CHAPTER - IV

OBJECT OF PERCEPTION (2): NEGATION

 IS 'NEGATION' AN OBJECT OF PERCEPTION ?

Having discussed the positive aspect of the

object of perception we turn to the analysis of the negative

aspect. Noxtf we ask the question: is negation (abhava) an

object of perception also ? This question has been very

seriously debated over by the philosophers of India. Even in

Western Philosophy this has aroused considerable controversy.

As a matter of fact, the philosophers of the East and the

West have been puzzled as to how negation (abhava) is

verified. A.J. Ayer has presented the situation in his

Philosophical Essays as follows: "The difficulty felt by

those philosophers who have shown themselves to be puzzled

by the subject of negation has not been that they failed to

understand the use of negative signs. I imagine that even

Parmenides who is supposed to have proscribed negation on

the ground that non-being could not be, and so to have been

led to monism was nonetheless able to make use of negative

expressions for the purpose of ordinary communication. So

long as he relied only upon the Greek language, he could

not, indeed, have formulated his own thesis without them.

Neither has the problem of such philosophers been to find

an adequate way of characterizing the class of negative

statements. They have been at a loss, not to understand

what negative statements are, but only to account for their

existence. Holding that the absence of a given quality is

not itself a quality, nor the absence of a given relation

itself a relation, they have been unable to see how it is

possible that statements which merely deny to a given

individual the possession of a certain quality, or to a

given set of individuals the possession of a certain

l
relation can yet be true and verifiable".

Among Indian philosophers some have accepted

Abhava (non-existence) as an independent category and

Kumarila has gone to the extent of admitting an independent

means of valid knowledge (pramaha) called anupajc>dhi/

(non-apprehension) for it. The Nyaya admitting negation

(abhava) as an independent category like other positive

facts holds that it is an object of perception and, therefore,

there is no necessity of some other means of cognition such

as non-apprehension. But why should we admit abhava

(negation) as an independent category at all ? It appears

that the chief factor which has led them to think of

existence of negative facts is our common language. We use

affirmative as well as negative statements. Just as we say

that there is a pot in this room similarly we also say that

there is no pot in the room. Now, so far as the affirmative

statement is concerned, there is a positive fact corresponding

to it. In the same way it would seem proper to think of

negative fact corresponding to negative statement. But

obviously negative facts are self-contradictory. Still

some philosophers guided by the above linguistic fact

visualise negation as a form of existence by which negative

judgment can be verified. In Indian philosophy the Nyaya

school, the Bhatta school of Purva Mimamsa and the Advaitet,

i »

Vedanta accept Negation (Abhava) as an independent category.

The Prabhakara School of Purva Mlmamsa, the Samkhya School

and the Buddhists are opposed to the above view.

When there is something present in the room

we can perceive it because there is. a contact between my

sense organs and the object, but when the thing is absent,

how can we perceive its absence as perception in the absence

of sense-object contact is impossible. Then what is the

means of the cognition of non-existence ? The philosophers

are divided over the above question. For our convenience

we may group them in the following four groups.

(1) The Bhattas

r*
and the Advaitins maintain that
abhava is an entity and is cognised not by
perception but by non-apprehension.

(2) The Prabhakaras and the Samkhyas are of the

view that abhava is not a distinct category at
all and it can be ascertained through perception.

(3) Nyaya holds that abhava is a reality but it

can be apprehended through perception.

(4) The Buddhists do not accept abhava as a

category and for them it is known through
inference.
Kumarila's View:

Kumarila accepts Abhava (Non-existence) as an

independent category. There are four kinds of negation.

(1) Prior Negation (Pragbhava)

(2) Posterior Negation (Pradhvams abhava)

(3) Mutual Negation (Anyony abhava)

(4) Absolute Negation (Atyantabhava)

The negation of a pot before its production is known as

prior negation, the negation of a pot after its destruction

is known as posterior negation, the facts that a cow is not

a horse
I
and a horse is not a cow are the cases of mutual

negation. The non-existence of a sky-flower or barren

woman's son is a case of absolute negation. The negative

judgement that we commonly use plead for the reality of

negation. If there were not negative facts corresponding

to valid negative judgments, then they would not have been

true. If a judgment is false then its contradictory is

true. Now if negative judgment such as 'there is no milk

in the curd' and 'the soul has no form' would be false

without negative facts corresponding to than, then their

contradictories such as 'there is milk in the curd* and
2
'the soul has form' respectively would be true .

Kumarila's contention is that to avoid such

an absurdity we are bound to recognise the existence of

negative facts. The negative judgments like positive

judgments are primary both logically and psychologically.

They cannot be derived from other judgments. A thing,

therefore, has double aspects positive as well as negative. 3

But what is the means of cognising negation ?

Kumarila has accepted an independent means called Anupalabdhi

(non-apprehension). Perception, inference etc. are means

of cognising the positive aspects. In perception there is

a contact between the sense organs and the object. There

is a modal change in the soul. But when the object is

non-existent, how can there be sense-object contact ? In

the absence of contact between the sense organs and objects

the question of perception does not arise at all. Prof.G.P.
i

Bhatta in his Epistemology of the Bhatta School of Furva

Mimamsa presents Kumarila's view as follows "Perception,

inference etc. are the means of knowing the positive aspect

of things. In perception, the object is some positive

entity. The sense organs and Manas act in some positive way

and there is a corresponding modal change in the soul. But

when the object concerned is negative e.g. the absence of

the jar on the ground, there is no sense-activity and no

corresponding modification of the soul. Whatever sense-

activity or modification of the soul there may be, it

pertains not to the absent object but to the object that is
present instead of the former. Absence of knowledge is thus

the means of the knowledge of absence. In knowledge there

is a subjective activity corresponding to some objective fact.

When the objective fact is positive the corresponding

subjective activity is positive and it takes the form of a

positive pramana e.g. perception, inference etc. When the

objective fact is negative, the corresponding subjective

activity in a similar way should be negative. The means

of knowing negative facts cannot be perception or inference,

which are positive means. In perception there is a contact

of a sense-organ with an appropriate object. Contact is

possible between two existing things. The eye of the

perceiver and the jar on the ground both are existing things

and from the eye-jar contact the perception of the jar arises.

But when the jar does not exist on the ground, how can there

be sense-object contact ? Hence the knowledge of absence

of the jar cannot be perceptible. There is no doubt that

we make the judgment ‘there is no jar on the ground1 validly

with our eyes open and fixed on the spot where the jar would

be expected. But here the^e functioning pertains to the

ground which is positive entity. There can be no pure

negation. Negation is always of some positive entity in

somes positive locus. So far as the positive locus of the

jar is concerned, the cognition is perceptual and so far as

the counter correlate of negation, viz.the jar is concerned

the knowledge is memory, but the negation itself is known

neither through perception ncf€ through memory but purely
through the manas”.4 The words 'purely through the tanas'

may lead us to think that negation is intellectual or mental.

Dr.P.T.Raju supports such a view. To quote him,"The Mimamsakas,
 123

for example, Kumarila holds that it (negation) is not

perceived by our senses but by our mind, though it is real.

It is an object of Manas Pratyaksa (mental perception) not

of Indriya vratyaksa (sense-perception). But the above

remark is highly misleading since Kumarila has accepted

negation as an objective fact which belongs to the external

world. It is never mental.

The fact that in the apprehension of negation

there is the absence of sense-activity is proved by the

following example. Suppose a person goes out in the morning.

In the evening somebody would ask him if Caitra was in the

house in the morning. He replies that Caitra was not in the

house in the morning. ' Here there is no sense functioning.

It is, therefore, not a case of perception. Somebody may

think that it is a case of memory. But it is not so since

in the morning the person was not conscious whether Caitra

was in the house. Had he been conscious of it by perceiving

Caitra1s absence in the morning it would have been a case •

of remembering something.. We remember something of which

we have an earlier perception. But in this particular case

the person was not conscious of Caitra1s absence in the .

morning till he was asked about it in the evening.

So Kumarila has proved that since sense­

functioning, sense-object contact etc. are indispensable for

perception and since they are absent in the cognition of

negation, the cognition of negation is not at all a case

of perception. He has also stated that since it arises

immediately without being preceded by the cognition of a

middle term and the memory of Vyapti (Invariable relation),

it is not a case of inference. He has concluded, therefore,

that it is a case of non-apprehension.

Is non-apprehension the same thing as perception

It might be argued that non-apprehension is a kind of

perception since the absence of a pot on the gound is seen

not by blind persons nor by a person with eyes closed. But

the argument cannot prove that negation can be perceived.

We can perceive only the ground but not the absence of a pot.

Negation is known not merely by non-apprehension but by

non-apprehension of a thing which is fit to be cognised.

It is fit to be cognised when all the conditions both

subjective and objective such as light and eye are present

but the thing is absent. The above example cannot prove

that non-apprehension is a kind of perception because the

conditions which are essential are absent. When the person

is blind or the eyes are closed at that time subjective

conditions which are as essential as objective conditions

are absent. Hence the above is a case of non-apprehension

which should not be confused with perception.

Jayanta, the Nyaya logician, has challenged

Kumarila's view that we have perception of the ground

whereas we have non-apprehension of the pot which is absent

there. To Jayanta the argument appears to be inconsistent.

He thinks that in a unitary cognition the different elements

of its content should be cognised by the same pramana. How

can the cognition involve two distinct pramanas, one

perception and the other non-apprehension ? But the

supporters of Kumarila would reply that the above contention

is not sound. In our knowledge such as "This is the same

Devadutta, whom I had seen yesterday"/ 'this1 is a case of

perception whereas 'Devadutta' whom I had seen yesterday is

a case of memory. So this is a glaring example as to how

a unitary cognition involves two pramanas (means of knowledge)

So the opponent's view is not reasonable. We have perception

of the locus but non-apprehension of the object which is

absent there.

In brief, Kumarila has.accepted negation as a

category which is as primary as a positive fact. It can

be cognised only through non-apprehension, which is a

distinct pramana. It can never he reduced either to

perception or to syllogistic reasoning.

The Buddhist (View;

The question, whether negation is an object

of perception or of inference, is discussed by Buddhists

with 'extraordinary thoroughness'. In Buddhist metaphysics

reality is identified with 'unique particular'. It is

productive in nature. Since negation is not capable of

producing in us any sensation directly like positive things
it is an ideality. When we say ’there is no pot on the

ground', the sensation is produced by the bare ground.

But the idea of the absent jar is called forth by memory.

WTe must distinguish between true ideality and false ideality.

'Sky flower1 is a false ideality which is not in touch with

the real. "Negation is an unreality of the latter kind.

It is an idea, it is imagination, but it is a trust worthy

idea, it is productive imagination, it is a source of

knowledge capable of guiding our purposive action."

The Buddhists maintain that reality is never

Split into existence and non-existence, but consists of

existence only and that negation is not a direct way of

cognizing reality but it is only a round about way and on

that account included in inference. ,The assertion 'there

is no jar' is preceded by an inferential process of which

it is the conclusion. Non-apprehension is the reason in

this process. The inference can be stated in the following

manners 'The existence of a perceptible thing is invariably

accompanied by its perception, the jar which is a perceptible

'* 7
thing is not perceived, therefore, it does not exist.

But here a question is raised. When we perceive

the bare gound, immediately the negative judgment arises.

So should we not accept it as a perceptual judgment ? In

fact the Buddhists have also declared it to be perceptual.

Then does it not appear inconsistent to describe it as both

perceptual and inferential at the same time ? Dharmattara,

the Buddhist Logician, tries to resolve the conflict. To

quote hiin, "But has it not been stated above that the judgment

"there is no jar" is produced by (sense-perception, by the

perception of) the bare place ? (And now we include the

judgment into the practical consequences deduced by inference

from the perception)(30.2). (Yes, we do not deny that).

Since the bare place is cognised by sense-perception, and

since (the negative judgment 'there is here no jar' is a

judgment produced by the direct function of perception, (that

function which makes the object present to our senses),

therefore, (it is quite true) that the negative judgment

immediately following on the perception of the bare place

is a perceptual judgment (30.4). Indeed, the negative

judgment, according to what has been said above, is directly
produced by sense-perception, because (qualified) perception

has just the capacity of producing judgment as to the

existence (before us) of a bare place (30.5). However, (the

proper function of negation consists in the next following

step)* Objects might net be'jperceived, but this only gives

rise to doubt, (the feeling arises as to which of them might,

be present). So long as this doubt has not been removed,

negation has no practical importance, (it cannot guide our

purposive action). (Imagination then steps in and) it is

thus that negation (as a negative deduction)^ gives practical ■

significance to the idea of a non-Ens. Since an object which

I imagine as present on a given place is not really perceived,
just therefore do I judge that 'it is not there'. Consequently
this negation of an imagined- presence (is an inference which)

gives life to the ready concept of a non-Ens, it does not

newly create this concept itself. Thus it is that (the

author maintains that) the negative judgment receives its

practical significance (through an inference) from challenged

imagination, although it is really produced by sense-perception

and only applied in life (through a deductive process of an ■

inference) whose logical reason consists in the fact of a

negative experience. A negative inference, therefore,

8
guides our steps when we apply in life the idea of a non-Ens"

From Dharmottara1s analysis it appears that an inferential

process strengthens our belief, removes our doubt, gives it

its practical significance and guides our activity. So on

the basis of pragmatic consideration negation is accepted

as an object of inference.

The Myaya View:

Like the Bhattas the Nyaya philosophers accept

abhava as^an independent category; but unlike the former

they do not admit of non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi) as an
independent means of knowledge. They argue that negation is

perceptible. The cognition of ground as well as the absence

of the pot on it is a unitary cognition just like the

cognition "there is no milk in the pot1.;, Negation is not an

object of inference. While inferring, fire from the smoke

on a hill, smoke is perceived not fire, and I have the memory
of Vyapti (invariable relation) between the two. But when

1' say that there is no pot on the ground the cognition of

the'ground as well as the absence of the pot both are

immediately cognised. So it is not a case of inference.

It might be argued that things which have

colour, shape etc. can be perceived and again for perception

sense-object contact is necessary. As these two conditions

cannot be satisfied in the case of negation, it cannot be

perceived. Jayanta repudiates this view in the following

way. A thing is perceived not because it has colour and

shape but because of the activity of the visual sense.

Atom is not perceptible in spite of having shape and colour.

Contact is not also essential because in spite of our sense-

object contact we cannot perceive ether. The opponents

would argue that if sense-object contact is not essential

in the case of perception, then we could see things outside

the globe. To this Jayanta replies that the principle of

sense-object contact is applicable only to positive objects.

As the non-existence is avastu (negative), the eye can

1 9
produce its cognition without having a contact with it or

there is sense-object contact in the case of negation also

which is of special kind known as Visesanata (the relation

of the qualification and the qualified) .

The Nyaya philosophers regard non-existence

an attribute of the locus. The ground is qualified by the

non-existence of the pot. 'The qualities of an object are

 130

known by perception and as non-existence is a quality of

the ground it 'is known by perception. For every perception

there must be contact (sannikarsa). In the case of the

perception of non-existence a particular contact technically

called (visesanata), the relation of the qualification and

qualified, is admitted. It needs little elaboration.

The Nyaya philosophers accept relations like

'Indriya Sarfivandha Visesanata1 (Negation as an adjective)

and 'Indriya Samvandha Visesyata' (Negation as a noun) which,

in short, may be called 'Substantive-adjective' relation

(Visesya Visesanabhava- Samvandha). When we have such

cognition as 'the ground is qualified by the absence of the

pot' (ghatabhavav.at Bhutalam), the absence of the pot is an

adjective to the ground and when we have such cognition as

'the pot is absent on the ground (Bhutale ghatanasti),

'the absence of the pot' is a noun. Therefore, in the

cognition 'the ground is qualified by the absence of the

pot' the eye has a particular relation with the negation

called 'Indriya Samvandha Visesanata' and in the cognition

I
'^he pot is absent on the ground1 the relation of the eye

with the negation is called 'Indriya SamvandhavisesyatS'.

Through the above relation called 'Visesyavis'esanabhava

Samvandha' (Substantive adjective relation) the eye can

cognise negation.

To the above view the opponents•particularly

the Mimamsa philosophers, who accept non-apprehension as .an

 131

independent means, would object on the ground that 'Vi^esya

Visesana bhava Samvandha' (Sabstantive adjective relation)

between the sense and the negation cannot be a relation

10
because relation must fulfil the following three conditions.

First, a relation must be distinct from the relata. When

there is a relation of 'conjunction' between two things

such as a pot and a cloth the relation itself is different

from objects. The pot and the cloth are substances whereas
'conjunction' is a quality. But the relation of 1 Vis^esyavi-
i
sesana Bhava is not distinct from the relata.

Another characteristic of relation is that it

must remain in both the objects related by it. But here

this condition also is not satisfied. In the case of 1Visesya

Visesanabhava' (Substantive adjective relation) Visesyabhava

(Substantivity)'remains in the substance and adjectivity

remains in the adjective. So they are two relations not one.

So the third condition that the relation must be One is also

not satisfied. Therefore, there is no relation like

Visesya- visesanbhava Samvandha (Substantive adjective

relation).. Conjunction and inherence are the only relations.

In the absence of relations between eye and negation,

.perception would not be possible. Therefore, non-apprehension

as an independent means is to be accepted.

The Nyaya philosophers in order to refute the

above contention holds that when our sense organs apprehend

positive things, such relations as conjunction, inherence etc.

which can fulfil the prescribed conditions are necessary.

But in the cognition of 'negation' the 'Substantive-adjective'

relation holds between the eye and the absence of the thing.

There is no alternative besides it. Again, if the MImamsi

philosophers hold that for the cognition of 'negation' there

is an independent pramana, then the Nyaya philosophers would

ask as to how non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is related with

negation ' (abhava). Since there cannot be any contact

according to them, with negation, so non-apprehension also

cannot be related to it. Therefore, abhava (negation)

cannot be cognised. So both sides have the same problem. 11

Therefore, there is no necessity in accepting non­

apprehension as an independent means. Abhava (negation)

car. be cognised through such relation as Visesya-

visesanabhava (Substantive adjective relation).

Prabhakara's Views

Prabhakara does not accept abhava as an

s
independent category. For him there is no such entity as

non-existence separate from existence. Non-existence is

not over and above existence. There -is no negative being.

Being is always positive. There 'is no negation in the

outside world. Is the judgment 'there is no pot on the ground'

false since there is nothing negative corresponding to it ?

Prabhakara maintains that negative judgment is only a

subjective mode of apprehending thing. A negative judgment
is valid not because a negative fact corresponds to it, but
because it refers indirectly to a positive fact.12 In fact,

there is nothing in the objective world corresponding to the

word ’No1. When I say "there is pot on the ground", actually

there is a positive being corresponding to my judgment but

when I say "there is no pot" it only refers to the subjective

fact that we do not perceive the pot. Non-apprehension of

a pot means the apprehension of the bare ground with the

idea that had there been any pot, then it would have been

perceived. We can form the following syllogism out of

Prabhakara's argument.

If there were a pot on the ground,we would

have perceived it. We do not perceive the pot on the

ground. Therefore, there is no pot on the ground.

It might be argued that the existence of the

pot is not sufficient for our perception of it. We may

not perceive it for other reason. But when normal conditions

are present in which a pot would have been perceived had it

been theire, then the legitimate answer would be that the pot

does not exist. The matter has been further elaborated.

A positive thing is perceived in two manners/either by

itself-only or alongwith another thing. We perceive the

ground sometimes with a pot and sometimes without it. Again,

the perception of a positive thing by itself is of two

kinds. The other entity may be perceptible or imperceptible.

When two things are equally perceptible but we perceive only

 cro
1

one, then arises a negative judgment that the other thing

is absent. The ground as well as the pot af^e equally

perceptible. But when we perceive the ground alone but not

the pot, then there arises a negative judgment that there

is no pot on the ground. So the negative judgment is only

a subjective mode of apprehending thing. There is nothing

negative in the external world corresponding to it.

Controverting Kumarila's admission of negation

as an independent category Prabhakara draws our attention

to the following example. Suppose there was jar on the

ground previously and now it is not there. If we.do not

accept negation,how can we explain the difference? But to

explain the difference there is no need of admitting negation

as a category. Y/ben the jar is absent either it is removed or

it is destroyed. If it is removed, it.is somewhere else and

if it is destroyed, then it is reduced totwo halves or

pieces. So they are positive but not negative. Therefore,

the cognition of the negation such as 'there is no pot on the

ground' is nothing but cognition of the bare ground alone in

terms of the other thing pot which is elsewhere and the

cognition does not need another pramana.

The above view of Prabhakara has been challenged

by Parthasarathi, the follower of Kumarila, in his

S as t r ad ip ik a". We give below a brief account of it. If

Prabhakara did not accept negation as a separate category

and non-apprehension as a distinct Pramdna (means of knowledge),
 135

then how could the statement 'there is no pot on the ground*

be explained ? What is the basis of this experience ? If

it is said that the ground is the basis, then we would have

such an experience as 'there is no pot on the ground' even

in spite of the presence of a pot since the same ground

which is considered to be the basis of negative experience

, ‘ . 13
is present.

But the above argument is not sound. When an

object is present on the ground and when it is absent, there

is certainly a difference between the former state and the

latter state of the ground so far as its relation with an

object is concerned. In the former case we have a bare

ground but in the latter case it is not. But again the

critics may argue and prabhakara has in fact argued that if

bare ground is the cause of our negative experience, then

wh^wf" an object such as a cloth is present on the ground^ then

we cannot have the negative experience of the absence of the

pot. It seems the critics such as Parthasarathi interprets

Prabhakara's view literally and ignores totally the spirit

of his argument. Again, they have completely overlooked

the subjective factor involved in our negative experience

on which Prabhakara had laid emphasis. Now, for a critical

analysis of the above views let us turn to Kumarila and the

Nyaya philosophers who have accepted non-existence (abhava)

as an independent category. But has 'negation' or

'non-existence' a being of its own ? Suppose in this room

there is a pot. It can produce sensation in the observer

by itself or independently. But has the absence of something,

say, the absence of a pot, any being in the external world

just as the pot itself has ? The pot by Itself can cause

sensation in the observer. It is determinate or we may say ,

that it has specificity. But the absence of a pot has no

'specificity'. It has no being at all in the external

world. A negative judgment is rather a subjective way of

apprehending things.- There is not only absence of a pot

in this room but the absence of so many things and the

absence of a particular thing I feel or notice only when

I think of the object.

Unless I think of the object or I am interested

in that object or somebody asks me about it, I do not realise

its absence. But a positive thing has an independent being

of its own, can produce sensation in me directly by itself

and its being is not dependent on my thought. The fact may

be explained in the following way when I see a bare ground

I do not have the knowledge of the absence of any particular

thing, a pot or a cloth. I see the ground only. If somebody

asks— 'Do you see a pot ?' I say 'No', I do not see a pot
there'. 'A piece of cloth ?' .'No', ''Any other thing". 'No4",

nothing except the ground'. So ground alone can cause its

sensation in me by itself whereas the ideas of absent things,

come to my mind depending upon extraneous factors. Unless

I am interested in that thing or somebody asks me about that

 137

or somehow accidentally the idea of that object comes to my

mind, I do not experience the absence of that thing. My

cognition of an existing object may not necessarily involve

the idea of the absence of some other thing. A cow is not

a horse. When I observe a cow I may think of a horse for

comparative judgment but my cognition of a cow is not

dependent on the idea of the absence of horse. Contrasts

and comparisons sophisticate my perception but are not its

necessary condition. A cow which is a positive being can

alone cause in me an experience. Suppose a man has not

seen any animal in his life-time. When he sees a cow for

the first time he can very well have a perceptive cognition

of the cow without any knowledge of_ a horse. My feeling

of the absence of something is related with the very thing

I had perceived in the past and which is absent here at

this moment. What has led these philosophers to conceive

of negation as a separate category like positive things ?

As stated earlier, the chief factor responsible for such

an assumption is our common language. In our language we

use affirmative as well as negative statements. Just as

we say that 'there is a cow here' similarly we also say

that 'there is no cow here1. So far as the affirmative

statement is concerned there is a positive fact corresponding

to it. In the same manner we conceive of negative facts

corresponding to negative statements. In this context one

may sarcastically remark that when somebody says, 'I saw.

nothing' there must be something .'nothing' which he saw.

If it is not something positive then it must be something

negative. In any case it has a room in the external

world as a positive thing such as a cow, a horse or a

pot has.

So the Indian philosophers' dispute over the

perceptibility or non-perceptibility of the absence of

something appears to be a linguistic confusion. Having

accepted 'absence' as analogous to 'presence' they put

themselves into the danger of finding out a means for

apprehending it. But should the problem be over if instead

of saying 'I see the absence of a pot' say, 'I do not see

any pot here' ? There are some philosophers who do not

accept 'negation' or 'non-existence' as an independent

category, but debate over the above question as to how

the absence of something is cognised. Prabhakara does

not admit negation as an independent category. Similarly,

the'. Buddhist philosophers say that being is always positive.

World is not split into positive facts and negative facts.

But so; far as the cognition of the absence of something

is concerned there is difference between Prabhakara and the

Buddhist philosophers. The Buddhists maintain that the

cognition of the absence of something is possible by means

of inference. ' But the opponents would challenge such a

view. When some thing is directly apprehended the question

of inference does not arise. . In an inference such as

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'there is fire on the hill because I see smoke there' what

I perceive is smoke only but not fire. But when I say

'the pot is absent in the room' I apprehend its absence

immediately and directly. The Nyaya philosophers think

that 'the absence of a pot' is a quality of the ground

and it is perceived. Just as the 'presence of a pot'

qualifies the ground so also the absence of a pot. But

we have denied that there is such an independent fact as

'absence of a pot' analogous to the 'presence of a pot'.

Admitting that the admission of 'negation' as an independent

category is due to a linguistic confusion, the absence or

negation of something appears to be a fact which we realise

in our-day-to-day experience. We can legitimately ask a

person, "how do you know that the pot is not in the room ?"

It leads to the further question 'how can negation be

verified ?'

Tt does not appear impertinent to suggest

that the verification of negation is possible by means of.

perception. When 'negation' is denied as an independent

category there is no justification for assuming a

separate means such as non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) for

its cognition. Negation is rather a negative experience

which is more a psychological fact than an objective something.

When I say 'there is no pot in the room' the cognition is

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certainly perceptual. I perceive all.other things but not ■

the pot which I am searching for. This negative experience

may be included in the perceptual process. When I find all

other things but not the pot immediately the idea about its

absence comes to my mind. It is true that perception is

a positive experience. But along'with my experience of

something positive the thought of the absence of another

object which is expected to be present with it arises in

the mind. Again, it may so happen that when I am engrossed

in the thought of the absent object I remain unaware of the

object that is present before me.