergeant Weiand assisted in replenishing the
liquid oxygen on the aircraft. Lieutenant Young went to base operations, checked
on the Sculthorpe weather and decided to chance it. While over Calais Lieutenant
Young checked with Anglia Center on the Sculthorpe weather and learned that
conditions had actually improved from what he had been given at Chateauroux.
When arriving over the Sculthorpe beacon the visibility was two miles in light
rain and ground fog. He initiated his approach to runway 06 - which was 9,000
feet long and 300 feet wide. Over the landing threshold Lt. Young reported his
airspeed at 150 knots, it may have been a bit higher, pulled the throttles to idle,
deployed the brake chute, which billowed, then collapsed but remained attached
to the aircraft. The Tower Officer on duty reported touch down 1,200 feet from
the approach end of the runway. The GCA operator, located at the 4,500 foot
point of runway 06 looked out of his unit noting that the aircraft passed at a speed
he estimated "as very fast. The aircraft continued past the end of the runway,
rolled on the sod for a distance of 991 feet, went through a security fence, and
250 feet farther into a field of growing barley where it came to rest with the nose
gear collapsed." There was no fire. The crew jettisoned their hatches and escaped
without injury. The aircraft suffered minor damage and was quickly returned
to duty. But surely it was an exciting landing for all. Young lieutenants learned
by doing. One lesson learned: keep the runway ahead of you when landing, not
behind you.•
Airmen are a superstitious lot, and even if they deny it, they believe and are
absolutely certain that misfortune always comes in lots of three . The l 9TRS flyers
didn't have to wait long for the third accident to materialize. On July 3, one day
after Lieutenant Young ran his airplane into a field of growing barley, Captain
Bill Maroum and his crew encountered a more serious problem. Captain Willis
Gray, the instructor navigator flying in the gunner's seat, was giving Lieutenant
Constantin Costen a navigation check. The check completed, with plenty of fuel
remaining, Captain Maroum decided to shoot some missed approaches. On a
go-around the left gear did not fully retract and lock. He recycled the gear and
all gears went where they were supposed to go . Maroum then decided to bum
off some fuel. Because of a high power setting he extended his speed brakes to
slow the aircraft. The crew heard a loud thumping noise in the crawlway when
the speed brakes extended - never a good sign.' Captain Maroum then noticed

75
 Glory Days

his hydraulic pressure dropping to zero. Captain Gray unstrapped, looked in the
crawlway, and their worst fears were confirmed - the hydraulic reservoirs were
empty. Gray proceeded to lower the gear using the emergency system. The nose
and right main gear came down and locked - the left gear did not. One cannot
land an airplane in such a configuration, so all three were forced to eject. Before
ejecting Captain Maroum engaged the automatic pilot, trimmed the aircraft for
straight and level flight and headed it toward the North Sea. Maroum estimated
they had about 20 minutes of fuel remaining when they ejected. "After the crew
abandoned the aircraft it entered a tum to the left and made four circles about five
miles wide north of Sculthorpe. It then flew over the base and crashed 27 miles
from Sculthorpe after flying for 26 minutes. Both engines flamed out prior to
impact. 5 lt was to be a somber 4th of July celebration for the 19th.(See Appendix
5)
Lewis J. 'Doc' Partridge was commander of the 43rd 1RS at Shaw in 1958
when he was tapped to take over the 19th at RAF Sculthorpe. He packed his
things and arrived with his family that October. "I had no sooner settled in at
Sculthorpe when I received orders to move the squadron to Spangdahlem in early
January 1959. All went well. It is the 3rd of July, I remember, when Colonel
James D. Kemp assumed command of the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
at Spangdahlem from Colonel Kenneth R. Powell. The change of command
ceremony was going to be a first rate affair, including a huge 48 ship fly-by, 12
aircraft from each of the four B-66 squadrons at Spangdahlem. The F-lOOs at
Bitburg Air Base, just down the road, added another 12 of their aircraft. I had the
honor of leading this huge formation of 60 aircraft. I lined up my 12 aircraft on the
taxiway. We performed our preflight checks, including running the fuel selector
switch through its positions to check all the tanks - forward, aft, and the wing fuel
tanks. I guess one of my crews got too interested in a ball game near our taxiway
and left the fuel selector switch in the Emergency Forward Tank position. Flight
time for that tank is about 30 minutes. We got off OK and were at our join-up
point over the Buechel beacon at 2,000 feet above the terrain, when Captain Jim
Wells called a double flame out. He was attempting an air start, then informed
me that he intended to make a power out landing at Spangdahlem if he couldn't
get the engines started. He was at a very low altitude and I couldn't afford to
have him close the runway with this many airplanes in the sky, so I ordered him
and his navigator to eject. Best decision I ever made. I then got everyone back
together and we flew across the field in a fairly good looking formation, minus
one aircraft."6
The fly-by proceeded as scheduled, although A/2C Pete West, standing tall
on the ramp watching and counting the planes wondered how it was that he

76
 The 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

had helped launch 48 airplanes, but only 47. by his count , passed overhead in
formation.' Not only were there only 47 aircraft in the formation, but Captain
'Swede' Jensen decided to do a slow roll while the formation passed over the
reviewing stand. Swede was grounded for ten days, Colonel Kemp's first official
act as commander of the I 0th Wing .8 Colonel Kemp and Lieutenant Colonel Doc
Partridge , wing and squadron commander respectively, soon found themselves
standing in front of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, 4ATAF, commander at
nearby Ramstein Air Base, Major General Gabriel Disosway, explaining the loss
of one of their aircraft. It was a fairly cordial meeting, Colonel Partridge recalls,
until General Disosway's vice commander, Brigadier General Benjamin 0 . Davis
Jr., asked why the crew - Captain James Wells and Lieutenant Edward Mullarkey
- was wearing low quarter shoes instead of flight boots. "The rest of the time that
we were at Spangdahlem," Colonel Partridge recalls, "either the commander, that
was me, or the operations officer, had to run a boot check on all crews before they
were allowed to fly." 9
Before ejecting from a perfectly good airplane that sunny July day in 1959 ,
Captain Wells put it on a heading where it would not endanger life or property
once it crashed. "The aircraft contacted the ground in a wings level attitude,
skipped through a wheat field for 480 feet, flew across a 150 foot wide ravine,
then smashed into the face of the ravine and exploded.'" 0 The crew was picked up
by a Spangdahlem rescue helicopter, no worse for wear, but a little apprehensive
about what was going to happen next . Fortunately for the two young flyers it was
a much more forgiving Air Force than today 's. The men had little time left on their
overseas tours and soon departed for other assignments without career impact,
other than their damaged egos .
The 10th Wing frequently was called upon for fly-bys on Memorial Day and
similar occasions . Their 48 aircraft formation passing over American military
cemeteries in Belgium, Luxembourg and France was a sight that brought out huge
crowds. The small village of Ettelbruck remembered General George Patton and
his tanks liberating them from Nazi occupation in 1945. Every year the villagers
put on a big celebration in honor of their beloved general who lay buried in the
nearby American cemetery. On the occasion of the 14th anniversary of their
liberation in June 1959, 48 Spangdahlem based RB-66s passed over the celebrants
at Ettelbruck, followed by 12 F-100C fighters from Bitburg Air Base. Such fly-bys
and accompanying open houses made Americans good and wanted neighbors ."
Airman Robert Ganci was a gunner in the 19th squadron. His perspective of
squadron life was of course a bit different from that of the officers. Ganci joined
the Air Force right out of high school. In 1958 hf! found himself at Lowry AFB,
Denver, Colorado, going through gunnery school. "Just about my entire class was

77
 Glory Days

sent to RAF Sculthorpe. I went to the 19th TRS which at that time was a part of
the 66th Wing at Sembach, Germany. My first regular assignment was on the crew
of our squadron commander, 'Doc' Partridge. Doc was a great pilot, but he flew
the RB-66 like it was a passenger plane. Everything was done very gently. It was
a night flight out of Sculthorpe I remember most. We were cleared for landing
when the famous Norfolk fog set in. Doc continued our descent following the
GCA operator's instructions . After we landed I still could not see the ground, it
was that foggy. Then Doc asked me to unstrap, get out of my seat and walk in
front of the aircraft shining my flashlight, he was going to follow. I had this vision
of being run over by a jet bomber. The navigator saved me by suggesting to Doc
that we just leave the airplane on the runway, which we did. The field was closed
for the night anyway.
"Flying at Sculthorpe was fun, but the real fun was the night life off base,"
Ganci recalls. "I was 19 years old, and between my base pay, overseas pay, flight
pay, separate rations, and TDY money, I was making much more money than
the average Brit my age, and more than I ever had before in my life. During
the week we gunners would go into Kings Lynn to the infamous Palm Court
pub which attracted beautiful young English girls from all the small towns and
villages nearby. On weekends we went to Great Yarmouth, a seaside resort on the
east coast. Yarmouth was one of the few towns that would not allow the Air Police
to enforce the law, as they did in Kings Lynn. So the town was a great place to
have fun. When the 19th transferred to Germany in January 1959 we were told it
was a scheduled move, but the rumor among us enlisted men was that we were
kicked out of the United Kingdom because we were having too much fun." 12 Bob
Ganci made the Air Force a career. Most of his fellow gunners got out after their
four year enlistments ended.
Captain Lester Alumbaugh was an F-86 and F-102 pilot who considered
himself lucky to get a B-66 flying assignment in 1960, a time when the Air Force
was shrinking and many pilots found themselves assigned to remote radar sites
watching airplanes on flickering radar screens, rather than flying one themselves.
Lester came from a small town, Robinson, in east-central Illinois, eight miles from
the Indiana state line. "My father worked in the pottery. They made plumbing
fixtures - toilets, sinks and bidets. At age 16, which was the minimum hiring age
then, I went to work after school in the pottery sweeping floors and boxing things
for shipment. What I really wanted to do was fly. A couple of my high school
chums decided to enlist in the Air Force and asked me if I wanted to come along.
I enlisted on July 6, 1948. I was 19. After basic training I became an aircraft
mechanic at Chanute AFB, Illinois, close to my home. At Chanute I applied for
aviation cadets . You had to be 20 years old, had to have good eye sight, and didn't

78
 The 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

need a college degree . I took the test and failed it by one question. The sergeant
looked at me and decided to give me credit for that one question. In June 1949
I went to James Connally AFB in Waco, Texas. I was selected for jet training,
but I wanted to fly the F-51 . I had an instructor who had flown the F-80 . He
told me 'F-5 ls are the past. Go into jets.' I went to Williams AFB near Tempe,
Arizona, and graduated in June 1950. My first take-off in the F-80 fighter by
myself was an experience beyond words. It was the thrill of a lifetime! I checked
out in the F-86A with the 8lst Fighter Wing at Moses Lake AFB in Washington
state, then went on to the F-860 at Truax Field in Wisconsin, staying long enough
to transition into the F-102. Life was as good as it could get for a kid from a small
town in rural Illinois.
"In 1960 the handwriting was on the wall, ADC was downsizing. An awful
lot of guys were being selected to go to GCI sites. My group received a levy
to provide a pilot for a B-66 assignment. I jumped at it. I went through RB-66
training at Shaw. The course was 21 weeks long. The instructor pilot sat in the
gunner's seat on take-off and landing and moved to the aisle behind the throttles
after level off. He sat on some kind of a box with no belt or chute. Not a very safe
situation. Obviously, going into the B-66 required adjustments . The first thing I
had to adjust to was the size of the airplane and my position in the cockpit. I was
now sitting on the left side, and I am used to having a stick in my right hand,
the throttle in my left. This airplane did not have a stick, it had a yoke. And the
throttles were in the center. To move a throttle I had to do it with my right hand, fly
the airplane left-handed. The airplane seemed a little heavy on landing compared
to the fighters I had been flying, required a little more arm effort to move the
wheel and of course you controlled the aileron with the wheel not a stick.
"After training at Shaw I was assigned to the 19th TRS at RAF Bruntingthorpe.
The 10th Wing headquarters was at Alconbury, along with two of our squadrons,
the 1st and the 30th TRS. The 42nd was at Chelveston, they flew RB-66Cs and
Ds, and we were at Bruntingthorpe. Our wing was scattered over three airbases
in England, not an ideal situation. I found the B-66 a nice airplarie to fly and
became quite attached to it. I don't recall any problems, just routine stuff. As far
as take-off distance, it took about 5,500 to 6,000 feet with a full internal fuel load.
Only occasionally did we practice in-flight refueling from a KB-50. It wasn't too
bad on the tail drogue, but the wing drogues were hell to refuel off. We mastered
it, but didn't like it. It took me about 300 hours flying time to learn to grease the
airplane in, make a really smooth landing. I did that every time after that. Now
and then I'd get another pilot's navigator flying with me and I get complimented
on my landings. They'd say, 'John doesn't land l~ke that.' I became an IP, then a
flight commander. Our wartime mission was bomb-damage- assessment, BDA,

79
 Glory Days

as well as pre-strike reconnaissance. We practiced those missions and had an

annual reconnaissance competition called Royal Flush. Our squadron lost a crew
practicing for that competition in 1961. One of those unexplained mysteries." 13
On the evening of March 16, 1961,Captain Harry Armani, pilot, with Captain
Daniel Harvey and First Lieutenant Frank Whitley, both navigators, launched in
aircraft number 54-430 on a practice Royal Flush mission from RAF Alconbury
along with two other RB-66 photo-reconnaissance aircraft. Armani, Harvey and
Whitley were from the 19th TRS at Bruntingthorpe. Doc Partridge had chosen
them precisely because they were his best. Every NATO country with an airborne
reconnaissance capability sent crews to this annual competition. Armani had flown
54-430 for his last 20 sorties, Jogging nearly 55 hours of flying time. He thought
he knew this airplane inside out. The three RB-66s proceeded to their practice
area in a loose trail formation . The target area was clear, a dark night with stars,
no moon. Their two targets were located on the West Frisian Islands of Vlieland
and Terschelling. Armani contacted ' Cornfield' the airborne range controller
and was cleared for his first practice run on the Vlieland target. Subsequent runs
were live runs using flare cartridges. The procedure called for the first run on
Vlieland, then a turn into the target on Terschelling. A left hand race-track pattern
was flown. While one plane was dropping flare cartridges over Vlieland, another
would be dropping over Terschelling, and the third aircraft would be on a cross-
wind leg near the Dutch coast. Ten runs were made, five against each target. Each
pilot flew the same run at the same altitude on the same target. After the last run,
aircraft one and two reported in to the airborne range controller - Armani did
not. After six to seven minutes the range controller attempted to contact 54-430.
There was no response . A search was immediately initiated. "Bits of wreckage
and one crewmember's helmet was later found which definitely established that
the aircraft crashed into the North Sea in the vicinity of the range. The area where
the aircraft was determined to have crashed was a WW-II mined area which was
subsequently swept by Royal Navy mine sweepers. The Royal Netherlands Navy
conducted an extended search of the area," but found nothing. The tragic Joss hit
hard in a close knit community of flyers. 14 Over the years that the 19th TRS flew
the RB-66B the squadron Jost seven aircraft to non-combat related causes, more
than any of its sister squadrons.
"The guns came out of the airplanes soon after I got to Bruntingthorpe in
1960," Lester Alumbaugh remembers. "ECM tail cones replaced the guns. We
then flew with a flight engineer instead of a gunner. In August 1962 the 10th Wing
moved again. The 19th and 42nd TRS went to Toul-Rosieres, France. After we left,
Bruntingthorpe and Chelveston closed. Toul was a pretty plush base compared to
Bruntingthorpe with the necessary support facilities for families, which was nice

80
 The 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

to have for a change. It was also nice being on the Continent. It wasn't far to
Germany and the big air bases at Ramstein and Wiesbaden with their large base
exchanges. Our relations with the French were good I thought, although we did
not talk to each other much . We didn't learn much French, and they didn't speak
English, even if they knew it.
The Wing had a fair weather base at Moron Air Base, Spain, near Seville.
It was always a treat to go there . We also used Nouasseur in Morocco, just
outside Casablanca. My navigator was Bill Robinson . Bill and I got crewed up
at Bruntingthorpe and stayed together until we rotated home in 1963. Like many
navigators , Bill had wanted to be a pilot. One day Bill said to me, 'Les, will you
let me fly ?' So I said, 'Why not. I'll scoot my seat back and you come up here
and sit on my lap and we ' ll see how it goes .' Bill unstrapped, came up front and
actually did quite well. We were flying low level, at about 1,000 feet. So we did
that a few times while flying out of Nouasseur. When it came time to go back to
Toul, Bill asked if he could fly us home . I told him I would take us off, climb to
altitude and get everything set, then he could take over. He wanted to hand fly,
while I would have been on autopilot. I told Bill not to strap in. If anything came
up we would change positions quickly. I had another navigator in the third seat.
Bill and I changed seats . After Bill got settled down he said, 'I'm all set, Les . Can
I kick it off autopilot?'
"I said,' Sure, go ahead.' We were above the clouds, in the clear. Bill kicked
her off autopilot. I noticed he was moving things around. Then he said, 'Hey, Les.
How do I stop this ?' He was in a dutch roll. I told him 'just hold the wheel in one
place , then level the wings.' He tried. The next thing I know we are doing a barrel
roll. Of course I came out of my seat, pulled the power to idle, and took the wheel
and completed the roll . I was off the intercom when I moved forward and I told
Bill to tell Ed, the second navigator, not to punch out, that all was OK . Recovering
the airplane was a piece of cake, but I didn't know Ed very well, and didn't want
him punching out on me - things like that happened. After that experience Bill
didn't ask to fly anymore .
"At Toul-Rosieres we stood alert with the 42nd TRS , our sister squadron .
We flew the photo-birds and pulled Whiskey Alert, while the 42nd flew B-66B
bombers converted to the ECM role, known as Brown Cradles . Their alert posture
was known as Echo Alert. They would accompany the F-IOOs if war broke out
and jam Soviet radars to help the 100s get through to their targets . I rotated back
to Shaw in 1963 and was assigned to the 9th TRS flying C and D models. I got
just over 1,000 hours in the B-66. It was a good airplane to fly. They always said
the engine was a weak link, but I never had any di~ficulties . My experience.in the
airplane was very positive." 15

81
 CHAPTER SEVEN

THE B-66 DOCTOR

OF SHAW AIR FORCE BASE

In 1940 Sumter, South Carolina, was just another small town in the deep south,
nestled among forests of pine and fields of cotton. Mule drawn wagons were a
common sight on its streets. Yet, some of its citizens were looking toward a future
filled with airplanes, not mules . A war was raging in Europe and the United States
might very well become involved. Leading citizens put their heads together and
set off for Washington D.C., to meet with their powerful senator, the Honorable
James F. Byrnes, a future Secretary of State in the cabinet of President Harry
Truman. Evidently Byrnes chatted with Major General 'Hap' Arnold, the Army
Air Corps' chief, and by May of 1941 Sumter had acquired an Army Air Corps
training base. The good citizens of Sumter knew it was a beginning. If they could
hold on to their good fortune, and hold on they did, it meant good jobs for years
to come. The citizens of Sumter did not have to think very hard about a name for
their new airfield: Shaw Field. Lieutenant David Shaw, a Sumter County native,
lost his life on a reconnaissance mission behind German lines on July 9, 1918.
Piston powered training planes at Shaw Field gave way to jets in the early postwar
years and Shaw Field was renamed Shaw Air Force Base, becoming the tactical
reconnaissance center for the United States Air Force.' In 1956 it was once again
time for change as the swept wing RB-66 made its appearance. The four squadrons
of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group, the 9th, 16th, 41st and 43rd, shed
their old aircraft and transitioned to the jet powered, swept wing newcomer.
The first RB-66B photo reconnaissance jet was flown into Shaw AFB on
January 31 , 1956, by Captain Tom Whitlock. Perhaps Tom arrived too early in the

82
 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base

The occasion is the delivery of an RB-668 to the 10th TRW at RAF Alconbury in August 1962. Colonel
Victor N . Cabas, IOTRW commander, is standing on the left next to the senior Douglas technical
representative to the 10th TRW, Clifford Wilcott . Third/mm right is Major Richard Miller who piloted
the plane from Tulsa , Oklahoma, to RAF Alconbury. Major John Conlon, navigator, third from left.
Cliff Parrott, the 'B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base,' second from right , accompanied the delivery
crew to Alconbury. Far right is Lawrence Gunderson, Director of Service Engineering of the Douglas
Tulsa Division.

83
 Glory Days

year for a proper welcome. Instead, the first RB-66C electronic reconnaissance
model, flown into Shaw from the Douglas plant at Tulsa by the 363rd Group
commander, Colonel Paul A. Pettigrew, on May 11, 1956, received the welcoming
ceremony Tom Whitlock did not get. The sun shone bright, the press was out in
force, and a quick thinking Air Force public relations team took advantage of
the opportunity to christen the RB-66C, tail number 54-452, City of Sumter. The
mayor, Ms . Priscilla Shaw, beamed and spoke kind words. Sandra Jernigan, Miss
Sumter of 1956, planted a big kiss on Colonel Pettigrew's cheek. Everybody was
happy.2
In December of 1955 a young Douglas Aircraft Corporation technical
representative and his family had arrived in Sumter. Clifford 'Cliff' Parrott's job
as the senior Douglas representative at Shaw Air Force Base was to take care of
all the little and large glitches that inevitably accompanied the introduction of new
technology. Cliff was a strapping six-foot-two young man with the optimism of an
Alaska gold rush miner. He would need every bit of that inner strength in the years
to come. Cliff Parrott was born in November 1927 in San Diego, California. His
mother died before he reached the age of one, and he was raised by a compassionate
aunt and uncle in Kansas City. The family moved to Pasadena, California, where
Cliff graduated from the Christian Brothers High School. At age seventeen he
joined the United States Marines. "I completed airborne radar training, and before
I knew it I was sitting in the back seat of a Grumman F-7F Tigercat night fighter.
I served with a night fighter squadron in the Pacific and in 1948 was discharged at
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro with the rank of sergeant. While in the Marine
Corps I discovered that I liked airplanes and electronics, so I entered the National
Engineering School in Los Angeles. I was looking for a job after graduation when
a friend from San Diego said, 'We can use you down here. They are looking for
someone with an electronic background. You could hire into the Air Force plant
representative's office, AFPRO, at the Convair Division.'
"What are they doing down there?' I asked.
'"Modifying B-36s.' So I went down to San Diego, filled out an employment
form, and they hired me within the week. I ended up in the Quality Assurance
Office of AFPRO, inspecting B-36Bs which were being converted to D-models.
They took the B-models and put two J47 jet engines on each wing, then upgraded
the radar bombing system from K-1 to K-3. I got checked out in all that stuff
and really enjoyed my work. Soon I was asked to go along on some Air Force
acceptance tests. I remember my first flight in the B-36D. It was like a house,
compared to what I had been flying in. You could go from the front of the airplane
through the bomb-bay to the back through a tunnel using a contraption like an auto
mechanic's roll-around with a rope to pull you along. I thought the experience

84
 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base

incredible. They served hot meals . It was like being in a flying restaurant. I flew
with these people , saw what the problems were, then tried to figure out how to fix
things. I remember the flight engineer on the B-36, he had his hands full with six
reciprocating and four jet engines.
"Later in the year I was called to the front office and told that they would like
to transfer me to the Douglas plant in Long Beach. So I went there in 1952, about
the time Douglas was awarded the B-66 contract. Right away AFPRO picked me
out to attend all sorts of schools. I thought they had a quota to fill and I was the
new guy, that 's why they were sending me. Most were electronics schools, but
they even sent me to a metallurgical school in Pittsburgh in the summer of '53.
They would take us from the school right down to the factories and show us how
steel was made, how they made iron and copper. This experience helped me later
in the B-66 program when we began to experience corrosion problems. At least I
knew what the engineer was talking about when he said we are having structural
fatigue . The school was completely out of the field of electronics, but it would fit
in just right for me.
"When the B-66 started coming along there was a lot of emphasis on the
bomber and the K-5 bomb system. So they sent me off to school again. Many
parts of the K-5 system I already knew, like the APS-23 radar. They sent me
back to APS-23 radar school even though I protested because I already knew the
system. I went to Johnson City, Tennessee, to Western Electric, the maker of the
K-5 system. Once back at Long Beach I was there the night the first two pieces
of metal were riveted together for the first B-66. I watched intently, not knowing
the impact that airplane was going to have on my life. I watched the assembly
process, looked down into where the fuel tanks would fit , saw what the wings
looked like before they put the skin on. I could picture in my mind for years
exactly how the airplane was made. That was a great experience. After they put
the wiring in, I did the inspection .
"I think it was 1954 when I was told they were doing a structural test on the
aircraft. It had been going on for some time . They ' d hooked all these tension
gauges to the wings to simulate flight hours, trying to find out what would go
wrong after 2,000 hours, and so on. This day, I was told, was going to be the final
test. Usually the aircraft would have to fail 150 percent above what the engineers
said it should fail at. I went into the hangar, and there were all these firemen
hanging around holding hoses hooked up to a tank of fire suppression foam. They
kept bending the wings up, up, up - the plane looked like a bird getting ready to
land where the wings are way high . One of the firemen said to me, 'Parrott, you
better stand back!' Pretty soon the right wing sp11r broke between the number two
engine and the fuselage. That spar caught fire, there was that much tension in

85
 Glory Days

there. It sounded like a cannon going off inside the closed hangar when the spar
broke. I knew this airplane was never going to lose a wing - and it never did.
"It was February 1955 . A friend of mine from my Marine Corps days came
to see me. He worked for Douglas. I was up on the wing of an airplane doing
something. He came up on the wing and said, 'Cliff, did you ever think of coming
to work for Douglas?'
'"No,' I replied.
'"You'd find it very satisfying work with all you know about the B-66. They
are looking for people to go into the field with the airplane. Service engineering
they call it.' I talked to my wife about it and decided to give it a try. The Air Force
was a little more than disappointed after all the training they had invested in me.
Soon after I went to work at Douglas I was sent to Edwards AFB, to the Douglas
flight test facility. They had five A-models and one B-66B bomber. In those days
test data had to be reduced with a slide rule. They'd fly one day, and before they
could get the data reduced it would be a week before they knew the results and
fly again. That's where I first met Captains Tom Whitlock and Click Smith, pilots
sent up from Shaw AFB to become familiar with the RB-66. Tom Whitlock was
the first Air Force pilot to fly the airplane, Click Smith the second. We got along
really well, and it was about September of '55, I think, when they put in a request
to have me go to Shaw. I should have gone to the 17th Bomb Wing at Hurlburt,
I'd been trained on the K-5 system, but instead I was sent to Shaw in December,
and we were going to get 100 RB-66s.
"Once at Shaw we started giving classes to supply people who were trying to
get the Air Force supply system working for the B-66. My team worked with the
electronic warfare officers, EWOs, of the 9th Squadron on their ECM systems,
and the electronics people on autopilot issues. I had a technical representative in
each of the four squadrons. The Air Force maintenance people were outstanding.
They knew airplanes. This one was just a little different. Guys would be out
on the ramp at two o'clock in the morning working on their airplane. No time
clock to punch there, nobody haranguing them 'do this, do that.' They did what
needed to be done, and more. Tom Whitlock and Click Smith got all the pilots
together and briefed them on everything they knew about the airplane. We had no
simulators, only procedure trainers that had a seat, control column, and switches.
You learned the switch to throw to put your boost pumps on, and you'd have
to reach over and throw or tum the switch. It was all very basic. Whitlock and
Smith taught others to fly, who in tum taught still others. All of the pilots had
some jet time. We had several RB-57C dual control trainers and T-33 trainers,
so it was relatively easy for most to transition into the B-66. I began flying with
them after a pilot came to me and said 'I was flying around and all of a sudden

86
 The B-66 Docror of Shaw Air Force Base

I heard a strange noise. It goes like this ,' and he made a sound I couldn't figure
out. As we were climbing through 15 ,000 feet, all of a sudden there was a bang
that sounded exactly like a door slamming shut. 'That's it,' he said . ' What do you
think it is?' It was two dissimilar metals expanding and contracting at different
rates . Every morning at Shaw I would meet with the maintenance people starting
with the 9th Squadron , which was at the end of the parking area . Then I'd go to
the other three squadrons , that's about a mile, and I'd ask the crew chief of every
airplane about his problems. Every morning I would do that and it proved to be a
sound approach . The maintenance people knew I was interested. At times I was
able to short-cut the supply system, which I didn't like doing, to get a part quicker
through Douglas . I liked the system to work. If it doesn 't work when I am not
there , that 's no good . But sometimes I had to intervene to keep things moving.
The first big problem I ran into had to do with windshields delaminating." 1
During acceptance inspections of the RB-66s in the 16th Squadron windshield
glass was found to be delaminating . Eight aircraft were grounded pending repair.
The probable cause was over-heating caused by the deicing system. The deicing
control switch, near the pilot 's left arm, could be accidentally tripped to the on
position leading to excessive heating of the glass . Corrective action involved the
replacement of the defective panels and constructing a guard to place over the
offending switch.'
"Well, we changed the windows," Cliff Parrott recalled with a wry smile. "A
sergeant came over to me carrying some window panels.
"' You know how to do it?' he asked .
'" I changed one at Edwards once,' I replied honestly.
" ' Oh ,' he said , Tm going to learn a lot, because I've never tackled one of
these new canopies before.' My experience was on the A-model, not the B-model ,
which had a completely different canopy. We had an awful time changing that
window panel. It was installed with a sealant that looked like black tar. Putting it
in was bad, but if you ever wanted to take one of those windshields out you had to
destroy it. It was bonded in there. Once removed, we had to take chisels to remove
the sealant. It was horrible . The glass problem was one of the biggest problems in
terms of cost - buying spares, the man hours involved in replacing a windshield,
and the time the airplane was down .
"Early on the engines were giving us problems as well. The first thing to go
wrong was a shroud around the alternator, fastened with screws that were not
safety wired . The screws came loose, went through the engine and damaged the
engine to the point where it had to be changed. Things like that I called ' horse
shoe nails.' Remember the fairy tale of the king who lost his kingdom because of
a horse shoe nail? I'd see some of these problems and I'd say to the maintenance

87
 Glory Days

people, we have a horse shoe nail working here, pretty soon we are going to lose
the kingdom." 5
On October 31, 1957, First Lieutenant Robert Webster, a former B-57 pilot
with the 66th TRW at Sembach AB, Germany, took RB-66B 53-451 out on a
routine training flight. Of course all flights are routine until things go wrong. "We
made several RBS runs," Bob Webster recalled. "On the last run I made a large
loop, went down low to burn a little more fuel, aiming to fly low over the house of
a gal I was dating. It was a starry night, no moon. I could see well. I went by this
gal's house, pushed up the power to climb out when the number two engine blew.
I closed the fuel valve to the engine. It turned out that when the engine broke up it
ripped off the valve and fuel kept pouring into the dead engine, something I didn't
know at the time. There was fire, but after ten minutes or so it blew itself out. I
had the navigator look out his window and tell me how the fire was progressing.
I didn't want it to get into the pylon and up into the wing. The airplane was flying
fine, so I headed for home. Avoiding to overfly towns. My navigator was saying
that pieces were kind of hanging out of the engine cowling here and there. The
engine had less than 200 hours on it." 6
"We went out to the airplane first thing in the morning," Cliff Parrott
remembers. "Bob Webster had landed late that night. We lowered the engine
cowling and the entire engine fell out just as though it had never been assembled
- all the rotors, all the blades. I looked at the mess and wondered how in the world
this could ever have happened? How could an engine blow up to this extent and
not cause a big fire? But this happened more than once. I can remember the people
responsible for the engine, a depot in Pennsylvania, coming down to talk to us
about engine failures. This man from the depot was talking. He said, 'Gentlemen,
we have to take a calculated risk. We are going to fly the engine until it has 100
flight hours on it. Then we'll pull it off and inspect it.' One of the navigators
present stood up and said, 'Sir, have you got a mouse in your pocket? What's
this WE stuff? What's this WE have to take a calculated risk?' That shut him up."
Lieutenant Colonel Donald MacClellan, the 16th Squadron commander, knew
great airmanship when he saw it and put Bob Webster in for an Air Medal. In time
the medal was presented to Bob at a 363rd Wing parade and awards ceremony.7
"We finally got to the point where every hundred hours we'd pull the engines
- a lot of manhours. Have another one ready to put on in its place, take the old
one and check all the blades, the entire engine. We finally found out the reason the
blades failed, then wiped out the compressor and the rest of the engine. The 5th
stage compressor produced a resonant frequency at cruise speed which caused the
blades to grow and hit the compressor case. The blades would fail at the base of
the blade where it dovetailed into the rotor, and the results were what Bob Webster

88
 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base

experienced on his flight in October. The length and weight of the blades was
changed and that solved the problem. That was one big horseshoe nail.
"The good thing we had going at Douglas was, if I had a problem at Shaw,
like these engines, I'd call the Douglas techrep at the 17th Bomb Wing and tell
him about things to look out for. We overcame the windshield problem and the 5th
stage problem with the engine . Then we started having trouble with the tailcone
of the engine nacelle . It had a titanium ring around it, and all of a sudden after
about a year pieces of the tailcone were missing, pieces as big as a hand. It turned
out to be a fatigue crack caused by the noise level of the engine. As soon as we
fixed that problem we started having problems with the control surfaces - flaps,
ailerons, elevators. They began showing cracks, usually rivet to rivet. All the
control surfaces were hollow on the inside, like a drum. When the engines were
operating, the exhaust flexed the aluminum skin causing the cracks. Someone at
Douglas came up with the idea to drill a hole between every rib, then fill the void
with stuff they called stafoam - some kind of plastic foam that when injected
expanded and filled the void. A good idea that quickly went bad.
"About a year later I got a call from a maintenance supervisor. 'I've got a
little problem on one of my flaps, Polly,' that's what they called me because of my
last name. We went out to the aircraft. There was a green colored residue oozing
from the flap. I looked at other airplanes and saw the same thing. What happened
was that when the airplane went up to 40,000 feet with these stafoam filled control
surfaces it cold soaked to minus 50 degrees Fahrenheit. Then the airplane came
down and sat out on the hot and humid Shaw tarmac . The moisture within the
control surfaces condensed, then became infested with algae. The foam within
deteriorated and reacted with the aluminum skin. It was a nasty looking mess. Not
only that, but the control surfaces became unbalanced because of varied amounts
of water within them. The one-time fix proved to be worse than the problem it was
supposed to fix . This was a railroad spike, not a horseshoe nail." 8
The 363rd TRW history of January through June 1958 reflects that, "during
this reporting period the operational capability of the RB-66 aircraft suffered due
to a maintenance remodification program pertaining to the removal of all Sta-
foam from aircraft control surfaces."9 The Air Force depot at Norton AFB fixed
the problem in coordination with Douglas by sending teams to the various B-
66 bases and replacing all of the control surfaces. The cause for many of the
failures - skin cracking, shroud rings failing - was acoustic fatigue caused by
the more powerful 171-13 engines which replaced the earlier failure prone -9 and
-11 versions. 10 Over time Cliff Parrott became known as 'Polly Parrott the B-66
doctor.' If there was a problem with an airplan,e , Polly was the one maintainers
and flyers alike turned to for help. Sometimes small things, like a washer, could
bring an airplane down.

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 Glory Days

On 18 September 1957, Captain Jay Spaulding of the 9th TRS flew a brand
new WB-660, a weather bird, up to Westover AFB, Massachusetts, to participate
in an airshow over the fairgrounds at Springfield. "Half of our squadron was
equipped with weather ships, the other half with ECM birds," Jay Spaulding
recalls. "We were briefed on the program schedule and given an orbit area in
which to hold until it was our time for the fly-by. With just the navigator on board I
took off using fuel from the forward tank. When in my assigned orbit I switched to
the rear fuel tank and suddenly both engines flamed out. I tried air starts, selected
another fuel tank- nothing happened. When the engines had nearly spooled down
I lost my alternators, and with them went my AC power and hydraulics. Our orbit
was within 20 miles of Westover. With the field in sight I decided on a belly
landing. Without hydraulics I couldn't get my gear down. Knowing that after the
fly-by numerous aircraft would be short on fuel and would have to come in and
land, I landed on the extreme side of the runway and slid to a stop. The accident
investigation revealed that a small washer on the fuel selector switch failed, and
when I rotated the switch, nothing happened. I only had access to the forward
tank, which was empty, and had a full load of fuel in the other tanks. The washer
design was changed and that solved the problem. The airplane, 55-391, which
only had 45 hours flying time on it, was repaired and returned to flying status.""
"There was an airplane out ofLajes in the Azores in 1959, and as he came in
for a landing, he lost hydraulic pressure, lost nose wheel steering, and once you
lose nose wheel steering you become a passenger in your own airplane. There is a
steep bank running adjacent to the runway. This WB-660, 55-400, returning from
a weather reconnaissance mission over the Atlantic, ran right up on that earthen
bank. Colonel Ford, the 363rd Wing commander, called me into his office and in
a firm voice said, 'Polly, I want you to head out to Lajes right away, and I better
not hear that it was pilot error.' I caught a B-29 out of Langley AFB, Virginia, and
flew up to Argentia, Newfoundland. From there we were going to go straight to
Lajes . At Argentia there is a lot of talk by the flight engineer about the number
three engine. He puts a ladder up the side of the engine and shortly tells the pilot
that someone put plugs in that were too long and when the pistons came up they
hit the plugs. The pilot said, 'What do you think?' The engineer replied, 'We
can do it on three.' They caged number three engine and off we went, down the
runway lined by burned wrecks of airplanes, reminding you to get your airspeed
up. As we got down the runway there was further banging, so we aborted. We
aborted three more times. The fourth time we finally made it off and made it to
Lajes. After landing, the pilot came over to me and said somewhat apologetically,
'Well, I got you here, didn't I.' That he did. We shook hands.

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 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base

"The people at Lajes were C-124 transport types, and they figured right away
the pilot of 55-400 had caused the crash. ' He landed wrong and couldn't control
his airplane,' they said. So I went out to the airplane . The pilot who accompanied
me was very nervous. He didn 't know what was going to happen to him. The
first thing I did was drop the cowling on the engine , took the hydraulic pump off,
took it to the hydraulic shop and pressurized it. It was cracked. The accident had
nothing to do with the pilot. Now I had to convince the accident investigation
board at Lajes . which I did . I saved the pilot's career and felt good about what
I had done . He never came by to say thank you."" The airplane belonged to the
9th TRS , as had the one that bellied in at Westover in 1957. Its ECM tail cone
had broken off and both wings were badly damaged . The Air Force decided the
damage to the airplane did not justify its repair and scrapped it. 11
" Fixing problems was my business , and in time we got to a point where
things were running pretty smoothly. We had a number of accidents, but then we
also had a large number of airplanes . Some accidents were of the foolish variety,"
Cliff Parrott recalls . The first happened on April 1I, I 957 , at Eglin. Captain John
McLain flew an instrument training mission, then was supposed to pick up his
squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Vanderhock, and take him back
to Shaw. The weather at Eglin was 1,000 feet visibility in light rain. On his first
approach , McLain broke out 1,000 feet to the right of the runway and was instructed
by GCA to go around . On his second approach, as his commander was watching,
McLain again was to the right of the runway, corrected, came in hot, landed long
and deployed his brake chute prematurely, which immediately separated from the
aircraft. Then the aircraft continued to bounce down the runway, onto the overrun,
down an embankment, and nosed into a swamp. The aircraft was destroyed, but
fortunately no-one was hurt. 14
If this accident was due to a lack of basic piloting skills , the crash of 53-473,
an RB-66B photo plane assigned to the 16th TRS, was due to bad judgement
and had tragic consequences. Three aircraft returned from a photo mission over
Virginia . Flying in formation the pilot of 473 climbed above the other two to
take a picture , but lost sight of the two aircraft he was trying to photograph. The
navigator bent over his driftmeter, located the aircraft and gave the pilot a heading
correction . Then a slight bump was felt as one of the two aircraft flying below 473
made contact. 473 went out of control. The navigator was killed instantly as the
eye piece of the driftmeter punctured his skull . The pilot and a second instructor
navigator ejected. The other two aircraft landed safely. The wing commander 's
wrath was understandable and had severe consequences for many in the 16th
Squadron. These were accidents beyond the skills of a Polly Parrott, having

91
 Glory Days

nothing to do with aircraft hardware or electronics, fuel pumps or hydraulic

systems . They simply were accidents caused by human failure. 15
Overall the B-66 accident rate for the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
in 1959 was 40.92 for 100,000 flying hours, the worst year for the Wing, losing
a total of four aircraft.16 Yet that rate was not excessive when compared to other
aircraft such as the RF-84, RB-57 or B-47. In other years B-66 squadrons had
substantially lower accident rates than B-47 or B-57 bombers or reconnaissance
aircraft. In 1953 for example the accident rate for jet fighters was 71 per 100,000
flying hours. The early jet engines were unreliable, and neither trainers nor
realistic simulators were available. It did not help the situation that the Air Force
attitude toward conversion to jets from propeller driven aircraft was one of 'an
airplane is an airplane.' It was not until the Strategic Air Command introduced
checklists and rigid procedures expected to be followed by aircrew that the Air
Force attitude toward flight safety and accidents began to change. In the early
years, an accident or incident was often considered part of doing business. The
Spangdahlem accident of July 3, 1959, is a prime example of this attitude. On that
occasion the pilot failed to properly set his fuel selector, flamed out and lost his
aircraft. In later years commanders were judged harshly on flight safety, and such
pilot-caused losses ended promising careers for many wing commanders. 17
Polly Parrott's days at Shaw were filled with diverse challenges. He met most
of them and became part of the furniture, so to speak. No-one could imagine doing
without Polly and his incisive instincts. Cliff Parrott was transferred from Shaw
to the Brookley Air Materiel Area at Mobile , Alabama, in the summer of 1961.
"By that time we didn't have too many day to day problems anymore. The major
issues had all been worked out. I still had responsibility for the Shaw airplanes
while I was at Brookley, so I found myself frequently back at Shaw. I was on a
business trip to Long Beach when I got a call from an Air Force captain who said,
'We have an award we want to present to you at the Douglas corporate offices.
Major General Osmond Ritland is going to do the honors.' People were always
calling me from Shaw and teasing, so I said to the captain, ' Yea, sure. I'll see
you later,' and hung up. Then one of our directors came into my office and said,
'Cliff, there is an Air Force captain on the line who wants to talk to you . He told
me he works for General Ritland. They got something planned for you. Talk to
the guy.' So I picked up the phone and the captain said, 'We have an award for
you. General Horace Aynesworth , the commander of the 837th Air Division at
Shaw has been working on it for some time. He got this thing pushed all the way
up to the top. Since the general cannot be here personally, General Ritland will
present the award at your corporate headquarters. We want to make sure the date
and time is alright with you.' I had the call on the squak-box, so my director got

92
 The B-66 Doctor of Shaw Air Force Base

the vice president involved, and they decided they were all going with me to Santa
Monica. When I arrived at Santa Monica there was Mr Douglas and a slew of vice
presidents, and anyone else who thought he was important. The general came
over and shook my hand like we've known each other for ever and presented me
with a certificate signed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Curtis E.
LeMay. General LeMay and I had met years earlier. I was told when they took
the certificate into the general's office for him to sign he said, 'I know this man .
They call him Polly.'
"I was in Washington with General Aynesworth. We were at a reception when
Aynesworth went over to General LeMay, he was vice chief of staff at the time,
and brought him over to introduce me to him. 'He is our Douglas representative
at Shaw on the B-66,' Aynesworth said, 'Mr. Clifford Parrott. The men call him
Polly.'
" 'Glad to know you,' General LeMay replied, holding out his hand. 'What
are you famous for?'
'" Well, nothing up to this time . But now I can say that I met you and I can tell
my grand-kids about it.' It was a cordial meeting, and the general didn't forget it
anymore than I did .
"Late in 1962 at Brookley I met a pilot and navigator from the 16th Squadron.
'What are you guys doing here?' I asked them. One was Captain Jerry Campaigne,
a navigator, the other Andrew Mitchell, a pilot. Andy was from Mobile. 'Oh,
we're over at Hurlburt, Eglin number 9, we're checking out in the B-26. We are
going to Vietnam.'
"'Why?'
'"As instructors. To teach them how to fly B-26s.'
"'Kind of strange, isn't it? You guys are checked out in the B-66, not the
B-26.' In April of 1963 I picked up the Mobile newspaper and here is a big
headline - Local Boy Killed in Vietnam. Their B-26 had crashed. According to
the newspaper they were number 98 and 99 killed in a war that would claim nearly
sixty-thousand American lives; a war that at the time none of us knew anything
about . The whole point of the story was, isn't it horrible, almost 100 people have
been killed over there? A month later I was at Douglas engineering . As I was
talking to someone on a technical matter, an Air Force officer entered and said
to the engineer I was talking to, 'I want to see you . Was tech order so-and-so
complied with on the B-26s?'
'"That tech order came out in 1945,' the guy I was talking to replied . 'You
need to look at an access plate on the wing to see if the order was complied
with. It dealt with corrosion.' Then the engineer dug out some old files and found
the technical order number for the officer. This was the proverbial guy in tennis

93
 Glory Days

shoes with green eye shades who never threw anything away and remembered all.
There was a company by the name of On-Mark over at Van Nuys Airport which
converted Douglas B-26s into VIP airplanes. So the Air Force officer and the guy
in 'tennis shoes' went over there to look at access plates. They pulled the plate
off one airplane and found a crack in the spar. The tech order had never been
complied with. What we think happened to Mitchell and Campaigne was, while
on a strafing run, as they pulled off the target, a wing came off the airplane. This
is how I was introduced to the Vietnam War.
"When I was first assigned to Edwards AFB in 1955, I would travel from the
Douglas Long Beach plant to Edwards on Monday and return on Friday evening.
This travel was done in a Douglas Aircraft Company owned DC-3. It flew daily
from Long Beach to El Segundo to Santo Monica and on to Edwards. I was
returning home one Friday evening when Mr. Donald W. Douglas came on board,
going back to Santa Monica from a meeting at Edwards. He came over and sat
next to me and asked my name and 'What are you doing for me?' I explained that
I was on the B-66 program and wanted to learn all I could about the airplane, and
how it performed in the air.
'"How do you manage to do that?'
"Well, sir, it probably isn't company policy, but I have been going to the
Douglas Test Division where they are flying various company required tests and
bumming rides. How can I tell the military about the aircraft unless I have actually
been in it?' He thought that was a great idea and gave me his blessing. At Edwards
I logged 25 hours in the RB-66A preproduction aircraft, the first five produced
- 52-2828 through 52-2832. These airplanes never went into the Air Force active
inventory, instead they were used in various R&D programs. I finished my career
in 1972 with 2,025 hours flying time in the B-66." 18

94
 CHAPTER EIGHT

OPERATIONS RED BERRY

AND DOUBLE TROUBLE

By 1958 the four squadrons assigned to the 363rd TRW at Shaw AFB had become
pretty familiar with their new airplane and its peculiarities. The B-66, all in all,
was an honest plane. It responded well to control inputs, and once settled down,
it pretty much flew itself. Bob Webster, of a generation fascinated by airplanes,
says "I've been nuts about airplanes since I was a kid." Bob was born in 1931 in
Lauderville , Maine. By the time he turned 16 he soloed in a J-3 Cub, obtained his
private pilot's license on his 17th birthday, and was working on his commercial
license when he ran out of money. His fascination with flying uncannily paralleled
that of another young flyer, Don Harding.
Robert Webster was accepted into aviation cadets and trained in the T-6, T-28
and B-25. In 1954 he found himself flying the RB-57 A out of Spangdahlem, the
trouble plagued predecessor of the RB-66B. "The only airplane we couldn't beat
in turns was the Canadian F-86. But at 40,000 feet and up, I could fly rings around
them as well. We were supposed to stay below 43 ,000 feet. That order was pretty
much ignored, cruising routinely up to 45,000 feet. We didn't have pressure suits .
I remember doing some tests on a new MSQ radar system, and the test started
at 35,000 feet. They kept asking me to go higher, and higher, and I finally got to
55 ,000 feet and the thing was still climbing at 500 feet per minute. I knew it would
have gotten to 60,000, but I quit there . Refused to go higher. It sure looked like
a long way down from there. I was used to that kind of flying when I got into the
B-66 program. On one of my early solo flights in the B-66 out of Shaw, cruising at
about 37 ,000 feet, this old National Guard F-80·tried to fly a pursuit curve on me .

95
 Glory Days

First Lieutenant Frank W. Bloomcamp, left, checks maps with his crew, Major Hecht, navigator, and
Technical Sergeant Ring, gunner, before take-off on a photo-reconnaissance mission over Lebanon
from Incirlik Air Base , Turkey . RB-66Bs and RF-JOl s from Shaw's 363TRW deployed on July 15,
1958, in support of Operation Double Trouble. Several RB-668 aircraft were hit by small arms fire
while flying over Lebanon and Syria .

96
 Operations Red Berry and Double Trouble

I put my speed boards out to help him along. We flew formation for a while, then
he turned back. I went into a 50 degree hard bank , something I'd done in the B-57
many times, and went by him like he was parked. I recovered at about 27 ,000 feet,
fell another 10,000 feet before I had the airplane under control again . I learned not
to do sharp turns in the B-66."'
In the ' 50s pilots either lived and learned, or died flying their new jets. Training
was still pretty much a seat of the pants affair, at best an evolving art . Although
the B-57 was used as a transition airplane into the B-66 because it was powered
by two jets, their flying characteristics were so dissimilar that in retrospect one
must wonder if it was really a good idea. Bob Webster chuckled when recalling
that "the RB-57 A had a very different wing from the B-66. I was used to making
high angle landings , using the large wing surface to slow me down rather than
riding my brakes . I was coming back from refueling practice with some KB-50s .
They had three drogues and wing tanks, but no jets . I got my 12 hook ups, but it
was a struggle working with those tankers. On the way back we went to a gunnery
range off the Carolina coast. The gunner fired out our 20mm tail guns . He then
stowed the guns and locked them in the full down position , rather than full up .
I came into Shaw making a B-57 type high angle landing and ground those gun
barrels down to stumps. My timing couldn 't have been worse. Ken Thomas was
my squadron's operations officer and he was in the Wing headquarter 's building
in conversation with the head man. When they looked out the window, there I was
with my nose high and , according to Ken, putting on a veritable fireworks display,
sparks trailing me down the runway. Needless to say, a new set of gun barrels was
required . In spite of that performance in front of the Wing commander, I was soon
upgraded to instructor pilot. As an IP I would sit behind the student on a box with
no chute or harness. The Air Force and TAC never got around to buying a dual-
control B-66 trainer like we had in the B-57C.
"It was January 1958 , and I was checking out Captain Heath who had a bunch
of B-57 time . You didn't make single engine go-arounds in the B-57 if you wanted
to live. I made the take-off. When I leveled out Heath got out of the gunner's seat
and took his place behind me on that 'salt box' - no chute, no harness , no ejection
seat. I demonstrated a number of things, then I nearly gave him heart failure when
I pushed the power up on one engine, pulled the other to idle, and went around
the pattern. The B-66 had terrific single engine control , but he had never been
told that. He figured he was a goner. He was so terrified when he saw me pull the
power on that second engine, he shot off the box in the aisle and bolted back to his
ejection seat to strap in . I thought the B-66 was about the best handling airplane
I flew in the Air Force . I am partial to the B-57, that was one heck of an airplane
for its day, but it was heavy on the controls . It h~d no boost except on the rudder
on the E-models." 2

97
 Glory Days

War planes, unlike their civilian counterparts, are made to fly and fight.
Fortunately, war is the exception rather than the rule. But to keep the crews sharp
and the airplanes in flying condition both are exercised regularly and put through
their paces. Any experienced military flyer knows that the best airplane is the one
that's flown a lot. If given a choice, never take the shiny plane, always choose
the one that looks dirty, just landed, and most likely has only minor write-ups.
Training aircrews, however, is quite another matter. Training for what? Well, one
has to fly a minimum number of hours each month to collect flight pay. But those
few hours in the cockpit don't make anyone a good pilot or navigator. Attaining
and maintaining the level of proficiency to survive in war means lots and lots
of flying under varied, often extreme conditions stressing the airplane and one's
flying skills to the maximum. Making a successful take-off under varied field
conditions is of course fundamental; as is the skill to make a successful and
if possible smooth landing - a skill, unfortunately, some pilots never seem to
acquire. One must be as comfortable flying at night and in adverse weather as on
a sunny, blue-sky day, if a flyer longs for long life and the joys of experiencing his
grandchildren. Above all, a pilot needs to be proficient in instrument flying . When
flying in the polar regions, for instance, under total whiteout conditions, or over
water at night, there are no horizons, and many a novice pilot has paid the ultimate
price flying by the seat of his pants rather than his instruments. With the advent of
the aerial refueling tanker came a requirement to be able to refuel in flight. Flying
a combat aircraft and maintaining proficiency, for pilot and navigator alike, was
and is demanding and a never ending task. On top of all that come unique mission
related skills - firing guns and missiles and hitting one's target, air to air or air to
ground; dropping bombs, taking photos. Whatever the mission, it meant training
and more training. It is what military flying is all about.
For the SAC flyers in their B-47 and B-52 bombers it was a pretty straight
forward matter of finding their target and dropping their nuclear devices. Their
training was fairly uncomplicated compared to that of a TAC flyer. For the TAC
boys, the mission was never clearly focused. Although supporting the Army was
written in large letters in the mission statement of the tactical air forces , the money
in the '50s went to those who carried special weapons. Recalls General Lobdell
who then was a staff officer at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, "SAC was
making all this hay out of the nuclear delivery mission. And if we were going to
get any money, that's the only way we were going to get it ... So the F-105 was
a nuclear delivery [aircraft] and the B-45 was. The B-66 was. All these airplanes
were designed as nuclear, sort of one-mission, one-bomb kind" of airplanes. "After
the Korean War was over, the only money was in nuclear delivery ... Nobody
thought we'd go through another Korea again ... We were going to drop nukes."3

98
 Operations Red Berry and Double Trouble

General 'Opie' Weyland's rapid reaction Composite Air Strike Force was
conventional in nature and all about getting somewhere fast. TAC's money
however went principally to the nuclear delivery mission for the B-66, the F-100,
and of course into the development of the exciting and new supersonic F-105 .
With an internal bomb bay, highly unusual for a fighter, the F-105 was principally
designed for all-weather nuclear weapons delivery. Special weapons, that's where
the money went, and the rest of the force was kept on a very tight budget. "They
were repairing the runway at Shaw in the summer of 1957 and we were sent
to Hurlburt Field," Dave Eby recalls, "that's where the 17th Bomb Wing was
bedded down . Colonel Clizbe was the 17th Bomb Wing commander and didn't
like us reconnaissance types mucking around his base. He parked our planes on
the east side of the field in the brush. I was number two for take off, watching
Jimmy Junge, he had about 30 hours in the 66, come in for a landing. A voice said,
'Mobile . That aircraft landed short.' Jimmy replied, 'No, I didn't,' and he didn't,
I was right there watching him come in. The next radio transmission was 'This is
Clizbe. That aircraft landed short.' Silence. Clizbe didn't like having us around
and made life difficult for us at every turn. That summer Shaw ran out of TDY
money, called us back from Hurlburt and parked our aircraft on a ramp. Another
pilot and I along with five crew chiefs baby-sat about 20 airplanes . I flew two
per day to keep them operating properly." There was little money allocated for
anything other than the nuclear mission.•
As an instructor pilot Bob Webster trained others in the RB-66B. When not
doing so he found himself sitting on flight lines showing off his airplane to throngs
of eager lookers, or doing fly-bys on the 4th of July or on Armed Forces Day, in
addition to flying photo recce sorties in support of Army exercises or whatever
the flying schedule called for. "May 19, 1957, Armed Forces Day, was the day I
nearly died . I remember it as killer day. I was number three in a flight of three. We
pulled up as scheduled over the crowd, and number two rolled to the right - he
was supposed to roll to the left. I had a whole windshield full of airplane. People
watching, seeing me fall out of my roll, probably thought I didn't know what I
was doing . I was just trying to save my life. Killer day.
"I flew numerous sorties out of England AFB, near Alexandria, Louisiana,
supporting Army maneuvers. One maneuver was called Sledge Hammer. I was
flying at 1,500 feet and popping out my photo cartridges when all of a sudden
everything in front of me disappeared . It was like a curtain had come down. I
thought the windshield had probably cracked. I pulled the power back and pulled
up. It was two o'clock in the morning and I had run into a flock of small birds
which had splattered all across the windshield, ,dented the leading edges of the
wings and the engine cowlings, went through the engines, it was a mess . I don't

99
 Glory Days

know what kind of birds flock at that time of the morning, but after I figured
out that nothing drastic had happened, we went back and finished our photo
run." Bob Webster flew the B-66 for three years from 1956 to 1959 when the
B-66 experienced most of its teething problems. He accumulating 550 frequently
challenging flying hours. Then he transferred into SAC KC-97 refueling tankers
at Pease AFB, near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. "The Boeing KC-97 had a gross
weight of 153,000 pounds, with a 2,000 pound overload limit. We sat alert and
regularly flew the airplane at 175,000 pounds. That made it a horrible airplane to
fly."'
Other big tasks laid on the 363TRW in support of the Army were Operations
Red Berry and Cold Bay, both operations were flown out of Eielson AFB, a few
gravelly road miles outside Fairbanks, Alaska. I flew out of Fairbanks in the early
sixties in an RB-47H reconnaissance plane. Conditions in that part of the world in
mid-winter are grim. The cold and very low humidity has to be experienced to be
appreciated. The 43rd TRS sent seven RB-66Bs to Eielson on October 15, 1957.
They returned on March 29, 1958, and were replaced by another B-66 contingent.
The Wing history for that period reflects that "Despite the extreme cold, all
work was accomplished. The maintenance section performed the majority of its
maintenance work out of doors to prevent aircraft damage due to temperature
changes."6 If I had not been at Eielson for a four months TDY in the Winter of
1963, this simple sentence would have meant little to me. But I know very well
the extreme conditions the B-66 maintenance crews endured to keep their planes
flying .
While Cold Bay supported Army winter maneuvers, Red Berry supported an
Army mapping project to photograph approximately 2,301 square miles of the
Alaskan peninsula. The specifications for photography were stringent: minimum
snow cover, no clouds, fly at 21,000 to 24,000 feet, with a minimum sun angle of
30 degrees. The weather, not aircraft maintenance, turned out to be the greatest
problem for Red Berry. A secondary problem was the distance of Eielson AFB
from the target area which limited the time available to make photo runs once
the aircraft arrived . Tankers were not available to support this project, and
Elmendorf AFB, near Anchorage, turned out to be unsuitable as a base because of
its changeable weather and lack of nearby alternates. In April 1958 75 hours were
scheduled to support Red Berry requirements. Weather canceled 13 missions, and
three more aborted due to mechanical difficulties. In May the RB-66s flew 92
hours , canceling only six sorties due to weather. Dave Eby, a retired colonel, then
a young lieutenant, participated in Operation Red Berry. "Coping with the cold
and the weather was a challenge. We sent an aircraft to Cold Bay every day the
weather permitted. I remember Art Smith flying our T-33 to the target area and

JOO
 Operations Red Berry and Double Trouble

calling back , 'It's all clear - come on out.' So off we went. On my first pass I laid
a contrail that spread in a short time obscuring the entire area. I never got any
pictures that day."'
While committed to Operation Red Berry the B-66s also flew intruder
missions against Alaskan Air Command radar sites, participated in fly-bys on
Armed Forces Day at Elmendorf and nearby Ladd AFB, and provided the usual
static display aircraft for such events. Flight proficiency checks were administered ,
training continued . In the last half of 1958 , with nearly I00 assigned aircraft , the
363rd TRW flew I.JOO hours in July, 1,200 in August , and a mere 1,000 hours
in September. the end of the fiscal year. As the new fiscal year made new money
available the number of flying hours jumped back up dramatically to 1,450 for
October, 1,550 for November. and 1,350 for December, even though December
was a short month because of the holidays. 8 The planes flew on JP-4 jet fuel, but
what really kept them flying was money and budget allocations .

•••

"The only shade is in the shadows cast by our Shaw aircraft drowned in a sweltering,
unrelenting sun . The area is flat and barren. It is a vast ocean of monotonous
brown: thirsty sand and dry, dust-drenched grass, its dullness broken only in spots
by small sparse patches of green fighting vainly for life in the parched earth.
Ropes hang limply from the neatly-arranged canvas tents . They sway slightly and
lazily- the only hint of a breeze in the still air. It is the flight-line of Shaw's 363rd
Composite Reconnaissance Squadron of TAC's Composite Air Strike Force.
Soon our jets will roar overhead on another sortie," wrote Major Art Frank in the
Shaw Recon Record, the base paper, on September 12 , 1958 , after returning from
Turkey. RB-66B and RF- 101 photo reconnaissance planes from the 363TRW had
deployed as part of a CASF from Shaw AFB to Incirlik Air Base near Adana ,
Turkey, in support of Operation Double Trouble. 0
On July 15 , 1958, President Ei senhower announced that he had given orders
for United States Marines to deploy to Lebanon at the request of President Camille
Chamoun. Chamoun feared for his government's survival because of threats
from rebelling Muslims supported by Nasser 's Egypt and the Soviet Union. The
previous day, King Faisal II of neighboring Iraq had been killed by his own army
officers. Within a day of the coup Iraq joined Gamel Abdel Nasser 's United Arab
Republic. Militarily and politically the situation continued to deteriorate . Lebanon
was not the first Cold War crisis faced by the United States, but it was the first in
which General Weyland's Tactical Composite ~ir Strike Force became a major
player. Most of the Air Force budget went into special weapons and the planes

IOI
 Glory Days

and missiles that carried them. Yet, they were of little use on occasions when
the need was for the swift application of small, carefully tailored elements of
conventional military force. The JCS acted promptly on President Eisenhower's
direction, dusted off Middle East contingency plans, and within 72 hours "5 ,000
Marines, 1,700 Army paratroops, 70 Navy warships, 270 carrier-based Navy
aircraft and 150 Air Force land-based aircraft" moved into Lebanon, or were on
their way to the Middle-East.10 Major General Henry Viccellio, commander of the
19th Air Force and nominal CASF director, received a call from General Weyland
to activate Task Force Bravo and move the CASF immediately to Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey. Within hours B-57 bombers from the 345th Bomb Wing at Langley
AFB, Virginia, F- lOODs of the 355th Fighter Squadron from Myrtle Beach AFB
in South Carolina, and RF-101 and RB!WB-66 reconnaissance aircraft from
the 363rd TRW at Shaw, were on their way east across the Atlantic - none of
the crews knowing their final destination which was to be announced enroute.
Everything was very, very hush-hush and not a little confused. Only weeks earlier
the first of TAC's KB-50 aerial refueling tankers had arrived on Bermuda and
in the Azores . So this deployment was not only the first real-life test for Opie
Weyland's composite strike force, but also for TAC's newly acquired tankers
to support a large scale movement of aircraft across the Atlantic. It was a night
time deployment, the weather over the Atlantic was lousy, and neither tankers nor
receivers had much experience with each other. In spite of such difficulties and
the refusal of Greece and Morocco to grant overflight rights, within 24-hours of
'Opie' Weyland's deployment order the first F-lOOs arrived at the sleepy Turkish
airport of Incirlik. 1\vo days later, the entire task force of over 100 aircraft was in
place. Ten RB-66B and WB-66D photo and weather reconnaissance aircraft were
part of Operation Double Trouble. 11
On July 15, 1958, the same day President Eisenhower made his Lebanon
decision, four aircrews of the 43rd TRS at Shaw AFB were alerted for a High Flight
ferry mission. All aircraft deliveries across the Atlantic, other than operational
deployments , were executed under the auspices of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery
Group at Langley AFB, Virginia, and code named High Flight. Most aircraft were
flown from the United States to Chateauroux Air Base, France, then moved to
their final destinations in Europe. A similar delivery procedure for Pacific based
squadrons was code named Flying Fish. 12 One of the designated B-66 High Flight
crews was that of Captain Clyde Trent, pilot, and his gunner, NlC Julius Rausch,
both from the 43TRS . Lieutenant Roth Owen was borrowed from the 41TRS,
since Trent's navigator was on emergency leave. The remaining 43TRS crews
were committed to Operation Red Berry. The High Flight mission was suddenly
changed to one of a classified nature, with the final destination to be announced

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 Operations Red Berry and Double Trouble

enroute. The crews and planes were destined to be part of Operation Double
Trouble, but were not told that. They were to proceed to a tanker rendezvous
near Bermuda, then land at Lajes, in the Azores , and await further instructions.
Two of the crews had their departure delayed because of crew rest limitations.
The remaining two aircraft, including RB-66B 53-459 piloted by Captain Trent,
proceeded with their pre-flight preparations. Lieutenant Owen noted during
preflight that the aircraft's N-1 compass system was overdue calibration. It had
not been swung in a year. Since the gyroscopically controlled compass system was
the primary means of navigation across the Atlantic, failure could spell disaster.
Both aircraft taxied to the end of the runway ready to take off. Trent's partner
suddenly experienced a malfunction requiring a maintenance delay. Instructions
received with the classified mission directive dictated that the abort of one aircraft
would not be cause for delay of another. Disasters never happen because of only one
isolated incident, but nearly always are a confluence of a string of often seemingly
unrelated events . The tragedy in the making was to be no exception. Captain Trent
took off, coasting out over the Atlantic over Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Before
take-off he checked the N-1 compass and noted that its reading coincided with the
runway heading. Enroute to their refueling area near Bermuda they were notified
by radio that they would not land at Lajes, but instead refuel from another KB-29
tanker and continue on to a destination to be announced. They made their tanker
rendezvous near Bermuda and continued into the night. Lieutenant Owen plotted
dead reckoning fixes, then noted that his navigation system indicated they were 60
miles north of the course he had plotted. As day dawned Owen tried to get some
wind readings from his driftmeter, but the sea was too calm. About 30 minutes
from Lajes Owen put his radar on its maximum 200 mile range looking for the
Azores. There was no sign of land. At their estimated time of arrival, still seeing
no land, the crew knew they were in trouble. At 40 ,000 feet, with 5 ,000 pounds of
fuel remaining, they had about an hour's flying time left.
Crossing the Atlantic in the '50s and '60s was fraught with danger. To insure
the safe arrival of aircraft ferried in either direction, two ocean going ships were
located along the northern and southern High Flight routes . They remained largely
'in place' to assist passing aircraft with navigation and weather data. In addition,
every time High Flight aircraft were scheduled to cross the Atlantic the Air Rescue
Service launched Duckbutt aircraft - SA-16 Albatross and longer range C-54
transports equipped with sea survival equipment. Their mission was to assure the
survival of downed aircrew. The Duckbutt aircraft also carried extensive radio and
radar equipment allowing them to provide radar tracking, homing and steering, to
aircraft in need . If an aircraft ever needed Duckbutt assistance it was RB-66B 53-
459. Unfortunately there were no Duckbutt airc~aft airborne . The scheduled High

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Flight had been canceled. Captain Trent's lone aircraft was on an unannounced,
classified mission. 13
The APN-82 navigation system indicated they were twelve miles south of
Lajes, but there was no land in sight. Captain Trent began to broadcast Mayday,
the international distress call, on UHF. He decided to look for shipping lanes
because he knew that they would have to abandon their aircraft soon. With about
15 minutes of fuel remaining they spotted a Norwegian ship, the Vespasian, and
decided this was the place. Trent descended to 10,000 feet, approaching the ship
on a parallel heading. The gunner, Airman Rausch, was to eject first, the navigator,
Lieutenant Owen, next, then Captain Trent. Before ejecting Rausch asked Trent
when to deploy his life raft. "In the air, before you hit the water," Trent replied.
Parallel to the Vespasian, at 10,000 feet, Trent slowed the aircraft to 200 knots,
lowered the flaps to 60 degrees and jettisoned the escape hatches. Rausch ejected
first, then Owen, and finally Trent. Seven hours and 15 minutes had elapsed since
they left Shaw AFB. Trent and Owen were picked up by the crew of the Vespasian.
Rausch vanished, never to be found. The loss was tragic. Even more so because
the ultimate cause, the failure of the C-2 remote compass transmitter, could not be
identified because the aircraft wreckage was not available for examination.
The C-2 transmitter was located in the extreme left wing which, along with
another sensor in the vertical stabilizer, provided magnetic direction and drift errors
to the N-1 compass and the APN-82 navigation system. Later, it turned out that
the access panel over the C-2 sensor in the wing tended to leak if maintenance did
not carefully apply a sealer. Moisture, once inside, corroded the sensor terminals.
As the saying goes, little things mean a lot. In this case these little things, as a
chain of seemingly unrelated coincidences, brought down an airplane and cost
one man his life. When 53-459's navigation system failed, providing erroneous
data to the navigator over the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean, Trent and his crew
became as lost as many a storm tossed sailor before them. 14 A tragedy within the
tragedy: Airman First Class Julius J. Rausch was scheduled to be discharged from
the Air Force within a week of his death.
Ten RB-66 and WB-66 aircraft followed 53-459, arriving safely at Incirlik
Air Base. They flew low altitude photographic and visual reconnaissance over
portions of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. During the July 17 to September 8, 1958,
deployment to Turkey in support of the Lebanon Crisis, the aircraft encountered
frequent 30 and 50 caliber small arms fire. Three of the RB-66 aircraft were hit in
rudders, wings, and fuselages. The damage was repairable and no crew members
were wounded. Lebanon was not a milk run. Somebody was mad enough to want
to shoot down our airplanes. Four of the deployed aircraft returned to Shaw on
August 30, and the remaining six returned on September 8, accompanied by one

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 Operations Red Berry and Douhle Trouble

lone RF-10 I.'~ General 'Opie ' Wey land 's Composite Air Strike Force concept
passed its first actual test with flying colors . He called the operation "A prompt
and most successful one to the Middle East under the most difficult conditions ."
Lieutenant Colonel Allan Webb, the commander of the 363TRS Composite
Reconnaissance Squadron, cobbled together from I 0 different Shaw squadrons,
called all the men together on their return to praise their skill, ingenuity and
dedication under difficult circumstances . They flew a record number of sorties
without incident. The maintenance guys beamed. For once they too got a pat on
the back.'"
Ronald Darrah was an A/2C crew chief from the 16th TRS . He and his friend
A/2C Jim Aspel , also an RB-66 crew chief, slept in squad tents on folding canvas
cots. " I don't know what the aircrews did," writes Ron Darrah , "but we enlisted
men stayed in a tent city set up alongside the Incirlik flight line . We had left Shaw
AFB on a C-130, refueled and ate lunch at Kindley Air Base, Bermuda, then
pressed on to Lajes in the Azores. There we stayed overnight before continuing
on to Chateauroux, France, then Wheelus Air Base in Libya. We finally arrived
exhausted at Incirlik. The temperatures got to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit every
day, then dropped at night into the thirties. You could not touch the bare metal
B-66s during the day without blistering your skin . We had to leave all the hatches
and access doors open to keep from cooking the electronics. Yet nothing really
went wrong and the airplanes flew just fine. The RB-66s flew over Lebanon nearly
every day. Some came back with bullet holes in them. The holes in the wet-wings
we patched with bolts and sealant. The worst thing for us was that there was little
drinking water. We had to drink reconstituted milk , and it tasted awful. We dug
a hole next to our tent and buried a 55 gallon fuel drum . We then went to town
and bought big slabs of ice to fill the drum . A couple of cases of soft drinks went
in last. It turned out to be a pretty good refrigerator, even on blistering hot days.
We spent our spare time watching U-2s take off and land . We didn't know their
missions were Top Secret. When we got home we told everybody." "

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 CHAPTER NINE

RAVENS, CROWS, AND EWOs

1957 was a year of change for the Strategic Air Command. Its visionary creator,
General Curtis E. LeMay, left for Washington in June to assume the office of Vice
Chief of Staff. It meant no change for SAC. General LeMay's disciple, General
Thomas S. Power, was to continue SAC's preeminence and growth in the spirit of
his mentor. The brand new 9-million dollar SAC headquarters building at Offutt
Air Force Base was finally ready for occupancy, and the all-jet nuclear strike
force was coming close to reality. The B/RB-36, a cumbersome leviathan, was
about to leave the inventory, replaced by 1,285 sleek B-47 medium jet bombers
and 243 eight-jet B-52 heavy bombers, with more on the way. The first KC-135
refueling squadron had been formed, and four more squadrons were in the process
of formation allowing SAC to phase out its KB-50 tankers . By 1958 SAC began to
augment its bomber force with nuclear armed inter-continental ballistic missiles
- Atlas and Titan missiles flowed quickly into the SAC inventory, augmented by
the Snark cruise missile, then referred to as a pilotless plane. 1
If bombers and ICBMs and their special weapons received most of the attention
of the press and Congress, LeMay had not ignored the eyes and ears needed to
gain essential target information. He was after all a combat veteran of World War
II, a battle-tested flyer who knew all too well that up-to-date intelligence was
essential to mission success. So LeMay built a sizeable reconnaissance force right
along with his strike force . The first high altitude U-2 spy plane joined the 4080th
Strategic Wing on June 11, 1957, at Laughlin AFB. Laughlin, a remote and dusty
Texas airfield near the legendary Rio Grande River, was the ideal place to hide

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 Ravens, Crows, and EWOs

Midway Island served as a staging base for RB-66 deployments to and from Yokota Air Base, Japan .
Yokota was the home of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and the //th and 12th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadrons, equipped with RB-668/CID aircraft.

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 Glory Days

a plane that was to define the clandestine nature of the Cold War in the years
to come. 216 less exotic but essential RB-47E/H/K photographic and electronic
reconnaissance jets, augmented by 20 high altitude RB-57Ds, assigned to 13
squadrons, rounded out the SAC reconnaissance force . Everything about SAC
was new and plentiful, from the planes it flew, to the air bases they launched
from, to the housing and mess halls the men slept and dined in. There were ample
spare parts and supplies to sustain the strategic force, and its flyers never wanted
for boots, suits, helmets, watches, and what ever else it took to outfit the men of
the Strategic Air Command. Even its promotion system was unique and special,
providing 'spot-promotions' to those who qualified as 'select' air crews . Spot-
promotions, over and above those normally earned, provided recipients extra
money and prestige. SAC was America's first, and deemed by many its only, line
of defense in the Cold War years. It was an air force within the Air Force, the
needs of which were carefully tended to on the Hill.2
In contrast to SAC, TAC was much less focused in defining its needs and
in convincing those who allocated budgets that as a force it was still relevant
to the defense of the country. TAC didn't help itself by pursuing unrealistic and
ill defined medium bomber projects such as the ill fated XB-51 and the equally
flawed B-68. TAC did little better in the fighter field, its bread and butter aircraft.
The acquisition of large numbers of the underpowered and straight wing F-84,
earning it the sarcastic moniker of 'lead sled,' went against all logic. While the
swept wing defined the jet aircraft of the strategic forces, TAC continued to cling to
dated straight wing fighters. The North American F-100 Super Sabre, a supersonic
derivative of the supremely successful F-86 with a 45 degree wing sweep, finally
put TAC on the right track. And recognizing that budgets were mostly allocated
to nuclear forces, TAC vigorously pursued the design and development of the
supersonic and nuclear bomb carrying Republic F-105 . Both the F-100 and the
F-105 were company designs, not TAC generated initiatives . This trend of being
unable to define its own aircraft requirements continued in future years, forcing
TAC to acquire Navy developed aircraft to stay up to date, such as the A-7 and
the ubiquitous F-4.
To find needed funds within its own limited budget every program was
repeatedly scrutinized and reviewed by both TAC Headquarters staffers and the
Air Staff, especially squeezing the interim B-57 and B-66 medium bomber force.
Spot promotions were not a part of the TAC flyer's lingo, nor was there sufficient
funding for essential TDY, temporary duty, travel, flight gear, aircraft fuel, spare
parts for its combat aircraft, or anything else that mattered. The tactical forces
operated on a shoe string to make the SAC build-up possible, and to pay for its
own follies. As a result of the frequent program reviews the initial B-66 bomber

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 Ravens. Crows, and EWOs

buy was cut nearly in half to 72 aircraft. The RB-668 night photo reconnaissance
aircraft numbers were reduced and a one-time planned purchase of 72 RB-
66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft was cut back to 36. Instead, 36 weather
reconnaissance aircraft were substituted, aircraft which never received the
required sensors. such as dropsonds and real-time communications gear, to make
them anything other than visual reconnaissance aircraft - a task that could have
been performed by nearly any other airplane. The 171 Allison engine had to do
for the interim B-66. rather than the more powerful and vastly more reliable 157.
Money for a dual-control B-66 trainer vanished as well. Although TAC certainly
was fumbling and unfocused in its efforts to stay relevant, the tactical air forces
were clearly neglected by powerful members of Congress who considered the
SAC nuclear force as the ultimate answer to war. Such skewed notions prevailed
not withstanding the fact that neither the Berlin crisis of 1948, nor the Korean
police action, as it was initially referred to, nor the French struggle in Indochina,
nor many other conflicts around the globe, were anything but conventional in
nature and not remotely resolvable by the employment of nuclear weapons .
The squeeze on the B-66 force extended not only to the basic air frames but
also to the development and acquisition of equipment to make the RB-66C the
tactical electronic collection platform it was intended to be. The C-model, when
first fielded in May 1956, had the same reconnaissance suit as SAC's RB-4 7H
strategic reconnaissance aircraft-ALA-6 direction finders ,ALA-5 pulse analyzers,
APR-9/14 search receivers, APD-4 automatic collection system, as well as wire
recorders which were obsolescent even then . The equipment to configure the C-
models came from SAC resources and was initially slow to arrive. Once installed,
TAC didn't have the money, interest, nor initiative to continue an upgrade program
of its own. The greatest need was for improved recording and direction finding
equipment. TAC was a fighter pilot's Air Force, and anything that didn't relate to
firing bullets, launching rockets, dropping napalm or bombs, wasn't of particular
interest nor deemed deserving of scarce funds. It is hardly surprising that while
SAC's electronic reconnaissance capability continued to improve, nothing similar
was undertaken on the tactical side. The RB-66C would largely continue to fly
with its dated electronic suite into the Vietnam War years.
In 1960, 32 of an initial buy of 35 RB-47H electronic reconnaissance aircraft
assigned to the 55th SRW underwent the Silverking modification at Douglas-
Tulsa. That update provided the three Ravens flying in a capsule in the rear of the
aircraft with state of the art audio and video recorders - the ALH-2 and ALH-4
- and APR-17 search receivers, a significant improvement over the older APR-9 .
More importantly, every aircraft was modified to carry an externally mounted
ALD-4 pod developed by the E-Systems Corporation, now a part of Raytheon,

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 Glory Days

which provided a far superior automatic collection capability than the APD-4.
This was the opportune time for the RB-66Cs to have received a similar upgrade,
but they continued to fly with what they had.
The mission of the RB-66C and the RB-47H was as different as their
airframes. The B-47 collected radar information in peace time for inclusion in a
master radar data base known as the Electronic Order of Battle, EOB, to support
SAC strike force planning. That data base was fairly static and not suited to a
fluid Vietnam War style situation where Fansong SAM radars and their associated
SA-2 missiles relocated on a daily basis to hundreds of prepared launch sites.
Information collected by the RB-66C in contrast was designed to benefit the
battlefield commander to be able to respond to such a fluid combat situation. The
RB-47H mission for all practical purposes ended once war began. The opposite
was true of the RB-66C mission. The RB-47H differed in other respects from
the RB-66C. It carried three Ravens, while the RB-66C had four. The RB-66
could climb with ease beyond 40,000 feet, while the RB-47H was too heavy and
underpowered to even reach 40,000 feet. While the RB-47H could fly twice as far
as the B-66, it was not survivable in a tactical battlefield situation. Nor did it have
any electronic counter measure, ECM, capability against enemy ground based
radars as did the RB-66C.
The men who manned these spy planes were Electronic Warfare Officers,
EWOs, trained in my time at Keesler AFB, Biloxi, Mississippi. Starting in the
mid-60s such training moved to Mather AFB, near Sacramento, California. Those
who manned the electronic countermeasure and defensive systems of the EB-66
and SAC B-52s were referred to as Crows, while those involved in the collection
of radar parameters referred to themselves as Ravens. Crows and Ravens - smart
and clever birds. The 36 RB-66C models came off the Douglas production line in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, in early 1956. Twelve of the aircraft were delivered to the 9th
TRS at Shaw; 12 to the 42nd TRS at Spangdahlem, Germany; and the last 12 RB-
66C aircraft went to the 11th TRS at Yokota AB, Japan. Each of the three RB-66C
squadrons also received 12 WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft manned by
the usual front end crew of pilot, navigator and gunner, and two weather observers
in the rear compartment, vice the four Ravens in the electronic reconnaissance
C-models.
Yokota was a long time reconnaissance base for USAF operations, flying
aircraft over and along the periphery of China, North Korea, and Russian territory
abutting the Sea of Japan. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was the parent
wing of the 11th TRS with its RB-66C and D-models, as well as the 12th TRS, an
RB-66B photo reconnaissance squadron. The 67th TRW was the only remaining
reconnaissance wing in the Far East as of July 1957. In addition to the RB-66

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 Ravens. Crows , and EWOs

squadrons the 67TRW also had RB-57 and RB-50 aircraft assigned . Recalls Bob
Stamm "As a green second lieutenant stationed at ltami AB in 1955, those were
heady times. Just out of aviation cadets and B-26 transition training into the left
seat of a black, glass-nosed Douglas WB-26C assigned to the weather flight of
the 11th TRS, life could hardly get any better. After a year or so I began hearing
rumors that we might get new airplanes. Before I knew it the 12th was headed
north to Yokota, while we in the 11th continued to fly our weather missions in the
Yellow Sea around Korea. Soon it was our tum to head north , up the still unpaved
road to Tokyo. It was February 1957 when the first RB-66Bs arrived, we didn't
get our first C-models until June ."'
Robert Stem, then an A/2C, retired as an FS0-1 Foreign Service Officer,
fondly remembers the delivery of some of the RB-66Bs to Yokota. "Back in early
1957 the Douglas 'Ironworks' in Long Beach, California, released a number of
RB-66B aircraft to go to the 12th TRS at Yokota. It was decided to island hop
them across the Pacific. The aircraft would fly from Long Beach to McClellan
AFB, then to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, with one aerial refueling, and on to Midway
Island , Guam, and finally to Yokota. As very few people had even heard of a B-
66, let alone seen one, a couple of small detachments of nominally competent
troops were sent forward to await their coming on each island. I was one of the
lucky souls to go to that Pacific paradise of Midway Island. Our small contingent
consisted of a second lieutenant, a staff sergeant and two A/2Cs, of which I was
one. Only we two airmen had ever laid eyes on a B-66 before. At age nineteen
I was the old pro in the bunch. Ignorant of the Pacific as I was, I assumed that
Midway would be like Hawaii , and packed lightweight clothes in February. Big
mistake. Midway is cold, and there is always a wind blowing. That wasn't the
biggest mistake . Someone seemed to have failed to check the length of the runway,
because a fully loaded B-66 on take-off would possibly have gone over the edge
into the reef and the shark kingdom without JATO . As it was, their landings were
interesting enough, stopping with very little room to spare.
"Luckily, there were JATO bottles on Midway, which the Navy used with
their P2V patrol aircraft and they turned out to be compatible with the RB-66. Of
course none of us had ever installed a JATO bottle, and the pilots had never used
JATO. So we had to put a lot of faith in the technical manuals. We got the first
aircraft off without a hitch, and I must say, with quite an audience of 'swabbies'
watching to see if the Air Force would screw this one up. We backed the planes
to the very edge of the runway with their tails hanging over the edge and with
six JATO bottles on each side. Away they went in a real cloud of smoke when
they cut those bottles in. I am confident that these were the shortest and fastest
takeoffs of B-66s in history. In due course all 24 RB-66Bs got to the 12th TRS. I

Jll
 Glory Days

was transferred to the 11th TRS when they received their RB-66Cs in June 1957,
and it was my privilege as a 19 year old N2C to be the crew chief on the first
RB-66C in PACAF. The Air Force was both shrinking in size in 1957 and slowly
converting to the jet age. Virtually all the NCOs and officers were coming out of
reciprocating aircraft units and only us kids had been school-trained on the B-66.
All of us crew chiefs were N2Cs. Unfortunately, we would all stay that way as
our specialty codes were frozen and there was quite literally no promotion this
side of the ocean, or on the other side for that matter as well. After four years
service I separated in 1960, still an A/2C."4
Jet Assisted Take-Off, JATO, was a World War II innovation. The B-47, B-
66 and F-100 were all JATO qualified, however, JATO was rarely used. Robert
Walker states that "JATO was used by the Douglas pilots when flying newly
manufactured B-66s from Long Beach to the Douglas facility in Tucson for final
flight test before acceptance. Fred Borman and I were the Air Force flight test
acceptance pilots there." In the Pacific region short runways and great distances
between airfields frequently required JATO use in the early years of B-66
deployments. Once sufficient air-refueling tankers became available, allowing B-
66s to take off with lighter fuel loads, JATO fell into disuse. The B-66 could carry
a maximum of 12 JATO bottles, six on each side. Each bottle provided 1,000
pounds of thrust during the critical take-off phase. Usually only six bottles were
used, three on each side. The bottles didn't always fire. "We used JATO once at
Spangdahlem while I was assigned to the 1st TRS," recalls Peter West. "One of
the bottles didn't fire . Lieutenant Dick Wilson jettisoned the bottles as he was
passing the tower. The failed bottle then ignited and went spiraling through the
air causing plenty of excitement." Frank Doyle and Bob Green recall a similar
incident at RAF Alconbury. "The bottles on one side of the aircraft fired, the others
didn't, causing the plane to spin around on the runway." John Parson remembers
practicing JATO take-offs at Wheelus Air Base in Libya. "We dropped the empties
in the Mediterranean. This was for training only." As for using JATO in the Pacific
region, recalls Dick Miles, "We used it every time we flew out of Clark Air Base
in the late '50s . The runway was only 8,000 feet long at the time, and it was very
hot. We needed all the help we could get." 5
Lieutenant Robert Stamm, the one-time B-26 pilot, eventually found himself
checking out in the new RB-66C jet. After many classroom sessions and studying
the -1, the B-66 flight manual "I found myself jammed into the gunners seat and
watched my instructor pilot make the take-off. The flight didn't last long . Just
as we lifted off the exhaust nozzle on the left engine failed. The IP showed little
concern and made a quick recovery. The next day that brave soul got to watch me
make the take-off. Probably no one who flew those wonderful planes in the early

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years ever forgot his first flight. Once airborne the outcome for me was never in
doubt, I loved that airplane . Training and integration into seven man crews was a
major part of my life at Yokota . Early on things didn't go too well for the aircraft
as its engine, the Allison 171-11, was still experiencing growing pains. We had to
overhaul the engines every 200 hours, at times that interval was reduced to 100
hours. Eventually we got the -13 which had a few hundred pounds more thrust
with most of the bugs worked out of it.
"Other exciting events were also taking place. The 67th Wing had its own
tanker squadron of KB-50s, the 42lst ARS, and we soon got more than our
share of refueling practice. This was an interesting mating between incompatible
aircraft. The B-66 moved right along once airborne, and it was not particularly
happy hanging on the end of a slow flying tanker's hose while getting heavy with
fuel. Most of the tankers had a J47 jet engine mounted on the outboard station of
each wing to give them a little more airspeed during refuelings. We normally used
the tail drogue, but had to practice occasionally on the wings . It was not unusual to
have a fighter on a wing drogue while a B-66 was using the tail drogue. We soon
added more excitement by putting drop tanks on the C-models. The extra fuel
gave us another hour of flying time on long reconnaissance missions ." 6
The transition in the 67th TRW from conventionally powered aircraft to jets
went relatively smoothly, although some pilots took to jet flying better than others .
Although the 11th TRS by December 1957 had all of its 12 RB-66C aircraft, only
three back-end crews of Ravens, four EWOs for each crew, were combat ready,
and eight pilots. EWOs were slow to arrive in the squadron from units and schools
in the States, and there was a lack of authorized ECM equipment. "In October the
austerity program cut down available RB-66 flying time to less than the amount
required. This discouraged any additional checkout of pilots and crews because
of the time required to maintain the checked-out crews proficiency. Unforeseen
maintenance problems occurred and the training program was impacted" even
more, reads the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing history from July to December
1957. The repair, replacement and maintenance of the 20mm guns on the RB-66C
aircraft was yet another issue. Lack of maintenance personnel made it necessary
to have "the gunners pull the weapons from the aircraft, transport them to the
Weapons Section, then reinstall the guns in the aircraft."'
On the positive side, in November 1957, the 11th TRS was awarded the 5th
Air Force Flying Safety Award for six months of accident free flying from January
through June 1957. Since October 1955, the 11th had flown 13,684 accident free
hours in the RB-26 and RB-66C. lts sister squadron, the 12th TRS, wasn't quite that
lucky. "The squadron experienced in July its first major aircraft accident in forty-
five months and 23,303 hours of accident free flying." On July 18 Captain George

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Slover was on a navigational training flight in RB-66B 54-428, accompanied by

Captain Ruderman, navigator, and his gunner TSGT South. There was a rumble in
the left engine, the tachometer dropped to zero, the elevator would not function,
"unable to force the column forward to nose the aircraft down," Captain Slover
alerted the crew. "When the aircraft assumed a nose high attitude," they ejected.
The aircraft dove into a hillside and exploded. "All three crew members ejected
safely with the pilot landing in a tree, the navigator landing in a rice paddy, and
the gunner touching down on a river bank. The only injury, broken ribs, was
suffered by the pilot" when he fell out of the tree.8 On September 6, 54-417 landed
in an extreme nose-high attitude striking the aft fuselage on the runway, resulting
in the loss of the brake chute, hot brakes, and considerable damage to the aircraft.
Then on the 16th, 53-439, returning from a photo mission landed 100 feet short of
the runway, skidding 2,000 feet before coming to rest. No one was injured in the
latter two accidents.9
On November 15, 1957, the 11 TRS flew its first classified reconnaissance
mission over the Sea of Japan along the Russian, Chinese and North Korean
coastlines. The aircraft was piloted by Captain Jack Furneaux. First Lieutenant
Dave Frankenberg was the navigator, and SSGT Townsend the gunner. The four
Ravens in back were Captain Collier and First Lieutenants Tharp, Kay and Vititow.
Like its soul-mate, the RB-47H, the RB-66C flew in radio silence from take-off to
landing. At a prearranged time they met a KB-50 tanker flying a racetrack pattern.
Using his search radar Dave Frankenberg picked up the KB-50 and talked Jack
Fumeaux into refueling position. At no time during the flight was the aircraft
allowed to be more than ten miles either side of its planned track. After recovering
at Yokota the crew debriefed with the local intelligence section, handing in their
logs, recordings and film. Two rotational RB-47H aircraft from the 55th SRW in
Topeka, Kansas, were attached to the 67th TRW, flying complementary missions.
All data collected was forwarded to the 544th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron
at Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, where it was used to update the
master radar order of battle. 10
Captain Arthur Kibby Taylor arrived at Yokota in the summer of 1957, soon
after the first RB-66C models arrived to replace RB-26s in the 11th TRS. "I am
named for two of my father's old World War I buddies -Arthur Hall and John
Kibby. I've gone by Kibby for as long as I can remember. I was born in Butler
County, Kentucky. My brother being two years older got to drive the tractor on our
farm. I had to plow the fields walking behind a team of mules. When I graduated
from high school in 1948 I decided 'I didn't want to walk behind mules no more.'
I attended Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green and joined Air Force
ROTC. I really wanted to fly. I majored in mathematics and physics, got married

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 Rm·ens, Crows, and EW0.1·

by the time I graduated, and was sent to Greenville, Mississippi, for T-6 training .
Then I moved on to Reese AFB in Lubbock, Texas, where I flew the T-28 and the
B-25, before ending up at Barksdale AFB, in the 376th Bomb Wing (SAC), flying
as a copilot in KC-97 tankers. I spent three years as a KC-97 copilot. When the
chance came to get out of that outfit I took it. When Joy and I got off the boat in
Japan, Bob Stamm was there to meet us. He was my sponsor from the !Ith TRS.
Bob told me that I had made captain while I was on the ship. We quickly found
a place to live off base. I got kerosene heaters from the nearby Army post, and
we were in business. When I signed in at the 11th I found that I was the last on a
long list of pilots to check out in the RB-66C. So it was about six months before I
got to step into the cockpit of a B-66. In the mean time I flew the T-bird, the T-33
trainer, and did any number of make-work jobs. Three of our aircraft deployed to
Misawa AB in northern Japan . They were picking up a strange radar flying the
Soviet coast line in the Sea of Japan and they wanted to nail it down . While they
were up there I would fly their mission materials back to Yokota in a T-33 to the
reconnaissance technical evaluation unit.
"When I checked out in the airplane I had Bob White as my instructor. The
first time up I was on my knees in the aisle behind him watching . When I looked
at the instruments turning on final, he was at 120 knots when he should have
been at no less than 140. That scared the daylights out of me. I scrambled back
to my ejection seat and strapped in. I was certainly glad when we landed, and
even happier to fly the airplane on my own from then on . On my air-refueling
check I had a little trouble with that KB-50. I finally stuck the probe through the
slats of the refueling basket, ripped the little bastard off, and carried it back to
Yokota with me on my fuel probe. In the 11th TRS we flew Cs and Os, we were
compartmentalized, so I never knew what the Ds were doing , and they didn't
know what we did . We were teamed up as crews - pilot, navigator, and four
Ravens . We'd fly together and get certified together. By the time I got checked out
the 55SRW with their RB-47H aircraft had pretty well taken over the Sea of Japan
missions , and we were only infrequently called upon to fly that area. Occasionally
we were intercepted by MiGs - Russian and Chinese.
"At times we 'd launch out of Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, and fly up to the
DMZ, go across Korea, then follow the coast line down to Taiwan and cut over
to Kadena AB on Okinawa. At other times we'd launch out of Yokota and refuel
over Korea, then fly the same route. I used to laugh ," Kibby Taylor noted when
I interviewed him, a generous smile spreading across his face "I was a captain
then and the rest of my crew were first lieutenants and a staff sergeant gunner.
We would meet the SAC RB-47H crew from the ,55th Wing going into or coming
out of recce tech for their briefings. They were all 'spot' majors and lieutenant
colonels.

l/5
 Glory Days

"I got so good at refueling that one day I decided I was tired of the tail drogue
and wanted to try refueling off one of the wing drogues. I called the tanker pilot
during our briefing and told him when I came up I wanted to try the left drogue. We
refueled over Korea. I hooked up, got my gas, then flew down through the Taiwan
Straits toward Hong Kong. About the time I came out of the Taiwan Straight I got
the damndest headache. The checklist then didn't call for us to be on 100 percent
oxygen during refueling. We sucked in the fumes from the J47 auxiliary jet engine
the tanker had mounted on his wing and I got carbon monoxide poisoning. I was
feeling so bad I declared an emergency. We were wearing poopy suits, it was
winter and really cold up north. I made my approach to Clark Air Base in the
Philippines. In the tum that hummer started mushing on me. I looked at my flaps
and noticed I didn't have any. They had crept up on me. I applied full power
and started easing out of the tum, heading straight for the control tower. They
abandoned the tower. The navigator gave me hydraulic override to lower the flaps
as we came around the second time. We landed and taxied in. By then they had fire
trucks and ambulances waiting. We must have been a weird sight, seven people
climbing out of the airplane in poopy suits," winterized water resistant flying
suits. "I went to the hospital. They gave me some medication and I got a good
night's sleep and got over it. Within days they issued an emergency change to the
refueling checklist - 100 percent oxygen. On the way back we went up into the
Gulf of Tonkin, a quiet place. We flew around Hainan Island off the China coast
and then back to Kadena and Yokota.
"At Clark Air Base they only had an 8,000 foot runway at the time. We used
eight JATO bottles, four on each side, to get us off the ground. When the JATO
bottles fired it gave us a pretty good kick. About five seconds after they fired I was
airborne, and it felt like I lost an engine when they quit. There was a dry riverbed
near Clark where we dumped the empty bottles on a clear day. If it was undercast,
we'd dump them over water. I was flying out of Clark one day, thunderstorms out
the ears. We were bouncing around and St. Elmo fire was dancing all over my
windshield and on the refueling probe. It was a bit unnerving, the sort of flight
you don't easily forget. Most of the flights were pretty routine. It was a great plane
to fly." 11

116
 CHAPTER TEN

HOURS OF BOREDOM -
MOMENTS OF STARK TERROR

Kibby Taylor, a seasoned RB-66C reconnaissance pilot by November 1958 , had

been detailed to Kadena AB , Okinawa, as RB-66C project officer. It was his
responsibility to get the air crews debriefed once they landed , take care of their
classified mission material , and make certain they were adequately housed and fed .
Captain George Taylor and his crew were tasked to fly a standard reconnaissance
mission from Yokota to Kadena. A couple days later the crew was to fly the same
route in reverse . "George was supposed to hit the tanker over Korea," Kibby Taylor
recalls, "then recover at Yokota. But the tanker was having trouble getting off, and
we knew that, so we delayed our take-off. We had a two-hour window to get off,
after that our coordination would run out with the air defense controllers and
everyone else we had to coordinate these missions with. George told me before
he took off, ' I want the GCA on the air at Kunsan.' After he took off I called 5th
Air Force and they relayed the message to Kunsan. An extensive effort was made
to get the GCA up and running , but it was a weekend, and the guys were in town
and could not be located."'
Aircraft number 54-476, an RB-66C piloted by Captain George Taylor with
over 300 flying hours in the C-model , departed KadenaAB at 0815 in the evening.
The weather at Kunsan was forecast to be good with a ceiling of better than 3 ,000
feet and five-miles-plus visibility. Three hours later Captain Taylor contacted
Kunsan approach control reporting that he was at 38,000 feet over the Kilo Sierra
Beacon . "54-476, you are cleared for a normal jet penetration,'' replied Kunsan
Control. George Taylor aligned on runway 17 flying a right hand traffic pattern .

11 7
 Glory Days

A flight of three WB-66D aircrews- pilots, navigators, gunners and weather personnel- assigned to
the /1th TRS, 67th TRW, stand morning inspection in front of one of their aircraft at Yokota AB, Japan ,
sometime in 1959. Captain DJ. Hegland, standing at attention to the left of the formation, is the flight
commander. The I ITRS hangar is in the background.

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 Hours of Boredom - Moments of Stark Terror

He was cleared to land and reported his gear down. While on short final Captain
Taylor notified the tower that he was going around and passed the control tower
at about 100 feet altitude. Approximately one mile beyond the end of the runway
he was observed to enter a gentle descending turn .' "When banking a plane,"
Kibby Taylor noted, "it tends to lose altitude because the wings no longer provide
sufficient lift and you have to increase your power to make up for it. Water and sky
look alike at night as well, and Captain Taylor apparently didn't realize his plane
was losing altitude. A wing tip touched the water and the aircraft cartwheeled.
There was no explosion or fire, and no survivors . By the time I returned to Yokota
the following day, the squadron intelligence officer had already contacted my wife
to let her know that it wasn't I who had crashed. My name was Taylor as well, and
friends had come by the house to offer my wife their condolences."3 The loss of
seven men was a crushing blow to the small RB-66C reconnaissance community
at Yokota. No one could figure out why the aircraft went down. Once retrieved ,
nothing was found among the wreckage to cause such a disaster. Neither could
anyone explain why Captain Taylor went around rather than land on his initial
approach to the runway. The brutal fact remained that George Taylor's aircraft
lost airspeed in a low level turn and seven men died. It was the first RB-66C to
be lost by the three squadrons flying the C-model. For the 11th TRS, worse was
yet to come.
First Lieutenant David Cooper was assigned to the 11th TRS on graduating
from navigator training at Harlingen AFB, Texas, in March 1957. "I and Second
Lieutenant Edwin Vokes arrived at Tokyo International Airport in April, Good
Friday, in a Pan American Stratocruiser - the much more comfortable civilian
version of the austere Air Force C-97 transport or KC-97 aerial refueling tanker.
We were processed through Yamata Air Station for assignment and approval by 5th
Air Force Headquarters. Within days Ed and I were assigned to the 11th Special
Activities Squadron at Yokota, awaiting the arrival of the 11th TRS from Itami
and the new RB-66C aircraft which were to replace their aging RB-26s. Several
11 TRS pilots were at Yokota already transitioning to jets in the T-33 trainer. Ed
and I had to scrounge flying time wherever we could find it. I was fortunate to
get on Captain Benjamin Maloney's crew. He was a senior pilot with World War
II experience. Our permanently assigned call sign was Outbreak which we used
on training missions . On classified reconnaissance missions, our first on January
30, 1958, we maintained total radio silence and there was no need for a call sign.
We were just an aircraft type and number in someone's log tracking us while we
were airborne . Between January 1958 and February 1959 I flew fifty classified
reconnaissance missions - many of them at D;ight. Most of our missions were
routine, including the presence of Russian MiGs off our wings .

119
 Glory Days

"One of the most interesting missions I flew was out of Misawa. The Russian
Navy was having an exercise and we were put on alert. On this particular morning
we were scrambled, and after becoming airborne we were turned over to one of
our GCI sites. We were directed to climb to flight level 320. Shortly after reaching
our altitude we were directed by a rather excited sounding controller to reverse
course and begin an immediate descent to 10,000 feet to make an identification
of an unknown target. Ben Maloney put out the speed brakes and went into a
port tum, descending rapidly. I looked out the little side window at my navigator
station and saw two MiGs go screaming by. Apparently the MiGs had approached
us visually and neither the GCI site nor we knew of their approach. The MiGs
never returned. We continued our descent and made contact with the unknown
aircraft. It turned out to be an RB-50, most likely on a mission similar to our own
and probably from the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron at Yokota. We then flew
our mission against the Russian fleet. I am grateful to say that the balance of the
missions I flew were never that spontaneous and uncoordinated.
"In early February 1959 we were scheduled on a four mission package from
Yokota to Kadena, with an aerial refueling enroute. Then from Kadena along the
China coast to Clark AB in the Philippines. After two days in the Philippines
we were to fly the same route in reverse. On the first refueling out of Yokota
the KB-50 tanker had to feather the number two engine. Normally the refueling
would have been canceled, but since it was a classified operational mission the
tanker crew decided to stay with us. We got our fuel and recovered as scheduled
at Kadena. The following day we flew the next leg of our mission to Clark. As
we were nearing Clark Air Base we had to shut down one engine, making an
uneventful single engine landing. We remained at Clark until February 15 when
a replacement engine had finally been installed in our aircraft. While our aircraft
was down for maintenance another crew commanded by Captain Robert White
was tasked to fly that portion of our mission that we were unable to fly."•
First Lieutenant Leon Kirk arrived in Japan in May 1958 and was assigned
to the 11th TRS. "I generally flew as Raven 3 after I checked out in the aircraft.
Our missions were largely canned, meaning that we flew the same route at the
same altitude over and over. Our flights were tracked by Russian and Chinese
radar and we were frequently intercepted by pairs of fighters. We had a seven man
crew - pilot, navigator and gunner up front, and four Ravens in the rear. The B-66
pilot had to perform all the functions shared with a copilot in other reconnaissance
aircraft such as the RB-47H. For many pilots this worked, but for pilots with
marginal skills, or who had hot and cold days, take-off and landing became a
challenge. Captain Robert W. White piloting our plane on February 9, 1959, was a
West Point graduate. Sometimes he was very good, and at other times he 'couldn't

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 Hours of Boredom - Moments of Stark Terror

hit the runway with both hands' to use an Air Force expression. February 9 was
not one of his good days. Our navigator was Lieutenant Dunn, the gunner A/2C
Jolly, Raven 1 Lieutenant Powell, Raven 2 Lieutenant Glandon, I was the Raven
3, and Captain Day was the Raven 4. The Raven 4 was the designated officer in
charge of the back-end crew. We Ravens were totally dependent on the intercom
for all flight information coming from the front end.
"We wore poopy suits, suits made of rubberized material. Since most of our
trips were over long stretches of very cold ocean we flew our missions in these
cumbersome survival suits. We sat on dinghy packs with parachutes on our backs.
Our planes had ejection seats - upward firing for the front end, downward firing
for the back end crew. We were told that we could eject from as low as 600 feet off
the ground with the zero second lanyard connected, opening the chute the second
we cleared the plane. But most of us believed that at that low altitude we would
just make holes in the ground.
"We were to fly from Okinawa up the China Coast, one of our canned routes,
across Korea below the DMZ, refuel from a KB-50 tanker over the Sea of Japan
and recover at Yokota. We taxied out for take off, but it soon became apparent
that we had a hydraulics problem. We taxied back to have the rudder/elevator
hydraulic boost pump on the number two engine replaced. Although the pump
was replaced, the hydraulic lines were apparently not properly bled. Air remained
in the system. Because of the coordinated take-off time and the need to arrive at
the tanker at a prearranged time, the pilot elected to take-off. We climbed to our
assigned flight altitude of 39 ,000 feet and flew along the China coast, crossed near
the Korean DMZ and rendezvoused with our tanker on schedule. The tanker went
into a shallow dive to gain speed and our pilot tried to hook up . Captain White
tried three times while the aircraft went through wild gyrations caused by the air
in the hydraulic system. Then he broke off his attempt to refuel and informed
us that he had only taken on as much fuel as he burned off during the refueling.
We couldn't make it to Japan. We reversed course and began a rather slow, low
level flight across Korea. We could have landed at a base on the east coast, but
continued on toward Kunsan on the west coast. It was early evening when we
began our descent into Kunsan Air Base, K-8. We did a normal pitch-out over
the base, turned back, about five miles out, at 1,200 feet it suddenly became very
quiet. There was no more engine noise. I asked the pilot over the intercom if we
were going to make it to base. He responded, 'I have idle power.' What he had
were two wind-milling engines. We heard nothing more from him during the brief
ride from 1,200 feet into the sea.
"Apparently our aircraft hit the water nosy high and the panels below our
ejection seats in the rear of the aircraft came off on impact. The cabin filled

121
 Glory Days

with water instantly. I have no recollection of the water rushing in. I was simply
suddenly looking up through water toward the escape hatch on top of the plane. It
had been jarred loose by the impact of our aircraft with the water. I swam for the
escape hatch opening, pulled myself about half way through, when I realized that
the dinghy attached to my chute was too big to make it through the hatch opening.
Frantically I unfastened one side and pulled the dinghy through side-ways. While
I was occupied with my dinghy, I felt someone clawing at my legs. It was Captain
Allen Day, our Raven 4. I helped him through the hatch, but it was evident that
he was in deep shock. I had inflated my water wings, but couldn't get him to do
the same. He was unresponsive. I pulled the knobs on his water wings, got them
inflated, then fastened the straps in front and back so he wouldn't slip out. I then
turned to inflate my dinghy. I had a tear in my flight suit and the water was very
cold. All this was very difficult and exhausting and it took me several minutes to
climb into the dinghy. When I was finally inside, I collapsed and lay there for a
few minutes to get myself together. When I looked outside again I noticed that
Captain Day was still floating on his water wings, but had taken no action to
inflate his dinghy. He had drifted away from me while I was busy getting into my
dinghy. I yelled at him to inflate his dinghy and to climb in, but I got no response.
Twilight set in and it was hard to see. As I floated along I could see Captain Day
rise on a wave and disappear on the other side, but there was no evidence of life.
"I was aware that the front-end crew had climbed out the top hatches, but
lost track of them as I floated over the top of waves and into the troughs between
waves. About an hour and a half passed without any rescue attempts. Then I heard
the sound of a helicopter in the distance and since it was nearly dark, I popped
a flare and the helicopter came in overhead and dropped a horse collar rescue
device on a cable and I put my arms through the collar and they began to hoist
me up. A short distance below the helicopter they stopped and the crew chief
yelled something. I couldn't make out what he was saying. After several more
unsuccessful attempts at communication they resumed hoisting me up. My dinghy
was tied to me by a strap, something we were taught to do in survival school and
it was dangling below me. The crew chief was trying to tell me to untie it and
let it go. He was afraid it could be sucked into the rotors. As soon as I arrived at
the door he cut the strap, the dinghy dropped away and they hauled me in. I later
learned that the helicopter was flown by South Korean student pilots who had
been diverted from their flying training somewhere in Korea for the rescue. They
couldn't speak English, but they did visit me in the hospital. Apparently no other
rescue capability was available at Kunsan. Captain White, Lieutenant Dunn, and
A/2C Jolly were rescued along with me and hospitalized. Captain Day was not
found until daylight the next morning. He was still floating on his water wings.

122
 Hours of Boredom - Moments of Stark Terror

Lieutenants Glandon and Powell, the other two Ravens, were found strapped in
their seats with broken legs ."'
The Stars & Stripes military newspaper reported the story of the Monday
evening crash the next day, quoting an Air Force spokesman who portrayed the
crash as a routine training accident. "The twin-jet aircraft was on a training flight
from Yokota AB , Japan, to Kunsan . It crash-landed two miles short of the Kunsan
runway after the pilot reported he was low on fuel. The aircraft was visible on the
mud-flats early Tuesday, the Air Force spokesman said. However, at high tide it
was submerged under water."•
Captain Kibby Taylor was appointed Summary Courts Officer for the
deceased Captain Allen Day. Taylor put Captain Day's affairs in order at Yokota ,
transferred his belongings to his family and assisted them in every way possible.
The subsequent investigation of the wreckage revealed that the aircraft still had
1,500 pounds of fuel in the forward tank . Evidently it all began on Monday when
the rudder/elevator hydraulic pump failed at Kadena prior to take-off. It was a
'Red X' system failure which normally would have grounded the aircraft. The
mission, although of an operational and high priority nature, should have been
aborted by the pilot who unfortunately decided otherwise. A pump replacement
was attempted by harried maintenance men within the time constraints dictated
by the mission. The replacement may not have been accomplished precisely in
accordance with the maintenance technical order which required bleeding of the
hydraulic lines to preclude the presence of air bubbles. The pilot assumed that
when maintenance signed off the Red X that all was in order. The crew was still
within the two-hour launch window, so they took off from Kadena. With air in the
hydraulic lines and a resultant erratic rudder/elevator system, an aerial refueling
was a near impossibility. The aircraft carried 450 gallon wing tanks in addition to
its standard fuel load in two internal wing tanks and the main fore and aft fuselage
tanks.
The engines normally were fed from the aft fuel tank, which in tum was fed
by transferred fuel from the forward tank or the internal wing tanks. The Center
of Gravity, CG, valve regulated the flow of fuel to the aft tank to keep the aircraft
weight distribution in balance. In normal operations, wing fuel transfer was not
initiated until the forward fuel tank was down to 3,900 pounds. At that point the
wing fuel transfer switch was turned to the ON position to transfer fuel from
the internal wing fuel tanks to the aft tank. In tum, the external wing tanks fed
the internal wing tanks. The CG valve between the forward and aft tanks was
closed when the wing fuel transfer switch was on. When the aft fuel tank quantity
began decreasing one knew that the wing tanks were empty and the wing fuel
transfer switch must be moved to the OFF position. If not, one will flame out

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 Glory Days

even though there is fuel in the forward tank, since the CG valve allowing transfer
from forward to aft tank is closed. The pilot could also monitor his fuel quantity
by flipping a switch between wing and fuselage tanks . The switch was normally
left in the fuselage tank position. Captain White very likely forgot that he had the
wing fuel transfer switch in the ON position, glanced at his fuel quantity indicator
- which gave him fuselage tank fuel readings and figured he had enough fuel to
make it to Kunsan. When the engines flamed out at 1,200 feet it was undoubtably
a shock to him. He should have immediately given the order to eject - having
earlier prepared the crew prior to this to be ready for just such an emergency.
Sadly, the November 1958 and the February 1959 crashes were both attributable
to human error.
The 11th TRS flew its twelve WB-66D aircraft on standard weather
reconnaissance tracks known as Wild Goose missions. Similar missions were flown
by WB-66D aircraft of the 9th TRS at Shaw and the 42nd TRS at Spangdahlem.
The WB-66s of the 11th TRS at Yokota frequently turned into typhoon hunters, in
addition to flying their standard Pacific weather routes. Lieutenant Lloyd L. Neutz
flew the D-model in the 11th TRS, and frequently found himself playing typhoon
hunter- always a memorable experience for the crew, especially the two weather
observers in the rear of the aircraft. "It was our job to fly into the storm's eye and
report on its diameter, speed, direction of movement, and the position of wall-
clouds . We passed our findings to the Guam Weather Central using HF radio. We
would fly directly through the eye of the storm at 40,000 feet. Because the air was
very warm in the center, providing less-lift, it was necessary to increase my power
setting to 100 percent. Even at full power we still lost 5,000 feet of altitude by the
time we reached the eye's far wall-clouds. Returning from one typhoon hunting
mission we nearly didn't make it. I was low on fuel, and approached Kadena AB
on Okinawa in heavy rain. The field was below landing minimums. The GCA
controller led us down in zero visibility in heavy rain and severe turbulence. By
the time I saw the runway it was too late for me to round out and I hit nose wheel
first and started porpoising. Every bounce I took became more severe. I felt I
was losing control over the aircraft, so I deployed the drag chute at a higher than
recommended speed and pulled back on the control column, hoping for the best.
Thank God it worked!" 7
In the first half of 1960 the 11th and 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons
and the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Yokota Air Base were deactivated.
With the region largely at peace there appeared to be no need to maintain this
costly reconnaissance capability in the Far East. The Air Force, under continuing
pressure to meet strategic force structure requirements decided not only to
deactivated the 67th TRW, but to go ahead and retire the aircraft of the 11th and

124
 Hours of Boredom - Moments of Stark Terror

12th squadrons although they were barely three years old. The RB-47H aircraft
from the 55th SRW extended their surveillance missions to include the routes
previously flown by the RB-66Cs of the 11th TRS . It was not only a time of low
military budgets, but also a time when technology was changing the world as
never before. On April 1, 1960, the first television/infrared satellite was launched
to provide instant and broad-based meteorological data, diminishing the need for
the WB-66D aircraft . And on June 22, 1960, the U.S . Navy, in great secrecy,
launched the GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background) signals intelligence
satellite to collect Soviet radar emissions . That August a super-secret Corona
satellite launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, and began transmitting high
resolution pictures of the Soviet Union from space, foreshadowing more change
to come.8
"We flew the airplanes back to the States in January 1960," Kibby Taylor
remembers. "We landed at Wake Island. Then we went on to Hawaii and McClellan
AFB in California. Two C-models, including mine, were diverted to Hickam
AFB, Hawaii, where we were to assist in locating the film package dropped from
one of our secret photo-reconnaissance satellites to be retrieved by a specially
configured C-119 transport. We were to help locate the film capsule's beacon as
it was descending , then guide the C-119 toward it. We picked up the beacon and
passed the information to the controllers, then we saw the parachute and hung
around long enough to see the C-119 catch the capsule ."9
The 12TRS RB-66B photo reconnaissance aircraft were sent directly into
storage in the Arizona desert. The ten C-models, however, because of their low
number of flying hours, were flown to Shaw AFB in Sumter, South Carolina. Ten
of Shaw's older C-models were sent instead to the aircraft boneyard in the Arizona
desert where they were scrapped. RB-66C 54-452, the City of Sumter, feted and
celebrated upon its arrival at Shaw a scant four years earlier, was quietly flown
to Davis-Monthan AFB near Tucson, Arizona, and along with nine other Shaw
RB-66Cs stripped of its equipment and sold for scrap . Clearly, it wasn 't one of the
best decisions the Air Staff ever made. The Japan based aircraft of the 11th TRS
had flown in a much more severe environment from those at Shaw, soon showing
signs of salt water corrosion which had to be dealt with. Only five years later, as a
growing war in far off Vietnam came to the public's attention , these ten C-models,
so quickly disposed of in 1960, were desperately needed. Their quick sale and
destruction gained the Air Force little. For some strange reason there was no room
to store them in the vast Arizona desert for possible future contingencies.

125
 CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER

The 42nd TRS at Spangdahlem AB , Germany - moved to RAF Chelveston,

England, in 1959, then in 1962 to Toul-Rosieres, France, and to nearby Chambley
Air Base in 1965 - flew the same type of reconnaissance missions along the Warsaw
Pact periphery as did the 11th TRS out of Yokota. Captain Arthur Roehling and
his crew departed Spangdahlem on March 12, 1958, and headed for Wheelus
AB, near Tripoli, Libya. They then proceeded across the Mediterranean to Incirlik
AB, near Adana, Turkey, where they remained for ten days flying Black Sea
reconnaissance. Similar missions were flown directly out of SpangdahlemAir Base
along the East German and Czechoslovakian borders. The Soviet Group of Forces
in the GDR, the German Democratic Republic which was neither democratic nor
a republic, was nearly always the first of Soviet groups of forces to receive new
equipment - especially air defense related radar and missile systems. After the
shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk on May 1,
1960, by a salvo of 14 SA-2 surface to air missiles, interest in intercepting the
associated Fruit Set radar, later renamed by NATO Fansong, became the highest
radar intercept priority for U.S. collectors. The RB-66Cs of the 42nd TRS, along
with many other airborne and ground based collectors, were actively involved in
searching for the Fansong SAM radar- to determine its parameters (pulse width,
pulse recurrence frequency, tracking-, guidance- and fusing frequencies, pulse
modulation, and ·whatever else might reveal itself) and thereby its capabilities. By
1960, RB-66C crews from Shaw's 9th TRS augmented the RB-66Cs of the 42nd
TRS in Operation Swamp Fox. Swamp Fox was a rotational deployment, sending

126
 The Missiles of October

President John F. Kennedy ties an Air Force Outstanding Unit Award streamer to the colors of the
363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Homestead AFB, FL. The honor was bestowed upon the Wing
for its performance during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Colonel Arthur A. McCartan, commander
of the 363TRW, stands facing the President. President Kennedy personally thanked the Wing and its
members for their outstanding work.

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 Glory Days

two of Shaw's C-models and associated air and ground crews to RAF Chelveston
to give their Ravens experience with Soviet radars. The rotations usually lasted
about three months, then another group of ground and air crews would replace
those who had come before.'
In September 1961 three RB-66C aircraft from the 9th TRS were tasked to
participate in an operation to monitor a suspected Russian satellite launch from
their customary launch site at Tyuratam, Kazakhstan. The pilots were Major
Paul Bjork and Captains Alvin Bobbitt and Jim Byram. They were to fly from
Shaw AFB to RAF Chelveston, with air refuelings near Bermuda and again near
the Azores. The second leg of the deployment was to take them to Naval Air
Station Sigonella, near Catania, Sicily, and then onward to their final destination
at IncirlikAB, Turkey. "Major Bjork, as the senior officer, was designated mission
commander," recalled retired Lieutenant Colonel Ned Colburn, then a Raven on
Bjork's crew. "Bjork began the crew briefing at Shaw by saying that we would fly
in a loose three ship formation, remaining within radio range of each other, with
Captain Bobbitt as number two, and Captain Byram flying as tail-end Charlie. The
flight to Chelveston was uneventful, aside from the never ending give and take
between Major Bjork, as our aircraft helmsman, and Captain Carl Covey, Bjork's
Magellan, our navigator. We departed Chelveston on September 11 heading for
Sigonella. As we neared Sigonella, while watching smoke rising from the crater
of Mount Etna, Carl Covey announced on the interphone that he had Sigonella on
his radar scope off the right side of the aircraft. "Paul Bjork responded, 'I've got
the field in sight,' then went ahead and canceled our IPR clearance with Catania
Control and called Sigonella tower.
'"Air Force 389, flight of three RB-66s. Request VFR approach and landing.
360 degree overhead pattern.'
'"Air Force 389,' Sigonella tower responded, 'understand a flight of 3 RB-
66s. Report five miles initial. Left break.' At this point Carl Covey, our navigator,
questioned whether or not Bjork had the correct airfield in sight. He was summarily
chastised and told to shut up, with further instructions for everyone else to stay off
the ship's intercom. Paul Bjork then called Bobbitt and Byram and told them, 'OK
guys, tuck it in real tight. We're going to show these U.S. Navy and Italian types
how to fly close formation and put on a real air show.' Bobbitt and Byram got as
close as possible to the other's aircraft and the show began.
"Bjork: 'Sigonella tower, Air Force 389, flight of three, five miles initial.'
"Sigonella: 'Roger 389. Not in sight. Continue approach. Report one mile
initial.
"Bjork: 'Sigonella, 389 one mile initial.'
"Sigonella: 'Roger 389. Not in sight. Continue approach. Report left break.'

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"Bjork: 'Sigonella 389 left break for landing.'

"Sigonella: ·Not in sight. Discontinue approach and re-enter pattern. Report
five miles initial .' A go-around was made, and we again entered initial for a 360
degree. full circle. overhead pattern and subsequent landing.
'·Bjork: 'Sigonella tower. Air Force 389. Flight of three. Five miles initial.'
"Sigonella: ' Roger 389, not in sight. Continue approach. Report one mile.'
"Bjork: 'Sigonella, 389 one mile initial.'
"Sigonella: ' Roger 389, not in sight. Continue approach. Report left break.'
"Bjork: '389 left break for landing.'
"Sigonella: ' Not in sight. Are you sure you are at the right airfield?'
"Bjork: 'Roger, we are directly overhead.' Sigonella then asked if he could
see a fishing village off to the left side of the airport with a long jetty and boats
anchored on both sides.
''Bjork: ' Roger, I see the village.'
"Sigonella: ' You, sir, are at the wrong airfield . You are over Catania, not
Sigonella.' We landed red faced at Sigonella where the U.S. Navy and the Italian
Air Force let us cool our heels sitting on the bare floor of base operations for about
four hours before refueling our aircraft. Bjork in the meantime was walking around
muttering unintelligibles. We took off from Sigonella and landed at Incirlik about
midnight. As we pulled off the runway onto the taxiway to jettison our brake
chute, Bjork pulled the throttles back to idle, with number one throttle slipping
past the detent into the off position. Realizing what happened, Paul Bjork, our
dear senior pilot, threw the number one throttle forward whereupon the pooled
fuel ignited in the engine and torched fore and aft, creating a fireworks display
against the dark Turkish sky. The gunner got out of the airplane, opened the fuel
drains and we shut down on the taxiway. After an engine change, we finally got to
fly our first ELINT (electronic intelligence) mission over the Black Sea.
"The RB-47Hs and RB-47E Tell-Two telemetry collectors from Forbes AFB
in Kansas were there, as well as the Navy A3Ds, and Willie Victors, Navy EC-
121s from their base at Rota, Spain. The SAC types from Forbes didn't wear
any name tags or wings on their flight suits, and wouldn't talk about why they
were at Incirlik. We had gone through flight training with many of the SAC crew
members and had fun asking them who they really were and what they were doing
in Turkey. In contrast we took the Navy types through the RB-66C, and they in
turn gave us a tour of the A3D and their EC-121. On September 21 we left Turkey
on our scheduled redeployment back to Shaw via Wheelus AB, Libya; Moron
AB, Spain, and the usual refuelings near the Azores and Bermuda. Paul Bjork
announced that he had flown fighters out of Wheelus and knew the base like the
back of his hand . 'Wheelus has a long runway/ he said 'so do not deploy your

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 Glory Days

brake chutes.' Bjork called Wheelus tower for a straight-in VFR approach, and as
we came in over the water he had to add power three times to rescue the aircraft
from mushing into the sea. Ed Breck in position two became a little bit nervous
having survived the crash of RB-66C 54-471 at Donaldson AFB in South Carolina
six months earlier. Bjork made a good landing on the runway numbers, but during
roll out he forgot that the runway at Wheelus had a hump in the middle. Seeing the
runway disappear in front of him at the high point, he mistakenly thought he was
nearing the end, stood on the pedals and 389 ended up with hot brakes. After the
mandatory brake-cooling period the aircraft was towed to the ramp for refueling
and instead of a minimum time quick tum-around we spent nearly four hours on
the ground before heading to Moron Air Base in Spain. At Moron we lost elevator
trim and instead of the scheduled non-stop flight back to Shaw we island hopped
to Lajes, Azores, then Harmon Air Base, Newfoundland, before arriving back at
Shaw on September 23, 1961. But there were small compensations such as the
57-cent All You Can Eat Steak Night at the Lajes Officers' Club; the 5-cent shoe
shines; 15-cent haircuts, and 25-cent sauna - all well worth stocking up on." 2
Whether Air Force, Navy, Marine or Army- flyers are the furthest any human
being could possibly be from being robots. They have to cope with the vicissitudes
of nature, coax often recalcitrant flying machines into doing things they were
never built to do, and fly into harms way whenever and wherever told to do so.
They are men, today women as well, with needs and wants and ambitions, having
learned early on not to suppress their fears, but to use the rush of adrenalin to
their advantage. At times, they just want to be foolish and free, letting off steam,
relieving the stresses of the world they live in and cope with twenty-four hours
a day. They fly, sleep, eat and drink together, all too often spending more time
with one another than with their families. They know each others strengths and
weaknesses, survive each others annoying little quirks by maintaining a forgiving,
if at times sarcastic sense of humor. In time of war and emergency when teamwork
is essential and reliance on one another is absolute, it is precisely then that these
carefully cultivated bonds enable men to accomplish the seemingly impossible.
And so our three RB-66C aircrews were quite typical.
On May 4, 1962, the 16th TRS and the 29th TRS at Shaw deployed nine
RB-66B and eight RF-101 aircraft to Eglin AFB, to participate in a firepower
demonstration for President John F. Kennedy. It was to be the biggest demonstration
of its kind ever put on by the Air Force. It was also a subtle yet unheeded warning
to the island nation gone Communist 90 miles south of Florida. Captain Gerry
Reponen was one of the pilots from the 16TRS selected to go to Eglin. "I was
chosen to fly the low level aerial refueling demonstration behind a KB-50 tanker
flying past the President. We deployed to Eglin on April 13 to practice. The final

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practice was flown on April 27 before the vice president, Lyndon B. Johnson, the
secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, and too many generals to recall. This
was quite a show. There were a total of 164 aircraft, and 126 of them were from
TAC-63 F-lOOs, eight RF-IO ls, seven F-104s, 31 of the new F-105s, two L-28s ,
four KB-50s, nine RB-66s, and three C-130s. The practice on the 27th began
with the RB-66 aircraft flying at 3,000 feet and 250 knots, with the lead aircraft
dropping twenty-one time release flash cartridges with a two second delay in a
twenty-one gun aerial salute to the President, with the cartridges set to burst at
1,500 feet in front of the reviewing stand." 3
Gayle Johnson, also from the 16TRS, flew the lead aircraft and was to drop
the 21 flash cartridges. "General LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the TAC
commander, General Walter C. Sweeney, were in the audience. Only 20 cartridges
came out- and LeMay did the counting. We learned all about the 20-count versus
the 21-salute immediately after landing when we dropped the entrance door to
our aircraft. Our remedy was to have the number two aircraft have its cartridge
door open to pick up any misses. The armament people filed and shined those
firing pins on the cartridge shells. Came the real thing- 21 cartridges went off on
schedule for the President. Our demonstration was preceded by a pair of F-104s
doing a supersonic run past the reviewing stand. President Kennedy sat in his
famous rocking chair on the platform, and word had it that he nearly got knocked
off his chair by the sonic boom."•
Three RF-!Ols from the 363rd TRW followed the RB-66s, demonstrating
the latest side-looking photo technology, flying 100 feet off the ground at 350
knots . Photographs taken by the RF-101 s of the presidential party were developed
immediately upon landing and presented to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson two
hours after the fly-by. This was the same technology that was to bring home the
pictures of the Soviet SA-2 missile sites four months later on the Island of Cuba.
There were various fighter aircraft making passes at maximum speed and minimum
altitude, some firing guns and rockets . Other aircraft performed maximum rate of
climb demonstrations, aiming to intercept B-57s cruising at 20,000 feet. The new
F-105 TAC fighter demonstrated nuclear weapons delivery tactics, other fighters
shot down a QF-80 drone aircraft with a missile. All this was followed by a B-52G
launching a simulated nuclear weapon at low altitude. "Finally, my tum came,"
recalls Captain Reponen, "Mission #11 - a mass in-flight refueling demonstrating
TAC's global reach and ability to move its aircraft to any part of the world using
aerial refueling. The first flight had an F-100 refueling from one wing-drogue of a
KB-50 tanker, and an RF-101 on the other. The second flight had an F-104 and F-
105 refueling off the wings of a KB-50, and the third KB-50 had one RB-66B with
me as the pilot refueling from the tail drogue. F.ollowing me were two C-130s.

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 Glory Days

"We had been flying in orbit just off shore over the Gulf at 2,000 feet. It was
extremely hot in the aircraft and we were bouncing all over the sky with low puffy
cumulus clouds in the area. As we fell in line to make our pass, all of us were to
make our connection to the tanker as we descended to 1,000 feet. I was bouncing
all over the place in the descent as I made my connection and pushed the refueling
hose in to about twenty-five feet. Passing the grandstand, I was told later, the
fighters were all over the sky and the only aircraft hooked up and close to the
tanker was the RB-66. Was I ever proud to hear that. The 3rd of May was a stand-
down day for maintenance to insure all aircraft would be ready the following day
for the real thing. We had a squadron softball game with the officers against the
enlisted men, to be followed by a barbecue. During the game I got hit by a line
drive on the end of my right index finger. It hurt terribly. The following day my
hand was swollen twice its size and I could only move my thumb and little finger.
I pretended everything was fine and hid my hand as best I could. I was not going
to miss flying past the President, a once in a lifetime opportunity. I told Neil, my
squadron commander who was flying in the gunner's seat, that he would have to
get out of his seat and tum the fuel selector and radio switches for me. I could
push the throttles back and forth with my right hand but that was all I could use it
for. We were briefed that no one was going to connect to the KB-50s so it would
all look uniform.
"We flew the same orbit pattern, the weather was just as ugly, turbulent and
hot as before. As we descended to 1,000 feet I flew up to the drogue of the tanker
and put the basket up against the right windshield so it was hidden and it looked
like I was connected. In that position we flew past President Kennedy. Neil got out
of his seat and tuned the radio for me so I could get landing instructions. After we
taxied in and shut the engines down I found our flight surgeon who was stunned
when I told him that I had just flown a low level refueling. I had a broken joint
where the finger joins the hand and it was too late for a cast. So I ran around with a
splint for a couple of weeks. The range demonstrations were extensive with all the
fighters doing various types of weapons deliveries. The C-130s made an assault
landing, unloaded a bunch of troops and then took off again. Probably the most
impressive demonstration was a flight of F-lOOs making a napalm and strafing
run, followed by another flight of four doing a bomb and strafing attack, who were
followed by yet four more F-100s firing rockets and strafing as well. The very last
mission showed off SAC's newest bomber, the B-58, making a minimum altitude
high speed fly-by. The entire show took 45 minutes and was a constant flow of
aircraft demonstrating one thing or another. In my Air Force career I was never to
see anything like it again."5

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 Th e Missiles of October

In October 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted , putting the nation and the
world at the edge of Armageddon. I remember those days well. I was a young first
lieutenant, flying as a Raven in one of SAC's RB-47H reconnaissance aircraft.
Suspicions were rampant for some time that the Soviets were up to something
in Cuba. U-2 and RF-10 I aircraft had photographed tell-tale SA-2 Star-of-David
missile sites . And we in the 55th SRW had picked up , recorded and located some
of the SA-2 associated SAM tracking radars . But it was Major Richard Heyser,
flying his U-2 spy plane over Cuba on the morning of October 14, 1962 , who
photographed and brought back the first pictures of Soviet SS-4 Medium Range
Ballistic Missiles mounted on trailers. SAC took its time verifying what it had ,
coordinating with the CIA and other intelligence agencies before confronting the
President with the news on Tuesday morning , October 16. "President John F.
Kennedy was still in his pajamas when his national security advisor, McGeorge
Bundy, delivered the news. Kennedy was stunned - Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev had given him a personal pledge not to deploy offensive weapons
in Cuba. 'He can 't do that to me!' Kennedy exclaimed. Summoned to the White
House to look at Heyser 's pictures , the President's brother Robert pounded his fist
in his palm and moaned , ' Oh shit! Shit! Those sons a'bitches Russians ."6
On Monday, October 22 , President Kennedy, in a televised speech to the
nation , announced that the Soviet Union was in the process of installing nuclear-
tipped missiles ninety miles off America's shores . A naval quarantine was to be
imposed on the island of Cuba until all missiles were removed . Missile-carrying
ships were to be intercepted and not allowed to proceed. By presidential directive
the Strategic Air Command went from Defense Condition 5 to Defense Condition
3 - from a routine alert posture for the nuclear strike forces to a readiness posture
where all aircraft were loaded with nuclear weapons and ready for launch . On
the day the quarantine went into effect , on Wednesday, October 24, the SAC
commander, General Thomas S. Power, unilaterally ordered SAC forces from
Defcon 3 to Defcon 2, making an already touchy situation worse . Over 1,000
SAC bombers sat on their dispersal bases crewed , loaded and ready to strike the
Soviet Union . Others were on airborne alert flying racetrack patterns high in the
sky above the Arctic Circle. Polaris nuclear submarines assumed their final launch
positions . It seemed that General LeMay 's carefully crafted strategy of nuclear
deterrence was about to fail. As a child in wartime Germany I survived 1,000-
bomber raids on Berlin. I knew that neither I nor my young family would survive
a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union . While the bombers sat alert or flew
their elliptical racetrack patterns high in the sky, we in the 55th flew our RB-
47H reconnaissance aircraft twenty-four hours a day around Cuba, maintaining
electronic surveillance and searching for an elusive missile-carrying Russian ship

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 Glory Days

- the Groznyy . High altitude U-2 photographic spy planes of the 4080th Strategic
Wing and low flying RF-101 photographic reconnaissance aircraft of the 363rd
TRW brought home the pictures needed to prove and monitor the Missiles of
October.
Black Saturday, October 27, proved to be a watershed day. A 55th Wing RB-
47H involved in the search for the Soviet ship carrying additional SS-4 missiles
crashed on take-off from Kindley Air Base, Bermuda. Its crew of four perished.
Another RB-4 7H located the Groznyy, crates of missiles crowding her deck. Navy
destroyers quickly challenged the Russians, putting the quarantine to the test. A
U-2 piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson from the 4080th Strategic Wing was
downed by an SA-2 missile while on a high altitude photographic run over Cuba,
killing Anderson. The fat was in the fire, as the saying goes. The Groznyy stopped
at the quarantine line, sat there for a while, then turned back. The following day,
Sunday, October 28, Russia agreed to remove its offensive missiles from Cuba.
The crisis was over.7
While the focus throughout those fateful October days was on the Strategic
Air Command, its bombers and high flying U-2 spy planes, the men of the 363rd
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing flying RF-101 and RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft
did what light, tactical aircraft did best. The RF-10ls, relocated from Shaw to
Homestead AFB on the east coast of Florida, flew photo reconnaissance over Cuba
at treetop level with their sensitive optical and infra-red cameras. They picked up
the residual heat-generated silhouettes of missiles on trailers parked on concrete
aprons, after they were hastily moved and hidden from their all-seeing eyes.
The RB-66Cs flying out of MacDill AFB, on Tampa Bay, picked up SA-2 radar
emissions, but it took Major Heyser's undeniable high altitude U-2 photographs
to leave no doubt of what the Russians were up to. RB-66B aircraft flew the film
from returning RF- I 0 Is to Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB,
Virginia, where it was processed before being passed on to the Pentagon and the
White House. RB-66Cs from the 9th TRS at Shaw continued to fly electronic
surveillance missions around Cuba out of MacDill until 1965, when another more
urgent war required their services.
On November 26, 1962, after the quarantine of Cuba was lifted, and the last
IL-28 Beagle bomber had been removed from the island, President Kennedy
met face to face with the men of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and
the 4080th Strategic Wing at Homestead AFB. While pinning the Outstanding
Unit Award streamer onto Wing flags he recognized their sacrifices: "May I say
gentlemen, that you take excellent pictures, and I have seen a great many of them,
beginning with the photos which were taken on the weekend in the middle of
October which first gave us conclusive proof of the build-up of offensive weapons

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in Cuba ... You gentlemen have contributed as much to the security of the United
States as any group of men in our history. We are much indebted to you ." 8 And the
entire nation was indeed indebted to these men, as well as to the visceral courage
of a young President who rose to a mortal challenge to the nation, coolly focused
on a peaceful solution until one was found .
Captain Eldon Canady was a Raven in the 9th TRS at Shaw and flew
numerous Red Lemon, later called Potato Chip, missions in RB-66C aircraft out
of MacDill around Cuba. This was good training that would stand him in good
stead in 1965 when he deployed to Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, RTAFB, in
Thailand, about 100 miles north of Bangkok, at the beginning of the Vietnam War.
"During those electronic reconnaissance missions the Cuban/Russian operators
often locked onto us with their Firecan anti-aircraft radars. We were under orders
not to jam them or drop chaff unless we were under attack. On one mission my
curiosity got the better of me . I wanted to find out how effective our jammers and
chaff would be against them. I knew that any chaff I released could be tracked by
our own radars in Florida, but jamming might not be detected. A Firecan radar
I had been DF-ing (direction finding) and analyzing locked on to us . I decided
to drop several bundles of chaff. Within moments after the chaff deployed the
lock was broken and the signal got weaker as it followed the false target. Once
the operator realized that lock had been broken, he went back into acquisition
mode and once again locked on to us. I again dropped some chaff and broke his
lock. After we passed out of range I wondered how I was going to explain all
this once we landed, because I was sure our own radars had tracked and reported
this activity. I saw myself getting grounded, or receiving some other punishment.
But I never heard a word about it. On another mission in the same area we again
were tracked by an anti-aircraft, AAA, fire control radar, this time I decided to use
one of our noise jammers. As before, I broke his lock. He tried to come back. I
broke his lock again with jamming. Then a rare thing happened . An SA-2 missile
tracking radar, a Fansong, came on the air. It was a really strong signal. I would
not see a Fansong again until I got to Vietnam. The purpose of our missions of
course was to pick up these signals, record their parameters, so they could be
analyzed. I got a really good recording of this particular Fansong radar, but I
didn't try to jam him or drop chaff. These Cuban surveillance missions gave me
great confidence when I deployed to Vietnam that we could successfully suppress
their fire control radars."9
The Cuban Missile crisis was not only a good training ground for the Ravens
of the 9th TRS, but also a wake-up call for Air Force planners of the lethality of
the SA-2. The loss of Major Anderson's U-2 over Cuba was preceded by the loss
over China of a U-2C to an SA-2 missile a month earlier, on September 9, 1962.

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 Glory Days

That aircraft was flown by a Taiwanese pilot. Still another Chinese Nationalist
U-2C was shot down on November l, 1963, to be followed by another on July 7,
1964, and a fourth U-2C on January 10, 1965.' 0 It became obvious that the day
of the high flying bomber was a thing of the past. SAC's XB-70 high altitude
bomber, destined to be the follow-on aircraft to the B-52, was one of the first
major weapons system programs to become a casualty of advancing technology.
B-47s and B-52s began practicing on low level oil burner routes, flying 500 feet
above the terrain, hoping to under-fly and evade enemy missile radars. Nuclear
weapon carrying fighters such as the F-IOOD and the new F-105 would have to
penetrate enemy territory low level as well and get expert at toss-bombing . The
full impact of the SA-2 SAM system on Air Force weapons systems and tactics
would not reveal itself until well into the air war against North Vietnam, but then
it changed the U.S. Air Force in ways few could imagine at the time.

136
 CHAPTER TWELVE

ONE MAN'S STORY

Gerry Reponen turned ten in 1939. " It was the year when my cousin Marvin
told me about a Pure Oil station on 6th Street in Duluth , Minnesota, where I
lived, giving away Jimmie Mattern books called Cloud Country . There were
three books in the series giving a pictorial history of famous flights up to 1935 .
Jimmie Mattern also had a radio program and his first twenty episodes made up
Book One , titled Wings of Youth . The Book Two episodes were titled Hawaii
to Hollywood , followed by Book Three, Lost in Siberia. I picked up the books
at the Pure Oil station when they came out and intently listened to Jimmie's
radio program. There was another radio program I listened to as well, Captain
Midnight . By age ten I was hooked on airplanes and flying and I thought about
becoming a pilot. I attended college and in 1952 was commissioned a second
lieutenant in the United States Air Force. I reported for duty with a hundred other
newly commissioned officers at McChord Air Force Base in Washington state . I
applied for pilot training , passed the physical and was selected, but didn ' t get a
class assignment until February 1954. I starting with the PA-18 Piper Cub and
ended up flying the twin-engine B-25 of World War II fame . After getting my
wings, I chose a T-290 assignment at Mather AFB, near Sacramento. We trained
navigator/bombardiers for the Strategic Air Command . After two years there I had
2,000 flying hours. I would have had more , but the Air Force only allowed us to
fly a maximum of 320 hours a quarter. It was at this time when I received a call
from personnel. They offered me the choice of a B-47 or a KC-97 assignment. I
was getting ready to pack up my family to mov,e to Plattsburg AFB, in New York

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 Glory Days

An RB-66C from the 42nd TRS, IOTRW. approaches a KB-50 aerial refueling tanker from the 420th
Air Refueling Squadron, a/the 47th BW, over the North Sea .

138
 s
One Man Story

state, when I got a call canceling my SAC assignment and sending me to the 66th
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, at Sembach Air Base, Germany. I was thrilled.
First though I had to report to Craig Air Force Base, near Selma, Alabama, to
qualify in the T-33 jet trainer. I was to report to Sembach in September.
" It was my last flight in the T-33 after 42 hours, a solo night mission . I flew
over Selma and marveled at the bright lights below. I decided to see what the city
looked like upside down, rolled over and flew again across Selma. Once I passed
the lights I rolled right side up and I found myself in total blackness - there were no
lights, no horizon. I couldn't tell which way was up. It took a lot of concentration
staring at the attitude indicator and convincing myself that I was flying straight
and level, while the seat of my pants was telling me I was flying into the ground.
I had a severe case of vertigo, and the many hours of instrument training in the
T-29D at Mather probably saved my life. On Wednesday, September 25, 1957, I
turned in my car for shipment to Germany and boarded a C-118 at McGuire Air
Force Base, New Jersey, to Frankfurt, Germany."'
When Germany was divided up at Yalta in February 1945, the American zone
of occupation was in the south and the British in the north . The French zone
was subsequently carved out of the British and American zones. American air
bases were clustered around Munich, Bavaria, such as Erding, Fuerstenfeldbruck
and Oberpfaffenhofen. Not exactly ideal locations for combat squadrons. The
most promising sites for alternative air base locations were in the remote Eifel
Mountains in the French zone of occupation. The French granted basing rights
to American forces in France in 1951, and acceded to the construction of three
new airfields and the expansion of two others in their zone of occupation as
well. Construction of Spangdahlem, Bitburg, and Hahn Air Bases began in 1951.
Sembach and Ramstein/Landstuhl, former Luftwaffe bases, were expanded to
accommodate jet aircraft and the families of American servicemen. The cost of
building the bases was born by a defeated Germany in the form of reparations .
By late 1952 the new air bases in the Eifel Mountains were mostly ready and
the 36th Fighter Bomber Wing moved its F-84Es from Fuerstenfeldbruck to
Bitburg. The 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing moved to Spangdahlem Air
Base, within sight of Bitburg, and the 50th Fighter Bomber Wing moved into
Hahn Air Base. Construction at Sembach was slowed down by opposition from
local fanners who did not want to give up their land, but by late 1952 Sembach
Air Base was mostly completed as well and became the headquarters of the 66th
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 66TRW, and two of its squadrons. The Air Force's
post World War II base realignment in Europe was pretty much completed by
late 1952, and American air power was facing its new adversary to the east from
new and well positioned air bases. First Lieutenant Gerald Reponen, on his way

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 Glory Days

to Sembach via Frankfurt Air Base, the port of entry for troops and dependents
traveling to Germany by air, arrived on September 26.
"After collecting my bags I went to the Officers' Club and had a German
beer. If I had been smart I would have gotten a room in the Bachelor Officers
Quarters, BOQ, but I chose instead to take a bus to Sembach and arrived there
well after dark. It turned out that Sembach had no quarters available and I ended
up staying in the Ramstein Visiting Officers Quarters, VOQ, getting to bed well
after midnight. Within days I was shunted off to a BOQ in Vogelweh, a huge Army
installation down the road from Ramstein and Landstuhl Air Bases. Although only
September, it was cold. All I had with me was my Class-A blue uniform. Clearing
into the 66th TRW was a paperwork nightmare. Every office seemed to have its
own form and special requirements. When I went to the finance office to collect
the travel money due me, about $900, I didn't get paid in American dollars, but
was handed a stack one-half inch thick of script money, issued by the military
in lieu of dollars. When I reported to the 30th TRS , my squadron, there were
more surprises in store for me. They had too many pilots and not enough flying
hours nor airplanes to go around. The 30th had six RB-57 As in its inventory,
and only twelve of its authorized twenty-four RB-66Bs had arrived so far. I was
assigned to Headquarters Squadron to fly a desk. When I went to the personal
equipment section I was able to check out one flight suit. They didn't know when
they would have a helmet for me, nor any of the other flying gear I was authorized
and needed. There was a lot of make-work for newcomers - taking the military
and European drivers tests, and briefings on European flying conditions and Air
Defense Identification Zones and procedures . Getting settled in seemed a never
ending process . I needed a transformer for my electric razor, was looking for a
cheap used car, spent endless hours trying to get my family's travel arrangements
straightened out, and put in for military housing. Using the military telephone
system and trying to call from one base to another was another riddle wrapped
in an enigma. Every evening I felt like I had gone through a meat grinder, yet I
hadn't touched nor seen an airplane since I arrived at Sembach.
"On October 7 I was finally notified that I would be the pilot of the 18th
crew in our squadron. This news got me only one thing, a room in the BOQ at
Sembach. Other than getting assigned to a squadron, going to ground school,
reading regulations , and moving ten miles, nothing changed. The following day I
learned that our squadron was scheduled to move to Spangdahlem in March. We
were supposed to move in December I heard, but the runways weren't ready. The
runway at Sembach couldn't take the weight of the B-66, so the airplanes which
had arrived from the factory sat at Landstuhl and Ramstein. A couple days later
I was informed that I finally would be able to get a T-33 flight. I still only had

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 One Mans Story

one flight suit and a clip board, no boots and no helmet. Then I was supposed to
go to Laon AB, France, for two weeks to get 50 hours in the B-57 before I could
even think about checking out in the B-66. Germany was pretty I discovered. I
found the villages interesting - the houses closely spaced, the roads paved with
cobblestones. a manure heap in every farmyard, close to the road and next to the
main house. I presumed the larger the pile the more prosperous the farmer." 2
The mission of the 66th TRW at Sembach was to provide day and night
reconnaissance information to the commanders of what the Wing 's history referred
to as , 'air-ground teams .' Its squadrons and aircraft were scattered and diverse.
The 19th TRS was assigned to the 66TRW in January 1957 and located at RAF
Sculthorpe in far away England, flying the RB-45C Tornado. The 19th converted
to the RB-66B Destroyer in February 1957. Another of its squadrons, the 30th
TRS, flew World War II vintage RB-26Cs, T-33 jet trainers, and trouble prone
RB-57 A jets, while the 302nd and 303rd reconnaissance squadrons flew single
engine RF-84Fs. The 302nd and 303rd squadrons' RF-84s sat at Sembach and
Laon, France, as did the Band RB -57As. Once the RB-66Bs arrived in July 1957
(Appendix 3), they were parked at Landstuhl and Ramstein, because the runway
at Sembach could not support their weight. The 66 Wing's diversity of aircraft and
far spread locations was a nightmare for any commander to manage and control.
Not surprisingly, Headquarters USAFE, located in an old German Kaseme in the
spa-town of Wiesbaden, Lindsey Air Station, late in 1957 decided to reorganize.
In January 1958 , the RB-668, C and D equipped squadrons were all put under
the 10th Wing at Spangdahlem. The 1st TRS and 42nd TRS, already there, were
augmented by the 30th TRS from Sembach in early 1958 and by the 19th TRS from
RAF Sculthorpe in January 1959. Finally, all the 10th Wing squadrons would be
under one roof so to speak. All RF-84F squadrons were placed under the 66TRW at
Sembach with aircraft at both Sembach and Laon, France. In late 1957 Lieutenant
Reponen found himself thrown into what one might call a dynamic situation. His
unit of assignment was in the process of aircraft conversion, anticipated physical
relocation and organizational change.'
"October was a period of turmoil for me just trying to understand what I had
become a part of," Gerry Reponen wrote . "I hadn't flown since I left the States
and I needed four hours flying time desperately to get my flying pay, or lose it. So
on the 21st of October I managed to get on an SA-16 Albatross rescue plane as a
copilot and flew to Belgium and back. I was thrilled when I finally got an RB-66
orientation flight. I rode in the gunner's seat behind the pilot. Money seemed to
be very tight. They were deactivating squadrons and cutting down on the number
of people. There was very little flying time available for us because of cutbacks in
flying hours. Nevertheless, being in a combat sguadron gave me an elite feeling.

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 Glory Days

We were always joking back and forth between the RF-84 pilots and those who
flew the B-57 and the B-66. Such camaraderie I had never experienced before.·
"To qualify in the RB-66 I had to have 50 hours twin-engine jet time. To get
that I had to go to Laon where the Wing had some B-57B bombers. Crossing the
border was an ordeal, but once on the other side driving was easier than in Germany.
The roads were wider, straighter and paved with black top, not cobble stones. The
fields were larger as well, not broken up into little strips as in Germany. The
villages were similar, but there were few people about nor cars on the roads. Laon
Air Base was spread all over the place and had a temporary look about it. There
were no trees on the base, house trailers instead of base housing, the BOQ looked
thrown together, with walls so thin that sound carried throughout the building. I
started flying in the B-57B on November 16. The weather was bad throughout my
stay and I never was able to get a VFR check ride. They finally signed me off and
I returned to Sembach and got a couple of flights in the RB-57A. The RB-57A
was very different from the bomber. The pilot sat in a bubble not seeing any part
of the airplane, otherwise the view was excellent. It was a strange feeling sitting
in this cockpit, like being at the head of a pin. To see the instrument panel I had
to duck down - not very safe. The second person rode in a compartment below, to
the right and back of the pilot. To change seats, the instructor pilot got out of his
seat and parachute and then kneeled down facing backwards holding the yoke of
the plane to control it as there was no autopilot. Then the other pilot would crawl
up beside him and step up into the bubble and sit down. This was not the safest
way of doing things, but the only way to get checked out in the A-model. Then
they grounded the planes because of flight control problems. I still didn't have 50
hours multi-engine jet time which I needed to fly the RB-66.
"Ruth and the children finally arrived at Frankfurt on December 23. We drove
to Vogelweh where I had two BOQ rooms waiting for us . There we celebrated
Christmas. We left for Spangdahlem Air Base on January 2, 1958. Finding a house
on the economy was difficult, base housing was not available. We moved in on
January 5, a small apartment on the main road to the nearby town of Bitburg. The
apartment was heated with a coal stove. We had an electric range in the kitchen,
and hot water came from a small electric appliance over the washbasin. The
bathroom was small and cold. At one end of the bathtub was a coal fired hot water
heater. If we wanted to take a bath we first had to make a fire to heat the water. We
had a lot of learning to do about life in a foreign country.
"My squadron, the 30th TRS, moved into a small cement building in the
forest near the east end of the runway at Spangdahlem. The main base was more
than a mile from our location. A Field Training Detachment, FTD, from Shaw
AFB ran an RB-66B aircraft familiarization course for us, going into the details

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 One Man's Story

of every aircraft system to the point where after a few days I thought my head
would explode. I didn't actually get to fly the RB-66 until March, and not at
Spangdahlem, but at Nouasseur Air Base, French Morocco, where the skies were
nearly always clear. After sixteen hours with an instructor I finally flew my first
solo mission on March 22, and within the week I was certified as a qualified RB-
66 combat pilot."•
The RB-66B assigned to Lieutenant Reponen was the last aircraft to be
transferred from the 66TRW to Spangdahlem - 54-528, a hangar queen. The 10th
Wing just had an Operational Readiness Inspection, ORI, and had been severely
criticized for the number of non-operational planes. The principal reason for
the groundings and cannibalization was that the Stafoam filled control surfaces,
ailerons and elevators, accumulated water inside and became too heavy to
function. 5 "Captain Fred Flanders flew the aircraft to Spangdahlem, making the
flight with the gear down," Gerry Reponen writes . "When Dan McGreevy, my
navigator, and I took it up, the landing gear would not retract. Trying to remember
my FTD lectures , I actuated the JATO jettison button. Suddenly I had hydraulic
pressure to the gear and it retracted. Dan said, 'Now that we have the gear up,
how do we get it down?' Placing the gear handle in either the up or down position
had no effect. Making my descent I hit the speed brake switch, and the gear came
down. Maintenance found a problem with the way the hydraulic lines had been
hooked up. It was the first of many challenges I encountered flying the RB-66.
"In April I pinned on captain's bars, a welcome raise came along with that
promotion. In addition we got the good news that an apartment had become
available in base housing at Bitburg. Ruth was excited - finally hot water again
when you turned the faucet, a washing machine in the basement laundry room
with plenty of lines to hang your wash, a small balcony to sit on, and central
heating, no more coal to mess with . At work I was appointed squadron flying
safety officer, and within days we had a puzzle to deal with. It was early summer
and that morning one of our aircraft taking off to the east knocked the arresting
barrier down. After much back and forth we recalculated our take-off data.
Runway 05 was slightly up hill, and for the weight of our aircraft with the current
weather conditions and field elevation at Spangdahlem we found to our surprise
that we needed 8,300 feet to make a take-off. No wonder the barrier was knocked
down, because we only had an 8,000 foot runway. From then on we all learned
how to use the performance charts in our flight manual, and computed every take-
off roll. During the summer months we couldn't take off with a full fuel load from
Spangdahlem.
"The Lebanon Crisis blew up that summer and we were put on alert and
restricted to the base. After a couple of weeks, things calmed down again and I

143
 Glory Days

was allowed to go on a long planned two-week family vacation. Wherever we

went on our travels we found the Germans to be friendly and kind. That year I
flew my first mission at Wheelus AB, Tripoli, in support of Matador missile tests.
We chased the missile down range and recorded its impact point in relationship
to its assigned target. In October the weather took a tum for the worse . And on
December 9, 1958, the 30th TRS had its first aircraft accident."6
Aircraft 54-535 was on a practice radar bomb scoring flight from Spangdahlem
to Nancy, France, then to Cologne, Germany, and back to Spangdahlem. Captain
Howard Strandberg, the pilot, intended to make a straight in GCA approach to
runway 23. It was near midnight as the aircraft approached. Captain Strandberg
requested to level off above the undercast, reporting that his engine anti-icing
system seemed to be inoperative. The aircraft descended from 7 ,000 to 4,000 feet,
then continued to descend to 2,700 feet. Nine miles from the end of the runway the
final GCA radar controller took over. The aircraft responded to his directions up to
the two mile point. At 1.8 miles from the runway the aircraft disappeared from the
radar scope and crashed, killing its crew of three . The subsequent investigation
did not reveal aircraft malfunction. It appeared to be pilot error. 7
"Acrobatics in the B-66 were a no-no. The wing fuel-bladders were hung in
such a way that unless positive G-forces were maintained they could come off
their hangars and bend the fuel probes inside the bladders. Acrobatics may have
been against the rules, but we all violated the rules - it was such an exhilarating
feeling no jet pilot could resist. In early 1959 our planes were finally equipped
with refueling probes and soon thereafter my flight commander, Captain Don
McKean and I took off for our first try at aerial refueling from a KB-50 tanker.
Little did they know that we had no experience. The tanker was in a 30-mile orbit
over Germany. I stayed off to the left to watch Don try to make a connect with
the tanker's drogue. For the best closure with the drogue we had been briefed to
fly five knots faster than the tanker, after connecting we would continue to push
forward until about 25 feet of hose remained before reducing speed. Refueling
was not easy at the slow 180 knots flown by the tanker, compared to our normal
cruise speed of 300 to 360 knots. I discovered quickly that a closure speed closer
to ten knots faster worked better. When coming in to the drogue too slow the
air pressure would build up in front of the drogue and deflect it away in one
direction or another. With a little faster closure speed I found things beginning
to fall into place. The biggest problem was reaching the IFR switch, (lnflight
Refueling Switch) located just above the floor and to the right, a difficult place
to reach. Reaching for the switch tended to give me vertigo. When transferring
fuel the added weight required additional power and created a nose high attitude.
When this happened I asked the tanker to tobaggon, and he would go into a slow

144
 One Man s Story

descent. Air refueling with the KB-50 tanker was work and it took lots of practice
to get good at it.
"In 1959 I participated in three 48-aircraft fligh-bys, a practice the 10th Wing
had become known for. During Armed Forces Day, and on two other occasions .
The 19th squadron had finally arrived from RAF Sculthorpe, and each of the
four squadrons put up 12 aircraft carefully assembled in one gigantic diamond
formation. It took work to get that done . I felt like I was just barely clearing the
trees and getting bounced around in the jet wash of other planes in the formation
above me. On August 13, 1959, my squadron, the 30th TRS, published orders
for us to move from Spangdahlem to RAF Alconbury. This came as a complete
surprise. We knew that relations between the U.S . and France had deteriorated ,
but none of us expected it to have such an immediate impact."'
President Charles de Gaulle ordered all American nuclear armed aircraft off
French soil in July 1959. Headquarters of the 10th TRW moved to RAF Alconbury
along with two of its squadrons, the 1st and 30th TRS. The 42nd TRS with its RB-
66C and D aircraft relocated to RAF Chelveston, and the 19th TRS, which had
arrived at Spangdahlem only in January, was sent to RAF Bruntingthorpe. All
of the British locations were old World War II bases with minimum facilities .
"I was told I would have to move my family to England within three weeks,"
Gerry Reponen notes "or they would be shipped back to the States and I would
be put in an unaccompanied tour status. On September 15 I finally found a house
in Cambridge, and was granted ten days permissive TOY to make arrangements
to move my family from Germany to England. Our English house was in a
workingman's neighborhood, a long row of narrow tenement houses with small
backyards. The house was cold and drafty. The weather in Germany had been
warm and pleasant compared to England where for some reason it seemed colder.
From October on almost every flight out of Alconbury was in weather. As a result
we did much of our flying out of Moron Air Base, near Seville, Spain. For our
night photo missions we used nearby bombing ranges where we could drop our
photo cartridges, and most of our day photo missions were of our own choosing.
"On January 4, 1960, I was not scheduled to fly and reported to my squadron
wearing Air Force blues, our Class-A dress uniform. Wearing a flight suit when
you were not scheduled to fly was prohibited. My flight suit and boots were at
home, twenty-five miles away. Because of the persistent inclement weather my
squadron was behind in its flying, and I was only one of two pilots in the 30th
squadron with a green instrument card, which permitted me to fly in weather
conditions others were not qualified to fly in. Before I knew it I found myself
taxiing an aircraft from the ramp to the runway, wearing my blue uniform and low
quarter shoes. I co~ld see maybe 30 feet ahead, the fog was dense . As I passed 80

145
 Glory Days

knots on my take-off roll, I suddenly could no longer see the runway. Switching to
instruments I continued the take-off, all the while hoping I wouldn't veer off to the
side. The fog bank that covered the base hugged the ground and was not very deep.
I could see the tops of buildings protruding through the fog as I climbed out. I flew
the mission as briefed and on my return to Alconbury the base was still fogged
in, forcing me to recover at Chelveston. Finally, on the 8th, the weather improved
and I was able to get back. After five days without any change of clothing nor
proper flight gear I had flown a total of five missions for 18 hours in my Class-A
uniform. I took a lot of ribbing from my squadron mates who referred to me as
the gentleman pilot."9
In early 1960 the 42nd TRS at Chelveston phased out its WB-660 weather
planes and replaced them with 13 modified B-66B bombers, Brown Cradles,
originally based at RAF Sculthorpe. The 13 aircraft had their bomb bays filled
with 22 noise jammers designed to jam Soviet anti-aircraft, missile guidance,
acquisition and height finding radars . In late 1959 three Brown Cradles were flown
in a very successful ECM exercise against U.S. Navy ships off the east coast of the
United States, WEXVALII. The Brown Cradle aircraft were now ready to assume
alert duties like other B-66 aircraft in support of various war plans. Although the
Brown Cradles were assigned to the 42nd TRS at Chelveston, they pulled Echo
Alert at other 10th Wing bases as well, using crews from the various squadrons.
"Several Brown Cradle B-66s arrived at Alconbury," Gerry Reponen remembers .
"With their bomb bays filled with electronic jammers it changed the airplane's
center of gravity. More of the weight was forward which required that we taxi
very slowly around comers or else it would shear the tread off the nose wheel tire.
A new alert facility was built for the Brown Cradles . Echo Alert was a seven day
affair. There were never more than four of the Brown Cradles at Alconbury, two
on Echo Alert while the other two were being flown and their ECM equipment
calibrated. We weren't too crazy about this new mission nor the airplane.
"The only English neighbors I got to know at all were Jack and Margaret
Hunter who lived directly across the street from us in Cambridge. The English
were very reserved, not exactly fond of Americans either, other than our money,
except for Jack, who was outgoing and liked Yanks. Jack would take my two young
boys into his garden with him and muck around in the dirt. The only vegetable I
remember him raising was brussels sprouts, which he seemed to have an unending
supply of. Jack would have me over for a drink on occasion. He would go into
his dining room, lift up a floor board, where he hid a bottle of scotch whiskey
presented to him on some memorable occasion during World War II. He would
pour a teaspoon of it into a small shot glass for each of us, then I would sit there
listening to his war stories.

146
 One Mans Story

" My squadron building at Alconbury was an old Quonset hut. In the center
of the hut we had two oil-fired stoves. In the winter of ' 59 to ' 60 those stoves
were always going full blast. The heat didn't radiate very far. We stood around
the stoves, all too often burning holes into our padded winter flying suits. Early
that summer I received a new assignment to Shaw AFB in South Carolina. During
my nearly three years in Europe I had flown the RB-66 for over 600 hours. It
had been a good airplane and I encountered few problems . The best places to fly
out of I thought were Spangdahlem and Moron . The German countryside was so
beautiful to look at from the air, and in Spain the weather was always warm and
sunny. There we stayed in a hotel in Seville, mingled with the Spanish people,
and ate our meals in the city where they didn't start serving dinner until after nine
in the evening . I looked forward to going home , taking back with me many fond
memories ."' 0

147
 CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE BLACK SHEEP SQ!JADRON

OF TOUL-ROSIERES

In the summer of 1960 the Air Force was at the beginning of significant structural
change. While SAC's generals still believed in the primacy of the bomber, the
bomber had already reached its zenith and was in decline. After 1962, when the
last B-52 rolled off Boeing's production lines, the total bomber force continued to
shrink and its importance diminish as the intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM,
grew in numbers and lethality. The missiles in SAC's inventory were not only
ascendent, but soon were to replace, then modify the role of the few remaining
bombers. The last of four Atlas-D ICBM squadrons was activated in 1960. Three
Thor IRBM squadrons manned by British crews and based in the United Kingdom
became operational that same year, as did the 171 powered Snark cruise missile
at Presque Isle Air Base, Maine. The nuclear-tipped missiles of the future - Titan
and Minuteman - were just around the comer. In 1960 the Strategic Air Command
had in its inventory 538 B-52s, 1,291 B-47s, and 58 B-58s, a total force of 1,887
bombers, not including squadrons of reconnaissance and Blue Cradle ECM
aircraft, as well as numerous spare bombers not included in the operational count.
SAC's missile force was at its very beginnings, consisting of 30 Snark pilotless
aircraft and 12 Atlas ICBMs. By 1965 SAC's bomber inventory had declined to
825 aircraft - 600 B-52s, 132 B-47s and 93 B-58s, while the missile force had
grown to 59 Titanl/s and 821 Minuteman. Snark,Atlas-D,E and F, and Titan /had
come and gone. Obsolescence came rapidly in a fast moving technological field
under the assertive leadership of General Bernard A. Schriever. 1

148
 The Black Sheep Squadron of Toul-Rosieres

J'OSl'TICN•A•
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The route of Captain Holland's ill-fated flight into East Germany. The planned route is shown on the
left, passing over Dortmund, heading for Nordholz. The actual route shown on the right leads the
aircraft into the central Berlin air corridor and a fateful encounter with two Soviet MiG-19 fighters .

149
 Glory Days

As SAC changed so did the rest of the Air Force. With the buildup of the
strategic missile force, the deployment of shorter range Matador and Mace
missiles in Europe, and the introduction of the nuclear capable Republic F-105
Thunderchiej into the USAFE inventory, the rationale to retain nuclear armed
medium bombers not capable of low level special weapons delivery disappeared.
In 1962 the 47th Bomb Wing at RAF Sculthorpe shut its doors and sent its aircraft
to the bone-yard in the Arizona desert. The reconnaissance world was undergoing
major changes as well. The shoot-down of a U-2 over the Soviet Union on
May 1, 1960, by SA-2 surface-to-air missiles ended the Eisenhower sanctioned
overflights of the Soviet Union and Iron Curtain countries. Again it was missiles
which provided a safer alternative to spy-planes, lifting reconnaissance satellites,
euphemistically referred to as National Technical Means, into near-earth orbits.
The RB-66 photo reconnaissance force in the Pacific region along with the B-66B
USAFE bombers were among the first to feel the impact of new technologies.
The two PACAF reconnaissance squadrons inactivating in 1960, and the USAFE
B-66 bombers in 1962. The USAFE RB-66 reconnaissance squadrons were
undergoing change as well. Although the numbers remained fairly constant at less
than 100 aircraft, the force composition changed. By 1962 the WB-66D weather
reconnaissance aircraft of the 42nd TRS were retired. And by 1965 the RB-66B
photo reconnaissance force was largely in the process of being replaced by the
newer and more capable RF-4C Phantom. The remaining B-66 aircraft in the
USAFE inventory were withdrawn from Europe by late 1965 and committed to
war in Southeast Asia. There, in the steamy world of triple-canopy jungles, in a
totally unanticipated environment and field of air combat, the B-66 along with the
B-57 justified an Air Force investment made many years earlier.2
Colonel James D. Kemp, the innovative commander of the 10th Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing from July 1959 to June 1962, was less than thrilled with the
move of his command in 1960 from Spangdahlem to Alconbury. Not only were
his squadrons scattered across several air bases, but the facilities were minimal
and the English flying weather terrible. He also felt that his aircraft were too far
removed from the potential battlefield. When the Brown Cradles arrived in 1960
and began to assume an alert posture at Alconbury and Bruntingthorpe, Kemp
felt something had to be done to make this important asset more relevant. He
moved the alert aircraft to a forward operating location at Toul-Rosieres Air Base
in France. The RB-66Cs of the 42nd TRS at Chelveston had a similar problem.
They conducted tactical electronic reconnaissance along the East German and
Czech borders and had to spend much too much time flying to and from the
area of interest. In August 1962, just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the
19th TRS from Bruntingthorpe, flying RB-66B photo-birds, and the 42nd TRS

150
 The Black Sheep Squadron of Toul-Rosieres

from Chelveston, with its Brown Cradles and RB-66C electronic reconnaissance
aircraft, relocated to Toul-Rosieres . Bruntingthorpe and Chelveston closed. The
10th Wing headquarters, however, along with the !st and 30th TRS, remained at
Alcon bury.
Captain Earl McClintock came up through the Aviation Cadet program.
Flew F-86Fs in Korea, F-86Ds in Air Defense Command, then transitioned into
the F-102. Then the bottom fell out of Earl's world. ADC began cutting back
in 1960 and sending surplus pilots to remote radar sites. "This was like a death
sentence to me. It was about this time when a bulletin came down from Air Force
looking for volunteers for the RB-66 . The assignment was to England, including
concurrent travel for my family. I knew nothing about the B-66, but the chance
to take my family with me to England and to continue flying was hard to pass up .
I volunteered and got the assignment. I checked out at Shaw, then went to RAF
Bruntingthorpe, to the 19th TRS. After two years there we transferred to Toul-
Rosieres . It was here at Toul-Rosieres, on April 5, 1963, that I was asked to check
out another pilot in aerial refueling , Captain Bill Lawson.
"Bill Lawson worked in the command post and didn't get all that much flying
time. My responsibility was to teach Bill how to refuel from a KB-50 tanker.
Since the B-66 only had one pilot seat, I flew in the old gunner's seat. Once he
was behind the tanker, I'd get out of my seat, kneel behind him, and from that
awkward position grasped the right side of the flight control with my left hand
and the throttles with my right to demonstrate a refueling hook-up. Bill Lawson
went through the normal start up procedures. We pulled the pins from our ejection
seats and prepared for take-off. From my position I could not see any of Bill's
instruments, but I could see Captain Douglas Grafftin's altimeter, Doug was our
navigator. The weather was IFR with a low overcast. We entered the clouds shortly
after gear up. Almost immediately I felt the airplane go into a rapid rolling motion
accompanied by the onset of a stall. Bill began to swear in an excited voice and
my eyes were on Grafftin 's altimeter, which was unwinding at an alarming rate. It
seemed to me that Bill had lost control of the plane. Having flown fighters, I was
very much aware of how it felt to be in an accelerated stall. The last thing I saw
in the cockpit was the navigator reaching for the ejection handles on his seat, and
I followed suit immediately, not knowing if a recovery was possible. My chute
opened, and I was in the open air below the clouds not far from the ground. I heard
the engine noise of the airplane and looked in that direction to see it dish out of a
rolling dive well below the clouds, just above the terrain, then pull back up . The
navigator and I were quickly picked up. There were no injuries. It all happened
very fast." 3

151
 Glory Days

Captain Kermit Helmke was in the control tower at Toul-Rosieres the day
Earl McClintock and Douglas Grafftin ejected from Bill Lawson's aircraft. "One
of the ejection seats fell into a transformer field and caused some power outages.
The weather at Toul-Rosieres was barely above landing minimums while the
weather at Alconbury, only a short flight away, was clear. Another B-66 piloted
by Joe Wagner was ready to take-off. Wagner was directed by the 10th Wing
command post to accompany Bill Lawson's sick bird to Alconbury where they
landed without further incident."• The 19th squadron was well on its way to
becoming the 'Black Sheep Squadron' of the B-66 force. Only two months earlier,
on February 4, 1963, a 19TRS aircraft coming out of IRAN (Inspect and Repair
as Necessary) at the Douglas Tulsa plant in Oklahoma, caught fire soon after take-
off, killing its pilot, Captain William Cox .5 Captain Lawson came awfully close to
becoming yet another statistic.
When President Eisenhower ended the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union
in 1960, he in no way limited the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program. The
RB-47s of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing continued to fly the borders
and coast lines of the Soviet Union and its satellites, monitored Soviet missile
launches at Tyuratam, and conducted other specialized operations to ferret out
the secrets of Soviet combat aircraft, missiles and radars. It was in the peripheral
reconnaissance role, flying over international waters, where Soviet fighters were
most prone to lash out at American aircraft. On July l, 1960, only two months after
the shoot down of a Central Intelligence Agency U-2 aircraft near Sverdlovsk,
an RB-47H of the 55th SRW was downed over the Barents Sea by MiG-19
interceptors.As early as April 8, 1950, the Soviets downed an American aircraft in
the Baltic Sea off the coast of Latvia, a Navy PB4Y2 with a crew of ten. Over the
years American reconnaissance aircraft of all types had been downed by Soviet
fighters over the Sea of Japan, Baltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, off the Kamchatka
Peninsula, over the Bering Strait, and Black Sea.6 Ben R. Rich, the director of
Lockheed's legendary Skunk Works wrote, "Had the American public known
about the ongoing secret air war between the two super-powers they would have
been even more in despair than many already were about the state of the world."7
By 1964, little had changed. Soviet military commanders of PVO Strany, their air
defense command, remained paranoid about intrusions into Soviet territory. On
January 28, 1964, a T-39 Sabreliner from Wiesbaden Air Base on a routine flight
through the southern Berlin corridor strayed beyond the 20 mile limit and was
shot down by Russian fighters . The crew of three perished.8
Captain David I. Holland reported for duty with the 19th TRS atToul-Rosieres
in 1963. "After flying a number of training missions I was declared combat ready.
I was assigned a brand new navigator straight out of navigator training, Second

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Lieutenant Harold Welch . Hal Welch was eager, alert, and a pleasure to work
with. After flying a dozen training missions together, I was pleased to have him
as my partner. The time for Hal's combat qualification check arrived - March 10,
1964. Captain Melvin J. Kessler was the instructor navigator who would monitor
and evaluated Lieutenant Welch . A few minutes after noon on March 10 the three
of us pre-flighted the aircraft, taking off at 1300. We proceeded to fly the mission
as briefed - a high-low-high profile to include a low level photo run of several
bridges in northwest Germany near Osnabrueck . The flight was scheduled to last
about two hours and twenty minutes. It was our practice on a check ride to leave
radio navigation aids tuned to Toul-Rosieres, because the navigator was being
evaluated and he could see the pilot's instruments from his position. When we
were about 100 or so miles from Toul, the VOR/TACAN was out of range of
the Toul VORTAC. We leveled off at 33,000 feet. I engaged the autopilot and
reported my position to the Frankfurt air traffic controller. We were flying in clear
skies above an undercast. Captain Kessler sitting to the left of Lieutenant Welch
could read the doppler latitude and longitude, showing that we were on course.
In reality, we were flying into the central Berlin corridor. Lieutenant Welch gave
me a new heading and time to descend for our low altitude photo target. I made
the tum, began the descent, and extended my speed brakes . We had gone down
about 2,000 feet when I felt a slight jolt and heard what sounded like a 'crump .'
I looked outside and saw at ten o 'clock a fighter streaking away and jettisoning
his external tanks. At first I thought it was a NATO fighter that had jumped us and
come a little too close. When my airspeed began to increase and my hydraulic
pressure was going to zero I realized that the aircraft was seriously damaged and
this was no ordinary event.
"I was on a westerly heading, I thought, with a standard penetration angle
and speed brakes extended. With the loss of hydraulic pressure the speed brakes
retracted, and elevator and aileron response was zero. I attempted to raise the nose
of the aircraft and the left wing, applying 100 percent power to the left engine,
but if there was a response it was negligible . When I heard Captain Kessler tell
me that we were passing through 15 ,000 feet and I had no control over the aircraft
I ordered the crew to eject. I heard two loud bangs, saw the airspeed indicator
passing through 400 knots, and then went through the ejection sequence myself-
left pre-ejection lever up, right pre-ejection lever up, squeeze trigger in right pre-
ejection lever. I believe I went out at about 10,000 feet as the plane cartwheeled
downward in flames . I then blacked out and didn 't wake until I felt a terrible pain
in the groin from my parachute straps . I tried to unbuckle my chute, then realized
I was still several thousand feet above the ground. One thing I remember clearly,
how quiet it was as I was floating to the groul}d. It turned out to be a very soft

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 Glory Days

landing with the tree branches catching the chute just right to allow me to touch
down gently on my feet. My first thought after touching ground was, 'Oh shit,
what have I done."' 9
On March 10, 1964, senior pilot Captain Ivannikov, at Wittstock airfield, was
on alert duty at readiness level two. "At 1646 Moscow time I was given orders
by my fighter division command post to assume readiness level one. I started my
engines, took the runway and took off at 1649, assuming a heading of 330 degrees .
As I was climbing to 15 ,000 feet the controller informed me that my target was on
a heading of 090 degrees at 30,000 feet. Four minutes later, to the left and about
6,000 feet above me, at an approximate range of about six miles, I spotted the
intruder, pulling contrails for about 1,500 to 2,000 feet behind him. I also saw the
aircraft of Captain Zinoviev. Without losing sight of either aircraft I completed
a hard left turn into the target. I saw there were no guns in the back of the B-66
- otherwise we would have been immediately destroyed. Captain Zinoviev fired
his guns as a warning signal for the intruder to land. After Zinoviev fired, the
target turned left to a heading of 270 degrees, and while he was turning Captain
Zinoviev fired again, but I couldn't tell if he hit anything. Half-way through the
turn I assumed an attack position behind the violator at a distance of about 1,000
feet, he extended his speed brakes, and my distance decreased to 600 feet. At
1657, after Captain Zinoviev finished his attack he turned left and away from the
target, I received a command from the controller to fire my C-5 rockets from a
distance of less than 500 feet. The rockets were programmed to fire singly. I saw
the rocket leave my plane, hit the target, its left engine began to smoke. I fired no
more rockets, because I was too close and the rocket's proximity fuse would not
have armed in time, so I used my 23mm cannons from a distance of about 300
feet. I observed hits in the vertical stabilizer and lower part of the fuselage and
speed brakes. I reported the results to the command post of my fighter division.
I broke off my attack and climbed away to the right. I inadvertently flew past
the aircraft, into the debris zone, and as a result punctured one of my wing fuel
tanks, something I didn't know until after landing. The target rolled to the left,
entered a steep spiral, and I saw three red and white parachutes, which I reported
to the command post. I was then ordered to land at Altes Lager airfield, because
Wittstock was below minimums. The entire flight from beginning to end lasted
about 25 minutes." 10
"It seemed only minutes after I had disconnected from my chute and taken off
my helmet that a jeep-like vehicle appeared with three people. 1\vo in uniform,
one in civilian clothes. They indicated through gestures that I should get in and
accompany them. I didn't think I had a choice. Where I touched down was near
the small town of Gardelegen in East Germany. I later learned that there were

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 The Black Sheep Squadron of Toul-Rosieres

6,000 Soviet troops in the area on maneuvers. I inquired about my crew, but no
one talked to me - this being the way things remained for the next 17 days . We
arrived at a hospital where I was made to disrobe, put in a bed, and examined by
medical personnel. I indicated to them that I had pain in my left arm and they
X-rayed it. I was frightened. I remembered the U-2 shoot-down in 1960 of Gary
Powers. I also thought about the three USAF officers on the T-39 from Wiesbaden
who had been shot down and died on January 28, just a little over a month ago .
One of the nurses whispered, 'I so wish you were not here,' adding to the drama.
Sometime during the middle of the night I was put in an ambulance and taken for
a bumpy ride to a Russian hospital in Magdeburg. My private room was small,
a guard was at the door, and the food was far from gourmet. I enjoyed pickled
herring , but what I thought was a piece of delicatessen fish turned out to be just
raw fish. The borscht wasn't too bad.
"Interrogation began the following day. The Russians clearly believed we
were on a spy mission, and tried hard to have me admit it. I was worried about
Hal and Mel, but the Russian interrogators wouldn't give me any information
about them . I had no idea whether the Air Force really knew what happened,
whether my family knew of my plight. I was kept in total ignorance. Although I
knew nothing about what was going on in the outside world, my relatives were
notified of our missing status, and the incident became a media event in Time,
Newsweek and all the dailies. Headlines continued until the Alaska earthquake
overshadowed our predicament. There was of course no way for me to know that
my government - President Lyndon B. Johnson, former Ambassador to the Soviet
Union Llewellyn Thompson, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, were making
every effort to secure our release .
"During the 17-days of detention and isolation there were five interrogations,
some threats of a trial in Moscow, and questions about 'Madrid Control.' The
Russians had salvaged the wire recorder from the RB-66 which evidently still
contained recordings of a pilot talking to Madrid Air Traffic Control when
proceeding to or from our fair weather base near Tripoli, Libya. Standard
procedure became being awakened at three or four in the morning to sign a paper,
which I of course refused to do . The days passed slowly, no radio, no newspaper,
no one to talk to. I had attended survival training at Stead Air Force Base near
Reno, Nevada, prior to reporting to Shaw. The training I received was effective in
preparing me mentally for this period of detention . I have the greatest admiration
for those who survived long periods of imprisonment as prisoners of war. The one
thing that sustained me during that relatively short detainment was my faith in my
government making every attempt to obtain my release .

155
 Glory Days

"After the 16th day I was led to a bathroom and allowed to take a shower.
The next morning, to my great surprise, I received a breakfast of scrambled eggs
with bacon. Something was up, but I didn't know what. After breakfast a Russian
officer entered my room with what he called a 'clothing list' and asked me to sign
it. It was in Russian and I refused to do so. He argued, but finally left. Another
person arrived later with my flight suit, underwear, socks, and boots. I began to
get my hopes up not to be going to Moscow, but back to my Air Force. What
happened next was puzzling. A Russian major escorted me to a room on the first
floor. There we sat and waited for a time. Then he escorted me to a waiting car
with a driver. When I asked where we were going, he put his index finger to his
lips. I got the message. We drove into Magdeburg, it was about noon. I was struck
by the lack of traffic and people in the streets. The Russian said something to
the driver, who pulled over to the side of the street and parked. It seemed that
whatever we were involved in had something to do with timing. Apparently we
were ahead of schedule. Then the major turned to me and asked me if I believed
in God. I said, 'Yes.' Answering his own question he said, 'Nyet.' We arrived at
the Helmstedt border crossing the same time as another car with Captain Kessler.
Prior to getting out of the car the Russian major told me not to shake his hand
when he turned me over to a U.S. Army officer.
"Kessler and I boarded an Army staff car which took us to Hannover. The
media was relentless, attempting to get newsreels and photographs of two U.S .
Air Force officers being released from Soviet captivity. In Hannover Kessler and
I boarded a C-54. A flight surgeon gave us a cursory physical examination, then
we flew to Wiesbaden Air Base. We were driven to the large Air Force hospital
in Wiesbaden. When I entered my room I was met by General Gabriel Disosway,
the commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe. 'I'm glad you're
back,' he said , shaking my hand. He cautioned me not to talk to anyone about
my experience except the OSI, Office of Special Investigations, officer assigned
to me. And added that this was ordered by President Johnson . I was also told by
General Disosway not to speak with Lieutenant Welch, who had the room next
to mine, or to Captain Kessler. While the general was giving me instructions an
airman ripped the telephone out of the wall.
"I was allowed to say hello to my crew mates, learning for the first time of
the extensive injuries suffered by Lieutenant Welch during his ejection. His left
leg was broken in two places, and his right arm was broken as well. He had a
neck fracture, which was not discovered until he was X-rayed at the Wiesbaden
hospital. While in the East German hospital, Hal Welch had been allowed a visit
by an Air Force flight surgeon, who, after examining him, asked for his immediate
release so he could get proper care. Lieutenant Welch was released after ten

156
 The Black Sheep Squadron o/Toul-Rosieres

days of captivity. The next five days I spent almost entirely with the OSI - daily
interrogations, a polygraph test, a visit to a psychiatrist who questioned me and
then administered a Rorschach test. Finally, it was over, and I boarded a T-29 for
Toul-Rosieres to meet the inevitable Flying Evaluation Board .""
The shoot-down by a Russian MiG-19 fighter on March 10, 1964, of the
straying RB-66B 53-451 , piloted by Captain David Holland reverberated through
the 19th Squadron, the 10th Wing, Headquarters USAFE in Wiesbaden, the State
Department, right up to the White House. It was one of the notable Cold War
incidents ranking right up there with the 1960 shootdown of Francis Gary Powers
U-2, and the downing of the RB-47H electronic reconnaissance aircraft over the
Barents Sea that same year. Within four days of the B-66 shoot-down Headquarters
USAFE established an Air Defense Identification Zone, ADIZ, and Brass Monkey
procedures for flights along the inner German and Czech borders to preclude any
further such incidents from happening. Any aircraft entering this identification
zone without authorization was contacted on Guard channel, monitored by all
aircraft at all times , and directed to immediately reverse course.
The Stars and Stripes military newspaper, Newsweek and Time magazines,
among many others, carried lengthy articles about the loss of the RB-66 . "One
of the trickiest games of the cold war is a sort of airborne electronic 'chicken,"'
speculated Time Magazine, "in which a high-speed aircraft without warning
dashes headlong for the enemy's border, turning away just in time. The game is
played both by East and West, and not just for fun . From such phony forays has
come a wealth of crucial information about one another 's defense capabilities
... In the past two years, according to one unofficial source, Soviet jets have
poked their noses into Western airspace 95 times - mostly on just such sniffing
missions. But when a Western plane goes into Communist territory, innocently
or not, the Russians do not hesitate to shoot. Since 1950, 108 U.S. airmen have
died or disappeared within Communist airspace, the last three only seven weeks
ago when an unarmed - and demonstrably innocent - T-39 jet trainer was blasted
from the leaden skies over Vogelsberg," Time Magazine wrote . "Last week ," the
weekly magazine continued its story, "a U.S. Air Force RB-66B reconnaissance
bomber bellowed off the runway at Toul-Rosieres Air Base in France, then sloped
east by northeast on a routine, 2 1/2 hour 'navigational training mission .' The
flight plan called for the 700 m.p.h., twin-jet bomber to swing over Germany's
beautiful Mosel Valley to Hahn Air Base, then bank north to Bremerhaven before
returning with zigzags and altitude changes to Hahn and home .. . The big swept-..
wing Douglas jet crossed into Communist East Germany in the vicinity of the
central Berlin air corridor. Moments later, two swift blips rose on the radar screens
- Soviet MiGs in deadly pursuit. The slower-moving blip that marked the RB-66

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 Glory Days

leaped suddenly into wrenching, zigzag evasive maneuvers, four minutes later
disappeared from the screen well within East German territory. On the ground a
German schoolboy watched the last moments of the flight: 'The fighter closed on
the bomber from behind and fired on it. The American plane burst into flames . I
saw a fireball on one wing. The crew of three came out by parachute. The first two
came out together. The third one came a bit later.' ... Whatever the nature of the
RB-66's mission, the Russians had all the ingredients for a fat, propaganda-loaded
'show trial' like that of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers." 12 Although East and West
played games aplenty as the Time magazine article chose to speculate, the RB-66
was clearly a victim of circumstance and an overly aggressive Soviet regime .

•••
Kermit Helmke, one of the more experienced navigators at Toul-Rosieres,
remembers that day well . "I was about to start a top secret briefing concerning
a change to our war plans. It was about one o'clock or so on the 10th of March.
The command post called the briefing room and asked for Lieutenant Colonel
McCormack, my boss and the chief of plans. We waited for about ten minutes.
Then I got a call to scrub the briefing and come down to the CP. When I got there
I learned that a border violation had occurred, and that a 19th Squadron airplane
was suspected. We called Bill Schrimsher, who was flying one of the Brown
Cradles in the same area where Dave Holland was supposed to be, to see if he
had heard from Dave. Nothing. In the next hour or so we learned that Holland had
been shot down. Then things got quiet for awhile. Colonel McCormack obtained
a radar plot of the track of Holland's aircraft and asked me what I made of it. It's
a compass malfunction I told him.
'"How do you know that?' The track is a very smooth curve leading me
to believe that a gyro was steering the aircraft. An open rotor or stator lead in
the system would cause a precession of this nature. My answer was based on
experience with selsyns as a remote control turret mechanic on the B-29. Vern
Gardina was listening to our conversation. Vern was the 19th Squadron senior
navigator."' 3 Early that evening the Wing commander, Colonel Arthur Small,
arrived from Alconbury and had dinner with Major Gardina. "We discussed the
possible causes," wrote Major Gardina. "I told him that something happened to
me seven years earlier that may have also happened to Dave Holland. In 1957,
Captain Hainley and I flew from Shaw to the Douglas plant in Long Beach,
California, test hopped an RB-66, then flew it back to Shaw. We were on auto
pilot. Halfway to Shaw I gave Hainley the heading and ETA, estimated time of
arrival, to the next check point, then slid my seat back and went to sleep. It had

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 The Black Sheep Squadron uf Tou/-Rosieres

been a long day. I woke up about 30 minutes later and looked at the radar scope
and couldn't believe what I saw. I checked the N-1 compass immediately and it
was reading as it should, 90 degrees , but there was the Mississippi River running
east and west, directly under the radar heading marker which was on 90 degrees .
We flew into Shaw using the standby whiskey compass. I described the symptoms
to maintenance. The next day they told me that one leg of a delta-wound coil had
failed and caused the compass to precess at a rate of two to three degrees per
minute to maintain the 90 degree heading.
"Colonel Small then instructed me to select the people I needed to pursue this
possibility. By day-break I was in the compass mock-up area in the Armaments
& Electronics shop. I told the maintenance men that I wanted to fail each leg
of the delta wound coil of the N-1 compass alternatively. There were three 120
degree legs in the coil located in the left wing of the aircraft. I wanted to check
the precession rate and duration especially on headings between 000 degrees
and 010 degrees, the heading from Hahn air base to Nordholz . We found the
compass mock-up too crude for a convincing test. So I had an RB-66 ground test
run with maintenance failing one , then another of the coil legs with all equipment
operating. We timed the precession and the effects on all associated equipment
that directly used the N-1 inputs. This test showed that if the B-phase of the coil
failed when the aircraft was trying to maintain a northerly heading, it would cause
the aircraft to turn toward 090 degrees in order to maintain a 360 degree heading
on the compass." 1•
The N-1 gyro stabilized magnetic compass system in the B-66 aircraft was
its primary directional reference. The navigator and pilot alike relied on it. The N-
I had a high level of reliability, so much so that few ever questioned the system.
The whiskey compass in the pilot station, installed as an emergency backup, was
notoriously unreliable as a meaningful cross-check reference. Not only because of
the distorted magnetic field in the cockpit, but also because of a serious problem
with a magnetized nosewheel in many of the B-66 aircraft. The N-1 was the only
directional input to the Doppler-driven ground position indicator, GPI, system. The
GPI provided continuously updated latitude and longitude to the navigator station,
and stabilized the navigation radar display to true north. Colonel Don Adee taught
the N-1 compass system to basic navigator-bombardier students at Mather AFB,
California. Adee remembers teaching his students that the power failure warning
light on the N-1 would illuminate whenever alternating current was lost on the
system. Only after Dave Holland's shoot-down was it discovered that the warning
light measured only one phase of the three-phase AC power. The phase lost on
aircraft number 53-451 flown by Dave Holland was not the one being monitored,
so Lieutenant Welch, Holland's navigator, had.no warning of the N-1 compass

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 Glory Days

failure. "In tactical radar navigation the navigator was required to obtain periodic
radar fixes. The beginning of the fix process was to obtain an initial position, in
this case Hahn Air Base, which would routinely have been obtained from the
GPI counters or by manually taking time, speed and direction from a last known
position. Next, the navigator would have looked at his navigation map using the
initial position he established as his starting point, then tried to detennine the
radar return pattern for his next fix. In the German environment where there are
so many cultural radar returns it is quite easy to find a similar pattern of returns
that matches those expected from your next position. Starting from an erroneous
position, then checking an incorrectly oriented radar display, the consequences
were predictable. The crew, flying over a total undercast, however, thought
everything was alright."' 5
After running a test on a squadron aircraft to prove his N-1 precession theory,
Major Gardina "hurriedly drew charts and graphs of all equipment affected by
the N-1 - autopilot, radar, APN-82 Doppler system, and the RMI - and briefed
Colonel Small. We also drew a prediction of the track from Hahn to Nordholz if
the compass failed. At a precession rate of two and one-half degrees per minute,
the prediction led the aircraft from Hahn into the central Berlin corridor. We had
no previous word on where the aircraft crossed the border, only our prediction.
Colonel Small in the meantime was under unbelievable pressure to find the cause
of what happened. He sent me and a standardization and evaluation pilot to brief
the Headquarters USAFE staff on what I had come up with on Wednesday evening,
the 11th of March. USAFE accepted us and my briefing like we were raw meat in
a lion's den. They were totally negative to anything technical and spent their time
berating and condemning us and the entire 10th Wing.
"We picked up our briefing charts and tattered remains, and returned to Toul
late Wednesday night. I proposed to Colonel Small that we fly a test with the B-
phase disconnected and photograph and record the instruments and the ground
to establish our actual track, using checkpoints to simulate Hahn Air Base and
Nordholz. We soon learned that our test had to be approved by the Edwards
Flight Test Center. We spent hours on the phone with them. Since we were the
world's center of attention at this time they gave their approval. The Headquarters
USAFE staff was totally negative to our doing the test, so we by-passed them and
went directly to friends in the Pentagon." 16 Major Gardina, flying in the gunner's
seat of an RB-66B photo-reconnaissance aircraft exactly like the one flown by
Dave Holland, jury-rigged a cut-off switch on the N-1 compass leads in the
C-2 compass transmitter housed in the left wing of the aircraft. That allowed
him to interrupt AC current flow, inducing the same error that led 451 into East
Germany. Norm Goldberg flew as navigator. "We headed north out of France

160
 The Black Sheep Squadron of Toul-Rosieres

toward the UK," recalls Norm Goldberg. "Verne disconnected the C-2 sensor lead
when we got over the English channel. After about 25 minutes of flight we were
heading due east toward the Dutch coast. The picture on my radar scope was
photographed with an 0-15 camera, standard equipment to record B-47 and B-66
radar presentations.""
"When we landed.'' Major Gardina states "the film was immediately
processed. The test proved that the entire navigation suit of the aircraft, including
the RMI, range measuring equipment, gave false indications. Even an experienced
navigator wouldn't have been able to recognize the misplaced returns encountered
by young Lieutenant Welch in a heavy industrial environment. We took this
information, the photographs and a better prepared set of charts and graphs, back
to Wiesbaden. Again, we were received like the plague. They condemned our
reasoning and discredited our test flight. We returned to Toul in the wee-hours of
Friday morning, March 13 . Reflew the test Friday morning to overcome some of
the USAFE objections. Again hurriedly put the data together and Colonel Small
and I returned to Wiesbaden. When we arrived in Wiesbaden the situation was
worse than before. There was pressure from the very top for an explanation - the
very top being President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Air
Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, and too many others to mention.
Scores of general officers were inbound to Wiesbaden to join in the melee . Before
the big meeting between Generals LeMay, McConnell, Disosway, and a jillion
other nervous generals , I briefed Major General Thorn, the USAFE Director of
Operations, and Lieutenant General Edmundson, the 17th Air Force commander.
Then Colonel Small and I tried to brief Major General Puryear, the 3rd Air Force
Commander, to make certain he was knowledgeable (the IOTRW fell under the
3rd Air Force at South Ruislip Air Station, England) since Colonel Small and I
were not permitted to be present in the General officer meeting - we were persona
non grata so to speak. I began to brief Puryear. He threw Small, me and all of our
charts out of his office and told us he wouldn't brief that bull-shit, and wished he
was 1,000 miles away.
"General Edmunson then got us two sharp generals who would be in the
briefing and I brought them up to speed and gave them my charts so that the
two could at least make a half-assed presentation. They were very nervous, not
technically oriented, and not convinced we knew what we were talking about.
While the meeting was going on Small and I were in a large room outside the
briefing room with a score of others. I was a major, everyone else was either a bird-
colonel or a general. Every damn one of them was giving me and Colonel Small
hell. Small was getting most of it. About 2100 hours that evening Small was called
to a command post telephone. Major Miller, frpm the 10th Wing Headquarters

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detachment at Toul, was on the line. 'Colonel,' he said, 'I have the best news you
ever heard.' Poor Small was under so much pressure that his first thought was
'They found out that Holland was a defector.' Instead, Major Miller informed him
that they had located the film from the GCI radar site. It, and Gardina's plot, was
no more than two or three miles off the whole way into East Germany. Small came
back and handed me the coordinates he had taken down from Miller. I had gotten
up at five o'clock on Wednesday morning, flew two test flights, made numerous
ground tests, prepared and gave briefings, and had made three trips to Wiesbaden.
I was exhausted. Flying back, wouldn't you know it, the weather was bad at Toul,
and we had to divert to Laon. I finally got to bed on Saturday morning." 18
Colonel Arthur Small was relieved of corrunand effective March 24, 1964, by
General Disosway, the USAFE corrunander. As always, there had to be a scapegoat.
Colonel Small, as the 10th TRW corrunander, fit the bill. As General LeMay was
quoted when responding to the firing of several B-47 bomb wing corrunanders
when they failed to properly execute a no-notice Cocoa alert - practicing their
assigned wartime mission - "I cannot differentiate between the incompetent and
the unfortunate." The border violation was due to a technical malfunction, and
Colonel Small was indeed unfortunate, and anything but incompetent. Yet he
was the wing corrunander, the man at the head of a combat wing who usually
paid the price for failure, no matter the cause. Major Dave Holland attributes
his exoneration by the Flying Evaluation Board to the extraordinary efforts of
Major Verne Gardina. Holland continued to fly and serve his country in Southeast
Asia, flying 146 combat missions. He was awarded five Air Medals and retired
in the rank of major. Major Gardina suffered no ill effects from his courageous
investigation to save one of his own. In 1976 he retired from the United States Air
Force in the rank of colonel. His last duty assignment was as Vice Corrunander of
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, the location of TAC Headquarters.
As a patriotic teenager in 1942, wanting to serve his country, Verne Gardina
carried a letter of corrunendation from his high school principal to the Anny
enlistment center. His principal described Vern as "a young man of good character,
manly bearing, and excellent poise. He is sincere and straight forward, and in my
judgement he possesses the qualities of leadership necessary in military service."
He served in the Pacific, was shot down, but survived. Colonel Gardina served
in the best traditions of the United States Air Force and certainly was all his high
school principal said of him, and more. He passed away on January 24, 1995.
Lieutenant Harold Welch, upon his return from Soviet detention, was unable to
recall any events after take-off from Toul-Rosieres. Welch did not return to the
19th TRS. 19

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 The Black Sheep Squadron of Toul-Rosieres

Things didn ' t end with that star-studded meeting of March 13, 1964, at
Headquarters USAFE in Wiesbaden. American overflights of the Soviet Union,
and the occasional shoot-down by Soviet fighters or surface-to-air missiles,
was an ongoing topic of discussion and formal exchanges between East and
West. The March IO shoot down of the RB-66, soon after the shoot down of
the errant T-39 over the GDR, was obviously grist for the Soviet propaganda
mill. At an April 4, 1964, meeting between Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E.
Thompson and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Dobrynin handed Ambassador Thompson the Russian-language text of a letter
from Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson. As expected, the letter was
long winded and self-serving, stating "The fundamental position of the Soviet
Union is the improvement of Soviet-American relations and strengthening peace,
and we would prefer of course, not to engage in demonstrations of force, of hard
firmness, and in the elimination of the consequences of incidents provoked by the
acts of American military forces, but to concentrate, with you, our efforts toward
guaranteeing for the peoples of our two countries a durable peace." Such verbiage
came from a man who only eighteen months earlier tried to put nuclear tipped
missiles on the island of Cuba aimed at the United States.
Chairman Khrushchev continued, referring to the T-39 shoot-down, "In spite
of the warning and the order to land, the aircraft continued to fly deep into the
GDR until it was shot down. The American side stated that this violation was
unintentional, that this was not a military plane but a training plane which had
lost its bearings. It is difficult to agree that even a training plane could stray off
course in such clear weather and over territory which is quite familiar to flying
personnel ... But hardly six weeks had gone by and on March IO there occurred a
new violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic. This violation
was committed by a military aircraft, a reconnaissance-bomber equipped with
air cameras as well as radio reconnaissance facilities which were in operation at
the time of the flight ... Can we fail to reach the conclusion, Mr. President, that
the RB-66 intentionally violated the air space of the GDR and did so in order
to engage in air reconnaissance? ... I believe that the flight of the RB-66 was
arranged without instructions from the President of the United States of America.
But I declare to you that I do not accept the idea that this was an accidental border
violation." The letter continued at length in the same spirit, counseling President
Johnson that he had a run-away military on his hands. 20
Khrushchev chose not to take the route of a show-trial. On April 17, 1964, the
President responded in a direct and brief letter, "I can quite well understand your
concern that within a short period of time two American airplanes crossed the
demarcation line. There is little I can say about, the incident involving a training

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 Glory Days

plane, since the crew were killed and we are unable to ascertain what actually
happened. I am disturbed that in both cases, however, there does not appear to
have been justification for the rapidity with which there was a resort to force by
Soviet planes . The American planes should not have been there, but I believe
that this fast and violent reaction is quite unjustified ... I recognize that this is
an astonishing series of errors, and upon my instructions the American military
authorities have established the most rigorous procedure possible in order to
prevent any repetition of such an incident." 21 Chairman Khrushchev had less than
six months left in power when he received President Johnson's reply.
Don Adee, who in later years taught young aspiring Air Force officers the
intricacies of aerial navigation at Mather AFB, wrote, "I arrived at Toul-Rosieres
in April 1964 and was assigned to the 42nd TRS. I became a navigator flight
examiner at Toul before we moved to Chambley in 1965. After the two shoot-
downs over East Germany, all of us new guys had briefings running out our ears
before we were allowed close to an airplane." 22
General LeMay who flew into Wiesbaden after Captain Holland's shootdown
on March 10 to whip his generals into line, had less than a year remaining as chief
of staff before retiring. With his departure an era in American military aviation
ended. In early August 1964 a fateful meeting between the destroyer USS Maddox
and North Vietnamese torpedo boats changed the American political and military
landscape. A rallying Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7.
The once secret war in Southeast Asia was out in the open. Few understood what
the United States was letting itself in for. Even fewer understood how unprepared
we were to fight a conventional air war half way around the world. We neither had
the iron bombs on hand to sustain an air campaign nor aircrews trained for anything
other than nuclear weapons delivery. Air-to-air combat of the World War II and
Korean War variety had been literally declared obsolete, and our newest fighter,
the F-4C Phantom, came armed only with air-to-air missiles. The technologies
necessary to further the development of conventional weapons had long ago been
put on the back burner by senior Air Force leaders focused on nuclear conflict.
Although precision guided munitions achieved a high level of development and
success toward the end of World War II - such as the U.S. Navy's Pelican and
Bat bombs, the Army Air Forces Awn and Razan glide bombs, and the German
Fritz-X and Henschel 293 - such weapons and their continued development was
deemed irrelevant in the nuclear age. 23 In 1964 the U.S. Air Force had little more
than old fashioned general purpose bombs, and not enough of them, to take out a
bridge the way it was done in World War II. If an aircraft didn't break the sound
barrier or was unable to carry a nuclear device it apparently wasn't needed in a
world of absolutes defined by mega-tonnage. As a nation and an Air Force we
were about to be given a costly lesson.

164
 CHAPTER FOURTEEN

OF BROWN AND BLUE CRADLES

Once the 47th Bomb Wing disbanded in June 1962 Captain Donald Harding was
reassigned to George AFB, an obscure base in the California desert on the road
to Las Vegas . Here the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing was forming and equipping
with the new supersonic F-105 . "It was my job to check out pilots in the T-33 dual
control trainer," Harding said "before they were allowed to transition into the F-
105 . Every day I made two or three flights. It was all very boring. After all, I had
4,000 hours in the T-33 already. I stayed at George for a little over two years. One
evening my wife was waiting up for me . 'Mark called,' she said. Mark Blizzard
was a long time friend from Sculthorpe who had the same kind of job I had at
McConnell AFB in Wichita, Kansas . ' Mark got a message sending him back to
B-66s in France.'
"Really? Then she smiled, 'He also said your name was in the message.' Was
I ever happy to get that news. I went to personnel the next morning. A sergeant
looked and couldn't find anything on me . Shook his head and said laughing , 'You
aren't going anywhere, sir. We need you here .' I called Mark and got the message
number and gave it to the sergeant. About an hour later he called me back, 'You
are going to France, sir.' This is about the time when things in Vietnam began to
pick up; they stopped the retirement of the RB-66 and found themselves short
of qualified B-66 pilots. I went to McGuire AFB in New Jersey to catch a plane
to France. When I arrived at Chambley there were no airplanes there, they were
still at Toul-Rosieres. Several of us then were sent TOY to Toul-Rosieres , about
20 miles south of Chambley, to check out in the, RB-66B. But the weather was so

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 Glory Days

In 1966 the United States Air Force withdrew its combat aircraft from bases in France at the request
of President Charles de Gaulle. RB-66 squadrons lowered the American flag for the last time at
Chambley Air Base on August 22, and Toul-Rosieres on October 5. The Brown Cradle ECM aircraft,
shown above, which stood Echo Alert.first in England then on bases in France , departed NATO under
a shroud of secrecy for a war building in Southeast Asia.

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 Of Brown and Blue Cradles

bad, they couldn 't generate any training flights . Off we went to Moron Air Base
in Spain with two airplanes and instructor pilots. We stayed there for about three
weeks. I never felt like I've been out of the airplane at all. When I got back to Toul
I was put in StanEval to help check out other incoming pilots. We had 13 Brown
Cradles in the squadron, and two C-models, the electronic reconnaissance version
of the RB-66 . The RB-66B photo birds were still being prepared in the States for
return to France."'
The Brown Cradle ECM aircraft was a take-off on the SAC B-47 Blue
Cradle, a creation of General Curtis E. LeMay. LeMay was the bomber general
of all bomber generals, a product of the bloody air battles over Europe in World
War II. As that war approached its end, radar countermeasures were routinely
employed by 8th and 15th Air Force bombers against German radars . Writes Dr.
Alfred Price in the April 2006 issue of The Journal of Electronic Defense, "In
return for this investment in jammers, plus some $5 million spent on chaff, an
estimated 400-450 heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force and 100 of the 15th Air
Force were saved from destruction by enemy ftak ." 2 LeMay knew that for his
SAC bombers to survive over the Soviet Union, a world of radar directed guns
and missiles, he had to give them a decent chance and provide the necessary
electronic countermeasure equipment to defeat the Soviet radar threat. The B-
47 six-jet bomber, the mainstay of the SAC bomber force in the 1950s, did not
have enough space to carry its own ECM self-protection equipment. Since SAC
had an abundance of B-47s, two wings, totaling 90 aircraft, were equipped with
electronic noise jarnmers and assigned a bomber escort mission.
The Blue Cradles, as these bombers were called, came in two versions . One
version carried 14 slow-sweeping jammers in its bomb bay, preset to specific
Soviet radar frequencies. The co-pilot would tum on the jammers at a designated
time and place, but had no controls to make adjustment of any kind. The other
version, the Phase V Capsule, had a pressurized capsule in the bomb bay manned
by a crew of two , who had receivers to monitor the Soviet radar environment
allowing them to make frequency and sweep rate adjustments to their jammers if
that was required. The conversion of the B-47 to an ECM jamming platform was
not a 'weapons system' approach, unlike the K-5 bomb/navigation system which
was designed into the airplane from the start. The noise jammers were stuffed into
the B-47's bomb bay as in the good old days, when you bought an airplane and
then figured out what to use it for. When the concept first was introduced to the
Air Staff, the B-47 Blue Cradle/Phase V Capsule conversion was viewed like so
many other things as a simple, low cost effort. As in the case of the Canberra to
B-57 and A3D to B-66 conversions, the Blue Cradle effort again was anything
but simple, nor low cost. SAC made the Blue Cradles and the Phase V capsules

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 Glory Days

work, but it cost a bundle of money the Air Staff had earmarked for other projects.
If it had not been for General LeMay's dogged insistence on ECM for his strike
forces, regardless of cost, the effort would probably have died and there would
not have been further meaningful ECM development. Electronic warfare would
have atrophied both for lack of money and interest by other major air commands .
In spite of many obstacles, money being the greatest, SAC continued to develop
both active and passive countermeasure and reconnaissance equipment for its
fleet of B-47 and B-52 bombers. With the arrival of the spacious eight-engine B-
52, however, there no longer was a need for escort jarnmers, and the EB-47E Blue
Cradle force was retired. The B-52 carried its own receivers and suit of tuneable
jarnmers operated by a dedicated electronic warfare officer. In the end, the tactical
air forces who watched passively, benefitted greatly from SAC's investment in
ECM.
As early as 1952, as the B-47 Blue Cradle conversion was running into cost
problems, the Air Staff insisted on electronic countermeasures for the interim
B-66 bomber force using an orderly weapons system approach. In a February
20, 1953, letter to the Commanding General of Air Research and Development
Command, ARDC, the Deputy Director of Research and Development at the Air
Staff, Brigadier General Kelsey, wrote, "On 26 August 1952, this headquarters
requested that your Command study the installation of jamming equipment on
the B/RB-66. The decision was made at that time to install the APS-54 Radar
Warning Receiver and the external chaff dispenser. The presentation on the
installation of electronic jamming equipment, however, was unsatisfactory.
In view of the tremendous problems that have been encountered in the B-47
electronic countermeasures installation, every effort must be made to install
all required provisions for countermeasures in future aircraft before they are
built." 3 On March 18, 1953, ARDC replied, "Since the effective utilization of
the extensive electronic countermeasures capabilities listed as a requirement for
Tactical Air Operations is dependent upon a continuous and thorough electronic
reconnaissance capability, it is the opinion of this Command that the endeavors
to fulfill both the electronic countermeasures and electronic reconnaissance
requirements must be concurrent as a single program." ARDC then recommended
"That approval be given of the proposed plan of action for incorporation of an
electronic countermeasures capability into the B and RB-66, and for the proposed
configuration of the electronic reconnaissance version of the RB-66."4
The dialogue between the Air Staff and ARDC, summarized in the above two
letters, in effect bore fruit and resulted in a cost effective weapons system approach
for the installation of self-protection ECM equipment in all types of B-66 aircraft.
It also resulted in a requirement for the RB-66C, the electronic reconnaissance

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 Of Brown and Blue Cradles

version of this interim bomber then under consideration. About this time staffers
at Headquarters TAC began to show at least a lukewarm interest in the B-66 ECM
program, calling a conference for March 25, 1953. It was at this conference where
the Brown Cradle concept first surfaced. The ARDC representatives recommended
a "jamming installation to afford jamming protection for other than the ECM
equipped aircraft." In other words, they wanted an escort jammer similar to the
B-47 Blue Cradle in addition to self-protection ECM equipment carried by B/RB-
66 aircraft. The TAC representative expressed his doubts and requested ARDC
to determine if the proposal would actually work. "If it does not," he noted,
"TAC requires that packaged inserts (a bomb bay pod) for the tactical bomber
be provided to be used on special missions where area jamming is needed ." The
idea was to have some sort of ECM pallet available that could be inserted in
any B-66 bomber if there appeared a need for it. If not, the ECM pallet would
remain in storage . TAC stated its position but remained reluctant to commit itself.
The conference conclusions were presented as suggestions not representing TAC
requirements . But the train had left the station, the Air Staff was not to be denied,
wanting an ECM equipped B-66 force, and in a cost effective manner.'
On December 16, 1954, Major General Irvine opened the meeting at
Headquarters TAC to present the findings and conclusions of the ARDC ECM
Weapons Phasing Group that had been sanctioned by the Air Staff. A production,
cost, and installation breakdown was provided for APS-54 warning receivers and
ECM tail cones to replace tail guns in all but 30 flight test aircraft. "ECM tail
cones and ECM Brown Cradles (bomb bay ECM inserts similar to the SAC B-
47 Blue Cradles) will be provided as optional features . They will be available as
accessories for operational use by TAC commanders." The plan was to pre-wire B
and RB-66 aircraft and allow commanders the option to replace guns with ECM
tail cones, and to wire all B-668 bombers as potential Brown Cradle jammers.
Initial planning called for 50 ECM cradles, a number that was soon reduced to
35, and one ECM tail cone for three B-66Bs. "Headquarters USAF arranges to
expedite this modification program without formal AFR 57-4 act.ion by Tactical
Air Command. A typical operational concept using the above configurations
would permit a bomb carrying B-668 using an ECM tail cone to employ four
jammers and two internal chaff dispensers enroute to the target. A companion
B-668 carrying the Brown Cradle could supply ECM support," configured with
"ten electronic jammers and eight chaff dispensers, and is likely to totally disrupt
enemy GCI radar and ground to air links."•
In the end, 113 ECM tail cones were procured replacing the 20mm guns on
selected RB-668, C and D model aircraft. The Brown Cradle wiring on bombers
was to provide the option to quickly reconfigUfe a fleet of them as ECM support

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 Glory Days

aircraft. Like the Blue Cradle development effort, the Brown Cradle conversion,
envisioned as low risk and low cost, turned out to be complex and costly. Instead of
an easily installable and/or removable pallet, it became a permanent installation in
only 13 B-66B bombers. The Brown Cradle aircraft that finally evolved replaced
twin-20mm guns and 1,000 rounds of ammunition with a much lighter tail cone,
housing two ALE-1 chaff dispensers. Its jammer configuration of initially ten
active ECM jammers would in time grow to as many as 22. For its day, the B-66
Brown Cradle became the best escort jamming aircraft in existence anywhere in
the world. But if it had not been for an air defense exercise that TAC was forced to
participate in, these 13 Brown Cradles might never have materialized. Although
the Air Staff was enthusiastic and supportive of escort jamming, the TAC senior
leadership remained unconvinced and viewed the entire concept as a diversion of
funds that could be spent in more productive ways .
"In 1958 the Institute for Defense Analysis [IDA] formulated a series of
elaborate tests to evaluate the effectiveness of various parts of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The purpose of the first Weapons Evaluation Test, WEXVAL, starting
in August 1958, was to evaluate the ability of the Air Defense Command to
defend the metropolitan USA against bomber attacks supported by electronic
countermeasures. Although the purpose of the tests was to evaluate" ADC, SAC
saw itself on trial. "The Nike missile batteries belonged to the Army, which was
anxious to demonstrate that the day of the manned bomber was nearing its end."
SAC, of course wanted to prove just the opposite. 7 "When the jamming EB-47s
came in I expected to see the radar screens suddenly to go white with jamming,"
recalls Major Ingwald 'Inky' Haugen, an Air Force observer from the 80lst Air
Division Tactics Branch at Lockbourne AFB, Ohio. "Instead, there was hardly a
flicker of jamming. We SAC people could hardly believe our eyes." 8 The WEXVAL
exercise proved that the SAC concept of slowly sweeping noise jammers across a
given frequency band was flawed. It also proved that ADC and the Nike air defense
missile system could operate effectively under degraded conditions. In the fall of
1959, IDA decided to run another series of tests, this time against the U.S. Navy
- WEXVAL II. Air Force planes supported by ECM aircraft were to attack Navy
vessels. Interservice rivalry doesn't get any bigger than that. IDA did not pass
the task to SAC, as expected, but to the Tactical Air Command. "TAC's level of
interest in jamming was commensurate with the amount of jamming equipment it
had available - hardly anything. The Command was populated mainly by fighter
and fighter-bomber pilots who relied on surprise, speed, maneuverability and
skillful low level flying to survive in the target area." 9
WEXVAL II gave TAC the incentive to actually configure several of its
B-66 bombers with electronic countermeasure equipment. Three aircraft were

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 Of Brown and Blue Cradles

equipped with Hallicrafter noise jammers tuned to Navy radar frequencies . The
jammers were procured under a special Air Force Quick Reaction Capability,
QRC, program which dispensed with multiple bids and various tests required for
standard acquisition programs. QRC filled an immediate, and at times transient,
operational need. The three Brown Cradle aircraft were sent to Griffiss AFB,
near Rome, New York, for testing. William Starnes, a retired Air Force lieutenant
colonel now residing in Knoxville, Tennessee, was one of a few TAC long time
EWOs in a period when TAC hardly knew how to spell electronic warfare .
Starnes was selected to participate in the Brown Cradle tests and served as the
Air Force and TAC project officer. "They were configured at the Douglas plant in
Long Beach where that airplane was originally built. I was there for the roll-out
and test-hop of the first aircraft. Then we flew the modified aircraft to Wright-
Patterson AFB, Ohio, where the lab guys tweaked the jammers for the Green
Dragon tests at Griffiss AFB , New York. The aircraft did very well flying against
the instrumented Verona test site and the Rome Air Defense Sector." In his usual
direct way Colonel Starnes said, "The Brown Cradle B-66B just blew out all the
radars, something the SAC boys never were able to do ." 10 As a result of these tests
and WEXVAL II tasking an additional ten aircraft were diverted from the 47th
Bomb Wing at Sculthorpe and configured as Brown Cradle ECM platforms .
Captain Jerry Sensabaugh, an electronic warfare staff officer at Shaw AFB,
participated in WEXVAL II as an Air Force observer and evaluator. "TAC
flew F-lOOs out of Myrtle Beach AFB against the Navy task force off the East
Coast. The Brown Cradle B-66s flew jamming escort missions in support of the
fighter bombers, while RB-66Cs kept a check on the frequencies the ship radars
were using . I spent three days on the USS Foresta/ watching the exercises from
the Navy side. I saw our jamming on their radar screens; it was effective and
prevented several interceptions ." 11 Cliff Parrott, the hands-on 'show me I'm from
Missouri' Douglas senior technical representative at Shaw AFB had yet a different
perspective of the exercise. Cliff decided to go along on some of the WEXVAL B-
66 missions. "As the jammers came over," Cliff recalls, "they bloomed the scopes
on the Navy ships. Those Navy guys wanted to intercept our aircraft at any cost,
and so, as we were flying along, it was a cloudy day, these damn interceptors kept
popping through the cloud deck like SA-2 surface to air missiles. The Navy had
no idea where our planes were, but I knew there was someone down there telling
the pilots 'You better get up there and find them.' So, they sent up their Douglas
interceptors, F4D Skyrays, and stuff like that. Seeing them punch through the
clouds I thought 'Hell, this is really dangerous.' 12 The results of WEXVAL II fell
out positively for the TAC Brown Cradles, vindicating the Air Staff push for ECM
capability in TAC. After WEXVAL II the 13 Brown Cradles were configured with

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 Glory Days

standard ALT-6B noise jammers and returned to the 47th Bomb Wing at RAF
Sculthorpe.
The Brown Cradles soon began sitting Echo Alert at RAF Alconbury, later
Toul-Rosieres in France, in support of F-100s sitting Victor Alert with H-bombs
strapped to their bellies. In 1960 three Brown Cradles participated in an air defense
exercise in the British Isles. August 'Gus' Seefluth, then the 10th TRW Wing EWO
observed the exercise from a British GCI site near Newcastle. "The standard RB-
66B photo airplanes with their load of four tail-cone jammers each, were assigned
to penetrate English air defenses from the east, corning in over the North Sea.
Though all of their jarnmers were operating, ground based radar burned through
the jamming and detected the planes, tracking them for interception by British
fighters . Then came the Brown Cradles . They never appeared on the radar screen
until they reached Scotland, and London air traffic control requested termination
of all jamming so it could resume commercial operations."' 3 Lieutenant Bill Sears
was one of the navigators on the B-66B Brown Cradles on another occasion. "We
flew 12 aircraft to the Norwegian coast and returned to the United Kingdom line
abreast. The Brown Cradles wiped out most if not all the radar and communications
in the United Kingdom." 14 For the first time USAFE and NATO had an escort
jammer that really worked.
Gus Seefluth was one of the officers in the middle who made things happen .
It was Gus who convinced the 10th Wing commander, Colonel James D. Kemp,
to remove the guns from the RB-66Bs and install the ECM tail cones. Their
principal mission was night reconnaissance. Enemy fighters if encountered would
be guided by GCI radar and use their airborne radars to locate the RB-66s . In
such a situation ECM noise jamming, combined with chaff, provided much more
protection to the RB-66 than a pair of 20mm tail guns. In addition, the reduction
in weight resulted in decreased take-off distance and increased the airspeed by 35
knots . That clinched it for Colonel Kemp. Then Gus persuaded Colonel Kemp to
request the transfer of the Brown Cradles from the 47th Bomb Wing to the 10th
TRW. The 10th was losing its WB-66D weather reconnaissance mission anyway,
so there wasn't a problem integrating the Brown Cradles into the 42nd TRS at
RAF Chelveston. Although the WB-66D weather mission went away, several D-
models were retained by the 10th Wing until 1965 for pilot and navigator training.
Finally, Gus tightened up the RB-66C electronic reconnaissance operation, pulling
them out of Black Sea flights which were not related to their tactical mission, and
focused them instead on the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany and nearby
Warsaw Pact countries. 15
The Brown Cradles moved with the 42nd TRS to Toul-Rosieres in 1962.
By the time Don Harding arrived at Chambley in early 1965 they were standing

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 Of Brown and Blue Cradles

Echo Alert. The photo birds were gone and the conversion to the RF-4C was in
full swing. The !st and 30th TRS at RAF Alconbury, Headquarters of the 10th
Reconnaissance Wing, began converting to the RF-4C in early 1965. The 10th
Wing became an RF-4C wing . The 42nd TRS with its RB-66C and B-66B Brown
Cradle aircraft was reassigned effective July I , 1965, to the newly activated
25th Tactical Reconnaissance Group at the one-time dispersal base of Chambley.
Although the 25th activated , the planes were still at Toul-Rosieres as Don Harding
found out when he arrived at Chambley. The 25th was a group with one squadron.
Toul-Rosieres transferred to the newly formed 26th Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing, its two RF-101 squadrons from Laon Air Base converted to the RF-4C once
they arrived at Toul. Reconnaissance wings and groups proliferated in USAFE.
One had to wonder if the USAFE headquarters staffers really knew what they
were doing . It was at this time of the 'great reconnaissance rodeo' when two
things were discovered by the busy bees at Headquarters USAFE in Wiesbaden.
First, the runway at Chambley did not support the 83,000 pound gross weight of
a B-66 Brown Cradle - the runway needed reenforcement before the 42nd TRS
could move to Chambley from Toul-Rosieres. Second, the RF-4Cs arriving at
Toul-Rosieres and Alconbury suddenly developed camera problems and USAFE
found itself with no night and little day photographic capability. So the RB-66Bs
of the 19th TRS were returned from Davis-Monthan and Shaw AFB to France
- and that was the reason Don Harding and his friends got to come back into the
RB-66 program. The 19th TRS was put under the 25th Reconnaissance Group at
Chambley effective October I , giving the 25th Group two squadrons, the 19th and
the 42nd TRS, and allowing the planners in Wiesbaden to re-designate the 25th a
reconnaissance wing .
"The RB-66B photo birds had already been sent home ," recalls Don Harding,
"so they ended up bringing them back. Once the RB-66s left Toul they had turned
in all their support equipment including the all important film processing trailers.
None of the photo and intelligence specialists were there either. All that equipment
and personnel had to be returned to make the squadron combat ready. We had a
terrible time putting humpty-dumpty back together again. To make matters worse,
the 25th Reconnaissance Group was scheduled for a Headquarters USAFE directed
Operational Readiness Inspection, ORI. I kept telling the Director of Operations,
'We are not ready for an ORI, colonel.' His reply, 'Oh, we'll do alright.' He had
connections. I guess they weren't good enough. We did poorly. We busted that
first ORI , and I had never busted an ORI before in my life. It made me feel pretty
bad. The first ORI was in September, the second 60 days later. We passed by the
skin of our teeth the second time around. I flew photo missions and was happy
doing so. It came back to me easily how to operate the cameras, and all else.

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 Glory Days

Before I was sent to Sculthorpe they had sent me through the photo-recce course
at Shaw. Finally, I was able to put all that knowledge to use." 16
In a letter to President Johnson, dated March 7, 1966, President Charles
de Gaulle informed the United States of France's withdrawal from NATO's
integrated military structure, and directed the United States to remove all military
forces from French soil by April 2, 1967. "From our headquarters building, my
office was on the second floor, I could look down across the security fence at the
squadron area where all the airplanes were parked," Don Harding recalls. "Base
operations was at the other end of the field. Here came this French tanker, making
low approaches. We had sold the French twelve C-135Fs, their version of our KC-
135. This tanker came by every day for a week, making low approaches. They had
never done that before. I got a set of binoculars and discovered that in back of the
wing a porthole had been cut that was not normal for the KC-135. So I went over
to the squadron to watch him make his low approaches, and I could clearly see
the camera inside the porthole. They were keeping track of us. They had gotten
wind that we had sent some Brown Cradle aircraft to Moron AB, Spain, then to
Takhli in Thailand. It was a sensitive political issue and the United States had not
told NATO that we had flown those airplanes out. Anyway, our French friends
were here counting our airplanes . We only had one hangar that could hold two
airplanes, so they could make a daily headcount. We had a top secret 'bug-out'
plan which called for us to blast off for Germany at low level should that be
necessary. We just didn't know what de Gaulle might have in store for us. All the
birds went back to the States - some to Shaw, others to Takhli, Thailand, not to sit
alert, but to fight a real war." 17
Chambley may have been the worst base in France, with few amenities.
Family housing consisted of 8x30 foot trailers, French economy housing wasn't
much better. Captain Ned Colburn, the 25TRG ECM officer claims there wasn't a
tree to be seen anywhere. When first activated, the 25th Tactical Reconnaissance
Group may have had only one squadron, but it had generally good leadership and
a fair number of seasoned B-66 flyers. Colonel Black Jack Fancher was the Group
commander, and well liked by his men. Captain Don Harding with thousands of
flying hours to his credit teaching men how to fly ran the pilot standardization
program, while Captain Bob Stamm, who had flown RB-66Cs in the Pacific, was
assigned to quality control in the maintenance shop, which included flight testing
aircraft after they'd gone through maintenance. Writes Bob Stamm, "My flight
test engineer was Technical Sergeant John Kelly. John was a natural for the job
and he and I did all the flight checks together. In 1966 the Lear-Siegler company
received a contract to perform an IRAN program on Chambley RB-66s. I don't
know how much experience Lear-Siegler had with B-66s, I don't think very much.

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 Of Brown and Blue Cradles

They set up shop at Etain Air Base, a few miles northwest of Chambley. When the
first aircraft was ready for pickup Sergeant Kelly and I went to Etain to test hop
the aircraft. The profile called for a climb to 38,000 feet, followed by a descent to
flight level 300 while the fuel selector switch was checked. Suddenly both engines
flamed out - first the right, then the left. The sound of silence was deafening . I
selected Emergency Forward Tank to Both Engines - nothing. For about 10,000
feet we were a glider. I switched the fuel selector switch back to Flight Normal
and at 25,000 feet tried an air start on the right engine - no joy. The book says
18 ,000 feet or below, so I was pushing things. I tried the left engine at 22,000 feet,
and it started - what a sweet sound that was - followed by a good start on the right
engine. Then, as they say, an uneventful landing was made. It turned out that the
Forward Tank to Both Engines position had been miswired causing the flame out.
This wouldn't show up on the ground check of the fuel selector switch because the
forward tank boost pump was only required above 14,000 feet altitude ."' 8
The 25th TRW was not to be around for long , serving more as a parking
place for men and planes destined for the war that was ramping up in Southeast
Asia . Both the 19th and 42nd TRS were inactivated in 1966, only to rise again at
Shaw AFB for the 19th, becoming the 19th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron,
and Takhli, Thailand, for the 42nd, which became the 42nd TEWS on December
15, 1966. The 25th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing officially struck its colors on
August 22, 1966. With that act, Chambley Air Base went back to the French. The
26th TRW at Toul-Rosieres relocated with its two RF-4C squadrons to Ramstein
Air Base on October 5, 1966. On April 1, 1967 , the American flag was lowered
at Toul-Rosieres for the last time and the base reverted to French control. NATO
headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels. The NATO alliance adjusted and
survived.

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 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

MOON GLOW

"During the spring of 1965 I was part of a High Flight delivering two RB-66Bs
from RAF Alconbury to Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona," recalls Lieutenant
Frank Oldis, a navigator on one of the planes. "The RF-4Cs had been arriving at
Alconbury steadily for several months and our 66s were headed for the 'bone yard.'
My pilot was Major Delbert C. Hainley, commander of the 30th TRS . Lieutenant
Ira Kroses was the navigator on the other crew in our two-ship formation. I can't
remember the other pilot's name, although I can still picture him, even hear
his voice, having shared many hours of Whiskey Alert. We were on our way to
Zaragoza Air Base in northern Spain, our fair weather base for a couple of years
after the U.S. military pulled out ofNouasseur, French Morocco, in 1963. We had
an agreement with the Spanish Air Force to give their F-86 pilots some intercept
practice when we crossed into Spain. We would try to jam their radar which in
their particular model of the F-86 provided range information only. Since the
weather was generally fair over Spain, especially above 30,000 feet, they usually
eyeballed us about 50 miles out. On this occasion as we watched the intercept
unfold, the pair of approaching F-86 fighters collided about the time they began
to convert from a frontal to a stem attack. We watched as one F-86 spiraled down
and ended in a fireball. I saw no chute. At our post-flight debriefing at Zaragoza
a Spanish air force officer questioned us briefly, then stated that the F-86s had
probably been flying too close to each other. The other F-86, we learned from
him, had limped to a nearby airfield and landed safely. Rumor had it that Franco
had taken away their parachutes since too many pilots were bailing out. That was

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 Moonglow

The B-57B, like the B-66, was an interim aircraft selection by the Tactical Air Command. Both the
B-57 and B-66 more than paid/or themselves during the Vietnam War years. Two squadrons of B-57B
bombers based at Clark Air Base , the 8th Bomb Squadron Yellow Birds and the I 3th Bomb Squadron
Red Birds, deployed to Bien Hoa AB, SVN, in early August 1964. Tragedy struck immediately.

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 Glory Days

possibly the reason why we didn't see a chute on the one that crashed. A couple
of days later, after many briefings and flight planning, followed by many boring
hours crossing the Atlantic, while approaching the east coast of the United States
we received word to divert to Shaw Air Force Base. Once at Shaw we learned that
many RB-66Bs were to undergo a transformation from photo-reconnaissance to
electronic warfare. It seemed that the tough old gal was needed in Southeast Asia
to live and fly another day." 1
Although war had been going on overtly in Vietnam and Laos since August
1964, the Air Force was slow to respond to the situation. The phase out of the
RB-66B photo reconnaissance force continued as if nothing had changed. Little
money had been spent in years past on the limited electronic warfare capability
available to TAC. As a result the RB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft were
still flying with the same equipment they received when they first came off the
Douglas production line at Tulsa in 1956 and 1957. And the 13 Brown Cradle
aircraft were the only aircraft of its type in the TAC inventory. SAC was just as
slow, and reluctant, to emerge from its Cold War nuclear mantle, and divert B-52
bombers from nuclear strike to the mundane business of dropping conventional
bombs. Not until February 1965 did the first contingent of B-52 bombers arrive
at Andersen Air Base, Guam, and the first B-52 strike was not fl.own until June
18. Yet B-57 tactical bombers and F-100 fighters had been waging war in South
Vietnam and Laos since August 1964. On their first Arc Light mission on June 18,
1965, against a target in South Vietnam, two B-52s collided and crashed at sea.
Eight flyers died. It was not an auspicious beginning. By April 1965 the big shift
from European and mainland U.S. bases to the Far East began in earnest. Aircraft
parking spaces at Clark AB in the Philippines, Kadena on Okinawa, Andersen on
Guam and any number of bases in South Vietnam suddenly became hard to come
by. American airpower may have been slow in its shift from a Cold War to a hot
war posture, but once the shift began it was a mass movement of steel, aluminum,
explosives, men and machines reminiscent of World War II .
The first Air Force jet, a B-57 bomber, had been downed by ground fire in
South Vietnam on August 6, 1964. The following day an F-100 was downed by
ground fire over Laos. And on the 9th of August F-105Ds flew their first combat
missions out of officially secret air bases in Thailand. By November 1 the war
became ugly when Viet Cong guerillas mortared Bien Hoa Air Base outside
Saigon, destroying five B-57s armed and lined up for take-off, damaging 15 more.
On February 7, 1965, President Johnson authorized Operation Flaming Dart. The
following day American aircraft attacked their first targets in the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, the DRV. On March 2, three F-105s and two F-lOOs were
lost over the DRY flying the first Rolling Thunder missions of many thousands

178
yet to come. Captain Hayden J. Lockhart , flying an F-lOOD out of Da Nang Air
Base , was among those lost that day, becoming the first American prisoner of war.
On April 4, two F-105s were downed by MiGs as they struck targets near Hanoi .
Suddenly the need for real-time tactical electronic reconnaissance and ECM
support to suppress enemy radar controlled anti-aircraft artillery, AAA, became
obvious . ~

According to the 41 st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron history, DRY air

defenses in early 1964 were rudimentary, consisting of approximately 1,500 guns,
a mere 22 early warning radars, some of Japanese vintage, and four Whiff AAA
fire control radars . There were no jet fighters, nor surface to air missile sites:'
But as early as November 17, 1964, the Soviet Politburo approved the dispatch
of military aid to the DRY, including military advisors and SA-2 SAM missiles,
the same missiles which in earlier years had claimed several of the high flying
U-2 spy planes. In January 1965 the DRY formed its first SAM regiment, the
236th .4 The situation in the DRY was changing rapidly - guns, jet fighters, SA-2
missiles and Russian advisors flowed into the DRY inventory. The U .S . Air Force
at last realized that " modem military forces, let alone tactical air forces, could
not survive in South East Asia, SEA, without effective ECM support."' The only
tactical EW assets available , both jamming and passive reconnaissance, were in
the process of being phased out of the Air Force inventory. That ill-advised process
was finally stopped, and in April 1965 two things started in a hurry: the movement
of available EW assets to Southeast Asia, and the augmentation of the limited B-
66 Brown Cradle force through the conversion of RB-66Bs to EB-66Es .
Captain Frank Oldis's RB-66B photo reconnaissance aircraft originally
destined for the scrap heap was diverted to Shaw AFB to be used as a trainer. An
additional 51 RB-66B aircraft were withdrawn from desert storage to have their
camera provisions removed and their bellies stuffed with 27 jammers covering
the entire radio frequency spectrum actively used by DRY air defense radars.
Obviously there is nothing like war to focus planners away from studies and dream
scenarios onto the compelling needs of the moment. Funding suddenly became
available as well from a willing Congress wanting to support the President and
the troops in harm's way.
On April 5, 1965, Major Bob Long was briefing officer for the 9th TRS at Shaw
AFB, South Carolina. "I was giving the final update for Exercise Banyan Tree,"
remembers Bob. "We were to deploy to Puerto Rico . Colonel Cabas, the 363TRW
commander, walked in and said, 'Stop the briefing.' You can imagine my feelings.
I was trembling. He was a stickler for perfection. I thought I had really screwed
up . Lieutenant Colonel Kuhlman, the 9th TRS commander, appeared equally
shocked. Colonel Cabas came on the stage, both.RB-66B and RB-66C crews were

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 Glory Days

assembled in the briefing room, and announced that buses were lined up in front
of the building and everyone except Colonel Kuhlman, Majors Bill Madsen, Jim
Estes, and I was to leave, board the buses, and go to the Officers' Club and have
coffee. Then Cabas said to us, 'Break out the deployment packages for SEA.' Our
instructions were to quarantine the aircrews and maintenance support personnel
and plan on leaving the next morning, April 6. There were four RB-66B infrared
equipped photo birds, and six RB-66C models involved. RF-lOls from the 363rd
Wing had departed earlier for Udorn Air Base in Thailand and Tan Son Nhut near
Saigon. No one was allowed to call home. For some, their families lived on base
only three blocks away. We stayed in a dorm across the street from the dining
hall. Monday morning we all launched for George AFB with an enroute refueling.
The RBs were first in line for take-off with Bill Kuhlman, Jack Seech, Bob Mann
and Gerry Reponen as pilots. The C-models were piloted by Jim Estes, Dick
Wilson, Bob Long, Ralph Lashbrook, Adrian Cordoni and Vern Johnson. Other
crews were sent after us by commercial air. We flew from Shaw to George. Short
tanker support on Tuesday, Wilson and Long were left behind. The first group
then proceeded to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, then flew on to Andersen AFB, Guam,
and into Tan Son Nhut near Saigon - arriving Friday, after four days of flying,
losing a day in the 'time-zone thing.' The two stragglers followed a day behind,
but were diverted to Clark Air Base, because there was no more parking space at
Tan Son Nhut or Bien Hoa. We stayed in a rented hotel in town that night."6
Tom Taylor, an EWO, left Shaw on April 5 as well on a C-130 transport,
leading an advance party to prepare for the arrival of the RB-66s at Tan Son Nhut.
"We departed Shaw on three C-130Bs on April 5 and arrived at Tan Son Nhut
around 1:30 in the morning on April 8. Total flying time: 36 hours and 25 minutes.
We only stopped to refuel. We had all been issued M-16s with lots of ammunition
at Shaw. At Tan Son Nhut all of us and our equipment were unloaded from the
130s at a rapid pace onto the parking ramp in an unlit area. The C-130s departed
immediately, leaving us sitting in the dark in a strange place with no-one to meet
us. After about 45 minutes a gaggle of military police showed up, confiscated our
M-16s and ammunition, and left \IS there in the dark.At daylight the RF-101 guys
from Shaw and RB-57G crews helped us get somewhat organized. There were no
quarters on base for us. We had to fend for ourselves and stayed in a rented house
in Saigon. The RB-66Cs arrived soon afterward. The rush was on to get the birds
over to protect the F-105s from ORV radar guided AAA. After all that hurry up,
the C-models were not tasked to fly their first missions until May 4."7
In 1963 four RB-66Bs were flown to Greenville, Texas, to have the latest
infrared equipment installed by Texas Instrument engineers. One of the aircraft
also was scheduled to receive a powerful strobe light system. "This was to be an

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operational test with the strobe lights. We had no idea if the theory would work
in practice," recalls Gerry Reponen, one of the test pilots for the system. "The
lights filled the entire bomb bay, like a giant photo-flash camera. In April and
May 1964 we took the four airplanes to Luke AFB, near Phoenix, Arizona, for
operational testing and to participate in Exercise Desert Strike. The flights were
almost all at night. I flew one mission between Phoenix and Tucson using the
strobe lights, flying close to the main road. This is 'flying saucer country' and sure
enough, one lady reported that a flying saucer had chased her down the highway,
she doing 90 miles per hour to escape, the whining saucer in hot pursuit. She
couldn't shake it, she said, feeling intense heat from it. It must have been a strange
sight having the strobe lights flash on and off as we were taking pictures from as
low as 500 feet above the terrain . But the system didn't work out and we never
used it operationally. That was not the case with the IR-system. After we worked
out the initial bugs the infrared photo system worked just fine." 8
"The IR equipment on the RB-66 was the same as that installed by General
Dynamics Corporation on a limited number of RB-57Es, the AAS-18 . It had a
germanium iodide detector cooled by liquid nitrogen . We tested it on a remote
set of railroad track," Tomayasu 'Kaz' Kazuto recalled "that ran from Sumter to
Myrtle Beach, flying at 500 feet at 350 knots. The initial images were very clear,
but rapidly deteriorated as the detector warmed up, being exposed to ambient air.
The engineers went back to the drawing board and came up with a fix that kept the
detector temperature at minus 250 degrees. Jerry Reponen and I were eventually
able to photograph the entire length of the 20 mile section of railroad track ."9
"By early 1965 I had passed the 2 ,000 hour mark in the RB-66, been promoted
to major, and was assigned to a test squadron at Eglin Air Force Base," Jerry
Reponen recalls. "The morning of April 5 my navigator, Neil Woollen , and I were
doing some testing down at Homestead when we were notified to pack our bags
and get on a waiting C-54 that would take us to Shaw. The crew said they had no
other information,just to get us back to Shaw as quickly as possible. They stopped
at Eglin allowing Neil and me to go home and pack a B-4 bag and bid our families
good-bye. My wife returned from a doctor's visit as I was walking out the door.
She inquired what I was doing home? I explained that I knew nothing, only that I
was to get myself to Shaw as quickly as possible. 'You are going to Vietnam,' she
said. As soon as we landed at Shaw a car drove up and took us to a briefing room
where we learned that we were to take four IR equipped RB-66s to Saigon. It was
day time and hard to go to sleep. Early in the wee-hours of the morning someone
came around and banged on our door in the VOQ. After breakfast we were taken
to a briefing room filled with other aircrews and told of our destination. The first
stop was George AFB in California. It was a five hour flight to George. I landed

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 Glory Days

first. On the roll-out I blew the right tire. I called the aircraft behind me and told
them that I would remain on the right margin of the runway and for them to stay
to the left, there was plenty of clearance. As I was shutting down the engines a
staff car with a single star flag flying on the front fender pulled alongside . As
I got out of the plane, there was Brigadier General James Kemp, my old 10th
Wing commander at Spangdahlem and Alconbury. He recognized me and said,
'Reponen, what do you mean closing my runway?' I saluted and we had a pleasant
chat. It had been over five years since I saw him last, but he remembered my
name.
"We flew to Hawaii, passing Midway and Wake Islands on our way to
Andersen AFB on Guam. It was a 3,500 mile leg, took two air refuelings, and
over eight hours. We passed the international date line and doing that - lost a
day. Now it was the 9th, not the 8th of April. Our departure from Andersen was
delayed because of a lack of tankers. I had never seen so many fighter aircraft as
there were on the ramp at Andersen. Between 100 and 150 F-4s, F-105s, F-104s
and F-lOOs were parked in whatever open spot was available when they arrived.
We finally got out of Andersen and made it to Tan Son Nhut. Once we landed
our problem was to find a place to stay. There was no advance party to set things
up like on a normal deployment, although later I learned that there was and that
they encountered problems similar to our own finding a place to hang their hats.
Neil and I finally managed to get a bed for the night in the Majestic Hotel in
downtown Saigon. The night of our arrival Major Clyde Trent and Lieutenant
Marvin Sproston flew the first RB-66B IR sortie. They arrived earlier and waited
for our planes to land so they could fly their first mission.
"The Majestic was located at the foot of Tu Do Street, across from the Saigon
River. At the hotel they assigned rooms according to rank. I was assigned a room
with two Navy lieutenant commanders, equivalent in rank to Air Force majors.
Neil was on the floor above with other Air Force captains. The best part of it
was the room was air-conditioned. Dr. Hursey was our flight surgeon. He arrived
before us and found a villa which was supposed to be available in a few days.
Flight crews were allowed to live in private houses if they could find them. All
others had to live in hotels. Living in a villa had advantages, not the least being
that we would receive a much higher per diem rate to compensate us for paying
rent. By several of us living together it worked out in our favor. The RB-57 crews
lived in apartments around the city and paid about $80 in rent a month. Their night
missions were similar to ours, to locate Viet Cong charcoal fires. They had the
same IR equipment as we did." 10
Kaz Tomayasu was there, flying RB-57Es . "We used the IR-gear to detect
'Charlie' preparing his evening meal around nine in the evening. They carried

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 Moonglow

small tin cans in which they put charcoal to cook their meal of rice and vegetables .
We could detect individual cooking stoves and on landing, intelligence would
read the still wet film and immediately call in the find to an artillery base. The
Viet Cong would deploy along the trail rather than coming together in a large
group. One of our technicians, from the University of Illinois I believe, was the
IR-system expert. He fine tuned the imagery to enhance only the cooking fires .""
"Our first flights were in the vicinity of the base and not up country until we
were fully familiar with the area," Gerry Reponen explains . "We used the same
call-sign as the RB-57s - Moonglow. On each flight when we were ready to taxi
we would call the control tower and say, 'Moonglow 235' or whatever our number
was, 'ready to taxi tactical.' The tower would respond with the active runway
number in use . We would taxi out to the end of the runway and call again with
our call sign, 'Moonglow ready for take-off tactical.' Using the word 'tactical'
meant you were flying a combat sortie and no one was advised where it might
go . The day after our arrival we were aiming to launch all four aircraft within a
two hour period. We had problems. I didn't get my first sortie until the following
evening. The next day I flew a third sortie at twilight which was the norm for night
missions . It was best to take-off in daylight and fly to the target area getting there
just as it got dark . At that time the Viet Cong were doing most of their cooking.
We carried no personal items on us, just our dog tags. The only other thing we
carried was an escape and evasion kit stuffed with various items, including plastic
maps , pointy-talky sheets in Vietnamese , a wire saw, gold coins and medicine . We
carried loaded .38 caliber revolvers in a shoulder holster over our left arm plus
lots of ammunition .
"The IR-missions we flew at 2,000 feet above the ground, while the RB-57s
flew down to 1,000 feet. At the altitude we flew we were safe from small-arms
fire. The first month or so no one was fired at. The Viet Cong obviously weren't
sure what we did and were trying to figure us out. The RB-57Es looked like the
bombers, but didn't carry forward firing guns. Our tail guns had been removed
long ago. Each flight was a combat mission, and if we flew six or more within
a month we collected combat pay. For each 25 missions we were awarded an
Air Medal. The RB-57 top mission pilot had 188 missions when he finished his
tour. It looked like I would get about 50 or 60 before I rotated home. On April 25
Neil and I moved into a villa I had located for us. The next day Al Kunkel and
Jack Seech moved in with us. For our villa we had to buy linens, pillows, towels,
pots and pans and dishes . The house had recently been built for a district police
chief, so we felt reasonably secure. It came with a 24-hour maid which was good,
someone to guard our things while we were gone . Language was a barrier. The
house, unlike the hotel, had no airconditioning. The outside temperature was near
100 degrees every day.

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 Glory Days

"I was the first to fly six missions, so I had to sit around for ten days until
everyone else had their six missions to qualify for combat pay. Normally we only
had two aircraft ready, the other two undergoing maintenance. Life became relaxed
and easy. We went to work at two in the afternoon and finished night flying around
ten, then went to the Officers' Club for dinner, and got to bed around midnight.
Chuck Fox came to see me when he heard the B-66s were at Tan Son Nhut. The
last time we were together was in England. He was flying out of Bien Hoa for two
weeks TDY, then was scheduled to return to Clark Air Base in the Philippines
where his squadron was based. He had just two months left on his overseas tour
before rotating home. At Bien Hoa they were under fire every night from Viet
Cong lobbing mortar rounds into the base, which was only 15 miles south of
Saigon. He spoke of his missions, sometimes two or three a day, each dangerous,
especially those flown outside South Vietnam. When I think of dedicated airmen,
Chuck Fox was one." 12
"At 08: 15 on Sunday morning, May 16, 1965, Captain Fox and his navigator,
Captain Haynes, were sitting in their B-57B at Bien Hoa about to start engines to
lead a flight of four aircraft on a strike. Fox's Canberra was loaded with four 750lb
bombs under the wings and nine 500lb bombs in the bomb bay. Fox's aircraft
exploded and debris hit other aircraft on the flight line causing further explosions
in what seemed to be a chain reaction. When the smoke cleared the scene was one
of utter devastation, with dead, dying and wounded airmen and wrecked aircraft
everywhere. A complete B-57 165 engine was hurled half a mile, and smaller
fragments were found at twice that distance from the flight line. The only man of
Captain Fox's flight of four aircraft to survive was a navigator, Lieutenant Barry
Knowles ... The cause of the explosion was thought to have been a malfunction on
a time-delay fuse on one of the bombs carried by Captain Fox's aircraft." 13
Gerry Reponen wrote his wife Ruth "I am writing this letter with tears in
my eyes. Chuck was among those who died instantly. I flew over the base taking
pictures at 1730 hours that evening and the flight line was a shambles. The next
morning some of the bombs were still exploding among the wreckage. We were
not using the strobe light at all, it would have been too dangerous to get low
enough, 500 feet, to have it work . At night we used either the photoflash cartridges,
which produced 265 million candlepower of illumination, flying at 5,000 feet, or
infrared at 2,000 feet. All of our flying was in-country, but we did fly to Da Nang
and north as far as the DMZ. Another friend of mine was Captain Vern Johnson,
he wore a hearing aid. Vern flew with the RB-66C spooks. They went North, but
I had no idea where they went. The best source of information for us was the
local Saigon English newspaper. It would list all of the air strikes, special forces
operations and casualties on a daily basis - and it was very accurate.

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"I got a mission up to Da Nang where the biggest VC build up was. We

were flying a lot of missions in that area trying to detect where the VC were
concentrating their forces. It was a pretty mountainous area, as was most of the
countryside north of Saigon. South of Saigon and west it was all flat, flooded rice
paddies. The mountains were covered with dense jungle with trees up to 100 feet
with three layers of canopies. The jungle was burned in many areas, and there
were always fires from air strikes in the area we were photographing. In May
we were told that we would stay until the RF-4Cs came to take our place. The
RB-66Cs were leaving for Thailand. There were several times when all four of
our aircraft were out of commission for various reasons. We had two down at one
time for broken windshields. Eating so often in the club and drinking soft drinks
with ice gave us stomach cramps and diarrhea . There were pills we could try, but
they did little. I decided to try a bottle of Vietnamese 33 beer. We were told that
it was aged with formaldehyde. I thought it might work on my stomach cramps.
Lo and behold my stomach cramps disappeared and I had no further trouble. The
one after effect of drinking 33 beer though was a headache as big as if someone
hit me on the head with a hammer. Every night I could hear mortars going boom,
boom in the distance." 14
Captain Jack Seech flew with Gerry Reponen. They lived in the same villa.
Jack's navigator was 'Spanky' McFarland. They were flying an IR mission in the
Delta, but carrying a full load of 40 M-123 flash cartridges. Jack was flying his
briefed racetrack pattern, assuring a certain amount of overlap. Suddenly a 50-
caliber machine gun opened up. "He kept getting better every pass I made until
a tracer came between the fuselage and the engine," Jack wrote, describing the
scenario. "I needed to do something. I came over the bend in the river where he
was, at about 200 feet and salvoed my full load of flash cartridges on top of him.
That was the end of him. I flew back the next day to do an unofficial BDA. But
early that June morning was the first B-52 Arc Light bombing of the Vietnam
war, and my target of the night before was right in the middle of their strike zone.
There was nothing left to look at other than lots of bomb craters. That river bend
was totally obliterated." The Saigon Post carried the news of the first B-52 strike
of the war, even giving names of crew members that perished when two aircraft
collided enroute.' 5
"I flew my 4lst and last mission on July 8. I enjoyed my stay in Saigon. It
was a pretty city. In the downtown district people were relaxed and moved slowly.
They were friendly toward Americans and would try to speak English, which
many of them did quite well. The thing that always amazed me was the clothing
the women wore - white, neat and clean. Some wore very thin silk dresses with
pretty colored patterns over silk slacks . With the dirt all around the city I could

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never understand how they could look so neat and clean. I read somewhere that
there were only 45 ,000 cars in the country, ninety-ti ve percent of them must have
been taxis. The streets were always jammed with taxis, pedicabs, motor bikes and
bicycles. There were few buses, and those I saw were always jam packed with
people. Saigon changed a lot during the three months that I was there. On July 16
Neil and I caught a Pan American flight out of Saigon for Hong Kong. Four days
later I was back home in Florida." 16
John T. Madrishin retired from the United States Air Force as a Chief
Master Sergeant, the highest enlisted rank. John was a gunner on RB-66s, and in
September 1965 flew as the third man in one of the IR equipped RB-66Bs out of
Tan Son Nhut on Captain Robert L. Mann's crew from the 9th TRS. Mann and
his navigator, James S. McEwen, arrived on the 27th and flew their first mission
two days later on September 29, 1965. Bob Mann had been at Tan Son Nhut in
the first deployment from Shaw in April with Gerry Reponen, Jack Seech and
others. Bob returned to Shaw in July, and was on his second deployment to Tan
Son Nhut. "We were in TDY status, flying two missions a day," John Madrishin
recalls, "photo and infrared. I was flying in the third seat tending to the infra-red
equipment. We found Viet Cong cooking fires every night. One of the enlisted
crew chiefs broke his leg and was sent back to Shaw for treatment, so Lieutenant
Colonel Mattson had me train Lieutenant Weger, a navigator, to operate the
camera and infrared systems . On October 22 I reported to Operations for a night
mission . Colonel Mattson felt I was in need of rest and decided Lieutenant Weger
would take my place. That night we flew two missions piloted by Captains Mann
and Puckett. After Colonel Mattson and I returned from dinner that evening we
went by Operations, only to learn that Captain Mann's aircraft was missing. We
called all the bases to see if a B-66 had made an emergency landing, but without
success. Captain Puckett reported that they were flying in an area with a lot of
fighter action when he lost contact with Captain Mann. He tried to raise him on
the radio, but received no response. He recalled seeing a large fireball in the area
where Mann was working. At first light Colonel Mattson took one of our 66s,
along with an RF-10 l, to the area Captain Mann had been working the night
before. We saw wreckage on top of a mountain and we knew it was 53-452. This
plane had large red stripes painted on the wings and around the rear fuselage near
the speed brakes. The red showed in the photos we took and was proof we had lost
our crew. It was a year later when a chopper finally lowered a man down to the
crash site to determine that the crew was killed in action ." The aircraft went down
in very rugged terrain west of Pleiku near the Laos border. "Not a day goes by that
I do not think of those three officers," Sergeant Madrishin writes. 17 53-452 was the
first B-66 lost in the war in Southeast Asia. It was not to be the last.

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 CHAPTER SIXTEEN

NOT FOR THE TIMID

Tan Son Nhut Air Base on the outskirts of Saigon was a sprawling, teaming city
that never went to sleep. In April 1965, Tan Son Nhut was a place filled to over-
flowing with men, materiel and airplanes, reflective of the hurried confusion that
accompanied the sudden escalation of the war. Its ramps were filled with aircraft
of every variety and type, except for the big bombers and tankers, which soon were
to trickle , then deluge, Andersen on Guam , Kadena on Okinawa, and U-Tapao Air
Base in the southern panhandle of Thailand. The four RB-66B infrared equipped
aircraft went into action within hours of their arrival at Tan Son Nhut on April 9 .
After the rush to deploy, the C-models did not fly their first mission until the 4th
of May. Their task would be to build the electronic order of battle, the EOB, for
North Vietnam, and to support RF-10 I and F-105 missions over the DRY. The
B-66s trickled into Tan Son Nhut, some having been diverted to Clark in the
Philippines because of a lack of parking space. Many of the air and maintenance
crews arrived by commercial air, others on military transports . Finding a place to
stay once they arrived was no small problem. There were few military quarters at
Tan Son Nhut, and many of the Saigon hotels rented by the military were filled
beyond capacity. Frequently the solution was finding friends who had rented a
villa in Saigon and were willing to share their quarters - a rather unusual way to
run a war. Perhaps a tent city would have been appropriate for the men in blue, as
it was done in World War II by airmen deployed in the Pacific region . But this was
another war, another time. Still, it was not a good omen. No way to run a war.

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 Glory Days

An EB-66E, returning from a combat mission over the North, pitching out for a high-speed, low level,
JOO mission end-of-tour pass over Takhli RTAFB. A view of an EB-66 North Vietnamese SA-2 SAM
crews coveted, but seldom got.

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 Not for the Timid

Captain Clarence Reuben Autery, known as Rube to his fellow flyers, was
the pilot of the first RB-66C mission flown into the ORV on May 4, 1965. Rube
had flown the RB-66C for many years out of England and France. He was no
newcomer to the game of electronic reconnaissance. Rube would climb to his
assigned altitude, then tried to give his four Ravens a stable platform to do their
work. The navigator on this mission was First Lieutenant Joe Sapere. Joe, young
and spirited, was a top of the line navigator and would prove his mettle many
times in the difficult days ahead. The back end crew was led by Lieutenant Joe
Canady flying in position four, with Ravens Larry Becker, Ken Sexton, and Curt
Nelson. Captain Tom Taylor, who arrived earlier in April on a C-130B, was the
staff EW briefing officer for this and subsequent RB-66C missions flown out of
Tan Son Nhut. The instructions provided by Tom Taylor to the aircrews were
both brief and non-revealing. According to Joe Canady Tom told them '"Provide
ECM for the fighter strikes.' In other words - go do your jobs. We decided we
would figure things out." Little guidance or direction was given aircrews. Little
information was available to briefers like Tom Taylor as to the existing ROB or
the deployment of ORV anti-aircraft guns .'
The SAC ROB maintained at distant Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha,
Nebraska, was of little use in Vietnam. It was relatively static and not reflective of
the current situation. Since North Vietnam had not been a strategic target for SAC
bombers in a general war, little effort had been expended by the 55th SRW to fly
reconnaissance in this region. Even if they had, the SAC process of validating and
integrating information into the ROB was slow and ponderous, not useful for a
tactical situation which changed on a daily basis. The reason the RB-66Cs were
here in the first place was to develop and maintain that dynamic, ever changing
ROB; then accompany the strike force and provide protection by jamming the
enemy's threat radars. "I got the route of the fighters," Joe Canady wrote, "then
laid out our route to provide the best possible ECM support to the F-105s. We
decided we would fly a zig zag pattern, back and forth, along the path of the
fighters up to their target at about 25 ,000 feet, then do a 180 and zig zag outbound.
We planned to do this several times, arriving about twenty minutes ahead of the
fighters, seeding in some chaff every three miles while jamming the Whiff and
Firecan AAA radars.
"One problem I had as the senior raven were the newly installed ALT-28
jamrners. I had never seen them before. Our checklist called for leaving all ECM
equipment off until after take-off. I cheated and turned my equipment on during
taxi . By the time we were airborne the jamrners were warmed up and operating. I
familiarized myself with the dials on the jamrners, then tried them out, watching
the jamrner output on my receivers. By the tim~ we reached the DRY I had things

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 Glory Days

figured out. With our chaff and the new jammers we took out all the AAA radars,
at least that's what I was led to believe. The mission went smooth as glass and it
was the first time I later learned from the fighter pilots that they had not seen lots
of AAA as they were inbound at higher altitudes. They were really impressed that
all the AAA radar controlled stuff had suddenly left town. We were an instant hit
with the fighter boys."2
Joe Canady was a dedicated Air Force officer and anxious to put his skills
to use in a wartime environment. He had gained experience during the Cuban
Missile Crisis in October '62 with Soviet deployed radars in Cuba, thinking about
what tactics he might employ against them if he ever had to. A saying firmly
believed in the electronic warfare community is that 'The best electronic counter-
measure is a well trained operator.' Joe Canady applied that philosophy skillfully
when planning the employment of the means available to him. He flew several
more missions out of Tan Son Nhut, then transferred to Takhli, Thailand, on May
25, when the runway construction there was completed and the B-66s were able
to move out of Tan Son Nhut. Joe flew his lOOth combat mission over North
Vietnam on December 13, 1965. Not only was he the first RB-66C Raven to fly
100 missions over the North, but he was the first airman regardless of rank and
aircraft to do so. 3
Of the first six C-models deployed to Southeast Asia, only five were at Tan
Son Nhut at any one time. One aircraft was always at Clark undergoing heavy
maintenance. This was only the first contingent of a total of 23 RB-66Cs still
in the Air Force inventory. Others from the 9th TRS at Shaw were undergoing
equipment upgrades and modifications before deployment to Takhli. For a time
no C-models were left at Shaw for training of follow-on aircrews. "The RB-
66Cs were modified over several weeks with ALT-28 S-band jammers" recalls
Tom Taylor, "with the controls located on a fold-down table between Raven 3
and Raven 4. The four ALT-28s allowed us to spot jam the Firecan radar which
controlled the AAA guns. Our mission was simple: Fly up north and keep the
Firecans from being a threat to the RF-lOls and the F-105s. The guidance from
up top was next to nil. We were on our own to plan the way we were going to fight.
It was common knowledge that with an RB-66C present, there were no losses to
radar directed AAA fire. Our type of mission was a first for theAir Force, it hadn't
been done before. The Marines beat us to being the first ECM aircraft over the
DRV by four weeks. They deployed a few old Douglas F3D Skynights of Korean
War vintage, redesignated EF-lOB, to Da Nang in April 1965. They were slow,
underpowered aircraft, and had short range, but they were there going in with the
strike force."• The Skynight crew of two, seated side by side, had no ejection seats.
They used a chute to escape the aircraft in an emergency. Not having an ejection

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 Not.for the Timid

seat saved on weight and production costs , but was not conducive to saving lives
in combat. VMCJ-l operated its Skynights out of Da Nang until 1968 , losing five
of its ten aircraft in combat. All ten crew members were killed in action.'
Keeping high performance aircraft flying in an inhospitable climate is no
easy task either. Sergeant Jerry Mosby recalls that " no real maintenance facilities
were available at Tan Son Nhut when we got there. We set up in a Quonset hut
style tent. Since our test equipment for the ECM equipment on the airplanes
required temperature stability we were the only place on the flight line with air
conditioning. That didn 't last long. Arriving for work one morning I discovered
the air conditioners gone , along with the generator that provided the power. There
was a note scrawled on the wall that read 'Thanks for the cooler. Your U.S. Army.'
We did get a replacement airconditioner and continued to work in the canvas shop
until we deployed to Takhli. When it came time to leave we loaded everything
on the C- I 30s using a small Army fork lift. After the equipment was loaded,
we loaded the fork lift on the last plane and took it with us. Turn-around is fair
play."•
After additional C-models from Shaw had been outfitted with the new ALT-
28 jammers and the jamming patterns tested on the Eglin range, the remaining
aircrews were sent to Takhli, Thailand. Maurice Turcotte, then a first lieutenant
remembers that move well. "The pilots and navigators accompanied by a crew
chief flew the aircraft to Thailand. The Ravens went commercial." The back-ends
of the C-models were filled with spare parts and test equipment, as was the case
in the initial deployment to Tan Son Nhut. "We left San Francisco on Continental
Airlines. Shortly after arriving in Bangkok we boarded a train for Takhli about
130 miles north-west of Bangkok. That was the ride of a lifetime. Sweltering
heat and more flies and bugs than one could stand. They came through the open
windows which didn't provide much relief from the heat. If one dared open his
mouth, a delicacy of one sort or another was sure to fly in. The train seemed to
stop at every crossing , never picking up enough speed to provide relief from the
heat. What I remember most is the dining car. Food was prepared over an open pit
fire on the floor of the car where rice was boiled and fried . Some five or six hours
later we arrived at the Takhli train station. We couldn't wait to get to the base to
sample American life once again. Big surprise. We were escorted to our hooch - a
teakwood open air barracks-like building where some 14 metal beds were lined
up, seven on each side, three feet apart . Of course we had the same airconditioning
system we had on the train, only this time the hooch was stationary. We did have
fans which helped when the electricity was on. After a brief introduction to our
hooch we were shown our communal showers and stall toilets - privacy at last.

191
 Glory Days

"On August 8, 1965, we newcomers flew our first combat mission over North
Vietnam, trying to electronically pinpoint the locations of SAM sites. Missions
came fast and furious during this time . On three separate occasions my crew flew
three missions in one day. As a result most of us had amassed some 80 combat
missions over the DRY by late November 1965. At this time a rumor made the
rounds that a mission limit was to be imposed- 100 or 150, no one knew for sure.
We were given the option of going home, we were there on temporary duty, or
PCSing (Permanent Change of Station) in place. All but two of us chose to PCS
in place. The 100 mission rule prevailed, and once you had 100 missions over the
North or 12 month on station, you could go home." 7
100 missions always arrived first, and with that there suddenly appeared a
shortage of aircrews - pilots, navigators and electronic warfare officers. Before
the arrival of Maurice Turcotte's group of additional aircraft and crews from
Shaw, the six 'early birds' from Tan Son Nhut kept a busy schedule. They were
the ones who carved out the tactics for escort and stand-off jamming which others
would follow. Not until 1968 would an EB-66 Tactics Manual be written. Until
then, word of mouth tactics were passed down from Rube Autery, Joe Sapere,
Paul Duplessis, Joe Canady, and others to the newly arrived. In 1965, before the
introduction of SAMs and MiGs , the RB-66Cs went where the strike forces went.
The only difference being that they operated at higher altitudes than the fighters.
There were certain restricted areas neither bombers nor ECM support aircraft
were allowed to enter - principally around Hanoi and Haiphong, and along the
Chinese border. DRY airfields also were off limits. It was frustrating once the
MiGs showed up. Aircrews could look down and see the MiGs sitting in their
revetments below, but were not allowed to touch them.
On July 24 Rube Autery's crew flew two missions up North in support of F-
105 strikes near Hanoi. They positioned themselves across the ingress and egress
routes of the F-lO?s, to provide maximum jamming support for the fighters as
they went in and came out again . The area became known as 'the pocket' running
from northeast to southwest of Hanoi, outside the restricted Hanoi area and up
against the 20 mile Chinese border restricted zone. Joe Sapere was the navigator
on both missions. On each sortie a second C-model accompanied Autery and
his crew. One was flown by Captain Vernon A. Johnson, the other by Lieutenant
Colonel Willard G. Mattson. It was to be a watershed day in the air war against the
North. The morning mission was anything but routine, recalls Larry Bullock, one
of the Ravens on Autery's crew. The Firecans came up and we drowned them out
with clouds of chaff and intense noise jamming. The radar directed AAA was as
usual impotent and forced to rely on optics. Then the unexpected happened. Two
strong Fansong signals came on the air from the Hanoi area. Their track-while-

192
 Not for the Timid

scan radars appeared to be following the egressing fighters. No missiles were

fired, at least no launch was detected by the RB-66C Ravens. The Ravens did
their thing- recording the Fansong signals, taking down the signal parameters for
subsequent analysis and confirmation: Pulse Width, Pulse Recurring Frequency,
Radar Frequencies. and most important , determining the location of the two
surface to air missile sites. Joe Sapere remembers "logging fixes every minute to
try to get an accurate plot of our location versus the SAM sites. Intelligence until
then had the misguided belief that SAMs could only be installed into hardened,
fixed sites . All the SAM sites being built were tracked by Intelligence, and there
were none in the corridor we flew northwest of Hanoi . Guess at our surprise when
we picked up not only one , but two sites."' Both aircraft passed their electrifying
discovery to 7th Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhut while still in flight.
John Norden, the navigator on Captain Vern Johnson's crew recalls, "First
Lieutenant Howie Shorr was the first Raven on our aircraft to get cuts on the
Fansong radar, Captain Jim Wolpert was a close second. Howie was a shining
star for about a week until he reported a Kresta class cruiser well up the Mekong
River. As the navigator I remember Howie's excitement and plotting the bearings
to the SAM site. We had the location of that SAM within three miles, which is
very good considering that we were using ONC charts where the size of a pencil
point was about a mile. Of course 7th Air Force didn't believe us, until a flight of
F-4Cs was nearly obliterated by the very SAM batteries we had discovered. Then
they had us flying around the clock. Of course the bad guys didn't tum their radars
on until they needed to . So it was a week of wasting JP-4 jet fuel." To be fair to
Lieutenant Howie Shorr, the North Vietnamese actually used several Soviet naval
radars normally deployed on Kresta class cruisers. Howie was right - only this
time the radars were not mounted on cruisers.
"The afternoon mission for the RB-66Cs was in the Dien Bien Phu area,"
recalls Larry Bullock, "in Route Pack 6, away from the SAM sites we discovered
earlier that morning. A flight of F-4s providing MiG cap for our strike apparently
did not get the word from 7th, or maybe 7th had not distributed the information
about the two SAM sites discovered by us that morning. Whatever the case, the
F-4s were trolling through the danger area. The SAMs came up, we called out a
SAM warning, they launched and shot down one F-4 - it blew up, and the others
in the flight of four were damaged. Captains Roscoe Fobair and Richard Keim
managed to eject from their stricken aircraft, but were listed as missing in action." 9
Keim was released as a POW on February 12, 1973. Fobair, a former 55SRW RB-
47H pilot, was not among the POWs who came home. 10 The three RB-66 crews
involved in the 24 July 1965 operation were awarded the Distinguished Flying
Cross by Headquarters Seventh Air Force for ex;traordinary achievement.

193
 Glory Days

The North Vietnamese 236th SAM Regiment formed in January 1965. It was
staffed with the best and brightest technical talent the small country had to offer.
Equipment and missiles arrived in April 1965 aboard a Soviet ship accompanied
by 70 Soviet advisors. The training program was intense. "On 24 July 1965 the
regiment fought its first engagement, shooting down one U.S . Air Force F-4C
Phantom and damaging three others. Because there had not been enough time to
train the Vietnamese missile crews, Soviet advisors personally took part in this
missile launch ... The Vietnamese admit it was one full month before the first all
Vietnamese missile crew conducted a combat missile launch." 11
The events of the 24th of July grabbed the attention of an at times all-knowing
and forever sceptical 7th Air Force staff. For the next two days the RB-66Cs stood
down - planning retaliation along with Takhli's and Korat's F-105s. They were
going to go in and take out those SAM sites with conventional bombs, unguided
rockets and napalm. Joe Sapere switched to Major Richard Wilson's crew for
the mission on the 27th. They asked Intelligence for anything they had on SA-2
missile sites in the area. "The photography of the sites was given to us," recalls
Joe, "and the date [on the photos] was July 15. Just another case of having the
intelligence, but not getting it out to the people who need it." 12 Distribution of
perishable intelligence information by headquarters organizations like 7th Air
Force to the combat units that desperately needed it was a recurring problem not
solved by Air Force Intelligence for many years.
The mission on the 27th was the first coordinated Air Force operation against
the seemingly emboldened North Vietnamese 236th SAM Regiment. The SAM
sites were taken out but at the cost of six F-105s and five pilots. Only one pilot
was rescued by a recently established Jolly Green Giant helicopter squadron
which didn't even have maps of that area of North Vietnam when they went in to
pull out Captain Frank Tullo. It was the first of many dramatic rescues performed
by that courageous and self-sacrificing unit. "It was also becoming obvious that
the greatest danger posed by the SA-2 was not the kill capability of the missile but
the fact that its mere presence forced U.S. aircraft to fly at lower altitudes where
AAA and small arms fire became more deadly." The air war had taken a decisive
tum .13
Aircraft and crews continued to arrive at Takhli from Shaw to join the recently
reactivated 41st TEWS and the 6460th TEWS -the latter deriving its designation
from the fact that it was the 6th squadron of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing to which both the 41st and 6460th were briefly assigned. They were at
Takhli, Thailand; the 460th TRW was at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam.
Apparently composite wings were not yet acceptable to the Air Force leadership
or both squadrons should have been assigned to the 355th TFW at Takhli, as they

194
 Not for the Timid

later were. The only type of EW aircraft at the time at Takhli were RB-66Cs .
Surprisingly, none of the Brown Cradle aircraft had yet been moved from Europe
to support an ongoing war. They continued to sit Cold War Echo Alert at Toul-
Rosieres in France, facing east. The rapid build up of tactical forces in Southeast
Asia was accompanied by organizational chaos. No one seemed to have a rational
idea how to organize the arriving B-66 contingent. Should they have their own
Group or Wing? Maybe, maybe not. The 25th Tactical Reconnaissance Group
at Chambley was established effective 1 October 1965 with only one squadron.
Apparently such a solution was not deemed appropriate for the two electronic
warfare squadrons at Takhli. Instead, the RB-66s were reassigned in September
1966 from the 460th TRW to the 432nd TRW at Udorn - while they continued
to be based at Takhli with the F-105s of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing. Finally,
in August 1967 , the by then redesignated EB-66 squadrons were attached to the
355th TFW - the obvious solution came to pass after two long years. The best
solution would have been to establish a tactical electronic warfare group at the
very beginning - but being part of a fighter wing was better than being managed
from afar by a commander who had little feel for nor understanding of EB-66
operations . The 355th Wing Commander managed his diverse combat squadrons,
F-105 and EB-66, by appointing deputies for EB-66 and F-105 operations. The
first Deputy Commander for EB-66 operations was Colonel Harrison Lobdell, a
long-time RB-66 flyer, having served in the 10th TRW at Spangdahlem in 1959,
then at RAF Chelveston and Alconbury. He retired in September 1978 as Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans at Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein
Air Base, Germany, in the rank of Major General. Colonel Lobdell ran a tight
ship at Takhli, but with a velvet hand. He was greatly admired by the air crews
he sent into daily combat, flying some of the most dangerous missions himself.
Unfortunately that was a practice few if any general officers in the Vietnam War
were known for. Had they done so, maybe the air war would have been fought a
bit differently.
"On September 30, 1965, an F-105 lit its afterburner at Takhli and began its
take-off roll down the 3 ,000 meter Jong concrete runway. It was about three o'clock
in the afternoon," recalls Ken Coolidge, an RB-66C navigator. "I was walking to
the squadron from the hootch area. The F-105 was part of a multi-aircraft raid
and had been rolling down the runway for about 15 to 20 seconds when all of
a sudden the afterburner roar stopped. So did my heart . I started running for the
flight line, and about that time the sirens went off. There was a plume of smoke
rising from near the end of the runway and a bunch of fire trucks were headed
in that direction. Suddenly they stopped and turned around . Someone told them
about the bombs. An ambulance, however, continued to head toward a lone figure

195
 Glory Days

standing near the end of the runway. When the F-105 aborted its take-off roll it
went off the runway, wiped out its gear, and caught fire as it went bouncing over
the ground into the swamp. The pilot managed to get out with a broken arm and
injured back and now was standing about 200 yards from his burning aircraft.
The ambulance crew scooped up the pilot and sped away from the burning plane
toward the hospital.
"The wreckage burned and burned. The bombs did not go off. Since it was
the departure end of the runway the field was closed to air traffic. No take-offs
or landings over the burning wreckage until the bombs were disposed of. We
had planes all over the place looking for a place to land and spend the night. The
next morning at 2 a.m . our crew - Bernie Russell, pilot; myself as the navigator;
Joe Canady our chief Raven, and Larry Becker, Ken Sexton and Bob Rein, the
other three Ravens on the crew, were awakened and told to report for a 3 a.m.
briefing. Seems we were to take off from the departure end of the runway for
an BLINT sweep up north and to recover at Da Nang. We flew our mission as
briefed and landed at Da Nang where we had a late breakfast. Off we went again
on another BLINT mission north and west of Haiphong. After returning from our
second mission to Da Nang 7th Air Force fragged (tasked) us to fly a third BLINT
sweep up north. There were numerous thunderstorms and the Ravens in back
were having a field day with all sorts of new and unusual signals to work. Seems
the bad guys didn't know we were there as they were transmitting up a storm.
Usually, as soon as we got within a hundred miles they shut down and only came
up for a sweep or two to verify our track. This night they must have been training.
We were picking up St. Elmo's fire on the windscreen and heading for a really
big thunder-bumper when Bernie, our pilot, wanted to tum. The Ravens wanted
us to go on just a little further. A SAM site locked on to us. The Ravens wanted
to keep on going. I figured we'd tum when the main bang on the Radar Warning
Receiver (APR-25/26) hit the 20 mile ring - then I told Bernie to tum. He rolled
into a standard 30 degree bank, I had my head in the scope keeping an eye on the
thunderstorms. All of a sudden there was a bright flash of light and the hair on
my arms stood straight up where I had rolled up my sleeves. The Ravens shouted
something about a ball of fire rolling down the aisle of their compartment. We'd
been hit by lightning - not a SAM. Bernie was looking at the refueling boom
when we got hit. He was blinded by the flash and hit the second station button for
me to take over and continue the tum and roll out. About five minutes later Bernie
had his night vision back. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We landed back
at Takhli at 2200 hours. We'd been up for 20 hours, flown three 'counters' over
North Vietnam, experienced a lightning strike, and had a chance to write and mail
free letters home from Da Nang. October l , 1965, was the first day of free mail

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 Not for the Timid

from Vietnam - the reason I remember the date and those mi ss ions . I checked
with maintenance the next day. They found a burn mark on the fuselage, but no
damage . Oh , yes . A young captain took an explosive charge out to the wreck of
the F-105 and wired it up for a blast on site. All the bombs went off and we were
back in business. Sure gave the snakes something to think about!" 14 Life at Takhli
was never dull.

197
 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE BROWN CRADLE

PATHFINDERS

The Air Staff was slow in moving the remaining Brown Cradle and RB-66C
aircraft from France to Southeast Asia. Part of the reason may have been a lack
of appreciation for their need. After the July 24, 1965, shoot-down of an F-4C by
an SA-2 surface to air missile, coupled with the heavy losses sustained by F-105s
from Takhli and Korat on July 27, it became clear to even the most ardent 'fly 'em
low and fast and damn the guns' advocates that the world had changed. It was high
time to bring to Southeast Asia the never quite understood, often neglected, EW
assets sitting on Cold War nuclear alert in France. In great secrecy preparations
were made to move a small number of the Brown Cradles out of France. They
had a NATO commitment, but NATO was not informed of the impending move .
Orders issued by the 25th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing on October 10, 1965,
read "The following individuals, unit indicated, USAFE, this station, will proceed
on or about 12 October 65 from Chambley AB, France, to Moron AB, Spain, with
variations authorized on TDY for approximately 179 days, in support of operation
unnamed ."'
NlC Alexander Underwood was a Brown Cradle crew member. He turned
on the 18 jammers in the RB-66's belly when there was a need to do so, dropped
chaff, refueled the airplane at strange bases, took care of small discrepancies,
performed preflight and postflight inspections. In other words, Underwood, and
others like him, were every pilot's dream of the proverbial 'man Friday' who
would and could do nearly everything to keep an airplane flying . "In October
1965 some of our crews were asked by personnel if they would like to go TDY

198
 The Brown Cradle Pathfinders

During the Monsoon season EB-668 Brown Cradle Pathfinders equipped with the sophisticated K-5
bomb/navigation radar provided a means of guiding F-105 , F-4 and B-57 aircraft to cloud obscured
targets.

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 Glory Days

to a tropical climate," Underwood recalls . "My crew volunteered to escape the

cold French winter. Before we knew it we had orders in hand sending us and four
other crews on a top secret mission for 179 days to Moron Air Base, Spain, for air
refueling training. Nobody knew where we were going." 2
USAFE's oneKB-50 airrefueling squadron, the420thARS at RAF Sculthorpe,
was disbanded in May 1964. The last KB-50 was scrapped at Yokota Air Base in
1965. In December 1965 the last SAC KC-97 air refueling tanker was sent into
storage. SAC became an all jet air force and the single manager of Air Force
air refueling assets. The new tanker aircraft replacing the KB-50s and KC-97s
was the four-jet, J57 powered, KC-135 . No more trailing hoses or triple refueling
stations on wings and fuselage . On the new KC-135 there was one boom lowered
from the aft section of the tanker and flown by a boom operator directly into the
receiving aircraft's fuel port. The hard-boom method transferred fuel faster and
at higher pressure than the old probe and drogue method. Although SAC aircraft
such as the B-47, B-52 and B-58 were refuelable in that manner, many of TAC's
older aircraft, such as the F-100 and the B-66, were not. They had been designed
for the probe and drogue refueling method. To refuel the older planes required the
KC-135 to have a flexible hose and a refueling basket, a drogue, attached to its
boom. Once so configured the KC-135 could refuel only probe equipped aircraft.
The F-105 and the older F-101 fighters were unique in that they were capable of
using either system.
The pressures emanating from Southeast Asia affected the Strategic Air
Command in numerous ways. For one, air refueling requirements sky-rocketed.
Since the other combat commands, USAFE and PACAF, no longer owned
tankers, SAC was under immense pressure to provide tanker support for both
its nuclear strike force sitting or flying alert, and the tactical air forces with
their ever increasing demands. Budget restrictions forced Secretary of Defense
McNamara to look in-house for resources. He found them of course in SAC .
McNamara phased out the last B-47 bomb wings. A pilot shortage arose as well
due to accelerated hiring by commercial airlines. SAC pilots coming out of B-
47s or other discontinued bomber programs found themselves heading straight
to TAC and Southeast Asia. In December 1965, B-52Bs and B-58s were added
to McNamara's list of aircraft headed for desert storage. Base closures followed
to save money for the insatiable demands of the growing war in the Pacific. A
contentious SAC promotion program was given the boot as well by Air Force Chief
of Staff General John P. McConnell. There would be no more 'spot promotions,'
the very successful incentive promotion program instituted by General LeMay in
1949.3 Under the pressures of the Johnson administration, the Vietnam War and
the continued march of technology, SAC, the premier nuclear strike force of the

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United States. was undergoing dramatic change , finding itself being drawn ever
more deeply into a conventional war.
When the five Brown Cradle crews arrived at Moron Air Base they received
two days of air refueling practice with the new KC-135. Airman Underwood's
pilot and navigator were Captains Art Smith and Ed Presto. Notes Ed Presto, "The
12th and 13th of October were spent flying local practice refueling sorties, as
some of the pilots had to become current. We departed on the 14th for Brookley."'
"Once at Brookley," notes Airman Underwood, "we were told not to call home .
We took off for McClellan in California, but shortly after take-off lost thrust on
one engine and headed back to Brookley. The B-66 had no fuel dump capability"
something that was added later in Southeast Asia, "so we had to make a heavy-
weight landing. Maintenance found a broken potentiometer cable which adjusted
the movement of the exhaust nozzle and regulated engine thrust. Because we
missed our tanker we proceeded to Amarillo , a SAC base, to refuel. The transient
alert sergeant asked me what base I was from . I told him that I couldn 't give him
that information. ' Well,' he said , 'then I can't give you any fuel. ' So I gave him
the Chambley APO number and he filled us up . We joined up with the other four
aircraft at McClellan , then followed a pair of tankers to Hawaii. Hickam AFB was
a good place to crew rest. On the 18th of October we headed across the Pacific for
Andersen Air Base on Guam . Some things we had to do differently refueling from
a KC-135. We no longer lowered our wing flaps to reduce airspeed. It was the KC-
135 which reduced its power settings on their inboard engines instead. They also
started a slow descent so that by the time we had a full fuel load we could keep up
with the tanker. That night at Andersen I didn't get much sleep. B-52s were taking
off. The noise level was deafening . I decided to do my laundry at two o'clock in
the morning. Later I headed for the SAC mess hall to have breakfast. I grabbed
a metal tray and started loading up on all kinds of good breakfast food. When I
arrived at the grill the cook asked me if I was in SAC. I said , 'No.'
'"Then you must be on that High Flight crew. Give me your tray, we already
have your breakfast ready. How do you want your steak?'
"I said, 'Keep your steak and leave me with the bacon .'
"The cook replied, 'I have my orders, steak and eggs for you guys . Some of
our guys here haven 't had a good steak in six months . Take what's coming your
way.' I did. It was a long take-off roll from Andersen's hot and sloping runway.
The KC-135s took off before us . We had our last in-flight refueling just past the
Philippines . Somewhere over the South China Sea Captain Smith opened an
envelope and handed a map to Captain Presto. We finally had our destination
- Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand." Smith, Presto and Underwood
logged a total of 38.7 hours flying time from Moron Air Base to Takhli .5 The five

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Brown Cradles to arrive at Takhli on the 19th of October were 53-482, -491, -495,
-497, and -498. 491and498 would not survive the war.
The newly arrived Brown Cradle contingent at Takhli became Detachment
l of the 25th TRW. They remained in TDY status at Takhli until January 1966
when they were replaced by another group from the 25th TRW. The second group
became known as Detachment 2. Once Detachment 2 returned to Chambley in
June 1966, they promptly were turned around and returned to Takhli. This time it
was a permanent change of station move, a PCS. They were assigned to the newly
activated 6460th TRS which fell under the 460th Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn .
The 6460th assignment was for flyers only - the maintenance men were assigned
to the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing at Takhli. None of it made much sense, but
that's the way it was.•
The remaining eight Brown Cradles of the 42nd TRS flew from Chambley
to Takhli in late May and early June 1966. The squadron's C-models did not
depart for Southeast Asia until August. That same month the RB-66B photo
reconnaissance aircraft of the 19th TRS were flown to the 363rd TRW at Shaw, and
the 42nd and 19th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons along with the 25th TRW
inactivated. The 19th reformed at Shaw on September I. The 42nd reappeared
at Takhli in December, absorbing the assets of the 6460th TRS, which ceased to
exist. (Appendix 3) Captain Charles Schaufler, who was part of the October '65
deployment from Chambley to Takhli notes, "For quite awhile our families were
not told where we were . Even the finance office at Toul-Rosieres asked if we were
at war with Spain, since that was where our orders said we were, and we were
drawing combat pay." 7
The arrival of the Brown Cradles was a welcome addition to the over utilized
C-models at Takhli. Within a week of their arrival the Cradles were flying their first
combat missions in the company of the more versatile Cs. Routine problems arose
in a new environment and had to be tended to. Recalls then Staff Sergeant Robert
Mansperger "We suddenly had maintenance problems we never experienced
before. I remember watching one of our Brown Cradles on its take-off roll. Just
as it lifted off two overhead escape hatches blew off. The crew turned around and
landed. We adjusted the hatch release mechanisms in every one of our aircraft for
a tighter fit." 8 Hatch blowing was an old problem, one which the 'B-66 Doctor at
Shaw' thought he had fixed permanently. Yet it came up once again in a different
climate.
Alexander Underwood was promoted to Staff Sergeant while at Takhli. He flew
100 combat missions over North Vietnam with the 6460th TRS. Alex reenlisted
on his lOOth mission on September 21, 1966, over North Vietnam. He earned
several Air Medals and the Distinguished Flying Cross for a mission he flew on

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 The Brown Cradle Path.finders

June 29, 1966. The flight he remembers most though is the one he didn't go on. "I
went to the squadron to check when I was flying again . When I got there I was told
that my pilot and navigator, Captain Dwight Lindley, a former 55SRW RB-47H
pilot, and First Lieutenant Donald Laird, were taking an aircraft back to the States
for modification . They were going to install a receiver in my position and replace
me with an electronic warfare officer. It looked like the flying engineer's job was
coming to an end for me . I did some quick figuring and thought I would at best
get a day or two while in the States to visit my folks in Philadelphia. I asked our
squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Noble McSwane , if maybe one of the
married engineer's would like to go in my place. 'I'd rather stay and fly missions
over the North than go home,' I told him. So I stayed and Technical Sergeant
Charles Bordelon went with my crew island-hopping back to the States . They had
been gone for a little over a week . As I walked into the squadron I was called into
the intelligence briefing room and told that they had gone down somewhere near
the Hawaiian Islands and were missing."•
Wreck 22 , the call sign of Captain Lindley's RB-66C, 54-475, had completed
IRAN at the Tulsa-Douglas plant and was functionally test flown on August 18.
That same day Captain Lindley, Lieutenant Laird and Sergeant Bordelon flew the
aircraft to McClellan AFB . A number of discrepancies were quickly cleared up and
the aircraft was prepared for overseas delivery. It was a Flying Fish mission, under
the control of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group at McClellan. No significant
enroute weather was forecast. Estimated time from McClellan to Hickam AFB
was five hours . Wreck 22 was accompanied by another RB-66C, Wreck 21. Each
aircraft completed two refuelings . After four hours of flight, Wreck 22 was flying
a close right wing formation with the tanker. The aircraft suddenly dropped down
to the left, passing under and behind the KC-135 .
"Wreck 21 : ' What's the trouble 22?'
"Wreck 22: 'I've got control problems. '
"Wreck 21 : 'What's the matter?'
"Wreck 22: 'I've lost my boost.'
"Wreck 21: 'Which one?'
"Wreck 22: 'All three .' (Apparently speaking of flight control surfaces rather
than boost systems .)
"Wreck 21: ' Well, did you lose it or is it intermittent?'
"Wreck 22: 'I lost it. All boost pressures are zero . No, I'm getting it
intermittently now.'
Wreck 22 kept falling behind. The conversation between Wreck 21, Wreck
22 and the tanker continued. Wreck 22 managed to get back behind the tanker,
hooked up once more, and started taking on fuel. Then "Wreck 22 was observed

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 Glory Days

by the boom operator to move forward and under the tanker and out of sight. This
was the last time Wreck 22 was seen ... Shortly after turning around, Wreck 21
spotted an oil slick." The aircraft and crew were lost 300 miles northeast of the
Hawaiian Islands. There were no survivors and no wreckage was recovered.' 0 The
loss of Wreck 22 and its crew was a sad day for Sergeant Underwood; a sad day
for many, including myself when I learned of Dwight's death. Dwight Lindley and
I flew together in the 55th SRW out of Forbes. The war took its grim harvest in
strange and different ways.
There was one unique thing about the RB-66B Brown Cradles. They were
former bombers converted to the ECM role and as a result had the K-5 bomb/
navigation system, far superior to the standard run of the mill navigation radar
carried by other B-66 aircraft. When the Brown Cradles arrived at Takhli in
October of 1965 it was the beginning of the Monsoon season. Visibility in the
target areas of North Vietnam was a major problem for the F-105s. If you can't
see the target, you can't deliver your bombs. Captain Charles Schaufter, a Brown
Cradle pilot, his navigator, Captain Bill Mahaffey, and an F-105 pilot, Captain
Bob Green, "were sitting in the club one night," Schaufler noted, and "Bob was
explaining all the problems they had with dive bombing. If a 3,000 pounder didn't
release, more than likely the F-105 would mush into the target with the bomb. If all
750 pounders did not release, it caused the aircraft to roll due to the asymmetrical
loading. Then there was the problem of finding the target in marginal weather.
They were short of bombs and required to retain the bombs on aborted missions
and land with them. Bill then jokingly said to Bob that we could do a better job
with our K-5 radar in the RB-66B . Bob rose to the challenge and said, 'OK, prove
it.' We didn't have bomb tables to use to figure when to tell him to release his
bombs because they never dropped their bombs from straight and level flight. The
wing commander approved a test using the range at Sattaheep in Thailand. On
the day of the test we went in at 23,000 feet and released three bombs - the first
hit 50 feet short, the second was on target, and the third was 50 feet long. When
the results were reported to 7th Air Force in Saigon, the B-66s were back in the
bombing business.""
Pathfinder bombing was a common practice in World War II. The Royal Air
Force Bomber Command routinely employed Mosquito fighters during night
bombing raids to pinpoint targets for the following bomber stream. In NATO, F-
l OOs of the 36th and 49th Fighter Bomber Wings teamed up with RB-66Bs of the
1st TRS at Spangdahlem in 1958 to form a combat team. The idea was for the RB-
66B to lead the F- lOOs to their target during inclement weather. Once a bombing
run was completed, the RB-66B would return to the target and take pictures
for bomb damage assessment purposes. The Pathfinder mission was briefly

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 The Brown Cradle Patl!finders

implemented, but discontinued when the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing was
forced to move from Spangdahlem to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1959.
In 1965 the Pathfinder mission was back for real. The way it worked , a Brown
Cradle aircraft would lead several flights of F-105 , F-4 or B-57 aircraft to the
target. Near the target the aircraft would fly straight and level in a tight formation.
The bomb run was under the control of the B-66 navigator, Jerry Grimes recalls ,
"his skill was the primary factor in mission success ." Captain Jerry Grimes led
numerous Pathfinder missions in early 1966. Jerry alerted the accompanying
fighters over the radio just before he broadcast a tone. When the tone stopped,
the fighters dropped their bombs . If by chance anyone had an inoperable radio, he
dropped when the others did. The system worked.
The Pathfinder B-66 gave Air Force a bad weather and night capability which
none of the Air Force fighters possessed on their own. The U.S. Navy introduced
the all-weather A-6A Intruder in February 1966. At the time it was the only all
weather tactical aircraft operational over North Vietnam. General John D. Ryan
as commander of PACAF pushed hard to obtain a limited night and bad weather
bombing capability, but until the arrival of the F-111 'all-weather and night'
bombing was mostly a patchwork of unsuccessful fixes. Ryans Raiders was the
best known effort along those lines, flying F-105s on night missions out of Korat.
Their impact, however, was minimal. " The most consistently successful effort
remained the B-66 Pathfinder mission. The tragedy is that the B-66B bombers so
hastily retired in 1962, and all too quickly scrapped, would have provided Ryan the
night intruder and bad weather capability over the North he so desperately wanted
and needed. The B-66B , with its sophisticated K-5 bomb navigation system, could
operate down to 500 feet AGL at night and in bad weather. To fulfill the role of the
night intruder was one of the reasons why these aircraft were procured in the first
place. In its spacious belly the B-66B could carry 14 750-pound general purpose
bombs, 14 960-pound cluster bombs, or four 3,000 pounders . Enough ordnance to
have done the Doumer Bridge on a rainy night.' 3
"13th Air Force was apparently quite happy with some of the early bombing
results, but soon began targeting smaller and smaller targets on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail," recalls then Captain Bill McDonald. "Lieutenant Colonel Webb, Monty
Givens and I finally made a trip to Clark to convince the staff that a wooden bridge
over a small stream under two layers of jungle canopy did not make a good radar
return from 20,000 feet up. I guess they believed us, because the targeting after that
became a bit more realistic . The Pathfinder role was the one I was the most proud
of. It vindicated my three years of unrequited bombardiering without bombing,
endless practicing for WW-III, and interminable periods of Victor Alert in the 47th
Bomb Wing at Sculthorpe. My satisfaction wa9 not even slightly diminished by

205
 Glory Days

the fact that instead of a Mark-6 A-bomb or a couple of Mark-28 H-bombs, the
Brown Cradles were filled with electronic gear and our bombs were transported
under the wings of our entourage of F-105, F-4 or B-57 aircraft." 14
On 25 December 1965 President Johnson and Secretary McNamara
announced their second bombing halt, a crucial part of their ill considered strategy
of gradual escalation. That pause lasted until January 31, 1966. The day after,
Captain Jerry Grimes led 20 F-105s from the 355th TFW at Takhli "on the first
official Pathfinder bombing raid over North Vietnam." On his initial run Jerry had
two flights of eight F-105s on his wings. On the second run he led an additional
12 aircraft over the target, dropping a total of 60 750-pound bombs on the harbor
installations of Vinh in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. 15
Captain Don Harding, who arrived at Chambley Air Base, France, in 1965 to
reconstitute the dismembered 19th RB-66B photo reconnaissance squadron, found
himself at Takhli RTAFB in Thailand by April of 1966. "I went through Jungle
Survival at Clark before I reported for duty at Takhli. That school was very good
training. There weren't many crews at Takhli yet, so we'd fly around the clock.
We were supposed to have eight hours rest after a flight. We weren't getting that. I
didn't care, I loved to fly. When I arrived at Takhli it was during the Monsoon and
they were flying Pathfinder missions. I got ten of those under my belt before they
axed the program. We dropped a lot of iron on Mu Gia Pass, mostly night missions,
when we thought they were putting trucks and people through there. I don't know
how effective we were. I never saw anything through the thick cloud cover. But
there was one memorable mission. Intelligence got word of s0me barges corning
down the coast. Just north of the DMZ they pulled into an inlet where we caught
them. I had a flight of four B-57s on my wings, and a good bombardier on board.
It was a moonlit night. I pulled them in real tight and we made our bomb run. We
emitted a ten second tone, the bombardier turned it on the last ten seconds of the
run, beeeeeeeeeeeeeep. When the tone stopped, the B-57s dropped their bombs.
The barges must have been loaded with ammunition, because when they blew
they lit up the sky like it was the 4th of July on the Mall in Washington. We got all
seven. The B-57 guys congratulated us, 'Good run, guys,' and went home. I made
about eight circles for 20 minutes watching the fireworks." 16
The B-66 Pathfinder mission was stopped in May 1966 and replaced by
Combat Sky Spot - former SAC MSQ-77 RBS, Radar Bomb Scoring, ground
based radars installed in both South Vietnam and Laos to guide aircraft to their
targets. The most famous of these sites was Lima Site 85, installed on top of a
5,200 foot karst mountain just inside Laos, on the very border of North Vietnam,
and 160 miles west of Hanoi. The site was nearly impossible to reach from the
ground . It was manned by Air Force enlisted men wearing civilian clothes under

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 The Brown Cradle Pat~finder.1·

the tutelage of the CIA and protected by Meo tribesmen. To flyers the site was
known as Channel 97. a thorn in the DRY's side. The North Vietnamese tried to
take out Lima Site 85 by using three Russian built AN-2 Colt bi-planes armed
with unguided rockets and 250mm mortar rounds set in vertical tubes. The attack
was launched on January 12, 1968. It failed . A CIA helicopter, piloted by Ted
Moore, was in the air over Lima Site 85 as the attack began. Moore pursued the
fleeing AN-2s. His crew chief, Glenn Woods, shot one AN-2 out of the sky with an
AK-47 . Another crashed trying to escape . The third Colt, chased by the persistent
Air America helicopter, came down I 8 miles north of Lima Site 85, inside Laos.
The downing of the three DRY Colt bi-planes by an Air America helicopter was
indeed one of the strangest aerial victories in the annals of aerial warfare. The
North Vietnamese, however, were not deterred; intent on getting rid of Lima Site
85 . On March 11, 1968 , a sizeable North Vietnamese force supported by artillery
climbed the mountain and routed some 100 Meo defenders. They destroyed the
radar equipment and everything else of value . Twelve of the nineteen U.S. Air
Force personnel manning Lima Site 85 escaped, the other seven perished.' 7
The July 15, 1966, edition of the Klong Times, published at Don Muang
Royal Thai Air Force Base in Bangkok, Thailand, ran a large front page photo of
a silver colored RB-66 leading a flight of four F-105s on a bomb run . Just like the
B-66, one of the 105s was still unpainted. It was obviously early in the war when
the picture was taken . "Radar Bombing" read the by-line, "SAIGON - Flying
under radar control with a B-66 Destroyer, Air Force F-105 Thunderchief pilots
bomb a military target through low clouds over the southern panhandle of North
Vietnam." The presence of U.S. combat forces in Thailand, although obvious to
everyone, was still officially a secret. B-66s had operated out of Tan Son Nhut
AB in South Vietnam in 1965, the obvious reason for mentioning SAIGON in the
by-line, but by July of 1966 they were long gone and the Pathfinder mission had
ended for the B-66 a few weeks earlier."

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 CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

DODGING SAMS AND MIGS

At the end of 1966 the DRY had a total of 114 combat aircraft: 99 MiG-15/17s and
15 of the advanced MiG-2ls. 28 of their aircraft had been lost in aerial combat
- five MiG-21s and 14 MiG-17s succumbed to Air Force missiles, the others met
their demise courtesy of the U.S. Navy. 1 Their tactics were straight out of the
Soviet playbook - guided by GCI controllers they made quick hit and run attacks.
When they were forced or trapped into dog fights, their losses rose steeply. The
most famous of such staged kill scenarios was Operation Bolo on January 2, 1967,
planned by Colonel Robin Olds. Olds' F-4C Phantoms appeared to the North
Vietnamese as bomb laden F-105s. The F-4s wiped out seven of the MiG-2ls that
morning, two more four days later. The small DRY fighter cadre was severely
mauled and intimidated, requiring political re-indoctrination and augmentation
by North Korean and Russian pilots. Later in 1967 the DRY moved many of its
combat aircraft into China.2
By the end of 1966 the DRY AAA count had more than doubled over 1965.
There were an estimated 4,435 20mm through 57mm guns, and 4,435 guns of
calibers greater than 57mm with a reach up to 30,000 plus feet. The large caliber
guns were directed by Firecan or Wh{,if radars, easily defeated by the electronic
countermeasures employed by the RB-66 crews.3 The F-105s faced thousands of
optically controlled guns of lesser calibers when they went into their low level
bomb runs, which took a heavy toll, and there was nothing the B-66s could do to
help . The obvious solution was to attack from up high. Unfortunately, the World
War II experienced fighter jocks who ran the war wouldn't hear of that obvious

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 Dodging SAMs and MiGs

....

This MiG-17 was downed by Colonel, then Major, Ralph Kuster flying an F-105D from the 388TFWI
13TFS, based at Karat RTAFB, Thailand, on June 3, 1967. Both MiG-17s and MiG-2/sfrequently
attempted to intercept EB-66 aircraft, but with little success .

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 Glory Days

solution and continued to taunt fate by having the pilots practically fly their
bombs into their targets. During the Rolling Thunder air campaign, 85 percent of
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft shot down over the North fell to the
smaller caliber guns.• When supporting B-52 air strikes in an EB-66E across from
Mu Gia and other passes leading into Laos, we frequently had lOOmm rounds
lobbed at us. None ever hit anything. They were just fireworks in the sky. To have
an impact the heavy AAA required guidance from their fire control radars, which
we jammed effectively, or be applied in much greater numbers than the North
Vietnamese appeared capable of doing . Their heavy guns proved noteworthy for
their lack of effectiveness throughout the war.
The SA-2 SAM system consisted of six Guideline missile launchers and
a radar guidance and control center built around the Fansong track while scan
radar. The SA-2 SAM was the critical factor that forced tactical air operations to
lower altitudes . Yet neither B-66s nor fighters especially feared the SA-2. If one
could see the missile coming it was easily avoided. Throughout the war the SA-2
claimed less than 100 of the nearly 1,000 aircraft lost over North Vietnam during
Rolling Thunder. 5 By the end of 1966, the ORV had 137 prepared SA-2 sites, a
number that continued to grow until it reached 320 by the time of the Linebacker
II campaign in 1972. Unlike other users of the SA-2 SAM system, the North
Vietnamese turned their missile battalions into a rapid deployment force. If not
truly a mobile system, by being able to break down an SA-2 site's components
and moving to another site within less than a 24-hour period, the SA-2 in fact
came pretty close to being just that. 6
One way the Air Force responded to the F-4C shoot-down on July 24, 1965,
was the formation of a SAM Task Force. Out of it grew the Iron Hand Wild Weasel
hunter killer concept, first flying two-seat F-lOOFs, but soon converting to more
capable and survivable F-105Gs. "During the first years of the war, long-range
jamming by electronic warfare aircraft, primarily RB-66s, flying just outside the
battle area, and Iron Hand strikes gave North Vietnamese missile crews the most
problems. The North Vietnamese immediately began targeting the RB-66s during
1966."7 The RB-66 electronic warfare crews would never forget 1966. They flew
unwavering into the face of fear, armed with neither guns nor bombs, trusting in
the electronics at their finger tips. The initial RB-66C and B-66B Brown Cradle
aircraft deployed largely with active jamming and passive search systems first
installed in the aircraft in the 1950s. The Air Staff and tactical commands spent
little money on upgrading their electronic warfare systems until 1965. Over the
next several years the B-66s received a large number of upgrades from recorders
to receivers to active jammers and steerable antenna systems, all provided through
the Quick Reaction Capability program. QRC allowed managers to put money

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 Dodging SAMs and MiGs

against an immediate need in support of combat operations . The conversion of

51 former photo reconnaissance planes to EB-66E active jamming aircraft was a
major jump in electronic warfare capability. Although the EB-66E had many more
jamming systems than the Brown Cradle aircraft, it still didn't have a directional
jamming capability.
Major Robert Walker was a long time RB-66 pilot. He flew with the 10th
TRW out of Spangdahlem in the late '50s, then transferred to RAF Alconbury
with the 30th TRS in 1959. Bob served at Shaw with the 363rd TRW, and in early
1965 accompanied the four RB-66B infrared equipped aircraft to Tan Son Nhut
Air Base as their maintenance officer. Major Walker had lots of experience flying
and maintaining the B-66, ending up at Clark as chief of maintenance for B-66
operations . Clark was where the heavy maintenance for the B-66 was done , work
that couldn 't be accomplished at Takhli or anywhere else in Southeast Asia. But
he wanted to get back into the flying business, so he wangled an assignment to
the 4lst TRS at Takhli . On February 25, 1966, Major Walker and his crew were
assigned RB-66C 54-457 to fly a surveillance mission over the Gulf of Tonkin,
crossing over to the other side near Vinh , in Route Package 1. Their call sign was
Gull l. 8
'This was my 13th combat mission," recalls Captain Wayne Smith, the
Raven 2 on the mission . "I was stationed at March AFB, California in B-52s
and didn't have the opportunity to go to any transitional training before reporting
to Takhli. Shaw had not set up a training program yet. Another Captain and I
were the first replacements for the original RB-66 crews sent to SEA, rotating
home after completing their 100 combat missions over the North. This day all
missions were canceled except ours. The weather was terrible. It was the height
of the Monsoon season. They told us to go anyway and do a little reconnaissance .
In SAC I had extensive signal recognition training, therefore I was intimately
familiar with the sound of the SA-2 Fansong radar. I was amazed when I got to
Takhli that the RB-66 crews turned off the APS-54 warning receiver. It was wired
into the intercom on the B-66 and the crews didn 't want to listen to all the noise
it generated. I convinced them to keep it on at a reduced volume . This way I was
able to listen to the electronic environment we were passing through . Our flight
took us over Vinh and I heard what I thought was the faint sound of a Fansong
radar on the APS-54 . I told Captain John Causey about it, the chief Raven flying
in position four. He looked for it on his receiver but the signal must have gone
down. On our return down the coast I heard the Fansong come up again, and I
called Causey's attention to it. When he intercepted the signal it was very strong,
and he told the pilot to tum. Then the Raven one said that he intercepted a strong
missile guidance signal," the BG06 "and the chief Raven told the pilot to start a

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 Glory Days

steep SAM break. I heard a loud pop. When Major Walker was finally able to level
off he discovered he had little control over the aircraft."•
Major Walker recalls that the plane wanted to pitch up. He had no rudder,
but seemed to have enough aileron to keep the wings level, and controlled the
plane with the engines which were still running fine. "The control column wheel
came back into my stomach and I had both knees on the wheel trying to keep it
forward, but with little success." It was time to leave and he gave the order to
eject. The seat gave him problems and didn't eject the first three times he tried.
"The plane was going very much out of control. One last squeeze of the trigger,
this time it worked." 1° First Captain John Kodlick, the navigator, ejected, then
Major Walker. Ravens one, two and three ejected. For some unknown reason
Captain John Causey didn't make it out, and crashed into the sea along with the
plane. Wayne Smith remembers that after the Raven one went, it was his tum. He
became confused. The B-52 ejection seat was different from the one in the B-66.
"I pulled that lever and then everything blacked out or redded out, and the next
thing I remember, I was dangling in my parachute. I do not know whether those
extra couple of seconds could have been the cause of Captain Causey not making
it. It haunts me to this day." 11
Gull 1's Mayday call was heard and the Air Force launched a recovery effort.
But the precise location of the crash was unknown. "A Navy A-lH Skyraider
from the USS Ranger was participating in a practice search and rescue exercise
when its pilot picked up several emergency beepers from an area where none were
supposed to be. He was able to establish voice contact and vectored two Navy
helicopters to make the pickup before the two Air Force Jolly Greens arrived." 12
Captain Causey was never found. Major Walker injured both feet during the
ejection from the crippled aircraft. The other men suffered no injuries. Captain
Smith completed 100 combat missions over the North, the only one of his crew to
do so. This first loss of an RB-66C to an SA-2 was not publicized by the Air Force,
announcing a subsequent loss on July 20 as being the first aircraft of its type to
be lost over North Vietnam. The first kill of an EB-66, however, was credited to
the SA-2 site near Vinh, then manned by Russian advisors. A/lC Richard Evans,
assigned to Detachment 2 of the 42nd TRS, 25TRW, at Takhli, remembers the loss
of 54-457 for other reasons. "I was an ECM technician and 54-457 was the first
RB-66 to have the new APR-25/26 Radar Homing and Warning receiver installed.
This system was a real step forward in electronic detection technology. 1\vo
technical representatives from Applied Technology were waiting for the return of
the aircraft to get the reaction of the crew. I was in the ECM shop when the tech
reps came in and told us that the aircraft may have been shot down. It was a sad
day in maintenance." 13

212
 Dodging SAMs and MiGs

"I was flying a Brown Cradle over the Gulf of Tonkin, off Haiphong. It was a
clear day," Don Harding remembers . "We got a strobe on the APR-25/26 warning
receiver at about 2 o' clock , and my EWO said over the intercom 'I think they are
locked on to us.' All of a sudden I saw this contrail coming up toward us . I did a
hard break to the left and dove to force the missile into a turn it couldn't execute,
but the darn thing went off right in front of our airplane . We ingested a lot of scrap
metal into the right engine and it started running a little rough. I shut it down,
went back into orbit, and finished our mission. When we got back to Takhli we
found a few shrapnel punctures in the engine cowling, but most of the stuff went
right into the engine. On another occasion the consequences were more severe.
A piece of metal went into the side of one engine when the missile exploded near
us. The engine began to run rough , but at a certain RPM setting it would smooth
out. So I kept it there and we finished our orbit. But instead of returning to Takhli
I decided to land at Udorn. I didn't feel right about that engine, and decided we
needed to get down quick. After inspecting the ·engine after landing, I think it
would have blown off the plane in a few more minutes . It was in really bad shape.
My crew and I went home on a C-47. Two weeks later I came back to pick up the
plane after they changed the engine. It was night. I began my take-off roll when
I saw a truckload of Thai workers on one of their big fancy painted trucks on the
runway. Oh my God!!! I didn't think I could clear the truck, but I couldn't afford
to just plow into it either. At the last possible moment I yanked the wheel into my
stomach and went right across the top of the truck. I stalled over the truck and
came back down on the other side and continued my take-off. I heard later that
some of the workers were badly hurt. The tower apologized profusely. It could
have been worse .
"Many times we flew in overcast conditions and that was scary. You couldn't
see anything and had to totally rely on your equipment to give you warning of a
missile launch . On July 20, 1966, I was flying a Brown Cradle directly behind a
C-model piloted by Captain William Means. We were near Dien Bien Phu when
the missile came up through the clouds and hit him. Bob Hubbard was in France
with me, the navigator, and a good friend . The missile came out of nowhere and
smacked him square where it hurts. I was five miles in back of him, could see
his exhaust trail. It was sort of a broken cloud environment. He'd disappear from
view every few minutes, and all of a sudden all I heard was beepers going off.
I heard no transmission, it happened that quick. I got the hell out of there. They
snuck a missile site way out of their normal deployment area west of Hanoi and
caught us by surprise. We let our guard down, were on the way home, in a place
where no SAMs were supposed to be. They wanted us, and they came after us."' 4
Devil 01 was the EB-66C shot down that day, serial number 54-464. Five of the

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 Glory Days

crew of six were captured. First Lieutenant Craig Norbert, one of the four Ravens,
was killed in action. 15
Getting 'nailed' by an SA-2 surface to air missile was not the only problem
facing B-66 aircrews. Oftentimes they ran afoul of whatever restrictions
Washington imposed on their operations, and the slimmest of violations could
see their careers heading south at the whim of any number of people at different
levels of authority - from the wing commander to the all mighty secretary of
defense, Robert S. McNamara. An ECM mission was to cover a strike force of
F-105 fighters going into the Hanoi area on June 29, 1966. "We normally would
have been a flight of two, one Brown Cradle and a C-model," Captain Vaughn
Wells remembers. "This day we were three. Two B-66Bs and a C-model. I had an
extra RB-66B, Devil 33, on my wing for the express purpose of keeping my new
navigator Alexander Birgerson out of trouble. Our call sign was Devil 32, and
the C was Devil 31 - the lead. The Cs always led. Birgie had never seen North
Vietnam, this was his first trip. Ed Presto, the radar navigator in Devil 33, was
experienced and proficient to see any mistakes Birgie might make, and was to
prevent what actually happened. Birgie never said a word the entire mission. As it
turned out he was lost the whole time, but didn't know it.
"The C-model went to a point just southwest of Hanoi to hold over the Thuds
ingress route . We went to a point directly west to hold over the egress route. A
flight of F-4s providing high cover had lost one member to a maintenance abort,
so there were only three of them. The three stayed together, as fighters never work
in less than pairs. They stayed with us, Devil 32 and 33, thereby protecting two
aircraft instead of just one - leaving the C-model to tool around MiG country
without an escort. The F-4 guys were thinking of me as Devil lead, a critical
mistake. The C-model was Devil lead. I told Birgie to mix up our headings in the
holding pattern so as not to fly a totally predictable pattern. Birgie would give me
headings to fly, and I had no way of knowing if they were right or wrong. It was
a solid undercast. No sweat, I thought, Mike Schurig, the other pilot in Devil 33
with Ed Presto, the experienced navigator, was tucked in on my right and surely
would never let Birgie take us into no-no land. Birgie would interpret those weird
little green blobs of light on his scope and give me a new heading every couple
of minutes, flying what we thought was a clever figure-eight modified racetrack
pattern. He took us into no-no land, also known as the Peoples Republic of China,
not once but four times, flying his nonstandard pattern and drifting with the high
altitude winds. Every time we approached the Chinese border the F-4 flight lead
with his up-to-date inertial navigation system would call, 'Devil lead' and give
the border violation code. I said to Birgie, 'Do you think he might be talking to
us by mistake?' Silence. The real Devil lead was of course the C-model, and if I

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 Dodging SAMs and MiGs

had used my brain properly I could have - should have - called the F-4 lead and
said, ' F-4 lead, this is Devil 32 rocking wings. Are you calling me?' As it was,
those extra brain molecules weren't there that day and Birgie and I trusted Presto,
the old head navigator, to closely watch Birgie's progress and prevent the very
thing that happened. Not a word from Ed Presto. After the final crossing into
China the strike was over and we all started south. Birgie had us heading directly
toward Udorn , he thought. Long after the time when Udorn TACAN (Tactical Air
Navigation aid) should have come alive on my instruments, I was still without
any navigation aids - and getting concerned. As I was about to ask my trusted
navigator about this discrepancy the F-4 flight lead said that we were out of MiG
danger and he was going to peel off and RTB (Return to Base) . I gave him a salute
of thanks and he turned his flight 90 degrees to port. I did not like the looks of that,
so I said to Lieutenant Birgerson , 'Do you know where the hell we are?' Birgie
came up from behind his scope with the most forlorn look in his eyes I had ever
seen and said, Tm in the weeds , man.' I asked Mike Schurig if he was picking
up Udorn TACAN and he answered, 'Affirmative.' I said, 'You have the lead.' He
too turned 90 degrees left. We were about to enter Burma." They landed at Udorn,
short on fuel. Then returned to Takhli .
"The next day," Captain Wells recalls "I left for Bangkok on R&R (Rest
& Recreation) only to be recalled on an urgent requirement to go and visit with
Colonel Daniel 'Chappie' James in Saigon. Schurig, Presto, and 'Birgie' had
preceded me on a C-47 out of Takhli to Saigon to meet with the 432nd staff. I
reported as ordered to then Colonel James, a legend in his own time. When he
stood up from behind his desk he went to about nine feet before he stopped rising
- glaring down on me . The man wanted to flay the hide from my bones, but I was
one of only two guys of five aircraft who truly had no way of knowing where
we were. The F-4s had their inertial navigation systems, and Birgie and I had Ed
Presto, a supervisory navigator, on our wing. James wanted to kill me, that was
certain . But being a fair man and understanding of the circumstances, in great
frustration and disappointment, he just threw me out of his office.16
The 'intrusion' into Communist China ended with that meeting between
Colonel James and Captain Vaughn Wells. Unlike an earlier intrusion on May
12, 1966, which only violated the 20-mile buffer zone along the Chinese border.
That one gained the attention of President Johnson and ended up before Secretary
of Defense McNamara. McNamara seemed to relish harassing the very airmen
who on a daily basis put their lives on the line to implement his flawed strategy
of gradual escalation . Captain Stanley L. Tippin was a Raven on the crew of
Lieutenant Colonel Allen 'Spider' S. Webb, commander of the 41 st TRS at Takhli .
On May 12 they were assigned aircraft number 54-387 to fly an ECM mission

215
 Glory Days

northwest of Hanoi in support of an F-105 strike. Their tasks were to jam Firecan
AAA and SA-2 Fansong radars and to provide missile warnings to the strike
force if that became necessary. Captain Verla 0. Eary was the navigator, getting
a flight check from 1/Lt William H. Hill, an instructor navigator. The rest of the
back-end crew of Ravens consisted of Captains Dave Gingery, Jim Barkley and
1/Lt Norman Kasch . "We were flying a northeast to southwest orbit," Stan recalls,
"only to come face to face with a flight ofMiG-17s which had approached from
the rear to make a visual attack with their 23mm cannons." Norm Kasch adds,
"We completed our mission a little early. The 105s were running a bit ahead of
schedule so we called in RTB and initiated our tum to a southwesterly heading. As
soon as we rolled out on our new heading, that's when we encountered the MiGs."
Stan continues, "Colonel Webb had World War II combat experience flying P-
40s against the Japanese at Guadalcanal, and instead of avoiding the MiGs he
turned directly into them, causing them to break formation and fire wild. He then
executed a split-S and dove for the deck. Meanwhile we Ravens in the back were
cleaning up our stations and getting ready to eject. One of the MiGs recovered
and followed in hot pursuit. We had a three ship F-4C MiG-cap. Major Wilbur R .
Dudley and his backseater 1/Lt Imants Kringelis, flying one of the three F-4s, saw
the single MiG-17 on our tail. He kicked in his afterburner and in short order was
trailing the MiG bent on shooting us down. Kringelis got a lock-on with his radar.
Dudley worried that if he fired a Sidewinder it might take out the B-66, but if he
didn't do something the MiG-17 was going to do the job for him. They fired an
AIM-9 heat seeking Sidewinder missile which failed to track. They immediately
set-up for a second shot. That missile went straight up the MiG's tail, the aircraft
exploded and rolled into a spin and crashed. No parachute was sighted, nor did
the F-4 crew see the markings on the aircraft. Upon landing at Takhli we were met
by Colonel William Holt, the 355th Wing Commander and escorted to the wing
command post. Here Colonel Holt informed us that the Chinese government had
lodged a protest with Washington that an F-4 and RB-66 had violated Chinese
territory and shot down one of their aircraft. Within hours Secretary of Defense
McNamara called for an investigation and all seven of us were flown to 7th Air
Force Headquarters in Saigon where we spent a grueling eight days documenting
our flight. The F-4 crew was already there when we got there. The press was
all over the story. I have clippings from the Bangkok Times, the Saigon English
language paper, the Los Angeles Times, and of course the Fort Lauderdale News,
my home town paper." 17
That engagement started when two of the F-4s protecting the RB-66 were
jumped by three MiG-17s firing their 23mm cannons. As his wingman took
evasive action, Major Dudley saw a fourth MiG line up behind the RB-66. "The

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 Dodging SAMs and MiGs

MiG pilot apparently had a case of tunnel vision (target fixation) when he bore
in on the RB-66 and never knew we were behind him. That was his mistake,
and one mistake is all you are allowed in this game." Dudley and Kringelis, the
F-4 back-seater, both said that the MiG-17 was firing on the RB-66 when they
launched their missiles. "I guess I was a little excited and fired the first Sidewinder
before the MiG was in firing range. Anyhow, it whipped off past him and missed,"
causing Dudley to fear that "their own heat-seeking Sidewinder missile would hit
the RB-66." By then Kringelis had obtained a radar lock-on and was yelling at
Dudley, "Go radar! Go radar! " to fire one of their radar guided missiles instead
of a Sidewinder. "But I had that MiG in my sights dead on, and I let loose with
another Sidewinder. I watched the missile , a little red ball with smoke spiraling
out, wind right into the MiG's tail. The next thing we saw was smoke and debris.
We were through it almost before it happened . There was no chance the MiG pilot
could have ejected." Dudley 's wingman saw the MiG spinning to the ground out
of control. The other MiGs fled. "I never got close enough to see his markings,"
said Dudley. 18
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of the President, sent a board of
officers headed by Marine [Corps] Brigadier General Robert G. Owens to gather
evidence on the incident," reported the Los Angeles Times, adding, "The instructor
navigator, Lt William H. Hill, was flown to Washington and is slated to testify
before a board of high ranking officers today, according to Lt. Gen. Joseph H .
Moore, U.S . Air Force Commander in Vietnam." All hands put in a week of long
hours in Saigon compiling information from a myriad of sources into a detailed
5-inch report . It was Lieutenant Norm Kasch , the Raven 2, who had worked early
warning and GCI radars during the mission and plotted their locations along with
the navigator's position reports which verified the position of the RB-66 as being
over ORV territory, but within the 20 mile buffer zone established by McNamara
along the Chinese border. The Marine Corps general returned to Washington with
his report, which apparently the Secretary didn't like."' 9
The MiG-17 downed by Dudley and Kringelis from the 390TFS, 35TFW,
was the 12th MiG kill of the war, the 9th kill for Air Force pilots.'0 Many more
were to follow as the North Vietnamese, with the help of Chinese, Russian and
North Korean pilots, continued to attempt to shoot down RB-66 aircraft. There
was no better testimony to the effectiveness of B-66 jamming against ORV AAA
and SAM operations than the DRV's continued efforts to destroy the B-66s, or at
least force them into more distant orbits to diminish the impact of their jamming.
As for the RB-66 crew, they returned to Takhli to fly their 100 missions over
the North, nauseated at having their Secretary of Defense side with the Chinese
Communist. Aircraft number 54-387 was not to survive the war. It was downed by

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 Glory Days

an SA-2 surface to air missile on February 4, 1967, while supporting an air strike
against the Thai Nguyen industrial complex near Hanoi. Three of the Ravens
were killed in action - Major Woodrow Wilburn and Captains Herbert Doby and
Russell Poor. Three others became prisoners of war - Major Jack Bomar, Captain
John Fer, and 1/Lt John Davies.
A Wild Weasel F- IOSF SAM killer, piloted by Captain Edward Larson with
Captain Kevin 'Mike' Gilroy in the back seat as the electronic warfare officer,
was hit by AAA fire north of Hanoi on August 7, 1966, and barely made it to the
Gulf of Tonkin where the two flyers ejected. They came down among a group
of islands occupied by North Vietnamese forces . Air Force and Navy jets were
in the area to keep the North Vietnamese at bay while an SA-16 was called in
to make a rescue attempt to get the two flyers out.21 An RB-66C, 54-470, piloted
by Major Rex Deaton, was in orbit off Hanoi during the strike and ready to
return to base. His escorting F-4 fighters called bingo fuel and left. Regulations
called for B-66s to depart a threat area once they lost their fighter escort. An
accompanying Brown Cradle aircraft did just that. As the drama of the downed
F-IOSF Weasel crew began to unfold below, Major Deaton's crew decided to stay
on and continue to suppress AAA radars which were providing guidance to guns
firing at the F-105s and F-4s trying to keep the North Vietnamese away from their
downed buddies. They turned all of their jammers on the Firecan radars. With
the AAA radars rendered ineffective, the F-105s and F-4s were able to roll in on
repeated strafing runs to suppress the ground fire. The SA-16 piloted by Captains
Ralph Angstadt and Bob Morita was now able to land on the water and rescue
Larson and Gilroy. (On a subsequent mission Mike Gilroy earned the Air Force
Cross, his pilot, Merlyn H. Dethlefsen, the Medal of Honor).22 The RB-66C crew,
including Captain Stan Tippin and First Lieutenant Norman Kasch, was awarded
the Distinguished Flying Cross for heroism. The Brown Cradle crew that departed
the area, although following instructions, received "a royal tongue-lashing from
their Wing commander." One has to do the right thing, rules or no rules . Rex
Deaton and his crew did the right thing. 23

21R
 CHAPTER NINETEEN

KIBBY TAYLOR FINDS A CLOUD

As 1966 drew to a close there were no signs that the ORV was responding to either
the increased pace of the Rolling Thunder campaign or to bombing pauses . To the
contrary, the North Vietnamese used every opportunity to repair and, if possible,
strengthen their air defense network, and exploit the sanctuaries provided by
Washington's politicians . Supplies of every kind poured into the port of Haiphong,
untouched by the fleet of American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin or by Air Force
jets roaring overhead. Although the build-up of American military force continued
in the South, the Viet Cong, contrary to Washington's expectations, wouldn't go
away. Bien Hoa Air Base, Da Nang, and any number of other American airfields
continued to be targets of mortar and daring sapper attacks . The McNamara
strategy of gradual escalation seemed to work precisely opposite of the way it
was intended. Gradual escalation, in fact, gave the enemy the opportunity to gain
experience , to adjust to its powerful adversary and, in time, cope and prevail.
Not only did politicians in Washington have a false and distorted picture of
the realities in the former French Indochina, the military response implemented by
Secretary McNamara was equally unimaginative and ponderous . The Commander-
in-Chief Pacific, CINCPAC, a Navy admiral, sat in a plush headquarters in
Hawaii, thousands of miles from the theater of war that he was directing. It is
doubtful Generals MacArthur or Eisenhower would have ever thought of fighting
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany that way. CINCPACAF, the Commander-in-
Chief United States Air Forces in the Pacific, also had his headquarters in the
Hawaiian Islands . Occasional trips to Thailand, or Vietnam air bases presumably

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 Glory Days

l to R standing - Lieutenants Klaus Klause and Wilbur Latham, Major James Tuck and Lieutenant
Rabini. Al2C Williams and A/JC Klodgo are their crew chiefs . In three minutes, on November 5,
1966, the two F-4C crews from the 366TFWl480TFSfrom Da Nang Air Base, downed two MiG-2ls
attempting to shoot down an EB-66C electronic warfare aircraft near Hanoi .

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 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud

made up for the lack of actual first hand experience for himself and his generals.
None of the generals and admirals directing the war in Vietnam had the smell of
gun powder in their nostrils, instead delegating responsibilities to a convoluted
and often over staffed headquarters conglomerate which would have done Rube
Goldberg proud. The 13th Air Force thought itself close to the war at Clark Air
Base in the Philippine Islands to make sound and timely decisions . Actually, only
the 2nd Air Division, redesignated 7th Air Force in April 1966 at Tan Son Nhut
Air Base could hear the sounds of war. But its commanders and deputies largely
ran the air war like their peers, sitting in leather covered high back swivel chairs
from behind mahogany desks, rather than being field commanders -a concept that
seemed to have gone out of vogue with the end of the Korean War. These multiple
headquarters were, of course, staffed by thousands of men . General Spaatz, who
at one time ran the strategic air war in Europe, and the first Air Force chief of staff,
was known for his disdain of intermediate headquarters. Spaatz would not have
believed what the men he once led into combat had wrought. On top of it all, SAC
continued to run its own Vietnam air show from Offutt AFB in frigid Omaha, and
Andersen Air Base on Guam.
The policies that flowed from this convoluted political and military effort were
clearly suspect. Evidently war was to be run on a nonintrusive basis , meaning that
the people at home should be inconvenienced by it as little as possible. Nothing
like the World War II approach when the nation pulled together and in short order
defeated two mighty adversaries in less than four years. On the Air Force side this
part-time war mentality expressed itself by making only limited use ofreserve and
air guard elements. Within the active force the transition from peace to war was
slow, even lethargic at times . The 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Shaw
Air Force Base, in Sumter, South Carolina, was the school house for all RB-66,
RF-10 l and RF-4C tactical reconnaissance training. By December of 1966 Shaw
had yet to establish a viable RTU, Replacement Training Unit, for the combat
squadrons in the field. Those squadrons in Vietnam and Thailand would not only
experience losses from enemy action or accident, but with the implementation
of the 100 mission rule, large numbers of flyers would return home in less than
a year's time . Everyone else, from airman to general, would rotate once their 12-
month tours were up . If World War II or Korea had been fought on such a part-
tirne basis, the outcomes of those conflicts would have been decidedly different.
On December 31, 1966, the 363rd TRW had all of three RB-66C aircraft to
train the replacement electronic warfare officers for the two combat squadrons
deployed in Thailand. It had no simulator for the Ravens to train on . When one
was finally procured it turned out to be a former SAC RB-47H simulator from the
55th SRW with only minor modifications to accommodate RB-66C differences . I

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 Glory Days

trained on that simulator when I flew with the 55th SRW; trained on it again at Shaw
before being sent to Takhli. It provided little that could be referred to as simulation
of an actual signal environment or an aircraft configuration representative of the
EB-66C.' The result: when the first replacement EWOs arrived at Takhli they
received little more than academic training. Their first combat missions provided
the flying training they should have received at Shaw. The initial RB-66 force that
arrived at Takhli, regardless if pilot, navigator, or electronic warfare officer, was
highly trained and experienced. Most having flown in the aircraft for many years.
As they departed the combat zone, they took with them an irreplaceable level
of experience and insight into an aircraft not all that common in the Air Force
inventory. They were replaced by SAC flyers who came from a very different
weapon system environment, and by young lieutenants just out of flying school.
Both combat effectiveness and flying safety suffered as a result.
John Matlock was a' green EWO ,'in his words; a young lieutenant undergoing
electronic warfare training at Mather AFB. "Our instructor said that he needed
three volunteers for SEA, and that we single guys should go ahead and volunteer
as all sorts of benefits would accrue, including choice of assignment after we
finished our Southeast Asia tour of duty. Three of us volunteered and were short
circuited straight to Takhli in January 1967. We did not even go to Shaw. My first
ride in an Air Force jet was a combat mission over North Vietnam. This was just
a couple of days after the John Fer shoot down [John Fer was the pilot of EB-66C
55-387 which was downed on February 4, 1967, by an SA-2 missile]. I completed
100 missions in August and put in for my choice of assignment as promised. SAC
wasn't even my hundredth choice, but that's where I went. At least I got to marry
the girl I left behind. I signed into my new unit at Fairchild AFB, Washington.
They were so glad to see me as they were about to deploy to SEA. I explained that
I had my tour of duty in SEA and they couldn't send me back until all other EWOs
had gone over. I wound up with two Arc Light tours in B-52s." 2
Frank Widic came from a little town on the eastern shore of Maryland named
after a big namesake - Berlin. Tobacco and chickens were the products of choice.
Frank was looking for something more than that. He joined the aviation cadet
program, graduating in December 1964 from navigator training at James Connally
AFB in Waco, Texas. Frank then completed electronic warfare officer training at
Mather AFB. "I applied for B-66s and was the only one in my class selected. My
next assignment was the 9th TRS at Shaw. When I arrived in September 1965
there was hardly anyone there. They were all in Southeast Asia. There was no
formal training program, there was nothing. A friend had an assignment to Takhli,
his wife was eight months pregnant, so I volunteered to take his place. Just before
I left Shaw I flew on an RB-66B for nearly three hours. That was my first flight in

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 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud

a 8-66 and my first flight in an Air Force jet. My second flight was on December
14 in position number 1 on an R8-66C. I remember that flight vividly because one
of the Thuds we were protecting got hit. His wing man was screaming 'Get out.
Get out.' He never punched out."·'
The Air Staff and TAC had been so busy phasing the 8-66 out of the
inventory that when war came in earnest and the situation changed, no one at
the Pentagon or at TAC headquarters took a hard look at future requirements .
As a result young second lieutenants straight out of flight training learned by
doing over North Vietnam . To their credit, and to the credit of the Air Force
instructors who prepared them at Mather, they performed well. On November
1, 1967 , Air Force finally bit the bullet and came out with a formal replacement
policy. ''The personnel situation resulting from the USAF commitment in SEA,"
wrote Lieutenant General Horace M. Wade , Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
"demands urgent action by commanders and personnel managers at all levels.
The Air Force has reached the point where it must soon join the other services in
returning some personnel to SEA involuntarily to support combat operations and
to preclude mission degradation . It is Air Force policy to prevent the involuntary
return of any member to that area until other similarly qualified personnel have
served a tour there ... The Chief of Staff further directed that policies governing
deferrals of personnel selected for SEA be reviewed in an effort to reduce the
number of personnel excused or deferred from assignment."•
The assignment policy, however, like the draft, had plenty ofloopholes. Special
security clearances were a sure way for many to avoid a combat assignment. The
Air Force Chief's letter directed close scrutiny of such deferments. The result was
that as time went on older and older staff personnel appeared in aircraft cockpits,
many not always well suited for the type of aircraft they were assigned to fly.
While the B-66 crews in the early days of the war were principally lieutenants and
captains, by 1970, majors and lieutenant colonels proliferated. Our adversaries in
the meantime manning radars, anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missile sites
had no 100 mission rule or one-year tour limits . They served for the duration of
the war or until they died, which ever came first. As a result, they developed a very
high level of expertise, in time learning to cope even with all but the most severe
EB-66 jamming.
In late 1965 the Navy introduced the ALQ-51 deception jammer which
"rather than trying to overpower radar receivers, created a number of false returns
on the SA-2 radar screens. The ALQ-5 ls initially gave the Vietnamese problems.
For a three month period in the summer of 1966 the Navy aircraft loss rate in
SAM-defended areas dropped precipitously ... By 1967 the Vietnamese became so
proficient against the Navy 's deception jamming, that during an engagement on 13

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 Glory Days

August 1967, two SA-2 missiles hit and destroyed three Navy A-4s."5 Thereafter,
EB-66E aircraft which came into the inventory about that time, flew a significant
number of missions in support of Navy strike aircraft on the Gulf of Tonkin side
of the DRV.
Major Kibby Taylor last flew the B-66 in 1960 when still assigned to the 11th
TRS at Yokota. After the RB-66s were retired in 1960, he spent the remainder of
his tour at 5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota. Then he volunteered for KC-
135 tankers, and was given an assignment to C-124 transports at Dover AFB,
Delaware. That unwelcome assignment came to an end when he was selected to
attend Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama.
"Out of Air Command and Staff I had an assignment to B-66s at Chambley,
France, but that was cancelled and I was sent directly to Takhli. Lieutenant
Colonel Dick Keller was with me and we went through Snake School together
at Clark before reporting to Takhli. When we arrived at Takhli they told Dick he
was the commander of the 41 st TEWS. The previous commander left after flying
his lOOth mission, and the operations officer was leaving the next day. I became
the operations officer for the squadron. There went the much prized continuity of
command. Dick and I knew nothing of anything about the operation. It was to be
a busy time for us.
"Two tactical electronic warfare squadrons were at Takhli, the 41TEWS
and the 6460TEWS, which later became the 42nd TEWS. It was in 1966 that
Air Force changed our squadron designations from Tactical Reconnaissance
to Tactical Electronic Warfare. The aircraft were re-designated from RB-66 to
EB-66. Nothing ever stays the same. Both of the squadrons were assigned to
the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udom, with maintenance and other
support provided by the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, the host organization at
Takhli . We were under the operational control of 7th Air Force in Saigon, and
assigned to 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. 7/13th Air Force
at Udom was the on-site coordinator of things. In administrative and personnel
matters we were controlled by Headquarters USAF. Such was the way our Air
Force was organized to train, fly and fight. Many of the EB-66Cs assigned to the
41TEWS were the same aircraft I flew in Japan. Then they had a pair of radar
controlled 20mm guns in the tail, but the guns had been replaced with a tail-cone
housing chaff dispensers and some jammers, giving us in the C-model a total of
nine. Fortunately I had been qualified as an instructor pilot in the B-66 .and had
operational experience with the passive electronic surveillance mission and the
larger crew of the C-model. I had confidence in the aircraft in spite of it being
under-powered, resulting in long take-off rolls. We were operating at maximum
gross weights of 83 ,000 pounds or heavier. Most new pilots had no experience

224
The 8-668 bomber 1·ersio11 ofrhe Desrrover. <!(which 72 were hui/1. could carry 14 750 pound. 4 3.000 pound or
3 5.000 po1111d co11venrio110! bombs. When assigned ro rhe 471h 8W rhe aircraft initially carried one Mark V (Fat
Man) nuclear bomb. /(//er nrn Mark 28 hvdrogen hombs.

The day/night photo RB-668 carried either 48.fiash bombs in a chain driven rack or 104Ml12 .flash cartridges.
Its APN-82 doppler naviga1ion system was the first to be installed in a production aircrqft providing automatic
position, ground speed. drift angle and heading data.
The RB-66C was the tactical equivalent of the SAC RB-47H strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Its/our Ravens,
seated in the bomb-bay area of the aircraft, were tasked to detect and locate hostile radars. Over time the RB-66C
acquired a substantial jamming capability which the RB-47H did not posses . The C-model is easily identifiable
by the wing-tip APD-4 antenna pods.

The WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft was built in lieu of 36 RB-66C aircraft. It housed two weather
observers in the aft compartment. The WB-66D never reached its potential because the atmospheric sensor and
necessary in-flight communication equipment was never procured. As a result the D-model was the first aircraft
in the series to be retired from active service .
The MD-1 fire control system, initially installed in all versions of the B-66, consisted of a gun-laying radar and
two 20mm tail guns with 500 rounds of ammunition each. The guns were replaced starting in the late '50s with
ECM tail cones consisting of ALE-2 cha.ff dispensers and ECM jammers. With the loss of the gunner and his radar
the pilot lost the only means of observing the aft quadrant of the aircraft.

Cockpit of a B-66B Brown Cradle, a former B-66B bomber, 13 ofcWhich were converted in the late '50s into ECM
support aircraft. Their NATO role was to accompany B-66 and F-lOOD strike aircraft in time of war and jam
enemy AAA and SAM associated radars.
The first ·RB-66C, 54-459, was delivered to the 42nd TRS of the 10th TRW at Spangdahlem AB, Germany, on
November 28, 1956. 1 n the Spring of 1957 459 was the star of an open house attended by over 30,000 Germans.
Named the City ofWittlich by its mayor, the city 's coat of arms was ceremoniously painted on the nose section of
459, barely visible in the picture.

An RB-668 on final approach to Spangdahlem AB, Germany, on a not so common blue sky day . RB-66Bs, assigned
to the 10th TRW, arrived in numbers in 1957, replacing trouble plagued RB-57As and aging RB-26s.
A I st TRSI IOTRW RB-66B turning off the active runway at Spangdahlem AB, ready to release its billowing brake
chute. The B-66's landing roll was nearly as long as its take-off roll, 7,000+ feet, using ~peed brakes, brake chute
and anti-skid brakes.

=:dflb

'\
-~

The 10th TRW became famous for its mass fly-bys on ceremonial occasions, launching 12 aircraft from each of
its four squadrons . In the foreground is an RB-66B of the 19th TRS, three RB-66Csjrom the 42nd TRS, with ECM
tail cones rather than guns fly in the background.1958.
An RB-66B of the 363TRW from Shaw AFB, SC, piloted by Randy Johnston over the Atlantic, July 1958, enroute
to lncirlik AB, Turkey, in Operation Double Trouble - the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. It was the first employment of
TA C's Composite Air Strike Force, CASF. concept instituted by TAC's commander General Otto P. Weyland.

L to R - Lieutenants Johnson and Jefferson, and A/JC Spotts, the gunner, in front of their aircraft at Incirlik.
Maintenance crew tents along the flight line are visible in the background. 1958.
Maintenance crews at lncirlik inspecting bullet holes in an R8-668 after returning from a low level reconnaissance
mission over Lebanon and Syria . 1958.

-
"'""'h:~";';.':.':,' C:..L

Three JO-caliber automatic weapon bullet holes are circled in .;ed on R8-668 53-470. Several R8-668 aircraft
were hit by 30 and 50-caliber bullets while flying over Lebanon and Syria during Operation Double Trouble.
The seven 363TRW RB-66B aircrews which participated in Operation Double Trouble in front of one of their
aircraft at Shaw AFB, SC, in September 1958. Pilots in front, navigators in row two, and gunners in last row
standing. They called themselves the 'Turkey Trotters.'

A widely circulated 1958 photo ofTAC'sjirst line combat aircraft taken over Shaw AFB, SC. A KB-50 tanker, only
released by SAC ro TAC weeks earlier, with an RF-10/C photo reconnaissance aircraft on the left wing drogue,
an F-/OODfighter bomber on the right wing drog ue , and an RB-66B photo reconnaissance aircraft on the tail
drogue.followed by two C- /30A s. The picture represented 'Opie ' Wey/ands Composite Air Strike Force concept
- 'Ha ve airplanes, will travel anywhere in the world.·
 -

Lieure11anr Bob Websrer'.< aircraft at England AFB, LA. Assigned to the 16th TRS at Shaw, Bob was flying in
support of US Armv 111a11euvers . 011 a low level 11ight run he ran illfo a flock of birds, an occasion he would never
forget. Mav 7, 1957.

In August of 1957 Bob Webster and the 16th TRS moved to N9rth AFB, SC, a satellite of Shaw AFB, duri11g
runway repairs at Shaw.
Lieutenant Webster while at England AFB in May 1957 Captain Vern Johnson in front of his aircraft. The left
admires the names of his crew and crew chief freshly windshield has been removed after cracking in flight,
painted on the wheel-well door of his aircraft. one of many problems that bedeviled the RB-66 in its
early years.

Four 16th TRS/363TRW RB-66Bs at England AFB, LA, May 1957.

 RB-66Bs from Shaw AFB passing through Chateroux AB, France, in September 1958.

RB-66C 54-470 of the 42TRS/ JOTRW at RAF Chelveston, England, in 1959. The lOTRWmovedfrom Spangdahlem
AB in August 1959 to bases in England when France insisted on the removal of American nuclear armed aircraft,
which were moved to bases in Germany.

- .. ,.,,.._ -"• ' ' J..-.till Cf 'i .. •

. ... ' . ' ..... - '
- •
1
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-
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54-459, the City of Wittlich, taking offfrom RAF Chelveston, its new home, after leaving Germany. 459 would fly
for nearly 20 years out of bases in England, France, Thailand and return to Germany before being retired. I flew
459 many times, and it always brought me home.
An RB-66B from the 16th TRS/363TRW at Shaw, flown by Bob Webster, is refueling from a Langley AFB, VA ,
based KB-50 tanker. Refueling from a slow KB-50 was a challenge/or B-66 pilots, especially if they had to refuel
from wing drogues. Once the B-66 became heavy with fuel it was a 'bear ' hanging on to the tanker.

Lieutenant Bob Stamm , I ITRS , hehind a KB -50 refueling tanker. Both aircraft were based at Yokota AB, Japan,
and assigned to the 67th TRW. The KB-50s released hy SAC to TAC only in 1958, were forced into retirement
in 1964 because of severe airframe corrosion. Those based at Yokota were in such bad shape that they were not
flown home , hut dismantled in place.
Once 1he KB -50s re/ired. SAC became 1he single man.ager/or air r~fueling asse/s. The KC-97 tanker was a great
improveme/I/ over 1he KB-50. bu1.1·1ill100 slow. 53-441 was used exlensively at Edwards AFB, CA.for /es/ and
evalu(//ion purposes by bo1h Douglas and Air Force /es/ pil01s.

The KC-135 }el tanker revolutioni~ecl aerial refueling. While newer aircraft used 1he high-pressure boom refueling
method, older aircraft such as the 8-66 and the F-100 required a baskel, a drogue, be al/ached 10 the boom to
allow 1hem to get their fuel . The F-105 was 1he only /aclical aircrcif/ configured lo use eilher boom or drogue and
probe refueling.
An EB-66E piloted by Captain Bob Welch, 42TEWS/388TFW. Koral RTAFB, in Vietnam era camouflage coming
in to get itsfuelfrom a KC-135.1972.

What a perfect hook-up between tanker and receiver looks like .

 9 T" TA C RECON SQ
p~~~MP FOX I CREWS (RD-66C)
FROM SllAW AFB~~!~ FO R DEPLOYMENT
' ~~F~~ff-OLYISTON, ENGLAND
l
ROY v. FAIR, (BACK ROW TBfRD FROM
' RIG81)

In 1960 Shaw based RB-66C electronic reconnaissance crews and aircraft from the 9th TRS began regular
deployments to RAF Chelveston to gain operational experience flying along Warsaw Pact borders - Operation
Swamp Fox. Two aircrews and staff personnel are shown posing before one of their aircraft at Shaw AFB before
departing for the UK.

A B-66B bomber, 54-418, of the 84th Bomb Squadron at RAF Sculthorpe is receiving a post flight inspection by a
maintenance team led by SSGT James Lord.
RB-66Bs of the !st TRS/JOTRW at RAF Alconbury in September 1959 soon after their move from Spangdahlem
AB.

... F

A /sr TRS RB-668, 4-520, raking o.ff on a rare clear day from RAF Alconbury, Sept 1959.
4-520 about to suck up its gear after raking offfrom RAF Alconbury. The 10th Wing falling star is clearly visible
on the vertical srabili:er.

RB-66B formation, 19TRS, TRAB , France, 1963. Crew of aircraft from which picture was taken: Capt Kellum,
pilot; Capt Colosimo , nav; A/ JC Phillips,jl.ight engineer.
In 1962 the 19th and 4211d TRS moved to Toul-Rosieres AB. France, TRAB . TRAB had the 1ypica/ layout for
a French air base. a nmway flanked by two daisy-like parking areas on one end, and a third at the other, to
acc011u11oda1e three airrroft squadro11s. The pic1ure shows the 42nd TRS parking and dispersal area at TRAB .

.-\ 2008 o»erhead satellite shot ofTRAB shows that li11/e has changed m ·er the i111en·e11i11g years. (Google)
19TRS RB-66Bformation, TRAB, 1963.
Chambley AB, France. 42TRS aircraft are shown on their hardstands, lower left, while deployed to Chambley AB
during TRAB runway constructionfrom May to October 1963. Picture was taken from a 19TRS aircraft.

RB-66Cs from the 9th TRS . Shaw AFB, SC, qfter initially deploying to Tan Son Nhut, SVN, arrived at Tahkli ,
RTAFB, Thailand, in May 1965. R-L - Dick Wilson, a fabled RB-66 .flyer who acquired over 5,000 hours in the
RB-66 and Adrian 'Hoss' Cordoni. Bill Keels on l~ft.
lilt John 'Jack' Norden , 9TRS!363TRW, posing in home-made survival vest before his aircraft after arriving at
Takhlifrom Tan Son Nhut AB, SVN. May 1965.

Airman Richard Erbe, left, unknown crew chief, right. By October 1965 the first B-66B Brown Cradles arrived
at Takhli from Europe. Erbe was an enlisted ECM operator. Once the Cradles were modified with receivers and
tunablejammers , the enlisted men were replaced by EWOs.
 Takhli village as seen from the air.

Takhli's 10,000foot runway. On hot days with a full fuel load, EB-66s used every foot of it.
This Japanese-built structure served as the 355TFW hospital. The signs in front give direction and mileage to
diverse cities in the world, mostly American.

Crew quarters 'hooches' built of teakwood. These are airconditioned, many were open air.
F-105 fighter bombers-the planes we were there to protect from radar guided AAA and SAMs.

Takhliflighr line 1968. RC coded aircraft belonged to the 41st TEWS; RH to the 42nd.
 Heading north to the 'pocket ' above Hanoi.

Two back-end EB-66C Ravens - Hank Shimabakuro and Jim Handschumacher.

 Joe Snoy and Bob Sherman , two Ravens , in front of the 41st TEWS squadron building at Takhli.

Last mission ./(11· Joe Snoy, second from right - mission #123, July 1968. A time for a champagne toasts and a
subsequent dunking in the swimming pool.
 EB-66 noses and F-105 tails and open canopies on the Takhlifiight line.

Bob Hope was accompanied by Raquel Welch, Dianna Carol - Miss USA - and Art Buchwald. I 967.
 .
:J
Colonel Heath Bottomly, 355TFW commander in 1969 on the right, his vice commander on the left.

In October 1969 the 4/st TEWS was inactivated, its aircraft transferred to Kadena and Spangdahlem - the Brown
Cradles went to the bone-yard. 54-459, here shown after returning from a combat mission, returned to its old
home of Spangdahlem, Germany.
A year later the 42nd TEWS transferred from Takhli to Koral and to the 388th TFW. 42nd TEWS aircraft are
shown raking off in support of Linebacker II operations - the bombing of Hanoi/Haiph ong that brought the NVN
to the negotiating table.

The Air Force frowned on pictorial art on its airplanes, but the day Bob Welch, the 42nd TEWS maintenance
officer had sharks teeth painted on his aircraft General John Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Sta.ff, came to visit and
loved what he saw. The wing commander felt differently, let Bob keep the teeth on his airplane, bur allowed no
others to be decorated.
Party suits - 4211d TEWS crews at Karat RTAFB, Thailand. L-R Captain Welch , Lt Broadaway Welch :S navigator
sitting next to him; Lt/Col Giannangeli, center, standing, and Lt Savilago .

Th e 19th TEWS formed at Kadena AB, Okinawa, in October 1969. An EB-66E of the 19TEWS on the Kadena
ramp.
 5pz1ngdahl~m
AIR BASE

HOME
OF THE
TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

The 39th TEWS activated at Spangdahlem AB in April 1969, a longtime RB-66 base. Spangdahlem was a satellite
toBitburg AB and the 36TFW. ln January 1972 Spangdahlem became home of the 52nd TFW.

EB-66E of the 39th TEWS at Spangddhlem AB, Germany.

Thefate of old airplanes-54-465, a C-model, is displayed at Shaw AFB, SC, the one-time 'reconnaissance school
house' of the United States Air Force.

Th e aurhor and son, Lt/Col Churl es Samuel, who flew into Wri ghr-Patterson AFB, Ohio, in an A-JO to be presenr
for rhe dedication ceremonies <~f rhe B-66 memorial ar the Museum of the United States Air Force in 2004.
Charles served in rhe 52nd TFW ar Spangdahlem in the 1990s.
 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud

operating the B-66 at such heavy weights. I recall one pilot who came in when I
did, as he neared lift-off he retracted his gear on the first skip, and as the gear was
corning up he was settling. He got airborne but only after grinding two inches off
the ECM antennas on the belly of the aircraft. We thought he'd belly in, but he
made it off.
"The take-off roll was a very critical phase of flight for the B-66 in a
high temperature environment. It may have been a 'lead sled' and could not
outmaneuver a fighter, but it was a stable platform and responded well if you
flew it with authority. Pilot visibility was limited making it difficult to see threats
approaching from below and within a 90 degree cone from the rear. That's one
thing I liked about having a tail gunner. He could see that rear quadrant on his
radar. We were essentially defenseless against fighters and very limited in our
ability to see and evade strikes from surface to air missiles. If attacked by either,
our best defense was high G turns, which could only be sustained by applying full
power in a rapid descent. Adding to our dilemma was the fact that we frequently
could not tell which direction to turn in. We believed our jammers were very
effective against AAA radars, and we were not scheduled to fly without fighter
cover in areas where the threat from MiGs was high.
"Our job was to protect our strike forces by degrading the capability of
enemy radar controlled weapons. In the heavily defended Route Packs 6A and
6B, the Hanoi/Haiphong area, we usually flew an EB-66C and an EB-66B or
E. We flew in trail formation in the threat area to always have one aircraft in
level flight, since jamming effectiveness was reduced in a turn. To do the job
my squadron had about twenty crews assigned at any one time, with one pilot,
one navigator and four Ravens per crew. When I arrived at Takhli some of our
navigators had come directly out of navigation training at Mather AFB, others
had been withdrawn from non-flying jobs, and only a few had recent operational
experience. Three quarters of our EWOs came directly out of electronic warfare
training into a combat assignment. The experience level had really declined. Most
of the missions we flew were over North Vietnam.
"The policy at the time was that for every 20 missions flown, a month was
taken off your one year tour. So after seven or eight months most of the guys were
rotating out of the squadron which resulted in a near total drain of experience. We
had a five mission checkout procedure. You'd start out flying in the lower Route
Packs - one, two, three and four. An instructor pilot would sit in the gunners seat
in the C-model and observe you. The first three flights must have been routine
for me because I can't recall anything spectacular, other than the intense activity
on the flight line during mission launch. My fourth mission was in the lower two
Route Packs on the east side over the Gulf of Tonkin requiring air refueling. I was

225
 Glory Days

a little apprehensive, this was my first night refueling from a KC-135. I wanted to
set a good example as the squadron operations officer. The flight did not get off to
a good start. Someone set off his survival beacon and we had to listen to that eerie
sound through take-off. The beacon did not fade with distance, so it was one of
my guys . We had to listen to it for the next six hours. They do not put the beacons
where you can easily get to them in flight. Once we landed, it turned out that the
beeper noise came from my own survival pack.
"The last of five missions was my flight check - up North in the Hanoi
area, November 5, 1966. The instructor pilot sat in the gunner's seat. I was lead,
Newark l, and an EB-66B, Newark 2, was to follow in trail. We were to cover a
large strike near Hanoi. Newark 2 aborted while climbing out and it was too late to
launch a spare, so we went on as a single ship to do the best we could with our nine
jammers instead of thirty. We rendezvoused with Opal flight, four F-4Cs out of Da
Nang Air Base. When I told Opal 1 lead that Newark 2 had aborted, he advised
Opal 3 and 4 to climb to a higher altitude to conserve fuel because they didn't
get topped off by their tanker. We started jamming the longer range acquisition
radars to degrade their ability to acquire the in-bound strike force. Entering North
Vietnam Opal 1 and 2 took up defensive positions behind and above us . We went
into the pocket northwest of Hanoi, just on the edge of the known SAM rings and
the 20 mile buffer zone along the Chinese border. The entry point into the pocket
was only about 12 miles wide and it took some maneuvering to get in there.
"About the time our time on target was up, I was listening to the 105s coming
off their strike, Red Crown called me by call sign, 'Newark 1, bandits 290 radial,
50 miles Bulls Eye.' Bulls Eye was Hanoi. Red Crown, a radar picket ship in
the Gulf of Tonkin, usually didn't do that. As a rule they gave an area warning.
My Ravens picked up the call and immediately began tracking the MiGs IFF,
Identification Friend or Foe. So I alerted Major James 'Friar' Tuck flying Opal 1
to watch for MiGs at 12 o'clock. Things began to happen fast. The Ravens picked
up the IFF of one MiG in our six o'clock position. I advised Opal l. Then all hell
broke loose. From a position to my right rear Opal 1's guy in back called, 'MiG!'
and Opal 2 also saw the MiG coming between the two F-4Cs headed straight
for us . The F-4Cs dropped their wing tanks to clean up their airplanes and get
ready for a fight when the second MiG-21 came in between them. Listening to
the Ravens tape at debriefing it sounded like the first MiG was locked on to us
and ready to fire. The MiG pilot fired a missile, and I heard Friar calling, 'Break
right, B-66. Break right.' That wasn't my call-sign. It took me a microsecond to
register, but about the second time he called he didn't have to call a third. I went
full power, hard right bank, full right rudder to start the nose down, followed by a
hard pull to haul that mother around. About that time I heard my navigator, Jack

226
 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud

McGinn, repeat , ' Break right and all the way down .' I could not see the MiG and
was totally dependent on Opal lead for guidance. The missile came screaming by
us to my left. I was going down rapidly in a tight spiral at above .92 Mach , redline
speed, into a hard shudder, near a high speed stall, pulling all the Gs I could. Then
I let up a little, banking , continuing my tight spiral. I was right up against Mach
I. Friar later told me that he lit his afterburners and went through the Mach going
after the MiG. I was going down, the MiG was on me, and Opal lead, Friar Tuck,
was on the MiG. A second MiG was on Friar's tail, and Opal 2 was behind that
MiG . Opal 2 called, 'Lead, you've got a MiG on your tail.'
"Friar coolly replied , 'How are you doing on him?' We had five aircraft
following in trail down a steep spiral. Friar Tuck told me later that he flew his F-
4C very close to the MiG-21 to try to drive him off us, and that we were pulling
too many Gs for him or the MiG to get off a missile. The MiG did pull off and
swung out to the left for a better position to get off a missile . We were down below
20 ,000 feet, and Friar called, 'He's doing a whifferdill on you. Take it back under
him.' So I broke left. When I reversed the spiral, I cut under the MiG and denied
him a shot at us . By this time we were down to 15,000 feet and I was about to run
out of ideas, altitude and airspeed. Then I saw a little white cloud in an otherwise
clear sky to my right. I pulled over to the right and flew into that cloud. As soon
as I hit that cloud I did a real tight tum to the left, heading down to 10,000 feet,
and continuing to tum. I could not sustain the high tum rate, and rapidly lost
airspeed at full power. I had to ease off and look for a new solution. The MiG
pursuing me went right on through the cloud, and Friar did too. While the MiG
was distracted looking for me, Friar got a missile off, exploding up the MiG's tail
pipe. Friar watched the MiG pilot eject from his aircraft . In the meantime Opal 2
fired a Sidewinder up the tail of the second MiG as it was positioning itself to fire
on Opal 1. I heard Opal 2's call as I was fighting for our lives, 'MiG splash into
the ground.'
"I was down to 10,000 feet and all the jammers were off line because of the
Gs we pulled. I wanted altitude . Get back up there and away from the AAA . The
Ravens were warning me that Firecan AAA radars were locked on to us as well
as a Fansong SAM radar. Then they picked up a missile launch signal, but we did
not see the missile . I had to do a little trade off between airspeed and altitude , and
I climbed back up to 15,000 feet. The F-4 guys were shouting with joy, debriefing
while they were flying. I said to them, 'Hey guys, cool it. I want to get out of here.'
So we headed out of there and went home, escorted out of the area by two of the
four F-4s of Opal flight. They flew the airplane the next day. All they found was a
cracked aileron bracket as a result of me pulling all the high Gs.

227
 Glory Days

"When I was in Japan in the late '50s with the 11th TRS I used to go out in
the local training area and fly that thing around doing engine stalls, pulling hard
turns,just wring the crap out of the airplane. I'd feel that 'Douglas rock' rattle and
shake, but never had any qualms that I couldn't make that airplane do anything
I wanted. Douglas put those airplanes together rock solid. Doing that stuff back
then is what saved my life that day near Hanoi. God must have put that cloud
there. Things like that make a believer out of you. The entire encounter took place
between 30,000 and 9,000 feet altitude and lasted 90 seconds.
"Later in the evening I talked to Major James E. Tuck, we all called him
Friar, and his back-seater, First Lieutenant John J. Rabini, and the crew of Opal
2, Lieutenants Wilbur J. Latham and Klaus J. Klause. I thanked them for saving
us from the MiGs and congratulated them on their kills. I had a friend stationed
at Da Nang act as my proxy, buying the Opal flight crews a well deserved dinner
and drinks. I elected not to tell my wife, who was living at Shaw. About ten days
later I received a letter from her including a news clipping about two F-4C crews
shooting down two MiGs and saving a B-66. 'Maybe you know someone,' she
wrote 'on that plane. Please give them this clipping.' She had no idea it was
me." 6
First Lieutenant Klaus Klause was flying the back seat of Opal 2 trying to
kill the MiG on Opal l's tail. The MiG "reversed his turn and started a vertical
pull to the left. I looked at the radar and it showed 200 knots overtake and we
were inside a mile. The next thing I heard was the whoosh of a missile leaving
our jet. I looked over Joe's right shoulder and saw the corkscrew path of our
Sidewinder fly directly toward the tail of the MiG-21. It hit the aft section and a
red fireball followed. At this time we were smoking by the right side of the MiG.
As if in slow motion we watched it snap roll and start a downward spiral, getting
a glance at an open cockpit. Of course we were excited and made one more 360
over the trundling airplane - proclaiming our aerial victory. 'We got one, we got
one,' Joe and I shouted over the radio, when the calm voice of the EB-66 pilot
brought us back to our senses, informing us 'I'm OK. Now watch for other MiGs.'
We checked our fuel and looked for the rest of the flight - no joy. We had 4,000
pounds left in our tanks, not the ideal fuel quantity sixty miles from Hanoi. We
started a climb into the ionosphere and got vectors to the nearest tanker, when two
more MiG-2ls passed above us, heading toward the Chinese border. On the way
home we learned that Friar and Rabini also got their MiG, and Opal 3 and 4 found
the EB-66 and escorted it to safety. There was a hell of a celebration at the DOOM
(Da Nang Officers' Open Mess) club that night as our two MiGs gave the 480th
TFS its fourth and fifth MiG kill." 7 It was the 22nd and 23rd MiG kill of the war
over North Vietnam.

228
 Kibby Taylor Finds a Cloud

Captain Roland Valentine was the Raven two on Kibby Taylor's aircraft and
had a uniquely different perspective of the entire engagement. He saw and heard
the world around him on the electronic receivers he operated at his position . "I
intercepted the MiGs radio transmissions which were getting stronger, and from
the directional strobes I was getting from my ALA-6 direction finder it seemed
they were moving from abeam to aft. I relayed this information to our pilot, who
relayed it to the F-4s. The MiGs flew right through the F-4s and attacked us. Upon
seeing the MiGs. Friar Tuck then called out, ' Break right 66, break right.' Kibby,
apparently unsure of what he heard then said something like 'What did he say? '
Our very cool navigator, Jack McGinn , said in a calm and firm voice, 'Break right
NOW, all the way down ,' which Kibby did with great skill and determination .
About this time the lead MiG fired a missile . As the left engine went up from
Kibby's right break I saw the missile pass underneath harmlessly. We continued to
trade G-forces for altitude until what I thought was about ground level in the Red
River valley. There were many Fansong and BG06 missile guidance radars up,
but none fired, probably because they were told to stand down for fear of hitting
their own aircraft ," they had shot down one of their own MiG-2ls on another
occasion . "I recorded the MiG conversations with their GCI controllers while
all this was going on. When we got back to Takhli our electronic analysis center
passed the tape to 7th Air Force in Saigon. I was rousted out of bed early the next
morning by a very angry colonel who chewed me out for recording politically
sensitive information. Apparently the pilot of the lead MiG was not Vietnamese,
but Chinese.""
Later on in the war the North Koreans would send an entire squadron to bolster
a depleted ORV fighter force . The Chinese stuck their noses into the DRY on other
occasions as well. Frank Widic was lead Raven on an RB-66C on June 29 , 1966,
part of the force that conducted the first strike against the Hanoi petroleum storage
sites. "One of our Ravens, Jim Osborne, spoke fluent Mandarin Chinese . Jim
would sit in position I or 2 and pick up the GCI controllers. When the intelligence
people debriefed him they would tell him that under no circumstances would he
mention this to anyone ."9 Political Washington was extremely nervous, paranoid
is probably a better word, about anything Chinese. A see nothing, hear nothing
kind of mentality prevailed.
Don Harding remembers Friar Tuck. "Larry Wensil was one of the Ravens
on the C-model that got jumped by the MiGs. Larry made a recording of the
intercept and the shoot-down of the MiGs . Friar was a Virginian with a deep
southern drawl. The tape opens up with Friar Tuck calling out, 'B-66 break right,
break right .. . 'in that deep southern drawl of his. Made for a good laugh after it
was all over. We called him Friar because he was pear shaped. Great guy and an
even greater pilot." 10

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 Glory Days

"In late November 1966 7th Air Force scheduled a tactics symposium,"
Kibby Taylor recalls, "to discuss operational tactics for Air Force units involved
with strike missions over North Vietnam. The symposium was hosted by
Colonels Robin Olds and Chappy James, commander and vice commander of
the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon. I attended along with two of our EWOs.
The importance of electronic support for air strikes was given emphasis when
Colonel Robin Olds chose to chair the ECM discussion panel and displayed good
knowledge of the technical aspects of electronic warfare. On Christmas day I flew
a single EB-66C to support strikes in the lower Route Packs. Occasionally I could
see the ground near Mu Gia Pass. The area was covered with bomb craters and
looked like a different planet. As we departed our orbit I contacted a radar site for
clearance. The operator's response was 'Roger Nelson,' followed by clearance to
Channel 49, Takhli TACAN. This routine response was like a personal Christmas
greeting - my navigator's name was Roger Nelson. Small things mean a lot and
lightened our spirits as we returned that Christmas day from a combat mission.
We all rejoiced over the MiG sweep Robin Olds led the first of January 1967,
bagging 7 MiG-2ls. I envied the men who flew the EB-66C in support of that
mission." 11

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 CHAPTER TWENTY

TO CHANGE AN AIR FORCE

The Tactical Air Command and its sister overseas commands, USAFE and PACAF,
always had been a ' Kick the tires, light the fires, first off is the leader,' kind of
operation. Some bomber generals ran the show for a while , but they didn't change
the hearts and minds of their pilots . The arrival of the nuclear bomb constrained
the long cherished, free-wheeling approach of taking the fight to the enemy ala
Zemke's Wolf Pack. Vietnam looked like it was an opportunity to get back to the
good old days. It turned out it wasn't. By 1965 TAC and USAFE combined had
all of 22 RB-66C tactical electronic reconnaissance aircraft remaining in their
inventories . They were augmented by 13 aging B-66B Brown Cradles, former
bombers with their bellies stuffed with 22 noise jammers. That was pretty much
all there was when it came to electronic countermeasure capabilities in the
tactical air forces. When the North Vietnamese changed the rules of air warfare
by introducing not only radar guided AAA , but the SA-2 SAM system as well, our
strike fighters were in trouble. On the afternoon of July 24 , 1965, the SA-2 missile
made its spectacular entry into the air war over North Vietnam when it blew an
F-4C out of the sky and severely damaged three others. It was a shock to the
planners in Saigon, Clark Air Base in the Philippines, Hawaii and Washington. Yet
the response to the DRVs introduction of SA-2 SAMs was slow, even lethargic .
Not until October did the Air Staff come around to releasing six Brown
Cradles from their USAFE Cold War commitment, well after the SA-2 entered
the fray in the North . The remaining seven Brown Cradles didn't arrive at Takhli
until late May 1966. Additional C-models arrivjed at an equally glacial pace. By

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 Glory Days

EB-66 noise jamming on radar scopes, such as that shown above , deprived North Vietnamese radar
operators of the target information they desperately needed to aim their AAA guns and surface to
air missiles against attacking F-105 and F-4 strike aircraft. The effectiveness of EB-66 jamming is
attested to by the frequent NVA attempts to intercept and down EB-66 aircraft, and the creation of
special MiG-21 and SAM units whose sole task it was to take down these hated American planes.

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 To Change an Air Force

the time the last Brown Cradle aircraft arrived at Takhli , Rolling Thunder Phase
IV was being implemented, and the North Vietnamese integrated air defenses had
grown quantitatively and improved significantly in performance . Air losses rose
correspondingly. The RB-66 aircraft and crews, their value obviously initially not
well understood, suddenly were in high demand to suppress the growing DRY air
defense threat. Although the RB-66Cs and the Brown Cradles were well equipped
to handle the DRVs AAA and missile acquisition radars , the SA-2s Fansong
track-while-scan radar was a challenge for the B-66 crews to defeat. Even the
most ardent ' kick the tires and light the fires' TAC flyer saw the writing on the
wall - they needed help, and soon. When the air war against the North first began
it may have been viewed as a piece of cake, but by "mid-1967 it became necessary
to cover strike forces in Laos with EB-66 ECM aircraft and Wild Weasel F-105s .
The air war had changed dramatically in our disfavor from what it had been in
early 1966."'
Unlike TAC, the Air Force R&D community had taken a somewhat more
measured approach to ECM and its development. After the loss of two U-
2 aircraft over the Soviet Union and Cuba to SA-2 missiles, and several more
over Communist China, Air Force Systems Command initiated efforts to develop
self-protection countermeasures for individual aircraft. Several approaches were
tried. Some of the new countermeasures were dismal failures, acting more like
beacons for the SA-2 missile crews who were tracking overflying U-2s. 2 August
Seefluth, a World War II flyer whose B-24 had been shot down late in the war
over Hungary, served as a Raven in the 10th TRS in Germany and England. In
1962 he found himself at Wright-Patterson AFB as a project engineer on a new
and exciting project - the QRC-160-1 ECM self-protection ECM pod . "When
I got there, General Electric at Utica, New York , had just received a contract to
develop a podded barrage self-protection noise jamming system to be carried by
fighter aircraft . It was supposed to go on the RF-110, which became the RF-4C.
We tried to get the pod development into normal production channels, but TAC
gave us little encouragement, so we stuck with the QRC approach . Quick reaction
meant that anything we produced would be contractor supported and not enjoy the
conventional in-house support of a normal weapon system. Our flight test airplane
was an F-100 and our pilot was Captain Ed White, the first Astronaut to venture
outside the capsule. He later died in the Apollo fire. By the time I left the office
we had 200 ECM pods on order with GE."'
The QRC-160 was the first instance where equipment of that nature was pod
configured for external mounting on a fighter. The pod took up a weapon's station ,
something TAC didn't like. The QRC-160 was optimized against AAA radars such
as the Whiff and Firecan, and the Fansong SAM•radar. It was a system specifically

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 Glory Days

designed to provide self-protection for a single aircraft, complementary to the

EB-66 jamming which provided protection for many aircraft. Testing was hurried
and done under combat conditions. The initial buy was for 58 QRC-160-1 pods
allocated to Misawa and Kadena Air Bases in Japan, then hurriedly sent to Tan
Son Nhut beginning in April 1965. The initial deployment of the pods proved to
be a disaster under a less than competent project management team. The RF-101 C
was flying some of the toughest missions early on in the war and needed all the
self-protection it could get. The airplane was not designed to carry ECM pods
on its wings . It had no hard points to mount external stores. All that had to be
developed, including the pylon on which the QRC-160 was to be hung . Tactically
the pod was designed to be carried on each wing of an aircraft. Seventh Air Force
project managers decided that four pods, two on each wing, would probably be
even better and make the RF-10 l something of a mini EB-66. In addition to a lack
of understanding of how to properly employ the new QRC-160 system, the pods
received rough handling. As a result reliability plummeted. Then the pods were
incorrectly tuned, mounted and maintained and acted more like beacons when
used, rather than providing protection for the vulnerable RF-10 ls . General Hunter
Harris , the PACAF commander, became utterly disgusted with what was going on
and got rid of both the pods and the people who brought them in .•
David R. Zook was an electronic warfare officer who loved his profession.
In 1963 Dave was assigned to Eglin AFB in Florida. "I tested a variety of ECM
equipments while at Eglin, but by far the most important turned out to be the
QRC-160-1 jamming pod. These pods had been given a combat test during 1965
at Ubon in Thailand. The RF-101 was selected for the test because their losses
were high . If anything could be done wrong it was done wrong at Ubon. As a
result ECM got a black eye. I was assigned a project named Problem Child, which
was to retest the QRC-160-1 pods. By virtue of my tests I became involved with
the Anti-SAM Task Force established by General McConnell in August 1965.
There was a lot to learn about the SA-2. The Foreign Technology Division at
Wright-Patterson AFB had gathered the available intelligence on the Fansong
radar and contracted for the building of a surrogate model on the Eglin test range
- SADS-1 (Soviet Air Defense System -1). At the heart of the system were three
operator positions. Each had a B-scope that was higher than it was wide. One
displayed azimuth and range, the other elevation and range. A master operator
operated an expanded range scope. It was the job of the master operator to match
azimuth, elevation , and range information when more than one target appeared
on the scope at the same time. When the operator had isolated a target and it was
between 6 and 30 miles away, he could initiate a simulated missile launch.

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 To Change an Air Force

"We calculated from the data we collected that the probability of getting a
missile within 200 feet of a target where the missile's proximity fuse would work
was 97 percent if the airplane was not jamming. Four percent if four airplanes in
the correct formation were all jamming the radar. The formation tactic was the
original idea of retired Lieutenant Colonel Ingwald Haugen . Inky Haugen knew
more about ECM than any other person I've ever met. Working with Inky was
like getting a graduate degree in ECM. Inky's tactic required four QRC-160-1 pod
equipped airplanes to fly in formation at altitude straight and level. The operators
on the ground saw their entire radar scopes filled with noise jamming. There was
no way for them to pick a single target . Firing a salvo of missiles into the mass
of airplanes only had a four percent probability of getting a missile close enough
to an airplane to trigger its proximity fuse . We flew the missions over and over
against the SADS-1 radar. The tactic defeated the radar. I hardly had written the
first draft of the test report when I was reassigned to the 41 TRS at Takhli to fly the
RB-66C ECM aircraft.
"I arrived at Takhli in May 1966. Whenever I had the opportunity I would
engage someone in conversation about the high loss rate of the F-105s and the
lack of self protection jamming . I told them about the success I had with the
QRC-160 pods at Eglin . One day Lieutenant Colonel Danny Salmon approached
me and asked me to accompany him to his mission planning room. Danny was the
commander of one of the three F-105 squadrons at Takhli . Several of his pilots
had gathered to hear what I had to say. There was an EWO present whom I hadn't
met before. As it turned out he had been responsible for the first combat test of the
pods at Ubon . I explained the Fansong radar and the importance of Inky Haugen's
formation tactic. Within a few days I was talking to Colonel Robert R. Scott,
the 355th Wing commander. Colonel Scott had me develop a flip chart briefing,
cautioning me to 'Keep it in fighter pilot jargon . Don't sound like an engineer.'
He arranged for me to give the briefing at 7th Air Force Headquarters in Saigon.
At Tan Son Nhut I briefed the director of operations and his staff. He asked what
I needed - people who know how to maintain the pods, and pilots willing to fly
straight and level into their target. Seventh Air Force passed its desire to run a
combat test to PACAF. PACAF was still adamantly opposed, but by this time
the Problem Child test report had made its way into distribution and was gaining
interest at the Air Staff. With strong reservations PACAF finally gave in. I recall
the captain who conducted the first test saying to me, 'Good, this test will bury
those pods once and for all.'
"Our plan was to load a QRC-160 pod on each wing of the F-105s and to
start with a mission into a low threat area. The four Thuds flew the formation at an
altitude above most of the AAA fire. I was in an RB-66C monitoring and recording

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 Glory Days

the mission. I could see the jamming on my ECM receiver and all pods checked out.
No missiles were fired. After each mission I went to the fighter pilots' debriefing
to gather the details and then went to the command post to call my contact at 7th
Air Force with the results. The day came for the final combat flight test. The 'frag
order' came in from 7th as it did every day, assigned the number of aircraft and
their targets. That day the frag specified 8 F-105s carrying the QRC 160-1 pods to
be flown as two four-ship formations. Their target, the Nguyen Khe fuel storage
tanks in the most heavily defended area in North Vietnam, Hanoi/Haiphong. My
RB-66C crew and I went into an orbit northwest of Hanoi to provide stand-off
jamming for the strike force. It was a savage mission. As the last of the Thuds
passed through the target area we all headed back to Takhli. As soon as we parked
our RB-66C I jumped out and headed over to the fighter pilot debriefing. None of
our pod carrying F-105s received any damage. I ran all the way to the command
post to make my report to 7th. From that day forth every Thud pilot wanted pods
on his airplane. The jamming pod formation was accepted by 7th Air Force that
October. In the preceding six months 72 F-105s were lost over North Vietnam to
radar guided AAA and SAMs. In the six months following, losses fell sharply to
23 . Every available pod, at that time 140, was sent to Thailand." 5
A Headquarters PACAF operations analysis paper reported in March 1967
that "Since their initial combat use on 26 September 1966, QRC-160-1 ECM
pods have been carried on an increasing number of sorties into North Vietnam and
Laos. In concept and in practice the QRC-160-1 pods complement the electronic
warfare capabilities of the EB-66 and other EW equipment. Pilots' reaction to the
pods and their effectiveness has been enthusiastic, and a lower percentage of SA-2
missiles was reported to track or guide."6 Carrying anything other than ordnance
and fuel on the wings of its fighters was something new to the tactical fighter
community in 1967. Today, every Air Force combat aircraft routinely not only
carries ECM pods into combat, but also flares and chaff. The SA-2 and subsequent
even more deadly SAM systems changed everything in the way air warfare was
conducted. The EB-66 proved itself as a tenacious and essential strike force
element, was followed by the EF-111 Raven, and today's EA-6B Navy/Air Force
jointly manned ECM aircaft. Change didn't come easy.
In time the North Vietnamese SAM crews discovered a weak spot in the
QRC-160-1. "On 15 January 1967 USAF bombers attacked a bridge near Hanoi.
The jamming patterns on the radar screens of the 236th Missile Regiment covering
Hanoi's inner defensive perimeter were unlike anything the radar operators had
ever seen. Only one of the regiment's four battalions was able to launch missiles,
and no U.S. aircraft were hit." North Vietnam's most experienced SAM regiment,
the 236th, "had been immobilized." Little changed for the DRVs SAM and AAA

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 To Change an Air Force

radar operators over the next several months. "On 5 May 1967, after a lull of almost
one week, USAF aircraft again attacked targets around Hanoi. Intense jamming
from QRC-160-1 jamming pods, combined with long-range jamming from EB-
66s northwest of Hanoi, covered the screens of the SAM units and blinded the
radars controlling Vietnamese 57mm and IOOmm guns . Every missile launched
by the 274th Regiment either self-destructed or crashed back to earth. The AAA
guns were forced to use optical fire control equipment or iron sights on the guns
to engage the attackers . While several aircraft were shot down, the situation was
desperate .. . The 5 May battle produced a bright spot. The 63rd Missile Battalion,
located southwest of Hanoi, fired at USAF aircraft from the rear as they exited
the area, destroying one F-105." The SAM crews had found a possible weakness
and a solution to their dilemma. They perfected the three-point and track-on-jam
method which relied on keeping the Fansong radar in a receive mode for much
of the time and relying on data inputs from Spoonrest acquisition radars . They
also began to launch SA-2 missiles in massed barrages. "Brutal interrogations
of newly captured pilots aimed at gaining tactical and technical information
increased significantly," as well. Losses to the SA-2 began to rise again. 7
Otis McCain got into the ECM business in the early days.just after World War
II . He flew in the few B-25 and B-26 aircraft TAC chose to convert to that role .
Those aircraft were too small in number to pose a threat to a potential adversary,
but provided excellent training for GCI, AAA and missile radar sites . After
serving in the 363TRW at Shaw flying RB-66Cs, in July 1967, McCain found
himself assigned to an ASCAT team, an Anti-SAM Combat Assistance Team. His
assignment was to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon Air Base in Thailand.
The wing was awaiting its first QRC-160-1 jamming pods, and the installation of
APR-25/26 radar homing and warning receivers. Few of the pilots showed any
enthusiasm for the new gadgets . It was Otis's job to change attitudes. Reports
kept coming in of a sudden increase in losses of ECM pod equipped aircraft.
"It occurred to me that one method to defeat the SAM missiles after launch was
to jam the missile guidance signal, the BG06. I was told in no uncertain terms
that this could not be done since the receiving antenna was in the missile's tail.
I was not convinced that pod jamming of the critical beacon signal could not be
accomplished. The difficult part was to get the necessary information from the
intelligence community of the precise frequencies." 8
Although Otis did not know it, that information had been obtained on
February 13 , 1966, by a Ryan Firebee target drone guided and monitored by
a specially equipped Firefly RB-47H of the 55th SRW flying out of Bien Hoa
Air Base. I myself flew on the Firefly aircraft after the Cuban Missile Crisis of
October 1962. By the time the aircraft modification was completed the crisis was

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 Glory Days

over. The Cubans did not oblige us to fire any of their SA-2s so we could pick
up fusing and terminal phase guidance signals. The RB-47H crew that flew that
critical February mission in 1966 was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross
for heroism. The SA-2 missile had a 286 pound warhead that exploded in a fan
shaped pattern ahead of the missile. After initial launch it achieved a speed in
excess of Mach 3 and had a maximum range of about 25 miles, reaching targets
at heights in excess of 80 ,000 feet. Below 1,000 feet the missile was not a threat.9
When Otis McCain received the information he needed he had several ALQ-160-1
pods retuned from just jamming the Fansong's track-while-scan radar to also jam
the missile beacon frequency. What evolved was that in a flight of four F-105s,
QRC-160 pods carried on the right wings were set to counter the SA-2s 'beacon
mode.' Pods carried on the left wing of aircraft one and three were set to counter
the azimuth beam of the Fansong radar, while left wing pods on aircraft two and
four were set to counter the F ansong elevation beam. Losses to SAMs dropped
dramatically. "My greatest reward was not the Bronze Star I was awarded for
this effort, but the thanks I received from pilots and weapons systems officers
returning from their missions." 10 On December 14, 1967, targets in the Hanoi
area came under heavy air attack, "almost every missile launched crashed back to
earth as soon as it left its launcher ... On 15 December the 236th and 275th Missile
Regiments launched a total of eleven missiles. Every missile crashed back to earth
shortly after launch. Once again the 236th Regiment took the lead in identifying
the cause of the problem. In August one of its battalions first detected a new
jamming signal directed at the missile guidance data-link frequency. The DRV
Air Defense Command, which was still congratulating itself for finding a solution
to the QRC-160-1 jammers, was in a state of shock."" Not only had -1 pods been
retuned to cope with the missile guidance, but Air Force had also moved on to a
new version of the pod, the -8, which later became the ALQ-87. ECM always has
been and always will be a game of one-upmanship. By late 1967, before the fifth
bombing pause, a Christmas cease fire, we were getting quite good at the ECM
game, and few remembered ever being opposed to carrying ECM pods.
When the war against the North ended in 1972, 83 percent of the 1,726 USAF
aircraft lost in combat over the North had been lost to ground fire ranging from
small arms to 1OOmm AAA guns. Of the 17 percent, or 289 aircraft, lost to other
combat causes, 37 percent, only 107 aircraft, were lost to the SA-2 surface to air
missile. The combat loss rate peaked in late 1965 and early 1966. Thereafter it
declined sharply, from 5.53 aircraft lost per 1,000 combat sorties flown in 1965,
to 3.16 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties in 1966, reflecting the impact of the increased
presence of EB-66 ECM aircraft, to a rate of 2.60 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties,
reflecting the increased reduction in losses due to the introduction of the QRC-160

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 To Change an Air Force

ECM pod. Although some of the toughest missions were flown during this period,
the pods. combined with support jamming, saved the day. By 1968 the loss rate
dropped to a low of 1.32 aircraft per thousand combat sorties. North Vietnamese
missile sites during that same period increased from a low of 65 in 1965 to a high
of 320 at the end of the linebacker II campaign in 1972. In contrast, their AAA
showed a steady decline in numbers from a peak of 6,452 pieces in 1967 to a
low of 1,203 guns deployed in North Vietnam in 1971. Much of the shift in AAA
numbers reflected movement into Laos and South Vietnam. The SAM sites, of
course, were not all occupied. As the war wore on, the 32 SA-2 SAM battalions,
with 192 launchers. reached a high level of proficiency in relocating from one
site to another within less than 24-hours. Their success rate, however, remained
low."
By the time President Johnson called a bombing halt against targets above
the 20th parallel, on April I, 1968, American fighters could again cruise at high
altitudes unmolested by SAM missiles and radar guided AAA, just as they had
when B-66s guided them in 1966 on Pathfinder missions. "The QRC-160-8
jamming pods could be used by small flights of four to eight aircraft to attack
areas such as Hanoi with powerful air defenses without having to worry about our
surface-to-air missiles," reflects the official Air Defense Command history of the
Democratic Republic of North Vietnam .'3 At this juncture of the air war, American
. political will to continue the fray faltered and the Secretary of State began to look
for a graceful exit. The air war over North Vietnam once and for all put World
War II and its brute force employment concepts behind us . A changed and battle
wise Air Force emerged from the skies over the DRY, once again equipping its
fighters with guns as well as air to air missiles, using 'smart' bombs to do what
dumb bombs couldn't, and routinely carrying ECM pods for self-protection to
defeat the electronic challenges posed by a wily enemy. We learned the hard way
to fight brawn with brain. Unfortunately, we paid an unnecessarily high price to
learn such simple and timeless lessons .

239
 CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE 41ST TACTICAL ELECTRONIC

WARFARE SQJJADRON

1967 began with a bang. On January 2 Robin Olds and Chappie James led the
fighter boys from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing on an elaborately designed ruse
into North Vietnam, shooting down 7 MiG-21s. Two more MiG-21s were claimed
by F-4Cs of the 8th two days later. Maybe the politicians in Washington did not
know what it was they wanted out of the war, but the flyers from the 8th TFW
were totally focused on what they did best - kill MiGs. The MiGs were baffled
by their losses. North Vietnam's "Air Defense Command issued new orders:
'MiG-21s will temporarily suspend combat operations to derive lessons learned,
to study and refine MiG-21 tactics, and to conduct further training to improv~
technical and tactical skills."'
War, of course, is arbitrary and cuts both ways. Major Arthur Kibby Taylor,
the operations officer of the 41st TEWS, on his fifth flight on November 5, 1966,
literally had two MiG-21s shot off his tail by his F-4C escort. Taylor remembers
"As 1967 began we had a change of commanders at 13th Air Force in the
Philippines. The old commander had grounded one of our pilots, Captain John
Fer, an Air Force Academy graduate and experienced flyer who ran his C-model
off the runway while landing in an intense rainstorm in the fall of 1966. You had to
experience the downpours we had at Takhli during the rainy season to understand
a pilot's problems when caught up in one of them. Our efforts to return him to
flying status resulted in his misfortune. On February 4 Captain Fer and his crew
were scheduled to support strikes in the lower Route Packs. Then 7th Air Force
directed a change and sent them up north to support a strike near Hanoi. Without

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 The 4/st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

The loss of EB-66C 54-473 on November 17, 1967, was one of the darkest days/or the men of the 4/st
Tactical Electronic Wwfare Squadron. The picture shows the desperate attempt of the pilot to eject,
the seat and pilot falling back into the flames of the burning aircraft.

241
 Glory Days

hesitation the crew launched on that mission. In the pocket northwest of Hanoi
they were hit by an SA-2 missile and went down, too deep in enemy territory for
a search and rescue attempt. Three of the Ravens were killed in action. Captain
Fer, his navigator Major Jack Bomar, and a young Raven, First Lieutenant John
Davies were captured. They spent six long years behind the infamous prison walls
of what we aircrew dubbed the Hanoi Hilton, a prison from French colonial days
turned into a rudimentary prisoner of war camp.
"In March, one of our returning aircraft couldn't get its left gear down. When
they burned off extra fuel we ran out of ideas and they had to set up for a gear-up
landing. The four Ravens in back of the aircraft had to escape through a single,
narrow hatch opening. The pilot and navigator could exit through their own
individual hatches. It was essential to repress fire to get them out. Crash crews were
positioned along the runway, an HH-43 fire suppression helicopter was in place,
cranes, anything we could think ofto get our flyers out if the worst happened. The
aircraft landed, sparks flew, the crew exited successfully. April 30 was a black
letter day for our brave F-105 flyers. The raid that day was led by Colonel Jack
BFOughton, the vice commander of the 355th. Three 105s went down, including
one Weasel aircraft. I wore a Leo Thorsness POW/MIA bracelet until his return in
1973. In June the new arrivals came in, including my replacement. I flew my last
combat mission on the first of July in 54-459. Two days later Colonel Keller, our
squadron commander and I departed for Bangkok."2
Like many other Ravens, I myself flew many missions in 54-459 after Kibby
Taylor left the 4lst, both at Takhli and later at SpangdahlemAir Base in Germany.
459 was one airplane that never let us down - always brought us home. Perhaps
airplanes have no souls and are just pieces of metal, plastic, glass and rubber - but
don't say that to anyone who flew a particular airplane into combat that brought
him back over and over again to live another day. That plane became more than
just a piece of metal, and was viewed with the sort of affection normally reserved
for human beings. The late General Robin Olds, a man I greatly admire, late in
World War II along with five fellow P-51 flyers attacked a German airfield. The
other five perished. Robin's P-51 was badly damaged but he would not abandon
the plane which had taken him through many a scrape with the Luftwaffe. Said
he, "Scat VI had taken me through a lot and I was damned if I was going to give
her up." With his determination to survive and her resilience both Robin and Scat
VI made it home in one piece. Such are airmen's sentiments about the machines
they fly into mortal combat. 3
Air Force planners had a eureka moment in August 1967, finally assigning the
two B-66 squadrons at Takhli to the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, their host wing
ever since they arrived in May 1965. For reasons only planners are privy to, the

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 The 41 st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

squadrons had been assigned as detachments to remotely located reconnaissance

wings. Colonel John C. Giraudo , later to become major general , assumed command
of the five squadron wing on August 2, 1967 . Giraudo , on his third combat tour,
embraced the B-66s like no other commander before or after. The B-66s were
part of his team and he would make sure they knew how he felt about them. In
an interview soon after he took command Giraudo said "The EB-66s are fragged
for 500 to 600 combat sorties a month, flying between 70 to 80 hours each . This
morning we had 16 EB-66s up working for the Navy, for the other F-105 and
F-4 wings. for everybody. Virtually no major air strikes are conducted into the
heavily defended airspace of North Vietnam without radar-jamming support." At
his change of command ceremony Giraudo turned to Colonel Harrison Lobdell,
his deputy for B-66 operations , and said "You now fly the F-66." Giraudo never
again referred to the 66 as a bomber. He was a fighter wing commander and all
of his airplanes were fighters . End of story. "I must confess I wasn't eager to find
out about these twin-engined electronic jammers," Giraudo said. "They were old,
ugly, underpowered relics from the past and they did things fighter pilots usually
were not interested in. In good conscience they were part of my Wing and I had
to show an interest. How fortunate that I did. Ace (Colonel Harrison Lobdell)
had a crew standing by to show me their aircraft. I came away from this meeting
thinking what great soldiers these crews were , to operate unarmed and unescorted
in a war zone under such dismal conditions . Back inside I gathered with Ace and
his top people and we discussed their problems and ours. I was curious what they
detected and recorded during their missions . And obviously how long it took for
their mission data to be processed and new information to be disseminated to the
fighter wings. I figured that from detection time to re-tuning our jamming pods
usually took two days. I was afraid to believe what I had heard . I called the DO
(director of operations), DM (director of maintenance), and told them to bring
their pod experts and meet me ASAP. When they arrived I asked them 'Why can't
procedures in the F-66 and the F-105 units be streamlined so that our pod people
can be informed that night about new frequencies and our people can then retune
the pods that same night in time to be used on tomorrow's mission? There ensued
a considerable technical discussion. In fact, they did accomplish it to our great
defensive benefit.
"Next came a discussion about the F-66 jamming capabilities . Ace and his
people showed us the fan-shaped beam pattern his aircraft transmitted and how
the jamming strength and effectiveness was proportional to their distance from the
ingress and egress route right down and up the F-66 jamming fan . In this manner
the radars had to look directly into the very powerful F-66 jamming, which, in
addition to the F-105 pod jamming made radar tracking near impossible . I directed

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that our F-105 mission leaders would have at their elbow while mission planning
the F-66 leader for that mission to coordinate jamming orbit locations with ingress
and egress routes, and adjusting them as necessary." 4
Giraudo was a compassionate, thinking, hands-on leader, the kind of
commander people followed to hell and back. He became suspicious that the
North Vietnamese were tracking their IFF over North Vietnam. I had no backup
for my gut feeling," Giraudo recalls. "That night I called Gordy Blood at 7th. The
next day I jumped into the Big Kahuna (his trusty F-105) and headed for Saigon
to meet with General Momyer. Momyer agreed to let the Takhli 105s tum off their
IFF over North Vietnam. General Blood argued against it. Momyer ended the
meeting saying, 'Gordy, send out a wire to the three wings involved approving the
355th to leave IFFs off over enemy territory.'
"When I returned to my office after visiting with General Momyer I was met
by an irate SAC general. He had come down to inspect the KC-135 detachment,
had been looking for me, and sounded mad. In strode this medium-sized, fit, burr-
haircut one-star who introduced himself as 'General Selmon Wells, commander,
322d Air Division, SAC,' and proceeded to inform me that the KC-135s were not
my aircraft but his and he would have no signs over their building saying they
were F-135s. He had ordered the sign taken down. I couldn't help but smile, and
said to him, 'General, no problem, that sign will be down every time you visit. I
must tell you that we couldn't do our job without your great people and their fuel
and, in fact, our people consider them part of our family.' The sign went back up
when he left."5
The Takhli flyers and maintainers, no matter the aircraft, were working their
proverbial asses off. The 41st was authorized 15 EB-66C aircraft, but at any one
time only had ten or eleven available. In July 1967 they flew 288 sorties, 262 in
August, and 272 in September. In 822 sorties they had only one abort. The B-
66s were always where they were supposed to be. Aircraft utilization averaged
nearly 93 percent - an astounding statistic for an old airplane and a credit to
the legion of maintenance men who worked day and night to keep the airplanes
flying. Others noticed. Colonel Robin Olds sent a certificate of appreciation for
the support provided by the 41st's EB-66Cs. The 7th Fleet commander, Admiral
John J. Hyland, did the same.6 The history of the 41st TEWS reflects "During this
period four additional Hearts and Flowers memos were received from other Navy
and Air Force units relative to specific missions supported by the squadron." It
was also the time when the old wire recorders finally came out of the airplanes
and Leach 14-track audio and video recorders were installed. High gain omni
directional antennas were provided for the APR-14 receivers in Raven positions
1 and 2. The BG06 missile guidance signal amplifier was modified to preclude

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failure, and long overdue improvements were finally made to EB-66C collection
and jamming systems .'
Alexander' Alex' J . Kersis was typical of the Ravens who manned the back-
ends of the EB-66Cs at the time . Born in 1943 in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Alex
attended Virginia Technical Institute in Blacksburg, majoring in metallurgical
engineering. "When I went to VPI (Virginia Polytechnical Institute) I didn't
realize that it was a military college, sort of like VMI, the Virginia Military
Institute. Every freshman had to join the corps of cadets. We had a plebe system.
The freshmen were called rats. and we had hazing . We would march to breakfast,
lunch and dinner. It was a regimented experience and if you were in the corps of
cadets it was expected of you to join ROTC. I signed up for Air Force ROTC,
thinking I wanted to be a pilot. My eyes weren't good enough, so I took the next
best thing, navigator. I was commissioned in 1965 and assigned to Mather AFB .
When I graduated the following year I chose to continue training as an electronic
warfare officer. Of course the war was going on and I heard from others that if
I went into B-52s I would spend a lot of time on Guam . Not only that, it didn't
count toward a SEA combat tour. I'd fly my B-52 missions, then I would end up
at Takhli in the B-66 anyway.
"The B-66 was a twin-jet tactical airplane and that sounded exotic to me .
So I, and a couple of my classmates, chose the EB-66 when we graduated in
February 1967. The three of us got into a car and drove across the country to
Shaw AFB in South Carolina. We finished our training in May and received orders
to Takhli, Thailand. First though we went to Homestead AFB, Florida, for sea
survival training, then on the way we stopped at Clark Air Base in the Philippines
for jungle survival. We were ready to head for the jungle at Clark when they
canceled our class. The class ahead of us was in the jungle and got caught in a
massive rainstorm. A cliff below which they had made their camp collapsed and
buried many. I learned later that one of the people killed was a classmate from
VPI who lived across the hall from me. When we arrived in Bangkok we caught
a C-47 Cooney Bird to Takhli - door wide open, flying at 6,000 feet, with the
clouds rushing in. The rule then was 100 missions over the North and you got to
go home . They were knocking off counters every day, every third day at the most.
So the experienced guys didn't stay around long .
"The accommodations at Takhli weren't anything like what was there several
months later. There were muddy ditches, wooden plank sidewalks, open hooches
with blankets strung on ropes to separate beds. The lights never went on because
someone was always coming off or going on a mission and they had to sleep. I
show up at my assigned hooch, open the door - and there is this musty smelling
black cavern. I had to get a flashlight to find my bed. Blankets everywhere. When

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I first got there most of the people were the old B-66 flyers from France, England
and Shaw. As they moved out over the next couple months they were replaced by
a mix of lieutenants from Mather straight out of school, like myself, and majors
and lieutenant colonels who had just graduated from service schools and AFIT
(Air Force Institute of Technology). And later yet SAC B-58 and B-52 people
began showing up. They were also dredging up former SAC EB-47 Blue Cradle
people who had wandered off into staff positions. The Military Personnel Center
at Randolph AFB in San Antonio, Texas, was combing through its personnel
records - there was no place for an EWO to hide. The same was true for pilots and
navigators. As time went on the rank structure rose to where there were more field
grade than company grade officers on our crews. I was at Takhli three months
when a massive modernization of base facilities began. Bulldozers and Thai
workers were everywhere digging holes, planting plants, pouring concrete. They
were gutting the hooches, putting in air-conditioners, paving roads.
"My first flight out ofTakhli was on June 21, 1967, up in the pocket northwest
of Hanoi. There was no local checkout. It was get in the back of the airplane and
go. I flew 133 missions over the North. Many of our missions were in support of
the Navy which lacked a good jammer until the EA-6A came along. It was on a
mission up north in the pocket northwest of Hanoi where I got my Distinguished
Flying Cross. It was on July 7, flying tail number 55-388. I was flying position 2,
covering the lower frequency bands. Suddenly all the acquisition radars started
to come up, it was almost like in a simulator. I had a Spoonrest stop its scan and
point right at us. The next thing we knew a Fansong SA-2 radar popped up, and
an F-4C flying cover for us called out a SAM launch. By then the Fansong radar
signal was off the scale on our receivers. The acquisition radars were off the scale
- they meant to get us. We made a SAM break into the missile and the thing went
right by us . After the SAM passed we discussed what to do next - move our orbit
further out or stay where we were and support the 105s. We stayed in that orbit
until the strike force returned. A couple of years later I was assigned to Ramstein
Air Base in Germany. We were telling war stories and I mentioned that I flew the
B-66. A major said, 'I had an occasion to save a B-66.' Then he told me where
and when. I shook his hand: 'You saved me!' A small Air Force it was at times.
It seems they only launched one missile to get us to move as the strike force was
approaching, but it didn't work.
"Unlike the E-model, which was set-up like a B-52 with good jammer
optimization against the Fansong missile radar with the ability to modulate its
jamming output, the C-model had no modulators. But we had the advantage of
being able to concentrate our jamming on a targeted radar with our steerable
antennas. We had lots of chaff and dropped that as soon as the pilot went into a

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 The 41 st Tactical Electronic Wwjare Squadron

SAM break. If we flew the C in the Gulf of Tonkin for the Navy, we would see
the Fansongs out of Hanoi and Haiphong. As we flew up the coast we would pick
up their Flat Face acquisition radars, see the ground picture evolve. One radar
would pick us up then pass us on to another and another. Once in a while we'd
do fun things like take a heading of 270 degrees and drive straight for the coast,
dropping chaff along the way. All of a sudden the entire radar network would
come up. Anything unusual they reacted to. I was on a frag team when I wasn't
flying, it's called an Air Tasking Order today. We would have people come over
from the F-105 squadrons and the Wild Weasel crews and we'd coordinate our
locations, times and tactics . Many of our orbits were assigned by 7th Air Force
in Saigon, but they gave us the latitude to shape our missions. This collaboration
was not always there. You do your thing, we do our thing was fostered by higher
headquarters by laying out every aspect of our missions. Coordination between
the 105s and us usually occurred when they were going downtown and knew they
needed all the insurance they could lay their hands on."'
Major Chris Divich who ended his Air Force career as a major general, was
assigned to the 4lst TEWS. Chris was the kind of guy people remembered - tall,
handsome, a ready smile, always willing to help. Chris hailed from a little town
in South Dakota, Durham. "My dad was a Yugoslavian immigrant. Came through
Ellis Island in 1911 and worked for the railroad and the WPA. I grew up in Durham
and was offered a basketball scholarship at the University of Kansas. I went down
there to play and joined Air Force ROTC for the ninety-dollars a month. Upon
graduation I completed flight training and ended up in the 40th Air Refueling
Squadron of the 40th Bomb Wing at Schilling AFB, Salina, Kansas. Then I was
sent to Squadron Officer School at Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama. I
really got into trouble there. There were 1,000 in the class, sixteen students in
each seminar - and there was one black kid named Jimmy Smith. This was in
September 1960. One of the first things our seminar leader said, right in front of
Jimmy, 'We can't have any parties off base, and you really can't go anywhere
downtown with Jimmy, and you probably shouldn't have him to your house.' And
I just went ballistic. 'This is absolute bull-shit, pardon my expression, nobody is
going to tell me that. I went through this stuff at the University of Kansas, and I'd
be goddarnned if I am going to go through this again. If I want Jimmy to my house
for dinner, I'll have him over for dinner. I'm going to do whatever I want to do.
If the Air Force doesn't like it, they can tell me to go home.' Well, the Air Force
didn't like it. When I got back to Kansas my squadron commander said, 'I tell you
Chris, you probably ought to get out.' I looked for a flying job but had too little
time for any of the airlines to show any interest. So I kept flying KC-97s.

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 Glory Days

"In 1959 we deployed 22 KC-97s to Thule Air Base in Greenland for three
months . At Thule we supported two RB-47H reconnaissance aircraft from the
55th Wing. Our job was to provide fuel. They needed 108,000 pounds of fuel to
go out and do their job and come home. It took three KC-97s to do that. We'd drop
them off near the Russian coast. The first time we launched three airplanes, one
aborted; launched four the next time and two aborted. It was so cold that we had
to take off with such high power settings, it diluted the oil and the engines failed.
Before we knew it we were doing eight ship MITO (minimum interval) take-offs,
15 seconds apart to support one RB-47H reconnaissance aircraft. And because of
that everybody got fired - the squadron commander, the operations officer, the
wing commander. Whoever they were at SAC headquarters finally realized that
KC-97s couldn't operate in 50 below zero temperatures. They replaced us with
KC-135 tankers out of MacDill. They came up and did the job with no problems.
"It was 1966 when my squadron commander told me that I was on the list
to go to Air Command and Staff College, also at Maxwell. I told him, 'That has
to be an error. I never told you this, but in my personnel records it says Not
Recommended for Air Force training.' He said, 'No Chris, you are on the list.' So I
went to Maxwell. One-hundred percent of my class received Vietnam assignments.
My initial assignment was to RF-4s in Saigon. That was a one year assignment
because they only flew over the South and Laos. Walt Sticher, a real good friend,
had a B-66 assignment. B-66s flew over the North and after completing 100
missions you went home. So Walt and I switched. I went to B-66 training at Shaw,
then over to Takhli. The irony, my friend Walt was shot down on his first mission
over Laos and became a POW until 1973. Once I started flying out ofTakhli they
changed the rules. They were really short on people and kept us there for a year,
100 missions or not. I ended up with 565 hours in the airplane.
"I loved the B-66. I didn't have any problems flying night, weather, turns
in the clouds, refueling, pulling Gs, what have you. We had tons of people who
couldn't do that. They'd fly straight and level and refuel, but they couldn't refuel
in a tum. When the B-52s started bombing the passes from North Vietnam into
Laos, we got a lot more night flying. I flew every single night I could. Sometime
I'd fly ten nights in a row because we didn't have enough people who could refuel
at night. The only scary thing was flight checks with people who couldn't fly very
well - on my hands and knees out of my seat with no chute on can scare the crap
out of you.
"I got crewed up with Bill McDonald at Shaw. He was in my seminar in Air
Command and Staff, a SAC navigator. Bill McDonald and I flew every flight
together at Shaw, and we played tennis every afternoon. We got to Takhli in
October. They were so short of crews at Takhli that half of our bunch never went

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 The 41 st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

through Jungle Survival School at Clark. I got my 'dollar' ride, and Bill got his
'dollar' ride . The next day he was killed . That was the worst day of my life and
really put a damper on things for me . Bill was flying with Major Max Nichols .
On his very first combat mission, on November 17, 1967, they took off and lost
the number two engine on climb out. They were heavy with fuel. Nick elected to
go around and come right back in for a landing. Just before reaching the runway
the aircraft dropped and hit the ground , maybe 150 yards from the runway, slid up
to the runway and caught fire. A very minor fire at first that quickly spread. Nick
didn't jettison the escape hatches, he was probably too busy flying the airplane
with both hands. He tried when on the ground, but his hatch only went up an
inch or two . The fire trucks were there when the aircraft stopped sliding. I can
still see the guy on the ladder with this great big crash axe, I am standing ten
yards from him. hacking away at that goddamn hatch. He couldn't break it. Nick
is in there screaming, can't get out, and in desperation ejects - his seat went
through the partially closed hatch and fell right back into the burning aircraft.
Sitting behind Nick is Bill McDonald and young Lieutenant Ted Johnson, the
instructor navigator. Both navigators broke their legs in the crash landing . They
couldn't have gotten out on their own. The Ravens in back got their escape hatch
open. but only two of them made it out in time , severely injured . After Bill was
killed I never played tennis again . My wife had bought me the most expensive
tennis racket in the world, and I thought I would have a good time over there - I
am going to fly in the morning and play tennis every afternoon with Bill. I was
so sick when Bill was killed, I took my racket and smashed it to pieces. I never
played a game of tennis again ."9
The loss of aircraft number 54-473, including the loss of five of their
squadron mates, may well have been the darkest day for the 4lst TEWS . The aft
fuselage section "was immediately engulfed in flame. The fire suppression and
rescue helicopter set down the fire suppression kit and fire fighting and rescue
team of three men." One of those men was SSGT Joseph A. Vultagio of the 355th
Air Force Dispensary. "This team was in action in less than 30 seconds. The
rescue craft by this time was again airborne in a hover position to deflect fire and
smoke. The first vehicular fire fighting unit was in position within the first minute .
Captains Robert Peffley and James Stamm evacuated the aft crew compartment
within this time period. Approximately 3 or 4 minutes later, as an attempt to reach
the pilot was in progress, the pilot's seat ejected, catapulting him to the top of the
fuselage . Further attempts to rescue crew members were unsuccessful." 10 Staff
Sergeant Vultaggio "with complete disregard for his own safety, rushed to the
burning aircraft and dragged one of the collapsed crew members to safety. In
spite of intense heat and grave danger of exploding fuel cells he remained at the

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burning aircraft and persevered in his life saving efforts until ordered to withdraw
when the fire was declared out of control." 11 Sergeant Vultaggio was awarded the
Airman's Medal for his heroism, pinned on his chest by Lieutenant General Albert
Clark, the vice commander of Tactical Air Command.
Then came the always depressing task of assembling the personal belongings
of the deceased and returning them to their loved ones. Chris Divich was appointed
Summary Courts Officer "to make disposition of personal effects of Major William
E. McDonald." 12 Al Kersis says "After that accident I looked at life differently.
How precious it was. It wasn't just flying over North Vietnam that could cost you
your life, but it was flying the airplane too. Then on December 6, another EB-
66C, 54-462, encountered sudden windshear on its final approach returning from
a combat mission. Once again it was an aircraft from the 41st TEWS. Three more
men died. One of the Ravens ejected, got out of his parachute, walked across the
field to his hootch and lay down on his bed. The lights were out and nobody knew
he was there. Someone finally found him - in shock. Jack Youngs was the pilot,
he worked in Wing headquarters and was attached to us for flying. It appears he
wasn't strapped into his chute when he punched out. It was probably fatigue, utter
exhaustion. He had worked so many hours. I was in the club at the time when the
word reached us that another B-66 had crashed at the end of the runway. The club
was across the street from the hospital built by the Japanese in World War II. Two
hours later we were walking out of the club, by the hospital, and there lay three
body bags on the sidewalk - the guys I had breakfast with, the guys I was at the
pool with. It was very hard. 13
"What happened shortly after this," recalls Chris Divich, "six or seven young
SAC EWOs got together and said they were not going to fly the C-model anymore.
The operations officer came over to see me and said, 'Chris, you have better
rapport with any of these guys than anyone else here. You need to get together
with them and explain that this won't fly. They will be courts martialed. They
will be out of the Air Force, could go to jail, but their lives will never be the same
again. I got together with Pete Pedroli, Pete and I were Air Command and Staff
College class-mates. I told Pete about the situation. So Pedroli and I got these kids
in a room and we closed the door and sat down. We must have talked for three
hours. The rules - you can say anything, nothing will leave this room, nobody
else will ever know that you refused to fly, but you have to get your asses back out
there and fly. And everyone did. They were really young kids, all lieutenants, not
a captain in the bunch." 14
November 17 and December6, 1967, left a deep scar in the psyche of the 41st
Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron.

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

PETE PEDROLI AND THE MrG-21

In early January 1967 the DRY Air Defense Command sent four SA-2 battalions to
an area northwest of Hanoi to ambush the EB-66s and drive them out of effective
jamming range . On 4 February 274th Missile Regiment's 89th Battalion shot down
an EB-66C over Bae Can province . Three crewmen from the downed aircraft
were captured. In the words of an official Vietnamese history, "The wreckage of
this EB-66C yielded numerous documents and provided extensive information on
enemy electronic warfare to the Air Defense Command's research and analysis
components , to the Military Technical Institute, and to the General Staff." The Air
Defense Command proclaimed the EB-66 shootdown as the Command's most
important achievement during the first three months of 1967 and awarded 89th
Battalion the Military Achievement Medal First Class, North Vietnam's highest
unit citation .' Maybe there were doubts in the minds of senior staff officers at
7th and 13th Air Forces, and all the way up at Headquarters PACAF and on the
Air Staff, about the effectiveness of the EB-66, but there were no doubts in the
minds of the North Vietnamese decision makers. No other weapon employed by
the hated Americans caused them more grief, confusion and failure to intercept
their bombers than the EB-66 . Combined with the newly introduced ECM pods,
the EB-66 severely diminished the effectiveness of the DRV's radar network . No
matter what the North Vietnamese did , the hated EB-66s kept coming back.
MiG-21 interceptors tried several times to get an EB-66, but every attempt
resulted in one failure after another. Either their aircraft were shot down by
vigilant F-4C fighters, or the B-66 skillfully e':'aded its attackers. Pushing them

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 Glory Days

A happy group of EB-66 flyers at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, in 1968. Among the si.x of them they had
flown 739 combat missions over the North. Major Chris Divich , second from right, stands next to Pete
Pedro/i , first on right, who was shot down on an earlier mission by a MiG-21, was recovered, and
chose to remain with his squadron to complete his JOO missions over the North . Such was the courage
of these men.

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 Pete Pedroli and the MiG-21

into more distant orbits provided only temporary relief. They kept coming back.
"Vu Ngoc Dinh claimed six kills in the skies over North Vietnam with only six
K-13 Atoll air to air missiles . Born in Thanh Hoa province Dinh had witnessed
the first dogfight of the war. Dinh 's first claim was an F-105 ... several victories
followed, after which Dinh was given command of a special anti EB-66 unit.
The North Vietnamese had been continually frustrated by these aging bombers
crammed with electronic countermeasures equipment. Dinh 's task was to devise
tactics to counter this thorny problem. The unit's only [successful] action [against
the EB-66) took place over Thanh Hoa province when GCI directed Dinh and
Nguyen Dang Kinh onto a strike force protected by EB-66s. The two MiG-2ls
bore in and Dinh quickly claimed a kill and a probable ."' It was not the unit's only
action against the EB-66 aircraft, but it was the only action crowned by success
during the entire war. The Vietnam Peoples Air Force, however, claimed not one,
but three aerial victories against EB-66 aircraft - on November 19, 1967 , another
on January 14, 1968, and a third EB-66 on March 3, 1968.)
"I have a very clear image in my mind of events related to November 19,
1967," says Joseph Snoy, an EB-66C Raven . "While flying a mission 50 miles
southwest of Hanoi, my aircraft was attacked by two MiG-2ls . We were providing
electronic reconnaissance and countermeasure support to a strike force of F-105
and F-4 aircraft . We had established our orbit at 30,000 feet when over the radio
we heard calls that MiGs were airborne and headed south from Hanoi. The radio
calls continued to broadcast the progress of the enemy aircraft as 50 miles south,
then 90 miles south, then 120 miles southwest of Bull's Eye. Since we were 50
miles southwest of Hanoi it was obvious that we were in a vulnerable position.
A minute later we were called by call sign that the MiGs were at our 6 o'clock
position at a distance of IO miles . Then followed the longest sixty seconds of my
life. The MiGs made a single high speed pass and fired their missiles. My pilot
reported seeing the missiles explode below us as the MiGs flew past, back toward
Hanoi. I have never been so scared in my life. We were awarded the Distinguished
Flying Cross for that mission."•
The North Vietnamese MiG-21 squadron kept pushing hard. On January 4,
1968, two EB-66C and E aircraft were covering air strikes in the Hanoi area.
Lieutenant Colonel Jess Allen, flight leader of the F-4C MiG cap reported "We
put two aircraft on each of the B-66s. The two aircraft flying on the lead ship flew
one to three miles in trail and approximately 1,000 feet high . The two F-4s on
the rear B-66 would fly approximately 1,000 feet low. Our primary mission was
not to shoot down MiGs, but to protect the B-66 . In our pre-brief we stressed the
importance of radar and visual search at all times, particularly as we crossed the
Black River in Route Package 5, and of course the Red River into Route Package

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6. It was our intent not to ask the B-66 to maneuver unless the MiGs became a
real threat, because frequently there would be MiGs in the area but they would not
approach the flight nor attempt to engage. Shortly after we crossed the Red River
we picked up two blips on the radar at 35 miles. We assumed they were MiGs.
We were on the radio with the B-66. He too had picked them up. We acquired the
bogies visually climbing in our direction . I directed the B-66 to turn to port 180
degrees. The B-66 broke to the left. We got a lock-on at 15 miles and in-range light
somewhere around six miles and they continued to press. We were still unable
to determine the type aircraft because they were coming at us head-on. I was
thinking of probably positioning myself off to the right to follow around in their
six o'clock position because they were still headed for the B-66, when suddenly
they broke to the right. At that time they were easily identifiable as MiG-21s,
heading back toward Phuc Yen. I started an immediate hard left turn, went into
three-quarters afterburner, and proceeded back toward the B-66. This could have
been a feint of two aircraft coming in high and at the same time they could have
been sending in two low from the opposite side. I rendezvoused with the B-66 as
rapidly as possible."5 Positive visual MiG identification was difficult for escorting
F-4 crews early in the war, especially when the enemy aircraft approached head-
on and appeared as no more than rapidly approaching blips. As the war progressed
F-4 aircraft were modified to enable them to identify MiG IFF transmissions.
This largely solved the friend versus foe identification problem. The next day,
January 5, the MiGs returned for another try. Wildcat l, an EB-66C, and Wildcat
2, an EB-66E, were providing ECM support northwest of Hanoi. The two EB-
66s had a four ship F-4 MiG cap. "Two MiG-2ls appeared to be on a quartering
head-on visual attack, closing to one to two miles of Wildcat 1. Vegas 1 and 2
dropped their centerline tanks and attempted a chase, as did Vegas 3 and 4. The
MiGs turned east. There was no IFF signal or Fansong radar activity at the time
of the sighting. Wildcat 1 intercepted an AI radar, High Fix, which would possibly
indicate a MiG-21C. The MiGs were silver and no markings were observed." 6
"Ron Lebert and I had been on R&R together," recalls Al Kersis. "We spent
New Year's in Hong Kong. Once back at Takhli we were waiting to get back
on the schedule. On the 14th of January, 1968, I flew tail number 388 in the
morning. We received MiG warnings from Red Crown while in orbit. We were on
the border of Laos and North Vietnam. The interesting thing was that the MiGs
came out of North Vietnam, went south into Laos, then turned around and came
back heading north toward us . Everyone on the crew was saying 'What's going
on? Why are these guys going so far south?' I believe they were making a practice
run. Once they were headed toward us they peeled off and went back into North
Vietnam. That afternoon, same orbit, same mission, same aircraft, different crew,

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 Pere Pedroli and the MiG-21

and they get hit. A rescue chopper went down as well and 7th Air Force went
berserk. General Momyer had good reason to ask. 'What the hell is going on? It's
eleven o'clock at night and I have 12 people down in North Vietnam . How can
this happen?"'
"I began my Air Force career as an enlisted man," Attilio 'Pete' Pedroli told
me during his interview. ''After being commissioned I spent the next 11 years in
SAC, much of it in the 17th Bomb Wing at Wright-Patterson AFB , Ohio, flying
B-52B models . l was a radar navigator. From there l went to Command and Staff
College at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama. Chris Divich and l were
classmates. l guess when they looked at my records they thought the B-66 was
a good fit for me . I had no choice in selecting my assignment. Here came this
piece of paper instructing me to report to Shaw AFB in South Carolina. I think I
had a week between graduation from Command and Staff before I had to report
to Shaw. I probably had about 4,500 hours flying time at this time. At Shaw I
went through the same training everyone else did . About three months later I was
headed to Takhli . I liked the B-66. It was a good , reliable airplane. I'll be brutally
frank, I didn't know much about its mission until I got there and we started flying .
I enjoyed the crew atmosphere, and at the time we had the 100 mission rule and
people were rotating every 7 to 8 months . So they needed replacements in the
worst way. On the way to Takhli I stopped at Clark in the Philippines to go through
jungle survival training . I had the dubious distinction to arrive when a typhoon
was moving through , so I never got to go. I flew to Bangkok, then caught a C-
47 shuttle out of Don Muong Airport for Takhli. Everybody who came in about
the same time as I did was either from the Staff or War College. In terms of age
we were a pretty senior group to be doing this kind of thing, a lot of majors and
lieutenant colonels .
"At Takhli the checkout procedure was quick and dirty. I had experience with
the K-system which we had in the B-36, but not the specific system installed in
the B-models . But a radar is a radar and I was a radar navigator. You tum it on
and it all works pretty much the same after that. The only difference in the B-
models was that it was a bombing radar, while the C-models had a much simpler
navigation radar. I had plenty of experience with that, so we just started flying. I
guess I was on my 29th or 30th mission when we got jumped by MiGs. We were
flying a C-model trying to pick up their AAA and missile radars and jam them
before the strike aircraft arrived . We were in our orbit about fifteen minutes when
we got jumped. I don't know what happened because we had little warning. I
thought I heard one of the Ravens call 'MiG, MiG,' and then the next thing I knew
there was an explosion and we lost the right wing. It was a heat seeking missile
and it caught us in the right engine. Best I can remember we were about 65 miles

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 Glory Days

southwest of Hanoi. Ours was a crew of seven. I was flying as an instructor with
a new navigator. It was the 14th of January, 1968, a Sunday.
"All the morning missions had gone well . I was working on the desk that day.
The guy who was supposed to be flying as the instructor came down with dysentery
and we couldn't find a replacement. So I went. I had my flight suit on and was
ready to go. We were at 28,000 feet when we got hit. The winter monsoon was
on. The airplane went into a tight spin. Sonny Mercer was the pilot. I heard him
saying, 'I can't control it.' I was watching the altimeter spinning. I think I punched
out at 21,000 feet. The chute opened. I came down in heavy rain and wind. I was
going through undercast, overcast, more cloud layers than I can remember, all the
way down I never saw the ground. I ended up in some trees, and I still couldn't
see the ground. Clouds were below me. The next thing I tried was to figure out
how the hell I was going to get out of that tree. I had a tree-lowering device
attached to my chute, it had a friction lock so I could stop myself. Then I thought,
wait a minute. If I go down and there isn't anything there I can't go back up. So I
changed my mind. I guess it was about four o'clock in the afternoon when we got
hit. I hung in the tree for a while to think things over. Looking around I noticed
some giant bamboo, and my chute was draped over it, two stalks about ten to
twelve inches thick. They had split and turned 90 degrees, like they were hanging
over the edge of a karst mountain, but they were right next to me. I figured if I can
get over to that bamboo, maybe I can get down. So I played Tarzan, pretending
that I was on a swing and started pumping to get over far enough where I could
grab one of the bamboo stalks and pull myself up in a sitting position in-between
the two stalks . I got in position. When I felt comfortable I released my chute. Then
I sat there for a while. When I had assembled enough courage I swung around one
of the trunks and started sliding down. Then all of a sudden it was straight down,
and there were these little knurls every 18 inches or so. I thought I'm glad I had
my kids, because there won' t be anymore.
"When I hit the ground at the foot of the bamboo tree I noticed there was a
steep drop-off. I had landed on top of a big karst mountain. By then it was getting
dark. I was wet and cold with all that rain. I took my dinghy and opened it and
buttoned it around me to get warm. Then I opened my survival kit. I had taken
some shrapnel in my left arm, and banged up my right arm going out of the plane.
I decided to do something about the cuts . Ripped off pieces of adhesive tape and
put them across the cuts. Then I put some gauze over the cuts and taped it all
down. By then I was exhausted and fell asleep. The next morning when I awoke
I was scared to death. When the animals started feeding at first light their noise
was unbelievable. I thought the entire NVN army was out looking for me. It just
turned out to be birds and what have you that I don't know about lives in jungles.

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 Pete Pedroli and the MiG-21

I figured out that I was above a village. I heard them banging a gong. I could only
assume it was the morning call for breakfast, or to go out in the rice paddies or the
fields or the forests. I had no idea where I was, because as I was coming down the
wind blew me all over the place.
"I didn ' t see or hear any member of my crew. That day I heard F-4s and F-
105s coming over. I got out my survival radio and made contact. One of those
flyers said that he took a bearing on me. Of course my chute was still up in the
trees and my beeper was still beeping. They said, 'Stand-by.' I only had one radio
and was worried about the batteries. I actually had two radios, but the other one
was up in the tree with my chute. They asked me what my condition was and I told
them that I had minor problems. Later that day I heard people out in the jungle.
They had dogs with them. That scared the hell out of me . But I was obviously
above the trails and I assumed because of all the heavy rain the dogs couldn't
pick up a scent. Whatever the reason , they made no effort to climb the mountain .
Then they started shooting into the brush, probably just trying to get me to run.
I thought, what the heck , and dug in deeper, playing the hand I had been dealt.
The next day they came out again. When I didn't hear anyone I talked to passing
aircraft. Otherwise I kept my mouth shut. I moved up the hill a bit more. When
it was quiet again I moved back down to my position. It was Tuesday now. On
Monday I had heard a number of people from my crew talking on the radio . On
Tuesday I only heard a couple. I assumed that some of the guys had already been
captured. Then a Jolly Green, an HH-53 helicopter, tried to rescue us and crashed.
I don't know why, but he went down."'
Howard Sochurek, a reporter for the National Geographic Magazine, wrote
about Pete Pedroli's rescue from the perspective of the guys whose job it was to
retrieve downed airmen from enemy territory. "Captain Gregory Etzel," wrote
Sochurek, "from Albany, Georgia, who wears the Air Force Cross among his
decorations, got the call on January 15, 1968 . An Air Force plane with seven
men aboard had gone down , hit by an air-to-air missile from a MiG-21 about 80
miles west of Hanoi . Captain Etzel with a crew of four took off in a Jolly Green
for the crash site. 'Visibility was 50 feet,' he said, ' and clouds were poring like
milk over the edge of the cliff. We had one more ridge to cross when we hit the
mountainside. The rotor blades broke on impact, the right front section of the
cockpit fell off, and I was thrown clear of the ship still strapped in my seat. ' Etzel
suffered a broken leg. Captain David Holt, the copilot, had a broken foot. Sergeant
Angus Sowell broke both a leg and an arm . Two others on the crew escaped injury.
The Five men," like Pete Pedroli, "found themselves on a rock face that dropped
at a 45-degree angle. Clouds and mist swirled over them, making prompt rescue
impossible. The rock they were on was black and slippery with wet vegetation

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 Glory Days

and moss. They tied stretchers to the ruins of the helicopter to keep the injured
men level and waited in the fog . Now there were two planes with a total of 12
men down in North Vietnam. The weather cleared on the morning of the 17th. The
pickup of the plane crew came first. The jungle was so thick, they passed right
over the pilot of the downed B-66 at 50 yards . When he popped his smoke, it took
three minutes to drift up through the foliage. The B-66 pilot had a broken leg, and
Airman Michael Dodd went down on a penetrator to get him. They located two
other survivors, Lieutenant Colonel 'Pete' Pedroli and Lieutenant Colonel Jim
Thompson. When they got Pete, he went to the back of the cabin where the pilot,
[Major Pollard 'Sonny' Mercer] was lying on a stretcher, and they just hugged
each other for a long time out of relief at being saved. No trace was found of the
other four crew members, who presumably were captured. A second Udom 'Buff'
rescue helicopter was searching for their comrades lost on the mountainside ...
recovering the five" and barely making it back to Udom.9
"They came on Wednesday afternoon," Pete Pedroli remembered. "First I
heard a bunch of Sandys flying overhead." Douglas Al Skyraiders flown by the
Air Force out of NKP, Nhakom Phanom Air Base, Thailand, in support of rescue
operations, had the call sign Sandy. "I called them. They told me to get the hell
off the radio, they were working a rescue. So I did. They had two different teams
going. I think they were working with Sonny Mercer. Sonny broke his legs when
he ejected. I don't know if the column didn't stow properly. Something didn't
happen. He caught his legs ejecting, and he had compound fractures in his legs
and one of his arms. He was a mess. He hung in a tree for almost four days. A PJ,
pararescue man, had to go down and get him. Then they came over and got me. I
could hear them coming up the valley next to the karst mountain I was on. There
was this huge umbrella shaped tree . I asked them if they could see it. They said,
'Yea. ' I said, 'Come over to the tree , make a left tum, come down about 1,500 feet
and you'll see my smoke.' When I heard them coming I popped some red smoke.
They dropped the tree penetrator almost on my toes, perfect, with about 200 feet
of cable. I got on the penetrator and they pulled me up. At that point they decided
to get out of there, peeled off, dragging me behind. When they leveled off they
pulled me up the rest of the way and a PJ grabbed me and pulled me in. Of course
they dropped me on my bad arm, and I kind of let out a groan. The PJ said, 'Sorry,
colonel.'
"I said, 'No, that felt good. That was a groan of happiness.' We picked up a
Raven, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Thompson. Jim had left his survival kit and was
just wandering around down in the valley, disoriented, in shock. They went down
and got him. So Thompson, Sonny and I were on the chopper. They had given
Sonny some morphine. He asked me for a cigarette, so I bummed a cigarette.

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 Pete Pedroli and the MiG-21

I had never smoked in my life. I lit it for him, trying to make him comfortable.
Of course they had ambulances waiting for us when we got to Udom. They took
Sonny first and whisked him off to the hospital. I went on the other ambulance .
I had a hospital corpsman helping me. He said, 'You look like you could use a
boost.' So he handed me a bottle of Old Overholz, or whatever it was called. I had
one swig, then I had another. At the hospital they offered me more whiskey. I said,
' No, but I want something cold.' They gave me a beer. I hadn 't had anything to
eat for four days. Two drinks and a beer - that was it. Then the intelligence people
showed up and wanted to sit down and write down everything that happened. I
said, ' You got to be kidding me . Get out of here.' It was a young captain just doing
his job . 'I'll get with you later,' I told him.
"They cleaned up Sonny and flew him to the main hospital at Clark in the
Philippines. H. Lobdell , we all called him ' H,' our B-66 deputy commander, flew
up in a C-47 and came to the hospital to see me . He asked me if I wanted to stay.
I said, 'Hell no, I don't want to stay here.' I walked out with him and got on his
C-47 and we flew back to Takhli. At the dispensary they let me shower and clean
up, gave me a straight razor so I could shave. I got one Purple Heart for getting
shot down. I should have gotten eight or ten for shaving. I was bleeding like the
proverbial stuck pig , never having used a straight razor before. John Giraudo , our
wing commander, then came to see me. We talked. Actually, they had me under
guard in the hospital. I asked him, 'Why do you have a security policeman at the
door of my room?'
'"What do you mean?'
"'Look, isn't that a security policeman? Why do you have me under guard?'
"'I don't know.' He called in the doctor, a young captain. A helluva funny guy
and a super doctor.
"He said, 'General,' Giraudo was a colonel, Tm only a doctor. What do I
know about these things? He showed up. That's why he is there.'
"Giraudo said, ' Does he have to stay in the hospital?'
"'I guess not,' replied the doctor. ' Exposure, dehydration, contusions,
abrasions, some cuts. Other than that I can 't think of any reason to keep him here.'
So I walked out of the hospital with Colonel Giraudo. We got in his car, me in
slippers and a seersucker robe and pajamas, and we went to the Officers' Club
and spent the rest of the night in the bar. Later on they just carried me to my bed.
After that I flew to Clark for a thorough examination. While there, I was invited
to spend some time with the jungle survival school people. We talked about the
situation, what I did and didn 't do, and how I was able to find all the water I
needed by cutting down small bamboo shoots. There was a lot of water in the
bamboo.About four o'clock that afternoon they.decided we needed to have a beer.

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 Glory Days

So we sat around and drank and talked some more . Then they presented me with
a certificate - a master's degree in jungle survival. They had checked my records
and found that I had not completed their program.
"There was very little to eat in the survival kit. I drank a lot of water. I really
wasn't hungry. You can last a Jong time without eating as Jong as you get plenty
of water. I carried baby bottles of water in the lower pockets of my flight suit,
everyone did. They were still there when I landed in the trees. That was my first
water. Then, after I got on the ground, I used a little knife I carried to make a small
hole in the bamboo and pored the water in my mouth or the empty baby bottles. It
took a lot of time, but I had little else to do. When I ejected my straps were tight,
but I lost my helmet in the wind and the rain . I was bleeding. I couldn't steer my
chute, so I just relaxed. I used to tell my kids when they climbed in trees, if you
get in a situation, don't just jump, sit and think about it a little. Sometimes doing
nothing is the best thing . I stayed in the trees about four hours before I got down
on the ground.
"Everybody got out of the airplane. Sonny died in the hospital at Clark from
an embolism. I got there on a Saturday afternoon, and I believe he died that
morriing,just before I arrived. When I asked to see him the nurses gave me no real
answers, kept evading my question. I finally said, ' Just tell me what room he is in.'
The head nurse then came over and said, 'You better talk to the doctor.' I found the
doctor who told me that Sonny had just passed away. I then returned home on 30
days convalescent leave. Everyone was telling my wife I didn't have to go back.
John Giraudo had said to me, 'Pete, please come back.' I went back and finished
my year, flew 119 combat missions, and left for home in October 1968.
"The others on my crew were captured. Lieutenant Ronald Lebert, a Raven,
came straight out ofEWO school at Mather to Takhli. My next assignment was to
Mather, initially as an instructor, then as executive officer to the wing commander,
vice commander, and base commander. At that point in time the POW wives
organized and became active. The wives in the area came in and it was my job
to meet with them. I met Ron Lebert's wife and we had her over to the house for
dinner a number of times. I got to know her quite well. I heard from a friend in
Intelligence, who swore me to secrecy, that Ron was OK. He said, 'Don't tell her
anything. Just say he is OK.' So I did.
"She said, 'How do you know?'
"'Don't ask, please,' I told her, 'just take my word for it.' She did. In 1973
Ron was released along with the other POWs. In the meantime I had been
assigned to Europe and returned to Mather as wing vice commander, later I
became wing commander. When Ron returned, he was an engineer, they put him
in a civil engineering job . Ron wanted to get back to flying . So I set up a special

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 Pete Pedroli and the MiG-21

program for Ron and got him re-qualified allowing him to return to crew duty.
Major Thomas Sumpter and Captain Hubert Walker were the other two Ravens
onboard the aircraft. Major Irby Terrell was the navigator whom I was giving a
Hight check that day. All three were captured and spent five years as POWs of the
North Vietnamese .
"As for my tour at Takhli . I think if you have to be in a combat environment,
you couldn't ask for a better place. Probably the most professional group of people
I associated with. Even though we had the constant rotation, people coming and
going, the quality of the people remained high. Unfortunately we didn't Hy as
crews . I would show up and walk in and there were a couple of other people there,
or five or six depending on the aircraft. Many times I wouldn't even know who
they were. We got on the airplane and Hew the mission. I believe the Ravens had
a crew system among themselves, and we pilots and navigators would try to Hy as
a team, but there were no integrated crews as I was used to in SAC . It just wasn't
possible with the constant turn-over. When I became the 4lst squadron navigator,
I would wait for a day when I didn't have much going on and jump on an airplane
and Hy. There were not many I didn't want to Hy with, not many. We had one pilot
we shipped to Saigon because he aborted every mission .
"As far as maintenance went, it was a reliable airplane . Extremely reliable .
We Jost one C-model, November 17, 1967. He lost an engine on take-off. A young
major, Max Nichols, he was a good pilot, an instructor pilot. I remember him the
night before it happened talking with others at the club. They were discussing
what not to do when you lose an engine right after take-off- 'Don't try to land the
damn airplane, because it can 't. When you get down low, you are heavy with fuel,
and it will stall out on you.' The next day it happened to him. He lost an engine
right after take-off. I am sitting at the end of the runway when he decided to come
in and land. I could see when he was about a couple thousand feet off the end
of the runway that he was settling. He hit short and the damn airplane burst into
Hames. The pilot , two navigators and two Ravens didn ' t make it. Nick ejected on
the ground and came down in the Hames .
"Occasionally Chris Divich and I would go to Bangkok for two or three days.
Go out and have a good Kobe steak. I loved the old Erawan Hotel. They had
fabulous lobster soup." 10
The war went on . There was no end in sight. Dedicated Air Force people kept
Hying North, and kept on dying .

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

POETS, PRIESTS,
AND FLIGHT SURGEONS

Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, was home to five squadrons ofF-105
and EB-66 aircraft. There wasn't a time of day or night when aircraft didn't roar
down the 10,000 foot runway headed towards North Vietnam. Aircraft were lost,
men died, were wounded, or psychologically shattered after seeing friends perish.
It all became very routine. Not that anyone got used to it. Chris Divich remembers
one of his Air Command and Staff College classmates. "He was a Thud pilot,
so fat when he first arrived at Takhli I didn't know how he fit into the cockpit,
much less stay in the Air Force. He went up every day in the hot, hot afternoon,
sometimes early in the morning, wearing big combat boots, shorts, and a T-shirt.
He said to me, 'Chris, when I get home my wife isn't going to recognize me.'
He slimmed down the way he wanted and got killed on his 98th combat mission.
That really had an impact. Everyone knew him, monitored his weight, joked with
him about how fantastic he was doing." 1 350 out of 733 F-105s built were lost in
combat over Laos and North Vietnam - 31 to SAMs, 23 to MiGs, and the rest to
AAA .2
In many ways it was a war like no other. The strategic bombers, the B-52s,
flew interdiction in Laos, and close air support in the South. The tactical aircraft
flew the strategic missions against the heavily defended heartland of the North.
The flyers chafed under the restrictions imposed by Washington politicians who
didn't seem to have the sliglitest idea of what real war was like - a place where
men died. At times it appeared that the men at the highest levels of the Johnson
administration couldn't care less about what happened to those they sent into

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 Poets , Priests , and Flight Surgeons

Father McMullen in June 1965 on the flight line at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand . The indefatigable
'combat ' Priest flew enough missions to earn an Air Medal - and the displeasure of the Air Force
chief of chaplains.

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 Glory Days

battle. A feeling of abandonment and resentment, particularly against Johnson and

McNamara, found expression in the bawdy songs they sang at the bars at the Takhli
and Korat Officers' Clubs. This also was a world of men without women and it
showed. Recalls Major General John Giraudo, "A special all-time best fighter
pilot's song book had been proposed to me, and I approved. I signed a welcoming
letter which would become the Foreword for the book ... The guys had really done
a great job," Giraudo thought. "Fighter pilot songs from World War I onward were
included. But also included were some songs unimaginable, one's I'd forbidden
them to sing at the club. I got red-faced just flipping through the book. Even more
embarrassed and mad when I saw my stupidly innocent welcoming letter at the
front. To this day I cringe when I think of some nice people running across one of
those songbooks in an attic or museum."' Yet there were many other sentiments
expressed in poetry and lyric by men somewhat more introspective and creative,
reflecting on the burdens they carried, trying to cope with death.
Captain William Rothas, an EB-66 EWO, reflected his pain in these touching
words while up high in the 'pocket' northwest of Hanoi, as he listened to his friend
Dick, down below, die in his F-105:

Different Missions
by William Rothas

The land appears so peaceful from thirty-thousand feet,

Though pockmarked by bombs and simmering in the heat.
You're aloft, and aloof, and thinking of the States,
While down below the Thuds are due, about to keep their dates.

Guard channel crackles and comes alive, Mayday, I'm going down,
Off eighty-nine, sixty east, do you read, Red Crown?
A pause, and then a calm, sure voice, Roger Scotch 2, we do.
We're on our way, balls to the wall, we've got three Sandys, too!

So I sit there in my orbit, five miles above the ground.

Sun in my face, warfare below, nice and safe and sound,
While Scotch 2, my buddy Dick, is scrambling to be free.
But there's little time, too many Gs - the rest is history.

My mission's over, successful again, it's time to RTB.

Red Crown calls on Guard, Scotch 2 come up! Silence.
The Officers Club's like death tonight, all eyes are filled with sorrow.
Dick is gone, forever now, and I fly again tomorrow.

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 Poets, Priests, and Flight Surgeons

...
The Red River Valley reflects both on the futility of the air war as experienced by
the combat crews and the disconnect between those doing the fighting and those
directing the war from comfortable headquarters environments:

The Red River Valley

by George Thatcher

Down this valley we ' re jinkin ' and weavin ' in our bomb loaded , over-grossed
Thuds,
Soon the air cover fighters are leavin' , and somehow we ' re not feelin ' like
studs.

Come and fly on my wing in the moonlight, do not hasten to call 'bingo
fuel'.
There are SAMs torching bright in the June night, you're in Nam , not graduate
school,

There's a bridge that they say we must take out, it's the same one we've
bombed before,
Through the clouds it's not easy to make out, with our bomb sights from
some other war.

But the frag, it was deadly specific, said the bad guys had made some
repairs.
Mission count makes the staff look terrific, as they lead from their large
swivel chairs.

So press on, count the scalps, just like Custer, your rewards are so easy to
see,
Twenty missions earn you an Air Medal cluster, every hundred a new DFC.

•••

Major Eugene Cirillo, assigned to the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing at Takhli,
Thailand, wrote the unforgettable and heart touching lines of The Wingmen From
Takhli . None of us who were there will ever forget them - the wingmen from
Takhli:

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 Glory Days

The Wingmen From Takhli

by Eugene Cirillo

When time passes on, and we have reached the twilight of our lives,
I shall harken back to over a hundred flights in these war-tom Asian skies
and,
Once again, I'll hear that roar of burner, blast of cannon and screech of tires.
Through weak and misty eyes in vain will I look and search the skies for
those wingmen no longer here.
And always, my heart, my soul, and my memory will take me back, Perhaps
to Quang Khe, or maybe Dong Hoi, but always
to those wingmen from Takhli.

These three poem are representative of many more written by men who faced
death every day in hostile skies. Unlike their fathers in World War II, theirs was
not a war understood or supported by the people back home. Upon their return
they received no parades or welcome home receptions, and their sacrifices were
not recognized for the longest time. Yet, they knew they served their nation well,
and believed in each other.

...
Captain Frank McMullen, known to flyers at Takhli as Father McMullen, relieved
the stresses of combat in a different way. He was at the end of the runway waving
us off, day or night. He was there when we returned. He was there for everyone. To
this day he is remembered for the calming inspiration he brought to the flight line.
Father McMullen was a flying priest. Born in Newark, New Jersey, in 1927, Frank
attended Brooklyn Catholic School after his parents moved there. "As a youngster
I admired the local priests, looked up to them, found them to be good role models,
real men and leaders. Our parish was very large and had six priests. One of the
priests told me that he lost a friend at Pearl Harbor, and immediately volunteered
to join the military. They put him in the Army Air Corps . He was killed in action .
A second priest joined the military as well . I thought if I'd ever become a priest
I'd want to be a military chaplain. I attended the seminary in Huntingdon, Long
Island, and was ordained to the diocese of Brooklyn. I asked my bishop several
times for permission to join the military, but the response always was, 'We are too
short-handed. I can't let you go.' Then Vietnam built up and I received permission.
The bishop asked me, 'How long is this going to be?'

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 Poets, Priests, and Flight Surgeons

"I replied, 'Three years.' I retired as an Air Force colonel twenty years later.
"My first assignment in October 1963 was to March AFB, California. I was
there a little over a year when one morning I received a telephone call and was
informed that I was going to Southeast Asia. Here I am, a brand new chaplain,just
finding my way around, and going to war. It was a bit intimidating. I got my shots
and in due course ended up at Takhli Air Base in Thailand. Things were rather
basic at Takhli in April 1965, they were just beginning to build hooches, few
people were there . We had a couple old Japanese buildings from the Second War,
not much else. This was a new world for me- the military, a tropical environment,
and the poisonous snakes. There were cobras everywhere. We had F-105s, two
squadrons, on temporary duty. I remember them flying missions over the North
every day, the newspapers denying anything like that happened. I got close to the
pilots. I'd go out to the flight line to bless them, see them on their way, and be
there for them again when they returned.
"Soon the B-66s came in. At first there were only a few planes, then more
arrived. I never forget the day when one of the B-66 pilots, Dick Wilson, said to
me, "You want to come along on a mission?' I had never gone through an altitude
chamber or survival school, flying was not in my job description. He said, 'You'll
be alright, Father.' So they put me in the spare front seat of the C-model, the one-
time gunner's seat, checked me out on the parachute and the ejection seat, and off
we went. Before take-off Dick added my name to the AF Form 1. In the column
where it read Crew Position he penciled in: DGS. Dick was a PLT. The navigator
a NAV. The four Ravens in back were identified as EWs. I asked Dick, 'What
does DGS stand for?' He gave me a sheepish look and said, 'Father, that should
be obvious. It stands for what you are - Divine Guidance System.' So that's what I
was from then on, a DGS. I don't know exactly where we went that day, but it was
up North, just west of Hanoi somewhere. It was a day mission, the F-105s were
coming in below us . I remember looking out the window on my side and seeing
the F-105s. My next mission I flew with the Ravens in back where all the black
boxes are and you had to eject downward. So I came to know all the flyers well.
"When the fighter pilots were getting into their cockpits I would go down the
flight line and climb up the ladders and bless them, 'God bring you home safely.'
I said that many, many times. I remember one day going down the line of F-105s
preparing for a strike when one of the pilots said to me, 'My wife is expecting
any day now. This is going to be a tough mission. If I don't come back, will you
contact her and tell her that my last thoughts would have been about her. Tell her
I love her.' Well, it was a bad mission. We lost a number of planes that day. Marty
Case came back. In 1984 the River Rats had their convention in Washington DC,
and of course I attended, being a proud River Rat myself. I looked around for

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Marty, and there he was with his wife. I went over to her and said, 'I want to
deliver a message to you Mrs Case,' and I told her what Marty had tasked me to
say so long ago when he thought he might not return.
"I remember the times at the end of the day when the guys came back and
they had lost one or two of their own. There were no smiles, only sadness. One
day one of the pilots came back and he was in tears. They had been up North and
his closest friend had gone in. He cried, 'He's gone. He's gone. There's no way he
could have gotten out. No way.' He was inconsolable, deeply distraught. He had
stayed over the crash site as long as he could and circled around. He was soaking
wet, tears running down his face. He put his arm around my shoulders and walked
back to the debriefing room with me - a visibly broken man. Several months later
we learned that his friend had gotten out after all, and become a POW. He was so
pleased, but couldn't figure out how he got out of that plane. I'll never forget that
day when this F-105 pilot put his arm around my shoulders crying, 'He's gone.
He's gone.' Such are the things that touch your heart. I knew all these men. Saw
them the night before in the club. Blessed them just before they took off on their
dangerous missions.
"I was on the mission on July 24, 1965, when the Ravens in back of our
aircraft intercepted the first operational Fansong radar near Hanoi. The crew
received the Distinguished Flying Cross for that mission. When we returned to
Takhli the squadron commander came out to meet our plane. He congratulated
each member of the crew personally, saying 'You earned your DFC today.' I said
to him, 'If anybody should get a cross, it should be me.' He smiled, 'Sorry Father,
I can't do that,' was his reply. I flew with the B-66s because they allowed me to
do so, invited me to go along and share their life. The reason why I wanted to fly
with them was to better understand what they were facing. Army chaplains go into
combat with their troops, they stay near them at the front lines, they want to be
there if they are wounded. Navy chaplains go on board ship. And those with the
Marines are right up there with them. In the Air Force the best I could do was to
share the life of the flyers, experience what they experienced. I remember a night
mission. We were coming back over Laos when a ground radar site contacted
us that we had an unknown ten miles behind us. I remember our pilot saying,
'Brigham, where is he now?' We never learned who that unknown aircraft was,
but that was life in the air. A little scary at times.
"One day a crew chief said to me, 'Father, you should have a chapel out here
on the flight line where we are most of the time.' They had little tents near the
flight line where they stayed while their planes were off on a combat mission. So
they built me a tent chapel, and over the entrance they put a sign reading: Spiritual
Maintenance - Flight Line Chapel. I had Mass out there every Sunday morning,

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usually around seven or eight. The early morning strikes had gone out and things
were kind of quiet then. The other days of the week I had Mass at six in the
morning in a little library section in the Wing administration building .
"I flew sixteen missions with the B-66s, day and night missions. I remember
seeing the lights of Hanoi. Dick Wilson put me in for an Air Medal when I left
that September for March AFB, in Riverside, California. Six months later, in April
'66, I got orders to go to Goose Bay, Newfoundland. There were six radar sites I
visited regularly. We had a little Otter plane equipped with floats in summer, skis
in winter. That 's how I got around . I spent the next 18 months up there . Then I
was transferred to Wichita Falls, Texas, a training base . One day I was notified
to attend the noon parade. All the students would march out before going to their
afternoon classes . This particular day Colonel McNabb, the commander, was on
the reviewing stand as well and he read the citation that accompanied the award of
the Air Medal. I remember him saying as he pinned the medal on me, 'How does
a chaplain get an Air Medal?' I just smiled."4
The B-66 crews fondly remember Father McMullen. John Norden, one of the
B-66 navigators at Takhli says "Father McMullen got along with everyone, airman
and officer alike. He was a fixture at the bar, glad to buy anyone a drink - and he
was always ready to listen. The first time I really took notice of him was when the
airmen erected a tent along the flight line with a sign above the entrance that read,
'Spiritual Maintenance.' Dick Wilson was the first to put him in the gunner's seat
for a mission . Father McMullen would get out of the aircraft when we passed the
arming area to bring canteens of water to the Thud jocks as they waited to get their
bombs and guns armed . Then he would get back in his seat. While we were in
orbit near Hanoi I could see him sitting next to me, doing laps on his rosary while
watching the air strikes below. Dick Wilson had our Awards and Decorations guy,
Sergeant Schantze , put Father McMullen in for an Air Medal. The medal came
through, and that 's when the stuffing hit the fan. The Air Force Chief of Chaplains
reassigned Father McMullen to Newfoundland, and we received orders never to
do that again. Four years later, I'm sitting in the bar at Bien Hoa on my way to
the 1st Cavalry Division to fly OV-lOs. I look at the next bar stool, and if it isn ' t
Father McMullen. He got himself another Southeast Asia assignment."'
Vernon Johnson, gently kidded by his fellow flyers for being the only Air
Force pilot with a hearing aid, recalls that night mission with Father McMullen
when a MiG tried to have a go at them . "We arrived in our working area over the
North . We never had fighter cover in the early days. GCI, Brigham, advised us
that a bandit was headed in our direction . I put the aircraft in a high-speed descent
toward the deck, figuring if the bandit had radar guided missiles he would have to
pick us out of the ground clutter, making it more difficult to achieve lock-on. On

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 Glory Days

the way down I hit Mach .92, and the B-66 buffets considerably when it gets close
to the speed of sound, making for a rough ride. I queried Brigham on occasion
about the position of the bandit who was closing on us. At one point Brigham
informed us that the radar return of the bandit and ours had merged on his scope.
I continued on down to ground level, leveled off and took up a heading for Ubon.
GCI then notified us that the bandit had broken off and was heading north. I
climbed back to altitude and returned to Takhli. I believe Father McMullen and
the rest of the crew earned their Air Medal that night." 6
Maybe Larry Bullock tells it best how the air crews felt about Father
McMullen, "Following one of our missions we were all standing around the B-66
operations hooch having a cold beer. Father McMullen came up. One in our group
remarked, 'It is Sunday Father, and we missed church.' Without missing a beat,
Father McMullen dipped his finger in his beer and proceeded to bless each of us .
I don't think they came any better than Father McMullen." 7 Amen .

•••

Combat and the stresses it imposes can be fully appreciated only by those who
have been there and done it. No flyer can share with anyone else his fears of what
he has faced and what the future might bring. Everyone in his own way tries to
find release from burdens and pressures at times seemingly unbearable . Some find
release at the bar singing loudly, others reading scripture, writing poetry, or in any
number of other ways. There are real physical maintenance issues to be addressed
as well by those injured in body and mind. It is the flight surgeon's task, a familiar
figure to every airman, to deal with injury and sickness, real or imagined. It is one
thing to do annual flying physicals at a well equipped Stateside air base, quite
another to operate under rudimentary conditions in a combat zone. Doctor Kenneth
G. Gould, a retired Air Force colonel, then a Major, was no more ordinary as a
flight surgeon than Father McMullen was as a priest. He was assigned to Takhli
Air Base in July 1966 as Director of Professional Services at the 355th TFW
dispensary, becoming its commander in March 1967. For flying he was assigned
to the 6460th TRS, the squadron that flew the Brown Cradles. Before Dr. Gould
knew it he was operating ECM equipment, flew 24 combat missions, and helped
alleviate a critical shortage of electronic warfare officers. Colonel Gould earned
two Air Medals in his part-time job as a B-66 combat flyer.
Doc Gould was born in 1929 to a physician father who in 1943 became the
chief flight surgeon for the 3rd Air Force in Tampa, Florida. Like his father he too
wanted to be a medical doctor. "My mother made me go to Duke in 1946 because
the University of Florida was too much of a party school and she wanted me to

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be a doctor like dad. I loved Duke. Became an SAE and learned to drink beer."
Ken Gould interned at the Ohio State Medical Center and joined the Air Force
in the summer of 1955. "In June 1966 I found out that I was to be assigned to
Takhli RTAFB, about 100 miles north of Bangkok, Thailand. On the north end of
the base the Thais had a squadron of F-86 jet fighters, on the southside the USAF
had about 5,000 men , no women, supporting three squadrons of F-105s and EB-
66 electronic warfare aircraft , a detachment of KC-135 tankers, and one ancient
Gooney Bird, a C-47. The headquarters of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing and the
base hospital were in a two story wooden building built by the Japanese during the
Second World War. Many of the enlisted men lived in tents, the lucky ones lived
in screened in hootches on stilts, as did most of the officers. There were a few
trailers housing senior officers. Construction was going on everywhere. About the
time I came the rains came as well. The wooden walkways between hooches and
other buildings floated in the water that was often a foot deep. The cobras, kraits
and other snakes sought refuge in the hooches, although no one was bitten in the
year I was there .
"Officers took their meals in the Officers ' Club where young Thai girls waited
tables . We knew no Thai . They knew no English. The menu consisted of a dozen
numbered items, so meals were by the numbers. Early in my year only one menu
item was available. It made no difference what you ordered, you always got the
same thing . Somehow there was always beer in the bar. There were only a few
things to do - fly, drink, eat, drink, go to town to visit the ladies in the bars, and
drink some more. None of the pilots wanted to fly the missions they had to fly,
but they did. Not to fly meant courts martial and discharge from the service they
loved, all they ever considered doing . They were asked to bomb the same targets
three days running . Johnson and McNamara called targets from the White House
for three days - because they were too busy to do it every day. On the first day
the target was destroyed and there was only light opposition. On the second day
the target was still destroyed but the North Vietnamese had moved in antiaircraft
guns that occasionally shot down an aircraft. On the third day the target was still
destroyed but had now sprouted surface to air missiles as well. On that day we
always lost one or more planes. Pilots were killed or ejected and were captured
or occasionally rescued in dramatic fashion . They had to operate under the rules
promulgated by the White House, ridiculous in the extreme.
"I cared for many good men who were physically ill on that third morning.
They could not eat or if they did, they went out behind the club and threw up .
They had difficulty sleeping. They lost weight and smoked too much . Their hands
shook and their vision blurred. They cried in my office, but never in front of
other aircrew. They were frightened beyond all measure and still they flew as

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 Glory Days

they were ordered to . My role was to provide care for these dedicated men who
deserved better leadership from the White House, and better understanding from
their fellow citizens in the USA . They were vilified daily in the press and by
demonstrations and did their duty at the direction of their president. They did not
want the war they fought and yet they could not quit. They were sworn to do as
ordered. They were wonderful heroes - all of them.
"When I was sent to Takhli as a flight surgeon I was to oversee the health of
one of the squadrons on base - the 6460th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.
While in Southeast Asia flight surgeons were excused from a monthly four-hour
flying requirement. Most flight surgeons, however, flew whenever possible.
When I reported to my squadron, I was astonished to learn there was a shortage
of EWOs, and they offered to teach me to fly that seat in a Brown Cradle aircraft
if I wished. I did! I read through a stack of manuals about electronic warfare
and the EB-66B . Then one day I found my name on the 'frag ' or schedule. Later
on I learned, after several flights, that I was mostly sent on low threat missions
outside of Route Packs 5 and 6. These low threat missions didn't count toward
100 missions required of aircrew to rotate back home and were therefore not
popular - give it to Doc. One day though, I was snookered into a mission by an
EWO who didn't want to fly this one. I showed up late for the briefing, it was 4
a.m. This EWO came over to me and said 'My pilot is drunk.' I went over and
talked to his pilot who seemed perfectly normal to me. 'He's not drunk,' I told the
EWO. 'Well,' he replied, 'if you are so sure Doc, why don't you go.' So I went.
Not until we were airborne did I learn the nature of our mission, that we would
fly in the red circles where the SAMs were without turning on our jammers so the
Thuds could evaluate the effectiveness of their new QRC-160 ECM pods . Only if
they ran into trouble were we to tum on our jammers. We had a couple of SAMs
fired at us, but jinked well enough. The commander of the 6460th put us in for the
Distinguished Flying Cross .
"Each of us had a small locker assigned in which we placed our personal
belongings before a flight - wallets , money, rings, bracelets and even our squadron
patches . We wore our rank, but no ratings," such as pilot, navigator, or flight
surgeon wings . "Each of us had our own helmet, parachute, and survival vest.
Mine was a little different than all others. When I had my first fitting, I had a
business-like 38 caliber pistol in a holster with extra clips of ammunition. I asked
the personal equipment specialist to remove the pistol and give me an additional
radio instead. 'But Doc,' he protested, 'what are you going to do if you get shot
down? How are you going to protect yourself?'
'"I want search and rescue to come and get me. I don't want to shoot the
village chief's son and then have his father run me through with a pitchfork,'

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 Poets, Priests, and Flight Surgeons

I told him. Everyone laughed because the vests already had two radios plus an
automatic radio beeper in the parachute. I was the only one as far as I knew who
flew with four radios - and for that I took a fair amount of ribbing .
'The dispensary in the old Japanese built wooden building was painted a
puke green. The paint on the door frames and walls was dirty and worn . Inside the
dispensary there was a waiting area. Along one wall of the hallway stood about ten
chairs of variable parentage. Around the corner was a bottled water dispenser. The
turbidity and color of the water did not give a feeling of confidence. In places the
floor had more than a slight slant. We didn't complain, this was one of the few air-
conditioned buildings on base. Downstairs were tiny offices for three of the eight
physicians assigned . The other doctors had offices in the buildings of the various
squadrons to which they were assigned. The pharmacy had few medicines and
the more frequently used items seemed often to be in short supply. In the spring
they had been down to their last bottle of Kaopectate, affectionately known as
cork. Diarrhea was something hard to avoid, it was only a matter of time for each
arrival until the symptoms set in. Fortunately there was an adequate supply of
penicillin to treat the almost epidemic gonorrhea that 5,000 airmen 12,000 miles
from home managed to find on an almost daily basis in the little town of Takhli.
When I arrived on base I spent some time trying to figure out who could authorize
shipment of medical supplies we so desperately needed. One day I discussed the
matter with one of our senior NCOs. He came up with a solution. He thought
the answer was to send men on 3-day R&Rs to Clark Air Base in the Philippines
with its well stocked and large hospital. They would meet with their friends and
'liberate' what we needed most. Miracles were produced. We set up one of the
best labs in all of Southeast Asia. We were never again short of cork.
"One morning the sergeant in charge of the lab called out, 'Hey major. Come
look at this, indicating the microscope. This summons was part of the usual game
between the lab techs and the doctors to see if the doctors really knew their stuff.
Peering through the lenses, I saw an ascaris egg typical of the intestinal parasitic
roundworm endemic in the local population. 'Who's ill?'
'"No one.
'"Well then? Where did this ascaris egg come from?'
"I was astounded by the answer. 'The water bottle in the hallway.' The water
came from supplies processed on the Thai side of the base. Water was drawn from
the nearby dirty brown canals, or klongs, that were used for every imaginable
purpose by the local population . The water was drawn into huge tanks and treated
with barium to flocculate the solids. Chlorine in large amounts was added to kill
anything alive. After the solids settled the clear clean water could be drawn off
the top and safely consumed. The trouble was that the system was inadequate to

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 Glory Days

supply the needs of the 5 ,000 Americans and the several thousand Thai airmen
and their families on the north side of the runway. Water was being drawn out of
the tanks before flocculation was complete. Actually the amount of chlorine used
was so great that nothing living survived in the water. It always choked me a little
to drink the water." 8
Doc Gould, like everyone else, rotated home after a year or so and was
replaced by other dedicated flight surgeons. The war developed a life of its own
and kept going on and on. In 1970, as part of a draw down of forces in Thailand,
the EB-66s moved from Takhli to Korat. Gerald Hanner, a navigator in the 42nd
TEWS remembers it was "just another sortie in the EB-66C. We had the flight
surgeon with us in addition to the four Ravens in back. Things were moving
smoothly, until at about 18,000 feet there was this soft 'P-toom' coming from
somewhere. The aircraft shook just a little. I scanned the number two engine, the
pilot scanned number one - we looked at each other. Everything seemed to be
fine. The flight surgeon sitting next to me in the gunner's seat looked just a bit
uncomfortable, probably wishing he had tagged along with someone else. Then
the lead Raven called to say that we had to return to Korat. 'Why?' the pilot asked.
Because we lost the escape hatch on climb out. They routinely had the hatch
open on the ground for ventilation, and unfortunately, this particular hatch on this
occasion did not latch properly, and poof, off it went when the Ravens pressurized
their cabin. We went back to Korat, changed aircraft, and off we went again sans
our good flight surgeon. Apparently, he had enough excitement for one day."9

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

THE ASQ96 FIASCO AND

THE BIRTH OF THE EB-66E

The first RB-66Cs arrived in South Vietnam in April 1965 when the war was
beginning to assume substance. The first five Brown Cradle jamming aircraft
followed six months later.By late summer of 1966 nearly all RB-66C and all Brown
Cradle aircraft had been moved from France and Shaw AFB to Takhli RTAFB
in Thailand. Few aircraft of the type remained at Shaw, forcing replacements to
report for duty at Takhli with little or no training in the aircraft they were to Hy
into war. In the war zone, especially north of 20 degrees latitude, survival without
ECM support pushed the odds in the enemy's favor. Unarmed, trusting in their
technical skills, holding a deep seated belief that the fighter boys depended on
them for survival, made the EB-66 crews go out day after day, night after night.
The RB-66C, with its crew of four Ravens, was flown nearly around the
clock. Only in the lower, less defended Route Packages could the Brown Cradles
operate on their own. Without the presence of a C-model the Cradles were
practically blind to the radar environment around them and would have been easy
victims to an SA-2 attack. The location of the SAM associated Fansong radars
was monitored by the RB-66C aircrews on a daily basis. If a Fansong radar came
up, its presence and location was passed to F-105 and F-4 strike fighters. If within
range of the SA-2, the B-66 would move just far enough to preclude the missiles
from reaching - and continue its critical jamming support of the strike force.
Joe Sapere was the navigator on the first RB-66C to Hy into the DRY and is
representative of the caliber of aircrew manning these planes. Frank Widic, the
lead Raven in position 4 in the back notes "With.Joe we were Hying with the APS-

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 Glory Days

A KC-135 tanker over Laos refueling two EB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft from the 42nd
TEWS bound/or a combat mission near Hanoi. The C-model, the most versatile of the EB-66 aircraft
series, was flown more than any other model, and suffered the highest losses.

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 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth <if the EB-66£

54 radar warning receiver in the ON position . We were picking up a Fansong

radar. The whole crew could hear it tracking our aircraft. The Fansong was about
15 miles off to our right, we were within easy range of its Guideline missiles . Joe
called over the intercom in his usual calm, smile filled voice, 'Raven 4.'
"'Yea.'
"'How about if we slide over to the left five miles? Would that be alright with
you?' The Raven 3 was jamming the upper beam of the Fansong. I was D/Fing
the lower beam. The Raven in position one was searching for the BG06 missile
guidance signal which wasn't up yet, so they hadn't launched a missile. I replied,
'Joe, do it.' I remember that exchange because I thought it was so cool the way Joe
handled the situation - as if it was the most routine thing in the world to ask of me.
After all, it was just a surface to air missile site trying to kill us. When the BG06
missile tracker came up and the signal jumped in intensity it meant the missile had
been launched. Only then, and if we were within range, would we execute a SAM
break. A SAM break was a modified split S for about 110 degrees away from the
SAM site, all the while descending and maintaining positive G-loading. After
that we'd execute a maximum performance climb in the opposite direction. The
Guideline missile could not follow steep turns and eventually self-destructed. All
the scrap from the exploding missiles fell on someone down below. SAM breaks
were not made unless absolutely necessary to survive, because while in the break
the B-66 was not providing protection to the strike force below. Crews learned to
cope with SAMs on instinct. If you flew often enough you knew just by what you
heard how close you could get to the site," Frank Widic asserted. "The closer we
got to the strike target, the harder it was for the SAM operators to deal with the
jamming. We pushed the envelope whenever we could."'
The task of the RB-66C and the accompanying Brown Cradle aircraft was
to warn the strike force and to handle threat radars. Two jammers were put on
the horizontally polarized upper beam of the Fansong radar, and two vertically
polarizedjammers on the lower beam at a predetermined sweep setting. In addition,
barrage jammers were put on the missile's tracking beacon frequency, and random
bundles of aluminum chaff were dropped to present false targets. Chaff, a World
War II technique of dropping aluminum strips cut to a radar's resonant frequency,
continued to be a powerful countermeasure. The North Vietnamese radar operators,
assisted by their Russian tutors, in time acquired their own techniques. A favorite
of theirs was to keep their Fansong tracking radars off the air as long as possible
while tracking potential targets from information provided by acquisition and
early warning radars such as Flat Face, Spoon Rest and the powerful, multibeam
Barlock. They attempted to launch on RB-66 generated jamming strobes, but
that technique proved to be much more difficult to implement in practice then in

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 Glory Days

theory. The Ravens of 1965 and 1966 had lots of experience in the B-66 and were
not easily succored into traps by North Vietnamese radar operators.
The B-66s changed their tactics when the radar environment in North Vietnam
expanded and the number of SAM missile battalions grew. A break came about
the time Captain David Zook perfected the QRC-160-1 ECM self-protection
jamming pod for installation on the Takhli F-105s. In three test missions flown in
quick succession by ECM pod equipped F-105s the pods proved their value. With
the strike fighters carrying their own self-protection devices it was now possible
for the RB-66s to jam not only SAM and AAA threat radars, but also the equally
dangerous SAM acquisition radars. Nothing remains static in war, even less so in
the battle of the beams, where seemingly small electronic innovations often made
a big difference. Constantly operating in a high threat SAM and MiG enviromnent,
the B-66s took their lumps. The first C-model was downed by a SAM near Vinh in
February 1966. Six RB-66Cs had been lost by January 1968 after flying thousands
of missions in support of their F-105 and F-4 strike buddies. Consequently, there
was an urgent need for additional aircraft of this type. For once the Air Staff
moved swiftly. In late 1966 permission was received from Secretary McNamara
to pull 9 WB-66Ds out of storage and reconfigure them as RB-66C electronic
reconnaissance aircraft using the latest technology available. Then everything
went wrong on that promising and essential project. 2
The ASQ-96 was a semi-automatic reconnaissance system designed to
perform many of the functions accomplished manually by four Ravens in the
RB-66C. The prototype system was installed in RB-66C 54-467 . The aircraft had
a history of being used for purposes other than what it was originally intended
for. When assigned to the 42nd TRS at Spangdahlem in the late 1950s, and later
at RAF Chelveston and Toul-Rosieres, 54-467 was modified to serve as a flying
command post. It was a very early version of much more sophisticated aircraft
with the same type of mission developed and flown in later years by the Strategic
Air Command. The aircraft received an ARC-65 single sideband HF radio and
seven additional UHF radios which served as radio relays. RB-66C 54-467 served
in an airborne command post capacity for the United States Air Forces in Europe
for many years. In time, 467 ended up at Eglin AFB, Florida, as a test aircraft with
the Armament and Development Test Center, ADTC.
Captain Stan Tippin led a small group of electronic warfare officers from
ADTC to a facility of the TRW Corporation at Los Angeles International Airport
- LAX. There, Stan and his group of Ravens was to become familiar with the
ASQ-96, fly test missions out of LAX, then return with the aircraft to Eglin for
final flight testing and evaluation before the system was installed in the former
WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft and the remainder of the RB-66C fleet.

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 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth of the EB-66£

The officers finished their familiarization course for the ASQ-96. Then they spent
a considerable period of time waiting for TRW to get the system installed and
ready. 'They just could never get the ASQ-96 to work," said Stan Tippin .' TRW
remained optimistic. The Air Force continued to prepare for the much needed
upgrade to its EB-66C tactical electronic reconnaissance fleet.
Lieutenant Al Kersis completed B-66 training at Shaw in May 1967, then
went to Homestead AFB, Florida, for ten days of sea survival training. Enroute
to Takhli his orders directed him and two other Ravens to stop for two weeks at
Redondo Beach , California, for ASQ-96 training. The idea was for Lieutenant
Kersis and others to train on the new equipment, and in turn they would train
Takhli aircrews once the ASQ-96 configured aircraft arrived . "It was gee-whizz
stuff back then," Al Kersis recalls, "but nothing ever came of it. At Takhli we
continued to fly the old C-models and the upgrades consisted of QRC-fixes to
our old equipment."4 Finally the Air Force decided to test-fly only the automatic
direction finding portion of the ASQ-96. "We took 54-467 back to Eglin," notes
Stan Tippin, "and flew it for several months. The airplane was so over-grossed
that everyone was a little afraid of it. Taking off south out of Eglin AFB, we feared
to get salt water on our belly from the surf as we struggled to get airborne. The
DF-system was a flop. Nothing worked . We finally flew 467 to Davis-Monthan in
October 1970 and parked her in the desert. On August 25, 197 5, 54-467 was sold
to Southwest Alloys Company for scrap .5
A second much more successful effort initiated by the Air Staff quickly bore
fruit, providing a significant upgrade in active ECM support capability for the
tactical forces in Southeast Asia. Beginning in mid 1967 the 13 aging Brown
Cradle jamming aircraft at Takhli were augmented by the much more capable
EB-66E. The EB-66Es were 51 former RB-66B photo reconnaissance planes
withdrawn from desert storage, reconditioned at the Douglas Tulsa facility, then
configured with a very capable and up-to-date ECM suit of receivers, modulators
and 28 noise jammers. The E-model was a significant improvement over the
Brown Cradle, in fact it was close to being a new airplane . However, the E-model
proved to be significantly heavier than the RB-66B photo airplane that it once
was, with a reconfigured cockpit which put the electronic warfare officer on the
right and the navigator on the left. Installation and integration of various electronic
systems was accomplished by Dynalectron at their Cheyenne facility under the
direction of the Sacramento Air Materiel Area, SAMA. The delivery of the new
E-models to the user organizations was not without problems. For instance, no
new documentation was provided to the flyers or maintenance crews to reflect the
aircraft's increased gross weight and higher fuel consumption. Such things the
good folks at Takhli and at Shaw had to figur~ out for themselves. There was a

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formal OT&E, Operational Test and Evaluation, of the E-model conducted by the
4416th Test Squadron at Eglin AFB . Captain Norman Kasch who survived several
surface to air missile attacks while flying over the North, as well as an attack by
two MiG-l 7s, ran the OT&E for the EB-66E. The aircraft was flown against the
SADS-1 system at Eglin using various jammer configurations and settings before
delivery to the field. 6
Don Harding had returned from Takhli to Shaw in late 1966 and was assigned
to the 44 l 7th Combat Crew Training Squadron where he flew mostly RB-66B
photo reconnaissance aircraft as an instructor pilot, training pilot replacements
for Southeast Asia. "It was April 1968 when I flew the High Flight from hell,"
Harding recalls . "It was a Flying Fish delivery flight, the code name for aircraft
being ferried across the Pacific. Flights to and from Europe were coded High
Flights, but we referred to all aircraft deliveries as High Flights. I believe it
was aircraft number 54-446, a former photo plane that had been converted to
an E-model configuration. I was to pick it up in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where the
Dynalectron Company had worked on it for the past six months. Any airplane
that isn't flown for that long will give you problems. The airplane had 39 external
antennas, I counted them, including several big sail antennas on the side and top
of the fuselage . When I first laid eyes on the plane it was leaking hydraulic fluid. I
started the engines, exercised all the control surfaces and taxied out to the 10,000
foot runway. The tower controller said, 'The runway has just been closed for
construction.' There isn't anything on the runway, and I have a full fuel load. I
tell them about my situation, but they remain adamant. I taxied back, downloaded
all my fuel except 8 ,000 pounds to get off a 7 ,000 foot runway at an elevation of
5,000 feet. I thought I'd fly to Buckley Air National Guard base near Denver, they
had a 12,000 foot runway. There was a housing development off the end of the
short runway in Cheyenne. I said to the tower controller, ' Those people are going
to get their dishes broken when I come over.' Still they wouldn't budge. So I took
off and headed for Buckley.
"At Buckley I got a full fuel load to get me to McClellan AFB in California.
After an uneventful take-off I set the power to 96 percent, the cruise speed setting
I've always used when I flew the RB . That should have given me about 450 knots.
Well, this heavy beast only gave me 420 knots and each engine was gobbling
3 ,000 pounds of fuel each hour. As soon as I got to McClellan I had to call the
4440th Aircraft Delivery Group at Langley AFB in Virginia to tell them about
my problem. They arranged for the SAC tankers to meet me over the Pacific, and
the tankers would only give me the fuel quantity called for in their charts for my
airplane. So I started cruising at 94 and one-half percent, that gave me 420 knots,
but only used 2,800 pounds of fuel per hour. Coming into McClellan my N-1

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 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth of the EB-66£

compass failed and without that I couldn't go anywhere . I knew nothing about
the navigator they put on board the aircraft, so I wanted to make doubly sure
that we didn 't vanish somewhere over the Pacific. They had civilian workers at
McClellan, good guys , and I told them my problem . They said they knew what
it was - the amplifier. They got another amplifier, installed it, I flew the aircraft
- same problem. Now I knew what the problem was - the C-2 Compass sensor in
the left wing. They didn 't believe me. After two more amplifier changes they did.
That fixed the compass problem and I was ready to go .
"I waited a week before I could get a tanker to get me to Hawaii. It was a perfect
rendezvous . That 's when the navigator's oxygen regulator blew its diaphragm.
We had eight liters of liquid oxygen on board , and the leak was slowly depleting
our oxygen supply. I had no choice but to turn back. They changed the oxygen
regulator, and another week went by before I got a tanker. Everything went well
on our flight to Hickam. Out of there we headed for Guam. The tanker was going
to take me and two F-100 fighters all the way. There was a Typhoon between us
and Guam. We got into it near Wake Island. I'd never seen so much water in the
sky in all my life. I was sitting on the tanker's wing tip, not more than 10 feet
away from him, and if I got any further out I lost sight of him . The water was just
gushing against the airplane . I wondered why the engines were still running . I'd
look at the instruments , they weren't even flickering . It was amazing . We landed
at Andersen Air Base on Guam . I was supposed to take off the next morning with
the same tanker. We did. About 90 miles out the KC-135 lost its number two
engine. We turned back. After landing I went through the checklist with the crew
chief. We were sitting on an incline on the taxiway and it was raining. The chief
said to me , 'Sir, I see hydraulic fluid running down the ramp.' Sure enough my
pressure was dropping . The main utility system had failed. I couldn't taxi and had
to get a tug to pull me to a parking place . There was only one thing that could
cause a total loss of hydraulic fluid , a broken pump casing. Andersen was a SAC
base filled with B-52 bombers and KC-135 tankers . The good SAC folks were
totally uncooperative . I didn't think we were in the same Air Force. I finally got
them to order the part I needed, which was flown in from Takhli.
"My sergeant and I changed the hydraulic pump on that engine. He looked at
me skeptically. 'Sarge, I used to be an aircraft mechanic,' I said to him . 'I know
how to do this. Don 't worry.' He smiled, 'Let's go for it, sir,' he said. So we did .
No help from our SAC friends. A major came by, looked us over, I was a captain,
and said, 'What are you doing captain?'
'"Changing the goddam hydraulic pump, sir. I got to get it into the war, you
know!'
'"Can't you get any help?'

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 Glory Days

'"Nothing from that bunch in transient alert.'

'"I'll look into it,' he promised. Nothing happened. After my crew chief and
I changed the pump I flew about an hour's test hop. Then we waited for a tanker
again. Finally a tanker became available and we headed toward the Philippines,
across the South China Sea. We came upon a magical line that my tanker friend
would not cross. It was at the point where I had scheduled my refueling. I slid over
in back of him, and all of a sudden he turned. 'Where are you going?' I asked the
tanker pilot.
"'I can't cross this line,' the copilot replied, 'because then they have to pay us
combat pay, and they ain't going to do that. I have to tum.'
'"Can't your navigator doctor his charts? It's easy.'
"'We don't do things like that,' he replied. I ended up going the wrong way
for the next ten minutes to get my gas. His little trick cost me 20 minutes of
precious flying time. We finally made it to Takhli without further incident. It
was the High Flight from hell and took me nearly three weeks to fly an airplane
from Cheyenne, Wyoming, to the war zone."7 Although we all wore the same
color flight suits, SAC ran its war from Offutt AFB, Nebraska, and Andersen Air
Base in Guam. The tactical forces ran their war from 7th Air Force in Saigon,
if it wasn't being run by the generals at 13th Air Force in the Philippines, or by
CINCPACAF from far off Hickam AFB in the totally unwarlike setting of the
Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii also was the headquarters of CINCPAC, an admiral,
who ran the whole show when it wasn't being run out of Washington. To be totally
fair to our SAC tanker friends, there were few like the rigidly bureaucratic aircrew
Don Harding ran into. Many of them did in fact fly into North Vietnam or high
up in the Gulf of Tonkin, disregarding instructions, to save a fighter running short
on fuel, knowingly putting their own Air Force careers on the line. The SAC
tanker crews received all too few rewards for the service they provided and the
many lives and aircraft they saved. As a result, if a tanker crew entered a bar in
Southeast Asia and TAC flyers were present, no fighter pilot worth his salt would
let them pay for their drinks. Maybe the tanker crews did not receive the medals
they deserved, but they earned our gratitude and respect.
Colonel Paul Maul, operations officer for the 4lst TEWS at Takhli in 1968
to 1969, was as capable a pilot as I ever flew with. The B-66, whatever model,
was a new airplane to him, having come from a long string of assignments in
the Strategic Air Command flying everything from KB-29 tankers with the old
English style trailing hose refueling system to B-47 and B-52 bombers. "By the
summer of 1968, my EB-66 class of new guys was filled with folks whose last
flying was in SAC or some other command," recalls Paul. "I have no idea what the
training costs were during the Vietnam War to assure that no one was involuntarily

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 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth of the EB-66£

reassigned to a second Southeast Asia combat tour until all other Air Force flyers
had a first tour there . Under Palace Cobra a program was implemented whereby
the large pool of pilots. navigators and electronic warfare officers assigned to
SAC, TAC, MAC, ATC , and other commands and operating agencies, was tapped
to replace those finishing their initial combat tours . Every month the major air
commands had to provide the Military Personnel Center at Randolph AFB in San
Antonio, Texas , with a list of names for air crew replacement training . It caused a
great amount of turbulence among flyers not to mention the high cost of training.
Fairness was the goal , if not always the result.
"In 1968 I graduated from the Air War College and found myself on my way
to Shaw AFB to become a TAC pilot. I considered myself an experienced and
skilled pilot. The probe and drogue refueling system, however, used in the B-66
was a new challenge. It was in this mixed environment of flyers from different
commands with very different backgrounds that we suddenly had the opportunity
to learn from each other. The rendezvous with the tanker flying the EB-66 was
very similar to my previous experience in SAC, with one significant exception .
TAC taught its flyers to approach the tanker not from directly behind, but to chase
the tanker slightly offset to the right. Also, the EB-66 had a very effective speed
brake for deceleration which allowed us to use significantly higher closure speeds
than what I had been used to flying B-47s or B-52s . After using the new procedure
I was amazed at how much less time was consumed in the chase before taking on
fuel. How many tanker overruns had I witnessed in tail chases through the years
in SAC. So many could have been avoided by that simple offset change. The tail
chase gave the receiver a single image on his windscreen of the rear of the tanker
growing slowly larger in size . The offset approach gave a three-dimensional view
of overtake speed, and it made it a safe overrun should that occur. The move over
to the pre-contact position was an easy sideways slide and the use of power to
move forward just short of the drogue.
"Once the sun set and it got really dark, even the simple could become
complex. There is that basket in front of you, moving, as a result of the bow wave
created by the EB-66. To have a successful connect the probe must be inserted in
the center of the basket, push the basket slightly forward so there is a curve in the
hose attached to the boom, and keep it that way. Sometimes the basket is moving
about, don 't rush , settle down, move forward, don 't push against the side of the
basket, reduce power. If I'd persist in applying power, the basket would tip over
and the airstream would push the drogue off the probe, then it would begin to spin
and hit the EB-66's probe. So it is essential to move slowly into the drogue and
hit he center of the basket - connect and take on fuel." The technique to ensure
a good refueling sounds all too simple, but add a bit of air turbulence and erratic

283
 Glory Days

movement of the throttles and many EB-66 flyers returned to base with a refueling
basket on their probes or, in some cases, with bent probes. "Part of the problem
was that the EB-66 refueling lights did not work well. As a result some pilots
never got good at night refuelings. A few months after I left for Southeast Asia,
a former SAC pilot pointed out the problem: 'For crying out loud you guys need
better light to see what you are doing at night' or something like that must have
been said. So the EB-66 got new refueling lights so the pilot could finally see what
he was doing. The positive side of this turnover of the crew force was that for once
there was an opportunity to learn from each other.8
"When I arrived at Shaw in the summer of 1968 and looked around, I
found that in my class there was only one captain. The rest of us, both pilots
and navigators, were majors or lieutenant colonels. Almost all of us had never
flown the B-66 before. Instruction in the bird was not easy, lacking dual controls.
The first time around the instructor sat in the pilot's seat and demonstrated, from
then on he sat on a home-made box of sorts behind the new pilot and taught air
refueling, formation flying and rejoins, tactical overhead approaches and landings
that most of us had never done flying heavies. The formation rejoins, while both
aircraft were turning, were dangerous . For the instructor pilot not to have access
to flight controls and out of his seat required courage and communication skills .
My instructor was 'Smiley' Pomeroy. Smiley was one of the best" a legend in
the B-66 community. "Absolutely fearless. Sitting on his box without a chute, he
demanded me to bank steeply and pull on the stick hard enough until the airplane
shook as we dropped the gear and flaps. The speed bled off as I pulled a 360
degree tum around to a short final approach. During a particularly steep tum and
hard shake Smiley flashed a big grin and gave a thumbs up to my navigator Clark
Aamodt, we trained as a team. When Clark later told me what Smiley had done I
was pleased. Smiley was a major and I was a lieutenant colonel.
"Many of the instructors at Shaw were outranked by their students, and it
didn't take long for some of the students to start being testy with their instructors.
My class soon had a tarnished reputation. We decided to throw a cocktail party to
make things right. Some of the instructors we had were the best pilots in the world
- Smiley Pomeroy had over 3,000 hours in the B-66, Don Harding had flown the
airplane as a bomber pilot at Sculthorpe, and Ike Espe had close to 3,000 hours.
These guys were good and deserved our thanks. I was the project officer for the
party. I sat down with the staff at the Shaw Officers' Club and decided to have an
open bar and heavy hors d' oeuvres. We looked at other recent parties and came up
with a cost. We couldn't have done anything that would have enhanced our image
more with the instructors than have them and their wives as our guest at a cocktail
party. Everyone had a good time. When the bill was presented the next day, my

284
 The ASQ-96 Fiasco and the Birth of the EB-66£

mouth dropped open . I couldn't believe it. We had sixty guests at the party and
estimated 240 shots - we had consumed 610. Every student had to pay double.
Those B-66 instructor pilots and navigators were not only good flyers, they could
hold their liquor as well. We had a lot of parties at Takhli, and at every one of
those parties I had to endure the retelling of the Shaw Goodwill Party."•

285
 CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

WINDING DOWN
A FAILING WAR

January 1968 was a turning point in the Vietnam War. It began with the resumption
of the Rolling Thunder campaign against the North, was followed by the shoot-
down of the first EB-66C ECM aircraft by a MiG-21, and ended with the start
of the bloody Tet Offensive by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Responding
quickly to the new threat, B-52 Arc Light missions increased from 800 to 1,200
a month. Two weeks later the B-52 mission total rose to 1,800. The Viet Cong
managed to sustain their offensive until the end of February when it collapsed
as a result of heavy losses. The greatest loser, however, was the United States.
Bodycount - a measure of combat success implemented by Secretary of Defense
McNamara was, in fact, not a good indicator of success or failure. It turned out
that perceptions of war were what counted at home, and those perceptions were
nearly all negative. Gradual escalation as a strategy had failed. President Johnson,
in recognition of that fact, and in agreement with the position taken by his former
Secretary of Defense McNamara who resigned the previous November, limited
bombing of the DRY to targets south of the 20th parallel. In a nationally televised
address Johnson revealed his intention not to run for a second term. He called for
Hanoi to come to the negotiating table for peace talks. It was all backwards from
the way it was supposed to happen. By November 1, 1968, Johnson halted all air
and naval attacks against the North. The final outcome of the war was now just
a matter of time and circumstances. War always has been an all or nothing affair
requiring a nation's total commitment- a lesson neither McNamara nor Johnson
understood.

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 Winding Down a Failing War

ltazuke Air Base, Japan, of Korean War fame, was reopened for Operation Combat Fox in response
to the capture of the USS Pueblo by North Korean gunboats on January 23, 1968. EB-66 and RF-IOI
aircraft from the 363TRW at Shaw AFB were quickly dispatched, first to Kunsan AB, Korea, then to
ltazuke. 54-510 is parked serenely below ltazuke Tower, made famous in a similarly named Korean
War vintage song.

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 Glory Days

Six days before the beginning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam,
on January 23, 1968, the USS Pueblo, a small 350 ton electronic intelligence
gathering ship was seized by North Korean torpedo boat crews and towed into
Wonsan harbor. Calls for help by the doomed ship resulted in no response from
U.S. forces, a situation that had not changed since an RB-47H of the 55th SRW
was attacked by North Korean MiG-17 fighters on April 28, 1965. The severely
damaged aircraft managed to shoot down one of the attacking MiGs, then made
a miraculous landing at Yokota Air Base. The lack of a timely response by either
Air Force or Navy aircraft doomed both the RB-47 and the Pueblo. A Navy EC-
121 was to fall prey to aggressive North Korean fighters a year later, on April
15, 1969, with heavy Joss of life. Fighter caps were never put in place to protect
vulnerable reconnaissance aircraft and ships from North Korean attacks, known
to be highly probable. 1
A week after the capture of the USS Pueblo the 363rd TRW was tasked to
provide a reconnaissance and electronic warfare element, including RF-101 and
EB-66 aircraft, for a strike force headed to Korea - Operation Combat Fox. Two
EB-66Cs and four EB-66Es were tasked to deploy withing 48 hours. Major Carwin
'Smiley' Pomeroy wrote, "Crews were formed immediately from instructor
personnel, all of which had already completed a combat tour in Southeast Asia.
Maintenance personnel were selected, and essential parts kits were created. The
catch was that no-one knew anything at all about the new EB-66Es which had
just arrived and been put in flyable storage. We had no technical data on the new
aircraft, no maintenance manuals, no Dash-1, nor aircrew checklists" - none of
that was apparently included in the contract. "Most of us had never been inside
an E-model, but all of us knew that the aircraft had been highly modified. On
Monday morning, February 5, we took off from Shaw for Hickam AFB, Hawaii.
I was flying a C-model with Harry Allison as my navigator. Ike Espe was flying
the other C with Stan Soszka navigating. Lieutenant Colonel Gere Martini was
the B-66 group commander, flying in the gunner's seat on Ike Espe's aircraft. Bob
Murdoch, Al Salisbury, Dick Miller and Dan Christian flew the four E-models.
None of them had ever flown the E-model before nor seen a scrap of paper
describing the airplane. I remember one of them coming over to me on Sunday
afternoon as we were laying out our mission saying, 'Smiley, I'm not refueling
qualified on the KC-135.'
"'You will be tomorrow,' I told him. He walked away chastened, knowing
what was expected of him. This was the first computer scheduled 'receiver
consumption and tanker off-load' deployment. Tankers would give us, the
receivers, a specified amount of fuel based on the past history refueling the B-66.
We quickly discovered that the fuel-bum on the E-model was higher than on the

288
 Winding Down a Failing War

other models, so we had a little problem. Things went fairly well crossing the U.S.
The original tanker cell dropped us off at the California coast and was replaced by
another group of tankers. As we proceeded toward Hawaii I tried to find out how
much fuel they were going to give us. I didn't get a straight answer. I was going
to get a certain quantity of fuel from one tanker, then a little more from another,
and the same went for the other B-66s. My navigator computed how much fuel
we would need to reach Hickam. After I continued to push the tanker-lead for a
straight answer he finally came across with a number - which would flame me
out about 200 miles short of Hawaii . A spirited discussion followed between the
tanker cell commander and Gere Martini . Martini told the tanker lead that we
were going to abort and return to California. Well, that wouldn't look so good .
After all , this was an operational deployment ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
So the tanker cell commander agreed to give us the required fuel off-load and in
addition stay with us all the way to Hawaii .
"We arrived at Hickam, spent the night, and launched the next morning for
Guam. At Andersen we split into three flights - two EB-66s to a KC-135 tanker.
The first flight made it into K-8, Kunsan Air Base, with no problems. One of the
Es in the second flight had to return to Guam thirty minutes out, and Dick Miller
flying the remaining EB-66E joined Ike Espe and me . We arrived at K-8 with
my aircraft having an inoperative TACAN, ADF, VOR and radar, so we made a
formation penetration in a raging snow storm. It turned out to be way less than
minimums and a hell of an interesting experience and test of my formation flying
ability. We went through the normal penetration from 32,000 feet down to 25,000
feet and into intense weather. We got down to 200 feet when the ground controller
announced 'minimums' and ceased providing further instructions. Here we were ,
three aircraft, 200 feet off the ground unable to see anything. I had difficulty
seeing Ike Espe 's aircraft with about one-half of a wing overlap, who initiated a
missed approach with no radio call."'
Smiley, busy concentrating on not losing sight of Espe 's aircraft, did not know
that Dick Miller had decided to go it alone. So they were a two ship formation .
Espe clearly remembers calling over the radio, '"Gear up. Flaps up.' I'd been
stationed at Kunsan in the mid-50s so I knew there was a small hill immediately
to the west of the runway and I was not about to tangle with it. Smiley admitted
to me later that he had already sucked up his flaps before my call, and that caused
him to come under my right wing and almost overshoot me, and also lose some
lift. So he was wobbling a bit, stuff I thankfully didn't know about." 3
"Espe initiated his missed approach," writes Smiley Pomeroy. "When he
applied power and retracted his speed brakes and gear he disappeared in the snow.
I poured the power to my plane, retracted the g~ar and the speed brakes, and set

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 Glory Days

sail to find Ike . I was completely blind without him. I found him in that snow
storm and rejoined without colliding. Then I heard him calling for a vector to K-
55, Osan, and the minimum enroute altitude . I frantically told him to take us to
20 ,000 feet, I was running out of fuel. He did, and as we leveled off at flight level
200 I checked my fuel gauges and realized I was not going to make it. My first
thought was that the Air Force did not accept pilots running out of fuel and losing
their aircraft. Here I was in such a situation on a deployment that had attention at
the highest levels. I told Harry Allison, my navigator, to zip his pockets and get
ready to eject."4
"We got close to Osan," Espe continues, "and broke out of the weather into
a nearly clear sky. Smiley pulled his throttles back and started down . My fuel
situation was bad, but not desperate as Smiley's was. So I stayed high until I got
a visual on the runway. Smiley sneaked in on a short final, but I thought, 'Hell,
I'll let them know who 's coming.' So I did a low approach to show off the EB-66
and landed with 1,200 pounds of fuel. We walked into the Officers' Club a little
later. A bunch of RF-101 jocks from Shaw were already there as well as crews for
about every other airplane in the USAF tactical air force inventory, all veterans
of Vietnam."'
With the Korea deployment the Shaw training establishment was again
unable to train electronic warfare officers, since most of the instructors and all
but one of the aircraft had deployed. Shaw had only three C-models, and two
of them were in Korea. In late January and early February 1968 , about 30 EW
Officers reported to Shaw for combat crew training in the EB-66, with subsequent
assignments to Takhli, Thailand. Gerald McBride was one of those lieutenants.
"I got to Shaw in early January and discovered that the fully equipped E-models
and the instructors had left for Osan Air Base, Korea. Later they moved to
Itazuke Air Base in Japan. Our trainers were staff officers hurriedly drafted from
Ninth Air Force Headquarters, also located at Shaw. My Takhli assignment was
eventually canceled. I became an instructor. Then I was sent along with three
other EWs to Itazuke in early July. Itazuke had been closed after the Korean War,
but hastily reactivated to accommodate aircraft pulled together for the Pueblo
crisis. We stayed busy flying training missions for Japanese Air Force F-86 and F-
104 interceptors, and flew jamming missions against their Nike Hercules missile
sites."6 The deployment simply petered out. The Pueblo issue was low-keyed
by the Johnson administration with its plate filled to overflowing with Vietnam
related events. On December 23, 1968, the Pueblo crew was released. The men
crossed the DMZ from north to south over the 'bridge of no return.'
On 5 August 1967 the 41st and 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons
were reassigned from the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udom to

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 Winding Down a Failing War

the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing at Takhli . Common sense finally prevailed. At
the time of reassignment the 4lst had 15 E8-66s assigned , flying 60 hours per
aircraft per month , and the 42nd had 13 E8-66 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense
increased the number of aircraft by 13 E8-66Es and raised the flying hour program
to 72 hours per aircraft per month.' That action increased the two squadrons' unit
equipment from 28 to 41 aircraft. Through March of 1968 the 4lst squadron
lost three C-models and one of the new E8-66Es. Two of the lost aircraft were
replaced, bringing the total count down to 39. On any given day the squadrons had
no more than 24 aircraft available to fly combat missions. That limited number of
aircraft flew 2,950 hours per month in April , May and June of 1968 ."
On April 8, 1968 , five E8-668/E models supported 14Air Force strike aircraft
in Route Pack l . The 57 /85mm AAA fire was inaccurate as a result of the E8-66
jamming, and no aircraft were lost. On April 15 six E8-668/C aircraft supported
strikes by Air Force and Navy fighters in Route Packages 1,2 and 3. No aircraft
were lost to AAA while the E8-66s were on station. On 31 May, 9 E8-668/C/E
aircraft supported 24 strike aircraft hitting targets in Route Packs 1 and 2. On
June 9, 6 E8-66Es supported 14 strike aircraft in the same Route Packs without
experiencing losses. The fighters, however, took losses during that period from
non-radar directed guns while operating at altitudes between 2,000 and 6,000
feet. While support of tactical strike aircraft was a bread and butter mission for
the E8-66s, support increasingly went to 8-52 Arc Light missions attacking the
passes leading from North Vietnam into Laos. It was during this time period that
it was discovered that when the E8-66 entered into a bank of 10 degrees or more,
jamming effectiveness was considerably reduced . All crews were briefed to fly
straight and level for a period of two minutes before to three minutes after the
8-52 drop-times. That allowed the full power of E8-66 jamming to be directed
against the target area.•
From October to December 1968 the E8-66 aircraft of the 355th TFW flew
2,044 combat sorties for a total of 7 ,258 flying hours. An older Brown Cradle
aircraft was lost in July, bringing the total number of aircraft possessed by the
two EB-66 squadrons down to 38. For the entire year of 1968 the sortie rate for
the EB-66s remained high. The low was 577 combat sorties flown in January,
and the high was 831 in August.' 0 The total bombing halt of the North, effective
November 1, diverted fighter and bomber strikes to interdiction points in Laos .
Reconnaissance missions, however, continued to be flown over the North by
Air Force RF-4s, Navy aircraft, and drones controlled from C-130 aircraft. The
bombing halt's immediate effect on EB-66 operations was that active jamming
shifted to support reconnaissance operations over the North, and to increased
electronic intelligence gathering.

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 Glory Days

Lieutenant Tom Copier arrived at Takhli in April 1968. Tom, a Ball State
University graduate, took Air Force ROTC and finished up in February 1966. He
went to Mather AFB for navigator training. While his classmates decided to go
into electronic warfare, Tom wanted 'bomb school.' When he arrived at Shaw for
his B-66 training they only had one EB-66E. Most of the aircraft and instructors
were deployed to Korea. "The pilot I was training with," Tom Copier recalls, "was
Dave Eby. Dave didn't want to be there. He had flown the B-66 in earlier times,
the bomber version, and then the RB-66B in France, and had close to 2,000 hours
in the aircraft. The Air Force was in desperate need of B-66 flyers and his name
popped up during a records check. So here he was, a reluctant warrior. At Shaw
I got six missions with a pilot instructor sitting on a box behind the student pilot.
The next six missions were with a navigator instructor to get me checked out
- airborne radar approaches, how to pick up a tanker at night, find the beacon and
making sure it was MY tanker, because we were going to wind up with three or
four tankers in a cell refueling a number of aircraft. Then you had to call the pilot
into the picture so he could visually acquire the tanker. In the dark in marginal
weather that was a tricky thing at times. I was lucky being paired with a pilot
with previous B-66 experience. Most of the pilots that came into the B-66 about
this time flew KC-135s, C-141s, every type of airplane you can think of other
than fighters. Most had never flown a fighter or a one pilot aircraft, hadn't had air
refueling training either. It was a hard go for many of them. Some never got good
at night refueling. There was a lot of ground training as well- hydraulics, engines,
and other critical aircraft systems. Then Dave and I went to water survival training
at Homestead, jungle survival at Clark, and on to Takhli. When I checked out at
Takhli the first six months was really rough. We flew missions every 12 hours
between debriefing one mission until the start of briefing for another. After the
bombing halt in November things slowed down.
"On May 23, 1968, we were flying off Vinh supporting a Navy strike. We
were supposed to sit in an orbit just out ofrange of the AAA and SA-2s, at 25,000
feet, and prohibited from going north of the 16th parallel unless we had MiG
cap. We called Red Crown and were cleared into our jamming area. We forgot to
confirm our MiG cap with Red Crown, and Red Crown forgot to ask. We could
see the Navy A-7 strike aircraft coming in below. There was weather over the
Gulf, but it was clear over land. Our jamming was apparently doing a great job.
We saw little AAA, nothing close to the A-7s, and only two SAMs which didn't
go anywhere. Then all of a sudden Red Crown called, 'Bandits approaching south
of Bulls Eye.' They kept getting closer and closer. When they got within 20 miles,
less than three minutes flying time, I asked Red Crown about our MiG cap. There
was a pause. Then the controller said, 'The cap is on the cat,' meaning they were

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just launching from the carrier and wouldn't do us any good . About that time Red
Crown called 'Bandits at your 5.' I could see two of them screaming toward us .
Two little dots on the horizon . I wasn't flying with Dave Eby for some reason .
My pilot said to me over the intercom, 'My mama told me to bring no medals
home,' and he ripped the airplane over and maneuvered it down into the cloud
deck. I kept up with our position because I had to know based on the calls we
were getting from Red Crown where the MiGs were and where we were trying
to top out again . At that point our MiG cap was on station. It was about time for
the A-7s to come back out, so we popped back up, watched them cross the coast
line. We got jumped by two MiGs right away again. They were at five miles, six
o'clock position . What confused Red Crown, and us, was that they had two MiGs
coming toward us, and the original two attackers were heading north. The MiG
cap saw the attack unfold and called to us - left tum, right tum. While we were
evading the MiGs the Navy F-4s shot one down and got a possible on the other.
When we returned to Takhli we thought we had done pretty good for one day. The
intelligence officer sent our debriefing up the chain. The result: the operations
folks at 7th Air Force were madder than hell that we had put ourselves and an
aircraft in danger and not paid attention to the rules of engagement. We wondered
what kind of a reprimand we were going to get. I mean they were hostile and had
nothing good in mind for us . Well, the admiral whose A-7s we supported and who
had launched the MiG cap that got the two MiGs got on the phone and called our
wing commander, commending the EB-66 crew that had supported his A-7 strike
force and ensured the guys got back safe and assisted with the kill of two MiGs.
Three or four weeks later we were put in for the Distinguished Flying Cross rather
than a reprimand.
"Some of our missions, especially when we got into the post Rolling Thunder
period, after November 1, 1968, were, to say the least, unusual. One was called
Gray Creeper, the code name was later changed to Frantic Goat. It was a C-
130, grey in color, dropping leaflets over the Ho Chi Minh trail. We had to put
our flaps down, speed brakes out, gear down, even fly a scissors maneuver, back
and forth, just to be able to stay with the C-130. It was a real mismatch. I don't
know how much jamming support we were really providing because of our
constant maneuvering, we were raising our wings up and as a result our jamming
effectiveness had to be less than optimum. Then there was the Busy Bee mission
- a Navy C-130 launching reconnaissance drones over North Vietnam. The
drones would fly into the Vinh area, and when they returned they were let down
by parachute and recovered. It was always interesting to watch that thing being
launched, go in, then we'd sit there in our orbit waiting for the drone to come back
out. Most of the time they did .""

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The Air Force began launching unmanned reconnaissance drones beginning in

1967. A total of 1,976 drones were launched with the highest number oflaunches,
500, in 1972. A total of 364 Air Force launched drones were lost over the years.
The worst year being 1969 with the loss of 97. The North Vietnamese AAA gun
crews, SAM missile launch crews, and fighter regiments continued to receive
plenty of opportunities to exercise their systems even after the Rolling Thunder
campaign came to an end. Most of the drone launches were supported by EB-66
aircraft, providing jamming support at the entry and exit points. Although the
drone had a smaller radar cross section than most strike aircraft, it did not carry
an ECM self-protection pod. The overall loss rate for the drones was 18.4 percent.
Of those losses, 110 were due to system malfunctions of one kind or another,
bringing the actual loss rate due to enemy action and unknown causes down to
an acceptable 12.8 percent. The loss rate from all causes steadily declined from
a high of 38 percent in 1967 to a consistent 10 percent level in 1971 and 1972.
The North Vietnamese success rate for all of their defensive systems declined
drastically to a mere six drones killed in 1971, and a truly diminutive total of only
five for 1972. The greatest cause of drone losses in those two years was a lack of
reliability. 12
"One night we had gone in at dusk supporting a drone mission," Tom Copler
continues. "We noticed as we came out of our orbit that our wing tanks were not
feeding. We didn't have enough gas to get back to Takhli and called for a tanker.
Red Crown came up and said 'We got a tanker for you at twenty miles.' I looked
into my radar and couldn't pick up a beacon. Then Red Crown called 'fifteen
miles.' I still couldn't pick up a beacon. Dave Eby couldn't see anything either.
Then they called 'five miles.' I looked hard and finally picked up some skin paint.
I had the antenna pointed all the way up and was picking up something out there.
I said to Dave, 'Dead ahead at four miles.' He looked , finally came back and
said, 'I can see something up there, but it doesn't look right.' We got behind that
'something,' and it turned out Red Crown had vectored us to a Navy A3D tanker.
The tanker pilot said, 'I got five to six-thousand pounds to give you. Will that do
you any good?' It was enough. The Navy does everything visual. No electronic
beacon like I was used to on the KC-135 . lt was a real shock to come up behind
that A3D. There was just a length of hose whipping around. It was sporty getting
our fuel, but much appreciated.
"The second time we ran into a fuel problem Red Crown couldn't come up
with a tanker and we headed to Da Nang. The GCA radar operator vectored us in
on a short final. We didn't see any runway lights. Just keep going the controller
said, we'll bring the lights up as you get closer. Just as we are coming down the
glide slope they turned on the lights, he had us dead center on the runway. We

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flared, touched down, and the lights went out again. We had a totally dark runway,
no lights on the edge, no reference marks, it was exciting in a strange way. As we
slowed we could see just the dimmest of lights of a Follow Me truck. The lights
on the truck turned out to be two flashlights held by an airman. Evidently there
were constant mortar attacks from the hills outside Da Nang. We got our fuel and
got out of 'Dodge' as quickly as possible.
"When I finished my tour at Takhli in '69 I had flown 150 combat missions. I
volunteered for a consecutive overseas assignment to get into the F-4 program at
Spangdahlem, Germany. My wife and I were looking forward to that assignment.
I received my orders to report to Holloman AFB, New Mexico, for F-4 training.
Everything was looking good. Suddenly my orders were canceled and instead
I was assigned to the 19th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron at Kadena Air
Base, Okinawa. In April I left for Kadena to fly the EB-66 again. I wondered
about what had happened and why. Then I learned that my good friend Dave
Eby, my pilot since our training days at Shaw, had called a friend at the Military
Personnel Center in San Antonio. Dave was going to Kadena to be the staneval
pilot in the 19th TEWS, and he wanted me as his staneval navigator.
"I never had a real emergency in the B-66, much less an accident. The closest
I came to punching out was one of those things you didn't talk about for years
because you might get caught up in a courts martial. We were coming off our
orbit. I wasn't flying with Dave Eby, and we had lots of fuel remaining. So my
pilot decided to climb the airplane to well over 40,000 feet, then dove to pass
through the sound barrier. We found out the reason why you can't do it in the B-
66. The airflow and the engine nacelles are not compatible. We passed through
10,000 feet in total silence. My pilot yelled at me, 'Don't punch out. Don't punch
out. I'll get them back.' And at 5,000 feet above the terrain he began to level off
and started up the left engine, then got the right one going. That was a sweet sound
to my ears."' 3

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

THE TRAGEDY OF 53-498

The bombing halt of November 1, 1968, and the accompanying termination of

Operation Rolling Thunder, was one of the last major actions of the outgoing
Johnson administration to affect the conduct of the Vietnam war. The incoming
Nixon administration was under immense pressure to get United States military
forces out of Southeast Asia, and end a war that cost the country more than just
money and the lives of tens of thousands of its servicemen. Although combat
operations over North Vietnam had been terminated, the bloody war in South
Vietnam and the secret war in Laos continued while peace negotiations in Paris
were under way. The draw-down of American military forces in South Vietnam
began within months after Nixon assumed the presidency.Amore modest reduction
of Air Force units was initiated in Thailand as well. In contrast the DRV moved
in the opposite direction, expanding its fighter inventory from a low of 80 at the
beginning of 1968 to 254, including 86 MiG-21s, 32 MiG-19s, and the remainder
older, yet still very capable, MiG-17s. Launch capable surface to air missile sites
remained steady at around 200. AAA units, however, declined and began to move
south from the Hanoi area, and west into Laos, soon to be followed by SAM fire
units . Immediately following the bombing halt the number of DRV early warning
and Firecan AAA and Fansong SAM radars increased by nearly 50 percent. None
of that had the sound, smell or look of peace about it. 1
While the Takhli based EB-66 squadrons continued to provide support for
B-52 Arc Light raids, bombing the passes leading from North Vietnam into Laos,
and to an ever increasing number of reconnaissance missions over the North,

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 The Tragedy of 53-498

The tragic crash of 53-498, an EB-66B Brown Cradle, on April 8, 1969, at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand,
resulted in the loss of its crew and was a reminder of how grossly underpowered the B-66 was. The
picture shows a 17 I engine of RB-66B 53-451 , years earlier at Shaw AFB, that fell in pieces to the
tarmac after maintenance opened the engine cowling. Bob Webster, the pilot, received the Air Medal
for bringing the aircraft back to Shaw. Although catastrophic failures of that scope were rare, the
General Motors Allison 171 engine remained the greatest single limiting factor throughout the life of
the B-66 .

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 Glory Days

there remained enough slack capacity to augment the still ongoing Combat
Fox commitment at ltazuke Air Base, Japan. Although the Pueblo episode was
long over and the ship's crew had returned in December 1968, a tactical strike
force continued to be maintained in Japan. The 355th TFW provided crews and
aircraft to the Combat Fox force. The commitment began with three EB-66 crews
rotating to ltazuki, Japan, in December 1968. Then in January 1969 the Air Staff
announced a more permanent arrangement, activating the 19th TEWS at Kadena
as part of the 18th TFW. The 19th would take over the Combat Fox commitment,
as well as the aircraft and crews at ltazuke, then move to Kadena. It would remain
a small squadron, consisting of only four EB-66E aircraft and two EB-66Cs.
The squadron's focus was Korea, and for that task the 19th was about the right
size. Concomitant with the creation of the 19th, the Takhli based squadrons were
reduced from 41to38 aircraft. Additionally, a new EB-66 squadron was activated
at Spangdahlem, Germany, the 39th TEWS, to satisfy a NATO requirement that
had been inadequately supported since the withdrawal of the EB-66 force from
France in 1966. The 39th TEWS officially came into being on April 1, 1969. A
cadre of personnel from Takhli was reassigned to Spangdahlem to get the squadron
off the ground. Finding volunteers for this assignment was not difficult.2
There obviously were no EB-66 aircraft sitting around idly to allow the
Pentagon to open up new squadrons at will. The only source was the Southeast
Asia force at Takhli. The creation of the 39th TEWS in Germany portended other
organizational changes. With the war in the doldrums, the hard core requirement
for ECM support had vanished. It came as no surprise then when the news
was announced that the Brown Cradles were going to be retired. The one-time
bombers converted to ECM duties in the late '50s had just too many hours on
their airframes. Of the original 13, 11 remained. I only flew a few missions in the
B-model and hated everyone. The B was a low-tech ECM aircraft compared to the
E-model, and the chance of surviving an ejection by the EWO was dim, unless he
was a very small person. Tom Copler recalls sitting in a B-model at Takhli when
he first arrived in early '68. "I was sitting in the right seat. I looked over, and the
EWO across from me was about six feet. I looked at the panel above him and said
to him, 'You are not going to make it.' I looked at the angle of the seat and knew
it would not pull him back far enough for him to make it out without losing his
knees. Scheduling made an effort to schedule only EWOs who were 5 foot nine
inches or less, a not always achievable task." 3 The 11 surviving Brown Cradles
were flown to Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona in three flights on October 27, 29
and 31. No tears were shed when those long-serving aircraft took the runway
at Takhli for the last time.• The biggest change, however, came on October 31,
1969, with the deactivation of the 4 l TEWS. "This decision, a part of the overall

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 The Tragedy of 53-498

reduction of U.S. forces in SEA was evidently a part of an economy move by the
Department of Defense to trim three billion dollars from the defense budget. On
October 29, 1969, the Stars & Stripes military newspaper announced that over
300 military installations in the U.S. and abroad were to be deactivated ." 5
The remaining Takhli squadron, the 42nd TEWS, retained 21 EB-66C and
E-models. In early March 1969 the new ALA-32 steerable antenna was used for
the first time on an EB-66C in support of a Bumpy Action reconnaissance drone
flying over North Vietnam. Developed by the U.S. Navy for use in its EA-3B
ECM aircraft, the ALA-32, in combination with the QRC-279 transmitter control
coupled to ALT-27 jammers allowed the EB-66C to focus its jamming on a specific
radar, rather than jamming in a 360 degree omni-directional pattern and wasting
much of the radiated energy. Within one day Air Force Security Service in San
Antonio indicated that the ALA-32/QRC-279 combination was highly effective.
That assessment was further documented on subsequent missions by Comfy Coat
evaluations issued by the Security Service. The EB-66s were given credit for
saving drones from SAMs in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, with the ALA-32 given as
the probable reason for the increased jamming effectiveness. Three EB-66Cs had
been modified with five ALA-32 steerable antennas each coupled to QRC-279
transmitter control boxes. The integrated tactical antenna system proved to be
an important step forward in the application of electronic countermeasures. For
the first time it gave the EB-66C the ability to simultaneously provide effective
jamming support and conduct electronic reconnaissance.•
About the same time the Navy fielded its version of the EB-66, the EA-3B
Skywarrior. The Skywarrior, the one time Navy strategic bomber that played a
part in the acrimonious B-36 controversy in the 50s, briefly flew as a bomber in
the early days of the Vietnam war, then metamorphed into several roles, including
electronic warfare. The EA-3B had two state of the art 157 Pratt & Whitney
engines producing 12,400 pounds of thrust with water injection and supporting
a gross weight of only 70,000 pounds. The EB-66E flew the dated 171 Allison
engines with a thrust of 10,200 pounds with no water injection, supporting a gross
weight in excess of 83,000 pounds. The EA-3B was equipped with 20 steerable
antenna systems, vice five for the EB-66C, and soon took over many of the Bumpy
Action drone support missions launched from the Gulf of Tonkin side into the
Hanoi/Haiphong area. It was a logical step. The Navy was closer to the areas
over the Gulf where the drones were launched, and it eliminated the requirement
for aerial refueling essential for EB-66 operations over the Gulf of Tonkin . In
addition, the EA-3B with its many steerable antennas proved more effective than
the EB-66E. Although equipped with 23 jammers, the omni-directional radiation
patterns of the E-model made it less effective than the very directional jamming
of the Navy aircraft.'

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Such changes were not viewed favorably by the men in blue who wore the stars
in Saigon, at 13th Air Force headquarters in the Philippines, and at Headquarters
PACAF in lush and tranquil Hawaii. Statistics ran this war, and combat mission
count and hours flown were only two of many statistics by which the military
services defined success or failure for themselves, made claims on the defense
budget, and used often spurious data for any other number of purposes beneficial
to themselves. Major Kenneth High, a long time B-66 flyer noted, "In January
1967 I flew a mission in support of a flight of F-4s in the Haiphong area. As I was
departing my orbit I was contacted by the Navy and asked if I could support a
flight of A-6 Intruders because their ECM aircraft had aborted. I told them I would
have to have a tanker, and in an instant a KA-3D tanker appeared. I refueled and
remained on station until the strike aircraft had cleared the area. When I returned
to Takhli I learned 7th Air Force was seething. I was spoken to strongly by the
355th TFW commander, who told me that, 'The Navy got six sorties out of that.'
Headquarters 7th Air Force then followed up with a message saying that the B-66
was incompatible with Navy fuel and that refuelings with Navy aircraft would
not occur again. Since I was the squadron standardization and evaluation officer,
I replied that the B-66 manual lists JP-5 as an unrestricted substitute. That was
quickly responded to with another message that read: 'Repeat, the B-66 will not
refuel from Navy aircraft.' We got the message." 8 Unfortunately it was that kind
ofa war.
The 42nd TEWS found itself rather busy after the departure of its sister
squadron, supporting a substantial number of B-52 Arc Light and Bumpy Action
drone missions. Equally important, its EB-66C reconnaissance missions revealed
an alarming spread of North Vietnamese SAM and AAA fire units into both Laos
and the lower Route Packs of North Vietnam. In the three month period from
October through December 1969, EB-66s on two occasions had SA-2 missiles
launched at them in the Ban Karai and Mu Gia Pass areas. On December 19 the
B-52 Arc Light and EB-66 support force came under SA-2 attack, but all missiles
succumbed to the effects of the combined EB-66 and B-52 jamming and went
wild. EB-66C intercepts and aerial photography indicated that four to five SA-2
missile battalions had deployed into the Vinh-Ban Karai-Mu Gia Pass areas. An
equally worrisome picture emerged for the deployment of medium and heavy
anti-aircraft guns. 9 The war might be in the doldrums, but it was far from over.
The one event towering over all others in 1969 was the loss of aircraft number
53-498, on April 8, 1969, one of the original Brown Cradles. Lieutenant Colonels
James E. Ricketts and Edwin P. Anderson were the pilot and navigator, and
young First Lieutenant Joseph Orlowski was the electronic warfare officer. The
day before Joe and I ate lunch together in the Officers' Club, ordering from the

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standard menu labeled from 1 through 12. We'd just point at the number, and the
shy, always smiling young Thai woman would take our order. We were in flight
suits, talked about our families and our plans for the future; not about the war
or the airplanes we flew. War takes an arbitrary toll, and Joe and I did not know
that he had less than 24-hours to live. I remember the morning of April 8, a clear,
nearly cloudless sky, no wind . The temperature was a bearable 80 degrees, the
humidity always high. The huge geckos in the big tree near the Thai BX sounded
as if they could swallow a man whole, unlike the little beasts on the ceiling of our
shower. Thailand, Vietnam , Asia were so different from anything any of us ever
experienced before . It happened as I walked to the Thai BX: the abrupt sound of
engines terminating, the black cloud at the end of the runway. I thought another
bomb laden F-105 had crashed. I was wrong . It was my friend Joe. When I learned
of his death I wanted to cry.
Colonel Ricketts aircraft , Hydra 9, was scheduled for a routine ECM
support mission with a 7:50 local take-off time. The aircraft had been serviced
with 27 ,400 pounds of fuel. During the take-off roll at approximately 5,200
feet from brake release , the tower controller called, 'Hydra 9, Takhli, you have
white smoke coming from your left engine ... your engine is on fire .' Hydra 9 did
not acknowledge and continued the take-off, becoming airborne just before the
overrun. The runway at Takhli was 9,855 feet in length with a 1,000 foot overrun.
The landing gear retracted immediately after lift off. The aircraft was observed to
climb, veer gradually to the left and impact nearly 5,000 feet from the end of the
runway, where it exploded.'0
Colonel Paul Maul, at that time the operations officer in the 41st TEWS
writes, "I was always happy to achieve Minimum Single Engine Control Speed,
MSECS, after take-off." So was everyone else who flew the EB-66 . "There was
this interval between S-1 - the speed on take-off beyond which an abort due to
engine failure would result in running off the end of the runway - and MSECS ,
which was well beyond take-off speed, where an engine loss would result in a
certain accident. Sometimes this time interval between S-1 and reaching single
engine flying speed was as much as 40 seconds. The safest course of action when
an engine failed within this 'coffin comer' was to pull the good engine to idle
and crash-land straight ahead while still in control of the airplane . It is one of the
conditions all aircrew flying the EB-66 in Southeast Asia faced on a daily basis
and speaks volumes as to their dedication and courage. Jim Ricketts lost an engine
in ' coffin comer' and may have reverted to his B-52 experience which called for
the take-off to be continued after S-1 speed was reached. Whatever course of
action a pilot chose in such a desperate situation, the outcome was most likely
the same. 11

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Tom Mangan remembers the tragic loss that day. "I lost two good friends.
The active runway was 22, so they took off in the direction of the road leading
to Takhli town. I know that Jim Ricketts was between a rock and a hard place. If
he tried to abort the take-off, the plane would overshoot the runway and the crew
would probably all die in the resultant crash and fire. If he chose to fly the airplane
in an attempt to reach the critical airspeed needed to eject, the airplane would
crash just beyond the runway and the crew would probably die as well. Jim had
been a B-52 pilot before he came to the B-66, so he did what any B-52 pilot would
do, he tried to fly the airplane. The plane came down in a bone-dry rice paddy on
the other side of the road . Jim Ricketts was a big man with a big smile, and an
uncanny ability to make his subordinates feel at ease. I met him at Shaw when we
both trained in the B-66. I was a first lieutenant, a brand new navigator headed for
my first operational assignment. He was a lieutenant colonel and an experienced
B-52 pilot. When we were off duty he called me Tom. I called him Jim. That's the
way he wanted it. When we arrived at Takhli Jim became the commander of the
42nd TEWS. I was assigned to the 41st. I distinctly remember a party we had in
one of the junior officer hooches one night. Jim was standing in the small common
area surrounded by lieutenants from our Shaw class. He made us feel good about
ourselves.
"Captain Joseph M. Orlowski, Joe, was a quiet, dignified man, an Air Force
Academy graduate, and a classmate of mine in navigator training. When we
graduated,Joe and I with our wives took a trip to Hawaii. He then entered electronic
warfare officer training . I went into navigator bombardier training. From there we
went to Shaw together. We were in different squadrons at Takhli, so we didn't
fly together anymore . There was a memorial service for them the next day, but I
couldn't go. Jim was a father figure to me, a friend . We were all getting short. I
had to bury things I didn't quite know how to cope with in some far comer of my
brain and get on with my life. In another 49 days Jim's tour would have been over
and he would have flown back to the States. Like Jim and Joe, many of the men
I knew who died in the war had been stationed outside Vietnam - in Guam and
Thailand. When the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated in 1982, I honestly
didn't know if their names would be on the Wall. That Memorial Day I sat in my
living room watching NBC's television coverage of the dedication. At the end of
the program, as the credits scrolled across the screen, the camera panned across
the black granite panels and I saw Jim Ricketts name etched on the Wall. It was
the first time I realized that somebody cared about what we had done. Until that
moment I didn't even know if anybody considered us Vietnam veterans. Both my
sister and sister-in-law told me that I was not a Vietnam veteran. It's strange how
people who were never there view those of us who were. When I went to visit

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the Wall I found Joe's name. Andy Anderson's was three lines above Joe's. Jim's
name was two panels away, as if the government hadn't gotten the word that they
all died in the same airplane.""
It appears highly likely that Colonel Ricketts had no cockpit indication of
engine failure. A few days after the crash a maintenance crew running up an
engine observed flames and molten metal come out of the tail pipe. There were
no indications of problems on the cockpit instruments. Several days after that a
crew getting ready to go on a night mission was running up the engines when the
tower called that flames came from the tailpipe of one of the engines. Again, no
indication of engine failure in the cockpit. It was the old-timers who remembered
that the 13th stage of the engine was prone to fail after 12,000 hours." The crash
of 53-498 curtailed EB-66 operations at Takhli for about three months. The
accident again focused attention on the fact that the EB-66 at high gross weights
was underpowered during take-off. "The accident also revealed the cause of the
crash to be failure of engine components . This led to an examination of all EB-
66 engines and a complete overhaul and replacement program. The result was a
virtual stand-down during May." 14 As executive officer of the 41TEWS I recall
getting together with our first sergeant, Master Sergeant Joseph Kupiek . Joe and I
hitch-hiked our way home on SAC KC-135 tankers on a quick unscheduled R&R .
The SAC schedulers couldn't have been more accommodating to hurry us home
and back again when the time came. The MAC C-141 types laughed in our faces,
'Can't take you along guys. We carry dangerous cargo,' I remember one MAC
scheduler telling me. 'I bet you do,' I responded in frustration, 'a can of paint?' He
shrugged his shoulders and left me standing . I wondered who the hell he thought
he was talking to . MAC, SAC, TAC - three air forces rather than one.
Don Christman arrived at Takhli in August of 1969 and remembers one
immediate change as a result of the April 8 crash - the take-off fuel load was
reduced. "We took off from Takhli, and later Korat, with only 15,000 pounds of
fuel, 28,000 pounds was a full load without external wing-tanks. Then we refueled
soon thereafter somewhere over central Thailand in an orbit that didn't cross the
Mekong River into Laos."" The accident had more far reaching implications
than the temporary curtailment of mission activity and a reduced take-off fuel
load. The Air Staff pushed one more time for a new engine for the EB-66. There
were plenty of used and new J57s available, as well as 15,000 pound thrust TF41
Allison/Rolls Royce turbofan engines from the A-7D program.' 6 But the Defense
Department turned the proposal down, a proposal that had many opponents within
the Air Force who viewed the B-66 as an old airframe not worthy of re-engining.
Aircrew safety never seemed to have been an issue that was considered, nor the
state of the 171 engine inventory, which was well past its prime.

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 Glory Days

In May 1969, soon after the crash of 53-498, General John P. McConnell,
the Air Force Chief of Staff, stopped EB-66 modernization as part of the cost
reduction efforts then under way. "The Air Staff made it known that remaining
EB-66s would have to be maintained through normal processes for perhaps five
more years."' 7 What that statement meant was that the Air Staff had abdicated its
responsibility to deal with the extant problems plaguing the B-66, specifically
its aging and underpowered power plant. In time, not even the absolutely
essential B-66 IRAN - inspect and repair as necessary - program was funded.
B-66 maintenance fell upon truly hard times. Shortages were everywhere. Parts
were scavenged from static display aircraft. The aircraft storage center at Davis-
Monthan AFB in Arizona was running out of fuel bladder replacements, or for
that matter anything else that was B-66 related. By early 1973 the EB-66 fleet in
PACAF was maintained on a shoe string. "The heavy frag of December (1972]
had put a strain on maintenance just keeping the aircraft marginally combat
capable (code II). There was simply no time or parts to put the planes in code I
shape. After months of continuous heavy combat requirements, aircraft OR/MR
rates began to drop. On 2 January [ 1973] the frag load was 11 lines with 5 spares.
Maintenance supplied all but 2 spares; however, most of the planes came back
Code III - non-combat ready. 3 January was indeed grim. The frag load was 12
lines and 5 spares. 7 lines were not flown because maintenance could not supply
any aircraft. There were no spares. The problems were engines, hydraulics, flight
controls, fuel cell leaks, you name the part and it was wearing out." 18
Lieutenant Colonel Terry Buettner, then a captain, was the flight safety officer
in the 42nd TEWS at Korat . "Most of the flying during the last few years was from
hot runways," Terry wrote. "The engines had lots of hours on them, and parts
were always a problem at Korat. There were times when we had only two or three
aircraft flyable out of a squadron of 24. They would fly those three airplanes for
three or four days, and one would break. By then they would have another one
working to replace it. It was like that for most of my tour. Many times I remember
waiting for an aircraft to return so I could fly the next mission. Several times I went
out to an airplane that was on jacks with no engines in the pods. This was so that
the mission could be called a 'ground abort' and not a 'maintenance non-delivery.'
Ahh, the games we played. We got a new maintenance officer who promised the
wing commander a 12-ship fly-by. We actually started 14 airplanes, got 12 into
the air, and did the fly-by. When it was over, only five of the planes were capable
of flying again . Korat had the last operational B-66 squadron. The supply lines
were long and slow. I don't feel there were any unsafe airplanes sent out, but they
were getting old in 1973, and it took hundreds of hours of maintenance for every
hour of flying time." 19

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

THE PEACE THAT

WOULD NOT COME

General John D. Ryan, once the commander of Pacific Air Forces, took the reins
from General McConnell as Air Force chief of staff on August 1, 1969. A few days
earlier, on July 20, Neil Armstrong set foot on the Moon, declaring "One small
step for a man, one giant leap for mankind," capturing our imagination . President
Kennedy 's dream, articulated in more peaceful days in the early '60s had become
reality. A rare bright moment for our nation, torn by ever more frequent, at times
violent, anti-Vietnam demonstrations . On November 15, 1969, 250,000 anti-
war protesters gathered in Washington. More anti-war demonstrations followed
in San Francisco, in other large American cities, and on college campuses . By
1970 there was little doubt that the United States was getting out of Vietnam.
U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam peaked at 536 ,000 in 1968, of which
58,000 were Air Force. By 1970 the numbers were 334,000/43 ,000 , and by 1971
157 ,000/29 ,000. South Vietnamese combat squadrons increased impressively in
number, flying everything from C-119 gunships to F-5 jet fighters . Their flying
skills and staying power was another issue. USAF strength in Thailand declined
as well. In November of '69 all F-105 aircraft were moved from Koral to Takhli .
And in October of 1970, this combat veteran of the Rolling Thunder campaigns,
was-finally told to call it quits . The 355th Tactical Fighter Wing folded its colors,
along with the 333rd and 357th Tactical Fighter Squadrons . Their 66 aircraft were
transferred to air national guard units in the United States . An era ended with the
departure of the F-105 from the scene in Southeast Asia. Takhli Royal Thai Air
Force Base closed its doors, at least the American side. For a year or so the geckoes

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 Glory Days

The 4Jst Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, in October 1969. Lt/
Colonel John C . Reed, Squadron Commander, standing.front center. Colonel Heath Bottomly, 355TFW
Commander standing to the left. Lt/Colonel Robert Childs, B-66 Deputy Commander, on the right. Lt/
Col Paul Maul, operations officer.far left front standing at attention. Author, in summer 505s, sixth
from left, standing behind row of men seated on tarmac.

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 The Peace that Would Not Come

and cobras had the run of the base. The 42nd TEWS preceded the departure of the
F-105s by moving to Korat on September 22. B-52 Arc Light missions followed
the same declining trend, being reduced in March 1970 from 1,800 to 1,400, to
1,000 missions in August. B-52 operations were then closed out at Andersen and
Kadena and consolidated at U-Tapao in southern Thailand.'
While American force reductions were ongoing and peace negotiations in
Paris were progressing at a languid pace, there was no corresponding let up in
North Vietnamese supplies passing down the Ho Chi Minh trail . North Vietnamese
AAA and SAM units continued to expand into areas they had never been seen in
before. Even the MiG interceptor force, at 257 combat planes, had never been
larger and was showing its muscle. On January 28, 1970, an HH-53 helicopter
on its way to rescue an F-105 pilot down in Route Pack 1, was attacked and shot
down by a MiG-21 while still over Laos. This was the first combat action with
a MiG since the 1968 bombing halt. On March 28 a Navy F-4J shot down an
aggressive MiG-21 over the Gulf of Tonkin. SA-2 missile sites, long suspected
to be present in the Mu Gia and Ban Karai Pass areas were photographed and
confirmed on November 3, 1970. It wasn't long before a SAM site was confirmed
on the Laos side of Ban Karai Pass.
On January 1, 1971 , Tom Leeper was the EWO on an EB-66E flying a B-52
support mission . "In the vicinity of Ban Karai we were engaged by a Fansong
radar. The site launched one or two missiles at us, and we went into a standard
SAM-break. Our jarnmers had been modified so they no longer went off line as
soon as you initiated a violent maneuver. I had a TWS (Track While Scan) function
on some jarnmers. I turned it on and realigned my jammers on the Fansong radar.
We pulled out of the SAM-break at 18,000 feet, and the missile went off behind
us ." 2 An F-4D flying near Dong Hoi on March 22 was not that lucky. Nor was an
0-2 observation plane, blasted out of the sky by an SA-2 missile on April 26, fired
from the same site that engaged Tom Leeper's plane two months earlier.
Air Staff intentions were to phase out the EB-66 force in 1970. As things were
shaping up that plan no longer looked like a good idea. In April 1970 Colonel
Heath Bottomly, the commander of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing at Takhli,
wrote the commander of 13th Air Force at Clark, "Request the EB-66 flying hour
allocation for Fiscal Year 4/70 be reduced from 4,000 hours to 3,426 hours."
Plainly speaking, Bottomly no longer had the resources to maintain the aging
aircraft, after a hefty slice of his maintenance force had been taken from him in
an earlier force reduction. The 42TEWS was programmed for a reduction from
20 to 18 aircraft effective April 1, 1970. While personnel strength was reduced in
accordance with the Thailand Force Reduction directives issued on March 12, a
reduction in aircraft was not implemented. "M~ntenance capabilities have been

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 Glory Days

exceeded this past quarter," wrote Bottomly, "a projected net loss of 150 aircraft
mechanics has placed maintenance in a position where sustained overflying could
jeopardize flying safety and decrease mission effectiveness." 3
That September, in accordance with the downsizing directions received under
Operation Banner Sun, the EB-66 force at Koral was reduced to 15 aircraft - five
C-models and 10 E-models. The small EB-66 squadron at Kadena, the 19TEWS,
was inactivated on October 1, its four E-models were flown to Clark Air Base
and scrapped. The two precious EB-66C reconnaissance aircraft were returned
to Shaw to provide training for replacement crews. About that time the projected
phase out plans for the EB-66 came to a halt. In October, CINCPAC, Admiral
John S. McCain, directed his component commanders to initiate a "concentrated
ELINT program to provide increased tactical intelligence on threat radars in the
areas of the Mugia and Ban Karai passes."• General George S. Brown, the 7th Air
Force commander in Saigon found that he did not have the resources to mount
a 24-hour ELINT collection program. He turned to PACAF and the Air Staff for
augmentation, requesting 11 additional EB-66 aircraft. CINCPAC reduced General
Brown's request from 11 to six, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to "deploy six
EB-66 aircraft and 158 personnel to Thailand for six months."5 By November 26
the 2nd Aircraft Delivery Group reported that the initial deployment of additional
EB-66 aircraft to Thailand under the nickname Coronet West was under way. The
42TEWS aircraft inventory would in fact rise to a total of 22 by May 1971 .6
Admiral McCain's staff then went back to the JCS and expressed concern
over General Ryan's plan to phase the EB-66 force out of the Air Force inventory
by July 1971.7 The Air Staff responded that actions to retain the force were already
underway, extending the 42TEWS with 13 aircraft to FY 4/72.8 It actually became
15 aircraft, with an additional two NOA (Nonoperational Active) aircraft provided
without corresponding manpower support. Ryan's staff then extended the entire
remaining EB-66 force world-wide. The 39TEWS at Spangdahlem with 16 aircraft
was rescheduled for inactivation in FY 1/73, instead of 1/72. The 39TEWTS at
Shaw, with 10 aircraft, was to inactivate in FY 2/72, instead of FY 3/71. Ryan's
plans to inactivate the EB-66 force bowed to CINCPAC and JCS pressure, but
didn't do anything to alleviate the ever-increasing maintenance requirements of
aging aircraft which continued to be flown beyond their limits .9
Commando Hunt V. directed by Admiral McCain, provided for 24-hour
ELINT coverage in October 1970, and illustrated how thinly the EB-66 force
was spread. "Daily 24-hour electronic reconnaissance coverage of Route Pack
1 was considered vital because of the threat posed by enemy SAMs and radar-
controlled AAA. Poor weather during the first weeks of the campaign limited
effective photo reconnaissance, making electronic reconnaissance even more

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 The Peace that Would Not Come

important to fix the location of enemy missiles and AAA guns . To compound the
problem, the enemy practiced excellent transmission security, keeping his radars
turned off until ready to fire . The broadest possible coverage was required to
enhance the probability of intercepting enemy radar emissions during times when
he was performing maintenance and calibration tests on his equipment. The five
EB-66Cs of the 42TEWS constituted the primary ESM force available to 7 AF for
Commando Hunt V. The aircraft were capable of providing approximately eight
hours of coverage each day." A coordinated schedule was then developed with
the U.S. Navy's Carrier Task Force 77 by which EA-3Bs began covering periods
between EB-66 missions augmented by EA-6As from the 1st Marine Air Wing.
Combat Apple EC-135M aircraft out of Kadena filled in the slack by covering
"RP- I for 12 hours on two consecutive days each week." The data collected was
sent to 7AF and the PACOM ELINT processing center in Hawaii which produced
the enemy electronic order of battle. In some cases the process took up to 24 hours
before mission data reached field commanders, much too slow for a tactically
fluid situation but the best that could be done with the resources available.
"The effective interface of USAF, Navy and Marine resources gave
Commando Hunt V the 24 hour ELINT coverage it required. But the experience
underscored the critical nature of the USAF's diminished ELINT force." In
addition to aircraft shortages, "the Air Force badly needed a new tactical electronic
warfare support platform, while the time delays in data processing pointed out the
need for a near real-time in-flight relay capability. Even more serious was the
fact that the EB-66 was itself antiquated and that many of its sensors reflected
the 'state of the art' of the late 1940s. A critical shortcoming was the inability of
the EB-66s direction finding equipment to accurately locate enemy radar sites.
At best the DF and navigation equipment was capable of placing a radar within
a radius of approximately 10 miles . The inherent inaccuracy of the equipment
was compounded by the enemy's transmission discipline, frequently permitting
only a single line bearing on the transmitter location." Efforts by 7th Air Force to
increase the 42TEWS to a 20 plane force , which it was back in April 1970, were
unsuccessful. Like it or not, "the aging EB-66 continued as the backbone of the
USAF ESM force in SEA." 10
The EB-66s patrolled Laos, looking for fire control radars , and flew ELINT
missions on the Gulf side of North Vietnam. Laos had never been a benign area to
operate in and with the increased introduction of larger caliber guns and fire control
radars by the North, it continued to be a very dangerous place. Reconnaissance
aircraft losses alone over Laos from January 1970 to May 1971 included three 0-
2, eight OV-10, six RF-4C and one EC-47 aircraft. The EB-66 aircrews and staff
continued to strive to provide the best possible ~upport with the aircraft they had .

309
 Glory Days

The primary mission for the E-models was to protect the B-52 bombers on their
daily raids against the passes leading into Laos from North Vietnam, and along
the DMZ, which was anything but demilitarized. The EB-66 squadron planners
held regular tactics meetings and were suspicious of their Arc Light support orbits,
which in the estimation of the EB-66 planning staff were too predictable. The
EB-66s were required to be in their orbits 15 minutes prior to the B-52s arrival
time over target. In their estimation, the position of the orbits relative to the
bomber ingress and egress headings provided tracking information to the enemy.
They wanted the flexibility to eliminate the orbits (designed and tasked by 7th
Air Force in Saigon) and insert themselves between the bombers and the enemy
threat. They felt the same about predictable orbits supporting drone and RF-4C
missions. Seventh Air Force gave a little, but essentially stuck to what they had
been doing for years past. Headquarters staffs and men on the line rarely view
things the same way.' 1
EB-66 effectiveness continued to resurface as a topic of discussion at various
staff levels whenever the pace of combat operations declined - a discussion as
predictable as the monsoon rains . Not only EB-66 effectiveness, but electronic
countermeasures in general continued to be viewed in some quarters of the
tactical fighter community with scepticism. For some unknown reason, SAC never
discounted ECM, wouldn't fly into an area without adequate ECM protection, and
considered its on board jammers more valuable than the guns they carried on their
planes. The Navy, although initially lagging behind the Air Force in tactical ECM
aircraft, in a short time had remedied that situation and introduced the EA-3B, then
the newer and much more capable EA-6B tactical jamming and reconnaissance
aircraft. Little had been done for the EB-66 fleet, yet it continued to be the major
source of protection for Arc Light operations, as well as manned and unmanned
reconnaissance operations over the North.
The Security Service in San Antonio, Texas, had various means to monitor
enemy responses to jamming and issued Comfy Coat evaluations. Refined over the
years, they proved remarkably accurate, were highly respected in the intelligence
community, and provided the only means to assess an effort that did not leave
behind bomb craters or bullet holes. Electronic countermeasures are comparable
to the efforts of a successful police department. As crime rates diminish, or major
crimes no longer occur because of police effectiveness, the department frequently
finds itself on the defensive in budget battles or when asking for .new equipment
and additional manpower. Success frequently equals cutbacks and reductions. It
is indeed difficult to measure that which has been prevented. The EB-66 force
had found itself in such a position for years. How many aircraft did it save from
destruction? How many air crews owed their Jives to the silent warriors? How

310
 The Peace that Would Not Come

many fighter bomber and reconnaissance missions were completed because the
EB-66s were there? The North Vietnamese air defense organization recalled the
EB-66s more vividly than its own detractors . In the words of Ho Si Huu , writing
in the Histor.v of the Air Defense Service , he recalls the "jamming pods, combined
with long-range jamming from EB-66s northwest of Hanoi, covered the screens of
the SAM units and blinded the radars controlling Vietnamese 57mm and IOOmm
guns. Every missile launched by 274 Regiment either self-destructed or crashed
back to earth. The AAA guns were forced to use optical fire control equipment or
iron sights on the guns to engage the attackers ." "
In a January 2, 1971 , evaluation, the Air Force Special Communications
Center (AFSCC) noted in one of its periodic reports that "The EB-66 is effective
against low frequency early warning and acquisition radars which provide data
to the SA-2 system. During Arc Light operations it adds a confusion factor to the
enemy's air defense system. The effectiveness of EB-66 jamming vs Fansong is
dependent upon optimum positioning relative to the threat radar and target aircraft.
The combined efforts of the B-52 jamming, Iron Hand suppression, F-105 Wild
Weasel aircraft, and EB-66 jamming have contributed to aircraft survival in the
threat environment ... In view of the EB-66 effectiveness against the enemy's low
frequency early warning and acquisition radars, it is recommended that EB-66
support not be withdrawn from current Arc Light operations ." 13 That, of course,
was a sound suggestion. No B-52 was ever lost to lOOmm gun fire, or to SA-
2 missiles while flying Arc Light missions supported by the EB-66. Even more
revealing is the fact that no MiG-21 intercepts were attempted against the B-52
force when EB-66s were present.
Seventh Air Force position papers echoed the AFSCC assessment of the
EB-66 and recommended retention, along with the selective use of ECM pods.
ECM pods , they pointed out correctly, will not prevent tracking by low frequency
acquisition and early warning radars .14 Colonel Joseph E. Thome, the director
of electronic warfare at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces in a message to 7th
Air Force wrote, "The jamming provided by the EB-66 must not be considered
alone, but as an integral part of the overall protection effort. It complements and
enhances the protection provided by Wild Weasel aircraft and the B-52 on-board
jarnmers. In presenting the role of the EB-66 I believe the term stand off jammer
is inappropriate and should be avoided. Escort or support jamming is a much
better choice of terrninology." 15 Not only was effectiveness evaluation of the EB-
66 jamming support a continuing issue, labeling was as well. The leadership of
the tactical air forces was long overdue providing a viable support jamming and
tactical electronic reconnaissance capability. In the absence of that, the EB-66
force at a minimum needed to receive whatev~r technical support it required to

311
 Glory Days

remain effective. Little was done. While generals and colonels argued about EB-
66 effectiveness, whether to retain them or not, how many aircraft to employ
where, when and for how long - the men who flew and maintained the airplanes
kept doing their jobs, largely unaware of the bureaucratic battles waged from
behind polished mahogany and scratched and dented grey Air Force issue metal
desks. Their problems were of a more immediate nature - eat, drink, sleep, fly,
survive another day. A cycle that repeated itself day after day, week after week.
Rumors came and went but little changed on the flight line or in the maintenance
docks.
"The C-model missions were solitary flights conducting passive
reconnaissance," recalls Don Christman, who flew as navigator. "We flew a late
night mission most nights up the Laos side of North Vietnam to the Fish's Mouth,
west to what used to be Burma, and back and forth until we had to go home for
fuel. The Ravens in back would usually only catch an early warning radar up for
one sweep, making sure we were doing what they expected us to be doing. They
knew our routes as well as we did. On one of these long and boring missions I
suggested to the pilot that we overshoot our turning point on the east bound leg
back toward the Fish's Mouth, the most northern of the natural passes coming out
of the North and feeding into the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. The pass was heavily
defended by AAA and SA-2 SAMs. He said, 'OK, but keep us out of North
Vietnam.' We weren't a minute past that planned turning point before the Ravens
in back hollered with joy over the intercom because of all the radars that suddenly
appeared on their scopes. They woke up in a hurry when we deviated from our
flight plan. Maybe we got a little too close, because one of the Ravens called
'station passage on a Firecan radar.' Which means we flew directly over him. I
flew several C-model missions in the Gulf of Tonkin supporting drone missions.
A C-130 would launch a drone out over the Gulf. The drone would descend to
around 500 feet, fly at about 400 knots as far as I could tell, and penetrate the coast
north of Haiphong, making for Hanoi, overflying the airfields, then head south.
The North Vietnamese expended a lot of AAA ammunition and SA-2 missiles
trying to knock down these small birds. It was one of these drones that got the
picture of our POWs waving from the Hanoi Hilton prison. The Ravens loved
these missions because of all the radars that would suddenly come up trying to
track the drones."' 6
Although most of the flying was war related, there were many routine
flights, such as functional check flights (FCF) after an aircraft had gone through
maintenance and required to be certified as operationally ready. Other aircraft
were flown to Clark Air Base in the Philippines for heavy maintenance that could
not be accomplished at Takhli or Korat. Others yet had to be flown back to the

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 The Peace that Would Not Come

Douglas factory at Tulsa for periodic inspections and repair. On April 21, 1970,
with the 42TEWS still at Takhli, Wring 69, an EB-66E, was getting ready to take
off from Hickam AFB, Hawaii, to McClellan in California, enroute to the Douglas
plant at Tulsa, Oklahoma. Major William Fletcher was the pilot, Major Charles
Quinn the navigator, and Sergeant George Stevens served as crew chief. At 0930
in the morning Major Fletcher started engines and taxied out to a position short of
the runway. He was cleared to take the runway by Honolulu Tower. When Major
Fletcher advanced the power an explosion occurred followed by severe vibrations.
Fletcher shut down the number one engine. Seeing flames shooting up from the
right side he ordered the aircraft abandoned. Fire trucks arrived within less than
two minutes blanketing the right wing and number two engine with foam .17
Major Thomas Boyle, flying safety officer at Hickam, was talking to the base
operations officer when the secretary came up to him and calmly announced, "A
B-66 is burning on the runway." Recalls Boyle, "I ran out to my car in front of
base operations and rushed to the airplane just short of the runway. The entry
door was lying on the ground, the crew of three was about 1,000 feet to the left
of the aircraft, running away. The crew must have assumed the plane with a full
fuel load was going to explode. I pulled myself up into the cockpit, sat down in
the pilot's seat, pulled both throttles to idle, turned off both master switches, and
pulled the engine fire control handles . The fire went out. The damage to the right
wing , however, was so extensive that the airplane was declared Class 26 - not
repairable ."' 8
Furl , an EB-66C with tail number 54-384, was scheduled to fly an Arc Light
support and reconnaissance mission, accompanied by Tint, an EB -66E. The
mission, on October 26, 1970, barely four weeks after the 42TEWS moved to
Korat, was scheduled for nearly seven hours with two in-flight refuelings. Furl
was delayed because its oxygen system had not been adequately replenished . Tint
took off without Furl to provide coverage for the Arc Light B-52s . Upon returning
to Korat, Furl descended to flight level 180, 55 miles east of the base in weather.
Major Donald Eversole, the pilot, and Major John O'Malley, the navigator, were
advised that the precision approach radar was down for repair and they should
expect a surveillance approach to runway 06. Should the approach fail they were
to proceed to Takhli where the weather was more favorable. The official Air Force
accident report notes, "Two items aboard the aircraft were not used: the TACAN
and the radar altimeter. All was going well down to the six mile point where the
aircraft was cleared to the published Minimum Descent Altitude . MDA is defined
in the Enroute Supplement as 'An altitude specified in feet above mean sea level,
below which descent will not be made until visual reference has been established
with the runway and the aircraft is in a posit.ion to execute a normal landing.'

313
 Glory Days

Based on an intercom transmission from the navigator, 'I have the field and it
looks clear,' the Raven monitoring the altimeter did not think it unusual when
the pilot descended below the MDA. However, the navigator was referring to a
radar presentation rather than a visual reference. The descent below MDA was
continued by the pilot, even though neither he nor the navigator had the field in
sight. The aircraft struck the ground three miles short of the runway, more than
360 feet below the MDA. Initial impact was light and the aircraft became airborne
again. It finally came to rest two miles short of the runway." Miraculously no one
was killed, although several of the crew suffered serious back injuries. 19 Everyone
involved regretted the omissions that led to this accident. Crew coordination,
the accident investigation board found, was lacking, and "the use of the radar
altimeter would have warned of proximity of terrain ." 20
Captain Merlyn Luke retired as a colonel and was one of the Ravens on board
the aircraft. "We managed to extricate ourselves from the downward firing ejection
seats, get the overhead escape hatch open and assist one another out to the top of
the plane. The rain had let up somewhat and we could see the flashing approach
lights off in the distance . I went forward on top of the plane to check on the pilot
and navigator. The navigator was in a daze and I coaxed him into consciousness
and helped him exit the aircraft. Fuel was everywhere, floating on top of all the
water, running downhill toward the cockpit. The pilot's seat had ripped loose
and was jammed into the instrument panel. He was conscious and busy trying to
get out of his harness. About this time the fuel from the leaking aft tank ignited
in a large explosion. The navigator jumped over the side and broke his ankle. I
went next. The pilot followed. We gathered near a tree, well clear of the aircraft
and watched it bum. A rescue helicopter picked us up and flew us to the airfield.
Except for me, all others were injured and flown home via a medical evacuation
flight . I had a sore back and a lacerated tongue . I remember thinking of my new
wife and our nine month old daughter. After a couple of visits to the flight surgeon
I was scheduled on my next C-model flight. The scheduler took pity on me and
decided I should fly the E-model instead for a few sorties." 21
On January 18, 1971 , Captain Robert Mead departed Korat, completed his
air refueling, and climbed to flight level 270 on his way to support an Arc Light
strike. Oil pressure on number 1 dropped rapidly to zero, the alternator failed, and
the ECM equipment and radar began to malfunction. Captain Mead shut down
number one engine, declared an emergency and headed for NKP, Nakom Phanom.
NKP could not locate them on their radar because their IFF was inoperable. The
oil pressure on number two engine began to drop. Captain Mead restarted number
one and left it in idle as a precautionary measure. At five miles the aircraft was
cleared to land, when at the one mile point a C-47 pulls onto the active runway

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 The Peace that Would Not Come

and the tower cancels the landing. Going around acceleration was marginal. The
aircraft climbed with difficulty to about 300 feet at 160 knots indicated airspeed .
Rolling out on the downwind leg, number one engine began to vibrate, then seized.
The oil pressure on number two decreased to zero. The final turn and landing was
accomplished using the number two engine.'2 A nightmare of an accident was
barely avoided .
On March 11 , 1971, a C-model suffered a runaway trim condition soon after
take-off, precluding the pilot from controlling the aircraft. The crew of seven
ejected successfully from the stricken aircraft. Later in the year the 42TEWS
temporarily moved operations to Udorn while the Korat runway was being
repaired. On November 17, Mascot 22, an E-model, took the runway, "completed
its line up and before take-off checklist. The throttles were advanced to military
power with both engines responding normally. Within a few seconds an explosion
occurred in the number two engine, causing the engine to disintegrate." All three
crew members evacuated the aircraft. "Captain Ardis, the EWO, had initially
attempted to egress through his escape hatch, but when he opened it flames entered
the cockpit causing slight bums to his right ear and neck . He closed the hatch and
egressed through the navigator's hatch opening. Then the navigator's ejection seat
cooked off." The aircraft was a total loss. 23
1970 and 1971 provided more than enough excitement for the flyers of the
42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron .

315
 CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

THE 39TH TACTICAL ELECTRONIC

WARFARE SQl)ADRON

The 39TEWS became an active Air Force squadron on April 1, 1969. By October
1969 all of its aircraft and personnel were in place at Spangdahlem Air Base,
Germany. Spangdahlem was a satellite base of nearby Bitburg Air Base, the home
of the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing. Two of the Wing's squadrons of F-4E aircraft
were based at Bitburg, while the other two, the F-4E equipped 23rd TFS, and the
39th TEWS with its 16 EB-66C and E aircraft, were bedded down at Spangdahlem.
Three years later, on December 31, 1972, the dual-base relationship for the 36th
TFW would end. Spang, as aircrews from the earliest days of its existence referred
to Spangdahlem, became the home of the 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing, and still is
to this day. Surrounded by thick pine, oak and beech forests, green meadows and
well tended fields, Spangdahlem was everything Takhli and Korat was not. It was
a permanent assignment for the new arrivals, as permanent as any military tour
of duty cari be - usually about three years in duration. Airmen were once again
accompanied by their families , lived in well cared for on-base housing which, as
the base itself, was built in the early '50s as the Cold War began to take shape.
The three story apartment buildings had two or three stairwells, six apartments to
a stairwell, with American style kitchens, living and dining rooms. The number
of bedrooms varied from three to four. The basement of each apartment house
provided room for storage and the communal washer/dryer area, with every family
assigned its own laundry day. There was an amply stocked Base Exchange, BX,
and commissary at both Spangdahlem and Bitburg, providing all the amenities of
home-town USA, and the schools were within walking distance for the children.

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 The 39th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

Three 39TEWS EB-66£ crews at Aviano AB, Italy, 1970. L to R standing - Captains Siders, Johnson,
Grazier, Wensil and Lieutenant Colonel Brammer. L to R sitting - Captain Allison, Majors Samuel
(author) and HardingJ/Lower picture -Armed Forces Day at Spangdahlem AB, Germany, 1957. RB-
66C 54-459 is the third aircraft from the left.

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 Glory Days

After the snakes and geckos of Thailand, the torrential downpours during the
monsoon season, and the oppressive heat and high humidity, Germany was the
ultimate good overseas assignment. Here the weather had four seasons, Santa
Claus came on Christmas day, the Weihnachtsmann on Christmas eve, and the
church bells rang loudly on Sundays across the quiet land. There was no flying
permitted on Sundays. War was but a memory for Americans and Germans alike,
although each remembered different wars.
Although many of the new arrivals were lucky enough to be assigned on-base
housing, there was not enough room for all. Villages and small towns surrounding
Spangdahlem such as Hereforst, Binsfeld, Trier, Dudeldorf, Speicher and others
became home to another generation of American servicemen and their families.
No longer here as occupiers, as in the early '50s, but as partners in the North
Atlantic Alliance formed in opposition to the threat posed by the mass armies
of the Soviet Union to the east. The nearby villages and towns were quaint
with their cobblestone streets, still a manure pile here and there attesting to an
agricultural heritage. The villages nestled in narrow river valleys around steepled
churches, houses built close together like chicks around a mother hen. Fairytale
castles, such as nearby Burg Elz, beckoned for Sunday visits. When there was
time, the more distant military recreation centers in Berchtesgaden, Garmisch-
Partenkirchen and Chiemsee provided vacation opportunities in a splendid
setting. The Berchtesgadener Hof in Berchtesgaden, a one time Nazi era elite
hotel with a spectacular view of the Watzmann Mountain, excellent restaurants,
and a large swimming pool, was my own family's favorite. From here we could
explore the Obersalzberg where Hitler once had his Eagle Nest perched high up
on a mountain top, or experience the joy of riding mining cars through narrow
tunnels in a one-time salt mine, sliding down steep wooden chutes into remote
chambers beneath the mountain, or visit Salzburg in nearby Austria, a city of light
and music, or any number of other cultural treasures dotting the Bavarian and
Austrian countryside.
The Eifel mountains surrounding Bitburg and Spangdahlem Air Bases
were not high like the Alps, but more like the White Mountains of Vermont, or
New York State's Adirondacks. Here the cuckoo called in April and May, and
at night the calls of screech owls added an eery quality to life in a foreign land
that somehow felt to many like home. Spangdahlem and Bitburg were near one
of Germany's great wine regions as well. On take-off we would tum over the
winding Mosel Valley with mile after mile of fabled vineyards decorating steep
slopes. Each fall there were winefests aplenty. Not only that, Bitburg was home
to one of Germany's most renown breweries as well. 'Ein Bit' Bitte,' as the jingle
went, a Bitburger Beer please, was a phrase that became as familiar to Americans
as to Germans.

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I finished my combat tour at Takhli in October 1969 flying with the 4lst
TEWS, which deactivated days after my departure. My follow-on assignment
was at Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, USAFE, in the beautiful
spa town of Wiesbaden. I had left Germany in January 1951 as a refugee boy,
leaving behind a war tom land where people were hungry, ill clad, and living in
house ruins and rotting former military barracks. This time I arrived at Frankfurt
International Airport accompanied by my wife and two children, Charles seven
and Shelley four. Admittedly I was a bit anxious to return to a land I had left
behind 18 years earlier under very differing circumstances. My sponsor met us at
the airport and had rooms reserved for us in the American Arms , a military hotel
in downtown Wiesbaden. Base housing would take a while. When housing did
become available we moved into a standard 3-bedroom apartment in Aukamm,
one of several American housing areas built along a ridge line above Wiesbaden.
Charles entered school, Shelley Kindergarten, and I reported for duty at Lindsey
Air Station, a former German army Kaserne dating back to the Kaiser's days,
which served as the headquarters of American airpower in Europe since 1945.
As the headquarters manager for the newly arrived EB-66 squadron at
Spangdahlem I would fly with the squadron, and anything that had to do with the
39TEWS and its B-66 aircraft came across my desk. It was admittedly one of the
best assignments I ever had in my Air Force career. My second task dealt with
the F-11 lEs slated to come into the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Upper
Heyford, replacing aging 'Huns'. The F-100 was about the same vintage as the B-
66 and on its way out of the inventory. CINCUSAFE's highest priority at the time
was to bed-down the F-11 lEs at Upper Heyford and get them combat ready. My
own task was to deal with the electronic warfare aspects of the F-lllE- its ALQ-
94 jamming system, flares, chaff, and the aircraft simulator. I had no idea what
tricks and subterfuge I would have to use in the weeks to come to obtain things
which I thought, as a novice headquarter's manager and junior major, should be
accompanying a new aircraft as a matter of course. Finding stocks of flares, re-
certifying them for use, and flying them into Upper Heyford was the least of
my problems. The ALQ-94 internal ECM system of the F-11 IE, touted by the
Sanders Corporation as the ultimate automatic deception jammer, was anything
but ultimate nor automatic, and was already in need of being updated. The F-111 E
simulator was in little better shape. I had my hands full and spent about as much
time at Upper Heyford and Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio on F-111 business as
I did at home.
In early December 1969 I set out for Spangdahlem to get some needed flying
time. We had a heavy snow fall the night before and I got as far as the Rhine
River bridge which was totally blocked by deep drifts . I waited two days, then

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 Glory Days

tried again. This time I got as far as the little town of Simmem in the Hunsrueck
Mountains. Again I had to tum around. The winter of '69 to '70 was very cold with
lots and lots of snow. The children in the American housing areas loved it, building
huge snow forts, or riding their American Flyer sleds down nearby hillsides from
morning to night. I finally made it to Spang in early January. It was good to smell
kerosene again, to strap on a parachute, get into the confines of an ejection seat,
and go somewhere, anywhere where the sun shone, like sunny Spain, Greece or
Italy. If it was a NATO country, the 39TEWS went there and provided air defense
fighters and ground radar controllers realistic electronic warfare training.
When I arrived at Spang there was a surprise waiting for me. On the ramp
nearest the fence sat 54-459 - my favorite C-model. On seeing that plane I felt I
had come home. 54-459 arrived at Spangdahlem for the first time on November
28, 1956, then brand new with less than 100 flying hours on it. The plane was
promptly christened Kreis Wittlich, then the county seat, in the presence of local
dignitaries at an elaborately staged ceremony during Armed Forces Day attended
by over 30,000 Germans. Then the aircraft was part of the 42nd TRS, assigned
to the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, the same wing which routinely put on
48-ship fly-bys on Memorial or Armed Forces Day. I had flown many missions
in 459 out of Takhli, and the plane had always brought me home. This plane was
special to me. Everyone assigned to the 39th squadron had at least one combat
tour in Southeast Asia. Many had flown 100 missions or more over the North in
Route Packs V and VI where the missiles and the MiGs came out to play. The
experience level of pilots, navigators and EWOs in the 39th TEWS was very
high . Many of the aircrew had thousands of hours of flying time in the B-66 - Bill
Puckett, 'Smiley' Pomeroy, Don Harding, Ike Espe, Jim Weir, Joe Sapere, and
many others were part of that elite group of flyers. Many had been among the first
to go to Tan Son Nhut and Takhli in 1965. These men had trained me when I went
through Shaw in '68 . They were the very best our Air Force had to offer. My first
flight at Spangdahlem was in 54-459.
In April 1970 I scheduled three of our E-models to participate in Exercise
National Week. National Week was fun . We flew against the Navy, the 6th Fleet,
and only at night. First we had to find the Fleet though. To our surprise we learned
that the Mediterranean wasn't all that small, it was large enough to hide a powerful
American fleet, its aircraft carrier, cruisers and destroyers. Usually a careless
radar or radio transmission would lead us to them. We played the enemy, flying
combat profiles of Soviet Badger bombers. It was good training for everyone and
Sigonella Naval Air Station on Sicily wasn't a bad place to operate out of. On
that April deployment I met Don Harding. He was my pilot. We took off from
Spangdahlem heading for the French border, climbing out slowly to 38,000 feet.

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We coasted out over the Mediterranean passing over Nice, then headed southwest
toward the U.S. Naval Air Facility Sigonella, near Catania, Sicily. From there
we flew several missions against the Navy, then returned to Spangdahlem via
Aviano, the main USAF air base in Italy. Don and I hit it off and became friends .
When our conversations turned to Vietnam we talked about things that made us
laugh. "You won't believe this," I recall Don saying to me . "I was above Hanoi,
near the Chinese buffer zone . The mountains start there, high mountains, wooded,
beautiful scenery." We were in a Catania restaurant bar, after dinner, talking. "I
looked down and there was this beautiful mountain lake surrounded by spacious
looking houses . There was a boat cruising the lake and a guy behind it water
skiing. I got my navigator/bombardier, Bill Crofoot, on the intercom. I called him
Willi . I said ' Willi, you ' ve got to see this. Look out your window,' and I rolled
the airplane on its side so he could see. Neither one of us could believe what we
saw. F-105s were dropping bombs a few miles south , and here was this guy water
skiing. Another time we were in an orbit outside Haiphong. We flew right up to
the edge of the SAM site. He had a slant range of 20 miles and locked his radar
on us , but he couldn't touch us, we were just out of his range. As I looked down
to my left there appeared this beautiful four-masted schooner painted solid white.
Everything was white - masts , sails , everything. It headed straight for Haiphong
harbor. Our time was up and I said to my navigator, 'I have to take a closer look.
This is so unreal , so bizarre. I went down to 18,000 feet but couldn't see any
people on board. There was a flag, but it just hung there . lfl hadn't been short on
fuel I would have gone down and buzzed that thing." Then Don said to me, "You
know about Kelly, don't you?
"' Yea . I flew with him at Takhli . Great guy. Funny. Loved his beer. What
about him? I haven 't run into him yet. '
"You won 't," Don said. "He's dead. So is John Holley." My mouth must
have dropped open . "I thought you knew. It was in early October. He aborted his
take-off, ran off the end of the runway and burst into flames .'' I was devastated to
hear the news . I didn't know Holley that well, but Ken Kelly and I had been close.
Before he left Takhli he came by to see me to 'pull my chain ' and tell me how
much he was going to enjoy bratwurst and beer at Spang. And he assured me that
he would be thinking of me while he was enjoying himself.
"Cem 34, an EB-66E, was scheduled for a ' routine training mission,' the
accident report states matter of factly. Take-off appeared normal up to the computed
take-off point at 6,550 feet. At approximately 8,000 feet down the runway Cem 34
was heard to retard engines, the drag chute deployed , and Captain Kelly called on
departure frequency 'Abort, abort, abort.' The aircraft continued straight ahead for
the remaining 1,700 feet of runway, continued on the 800 feet of PSP (perforated

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 Glory Days

steel planking) overrun, then made a slight left tum to the boundary fence, went
through the fence 'and immediately became engulfed in flames. There was no
apparent attempt at ejection by the crew members. The surviving crew member,
Lt/Colonel Fucich, was found approximately 20 feet forward of the aircraft with
a broken leg and extensive bums and was evacuated by helicopter to the 36TFW
hospital at Bitburg."2
Major Donald Harding and Lieutenant Colonel Carwin 'Smiley' Pomeroy,
the 39TEWS operations officer, participated in the accident investigation. At first
they could not figure out what could possibly have gone so very wrong . It wasn't
the engines. Harding recalls "When I looked at the aircraft, there was little left
of Kelly, he had been thrown over the side under the left engine. The airplane
came to rest down a steep slope, up against the tree line of a dense forest. There
was a slight breeze coming down the canyon, and the left wing flap was swinging
freely in the breeze. I looked at that thing and called to Smiley, 'Come over here.'
I pointed out to him that the flaps were up when we first came down here. There
was no smoke residue on the remaining flap surface dangling in the breeze. It was
clean. Everything else was covered with soot. If the flaps had been down when
Kelly made his take-off, they would have been black and tom. The other wing was
burned too much to check that flap. Those flaps were up. He miss-set them. If you
take the flaps to 60 percent, then 80, while performing your pre-take-off check,
then, if you come back up to 60 percent and stop, what you've done is push the
hydraulic fluid to the other side of the cylinder. You've pushed that fluid right out
of there, and the flaps will blow up on take-off. We questioned the crew chief and
he saw Kelly reset the flaps in the parking area.
"When the aircraft came down the runway and went over the hill it hit several
concrete approach light stanchions. One came up into the cockpit and cut off
Kelly's legs, then the cockpit turned sideways and he rolled under the engine. A
large splinter from one of the poles caught Holly square in the chest, like a spear.
And poor old Frank Fucich, the navigator, was sitting up there, going down the
hill with no one around him as the fuselage hit two big oak trees. His ejection seat
fired, then 'I went tumbling down that hill, got out of my seat, looked back up
and thought I'll crawl toward the sun,' he told me in the hospital. Well, there was
no sun, just a burning forward fuel tank that had been thrown out of the airplane
and was burning fiercely. Frank, in shock, crawled up toward 'the sun' and that's
how he got his bums. Otherwise he would have gotten out of that accident nearly
unscathed. His hands and face were bumed." 3 Al Kersis will never forget that
day either. "I was watching this fire truck come racing up on the runway, then
following in the path of the EB-66E that had just roared down that same runway
moments before. I was supposed to be on this airplane. I arrived in the morning

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at the squadron. I looked up at the scheduling board and my name was up there
as the EWO. About five minutes later the scheduler wiped my name off the board
and wrote in another 's name - Holley. Holley was new and needed a flight."'
Black Eagle was another exercise we participated in regularly, it took place
up north, involving air defense sites in Denmark and northern Germany. At times
the effect of EB-66 jamming was traumatic for inexperienced radar operators not
trained to cope with whitened out radar scopes. They activated their countermeasure
circuitry, but in the process also lost sensitivity and target information. The Shah
of Iran requested that his GCI sites be evaluated. We promptly sent a flight of EB-
66Es to Tehran. Ground observers were stationed at the radar sites. They reported
in their formal report seeing the Iranian controllers going into near shock when
their scopes whited out with jamming from the EB-66 aircraft. At Lindsey Air
Station the branch I worked in was located next door to the RF-4C reconnaissance
branch. We all thought it a good idea to team up the RF-4s with the EB-66s to
monitor the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, which often was at anchor off the island
of Crete. We then flew day and night reconnaissance against the Russians out of
Athens Airport - the RF-4s taking pictures after the EBs led them to the Kresta
cruisers whose radar emissions gave them away. The crews loved the variety of
deployments, taking them all over Europe from the North Cape to Turkey, and at
times beyond.
We routinely provided training for NATO interceptors. It was an early
morning mission I was on. The aircraft I flew had returned the night before from
a Black Eagle exercise and been turned around quickly. We flew an orbit over
the Black Forest at 28,000 feet. It was a beautiful day, little wind, and the Alps
in the distance rose in all their splendor. The first flight of German F-104s came
up and I dropped chaff with the usual effect. The second and succeeding flights
of interceptors, however, reported no effect on their radars . I was puzzled. Then
Frankfurt Control came on the air and demanded, 'Cease ECM.' We did. When
we landed at Spang, two blue Air Force staff cars followed us into our parking
area. The Wing commander accompanied by several of his deputies, all colonels,
was not in a good mood. "Samuel, did you check your chaff load before take-
off?" I still had no idea what all the fuss was about, or why the wing commander
was involved. I took out the Form 781 and showed them the chaff load that
maintenance supposedly had loaded on the aircraft - high frequency chaff for use
against fighter radars . "Damn, Samuel. You took the Munich airport radar off the
air with your stuff. The Germans are really upset. They had to divert air traffic to
Frankfurt and Paris. How the hell did you do it? Did you drop some bundles of
chaff before take-off to verify that the proper stuff was loaded?" I had, and signed
off on the Form 781 accordingly. By then maintenance had opened the two ALE- I

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chaff dispensers in the tail of the aircraft, and low and behold, the remaining chaff
in the hoppers was not high frequency stuff that we used against fighter radars, but
the low frequency chaff we used against GCI and early warning radars up north
during Exercise Black Eagle. The maintenance crew that regenerated the aircraft
after it returned from the Black Eagle exercise did not empty the chaff hoppers,
just topped them off with a few bundles of high frequency chaff.
Come late autumn through winter into early spring, weather frequently
posed a challenge to flying at Spangdahlem and Bitburg. More than once I sat
in the squadron building cooling my heels waiting for the fog to lift. Sometimes
we made it out to the end of the runway, then had to tum around, that's how
quickly the situation changed on us. The Eifel Mountains were notorious for their
marginal weather conditions. Of the four American fighter bases in the Eifel -
Spangdahlem, Bitburg, Ramstein and Hahn - Hahn had by far the worst weather
and the fewest flying days. Major Bill Rothas, pilot, and Captains George Ciz
and Gil Cooley, EWO and navigator, launched from Spangdahlem on a routine
training mission in an EB-66E into a typical Eifel sky - grey, nearly touching the
runway, but not quite, ready to spit snow at any moment. "We took off, barely
got to altitude," recalls George Ciz, "when we received a call from our command
post directing us to return to base ASAP, before the weather closed the base. We
flew back to Spangdahlem and were on final approach when we were diverted
to Bitburg. Off we go to Bitburg. Do the same thing all over again. Get on final
approach and the base closes on us for weather and we are diverted to Hahn of all
places. At this point we were getting a bit low on fuel, so Hahn was going to be
it. We lined up for our final approach, the weather and snow closing in on us. Bill
could barely make out the runway. It gets dark early in the northern latitudes in
winter, and twilight was turning into darkness. Finally Bill saw the runway lights,
and as the wheels touched the runway the lights went out on us. We still had our
aircraft lights, the chute deployed properly, the brakes worked and Bill stopped
the aircraft. Where to next? The tower called us and directed us to shut down our
engines and to remain where we were - on the runway. The runway was closed
until further notice. We put the pins in our ejection seats, closed up the aircraft,
and since no one could come out to pick us up because of the snow and no lights,
the three of us walked through the driving snow to base operations. We then went
to the Officers' Club, ate dinner, stayed in the VOQ over night and took off the
next morning on another training mission." 5
In addition to flying ECM training missions and participating in numerous
exercises, the squadron's C-models routinely flew electronic reconnaissance
along the East German and Czech borders as the 42nd TRS had done before them
in the 50s and early 60s . They were the first to pick up the SA-6 SAM radar when

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it first deployed with the Group of Soviet Forces in the former GDR. They were
good at what they were doing. I had scheduled myself on a C-model on August
28, 1972. The 39TEWS schedulers always put us ' staff weenies,' as they referred
to me and Major Gerry Bailey, my counterpart at 17th Air Force at Ramstein Air
Base, into positions one or two - keeping the more interesting work in positions 3
and 4 for themselves. That day I was supposed to fly position one. The afternoon
of the preceding day, as I got ready to drive to Spangdahlem, my boss caught me
in the parking lot and told me that I had to cancel my flight. "General Jones wants
a briefing tomorrow morning on EB-66 operations in the Mediterranean. Forget
about flying and build your briefing." Jones, our four star, was the Commander in
Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe. I called the 39th and they got Captain
Bob Sherman to fly in my place. Bob was one of the Ravens to deploy to Takhli
from Shaw in April 1965, flew the pocket and had 100 missions over bad guy
country.
Major Don Harding was the chief of stan/eval for the 39th TEWS . "I had
no assistant, so I administered all pilot flight checks. I had a navigator and an
electronic warfare officer assigned to me . Larry Wensil, my EWO, was in the rear
compartment on August 28, evaluating the three Ravens, while I was up front.
This was to be a pilot proficiency and standardization flight check for the crew
on a standard electronic reconnaissance mission along the East German border.
Captain Dan Craven, a former SAC KC-135 tanker pilot, had proven himself to
be a steady pilot in the squadron. I did not anticipate any problems . Dan Craven
was a straight and level type of flyer, while I flew the airplane more like a fighter.
Dan and I made the preflight walk-around. I paid particular attention to the
elevator boost hook engagement above the drag chute compartment. Start up and
taxi went well. The quick-check team checked us over before taking the active
runway and found nothing out of the ordinary. We began our take-off roll. Dan
made the elevator boost engagement check at 80 knots. The check was made by
pulling back the control column to see if the boost was working. The pilot could
feel if there was a problem in the elevator control and be able to abort the take-off
safely if that was necessary. At the 145 knot check I looked for rotation to take-off
attitude, and take-off at 155 knots, when Dan exclaimed 'The elevator's locked.'
"I saw Dan shaking the yoke, but the control column was solidly locked in
the neutral position. We were accelerating now, and the airplane really wanted to
fly, beginning to porpoise. I saw 170 knots on the navigator's airspeed indicator
and yelled at Dan, 'Trim it off Dan. Trim it off!!!' That thing would have flown
off just using the trim control. Then you adjust the trim and establish climb, or
you bank and drop the nose and then trim it out. But Dan wasn't used to that sort
of flying, fighter pilot type of flying. Instead, Dan chopped the throttles. My heart

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 Glory Days

jumped into my throat. I knew what was coming next. We were in the same boat
Ken Kelly found himself in in '69. There was a delay after the throttles were cut,
the drag chute was not deployed, so I yelled, 'Pull the gear up, pull the f ... gear
up!!' Dan finally reacted.
"Of course the way the gear comes up - nose first, then right followed by
the left gear - the right wing went down . We went on our belly with a slight right
hand skid. We hit an arresting gear unit at the end of the runway with the left
engine - blaaammmrn. It ripped the arresting gear right out of the ground, but it
jarred the left side so badly that it ruptured the wing tank and it soon caught fire. I
immediately released my escape hatch, at the same time telling the Ravens in the
rear to jettison their hatch . The navigator, Major Harry Wilkerson, jettisoned his
hatch. Dan didn't. It was an extremely rough ride. The aircraft bumped and banged
along, finally it slid to a stop, just short of the airfield perimeter road. I unstrapped
and saw the fuel fire fed by the ruptured left wing tank boiling up around the left
side of the cockpit. We were on a slight downhill grade and I elected to jump into
the edge of the fire, hitting hard in a football type roll and came up running.
"I still had my helmet on, didn't get burned, and felt as if God had his hand
around me all this time. I ran to the other side and saw that Dan was still sitting
in the pilot's seat. He had cut his arm on something, looked dazed. I hollered at
him and he gave me a thumbs up sign and started throwing his shoulder straps
off. Wilkerson was letting himself down easy from his hatch position. I didn't
realize how badly he was hurt, he suffered compression fractures of the spine,
making his way to an open area near the left wing tip. Dan was emerging through
the navigator's hatch . I was standing near the right engine and it was still turning,
making an awful clattering sound. The first Raven came running down the wing,
then Captain Wensil followed, hobbling along with a broken right ankle. Things
that followed are hazy, but I do remember pulling myself up on the wing. The
third Raven was standing on top of the fuselage close to the raging fire, looking
dazed and confused. I gave him a shove toward the right wing tip and said, 'Thatta
way.'
"The last Raven was Captain Bob Sherman who somehow had managed to
get up the aft compartment ladder and had his arms on top of the fuselage. I
grabbed his right hand and pulled his 175 pounds out of there, over to the leading
edge of the right wing. My adrenalin was really pumping. The fire was coming
over the top of the fuselage and it was very hot. Then one of these strange little
things your mind records in a situation like this occurred. I saw a stream of fuel
shooting into the air from the aft fuel tank vent. The fuel cell bladder had probably
collapsed and was forcing fuel out the vent. It looked like the stream from a high
pressure garden hose, and I thought that aft tank filled with 12,500 pounds of fuel
was going to go up in flames any minute now.

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"I jumped to the ground and will never forget Bob Sherman swinging his
leg in front of my face exclaiming, 'Don, I think my leg is broken.' I said, 'Yeah,
Bob,' and slid him off the wing onto my shoulders . His shinbone was sticking out
through his flight suit and his foot was swinging free . I carried Bob 40 yards past
the wing tip, and sensing we were safe my legs turned to rubber and I collapsed.
Bob was in great pain and thrashing around . I got his chin under my elbow, arm
across his chest, and I grabbed the left leg of his flying suit and pulled his leg up .
I didn't want him to stab the bone into the dirt . I was holding Bob, seeing the
rescue chopper approaching with a fire bottle attached . It was then that the aft
tank exploded and engulfed the entire fuselage in fire . The forward tank caught
fire next. It was one of those old fashioned Kaman HH-43 rescue choppers . We
put Bob on board and they flew him to the Bitburg hospital. JP-4 had gotten into
everything and I soon came down with a severe rash on my feet. So I went to
supply and got a new pair of boots and wore plastic bags over my feet until they
healed. A few days later I gave Captain Craven his pilot proficiency check in an
E-model." 0
Major Harding was awarded the Airman's Medal for his heroic rescue of
Captain Robert Sherman. Bob Sherman was evacuated to the larger Wiesbaden
hospital, then sent to Fitzimrnons Army Hospital in Denver, Colorado, for
recuperation and treatment. One day Bob was sitting in his doctor's waiting room
at Fitzimmons Army Hospital. He was in his Class-A blue uniform. The elderly
gentleman sitting next to him glanced at Bob's cast, then asked, "May I ask what
happened to you? My son is in the Air Force."
Bob, in his usual jovial manner introduced himself, "Captain Bob Sherman. I
was in an aircraft accident. Lucky to get out alive."
"What kind of Airplane did you fly?"
"I am not a pilot," Bob said. "I am an electronic warfare officer and I fly in
B-66s at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany." The elderly gentleman could hardly
contain himself. "So does my stepson," he said. "His name is Wolfgang Samuel.
Do you know him?" Bob didn't tell my dear stepfather, Leo Ferguson, that it was
I who should have been in that aircraft that day, and that he had taken my place
when I was pulled off that flight. Fate.
In the spring of 1972 the North Vietnamese began their invasion of the
South and Operations Freedom Train and Linebacker I got underway, unleashing
American air power against an over confident invader. Crews from the 39TEWS
were sent to Korat, Thailand, in order to augment the 42nd TEWS. Linebacker I
ended in October, and on December 18 Linebacker II was launched - a massive
B-52 led assault against the Hanoi and Haiphong areas . By that time the former
39TEWS aircraft had either returned to the United States or to the war zone to

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augment the 42nd TEWS at Korat Air Base. On January 1, 1973, the 39TEWS
was officially inactivated. Fittingly, Colonel Karwin 'Smiley' Pomeroy was the
squadron's last commander.
And what happened to good old 54-459 - the C-model that in November
1957 arrived at Spangdahlem Air Base to much fanfare? For years, as part of the
42nd TRS, 459 flew out of bases in Germany, England and France, went to war
in 1965 in Southeast Asia, returned from Takhli to Spangdahlem in 1969, and in
the summer of 1972 was flown once more back to Korat Air Base in Thailand to
support Linebacker I and II operations. In March of 1973 the old war horse, for
one last time, went through corrosion control at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa,
receiving a new paint job in the process. Then in January 1974, after thousands of
hours of flying time in both peace and war, 54-459 was flown to Clark Air Base,
Philippine Islands. There the plane was parked on an unused ramp along with 23
other B-66s, stripped of its electronics, and months later cut up for scrap. 7

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 CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

BAT-21

1972 began the way 1971 left off, with the North Vietnamese continuing to push
SAMs and AAA into Laos and South Vietnam. President Nixon continued his
efforts to get the United States out of a war which had little support at home - a
fact the enemy was well aware of and counted on to prevail. The demonstrations
of May 4 , 1970 , on the campus of Kent State University in Ohio resulted in the
death of four students, indicative of the deep divisions within American society
and the dissatisfaction of a large segment of the American public with the war in
Southeast Asia. The American troop level in South Vietnam continued to decline
from 139 ,000 at the start of the year to 69 ,000 by May 1. Most Air Force combat
squadrons had already redeployed to the United States, or turned their aircraft
over to the South Vietnamese. Negotiations in Paris were at a near stalemate. The
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was getting nowhere with stone-faced North
Vietnamese negotiators sitting across the table waiting for the final departure of
American military forces from the South. When that happened, obviously, there
no longer was a need to negotiate. The situation was about to change.
At Karat the 42nd TEWS continued to struggle to meet its tasking from 7th
Air Force. In late November three additional aircraft arrived to replace 54-427,
lost on November 17 due to an engine fire on runup. Two more aircraft were
pulled because of wing cracks . February 2 was not a good day at Korat. An F-
1050 from the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron crashed on take-off, killing the pilot
Major Charles Stone.' Two EB-66s, one C-model , Cobra 24, and one E-model,
Cobra 25, were delayed for two hours, waiting for the F-105 wreckage to be

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 Glory Days

Jungle Survival School at Clark Air Base, PI, provided the best possible preparation for downed
aircrew in a difficult environment.

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cleared from the runway. Master Sergeant Steve Hock, a combat photographer
at Korat, was tasked to fly on the C-model, but was pulled off the mission to
photograph the remains of the crashed F-105. Cobra 24 , the flight lead, rolled at
1236. Cobra 25, EB-66E 54-540, followed at 1237. All line checks were normal.
At 140 knots Captain Neil Henn rotated, placing the gear handle in the up position
at 150 knots . The Korat runway had a dip in its middle. When Captain Henn
rotated he was on the upward sloping portion of the runway. The aircraft's tail skid
made contact, broke contact for about 100 feet , then made contact again , this time
breaking from the aircraft. Then the lower antennas contacted the runway and the
rest of the airplane followed, coming to rest 656 feet beyond the overrun. All three
of the crew escaped unharmed .2 Another airplane gone. The 42nd was running
out of spare parts and airplanes. Headquarters PACAF went to the Air Staff and
requested an additional four aircraft and crews. In response to that request six
EB-66E/C aircraft were sent from Shaw AFB to Korat, along with experienced
aircrews from both Shaw and the 39th TEWS at Spangdahlem.
The North Vietnamese, counting on South Vietnamese weakness and the fast
disappearing American presence, launched their offensive in the early morning
hours of March 30, 1972. Three regular NVA divisions supported by T-34 and
T-55 tanks, 105mm artillery, and a formidable air defense capability including
SA-2 SAMs, and for the first time, hand-held SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, rolled
across the DMZ into Quang Tri province. NVA attacks were also launched in
the highlands to the west of Quang Tri and to the northwest of Saigon. This
was a conventional attack, a reflection of how certain the NVA was of success.
Thousands of trucks supporting a conventional army moved from north to south.
It was the type of military operation American airpower was built to defeat. 3
In response to this overt challenge, American combat squadrons returned in a
massive movement of aircraft from the United States to bases in Thailand. Under
Operation Constant Guard the 49th TFW moved its 72 F-4Ds from Holloman
AFB in New Mexico to Takhli, the onetime F-105 and EB-66 base. F-105G Wild
Weasels from McConnell AFB in Wichita, Kansas, deployed to Korat, and more
F-4Es followed. B-52s returned to Andersen Air Base on Guam in February. By
May of 1972, 161 additional B-52Ds and Gs brought the total number of B-52
aircraft in the western Pacific to 206.•
On April 2 two OV-10 observation planes flying over the Ben Hai River in
the DMZ dividing North from South Vietnam, looking for survivors of a downed
EB-66C aircraft, Bat 21, had a surprise waiting for them . As they broke into
the clear one of the FAC's called out to the other, "My God, you should see the
people down here - all over the place - people, tanks , trucks , the whole nine
yards. And everybody is shooting." 5 Bat 21, an EB-66C , and Bat 22, an EB-66E,

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 Glory Days

both from the 42nd TEWS at Korat, were flying ECM support for a B-52 Arc
Light strike against NVA units crossing the DMZ into South Vietnam. The EB-
66s were heading east along the DMZ. "As the B-52s drew close to their target
at least ten missiles were fired in salvoes. All missed. When the EB-66s turned
northwest to clear the target area a SAM site to the north of the DMZ launched
three more missiles, one of which hit Bat 21 at 24,000 feet" while initiating a
SAM break. 6 The missile struck the aircraft in the belly where the four Ravens sat.
The Ravens did not have a chance. Only the navigator, Lieutenant Colonel Iceal
'Gene' Hambleton, was able to eject.7 The rescue of Gene Hambleton would tum
into a harrowing and deadly experience for many, in later years chronicled in two
books and a movie starring Gene Hackman. Not only would the mobile SA-2s
accompanying the invading North Vietnamese Army divisions take a toll of F-4s
flying air strikes, but the slower moving conventionally powered A-IE Sandies,
OV-10 observation planes and helicopters were to suffer heavy losses from the
handheld SA-7 Strela missile.
After many years in the ICBM field, Lieutenant Colonel Gene Hambleton 's
tum came to return to the cockpit and pull a Vietnam tour. Gerald Hanner, an
EB-66 navigator, recalls going through training at Shaw with Gene. "He was one
of three Lieutenant Colonels who were rather long in the tooth, but they all took
the assignment because they wanted to retire with thirty years. Gene seemed to
glide through training with little effort. He made it look easy. Then we were all off
to Korat via one or more survival schools."8 Hambleton went to Turkey Point in
Florida for water survival, then headed to Clark for snake school - jungle survival.
At Korat he soon became squadron navigator and began flying combat missions.
The area adjacent to Route Pack 1 was considered a milk run throughout the war
when compared to missions further north in and around Route Packs V and VI,
in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. "Part of the EB-66s role was trolling for SAMs at an
altitude seven to eight-thousand feet below the B-52 formation, putting themselves
between the bombers and the SAM sites . If electronic countermeasures did not
defeat a SAM, they would insure it was locked on their aircraft and not the B-52s.
Count to ten after a launch to allow the missile to get up to 25,000 feet, then go
into a SAM break. The EB-66 could get into a five-G break in a hurry while the
SAM's gyroscopes tumbled at just over two-Gs as it tried to follow. 'We'd giggle
and laugh and drop down to about 10,000 feet, then come up and let them shoot
another one at us"' Hambleton said in an interview after his rescue. 9
The NVA air defense build-up which started in January 1972 progressed to
the point where aircrews reported that the intensity of fire near the DMZ was
equal to that encountered during raids in the Hanoi area. The fact that SAMs
had been forward deployed was not news to Hambleton or his crew. "The SAM

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 Bat-21

site that shot us down we had been plotting for about two months. I kept telling
people there's a missile site there and nobody would believe us , because they
never launched. You 'd fly one mission and there wouldn't be any signal there.
Somebody else would come back and say, 'Hey, I plotted this guy right there,' and
that was south of the DMZ."' The 42nd TEWS had good intelligence on where the
active SAM sites were, but did not connect their presence with the NVA's spring
invasion. Nor did 7th Air Force intelligence in Saigon put much credence in their
reported SAM intercepts. After all, the EB-66C's direction finding equipment was
not state of the art. They just didn 't DF it right. Such is the stuff of tragedies. '0
As the squadron navigator Hambleton had the ironic opportunity to schedule
himself for his last mission . When the SAMs came up south of the DMZ they
fired two salvos of at least ten missiles at the B-52s and the EB-66s protecting
them . All ten missiles went wild, attesting to the effectiveness of the electronic
countermeasures employed. The Fansong radar signal did not come up as usual
though. The APR-25/26 radar warning receiver gave no low and high power
indication. The SAM site was probably using a Spoonrest or Flatface acquisition
radar for its target inputs . The first indication of a launch came when the BG06
missile guidance signal popped up . Then the crew of Bat 21 and 22 got launch
lights , but the missile was already on its way. "The timing count was started for
a right hand break, but the Ravens shouted, ' Negative , negative,' believing the
SAM was tracking from the south, not the north . The pilot, Major Wayne Bolte,
tried to correct the SAM break, the missile got there first, they were hit in mid-
break . The crew of Bat 21 had been caught five seconds late, looking in the wrong
direction . The North Vietnamese stole a five second lead on Bat 21 by launching
the missile at the EB-66 without the use of the Fansong track-while-scan radar.
Hambleton knew the guys in back were lost when the SAM detonated, and he ran
through his ejection sequence on the pilot's signal. He fully expected to see the
aircraft commander [Major Bolte] to follow. Almost immediately after he ejected a
second explosion rocked the air, disintegrating the aircraft and putting Hambleton
in a spin. He opened his parachute manually to stop the spin at somewhere below
28,000 feet. ' I didn't realize it was going to take me 16 minutes to hit the ground.
But opening the parachute when I did was probably the smartest thing I did . There
was a fog bank starting to roll in, and it gave the bank time to move in completely.
When I came down, I came right through it. If I'd waited for the barometric
opener [to open the chute at 14,000 feet] I'd have been out in the clear with 30,000
enemy troops around me , and I wouldn't be here today. I got down about half-
way, probably at 16 or 17-thousand feet when I saw this little 0-2 orbiting. So I
unzipped the survival vest and took one of the' radios out and cranked up Guard
Channel. I called, '0-2, 0-2, do you hear me?'

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 Glory Days

"He came back, 'Yes, where are you?'

"'I'm in a parachute hanging about four or five thousand feet above you.'
'"You gotta be kidding me.'
"'No, I'm not.' So, he poured the power to that little thing and he came up
and orbited with me right down to the ground. While he's orbiting with me, he
calls in other aircraft, Sandies and F-4s who 'sterilized' the area. When I hit the
ground I had a pretty clear area and there weren't too many people too close, if
you know what I mean.
"This all happened about twilight, it was five o'clock in the afternoon. I
landed in a rice paddy, so I got up against this mound of dirt and lay there for two
or three hours . As soon as it got dark I took off, got up in the jungle, and dug in
for the night. The third day I went out and got some food, com, four little ears
of com about as big around as your thumb. It's not too tasty unless you are very
hungry. I didn't have any water with me. I think it was the third night, it started
to rain and I had one of these rubberized escape and evasion maps that I laid on
top of a bush. I got my plastic bottle out and filled it with water." On the fourth
day the OV-10 got shot down and Hambledon was ready to give up. But a FAC,
a first lieutenant, wouldn't let the colonel entertain the thought. "He called me
every name in the book and he told me what he was going to do to me if I gave
up. He wouldn't let me quit." The second low point came when the Jolly Green
got shot down, about two days later. "They were within two minutes of picking
me up and all at once that thing goes up in a ball of fire. I thought, this thing isn't
worth it. I was a 53 year old lieutenant colonel and I cried. The people that shot the
chopper down were in this village and the Air Force decided to neutralize it. The
day before I started to walk, they came in with two or three F-4s with smart bombs
and they did a pretty good job on the village. I didn't think there was anyone left."
But Hambleton did run into someone as he passed through the village. He was
stabbed in the back, then ran for the river where he was supposed to be picked
up. "I got down to the river and got lost in a banana grove. Around four o'clock
in the morning, about daylight, I saw the river. I was so damn excited, I stepped
off into nothing - and fifteen or twenty feet later I am laying up against a tree. I
fractured my arm." 11 Hambleton had been told to get across the river as quickly
as possible. "I hadn't been on the other side thirty minutes when twenty or so of
these guys walked right up to where I'd been sitting. They beat the bushes for a
while and then they took off, they never came across the river. There were two
or three nights early on when patrols walked within 20 feet of my hiding place.
They stopped, sat down, lit cigarettes and talked. Finally they just put out their
cigarettes and walked away. That happened twice. And there's a little word in the
English language - pray. I did. You sit there and pray that everything will work

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out right." Then a sampan appeared on the river and it had a Navy SEAL team on
it. Tom Norris, a Navy Seal received the Medal of Honor for his part in the rescue.
Lieutenant Colonel Hambleton was awarded the Silver Star, the Distinguished
Flying Cross, the Air Medal, and the Purple Heart. 12
EB-66C 54-466 was one of Shaw's electronic reconnaissance training aircraft
flown over to Karat to augment the strained resources of the 42nd TEWS . I had
flown training missions in 466 back in 1968 before reporting for duty with the
41st TEWS at Takhli. When 466 was shot down that first Sunday in April 1972,
five men died. A UH- I H Huey helicopter was shot down attempting a rescue
with the loss of four lives. Two OV-10 FACs were downed by SA-7s - two men
were killed, a third became a prisoner of war, and a fourth made good his escape.
Six more lost their lives when a Jolly Green rescue helicopter was shot down.
That Others May Live is the motto of those who risk their lives rescuing airmen
in distress - no truer words were ever spoken in the rescue of Gene Hambleton.
Nearly 1,000 air strikes were flown in support of Hambleton's rescue at the cost
of eight aircraft and four seriously damaged. Bat 21 was the most extensive and
costly rescue effort ever undertaken by the U.S . Air Force .' 3 The Marines take
pride in never leaving any of their own behind, so does the Air Force - if it is at
all possible. Says Gerald Hanner "One quote I do recall Hambleton making to us
once he returned to Korat, 'It was a hell of a price to pay for one life. I'm very
sorry.,,,,.
Hambleton's rescue, although massive in scale, was just one of many such
rescues between 1964 and 1972. Only six weeks later, as air battles raged over the
North, and the North Vietnamese air force was being decimated as never before
by well trained and missile and gun equipped F-4Ds and Es, Captains Lodge and
Locher in an F-4D on May 10 downed their third MiG-21. Moments later, with
another MiG-21 in their sights, their aircraft was riddled by 30mm gun fire from a
MiG-19 coming in from behind and below. Captain Lodge, the pilot, died. Locher
ejected and survived 21 days northwest of Hanoi, a few miles from a large MiG
base. "On June 2, we went back," said Dale Stovall the HH-53C Jolly Green
pilot, who retired as a brigadier general. "We shut down the war to go get Roger
Locher. There were 119 aircraft over North Vietnam supporting us," among them
EB-66s from Korat. Stovall 's HH-53 crew hoisted Locher into the helicopter from
a steep, 1,200-foot slope while crew members blazed away at North Vietnamese
troops with mini guns. Stovall was awarded the Air Force Cross. The men of
the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service saved 1,298 aircrew members in
Southeast Asia, many, like Hambleton and Locher, from deep inside enemy
controlled territory- almost always at great ris'k to themselves .15

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The NVA spring invasion of Quang Tri province did not sit well with President
Nixon and his cabinet in Washington. He promptly authorized air attacks against
targets in North Vietnam up to 20 degrees latitude - Operation Freedom Train.
That restriction was soon lifted and targets further north were authorized. On April
9, 12 B-52s struck a POL storage area and rail yard near Vinh. On the 12th 18 B-
52s from U-Tapao attacked Bai Thuong Air Base south of Hanoi. On April 15, 17
B-52s, again coming from U-Tapao in Thailand, received the go-ahead to attack
a POL site near Haiphong. Time Magazine in an article entitled, The Harrowing
War in the Air, posted Monday, May 1, 1972, described the effect of that raid on
the surprised North Vietnamese. "It was slightly before 2 a.m. of what was to be
the first warm and sunny Sunday of the year in North Vietnam. Suddenly, inside
the big Soviet-built area surveillance radar stations near Haiphong and Hanoi, the
radar scopes exploded into life with the blips of approaching aircraft - more than
the technicians had seen at any one time in years. After a moment, the images
smeared and the blips disappeared, as if overtaken by some evil magic. The radar
scopes filled with impenetrable 'snow' -or simply went dark.As U.S. intelligence
experts later reconstructed what had probably happened, the Communists worked
furiously to switch their jammed equipment to alternate frequencies and different
antenna systems, but with no success. They knew what the electronic symptoms
meant: for the first time in the war, the U.S. was sending its eight-jet B-52s to
bomb targets in North Vietnam's Red River heartland. The tip-off was the havoc
created by the electronic 'pilot fish' that, as the North Vietnamese know by now,
often precede the B-52s: EB-66 Destroyers and EA-6B Intruders, designed to
confuse ground radar, as well as needle-nosed F-105 'Wild Weasels,' whose
special radiation-seeking missiles lock onto and streak toward active enemy radar
installations. Then, after the pilot fish, came the sharks: 17 B-52s. The B-52s
dropped their 30-ton bomb loads into the darkness over Haiphong from 30,000
feet . The explosions destroyed a petroleum tank farm near the Haiphong harbor
quay, provoking a fireball so large that it was seen from the bridge of the aircraft
carrier Kitty Hawk 110 miles out at sea in the Gulf of Tonkin. At 2:30 Sunday
afternoon, the sirens wailed again in Haiphong. For more than an hour, 40 Navy
jets from carriers wheeled around the city, pummeling warehouses, a huge truck
park and nearby Kien An Airfield, where three MiG-17 fighters were destroyed
on the ground. By the time the third attack had ended the sky over Haiphong was
streaked by the vapor trails of SAM missiles. In all, the North Vietnamese gunners
fired an astonishing 242 missiles at the American warplanes ... Thanks largely to
the new sophistication of U.S. electronic wizardry, the Communists had managed
to score only two hits ... Only four of the 88 MiG-21s known to be based in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area rose to meet the invading U.S. planes: three were shot

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down .. . The rapid air buildup continues. Within the past three weeks, more than
150 warplanes -F-4 Phantoms, all-weather F-105s, stubby EB-66s, B-52s -have
been flown to the theater from Japan, the Philippines and even the U.S."' 6
Captain Tom Copier, who returned to Shaw AFB in November 1970 after the
inactivation of the 19th TEWS at Kadena, Japan, was one of those experienced
EB-66 flyers returned to Korat. Tom had flown over the North on an earlier tour
of duty. He was going to get a chance to do so again . "I went over in April for
120 days . It was pretty exciting . The war was different from before, the tempo
higher than when I first got to Takhli in '68. We were going North all the time .
We actually flew the airplanes over there. I remember asking how long we had at
McClellan before we launched for Hawaii , and I was told that we had dedicated
tankers and we were going straight from Shaw to Hickam AFB. It was a brutal
flight. We took off from Shaw about eight in the morning in two flights of three,
taking six airplanes to Korat. Joe Sapere had come over from Spangdahlem and
was a navigator in my flight. Joe had flown the first B-66 mission over the North
back in '65 . From Hickam we went to Clark, then straight to Korat. We arrived in
less than 72 hours. We immediately started flying combat.
"The guys in the 42nd at Koral wanted to keep their crews together. We
agreed . Then they complained that we were getting all the easy missions. So we
went to the operations officer, we were all experienced crews , and proposed to
take all the night missions. Then they thought we had gone crazy. At night, can
you see the SA-2s coming up? You bet you can . Also, there were hardly any
MiGs to worry about. We thought the new arrangement was great. Almost all of
our orbits were either off Haiphong harbor supporting the Navy, or in Route pack
VI, probably 30 miles west of Hanoi, wherever we could find a hole between the
20 mile circles of the SA-2s. This happened on one of my early missions, a day
mission . I always liked to do a figure eight and change the end points of my orbit
by about three or four miles right or left. Never do the same thing twice. We had
three aircraft in three separate orbits backed up against one another at different
altitudes with some overlap. The guy in the center kept flying the same way, back
and forth . My pilot said to me, 'Look at him. What is he doing?' About that time
the 85mm got his range and started coming up. When we got home we had a big
discussion - don't ever be predictable." It was predictability that would cost the
B-52s dearly in Operation Linebacker II."
The entire war assumed a different character after the POL strike by the B-
52s on April 15 near Haiphong. The following day F-4Ds from the 432nd Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn, a composite wing with a variety of aircraft types,
downed three MiG-21s . It was the beginning of a long death spiral for North
Vietnamese fighter pilots, or whoever was manning their cockpits, Russians and

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 Glory Days

North Koreans. Between April 16 and October 15, F-4s from Takhli and Udom
downed 42 MiG-19s and MiG-2ls. On April 21, the B-52s struck again at a
target near Than Hoa. For the first time a B-52 was damaged by a surface to air
missile and had to make an emergency landing at Da Nang. Six days later, on
the 27th of April the Than Hoa bridge was severely damaged by 2,000-pound
electro-optically guided Paveway smart bombs released by four F-4 fighters, even
though the weather was bad. And on May 13, with the weather improved, 14 F-4s
returned and put the bridge into the river, without loss to themselves. 18 Earlier in
the war, that same bridge had withstood the concerted attack of 871 F-105 sorties
with superficial damage. The Paul Doumer bridge soon joined the fate of the
Than Hoa bridge, probably the two most important bridges of North Vietnam's
transportation network. On May 10 and 11 Mk-84 laser guided bombs dropped
several spans of the Doumer bridge into the river. "All flights encountered heavy
AAA ground fire and it was later estimated that more than 160 SAMs were fired
at the strike force . It seems hard to believe that not a single aircraft was lost ... A
great deal of credit for this remarkable record went to the support crews whose
job it was to protect the strike force," including four EB-66 aircraft. 19 "It was an
outstanding display of the effectiveness of the EB-66s."20 It was a different air
force the North was facing. The F-4s were armed not only with air to air missiles,
but again carried guns for the close-in kill. 'Knife fighting' as Navy flyers referred
to it, was back in style in the Air Force. Smart bombs had taken the place of
unguided conventional bombs. Missing its target was as rare for a smart bomb as
a hit was for dumb bombs in days gone by. Not only had the American tactical
fighter force changed, but the B-52 strategic bombers were finally employed in
the manner intended: pounding the strategic targets up North once reserved for
more vulnerable tactical fighters .
By May 8 the North Vietnamese began to understand that their hasty invasion
of the South and their continued stalling tactics in Paris had produced a painful
backlash. President Nixon not only authorized the resumption of air strikes
throughout North Vietnam, but authorized the mining of its ports and harbors
as well - a tactic that should have been used early on in the war now proved
eminently successful. There were no threats of nuclear retaliation from Communist
China or the Soviet Union as President Johnson and his advisor McNamara once
feared. The North Vietnamese had finally committed a cardinal sin, a sin which
for many years had been the sole province of American politicians in Washington:
underestimating their enemy.
Lieutenant Gerald P. Hanner flew a night mission south of the DMZ after
the loss of Bat 21 and the Doumer Bridge attack. They were no longer certain
if any of the SA-2s the NVA had dragged south into Quang Tri province were

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 Bat-21

still operational. "An hour or so passed. We were flying an E-model in the Hue
vicinity, supporting an Arc Light strike, looking for SAMs. Below we could see
lots of flares and fires burning as the South Vietnamese army was battling the
NVA . My pilot , a relatively new guy, was puffing away on his pipe and watching
the show below. Then something caught his attention . We were heading north-
northeast, and out in the distance he could see two or three bright yellow-white
lights . The lights were getting bigger. He was about to ask me what those lights
were in front of us, when it suddenly dawned on him what he was seeing. 'I've got
SAMs,' he said. At that time our EWO called over the intercom, 'I've got uplink.'
Our pilot executed a SAM break to the right, and directed me to make a SAM
call on guard channel. I hesitated, not knowing where the SAMs were coming
from. Finally I went out over UHF guard channel with 'SAM, SAM, vicinity of
Hue.' Immediately an F-1050 Wild Weasel patrolling closer to the DMZ, and at
the moment engaged in a duel with a SAM site, called, 'SAM, SAM, DMZ.' That
cleared things up.
"We recovered from our first SAM break, when two more missiles came off a
launcher, and we went into another. As we recovered from the second break I saw
that we were about 20 miles off shore, and considerably lower than when all the
excitement had started. I told my pilot we were clearly out of range of any SAMs
and to stay wings level if they fired again. Sure enough , another missile came off
a launcher, but this time our jamming was effective and the missile went ballistic .
We were bingo fuel and headed for home. I worked in the 388th TFW frag shop
where we processed the daily tasking that came in from 7th Air Force. The next
day I read a report on the previous night's action and learned that the SAM site
that engaged us had been involved in a fight with some F-4s, shooting one down.
Then my boss, an F-4 pilot, came back from a mission that afternoon extolling the
courage of a KC-135 tanker crew. 'They crossed the DMZ into Route Pack I with
me on their boom to rescue another F-4 that had been shot up and was badly in
need of fuel.' He showed me where the tanker took him - right across the area of
last night's SAM firings." 21 Dumb luck is better than no luck at all.

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 CHAPTER THIRTY

OPERATION LINEBACKER II

The air war over the North continued and Captains Ritchie, DeBellevue and
Feinstein became aces. Operation Linebacker I began the day the Downer Bridge
fell to smart bombs. B-52s routinely began to strike targets in the lower Route
Packages again. By early June 1972 the Strategic Air Command had assembled
206 of its B-52 bombers at Andersen on Guam and at U-Tapaoh in Thailand. It
was the largest SAC bomber force ever assembled in the western Pacific, aimed
to strike at the North. As impressive as that assembly of conventional striking
power was, it also reflected the changed role of the strategic forces. Originally
designed to overpower the Soviet Union in a massive nuclear confrontation, the
force now was largely supporting a conventional war scenario. The nuclear role
was to a great extent carried by Minuteman and Titan II ICBMs, and submarine
launched Polaris missiles. The vaunted TRIAD of air, land and sea based nuclear
deterrence still existed, but the air component had definitely become a reduced
player.
General John C. Meyer assumed command of SAC on May 1, 1972, from
General Bruce Holloway. He, as his counterpart at TAC, General William W.
Momyer, had risen quickly in World War II to the rank of colonel. Momyer was
credited with eight aerial victories and Meyer with 26, two of which he added
in Korea. Their principal training ground had been World War II and its massed
employment of air power against Nazi Germany. Their past experience clearly
left its imprint on how American air power was employed in Vietnam. General
Meyer's SAC, however, was a pale shadow of the force once commanded by

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···'·

A B-52G SAC bomber in pre-Vietnam colors refueling from a KC-135 tanker over the Cascade
Mountains. The D-model, not the G, was the workhorse of the Vietnam war. The G proved to be
significantly more vulnerable to enemy missiles because of its wet-wings and a less sophisticated ECM
suit than that carried by the B-52D.

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 Glory Days

General LeMay. The 206 B-52s assembled in the Pacific region in June 1972
represented fifty percent of the total B-52 force of 402 combat aircraft. Nearly
2,000 B-47 bombers had retired a number of years earlier, along with the early
models of the B-52. Sixty FB-1 lls added little extra striking power to SAC. The
FB-111 s were viewed by SAC old timers as tactical aircraft playing a strategic
role. At best, the FB-11 ls were an interim aircraft choice again, like the B-47, B-
57 and B-66 before them. They would do until the next ultimate strategic bomber
came along.'
SAC had changed in ways other than the types and numbers of aircraft it
flew. No longer did a homogeneous SAC-trained and SAC-for-life crew man its
bomber force. The aircrews were riddled with 'outsiders' as a result of the Air
Force policy not to return crew members to Vietnam for a second time until all
others had their tum. Men like Captains David Zook and Nutter Wimbrow, former
EB-66 electronic warfare officers with 100 combat missions over the North, found
themselves flying SAC's giant bombers and pulling Bullet Shot tours of duty on
Guam flying Arc Light and Tiny Tim missions. Once assigned to a Stateside strategic
bomber unit, however, the Vietnam combat tour exception no longer applied.
Dave Zook would go to war again over the North in a B-52G during Operation
Linebacker II, the 11 day air campaign against the North intended to bring the
North Vietnamese delegates back to the Paris negotiating table. Linebacker II
achieved its objective, although things started off pretty shakily. The late Captain
David S. Zook, who retired as a lieutenant colonel, tells the story of the 11-day air
campaign against the North as part of his unpublished manuscript Seven Years of
Vietnam: A Raven Goes To War. I chose excerpts from Dave Zook's manuscript
to portray the Linebacker II air campaign. Although Linebacker II involved many
types of tactical aircraft, from aging EB-66s to the newest F-4E and F-111, it is a
bomber story - the B-52 story, and at that their finest hour.
"I arrived in Los Angeles on New Year's Day of 1967," wrote then Captain
David Zook, "after a long flight from Bangkok. I was glad my tour in Southeast
Asia was at an end and that I had made a contribution. I didn't know then that
my time in SEA had not ended, but was to continue for six more years. I was
assigned to the 5th Bomb Wing at Travis AFB, California. Within the year we
moved our B-52Gs to Mather. The only downside of it was a lot of TDY - both
Bullet Shot Arc Light tours and ground alert at remote bases. The Bullet Shot tours
would start at Andersen Air Base on Guam, then rotate to Kadena on Okinawa,
and finally to U-Tapao, Thailand. Flying a few hundred missions from these three
bases comprised the most boring segment of my adult life. However, on my last
Bullet Shot tour there was to be an exciting conclusion - four missions during
Linebacker II.

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 Operation Linebacker II

"I was on a thrown-together crew flying B-52Gs out of Guam. We carried a

smaller bomb load than the B-52Ds and had a much inferior ECM suite to work
with . Also. because the B-52G had a wet wing, it was far less survivable than
the D, E and F models . Only one B-52G ever made it back to an American base
after suffering battle damage. Our crew was a strange blend. The radar navigator/
bombardier was Lieutenant Colonel Walt Nickerson . The two of us had been
crewed up for a long time and had been on a senior standardization and evaluation
crew at Mather AFB . Our pilot had a helicopter background, and the new co-pilot
had flown light observation planes as a Forward Air Controller. Our navigator
came from a desk job and had been getting his flying time in KC-135 tankers. We
had been on Guam for a few weeks flying routine iron bomb missions over the
South . Even though these were real bombing missions they also served as crew
training . Except for Walt and me, none of the other crew members had flown on
a regular SAC combat crew. A lot of mistakes were made, and Walt and I tried
as best we could to train our new crew members . The co-pilot was trying hard to
learn , but the pilot took our suggestions as challenges to his authority as aircraft
commander. It was a touchy situation for all of us.
"We weren't expecting what we found when we went to the briefing room
on the 18th of December 1972. There were a lot more than the normal number
of crews at the briefing, the room was packed. First the briefing officer took the
stage and announced, 'Standby for time hack.' Then he called for the curtains
to be drawn back from the screen. As the screen was coming into view he said,
'Gentlemen , tonight's targets.' There, before us, was a map of North Vietnam.
And the targets were all in the Hanoi area . The silence was deafening. After
several seconds the briefer continued, '129 B-52s from Guam and U-Tapao are
going to join in three waves to bomb the Hanoi area.' My only thought then was,
'Well, it's about bloody time ... we've had this war dragging on for seven years
of my life and we ' ve wasted too damn many fine airmen bombing some pretty
meaningless targets . After the primary briefing we separated for our specialized
briefings. I could hardly believe some of the things I was told we could and could
not do during the mission . No chaff was to be dispensed unless we were under
attack by a fighter. Even with the Phase III ECM suit I would have on my B-52G,
I was to allocate one jammer to jam the missile downlink signal. That was more
than wasted jamming power, it would also take a jammer away from the more
important role of jamming a threat radar. We went over the known threat radars in
our target areas and there were lots of them. The SA-2 SAM sites overlapped so
there was solid coverage from before the Initial Point, IP, to the Egress Point. The
boundary was called the Lethal SAM Line, LSL.

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 Glory Days

"After the briefing our crew reformed outside the alert facility awaiting
transportation to our aircraft. Our pilot didn't seem to know how he was to act
or feel. He only had a couple of hundred hours in the B-52 and still felt awkward
trying to manage a six man crew. When we reached the plane he ordered us to
line up for a pre-mission personal inspection. He wanted our helmets lined up
and us standing behind them. Walt and I hadn't done anything like that since the
Bombing Competition a year and a half earlier. Walt looked at our pilot and said,
'Captain, do you want to take a group picture?' No, he wanted to conduct an
inspection. I had a small 35mm camera in my helmet bag and I handed it to the
crew chief and asked him if he would take our picture. Three shots. One close in
of just the crew, one with the crew and the nose of the airplane, and one further
away to include most of the airplane. When the pictures were taken the chief
returned the camera and I turned to our pilot, 'You were just kidding about the
inspection, right?' I patted him on the back and we started loading our gear on the
plane. The bombers had already been pre-flighted by crews not scheduled to fly.
The mission was to be 16 hours long, plus briefings before, and debriefings after,
would make for a very long day. All we had to do was climb into the airplane, start
engines, and we were ready to take off.
"Finally it was time to start engines for the first wave. The noise level rose
as the eight-engine bombers came to life. KC-135 tankers were already airborne
and heading for the rendezvous points to top us off. We were scheduled for three
airborne refuelings. The bombers taxied to the active runway and began a minimum
interval takeoff, MITO. Bomber takeoffs continued for 87 minutes. The noise
level rose to an ear splitting crescendo. All over the field people stopped to watch
as one after another of the big bombers lumbered down the Andersen runway. At
about the midpoint the wing tips would rise and then slowly the bomber would
separate itself from the concrete and begin to fly. The end of Andersen's runway
went almost to the cliff at the edge of the island. As each bomber came to the edge,
it dropped down slightly, picking up speed before starting to climb. About a mile
from the end of the runway the plane and its black exhaust would reappear and
climb from view. Our call sign was Charcoal 02. We were next for takeoff. We
swung onto the active, the pilots advanced the throttles to maximum power and
the big bomber began its roll, everyone watching time and airspeed as we became
committed to our takeoff.
"I heard the landing gear retract and I knew that put us over the cliff. A few
seconds passed when I heard the radar navigator tell the pilots, 'Get the nose
down!' We were almost at stall speed. The pilot tried to climb the aircraft too
fast, and the plane began to shudder as it entered the beginning of a stall. Again
Walt called over the intercom, 'Get that nose down!' The co-pilot acknowledged

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 Operation Linebacker II

the call, pushed forward on his control column to start a shallow descent and
pick up some airspeed . I am eternally grateful that Walt had been monitoring
our airspeed and altitude. It was reassuring to have a veteran B-52 crew member
pull our butts out of the fire . At our first refueling it became increasingly clear to
me how nervous our pilot was. He made several attempts before finally getting
hooked up to the tanker. We continued on to Thailand and entered a timing pattern
so we could join up with the planes from U-Tapao. After the first attack wave had
formed we continued north across Thailand and Laos. We had been preceded by
chaff laying F-4s, but high winds at our altitude had blown most of the chaff cloud
away before we arrived.
"The night sky over North Vietnam was filled with a variety of aircraft, there
to support the B-52s. While still over Laos I began to see the North Vietnamese
air defense radars appear on my receiver. By the time we reached the North
Vietnamese border it was clear they knew we were coming as they must have
had every radar they owned turned on . The first of our planes were over the target
and released their bombs. On my scope I saw clusters of strong Fansong signals
as well as missile launch indications . I notified the crew over the intercom of the
greatest threats. The radio chatter increased as crews broadcast SAM sightings.
Occasionally one of our two pilots would describe what they were seeing. I wasn't
hearing anything from our navigators. I went on private intercom and called Walt,
our radar navigator and bombardier. 'Walt, what's happening down there?' He
replied, 'The navigator has folded his hands and bowed his head and has been
praying from the time we turned inbound.'
"Walt was getting ready for the bomb run and returned to his task. Shortly
afterwards he announced we were at the IP and told the pilot to center the PDI. I
was calling out missile launches, and the pilots occasionally described the battle
scene. The radio chatter continued to mount, and now there were also distress
signals. Only moments before our bomb release the copilot announced that
Charcoal 01, our cell leader, had been hit and was going down in flames . He
mentioned that he was seeing missiles coming up at us . We were too close to
bombs away to do anything but press on. I had covered the strongest Fansong
radar signals with my jammers and I knew we were probably being tracked . Walt
announced bomb release, then called for the post-target tum. We were at a point
of maximum vulnerability. As a B-52 banks, it doesn't send its jamming energy
down toward the radar and we could be more easily tracked. Since the bomber in
front of us was gone we had lost any mutual jamming support we may have gotten
from him, so I decided to put out three bundles of chaff as we began our tum . I
figured Fansong operators were only human oeings. My dispensing chaff added
one new element to their tracking problem. It might just help us survive. It was at

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 Glory Days

that time that we began to hear the emergency beepers of crews that ejected from
their aircraft." 2
Tom Copier arrived at Korat on December 16. "On the 17th," Tom recounts,
"one of the permanent party guys came over to me and asked, 'Have you been
North?' I said, 'Probably 40 to 50 times in early '68.' He pulled out a map, showed
me where the B-52s were going and where we were supposed to be 15 minutes
in front of them at 25,000 feet. They were coming in at 35,000 feet. We had three
orbits lined up to cover them coming in. They did a 180 degree tum over the
target, changed altitudes and came back on the same track they had come in on.
Why wouldn't you go out over the Gulf? The B-52s became predictable, and that
cost them dearly a couple of nights later. The planes came in on the same exact
corridor, 15 minutes apart, giving the bad guys just enough time to reload and fire
again. We were jamming, and they were lobbing SAMs up blind. They lobbed 200
and some missiles up the first night on the 18th of December. I saw a B-52 fall out
of the sky, it made you want to cry. We did this every night until Christmas, then
for a couple days more.
"The number of tankers over the Plain des Jars to refuel bombers, fighters
and ECM aircraft was unbelievable. One night the wing tanks stopped feeding on
one of our planes in orbit near Hanoi. He called for a tanker, but knew he wasn't
going to make it. One of our radar sites put him on a frequency with a tanker over
northern Laos. The tanker pilot said to our guy, 'Just keep coming at me.' He
flew that KC-135 right into North Vietnam and picked him up. Then he said, 'For
God's sake, don't tell anybody that I refueled you here.' He came right into North
Vietnam and saved one of our EB-66s. In the end, the guys on the hot end of the
stick are the ones who have to make things work. 3
"We had a strong tailwind going into the target," Dave Zook continues, "and
as we turned around it became a headwind slowing our egress. The tum seemed
to last forever and the SAM radar signals were saturating my receivers . I was still
receiving missile guidance signals, but the pilots couldn't see anymore missiles
coming our way. Finally we were wings level and departing the target area. Walt
and our navigator were having a conversation and the navigator had finally gone
back to work. I then did something I had never planned on doing, send a missing
aircraft report to SAC via HF radio. I pulled out the book with report formats and
filled in the blanks for the loss of Charcoal 01 with grease pencil. We were now
well out of SAM range, so I sent the report - a chilling moment for me. The flight
back to Guam was long and quiet. By the time we landed the second day wave
was getting ready for takeoff.
"We learned that we were scheduled to fly again on day three. We had a
pretty intense crew meeting. The experience of the first night motivated everyone

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 Operation Linebacker II

to work as a team , both to accomplish the mission and to survive. We were given
a special breakfast on day three - steak and eggs , and just about everything else
you could imagine seeing in an Air Force mess hall. I thought maybe it was our
last meal, like the condemned get in prison before being executed. As always we
started our briefing with a time hack and then the route and targets were shown .
Same route , same general target areas . I found it difficult to believe that for three
nights in a row massive B-52 strikes would so closely follow the same routes and
use the same tactics. It seemed Air Force planners were violating the rules of war
and becoming predictable. I felt better about the airplane we were to fly on night
three. It had an improved ECM suite to give us better protection. We had the call
sign Tan 02 and our target was the Kinh No military complex on the northwest
side of Hanoi . We would be even closer to downtown Hanoi then on night one.
"The crew seemed more together than on any of our previous missions.
The air refueling went well and we settled down and got ready to do our jobs.
Ninety-nine B-52s were to make up the strike force. Our wave consisted of 12
B-52Gs and 9 B-52Ds from Andersen, plus 18 additional Ds from U-Tapao. We
formed up and headed north. I was monitoring the radios and I could hear on the
HF radio that the first wave had lost three planes with others damaged. As we
approached Hanoi I could hear the battle activity and our pilots could see it. Later
I learned that 220 SA-2 missiles were fired at our strike force that night. There
was a mass of Fansong signals on my receiver. The little screen on the APR-
25 warning receiver showed SAM strobes from the 9 o' clock position to the 3
o 'clock position. This was an electronic war. Our wave leader was over his target,
the Hanoi rail yards. One plane was hit, but the crew managed to fly to a safe area
where they could eject. The cell directly in front of us with the call sign Olive
had gotten out of formation, taking evasive action. Olive 03 ended up about two
miles ahead of Olive 02 at the target. Olive 01 was hit by a SAM. Olive cell had
been bracketed by seven SA-2 sites and they reported 38 SA-2 missiles during
their time over Hanoi. We were next. Less than ten minutes after Olive cell had
released its bombs we were in the target area . A missile hit Tan 03 and the plane
blew up . Only one crew member was able to eject. The toll for the night - four
B-52Gs and two B-52Ds .
"The SAC planners were finally seeing the light. The B-52Gs were pulled
out of the lineup for the time being, and only the more survivable and better ECM
equipped B-52Ds were to carry on. The single line of bomber tactic was discarded,
instead, we were to tighten up the time between cells and waves to give the NVA
less time to reload their missiles . The high banking turn coming off the target was
also discarded. In addition we would attack from different directions to make the
North Vietnamese air defense problem more difficult. This was beginning to make

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 Glory Days

some sense to me. 120 bombers were going to bomb ten targets in the Hanoi and
Haiphong area with a common time over target on the eighth night, December
26, of Linebacker II operations. Seventy-eight bombers came from Andersen,
including 45 B-52Gs and 33 B-52Ds. The other B-52Ds came from U-Tapao.
The better ECM equipped D-models were to attack in the heavily defended Hanoi
area. We would be in a force of 15 G-models and three D-models targeting the
Thai Nguyen rail yards north of Hanoi. Our cell of 18 planes took no hits. There
were strong Fansong and launch signals and the pilots could see missiles in flight,
but they caused no harm. Our after release turn was to the left out over the Gulf
of Tonkin. The new tactics produced good results and the NVAdefenders couldn't
meet the challenge. I flew only one more mission on night ten. There were no
losses for us that night."•
Operation Linebacker II ended on December 29, 1972. The North Vietnamese
delegation returned to the Paris negotiations chastened, but not defeated. Air Force
losses over 11 days of around the clock air operations against North Vietnamese
targets included 15 B-52 bombers, two F-4 fighters, two F-llls and one HH-53
search and rescue helicopter. The U.S. Navy Jost two A-7s and A-6s each, one
RA-SA and one F-4B. Seventeen of these losses were attributed to SA-2 missiles,
three to MiGs, three to AAA, and three to unknown causes.' The NVA's showing
was dismal. During those 11 days the MiGs were pretty much a no show force.
Five that chose to come up were shot down, two by vigilant B-52 gunners, the
only occasion the B-52 bombers used their defensive armament in a combat
situation. Anti-aircraft defenses were largely nullified by having their tracking
radars, Whiff and Firecan, jammed. Over 1,000 SA-2 missiles were fired at the
attacking force. Again, electronic countermeasures applied by B-52s, EB-66s and
EA-6Bs largely rendered the SA-2 surface to air missile system ineffective. "By
28 December, the North Vietnamese air defenses had been practically neutralized,
and on the last two days of Linebacker II, the B-52s were able to fly over Hanoi
and Haiphong without suffering damage." While SAC entered the battle using
dated World War II bomber tactics. Its staff quickly learned a critical lesson: to
survive in the electronic age you adapt or perish. They adapted. "Of the 92 crew
members aboard the downed bombers, 26 were recovered by rescue teams, 33
bailed out over North Vietnam and were captured, 29 were listed as missing, and
four perished in a bomber that crash landed."6 Among the dead was Captain Nutter
Wimbrow, an electronic warfare officer on Ebony 02, a B-52D out of U-Tapao,
shot down over Hanoi on the night of the 120 bomber raid. Captain David Zook
may not have known that his one-time EB-66C crew mate from Takhli was in the
air that night, in a B-52 cell just ahead or behind him.

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There were other operational losses as well, not reflected in the official Air
Force listing of combat losses. The EB-66s of the 42nd TEWS from Korat were
there every night to help protect the vulnerable B-52 bombers. They flew their
defensive orbits, arriving fifteen minutes before the B-52s, and staying until the
last bomber exited the target area. The EB-66s flew lower than the bombers to
provide optimum ECM support, and were frequently within easy reach of the
SA-2 missile systems. Yet surprisingly none of the EB-66s or Navy EA-6Bs were
lost or damaged. On December 23, the sixth night of Linebacker II operations, the
42nd TEWS was tasked to provide ECM support for 30 B-52s attacking targets in
the Haiphong area. Their orbits were to be east of Haiphong. Seventh Air Force
tasking called for a minimum of two aircraft, three if possible. Hunt 01, 02 and 03,
three EB-66Es, took off on time and proceeded to their refueling track over the Gulf
of Tonkin. After 30 minutes of flight, Hunt 02 returned to Korat when his canopy
cracked and pressurization was lost. Blue Chip, the 7th Air Force command post,
requested a relaunch, based on a 45-minute time over target slip for the B-52s.
Another aircraft was available, 54-529. The crew switched planes and took off to
rejoin the other two EB-66Es. Again, they experienced pressurization problems
and had to return to Korat.
Hunt 02 was eight miles from touchdown . Major Sasser was advised by the
final controller, 'Wheels should be down. Begin descent.' At four miles Hunt 02
was on glide path, then turned left, was on course at three miles, continued on
glide path. At decision height, Hunt 02 was 'On course, on glide path, over the
approach lights.' It was then that Major Sasser called 'Going around.' The GCA
controller continued, 'Over landing threshold. Understand you are going around?'
Sasser replied 'I just lost an engine.'' The aircraft was over the landing threshold.
Could have and should have touched down. Instead, Major George Sasser elected
to go around, experienced engine failure, made a gentle, descending 90 degree
tum off the end of the runway - and crashed.
Captain Terry Buettner arrived at Korat in October 1972. As the squadron
flying safety officer Terry was tasked to lead the accident investigation. "It was a
clear night, with no wind to speak of," Terry recalls. "Major Sasser flew a precision
radar approach, and the tapes from the tower indicated that he was pretty much
on course, on glide slope all the way. The left engine flamed out, and he started
a go-around. We never knew why he initiated the go-around. At about 500 feet
above the ground, and three-fourth of the way down the runway, people reported
seeing the aircraft enter a gentle left tum, the aircraft was descending slightly, and
continued to descend until it was lost from sight. The aircraft impacted in a Royal
Thai Air Force housing area. The crew of three perished in the crash. I conducted
flight tests with a similar aircraft at the computed gross weight of the accident

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 Glory Days

aircraft, and it was completely controllable. It would climb on one engine, even
with the landing gear extended. All members of the accident board kept asking
'Why would he go around when the landing was assured?' We never found an
answer."8

350
 CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

A TIME FOR WAR

AND A TIME FOR PEACE

The last MiG-21 of the war was downed on January 7, 1973, by an F-4D from the
4th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, at Udorn
RTAFB, Thailand. Linebacker II had ended on December 29, a week earlier. On
January 15 , offensive operations against North Vietnam were officially suspended
and the Paris negotiated cease fire became effective on January 28 . On February
12 Operation Homecoming was initiated, the return of 591 American prisoners of
war from North Vietnamese captivity - men incarcerated under utterly degrading
circumstances, having experienced both torture and deprivation. On April 17 the
last B-52 Arc Light mission of the war was flown against targets in Laos, and
the last Air Force combat missions of the war were flown by A-7D and F-11 lF
aircraft against targets in Cambodia. The shooting war in Southeast Asia was over.
No 'dominoes' fell as a result of the war's outcome. In years to come a black
marble monument would arise on the Mall in Washington D.C., commemorating
the ultimate sacrifice of over 50,000 American fighting men . On April 30, 1975,
Saigon was captured by the North Vietnamese Army and renamed Ho Chi Minh
City - the final irony of a strange war.
The 42nd TEWS at Korat entered an operational twilight zone in 1973. In
early January EB-66Es supported 192 B-52 Arc Light missions over the North
Vietnamese panhandle and Laos. By February Arc Light support dwindled to
116 missions, then 41 missions in March. When on April 17 the last B-52 Arc
Light mission was flown, the EB-66E janunil)g aircraft was out of a job. Since
the E-model was considered an offensive aircraft, 7th Air Force decided that their

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 Glory Days

Going home. Lieutenant Al Kersis, second from left, celebrates completing JOO missions over North
Vietnam in 1968. He later flew with the 39th TEWS at Spangdahlem, then transferred to the backseat
of an RF-4C at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

352
 A Time for War and a Time for Peace

jammers could not be turned on even for training purposes. The EB-66C moved
to the fore, flying ELINT missions against North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin
and along routes over Laos. Cambodia was added as a potential location for SA-2
SAM systems. Searches by EB-66C aircraft turned up no Fansong radars, nor any
other radars in Cambodia. Even these limited training opportunities dwindled as
the Cambodian cease fire on August 15, and the earlier Laotian peace agreement,
restricted reconnaissance flights to routes within the borders of Thailand.
In spite of the war's end, the42nd TEWS,only authorized a total of 13 aircraft ,
maintained a strength of 25 E and C-models. Pilots, navigators and electronic
warfare officers from the 39th TEWTS at Shaw AFB continued to augment a
squadron which did not have enough work for the men it had assigned . In the
draw-down of forces someone at Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia, forgot about them. Captain Tom Copier, on his third
temporary duty tour at Korat, did not. "I went over in April '72 for 120 days, then
again in December '72 for 90 days, and back again in May of '73 for my last TDY.
The war was over, and we weren't flying at all. The general commanding 13th
Air Force at Clark had one of his budget officers get suggestions on how to save
money. I submitted a suggestion on how much it was costing to keep us on TDY
over here, not flying airplanes, when we could be back home, and if necessary
return within 72 hours. What was the sense of us sitting at Korat? Evidently TAC
headquarters had forgotten us , and the folks at Shaw weren't saying anything.
I put this thing together and sent it to 13th Air Force. The next thing I know
I get a phone call from Shaw raising holy hell with me for getting them into
trouble . Phone call or not, we were out of there within 48 hours." By February
of 1974, after the 39th TEWTS at Shaw closed its doors, Tom Copier, Joe Sapere
and several other EB-66 navigators received assignments to F-111 s at Mountain
Home AFB, Idaho. Tom retired in the rank of colonel.'
Colonel Robert K. Crouch was the commander of the 388th Tactical Fighter
Wing at Korat. It had become a composite wing including F-4E, A-7D, EB-66,
F-1050 and C-130 aircraft. It no longer bothered anyone that a fighter wing
accommodated different aircraft types. "On assuming command in July 1973 my
primary task was to continue supporting the Cambodian and Laotian war efforts,"
wrote Colonel Crouch in his end of tour report. "On average we launched 18
F-4Es a day and 14 A-7Ds, three or four EB-66s, and five C-130s. The F-1050
Wild Weasel aircraft were withdrawn when it was determined that a SAM threat
did not exist in Cambodia. We also had three EC-121s from the College Eye task
force as a tenant unit. On August 15 , the day of the Cambodian cease fire , the
war in Southeast Asia officially ended." A-7Ds from the 388th TFW flew the last
bombing mission that afternoon, and the honor of flying the last combat mission

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 Glory Days

of the war went to an EC-121 aircraft which landed at Korat after the A-7Ds had
already returned. "On 15 August an era of combat ended and we entered a period
of training. The 388TFW continued to fly 7AF directed missions over unfriendly
territory in C-130 and EB-66C aircraft. These were electronic surveillance
missions of Laos, Cambodia, South and North Vietnam, but only overflew Laos
and Cambodia. To provide training for our crews we developed an exercise with
the Navy, WEASELEX. In this exercise the EB-66Es flew together with the F-
105G Wild Weasels against the radars of the U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
This training was ended in November 1973 because of the war in the Middle East
and the ensuing fuel shortage." 2 One war ended. Another began.
Keeping its 25 aging EB-66 aircraft in flying condition continued to be a
problem for the commanders of the 42TEWS. On February 4, EB-66E 54-442
developed low oil pressure which led to the engine being shut down. On shutting
down the engine, complete electrical failure was experienced and the back-up
systems were not operating as they should have. A night blackout single engine
landing was made at Nakom Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base - no panel
lights, no cabin lights, no interphone nor radio. The EWO used his flashlight to
illuminate the flight instruments for the pilot. The aircraft landed long, the drag
chute failed, and the right tire blew when brakes were applied. The aircraft ran off
the end of the runway. Reflects the squadron history, "The crew escaped safely
with minimal damage to the aircraft." On February 23, 54-523 on a local training
sortie had number two engine flame out - complete electrical failure was the
immediate result. The engine restarted and an uneventful landing was made. The
aircraft was grounded until all electrical systems were thoroughly checked. On
another occasion an aircraft experienced an engine fire while taxiing. A major
fuel leak in an engine occurred on yet another aircraft as it was passing through
10,000 feet. Rudder trim mechanisms jammed. The throttle on an aircraftjanuned
so power could not be reduced. There seemed to be no end to the number and type
of problems these worn out aircraft began to experience. Engines, flight controls,
landing gear, hydraulics, flaps - all had multiple failures in the first quarter of
1973.3
With a reduced flying schedule in the second quarter of 1973, maintenance
was able to substantially improve the in-commission rate of their airplanes. Then
on May 3 the routine turned into tragedy. EB-66E 54-445 was at the maintenance
dock undergoing a Phase VI inspection, which included up and down jacking of
the aircraft, trimming the engine, and hot jet calibration. The engine trim and hot
jet calibration were scheduled for the morning hours, with Staff Sergeant Clarence
Lords as the A-man, the man in the cockpit. Lords's assistant, called the B-man,
was Technical Sergeant William E. Tompkins who would do the outside work.

354
 A Time for War and a Time for Peace

Technical Sergeant Larry A. Kelly was with Lords to receive instructions. The
crew chief for the engine trimming and calibration work was Sergeant Vauriece
D. Maddox. Sergeant Lords began his walk-around with Kelly by his side. They
noted that the aircraft chocks were in place and snug . In the cockpit, Kelly sat
down in the pilot 's seat. Lords stood to his rear instructing him on circuit breakers,
panels and switches . Somehow the anti-skid switch was overlooked - it should
have been in the off position . Immediately after the accident the switch was found
to be in the on position.
The engine start-up continued in accordance with established procedures .
The parking brakes were set before the right engine was started and brought to 80
percent power. Then the left engine was started. Both engines were stabilized in
idle at which time the parking brakes were reset. The next step was to bring the
engines to military power, allow them to run for three minutes, and then start the
calibration check. After two minutes of running the engines at full military power,
the aircraft suddenly lurched forward . Maddox, sensing motion, tried to run,
then threw himself to the ground. Tompkins, not perceiving aircraft movement ,
was knocked down . The right tire of the plane virtually severed his left leg six
inches below the hip joint. In the cockpit, Kelly tried to reapply the brakes by
hitting the brake pedals, but got no braking response . He cut off the engines .
The aircraft traveled about 170 feet, knocked down a concrete electric pole and a
wooden outside latrine before coming to a stop off the trim pad. Lords ran over to
Tompkins and stopped the bleeding by pinching off a severed artery to the leg. He
continued to do that until the doctor arrived. Lords quick thinking saved the life
of Sergeant Tompkins. Sergeant Tompkins was evacuated to the U-Tapao hospital
where his leg was amputated .4 Damage to the airplane was minor. However, the
decision was made to take Class 26 action and write the airplane off as a loss .
Aircrew proficiency began to decline as flying was reduced to a minimum.
Ninety-five percent of the new crews had little B-66 experience. Their first
experience with the aircraft was at Shaw AFB. It is hardly surprising that the
average for EB-66 flying time for all aircrews was between 150 and 175 hours.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Mendonca, who took command of the squadron in
July, had his job cut out for him to keep his inexperienced aircrews flying safely
and responding to inflight emergencies in an appropriate manner. To Mendonca's
credit, he did just that. Although the aircraft continued to experience a variety of
in-flight emergency situations, his pilots always brought the aging aircraft back.
In September a number of squadron personnel had their tours curtailed and were
reassigned to other duties. By October all training flights were suspended for
the EB-66E. EB-66C training missions were c'anceled effective November 5 as
a fuel conservation measure . On December 24 , the last combat coded mission

355
 Glory Days

was flown by an EB-66C. A message received the following day from 13th Air
Force at Clark directed the deployment of all aircraft to Clark Air Base where
'reclamation would be accomplished.' All 24 aircraft were to be ferried to Clark
in two, two-ship formations every third day. On 2 January 1974 the first four
aircraft departed Korat for Clark Air Base near Manila in the Philippine Islands, a
frequent stop for B-66s since 1957 . The last group of four aircraft departed Korat
on January 17, arriving without mishap at their final destination. There the aircraft
were stripped of all useable equipment. For a long time their fading hulks sat on
an unused ramp at Clark reminding arriving aircraft of the eventual fate of all
combat planes. For nearly nine years these airplanes, manned by truly courageous
aircrews, had flown into the face of fear so that others might live. MiGs and SAMs
tried hard to knock them from the skies, few succeeded. Time eventually did what
a determined enemy failed to accomplish.5 The remaining members of the 42nd
TEWS departed Thailand in early February 1974, and the squadron was formally
inactivated on March 15. While involved in combat operations in the Vietnam
War the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron was awarded the Presidential
Unit Citation; the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with combat V device for
valor on four different occasions; the Navy Meritorious Unit Citation, and the
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm. The men, those who flew and
those who maintained, earned everyone of those scant recognitions for their years
of challenging and difficult service to their nation. 6
With the demise of the last EB-66 combat squadron, there was no further
need for the 39th Tactical Electronic Warfare Training Squadron at Shaw AFB
at Sumter, South Carolina. The squadron, like the 42nd TEWS at Korat, began
transferring its remaining aircraft early in the year to the Aircraft Storage and
Disposition Center at Davis-Monthan AFB, in Tucson, Arizona, better known
as the boneyard. Al Kersis, a Raven assigned to the 39th TEWTS recalls "Jim
Milam and I took a C-model from Shaw to Nellis AFB on January 4, 1974. We
stayed there until February 2nd, flying the Nellis air combat ranges doing signal
measurements. That was the last operational mission flown by a B-66 aircraft."7
The formal squadron inactivation ceremony was presided over by the 363rd
TRW commander, Colonel William J. Bally. All that remained to be done was to
mount 54-465 at Shaw's front gate. 54-465 became a symbol of memories and
accomplishments spanning twenty years of service to the nation in peace and war
- a reminder for the men who flew and maintained these aircraft, for their families
and friends, and all visitors to Shaw Air Force Base, of a proud and stellar past.

356
 NOTES

Notes Chapter I
I. Samuel, Wolfgang, W. American Raiders: The Race to Capture the Luftwaffe's Secrets,
University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, 2004, p. 63.
2. James , Martin E. Historical Highlights , United States Air Force in Europe , 1945-1979, Office
of History, Headquarters USAFE.APO New York 09012 , 28 November 1980, p. 4 .
3. Hooper. Craig. Going Down With the Ships , The Washington Post, March 5 , 2007, p. Al5 .
4. Samuel , Wolfgang W.E. I Always Wanted to Fly: America's Cold War Airmen , University
Press of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, 2001, p. 182.
5. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. American Raiders: The Race to Capture the Luftwaffe 's Secrets ,
University Press of Mississippi , Jackson, MS, 2004, p. 429.
6. James, Martin E. p. 9.
7. LeMay, Curtis E. Mission With leMay, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York,
1965, p. 411.
8. Kennan. George F. Memoirs 1925-1950, The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, MA , 1967, pp.
291-292, 364.
9 . Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command 1946-1976, Office of the Historian,
Headquarters , Strategic Air Command , Offutt AFB, Omaha, NE, 21 March 1976, p. 2.
10. LeMay, Curtis E. pp. 432-433.
11. Ibid, p. 441.
12. Samuel, Wolfgang W.E. /Always Wanted to Fly, p. 305 .
13 . Lobdell , Hanison, Jr., Interview by Hugh N . Ahmann, 15 March 1991 , Maxwell AFB . AL.
14. Samuel , Wolfgang W. E. American Raiders, p. 152.
15. Ibid, p. 434.
16. Bohn , p . 13 .
17. Smith, Richard K. 75 Years of Inflight Refueling, Highlights, 1923-1998, Air Force History
and Museums Program. Washington DC, 1998, pp . 29-3 1.
18. Tilford, Earl, H. Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why, Air University Press ,
MaxwellAFB , AL , June 1991,pp. 11-15.

Notes Chapter 2
I. Ridgway, Matthew B . Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, Greenwood Press ,
Westport, CN, 1956, p. 191.

357
 Glory Days

2. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. /Always Wanted to Fly, p. 99.

3. Summers, Harry G. Jr., Korean War Almanac, Facts on File, Inc., New York, 1990, p. 117.
4. Lobdell, Harrison, Interview.
5. Knaack, Marcelle S. Post-World War ll Bombers 1945-1973, Office of AF History, Washington
DC, 1988, pp. 546-551.
6. History of the Tactical Air Command, Volume IV, Jan-Jun 1953, Langley AFB, VA, p. 54.
7. Ibid, pp. 297-303.
8. Ibid, p. 343.
9. B-RB-66 Tactical Support Airplane, Memorandum, HQ AMC, Wright Patterson AFB, OH,
5/22/53, to CCffAC, Langley AFB, VA, p. 9
10. Wagner, Reginald W. Report of TDY, HQ AMC, ECM Weapons Phasing Group, Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH, 16 Dec 1954, p. 3.
11. Improved Turret for B-66, Memorandum, HQ TAC/OA, to DO/DM/RQ, 9 March 1954.
12. Aircraft Equipment (BIRB-66) , Ltr from HQ TAC, Langley AFB, VA, to Director
Requirements, HQ USAF, Washington DC, 2April 1953.
13. Schroder, Karl H. Readers Forum, Letter to the Editor,Air Classics, January 1974, p. 61.
14. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. American Raiders, p. 218.
15. Ibid, p. 131.
16. Hotz, Robert, Moscow's May Day Air Review. Reds' Surprise: 15,000-lb-Thrust Jets,
Aviation Week, 5/31/54, pp. 11-12.
17. Alling, Frederick A., History of the BIRB-66 Weapon System 1952-1959, Vol I, Historical
Study No. 324,Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 1960, p. 10.
18. Ibid, Knaack p. 407.
19. History of the Tactical Air Command, Aircraft Requirements, Jan-Jun 1954, Langley AFB,
VA,p . l.
20. Interview with Colonel Kenneth Chilstrom, USAF (Ret.), June 19, 2007.
21. Lightweight J-57 Engine for F-100 Aircraft, Ltr HQ USAF, Washington DC, to CCffAC,
Langley AFB, VA, 10 Sep 1953.
22. History of the Tactical Air Command, Jan-Jun 1954, p. 2.
23. Lobdell, Harrison, Interview.
24. Knaack, Marcelle S. Post-World War II Bombers, pp. 546-551.
25. Unsatisfactory Report, RB-66 J-71-9111, AFTO Form 29, #55-1690, AF Flight Test Center,
Edwards AFB, CA, 8 Oct 1955.
26. Manlove, Cliff, The Early Years, The Destroyer, Summer 2005 .
27 . Ibid, Alling p. 11.

Notes Chapter 3
1. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. J Always Wanted to Fly, p. 183.
2. Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command, p. 43.
3. Destination Freedom, Aviation Week, April 26, 1954, p. 44.
4. Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command, pp. 44-45.
5. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. J Always Wanted to Fly, pp. 188-189.
6. Ibid, pp. 198-214.
7. News at Deadline -Newsletter, American Aviation, May 24, 1954, p. 3.
8. Ferrel, Robert H. ed. The Twentieth Century: An Almanac, World Almanac Publications, New
York, 1985, p. 331.
9. Knaack, Marcelle S. Post-World War ll Bombers, p. 415.
10. RB-66A CTC Inspection, Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach, CA, March 22, 1954,
pp. 1-71.
11 . B-RB-66 Tactical Support Plane, Memorandum, HQ AMC, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 22
May 1953, to CCffAC, Langley AFB, VA, p. 6.
12. Email June 20,2006, from Colonel Tom Whitlock to Cliff Parrott, former Douglas Company
Senior Technical Representative at Shaw AFB, SC, Subject: B-66.
13 . Chilstrom, Kenneth and Leary, Penn, ed., Test Flying at Old Wright Field, Westchester House
Publishers, Omaha, NE, 1993.
14. Email Nov 30, 2006, from Cliff Parrott to Colonel Wolfgang Samuel, Subject: Ejection
Questions.

358
 Notes

15. Lusk . Ralph W. & Porter John A . Phase V (Adi·erse Weath er) Flixht Tesr of RB-668 Aircraft.
Wright-Air Development Center. Wright-Patterson AFB. OH . July 1956. pp. 1-9.17.
16.lbid.pp.11-16.
17. Aircraft Crash. Fire and Rescue Report. AF Form 282 . Explosion of Right Wheel Assembly,
B-66B 53-418. Kirtland AFB . NM. 3 Apr 56.

Notes Chapter 4
I. Operarinns and Air Training Activitv and Srarus Reporr. from HQ I ?Bombardment Wing ,
Hurlburt Field. FL. to CC/9AF. Shaw AFB. SC. 5 April 1956. p. 2.
2. Ibid. p. 32.
3. Werre II. Kenneth P. Those Were rhe Days: flving Safety during rhe Transirion ro Jers, 1944-53.
Air Power History. Winter 2005. pp. 49-51.
4. Ibid. Operarions and Air Training Activity and Status Report, p. 2.
5. Email. James B. Story. Lt/Colonel. USAF (Ret.). January 31, 2007. to Colonel Wolfgang
Samuel. USAF (Ret.). Subject: B-66.
6. Hisrorv of rhe Tacrical Air Command, Aircraft Requirements. Langley AFB, VA. Jan-Jun
1954. p. 20.
7. Hisrory of the 363D Tacrical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB , SC, Jan-Jun 1956, p. I.
8. Operations and Air Training Acriviry and Sratus Reporr, p. 27.
9. Reporr of Aircraft Accidenr. AF Form 14, 34BS/17BW. Hurlburt Field , FL. B-66B 54-497.
Fuel Filter Design. 6 October 1956.
IO. Reporr of Aircraft Accidenr, AF Form 14, 9TRS/363TRW Shaw AFB , SC, WB-66D 55-394,
Fuel Filter Design. 5 September 1961.
11. Reporr of Aircraft Accident. AF Form 14, 42TRS/ IOTRW. RAF Chelveston, RB-66C 54-460.
Fuel Filter Design. 7 February 1962 .
12. Ibid . Samuel. Wolfgang , I Always Wanted to Fly, pp. 215-229.
13. Ibid , Bohn. John T.. Development of Strategic Air Command, p. 60.
14. Witze. Claude 0 .. Administration Hits Airpower Opponents, Aviation Week, May 14. 1956,
pp. 26-27 .
IS. Johnson. Katherine, USSR Will Have Knock-Out Punch in '59, Aviation Week, May 28 ,
1956. p. 27.
16. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 95BS/l 7BW Hurlburt Field, FL. B-66B 54-493.
April I. 1957.
17. Reporr of Aircraft Accidenr. AF Form 14, 95BS/17BW Hurlburt Field, FL, B-66B 54-495,
Sept3.1957.
18. High, Kenneth Lt/Colonel. USAF (Ret.), Memorandum, 'Mobile Zebra,' April 13, 2007.
19. History of the Tactical Air Command, Aircraft Requirements , Langley AFB, VA, Jan-Jun
1954. p. 16.
20. Air Force to Use Fiscal '57 Funds to Build Successor to 8-52, Industry News Digest,
American Aviation , May 7. 1956. p. IO.
21. l 7BW Supplement to USAF Operations Plan 57-2 , Deployment of 8-668s, and Operations
Order 79-57, HQ 17BW. 20 December 1957, Air Operations.

Notes Chapter 5
I. Interview with Lt/Colonel Donald Harding , USAF (Ret.), October 2006 , San Antonio, Texas.
2. Memorandum from Major General David V. Miller, July 2007.
3. Harding interview.
4. Email from John Davis, June 27 , 2006, Subject: B-66.
5. Harding interview.
6. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 84BS/47BW RAF Sculthorpe, B-66B 55-314,
March 30, 1958 .
7. Miller memorandum .
8. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 85BS/47BW RAF Sculthorpe, B-66B 54-499,
October 26, 1961.
9. Memorandum from Major Kenneth High, USAF (Ret.) to author re presidential escort mission
in 1959.

359
 Glory Days

10. Ltr from Lt/Col Donald Orr to 89 Airlift Wing, Andrews AFB, MD, dated April 21, 2004.
Subject: Escort of Air Force One by B-66B Aircraft on 7/14 December 1959 over Turkey and Iran.
HQ/USAF msg, 4 Dec 1959. Subject: Jet Fighter Escort for Monsoon. HQ/USAFE msg, 2 Dec 1959.
Subject: Jet Fighter Escort for Monsoon . HQ/USAF msg, 4 Dec 59, same subject.
11. High memorandum.
12. Ltr from Colonel Harris B. Hull, HQ PACAF, to Lt/General Ira Eaker, February 3, 1958.

Notes Chapter 6
I . Major General Miller interview.
2. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, RB-66B 54-422, l 9TRS/ IOTRW, RAF Sculthorpe,
April 14, 1958.
3. Email , August 7, 2006, Sgt Ken L. Weiand, USAF (Ret.), Subject: B-66 Incidents.
4. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, RB-66B 54-437, 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Sculthorpe,
July 2, 1958.
5. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, RB-668 54-433, 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Sculthorpe,
July 3, 1958.
6. Email, July 26, 2006, Colonel Lewis J. Partridge, USAF (Ret.), Subject: 19TRS.
7. Email, Aug 10, 2006, Pete West, Subject: June 59 Crash at Spangdahlem.
8. Email, Aug 16, 2006, Thomas Fitzgerald, Subject: And Now the Rest of the Story.
9 . Email, Aug, 2006, Colonel Lewis Partridge, USAF (Ret.)
10. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, RB-668 54-432, 19TRS/10TRW, Spangdahlem,
July 3 1959.
II. Village Plans for Annual Patton Tribute, Cackle, Paul, Skyblazer, Spangdahlem Air Base
weekly paper, Jµne 1959.
12. Email, July 24, 2006, Robert J. Ganci, Subject: A B-66 Gunner's Life .
13. Interview with Lt/Colonel Lester Almbaugh, USAF (Ret.), Vienna, VA, July 7, 2006.
14. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, RB-668 54-430, 19TRS/l OTRW, RAF Alconbury,
March 16, 1961.
15. Almbaugh interview.

Notes Chapter 7
I. Hrivnak, Michael J. 50thAnniversary Shaw Air Force Base, S.C.1941-1991, Office of History,
363 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, 1991, pp. 2-35 .
2. Ibid, p. 64.
3. Interview with Cliff Parrott, Senior Douglas Aircraft Corporation Representative (Ret.), at
Shaw AFB, SC, June 6, 2006, Knoxville, TN.
4 . History of the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, Jan-Jun 1956, p.52.
5. Cliff Parrott interview.
6. Interview with Robert R. Webster, USAF (Ret.), October 2006, San Antonio, TX.
7. Cliff Parrott interview.
8. Cliff Parrott interview.
9. History of the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, Jan-Jun 1958, p . 15 .
10. Cliff Parrott interview.
11 . Email from Jay Spaulding, USAF (Ret.) , July 29, 2006, Subject: RB-66 Accident.
12. Cliff Parrott interview.
13. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, May 29, 1959, 9TRS/363TRW Shaw AFB, SC,
WB-66D 55-400.
14. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14,April II, 1957, 43TRS/363TRW Shaw AFB, SC,
RB-668 53-410.
15. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, May 8, 1959, 16TRS/363TRW Shaw AFB, SC,
RB-668 53-473 .
16. History of the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, Jan-Jun 1959, p. 7.
17. Werrell,Kenneth B., Those Were the Days: Flying Safety during the Transition to Jets, 1944-
53,Air Power History, Winter 2005, p. 51.
18. Cliff Parrott interview.

360
 Nores

Notes Chapter 8
l. Email from Robert R. Webster. USAF (Ret.) . February 7. 2007. Subject: B-66.
2. Email from Robert Webster. USAF (Ret.). February 26, 2007. Subject: Interview Tape.
3. Interview with Harrison Lobdell . Jr. Major General, USAF (Ret.) , by Hugh N. Ahmann, 15
March 1991.MaxwellAFB.AL.
4. Email from Dave Eby. Colonel , USAF (Ret.). January 27 , 2007. Subject: B-66 Book.
5. Interview Robert R. Webster. USAF (Ret.). February, 2007 , Hardin , KY.
6. History of the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing . Shaw AFB, SC. Jan-Jun 1958 , p.48.
7. Email from Dave Eby. Colonel , USAF (Ret.} , January 27 , 2007, Subject: B-66 Book.
8. Ibid. History of the 363d. Flying Hour Allocation .
9. Frank . Art . Report.from Adana , RECON Record , 12 September 1958, 363d TRW, Shaw AFB ,
SC.
10. Out of Briefcases & Red Folders , a Classic Show of Power & Speed, Jul 28 , 1958, National
Affairs. Time Magazine (www time com)
11 . Richards , Leveret G. , John Day Co. Inc .. 1961 , TAC: The Story of the Tactical Air Command ,
pp. 159-173.
12. History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group (TAC). 15 January - 30 June 1958 , Langley
AFB , VA , pp. 124- 128.
13 . Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 17 July 1958 , RB-66B 53-459, 41TRS/363TRW,
Shaw AFB , SC.
14. Ibid.
15 . Memo from Cliff A. Parron. Douglas Service Representative , Shaw AFB , SC , to R.F.
Killingsworth. C2 l 3. 11 September 1958 . Subject: Battle Damage of RB-66B Aircraft.
16. Shaw Contingent Commended, RECON Record , September 1958 , 363d TRW, Shaw AFB ,
SC.
17. Letter from Ronald Darrah , recollections of deployment to Adana, Turkey, during 1958
Lebanon crisis.

Notes Chapter 9
1. Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command 1946-1947, Office of the Historian.
Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB , Omaha, NE, March 1976 , pp. 65-74.
2. Ibid.
3. Stamm, Robert Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Reflections on the 11th and 12th TAC Recon
Squadrons , 67TRW, Yokota Air Base , Japan , The Destroyer, Summer 2002, p. 3.
4. Stem, Robert FS0-1 (Ret.) , The Very Old Corps. The Destroyer, Summer 2005 , pp. 9-10.
5 . Emails from Dick Miles, John Parsons, Peter West, Dave Henby, Ken High and Leon Kirk ,
June 27 . 2007 , subject: JATO.
6. Email from Robert Stamm February 8, 2007, re KB-50 aerial tanker and RB -66 refueling.
7. History of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Yokota Air Base, Japan, 1 July - 31
December 1957, p. 32.
8. Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 18 July 1957 , RB-66B 54-428 , 12TRS/67TRW,
Yokota Air Base, Japan .
9. Ibid , History of the 67TRW, pp. 12-13.
10. Ibid, History of the 67TRW, pp. 142-143.
11 . Interview with Arthur K. Taylor, Colonel , USAF (Ret.) , October 2006, San Antonio, Texas.

Notes Chapter 10
I. Interview with Arthur K. Taylor.
2. Report of Aircraft Accident , AF Form 14, 15 November 1958 , RB -66C 54-476, llTRS/
67TRW Yokota Air Base, Japan .
3. Ibid , Interview with Arthur K. Taylor.
4. Memorandum from David D. Cooper, USAF (Ret.) and emails dated June 27, 28 and July 9 ,
2006 re reconnaissance operations of l lTRS and crash of RB-66C November 15 , 1959.
5. Email from Leon Kirk , USAF (Ret.) , May 121 2006, Subject: B-66, relating to events
surrounding crash of RB-66C on February 9, 1959; and Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14, 9
February 1959, RB-66C 54-472, l 1TRS/67TRW Yokota Air Base , Japan .

361
 Glory Days

6. AF Jet Crashes In Korea; 4 Safe, I Dead, 2 Missing, The Stars & Stripes, Pacific Edition,
date unknown.
7 . Email from Major Lloyd Neutz to author, January 31, 2007, Subject: B-66 DFC Flight.
8. Air Force Magazine, 2007 Space Almanac, Mehuron, Tamar A. ed., pp. 74-91,August 2007 .
9. Ibid, Interview with Arthur K. Taylor.

Notes Chapter 11
l. Email Jerry Mosby, December 28, 2006, Subject: More RB-66 Info.
2 . Email Ned Colburn, July 18, 2002, Subject: Paul Bjork & Carl Covey Remembered.
3. Reponen, Gerald Lt/Colonel , USAF (Ret.), unpublished memoir, p. 8-26.
4. Email Gayle P. Johnson, April 12, 2007, Subject: Eglin Firepower Demo.
5. Ibid, Reponen, pp. 8-26- 8-27 .
6. The Washington Post Magazine , story about The Missiles of October and the role of Major
Richard Heyser, October 26, 2003, Michael Dobbs, pp. 15-21.
7. The Missiles ofCuba-1962,PartI,SandersA. Laubenthal,Klaxon, Vol 7 ,Spring 2000,pp. 1-
2; Part II, Fall 2000, pp. 36-39. The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962, January 2001, Naval Historical
Center, Washington DC.
8. Hrivnak, Michael J., 50th Anniversary Shaw Air Force Base, S.C. 1941-1991, pp. 83-84.
9. Email Joe Canady, December 18, 2006, Subject: B-66. Addresses reconnaissance operations
against Cuba.
10. Ibid, Samuel, Wolfgang W. E.,J Always Wanted to Fly, pp. 150-151.

Notes Chapter 12
1. Reponen, Gerald Lt/Colonel , USAF (Ret.), unpublished memoir.
2. Ibid.
3. History of the 66th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 1 July 1956 - 31 December 1956, pages
not numbered.
4. Ibid Reponen.
5. Emails Steve Wooden, May 7, and May l l, 2006, Subject: B-66.
6 . Ibid Reponen.
7 . AF Form 14, Report of Aircraft Accident, 9 December 1958 , RB-66B 54-535, 30TRS, lOTRW,
Spangdahlem AB, Germany.
8. Ibid Reponen .
9. Ibid Reponen .
10. Ibid Reponen.

Notes Chapter 13
I. Bohn, John T. pp. 57-60.
2. James, Martin E. pp. 29-31.
3. Letter, April 22, 2007, from Earl McC!intock, USAF (Ret.), describing the events surrounding
the ejection from an RB-66B on April 5, 1963, Toul-Rosieres AB, France.
4. Email from Kermit W. Helmke, April 28 , 20007, Subject: RB-66B Ejection.
5 .AFForm 14, Report of Aircraft Accident, February 4, 1963, RB-66B 54-530, 19TRS, lOTRW,
Tulsa, OK.
6. Ibid , Samuel, Wolfgang W.E. I Always Wanted to Fly, pp. 148-15!.
7. Rich, Ben R. Skunk Works, Little Brown & Company, New York, 1994, p. 123 .
8. Ibid, Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. I Always Wanted to Fly, p. 150.
9. Letter from Major David I. Holland, USAF, (Ret.), October 10, 2006, with attachment: 'Check
Ride to Soviet Detention.'
10. Fighter Regiment of Strategic Containment, from the History of the 35th Fighter Air
Regiment, The world of Aviation, February 2002 , pp. 44-50, as translated by N. Connors, June 2,
2004.
11 . Ibid, David E. Holland.
12. The 120-Mile Error, The World , Time Magazine, March 20, 1964, Time Archive 1923 to
the Present.
13. Email Kermit W. Helmke, October 17, 2004, Subject: RB-66B.

362
 Notes

14. Check Ride to Soviet Detention. Major David I. Holland. USAF (Ret.). Daedalus Flyer,
Spring 1990. p. 23.
15. Email Don Adee. August 10. 2006. Subject: RB-66 Shootdown 1964.
16. Ibid. Check Ride to Sol'iet Detention, letter from Colonel Gardina. USAF (Ret.) reflecting on
the events after the shoot-down of Major Holland , pp. 23-24.
17. Email Norm Goldberg. September 18. 2006. Subject: B-66 Shootdown.
18. Ibid. Check Ride to Soviet Detention, letter from Colonel Gardina. USAF (Ret.) reflecting on
the events after the shoot-down of Major Holland. pp. 23-24.
19. Handwritten note from Mrs. Rosemary Gardina to Kermit Helmke. January 9. 1996, including
an unidentified newspaper clipping of the obituary of Colonel Verne Gardina . Colonel Gardina was
laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery on January 30. 1995.
20. U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XIV,
Office of the Historian. Document 20. Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson,
Moscow. April 2. 1964.
21. Ibid . Document 21 . Letter from President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev, Washington ,
April 17. 1964.
22 . Ibid. email Don Adee .
23. Baxter. James P.. Scientists Against Time , The M.l.T. Press , Cambridge , MA. pp. 187-200.

Notes Chapter 14
I. Harding. Donald E. Major USAF (Ret.) , interview, October 2006 , San Antonio, Texas.
2. Magic Carper rn Survival. Dr. Alfred Price. The Journal of Electronic Defense, April 2006 ,
pp. 31-33.
3. Letter from Headquarters USAF/R&D. Washington DC, February 20, 1953, to Commanding
General, ARDC. Baltimore . MD , Subject: Electronic Countermeasures in the B/RB-66.
4. Ibid , HQ ARDC response to HQ USAF !tr of February 20 , 3118/53 .
5. Memorandum on Conference on ECM Configuration of BIRB-66 Aircraft , HQ Tactical Air
Command . Langley AFB, VA. 3/26/53.
6. Report ofTDY by Major Reginald W. Wagner. HQffAC , at HQ/AMC , HQ/AMC - WADC
ECM Weapons Phasing Group, dated 12/16/ 1954.
7. Price , Alfred, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare , Vol II, Association of Old Crows ,
Washington DC , 1989, pp. 211-212.
8. Ibid. pp. 213-214.
9. Ibid, pp. 248-250.
IO. Email William Starnes Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.), July 7. 2006, Subject: B-66B Brown Cradle
Operation WEXVAL.
11. Ibid, Price , Alfred , pp. 250-253.
12. Parrott , Cliff, Interview, June 6, 2006, Knoxville, TN .
13 . The Other Jammer, August R. Seefluth, Air Force Magazine, March 1992 , pp. 74-77; also
letter from August R. Seefluth , undated, Subject: Preparing for Electronic Combat.
14. Email Rex L. Davis. 11 /22/2006, Subject: Operation Shabaz Nov 62 , details Brown Cradle
ECM exercise over the UK.
15. Ibid, August R. Seefluth.
16. Harding interview.
17. Ibid.
18. Emails Robert W. Stamm, Lt/Colonel , USAF (Ret.), Feb 5, Mar 30 , Oct 2, 2007 . Subject:
Chambley AB/First Etain Test Flight.

Notes Chapter 15
I. She Lived to Fly Another Day, Frank Oldis, The Destroyer, Summer 2005, p. IO.
2. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, Calendar Years 1961-1972 , As of 31
December 1972, Headquarters USAF, Washington DC, 1973 , pp. 1-2.
3. History 355TFW/41TEWS , Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, October - December 1969. War in
Vietnam - Background, p. 59. '
4. The -0/ogy War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967, Merle
L. Pribbenow II, Journal of Military History, Vol. 67 , No. I, January 2003, p. 177.

363
 Glory Days

5. Ibid , History 355TFW/41TEWS, October-December 1969, p. 60.

6. Email Robert Long to Jim Milam, April 5, 2001 , Subject: B-66 in SEA.
7. Email Tom Taylor December 3, 2006, Subject: B-66 Information, initial deployment aspects .
8. Reponen, Gerald, unpublished memoir.
9. Email Kazuto Tomayasu November 23, 2006, Subject: EB-66C with B-57s Dropping Bombs.
Infrared equipment and tests on RB-66 and RB-57 aircraft.
10. Reponen, Gerald, unpublished memoir.
11. Ibid, email Kazuto Tomayasu.
12. Ibid, Reponen, unpublished memoir.
13. Hobson, Chris, Vietnam Air Losses, Midland Publishing, Hinckley, England, 2001, p. 20.
14. Ibid, Reponen, unpublished memoir.
15 . Email Jack Seech November 26, 2006, Subject: Early Days in SEA. Deals with photo recon
mission in the Delta region.
16. Ibid, Reponen, unpublished Memoir.
17 . Madrishin, John T. CMSGT, USAF (Ret.), on B-66 web site// ltr from Captain William
R. Puckett, Operations Officer, Det I, 6250 CSG/9TRS Task Force, Tan Son Nhut AB , SYN, to
Commander 9TRS, Shaw AFB , SC, Subject: Letter of Commendation for SSGT J. T. Madrishin.

Notes Chapter 16
I. Email Eldon J. Canady, Major USAF (Ret.) , December 18 , 2006, Subject: RB-66 Operations
- Cuba and 100 Missions Over North Vietnam.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Email Tom Taylor, USAF (Ret.), January 5, 2007, Subject: RB-66C Operations.
5. Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, p. 270.
6. Email Jerry Mosby, USAF (Ret.), January 10, 2007 Subject: B-66 Operations Tan Son Nhut
AB , SVN.
7 . Turcotte, Maurice E . Memoirs of 1st RB-66C Deployment to Takhli Royal Thai Air Base,
November 10 , 2001, B-66 Website.
8. Sapere, Joseph, Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.) Interview November 21 , 2006. Email November 23,
2006 , Subject: Early Days in SEA.
9. Emails John Norden USAF (Ret.), November 23 and 24, 2006, subject: Early Days in SEA.
DAF, HQ7 AF, SO-G-529, dtd I July 1966, "Each of the following is awarded the Distinguished Flying
Cross for extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight on 24 July 1965 ," includes Lt/
Colonel Willard G . Mattson; Captains Clarence R. Autery, Vernon A. Johnson , Frank A. Noble, Edwin
R. Payne, David F. Schnelker, Thomas J. Taylor, James H. Wollpert. First Lieutenants James K. Beaty,
Lawrence J. Bullock, Lowell D. Girod, James R. Maury, Curtis V. Nelson, John A. Norden, Joseph R.
Sapere, Howard L. Shorr, Richard A. Utzke .
10 . Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, p. 26.
11 . Ibid, The -Ology War: Technology and ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967,
Merle L. Pribbenow II, p. 177.
12. Ibid , Sapere, interview and email.
13 . Ibid , Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses, p. 27 .
14. Email Kenneth Coolidge, USAF (Ret.), March 6, 2007, Subject: When the F-105s Aborted.

Notes Chapter 17
I. DAF/HQ 25TRW (USAFE), APO New York 09247, Special Order T-375, dtd 10 October
1965, directed named individuals to deploy "from Chambley AB, France to Moron AB, Spain, with
variations authorized on TDY for approximately 179 days, in support of operation unnamed."
2. Memorandum, B-66 Story-Pins , Canopy, lanyard, undated, Underwood, Alexander, MSGT
USAF (Ret.).
3. Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command, pp. 119-125 .
4. Letter, The B-66B Brown Cradle Deployment to SEA in October 1965, February 20, 2007,
Edward J . Presto, USAF (Ret.).
5. Ibid, Underwood.
6. DAF/HQ 25TRW (USAFE), APO New York 09247, Special Order A-468, dtd 4 May 1966,
relating to assignment of individuals to 355TFW, APO San Francisco 96273 - Takhli, Thailand.

364
 Notes

7 . Schaufler, Charles H. USAF (Ret.). Deployment of the EB-66Bs From Europe to Thailand ,
undated , B-66 website.
8. Email to author. Robert Mansperger. SMSGT USAF (Rel.) March 13, 2007, Subject: EB-66s
at Takhli.
9. Ibid. Underwood.
10. AF Form 711 , USAF Accident/Incident Report, August 20 , 1966, EB-66C 54-475, 460TRW/
4ITRS, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand .
11. How the EB-66B Brown Cradles Got in the Vietnam Bombing Business (Pathfinder), Charles
Schaufler, The Destroyer, Issue V, 2002, p. 2.
12. Radar Bombing During Rolling Thunder- Part I: Ryan'.' Raiders , W. Howard Plunkett, Air
Power History. Spring 2006, pp. 11-19.
13 . B-66 General Information Report No. LB-22387, Douglas AC Corp., I March 1956.
14. Email to author, William McDonald USAF (Ret.), Subject: B-66 Pathfinder Missions in
SEA.
15 . Ibid. W. Howard Plunkett, Radar Bombing .... p. 7.
16. Harding, Donald, interview.
17 . Berger. Carl, ed .. The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973, Office of AF History,
Washington DC, 1977.pp. 126-127 .
18 . Radar Bombing , Klong Times , Don Muang RTAFB , Thailand. July 15 , 1966, p. I .

Notes Chapter 18
I . USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, p. 38.
2. Aces & Aerial Victories. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-1973, multiple
authors. Office of Air Force History. Headquarters USAF, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 38-42.
3. Ibid, USAF Management Summary, p. 40.
4. Tilford , Earl , H. Jr.. Serup- What rhe Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why.Air University Press ,
Maxwell AFB.AL, 1991 , p. 123.
5. Ibid , pp. 123-125 .
6. Ibid, USAF Management Summary, p. 39.
7. The -0/ogy War, Merle L. Pribbenow 11, p. 178.
8. Email Major Robert P. Walker, USAF (Ret.) to Cliff Parrott, November 30, 2006, Subject:
Shoot Down of RB-66C February 25 , 1966.
9. Smith , Wayne H. USAF (Rel.), First EB-66C Shot Down in Vietnam February 25, 1966, B-66
website. Smith is a survivor of the shootdown; and email from Paul Duplessis to author, November 27,
2006. Subject: First RB-66C Shotdown in SEA.
IO. Emails Major Robert P. Walker to Cliff Parrott, December 2 and 16, 2006, Subject: Shootdown
of RB-66C February 25. 1966, Elevator Slab.
11. Ibid, Wayne H. Smith.
12. Lopez, John Jr. , Major USA (Ret.), Postscript on loss of Gull I on February 25, 1966, and
recovery of crew by Navy helicopters . B-66 website and email to author by Paul Duplessis, November
27,2006.
13. Email Richard A. Evans , USAF (Ret.) to author, January 10, 2007 , Subject: APR 25/26
installation in EB-66C aircraft lost on February 25 , 1966.
14. Harding, Donald interview.
15 . Hobson , Vietnam Air Losses, p. 67.
16. Emails Vaughan Wells, USAF (Ret.) to author, February 2, 15 and 16, 2007, Subject: China
incursion; Edward Presto, USAF (Ret.) to author, same subject, April 7 and 11 , 2007.
17. Memorandum from Stanley L. Tippin on events relating to the shoot-down of MiG-17 fighter
on May 12, 1966, making an intercept on an EB-66C reconnaissance aircraft.I/Email Norman Kasch
to author, January 16, 2007, Subject: May 12, 1966 Events. Kasch and Tippin were Ravens on the
EB-66C aircraft.//DAF/355CSG (PACAF), APO San Francisco 96273 , Special Order T-511, 24 May
I 966 - order extends TDY of EB-66C aircrew being interrogated at HQ/7 AF, Tan Son Nhut Air Base,
SYN, re May 12 events.
18. Various newspaper clippings quoted Major Dudley and Lieutenant Kringel is including the
Fort Lauderdale News, May 13 , 1966, U.S . Downs MIG , Ponders Raiding N. Viet Jet Fields and
Srepped-Up Air Fighting Looms Over Norrh Vietnam. AF Bags MIG No. 12 , Stars & Stripes Asia

365
 Glory Days

edition, 13 May 1966, p. I. Air Force News, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, Vol 2, No 19, May 20, 1966,
Phantom Crew Scores 12th MiG Jet Kill.
19. lbid Stanley L. Tippin memorandumJ/Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1966, by Jack Folsie,
U.S. Navigators Deny Craft Crossed China.
20. U.S. Air Force Combat Victory Credits Southeast Asia, Office of AF History, Headquarters
USAF, Washington DC, 1974.
21. Samuel,/ Always Wanted to Fly, Lincoln Flight, pp. 300-322.
22. Schneider, Donald K., Air Force Heroes in Vietnam, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL,
1979. pp. 22-31.
23. Memorandum, undated, from Stanley L. Tippin re RB-66C mission over the Gulf of Tonkin,
August 7, 1966J/DAF/HQ7AF (PACAF), Special Order G-869, 10118/1966, awarding the DFC for
heroism on 8/07/1966 to Major Deaton; Captains Alexander, Lundberg and Tippin; First Lieutenants
Kasch and Niemoller.

Notes Chapter 19
1. History of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB, SC, July - December 1966,
pp. 37-66.
2. Email John Matlock to William Starnes, September 13, 2002, Subject: Takhli and lack of
training at Shaw AFB .
3. Interview with Lt/Colonel Frank Widic USAF (Ret.), February 16, 2007, Fredericksburg,
Virginia.
4 . Letter from Headquarters USAF/AFPM, Washington DC, I November 1967, to all major air
commands and operating agencies. Subject: Personnel Rotation Programs for Southeast Asia. Signed
- Lt/General Horace M. Wade .
5. The -0/ogy War, Merle L. Pribbenow II, p. 179.
6. Interview with Lt/Colonel Arthur K. Taylor, USAF (Ret.), October 2006, San Antonio, TXJ/
Autobiographical sketch by A . K. Taylor, March 2002, B-66 website.
7 . Email Klaus Klause to author, January 28, 2007 , Subject: MiG Kill Summary.
8. Email from Roland Valentine to author, April 12, 2007, Subject: MiG attack; recorded NVN
GCI controller/pilot conversation.
9. Widic, Frank interview.
10. Harding, Donald interview.
11. Taylor interview.

Notes Chapter 20
I . Momyer, William W. General USAF (Ret.), Airpower in Three Wars, Department of the Air
Force, Washington DC, 1978, pp. 204-205 .
2. Rich, Ben R., Skunk Works, Little Brown & Company, New York, 1994, pp. 162-163.
3.Commentary, The Nature of ECM Types, August Seefluth, undated, B-66 website.
4. QRC 160-1 Assistance Team Trip Report, Visit to SEA, OAF/Warner Robins Air Materiel
Area (AFLC), Robins AFB, GA , 6 December 1966, pp. 1-8.
5. Autobiography, unpublished, Seven Years of Vietnam - A Raven Goes to War, Lt/Colonel
David S. Zook USAF (Ret.), p. 8.
6. Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Operations Analysis Working Paper No. 31 , QRC 160-1
Effectiveness, Samuel J . Scott and James J . Donaghy, 16 March 1967.
7 . The -0/ogy War, Merle L. Pribbenow II, p. 183.
8. Memorandum to author, undated, Lt/Colonel Otis E. McCain USAF (Ret.),Anti-SAM Combat
Assistance Team member, 8TFW, Udom RTAFB, Thailand. Observations on QRC-160 employment
and effectiveness.
9. Bailey, Bruce, Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.), The RB-47 and the RC-135 in Vietnam, 55SRW
Website.
JO. Ibid, McCain memorandum.
11. lbid, Pribbenow, p. 196.
12. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, p. 30.
13 . Ibid, Pribbenow, p. 199.

366
 Notes

Notes Chapter 21
I. The -0/ogv War. Merle L. Pribbenow II. p. 182.
2. Taylor. Arthur K .. interview.
3. Email. Bob Hipps. June 29. 2007. Subject: Warrior. A tribute to General Robin Olds.
4. Giraudo. John C .. Major General. USAF (Ret.), Oral History Interview 8-12 January 1985 by
Lt/Colonel Charles M. Heltsley. Treasure Island. FL.
5. Giraudo interview.
6. Citation from Commander Seventh Fleet , Vice Admiral John J. Hyland , to the 6460th TEWS
for combat operations over North Vietnam from 8 January to IS May 1967 for providing 'outstandingly
effective electronic countermeasures support for strike aircraft from the Seventh Fleet attack carrier
striking force.'
7. History of 355 Tactical Fighter Wing. 41 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron I July - 30
September 1967. Operations. unnumbered pages.
8. Alex Kersis. Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.) , interview July 21. 2006 , Alexandria , VA.
9. Chris Divich. Major General USAF (Ret.). interview October 4 , 2006 , San Antonio . TX.
10. AF Form 71 IB Aircraft Accident/Incident Report . November 17 . 1967 , EB-66C 54-473.
11. News clipping w/o date from the local 355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, base paper including picture
of General Albert P. Clark. TAC vice commander. awarding the Airman 's medal to SSGT Vultaggio.
12. DAF/HQ 355TFW (PACAFJ.APO San Francisco 96273. Special Order A-98 , para 6, "Major
Chris 0 Divich. FR57944. 41 TAC Elect Warfare Sq, PACAF, this stn, is appointed as Summary
Courts Officer to make disposition of personal effects of MAJOR WILLIAM E MCDONALD "
13. Kersis interview.
14. Divich interview.

Notes Chapter 22
I. The -0/ogy War , Merle L. Pribbenow II, p. 182.
2. Aces of the Yellow Star - The Little-Known Story of North Vietnam's Aerial Aces, Michael
O'Connor. Air Combat, September 1978, pp. 77-82.
3. Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam: The Vietnamese Peoples' Air Force 1949-
1977, Squadron Signal Publications, Carrolton. TX , 1998, pp. 23-26 and 63.
4 . Email Joseph Snoy, USAF (Ret.) to author with attachments, October 29, 2006, Subject: EB-
66 Info (Attachment: My Air Force Career 1965-1985).
5. Debrief of Lt/Colonel Jess Allen, MiG-cap F-4C lead pilot providing protection to two EB-66
aircraft in the Yen Bai area of North Vietnam.
6. Message from 432TRW, Takhli RTAFB. Thailand to CINCPAC/PACAF CC/7AF, Subject:
MiG Sighting.
7. Kersis interview.
8. Interview with Attilio Pedroli. Brigadier General USAF (Ret.), July 12, 2006, Richmond ,
VA .
9. Air Rescue Behind Enemy Lines , Howard Sochurek , National Geographic. September 1968,
pp. 346-369.
10. Pedroli interview.

Notes Chapter 23
1. Divich interview.
2. Hobson , Vietnam Air Losses, pp. 270-271.
3. Giraudo interview.
4 . Interview with Father Frank McMullen, January 26, 2007, Accokeek, MD .
5. Email from John Norden USAF (Ret.) to author, January 27 , 2007, Subject: Father
McMullen.
6. Email from Vernon Johnson USAF (Ret.) to author, February 16, 2007, Subject: Father
McMullen.
7. Email from Larry Bullock USAF (Ret.) to author, January 27. 2007, Subject: Father
McMullen. ,
8. Memoranda from Dr. Kenneth G . Gould Jr., MD PHD, Colonel USAF (MC) Retired , provided
to author: Doctor We Have a Problem; How To Go To War; My Sometime Role As An EWO.
9. What the Hell was That? Gerald P. Hanner, Destroyer, Summer 2006, p. 13.

367
 Glory Days

Notes Chapter 24
!. Widic interview.
2. Knaack, Marcelle Size, Post-World War fl Bombers, p. 455.
3. Memorandum from Lt/Colonel Stan Tippin USAF (Ret.), undated, Subject: RB-66C 54-467
and the ASQ-97 installation and test. Lt/Colonel Tippin led the team of four EWOs who were to test
the system.
4 . Kersis interview.
5 . Email from Stan Tippin to author, December 21, 2006 Subject: EB-66C 54-467.
6. Email from Norman Kasch Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.), February 15, 2007, Subject: EB-66E
OT&E.
7. Harding interview.
8. Email from Paul Maul, Colonel USAF (Ret.) to author February 9, 2007, with attachments,
Subject: Cross Fertilization of Cultures: Palace Cobra and New Guys in TAC Aircraft.
9. Email from Paul Maul to author December 5, 2006, with attachment, Subject: B-66 Training
at Shaw - a Tribute to Smiley Pomeroy.

Notes Chapter 25
1. Samuel, Wolfgang W. E., I Always Wanted to Fly, The Last Flight of 3-4290, pp. 230-254.
2. Hand-written notes written by Colonel 'Smiley' Pomeroy shortly before his death September
5, 2003, and provided to his friend Colonel 'Ike' Espe by Mrs Louise Pomeroy.
3. Email from Colonel Espe to Colonel Milam May 22, 2006, and forwarded to the author,
Subject: Comments on Smiley's Notes.
4. Pomeroy notes.
5. Espe email.
6. Email from Gerald McBride USAF (Ret.) to Colonel Espe and provided to author, November
5, 2005 , Subject: Deployment to Itazuke after Pueblo capture.
7. Message from CINCPACAF to CSAF/AFOMO, 17 April 1968, Subject: EB-66 Organization
Takhli.
8. History of 355TFW, April - June 1968, Volume III, Electronic Warfare, Aircraft Maintenance
Data, EB-66 Aircraft, no page number.
9. History of 355TFW, 41TEWS, April-June 1968, Volume I, Operations, unnumbered .
10. History of 355TFW, October- December 1968, Volume II, Appendices 1-4, Sorties Flown
EB-66B/C/E January to December.
11. Copier interview.
12. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, USAF Drone Activity - Launches
and Losses, p. 24.
13 . Copier interview.

·Notes Chapter 26
1. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, pp. 36-40.
2. History of the 355TFW, January - March 1969, Vol 1, p. 16-17. "Twelve officers, four with
projected assignments and eight who were June returnees, received directed orders to the 39 TEWS
scheduled for activation April I , 1969 ."
3. Copier interview.
4. 355TFW message to 7/13AF, 29 October 1969, Subject: 41TEWS Deactivation. Outlines
deactivation of squadron and scheduled aircraft and personnel reductions.
5. History of 355TFW, 41TEWS, October- December 1969, Vol II, p. 89.
6. History of 355TFW,41TEWS, January-March 1969, Vol I, pp. 64-65 .
7. History of 42TEWS, I October- 31December1969,p. 9.
8. Letter to the editor by Major Kenneth H. High, USAF (Ret.), Air Force Magazine, May 1992,
p.10.
9. History of 42TEWS, I October - 31December1969, p. 15.
10. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report, April 8, 1969, EB-66B 53-498, 42TEWS,
Takhli RTAFB, Thailand.
11. Memorandum Colonel Paul Maul, USAF (Ret.) to author, June 28, 2007, Subject: Minimum
Single Engine Control Speed.

368
 Notes

12. Email Thomas J. Mangan . USAF (Ret.) to author. August 13. 2006. Subject: EB-66 Crash
on April 8. 1969.
13. Email Lee Walters . USAF (Ret.) To author. August IO, 2006, Subject: EB-66B 53-491.
14. History 355TFW. 41TEWS. October - December 1969, Condensed History 13 November
1917 to 31 October 1969. The 4lst TEWS is beset with engine problems, p. 82.
15. Email Don Christman USAF (Ret.) to author. July I. 2006, Subject: B-66 Operations 1969-
1970.
16. B-66 Destroyer Association Newslener. RB-668 Engine Test Bed, Bill Keels , Fall 2007 , p.
12.
17. Knaack . Marcelle Size. Post-World War II Bombers, p. 429.
18. History of the 388TFW. 42TEWS . January - March 1973, Vol 2, p. 22.
19. Emails Terry Buettner. Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.) to author. August 3 ,4,6 and 7, 2006 , Subject:
RB-66 Accidents.

Notes Chapter 27
I. Southeast Asia Review 1961-1972, HQ USAF, Washington DC, Jan 31, 1973.
2. Email Tom Leeper USAF (Ret.) to author, January 29. 2007. Subject: EB-66 Story. SA-2
encounter near Ban Karai Pass.
3. Letter Colonel H. Bottomly. CC/355TFW. to CC/13AF, 17 April 1970, Subject: Reduction of
EB-66 Flying Hour Allocation .
4. CINCPAC msg to component commanders, 1120372 Oct 70. directed initiation of ELINT
program to provide increased tactical intel of threat radars in Mugia/Ban Karai Pass areas.
5. ?AF/IN message 1511352 Oct 70 to MACV/PACAF requests ELINTaircraft augmentation.//
7 AF/CV message 1913002 Oct 70 to MACY /PACAF affirms requirement for 24 hour ELINT coverage ,
however. lacking assets to provide such.//PACAF message 0403002 Nov 70 requests ?AF submit
requirement for additional EB-66 aircraft.//7AF/DO in message 0611452 Nov 70 states a requirement
for 11 additional EB-66 aircraft.//CINCPAC message to JCS 1310422 Nov 70 recommends six .//JCS
message 1620392 Nov 70 directs CSAF to deploy six EB-66 aircraft and 158 personnel to Thailand.
6. Project CHECO Report. USAF Tactical Reconnaissance in SEA, July 69-June 1971, 23 Nov
1971 , HQ PACAF/DOA.
7. CJNCPAC message 230035 Dec 70.
8. CSAF message 2320152 Dec 70.
9. CJNCPACAF message 3100452 Dec 70 to ?AF and 13AF, Subject: Changed inactivation
dates for EB-66 squadrons.
IO. Ibid , Project CHECO Report, pp. 43-44.
II. Letter from 355TFW/DOE, 23 March 1970, to PACAF/DOEW, Subject: EB-66 Support
Tactics. Attachment: Minutes of EB-66 Tactics Meeting , Arc Light Support Tactics, 7 Feb 1970.
12. The -Ology War, Merle L. Pribbenow II, p. 186.
13. Staff Summary Sheet, 7 AF/DO PR , 2 January I 97 I , Subject: EB-66 Evaluation . Recommends
retention of EB-66 force.
14. 7AF Position Paper on Removal of EB-66 ECM Support for Photo Reconnaissance in RP-
I , undated. Recommends retention of support jamming; that RF-4C carry QRC-335 pods; that F-4D
escorts give up their Mark 82 bombs and carry two ECM pods.
15. Message January 5 . 1971 , from Colonel Thome to Lt/Colonel Shortt at 7 AF, Subject: Force
Plans.
16. Email Don Christman USAF (Ret.) July I , 2006, to author. Subject: EB-66 Operations 69
to70.
17. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report. April 21, 1970, EB-66E 54-439, 42TEWS/
355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand.
18 . Emails Thomas Boyle USAF (Ret.) to author August 2 and December 14, 2006. Subject:
April 21 , I 970 EB-66E fire at Hickam AFB .
19. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report, October 26, 1970, EB-66C 55-384, 42TEWS/
388TFW, Korat RTAFB. Thailand.
20. B-66 Flight Safety Officer Study Kit, Feb/Mar 1971, 42TEWS , Korat RTAFB, Thailand,
written by Lt/Colonel Gerald A. Kutz'
21 . Memorandum on the events surrounding the crash of EB-66C 55-384 on October 26, 1970,
from Colonel Vernon Luke to author.

369
 Glory Days

22. Message 231 I !OZ Jan 71 , from 388TFW to various orgs, Subject: USAF Aircraft Incident
Message Report.
23. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report 17 November 1971, EB-66E 54-427,
42TEWS/388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand J/Emails from David G . Ardis USAF (Ret.) August 6,7
and 10, 2006, to author. Subject: EB-66E fire at Udom .

Notes Chapter 28
1. Harding interview.
2. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report, October 9, 1969, EB-66E 54-536, 39TEWS/
36TFW, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.
3. Harding interview.
4 . Kersis interview.
S. Email from George Ciz USAF (Ret.) to author, May 3, 2007. Subject: B-66 Operations in
Germany.
6. Harding interview.
7. History 388TFW/42TEWS, January- March 1973, Vol 2, p . 24.

Notes Chapter 29
1. Hobson , Chris, Vietnam Air Losses, p . 218 .
2. AF Form 71 I USAF Accident/Incident Report, February 2, 1972, EB-66E, 54-540, 42TEWS/
388TFW, Korat RTAFB , Thailand.
3. Lavalle, A. J. C., ed . Airpower And The 1972 Spring Invasion, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington DC, 1976, pp4-9 .
4. Ibid, pp. 20-27.
S. Ibid, pp. 31.
6 . Ibid, Hobson p. 220.
7. Ibid, Lavalle pp. 36-37.
8. Remembering Gene Hambleton, Gerald P. Hanner, The Destroyer, Winter 2005, pp. 10-12.
9. U.S . Army War College Military Studies Program Paper, Bat 21: A Case Study.An Individual
Study Project by Lt/Colonel Stanley L. Busboom, USAF, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1990, pp. 6-14.
IO. Ibid.
II. Ibid, 15-19.
12. Ibid, 73-81.
13 . Ibid, Lavalle, pp. 34-43.
14. Ibid, Hanner, p. 13.
IS. Emblems of Courage, Fred L . Borch and Robert F. Dorr, Military Officer, May 2007, p. 73.
16. The Harrowing War in the Air, The Nation, Time Magazine, May I, 1972, Time website.
17. Copier interview.
18. Lavalle, A. J. C ., ed. The Tale ofTwo Bridges and The Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam,
Government Printing Officer, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 79-86.
19. Ibid, pp. 90-92.
20. The USAF's Destroyer, Richard K. Schrader, Air Classics, April 1988, p. 78.
21. SAMs on the DMZ, Gerald P. Hanner, The Destroyer, Spring 2006, pp. 12-13.

Notes Chapter 30
I. Bohn, John T. Development of Strategic Air Command 1946-1976, pp. 160-163.
2. Autobiography, unpublished, Seven Years of Vietnam: A Raven Goes to War, Lt/Colonel David
S. Zook, USAF (Ret.)
3. Copier interview.
4 . Ibid, Zook.
S. Operation Linebacker ll, Air Force Historical Studies Office, AF/HO, Washington DC. An
operational summary.
6. Ibid, Bohn, p. 164.
7. AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report, 21 December 1972, EB-66E 54-529, 42TEWS/
388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand.
8. Email Terry Buettner, Lt/Colonel USAF (Ret.) to author, August 4, 2006. Subject: B-66
Accident 54-529. Colonel Buettner was a member of the accident investigation board.

370
 Notes

Notes Chapter 31
I. Copier interview.
2. Crouch, Robert K. Colonel. Commander. 388TFW. Koral RTAFB , Thailand, End of Tour
Report , I July 1973 to 3 January 1974.
3. History of the 388TFW/42TEWS, January - March 1973, Vol 2, Flight Safety, pp. 14-15.
4 . AF Form 711 USAF Accident/Incident Report, 3 May 1973, EB-66E 54-445, 42TEWS/
388TFW. Korat RTAFB. Thailand.
5. History of the 388TFW/42TEWS. I October 1973 - 31 January 1974, pp. iv-v.
6. History and Lineage of the 42nd Squadron, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB,
AL .
7. Kersis interview.

371
 APPENDICES

Appendix 1
Terms and Abbreviations

AAA- Antiaircraft artillery.

NI C - Airman first class.
N2C - Airman second class.
A/3C - Airman third class .
AB - Air Base
Acquisition Radars - Medium range radars which acquire target aircraft for AAA or SAM terminal
defense radars and feed the information to gun laying/terminal defense radars prior to target
engagement. Flat Face and Spoonrest were Soviet designed acquisition radars used by the North
Vietnamese.
ADC - Air Defense Command.
ADIZ - Air Defense Identification Zone.
AFB - Air Force Base.
AFPRO - Air Force Plant Representative Office.
AGL - Above Ground Level.
AOB - Air order of battle.
AR - Air refueling .
Arc Light - Code name for B-52 bomber strikes in Vietnam and Laos.
ARCP - Air refueling control point.
ARDC - Air Research and Development Command, USAF.

Bandit - Enemy aircraft.

Barlock - Powerful Soviet multi-beam early warning radar.
BOA - Bomb damage assessment.
Barrel Roll - Laos
Bingo Fuel - The minimum fuel needed to arrive at home base with 5,000 pounds of fuel
remaining.
Bogey - Unknown aircraft presumed hostile.
Brown Cradle - B-66B bomber aircraft modified for ECM operations.
BS - Bomb/Bombardment Squadron.

372
 Appendices

Bullseye - Hanoi . used as a reference point for MiG warnings.

Burnthrough - Point at which the enemy can read through jamming.
BW - Bomb Wing .
BX - Base exchange - an Air Force on-base dry-goods store for military personnel.

CAP - Combat Air Patrol.

CASF - Composite Air Strike Force.
CCTS - Combat Crew Training Squadron.
CEP - Central Error Probable; a calculation of bombing accuracy integrating past and present
results.
CG - Center of gravity.
Chaff - Strips of aluminum foil used to jam enemy radar.
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency.
CINCPAC - Commander-in-Chief-Pacific
Combat Sky Spot - MSQ-77 radar controlled bombing missions
Constant Guard - Aircraft deployment code to SEA in 1972 in response to NVN spring invasion
Counter - Mission over Route Packs III to VI. counting toward 100 missions to be flown to complete
a tour of duty.
CSAF - Chief of Staff United States Air Force.

DOR - Deutsche Demokratische Republic Germany (Communist East Germany)

DF - Direction finding.
DFC - Distinguished Flying Cross.
DME - Distance measuring equipment.
DMZ - Demilitarized Zone established between North and South Vietnam at the Geneva Peace
Treaty of I 954. It was demilitarized in name only.
DRY - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) .

Echo Alert - NATO alert status code for Brown Cradle B-66 ECM aircraft.
ECM - Electronic countermeasures such as noise or deception jamming. the dropping of chaff,
anything that will prevent or reduce the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum by enemy
radar.
EOB - Electronic Order of Battle.
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence (Radar).
EGT - Engine Exhaust Temperature.
ELINT - Electronic intelligence.
EOB - Electronic order of battle. The disposition of enemy radars throughout an area.
ETA - Estimated time of arrival.
EW - Early warning radar; or a term used to refer to an electronic warfare officer; or the art and
science of electronic warfare.
EWO - Electronic warfare officer.

FAC - Forward Air Controller.

Fansong - The track while scan radar that acquires a target and through uplink guidance controls
the Guideline missile 's flight path.
FCF - Functional Test Flight.
FEAF - Far East Air Forces.
Fence - The Mekong River that divides Thailand from Laos.
Firecan - Soviet AAA radar.
Flaming Dart - US air raids against North Vietnam in February 1965.
Flatface - Soviet intermediate range target acquisition radar.
Frag - Fragmentary Operations Order. The daily listing of 7th Air Force directed combat sorties .
Freedom Train - Air campaign against lower route packs in North Vietnam in response to the spring
invasion of South Vietnam.

373
 Glory Days

G - Unit of acceleration exerted upon a body at rest equal to the force of gravity.
GCA - Ground control approach radar. The radar that leads an aircraft to a runway.
GCI - Ground control intercept radar. The radar that leads a fighter to a target aircraft.
Guard-A UHF radio frequency monitored by all air and ground receivers.

HF - High frequency.
Ho Chi Minh Trail - The routes taken by NVN forces through Laos and Cambodia into South
Vietnam.

IAS - Indicated airspeed.

IDA- Institute for Defense Analysis.
IFR - Instrument flight rules.
IFF - Identification friend or foe. A coded transmission transmitted by a transponder from an
aircraft in response to an interrogating device at a ground radar station. In the Vietnam War
many aircrews believed that the enemy could read their IFF.
IFR - Instrument Flight Rules .
IMC - Instrument Meteorological Conditions.
IP - Initial point from which a bomb run is initiated. Also, Instructor Pilot.
IR - Infrared.
IRBM - Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile.
Iron Hand - The mission flown by F-IOSF/G aircraft used for suppression of anti-aircraft and
surface to air missile sites.

JATO - Jet/Rocket assisted take--0ff.

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jolly Green Giant - Nickname for USAF rescue helicopters, specifically the HH-53.

KIA- Killed in action .

Knot - One nautical mile per hour.

LABS - Low Altitude Bomb System - a high G low altitude nuclear weapons delivery looping
maneuver.
Linebacker I -Air campaign against North Vietnam April to October 1972.
Linebacker II - Air campaign against North Vietnam December 1972.

MAC - Military Airlift Command.

MACY - Military Assistance Command Vietnam.
MHZ - Megaherz, referring to radio frequencies.
MIA- Missing in action.
MiG - Soviet fighter aircraft designed by the Mikoyan and Gurovich design bureau, such as the
MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-21 used by the North Vietnamese air force .
MSL - Mean Sea Level.
MSGT - Master sergeant.

NCO - Noncommissioned officer; a sergeant.

NIKE - Army surface to air anti-aircraft missile.
NKP- Nakhon Phanom RTAFB .
NRO - National Reconnaissance Office (During Vietnam War even its name was classified;
organization responsible for high altitude reconnaissance operations such as the U-2/SR-71
aircraft and satellites) .
NVA- North Vietnamese Army.

ORI - Operational Readiness Inspection.

PACAF - Pacific Air Forces.

PARPRO - Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program.

374
 Appendices

PCS - Permanent change of station

POW - Prisoner of war
PRF - Pulse recurrence frequency.
PSP - Perforated steel planking.
PW - Pulse width .

QRC - Quick reaction capability referring to the rapid acquisition of electronic warfare related
equipments or modifications outside the normal acquisition cycle.

RAF - Royal Air Force.

Raven - An electronic warfare officer on an ELINT collecting reconnaissance aircraft.
RBS - Radar Bomb Scoring site , used especially by SAC bombers for training/evaluation
purposes.
Red Crown - A GCI capability on-board the naval vessel USS Long Beach, a cruiser in the Gulf of
Tonkin, which controlled air traffic in its positive radar identification zone , the PIRAZ, issuing
MiG warnings to friendly aircraft.
ROB - Radar Order of Battle.
ROC - Required Operational Capability.
Rolling Thunder- US air campaign against North Vietnam 1965 to 1968.
Route Packages - North Vietnam was divided for targeting purposes into 6 route packages, referred
to as route packs. Route pack I started in the lower southern panhandle of NVN; Route pack 6
was divided into 6a and 6b covering the Hanoi/Haiphong area .
RHAW - Radar horning and warning equipment such as the APR-25/26 , later the APR 36/37.
RTAFB - Royal Thai Air Force Base.
R&R - Rest and Recreation.

SAC - Strategic Air Command.

SAM - Surface to air missile, in the context of the Vietnam War it refers to the Soviet designed SA-2
air defense missile system.
SEA - Southeast Asia
SEAL - Navy special operations group - Sea/Air/Land .
SIF - An electronic device with variable codes for identification purposes of airborne aircraft.
SIGINT - Signals intelligence.
SIOP - Single Integrated Operations Plan (nuclear).
SLAR - Sidelooking radar.
SMSGT - Senior master sergeant.
Spoonrest - Soviet acquisition radar used by North Vietnamese.
SRS - Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron.
SRW - Strategic Reconnaissance Wing.
SSGT - Staff sergeant
Stall - The point where the wing no longer produces lift.
Staneval - Standardization and Evaluation Section of a squadron or a wing that ascertains that
aircrews fly according to established directives .
SYN - South Vietnam.
SW - Strategic Wing,(SRW - Strategic Reconnaissance Wing) .

TAC - Tactical Air Command.

TACAN - Tactical air navigation system using a ground-based UHF transmitter providing bearing
and distance information to the ground station from an aircraft.
TARC -Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center at Eglin AFB , FL.
TDY - Temporary Duty. TDY duty is normally limited to l 79 continuous days , or it becomes a
permanent change of station assignment, a PCS.
TEWS - Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron.
Tet - Vietnamese lunar new year.
TFW - Tactical Fighter Wing .
Thud - Nickname for the F-105.

375
 Glory Days

Tiny Tim - B-52 raids into North Vietnam and Laos .

TRS - Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.
TRW - Tactical Reconnaissance Wing .
TSGT - Technical sergeant.
TWS - Track While Scan - a radar tracking technique used by the SA-2 Fansong radar.

UE - Unit equipment from a table of authorization.

UHF - Ultra High Frequency.
UK - United Kingdom .
USAF - United States Air Force
USAFE - United States Air Forces in Europe.
USCINCEUR - United States Commander in Chief Europe .
USMC - United States Marine Corps
USN - United States Navy
USNS - United States Naval Ship (transports/non-combatants)
USS - United States Ship (combatants)

VC - Viet Cong ( North Korean led guerilla group operating in South Vietnam)
VFR - Visual flight rules .
Victor Alert - NATO Alert status code for nuclear armed fighters/bombers .
VOR/VORTAC - Radio ranging and directional aid .

WEXVAL - A series of weapons evaluation tests run by the Institute for Defense Analysis to
determine ECM readiness of national air defense assets .
Whiff - Soviet AAA radar based on the US WW-II SCR-584.
Whifferdill - To change direction 180 degrees - raising the nose 30 to 60 degrees, then applaying 90
degrees of bank to reverse direction and pulling the nose down below the horizon .
Whiskey Alert - NATO Alert status code for RB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft.
Wild Weasel - Aircraft modified to locate and destroy SAM sites or any other ground based radar
guided system used for aircraft targeting.

Zulu - Z time; Greenwhich mean time .

376
 Appendix 2
Selected U.S. Post WW-11 Jet Aircraft Developments

Aircraft #Engines Type & Thrust Rating I"' Flight T.O.WT T.O. Total
(Proto) (Lbs) Run Built

Strategic
B-47E Stratojet 6 J47-GE-25A 6.000lbs s.t. dry 1947 206.700 10.000"+ 2,032
Boeing 7,2001bs wet

B-52F Stratofortress 8 J57-PW-43W I l.2001bs s.t. dry 1952 420.000 7.00()"+ 744
Boeing 13,7501bs wet

B-58A Hustler 4 J79-GE-5B 10,000!bs s.t. 1956 163.000 8.00<r 116

Convair 15.600lbs with a.b.
;:...
KC-135A Stratotanker 4 J57-PW-59 I 3,700lbs s.t. 1954/56 316.000 732
<....., Civ/Mil
~
'l
'l
"'
§.,
Tactical ~
F/RF-&_4F Thunderstreak I J65 -W-3/7 7.2201bs s.t. 1950 28.000 5,000 ' 3.063 "'
Republic

F-1 OOD Super Saber I 157-PW-2 I A I 1.700lbs s.t. 1953 34,800 5.ooo·+ 2.294
North American 16.9501bs with a.b.

F/RF- IOIA/C Voodoo 2 157-PW-13 10. IOOlbs s.t. 1954 48,100 4.000 ' 327
McDonnell 14.8801bs with a.b

F-1050 Thunderchief I J75-PW-19W 17,200lbs s.t. 1955 52,500 6,000 ' + 833
Republic 24.5001bs with a.b.
26 ,500 wet

B/RB-578 2 165-W-5 7,200lbs s.t. 1953 57.000 5.ooo· 383

Martin
 RB-570 2 157-PW-9 11,000lbs s.t. 1955 20
Martin

B/RB-66 Destroyer 2 171-A-13 10,200lbs s.t. 1954 83,000 7,000'+ 294

Douglas

Air Defense
F-10 IB/F Voodoo 2 157-PW-55 10,700lbs s.t. 1957 45,664 3,000' 480
McDonnell 16,900lbs with a.b.

F-102A Delta Dagger 1 157-PW-23 ll,700lbs s.t 1953 31,500 3,000' 906
Convair 17,200lbs with a.b.

F- 104C Starfighter 1 179-GE-7 10,000lbs s.t. 1954 27,853 6,000' 663

Lockheed 15,800lbs with a.b.

F-106A Delta Dart

Convair
1 175-PW-17 17,200lbs s.t.
24,500lbs with a.b.
1956 38,250 3,000' 340
~
~
'""
O;l ti
U.S. Navy ~
c.,
F3HDemon 1 171-A-2E 9,500lbs s.t. 1951 39,000 522
McDonnell 14,250 with a.b.

F4D Skyray 1 157-P-8B I0,200lbs s.t. 1951 30,000 422

Douglas 16,000 with a.b.

A3D Skywarrior 2 157-PW-10 I0,500lbs s.t. 1952 82,000 282

Douglas 12,400lbs wet

A4ESkyhawk 1 152-PW-6A 8,500lbs s.t. 1954 24,500 2,960

Douglas

F-8E Crusader 1 157-PW-20A 10,700lbs s.t. 1955 34,000 925

Chance Vought 18,000lbs with a.b.
 Appendices

Abbreviations
s.t. = Static Thrust
with a.b. =with after burner
wet= using water/alcohol injection to increase thrust
T.O. Weight with bomb load if applicable
A - Allison
GE - General Electric
PW - Pratt & Whitney
W-Wright

Notes
Production quantities shown are for all models, including test aircraft and Military Assistance
Programs.

First flight is for the initial prototype.

The 171 engine powered the NBIC models of the Snark (SM-62) cruise missile. Was replaced with the
J57 engine in the SM-62D model.

Take-off ground runs for air force aircraft are at sea level. Distance is longer if aircraft is to clear 50'
obstacle off end of runway. T.0. runs increase with altitude and temperature, requiring download of
weapons and/or fuel. NI A for Navy aircraft which are catapult launched from carriers.

RB-57D production quantity of 20 is part of total production run of 403 B-57 aircraft.

It is worth noting that the J40 Westinghouse turbojet failure had a significant cascade effect on several
other aircraft programs at the time , including the B-66 aircraft.

Sources
The World 's Fighting Planes, William Green, Doubleday, NY, 1965; Post-World War II Bombers,
Marcelle Size Knaack, Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C ., 1988; Post-World War II
Fighters 1945- 1973, Marcelle Size Knaack, Office of Air Force History, Washington , D.C., 1986;
American Military Aircraft , Bames&Noble Books , New York, 2005. Combat Aircraft of the World ,
John W. R. Taylor, Putnam, New York , 1969.

379
 Appendix3
B-66 Squadrons 1956 - 1974

B-66 Squadrons

1954-55
Test and evaluation was principally conducted at Edwards AFB, CA, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and Eglin AFB, FL. First flight of an RB-66A- June 28, 1954.
Two RB-66Bs flew in March 1956 from Tucson, AZ, to Crestview, FL, at an average ground speed of 700mph. Placard restrictions limit the aircraft to mach
.95 at altitudes above 5,000 feet. The B-66 was not designed to be a supersonic aircraft.

1956
9TRS (E&W) 363TRW RB-66C Shaw AFB , SC FromRB-26
First RB-66C, 54-0452, delivered to Shaw AFB , SC, May 11 (City of Sumter)
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC FromRB-57A
First RB-66B, 53-0442, delivered to Shaw AFB, SC, January 31
34BS (T) 17BG B-66B Hurlburt Field, FL From B-57A
C)
37BS (T) l 7BG B-66B Hurlburt Field, FL From B-26 (3"'
First B-66B delivered to Hurlburt Field, FL, March 16 ~
'gg""' 41TRS (NP) 432TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC From RB-26
42TRS (E&W) IOTRG RB-66C
First RB-66C, 54-0459, delivered to Spangdahlem AB , Ger, Nov 28 (Kreis Wittlich)
Spangdahlem AB, GE FromRB-26
~
43TRS (NP) 432TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC FromRB-57A
95BS (T) I 7BG B-66B Hurlburt Field, FL FromB -26

1957
ITRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B Spangdahlem AB, GE FromRB-57A
9TRS (E&W) 363TRW R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB, SC
First WB-660, 55-0391, delivered to Shaw AFB , SC, June 26 FromWT-33A
IITRS (E&W) 67TRW R/WB-66C/D Yokota AB, JP
Five RB-66Cs delivered in June, last of 12 delivered Aug IO
12TRS (NP) 67TRW RB-66B Yokota AB, JP
First RB-66Bs delivered in February
16TRS (NP) 363TRG RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
19TRS 66TRW RB-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK FromRB-45C
First RB-66B arrives at RAF Sculthorpe Feb 3/to 66TRW as of Jan I
30TRS (NP) 66TRW RB-66B Sembach AB, GE From RB-57A
First RB-66B delivered to 66TRW, Landstuhl AB, Ger, July 7
 34BS (T) 17BW B-66B Hurlburt Field , FL
37BS (T) 17BW B-66B Hurlburt Field , FL
41TRS (NP) 432TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC
42TRS (E&W) JOTRW R/WB-66C/D Spangdahlem AB , GE RN Dec 8
43TRS (NP) 432TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB. SC
95BS (T) 17BW B-66B Hurlburt Field , FL

1958
ITRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B Spangdahlem AB . GE From RB-57A
9TRS(E&W) 363TRW* R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB . SC
llTRS(E&W) 67TRW R/WB-66C/D Yokota AB . JP
12TRS (NP) 67TRW RB -66B Yokota AB . JP
16TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB. SC
19TRS IOTRW RB-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK Jan 8 to IOTRW
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB -66B Spangdahlem AB . GE Jan 8 to IOTRW
34BS (T) 17BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK Jan-Mar/IA Jun 25
~
37BS (T) 17BW B-66B RAF Alconbury. UK May/IA Jun 25
....... 41TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB. SC
Clo
..... 42TRS (E&W) IOTRW R/WB -66C/D Spangdahlem AB. GE "'
;:,

43TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB. SC ~

84BS (.T) 47BW
First B-66B delivered to 47BW, RAF Sculthorpe, Jan 18
B-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK From B-45 "'"'
85BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK From B-45
86BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Alconbury, UK From B-45
95BS (T) 17BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK
IA Jun 25
*837 Air Division activated Feb 8 with 363TRW (RB-66) and 432TRW (RF-IO I)

1959
ITRS (NP) IOTRS RB-66B Spangdahlem AB. GE
RAF Alconbury, UK As of Aug 25
9TRS(E&W) 363TRW* R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB. SC
llTRS(E&W) 67TRW R/WB-66C/D Yokota AB. JP
12TRS (NP) 67TRW RB-66B Yokota AB . JP
16TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB. SC
I9TRS IOTRW RB-66B Spangdahiem AB. GE As of Jan IO
RAF Bruntingthorpe, UK As of Aug 25
 30TRS (NP) lOTRW RB-66B Spangdahlem AB, GE
RAF Alconbury, UK As of Aug25
41TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC IA May 18
becomes 4415CCTG
42TRS (E&W) lOTRW RJWB-66C/D Spangdahlem AB , GE
RAF Chelveston, UK As of Aug 25
43TRS (NP) 363TRW* RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC IA May 18
84BS (T)** 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
85BS (T)** 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
86BS (T)** 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK As of Aug 5
4411CCTG 837AD* RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC AC April 8
441SCCTG 837AD* RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC AC April 8
*837AD reorganizes - 432TRW and 41TRS/43TRS inactivate May 18.
20TRS/29TRS (RF- I 0 I) transfer to 363TRW. 4411CCTG/44I5CCTG activate April 8 directly under 837 AD.
**13 B-66B ECM-<:onfigured bombers (Brown Cradle), return to 47BW in November after participating in Exercise Wexval II against U.S. Navy.

1960 Cl
...., (S'"
ITRS (NP) lOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
~
~ 9TRS (E&W) 363TRW RJWB-66C/D Shaw AFB, SC
l!TRS (E&W)
12TRS (NP)
67TRW
67TRW
RJWB-66C/D
RB-66B
Yokota AB, JP
Yokota AB, JP
IAMar8
IAMar8 ~
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC
19TRS lOTRW RB-66B RAF Bruntingthorpe, UK
30TRS (NP) lOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
42TRS(E&W) lOTRW RB-66B/C* RAF Chelveston, UK
84BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
85BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
86BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
4411CCTG 837AD RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
4415CCTG 837AD RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
*13 B-66B Brown Cradle ECM aircraft from 47BW replace 12 WB-66Ds.

1961
lTRS (NP) lOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
9TRS(E&W) 363TRW RJWB-66C/D Shaw AFB, SC
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
 19TRS IOTRW RB-66B RAF Bruntingthorpe , UK
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
42TRS (E&W) IOTRW RB-66B/C RAF Chel veston. UK
84BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
85BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe. UK
86BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK
4411CCTG 837AD RB -66B Shaw AFB , SC
4415CCTG 837AD RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC

1962
ITRS (NP) IOTRW RB -66B RAF Alconbury, UK
9TRS (E&W) 363TRW R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB , SC
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC
Deployed to MacDill AFB 10/22 to 11 /30 during Cuban Missile Crisis
19TRS IOTRW RB-66B RAF Bruntingthorpe, UK To Aug 1
Toul-Rosieres AB , FR
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B :i.
RAF Alconbury, UK
<..., 42TRS(E&W) IOTRW RB-66B/C RAF Chelveston, UK To Aug 1 ~
ez Toul-Rosieres AB , FR "'9-:
;:,

84BS (T) 47BW B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK IA Jun 22

...,
85BS(T)
86BS (T)
47BW
47BW
B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK IA Jun 22 "'"'
B-66B RAF Sculthorpe, UK IA Jun 22
44 11 CCTG 837AD RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC IA Jan 31 , 1963
4415CCTG 837AD RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC IA Jan 3 I. 1963

1963
ITRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
9TRS (E&W) 363TRW R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB , SC
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
19TRS IOTRW RB-66B Toul-Rosieres AB , FR
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
42TRS (E&W) IOTRW RB-66B/C Toul-Rosieres AB , FR May-Oct at Chambley
4411CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC AC Feb I/was 837AD
4415CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC AC Feb I
4416TS TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC AC Feb I
 1964
lTRS(NP) lOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
9TRS (E&W) 363TRW R/WB-66C/D Shaw AFB, SC
16TRS (NP) 363TRW RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC ToRF-4C
19TRS IOTRW RB-66B Toul-Rosieres AB, FR
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK
42TRS(E&W) lOTRW RB-66B/C Toul-Rosieres AB, FR
4487TS 4485TW RB-66B/C Eglin AFB, FL ACAug4
4411CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
4415CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC ToRF-4C
4416TS TARC RB-66B/Other Shaw AFB, SC

1965
ITRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B RAF Alconbury, UK ToRF-4CMay
9TRS 363TRW RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC WB-66DtoDM
19TRS IOTRW RB-66B Toul-Rosieres AB, FR
25TRG/W RB-66B Chambley AB, FR
RAF Alconbury, UK
As of Oct 1
ToRF-4C
~
30TRS (NP) IOTRW RB-66B ~
'""
~ 4!TRS 363TRW No AC Hq TAC/Langley AFB AC Jun 30 ti
355TFW RB-66C Takhli RTAFB, TH Nov 8 to Feb 66 ~
42TRS (E) IOTRW RB-66B/C Toul-Rosieres AB, FR RN Jul 1, 65 "'
25TRG/W RB-66B/C Chambley AB, FR As of Jul 1
4411CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB, SC
4416TS TARC RB-66B/RF4 Shaw AFB, SC
4487TS 4485TW RB-66B/C Eglin AFB, FL IA 1965
Det l/41TRS 33TACGP/ RB-66B( 4a/c) Tan Son Nhut AB , SYN As of April
6250CSG
Det l/9TRS 363TRW RB-66C(9a/c) Tan Son Nhut AB , SYN As of Apr 13
To Takhli RTAFB May 25
6460TRS 460TRW Takhli RTAFB, TH As of Jul29
(was Detl, 9TRS)
432TRW AsofSep 18/IA Oct 25
Det l/42TRS 25TRW RB-66B(5a/c) Takhli RTAFB, TH Brown Cradle
October 18, 1965 to January 1966 ·
 1966
9TRS 363TRW RB-66C Shaw AFB. SC To RF-4C
19TRS 25TRW RB-66B Chambley AB, FR IA Aug 22
!9TEWS* 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC As of Sep 1
41TRS 460TRW EB-66C Takhli RTAFB , TH Feb 18
4ITEWS* 432TRW Sep 18 to 432TRW
42TRS(E) 25TRW EB-66B/C Chambley AB, FR IA Aug 22
42TEWS 432TRW EB -66B/C Takhli RTAFB, TH AC Dec 15
4411CCTG TARC RB-66B Shaw AFB , SC IA July 1
4411CCTG 363TRW July 1 to 363TRW
4416TS 363TRW RB-66B/F4 Shaw AFB , SC
4417CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB , SC AC Feb 1
6460TRS** 460TRW EB-66B Takhli, RTAFB, TH AC Jun 8
K 432TRW Sep 18 to 432TRW
Det l /41TRS RB -66B Tan Son Nhut AB. SYN IA Apr
Det2/42TRS 25TRW RB-66B Takhli RTAFB. TH Jan to Jun 1966
;i,..
*Redesignation from TRS to TEWS October 8. **IA Dec 15 :g
""~
~
1967
!9TEWS 363TRW EB-66B/C Shaw AFB , SC
41TEWS
42TEWS*
355TFW EB -66B/C Takhli RTAFB, TH 5 Aug to 355TFW "'
355TFW EB-66B/C Takhli RTAFB , TH 5 Aug to 355TFW
4416CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC RN Jul 67
4417CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC
*Was 6460TRS

1968
19TEWS* 363TRW EB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC
41TEWS** 355TFW EB-66B/C/E Takhli RTAFB , TH
42TEWS** 355TFW EB-66B/C/E Takhli RTAFB, TH
4416CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/E Shaw AFB, SC
4417CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC
*Six EB-66C/E aircraft deployed Feb 68 to Osan, then Itazuke, JP, Operation Combat Fox, in response to the capture of USS Pueblo by North Korea.
**Effective 17 April 41/42TEWS VE aircraft increased from 28 to 41.
 1969
19TEWS 18TFW EB-66C/E Itazuke AB, JP As of Dec 31, 68
Kadena AB, JP AsofMay 15
39TEWS 36TFW EB-66C/E SpangdahlemAB, GE AC Apr 1
39TRTS 363TRW R/EB-66B/C/E Shaw AFB, SC AC Oct 15/was 4417
41TEWS 355TFW EB-66C/E Takhli RTAFB, TH IA0ct31
42TEWS 355TFW EB-66C/E Takhli RTAFB, TH
4416CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC IA Oct 31
4417CCTS 363TRW E/RB-66B/C Shaw AFB, SC IA Oct 15

1970
19TEWS 18TFW EB-66C/E Kadena AB, JP IAOct31
39TEWS 36TFW BE-66C/E SpangdahlemAB, GE AC
39TEWTS 363TRW BE-66E Shaw AFB, SC RN Feb 15 was 39TRTS
42TEWS 355TFW BE-66C/E Takhli RTAFB, TH To Sep22
388TFW Korat RTAFB, TH As of Sep 21
Cl
0
<.;,; 1971 ~
~ 39TEWS 36TFW EB-66C/E Spangdahlem AB, GE ti
39TEWTS 363TRW EB-66C/E Shaw AFB, SC ~
42TEWS 388TFW EB-66C/E Korat RTAFB, TH "'
1972
39TEWS 52TFW EB-66C/E SpangdahlemAB, GE Effective Jan 1
39TEWTS 363TRW EB-66C/E Shaw AFB, SC
42TEWS 388TFW EB-66C/E KoratRTAFB,TH

1973
39TEWS 52TFW EB-66C/E Spangdahlem AB, GE IA Jan 1
39TEWTS 363TRW EB-66C/E Shaw AFB, SC
42TEWS 388TFW EB-66E/C Korat RTAFB, TH Dec 24 final mission

1974
39TEWTS 363TRW EB-66C/E Shaw AFB, SC IA Mar 15
42TEWS 388TFW EB-66E/C Koral RTAFB, TH IA Mar 15
 Abbreviations:
AD =Air Di vision TARC =Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center
RN=Renamed RD = Redeployed
AC= Activated TRW =Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
IA= Inactivated TRS =Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
BW = Bombardment Wing TRG =Tactical Reconnaissance Group
E&W =Electronics & Weather TEWS =Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
NP = Night Photo TEWTS =Tactical Electronic Warfare Training Squadron
TFW = Tactical Fighter Wing TRTS =Tactical Replacement Training Squadron
TS = Test Squadron CCTS =Combat Crew Training Squadron
TAC =Tactical Air Command CCTG =Combat Crew Training Group

Sources:
Wing/Squadron Histories; air crew orders; 50th Anniversary, Shaw AFB, SC. 1941-1991, 363TFW, Office of History, Shaw AFB , SC, 1991 . Active Air Force
Bases Within the United States, Volume I, Robert Mueller, Office of Air Force History, Washington DC, 1989. Historical Highlights: US Air Forces in Europe,
1945-1979, Office of History, USAFE, APO 09012, November 28, 1980. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review, 1961 -1972, 31 Jan 1973.
CINCPAC msg 170415ZApr 68.
~
'""
Oo
'-l ~
~
"'
 Glory Days

Appendix4
Significant Events of the Vietnam War

1945
08 May: VE Day.
02 Sep: Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh proclaim the independent Republic of Vietnam, the day the
Japanese sign surrender documents on the USS Missouri . When the French attempt to reestablish
colonial rule the Viet Minh begin guerilla warfare.

1946
06 Mar: France recognizes Vietnam as an independent republic within the French union however, Ho
Chi Minh and the Viet Minh insist on independence.
23 Nov: French bomb Haiphong killing 6,000 - the war begins in earnest for both the French and the
Viet Minh .

1950
00 Jan: Viet Minh recognized by Communist China and the Soviet Union.

1954
10 Feb: President Eisenhower warns of U.S . involvement in Vietnam, rejecting requests by the French
to intervene.
07 Apr: President Eisenhower speaks of 'dominoes falling' at a news conference.
07 May: Dien Bien Phu falls to Viet Minh. Decisive defeat. Battle began on Nov 20, 1953. Over
95 ,000 French soldiers died in the struggle for Vietnam.
21 Jul: Vietnam partitioned in Geneva into North and South at the 17th parallel. Cambodia and Laos
recognized as independent states. US provides economic and military aid to the South, accepts but
does not sign accords .
11 Oct: Viet Minh take control of North Vietnam.

1955
12 Feb: First U.S. military advisors sent to SYN. North supports continues insurrection by Viet Cong
in the South from 1955 to 1961.

1961
00 000: Bernard Fall publishes Street Without Joy.
10 Mar: National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam announces guerilla offensive against SYN to
prevent elections scheduled for 9 April.
00 May: U.S. Army deploys radio direction finding teams to SYN.
20 Oct: Four RF-lOIC reconnaissance aircraft from 363TRW arrive at Tan Son NhutAir Base, SYN.
14 Nov: Operation Farmgate - Det 2A, 4400CCTS, arrives at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Bases
with 16 T-28/C-47/B-26 aircraft.

1962
02 Feb: First American fixed wing aircraft, C-123, lost in SYN. (Air Force combat and operational
losses between 1962-1972 total 2,236 aircraft)
08 Oct: 2nd Air Division established at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

1963
08 Apr: Captains Mitchell and Campaigne,former RB-66fiyersjrom Shaw AFB, KIA when their Bien
Hoa based B-26 lost a wing on a strafing run.
01 Nov: President Diem assassinated.

1964
08 June: Six F- IOOs arrive TOY at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand.
02 Aug: Destroyer USS Maddox engages NVN torpedo boats in Gulf of Tonkin.
04 Aug : USS Turner Joy and USS Maddox report engagement with NVN vessels; attack disputed; no
evidence it ever took place.

388
 Appendices

05 Aug: Operation Pierce Arrow - 7th Fleet aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation
bomb NVN torpedo boat bases.
20 B-57 aircraft from 8BS (Yellow Birds) and 13BS (Red Birds) deploy from Clark , PI , to Bien
Hoa. Two ale collide on landing. Others land at Tan Son Nhut , one crashes.
One squadron of 18 F-105s deploys from Japan to Korat RTAFB. Thailand.
07 Aug: Congress passes Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
01 Nov: Vietcong mortar attack at Bien Hoa destroys 5 B-57 aircraft.

1965
20 Jan: Lyndon B. Johnson is sworn in as president of the United States.
07 Jan: NVN forms first SAM unit - 236th SAM Regiment.
07 Feb: President Johnson approves Operation Flaming Dart, air strikes by Navy aircraft against
targets in the Dong Hoi area of North Vietnam.
12 Feb: B-52Fs arrive at Andersen Air Base, Guam.
02 Mar: Beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder. Limited to targets in NVN below 20 degrees North
Latitude.
First air force aircraft downed over NVN (3 F-105s/2 F-IOOs); first Air Force pilot captured -
Captain Hayden J. Lockhart.
08 Mar: 3500 Marines arrive at Da Nang - !st US ground forces in Vietnam.
04 Apr: First loss of U.S. aircraft to MiGs over NVN (2 F- I05s downed by MiG- l 7s attacking the
Than Hoa bridge).
25 Apr: Four IR equipped RB-66Bs arrive at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, SVN.
03 May: First Army troops arrive - 3500 men of the l 73rd Airborne Brigade.
l 2May: First bombing pause.
16 May: B-57B explodes at Bien Hoa. Secondary explosions destroy IO B-57Bs, 11 YNAF Skyraiders
and one F-8 Crusader.
18 May: Rolling Thunder Phase II begins. Targets gradually expanded north- except for 30 mile buffer
along Chinese border and 30/10 mile Hanoi/Haiphong buffer.
17 Jun: 2 MiG-l 7s downed by Navy F-4Bs.
18 Jun: 27 B-52Fs carrying 51 750-lb bombs each fly the !st Arc Light mission against a target near
Saigon , SYN. 2 B-52s collide enroute and crash.
30 Jun: 4/TRS activated at Takhli, Thailand.
00 Jun: B-57Bs move to Da Nang, assigned to 35TFW.
10 Jul: 2 MiG-17s downed by F-4Cs from 45TFS/2Air Div - first Air Force MiG kills of war.
(Holcombe/Clark & Roberts/Andersen)
24 Jul: RB-66C intercepts first Fan Song SA-2 radar NW of Hanoi in a morning mission.
First Air Force aircraft (F-4C) downed that afternoon by same SA-2 battery.
27 Jul : First attack on SA-2 site by F-I05s; flack trap; six F-I05s lost.
13 Aug: General John P. McConnell , USAF Chief of Staff, forms Anti-SAM task force.
31 Aug: President Johnson signs law outlawing draft card burning.
22 Oct: RB-668 lost on low level IR mission out of Tan Son Nhut . First combat loss of 8-66 aircraft.
07 Nov: 236 SAM regiment nearly destroyed with loss of 2 of its 4 SA-2 fire battalions and its technical
support battalion.
28 Nov: 4 F-JOOF Wild Weasels from Koratjly orientation flights with EB-66C.
20 Dec: First F-lOOF Wild Weasel aircraft lost to AAA . Two additional F-lOOFs arrive.
22 Dec: Wild Weasels kill first SAM site.
25 Dec: Second bombing pause lasting 37 days , to January 31.

1966
08 Jan: U.S. troop level in SYN - 190,000.
31 Jan: Rolling Thunder Phase III - limited to 300 strikes a day below 20 degrees North Latitude. US
aircraft attack after 37 day bombing pause.
00 Jan: NVN moves 4 SA-2 battalions, 24 launchers , NW of Hanoi to ambush RB-66C.
25 Feb: RB-66C 54-457 damaged by SA-2 near Vinh . Crashes in Gulf of Tonkin - I fatality .
31 Mar: Rolling Thunder Phase IV - all of NVN released except for certain sanctuaries.
00 Mar: RB-66Bs begin Pathfinder missions .

389
 Glory Days

01 Apr: 7th Air Force established at Tan Son Nhut; 2nd Air Division inactivated.
12 Apr: First B-52D Arc Light strike against NVN, Mu Gia Pass. The B-52D, modified in 1965 to
carry 108 5001b bombs or 66 750lb bombs, replaced the B-52F.
26 Apr: MiG-21s launch attacks against EB-66 aircraft. First MiG-21 downed by F-4C.
480TFS/35TFW (Gilmore/Smith)
29 Apr: US troop level in SYN - 250,000.
12 May: EB-66C attacked by MiG-17s; one MiG downed by F-4C escort.
390TFS/35TFW (Dudley/Kringelis)
29 Jun: Attacks on Hanoi/Haiphong authorized. EB-66Bs supporting strike force violate China buffer
zone.
20 July: EB-66C 54-464 shot down by two SA-2 Guideline missiles near Thai Nguyen. One fatality.
20 Aug: EB-66C 54-475jrom 41TRS, Takhli, crashes near Hawaii, 3fatalities.
00 Sep: QRC-160 ECM pods tested successfully at Eglin.
26 Sep: First use of QRC-160 by Takhli F-105s.
00 Oct: 8 and 13BS, B-57, move to Phan Rang, SYN.
Soviet Union announces it will provide military assistance to North Vietnam.
01 Nov: SAC authorizes 600 B-52 Arc Light sorties per month.
05 Nov: EB-66C attacked by MiG-21 s - both MiGs shot down by F-4C escorts.
480TFS/366TFW (Tuck/Rabeni & Latham/Klause)
14 Dec: First loss of Air Force aircraft, F-105, to Mig-21.
24-25 Dec: Third bombing pause.

1967
02 Jan: Operation Bolo, led by Colonel Robin Olds of 8th TFW. 7 MiG-21s shot down.
05 Jan: 2 MiG-21s attack 2 EB-66s. Driven off by F-4Cfighter escort.
06 Jan: F-4Cs from 8TFW down 2 more MiG-21s.
01 Feb: SAC increases B-52 Arc Light sorties to 800 per month.
04 Feb: EB-66C 55-387 downed by SA-2 SAM north of Thai Nguyen. 3 fatalities.
08-15 Feb: Fourth bombing pause - Lunar New Year; TET.
19 Feb: Bernard Fall, author of Street Without Joy dies on the road he wrote about.
26 Apr: NVN unable to cope with EB-66 ECM - shoot down own MiG-21; N. Korean pilots arrive to
augment NVN air force .
13 May: F-4Cs of 8TFW shoot down 2 MiG-17s.
F-105s of355/388TFW shoot down 5 MiG-17s.
14 May: F-4Cs of 366TFW shoot down 3 MiG-17s.
20 May: F-4Cs of 366/8TFW shoot down 2 MiG-21 s/4 MiG-17s.
07 Jul: Two B-52Ds collide over South China Sea. Six aircrew killed including MG William Crumm,
3AD/CC.
08 Jul: B-52D crashes attempting emergency landing at Da Nang. 5 KIA.
30 Sep: U.S. casualties exceed 100 ,000 (killed and wounded) .
19 Oct: Air Force loses I ,OOOth fixed wing aircraft in SEA operations.
27 Oct: NVN moves most of its jet combat aircraft into southern China.
17 Nov: EB-66C 54-473 crashes at Takhli. 5fatalities.
20 Nov: MiGs attack EB-66 unsuccessfully.
29 Nov: SecDef Robert McNamara resigns.
06 Dec: EB-66C 54-462 crashes at Takhli. 3 fatalities.
24-25 Dec: Fifth bombing pause - Christmas cease fire.

1968
01-02 Jan: Sixth bombing pause.
03 Jan: Rolling Thunder Phase V.
14 Jan: EB-66C 55-388 shot down by MiG-21 west of Hanoi. I fatality.
31 Jan: Beginning of Tet offensive in SYN by Viet Cong; lasts until 29 Feb.
00 Jan: 13BS, B-57, deactivated.
01 Feb: B-52 Arc Light missions increase from 800 to 1,200 a month.
15 Feb: B-52 Arc Light missions increase from 1,200 to 1,800 a month.

390
 Appendices

06 Mar: EB-66£ 54-524 crashes during refueling.

31 Mar: President Johnson announces he will not seek a second term .
0 l Apr: President Johnson limits bombing of NVN to area south of 19th parallel (Route Packs 1,2
& part of 3).
10 May: Peace talks begin in Paris.
23 May: EB-66 artacked by MiG-2 ls over Gulf <if Tonkin. Navy MiG-cap downs two.
25 May: EA-6B EW aircraft makes first flight at Long Island.
0 l Jul: General Creighton Abrams replaces General Westmoreland.
19 Jul: EB-66B 53-491 crashes on landing at Takhli.
01 Nov: President Johnson halts air and naval attacks against NVN. End of Operation Rolling
Thunder.

1969
20 Jan: Richard Nixon becomes president of the United States.
08 Apr: EB-66B 53-498 crashes on take-off at Takhli. 3 fatalities .
08 May: National Liberation Front offers peace proposal in Paris.
24 Jun: RB-66B 53-415 363TRW, Shaw AFB. loses engine during refueling. I fatality.
02 Sep: Ho Chi Minh dies.
08 Jul: Redeployment of U.S. military personnel from SYN & Thailand begins.
00 Sep: 8BS , B-57. down to 9 aircraft: returned to DM. Of94 B-57s assigned to SEA. 51 were lost in
combat including 15 destroyed on the ground.
3 1 Oct: 4/TEWS ( EB-66CIE). Takhli RTAFB. Thailand, inactivated.
24 Nov: F-105 tactical fighter squadrons (4) consolidated at Takhli .
00 Dec: Total US military deaths in SEA due to hostile action exceed 40 ,000.

1970
28 Jan: HH-53 helicopter attempting pick up of F-105 pilot is shot down over Laos by MiG-21 using
air to air missiles. l st MiG encounter since Nov '68 bombing halt.
20 Mar: B-52 Arc Light missions reduced to 1,400 a month.
28 Mar: Navy F-4J shoots down first MiG-21since1968 bombing halt.
21 Apr: EB-66£ 54-439 burns at Hickam AFB, HI.
17 Aug: B-52 Arc Light missions reduced to 1,000 a month .
19 Sep: B-52 Arc Light operations consolidated at U-Tapao, Thailand.
22 Sep: 42TEWS moved to Korar from Takhli.
00 Oct: F-105 squadrons redeploy from Takhli RTAFB, Thailand. 355TFW and its three squadrons
inactivate:66 aircraft transferred to air national guard.
26 Oct: EB-66C 54-384 crashes on landing ar Koral.
03 Nov: SA-2 sites photographed in vicinity of Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes.
00 Nov: Six EB-66 aircraft deploy from Shaw AFB to Koral to counter expanding threat to B-52s over
Laos. (Tora/ EB-66 count at Koral: 26)
21 Nov: USAF and Army helicopters raid Son Tay POW camp near Hanoi - unsuccessful.
21 Nov: USAF and Navy aircraft strike suspected SAM and AAA sites in NVN south of 18 degrees
North.
00 Nov: 6010TFS F-105 Wild Weasel activated at Korat.

1971
04 Mar: First SAM site confirmed in Laos, 2.5 miles west of Ban Karai Pass.
11 Mar: EB-66C 55-389 crashes after rake-offfrom Korar. Crew ejects.
15 Mar: Four additional EB-66s deploy from Shaw to Karat in support of B-52 operations. Total EB-
66 aircraft at Karat: 30.
22 Mar: F-4D shot down by SAM near Dong Hoi, NVN . First since Feb 68.
26 Apr: 0 -2 shot down by SA-2 over Laos, near Ban Karai Pass.
01 Jun: Arc Light sortie rate returns to 33/day. U-Tapao beddown decreases to 42 B-52s.
00 Jun: Ten EB-66 aircraft deployed from TAC in support bf B-52 ops return to CON US. Number of
EB-66s at Koral: 20.
12 Nov: USAF strength in SYN 26,898.

391
 Glory Days

17 Nov: EB-66E 54-427 engine failure on run-up - ale lost.

22 Nov: Three EB-66s arrive at Koratfrom Shaw AFB to replace 2 aircraft with wing cracks, and
another destroyed when an engine exploded.

1972
00 Jan: President announces military strength reduction in Vietnam from 139K to 69K by May 1.
02 Feb: EB-66E 54-540 crashes on take-off.
16 Feb: B-52 Arc Light strikes increase from 33 per day to 51 sorties per day.
SA-2 sites move into DMZ - fire 81 missiles . F-4D shot down by SAM ..
21 Feb: MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 555TFS/432TRW.
00 Mar: Contingency package of ALQ-101-4 ECM pods arrive at Udorn to counter possible
introduction of SA-3 SAM.
01 Mar: MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 555TFS/432TRW.
28 Mar: AC-130A gunship downed by SA-2 over Laos - 14KIA.
30 Mar: MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 13TFS/432TRW
NVN troops and armor cross DMZ into Quang Tri province (Spring Invasion).
31 Mar: AC-130E Pave Specter gunship downed by AAA over Laos. Crew of 15 recovered .
02 Apr: EB-66C 54-466 shot down by SAM while supporting B-52 air strike near DMZ. 5 fatalities,
one survivor.
06 Apr: US aircraft authorized to strike targets in NVN to 20 degrees North Latitude (Operation
Freedom Train).
09 Apr: 12 B-52s strike POL storage area and railyard in Vinh area, NVN.
12 Apr: 18 B-52s (Freedom Dawn) from U-Tapao, strike Bai Thuong AB, NVN.
15 Apr: 17 B-52s (Freedom Porch Bravo) from U-Tapao, strike POL area at Haiphong.
F-105G shot down by SAM - 250 SA-2 missiles fired during raid.
16 Apr: Two MiG-21s downed by F-4Ds from 13TFS/432TRW
One MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 523TFS/432TRW:
21 Apr: 18 B-52s (Freighter Captain) from U-Tapao, strike transshipment point near Than Hoa. One
B-52 hit by SAM makes emergency landing at Da Nang . One F-4D lost to SAM.
23 Apr: F-4E downed by SAM near Dong Hoi.
27 Apr: 4 AF fighters releasing Paveway smart bombs knock down Than Hoa Bridge - previously 871
sorties using dumb bombs resulted in only superficial damage.
00 Apr: PACAF requests 4 EB-66 replacement aircraft as additional EB-66 aircraft, crews and
instructors from Shaw and Spangdahlem move to Koratfor 90 days TDY (Constant Guard).
President announces reduction of military strength in SVN from 69 ,000 to 49 ,000 by 1 July.
08 May: Pres. Nixon authorizes mining ofNVN ports and resumptions of air strikes throughout NVN;
Navy A-6 Intruders mine Haiphong harbor May 9.
MiG-19 downed by F-4D, 13TFS/432TRW
MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 555TFS/432TRW
10 May: Start of Linebacker I - 8TFW F-4s put Paul Doumer Bridge out of action using smart
bombs.
3 MiG-21s downed by F-4Ds, 555TFS/432TRW.
F-4D and F-4E shot down by MiG-19s .
10 May: Lt Randy Cunningham and LtGg) Willie Driscoll, USN, shoot down three MiG-17s, then
eject after being hit by SA-2, becoming !st aces of war with two earlier kills on Jan 19 & May 8
(USS Constellation).
11 May: MiG-21 downed by F-40- 555TFS/432TRW
F-4D shot down by MiG-21.
12 May: MiG-19 downed by F-4D, 555TFS/432 TRW
18 May: F-4D shot down by MiG-19.
20 May: F-4D shot down by MiG-21.
23 May: MiG-19 downed by F-4E, 35TFS/366TFW
MiG-21 downed by F-4E, 35TFS/366TFW
31 May: MiG-21 downed by F-4E, 13TFS/432TRW
MiG-21 downed by F-4D, 555TFS/432TRW
02 Jun: MiG-19 downed by F-4E, 58TFS/432TRW

392
 Appendices

08 Jun: B-52s total 206 - largest SAC bomber force ever assembled in Western Pacific.
08-21 Jun: B-52s routinely strike targets in Route Pack I, NVN .
13 Jun: F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
18 Jun: Third AC-DOA gunship downed over Laos by SA-7 - 12KIA/3 survivors.
21 Jun: MiG-21 downed by F-4E. 469TFS/388TFW.
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
22 Jun: B-52s fly all time daily high of 111 sorties against 37 targets.
24 Jun: F-4E/F-4D shot down by MiG-2 ls.
27 June: Two F-4Es shot down by MiG-2ls.
05 Jul: Two F-4Es shot down by MiG-2ls.
08 Jul: MiG-21 downed by F-4E , 4TFS/366TFW.
2 MiG-2 ls downed by F-4Es, 555TFS/432TRW
F-4E downed by MiG-21.
18 Jul: MiG-21 downed by F-4D , 13TFS/432TRW.
24 Jul : F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
29 Jul: MiG-21 downed by F-4D . 13TFS/432TRW.
MiG-21 downed by F-4E,4TFS/366TFW
F-4E shot down by MiG-2 1.
30 Jul: F-4D shot down by MiG-21.
00 Aug: ALQ-119 ECM pods shipped to SEA to counter possible SA-4 SAM threat.
12 Aug: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 58FS/432TRW (Richard/Ettel - USM/USN).
15 Aug: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 336TFS/8TFW
19 Aug: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 4TFS/366TFW
28 Aug: MiG-21 downed by F-4D 555TFS/432TRW
02 Sep: MiG-19 downed by F-4E 34/34TFS/388TFW
09 Sep: MiG-21 downed by F-4D 555TFS/432TRW
2 MiG-19s downed by F-4Ds 555TFS/432TRW
11 Sep: MiG-21 downed by F-4J (Cummings/Lasseter); only USMC MiG kill.
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
12 Sep: 2 MiG-2ls downed by F-4Es 35TFS/388TFW
MiG-21 downed by F-4D 469TFS/388TFW
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
16 Sep: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 555TFS/432TRW
05 Oct: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 34TFS/388TFW
F-4D shot down by MiG-21 .
06 Oct: MiG-19 downed by F-4E 34TFS/388TFW
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
08 Oct: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 35TFS/388TFW
12 Oct: MiG-21 downed by F-4D 555TFS/432TRW
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
13 Oct: MiG-21 downed by F-4D 13TFS/432TRW
15 Oct: MiG-21 downed by F-4E 307TFS/432TRW
MiG-21 downed by F-4E 34TFS/388TFW
MiG-21 downed by F-4D 523TFS/432TRW
22 Oct: Linebacker I ends - USAF flew 9,315 sorties over North Vietnam; 2,750 SA-2 missiles
were fired resulting in loss of 46 aircraft (60 SA-2/aircraft vs 18 SA-2/aircraft in 1965)
11 Nov : CINCSAC personally designates missions scheduled into high threat areas of NYN Route
Packages 2, 3 and 4.
22 Nov: First B-52 lost to SAM near Yinh, crew ejects successfully over Thailand.
18 Dec: Paris peace negotiations stall.
Linebacker II begins - 129 B-52s attack targets in Hanoi area - 3 B-52s lost to SAMs. One B-52
reaches Thailand where crew ejects successfully.
MiG-21 downed by B-52D 307SW
19 Dec: 93 B-52s hit targets in Hanoi area - I B-52 hit by•SAM , recovers at Nam Phong, Thailand.
20 Dec: 99 B-52s attack targets in Hanoi area - 6 B-52s lost to SAMs. Crews of two eject over Laos
and Thailand.
21 Dec: 30 B-52s attack Hanoi - 2 B-52s lost to SAMs.

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MiG-21 downed by F-4D 555TFS/432TRW

22 Dec: 30 B-52s attack Haiphong - no losses.
MiG-21 downed by F-4D 555TFS/432TRW.
23 Dec: 30 B-52s attack Haiphong - no losses.
EB-66E 54-529 crashes on returning from a Linebacker support mission. 3 fatalities .
24 Dec: 30 B-52s attack Hanoi - no losses.
MiG-21 downed by B-S2D 307SW
26 Dec: 120 B-S2s attack Hanoi/Haiphong - 2 B-S2s lost to SAMs
27 Dec: 60 B-52s attack Hanoi - 2 B-S2s lost to SAMs
F-4E shot down by MiG-21.
28 Dec: 60 B-S2s attack Hanoi/Haiphong - no losses.
MiG-21 downed by F-4D SSSTFS/432TRW
F-4E shot down by MiG-21 - last US aircraft lost to MiGs.
29 Dec: Linebacker II ends. Paris negotiations resume on January 8, 1973. (Total of 27 USAF aircraft
lost in Linebacker II; IS B-S2s).

1973
03 Jan: B-S2D hit by SA-2 near Vinh, abandoned over water near Da Nang.
07 Jan: MiG-21 downed by F-4D 4TFS/432TRW (Howman/Kullman) - last of 137 confirmed USAF
aerial victories .
13 Jan: B-S2D damaged by SA-2 during Arc Light raid lands at Da Nang. Scrapped.
IS Jan: Suspension of offensive operations against NVN.
28 Jan: Paris negotiated cease fire becomes effective.
29 Jan: Last combat missions flown in South Vietnam.
12 Feb: Start of Operation Homecoming - return of S91 POWs.
21 Feb: Laotion cease fire signed.
17 Apr: Last B-S2 Arc Light strikes into Laos.
03 May: EB-66E 54-445 ground accident, Class 26 - last B-66 loss.
16 Jun: Last American aircraft lost to enemy action, F-4E, while flying over Cambodia.
IS Aug: Last Air Force bombing mission flown by A-7Ds attacking targets in Cambodia.
Cambodian cease fire agreement signed. War in Southeast Asia ends.
lS Sep: Laotion peace agreement signed. Overflight of Laos by US aircraft prohibited.
24 Dec: EB-66C of 42TEWS, 388TFW, Karat RTAFB, Thailand.flies last operational EL/NT mission
a/Vietnam War.

1974
02 Jan : First/our EB-66 aircraft flown to Clark Air Base, Pl.for 'operational salvage.'
17 Jan : Last/our o/20 EB-66 aircraft flown from Karat RTAFB to Clark Air Base.
15 Mar: 42TEWS and 39TEWTS, last two EB-66 squadrons .formally inactivated.

1975
30 Apr: Saigon captured by NVN forces .

Note: USAF airmen were given official credit for the downing of 137 enemy aircraft (MiG-17/19/21)
between 196S and 1973. There were many more kills claimed but disallowed due to insufficient data
to positively confirm such claims . 73 Air Force fixed wing aircraft were lost to MiGs, including one
EB-66C; 99 fixed wing Air Force aircraft were lost to SA-2 surface to air missiles, including 17 B-S2
heavy bombers and four EB-66C electronic warfare aircraft.

Sources: USAF Management Summary - Southeast Asia in Review 1961 - 1972, Headquarters USAF,
Washington, D.C. January 1973 . U.S. Air Force Combat Victory Credits Southeast Asia, Office of
Air Force History, Hq USAF, March 1974. Aces & Aerial Victories, The United States Air Force
in Southeast Asia 196S-1973 , Office of Air Force History, Hq USAF, 1976. Air Force Magazine,
December 2003, Up From Kitty Hawk; and September 200S issue, The Air Force and the Cold War: A
Chronology, l 94S-9 l. Vietnam Air Losses by Chris Hobson, Midland Publishing, 200 I . Development
of Strategic Air Command 1946-1976, Office of the SAC Historian, 1976. The Encyclopedia of
Military History, Ernest & Trevor Dupuy, 1970.

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 Appendices

Appendix 5
B-66 Combat Losses and Major Accidents

Over the span of the aircraft's service life from 1954 to 1974 a total of 51 aircraft were downed by
enemy action . crashed from a variety of causes . or were so severely damaged that they were written
off by the Air Force as total losses (Cl ass 26). This is the complete listing of losses experienced
by all versions of the 294 B/RB/WB-66A/B/C/D aircraft built by the Douglas Aircrati Corporation.
The prefix EB took the place of RB in October 1966 for aircraft with a SIGINT/ELINT/ESM/ECM
functi on.

Summary of Aircraft Losses

SIN Type Date Org Base

54-0497 B-66B 10106156 17BW/34BS Hurlburt Field. FL
54-0493 B-66B 04/01 /57 17BW/95BS Hurlburt Field . FL
53-0410 RB-66B 04/11 /57 363TRW/43TRS Shaw AFB , SC
54-0428 RB-66B 07/ 18/57 67TRW/ 12TRS Yokota AB . Jap
54-0495 B-66B 09/03/57 17BW/95BS Hurlburt Field. FL
54-0517 RB-66B 12/16/57 lOTRW/ITRS Spangdahlem AB, Ger
55-0314 B-66B 03/30/58 47BW/84BS RAF Sculthorpe , UK
54-0422 RB-66B 04/ 14/58 lOTRW /l 9TRS RAF Sculthorpe , UK
54-0433 RB-66B 07103158 IOTRW /l 9TRS RAF Sculthorpe, UK
54-0444 RB-66B 07/08/58 IOTRW/ ITRS Spangdahlem AB , Ger
53-0459 RB-66B 07/ 17/58 363TRW/41TRS Shaw AFB , SC
53-0411 RB-66B 10/07/58 363TRW/4ITRS Shaw AFB , SC
54-0476 RB-66C 11/15/58 67TRW/ llTRS Yokota AB, Jap
54-0535 RB-66B 12/09/58 IOTRW/30TRS Spangdahlem AB , Ger
54-0472 RB -66C 02109159 67TRW/ llTRS Yokota AB , Jap
54-0547 RB -66B 04/01 /59 363TRW /l 6TRS Shaw AFB , SC
53-0473 RB-66B 05/08/59 363TRW /l 6TRS Shaw AFB, SC
55-0400 WB -660 05129159 363TRW/9TRS Shaw AFB , SC
54-0544 RB-66B 06/26/59 363TRW/16TRS Shaw AFB.SC
54-0432 RB-66B 07/03/59 IOTRW/ !9TRS Spangdahlem AB, Ger
54-0421 RB-66B 12/ 14/59 IOTRW/19TRS RAF Bruntingthorpe , UK
53-0409 RB-66B 11 /01 /60 IOTRW/ ITRS RAF Alconbury, UK
54-0430 RB-66B 03/ 16/61 10TRW/19TRS RAF Bruntingthorpe , UK
54-0471 RB-66C 03/31 /61 363TRW/9TRS Shaw AFB , SC
55-0394 WB-660 09105161 363TRW /9TRS Shaw AFB.SC
54-0499 B-66B 10/26/61 47BW/85BS RAF Sculthorpe, UK
54-0460 RB-66C 02/07/62 IOTRW/42TRS RAF Chelveston , UK
54-0530 RB-66B 02/04/63 IOTRW/ 19TRS Toul-Rosieres AB , Fr
54-0541 RB-66B 03/ 10/64 IOTRW/ 19TRS Toul-Rosieres AB , Fr
53-0452 RB-66B 10/22/65 4485TW/4487TS Eglin AFB , FL-TSN AB , SVN
54-0457 EB -66C 02125166 460TRW /6460TEWS Takhli RTAFB, Thai
54-0464 EB-66C 07120166 432TRW/6460TEWS Takhli RTAFB. Thai
54-0475 EB-66C 08/20/66 460TRW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB , Thai
55-0387 EB-66C 02/04/67 432TRW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB. Thai
54-0473 EB-66C 11117/67 355TFW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB , Thai
54-0462 EB-66C 12/06/67 355TFW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB, Thai
55-0388 EB-66C 01 11 4/68 355TFW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB, Thai
54-0524 EB-66E 03/06/68 355TFW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB , Thai
53-0491 EB-66B 07/19/68 355TFW/41TEWS Takhli RTAFB. Thai
53-0498 EB-66B 04/08/69 355TFW/42TEWS Takhli RTAFB, Thai
53-0415 RB-66B 06124169 363TRW/4417Q:CTS Shaw AFB, SC
54-0536 EB-66E 10109169 36TFW/39TEWS Spangdahlem AB , Ger
54-0439 EB-66E 04121 170 355TFW/42TEWS Takhli RTAFB . Thai

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 Glory Days

54-0384 EB-66C 10126no 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai

55-0389 EB-66C 03/llnl 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai
54-0427 EB-66E ll/17nl 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai
54-0540 EB-66E 02102n2 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai
54-0466 EB-66C 04/02/72 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai
54-0386 EB-66C 08/28172 52TFW/39TEWS Spangdahlem AB, Ger
54-0529 EB-66E 12/23/72 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai
54-0445 EB-66E 05/03173 388TFW/42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thai

October 6, 1956 B-668 54-0497 34BS/17BW, Hurlburt Field, FL

Returning from Exercise Whipsaw in Europe, accompanied by three other B-66s, via Lajes Field,
Azores, to Harmon AB, Newfoundland, aircraft number 54-0497 experienced fluctuating fuel flow
about 50 miles out of Harmon. Then, both engines flamed out. Captain Zacheus W. Ryall prepared
to make an engine out landing, when on the base leg both engines regained full power. Fuel system
icing was suspected. On the following day, October 6, Captain Ryall intended to fly from Harmon
to Hurlburt Field, FL, his home station. While over Virginia, at flight level 370, both engines flamed
out again, and Captain Ryall prepared to make an engine out landing at the Blackstone, VA, airport.
Unfavorable weather prevented an engine out landing, and the crew of three ejected eight miles from
Blackstone, after directing the aircraft toward an unoccupied area. First Lieutenant Darrell E . Selby,
navigator, and A/2C Callix J. Perusse, gunner, as well as Captain Ryal! ejected without injury to
themselves. It was later determined that at altitude the fuel thickened and the fine mesh fuel filters
became barriers to fuel flow. Redesigned filters solved this problem. However, two more B-66 aircraft
would crash, with loss of life, because not all old filters were purged from the supply system. Source:
Air Force Safety Center, Kirtland AFB, NM , (AFSC); Cliff Parrott, Douglas Aircraft Corporation B-
66 Technical Advisor.

April 1, 1957 B-668 54-0493 95BS/l 7BW, Hurlburt Field, FL

The aircraft was one of three scheduled to participate in Exercise King Cole, launching at 0015 hours
into light rain and thunderstorms . Immediately after take-off the pilot reported the loss of his escape
hatch. The tower gave Lieutenant Dinger clearance for a requested visual approach; GCA monitoring
the aircraft throughout the remaining portion of flight. Three miles from the runway the aircraft was
observed by GCA to be going dangerous low. The aircraft entered ground clutter, hitting a tree and
shearing off the leading edge slat on one wing, briefly reappeared on the radar scope, then crashed into
a swamp one mile short of the field . Flight time: 7 minutes. Aircraft and crew perished. I/Lieutenant
Richard J. Dinger, pilot. Captain John A. Runion, navigator. TSGT Stanley P. Klatz, gunner. Source:
AFSC.

April 11, 1957 RB-668 53-0410 43TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

Aircraft departed Shaw AFB, SC, at 1045. on an instrument training flight, with the secondary mission
of picking up the 43TRS commander, Lt/Colonel Paul Vanderhock, from Eglin AFB, Florida, and fly
him to Shaw AFB, SC . The weather at Eglin was 1,000 feet in light rain . After the pilot was turned
over to Eglin GCA for a precision approach, he broke out at 1,000 feet to the right of the runway
and was instructed to go around . On his second approach he was again to the right of the runway,
pulling the throttles to idle when he realized he was going to land long. The drag chute was deployed
prematurely, and immediately separated from the aircraft (Speed limit for chute deployment was 170
knots). The aircraft bounced, continued down the runway centerline onto the overrun, went over a
40 foot embankment, became airborne again for 175 feet, then struck a swampy area in a left wing
low, nose down attitude, breaking up on contact. The navigator, Captain George F. Duncan, was not
injured, and assisted the injured pilot, Captain John T. McLain, to safety. There was no fire . The
aircraft was destroyed. Source: AFSC.

July 18, 1957 RB-668 54-428 12TRS/67TRW, Yokota AB, Japan

Less than an hour into their round robin navigational flight from Yokota Air Base, the navigator,
Captain Max Ruderman, called the pilot, Captain George H. Slover, and asked, "What is making the
aircraft shake so much?" They were flying IFR at flight level 350. Captain Slover ascribed the shaking
to turbulence from nearby thunderstorms . Then he noticed that the left engine alternator was carrying

396
 Appendices

a heavy load, and the right alternator was near zero. A sudden loud rumble was followed by the
tachometer on the number l engine dropping to zero and the off flag popping up on the flight indicator.
Captain Slover immediately took the aircraft off autopilot. When he did, the plane entered a nose high
attitude. Pushing the control column forward to nose the aircraft down he realized that his elevator
control was frozen , and he alerted the crew to prepare for ejection. The airspeed was falling off rapidly,
at 170 knots the aircraft began to buffet, at 120 knots it stalled and entered a steep spiral to the left.
Captain Slover attempted to blow the escape hatches, but due to the high G-loads he had to get both
hands on the Emergency Canopy Release to pull it out. The gunner, T/Sgt Wilburn G. South, ejected
first, followed by the navigator. As the aircraft accelerated past 200 knots Captain Slover extended
the speed brakes, ejecting at 17 ,000 feet at 300 knots. The aircraft dove into a hillside and was totally
demolished. All three crew members landed safely and were unhurt. Source: AFSC.

September 3, 1957 8-668 54-0495 958S/178W, Hurlburt Field, FL

The aircrew was scheduled to fly a practice radar bombing mission against the Houston radar bombing
range . Bomb plot altitude was flight level 370. The weather was clear, except in the Houston area
where layers of cloud and thunderstorms were expected. Shortly after the bomb run two explosions
were heard from the #2 engine. Instruments became erratic, and while the pilot was trying to assess
the situation. he entered a thunderstorm , encountering moderate turbulence. The altimeter was
descending. airspeed was past ' the barber pole ', with no immediate effect noticed when power on # l
engine was reduced to idle. The pilot felt he could not regain control of the aircraft and ordered the
crew to eject - the navigator, then the pilot, and finally the gunner ejected , in that order. The three crew
members and the aircraft landed near Alvin, Texas . The pilot, I/Lt David E. Moore and the gunner,
S/Sgt R.J. Newland, suffered major injuries. The navigator, Captain Arthur J. Manzo, was killed .
Source: AFSC.

December 16, 1957 R8-668 54-0517 lTRS/lOTRW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

Aircraft departed Spangdahlem Friday, 13 December, for a photo mission to Chateauroux AB , France,
Nouasseur AB , Morocco, and return. Weather delayed the crew at Chateauroux until December 16
when an early morning take-off was scheduled. The right engine torched on run-up due to excessive
fuel accumulation and late ignition. At the end of runway 04 the pilot was observed to run-up his
engines several times, switching landing lights on and off before taking the active. As he rolled down
the runway the landing lights went off after 150 feet. The aircraft became airborne at the computed
take-off distance of 5,000 feet, the take-off appearing normal to observers, seeing a continuous red
glow from both engines. The aircraft leveled off at 200 feet, began a shallow descent , disappearing
beyond the horizon , where next an explosion was observed. All observers heard the sound of the
engines until the explosion and thought they sounded normal. Aircraft and crew perished. I/Lieutenant
Dan K. Henderson , pilot. 2/Lieutenant Glen D. Watson. navigator. N2C Arthur J. Dufresne , Jr..
gunner. Source: AFSC.

March 30, 1958 8-66B 55-0314 848S/478W, RAF Sculthorpe, UK

The crew of 55-0314 along with two other 84BS aircrews briefed at 1300 hours on Friday, 28 March ,
for a weekend mission to Landstuhl Air Base, Germany, practicing radar bombing on London bomb
plot on the outbound leg. Take-off was scheduled for Saturday morning before 0900 local. after which
the 9 ,000 foot runway was to be closed. Take off was made and the mission proceeded uneventfully.
Sunday early afternoon the three B-66s were cleared !FR on top direct to Sculthorpe. Upon arrival
at Sculthorpe visibility was reported as 1.8 miles in light rain and dropping. The landing was to be
made on the short, 6,000 foot runway, the primary runway was still closed for repairs. First Lieutenant
William H . Fulton, the pilot of 314 was the last of the three B-66s to attempt a landing. By the time
he was inbound to the homer beacon at 5 ,000 feet visibility had dropped to 1.2 miles or less, braking
action though was reported as good by the preceding B-66. Fulton touched down 500 feet from the
runway threshold at a flare speed of 141 knots, deployed the brake chute, which blossomed, then
immediately released. Fulton applied maximum braking with anti-skid. With approximately 2,000 feet
of runway remaining the B-66 was still traveling at 80 knots. He informed GCA that he would go onto
the overrun, then shut down the right engine. The aircraft proceeded onto the runway overrun, onto
the grass beyond, then tore into the perimeter fence, coll~psing the nose gear, and came to rest in a
plowed field where a small electrical fire started below the crew compartment. The gunner, A/lC Earl

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 Glory Days

W. Churchill, opened his escape hatch manually and exited the aircraft, followed by Captain George
T. Dugan, the navigator. Lieutenant Fulton exited the aircraft last, after turning off all switches. The
aircraft was deemed repairable at an estimated cost of $400,000 and 3,500 man hours. Lieutenant
Colonel Fulton, USAF (Ret.), stated in an interview in October 2006 that because of the short runway
and the deteriorating weather he had requested to divert to his alternate, a French base. His request
was denied by the Wing Commander, Colonel Glover. The accident, according to Colonel Fulton, was
subsequently classified as 'supervisory error,' by the accident investigation board. The aircraft was
placed in a hangar, where it remained, being used for spare parts. It was eventually taken off the active
rolls and disposed of through Class 26 action. Source: AFSC/Lt/Col William Fulton.

April 14, 1958 RB-66B 54-0422 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Sculthorpe, UK

Aircraft departed Sculthorpe at 1051 local for a three hour round-robin training flight. Weather was
changeable. At 14:06 weather was 600 feet overcast, two miles in fog and haze, with fog increasing
rapidly. The aircraft was handed over to the final controller on the base leg 8 miles out. The final
approach appeared normal, then the aircraft started to go high on the glide slope, drifting left, then
right. At 14:22 the GCA controller suggested a go-around, "tum to a heading of 300 degrees and
climb to 1,500 feet." The pilot responded that he was on a missed approach, heading 060 degrees.
He was advised to tum to 100 degrees and climb to 5,000 feet, or 1,000 feet on top. The pilot did
not respond . At 14:25 the Fakenham police received a report of an airplane crash. Aircraft and crew
perished. Captain Roger E. Taylor, pilot. I/Lieutenant Robert B. Handcock, navigator. TSGT Bernard
M. Valencia, gunner. Source: AFSC

July 3, 1958 RB-66B 54-0433 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Sculthorpe, UK

The aircraft departed Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, for its home station of RAF Sculthorpe in the
United Kingdom. En route the aircraft experienced a total loss of utility and main emergency hydraulic
pressure. Arriving over RAF Sculthorpe, Captain William A. Maroum, pilot, attempted to lower the
landing gear. The nose and right main gear extended and Jocked; the left main gear stayed in the wheel
well and would not move. Captain Maroum then put the aircraft on autopilot and ordered Captains
Willis B. Gray, instructor navigator, and Constantin Costen, Jr., navigator, to eject. The crew ejected
successfully~ After the crew abandoned the aircraft, it flew for another 20 minutes, doing several large
circles near the base, once flying over RAF Sculthorpe, before crashing in a field after both engines
flamed out. Source: AFSC.

July 8, 1958 RB-66B 54-0444 1TRS/lOTRW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

"Carrot Blue One" was on a training mission to take aerial photos in the LeHavre area of France.
Departure was normal and all photo runs were accomplished as scheduled at 10,000' with a ground
speed of 325 knots. The aircraft began its penetration to Spangdahlem at 1656Z, crashing at l 711Z,
7 ,200 feet short of the runway. The crew of three ejected at a low altitude and were killed on impact,
with chutes not fully deployed . Aircraft and crew perished. Captain Donn F. Chandler, pilot. Captain
Robin W. Gray, navigator. I/Lieutenant Helmut Heimann, navigator. Source: AFSC.

July 17, 1958 RB-66B 53-0459 41TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

Four RB/WB-66 crews in the 43rd TRS were placed on alert status on July 15 and briefed to proceed
on a classified mission (1958 Lebanon crisis) from Shaw AFB to Lajes AFB , with air refueling near
Bermuda. The pilot and gunner of the crew involved in the accident were from the 43rd TRS, the
navigator from the 4lst TRS, because Captain Trent's regular navigator was on emergency leave
and no spare 43rd TRS navigators were available. Two of the crews were delayed in their departure
because of aircraft maintenance problems. The crews of 'Smokestack Delta 1 and 2' proceeded to
their aircraft for preflight. SDI, the lead aircraft, aborted temporarily for maintenance. SD2, having
been briefed that because of the seriousness of the mission to proceed, continued with its preflight.
The Form 781 reflected that the N-1 compass was overdue a swing. SD2 lined up for take-off, the
pilot checked the N-1 compass with the runway heading noting no difference. A normal take-off
was made at 0720 on July 17. Near Bermuda they refueled from a KB-50 tanker, and were given
instructions to refuel over Lajes, instead of landing, and await further instructions as to where to
proceed to next. About 30 minutes out of Lajes the navigator began to concentrate on his radar using
its full range of 200 miles. There was no sign ofland. Five minutes before ETA the pilot turned to UHF

398
 Appendices

Guard and began to broadcast his difficulty in the blind . The crew realized that they were lost with a
malfunctioning NI compass (The APN-82 indicated that they were within 12 miles of Lajes, but they
could see no land). SD2 then turned north toward active shipping lanes searching for the islands , with
the navigator keeping his radar on maximum range. They sighted no land. The pilot then got out his
Dash-I and reviewed bailout procedures with the crew. Spotting the Norwegian freighter Vespasian
they descended to 10.000 feet and approached the ship on a parallel heading. The pilot reduced speed
to 200 knots. lowered flaps to 60 degrees . jettisoned the hatches. then they ejected - the gunner first.
the navigator second. and the pilot last. The pilot. Captain Clyde B. Trent. and the navigator, I/Lt Roth
0. Owen. were rescued by the Vespasian. The gunner. A/IC Julius J . Rausch , was lost at sea. Source:
AFSC.

October 7, 1958 RB-66B 53-0411 41TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

Aircraft was on a routine cross-country flight from Shaw AFB. SC. Captain Richard Wilson, the pilot,
wrote up the #2 engine as being 'soft ,' not maintaining normal thrust , and decided to land at McClellan
AFB. CA. Maintenance at McClellan (Sacramento Air Materiel Area - SMAMA) decided to replace
the engine. Captain Wilson and his navigator returned to Shaw, intending to return for a FCF when the
aircraft was ready. The Functional Check Flight was flown instead by a SMAMA pilot, accompanied
by two SMAMA civilians. Shortly after takeoff #2 engine failed and the aircraft crashed and burned.
Apparently nuts/bolts (FOO) was left in the cowling of #2 engine and ingested when the inlet screens
retracted on lift-off. Aircraft and crew perished. The Shaw Douglas technical representative had
planned to accompany Captain Wilson to McClellan AFB for the functional check flight of the aircraft ,
once notified by the depot that the aircraft was ready. The inlet screen FOO inspection was a regular
part of the walk-around checklist, and may have been overlooked. Captain Richard W. Hughes, pilot.
Mr Blaine L. Mains , SMAMA. Mr George E. Sarabale , SMAMA. Source: C. Parrott/AFSC.

November 15, 1958 RB-66C 54-0476 11TRS/67TRW, Yokota Air Base, Japan
476 was returning from a night reconnaissance mission to Kunsan AB, Korea. Due to the classified
nature of the mission , no flight plan had been filed, and radio silence was maintained until the
aircraft was within JOO miles of Kunsan. Approaching Kunsan, the pilot was cleared for a normal
jet penetration. Two miles out of Kunsan the pilot reported VFR conditions and was cleared by the
Kunsan tower for a visual landing pattern . He reported gear down on long final, and was cleared to
land. On short final, the pilot advised that he was going around. He executed his go-around and passed
the tower at an altitude of approximately 100 feet. He continued until about I mile beyond the end of
the runway when he was observed to enter a gentle right descending turn, crashing into the water off
the end of the runway with no explosion or fire resulting from the crash. The aircraft was destroyed,
the crew of seven perished. Captain George A. Taylor, pilot. I/Lieutenant Robert A. Chase, navigator.
Staff Sergeant Howard M . Hicks , gunner. Captain James M. Stitzel, Electronic Warfare Officer. I/
Lieutenant Thomas C. Bryce, Electronic Warfare Officer. I/Lieutenant Smith Davis, Jr., Electronic
Warfare Officer. I/Lieutenant Lawton 0. Mueller, Electronic Warfare Officer. .Source: AFSC.

December 9, 1958 RB-668 54-0535 30TRS/10TRW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

Returning from a practice RBS training flight from Spangdahlem to Nancy to Cologne , back to
Spangdahlem, 'Research 19' was contacted by Rhein-Control and accepted a radar letdown and
GCA approach to Spangdahlem air base. At 16 miles from the runway the aircraft was handed from
Spangdahlem approach control to GCA for a straight in approach to runway 23 . The aircraft descended
from 7 ,000 to 2,700 feet. At 9 miles from the end of the runway the GCA final controller took over. The
aircraft was reacting to heading instructions up to the 2 mile point, after which there was no response
from the pilot. The aircraft crashed 1.8 miles from the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and the crew
perished. Captain Howard E. Strandberg, pilot. Captain Wilfred E. Cather, navigator. Captain Joseph
0 . Loefler, navigator. Source: AFSC.

February 9, 1959 RB-66C 54-0472 11TRS/67TRW, Yokota Air Base, Japan

EB-66C reconnaissance aircraft of the 11th TRS routinely flew missions from Yokota air base , to
Kadena on Okinawa, then to Clark air base in the Philippine Islands , and back. On February 9, 472
with a crew of seven , was to refuel over the Sea of Japan before proceeding on its final leg to its home
at Yokota air base. As usual the take-off from Kadena was under radio silence. While taxiing the

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pilot noted a hydraulic discrepancy, taxied back to the parking area and had the rudder and elevator
boost pump replaced. Apparently the pump replacement was hurried, and the hydraulic lines were not
properly bled, leaving air in the system which would cause erratic rudder and elevator operation. As
a result the pilot was unable to obtain sufficient fuel from a KB-50 tanker, and decided to divert to
Kunsan AB, South Korea. At about 5 miles from the runway, at about 1,200 feet, the engines flamed
out, the aircraft ditching in the water in a nose high attitude. Captain Robert W. White, pilot; l/Lt
Marcell J. Dunn, navigator; N2C Forrest E. Jolly, gunner; and 2/Lt Leon S. Kirk, electronic warfare
officer, survived the crash. Three electronic warfare officers in the rear compartment of the aircraft
perished. An accident investigation board subsequently detennined that at flame out the aircraft still
had 1,500 pounds of fuel remaining in the forward tank, suggesting insufficient knowledge of fuel
management procedures on the part of the pilot. Captain Allen H. Day, Electronic Warfare Officer.
I/Lieutenant Harold W. Glandon, Electronic Warfare Officer. 2/Lieutenant James T. Powell, Jr.,
Electronic Warfare Officer. Source: AFSC/survivor.

April 1, 1959 RB-668 54-0547 16TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

Captain James H. Moore and crew were assigned aircraft 54-547 for a night photo reconnaissance
training mission over the Avon Park Bombing Range. He was assigned the number two position in a
flight of three. All three aircraft were assembled on runway 22. The lead aircraft started a normal take-
off roll and thirty seconds later number two released brakes and began his take-off. Acceleration was
normal and computed line speeds were met at the proper distances. At 140 knots IAS the pilot began
to exert pressure on the flight controls to rotate the aircraft to take-off position. The control column
moved only slightly and resisted all further efforts of the pilot to exert back-pressure. By this time
lift-off speed and take-off distance were exceeded. Realizing the ineffectiveness of the flight controls,
the pilot actuated high speed AC trim to the nose up position, but noticing no effect, he elected to
abort the take-off, moved the throttles to the cut-off position, deployed the drag chute, then alerted
the control tower and prepared to engage the arresting barrier. At approximately 400 feet from the end
of the runway, Captain Moore realized he would not stop on the runway, so he delibeFately retracted
the landing gear and pulled the emergency jettison handle for all escape hatches. The aircraft crashed
through the arresting barrier, the right main gear door engaging the barrier cable and bringing the
aircraft to a stop. Fire developed in both engines and along the left central fuselage. The crew of three
- Captain Moore, pilot; Captain John A. Reinsmith, navigator; Technical Sergeant Kenneth H. Latzka,
gunner - escaped without harm. Extensive damage was done to both engine nacelles, underside of the
fuselage, nose and main gears, as well as fire damage to the fuselage, resulting in the aircraft being
classified as a loss to the aircraft inventory and to be reclaimed for the spare parts program. Source:
AFSC.

May 8, 1959 R8-668 53-0473 16TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

Three RB-66B aircraft (53-0418, 53-0473, 53-0413) were to fly a photographic mission in Vrrginia,
and upon their return take a photograph of the formation above the city of Sumter, SC. After completing
the Virginia mission, the lead aircraft, 473, assumed the #3 position to take the required photo; 413
assumed the lead, with 418 in the #2 position. The formation descended VFR to 11,500 feet and
leveled off. Captain Woodworth in 473 dropped back and climbed to 12,100 feet to make a pass above
the formation and take the picture. As he approached in this position, the formation disappeared from
sight below the nose of his aircraft. After receiving a heading correction from his navigator by use
of the driftmeter, a jolt was felt, then 473 began to tumble. Captain Roy E. Woodworth, pilot, and
James F. Young, instructor navigator ejected successfully. Captain Julian T. Stewart, the navigator, was
thrown from the aircraft upon impact (and may have been already killed during initial contact as he
was looking through his driftmeter). 473 crashed and burned 5 miles east of Sumter. The pilot of 418,
after feeling the initial contact, maintained control of his aircraft, reported the incident to the Shaw
AFB tower, and landed successfully. "The primary cause of the accident was supervisory error in that
the briefing officer prepared, briefed and flew a mission which was not authorized and in violation of
Air Force Regulation." Source: AFSC/363TRW History.

May 29, 1959 WB-66D 55-0400 9TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

On landing at Lajes, Azores, the pilot made one application of brakes, then lost all braking action and
nosewheel steering. Attempts to arm the emergency air brake failed . Apparently the hydraulic pump

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on engine #2 failed, which affected nosewheel steering and braking. The aircraft veered off the runway
and hit an adjacent embankment. The crew of two weather observers (I/Lt A. L. Kellerstrass and
M/Sgt E. R. Iverson). gunner (A/2C W. E. Ross), navigator (Major V. R. Morris), and Captain Willard
G. Mattson . the pilot, survived without injury to themselves. The aircraft was declared Class 26 and
scrapped. Source: C. Parrott/ AFSC.

June 26, 1959 RB-66B 54-0544 16TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

'Ridge Fox Blue· departed Langley AFB. VA. at OOOOZ on June 26 for San Antonio, Texas , with an
enroute refueling from a KB-50 tanker. The tanker rendezvous was uneventful. off-loading 10,000
pounds of fuel. At 04 lOZ approaching Kelly AFB, Ridge Fox Blue was cleared to descend to flight
level 200. Upon reaching 20.000 feet RFB was cleared for an ILS approach, straight in from the Kelly
OMNI beacon to runway 15 . It was a clear night with visibility reported at 7 miles . At 0423Z Ridge
Fox Blue was observed by San Antonio approach control radar to be 11 miles WNW of the Kelly
OMNI at 7 .000 feet. He was given Kelly winds and current NOTAMS on lighting condition at Kelly
(only _ of the runway was lit). The pilot reported leaving 7 .000 feet. At 0427Z radar contact was
lost. The aircraft crashed and burned near the top of the hill 5 miles northwest of the Kelly OMNI.
The aircrew perished. "The most probable cause was pilot error in that the pilot descended below the
minimum published altitude during a jet penetration." Captain James L. Junge, pilot. I/Lieutenant
William H. McCasland. navigator. A/2C Michael J. Kemp , gunner. Source: AFSC/363TRW History.

July 3, 1959 RB-66B 54-0432 19TRS/IOTRW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

On July 3, 1959, the 10th TRW launched 48 W/RB-66 aircraft for a formation fly-by at a wing
change-of-command ceremony. The formation was to be led by 12 19th TRS aircraft, Alpha Flight,
commanded and led by Lt/Colonel 'Doc' Partridge. Each Alpha Flight aircraft received a full fuel
load of 27 ,000 pounds. The crew of Alpha 10, RB-66B 432 , was element lead of the slot element of
Alpha Flight, and while going through their pre-takeoff checklist, left the fuel selector switch in the
AUXILIARY position. The flight assembled and held in an orbit over the Buechel beacon while Bravo
Flight, 30TRS. Coco Flight, 42TRS. and Delta Flight, from the 1st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron ,
took off from Spangdahlem Air Base and assembled in their respective holding areas. Flight level was
between 3.000 and 4,000 feet AGL over the Buechel beacon. After all the formations had assembled
and the fly-by was about to begin Colonel Partridge ordered his 12 aircraft to initiate a 'transfer of
wing tank fuel' from the wing tanks to the main tanks. About 2 minutes after starting the fuel transfer
Alpha 11 and 12, flying off the wings of Alpha 10, noted flame coming from Alpha !O's exhaust cones,
and momentarily Alpha IO reported a double flame out and intention to attempt a crash landing in an
open field. Colonel Partridge ordered the crew of two - Captain James A. Wells , the pilot, and I/Lt
Edward J. Mullarkey, the navigator - to eject from their aircraft, which they promptly did. The aircraft
landed on the ground wings level, skipped through a field, and only after smash ing into a ravine did it
burst into flames . Colonel Partridge continued the fly-by, now flying a missing man formation. Neither
pilot nor navigator were injured. Source: AFSC/Colonel Partridge.

December 14, 1959 RB-66B 54-0421 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Bruntingthorpe, UK

Crew delivered RB-66B 54-0430 to RAF Alconbury to undergo periodic maintenance; then picked
up aircraft #421 which had completed scheduled maintenance and been released after a functional
check flight for return to RAF Bruntingthorpe. 'Puff Zero Five' was airborne at l 732Z, climbing to
flight level 370, and entered a holding pattern upon arrival over Bruntingthorpe. At !948Z Puff 05
reported penetration turn to Bruntingthorpe tower, which requested Puff 05 report field in sight. Puff
05 acknowledged transmission, stating that they were trying to find the field. At I 950Z Puff05 crashed
into the ground at a point 11 miles from the BT beacon, three miles short of Bruntingthorpe, with flaps
and gear down. The aircraft was destroyed and the crew perished. I/Lieutenant Gary R. Coad, pilot.
1/Lieutenant Charles L. Boone, navigator. A/2C Ralph L. Noell, gunner. Source: AFSC.

November 1, 1960 RB-66B 53-0409 lTRS/lOTRW, RAF Alconbury, UK

Aircraft launched on a routine photographic training flight in the Laon-Toul area of France. After
starting engines the pilot experienced alternator and oil pressure problems which were apparently
resolved by maintenance before take-off. After about five 'minutes of flight , in IFR conditions, at
10,000 feet, the #2 engine flamed out, both left and right alternator warning lights came on - which

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resulted in the loss of AC power. An attempt to obtain AC power from the emergency inverter was
unsuccessful. Still in IFR conditions, with all instruments inoperative, the pilot experienced vertigo,
but broke out of the clouds in a wing level, nose down attitude just before ordering ejection. The pilot
then felt extreme heat emanating from near the control column, the control column initiator fired,
stowing the column without warning. The pilot pulled the control wheel from the stowed position and
regained partial control, attempting to join up with a 2nd B-66 which had come up to render assistance
and guide him to a straight in landing. Before the rendezvous was made 409 yawed to the left, which
the pilot interpreted as a loss of engine power, and he ordered the crew to eject. The aircraft impacted
the ground in a near vertical descent. !st Lieutenant Larry N. Fealy, pilot; !st Lieutenant Peter J.
Hollitscher, navigator; and SSGT John R. Gaskill, flight engineer, ejected without serious injury to
themselves . The aircraft crashed near RAF Bruntingthorpe. Source: AFSC .

March 16, 1961 RB-66B 54-0430 19TRS/10TRW, RAF Bruntingthorpe, UK

On the evening of 16 March 1961, three photo-reconnaissance aircraft, comprising the Royal Flush
competition team, were scheduled to participate in a night photography training exercise off the Dutch
coast in preparation for the annual NATO photographic reconnaissance competition. An IFR clearance
was filed - the weather was clear, a dark, starlit night, no moon . The targets were located in a danger
area on the West Frisian islands of Vlieland and Terschelling. After ten runs were made, in a left hand
racetrack pattern starting with the Vlieland target, then the Terschelling target, turn, and repeat the
same procedure, 430 was observed to pass overhead of the other two aircraft. The pilot stated to the
range controller that he had a radar problem, had the other two aircraft in sight, and would resume
his position behind the second aircraft at 1,000 feet as they exited the range. The pilots of the other
two aircraft reported to the range controller as they exited the range; 430 was not seen or heard from
again. Bits of wreckage and one helmet were later found in the vicinity of the range. Attempts by
the Royal Navy to locate the aircraft were unsuccessful. A Dutch fishing vessel reported an oil slick
the following day near the Terschelling Islands, and several ships reported seeing a sudden brilliant
glare in the same area Thursday night; although all three of the aircraft dropped numerous photo
flash cartridges during their respective runs. The aircrew, initially listed as missing, was subsequently
declared deceased Captain Harry V. Armani, pilot. Captain Daniel Harvey, navigator. I/Lieutenant
Frank L. Whitley, Jr., navigator. Source: JOTRW History/AFSC.

March 31, 1961 RB-66C 54-0471 9TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

'Tasty One Five' an RB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft, piloted by Major Henry Gibbia, was
scheduled to fly weather reconnaissance from Shaw AFB to Minot AFB, North Dakota. A weather
officer, I/Lt David Gurkin, flew in the gunner's/flight engineer's seat. The weather at Shaw on take-
off was 300 feet overcast, I mile in rain and light fog. Tasty 15 reported to Atlanta Center arriving
at flight level 310, losing #2 engine and requested a let down to Donaldson AFB , SC. Weather at
Donaldson was similar to the weather at Shaw on take-off. Donaldson GCA picked up Tasty 15 on
guard channel and proceeded to direct the aircraft . Tasty 15 descended to 2,500 feet, GCA had good
radar and radio contact at this time and directed 15 into position for an approach to runway 040. Then
Tasty 15 asked, "Do I have open country under me?" The controller did not understand the question
- Tasty 15 dropped its two wing fuel tanks (one impacting hannlessly in a field, the other near a small
shopping area causing no injury or damage) . Despite full left rudder and trim, according to the pilot,
the aircraft yawed to the right, and when GCA called the aircraft too far off centerline to land, Major
Gibia initiated a one-engine go-around . On the second attempt the aircraft again ended up 1,500 feet
right of the runway. GCA called for a missed approach, the pilot lost altitude, then struck the ground
50 feet too the right and 1,700 feet short of the runway. Fire damaged the aircraft beyond economical
repair. The crew of 7 suffered no noteworthy injuries. A claim of backward wired rudder trim was not
substantiated by the Douglas technical representative . Source: AFSC/other.

September 5, 1961 WB-66D 55-0394 9TRS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

The aircraft was scheduled for a routine weather reconnaissance mission from Kindley AFB, Bermuda,
returning to Kindley, with an estimated time enroute of 2:15 hours. The flight progressed normally
until turning point #2 when an electrical power surge affected radios and navigation equipment. On the
return leg to Kindley both engines flamed out. The aircraft descended from flight level 200 to 90; both
engines restarted , then failed again. While the pilot attempted several engine restarts, the two weather

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observers. Captain Kenneth F. Gordon and M/Sgt Ercell R. Iverson. ejected when they received a
warning bell. Simultaneously with the ejections. one engine restarted . and the aircraft leveled at 2.500
feet. When the remaining engine flamed out abruptly. the pilot said. "Let's get out of here;· and 2/Lt
Donald R. Fritz. the navigator. and Lt/Colonel William K. Bush. on a familiarization flight riding in
the gunner's seat. ejected in that order. As Lieutenant Fritz ejected he saw the pilot still at the controls
attempting to restart the engines. Bush. Fritz. Gordon and Iverson were rescued the following day.
The pilot . Captain Jesse B. Kendler. was killed in the crash. The suspected cause of the flame-out
was installation of previously condemned fuel filters . which resulted in filter icing and fuel starvation.
Source: AFSC.

October 26, 1961 B-668 54-0499 85BS/47BW, RAF Sculthorpe, UK

The aircrew was scheduled for a normal round robin training flight of 3 _ hour duration. Fuel on
board the aircraft was for 4 hours and 15 minutes. Major Brooks, the instructor pilot, was sitting on
a 'bucket' in the aisle adjacent to the pilot's seat observing Captain 'Doc ' Savage during engine start,
taxi and presumably throughout the flight. The bucket is a can the IP sits on: not a part of the aircraft
configuration. nor secured in any way. Take-off at I 846Z was normal. At I 848Z 499 contacted Anglia
Control (USAF Radar Air Traffic Control Center) and advised of being airborne and proceeding to
the departure fix. Anglia instructed the pilot to continue climbing to flight level 300. At I 856Z 499
reported "just passing FL 200" and requested permission to reverse course and continue climb. With
499 halfway through its tum Anglia advised. "499, traffic in your one o'clock position, direction of
movement unknown. range three miles ... "499 is IMC" was the reply (Instrument Meteorological
Conditions - they couldn 't see a thing). "499 tighten your tum , you should miss him." There was no
response from 499. The two blips merged on the radar screen. Between I 859Z and I 900Z the pilot
transmitted, "Eject. eject. 499. 499" followed by some garbled utterings. Subsequent evaluation of the
tape from Anglia control center revealed the garbled uttering as "Help" and "It's alright Doc." Doc
was the nickname of Captain Savage. One of the two blips emerged on the radar scope , the other target
return varied in intensity (picked up by British GCI sites and photographed) , possibly due to rotation,
spinning and tumbling of 499 until it disappeared from observation. The other aircraft, a KLM DC-8
from Schiphol Airport , Amsterdam, Holland, on a flight to New York , was on top of the clouds at FL
285. and didn't know anything happened. Anglia control had no knowledge of the KLM flight. The
crew perished and was never found. Aircraft wreckage was not located until 15 November 1961.
Major Paul W. Brooks, instructor pilot. Captain Ralph L. Davenport, Jr., navigator. Captain Paul J.
Savage , pilot. Source: AFSC.

February 7, 1962 RB-66C 54-0460 42TRS/10TRW, RAF Chelveston, UK

Aircraft departed Chelveston for a tactical reconnaissance mission along the East German border
with a scheduled landing at Toul-Rosieres, France. The tactical mission was aborted due to a failing
navigation radar, and after 2:30 hours local flying at flight level 340, a standard approach/landing at
RAF Chelveston was initiated. The approach configuration for the aircraft was gear down, flaps down,
speed brakes extended. On the glide path the pilot experienced gusty winds and turbulence. While still
maintaining near level flight, he detected a slight surge in engine power. Then the surging intensified,
leading to a loss of thrust - RPM and EGT decreasing. While near the end of the runway, at about 700
feet altitude, the pilot alerted the crew to prepare for ejection , attempting to gain additional altitude
while the engines continued surging. Flameout of both engines seemed imminent when he advised the
crew to eject. The navigator ejected successfully. The pilot's right ejection lever malfunctioned and
forced him to ride the aircraft to the ground, where it slid for 540 feet before coming to a stop. No fire
ensued. He evacuated the aircraft through the overhead escape hatch, noting that one of the electronic
warfare officers, whose seat also malfunctioned , was making an escape through the aft escape hatch.
The cause of the crash was determined to be fuel filter icing, caused by a flat, fine mesh screen design.
The fuel filters had been redesigned as a result of a 6 October 1956 crash of a B-668 flown by Captain
Ryall of the 17th Bomb Wing . Obviously not all old filters had been removed from inventory- costing
four men their lives. There was insufficient altitude for the three electronic warfare officers in the rear
compartment, with their downward firing ejection seats, to survive. The pilot, Captain Charles E. 'Skip'
Jones, suffered minor injuries. I/Lt Norbert J. Maier, the electronic warfare officer whose ejection seat
malfunctioned and I/Lt Richard A. Morris, the navigatot, suffered no injuries. The remainder of the
crew perished. I/Lieutenant William R. Becraft, Electronic Warfare Officer. I/Lieutenant Reynolds

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W. McCabe, Electronic Warfare Officer. I/Lieutenant James T. Weymark, Electronic Warfare Officer.
SSGT Leroy Dauphenbaugh, Jr., Flight Engineer. Source: AFSC.

February 4, 1963 RB-66B 54-0530 19TRS/10TRW, Toul-Rosieres AB, France

Aircraft 54-530 was based at Toul-Rosiere, had completed IRAN (inspect and repair as necessary)
at the Douglas-Tulsa plant, and was on its way back to T-R via Langley AFB, VA. On February 4,
Captain William Cox, Jr., assigned to the IOTRW at RAF Alconbury, filed a flight plan from the Tulsa
VOR, at flight level 330, direct to Langley AFB, VA. 'Alive 71' departed the Douglas ramp at 1505
local, climbed out to FL 330 and reported a malfunctioning APN-82 . In conversation with Douglas
representatives it was decided that the malfunction could not be fixed in the air and Alive 71 was to
return to the Douglas plant after burning off fuel. The aircraft made several overhead approaches
to Tulsa Municipal. On the final approach Captain Lynwood Odom, the navigator, detected popped
circuit breakers which would not reset, subsequently radio and intercom was lost, and he detected the
reflection of fire on the right engine nacelle . Captain Cox, losing response from the control column,
motioned for Captain Odom to eject, which he did without injury. Ground witnesses reported seeing the
aircraft on fire and shedding parts, impacting at 1700 local time 16 miles east of the Tulsa VORTAC.
Captain Cox perished in the aircraft . Subsequent analysis determined that a fire broke out in the crawl
way under the forward fuel tank. Source: AFSC .

March 10, 1964 RB-66B 54-0541 19TRS/10TRW, Toul-Rosieres AB, France

On a navigation check flight a precessing NJ compass put the aircraft in the central Berlin air corridor
over East Germany where it was shot down by Soviet MiG 19 fighters. The aircraft crashed near
Gardelegen. The crew of three - pilot, Captain David Holland, and two navigators, Captain Melvin J.
Kessler and 1st Lieutenant Harold Welch - successfully ejected, were captured by Soviet troops, then
released to US authorities . Source: Various.

October 22, 1965 RB-66B 53-0452 4487TS/4485TW, Eglin AFB, FLwith duty assign-
ment Det l/33TAC GP, Tan Son Nhut AB
The first B-66 aircraft lost in Southeast Asia, 53-0452 was deployed on temporary duty to Tan Son Nhut
Air Base, Vietnam. During a night, low level, IR reconnaissance mission while in a tum the aircraft
flew into an adjacent mountain 25 miles west of Pleiku. The crew perished. Cause: Combat loss.
Captain Robert L. Mann, pilot. Captain John Weger, Jr., navigator. I/Lieutenant James A. McEwen,
navigator. Source: Hobson/other.

February 25, 1966 EB-66C 54-0457 6460TEWS/460TRW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Gull 0 I' was damaged by an SA-2 surface to air missile north of Vinh. Major Robert P. Walker, pilot,
managed to get the aircraft out over the Gulf of Tonkin where the crew of six ejected. All but one crew
member was rescued by US Navy helicopter. Killed in action was: Captain John B. Causey, electronic
warfare officer. Source: Hobson/other.

July 20, 1966 EB-66C 54-0464 6460TEWS/432TRW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Devil 01' was providing ECM/ESM support to F-105 strike aircraft near Thai Nguyen when it was
hit by up to two SA-2 surface to air missiles . Captain William H. Means, pilot, managed to fly the
aircraft 55 miles toward friendly territory, but then had to give the order to eject. Five of the crew of
six were captured and became POWs - Captain William H. Means; I/Lt Edward L. Hubbard; Captain
Lawrence Barbay; Captain Norman A. McDaniel, and Captain Glendon W. Perkins. I/Lt Craig R.
Norbert, electronic warfare officer, was KIA. Source: Hobson/other.

August 20, 1966 EB-66C 54-0475 41TRS/460TRW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Wreck 22' completed IRAN at the Tulsa-Douglas facility and was functionally test flown on 18
August . Captain Lindley and his crew accepted the aircraft and flew Wreck 22 to McClellan AFB,
California. Wreck 22 then paired up with another EB-66C, Wreck 21, and a KC-135 tanker, 'Brim
68', and on August 20 proceeded on a standard aircraft delivery route (Flying Fish) to Hickam AFB,
Hawaii. Less than an hour out of Hickam Wreck 22 suddenly dropped down and to the left, passing
under the tanker and out of sight. Wreck 21 called Wreck 22 trying to determine what the problem
was. Wreck 22 responded, "I've lost my boost." Wreck 22 then fell about four miles behind the tanker

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 Appendices

and Wreck 21 . 21 was running short on fuel and hooked up to the KC-135 to obtain 2,000 pounds of
additional fuel. During the refueling Wreck 22 moved under the tanker and the refueling B-66, and
out of sight of the boom operator. That was the last time Wreck 22 was seen. After disconnect the two
aircraft searched for Wreck 22 - spotting an oil slick and possibly a life preserver. None of the search
aircraft or vessels ever found the oil slick or any wreckage or survivors. Search and rescue operations
were terminated at sundown of the 4th day. The crew was eventually declared dead . Captain Dwight A.
Lindley. pilot. I/Lieutenant Donald E. Laird. navigator. TSGT Charles Bordelon. crew chief. Source:
AFSC.

February 4, 1967 EB-66C 55-0387 41TEWS/432TRW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

·Harpoon 0 l · was providing ECM/ESM support to F- 105 strike aircraft when it was hit and downed
by an SA-2 surface to air missile north of Thai Nguyen. North Vietnam . Of the crew of six. three were
captured (Captain John Fer. pilot: Major Jack W. Bomar, navigator; and I/Lt John 0. Davies), three
perished. Major Woodrow H. Wilburn , electronic warfare officer. Captain Herbert Doby, electronic
warfare officer. Captain Russell A. Poor, electronic warfare officer. Source: Hobson/other.

November 17, 1967 EB-66C 54-0473 41TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

" Elmo l " followed "Elmo 2" on take-off at 20 second interval at 1255 hours. Take-off and initial climb
were normal. After a right tum for enroute climb the pilot advised of #2 engine failure and requested
vectors to return for immediate landing. requesting a ten mile final approach , appearing to have full
control of the aircraft. At 6 nautical miles from touch down the pilot advised that he was unable to
maintain altitude and losing it slowly. The aircraft continued settling, wings level, nose high. trailing
a heavy exhaust trail indicative of a high power setting for #1 engine. Just prior to impact the EW
overhead escape hatch was jettisoned; the three hatches for the forward compartment were not. A
controlled , wings level, gear up touchdown was accomplished on level terrain 1195 feet short and 205
feet right of an extension to the runway centerline. The aircraft was engulfed in flames immediately
after coming to rest , and destroyed by fire . A rescue helicopter set down a rescue team within 30
seconds of the crash. An attempt by the pilot to open his escape hatch was unsuccessful, he then
ejected. the seat dropping into the burning fuselage . Further rescue attempts were unsuccessful. Two
crew members , Captain James D. Stamm and Captain Robert D. Peffley, both with serious injuries ,
escaped the aft crew compartment. Five crew members perished. Major Max E. Nichols, pilot. l /
Lieutenant Theodore W. Johnson, instructor navigator. Major William E. McDonald, navigator.
Captain Rey L. Duffin , electronic warfare officer. Captain Karl D. Hetzel. electronic warfare officer.
Source: AFSC.

December 6, 1967 EB-66C 54-0462 41TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

On December 6. 462 flew an uneventful reconnaissance mission on the Laos side of the North
Vietnamese border. On returning to base the pilot began his GCA controlled final approach at 1,500
feet AGL with landing gear down and locked. flaps 100% , and speed brakes extended. The aircraft
gross weight was computed at 57 ,000 pounds giving an approach speed of l SO knots, and a stall
warning speed of 117 knots IAS . The approach was excellent to 400 feet AGL when the aircraft
descended 40 feet below the glide path , then the aircraft rose rapidly above the glide path and GCA
asked if the pilot wanted to go-around. The response, "Roger, got a control problem." At this time
the pilot had full throttle on both engines, was holding the yoke full forward and was attempting
to keep the wings level as the aircraft first rolled to the right , then to the left. The next and final
transmission: "Eject! Eject'" Thirty seconds later the aircraft crashed and burned 1,800 feet right
of the overrun . Cause of the accident may have been sudden wind shear, also experienced by other
aircraft, some crashing on final, others experiencing hard landings. All crew members ejected , but
only three survived - I/Lt Ronald A. McBride , navigator; Captain Alvin Taylor, Jr. and I/Lt Arvid
0. Peterson , both electronic warfare officers. Three perished. Lieutenant Colonel Jack M. Youngs ,
pilot. Captain Larry A. Moore, electronic warfare officer. I/Lieutenant Paul S. Krzynowek, electronic
warfare officer. Source: AFSC/other.

January 14, 1968 EB-66C 55-0388 41TEWS/355JFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

Aircraft was shot down by a MiG-21 over North Vietnam , west of Hanoi. MiG-17 and MiG-21
aircraft made several attempts to down B-66 aircraft which were causing severe degradation to their

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air defense radar network. 'Preview 01' would be their only success. Of a crew of seven, three were
rescued (Lt/Col Attilio 'Pete' Pedroli, Lt/Col Jim Thompson, and Major Pollard H. 'Sonny' Mercer,
Jr., pilot. Major Mercer later died, on January 20, from injuries received during ejection from the
aircraft. Four crew members were captured and became POWs: Major Thomas W. Sumpter, Captain
Hubert C. Walker and I/Lt Ronald M. Lebert, all electronic warfare officers, and Major Irby Terrell,
navigator. Source: Hobson/other.

March 6, 1968 EB-66E 54-0524 41TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Baffle 2' was fragged for a 6+ hour night, classified ECM support mission, with an air refueling
scheduled 2+35 hours after take-off. The flight progressed normally. Viking Control vectored Baffle 2
to the scheduled refueling rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker; Call sign: Blue Anchor 35 Papa. Baffle
2 made several brief contacts, but was unable to take on sufficient fuel. At about 2+50 after take-off
Baffle 2 experienced a rumble in #2 engine; the engine flamed out. Momentarily the other engine
flamed out as well, came back on line, then flamed out for the final time . As the aircraft descended
through flight level 120 the pilot made the decision to abandon aircraft. The ejection occurred in the
prescribed sequence, with the pilot, Captain William H. Lewark, Jr., ejecting last. Major Alfred S.
Benziger's, navigator, automatic chute device failed . While clawing for the D-ring Major Benziger
ripped off a portion of a finger on his right hand . Captain Warren K. Marler was the electronic warfare
officer. Blue Anchor 35 Papa then observed a huge explosion as Baffle 2 impacted the ground. The
tanker circled the area for the next three hours, initiated the rescue effort, stayed in continuous contact
with the downed aircrew, and provided essential navigation fixes for rescue aircraft. Source: AFSC.

July 19, 1968 EB-66B 53-0491 41TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Hokum 4' flew a standard night tactical ECM support mission, experiencing IFF/SIF failure about
100 miles out ofTakhli. Approach control, using skin paint, positively identified Hokum 4 by having
the aircraft make a 30 degree identification turn. The pilot reported good visual contact with the airfield
and the runway 20 miles out from the base. When handed over to the final controller Hokum 4 flew a
reportedly satisfactory precision approach , never more than 30 feet off the glide path. At three-quarters
of a mile from touchdown the controller informed Hokum 4 of being 30 feet below glide path, when
the aircraft entered a sudden heavy rain shower, obscuring the pilots view of the runway. Captain
David M. Bentley decided to initiate a go-around when the aircraft struck the ground 2,473 feet short
of the GCA touchdown point. The aircraft skidded along the ground for a considerable distance, a
small fire developing under the left wing, and heavy rain continuing to fall. The crew jettisoned their
escape hatches and assembled about I 00 yards in front of the wrecked aircraft. The fire was rapidly
extinguished. There were no injuries. Captain Wesley R. Hill was the navigator and Captain Robert B.
Huey, Jr., the electronic warfare officer. Source: AFSC.

April 8, 1969 EB-66B 53-0498 42TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

'Hydra 9' was scheduled for a standard 2+50 hours ECM support mission near the MuGia Pass,
a standard target for B-52 bombers. The crew had sufficient time for a thorough preflight, taxied,
maintaining communication with the tower through clearance for take-off. Local procedures called for
a change to departure control and to monitor guard frequency just before take-off. The pilot "Rogered"
his intent to do so. Weather was clear, temperature 79F. During the take-off roll, at approximately
the 5,200 foot point from brake-release, the tower controller called on UHF guard channel, "Hydra
9, Takhli , you have white smoke coming from your left engine ... your engine is on fire." Hydra 9 did
not acknowledge, continuing its take-off roll, lifting off, climbing very little before crashing left wing
slightly low, tumbling and bursting into flame. (It is suspected that the pilot may have been talking
on the interphone while the tower tried to contact him) . The navigator and electronic warfare officer
ejected too late, and landed in the burning aircraft. As a result of this accident and two other similar
incidents, all engines with 12,000 hours were pulled to replace the 13th stage, prone to failure. Rescue
arrived within 5 minutes of the crash, across the highway from the base, in Takhli township. All three
crew members perished. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Ricketts, Jr., pilot (Commander 42TEWS).
Lieutenant Colonel Edwin P. Anderson, Jr., squadron navigator. Captain Joseph M. Orlowski,
electronic warfare officer. Source: AFSC/other.

406
 Appendices

June 24, 1969 RB-66B 53-0415 4417CCTS/363TRW, Shaw AFB, SC

We were flying out of Myrtle Beach AFB. because Shaw's runways were undergoing repair, training
replacement crews for Southeast Asia. The night of June 24 Major Edwin B. Welch was the IP on
' Flaw 61 '.an RB-66B model we used for aerial refueling training . This night refueling was the final
sortie for Majors Jimmy L. Cornwell. pilot. and Rudolph H. Hentschel, navigator, before certifying
them as combat ready. The squadron commander, Lt/Colonel Delbert Hainley. was in another airplane ,
on the ' perch·. behind Welch. when the accident happened. Hainley saw 415 get its fuel, back off from
the KC-135 tanker. and immediately after clearing the refueling basket (drogue) the airplane snap to
the left and disappear into the darkness of night. I was 5 miles back in the stream of aircraft awaiting
my turn to refuel when I heard the commotion. and almost immediately heard beepers. I knew they had
gone in. Hainley flying behind the stricken aircraft on guard frequency canceled all further refueling
and ordered his aircraft to return to Myrtle Beach. By the time we landed the two student survivors of
415 had already called in and were being picked up. When we assembled the wreckage on the floor
of a hangar at Seymour Johnson AFB. this is what we found. After getting his fuel and disconnecting
from the tanker 's drogue , the student pilot yawed his airplane just a little and allowed the #2 engine
to ingest 20-40 gallons of fuel spray (normal). This engine had a IO-inch crack in the compressor case
(we were allowed to fly with up to an 8-inch crack). The ingested fuel was forced out of the crack
around the hot section of the engine nacelle and exploded. The explosion took out the front engine
mount , the engine dropped to a 20-30 degree angle, the slip stream ripped it off, pulling the pylon off
with it. The loss of the right engine caused the airplane to roll violently to the left. As the airplane
rolled . the engine hit a tail fin and tore off the aft section of the airplane . The airplane ended up in an
inverted spin until hitting the ground. Major Edwin B. Welch , the instructor pilot , who was out of his
seat observing the student pilot. managed to get back to his seat and eject. He incurred fatal injuries
upon releasing himself from his parachute harness, caught in a 40-foot high tree, falling head first to
the ground. The fact that the aircraft was allowed to fly with a known crack in the engine compressor
is a controversial decision with dire consequences. All aircraft at Takhli were grounded for a period
while engines were inspected for cracks in compressor casings. Source: Maj D. Osborne/Accident
Inv. Off./AFSC.

October 9, 1969 EB-66E 54-0536 39TEWS/36TFW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

' Cem 34' was scheduled for a standard USAFE Reg 51-66 training mission with a take off time of
l 200Z. All preflight and take-off preparations were normal. The computed take-off distance was 6 ,550
feet. The aircraft did not break ground, instead, at the 8,000 foot point the engines were heard being
retarded. the drag chute was deployed , and the pilot broadcast ·Abort. Abort.' Cem 34 continued
down the centerline of the runway and overrun, its final resting place being 950 feet from the end of
the overrun . The aircraft immediate burst into flames. The navigator, Lt/Colonel Frank W. Fucich,
managed to escape with serious burns and a broken leg. Major Kenneth H. Kelly, pilot, and Captain
John A. Holley, electronic warfare officer, perished. Aircraft apparently did not achieve take-off speed,
suspected flap-blowback. Source: AFSC/other.

April 21, 1970 EB-66E 54-0439 42TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

At 1000 Local , 21 April 1970 , ' Wring 69' was on its way from Takhli AB , Thailand , via Hickam
AFB, Hawaii , to Tulsa , OkJahoma, for IRAN - inspect and repair as necessary. The aircrew, from
the 42nd TEWS at Takhli was Major William A. Fletcher, pilot; Major Charles D. Quinn, navigator;
and Sergeant George W. Stevens, crew chief. At 0930 the pilot started engines and followed his
accompanying KC-135 tanker toward the active runway. At 0959 Wring 69 advanced power to take
the active, when number 2 engine experienced explosions and severe vibrations, and began to bum.
The pilot seeing only flames shut down number I and ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. The
navigator and the crew chief escaped through the crew entrance door; the pilot released his escape
hatch and escaped down the fuselage and over the left wing. The crash-net was activated at 1000, the
first fire trucks arrived at I002 and blanketed the right wing and #2 engine with foam and C02; the fire
was under control at 1002:40. Source: AFSC.

October 26, 1970 EB-66C 54-0384 42TEWS/388;I'FW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand

"Furl" was returning from a night combat mission the morning of 26 October 1970. The aircraft was
cleared for an airborne surveillance radar approach; weather was 3 miles in rain. The penetration was

407
 Glory Days

normal. On final approach the aircraft was cleared to a minimum descent altitude of 1,140 feet to
runway 06. The pilot, Major Donald L. Eversole, continued descent below the MDA although neither
he nor the navigator, Major John F. O' Malley, had the field in sight visually. The aircraft then passed
through small trees and bushes , struck the ground about 3 miles short of the runway, became airborne
again, and several seconds later reimpacted the ground, finally coming to rest two miles short of the
runway. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. All crew members survived, although several with severe
injuries. The electronic warfare officers on board were Lt/Colonel Alton B. Duke, Jr., Majors Alva E.
Driscoll and Richard L. Bartholomew, and Captain Merlyn L. Luke. Source: Ltr from 42TEWS/CC
to Sq Personnel/AFSC .

March 11, 1971 EB-66C 55-0389 42TEWS/388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand

'Rick 31 ' was scheduled for an electronic search mission of North Vietnam. Takeoff and climb were
routine until departure control requested Rick 31 to level off at 7 ,000 feet MSL. When the autopilot
pitch trim knob was rotated to initiate the level off, the aircraft pitched up violently. Lieutenant Colonel
Melvin L. Jackson, pilot, pushed the control column full forward , disengaged the autopilot, and
initiated forward A/C trim, in an attempt to counteract the pitch-up condition. The aircraft continued
to climb but the airspeed had dropped by 130 knots, causing Colonel Jackson to roll the aircraft to
the right to decrease lift and lower the nose so that flying airspeed could again be regained. As the
aircraft rolled right it pitched up and entered a heavy buffet. Colonel Jackson gave the order to eject.
Lt/Colonel Robert W. Curry navigator, and Majors George K. Klump and Albert R. Bernard, Jr., and
Captain Robert J. Osterloh and I/Lieutenant Darryl J. Bullock, electronic warfare officers, all ejected
from the disabled aircraft, some suffering minor to severe injuries. Source: AFSC.

November 17, 1971 EB-66E 54-0427 42TEWS/388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand

The runway at Koral was being resurfaced at night. Missions scheduled to land during runway down-
time recovered at Udorn Air Base, and after crew rest, flew another combat mission, then recovered
at Koral. Captain Robert C. Helt was the pilot, I/Lt George W. Cantrell the navigator, and Captain
David G. 'Butch' Ardis served as electronic warfare officer. ' Mascot 22' took the active runway 30,
completed the before take-off checklist, then advanced the throttles to military power with the brakes
set, as was the procedure, when the right engine disintegrated, sending turbine blades through the main
body fuel tank .just aft of the crew compartment. Captain Helt pulled engine power to idle and ordered
the evacuation of the aircraft. All three crew members egressed through canopy escape hatches. The
navigator and EW through the navigator's hatch, and the pilot through the pilot's hatch. Captain Ardis
had initially attempted to open his escape hatch, but when flames entered the cockpit, slightly burning
his right ear and neck, he had taken off his helmet, he quickly lowered the hatch again . After the crew
had evacuated the aircraft the navigator's ejection seat "cooked off." The fire was under control within
10 minutes of occurrence. Source: David Ardis/George Cantrell/AFSC.

February 2, 1972 EB-66E 54-0540 42TEWS/388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand

Captain Neil F. Henn, the pilot of 'Cobra 25,' led the standard pre-takeoff mission briefing for his crew
of Major Merlin H. Thompson, the navigator and I/Lt Colin D. Greany, the electronic warfare officer.
It was to be a two-ship joint mission . Cobra 24 would be the lead aircraft for take-off and the duration
of the mission . Engine start, taxi and quick check were all normal for both aircraft. Cobra 24 initiated
take-off at 12:36. Cobra 25 followed one minute later. The take-off roll appeared normal to the crew
with all systems operating normally and the computed acceleration line speeds met or exceeded at
the 7. 6 and S,000 foot runway markers. Captain Henn rotated for take-off at l 40K !AS, placing the
gear handle in the up position at !SOK !AS . The aircraft tail made contact with the runway, then the
lower ECM antennas contacted the runway, followed by fuselage contact. The aircraft slid for over
S ,000 feet, coming to rest beyond the runway overrun. The crew evacuated through the pilot's and
navigator's escape hatches. The aircraft was written off; there were no injuries. Source: AFSC.

April 2, 1972 EB-66C 54-0466 42TEWS/388TFW, Korst RTAFB, Thailand

' Bat 21 and 22, both EB-66C ECM/ESM support aircraft, were providing support to three B-52s
striking targets just south of the DMZ. The North Vietnamese had moved SA-2 surface to air missile
batteries to the area and fired two salvos of at least IO missiles at the B-52s and B-66s. All missiles
missed. A SAM site north of the DMZ then entered the fray firing three missiles, one of which hit Bat

408
 Appendices

21. The only member of the crew of six to eject safely was Lt/Colonel lceal E. Hambleton, navigator.
The remainder of the crew was killed in action. Major Wayne L. Bolte , pilot. Lieutenant Colonel
Charles A. Levis. electronic warfare officer. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony R. Giannangeli. electronic
warfare officer. Major Henry M. Serex, electronic warfare officer. I/Lieutenant Robin F. Gatwood,
electronic warfare officer. The rescue of Lt/Colonel Hambleton became a major SAR effort resulting
in additional loss of life and aircraft. A feature movie was made of the incident in 1988. Source:
Hobson/other.

August 28, 1972 EB-66C 54-0386 39TEWS/52TFW, Spangdahlem AB, Germany

' Yate 71' was scheduled for an annual tactical proficiency check, and a Creek Mule reconnaissance
mission along the East Gemrnn border. All aspects of the take-off were normal until reaching 6,000' of
roll and 145KIAS. At this time the pilot was unable to move the yoke far enough to rotate the aircraft
to a take-off attitude. A second attempt. using both hands on the yoke. failed, and the pilot initiated the
abort. After the crew evacuated the aircraft it was destroyed by fire. Major Daniel H. Craven was the
pilot: Major Donald E. Harding. flight-examiner pilot: Major Harry C. Wilkerson, navigator: Majors
Roland M. Valentine and Larry E. Wensil , and Captains Robert S. Sherman and Kenneth L. Lykosh,
electronic warfare officers. All but Craven and Harding sustained some injuries. Source: AFSC.

December 23, 1972 EB-66E 54-0529 42TEWS/388TFW, Koral RTAFB, Thailand

'Hunt 02· was one of three EB-66E aircraft launched to support Linebacker operations with ECM
orbits east of Haiphong harbor. The aircraft was returning to Korat after aborting its mission due to
pressurization problems. Hunt 02s approach to Korat was normal in every respect. At 2 miles the
aircraft was on glide path: at decision height, Hunt 02 was on course. The final GCA controller then
called "on course. on glide path. over the approach lights , on glide path" when Hunt 02 responded
"Going around." The controller continued, "over landing threshold" and gave the pilot of Hunt 02
the tower frequency. Hunt 02 responded. " I just lost an engine ." The landing light was observed from
six miles on final until the go-around was initiated, indicating that the gear was down and locked. All
available information indicated that the aircraft was in a favorable position to land when the go-around
was initiated. The aircraft climbed to about 500 feet , approximately 3/4th down the runway it entered a
gentle left tum to the north, descending slightly until lost from sight. The aircraft impacted in a Royal
Thai Air Force housing area. Major Sasser ejected just before impact, but struck the ground before his
parachute could inflate. Captain Baldwin ejected , striking a house , and the electronic warfare officer,
Major Repeta, was found in the wreckage. The accident board was unable to determine the reason for
the go-around when the landing was assured. This was the last B-66 to be lost in Southeast Asia. Major
George F. Sasser, pilot. Captain William R. Baldwin. navigator. Major Henry J. Repeta, electronic
warfare officer. Source: Lt/Col T. Buettner/Member accident inv. board/ AFSC.

May 3, 1973 EB-66E 54-0445 42TEWS/388TFW, Koral RTAFB, Thailand

The aircraft was sent to the dock for Phase VI work which included a jacking phase. When the aircraft
was down-jacked, the struts were left in the extended position , which was in violation of maintenance
directives. Being in the extended position meant that the landing gear safety switches were in the
inflight, struts extended , position. The next action was engine trim and hot jet calibration, both
required as part of Phase VI work. SSGT Lords was in the cockpit, while TSGT William E. Tompkins
worked on the outside. Because of their familiarity with the procedure they did not use a checklist ,
and the struts remained in the extended position. Also it was later noted that the anti -skid switch was
in the on position ; it should have been in the off position. Both men noted that the chocks were in
place and snug. The engine start-up proceeded normally. Once the engines were stabilized in idle,
the parking brake was reset. Then the engines were run at full military power. After approximately
two minutes running time at military power, the aircraft lurched forward , the right tire running over
TSGT Tompkins left leg , virtually severing it six inches below the hip joint. The aircraft continued
to travel about 70 feet before coming to a stop, colliding with and knocking down a concrete electric
pole. Sergeant Lords ran to TSGT Tompkins aid and stopped the bleeding by pinching off an artery to
the leg , which he continued to do until a doctor arrived. Lords ' action most probably saved Sergeant
Tompkins life. Although the aircraft was repairable, the ppase-out of the EB-66 was expected in the
near future, therefore, the aircraft was declared Class 26 and released for fire fighting practice. A
number of small oversights led to a tragic end. Source: AFSC.

409
 Glory Days

A Sobering Statistic
Out of a production run of 36 R/EB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft, 15 were lost in combat or
crashed due to other causes.

Where Did All The Airplanes Go?

11 TRS Yokota AB, JP- deactivated 8 March 1960
10 RB-66Cs flown to Shaw AFB, SC, and 10 363TRW C-models were flown to MASDC,
Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson , AZ, and scrapped.

12TRS Yokota AB, JP- deactivated 8 March 1960

22 RB-66B aircraft put in storage at MASDC, Tucson, AZ

l 9TEWS Kadena Air Base, Okinawa - deactivated 31 October 1970

4 EB-66E aircraft flown to Clark Air Base, Pl, and scrapped.

39TEWS Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany - deactivated I January 1973

Aircraft distributed to 42TEWS/363TRW.

39TEWTS Shaw AFB , SC- deactivated 15 March 1974

Aircraft flown to MASDC, Tucson, AZ and scrapped.

41TEWS Takhli RTAFB, Thailand- deactivated 31October1969

EB-66C/E aircraft to 39/42TEWS
11 EB-66B aircraft stored/scrapped at MASDC, Tucson, AZ.

42TEWS Korat RTAFB, Thailand - deactivated 15 March 1974

24 aircraft flown to Clark AB, Pl, in January 1974, scrapped.

84/85/86BS RAF Sculthorpe, UK- deactivated 22 June 1962

50 aircraft flown to MASDC, Tucson, AZ, scrapped.

RB-66Bs of units converting to the RF-4C were put in storage at MASDC, 51 of which were
refurbished in 1966-67 by the Douglas Aircraft Corporation and converted to EB-66Es. The surviving
34 WB-66Ds were transferred to MAS DC between 1960 and 1965 and either scrapped, or used as test
beds or display aircraft.

Last Flights
EB-66C 54-0465, in January 1974, flew calibration missions against radar equipment on the Nellis Air
Force Base ranges, then returned to Shaw AFB, SC, on 2 February. That was the last Air Force EB-
66 mission flown. Upon deactivation of the 39th TEWTS, on March 15, 53-0465 was mounted on a
pedestal in front of the Shaw Air Force Base main gate. WB-66D 55-390 was used by the Westinghouse
Corporation of Baltimore, MD, as an EW test bed until 1976. It made its final flight to Kelly AFB, TX,
that year, then was towed to Lackland AFB, adjacent to Kelly, for display.

B-66 Aircraft on Display

EB 54-0465C Shaw Air Force Base, SC
RB 53-0412B Chanute Aerospace Museum, Rantoul, IL
RB 53-0466B Dyess Air Force Base, TX
RB 53-0475B Museum of the United States Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
WB 55-03900 Lackland Air Force Base, TX
WB 55-0392D Warner Robins Air Museum, GA
WB 55-0395D Pima Air & Space Museum, Tucson, AZ

410
 B-66 Aircraft Losses by Year
(Non-combat/combat and operational)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
00 01 05 08 07 01 04 01 01 00/01 00/0 1 01/02 00/03

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974

00/03 02/01 01/01 00/02 02/02 01/00 00/00
*The 1964 shoot-down of an RB-66B over East Germany is classified as an operational loss.

B-66 Aircraft Losses by Squadron

34BS - I 1TRS - 3 16TRS - 3 39TEWS- 2 4487TS - I
84BS - I 9TRS - 3 19TRS - 7 41 TRSffEWS - 9 6460CCTS- 2
85BS - 1 l lTRS - 2 30TRS- I 42TRSffEWS - 10
95BS - 2 12TRS - 1 43TRS- 1 4417CCTS- 1

Principal Causes of B-66 Losses

:i..
Fuel filter design - 3
Pilot error - 8
FOO - I
Fire (broken fuel line/brakes) - 2
:g
""'............ Supervisory error - 2 Combat (SA-2/MiG-21) - 6 ";:,
!?:
Engine failure - 9 Weather - 2
""
Hydraulics/Mechanical/Electrical - 7 Ground accident - l "'
NI Compass failure - 2 Unknown - 8
Frequently more than one factor played a role in the loss of an aircraft.

B-66 Losses by Type

(# Built/# Lost to Combat or Accident)
RB-66A 005/00 Preproduction aircraft were used for test purposes only.

B-66B 072/05 Bombers served with l 7BW; then 47BW, were equipped with B-47 K-5 radar bomb system. Retired in 1962 and scrapped.
13 airframes were converted to EB-66B Brown Cradle tactical ECM aircraft in 1959; 4 were used by ASD to conduct load
bearing, gear, brake and other endurance tests.

RB-66B 145/20 Photo reconnaissance aircraft replaced by RF-4C starting in 1965. 4 aircraft equipped with IR sensors and SLAR in 1963 ;
employed in Vietnam in 1965. 51 RB/B-66B airframes removed from storage and converted to EB-66E ECM configuration

RB/EB-66C 036115 Electronic reconnaissance version flew from 1956 to 1974

 WB-66D 036/02 Entered service in 1956. Retired between 1960 and 1965.

EB-66B 000/02 Converted B-66Bs to Brown Cradle ECM aircraft (13)

EB -66E 000/07 Converted RB-66Bs to EB-66E ECM aircraft (51)

B-66 production/losses of all types: 294/51

B-66 Aircraft Serial Numbers

RB-66A Pre-production aircraft - 5 52-2828 to 52-2832
B-66B Bombers - 72 53-0482 to 53-0507, 54-0477 to 54-0505,
54-0548 to 54-0551 and 55-0302 to 55-0314
RB-66B Photo reconnaissance aircraft - 145 53-0409 to 53-0481 , 54-0417 to 54-0446
and 54-0506 to 54-054 7
RB-66C Electronic reconnaissance aircraft - 36 54-0447 to 54-0476 and 55-0384 to 55-0389
WB-66D Weather reconnaissance aircraft - 36 55-0390 to 55-0425

RB-66C and WB-66D models were produced at the Douglas-Tulsa plant. B-66B and RB-66B aircraft were produced at the Douglas-Long Beach plant. c;J
c;-
._
;>.. The ' EB' prefix replaced 'RB 'in 1966 in recognition of the aircraft's primary function being electronic warfare rather than reconnaissance. ~
l'V ti
~
"'
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Remembering the planes we flew. the places we saw. the men with whom we served, and that freedom
is not free . never has been free. and will be ours as long as there are men and women willing to serve
and die for their country.

Books, Monographs and Technical Documentation

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Berger, Carl. ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 . Washington , D.C.: Office
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Dupuy. Ernest and Trevor, The Encyclopedia of Military History, Harper & Row, New York , 1970.
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413
 Glory Days

Hall, Cargill R. NRO History - Early Cold War Strategic Reconnaissance. The NRO History Office,
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Manchester, William. The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1973.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
McDaniel , Norman A. Yet Another Voice, Hawthorne Books, New York, 1975 .
McVeigh , W. B. ed. RB/B-66B Familiarization Manual, Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Long Beach,
CA, 1956.
Mack, Stephen B. Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, 1956, Army & Navy Publishing Co., Baton
Rouge, LA, 1956.
Momyer, William W., Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam). Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, 1978
Mueller, Robert. Air Force Bases: Active Air Force Bases Within the United States of America on 17
September 1982, Vol I. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1989.
Nalty, Bernard C . Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force,
Washington D.C., 1973.
Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The Twenty-five-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
Pribbenow, Merle L. II . The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of
Hanoi, I 967. The Journal of Military History, Vol 67, January 2003 .
Price, Alfred . The History of US Electronic Warfare: The Years oflnnovation-Beginnings to 1946, Vol
I. Westford, MA: The Murray Printing Company, 1984. Vol II: The Renaissance Years, 1946 to
1964, 1989. Vol III: Rolling Thunder Through Allied Force, 1964 to 2000, 2000.

414
 Bibliography

RB/B-66B Familiarization Manual. Long Beach. CA: Douglas Aircraft Company. 1956.
Rich. Ben R. Skunk Works. New York: Little. Brown. 1994.
Richards . Leverett. G. TAC: The Story of the Tactical Air Command.
Ridgway. Matthew B. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press. 1956.
Roth, Mick & Francillon. Rene. Aerofax Minigraph 19: Douglas B-66 Destroyer. Arlington. TX:
Aerofax Inc .. 1988.
Samuel. Wolfgang W. E. American Raiders: The Race to Capture the Luftwaffe's Secrets. Jackson:
University Press of Missi ssippi. 2004.
Samuel. Wolfgang W. E. I Always Wanted to Fly: America's Cold War Airmen. Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi. 2001 .
Schlight. John. A War Too Long: The History of the USAF in Southeast Asia. Washington, D.C.: Air
Force History and Museums Program , U.S. Air Force . 1996.
Schneider. Donald K. Air Force Heroes in Vietnam. Maxwell Air Force Base . AL: Airpower Research
Institute. 1979.
Smith. Richard K. 75 Years of Inflight Refueling: High lights, 1923-1998. Washington , D.C.: Air Force
History and Museums Program , Department of the Air Force , 1998.
Stroop. Paul D. Chief of Bureau of Naval Weapons, Aircraft Recognition Manual NavWeaps 00-80T-
75. Department of Defense. Washington DC. 1962.
Summers. Harry G. Jr.. Korean War Almanac . New York. Facts On File, Inc ., 1990 .
Summers. Harry G. Jr.. The Vietnam War Almanac . Novato . CA , Presidio Press, 1999.
Tilford. Earl H. Jr. Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell AFB , AL: Air
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Toperczer. Istvan . Air War Over North Vietnam: The Vietnamese People 's Air Force 1949-1975 ,
Squadron/Signal Publications, 1998.
Truman. Harry S. Memoirs. 2 Vols . Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955.
United States Air Force Combat Victory Credits Southeast Asia. Washington , D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, U.S. Air Force. 1974.
Winchester. Jim. Ed. American Military Aircraft. Bames&Noble Books , New York, 2005.

Periodical Articles
A Good Thought to Sleep On, John L. Fri sbee , Air Force Magazine. March 1992 .
Birds of a Feather, Steve Pace, Airpower, July 1988, pp 10-37.
Ceaseless Watch. Warren E. Thompson . Fly Past , pp 62-67.
Cold War: The Douglas RB-66 Story, Warren E. Thompson , Airpower, May 2006, pp 29-4 1.
Destination Freedom. Fletcher Aviation Corporation , Aviation Week , April 26 , 1954.
Douglas EB-66/EKA-3B , Allin R. Scholin, Air Progress . October 1968 , pp 46-48.
EB-66 Training , Kenneth B. Coolidge. Tactical Air Reconnaissance Digest, November 1967, pp 6-9.
Emblems of Courage , Fred L. Borch & Robert F. Dorr. Military Officer, May 2007, pp 70-73.
Going Down With the Ships, Craig Hooper, The Washington Post , March 5, 2007, p Al5.
Hostile Radar Location Gear Pushed, Barry Miller, Aviation Week & Space Technology, September
1, 1969.
Letter to the Editor, Major Kenneth H . High, USAF (Ret.),Air Force Magazine , May 1991 , p 10.
Letter to the Editor, Karl H. Schroder, Air Classics. January 1974, p 61.
Magic Carpet to Survival. Dr. Alfred Price, The Journal of Electronic Defense, April 2006, pp 31-33.
Missiles of October, Michael Dobbs, The Washington Post Magazine, October 23 , 2003, pp 15-1 8.
Missions Accomplished: The Incredible Story of the USS Indianapoli s, Stephen White , Solano
Historian, Vol. 19-2, Winter/Spring 2003-2004. pp. 8-25.
Radar Bombing, Klong Times, Don Muang RTAFB, Thailand, July 15, 1966.
Radar Bombing during Rolling Thunder - Part 1: Ryan's Raiders , W. Howard Plunkett, Air Power
History, Spring 2006, pp 4-21.
Radar Bombing during Rolling Thunder - Part 2: Combat Lancer and Commando Club, W. Howard
Plunkett, Air Power History, Summer 2006, pp 4-19.
Reds ' Surprise: 15 ,000-Lb-Thrust Jets , Robert Hotz, Aviation Week, May 31 , 1954.
The ADC Story, Richard F. McMullen , Interceptor, September 1972 , pp 10-15 .
The Air Force and the Cold War: A Chronology, 1945-9 1, John T. Correll , Air Force Magazine,
September 2005, pp 70-75.

415
 Glory Days

The Other Jammer, August R. Seefiuth,Air Force Magazine, March 1992, pp 74-77.
The Periscope, Newsweek, November 23, 1955, p 23.
The USAF's Destroyer, Richard K. Schrader, Air Classics, April 1988, pp 20-22.
Those Were the Days: Flying Safety during the Transition to Jets, 1944-53 , Kenneth P. Werrell, Air
Power History, Winter 2005, pp 39-53
USAF Simulates Soviet Defense System, Barry Miller, Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 30,
1970 ..
Various,American Aviation, May 24, 1954, pp 1-66.
Veteran Aircraft Returns to Spang, Skyblazer, 36TFW, Bitburg and Spangdahlem air bases, Germany,
March 20, 1970.
Vietnam TAC-RECCE, Part I, Doug Gordon,Air Enthusiast, July/August 2004, pp 66-75 .
Vietnam TAC-RECCE, Part II, Doug Gordon, Air Enthusiast, Sept/October 2004, pp 58-68 .
War of the Wizards, Loren B. Leonberger, Airman, November 1970, pp 17-19 .
Yesteryear...The Douglas B/RB/WB-66 Destroyer, R.E. Williams, Douglas Service, June 1982.

Internet Sites
Air Force Historical Studies Office, Operation Linebacker II, www airforcehistoey hq af mil
Air Force Historical Research Agency, www afhra.maxwel! af mil
Answers .com, USS Pueblo , www answers com
Army, Navy & Air Power, Time Magazine, July 12, 1954, www time com
B52 Combat Losses/Operational Losses in Vietnam, www nampows org/B-52.htrnl
B-66 internet site, www b66 info com
1958 & Beyond, Time Magazine, Feb 25, 1957, wwwtime com
Rushden.Org, RAF Chelveston, www rushden org
The Harrowing War in the Air, Time Magazine, May I, 1972, www time com
Out of Briefcases & Red Folders: A Classic Show of Power & Speed, Time Magazine, July 28, 1958,
wwwtime.com
USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL. History and Lineage of the 42"' Squadron
wwwau.afmil
Zook, David S . Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Seven Years of Vietnam -A Raven Goes to War.
www ocs6Qc.com/zookrayen htm

United States Air Force Documentation/Correspondence

Active Passive ECM Spt of Commando Club on MSN , msg, 355TFW to 7 AF, 11 Feb 1968.
Aircraft Equipment (B/RB-66) , Ltr from HQ TAC , Langley AFB , VA, to HQ AF/Director of
Requirements , Washington DC, 2 April 1953.
B-47 vs Aircraft Now Programmed for Tactical and Light Bomb Units, Memorandum from HQ TAC/
OA to TAC/RQ, Langley AFB, VA, I December 1954.
Conference on ECM Configuration of B-RB-66 Aircraft, HQ Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB,
VA, memorandum, 26 March 1953 .
Control Evaluation RB-66B, AF Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA, 2/Lt Jerome B . Reed, Project
Engineer, Lt/Colonel Harold G . Russell, Project Pilot, October 1955.
Cooper, Larry T. Colonel, USAF, 388TFW/DO, Korat RTAFB, Thailand, End of Tour Report, 2 June
1973 - 2 June 1974.
Crouch , Robert K. Colonel, USAF, Commander 388TFW, Korat RTAFB, Thailand, End of Tour
Report, I July 1973 to 3 January 1974.
EB-66 Effectiveness Evaluations, Comfy Coat, USAFSS, San Antonio, TX, undated.
EB-66 Assistance Team Recap, msg from 355TFW to WRAMA Robins AFB, GA, 26 Feb 68.
EB-66 Evaluation, Summary Report, USAFSS, 2 January 1971, 7 AF/DOPR.
EB-66 Organization, Ltr, CSAF/John D. Ryan, to CINCPACAF, 4 Sep 1969.
EB-66 Organization Takhli, msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 17 April 1968.
EB-66 Support Tactics, Ltr from 7 AF/DOE to PACAF/DO, 23 March 1970.
Electronic Countermeasures in the B/RB-66, Ltr from HQ/USAF to Commanding General, Air
Research and Development Command, Baltimore, MD, 20 Feb 1953.
Forty-two TEWS Crew Manning, 7AF Recon/EW Division, 31December1970.
History of the Tactical Air Command, 1 January - 30 June 1953.

416
 Bibliography

History of the Tactical Air Command, I January - 30 June 1954 .

History of the Tactical Air Command, Vols I, II , III. I July - 31 December 1954.
History of the AF Plant Representative, Douglas Aircraft Co, Long Beach , CA , Jan - Jun 1955 .
History of the AF Plant Representative, Douglas Aircraft Co, Long Beach, CA , Jul - Dec 1955 .
History of the 17th Bombardment Wing , l July - 31 December 1955 .
History of the 66th TRW, I July - 31 December 1956.
History of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Vol I, III, I January - 30 June 1956.
History of the AMC Liaison Office , San Bernardino AMA. Edwards AFB, CA, l July - 31 December
1956.
History of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing , July l - 31 December 1956.
History of the AF Plant Representative Office, Douglas Aircraft Co , Long Beach, CA, l Jan - 30 Jun
1957 .
History of the 67th TRW. I July - 31 December 1957 .
History of the 47th Bomb Wing , l January - 30 June 1958.
History of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing , I January - 30 June 1958.
History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group (TAC), 15 January - 30 June 1958.
History of the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing , I January - 30 June 1959.
History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB , VA , I Jan 62 - 30 Jun 62.
History of the 363rd TRW, l July - 31 December 1966.
History of the 41st TEWS , 355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, I July - 30 September 1967 .
History of the 355th TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, January - March 1968.
History of the 4lst TEWS , Takhli RTAFB , Thailand, I April - 30 June 1968.
History of the 355th TFW, Vol I, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, April - June 1968 .
History of the 355th TFW, Vol II , Takhli RTAFB , Thailand, October - December 1968.
History of the 355TFW, Voll , Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, January- March 1969 .
History of the 2nd Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB , VA, 1 October - 31 December 1969.
History of the 355TFW, Vol III, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, October - December 1969.
History of the 41TRSrrEWS, (condensed), June 1965 - 31October1969.
History of the 42nd TEWS , 355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, 1October-31December1969 .
History of the 388TFW, Vol 2, Korat RTAFB , Thailand, January-March 1973 .
History of the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Karat RTAFB, Thailand, l April - 30 June
1973 .
History of the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Koral RTAFB, Thailand, 1 July - 30
September 1973.
History of the 42nd Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Karat RTAFB , Thailand, 1 October 1973
-31January1974.
Improved Turret for B-66, Memoranda, from TAC/QA to DO, 9 March 1954.
Increasing Electronic Warfare Officer Training, Ltr, AFMPC, Randolph AFB, TX , to ATC/SR,
Randolph AFB , TX, 31 August 1967.
Letter Order IOCAG (3-451) , HQ IOTRW, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, 11March1958.
Letter Order IOADM (4-696) , HQ IOTRW, Spangdahlem Air Base , Germany, 11 April 1958 .
Lightweight J-57 Engine for F-100 Aircraft, Ltr HQ AF, Washington DC, to Commander, TAC,
Langley AFB , VA, September 10, 1953.
Limited Phase IV Performance and Stability RB-66C , AF Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA,
Harry W. Berkowitz, Project Engineer; Captain John E. Allavie, Project Pilot, Jan 1958 .
Minutes of EB-66 Tactics Meeting, 42TEWS/355TFW, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, 7 Feb 1970.
North American Report No. NA-53-955, Memorandum HQ TAC/QA to OT/RQ, Langley AFB, VA ,
11 Jan 1954.
Operations Plan 66-56,Annex B, Logistics , 17BW, Hurlburt Field, FL, 28 October 1955 .
Operations Proposal IX, from 41/42TEWS Tactics Team to DC0/66, 20 Feb 68 .
Operations Order 79-57 , l 7BW, Annex B, Air Operations (47BS deployment to RAF Sculthorpe), 20
December 1957.
Personnel Rotation Program for Southeast Asia, Ltr, AF/MPC, Randolph AFB, TX to all Commands,
1 November 1967 . ,
Phase IV Performance Test RB-66B, AF Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA , Eldon J. Snawder
(Engineer), Captain Charles C. Bock, Project Pilot, 25 April 1956.

417
 Glory Days

Phase IV Stability and Limited Performance Test, AF Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA, I/Lt
Jerome B. Reed, Project Engineer; Captain John M. Carlson, Project Pilot, Sep 1957.
Phase V (Adverse Weather) Flight Test of RB-66B Aircraft, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Edward A.
Vincent, July 1956.
Position Paper on Removal of EB-66 ECM Support for Photo Reconnaissance in RP-I, 7 AF,
undated.
Preparation for Conversion to B-66B Aircraft - 345BG, from HQ TAC, Langley AFB, VA, to
Commander, 405FBW, Langley AFB, VA, 29 July 1954.
Program Changes, msg from CSAF to CINCPACAF, 23 Dec 70.
RB-66 Tactical Support Airplane (Description of airplane and requirements), Report provided by HQ
AMC, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, to Commanding General, TAC, Langley AFB, VA, May 22,
1953 .
Reconnaissance in SEASIA, July 1966-June 1969, Project CHECO Report, HQ PACAF, Directorate,
Tactical Evaluation, 15 July 1969.
Reduction of EB-66 Flying Hour Allocation, Ltr from 355TFW/CC to 13AF/CC, 17 Apr 1970.
Reports of Aircraft Accidents, B/RB/WB/EB-66A/B/C/D, AF Forms 14.
Report of TDY - Major Reginald W. Wagner; HQ AMC - WADC, ECM Weapons Phasing Group, re
Ground Rules Governing the B/RB-66 ECM Modification Program, 16 Dec 1954.
Report of TDY - Major E.T. Eden, to 26th Meeting of B/RB-66 Weapons Phasing Group, HQ AMC,
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 10 December 1954.
Retention of EB-66 in SEA, Ltr Colonel Joseph E. Thome, HQ PACAF, to Lt/Colonel Gilbert E.
Shortt, HQ 7AF/DO, 28 Dec 1970.
Retention of EB-66 in SEA, Response from Lt/Colonel Shortt to 28 Dec 57 !tr from Colonel Thome,
Jan 1971.
Special Orders 25TRG P-6, 8 July 1965; 25TRW T-375 10 Oct 1965; T-457 20 Oct 1965; T-44 12
January 1966; A- 468 4 may 1966.
Special Orders 363TRWTB-172 4 May 1965; TB-200 29 June 1965.
Special Order HQ 7AF, G-529, 1July1966.
Status Report, Operations and Air Training Activity 1956, HQ 17BW, Hurlburt Field, FL, to
Commander 9th Air Force, 5 April 1956.
Status Report, Operations and Air Training Activity 1959, HQ 17BW, Hurlburt Field, FL, to
Commander 9th Air Force, re transfer of B-66 to 47BW.
Support Forces for Arc Light, Talking Paper, undated.
Syllabus of Instruction for Tactical Reconnaissance Crew RB-66, 4411 CCTG, Shaw AFB, SC, 1959.
Tactical Electronic Warfare in SEA (EB-66), 355TFW/DC0-66, 28 Sep 1969.
Technical Order IB-66{E}B-l Flight Manual EB-66B, RB-66B & EB-66C Aircraft. U.S. Air Force,
1967 .
Trip Report, QRC-160 Assistance Team, Visit to SEA, 6 Dec 1966; Warner Robins Air Materiel Area,
Robins AFB, Georgia, to HQ PACAF, 6 December 1966.
Unsatisfactory Reports, AFTO 29, Serial Numbers: 55-1016; 55-1123-25; 55-1155-56; 55-1629-30;
55-1678-80; 55-1688-94; 55-1703(1-4); 55-1719-21; 55-1744, AF Flight Test Center, Edwards
AFB, CA, 1955 .
USAF Electronic Warfare in SEA, Talking Paper, 7AF/DOE, Colonel Wack, 12 Nov 1969.
USAF Tactical Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, July 69 - June 71, Project CHECO Report, HQ
PACAF, Directorate of Operations Analysis, 23 November 1971.
United States Air Force Management Summary: Southeast Asia Review, Calendar Years 1961-1972.
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Air Force, 1972.

Interviews
Alumbaugh, Lester Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Belli, Robert E. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.
Bloomkamp, Frank Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Chilstrom, Kenneth Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Copier, Thomas Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Divich, Chris Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Eby, David Colonel, USAF (Ret.)

418
 Bibliography

Giraudo, John C. Major General, USAF (Ret.)

Harding. Donald E. Lieutenant Colonel. USAF (Ret.)
Kaehn. Albert Brigadier General. USAF (Ret.)
Kersis. Alexander J. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Lobdell. Harrison Major General. USAF (Ret.)
Martin. Francis T. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
McMullen. Francis R. Father. Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Milam. James R. Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Parrott, Cliff Douglas Aircraft Corporation (Ret.)
Pedroli, Attilio Bridgadier General. USAF (Ret.)
Reponen, Gerald Lieutenant Colonel. USAF (Ret.)
Sapere. Joseph R. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Starnes. William Lieutenant Colonel , USAF (Ret.)
Taylor. Arthur K. Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Webster, Robert Lieutenant Colonel. USAF (Ret.)
Widic. Frank Lieutenant Colonel. USAF (Ret.)

Pictures
Pictures used in the book came from various sources including the author, the Air Force Flight Test
Center. Frank Bloomkamp, David Cooper, Thomas Copier, David Eby, Robert Ganci, Scott Hegland,
Alexander Kersis, Guenther Klassen, Francis McMullen, John Norden, Cliff Parrott, ' Pete' Pedroli,
Theodore Pruss. Joseph Snoy, Robert Stamm, Anthony Tambini, Thomas Taylor, Robert Webster,
Robert Welch, Alec Bailey, Richard Anderson, James Phillips.

Letters/ Other Written Communications

B-66 Destroyer Association Newsletters, quarterly 2002-2007
Bruenner, Willi , Colonel , USAF (Ret.) - Emails re RB-66 operations in Germany/SEA.
Buettner, Terry Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - emails B-66 operations at Korat 1972-1973.
Bullock, Lawrence - emails re RB-66C operations in 1965, SEA.
Canady, Joe Major, USAF (Ret .) - email: Brief History of Joe Canady's !st 100 Missions over North
Vietnam 1965 to 1966.
Ciz, George C. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - email Flying with the 39th TEWS.
Christman, Don Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - email Pilot perspective of flying the B-66 out of Takhli ,
Thailand.
Colburn, Ned Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Memorandum: A perspective on his AF career. Emails:
Remembering old friends - Paul Bjork & Carl Covey; Black Sea operations;
Coolidge, Kenneth - email re early Vietnam combat missions.
Cooper, David D. - Ltr, B-66 operations out of Yokota AB, Japan.
Douglas Aircraft Company, Douglas-Navy A3D Skywarrior Background Release, El Segundo
Division, CA, undated.
Darrah, Ronald L. - Memoranda re Lebanon Deployment 1958.
Davis, John MSGT, USAF (Ret.) - email 17BW/37BS, Victor Alert at Sculthorpe.
Davis, Rex L. - email re Royal Flush and Brown Cradle employment in England.
Eaker, Ira C. Lt/General, USAF (Ret.) - Ltr to Colonel Harris B. Hull, HQ PACAF, re lack of spares
for B-66 aircraft.
Erbe, Richard MSGT, USAF (Ret.) - emails: deployment from Toul-Rosieres to Tan Son Nhut.
Espe , Ira K. Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - email Comments on B-66 deployment to Korea , Feb 68.
Everson, Dale Lt/Colonel , USAF (Ret.) - email Blue Cradle operations at Lockbourne AFB, OH.
Fitzgerald, Tom - re RIEB-66C 54-459.
Frankenberg, Dave Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - !tr re RB-66 operations out of Yokota AB, Japan .
Ganci, Robert J. MSGT, USAF (Ret.) - emails re life of a gunner 47BW/10TRW.
Gould, Kenneth G. Dr. MD PhD, Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Memoranda: A flight surgeon's perspective
on war in Southeast Asia, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand.
Hegland, Scott - Emails re RB-66 operations out ofYokotaAB, Japan .
Helmke, Kermit W. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Emails relating to B-66 operations.
High, Kenneth Lt/Colonel , USAF (Ret.) - Memos re Mobile Zebra and Presidential Escort.

419
 Glory Days

Holland, David I. Major, USAF (Ret.) - Memorandum 'Check-ride to Soviet Detention.'

Hull, Harris B. Colonel, USAF - Ltr dtd Feb 3, 1958 to Lt/General, USAF (Ret.) Ira C. Eaker, re
Sputnik and Cold War.
Johnson, Gayle P. - Email re firepower demo at Eglin AFB, FL.
Kash, Norman Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - emails re EB-66E OT&E at Eglin.
Leeper, Tom - email re SA-2 Iaunch near Ban Karai Pass, NVN, 1971.
Long, Robert - email re initial deployment from Shaw to Tan Son Nhut.
Mansperger, Robert SMSGT, USAF (Ret.) - email re failing escape hatch seals on RB-66.
Maul, Paul Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Memo re Palace Cobra, New Guys in TAC, Air Refueling
Challenges.
McCain, Otis E. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - emails re testing and introduction of ECM pods.
McClintock, Earl - Ltr, Ejecting from a B-66 at Toul-Rosiers AB, France.
McDonald, William Major, USAF (Ret.) - Email re B-66B and Pathfinder operations.
Mendonca, Robert Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - I 7 /47BW documentation; 42TEWS reports.
Milam, Jim Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - email EW training.
Mosby, Jerry MSGT, USAF (Ret.) - emails Deployment Shaw to Tan Son Nhut; Swamp Fox, Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Neutz, Lloyd Major, USAF (Ret.) - emails re RB-66 operations out of Yokota/SEA.
Norden, John A. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - email re 1965 combat missions SEA.
Orr, Donald E. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Documentation relating to 1959 escort of Air Force One by
B-66B bombers from 4 7BW.
Parrott, Cliff - Emails re B-66 design, build, delivery to Shaw AFB, SC; operations at Shaw.
Pase, Roy - Email re Victor Alert at 47BW.
Presto, Edward - Email re deployment from France to SEA; B-66 intrusion into China while under
MiGattack.
Pruss, Ted - Ltr, re Itazuke operations.
Roland, Valentine - email re MiG attack on RB-66C; shoot down of 2 MiGs by F-4Cs.
Seech, Jack- email re IR equipped RB-66Bs flying out of Tan Son Nhut.
Stamm, Robert W. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - emails re B-66 operations Yokota to Toul-Rosieres;
RB"66 air refuelings. Memorandum: Reflections on the 11th and 12th Tactical Reconnaissance
Squadrons, 67TRW.
Starke, Richard Major, USAF (Ret.) - emails: Black Sea operations.
Story, James B. Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.)- email re B-66 operations in Europe.
Taylor, Tom - Email re RB-66C mods, ALQ-87/QRC-160 testing, pods on RF-IO ls, SEA deployment
1965.
Tippin, Stanley Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Flight logs/emails & related documentation re ASQ-96
testing at LAX/Eglin AFB, FL.
Underwood, Alexander, MSGT, USAF (Ret.) - B-66 Story: Pins, Canopy, Lanyard - reflections on
flying the B-66B Brown Cradle in France and Vietnam.
Welch, Robert, Lt/Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - emails re initial deployment of RB-66C to Vietnam.
Wells, Vaughn - email re B-66 intrusion into China while under MiG attack.
Whitlock, Thomas, Colonel, USAF (Ret.) - Emails re wheel explosion at Kirtland AFB, NM;
aircraft stability.
Wooden, Steve - email re Hangar Queen at Spangdahlem, IOTRW; problems with control surfaces.
Ziegler, Robert - email re Victor Alert at 47BW.

420
 INDEX

A-IH/E 210, 256. 330, 332 Atomic/nuclear bombs/special weapons 13, 20-
A/EA/KA-3 20, 28, 30, 34-35, 127, 292, 297- 21, 28, 30, 32-33, 37, 50, 54, 56, 60-61, 71,
298, 307-308 96-97,129, 131, 170,204
A/EA-6 203, 298, 307-308 , 334, 346-347 Austin, Harold R., 39
A-7 290-291 , 301, 346, 349, 351-352 Autery, Clarence R., 187, 190
Aamodt, Clark 282 AvianoAB 319
Adee , Donald 157, 162 Aynesworth, Horace D. 90
AJlavie. John E. , 42
Allen, Jess 251-252 B/RB-2614, 18-19,22, 24,26-27,33,45,47-48,
Allison, Harry 286, 288 69, 91-92, 109 , lll-112, 117, 139,235
ALQ-51 deception jammer 221 B/RB/KB-2917,20,59,88, JOI, 156,280
Alumbaugh, Lester E., 76-79 B-36 17, 20, 28, 37, 59, 82-83, 104, 253
Amarillo AFB 199 B/RB-45 19, 26, 29, 37, 39, 47 , 56, 59-60, 69,
Andersen AB 176, 178, 180, 185, 199, 219, 279- 96, 139
280, 287, 305, 329, 338, 340, 342, 345-346 B/RB-47 19, 26, 28-29, 37, 39, 44, 47, 52, 90,
Anderson, Edwin P. Jr. , 298-299, 301 96,98, 104, 106-108 , 110, 112-1!3, 118, 123,
Anderson, John B., 69, 71 127, 131-132, 134, 146, 150, 155, 160, 165-
Anderson, Rudolph 132-133 166, 198,201,219,235-236,246,280,286
Andrews AFB 16 BIK/RB-50 20, 48, 55, 62-63, 67, 77, 95, 100,
Angstadt, Ralph 216 104, 109, ll l-11 3, 118-119, 128-130, 142-
Anti-SAM task force 232 143, 149, 198
Arc light 176, 183, 220, 284, 294, 298 , 305, 306, B-52 18-19, 31-33, 37, 53 , 56, 96, 104, 108 , 129,
309, 311,330,337,340,349 134, 146, 166, 176, 198, 208-209 , 220, 243-
Ardis , David G., 'Butch' 313 244, 246, 253 , 260, 280, 284, 289, 300, 308,
Argenti a AB 88 325,329-331,334-336,338,340-347
Armani , Harry V., 78 B/RB-57 27-28, 31, 33, 45,47-49, 52, 56, 69, 84,
Armstrong, Neil 303 90, 93, 95, 100, 106, 109, 129, 138-140, 148,
Arnold, Henry H., 31, 80 176, 178, 180-181, 203-204
AshiyaAB 24 Bailey, Jerry 323
Aspel, James 103 Bally,,William J ., 354
Atlas ICBM 104, 146 Barkley, James 214
Barlock EW/GCI radar 275

421
 Glory Days

Becker, Lawrence P., 187, 194 Causey, John B., 209-210

B-68 106 CASF 50-51, 54, 97, 99, 103
BienHoaAB 176, 178, 182,217,235,267 CEP63
Birgerson, Alexander 212-213 Chambley AB 72, 124, 162, 163, 171-173, 193,
Bitburg AB 74, 137, 314, 316, 320, 322, 325 196, 199-200, 204
Bjork, Paul 126-128 Chateauroux AB 62, 65-66, 73, JOO
Blizzard, Mark 163 Chilstrom, Kenneth 33
Blood, Gordon 242 Christian, Daniel 286
Blue Beetle 62-63 Christman, Donald 301, 310
Blue Cradle EB-47E 165-168, 244 CINCPAC 217, 280, 306
Bobbitt, Alvin 126-128 CINCPACAF 217, 280
Bock, Charles C., 42 Cirillo, Eugene 263
Boeing 707NC-137 31, 36, 66 City of Sumter 82, 123
Bolte, Wayne L., 331 Ciz, George 322
Bomar, Jack 216, 240 Clark AB 20,22,54-56, ll0, 113-114, 118, 176,
Bomber gap 40 178 , 182, 185, 188, 203-204, 209 , 219, 222,
Bordelon, Charles 201 243, 247,253,257,271,290,305-306,310,
Borman, Frederick A., 110 326,330,335,351,354
Bottomly, Heath 305-306 Clark, Albert 248
Boyd, Albert 26 Clizbe, Reginald J., 53-56, 97
Boyle, Thomas 311 Colburn, Ned D., 126-128, 172
Brass Monkey procedures 155 Collier, John M., 112
Breck, Edward 128 Cooley, Gilbert 322
Bronson, Howard F., 45, 47 Coolidge, Kenneth B., 193-194
Brookley AFB 90-91, 199 Cooper, David 117
Broughton, Jack 240 Copier, Thomas 290-293, 296, 335, 344, 351
Brown, George S., 306 Cordoni, Adrian 178
Buckley AFB 278 Corona satellite 123
Buettner, Terry 302, 347-348 Costen, Constantin Jr., 73
Bullis, Frank 24 Covey, Carl 126-128
Bullock,LawrenceJ., 190-191,268 Cox, William H., 150
Bumpas, Guy 65 Cox , William R., 67
Bumpy Action (drones) 291-292, 297-298, 310 Craig AFB 137
Burchinal, David A., 39 Craven, Daniel 323-325
Burnett, Chester 61 Crofoot, William 319
Byram, James 126 Crouch, Robert C., 351
Byrnes, James F., 80
Da Nang AB 177, 182-183, 188, 194, 217, 224,
C/KC-97 37, 98, 113, 117, 198, 245-246 226, 292-293, 336
C-11948, 123 DahranAB 20
C/EC-121127,286,351-352 Darrah, Ronald 103
C-130 66-67, 103, 129-130, 178, 289, 291, 310, Davenport, Ralph L. 56
351-352 Davies, John 216, 240
C/KC/EC-135 31-32, 104, 172, 198-199, 201, Davis, Benjamin 0 . Jr., 75
224, 242, 246, 269, 279-280, 286-287, 290, Davis, John 63
292,301,307,337,341-342,344 Davis-Monthan AFB 20, 66, 123, 171, 174, 277,
C-141 301 296,302,354
Cabas, VictorN., 177 Day,AllenH., 119-121
Campaigne, Jerry A., 91-92 DC-8 36,66
Canady, Eldon 133, 187-188, 190, 194 de Gaul, Charles 50, 68, 71, 143, 172
Canberra 26-27 Deaton, Rex A., 216
Cannon, John K., 32-33, 49 Dempster, Kenneth C., 63
Carlson, John T., 42 Dethlefsen, Merlyn H ., 216
Carswell AFB 20 Dien Bien Phu 40, 191, 211
Carter, Frederick W., 67 Dinger, Richard J. 54
Case, Marty 265-266 Disosway, Gabriel P., 33, 75, 154, 159-160

422
 Index

Divich. Chris 0 .. 245-246. 248, 253. 259. 260 F/EF/FB-111 203 , 234, 317, 340 , 346, 349, 351
Dobey. Herbert 216 Fairchild AFB 220
Douglas. Donald W.. 91-92 Fancher. Jack 172
Donaldson AFB 128 Fansong SA-2 radar 108, 124, 133, 190, 208-
Doolittle s Raiders 56 209, 214, 225, 227, 231-233, 235-237, 244-
Dover AFB 222 245, 252, 266 , 273, 275, 294 , 305, 309, 331 ,
Doyle. Francis 110 343' 345-346' 351
Duckburr aircraft 101 - 102 Fer, John 216, 220, 238, 240
Dudley. Wilbur R., 214-215 Firecan!Whijf AAA radars 133 , 177 , 187-188,
Dulles. John F.. 3 7 190,206,214,216, 225,231,294,310,346
Dunn. Marcel J .. 119- 120 Flanders, Frederick 141
Duplessis. Paul E .. 190 Flat Face acquisition radar 245, 275, 331
Fletcher, William A., 311
Eary. Verla 0., 214 Flying Fish 100, 201, 278
Eby, David 97-99 , 290-293 Fobair, Roscoe 191
Echo Alert79. 144. 170-171, 193 Forbes AFB 29, 44, 127
Edwards AFB/Flight Test Center 25-26, 32, 34, Ford, Thomas R., 88
41-42,49,84.92. 158 Fox, Charles N., 182
Eglin AFB 44, 48, 89, 128, 179, 189 , 232-233, Frank, Art 99
276-278 Frankenberg, David C., 112
Eie!son AFB 98 Frankfurt AB 138
Eisenhower, Dwight D .. 37, 40 , 53, 66-67, 99- Fruit Set SA-2 radar 124
100 , 148, 150,2 17 Fulton, William H., 55, 66
El Toro USMC Air Station 82 Fumeaux , Jack 112
Elmendorf AFB 98-99 Fucich, Frank W. , 320
England AFB 97
Espe, Ira K., 'Ike' 282, 286-288 , 318 Ganci, Robert J., 75-76
Estes , James 178 Gardina, Vernon 156, 158-160
EtainAB 173 George AFB 55, 163 , 178-180
Etzel, Gregory 255 Gilroy, Kevin 18, 216
Evans, Richard 210 Gingery, David 214
Eversole , Donald L., 311 Giraudo, John C., 241-242, 257-258, 262
Exercise Black Eagle 321-322 Givens, Monty 203
Exercise National Week 318-319 Glandon, Harold W., 119-121
Exercise Royal Flush 78 Glover, John G., 66
Exercise WEASELEX 352 Goldberg, Norman 158-159
Explorer satellite 68 Goose Bay AB 267
Gould, Kenneth G., 268-272
F3D/EF-10B 188-189 Gould, Robert A., 67
F/RF-4 148, 162, 171 , 174. 180, 183 , 191-191 , Gould, Warren 55
203-204, 206, 208, 212-214, 216, 219, 224- Grafflin, Douglas 149- 150
227, 229, 231, 238, 241, 244, 246, 249, 251- Gravatte, Charles 55
252,255,273,276,289,291,298,307,314, Gray, Willis B., 73
329,332-333,335-337,343,346,349,351 Green, Robert 110, 202
F-100 31, 33, 64, 71, 74-75, 79, 97, 100, 106, Griffiss AFB 169
110, 129-130, 134, 169- 170, 176- 177 , 180, Grimes, Jerry 203-204
198 ,202,208,23 1,279,305,3 17 ,32 1,330 Groznyy, Soviet IRBM carrying ship 132
F/RF-101 31-33, 42, 59, 103, 128-129, 131-132,
171 , 178, 184- 185 , 188, 198, 219, 232, 286, HahnAB 137, 157-158,322
288 Hainley, Delbert C.. 156, 174
F-105 18, 33, 96-97, 106, 129, 134, 148 , 163, Hambleton , Jceal E., 330-333
176-178, 180, 185 , 187-188 , 190-191, 193- Handcock, Robert B., 72
196, 198 , 202-206, 212, 214, 216, 221, 224, Hanner, Gerald P., 272, 330, 333, 336-337
233-234, 240-242, 244-245, 251, 255, 260, Hans0n, Robert C., 67
265-266 , 269, 273, 276, 299, 303, 305,319, Harding, Donald 57, 59-66, 93, 163, 171-172,
327,329,335-336,351 204, 211, 227, 278-280, 282, 318-320, 323-
324

423
 Glory Days

Harlingen AFB 117 Keesler AFB 18, 108

Harmon AB 51 , 128 Keirn, Richard 191
Harris , Hunter 232 Keller, Richard M ., 222, 240
Harvey, Daniel 73, 78 Kelly, John 172-173
Haugen , Ingwald ' Inky' 168, 233 Kelly, Larry A., 353
Haynes, Vernon L., 182 Kelly, Kenneth H ., 319-320, 324
Helmke, Kermit W., 150, 156-157 Kemp, James D ., 74-75 , 148, 170, 180
Henn, Neil F., 329 Kendler, Jesse P., 52
Henry, John B., 39 Kennedy, John F., 128-133, 303
Heineman, Edward H., 28 Kennedy, Robert 131
Heyser, Richard 131-132 Kersis , Alexander J., 243-245, 248, 252-253,
HH-43 rescue/fire suppression helicopter 240, 277' 320-321 , 354
247,325 Kessler,MelvinJ ., 151, 154
HH-53 Jolly Green Giant helicopter 192, 210, Khrushchev, Nikita 131, 161-162
255,305,332-333 , 346 Kindley AB 52, 103, 132
Hickam AFB 20, 109, 123, 178, 199, 279-280, Kirk, Leon 118-120
286-287' 311, 335 Kirtland AFB 44
High , Kenneth H., 54-56, 62-64 , 66-67, 298 Klause, Klaus J., 226
High Flight 100-102, 174, 199, 278 , 280 Knowles, Barry 182
Hill, William H ., 214-215 Kodlick, John 210
Hock, Steven 329 Korat RTAFB 192, 196, 203, 262, 272, 302-303,
Holland, David I., 150-154, 156-157 , 160, 162 305-306, 310-311, 313, 325-327, 329-330,
Holley, John A ., 319-321 333,335,344, 347,349,351-352,354
Holloman AFB 329 Kringelis , lmants 214-215
Holloway, Bruce K., 33 , 338 Kroses , Ira 174
Holt, David 255 Kuhlman, William 177
Holt, William H., 214 Kunkel, Allan D., 181
Homestead AFB 132, 179, 243, 277, 330 KunsanAB 113, 115 , 119-122,287
Hubbard, Robert 211 Kupiek, Joseph 30 I
Hurlburt Field/Eglin #9 27, 45 , 47-48 , 56, 64 , 67,
84,91,97 LABS maneuver 65 , 67
Hyland, John J ., 242 Ladd AFB 99
Laird, Donald E ., 201
Incirlik AB 67, 99-100, 102, 124, 126-128 Lajes AB 20, 51 , 88-89, 101 -103, 128
ItamiAB 109, 117 Langley AFB 16, 18, 24-25, 27, 56, 88, 100, 132,
Itazuke AB 288, 296 160, 351
lwakuni AB 24-25 LaonAB 27, 139-140, 160, 171
Laredo AFB 59
James, Daniel 'Chappie' 213 , 228 , 238 Larson, Edward 216
James-Connally AFB 77 , 220 Lashbrook, Ralph 178
JATO 109-110, 114, 141 Latham, Wilbur J ., 226
Jensen, John S ., 75 Laughlin AFB 53, 104
Jernigan, Sandra 82 Lawson , William 149-150
Johnson AB 22 , 24 Lebert, Ronald M., 258-259
Johnson , Gayle 129 LeMay, Curtis E., 14, 17, 20 , 33, 37, 39-40, 45,
Johnson, Lyndon B., 129, 153-154, 159, 161- 48, 52-53, 91 , 104, 129, 131, 159-160, 162,
162, 172, 176, 204, 213, 237, 262, 269, 284 165-166, 198, 340
Johnson, Theodore W., 247 Leper, Thomas 305
Johnson , Vernon A., 178, 182, 190-191, 267-268 Lindley, Dwight A., 201-202
Junge , Jimmy 97 Lindsey AS 317, 321
Lobdell, Harrison Jr., 18-19,24, 33 , 96, 193, 241,
Kadena AB 113, 115, 118, 121-122, 176, 185, 257
232, 293,296 , 305-307,326, 340 Locher, Roger C ., 333
Kasch, Norman W. , 214-216, 278 Lockbourne AFB 37, 168
Kay, Robert L., 112 Lockhart, Hayden J., 177
Kayworth, Edward A., 44 Lodge , Robert A ., 333

424
 Index

Long. Robert 178 Mead , Robert 312

Lords, Clarence R .. 352-353 Means, William 211
Loring AFB 51 Mehrabad AP 67
Lowry AFB 75 Mendonca, Robert R. , 353
Lucky Lady ll 20 Mercer, Pollard H. Jr. , 'Sonny' 254 , 256-258
Luke AFB 32. 179 Meyer, John C., 338
Luke . Merlyn L. , 'Vern' 312 Milam , James R. , 354
Lusk. Ralph W., 42-44 MiG- 15117 19. 40, 206, 214-215 , 278, 286, 294,
Lynn. Bobby H .. 67 334
MiG- 19 150, 155 , 294, 333, 336
MacClellan, Donald 86 MiG-21 206, 224-227, 238, 249, 251-252, 255,
MacDill AFB 48, 132-133, 246 284,294,305 , 309,333-336,349
Maddox. Vauriece D. , 353 Miles, Richard A. , 110
Madrishin. John T. , 184 Miller, Richard M ., 159, 286-287
Madsen . William 178 Miller, David V. , 60, 66, 72
Mahaffey, William 202 Minuteman ICBM 146
Maloney. Benjamin 117 MisawaAB 113 , 118 , 232
Mangan, Thomas J ., 300 Mitchell , Andrew C., 91 -92
Manlove. Clifford T. , 34 Mixson, Marion C., 13, 39
Mann.Robert 178, 184 Momyer, William W., 242, 253 , 338
Manor, Charles P., 67 Moore , Joseph H., 215
Mansperger. Robert 200 Morita, Robert 216
Manzo , ArthurJ.54 Moron AB 79, 127-128, 143, 145 , 165, 172, 196,
March AFB 39, 209, 265, 267 198-199
Maroum , William A., 73 Morris, Paul 0., 67
Martini. Gere 286-287 Morriss, George 44
MatherAFB 108, 135, 137, 157, 162,220-221. Morrow, James 63-65
223 , 243-244,258-259, 290 ,340-341 Mosby, Jerry 189
Matlock , John 220 Moses Lake AFB 77
Matson, Willard G. , 184. 190 Mountain Home AFB 351
Maul , Paul 280-283 , 299 Mullarkey, Edward J. , 75
Maxwell AFB 222-223 , 245-246, 253 Murdoch , Robert F., 286
McBride . Gerald B., 288 Myrtle Beach AFB 100
McCain , John S., 306
McCain , Otis E. , 235-236 Nellis AFB 354
McClellan AFB 109, 123, 199, 201, 278-279 , Nelson , Curtis 187
311 Nelson, Roger 228
McClenny, Jack 54-56, 64-65 Neutz , Lloyd L. , 122
McClintock, Earl 149-150 Nhakom Phanom RTAFB 'NKP' 256, 312, 352
McConnell AFB 163, 329 Nichols, Max E., 247, 259
McConnell, John P., 198 , 232, 302-303 Nickerson , Walter 341 -343
McCord AFB 19, 135 Norbert , Craig R., 212
McCormack , Lemuel H., 156 Norden,JohnA., 191 , 267
McDonald , William 203 Norris , Thomas 333
McDonald, William E., 246-248 Norton AFB 45, 87
McEwen, James S. , 184 NouasseurAB 39, 79, 141, 174
McFarland, David 183 Nuclear Deterrence, strategy 131
McGinn , Jack 224-225 , 227
McGreevy, Daniel 141 0-2 307 , 331
McGuire AFB 137, 163 Offutt AFB 16, 39, 104, 112, 187, 219, 280
McKeon. Donald 142 Oldis, Frank 174, 176-177
McLain, John T., 89 Olds, Robin 206 , 228, 238 , 240, 242
McMullen, Frank 264-268 O'Malley, John F., 311
McNamara, Robert S., 129, 159, 198, 204, 212- Operation Bolo 206, 228 , 238
215 , 217, 262, 269, 276, 284 Operation Combat Fox 286, 288 , 296
McSwane, Noble 201 Operation Commando Hunt V 306-307

425
 Glory Days

Operation Constant Guard 329 Rabini , John J ., 226

Operation Flaming Dart 176 RAF Alconbury 60, 63, 77-78, 110, 143-145,
Operation Freedom Train 325, 334 148-150, 170-171, 174, 193,209
Operation Gift 63-64 RAF Bruntingthorpe 71, 77-79, 143, 148-149
Operation Homecoming 349 RAF Chelveston 52, 77, 124, 126, 143-144, 148-
Operation Homerun 53 149, 170-171, 193,276
Operation Linebacker Ill/ 208, 237, 335, 338- RAF Fairford 40
349 RAF Sculthorpe 29, 37, 39,59, 63, 65-67, 71-76,
Operation Mobile Baker 50 139, 144,163, 169-170,198,203,282
Operation Mobile 7.ebra 54 RAF Upper Heyford 317
Operation Monsoon 66-67 RAF Wharton 26
Operation Rolling Thunder 176, 208, 217, 231 , Rarnstein/Landstuhl AB 79, 137-138, 173 , 193,
284, 291-292, 294 244, 322-323
Operation Swamp Fox 124, 126 Randolph AFB 244, 281
Operation Whipsaw 50-51 Rausch, Julius 100-102
Orlowski, Joseph M., 298-301 Reese AFB 113
Orr, Donald E., 67 Rein, Robert 194
OsanAB 288 Reponen,Gerald 128-130, 135-145, 178-184
Osborne, James 227 Rich, Ben R., 150
OV-10 267, 307, 329-330, 332-333 Richards, Donald B ., 44
Owen, Roth I00-102 Ricketts, James E. Jr., 298-301
Owens, Robert G., 215 Ritland, Osmond 90
Robinson, William 79
Parkhurst, George J ., 67 Rodriguez-Mattei, Vincente 67
Parson, John Roeling,ArthurJ., 124
Parrott, Clifford A., 43, 82-86, 89-92, 169 Roles and Missions 6-7
Partridge, Lewis J., 71, 74-76, 78 Rothas, William 262, 322
Patton, George 75 Ruderman, Max 112
Peace Time Aerial Reconnaissance Program Rusk, Dean 153
(PARPRO) 150 Russell, Bernard 194
Pease AFB 98 Ryal!, Zacheus W., 51
Pedroli, Attilio ' Pete' 56 , 248, 253-259 Ryan, John D., 203, 303, 306
Peffley, Robert 247 Ryan's Raiders 203
Perusse, Callix J ., 51
Pettigrew, Paul A., 82 SA-2 SAM 68, 106, 124, 129, 131-132, 134, 148,
Plattsburg AFB 135 177, 194-195, 208, 210, 212, 216, 221-222,
Polaris missile/submarine 68, 131, 338 229,231-234,236, 240,249,270,273,275-
Pomeroy, Carwin 'Smiley' 282, 286-288, 318, 276, 290, 294, 298, 305, 309-310, 319, 329-
320,326 331, 334-337, 341, 343-347, 351, 354
Poor, Russell A., 216 SA-7 Strela 329-330, 333
Porter, John A., 42-44 SA-16 Albatross 216
Powell, James T. Jr., 119-121 SACEUR50
Powell, Kenneth R., 74 Salisbury, Al 286
Power, Thomas S., 104, 131 Salmon, Daniel 233
Powers, Gary F., 68, 124, 153, 155-156 SAM-break 275, 305, 330, 337
Precision guided munitions/Smart bombs 162, Sapere, Joseph R., 187, 190-192, 273, 275, 318,
332,336 335,351
Presque Isle AB 146 Sasser, George F., 347
Presto, Edward J., 199, 212-213 Schaufler, Charles 200, 202
Puckett, William R., 184, 318 Schrimsher, William 156
Schroder, Karl 30
QRC-160/AIQ-87 ECM pod 231-237, 270, 276 Schurig, Robert M 'Mike' 212-213
QRC program 169, 208-209, 231, 277 Scott, Robert R., 233
Quinn, Charles D., 311 Seamaster 35-36
Sears, WilliamA., 170
Seech,Jack 178, 181, 183-184

426
 Index

Seeftuth , August 170. 231 213-214 . 220, 222-223 , 228 , 231 , 233 , 240,
Selby, Darrell E. , 51 242-244 , 246 , 253, 257 , 260, 262, 265-273,
SembachAB 27 , 72 , 76 . 86. 137-138 , 140 276-280 , 283 , 288-293, 296 , 298 , 301 , 303 ,
Sensabaugh. Gerald 169 305. 310-311 , 317-318. 335-336
Sexton, Kenneth D .. 187, 194 Tan Son Nhut AB 178 . 180, 182, 184-1 85, 187-
SHAPE 50 189. 209. 219, 232-233 , 318
Shaw AFB 27. 39 , 41. 43. 59 , 69. 71. 77. 79-80, Taylor, Arthur K .. 'Kibby ' 112-115, 117 , 121 ,
82-89. 93. 97. 100. 102. 122-124, 126- 128. 123 , 222-228 , 238,240
132. 145, 149. 156-157 . 169, 171-173, 176- Taylor, George A., 115, 117
177. 188 . 192. 200. 209. 219 -220, 226. 243 . Taylor, Roger E., 72
246. 253. 273. 277-278 . 281-283 . 286 , 288 , Taylor, Thomas 178 , 187-188
290. 300 , 306 . 329-330, 335 , 351 , 353-354 Terrell , Irby D., 259
Sheppard AFB 59 Tharp , John D., 112
Sherman. Robert S .. 323-325 Thatcher, George 263
Shorr. Howard 191 Thomas , Kenneth 95
Sidi Slimane AB 39. 51 Thomas , William 67
Sigonella Naval Air Facility 126-128 , 318-319 Thome, Joseph E., 309
Silverking modification 107 Thompson , James 256
SIOP 18 Thompson , Llewellyn 153, 161
Skyspor/Lima Sire 85 204-205 Thorsness , Leo 240
Slover, George H .. 111-112 Thule AB 53, 246
Small.Arthur 156- 160 Tippin, Stanley L., 213-214, 216, 276-277
Smith.Art 98-99.199 Titan ICBM 68 , 104, 146, 338
Smith , Click D. Jr., 41 , 84 Tomayasu,Kazuto 179- 180
Smith, Wayne 209-210 Tompkins, William E., 352-353
Snark cruise missile 35-36, 146 Toul-Rosieres AB 72 , 78-79, 124, 148-151 , 155-
Snoy, Joseph A., 251 156, 158- 160, 162-163, 165 , 170-173, 193 ,
Soszka, Stanley 286 200 , 276
South. Wilburn G ., 112 Townsend 112
South Ruislip Air Station 68 , 71 Travis AFB 340
Sowell , Angus 255 Trent , ClydeB., 100-102, 180
Spangdahlem AB 51 , 69 , 71, 74-75 , 90, l 10, 122 , Truax Field 77
124, 137, 140-142 , 145 , 148 , 193 , 202 , 209, Truman, Harry S ., 21 , 37 , 80
276.296,314-326.329,335 Tuck , James E., ' Friar ' 224-227
Spaulding, Jay 88 Tullo, Frank 192
Spoonrest acquisition radar 235 , 244, 275, 331 Turcotte, Maurice E ., 189-190
Sproston, Marvin 180 Twining , Nathan F., 40
Stovall , Dale 333
Sputnik 68 U-2 53 , 68 , 103-104, 124, 131-134, 148 , 150,
Stafoam 87, 141 153, 177 , 231
Stamm, James 247 Ubon RTAFB 228, 232-233, 235 , 268
Stamm, Robert W.. 109-111 , 113 , 172-173 Udorn RTAFB 178 , 193 , 200 , 211, 213 , 222 ,
Starnes , William 169 256-257,288 , 313 , 335-336,349
Stead AFB 153 UH-IH 333
Stern, Robert 109-110 Underwood , Alexander 196, 198-202
Stevens , George W., 311 USCINCEUR 50
Stone. Charles 327 USS Foresta/ 169
Story, James B., 49 USS George Washington 21, 68
Strandberg , Howard E., 142 USS Hornet 56
Sumpter, Thomas 259 USS Kitty Hawk 334
Sweeney, Walter C. Jr., 39, 129 USS Maddox 162
USS Nautilus 21
T-39 shoot-down 150, 153 , 155, 161 USS Pueblo 286, 288, 296
Taegu AB 25 USS.Ranger210
Takhli RTAFB 35 , 133, 172-173, 188-189, 192- USS United States 20, 28
193, 195- 196, 199-200, 202 , 204 , 209-210 , U-Tapao AB 185 , 305 , 334, 338 , 340, 343, 345-
346, 353

427
 Glory Days

Valencia, Bernard M., 72 XB-5125-28,33 , 106

Valentine, Roland 227
VandenbergAFB 123 Yokota AB 24, 39, 108-109, 111-115, 117-120,
Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 26 124, 198,286
Vanderhock, Pau189 Yeoman, Whitey 19
Vanguard nissile failures 68 Young, Van B., 73
Vespasian 102 Youngs, Jack M ., 248
Victor Alert 60-6 l, 63 , 170, 203
Viccelio, Henry 54, 100 ZaragozaAB 174
Vititow, Charles D., 112 Zook, David R., 232-233, 276, 340-346
Vokes, Edwin 117
Vultagio, Joseph A., 247-248 Unit Index
I st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 71, 77,
Wade, Horace M., 221 110, 139,143,148,171,202
Walker AFB 20 3rd Air Force 71 , 159
Walker, Hubert C ., 259 4th Tactical Fighter Squadron 349
Walker, Robert 110, 209-210 5th Air Force 111, 115, 117, 222
Walmsley, John S., 24 5th Bomb Wing 340
Wagner, Joseph 150 7th Air Force (2nd Air Division) 191-192, 194,
Webb, Allan S., 'Spider' 103, 203, 213-214 202, 214, 219, 222, 227-228, 232-234, 238,
Webster, Robert R., 86-87, 93, 95, 97-98 242, 245,249,253,280,291,298, 306-307,
Weger, John 184 308-309,327,331,337,347,349,352
Weir, James 318 8th Tactical Photo Reconnaissance Squadron 24
Weiand, Kenneth L., 72-73 8th Tactical Fighter Wing 228, 235, 238
Welch, Harold 151, 154, 157, 159-160 9thAirForce 14,69,88,288
Wells, James A ., 74-75 9th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 69, 79-80,
Wells , Selmon 242 85, 89, 108, 122,124,126-128,132-133, 177,
Wells, Vaughn 212-213 184, 188, 220
Werrell, Kenneth P. 47 10th Tactical Reconnaissance GroupMmg 69 ,
West, Peter 74, 110 71, 75 , 77, 137, 139, 141 , 143, 148-149, 155,
Westover AFB 88 158-160, 170-171, 193,203,209,231,318
Wexvalll/II 144, 168-170 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron I 08-113 ,
Wensil, Larry F., 227, 323 117-118, 122-124,226
Weyland, Otto P., 49-50, 54, 97, 99-1 00, 103 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 108-
Wheelus AB 103, 110, 124, 127-128, 142 109, 111-123
Whiskey Alert 79, 174 13th Air Force 203, 219, 222, 238, 249, 280, 298,
White, Edward H., 231 305 , 351, 354
White , RobertW., 113, 118-119, 122 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 41 , 69,
Whitley, Frank L. Jr., 78 80,85,89,91, 103, 128-129
Whitlock, Thomas W., 41-42, 80, 82, 84 17th Air Force 159,323
Wichita Falls AFB 267 17th Bomb Wing 27 ,45,47-51,53-54,56, 64,87,
Wiesbaden AB 53 , 79, 150, 154 97,253
Widic, Frank 220, 227, 273, 275 18th Tactical Fighter Wing 296
Wilburn , Woodrow H., 216 19th Air Force I 00
Wild Goose 122 19th Tactical Reconnaissance/EW Squadron 39,
Wild Weasel/Iron Hand 18, 216 , 231, 240, 245, 69 , 71 -78,139, 143, 148-150, 155-156, 160,
309,327,329,334,337,351-352 171, 173,200,204,293,296,306,335
Williams AFB 77
Wilkerson, Harry C ., 324 20th Tactical Fighter Wing 317
Wilson, Charles E., 34, 53-54 22nd Bomb Wing 39
Wilson, Richard 110, 178, 192,265,267 25th Tactical Reconnaissance Group/Wing 171-
Wimbrow, Nutter 340, 346 173, 193, 196,200,210
Wolpert, James 191 26th Fighter Squadron 57
Woollen , Neil 179, 181, 184 26th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 171, 173
Wright-Patterson AFB 17, 19, 30, 33 , 39, 42-43, 29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 128
56,69, 169,231 -232,253,317

d?R
 Index

30th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 71, 77 , 91 st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 39

138-140, 142-143 , 148 , 171. l74. 209 95th Bomb Squadron 54
35th Tactical Fighter Wing 215
36th Fighter Bomberffactical Fighter Wing 137 , l 62nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 19
202 , 314, 320
39th Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 296, 322nd Air Division 242
306. 314, 317-318,314-326,329 322nd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron 37
39th Tactical Electronic Warfare Training 345th Bomb Group/Wing 27 , 56, 100
Squadron 306, 351 , 354 355th Fighter Squadron 100
355th Tactical Fighter Wing 163, 192- 193 , 200,
40th Bomb Wing 245 204, 214, 222, 233 , 240, 242, 268-269, 289,
41 st Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 296, 298,303,305
Squadron 35. 69, 80, 100, 177 . 192, 209, 213, 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group/Wing 18 ,
222. 233. 238. 240. 242, 247-248,259, 280. 27 , 42-43,69 , 80, 82,86-90 , 93 , 98-100, 103,
288-289, 296, 299-301 , 317 , 333 129 . 132, 177,200,209,219,235 , 286 , 354
42nd Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare 376th Bomb Wing 113
Squadron 71 , 77. 79 , 108 , 122, 124, 139 , 143- 388th Tactical Fighter Wing 337, 351 -352
144, 148. 162. 170-171. 173, 200, 210, 272, 390th Tactical Fighter Squadron 215
276. 288-289. 297-298, 300 , 302 , 305-307,
311. 313, 318. 322, 325-327 , 329-331. 333 , 420th Air Refueling Squadron 63, 67 , 198
335.347 , 349,351 -352,354 421 st Air refueling Squadron 111
43rd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 69, 74, 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 193, 213 ,
80 , 98 , 100 222,288,335,349
43rd Air Refueling Squadron 20 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 192- 193,
47th Bomb Wing 29, 37, 56, 59-60, 67, 71-72 , 200
148 , 163 , 169- 170, 203 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron 226
49th Fighter Bomberffactical Fighter Wing 202 ,
329 509th Air Refueling Squadron 20
544th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron 112
50th Fighter Bomber Wing 137
51 st Fighter Wing 57 837th Air Division 90
52nd Tactical Fighter Wing 314
55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 29, 44 , 107, 3245th Test Group 44 , 47
112-113, 123 , 131, 150, 187, 191 , 201-202,
286 219-220, 235, 246 4080th Strategic Wing 53, 104, 132
44 l 6th Test Squadron 278
66th Tactical Reconnaissance Group/Wing 27 , 44 l 7th Training Squadron 278
69. 76,86, 137-139
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 69 , 108-109, 6091 st Reconnaissance Squadron 118
111-112, 122 6460th Tactical Reconnaissance/Electronic War-
fare Squadron l 92 , 200, 222 , 268, 270
8lst Fighter Wing 77
84th Bomb Squadron 60, 63-64, 66-67
85th Bomb Squadron 60, 66
86th Bomb Squadron 60

429