1. DOJ Pros. Arellano vs.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
Gatdula of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals.
Injunction/ preliminary
investigation/ Factual Antecedents
prejudicial question
Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo) wrote about the alleged kidnapping and extortion of Noriyo
Ohara (Ohara) purportedly committed by several agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). Owing to the gravity of the accusations, former President
Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) issued a verbal directive to then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. de Lima (Secretary De Lima) to
investigate the same.3
Secretary De Lima released Department Order (D.O.) No. 10074 creating a fact-
finding panel to investigate the matters raised in Tulfo's column.
The fact-finding panel invited resource persons to shed light on the
circumstances involving the alleged kidnapping and extortion of Ohara.
Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula (Gatdula), who was then the NBI Director,
appeared before the fact-finding panel as one of the resource persons invited.5
In a report submitted, the fact-finding panel recommended that Gatdula be
included in those to be indicted for the alleged kidnapping of Ohara.
Gatdula filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC) praying that D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407 be declared
unconstitutional. He also asked that all evidence gathered in the course of
investigation by the fact-finding panel be deemed null and void. Executive Judge
issued an order granting Gatdula's application for the issuance of a 72-hour
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which was eventually extended effectively
for 20 days.9
On February 13, 2012, Ohara filed a Letter-Complaint before the DOJ charging
Gatdula, among other individuals, with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
On February 15, 2012, petitioner Prosecutor Arellano issued Office Order No.
106 establishing a Panel of Prosecutors to handle the preliminary investigation of
Ohara's complaint.
Meanwhile, in its February 20, 2012 Order,12 the RTC granted Gatdula's
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Gatdula filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings Ex Abundanti Ad Cautela to the
DOJ, prayed that the preliminary investigation be suspended pending the
resolution of his petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC assailing D.O.
Nos. 1007 and 407. This however was denied.
Aggrieved, Gatdula filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA Decision
In its Decision, the CA partially granted Gatdula's petition for certiorari. The
appellate court ruled that the case lodged with the RTC assailing D.O. Nos. 1007
and 407 is not a prejudicial question with regard to the preliminary investigation
the panel of prosecutors were conducting. It explained that while they may be
closely related, the resolution of the case before the RTC did not pose a
prejudicial question to the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Nevertheless, the CA ordered that all supporting affidavits in the complaint filed
by Noriyo Ohara which were obtained during the questioned fact-finding panel
investigation are nevertheless EXCLUDED for being inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
WON the Certiorari and Prohibition before RTC assailing DOJ Dept Orders are
constitutive of Prejudicial question to suspend proceedings on PI; whether an
injunction may lie in criminal prosecution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Gatdula, in his Petition to Suspend Proceedings Ex Abundanti Ad Cautela,
Gatdula prayed that the Panel of Prosecutors defer the conduct of the
preliminary investigation. He argued that the RTC case constituted a prejudicial
question because it questions the validity of the creation of the fact-finding panel,
as well as the conduct of its proceedings. In addition, he highlighted in his
petition to suspend proceedings that the RTC even issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the fact-finding panel from issuing or transmitting any report
to any government agency as a result of its investigation.
As a general rule, courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction to enjoin
or restrain any criminal prosecution.29 Nevertheless, it admits of certain
exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid

oppression or multiplicity of actions;
 (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;

(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust of
vengeance; and

(j) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.30
Here, Gatdula anchors his plea for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation on the existence of a prejudicial question. In order for there to be a
prejudicial question, the following elements must concur: (a) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (b) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (c) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.32
In the present case, the facts involved in the RTC decision and the preliminary
investigation are intimately related as it revolved around the alleged kidnapping
of Ohara. However, the pendency of the RTC case did not constitute a
prejudicial question to the conduct of the preliminary investigation as the issues
therein had nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of Gatdula regarding the
accusations against him.

2. People vs. Tan Facts:

The case stemmed from the killing of Francisco "Bobby" Tan, his wife, Cynthia
Determination of Marie, and Katherine (second youngest daughter of Bobby).
probable cause
On hearing about the crime, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) Regional Chief directed his own men to investigate the crime scene.
Police officers from the Regional CIDG submitted their investigation report to the
City Prosecutor's Office of Iloilo City. This pointed to respondents Archie and
Jan-Jan as principal suspects in the brutal killing of their parents and a young
stepsister. On January 18, 2006 police officer Eldy Bebit of the CIDG filed a
complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor's Office, accusing the two brothers of
parricide and double murder. The parties submitted their affidavits and pieces of
evidence at the preliminary investigation.

The City Prosecutor's Office filed separate informations for two murders and
parricide against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City. Respondents Archie and Jan-Jan filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to suspend the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them in the meantime.

The acting presiding judge of the RTC issued an order, directing the prosecution
to correct certain deficiencies in its evidence against respondents. On October
20, 2006, the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City filed a manifestation, informing the
RTC of his partial compliance with its order. He also filed an urgent ex parte
motion for clarificatory exception.

Then temporarily presided over by Judge Narciso Aguilar, found no probable

cause against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan. Judge Aguilar thus granted their
motion to suspend the issuance of warrants for their arrest and to defer the
proceedings. The two respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the case. On
January 12, 2007 the RTC issued an order, directing the City Prosecutor's Office
to submit additional evidence in the case but the latter office asked for more time
to comply. Meanwhile, the DOJ issued a resolution dismissing respondents
Archie and Jan-Jan's petition for review.

After a new presiding judge, Judge Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, he
issued an order on March 30, 2007 granting the prosecution's request for
additional time within which to comply with the court's order of January 12, 2007.
On April 2, 2007 the prosecutor's office filed its compliance and submitted its
amended resolution in the case. The petitioners assailed this amended
resolution and pointed out that the public prosecutor did not submit any
additional evidence.
 Judge Justalero reversed the order of the previous presiding judge. He found
probable cause against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan this time and ordered
the issuance of warrants for their arrest. Without seeking reconsideration of
Judge Justalero's order, Archie and Jan-Jan filed the present petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) of Cebu City. After hearing, the CA
granted the petition, set aside the RTC order of April 23, 2007, and annulled the
warrants of arrest that Judge Justalero issued. The CA also dismissed the
criminal cases against the respondents. The public prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA's decision through the Office of the Solicitor General
but the latter court denied it, hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON the determination that there is probable cause against the respondents by
Judge Justalero correct

Held:
Yes. The determination that there is probable cause against the respondents is
correct.

The Court defined what probable cause is. Probable cause assumes the
existence of facts that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that a crime has been committed and that it was likely committed by the
person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and
convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the
evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has
sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.

Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is

merely circumstantial. The prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in
that they had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had
opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took place.
Archie took two pairs of new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was
apparently executed inside Archie's room. The separate rooms of the two
accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A
trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to
either side after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination
or on cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis
for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe
to the CA's position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.

The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals' decision dated
December 19, 2007 and resolution dated March 25, 2008, and AFFIRMS and
REINSTATES the Regional Trial Court's order dated April 23, 2007.

3. People vs. Grey Facts:

Judge’s duty – Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two
determining probable others were charge of the crime of murder for the death of Rolando Diocton.
cause Judge Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She
directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence but
later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the proceedings of the case.
After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he
issued warrants of arrest against respondents.
The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for
him to personally determine the existence of probable cause. According to the
CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal
assessment of the evidence before him and the personal justification for his
finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively quoted from the
Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence
to support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution
commands the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause
before issuing warrants of arrest.

Issue:

WON Judge Navidad fail to personally determine the existence of probable

cause?

Court Ruling:
 No. The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest is mandated by Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution. In
Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision does
not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means
that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor
but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted
to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and
his witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only
when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his
discretion in issuing the same.
It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could
have led Judge Navidad to determine that the accused were given the widest
latitude and ample opportunity to challenge the charge of Murder which resulted,
among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of Perjury. Likewise, his personal
determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the prosecution and no
circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous Order,
denying the motion for the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct. These
statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the
constitutional mandate for personal determination of probable cause before
issuing the warrants of arrest.

4. People vs. Racho FACTS:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
Overt acts/ acting on phone with appellant Jack Racho for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported
“Reliable information” the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to
apprehend the appellant. The following day, appellant called up the agent with
the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler,
Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at
around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the
team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected
of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police
station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents
of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
RTC convicted accusedof violation of Section 5, Art 2 of RA 9165. CA affirmed
the decision.
Issue: Whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a
valid warrantless arrest.
Ruling: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information"
alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find
no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain
"Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large
volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and
deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building
where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team
members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag.
 Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked
about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon
inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril
Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the
neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report,
the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1,
1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato
and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00
p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await
Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each
other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if
they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely
because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of
some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant
was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would
have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated. We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems
"reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest.

5. Sindac vs. People Facts:

Flagrante delicto/ Sindac testified that one morning, he was riding a tricycle bound for Barangay
presence of police Ungos when PO3 Peñamora stopped the vehicle and ordered him to get off.
officer Then, he was invited to the police station where he was made to undress and
was frisked by PO3 Peñamora, who found nothing. PO3 Peñamora left with
Sindac’s wallet was searched anew and a sachet of suspected shabu was found
inside. Then, PO3 Peñamora made Sindac sign a blank piece of paper which
turned out to be a receipt for evidence seized.

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Sindac of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The RTC found
Sindac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC opined
that the policemen committed a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on
Sindac pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the ROC.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision, holding that Sindac is estopped from
questioning the legality of his warrantless arrest as he failed to raise such issue
before entering his plea during the arraignment. Sindac filed a MR but it was
denied; hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the warrantless arrest made by the police officers is valid in
this case

Ruling: No.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the ROC provides for circumstances wherein a lawful
arrest may be effected without a warrant. In warrantless arrests made pursuant
to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely, (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is

essential. Under the rules, the officer himself must have witnessed the crime.

In this case, the Court found that there has been no lawful warrantless arrest
made on the person of Sindac. Based on the records, the arresting officer, PO3
Peñamora that he was about five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and
Cañon when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to the former.
Considering the distance away from the alleged criminal transaction, not to
 mention the atomity of the object thereof (o.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it highly doubtful that
said arresting officer was able to reasonable ascertain that any criminal activity
was afoot so as to prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and,
thereupon, a warrantless search.

Sindac’s actuations of talking to and later on, receiving an unidentified object

from Cañon, without more, should not be considered as ongoing criminal activity
that would render proper an inflagrante delicto arrest under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the ROC.

As a consequence of the unlawful arrest, it follows that there could be no valid

search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the plastic sachet
containing shabu from Sindac.

While it is true that Sindac failed to question the legality of the warrantless arrest
against him before arraignment and actively participated in the trial of the case, it
must nevertheless be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver only as to
any question concerning any defects in his arrest, and not with regard to the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Sindac is acquitted.
6. Judge Abelita vs. Facts:
P/Supt. Doria
Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3
Reasonable suspicion Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he and his family are on their way home,
these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken
and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and
he was arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder. The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police
officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable
grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in
the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that
petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were
valid and legal,thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
Ruling:

No.For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3Ramirez
investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in
the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause. The seizure of the firearms
was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The police authorities were in the area because that was where they
caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the
vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took
place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was
apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime,
hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.

7. Pestilos vs. Generoso Facts

Hot pursuit/ personal 1. At around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the
knowledge of facts or petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy
circumstances Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
2. Atty. Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police Station to report the incident.
3. Acting on this report, Desk Officer Primitivo Monsalve dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.
4. SP02 Javier arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
5. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him.
6. This prompted the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to Batasan
Hills Police Station for investigation.
7. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police
Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.
8. The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
9. The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested.
10. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police
officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the
crime. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure
for preliminary investigation should have been performed.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

Ruling

There was a valid warrantless arrest.

1. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in

Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
2. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) above has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
3. The provision applicable in the present case is Section 5(b).
4. Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b) were complied
with, namely:
a. Has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?
b. Did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and
c. Based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed
at the time of the petitioners’ arrest, would a reasonably discreet and
prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?
5. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
a. Has the crime just been committed?
 The reason for the element of immediacy is this: as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
 In this case, the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than
one hour after the alleged mauling.
b. Did the arresting officer have “personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances” that the petitioners committed the crime?
 The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to
the Black’s Law Dictionary, “circumstances are attendant or accompanying
facts, events or conditions.” Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police
officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the
crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination
of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with
the element of immediacy.
 In this case, Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling. More importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in
the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version
of what transpired.
c. Based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed
at the time of the petitioners’ arrest, would a reasonably discreet and
prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?
 The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.
 In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information
as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.
 With the facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, the Court deemed it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the
police officers’ observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the
arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal
observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.

Extra:

Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and
the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

The standard for determining “probable cause” is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case
may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine “probable cause,: within the spheres of their respective functions, its
existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within
their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the
evidence submitted by the parties.
 In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited
time frame.

Hence, in United States vs. Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent
limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the
urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should
not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise
the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to
make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the
escape of the criminal.

8. OCA vs. Judge Flor The OCA received a letter from the Clerk of Court of RTC Br.28 of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizacaya. It was stated in the letter that Judge Flor granted bail in
Bail applications criminal cases involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which is a non-bailable
offense; granted motion to reduce bail without hearing and that he granted bail
which did not contain summary of prosecution evidence.
The OCA found Judge Flor liable for gross ignorance of the law for his failure to
conduct hearings on the Motion to Reduce Bail in Criminal Case Nos. 6998 and
7091 and on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying bail in Criminal
Case No. 7826. In both cases , Judge Flor complied with the requirement of
hearing under Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, when both
accused moved for the reduction of the bail, he granted the motions filed by the
accused without conducting a hearing or requiring the public prosecutor to
comment on the motion. Judge Flor in haste granted the motion for reduction of
bail in Criminal Case No. 6998 without giving the prosecution the chance to be
heard. In Criminal Case No. 7091, although the public prosecutor had a marginal
note on the motion submitting the motion to the sound discretion of the court,
Judge Flor should have conducted a hearing to ascertain if the public prosecutor
was not contesting the reduced amount of bail. It is also noted that a cursory
reading of the resolutions issued in Criminal Case Nos. 6964, 7060, 7348[-49,
7409 and 7091 shows that Judge Flor failed to make a brief summary of
evidence adduced by the prosecution, which is necessary to determine whether
he has adequate basis for granting bail.

Issue: WON the grant of bail/reduction of bail by Judge Flor were in accordance
with the law/rules.

Ruling: No- Judge Flor was GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
DISMISS

It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without a prior hearing to a person charged
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. As such,
bail is a matter of discretion and its grant or denial hinges on the issue of
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Yet, the
determination of the requisite evidence can only be reached after due hearing.
Thus, a judge must first evaluate the prosecution's evidence. A hearing is
likewise required for the trial court to consider the factors in fixing the amount of
bail. Notably, this Court outlined the duties of a judge in resolving bail
applications, to wit:
1 In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2 Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion;
3 Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4 If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond; otherwise, petition should be denied.

Admittedly, Judge Flor, Jr. granted bail in Criminal Case No. 7826 without a
hearing because the accused is a minor and a mental retardate. However,
the 2009 Revised Rules on Children in Conflict with the Law is explicit that a
child charged with a capital offense shall not be entitled to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong. As discussed, the determination of the requisite evidence is a
matter of judicial discretion. Consequently, absent a prior hearing, the order
granting bail can hardly be a product of Judge Flor, Jr.'s sound discretion. Also,
Judge Flor, Jr. exhibited cavalier indifference to the rules when he allowed in
Criminal Case No. 7091 the motion to reduce bail without a hearing. This is
contrary to the clear mandate of the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails
 by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial that a
motion to reduce bail shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases.
Lastly, Judge Flor, Jr. conceded that the orders/resolutions granting bail in
Criminal Case Nos. 6964, 7060, 7348-49 and 7409 did not contain a summary of
the prosecution evidence. In numerous cases, we held that the order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence which is an aspect of
judicial due process for both the prosecution and the defense.

9. Barbero vs. Judge Facts: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero
Dumlao (Barbero) against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.Barbero filed a criminal case for
Authority to grant bail estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The case was raffled to
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19
February 2003, Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest commanding the
proper officer to arrest Medina. Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of
arrest. However, Judge Dumlao approved Medina‘s bail and, on 9 May 2003,
issued an order commanding the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and
the Philippine National Police to release Medina. Barbero alleged that Judge
Dumlao‘s approval of Medina‘s bail and his order to release Medina were
unlawful.

Issue: Whether or not the granting of bail is proper?

Ruling:No. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person
under detention by legal process shall be released except when he is admitted to
bail. Section 19 provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval of
the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17.
Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case
is pending. If the judge is absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed with
another branch of the same court. If the accused is arrested in a province, city,
or municipality other than where the case is pending, the bail should be filed with
any RTC of the place. It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by
complainant against Herman Medina were pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was
issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order
of release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been
issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by
another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is no
proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of
the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao]
ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of
Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts. It is elementary that a
municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested
outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114
x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes
that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed
in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in
approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that
certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve Medina‘s
bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it
leaves little room for error. The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of
accused whose cases are pending before other courts constitute gross
ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious offense punishable
by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but
not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding
P40,000.