EN BANC

[ GR NO. 174010, Feb 08, 2007 ]

LAISAN T. PERMAN v. COMELEC +

DECISION

544 Phil. 155

TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court with Prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Petitioner Laisan T. Perman and private respondent Lino Landong Iddong were duly
certified candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Tipo-Tipo Proper, Tipo-Tipo,
Basilan in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections. Private respondent was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers as
the winning candidate by a margin of sixty-seven (67) votes.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the  Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Lamitan, Tipo-Tipo-Tuburan, Lamitan, Basilan, docketed as Election Protest Case No.
11-02. After the revision of ballots, the trial court invalidated eighty-three (83) ballots in
favor of private respondent for being marked and deducted the same from his total
votes.

Consequently, on 9 July 2004, the MCTC rendered a decision, [1] the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the Protestant, LAISAN T.
PERMAN as having won over Protestee, LINO LANDONG IDDONG, with a majority of
13 votes during the Barangay Election[s] in Barangay Tipo-Tipo Proper, Municipality of
Tipo-Tipo, Basilan Province held on July 15, 2002.

SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed an appeal with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). [2] On
23 February 2005, the COMELEC First Division validated the ballots that were
invalidated by the MCTC and consequently ruled in favor of private respondent who
came out as the winning candidate by a margin of sixty-seven (67) votes.[3]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 February 2005 resolution.  On 31
July 2006, the COMELEC En banc denied the motion for reconsideration.[4]   Hence,
this petition.

A perusal of the petition shows that there is actually only one issue to be resolved:
whether the COMELEC En banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of the contested ballots, sixty-five (65) ballots
for private respondent and two (2) ballots for petitioner.

The COMELEC En banc validated sixty-five (65) ballots in favor of private respondent

and added the same to his total votes. Petitioner contends that said ballots should be
invalidated for having been written by two persons.
As for the other two (2) ballots for petitioner, the COMELEC En banc invalidated them
for being marked and accordingly deducted petitioner's total votes by two (2). Petitioner
contends that the poll body should have credited the two (2) ballots to him consistent
with its rulings on similarly situated ballots of private respondent and with the rules of
appreciation of ballots which favor validity in case of doubt in order to uphold the will of
the voters.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The applicable rule on appreciation of ballots, embodied in Rule 23 under Sec. 211 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), provides:

23. Any ballot which clearly appears to have been filled by two distinct persons before it
was deposited in the ballot box during the voting is totally null and void.
The Court had occasion to explain this rule in Trajano v. Inciso.[5] The rule of
interpretation then in force was found in Sec. 149 (23) of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised
Election Code), the text of which is exactly as that found in Sec. 211 (23) of the Omnibus
Election Code quoted above. The Court in that case held:

The allowance or rejection of a ballot filled by more than one person depends on its
condition before it was cast in the ballot box: If at the time it was cast it was filled only
by one person, but thereafter it was tampered and entries were made thereon by other
persons, the ballot is valid. If, on the other hand, it already bore the fillings of two or
more persons when cast, said ballots are deemed marked and thus void. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The presumption juris tantum is that a ballot found to be with the handwriting of two or
more persons suffered this defect before it was cast.[6] It is only a presumption juris
tantum, rebuttable by evidence. x x x
The presumption that a ballot found to be in the handwriting of two or more persons
suffered this defect before it was cast was overcome in Trajano. Similarly, in the case at
bar, the COMELEC En banc, found that the presumption had indeed been overcome.
Following Columbres v. COMELEC,[7] the presumption was overcome by evidence that
the ballots were tampered with after they had been deposited in the ballot box.

The COMELEC En banc arrived at the following findings:

1. In all the ballots coming from the three different precincts, only one and the same
person made the insertions as can be gleaned from the singular handwriting that
characterizes these insertions;

2. This person made it a point to always use a color of pen different from the one
used by the original voter, as if he wanted to make sure that the insertion is
readily noticed. The person even took the effort of overwriting his own color of
pen with another upon noticing that the first pen he used matched the color of
the pen used by the original voter. Thus, if the color of pen used by the original
voter was black, the insertion was made with the use of a blue pen, and vice versa;
and

3. The insertions made were redundant. Even after the original voter already wrote
a clear and categorical vote for appellant, the one person making the insertions
still inserted the name of appellant, either by writing it on the lines for kagawad
or by adding it to the name already written on the line for punong barangay.
[8]
 [Emphasis supplied.]

In arriving at the above findings, the COMELEC En banc closely scrutinized the

contested ballots. It painstakingly described and examined each and every insertion or
mark therein. It then concluded that, in view of the findings above, the sixty-five (65)
ballots for private respondent were tampered with after they were deposited in the ballot
box. We agree with the conclusion reached by the COMELEC En banc.

Verily, it must have been a different person or persons who made the marks. At the time
the ballots in question were deposited in the ballot box, these were not marked,
containing, as they did, only the will of the voters concerned as expressed in the writings
originally found in the ballots.

As to the two (2) ballots for petitioner, experience has shown that it is difficult to lay
down any absolute rule as to what constitutes cause for rejecting a ballot as marked,
and, therefore, great care must be exercised in rejecting such ballots. [9]  In order for a
ballot to be considered marked, in the sense necessary to invalidate it, it must appear
that the voter designedly placed some superfluous sign or mark on the ballot which
might serve to identify it thereafter. No ballot should be discarded as a marked ballot
unless its character as such is unmistakable.[10] The distinguishing mark which the law
forbids to be placed on the ballots is that which the elector may have placed with the
intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating
the secrecy of suffrage which the law establishes.[11] Thus, marked ballots are ballots
containing distinguishing marks, the purpose of which is to identify them.

In the case at bar, Exhibits 24 and 24-A contained the encircled numbers "16" and "15,"
respectively, in the voter's own handwriting after the name of petitioner. There can be
no reason for placing the said numbers immediately after the name of the candidate,
which mark is too big for a period, except to mark the ballot. [12] It was also for this same
reason that the COMELEC En banc similarly invalidated eleven (11) ballots for private
respondent.[13]

Finally, this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Under this
rule, findings of fact of the COMELEC supported by substantial evidence shall be final
and non-reviewable.[14]   We see no reason to depart from the principle.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Status Quo Ante Order is DENIED for being moot. The questioned Resolutions dated 23
February 2005 and 31 July 2006, of the COMELEC First Division and En banc,
respectively, in EAC No. 58-2004, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Corona, and Nachura, JJ., on leave.
EN BANC

[ GR No. 180051, Dec 24, 2008 ]

NARDO M. VELASCO v. COMELEC +

DECISION

595 Phil. 1172

BRION, J.:
This petition for certiorari - filed by Nardo M. Velasco (Velasco) under Rule 64, in
relation with Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court - seeks to set aside and annul [1] the
Resolution dated July 6, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and [2] the Resolution dated October 15, 2007 of the COMELEC e n banc, in
SPA Case No. 07-148 entitled Mozart P. Panlaqui v. Nardo M. Velasco. The assailed
resolutions denied due course to the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) Velasco had filed for
the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952 to Arsenio
Velasco and Lucia Mangalindan. He married Evelyn D. Castillo on June 29, 1975 at the
Roman Catholic Church of Sasmuan. In 1983, he moved to and worked in the United
States of America where he subsequently became a citizen.

Sometime in 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. His
application was approved on July 31, 2006. On the same day, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006 and has not left
since, except for a 3-day Hongkong trip from September 26, 2006 to September 29,
2009.

Soon thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of
Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his application.
Thereupon, Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters with
the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan (MTC). The MTC, finding no evidence of
Velasco's change of domicile, granted Velasco's petition on February 9, 2007; it
reversed the ERB's decision and ordered Velasco's inclusion in the List of Voters of
Sasmuan.

On March 1, 2007, Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (RTC)
reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC reasoned out that Velasco
lost his domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga] when he became a US citizen; under
Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in the Philippines as a visitor or as a
resident alien. Velasco, according to the RTC, only regained or reacquired his Philippine
residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. The RTC based
this conclusion on our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals[1] that naturalization in a
foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Thus, the
RTC found that Velasco failed to comply with the residency requirement under the
Constitution, making him ineligible to vote in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98259.

It was against this factual backdrop that Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his
COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan. Velasco's COC contains, among
others, the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of
Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning,
and relinquishing his American citizenship.

The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui), who also filed his COC
for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To
Cancel Velasco's COC, claiming that: (1) contrary to Velasco's claim, he is not a
registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A, as his name is not included in the list of voters;
(2) the RTC has rendered a decision denying Velasco's petition for inclusion as voter; (3)
Velasco does not possess the constitutional requirement of legal residency (i.e., one year
residency in the Philippines immediately preceding the election as provided under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution) to register as voter; he arrived in the Philippines
only last September 14, 2006; and (4) Velasco is not eligible to run for office since he is
not a qualified voter. Panlaqui asked for the annulment, revocation and cancellation of,
or denial of due course to, Velasco's COC that allegedly contained obvious and gross
material misrepresentation. The case was docketed as SPA Case No. 07-148.

In his Answer, Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaqui's petition and claimed in
defense that: (1) he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan, as he is a
domiciliary and permanent resident of the Philippines and Sasmuan since birth; that,
when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he is considered not to have lost
his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to enjoy full civic and political rights
under the Constitution and the statutes; (2) the appeal or review of the RTC decision is
pending resolution with the Court of Appeals; (3) he did not act with malice, bad faith
and gross misrepresentation when he stated that he is a registered voter of Precinct No.
103-A of Sasmuan in his COC, as the MTC decision has not been reversed with finality;
(4) he has renounced his American citizenship on March 29, 2007 or prior to the filing
of his COC, making him eligible to seek elective public office pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9255; and (5) he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan and of a
candidate for Municipal Mayor, Sasmuan being his domicile of origin and permanent
residence. He claimed that he is qualified to vote and seek public office until a final
judgment is rendered saying otherwise; hence, he did not commit any misrepresentation
and Panlaqui's petition should be dismissed.

Velasco garnered 7,822 votes [the most number] for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan
in the May 14, 2007 election. As the COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaqui's petition
prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor of Sasmuan on May 16, 2007. He
took his oath of office and assumed the powers and functions of the office on June 30,
2007.

On July 6, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution - the first of
the interrelated resolutions assailed in the present petition - canceling Velasco's COC
and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void. Citing Section 138
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)[2] which declared the decision of the RTC in the
voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and executory, the Second Division of the
COMELEC found Velasco guilty of material misrepresentation when he claimed in his
COC filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. This
defect, according to the Second Division, effectively voided Velasco's COC.

Velasco moved to reconsider the Second Division's Resolution, but the COMELEC en
banc in a Resolution dated October 15, 2007 (also assailed in this petition) denied the
motion. The COMELEC en banc essentially affirmed the Second Division's ruling.
Additionally, the COMELEC pointed out that in the absence of a writ or order issued by
the CA (where the appeal from the RTC decision in the inclusion/exclusion case was
then pending) enjoining the enforcement of the RTC decision, it had to apply Section
138 of the OEC. Velasco responded to this development by filing the present petition
with this Court.

THE PETITION, COMMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

The petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:

1. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it

decided the issue on petitioner's right to vote despite its apparent lack
of jurisdiction on this issue and the pendency of such prejudicial issue
before the CA.

2. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that the March 1, 2008 decision of the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga reversing the earlier decision of the MTC of Sasmuan,
Pampanga is already final and executory.

3. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it

annulled the proclamation of the petitioner without notice and
hearing.

4. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it

ruled that petitioner committed material misrepresentation in his
COC by merely relying on private respondent's baseless allegations in
the petition to deny due course to petitioner's COC without taking into
consideration that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualification of a voter.

In his comment, Panlaqui asserts that: (1) Velasco committed forum shopping, as
another case involving the same issues is on appeal and pending resolution with the CA;
and (2) in light of this appeal, not all the requisites for a petition for certiorari are
present; in the alternative and assuming certiorari to be proper, the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, as the RTC decision is final, executory, and non-
appealable.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the COMELEC.
The OSG argues that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The
COMELEC has jurisdiction - under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended,
or the OEC - over petitions to deny due course and/or cancel a COC
(COC-denial/cancellation). There was likewise no denial of due process; Velasco filed an
Answer to Panlaqui's petition and was fully heard before the COMELEC denied due
course to his COC. The OSG also argues that Velasco's immigration to the United States
and subsequent acquisition of US citizenship constituted an abandonment of his
Philippine domicile and residence. Finally, the OSG claims that Velasco committed
misrepresentation in declaring his residence at Sasmuan in his COC - a ground for the
cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the OEC. The real issue, according to the OSG,
is not Velasco's right to vote, but the misrepresentation he committed when he filed his
COC.

On March 5, 2008, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution to implement the assailed
resolutions. The CA, on the other hand, rendered on March 13, 2008 its decision in CA-
GR SP No. 98259 granting Velasco's appeal, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC
decision. The appellate court ruled that, contrary to the RTC's finding, Velasco
effectively reacquired his residence when he decided to relocate in the Philippines for
good in 2003; from 2003-2006, Velasco stayed in the Philippines for a total of almost
two (2) years for the last three (3) years immediately preceding the May 14, 2007
election; from the totality of these acts, Velasco revealed his intention to reacquire his
rights as a Filipino citizen. Citing Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,[3] the CA
considered Velasco a qualified voter.

On Velasco's motion, we issued a status quo ante order enjoining the COMELEC from

implementing the assailed resolutions.

In an interesting twist, the CA issued on August 19, 2008 an Amended Decision - in

response to a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision - dismissing Velasco's
Rule 42 petition for lack of jurisdiction. It reversed its earlier ruling that it has
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, explicitly stating that the jurisprudence it cited to
support its appellate jurisdiction in voters' inclusion/exclusion proceeding is no longer
good law because of the amendments to the election law on which its cited
jurisprudence was based. It declared that "Section 138 of the OEC being explicit that the
decision on appeal by the RTC in inclusion and exclusion cases is immediately final
and executory appears to be a clear mandate for this Court (the CA) not to entertain
instant petition for lack of jurisdiction."

Based on these submissions, we are called upon to resolve the following issues: (1)
whether Velasco forum-shopped; and (2) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in canceling Velasco's COC.
  
 
EN BANC

[ GR No. 181809, Feb 17, 2010 ]

ROSE MARIE D. DOROMAL v. HERNAN G. BIRON +

DECISION

626 Phil. 823

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

We reiterate settled rulings on the appreciation of election returns in this case, to wit, (1)
before a certificate of votes may be used to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or
any other anomaly committed in the election returns, it must comply with Sections 16
and 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6646,[1] (2) the exclusion of election returns on the
ground of tampering must be approached with extreme caution and must be based on
clear and convincing evidence, and (3) in case of discrepancy in the other authentic
copies of an election return, the procedure in Section 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code[2] (OEC) should be followed. For failure to comply with these rules and principles,
we hold that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and accordingly order it to rectify
the unjustified disenfranchisement of voters in this case.

This Petition for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the COMELEC En Banc's February 1, 2008 Resolution.[3] The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed its Second Division's September 12, 2007 Resolution [4] in
SPC No. 07-147 which ordered the exclusion of 11 election returns in the canvassing of
votes for the position of vice mayor in the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Rose Marie D. Doromal (Doromal) and private respondent Hernan G. Biron
(Biron) were the vice mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo in
the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvassing of votes, Biron orally objected to the
inclusion of 25[5] election returns. Biron anchored his objections to the inclusion of the
21 returns on the alleged missing taras[6] in Copy 4 of the contested returns, which he
obtained as the standard bearer of LAKAS-CMD, the recognized dominant majority
party in said elections.[7] As regards the remaining four contested returns, Biron
opposed their inclusion allegedly because there was a discrepancy between the number
of votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes issued by
the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). In view thereof, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) deferred the canvassing of the said returns. Thereafter, Biron filed
his written objections and supporting evidence.

On May 18, 2007, the MBC denied[8] the petitions for exclusion. It found that there was
no tampering on the number of taras for Doromal in the copy of the election return for
the MBC. It also held that the copy of the election return of the MBC was complete with
no material defect and duly signed and thumbmarked by the BEIs. [9]

Aggrieved, Biron appealed to the COMELEC. The case was docketed as SPC No. 07-
147[10] and raffled to the Second Division. Pending the resolution of the appeal, the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate was ordered suspended.

Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division

On September 12, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division, voting 2-1, issued a Resolution
partially granting Biron's appeal. It ordered the exclusion of only 11 contested election
returns while at the same time ordered the inclusion of the remaining 14 election
returns in the canvassing of votes, viz:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The election returns in Precinct Nos. 17A/18A, 20A, 21A/21B, 30A/31A,
59A/60A, 122A/122B, 162A/163A, 169A, 173A/173B, 174A/174B, 192A, 202A, 204A and
207A, are hereby ordered INCLUDED in the canvass of returns for the vice-mayoralty
position in Dumangas, Iloilo. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dumangas, Iloilo is
hereby ordered to RECONVENE and PROCEED with the canvass of the said election
returns and PROCLAIM the candidate who garners the most number of votes.

The election returns in Precinct Nos. 107-A, 114-A, 6A/6B, 55-A, 67A/67B, 116A/116B,
130A, 42A/43A, 90A/90B, 7A/7B and 208A/208B are hereby ordered EXCLUDED in
the canvass of returns by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dumangas, Iloilo.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the 11 election returns (subject
returns) because the same were allegedly tampered or falsified. It held that eight of the
11 subject returns showed that the taras were either closed on the third or fourth vote,
instead of on the fifth vote, resulting in a discrepancy between the number of taras vis-
à-vis the written figures and words in the said returns. With regard to the remaining
three returns, the Second Division noted a glaring dissimilarity between the votes stated
in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes. Further, it lent credence to
the affidavits of Biron's poll watchers stating that numerous irregularities attended the
tallying of the votes at the precinct level. According to the Second Division, these
irregularities pointed to a scheme to increase the votes of Doromal, thus, necessitating
the exclusion of the subject returns.

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) registered a dissent. He

reasoned that the missing taras did not, by themselves, conclusively establish that the
subject returns were altered or tampered. Also, the affidavits of Biron's poll watchers
should not have been given weight for being self-serving. In his view, the proper
recourse was not to exclude the subject returns but to order the correction of manifest
errors so that the number of votes in figures and words would conform to the number
of taras in the subject returns.

Thus, on September 24, 2007, the MBC reconvened and proceeded to canvass the
abovementioned 14 returns. As a result, Biron emerged as the winning candidate with
12,497 votes while Doromal received 12,319 votes, or a winning margin of 178 votes. On
even date, Biron was proclaimed as the duly elected vice mayor of the Municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo.

Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

On February 1, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second

Division. It held that the Second Division properly appreciated the affidavits of Biron's
poll watchers given the serious allegations of irregularities that attended the tallying of
votes; that the use of the certificate of votes to establish tampering in the subject returns
was proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; and that an examination of the records of
this case supported the Second Division's findings that the subject returns were
tampered or falsified.

Commissioner Sarmiento maintained his previous dissent that the exclusion of the
subject returns was improper. He further noted that in case correction of manifest
errors was not viable, votes may be recounted pursuant to Section 236 of the OEC.

Issues

The issues raised by petitioner may be summarized as follows:

1. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to compare the
contested returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that there
was tampering or falsification of the said returns.

2. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it used the certificate of votes
to exclude the three contested election returns considering that it cannot go
beyond the face of the returns in establishing that there was tampering or
falsification and considering further that said certificates did not comply with
Section 17 of RA 6646.

3. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave credence to the self-
serving affidavits of private respondent's poll watchers.

4. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the exclusion of the
subject returns because, in case of falsification or tampering, the procedure under
Sections 235 and 236 of the OEC should have been followed in order not to
disenfranchise the voters.[12]

Petitioner's Arguments

Doromal advances several possible reasons for the missing taras in Copy 4 (i.e., copy of
the dominant majority party) of the subject returns, to wit, (1) the pressure exerted by
the poll clerk in accomplishing duplicate originals of the subject returns was not
sufficient as to leave its mark on the succeeding pages, (2) the carbon paper had poor
quality, (3) the election return papers were misaligned relative to the carbon paper, or
(4) the erasures were deliberately made by Biron on Copy 4 to pave the way for the
subject pre-proclamation controversy.

Further, while the instant petition was pending resolution before this Court, Doromal
requested the COMELEC to open the ballot boxes where the COMELEC's copy of the
subject returns (i.e., Copy 3) was safekept. On April 21, 2008, the COMELEC granted
the request and ordered the opening of the ballot boxes. It thereafter allowed Doromal
to photocopy Copy 3 of the subject returns found therein. On June 17, 2008, petitioner
filed a Motion for Leave to File Manifestation[13] with attached Manifestation[14] before
this Court summarizing her observations with respect to Copy 3 of the subject returns.
She noted that some of the missing taras in Copy 4 were not found in Copy 3. With
respect to the missing taras in Copy 3 just as in Copy 4, petitioner reiterated that the
cause thereof was the insufficient pressure exerted by the poll clerk in accomplishing the
election returns or the misalignment of the election return copies while the duplicate
originals were being accomplished using carbon paper. Thus, there was no basis for the
COMELEC to rule that the subject returns were falsified or tampered.

Petitioner also claims that the COMELEC never compared Copy 4 of the subject returns
with the other authentic copies of the said returns as required under Section 235 of the
OEC. Assuming that the COMELEC made such comparison with the other authentic
copies, this was not done in the presence of petitioner in violation of her due process
rights.
Anent the exclusion of the three subject returns, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC
erred in using the certificate of votes to establish falsification or tampering because the
COMELEC cannot go beyond the face of the returns in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Assuming arguendo that the COMELEC may use the certificate of votes, the
requirement set by Section 17 of RA 6646 was not complied with. Thus, the certificate of
votes is inadmissible in evidence.

Petitioner faults the COMELEC for relying on the affidavits of private respondent's poll
watchers in concluding that irregularities attended the preparation of the subject
returns. Evidently, these affidavits are self-serving and of no probative value.

Lastly, petitioner argues that assuming that the subject returns were falsified or
tampered, the proper recourse would be to follow the procedure outlined in Sections
235 and 236 of the OEC and not to summarily exclude said returns. Under the aforesaid
provisions, the COMELEC should have authorized the opening of the ballot boxes and
thereafter ordered the BEI to recount the votes of the candidates affected and prepare a
new return which shall then be used by the MBOC as the basis of the new canvass.

Private Respondent's Arguments

Private respondent contends that the points raised by petitioner are factual in nature,
thus, not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which is limited to questions
of jurisdiction. He claims that the findings of the COMELEC with respect to the
falsification and tampering of the subject returns must be accorded respect and even
finality by this Court. Biron also points out that in making such a finding, the COMELEC
Second Division compared the subject returns with the other authentic copies thereof
which was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc after the latter made its own
independent examination of the records of this case.

Biron also claims that there was no denial of due process. Since a pre-proclamation
controversy is summary in nature, Biron posits that the COMELEC properly appreciated
the evidence in this case consisting of the pleadings and documentary evidence of the
respective parties without the need of holding a formal or trial-type hearing.

He also avers that the COMELEC properly gave credence to the affidavits of his poll
watchers. He emphasizes that the subject returns appear to be tampered and falsified on
their face so that the affidavits were merely used to buttress or substantiate the cause of
these irregularities.

Finally, Biron claims that the procedure under Sections 235 and 236 of the OEC is not
applicable to this case because the same refers to the board of canvassers and not the
COMELEC. Also, these provisions do not allow the COMELEC to motu proprio order
the opening of the ballot boxes.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

An act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or executed

whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.[15] In the instant case, we find that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
exclusion of the subject returns. The ruling contravenes clear legal provisions as well as
long standing jurisprudence on the admissibility of the certificate of votes and the
appreciation of election returns. Lamentably, the refusal of the COMELEC to heed this
Court's repeated pronouncements has again led to the disenfranchisement of voters in
this case. The writ, therefore, lies to correct this grossly abusive exercise of discretion.

The certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove tampering, alteration or falsification

for failure to comply with Sections 16 and 17 of RA 6646.

In excluding three of the 11 subject returns, specifically, those coming from Precinct
Nos. 90A/90B, 7A/7B and 208A, the COMELEC relied on the alleged glaring
dissimilarity between the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the
certificates of votes. Hence, it concluded that the subject returns were falsified and
thereafter ordered their exclusion.

The certificate of votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate,
is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly accredited watcher pursuant to Section
16 of RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of said law provides -

Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in
evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the
election returns concerned, when duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary
evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of the board of
election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided, That failure to present any
certificate of votes shall not be a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn the
authenticity of the election returns.

While the above-quoted provision authorizes the COMELEC to make use of the
certificate of votes to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly
committed in the election returns, this presupposes that the certificate of votes was
accomplished in accordance with Section 16, viz:

Sec. 16. Certificates of Votes. - After the counting of the votes cast in the precinct and
announcement of the results of the election, and before leaving the polling place, the
board of election inspectors shall issue a certificate of votes upon request of the duly
accredited watchers. The certificate shall contain the number of votes obtained by
each candidate written in words and figures, the number of the precinct,
the name of the city or municipality and province, the total number of
voters who voted in the precinct and the date and time issued, and shall be
signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in Patoray v Commission on Elections,[16] we ruled that the certificate of votes is

inadmissible to prove tampering because it was signed only by the chairperson of the
BEI, whereas Section 16 required that the same be signed and thumbmarked by each
member of the BEI which issued the certificate. [17] Similarly, in Recabo, Jr. v.
Commission of Elections,[18] we rejected the certificate of votes because it did not state
(1) the number of votes obtained in words, (2) the number of the precinct, (3) the total
number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (4) the time of issuance. Further, the
certificate was merely certified true and correct by an acting election officer. [19]

In the instant case, the certificates of votes from Precinct Nos. 90A/90B[20] and
7A/7B[21] are defective, for they do not contain (1) the thumbmarks of the members of
the BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the time of the
issuance of the certificates. Likewise, the certificate of votes from Precinct 208A [22] is
defective because it does not contain (1) the names, signatures and thumbmarks of the
members of the BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3)
the time of the issuance of the certificate. Aida Pineda, private respondent's poll watcher
in said precinct, claims that she prepared a certificate of votes reflective of the true tally
in the election return, but the members of the BEI refused to affix their signatures
thereto. Even if we were to concede that the BEI members unjustifiedly refused to sign,
this would not validate the said certificate. Private respondent's remedy was to compel
the BEI to issue the certificate of votes under pain of prosecution for an election offense.
[23]
 At any rate, we cannot admit the defective certificate because, by Pineda's own
admission, she was the one who prepared the entries in the said certificate and not the
BEI as required by Section 16 of RA 6646, thus raising grave doubts as to its accuracy. [24]

Moreover, before the certificate of votes may be admitted as evidence of tampering,

Section 17 requires that the certificate be duly authenticated by testimonial or
documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of
the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate. This requirement originated
from Section 11[25] of House Bill (HB) No. 805 and was later consolidated, with minor
revisions, in Section 17[26] of HB 4046 - the precursor of RA 6646. During the period of
interpellations, Representative Zarraga proposed that the aforesaid authentication
requirement be dispensed with, viz:

MR. ZARRAGA. [I]n connection with Sections 16 and 17, on House Bill No. 4046, only
insofar as it concerns the admissibility in evidence of the certificate of votes.

MR. PALACOL. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ZARRAGA. Under Section 17, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence
only when duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the
Board of Canvassers by at least two members of the Board of Election Inspectors who
issued the certificate.

The presentation of the certificate of votes is, of course, during the

proceedings. And said proceedings may be one, two or three months,
probably even more, after the voting has taken place.

And under Section 16, will the certificate of votes be signed and thumbmarked by each
member of the Board of Inspectors?

MR. PALACOL. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ZARRAGA. This Representation feels that this should be sufficient to consider the
certificate of votes as duly authenticated, especially because at that time the members
have just prepared said certificate and therefore, there should be no need to
further require two members of the board subsequently because they may
no longer be available to authenticate the certificate of votes.

This Representation would like to inquire from the Gentlemen if the distinguished
sponsor will be willing to also amend Section 16 in such a way that the certificate of
votes, when already signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board, shall be
considered as duly authenticated and admissible in evidence in any subsequent
proceedings.

In other words, we should already dispense with requiring two other

members at a subsequent time, when they may no longer be present to
authenticate a document which, in the first place, has already been signed
and thumbmarked by each member of the board in accordance with the
proposed Section 16 of House Bill No. 4046.

MR. PALACOL. The Gentlemen [are] assured that we are going to consider all these
amendments during the period of amendments. And I always grant that the Gentlemen
from Bohol will submit valuable amendments in order to ensure a clean and honest
election.
MR. ZARRAGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. x x x[27] (Emphasis supplied)

It appears, however, that Representative Zarraga's proposal was no longer pursued

during the period of amendments as Section 17 of HB 4046 was passed on third reading
without any change in its wording as now found in Section 17 of RA 6646. The clear
legislative intent was, thus, to impose the additional condition under Section 17 before
the certificate of votes may be admitted in evidence to prove tampering.

The rationale of the law is perceptible. By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly
authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the same, the law seeks to
safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to the
watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it is
presented to the board of canvassers to prove tampering. The legislature may have
reasonably foreseen that the certificate may be easily altered while in the hands of the
watcher in order to orchestrate a sham pre-proclamation controversy. To
counterbalance this possibility, the law imposes the condition that the certificate, aside
from complying with Section 16, must be subsequently authenticated at the time of its
presentment to the board of canvassers in the event that it shall be used to prove
tampering. This way the COMELEC may be assured that the certificate of votes issued
by the BEI to the watcher of a protesting candidate contains the same entries as the one
thereafter presented before the MBC to prove tampering. The procedure is consistent
with the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return, which
appears regular on its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of
votes may be used to controvert the election return's authenticity and operate as an
exception to the general rule that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the inquiry is
limited to the four corners of the election return.

In the instant case, the records indicate that Biron failed to comply with the
requirements set by Section 17 with respect to the certificates of votes from Precinct
Nos. 208A, 90A/90B and 7A/7B which he submitted in evidence before the MBC. This
should have provided an added reason for the COMELEC to refuse the admission of said
certificates had the COMELEC carefully examined the certificates of votes appearing in
the records of this case.

In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in admitting in evidence the
aforementioned certificates of votes which did not comply with Sections 16 and 17 of RA
6646. To make matters worse, the COMELEC excluded the subject election returns on
the basis of these defective certificates thereby leading to the disenfranchisement of 467
voters as per the records of this case.[28] These votes can materially affect the outcome of
the elections considering that private respondent won by only 178 votes. Accordingly,
the COMELEC is ordered to include the election returns from Precincts 208A, 90A/90B
and 7A/7B in the canvass of the votes in this case.

The affidavits of private respondent's poll watchers are self-serving and grossly
inadequate
to establish the tampering of the subject returns. Similarly, the one, or, at most, two
missing
taras in each of the eight subject returns, without more, does not establish tampering.

In excluding eight of the 11 subject returns, specifically, those coming from Precinct Nos.
107A, 114A, 6A/6B, 55A, 67A/67B, 116A/116B, 130A and 42A/ 43A, the COMELEC ruled
that the said returns were tampered or falsified based on the missing taras in the other
authentic copies of the said returns, viz:

[A]fter a careful inspection of the contested election returns and other authentic copies
of the same, this Commission finds sufficient basis for the exclusion of some of these
returns for being tampered or falsified. The exclusion of the said returns is based on the
following findings:

a. In the election return for Precinct No. 107-A, an examination of the same shows
that the tallies or taras for the fourth box or square for Respondent-Appellee
Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

b. In the election return for Precinct No. 114-A, an examination of the same shows
that the tallies or taras for the twelfth box or square for Respondent-Appellee
Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

c. In the election return for Precinct No. 130-A, an examination of the same shows
that the tallies or taras for the fifth and seventh boxes or squares for Respondent-
Appellee Doromal were closed on the fourth vote;

d. In the election return for clustered Precinct Nos. 6-A and 6-B, an examination of
the same shows that the tallies or taras for the seventh box or square for
Respondent-Appellee Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

e. In the election return for Precinct No. 55-A, an examination of the same shows
that the tallies or taras for the sixth box or square for Respondent-Appellee
Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

f. In the election return for clustered Precinct Nos. 67-A and 67-B, an examination
of the same shows that the tallies or taras for the fifth box or square for
Respondent-Appellee Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

g. In the election return for clustered Precinct Nos. 116-A and 116-B, an
examination of the same shows that the tallies or taras for the eighteenth and
nineteenth boxes or squares for Respondent-Appellee Doromal were closed on
the fourth vote;

h. In the election return for clustered Precinct Nos. 42-A and 43-A, an examination
of the same shows that the tallies or taras for the twenty-first box or square for
Respondent-Appellee Doromal [were] closed on the fourth vote;

Considering that a substantial number of these election returns have the same type of
discrepancy, i.e., the taras were not closed on the fifth vote, the said election returns
cannot be relied upon to determine the votes in the said precincts. Evidently, the
methodical tampering of these returns permanently put in doubt their authenticity as
valid bases for the results of the elections. Thus, they should be excluded from the
canvass.[29]

The COMELEC also gave credence to the affidavits of private respondent's poll
watchers, who stated that numerous irregularities allegedly occurred during the tallying
of the votes at the precinct level.

We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns to be fatally
flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election returns
must be upheld.[30] A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or
false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with
extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof. [31] Corrolarily, any plausible
explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and
of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which
results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. [32] As will be
discussed shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELEC's findings that the
subject returns were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring "extreme caution"
before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in
concluding that the subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

At the outset, we find that the COMELEC placed undue reliance on the affidavits of
Biron's poll watchers to establish the irregularities and fraud allegedly committed
during the counting of votes. These affidavits are evidently self-serving. Thus, we have
ruled that reliance should not be placed on affidavits of this nature for purposes of
setting aside the validity of election returns.[33]

Furthermore, the contents of these affidavits are grossly inadequate to establish

tampering. Private respondent's poll watchers, namely, Michelle Duhina and Cirilo
Demadante,[34] Mary Grace Jiz-Deseo and Lito Duller,[35] Victoria Develos and Joy May
De La Gante,[36] Rizal Artoro Deza III and Reno Demonteverde,[37] Cecile Alcanzarin and
Horte May Dimzon,[38] Rosie Ventura,[39] and Babylyn Dedoroy and Sarah Dondoy
Ano[40] stated, in substance, that: (1) some of them were not so situated in the precinct to
see clearly the tallying of the votes in the election returns, (2) there was a 30 minute
brownout in some of the precincts (i.e., Precinct Nos. 107A and 114A), (3) some of them
were asked to affix their signatures and thumb marks ahead of the members of the BEI,
(4) some of them were not given Copy 4 of the subject returns after the counting, and (5)
they noticed the discrepancy between the taras and written figures only later on when
they were shown Copy 4 of the election returns.

While these statements suggest that the watchers failed to assert their rights or to
perform their duties under the OEC,[41] we fail to see how they established that the
election returns were tampered. On the contrary, these affidavits reveal that the
watchers failed to detect any anomaly during the actual tallying of the votes at the
precinct level because the missing taras were discovered only later on when Copy 4 was
shown to them.

Neither can we deduce from the missing taras the fraud that allegedly marred the
tallying of votes therein. We have examined Copy 4 and Copy 5[42] of the subject returns
as appearing in the records of this case, and we note that the said returns are regular on
their face save for one or, at most, two missing taras in each of the eight contested
election returns.[43] We find it significant that in some of these returns (i.e., those from
Precinct Nos. 114A,[44] 55A[45] and 42A/43A),[46] while one tara is indeed missing in Copy
4, no such missing tara exists in Copy 5, although the supposed missing tara in Copy 4
is located very near the border, if not on the border, of the box in Copy 5 of the election
returns. This suggests that in making the duplicate originals, the forms for Copies 2 to 7
of the election returns were not perfectly aligned with Copy 1 (i.e., the MBC's copy),
resulting in the misalignment of the taras in the carbon copies of the said returns. This
may explain why there appears to be a missing tara in Copy 4 of these returns. It should
also be noted that the number of votes in written figures and words is not disputed as
they appear to be uniform in Copies 4 and 5 of the subject returns. The discrepancy is,
thus, limited to the number of taras vis-à-vis the number of votes in written figures and
words. In view thereof and in the absence of clear and convincing proof, the evidence on
record fails to establish the tampering or falsification of the subject returns. At most,
there are minor discrepancies in Copies 4 and 5 of the subject returns consisting of one
or two missing taras.

In case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of an election return, the procedure
in
Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code should be followed.

In Patoray, we ordered the COMELEC to proceed in accordance with Section 236 of the
OEC after it was determined that there was a discrepancy between the taras vis-à-
vis the written figures and words in the election return.[47] With the above finding that
there are minor discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the subject returns,
specifically Copies 4 and 5, the proper procedure then is not to exclude the said returns
but to follow Section 236, viz:

SECTION 236. Discrepancies in election returns. -- In case it appears to the board of

canvassers that there exists discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the
election returns from a polling place or discrepancies in the votes of any candidate
in words and figures in the same return, and in either case the difference affects
the results of the election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of canvassers
or any candidate affected and after due notice to all candidates concerned, shall proceed
summarily to determine whether the integrity of the ballot box had been preserved, and
once satisfied thereof shall order the opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast
in the polling place solely for the purpose of determining the true result of the count of
votes of the candidates concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC should, thus, order the canvass of the election returns from Precinct
Nos. 107A, 114A, 6A/6B, 55A, 67A/67B, 116A/116B, 130A and 42A/ 43A. After
canvassing, it should determine whether the total number of missing taras will affect
the result of the elections. If it will not affect the result, the COMELEC should proclaim
as winner the vice mayoralty candidate with the highest number of votes. On the other
hand, if the total number of missing taras will affect the results of the election, the
COMELEC, after due notice to all candidates concerned, should proceed summarily to
determine whether the integrity of the ballot boxes (where the election returns with
missing tara/s were tallied) have been preserved. Once satisfied therewith, the
COMELEC should order the opening of the ballot boxes to recount the votes cast in the
polling place solely for the purpose of determining the true result of the count of votes of
the candidates concerned.[48] However, if the integrity of the ballots has been violated,
the COMELEC need not recount the ballots but should seal the ballot box and order its
safekeeping in accordance with Section 237 of the OEC, thus:

Sec. 237. When integrity of ballots is violated. -- If upon the opening of the ballot box as
ordered by the Commission under Sections 234, 235 and 236, hereof, it should appear
that there are evidence or signs of replacement, tampering or violation of the integrity of
the ballots, the Commission shall not recount the ballots but shall forthwith seal the
ballot box and order its safekeeping.

In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject
returns resulting in the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of
this case.[49] The proper procedure in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of
the election returns is clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening
this legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

We end with some observations. Had there been sufficient evidence of tampering in this
case, it would still be highly improper for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the
subject election returns. In such a case, the COMELEC should proceed in accordance
with Section 235[50] of the OEC which is similar to Section 236 in that the COMELEC is
authorized to open the ballot box as a measure of last resort. This has been our
consistent ruling as early as in the 1995 case of Patoray followed by Lee v. Commission
on Elections,[51] Balindong v. Commission on Elections,[52] Dagloc v. Commission on
Elections,[53] and Cambe v. Commission on Elections.[54] It is quite disquieting, therefore,
that despite these repeated pronouncements, the COMELEC persists in summarily
excluding the election returns without undertaking the requisite steps to determine the
true will of the electorate as provided in the pertinent provisions of the OEC. The
paramount consideration has always been to protect the sanctity of the ballot; not to
haphazardly disenfranchise voters, especially where, as here, the election is closely
contested. The COMELEC's constitutional duty is to give effect to the will of the
electorate; not to becloud their choice by defying the methods in the OEC designed to
ascertain as far as practicable the true will of the sovereign people. Verily, the strength
and stability of our democracy depends to a large extent on the faith and confidence of
our people in the integrity of the electoral process where they participate as a particle of
democracy. That is the polestar that should have guided the COMELEC's actions in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc's February 1,

2008 Resolution is NULLIFIED.

The COMELEC is ORDERED to raffle SPC No. 07-147 to one of its divisions which is
directed to resolve the same with deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision
by:

(1) Including the election returns from Precinct Nos. 90A/90B, 7A/7B and 208A in the
canvassing of votes for the position of vice mayor of the Municipality of Dumangas,
Iloilo;

(2) Proceeding in accordance with Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
outlined in this Decision, with respect to the canvassing of the election returns from
Precinct Nos. 107A, 114A, 6A/6B, 55A, 67A/67B, 116A/116B, 130A and 42A/43A for the
position of vice mayor of the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo;

(3) Proclaiming the winning candidate for the position of vice mayor of the Municipality
of Dumangas, Iloilo in the May 14, 2007 elections after the canvassing of the
aforementioned election returns.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and  Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 207851               July 8, 2014

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

A politician thinks of the next election –

a statesman of the next generation.

- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author

The Case

A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three
consecutive terms. But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following
questions. First.What are the consequences to the provincial board member’s eligibility
to run for the same elective position if the legislative district, which brought him orher to
office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out
of its 10 town constituencies are carved out and renamed as another district? Second.
Is the provincial board member’s election to the same position for the third and fourth
time, but now in representation ofthe renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit
rule?

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorariwith an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction1 filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court to assail the following resolutions of the public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC):

(a) Resolution2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5,

2013, in SPA No. 13-166 (DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson B. Julia (Julia),
seeking to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy3 (COC) as Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawiganof Camarines Sur (Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is
allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local officials as provided
for in Article X, Section 84 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local
Government Code (LGC); and

(b) En BancResolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, denying

Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration7 to the Resolution dated March 5, 2013.

Antecedents

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8 which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner:

[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/
july2014/207851.pdf]]

District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716

1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,

Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao

Fernando, Del Gallego,

Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,

Cabusao

2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,

Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San

Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor

Calabanga,9 Gainza,

Milaor

3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,

Goa, Lagonoy, Camaligan, Canaman,

Presentacion,
Magarao, Bombon,
Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon,
Calabanga
Tinambac, Siruma

4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,

Presentacion, Sangay,
San

Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,

Siruma

5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,

Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present
Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns,
Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the
Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and filed beforethe COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served
the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit
rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run
as a Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit
rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.12

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division

In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds stated below:

[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the elective
posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary requirements for
eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation cognizable under Section 78 of
the [OEC].

xxxx

The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the important
components of[Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution]:

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.

Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has servedthree consecutive terms in

an elective local office[;] he must also have been electedto the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. x x x

x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for
public office for three consecutive terms. The candidate must have been elected in the
samelocal government post. This connotes that the candidate must have been inthe
same elective position serving the same constituency who elected him to office for three
consecutive terms.

xxxx

The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to prevent the
monopoly of power centered only on a chosen few. The said disqualification was
primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective
local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office.
The framers also considered the necessityof the enhancement of the freedom of choice
of the electorate by broadening the selection of would-be elective public officers. By
rendering ineligible for public office those who have been elected and served for three
consecutive terms in the same public elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse new
blood in the political arena.

xxxx

x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed of
the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the towns
Gainza and [Milaor]. The territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the term 2013-
2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The electorate who
voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 isthe same electorate who shall vote for him
come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters who elected him into
office for three consecutive terms.

The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA
No. 10-078)13 cannot be applied inthe case at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from
Libmanan belonged to the First District of Camarines Sur. With RepublicAct 9716,
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally belonging
to the First District, were merged with Gainza and Milaor to form the Second District.
With the addition of the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it cannot be said that the
previous First District became the Second District only by name. The voters of Gainza
and Milaoradded to the electorate of the new Second District formed a different
electorate, different from the one which voted for Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and
2007 elections. In the case at bar, the municipalities comprising the new Third District
are the same municipalities that consisted of the previous Second [District], absent
Milaor and Gainza.

The Supreme Court, in Latasav. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor[.]

x x x x14 (Citations omitted)

The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en

bancdenied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed
out thatabsent the verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, the
COMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Naval’s motion, viz:

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant
case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same
government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and
discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the
question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already
served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of
the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that
the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal
mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court
took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the]
city was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same
group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and
(3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval] has
filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for which he
had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.

xxxx

x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the
same: First, the territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except for the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716; Second, the
inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is presently running as
member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected him for the past three (3)
consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd ] District are the same group of
voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the [Sanggunian] representing the 2nd
District.

x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval’s] post [into one] different
from [w]hat he [previously had]. As correctly ruled by the Commission (Second
Division), [Naval] ha[d] already been elected and ha[d] already served inthe same
government post for three consecutive terms, x x x[.]

x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)

Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not the
COMELEC gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:

I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE

TERMS IN THE SAME GOVERNMENT POST;16

II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY

LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS;17 and

III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8,

ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC
APPLIES TO NAVAL.18

The Arguments of the Contending Parties

In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of
new sets of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight
towns which used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative
District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004
and 2007 elections.

Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are
elected by districts. Thus, the right to choose representatives in the Sanggunianpertains
to each of the districts. Naval was elected as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by
the Second District. In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third District, which brought him to
office. Essentially then, Naval’s election in 2013 is merely his second term as
Sanggunianmember for the Third District.

Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification on
the ground of the three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, but it is also required that he or she
had been elected to the same position for the same number of times.21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC’s interpretations of the rulings in Latasa
v. COMELEC22 and Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court applied the
three-term prohibition only because notwithstanding the conversion of the Municipality
of Digos into a city, the mayor was to serve the same territorialjurisdiction and
constituents. Naval asserts that the same does not hold true in his case. Naval further
avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in the instant petition, the
COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot be invoked in a situation where the
legislative districts have been altered. An extraction or an addition both yields a change
inthe composition of the voters.

Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his
constituents, whose will and mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julia’s counsel
already withdrew his appearance, indicating no less than his client’s lack of interest in
still pursuing Naval’s ouster from office.24

In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the
instant petition. The OSG contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served
the same local elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violatedSection 78
of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility. Naval’s reliance
on Bandillo is also misplaced since in the said case, two towns were instead added to
form a new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new set of voters. The
OSG also alleges that Naval is not entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by this
Court. No clear and unmistakable right pertains to Naval and it is his eligibility to be
elected as Sanggunianmember for the Third District which is the issue at hand.

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the petition.

As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.

The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties cite
Latasa, Lonzanida v. COMELEC,26 Borja,Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,27 and Bandillo,
which all involve the application of the three-term limit rule, the factual and legal
circumstances in those cases are different and the doctrinal values therein do not
directly address the issues now at hand.

In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The
then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term
limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he
previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there was no
interruption of the incumbent mayor’s continuity of service.

In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive
elections. While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months
before the expiration of the mayor’s third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again
for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed
assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit
rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not beconsidered as having served a full third
term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to
break the elected official’s continuity of service.

In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In
the two immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty
post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his disqualification was
sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that whenhe
assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated
as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice
elected for and had served the same post consecutively. In Aldovino, preventive
suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the
said suspension did not interrupt the elective official’s term. Although hewas barred from
exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his continued
stay and entitlement tothe office remain unaffected.

In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of
the ten towns, which used to comprise Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the
new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule against
the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and
Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.

In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term
limit rule upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the
process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the nature of
public office in a democratic and republican state like ours.

The Role of Elections in our

Democratic and Republican State,

and the Restraints Imposed Upon

Those Who Hold Public Office

The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.28

Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state
and a public office, viz: A republic is a representative government, a government run by
and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves
directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection
by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the
people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government
is a responsiblegovernment whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable to the people’
they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost needless
to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people
themselves.29 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral

process in the following wise:

The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework
because it isthrough the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through
the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able
to choose their leaders in accordance with the fundamental principle of representative
democracy that the people should elect whom they please to govern them. Voting has
an important instrumental value in preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. It
has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation.31 (Citations
omitted and italics ours)

The importance of elections cannottherefore be over emphasized. Thus,

True, election is the expression ofthe sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. x x x.32 (Italics
ours)

Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic
polity is to give effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations tobeing
elected to a public office.33 Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence
of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens
shall have equal access to public service.34 Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on
term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court
has time and again declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested
property right.35

The Deliberations of the Members

of the Constitutional Commission

on the Three-Term Limit’s

Application to Local Elective

Officials

Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
exchanges of the members on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposed on local
elective officials: VOTING ON THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local
Governments had not decided on the term of office for local officials and suggested that
the Body decide on the matter.

xxxx

On Mr. Bacani’s inquiry regarding localofficials, Mr. Davide explained that local officials
would includethe governor, vice-governor and the members of the provincial board; the
city mayor, city vice-mayor and members of the city board; and the municipal mayor,
municipal vice mayor and members of the municipal council. He stated that barangay
officials would be governed by speciallaw, to which Mr. Nolledo agreed.

xxxx

MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3

In reply to Mr. Guingona’s query onwhether the Committee had decided on the
interpretation of "two reelections", Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be submitted to
a vote.

Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as proposed by
Mr. Garcia, would allow a local official three terms, after which he would not be allowed
to seek any reelection; or whether, as interpreted by Mr. Davide, it would mean that
after two successive reelections or a consecutive periodof nine years, he could run for
reelection after the lapse of three years.

xxxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS

Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which, they
would be barred from ever runningfor reelection.

On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf ofthe Committee, stated that local officials
after two reelections would be allowed to run for reelection after the lapse of three
years.

xxxx

MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulomanifested that the Body would proceed to the
consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials, namely:
1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative
No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1

Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to
prevent monopoly of political power because the country’s history showed that
prolonged stay in public office could lead to the creation of entrenched preservesof
political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choiceso that more people could be enlisted to the
cause of public service; 3) no one is indispensable in running the affairs of the
countryand that reliance on personalities would be avoided; and 4) the disqualification
from running for reelection after three terms would create a reserve of statesmen both in
the local and national levels.

He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the
introduction of new ideas and approaches. He stressed that public office would no
longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition, and that public service would no
longer be limited to those directly holding public office, but would also include
consultative bodiesorganized by the people. INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO

In reply to Mr. Regalado’s query whether the three terms need not be served
consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered in the affirmative.

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2

Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power
because of a new awareness, a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the
same time, it pre-screens the candidates among whom the people would choose by
barring those who would have served for nine years from being reelected. He opined
that this would actually require an additional qualification for office to a certain number
of people.

He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of statesmen,
their future participation is actually limited to some areas and only for a certain periodof
time. He added thatit is not for the Commission to decide on the future of our
countrymen who may have more years ahead of them to serve the country.

xxxx

INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE

xxxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod’s manifestation, Mr. Ople expressed
apprehension over the Body’s exercise of some sort of omnipotent power in
disqualifying those who will have served their tasks. He opined that the Commission
had already taken steps to prevent the accumulation of powers and prequisites that
would permit officials to stay on indefinitely and to transfer them to members of their
families. He opined, however, that perpetual disqualification would deprive the people of
their freedom of choice.He stated that the Body had already succeeded in striking a
balance onpolicies which could ensure a redistribution of opportunities to the people
both in terms of political and economic power. He stated that Philippine politics had
been unshackled from the two-party system, which he said was the most critical support
for the perpetuation of political dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already
a victory, Mr. Ople stated that the role of political parties should not be despised
because the strength of democracy depends on how strong political parties are, that a
splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of democracy.

Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.

x x x x.

MR. GARCIA’S RESPONSE TOMR. OPLE’S STATEMENTS

Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1) the
recognition of the ambivalent nature of political power, and 2) the recognition of
alternative forms of public service. He stated that it is important to remember the
lessons learned from the recent past; that public service is service to the people and not
an opportunity to accumulate political power, and that a prolonged stay in public office
brings about political dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political parties, he stated
that it will encourage the constant renewal of blood in party leadership, approach, style
and ideas. He opined that this is very healthy for a pluralist and multi-party democracy.

On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that public
service could be limited to public office since many good leaders who were in the
streets and in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public service would
also mean belonging to consultative bodies or people’s councils which brought about
new forms of service and leadership.

REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR

Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of
God.He stated that if the people want to elect a representative to serve them
continuously, the Commission should not arrogate unto itself the right to decide what
the people want. He stated that in the United States, a Senator had served for 30 years.

xxxx

REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO

Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Tan,
although she stated that they spoke of the same premises. She stated that she agrees
with them that leaders need not be projected and developed publicly in an election as
leaders are better tempered and tested in the various forms of mass struggles and
organized work. She stated that if the people are to be encouraged to have their own
sense of responsibility in national leadership, what ultimately matters is the political
determination of the citizenry to chart their own national destiny. She opined that the
Body should allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and imbibe the
salutary effects of their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself. She
stressed that in the final analysis,the Commission cannot legislate into the Constitution
the essence of new politics as it is a chastening experience of learning and unlearning.
Adverting to Mr. Garcia’s statement that politics is an imperfect art, she stated that the
Commission could correct politics with all its imperfections and flaws by a constitutional
provision. She opined that perpetual disqualification cannot provide the cure. She
maintained that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which could also be
counter-productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of realpublic
service.

REMARKS OF MR. BACANI

Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and that
proposals were made to empower the people to engage in the legislative process,the
Body presupposed the political maturity of the people. He observed that in this instance,
political maturity is denied with the constitutional bar for reelection.He opined that the
Body should stick to the premise that the people are politically mature.

REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA

By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani’s statements,Mr. Garcia stated that the proposal was
basically premisedon the undue advantage of the incumbent in accumulating power,
money, party machine and patronage and not on lack of trust in the people.

Mr. Garcia stated that politics isnot won by ideals alone but by solid organized work by
organizations. He stated that with three terms, an official would have served the people
long enough.

xxxx

VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES

Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.

xxxx

RESULT OF THE VOTING

The result of the voting was as follows:

Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes

Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26 votes

With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the Chair
declared Alternative No. 2 approved by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)

The Constitution mandates the

strict implementation of the

three-term limit rule.

The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had
not discussed with specifity the subject of the three-term limit rule’s application on
reapportioned districts.

From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of
the Constitutional Commission on the general application of the three-term limit rule
show. On one side were those who espoused the stern view that perpetual
disqualification to hold public office after three consecutive terms would ensure that new
blood would be infused into our political system. More choices for the voters would give
fuller meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other side of the fence were those
who believed that the imposition of termlimits would be tantamount to squandering the
experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the citizens to
elect whoever they want to remain in office.

In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that
no immediate re-election after three successive terms shall be allowed. On the other
hand, 17 members stood pat on their view that there should be no further reelection
after three successive terms.

Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant
evils if there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting
preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or
temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive elections tothe same position
would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post
provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule
answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few,
while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service
those who are worthy to be called statesmen.

The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of
exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is
significant. Thus, the rulecannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict
application is called for.

Ratio legis est anima.37

"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose."38 In Aldovino, the
Court describes the three-term limit rule as inflexible.

In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-
term limit on the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of
suspension was imposed upon him. Although not in all four withNaval’s case, there are
principles enunciated therein which undeniably hold true, viz:

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the
first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years– during
which an official has title to office and can serve. x x x[.]

xxxx

The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—"no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation—no
more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an
inflexible rule. x x x.

xxxx

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth.
x x x.

xxxx

x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively,
these cases teach usto strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.

xxxx

[In] Latasa v. Commission on Electionsx x x[,] [t]he Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. x x x.

xxxx

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by

structure and substance—fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in
office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. x x x.39 (Citations omitted,
italics and emphasis in the original and underscoring ours)

Reapportionment and its Basis

Reapportionment is "the realignment orchange in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation."40 The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and
voting power among districts.41 The basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.42

R.A. No. 9716 and the Reappor-

tioned Districts of Camarines Sur

Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:

Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in order to create an
additional legislative districtto commence in the next national elections after the
effectivity of this Act.

Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the

municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando of the
current First (1st) Legislative District are hereby consolidated with the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor of the current Second (2nd) Legislative District, to comprise the new
legislative district authorized under this Act.

Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized as
follows:

a) First District – The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st) Legislative
District shall continue to be designated as the First (1st) Legislative District, composed
of the following municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;

b) Second District – This new legislative districtshall be composed of the municipalities

enumerated in Section 2 hereof;

c) Third District – The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamedas the
Third (3rd) Legislative District, composed of the following: Naga City and the
municipalities of Pili, Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman, Magarao, Bombon and
Calabanga;

d) Fourth District – The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any change in its
composition, shall be renamedas the Fourth (4th) Legislative District, composed of the
following municipalities: Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion,
Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and Siruma; and

e) Fifth District – The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any change inits
composition, shall be renamedas the Fifth (5th) Legislative District, composed of the
following: Iriga City and the municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and
Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)

As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of
Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third
District and now configured as follows:43

[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/
july2014/207851.pdf]]

Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

RA 9716 RA 9716

2 3rd District

nd Population: 439,043

District Naga

Population: 474,899 Pili

Gainza Ocampo

Milaor Canaman

Naga Camaligan

Pili Magarao
 Ocampo Bombon

Canaman Calabanga

Camaligan

Magarao

Bombon

Calabanga

R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second

District, but it merely renamed the

other four.

The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the
current Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population
of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007.
However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent of the lawmakers to create a
single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with
Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used
the word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not
found in Section 3(c), unlike in Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive isthe clear
intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.

The following statutory construction rules surface:

First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary
and common usage meaning; the words should be read and considered intheir natural,
ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced or subtle
construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation. Second, a word of general significance ina
statute is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that
the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally
spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a
general sense.44 (Citations omitted)

The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning.45

In Naval’s case, the words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis
to be created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum.
The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptanceand negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what
they say.46

The verb createmeans to "make or produce something new."47 On the other hand, the
verb renamemeans to "give a new name to someone or something."48 A complete
reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers
intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current Third District.
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second
District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population
of the latter. This numericalfact renders the new Third District as essentially, although
not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunianmembers are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that
the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought
him to office in 2004 and 2007.

The application upon Naval of the

three-term limit rule does not

undermine the constitutional

requirement to achieve equality of

representation among districts.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve

equality ofrepresentation among the districts.49 It is with this mindset that the Court
should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him
into office in 2010 and 2013.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not
undermine the right toequal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With
or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents,
would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

The presumed competence of the

COMELEC to resolve matters

falling within its jurisdiction is

upheld.

"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the
COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to
be most competent in matters falling within its domain."50

"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not
merelyreversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or
resolution."51 "Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."52

In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s disquisitions to be amply supported
by the Constitution,law and jurisprudence.

Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval.
For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent
unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that
the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise
among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or
exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovinoaffirms this interpretation. Further,
sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15
years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.

Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, soto speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that
as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by
side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled
"What Term Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot."53 In the article, Greek mythology
was tapped to make a tempting analogy. The gist of the story follows.

In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all
men approaching them with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens’ trap never
returnedhome to their wives and children. A clever strategy was thus hatched to secure
safe passage for Odysseus and his men. The men were to plug their ears with wax to
muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus, on the other hand, was to be tied to the mast
of the ship so he could still listen to the songs, which may contain clues on how they
can get home. When the wind died down,Odysseus heard beautiful voices calling out to
them. The voices were incomparable to anything he had ever heard before. Even
whenOdysseus knew that the irresistible voices were coming from the Sirens, he
struggled with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but was unable to do so.
The voices became fainter as the men continued to row. When the voices can no longer
be heard, Odysseus realized how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made it
through safely and Odysseus was untied. It was their clever plan which kept them all
alive.54

The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the
Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in
power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen's equal
access to public service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they
are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our republican institutions.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

Resolutions dated March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in
SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
EN BANC

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES

MARK TERRY L. RIDON AND MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I.
ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z.
RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY- GENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE
BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANSA NG
MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); AND SINING MARIA ROSA L.
MARFORI, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, ON, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by herein

petitioners Kabataan Party-List, represented by Representative James Mark
Terry L. Ridon and National President Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah Jane I.
Elago, President of the National Union of Students of the Philippines; Veneer
Mari E. Crisostomo and Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson and Deputy
Secretary-General of Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila, National
President of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine
I. Bañez, Chairperson of the League of Filipino Students; Arlene Clarisse Y.
Julve, member of Alyansa ng mga Grupong Haligi ngAgham at Teknolohiya
para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining Maria Rosa L. Marfori
(petitioners) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367,
entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration,"2 as
well as respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos.
9721,3 9863,4 and 10013,5 all related thereto.

The Facts

On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA
10367, which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No.
1030, passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on December
11, 2012 and December 12, 2012,6 respectively. Essentially, RA 10367
mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new voters7 in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent,
and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.8 RA
10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013,9 and took effect fifteen
(15) days after.10

RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics

have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation."11 "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
[E]lections shall be deactivated x x x."12 Nonetheless, voters may have
their records reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they
comply with the procedure found in Section 2813 of RA 8189,14 also known as
"The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."15

On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which

serves as the implementing rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus,
prescribing the procedure for validation,17 deactivation,18 and reactivation of
voters' registration records (VRRs).19 Among others, the said Resolution
provides that: (a) "[t]he registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated in
the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be conducted prior to
said elections";20 (b) "[t]he following registered voters shall have their
biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do not have BIOMETRICS
data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those
who have incomplete BIOMETRICS data appearing in the VRS";21 (c)
"[d]eactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d)
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting,
ERB hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters."23 Resolution No. 9721 further states that, as of the last day of
registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31, 2012, a
total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics
data.24 Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct
[an] information campaign on the conduct of validation."25cralawred

On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution,

commenced the mandatory biometric system of registration. To make
biometric registration convenient and accessible to the voting public, aside
from the COMELEC offices in every local government unit, it likewise
established satellite registration offices in barangays and mails.26

On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which

amended certain portions28 of Resolution No. 985329 dated February 19,
2014, by stating that ERBs shall deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to
submit for validation despite notice on or before October 31, 2015," and
that the "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made
during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."30

A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-

NoBoto public information campaign which ran concurrently with the
period of continuing registration.31

On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which

provides for the "procedures in the deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have
biometrics data in the [VRS] after the October 31, 2015 deadline of
registration and validation."33 Among others, the said Resolution directed the
EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the
bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in
the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) "[s]end
individual notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of
voters without biometrics data."34 It also provides that "[a]ny
opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be filed not later
than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,35 [Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853."36 During the ERB hearing, which
proceedings are summary in nature,37 "the ERBs shall, based dn the list of
voters without biometrics data, order the deactivation of registration records
on the ground of 'failure to validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to
"[s]end individual notices to the deactivated voters within five (5) days from
the last day of ERB hearing."39 Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that
the "[Registration records of voters with incomplete biometrics data and
those corrupted data (biometrics) in the database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized
National, Local and [Autonomous Region on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)]
Regional Elections."40

On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend
that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial
qualification where there is penalty of deactivation;41 (b) biometrics
deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987
Constitution;42 (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a
compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable
deprivation of the right to suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not
afforded due process;44 and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve
as warning against exacting adherence to the system.45 Albeit already
subject of a prior petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also raise
herein the argument that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in
the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section
847 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013,
unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from
deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate
voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already
been delisted, and to extend the system of continuing registration and
capture of biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016.49

On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to file its comment
to the petition. Meanwhile, it issued a TRO requiring the COMELEC to desist
from deactivating the registration records of voters without biometric
information, pending resolution of the case at hand.50

On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista, through

a letter51 addressed to the Court En Banc, urgently appealed for the
immediate lifting of the above-mentioned TRO, stating that the COMELEC is
set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP) on December 15, 2015, and that
the TRO issued in this case has the effect of including the 2.4 Million
deactivated voters in the list of voters, which, in turn, would require
revisions to the POP and consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all
other interrelated preparatory activities to the prejudice of the successful
implementation of the Automated Election System (AES) for the 2016
Elections.52

On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its comment53 to the instant petition. On even date, petitioners
filed a manifestation54 asking the Court to continue the TRO against the
deactivation of voters without biometric information.55

With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was submitted for
resolution.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are
unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

I.

At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this
case. In particular, the COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to
implead the Congress, the Office of the President, and the ERB which it
purports are indispensable parties to the case;56 (b) did not have the legal
standing to institute the instant petition;57 and (c) erroneously availed
of certiorari and prohibition as a mode of questioning the constitutionality of
RA 10367 and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.58

The submissions do not hold.

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue

pertaining to the right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of
transcendental public importance and of compelling significance.
Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural
barriers and instead, resolve the case on its merits. As resonated in the case
of Pabillo v. COMELEC,59 citing Capalla v. COMELEC60 and Guingona, Jr. v.
COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May
2016] elections is a matter of great public concern. On election day, the
country's registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right of
suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our
democracy, the coming elections also embodies our people's last ounce of
hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our
people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our
country. If there is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of
ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern,
it is the coming elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public
importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by
respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice
would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation,
as provided under RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, should be upheld is one that demands immediate adjudication
in view of the critical preparatory activities that are currently being
undertaken by the COMELEC with regard to the impending May 2016
Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this
controversy not only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to
stymy the operations of a co-constitutional body. As pronounced in Roque,
Jr. v. COMELEC:62
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the
operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require. Put a bit
differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of
procedure.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues in
this case.

II.

Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the

biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with
the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has
risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the
exercise of the right of suffrage.64 They submit that the statutory
requirement of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional
requirement of literacy and property because mere non-validation already
absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through
deactivation.65 Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not
the disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise
of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.66

The contestation is untenable.

As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v.

Corral,67 it has been recognized that "[t]he right to vote is not a natural right
but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the
State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for
the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative
system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a
small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the
enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the
mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise."68

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current

parameters for the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order
to exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second,
he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right
of suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing
statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do
not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy,
property or other substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be
gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant
standards that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have
no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good.

To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took
effect on January 15, 1907, mandated that only men who were at least
twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised within one of the following three
classes" were allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th of August,
1898, held the office of municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde,
lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those
who own real property to the value of P500.00, or who annually pay P30.00
or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write
English or Spanish.

When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was
lowered to twenty-one (21) and the foregoing class qualification and
property requirements were removed.69 However, the literacy requirement
was retained and only men who were able to read and write were given the
right to vote.70 It also made women's right to vote dependent on a plebiscite
held for such purpose.71

During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove

the literacy and property requirements to broaden the political base and
discontinue the exclusion of millions of citizens from the political systems:72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus

DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the subject

matter of Report No. 11 contains amendments that are designed to improve
Article V on suffrage and to broaden the electoral base of our country. The
three main points that are taken up in this draft which will be developed in
the sponsorship speeches that will follow might need explanatory remarks, x
x x.
xxxx

(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated and instead
a provision is introduced which says, "No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage;"

xxxx
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the
broadening of the electoral base already begun with the lowering of
the voting age to 18, and it is in keeping further with the
Committee's desire to discontinue the alienation and exclusion of
millions of citizens from the political system and from participation
in the political life of the country. The requirement of literacy for voting
is eliminated for it is noted that there are very few countries left in the world
where literacy remains a condition for voting. There is no Southeast Asian
country that imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme Court
only a few months ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would
continue to impose this requirement for voting.

xxxx

It is to be noted that all those who testified before the Committee favoured

the elimination of the literacy requirement. It must be stressed that
those witnesses represented all levels of society x x x.

Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez

x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our people were left to
the sidelines because they could no longer participate in the process of
government simply because their ability to read and write had become
inadequate. This, however, did not mean that they were no longer
responsive to the demands of the times, that they were unsensible to what
was happening among them. And so in the process as years went on,
conscious efforts were made to liberate, to free these persons who were
formerly entitled in the course of election by means of whittling away the
requirements for the exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the
property requirement. There were times in the English constitutional
history that it was common to say as an answer to a question, "Who are
entitled to vote?" that the following cannot vote - - criminals, paupers,
members of the House of Lords. They were landed together at the same
figurative category.

Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was

eliminated but the last remaining vestige which bound the members of the
community to ignorance, which was the persistence of this requirement of
literacy remained. And this is again preserved in our Constitution, in our
Election Code, which provides that those who cannot prepare their ballots
themselves shall not be qualified to vote.

xxxx

Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the
underprivileged, the urban guerrillas will forever be outcasts of our
society, irresponsive of what is happening. And if this condition were
to continue, my friends, we cannot fully claim that we have
representative democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us eliminate the
social imbalance by granting to these persons who are very responsible the
right to participate in the choice of the persons who are to make their laws
for them. (Emphases supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other substantive requirement"
carries the same tack as the other standards alienating particular classes
based on socio-economic considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as the
payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly noted and as will be later
elaborated on, the phrase did not contemplate any restriction on procedural
requirements, such as that of registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line 3, the following appears:
"For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
just what is contemplated in the phrase, "substantive requirement?"

DELEGATE OCCEÑA: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere of

someone else in the Committee. We use this term as distinguished from
procedural requirements. For instance, the law cannot come in and say
that those who should be allowed to vote should have paid certain
taxes. That would be a substantial requirement in addition to what is
provided for in the Constitution. But the law can step in as far as certain
procedural requirements are concerned like requiring registration,
and also step in as far as these classifications are
concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement was proscribed and the following provision on
suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall
provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal to exclude
literacy requirements from the limitation,75 the exact provision prohibiting
the imposition of "literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement[s]" in the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in the 1987
Constitution.

Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, among
others, imposed the following legal disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from
voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That
any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence.

(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent
court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the
duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-
subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided,
That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.

(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties
(such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one
eligible for a position or office, or to perform a public duty or function."76

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the

discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept
of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by
which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v.
Abaño,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it was stated that "[t]he act of registering
is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes
the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote."79 In said case, this Court definitively
characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification
for the right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not
a qualification for such right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is
dutifully enjoined. Section 115 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector
may vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be
registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in
which he resides. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a

mere procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that
"[n]o literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage." This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v.
COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.
Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains
conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of
all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is

necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically,
a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to
the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law
to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines
"registration" as "the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application
for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2
thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters."

To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA

10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February
2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it
institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters through the adoption
of biometric technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive
identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint,
signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features."84

Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new

voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. - Registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for validation.

Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. - The Commission shall

implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of
taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet
been captured."

The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the

removal of the registration record of the registered voter from the
corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the
validation process as required by [RA 10367]."85 Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the
May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases
supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of
validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument
that the law creates artificial class of voters86 is more imagined than real.
There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-
compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal
protection of the laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality."87

It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA

8189 already provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only
the disqualifications under the Constitution or the Omnibus Election are
listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the
registration and remove the registration records of the following persons
from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly
marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause
or causes of deactivation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer

imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;

b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent

court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty
to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of
the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national
security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance
with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent

unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration
of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent;

d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular
elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular
elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;

e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court;
and

f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal (

Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall
furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the end of
each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph
(a) hereof, with their addresses. The Commission may request a certified list
of persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or
incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list
of those persons whose registration were deactivated and the reasons
therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of political parties, the
national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics
validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this
requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage,
but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the
existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be
reminded of this Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was
held that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners'
argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to
vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important
end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not
indifferent, and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the
prevalent circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a
literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic
standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

III.

For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not
poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an
unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.89 They cite the case
of White Light Corp. v. City of Manila90 (White Light), wherein the Court
stated that the scope of the strict scrutiny test covers the protection of the
right of suffrage.91

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny

test.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to

the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection.92 As pointed out by
petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access,
and interstate travel.93

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,

rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of
less restrictive means for achieving that interest,94 and the burden
befalls upon the State to prove the same.95
In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was
precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having
flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the
sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the
law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral
fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the
genuine will of the people.96 The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a
compelling state interest.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for
achieving the above-said interest. Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets
the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only
required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer;
(b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating
one's registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time
registration for new registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified
by the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like
biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly
plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be
inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on
certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of
voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented
by the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC
has not turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the
exigencies by holding continuous registration as early as May 6, 2014 until
October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months. To make the validation
process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to the extent of
setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and
conducted the same on Sundays.98 Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA
10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit
themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only
required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which
shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an
active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated
voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To
rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation99 following the
procedure laid down in Section 28100 of RA 8189.

That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was
sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling state interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive means in
promoting that interest.101

IV.

Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the tenets of procedural due process because
of the short periods of time between hearings and notice, and the summary
nature of the deactivation proceedings.102
Petitioners are mistaken.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through

Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters
without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall,
Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the notice of
ERB hearing;" and (b) [s]end individual notices to the affected voters
included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data.103 The same
Resolution also accords concerned individuals the opportunity to file their
opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9,
2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4,104 Chapter I,
Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863
respectively state that "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the
requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual notices to the
deactivated voters,"105 and that the "Reactivation for cases falling under this
ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board
hearing."106 While the proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of
finalizing the voters' list for the upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift
and immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to
comply with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the
May 2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary
nature of the proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners
were given the opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently

informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and its deactivation feature. RA
10367 was duly published as early as February 22, 2013,107 and took effect
fifteen (15) days after.108 Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications,
all are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences
of non-compliance. As implemented, the process of biometrics validation
commenced on July 1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years
before the October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a
massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto, from May 2014
until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters
were reminded to update and validate their registration records. On top of
that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process more
convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro
Manila to serve as satellite registration centers and declared Sundays as
working days for COMELEC offices within the National Capital Region and in
highly urbanized cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court finds that the
public has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and
its penalty of deactivation in case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no
violation of procedural due process.

V.

Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries - i.e.,

Guatemala, Britain, Cote d'lvoire, Uganda, and Kenya - in implementing
biometrics registration should serve as warning in adhering to the system.
They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the same such as
environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training and skills,
mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even
adrnitted that while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by
multiple registrants, it does not, however, solve other election-related
problems such as vote-buying and source-code manipulation.110

Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper.

Clearly, petitioners' submissions principally assail the wisdom of the
legislature in adopting the biometrics registration system in curbing electoral
fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that questions relating to
the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that
should not be addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the case of Fariñas
v. The Executive Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It
is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious,
conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.112 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of
discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which,
in this case, was through the establishment of an updated voter registry. In
making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily
sifted through the policy's wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse.113 Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was
the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not
present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason
behind the legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration
notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its
implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally pressing
election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny.

VI.

Finally, petitioners' proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline
for validation on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189 which
states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing
of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election. (Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.

Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue despite already
being subject of a prior petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R. No.
220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day periods
stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration
may no longer be conducted. As already resolved in this Court's Resolution
dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it
only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended
depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.115 Verily,
as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws,
the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to fulfil its mandate.116 Perforce, this power includes the
determination of the periods to accomplish certain pre-election acts,117 such
as voter registration.

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does
not begin and end with the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the
initial phase that must be followed by the approval of applications by the
ERB.118 Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion
follows. These steps are necessary for the generation of the1 final list of
voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the preparation and completion of
the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP
contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered
precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces,
legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the names and
locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are
assigned.119 The POP is necessary to determine the total number of boards of
election inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to
be procured for the election day, the number of vote counting machines and
other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More
importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the fmalization of the
Election Management System (EMS) which generates the templates of the
official ballots and determines the voting jurisdiction of legislative districts,
cities, municipalities, and provinces.120 The EMS determines the configuration
of the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,121 the
COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies
of the upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should be
respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any
reasonable justification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The

temporary restraining order issued by this Court on December 1, 2015 is
consequently DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 222731, March 08, 2016 ]
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, AS
CHAIRMAN OF BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., PETITIONERS,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
A petition for mandamus may be granted and a writ issued when an agency "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office."[1]

Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc.

(Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this
Petition[2] for mandamus before this court to compel respondent Commission on
Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature.

Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit corporation.[3] It operates through

Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines,[4] a national political party duly
registered with the Commission on Elections.[5]

Former Senator Gordon is a registered voter and taxpayer.[6] He is an official candidate

for the Senate of the Philippines[7] and is the Chairperson of Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.
Gordon authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law that amended Republic Act No. 8436,
otherwise known as the Automated Election System Law.[8]

The Commission on Elections is a government entity[9] "vested by law to enforce and

administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections in the country."[10]

On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No. 8436[11] authorized the Commission on

Elections to use an automated election system for electoral exercises.[12] After almost a
decade, Republic Act No. 9369[13] amended Republic Act No. 8436. Republic Act No.
9369 introduced significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related
statutes.[14]

Automation is hailed as a key "towards clean and credible elections," reducing the long
wait and discouraging cheating.[15] In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections
enforced a nationwide automated election system using the Precinct Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the Commission on
Elections has opted to use the Vote-Counting Machine.[16] The vote-counting machine is
a "paper-based automated election system,"[17] which is reported to be "seven times
faster and more powerful than the PCOS because of its updated
processor."[18] Likewise, it is reported to have more memory and security features,[19] and
is "capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)."[20] This
VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the
votes in the vote-counting machine.[21]

Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, there are several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure the
sanctity of the ballot. Among these is the implementation of the VVPAT security feature,
as found in Section 6(e), (f), and (n).

The full text of Section 6 is as follows:

SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated election system must at least
have the following functional capabilities:

(a) Adequate security against unauthorized access;

(b) Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation,

consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, and storage of results;

(c) Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;

(d) System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote
recording and counting process;

(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;

(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the
correctness of reported election results;

(g) An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the
casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report and display election result in
the shortest time possible;

(h) Accessibility to illiterates and disable voters;

(i) Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;

(j) Accurate ballot counters;

(k) Data retention provision;

(l) Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used
in the election process;

(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;

(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has
registered his choice; and

(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and function. (Emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners claim that VVPAT "consists of physical paper records of voter ballots as
voters have cast them on an electronic voting system."[22] Through it, the voter can verify
if the choices on the paper record match the choices that he or she actually made in the
ballot.[23] The voter can confirm whether the machine had actually read the ballot
correctly. Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on Elections to have the vote-
counting machine issue receipts once a person has voted.

According to petitioners, the VVPAT "will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt
to alter the results of the elections."[24] There will be "an electronic tally of the votes cast"
or the vote stored in the vote-counting machine, as well as "a paper record of the
individual votes" cast or the VVPAT receipt.[25] Should there be any doubt, "the
electronically generated results . . . can then be audited and verified through a
comparison . . . with these paper records."[26]

In the Terms of Reference for the 2016 National and Local Elections Automation
Project, the Commission on Elections lists the Minimum Technical Specifications of the
Optical Mark Reader or Optical Scan System, precinct-based technologies that the poll
body shall accept.[27]

Component 1 (B), subparagraphs (5) and (19) states as follows:

5. The system's hardware shall have a display panel that is capable to display customizable
messages or prompts of each stage of the process execution, including prompts and
messages for user interaction purposes.

...

19. The system shall have a vote verification feature which shall display and print the voter's
choices, which can be enabled or disabled in the configuration using the [Election
Management System]. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that the Commission on Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT
function based on fears that the security feature may aid in vote-buying, and that the
voting period may take longer.[28] On February 9, 2016, petitioners read from ABS-CBN
News Online that with a vote of 7-0, the Commission on Elections En Banc decided not
to implement the VVPAT for the 2016 Elections.[29] Petitioners attached a copy of the
article.[30] Other news reports state that the Commission on Elections ruled similarly
against the voting receipts in 2010 and 2013.[31]

At the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System on

February 16, 2016,[32] the Commission on Elections, through its Chairperson Andres D.
Bautista (Chairperson Bautista), supposedly gave its reasons for refusing to issue paper
receipts. First, "politicians can use the receipts in vote buying[;]" second, it may increase
voting time to five to seven hours in election precincts:[33]

[T]he poll body has decided against printing the receipt because it might be used for
vote buying and that it would result in the vote-counting process being extended from
six to seven hours since it takes about 13 seconds to print a receipt, meaning each
machine would have to run for that long for the receipts.

Bautista said another "big concern" is that "there might be losing candidates who might
question the results, basically instructing their supporters that when the machine prints
out the receipt, regardless of what the receipt says, they will say that it's not correct."[34]

On February 11, 2016, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No.

10057[35] providing for "rules and general instructions on the process of testing and
sealing, [as well as] voting, counting, and transmission of election results."[36] Adopting
Resolution No. 10057 by a vote of 7-0, the Commission on Elections En Banc made no
mention using VVPAT receipts for the 2016 national elections.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections' fears are "baseless and
speculative."[37] In assailing the Commission on Elections' reasons, petitioners cite the
Position Paper[38] of alleged automated elections expert, Atty. Glenn Ang Chong (Atty.
Chong). Atty. Chong recommended that the old yellow ballot boxes be used alongside
the voting machine. The VVPAT receipts can be immediately placed inside the old ballot
boxes.[39]

After the voter casts his or her vote, he or she gets off the queue and walks to where
the old ballot box is. There, the voter may verify if the machine accurately recorded the
vote; if so, the voter drops the VVPAT receipt into the old ballot box.[40] Should there be
any discrepancy, the voter may have it duly recorded with the poll watchers for analysis
and appropriate action.[41] The poll watchers must ensure that all receipts are deposited
into the old ballot box.[42] This will guarantee that no voter can sell his or her vote using
the receipt.[43]

At the end of the polling, the old ballot boxes shall be turned over to the accredited
citizens' arm or representatives of the public for the manual verification count of the
votes cast. A member of the Board of Election Inspectors may supervise the count. The
result of the manual verification count (using the old ballot boxes) shall be compared
with that of the automated count (saved in the vote-counting machine).[44]

Petitioners add that during Senate deliberations,[45] the main proponent of the

amendatory law, Former Senator Gordon, highlighted the importance of "an audit trail
usually supported by paper[.]"[46]

On November 10, 2015, Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. sent Commission on Elections

Chairperson Bautista a letter demanding the implementation of the VVPAT feature for
the May 9, 2016 Elections.[47] However, the Commission on Elections never answered
the letter.[48]

According to petitioners, the inclusion of VVPAT, a "mandatory requirement under the

automated election laws, [has been] flagrantly violated by [COMELEC] during the 2010
and 2013 Elections." They claim that the previous demands made on the Commission
on Elections to reactivate the VVPAT security feature "fell on deaf ears."[49] In the 2010
and 2013 Elections, all a voter received from the voting machines were the words,
"Congratulations! Your vote has been counted," or an otherwise similar phrase.[50]

Petitioners claim that under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9369, amending Section 35
of Republic Act No. 8436, anyone "interfering with and impeding . . . the use of
computer counting devices and the processing, storage, generation and transmission of
election results, data or information" commits a felonious act.[51] The Commission on
Elections allegedly did so when it refused to implement VVPAT.[52]

In view of the foregoing, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under
Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. They ask this court to compel the Commission
on Elections to comply with the provisions of Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.

Petitioners argue that mandamus is proper to "enforce a public right" and "compel the
performance of a public duty."[53] Under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution, this
court has original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus. In addition, Rule 65, Section
4 of the Rules of Court allows for a civil action for mandamus to be directly filed before
this court.[54] There is no reglementary period in a special civil action for mandamus.[55]

According to petitioners, the law prescribes the "minimum" criteria of adopting VVPAT
as one of the security features. The use of the word "must"[56] makes it mandatory to
have a paper audit "separate and distinct from the ballot."[57] The Commission on
Elections allegedly has neither leeway "nor right to claim that the ballot itself is the
paper audit trail."[58] Likewise, the words, "voter verified" in VVPAT means the voter, not
the Commission on Elections, must be the one verifying the accuracy of the vote cast.[59]

Petitioners conclude that the Commission on Elections' "baseless fear of vote buying" is
no excuse to violate the law. "There is greater risk of cheating on a mass scale if the
VVPAT were not implemented because digital cheating" is even more "difficult to
detect . . . than cheating by isolated cases of vote buying."[60]

In the Resolution dated February 23, 2016, this court required the Commission on
Elections to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after
receiving the notice.

Instead of submitting its Comment, the Commission on Elections filed a Motion for
Additional Time to File Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General.[61] The
Office of the Solicitor General alleged that it "has not yet received a copy of the Petition
and has yet to obtain from COMELEC the documents relevant to this case."[62]

It is not often that this court requires the filing of a comment within a non-extendible
period. This is resorted to when the issues raised by a party is fundamental and the
ambient circumstances indicate extreme urgency. The right of voters to verify whether
vote-counting machines properly recorded their vote is not only a statutory right; it is
one that enables their individual participation in governance as sovereign. Among all
government bodies, the Commission on Elections is the entity that should appreciate
how important it is to respond to cases filed by the public to enable these rights. It
perplexes this court that the Commission on Elections failed to immediately transmit
relevant documents to the Office of the Solicitor General to allow them to respond within
the time granted.

The Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc noted that both the Commission on Elections
and the Office of the Solicitor General were already furnished with a copy of the Petition
when this court ordered them to file a comment.[63] Due to the urgency to resolve this
case, this court denied the Commission on Elections' Motion. This court cannot fail to
act on an urgent matter simply because of the non-compliance of the Commission on
Elections and the Office of the Solicitor General with its orders. This court cannot accept
the lackadaisical attitude of the Commission on Elections and its counsel in addressing
this case. This court has been firm that as a general rule, motions for extension are not
granted, and if granted, only for good and sufficient cause.[64] Counsels, even those from
government, should not assume that this court will act favorably on a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading.[65]

For this court's resolution is whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled,
through a writ of mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system
capability feature for the 2016 Elections.

We grant the Petition.

Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[66]

Through a writ of mandamus, the courts "compel the performance of a clear legal duty
or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent"[67] by operation
of his or her office, trust, or station. The petitioner must show the legal basis for the
duty, and that the defendant or respondent failed to perform the duty.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully neglected to perform its
legal duty of fully implementing our election laws, specifically Republic Act No. 8436,
Section 6(e), (f), and (n), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369:[68]

SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated election system must at least
have the following functional capabilities:

....

(e)  Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;

(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the
correctness of reported election results;

....

(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has
registered his choice;

Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10057 promulgated on February 11, 2016 did
not include mechanisms for VVPAT. Under Part III of the Resolution, it merely stated:
 SEC. 40. Manner of voting. -

a. The voter shall:

1. Using a ballot secrecy folder and the marking pen provided by the Commission, fill
his/her ballot by fully shading the circle beside the names of the candidates and the
party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list system of representation,
of his/her choice; and

2. After accomplishing his/her ballot, approach the VCM, insert his/her ballot in the
ballot entry slot;
i. The VCM will display "PROCESSING.../PAKIHINTAY... KASALUKUYANG
PINOPROSESO";

ii. The ballot shall automatically be dropped inside the ballot box. The VCM will then
display the message "YOUR VOTE HAS BEEN CAST/ANG IYONG BOTO AY
NAISAMANA."

iii. The VCM will display the message "AMBIGUOUS MARK DETECTED" if the ovals
are not properly shaded or an unintentional mark is made. It will display the message
"AMBIGUOUS MARKS DETECTED/MAY MALABONG MARKA SA BALOTA." The
following options shall be provided "TO CAST BALLOT PRESS/PARA IPASOK ANG
BALOTA, PINDUTIN" or "TO RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK ANG
BALOTA, PINDUTIN." Press the "TO RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK ANG
BALOTA, PINDUTIN" to return the ballot to the voter. Let the voter review the ballot
and ensure that the ovals opposite the names of the candidate voted for are fully
shaded.

iv. In case of illiterate voters, PWD voters who are visually-impaired, and senior citizens
(SCs) who may need the use of headphones, the BEI shall insert the headphones so
they can follow the instructions of the VCM.
b. The poll clerk/support staff shall:

1. Monitor, from afar, the VCM screen to ensure that the ballot was successfully
accepted;

2. Thereafter, whether or not the voter's ballot was successfully accepted, apply
indelible ink to the voter's right forefinger nail or any other nail if there be no
forefinger nail; and

3. Instruct the voter to return the ballot secrecy folder and marking pen, and then leave
the polling place.
In a press conference last March 4, 2016, Commission on Elections Chairperson
Andres Bautista manifested that the Commission on Elections decided "to err on the
side of transparency" and resolved to allow voters to have 15-second on-screen
verification of the votes they have casted through the vote-counting machine.[69] Allowing
on-screen verification is estimated to add two (2) hours to the voting period on May 9,
2016. As reported, the meeting of the Commission on Elections En Banc to pass this
Resolution was on March 3, 2016, three (3) days after they were required to file a
comment before this court.

Nonetheless, the inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature
of the vote-counting machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No.
8436, as amended.

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of

Elections to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election." One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the
automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper
audit trail.

Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current vote-counting
machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT.
However, the Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this feature runs
contrary to why the law required this feature in the first place. Under Republic Act No.
8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state that the votes reflect the
genuine will of the People.[70] The full text of the declaration of policy behind the law
authorizing the use of an automated election system states:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, credible and informed elections, plebiscites, referenda, recall and
other similar electoral exercises by improving on the election process and adopting
systems, which shall involve the use of an automated election system that will ensure
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation and transmission
documents in order that the process shall be transparent and credible and that the
results shall be fast, accurate and reflective of the genuine will of the people.

The State recognizes the mandate and authority of the Commission to prescribe the
adoption and use of the most suitable technology of demonstrated capability taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose.

By setting the minimum system capabilities of our automated election system, the law
intends to achieve the purposes set out in this declaration. A mechanism that allows the
voter to verify his or her choice of candidates will ensure a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, credible, and informed election. The voter is not left to wonder if the machine
correctly appreciated his or her ballot. The voter must know that his or her sovereign
will, with respect to the national and local leadership, was properly recorded by the vote-
counting machines.

The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436,
as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to
ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.

The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual
voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that
the verification at minimum should be paper based.

There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a "voter verified paper audit
trail." The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may
be instances where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or the voter
inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.

In Maliksi v. Commission on Elections,[71] the losing mayoralty candidate questioned the

result of the elections. Upon inspection of the physical ballots, several votes were
invalidated due to the presence of double-shading. However, when the digital printouts
of the ballots were checked, the questioned ballots only had single shade. The physical
ballots were tampered to invalidate several votes.

The situation in Maliksi could have been avoided if the Commission on Elections utilized
the paper audit trail feature of the voting machines. The VVPAT ensures that the
candidates selected by the voter in his or her ballot are the candidates voted upon and
recorded by the vote-counting machine. The voter himself or herself verifies the
accuracy of the vote. In instances of Random Manual Audit[72] and election protests, the
VVPAT becomes the best source of raw data for votes.

The required system capabilities under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, are
the minimum safeguards provided by law. Compliance with the minimum system
capabilities entails costs on the state and its taxpayers. If minimum system capabilities
are met but not utilized, these will be a waste of resources and an affront to the citizens
who paid for these capabilities.

It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer the
elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." The Commission is
not given the constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to
uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is law. Should
there be policy objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it.

The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to
assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper
procedures. The Commission on Elections has the power to choose the appropriate
procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with
the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.[73]

We see no reason why voters should be denied the opportunity to read the voter's
receipt after casting his or her ballot. There is no legal prohibition for the Commission on
Elections to require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt, he or she is to
leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct. Definitely, the availability of all
the voters' receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.

The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the
confidence of each voter that his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It
is in that local precinct after the voter casts his or her ballot that this confidence starts. It
is there where it will be possible for the voter to believe that his or her participation as
sovereign truly counts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. The Commission on Elections

is ORDERED to enable the vote verification feature of the vote-counting machines,
which prints the voter's choices without prejudice to the issuance of guidelines to
regulate the release and disposal of the issued receipts in order to ensure a clean,
honest, and orderly elections such as, but not limited to, ensuring that after voter
verification, receipts should be deposited in a separate ballot box and not taken out of
the precinct.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.